

**LEADERSHIP CRISES AND DECLINE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE ALL NIGERIA PEOPLE'S PARTY (ANPP)
1999 TO 2009.**

BY

**SULEIMAN, SUNDAY
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SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

PROF.AYO, DUNMOYE - CHAIRMAN

DR KAYODE, OMOJUWA - MEMBER

DR HUDU A AYUBA - MEMBER

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DECLARATION

I, Suleiman Sunday, do hereby declare that to the best of my knowledge, the data contained in this dissertation are from my original research efforts and they have not been submitted to any other University for examination.

Student's signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled “Leadership Crises and Decline of Opposition Parties in Nigeria: A Case Study of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) 1999 to 2009”. By Suleiman Sunday meets the regulations governing the award of the Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Prof. Ayo Dunmoye

Chairman, Supervisory Committee Signature Date

Dr. Kayode Omojuwa

Member, Supervisory Committee Signature Date

Dr. Hudu Abdullahi Ayuba

Member, Supervisory Committee Signature Date

Dr. Hudu Abdullahi Ayuba

Head of Department Signature Date

Prof. Adebayo. A. Joshua

Dean, Postgraduate School Signature Date

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DEDICATION

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ACRONYMS

AC	Action Congress
AD	Alliance for Democracy
AG	Action Group
ANC	All Nigerian Congress
ANPP	All Nigeria Peoples Party
APP	All Peoples Party
APPN	All Peoples Party of Nigeria
BDC	Bauchi Discussion Circle
BGIU	Bauchi General Improvement Union
BoT	Board of Trustees
CDC	Constitutional Drafting Committee
CFA	Conference of Fused Associations
CNC	Congress of National Consensus
CPP	Citizen Popular Party
DAM	Democratic Alliance Party
DPN	Democratic Party of Nigeria
DV	Democratic Vanguard
EMU	Eastern Mandate Unions
EPM	Edo Professional Movement
GDM	Grassroots Democratic Party
GNPP	Great Nigerian Peoples Party
GNU	Government of National Unity

INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
NAP	Nigerian Advance Party
NCPN	National Centre Party of Nigeria
NDLP	National Democratic Labour Party
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NEPU	Nigerian Element Progressive Party
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	Northern Peoples Congress
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigerian Peoples Party
NRC	National Republican Convention
NSPA	National Solidarity Peoples Alliance
NUF	National Unity Forum
NUF	National Union Forum
NWC	National Working Committee
PC	Peoples Congress
PCF	Peoples Consultative Forum
PCP	Peoples Consensus Party
PDM	Peoples Democratic Movement
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party

PPN	Progressive Party of Nigeria
PPP	Peoples Progressive Party
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SGN	Solidarity Group of Nigeria
SLA	Southern Leaders Forum
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SPP	Social Progressive Party
TBO	The Buhari Organization
UDP	United Democratic Party
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UNCP	United Congress Party of Nigeria
UPN	United Party of Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Political parties in general and opposition parties in particular are viewed as essential institutions for organizing political competition, and they are expected to play crucial roles in aggregating societal interests, linking political leaders to their constituents and recruiting future generation of political leadership. The re-introduction of multiparty electoral politics in Nigeria in 1999 was widely hailed as a promising beginning after decades of failed transition programs under different military regimes. The optimistic assessments of the Nigeria democratic future initially engendered by the return to democratic rule has, however, steadily given way to a resurgent pessimism, as the largest opposition party, the ANPP, has fallen short of the hopes of providing credible and virile alternative with a view to consolidating Nigeria's democracy. This study investigates the reasons why, after a decade of multipartism in Nigeria, the largest opposition party, the ANPP has been constantly mired in crises of many dimensions and there seems to be little or no chances of acceding to power at the national level despite having a promising beginning in 1998. In order to generate data the study employed in-depth interview method to get the opinions of some of the founding members of the ANPP, as well as its other major stakeholders. Also, content analysis method was used to complement the interviews, within the theoretical framework of Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy. The study reveals among other things that it is not impossible, rather difficult for opposition parties to accede to power, it has happened in Ghana, Japan, UK and the US. However, the ANPP during the period under study grappled with severe challenges perpetuated by the insistence of some oligarchic groups and individuals to lay claims to the leadership structure of the party. Also the inability of the party to have a distinct identity, programs and ideology, set a high standard in terms of party discipline and internal democracy for other political parties to emulate and to earn public confidence, had severely compromised its survival, legitimacy and effective operations as a major opposition party. These challenges had resulted in undesired outcomes in the form of declining membership, electoral losses, lack of cohesion shrinking organizational and structural capability, proliferation of factions and poor state of finance. These ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the ANPP and as such the party lost credibility before the electorate.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

In democratic societies, political parties are indispensable voluntary and informal associations of society, where people share commonly understood values, customs and attitudes to their roles in politics. They are products of and operate within economic structures, and in a context of interests that are affected by and respond to the accumulation and distribution of goodwill and resources, including the wealth of society. As instruments of collective actions, political parties are the creation of the political elite in a bid to control the resources and personnel of government in order to implement an ideology or a political program. In competitive political systems, parties are organized by politicians to win elections; in authoritarian systems, parties are organized to affect the attitudes and behaviours of the population. In both instances, an organizational structure must be forged, money must be raised, cadres recruited, officers elected or selected and procedures for internal governing established and agreed upon.

In competitive multi-party politics, the party that is elected to form government seeks to enact into law a number of policies and programs (oftentimes consistent with the party's manifesto). Opposition parties are free to criticize the ruling party's policies, ideas and programs and proffer alternatives. Democratic opposition political parties recognize and respect the authority of government even when their parties are not in power. This is possible because democratic systems are considered to have the values of tolerance, cooperation and compromise. The roles of the opposition parties are essential to democratic sustenance, it means that all sides in the political arena , however deep their

differences, share the fundamental democratic values of freedom of speech, the rule of law, and equal protection under the law.

The opposition political parties oppose but not obstruct. Both governing and opposition parties nourish and preserve society by helping to transform private or group demands into acceptable public policies.

Functional constitutional democratic system is about choice. In such a system, there must be a constant reminder to the populace that there is a viable alternative to the incumbent political grouping that holds the potential of moving the country onto a higher qualitative democratic setting.

Multiparty democracy exists when political participation stems from periodic elections with many parties contesting for votes cast on individual basis with a view to occupying public positions in order to implement certain party manifestoes, parties that lose elections become the opposition parties. The opposition parties then, are essentially “governments-in-waiting”. For a culture of democracy to hold, opposition parties need to have the confidence that political system will guarantee their right to organize, speak, dissent and/or criticize the party in power.

In many democratic systems, the opposition parties have often been described as minority parties or parties that do not wield executive power, the parties that act as a check on the government. The opposition parties express the view of a significant section of the electorate and help to ensure that the concerns of the various groups and other interests not represented in the government is not forgotten. The opposition party presents itself as a viable alternative to the ruling party. It may do this by presenting an alternative ideological platform or simply show that it has a greater competence to govern.

It has been acknowledged by democratic theory that the principle of legitimate political opposition is one of the most fundamental components of any liberal democracy (Diamond and Linz, 1998). Over the last few decades, the functionality of competitive party politics in the democratization process has also become a subject of renewed debates. Democracy is an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of the forms of government. The fundamental role of political opposition, both as a normative value and an empirical manifestation of a proper working liberal democracy, has finally, come to be acknowledged by the overwhelming majority of political elites and citizens of all democracies.

What is debatable however, are the roles of the opposition parties in expanding space for the rule of law, respect for human rights and “good” governance in developing democracies such as Nigeria. The reading of history proves that respect for human rights, and good governance die where there are no criticisms, therefore, in any liberal democracy; the role of opposition parties cannot be overemphasized. The position of ANPP in Nigeria since 1999 makes it not only the second largest party but the largest opposition party at the national level. The ANPP therefore by virtue of its position as an opposition party is expected to perform the following functions as outlined by Southall (2005): Mobilisation of voters, presenting viable alternatives to the electorate, exposing the shortcomings in government policies, promoting open debates during conferences and seminars, promoting internal democracy, ensuring prudent use of the party’s finances and working closely with the Civil Society Organisations to ensure electoral prudence at voters registration and during elections.

The state of the opposition parties in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) is not as depicted above, basically because of some challenges such as protracted internal wrangling that the party has faced over the years. In 1998 when the ban on political parties and political activities were lifted, All Peoples Party (APP), now known as All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), emerged as one of the promising parties poised to achieve some measurable success at the polls considering the caliber of the seasoned politicians across the country who were members of the party. In the 1998 Local Council elections results which INEC used to provisionally register political parties, APP won two hundred and one local governments and in fact got the highest number of the total votes cast. (INEC Report of 1999).

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

In a competitive multiparty democracy, all the recognized political parties participate in the electoral processes and make adequate use of the entire institutional framework put in place to enhance their participation. One particular party does not dominate the political scene for too long, political power alternates among the major political parties, an indication that the system is vibrant and dynamic. Under this condition, opposition parties are always up and doing in terms of alternative policies and ideas, all in the bid to keep the incumbent on its toes.

In the 1999 States Houses of Assembly elections the APP won two hundred and three Assembly seats, spread across the country and at the gubernatorial elections the APP secured nine States namely; Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Gombe, Kogi, and Kwara States. In the National Assembly elections the APP got twenty-seven

Senators (27) and ninety-seven (97) House of Representative Members, constituting about 24% and 27% of the total members of the National Assembly respectively.

Despite the bright showing of the ANPP at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the party is yet to have any minimum chance of acceding to power at the national level. This is as a result of the several internal disagreements and quarrels that have become an endemic malaise that has afflicted the party in all aspects of its operations, vision, focus and fortunes. Leadership turn over of the ANPP is the highest among the major political parties in Nigeria (Senator Ahmed Yerima, 2009). Between 1998 and 2007, the ANPP changed its national executives eight times. The transformation of the All Peoples Party (APP) to All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in 2002 has not in any way changed the standings, fortunes and the image of the party before the public. In fact, the prospect of the party has further drastically declined and its national spread shrunk. It lost Kogi and Gombe States to the ruling PDP in 2003 general elections.

In 2007 general elections the ANPP amidst deep seated factionalism ,struggled to retain only four governorship seats namely; Yobe, Zamfara, Kano, and Borno States. While Sokoto, Kebbi and Jigawa States slipped off its hands but won Bauchi State. Within one year the Governors of Zamfara and Bauchi, Mahmud Shinkafi and Isah Yuguda respectively defected to the ruling PDP along with the party's structures and supporters. After the 2007 general elections, a major disagreement ensued between the two time presidential candidate of the party, Gen Muhammadu Buhari and his running mate in the 2007 general elections, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke over the ANPP's participation in the Government of National Unity (GNU). While Muhammadu Buhari and his group were against the participation of the ANPP in the arrangement, the former national chairman of

the party, Ume-Ezeoke and some executive members of the ANPP supported the participation of the party in the GNU. This misunderstanding and other several internal problems have become almost irreconcilable as such; have impacted negatively on the ANPP's credibility and performance in providing a credible alternative to the current PDP regime.

This study attempts to unravel the reason why the ANPP has failed to effectively perform its duties as an opposition party rather than the party is constantly mired in crises and upheavals of many dimensions, a situation which has prevented the party from providing a credible alternative to the ruling PDP by acceding to political power at the national level despite having a promising beginning in 1998.

1.3 Research Questions

The questions that arise therefore are:

- (i) How well has the ANPP organized itself as a credible political party in general and as an opposition party in particular?
- (ii) In what ways have the leadership crises within the ANPP affected its organizational capacity, party discipline and credibility as an opposition party?
- (iii) Why has it become increasingly difficult for the ANPP to provide a credible alternative to the ruling PDP?

1.4 The Significance of the Study.

There are remarkably few studies on opposition parties in contemporary Nigeria as well as Africa in general. Studies on political parties have typically focused on the parties in power (e.g. Van de Walle, 2003) on party systems (e.g., Kuenzi and Lambright,

Mozaffar *et al.* 2003, Randall and Svasand.2002, Manning 2005), or on the general dynamics of electoral competition (e.g Basedau *et al.*, 2007, Salih, 2003).Studies on the opposition in Nigeria since the present dispensation started in 1998 have also tended to focus on the broader category of civil society(Olukoshi 1998), and have mostly ignored electoral competition and legislative politics. There is no documented academic research that has attempted to examine, specifically the activities of the opposition parties at the various levels of government such as at the National Assembly, Federal Executive Council level and among the governors' forum.

The ANPP as an opposition party is a recent phenomenon. It has not been sufficiently covered by academic research.Even where studies on the opposition parties have been discussed mostly on the pages of newspapers and wokshops, they have not sufficiently covered the realities of the opposition politics in Nigeria particularly with respect to the ANPP.The study has come to fill the huge academic gap created.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

Specifically, the study intends to:

- i) Establish the level to which the ANPP has organized itself to make it competitive with other political parties.
- ii) Examine how the leadership crises within the ANPP have affected the party's organizational capacity and discipline.
- iii) Examine how the ANPP has portrayed itself to the electorates as a credible alternative government.

1.6 Research Propositions

The research propositions for the study are as follows:

- (i) There is a relationship between frequent leadership crises in the ANPP and its poor performance at the polls
- (ii) Level and quality of resources affects the performance of political parties
- (iii) Weak organization and low level of discipline within a party leads to infiltration and Manipulation by other better organized political parties

1.7 Scope of the Study

The scope of this study covers the activities of All Nigeria Peoples Party in and out of the National Assembly, before and after elections. Also actions of some prominent members of the party were also analyzed within the context of the politics of opposition from 1999 to 2009. The study also covers the forces and factors that have shaped the formation of the Nigerian state, political parties and the various dimensions that political opposition politics have taken from colonialism to post colonialism. The study also covers the analysis of the characters and forces that had led the party through the path of crisis between 1999 and 2009.

1.8 Organization of the Study

Chapter one is on the general background to the study. It contains the statement of the research problem, aims and objectives, research assumptions, scope of the study and the significance of the study.

Chapter two dwells on the review of the related literature on political parties, political opposition around the globe, Africa and Nigeria. The gaps in the literature are identified, which justified the study. Also, in this chapter, theoretical consideration of the relevant theories on political parties are undertaken and hence adopted the Roberto Michel's Iron law of oligarchy is adopted as the theoretical framework of the study.

Chapter Three deals with the research methodology, method of data collection and analysis of the study is extensively discussed; the criteria for selecting certain informants for interview are highlighted as well as the details of the content analysis method adopted to compliment the data gotten from the individual interview conducted.

Chapter Four is a chapter that covers the history and trends of political party formation and political opposition activities in Nigeria, regime by regime.

Chapter Five centres on the discussion of the activities by individuals and groups that led to the emergence of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Also the structure of the party is discussed.

Chapter Six covers an assessment of the travails of the ANPP as an opposition party in Nigeria from 1999 to 2009.

Chapter Seven is the summary and conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Literature Review. Emphasis here is on the various democratic attributes and ingredients especially on multi party systems as being practised in matured and developing democracies.

2.1.1. Conceptualising Democracy in Modern Context

As a rule, empirical definitions of democracy have been concerned with explication of certain behavioural or institutional variables operational in the actual working of democratic political systems. A representation of these conceptions may be found in the works of Joseph Schumpeter, Carl Friedrich, Robert Dahl, Schattschneider and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Having explicitly rejected the “classical doctrine of democracy”, Schumpeter gives an alternative definition of democracy in terms of leadership and competition in a pluralistic political environment. The primary function of the people, he states, is not to decide issues but “to produce a government” The democratic method is that “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggles for the people’s votes” (Schumpeter.1962).

Friedrich (1960), equates democracy with constitutional democracy. Constitutional democracy he adds, is “to be understood as a system of effective restraint upon governmental power, thereby ensuring political responsibility.”

For Dahl and for, as for many other theorists, democracy requires, as a minimum, the existence of “a process by which ordinary citizens exerts a relative high degree of

control over leaders” (Dahl 1970). Pluralism, competition, bargaining and moderation are seen as major attributes of the democratic political system.

Having argued the thesis that : (1) the pattern of politics is to be found in the “contagious of conflict” and (2) the primary function of democracy is the ‘socialisation of conflict’, Schattschneider defines democracy as a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision making process (Schattschneider.1960). He specifically rejects the classical definition, arguing that “the wisdom in democratic theory is to be distinguished between the things the people can do and the things the people cannot do (Schattschneider.1960 .56).

For Lipset, finally, democracy consists of “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for the growing official and social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among the contenders for political offices (Lipset.1960.8). This requires at least three conditions: (1) one set of leaders in office;(2) one or more sets of leaders out of office;(3) a political formula legitimising the system as a whole.

It can be seen, then, that the contemporary empirical conception of democracy have fundamentally departed from the major precepts of the classical theory in stipulating a set of behavioural patterns, process, and procedures that can be observed in the actual working of political societies. The essence of the newer definitions may be summed up in terms of pluralism, competitions, responsiveness and accountability.

The key features of legal democracy are a constitutional state (modeled on features of the Anglo-American political tradition, including the clear separation

of powers), the rule of law, minimal state intervention in civil society and private life, and a free-market society given the fullest possible scope. Its general conditions include effective political leadership guided by liberal principles, limitations on bureaucratic regulation, and if possible, the eradication of the threat of collectivism of any kind.

On the other hand, there is the Marxist model, inspired notably by Rousseau's skepticism regarding the representative structure and codification of the General Will. Like all others, this model has evolved considerably throughout history. It is one of the principal sources of inspiration. What is called participatory democracy is defined in the following manner:

An equal right to self-development can only be achieved in a participatory society, a society which fosters a sense of political efficacy, nurtures a concern for collective problems and contributes to the formation of a knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a sustained interest in the governing process (Held 1987).

Its key features are the direct participation of citizens in the regulation of the main institution of society, including the workplace and the local community; the reorganization of the party system with political parties much more integrated into the parliamentary structure; the adoption of the principle of better distribution of resources; and an open information system to ensure informed decisions.

The promotion, practice and vicissitudes of democracy in different parts of the world have no doubt exposed the concept to some definitional haze and diverse forms of interpretation. Indeed, as Larry Diamond has observed "As a concept, democracy is pervasive in modern value systems but elusive in definition. By the same word, different theorists and ideologies mean many different things" (Diamond 1988). To summarize the

opinions of scholars like Lipset, Dahl, Schumpeter and Linz, Diamond suggests that a democracy is a political system which meets such essential conditions as:

Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties), either directly or indirectly, for the major positions of governmental power; a “highly inclusive” level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organization – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation. (Diamond 1988).

Some other views are either less inclusive or are extended in definitional and operational terms to include economic and social factors and systems. From those who base their theories on the direct democracy of the Athenians to those that are representational and the other variants have come diverse propositions that emphases vary from cultural values to class structures.

The Post-World War II process of decolonization and the struggle for democracy influenced the socio-cultural perspective on democracy while variants have been proposed by such modernization theorists as Huntington (1968) and Dahl (1971).

In recent years, two views have constantly been projected and have remained deviant. One stresses the ethnic factor while the other harps on Africa (specifically Nigeria) peculiarities and propensities which defy operation within the popular democratic ethos. To those who stress the ethnic factor, the sub-cultures of ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies make ethnicity a hindrance to democracy. It is evident from the findings of Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Nnoli (1978). However, it is the negative use of ethnicity that is dysfunctional to democracy (Rabushka and Shepsle: 1978). Those who stress the African uniqueness have been those engaged in distortions which defy any

theoretical model. They disregard socio-political dynamics and societal constraints and variables in their preconceptions and apologia and merely justify assaults on democracy is not an absolute value or, at best, does not need to be same thing to all peoples and take the same form in all places.

Based on Diamond's summation, when reduced to fundamentals, we could deduce that democracy, in operational terms, could be regarded as meaningful representative democracy. This means participation in decision making and the overall organization of the society in a representational way with the use of the constitution as the supreme and fundamental law. With the growing complexity of modern societies, it has expanded as a philosophy to entail insistence on the right and capacity of a people (acting either directly or through their representatives) to control their institutions for their own objectives. It places a high value on the equality of individuals and frees people from any restraints not self-imposed or imposed by the consent of the majority. In a democracy, both the ruled and the rulers are regulated through constitutional provisions.

From the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that while there are contending views which sometimes appear to be in conflict with, rather than corroborate each other, there are some elements which are, to varying degrees, common to all conceptions of democracy. The deductions that could be made from all conceptions of democracy as a way of life are that, it has certain characteristics which include the right or opportunity to choose within a given political context. It also implies some opportunity and the exercise of free will. It provides an environment for popular participation in the political process and promotes active involvement of the greater percentage of the people in the determination of how they would be governed, who would govern them and the nature

and extent of government. In other words, they participate in politics and make inputs into the policy environment in varying degrees – its conception, its limitation, its promotion or formulation and its implementation.

For democracy to survive or be entrenched therefore, it must be accepted as a value that is worth securing. Political parties must exist as organized alternatives and as the masses major tool for affecting the composition and policies of government while competition must be healthy with crises and conflicts managed through appropriate institutions and procedures.

2.1.2 The Centrality of Political Parties in Modern Democracies

Schattschneider posited six decades ago that: ‘political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable without the political parties’ (Schattschneider; 1942). This affirmation of the centrality of political parties for modern democracy is generally accepted both by contemporary scholars and by policy-makers charged with fostering the development of newly emerging democracies or with improving the quality of democracy in established democratic politics. While parties were not necessarily seen as inevitable, let alone desirable, political institutions when they first emerged, they have now become firmly rooted in the established democracies and have rapidly acquired relevance in recently emerging democracies in Africa and Europe, to the point that they are widely seen as a *sine qua non* for the organization of the modern democratic polity and for the expression of political pluralism.

Behind the apparent consensus concerning the desirability of democracy and the centrality of political parties to the actual functioning of contemporary democratic states, however, there lies considerable disagreement. Most immediately, there is disagreement

concerning the performance of existing parties. Much of the recent anti-party criticism, particularly from emerging democracies, stems from disappointment with the ways in which parties operate. As articulated by Schmitter (2000), political parties are not what they once were. More specifically, their perceived failures have given rise to a debate on the 'decline' of parties, with the argument that they are losing relevance everywhere as vehicles of representation, instruments of mobilization, and channels of interest articulation and aggregation. At the same time, however, they have retained the more or less exclusive control over candidate recruitment and the organization of government.

Distinguishing between the two broader sets of representative functions, on the one hand, and procedural or institutional functions, on the other Bartolini and Mair (2001) thus argue that while the representative functions of parties may have declined their procedural role is still intact or might even have been enhanced.

Paradoxically, parties are not only seen to be the key institutions of representative or competitive democracy but are also perceived to be increasingly incapable of performing those functions that are essential to a healthy functioning of democracy. The seeming incompatibility between these two propositions, simultaneously maintaining that parties are necessary institutions for representative democracy but they perform inadequately with regard to their representative functions, is indicative of a changing role of parties in modern democracy and of changing conceptions of political parties themselves. More particularly, modern strand of thinking reflect an ideational transformation of political parties from the traditionally voluntary private associations: a conception with its roots in the liberal traditions of democratic thought in West European democracies; towards a conception of parties as an essential public good for democracy (Katz 1996).

Moreover, underlying these debates about the contemporary performance of the existing political parties and party systems there are deeper and perhaps more functional disagreements about the meaning of democracy and the actual roles of political parties within the system.

Complaints about the decline of party, the growing disengagement from partisan politics, increasing dissatisfaction with and distrust in parties and politicians, the weakening of their representational and governmental roles, or the problem of accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy, all rest upon, usually implicit, normative assumptions concerning what is valuable about democracy and about how democracy should work. Indeed, any discussion of the role of parties (including opposition party) in modern democracies tends to involve strong normative overtones and *a priori* assumptions that are rarely spelt out (Daalder, 1992; Bartolini and Mair, 2000). But with relatively few exceptions (Katz 1997), even when these assumptions are made explicit, they generally are simply stated as self-evident truths, rather than being recognized as contentious choices. At the same time, and equally surprisingly, the literature on democratic theory has remarkably little to say about political parties, or at best implicitly views parties as an obstacle to democracy. In other words, notwithstanding their importance to one another, the literature on parties and democratic theory has developed in a remarkable degree of mutual isolation.

As Bryce argued, no one has shown how representative government could work without parties (Bryce, 1921). If it is true, however, that representative democracy presupposes the presence of political parties and that parties are transforming such that they are losing their capacity to act as agents of representation, this obviously has far-

reaching implication for the nature of democracy. It is only with reference to theories of democracy that we can address the fundamental tension between the centrality of parties and their marginalization in an area quite essential to any modern democracy, and that we can try to make sense of the place of party in contemporary democracy more broadly. In particular, when faced with the challenges of consolidating liberal democracy in more recently established democracies, resolving problems arising from the changing nature of parties in the established democracies, and addressing the democratic deficit of the European Union resulting at least in part from the lack of adequate channels of representation. It is imperative that the literature on political parties and democratic theory take more notice of one another. For this reason, it is important to look at the works of early European political party theorist (s) or writers.

It is important first to recall that the party as a political institution is a relatively recent phenomenon and that its presence at the time of its initial emergence was not necessarily seen as inevitable or desirable. Parties when they first appeared were primarily perceived as a threat to the general interest or as overriding the interests of the individual. Indeed, their existence was fundamentally incompatible with the liberal democratic tradition rooted in the political philosophy of Locke and the radical democratic tradition inspired by Rousseau, both of which are difficult to marry with partisan institutions, which by their very nature transcend individual interest and refute the existence of a *volute generate*. It was the advent of mass democracy which made direct links between the state and the individual increasingly unrealistic and which thus served to legitimize the existence of parties as intermediary institutions between individual citizen and the state.

While early democratic theory typically tended to view parties as obstacles to democracy, reflections on the emerging political parties of the 19th century did not necessarily deny the democratic legitimacy of the political party per se. Rather, as the works of such authors Ostrogorski, Michels and Webber illustrate, their primary concern was with the lack of internal party democracy and with the undemocratic and Oligarchic tendencies of bureaucratic mass parties in particular.

Ostrogorski's monumental two-volume study of the English and American parties of the late 19th century essentially draws two key conclusions, i.e. that organized political parties emerged to serve the needs of mass democracy and that party organization itself is pernicious (Scarrow 2001). In this sense, it can be seen to be a typical reflection of the dominant mode of thought on political parties and democracy at the turn of the 20th century. Ostrogorski acknowledged that parties had been relatively successful in 'ensuring the daily working of the governmental machinery in a democratic community whose volume was increasing with unprecedented rapidity.' He also argued that they had 'failed miserably' in 'upholding the paramount power of the citizen.' (Scarrow 2001). In other words, and in the language of the contemporary party literature, while parties were successful in carrying out their procedural and institutional functions they could be seen to be failing with regard to their representational functions.

This is so, Ostrogorski argues, because party organization fundamentally brings about a dwindling of individuality and a wearing away of individual autonomy. It obliterates the individual by creating a loyalty to the party and its official doctrines, thus wiping out independent thought, initiative and political conscience, dominated by professional politicians the party 'machine' had come to provide the electorate with

convictions, and their sympathies and antipathies, and to prescribe political conduct and choice. Ultimately, and taking the mechanistic metaphor to its extreme, this would result in a government by machine instead of a responsible government by human beings (See Scarrow 2001).

Ostrogorski's solution to what he saw as the suffocating internal discipline of mass parties was to create a polity without permanent parties. Parties were to be eliminated altogether and to be replaced by leagues or temporary parties, which would deal with one issue or one problem at a time. Party organizations would be dissolved and members would be free once their objectives had been achieved and the problem for which they were constituted had been resolved. In this scenario, any loyalty to the party would be finite given the provisional nature of the organization. These are some factual reasons to doubt the practical viability of his theory, not least because it makes rather heavy demands on the cognition and organizational skills of 'amateur' politicians and because it might lead to the dominance of administrative officials as the exclusive holders of continuity in expertise and organization.

Ostrogorski's views were echoed by those of Robert Michels. As a student of (Italian and German) socialism, the political views of Michels were, in part influenced also by the political-thought of George Sorel, those of a romantic revolutionary syndicalist with little sympathy for the political course of the German-Social-Democratic Party (SPD), the most influential socialist party of the early 20th century. Similarly to Mosca's, the elitist political theory of Michels emphasizes that the power of an elite rests upon its organizational abilities. Indeed, it is his contention that every organization produces its elite and that this is embedded in the 'law of nature, in Michels' own

celebrated formulation of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators.

In other words, in any large organization, leadership will inexorably become a necessity. The nature of any organization is such that leadership activities are free from control and can never be fully held accountable by those who hold subsidiary positions within the organization. Hence, while organization is inevitable in complex societies and mass democracies, any organization that reaches a certain size and attains a certain degree of complexity also inevitably produces a situation of domination of leaders over their followers, with oligarchisation as the (unintended) consequence of the two broader sets of causal mechanisms which produce oligarchisation – i.e. ‘technical’ and psychological—the former (division of labour, specialization, the ‘technical indispensability of leadership’) are considerably more important.

Michels made his case by analyzing the socialist parties and trade unions, and the German socialist party in particular, which *prima facie* seemed to constitute the counter – example to the iron law. In other words, through what contemporary comparativists would call a ‘critical case study,’ he demonstrated that even party organizations which are formally organized according to a model of internal democracy ultimately cannot avoid being dominated or controlled by unaccountable elite. The corollary is that the iron law must apply to political parties with less or no concern for internal party democracy and, therefore, to all parties. Moreover, and more broadly, the law is meant to be valid not only for political parties but also for all large and complex organizations.

The extent to which his theory can be seen to legitimate undemocratic principles, however, or indeed Michels' own personal values and beliefs, do not need to concern us at this moment. What is more relevant to recognize here is the relevance of his theory to the question of the role of opposition in a transiting or nascent democracy like Nigeria? Michels' own conceptualization of 'democracy', however, is rather ambiguous, as is indeed his answer to this question. Nevertheless, if internal party democracy is a precondition for democracy or if the iron law of oligarchy should be seen also to apply to the organization of the state itself, Michels suggests we should be pessimistic regarding the chances for the ultimate realization of democracy.

Like Ostrogorski and Michels and as Duverger (1954) would argue in greater detail a few decades later, Weber in *Politics as Vocation* observes that the early forms of party were little more than cliques of notables and that the introduction of mass democracy had produced a new type of party with a strong and permanent organization facilitated by the psychology of the followers and the charismatic authority of the party leader, these 'machines' had taken a plebiscitarian form and were being dominated by a political elite or a single leader.

Taking the historical development of political parties in England as point of departure, Weber observes that parties were, at first, primarily followings of the aristocracy or parties of notables, formed according to class interest, family traditions or for permanent associations between localities and parties were active only during periods of election: cohesion was created only at the level of the parliamentary delegates. A member of the parliamentary party would act as the leader of the party central office and maintain contact with the local organizations. Paid professional politicians were absent

outside the central party bureau: 'Politics was formally and by far predominantly a vocation.' (Weber, 1946)

The modern forms of party organization, brought about by the democratization of the franchise, which encouraged the development of an apparatus of apparently democratic associations, stand in sharp contrast to the old types of party. According to Weber, "These modern forms are the children of democracy, of mass franchise, of the necessity to know and organize the masses, and develop the utmost unity of direction and the strictest discipline.' This is when professional politicians outside parliament take control of the party organization, when power comes to rest in the hands of those who continuously work for the party, and when those who direct the whole apparatus keep the members of parliament in check. In the English context, and the development of the Birmingham caucus in the second half of the 19th century in parliament, 'the result was a centralization of all power in the hands of a few and, ultimately, of the one person at the top of the party.' (Weber, 1946). In these forms of party organization, the party leader thus comes to occupy a special position, for it is the leader whom the machine now follows. In other words, Weber argues, 'the creation of such machines signifies the advent of plebistatian democracy.' (Weber 1946). This originally sees parliament as a rubber stamp, as members of parliament are reduced to nothing better than well-disciplined 'yes' men, therewith, Weber goes on to argue, 'the plebistatian dictator actually stands above parliament, 'in addition, by bringing the masses behind the leader by means of the party machine, a state of affairs has been created, which one might call 'a dictatorship resting on the exploitation of mass emotionality. (Weber, 1946). In

America in particular, party organization could be seen as structured upon the plebiscitarian principle in its purest form.

Although Weber seems to leave little doubt about the implications of this development for the political system, it should be noted that his interpretation of the relationship between political leadership and democracy is rather more positive than it would seem at first glance, while for both Ostrogorski and Michels the absence of internal party democracy seems to undermine the democratic system as a whole, Weberian analysis, is a conception of democracy rather akin to that later embraced by Joseph Schumpeter, which suggests that strong and responsible political leadership may in fact be a necessity for the healthy function of democracy. This is so because, unless it is controlled by strong political leadership, bureaucracy could, by virtue of the efficiency of its organization, easily obtain a predominant political position and become the de-facto ruling group, without being accountable to the public. Responsible and principled political leaders are therefore needed to keep bureaucratic officials in check and to ensure that they take care of ‘impartial administration’ and do not engage in politics.

Political parties have always been among the handful of institutions whose activities are absolutely essential for the proper functioning of representative democracy. Given the centrality and fundamental position of political parties, it is not surprising that students of democracy have, since the very beginning of modern political science, recognized the importance of constantly monitoring and analyzing their evolution and the quality of their performance (Richard 2002). Bryce (1921), for example, argued “that parties are inevitable: no free country has been without them; and no one has shown how representative government could work without them”.

In the early 1940s, Schattschneider (1942) succinctly summarized their importance by stating that “modern democracy is unthinkable without political parties”. Several decades later, similar words were used by other scholars to illustrate the central role played by parties. As described by Stokes (1999), parties are ‘endemic to democracy, an unavoidable part of democracy’. Americanists have long believed that ‘political parties lie at the heart of American politics’ (Aldrich, 1995). Not to be outdone, West Europeanists have asserted ‘Europeanist democracies are not only particularly democracies but also party democracies’ (Muller 2000). This is because political parties dominate the democratic activities and one of the constitutional means of recruitments

2.1.3 Models of Competitive Party Behaviours

Rational Choice theories have developed a set of theories of competitive party behaviours. According to the stipulated objectives of political parties, we can distinguish between (1) Vote- seeking, (2) Office-seeking, and (3) Policy-seeking models of party behaviours. These models, which may be further subdivided, have been developed for a variety of theoretical purposes and have influenced the study of political parties far beyond the formal literature. Let us consider them successively.

2.1.3a -The Vote-Seeking Party

This model derives from the Downs’s (1957) original work on electoral competition, in which political parties “are teams of men” seeking to maximize their electoral support for the purpose of controlling government. Thus, Downsian parties are not only vote seekers but maximisers. This is the only objective that Downs attributes to political parties and it is the basis of his theory of electoral competition. However, Downs’s justification of the vote-seeking assumption remains underdeveloped. Partly because of

this neglect, subsequent theorists have amended Downs in a variety of ways. If turn-out is variable and vote-seeking ultimately serves office ambitions, then in a single district, it makes more sense to maximize pluralities than votes (Hinich and Ordeshook.1970).And in a multi- district contests, the rational party leaders maximize their probability of alternative models and all still belong to the family of vote-seeking parties.

2.1.3. b -The Office-Seeking Party

Office-seeking parties seek to maximize, not their votes, but their control over political office. In the context of this work, office benefits refer to private goods bestowed on recipients of politically discretionary governmental and sub governmental appointments. Office seeking model consists of the pursuit of such goods, over electoral success or policy effectiveness, but for present global realities, behaviour motivated by such expectations is not considered office seeking (Budge and Laver1988).Whereas the vote-seeking party is familiar from the work on electoral competition, the office seeking party has been developed mainly in the study of government coalitions in parliamentary democracies. The office seeking party, as described by such coalition theorists as Riker (1982) and Leiserson (1968), aims to maximize its control office, operationally defined in terms of government portfolios.

2.1.3c -The Policy-Seeking Party

The policy seeking party maximizes its effect on public policy. Like its office seeking counterpart, the policy-seeking model is derived from coalition studies. A smaller literature on policy-seeking parties has emerged within theories of electoral competition (Chappel and Keech 1986; Hanson and Stuart 1984; Wittman 1973).This model was developed in response to the ‘policy-blind’ axiom of the first generation of

game theoretical studies of government formation and specifically the assumption that all admissible coalitions are equally feasible. Policy-based coalition theory instead assumes that coalitions will be made by parties that are connected'' (Axelrod 1970), or at least close to each other, in policy space. However, policy pursuit is typically presented as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for office motivation (Lijphart 1984). Policy-oriented coalition theory typically assumes that parties also pursue office at least instrumentally, as elective office is taken to be a precondition for policy influence. Thus the policy-seeking party is concerned about portfolios, as well as about the ideological disposition of the coalition in which it participates(Budge and Laver 1986).Since the trade-off between these objectives has never been resolved, the policy-seeking party remains the least adequately developed model of competitive party behaviour.

2.1.3. d -Critique of the Three Models

Several shortcomings are common to all the three models, whereas others are peculiar to one specific theory. Beginning with the empirical fit of each model and proceeding to more general issues. On the vote-seeking party, criticism of the assumptions of vote maximization is easy and common place. The assumptions and logic of the basic Downsian model have been widely criticized(Barry 1970;Riker 1982,Stokes 1983).Critics of the vote-seeking model have pointed to the desertion of the median voter by both major parties of the developed democracies after mid-1970s as disconfirming evidence. Consider, for example, the electoral suicidal platform adopted by the British Labour Party in 1983.In multi-party systems a host of parties catering for small and declining social groups, such as the Swedish People's party in Finland, similarly defy the

logic of ‘‘catch-all’’ competition (Kircheimer1996).So do a number of spectacularly unsuccessful hard-line Stalinist parties across the Western world.

The Office-seeking model has been criticized by proponents of policy-oriented coalition theory. Evidently, many parties willingly forgo the benefits of holding office. Participants in coalition governments frequently resign in the middle of a parliamentary term, even when there is no chance of joining an alternative government. The lay centrist parties in Italy, for example, have often engaged in such behaviour (Marradi 1982).More generally, the high incidence of minority governments in many parliamentary democracies indicates office-shyness.

On the policy-seeking party, since the model is less developed than the other two, it is also more difficult to refute. However, no party can join a government without effecting policy in its favour.Political systems with policy oriented political parties should exhibit high degrees of party government (Castles and Wildenmann 1986; Katz 1987). A pure policy-seeking party should not condone, much less promote, the institutionalization of corporatism, disaggregated pluralism, or referendum democracy (Katz 1987), as these practices generally reduce the policy influence of parties.

However, the problems with the three models of party behaviour extend beyond empirical fit. In their basic forms, they share three unrealistic but consequential assumptions:

1. Except for some promising recent work (Auste-Smith and Banks 1988; Laver and Shepsle 1989; Schlesinger 1985), models of party behaviour are generally *static*. Each election and each process of government formation is analyzed separately; as if parties had no history and no future (see Laver and Budge, 1990). Moreover,

government formations are commonly modeled as though, at the end of the day, each party simply “took its benefits and went home”. But surely party leaders are neither amnesiac nor myopic. Their strategies in elections and coalitional bargaining are typically conditioned by past events, as well as by the anticipation of future benefits;

2. All three basic models treat parties as *unitary* and *unconstrained* actors. In fact, parties are complex organizations that impose various constraints on the behavior of their leaders. For example, party leaders often operate under self-imposed constraints due to “contracts” they have made with members of their organization or with other party leaders. Thus a dynamic model of party competition may also help us understand limitations on a party’s freedom of action. Constraints may also be exogenous, as in the case where coalitions or electoral strategies are prohibited by the constitution or by foreign powers;
3. Finally, most theories ignore the institutional environment as a determinant of behaviour. Party behaviour is viewed strictly from a *demand-side* perspective, as if behaviour were determined by the preferences of party leaders alone. In reality, however, the *supply* of political goods such as policy influence and office benefits varies between political systems according to institutional characteristics. The actual behaviour of political parties may depend as much on supply factors as on demand (Harmel and Janda, 1982). To put it simply, there must be spoils for parties to be spoils oriented.

Although political parties as such are not, usually, part of the definition of democracy, the emergence of some form of multi-party system is seen both as an unavoidable

consequence of basic democratic rights, such as freedom to associate and freedom of expression, and as a necessary components of the idea of democracy as it is practiced in matured world democracies. In Crotty's view for example:

Democratic government is unlikely and may not be possible in the absence of competitive political parties...Orderly government; much less a democratic polity cannot exist without some form of stabilized political party representation.

And more recently Seymour Martin Lipset (2005) speaks of "the indispensability of political parties". An interest in the role of political parties is of course not only due to the transition to multiparty democracies, but reflects a change in approach in political science more generally.

The functions that it is hoped parties can perform can be grouped as follows:

(1) Representation: Political parties need to play a key role in organizing elections.

But beyond this they have a wider function of representation, not only in the sense of standing for their members/constituents/sections of the public but helping to articulate and aggregate their interest (Scott Mainwaring, 1995). As an extension of this, Crotty (1993) talks about how, where civil society organizations are relatively well developed, the party can assume the role of an additional brokerage agent serving to inter-connect the mediating groups into larger and more powerful electoral coalitions.

(2) Making government accountable: In consolidated democracies the political leadership is held accountable for its actions. Accountability has many facets but a common distinction is between vertical and horizontal accountability. Political parties have a central role in both types. Regular elections are the formal

mechanism for ensuring ‘vertical accountability’ and political parties’ role in this process usually implies two separate mechanisms. First parties are supposed to offer various policy alternatives to the electorate and the underlying assumption is that voters will choose among those preferences. The electorate is supposed to reward office holders they approve of and throw out the ones they are dissatisfied with. The party label is a way for the electorate to identify candidates with past as well as future performance. For this to take place there must be some continuity in the party system and that different parties are perceived to represent alternative policies. Secondly, parties constitute opposition which challenges the incumbent government. Thus, the role of and the structure of political opposition become important. Horizontal accountability is the answerability of political institutions to each other; such as a government’s accountability towards the parliament. Horizontal accountability is ensured when for instance the legislative is able to control the executive arm of government.

Making government accountable implies the ability of political parties, or at least the elected officials, to effectively gain control of the governmental apparatus while at the same time not subjugating this apparatus to their own personal benefits and using it as a tool against the opposition. According to Dunn (1999 p.8)

“Democratic accountability is best seen as a relation between the past acts of those who exercise public power and their future personal liabilities,” the argument to be made in favour of political parties is that they are tools, not only for representing the electorate, but also a way for the electorate to hold, parties accountable for their actions

and promises. This rests on the assumption that some political parties are capable of constituting a regularized and effective source of opposition.

(3) Institutionalizing Democracy: Political parties themselves should be mechanisms within which people become habituated to democratic norms and procedures. Pridham (2000:p.24) for instance, talks about “the way in which parties, acting individually and collectively, give substance to constitutional rules and thus confirm and enlarge on the formal outcome of transition”. Going by Linz and Stepan (1997-15) three aspects of democratic consolidation, parties as institutions are especially critical for behavioural consolidation, thus is in eliminating non-democratic behavior.

(4) Regime Legitimacy: Effectively performing the preceding functions, party system can contribute to regime legitimacy, establishing a reservoir of good will to help fragile and new democracies tide over bad times (Mainwaring 1998).

2.1.4a. The Relevance of Party Leadership

Party leaders are the highest-ranking office holders within the party. There are variations and differences across the world in terms of titles. In some countries, party leaders are called presidents, secretary general, and while in some countries like Nigeria, party leaders are called national chairmen and they are elected through national conventions

Recent research on political parties highlights party leaders’ increased salience in party policy positions and election success. Farrell and Webb (2000), find that since the 1980s, party leaders in OECD countries play an increasingly important role in election campaigns, where rulers look to their leaders for the party image and campaign message.

While they state that party leadership selection is becoming more democratic across countries, leaders hold considerable control over various aspects of participating in an election. Scarrow, Farrel, and Webb (2000.23) also find that leaders of electoral parties have considerable power in drafting elections manifestoes. Party leaders' personality and character traits mainly, competence and charisma also seem to influence elections outcomes, because in most cases voters take into account leadership personality traits when deciding which part to vote for.

Leadership in a political party like any political or business organization is crucial in the success of political party. If a party is to engage in activities that require funding, campaigning etc. the leader plays a vital role in ensuring it achieves the desired success. Often the concern has been with the actual rules and procedures for selecting leadership. This is where the issue of internal democracy becomes very important.

2.1.4b Internal Democracy and Leadership Selection

The very concept of what internal Democracy consists of has remained ambiguous (Linz 2002:12). The main line of contradiction stems from the differential perspectives on the long-standing question whether internal Democratization refers to the participation and voice of parties' rank-and-file or to the responsiveness of parties to voters in the large electorate. Gibson and Harmel (1998.7) trace this distinction back to the classic writings of Duverger and Michels. For Duverger, internally democratic parties would have member and leaders who adequately represent the party voters. Michels, however, conceptualized internal party democracy in terms of the process exclusively within the parties. For Michels, internal democracy would give substantial decision-

making power to their members and this grant them the capacity to control through organizational mechanism the party leaders and party elected officials.

The above divergence in conceptual perspectives is both reflected and reconciled in the heart of the present analysis. To begin with, internal party democracy is broadly conceptualized as a characteristic of the distribution of decision-making power within parties, among sympathizers, members, activists, and leaders, and at the same time along two principal dimensions, namely; inclusiveness and decentralization. In most general terms, inclusiveness refers to how wide the circle of party decision-makers is, whereas centralization describes the extent to which decision-making is concentrated in the hands of a single organizational layer (Scarrow 2000). While inclusiveness refers to the openness of political parties to inputs from both within and outside the party members, decentralization captures exclusively the distribution of decision-making power within the party organization. The decisional autonomy of party parliamentarians and the representativeness of MPs to party voters and personal constituencies also belong to the internal party democracy concept but only in terms of the degree of control that central party organizations have over their elected officials. Thus, internal democracy is a multi-layered concept that incorporates differential degree of influence from both within and outside the boundaries of the formal party organization.

Candidate selection is probably the most important aspect of internal democracy in terms of its effects on the relationship between parties and society. In determining the centers which gauge inclusiveness and centralization in candidate selection, Rahat and Hazan (2001) as Bille (2001) provide the framework. The authors establish that the degree of intra-party democracy in candidate selection is determined according to the

inclusiveness criteria of “who can be selected” and “who selects candidates” and the centralization of “where are candidates selected”. Both dimensions of inclusiveness and centralization represent analytical conditions.

Scholarly literature provides a number of opposing arguments on the effects of internal democracy on political parties. On one side of the debate, it is maintained that increase in inclusiveness and decentralization of internal democracy benefits parties and society in terms of organizational legitimacy, candidate quality, policy deliberations, and opinions representation. On the other hand, critics of intra-party democracy argue that it is an obstacle to parties’ ability to select moderate candidates and formulate outreaching policy visions. In additions, internal democracy is suspected to hinder parties’ organizational efficiency and unity. The way parties conduct their internal affairs is generally considered indicative of the ways parties would behave in relation to other political actors and the citizenry. Katz and Mair (1995.3-4) argue that more internally democratic parties are likely to appear more willingly to “listen”, more suited to receive input from society and more committed to the norms of equal participation and accountability. In addition, the more a party is internally democratic, the less prone to crises of legitimacy.

2.1.5. Political Opposition in Democracies

In the academic works on political opposition undertaken by Dahl (1966 and 1971), the wider attention is on industrialized, liberal democratic societies and the place of legally protected political parties therein. However, at the outset of the first of these works, Dahl (1966) observes that the right to such an opposition is a particularly modern phenomenon, especially in the context of electoral system based on universal franchise.

To be sure, Dahl was in doubt about the importance of the context within which parties operate as he stated: ‘A country with universal suffrage and a completely repressive government would provide fewer opportunities for opposition, surely, than a country with a narrow suffrage but a highly tolerant government’ (Dahl 1971:5). Furthermore, he recognized that: to the extent that an opposition concentrates on elections and parliamentary action, it may be powerful in unimportant encounters and feeble or even absent when key decisions are made. (Dahl 1966: 395). Nonetheless, the question he was fundamentally concerned with related to the factors that facilitate or obstruct this form of opposition, and the variety in the character of political oppositions taking this particular form.

In Dahl’s scheme, the two extremes of political regimes are polyarchic and hegemonic systems. The former he describes as ‘highly inclusive and open to public contestation’ which manifests in the greatest number and variety of interests represented in policy making. By contrast, the latter prohibits any form of organized dissents or opposition on a highly exclusive decision making regime. No distinction is drawn between constructive and destructive opposition. Rather, by definition opposition is regarded as destructive and must be repressed (Dahl 1973: 9-13). One of Dahl’s central observations is that the tolerance by authorities of opposition is linked to calculations by governments about the political costs of otherwise attempting to coerce or obstruct opponents.

The tolerance or lack of tolerance towards a ‘loyal’ opposition is obviously a basic yardstick for measuring the level of democratic space within a system. The concept has its roots in eighteenth century Britain, used to describe the party one of power as ‘His

(Her) Majesty's Loyal Opposition.' Such an opposition was understood to be loyal to the crown, even if it was office seeking. Most importantly, loyal opposition attempts to gain office through constitution rather than revolutionary means. In a broad sense, this commitment materially affects the content of opposition in so far their alteration; and hence a readiness 'at any moment to come into office without a shock to the political traditions of the nation' (Lowell as quoted in Punnett: 1973:13)

There are important distinctions to be made between the different characters of political parties seeking to replace the government and the margin of tolerance for their challenge. Opposition to government policies in liberal democracies comes from various sources and takes numerous forms, including interest groups and social movements. This has long been recognized in liberal political theory, in which political parties are understood to either straddle civil society and formal institutions or act as conduits for societal demands conveyed through civil society (Bobbio 1989:25). Even so, much of the interest in opposition of this sort has been in its role complementing or supporting competitive party systems rather than as opposition in its own right.

However, not all the literature so acutely privileges party politics. Definitions of democracy which extends themselves beyond mere formalism or electoralism acknowledge the importance of extra parliamentary activities somewhat differently. Schmitter and Karl (1991:78), for example, contend that: 'modern democracy, in other words, offers a variety of competitive process and channels for the expression of interests and values: associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral to its practice'. Much earlier, Bertrand de Jouvenel (1966:157) argued that 'the means of opposition are the infrastructure of political liberty:

the party in opposition is simply an element of superstructure'. He emphasized the difference between seeking to be involved in government, at any level, and seeking political representation and warned that the biggest threat to representation was its absorption into the system of government through co-option, (Government of National Unity) (de Jouvenal: 1986:168) At the time, he had trade unions in mind as a clear example of the prescribed duality. Both these approaches come closer to acknowledge the plurality of oppositional forms in liberal democracies alongside, rather than in the service of, electoral politics. But, they are also promised on the existence of liberal democracy.

Barker(1971:4-6) emphasizes that, in addition to the concept of 'loyal opposition' with which many liberal theorists were preoccupied, 'opposition' can also be understood as: outright resistance to the state, resistance to the power of the state when that power is exerted oppressively; resistance to the group, faction or dynasty controlling the state, a system of constitutional checks and balances guarding against power abuse: and method employed by citizens or groups to modify the actions of government without openly challenging that government. Like Dahl, Barker (1971) emphasizes how contemporary a phenomenon, and indeed an idea, institutionalized loyal opposition is. As he argues, such an opposition is by no means synonymous with liberalism, at least not in its earlier variants expressed through such people as John Stuart Mill certainly believed government benefited from the debate of diverse opinion in parliament, but guided by reasoned, disinterested argument. Rather than the formalization of dissent through a loyal opposition and party politics, Mill placed emphasis on the critical role of a free press in scrutinizing government. According to Barker (1971:17), 'It was not the existence of an

organized opposition that liberals valued, but the freedom to oppose and criticize, a freedom which could not be properly exercised in formal organized parties.

Barker (1971:25-26) criticized Dahl for his overly-prescriptive attachment to liberal democracy which he believed led to insufficient differentiation of the forms and contents of oppositions in favour of a celebration of the existence of opposition per se. a similar criticism was made of Ionescu and de Madariaga's editorship. These authors contended that 'the presence or absence of institutionalized political opposition can become the criterion for the classification of any political society in one of two categories: Liberal or dictatorship, democratic or authoritarian, pluralistic-constitutional or monolithic (Barker 1971:26).

Subsequent to Barker's criticisms, an edited collection by Dahl included the work of Juan Linz and others attempting to address some of these concerns. In contrast with liberal democracies in which the major distinction to make was between loyal and disloyal opposition, Linz (1973) emphasized that in authoritarian regimes the major distinction was between opponents inside and outside the system", and that this was not simply a distinction between legal and illegal opposition. The concept of 'Semi- Opposition' was advanced by Linz in drawing this out. According to Linz (1973:191), semi-opposition 'consists of those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime'. Such opposition is not institutionalized, as in the case of political parties, and may take seemingly apolitical forms, a religious association or an educational institution, for example.

Although Linz and others attempted to draw attention to the particularities of political oppositions other than formal, constitutional, loyal oppositions, much of the recent interests in the prospects of political change in industrializing countries and south-east Asia remain indifferent to the conceptual challenge Linz took up. In Lawson's work on political opposition in Asia, for example, she contends that: 'Where there is no possibility of alternation in power between governing elements and oppositional elements through a peaceful process of fair and open election, there is no constitutional opposition, and there no genuine democracy' (Lawson 1993:194). Certainly there can be no liberal democracy without constitutional opposition, but this does not necessarily mean opposition itself is entirely absent. This privileging of a particular oppositional form is understandable if we are only interested in whether liberal democracy exists, but it is not helpful if we are trying to identify the extent and nature of political oppositions *per se*.

Elections provide individuals and social groups with an opportunity to select political elites who share their views at given points in time. This results in winners and losers, the role of the former being to govern, and of the latter to voice political dissent or political opposition. The opposition party provides an internal check-and balance mechanism against the government. Guided by its leadership, it presents a united challenge to the government on all issues it may choose to contest. Second, it is a permanent structure in that it exists as a continuous corporate body, rather than as something which is created as disbanded in an *ad hoc* fashion. Third, it is representative in that it has a group of dedicated followers throughout the country with whom it is organically connected. Fourth, it is a potential alternative to the government; if the government falls or is defeated in an election, the opposition takes over. Fifth, it is

participant in that it helps the government shape its programmes by participating in its decisions through its opposing/alternative propositions.

As a political body with the functions of providing checks and balances, the opposition parties do several things. It participates in deliberation in parliament. It opposes objectionable policies by voice and vote. It compels the government by all acceptable (legal and constitutional) methods to modify its policies it also attempts to create public sentiments against the government and sympathy for itself as a precondition for winning the next elections. Above all, and this is the essence of its very existence, it proposes alternative programmes. Under normal circumstances, three courses of action are usually open to the opposition parties. First is the winning of amendments to legislation from the government. Second, it expresses the weaknesses or injustices of government policies, thereby eliciting modifications or cancellations. Third, through its rhetoric and criticisms, the opposition can create an anti-government mood among the electorate. The opposition can achieve its objectives, and pursue them more assiduously and effectively if there is salient factor such as ideology which significant segments of the electorate can emerge.

In any liberal democracy, any party that contests and losses elections become an opposition party and always almost scrutinize, and criticize the policy of government. The best known attempt to describe systematically the different characteristics of political opposition is no doubt Dahl's categorization in 1966 based on empirically observed patterns in the West (Dahl, 1966). According to Dahl, the goals of the opposition are to influence both their choice of strategies and the choice of site or setting for the encounter between opposition and those who control the government. The organizational cohesion

or concentration of the opponents, the compatibleness, the distinctiveness or the identifiability of the opposition and the decisiveness of the sites for opposition – influence the choices of sites and strategies.

What factors, asked Dahl (1966), increase the probability that government will fail in trying to suppress political opposition, and what factors increase the relative costs of the successful use of force (Dahl, 1966)? A key question in unstable or emerging democracies is also what the opposition is supposed to be all about. A notable development in Western parliamentary history was the emergence of the distinction between opposing the state (the king) or opposing the present policies and the party running it:

.... an important rhetorical move in the development of legitimate opposition... permits a distinction to be made between opposing the state and opposing the ministers of the state. Much like blaming the 'king's wicked advisors and not the king', it renders possible for dissenters to claim to be more loyal to the system than are those actually exercising power (Parry: 1997.34).

It seems as if many of the patrimonial political and social systems in any sub-Saharan African countries have or have had presidents who in fact embody the role of a traditional king. Many of the presidents have stayed in power for over three to four decades; few have died on the throne while their close allies or relatives have taken over. In all these instances, opposition activities have either been outlawed or reduced to the barest minimum.

The space for peaceful political opposition could thus be widened by emphasizing the distinction between criticizing the ruler on the one hand, and his associates on the other. If the distinction is not made, there is the risk that both the

president in power and the opposition view the political competition as a game with very high stakes, win or die.

Furthermore, in patrimonial political systems where bonds between dominating leaders and their supporters are particularly strong the idea of losing supremacy through defeat in an election has been interpreted, particularly in the African context as an unbearable loss of prestige for the person in power (Southal: 2006.13). A more “secular” interpretation of the executive power, giving it less of a mystic aura and more of a mundane character, may thus be an important factor behind toleration of a peaceful opposition.

The problem is that most sub-Saharan countries inherited authoritarian and centralized institutions from the colonial powers, where “home rule” and the corresponding democratic rights and responsibilities for citizens and civic groups had not developed to the level obtained in the West, particularly not for the indigenous population. In many countries, the colonial administration organized formal structures for party politics, including multi-party rule, but the centralized state was still the model. The late 1950s till the late 1960s; also coincided with the peak of government regulation of the economy in the West, a model which were transferred to most colonies and which can be traced e.g. in the state monopolies for markets via “state market-board” for crops.

Another path is decentralizing power from the state to citizens and civil society, as suggested by Jim Wunsch (1995.89):

Perhaps the most immediately clear difference between regimes of self-governance and regimes of rulership lies in the roles reserved for citizens in the former. Individual citizens and corporate entities retain political prerogatives which allow them, in effect, to share in the process of governance... Those who occupy particular political roles

are not 'rulers' by virtue of that, but are agents or trustees for a broader community of persons

A more polycentric political system, where checks and balances and greater regional autonomy, as well as more power vested in the citizens and civil society, would indeed enhance prospects for pluralism and political opposition (Ostrom 1998.76).

2.1.5. a Ethnicity and Politics of Opposition

Ethnicity has long been understood as playing a crucial role in structuring party politics especially in Africa (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004). However, recent research has suggested that the impact of ethnic identities is extremely complex and varying. Norris and Mattes (2003) find that ethnicity does play role in determining support for ruling parties as well as opposition parties, but that ethnicity is not always the primary determinant of cleavages in African politics. Scarrit and Mazaffar (2005) demonstrate that both ethno-political fragmentation and the geographical concentration of the ethnic groups are important factors in explaining the number of political parties. Wombin Cho (2007) has argued that relationship between ethnic fractionalization and popular trust in political institutions varies in response to electoral design. Bannon, Miguel, and Posner (2004) demonstrate that there is no single relationship between ethnic fractionalizations and the likelihood that individuals will identify themselves first and foremost in ethnic terms.

Clearly, there is a pressing need for a systematic and comparative evaluation of the significance of ethnicity for political behaviour both between political parties and ethnic groups in any one country and across the range of African countries, and overtime. Despite this, there have been relatively few attempts to study the significance of ethnicity as a political cleavage using the data collected by Afrobarometer. Morris and

Matters stand out as some of the few researchers to have adopted Afrobarometer data to undertake a co-operate analysis of the importance of ethnicity for political affiliation across sub-Saharan Africa.

Comparing ‘ethnic polarization’ and ‘ethnic diversity’ across types of party, between countries, and overtime, they find support for three hypothesis of real significance to the study of political mobilization and the process of democratization in Africa. First, in line with the work done by Scarritt (2006), they discover that the vast majority of political parties in Africa are not ‘ethnic parties’. Second their result demonstrates that on average opposition parties are less ethnically diverse than ruling parties. This finding calls into question analysis of party systems and ethnic ruling parties in Africa which had dominated academic ananalysis of African politics. (Lijphart, 1977, Horowitz, 1985). Third, trends in the levels of ‘polarisation’ and ‘diversity’ across the three rounds of the Afrobarometer suggest that ruling and opposition parties are diverging. According to Scarrit (2006), “While ruling parties are becoming increasingly ethnically diverse and less ethnically polarized, the reverse is generally true of opposition parties”. This suggests that the evolution of ethnicity as a political change is complex.

On the one hand, as Norris and Mattes (2003) explain, the need for ruling parties to build large locations in order to retain power appears to have encouraged the development of multi-ethnic political alliances which are becoming increasingly representative of the national population. This trend is likely to continue as aspiring leaders recognize the (electoral) need to present themselves as national, rather than sectional, region, or religious leaders. If it does continue, it is likely to undermine the salience of ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, as Scarritt (2006) noted, many opposition

parties have responded to electoral defeat by mobilizing increasingly ethnically homogenous communities. It may be that those aspirants who do not have the support or political resources to compete for high office might attempt to establish and maintain their position within the political landscape by securing the support of their “home” communities or ethnic group.

2.1.6 Opposition Parties in Contemporary Africa

If the opposition parties in Africa are considered to be weak, political parties need not necessarily be the most important groups that oppose the government. According to Stepan (1997), political opposition in non-democratic systems remains in existence, resist integration into the regime, guard its zones of autonomy, despite the government’s legitimacy, raise the costs of non-democratic rule and create a credible democratic alternative. What follows is that the mutually perceived legitimacy both of the regime, if democratically elected, and of the opposition, if following democratic rules, is an important factor behind democratic political practice. Related to this factor are the kinds of political transformations that have taken place since independence, if peaceful or violent, if military or civilian.

Apter (1960), in a reflection on the role of political opposition in new or emerging democracies in Africa in the 1960s, posits that:

New governments rarely see the necessity for a regular opposition party nor do they always accept the idea of opposition as a normal feature of government (Apter, 1960.61).

This argument emanated from the fact that, during nationalist struggle, all parties were united in principle to fight for political independence and to put the destinies of their respective countries in their own hands. Also, these nations were plagued with myriad of

problem ranging from political problems to economic development. Against this backdrop, Apter argued that: “the idea of opposition politics was regarded as activities typical of the Western countries with developed democracies” (Apter 1960). Nationalist leaders, particularly those that took over political power from the colonialists had the fear that opposition would produce factions, corruption, and separatism among the people of the new nations.

Along the same line of argument, Makinda (1999:24) argued that:

... most African societies do not have a tradition of liberal democracy, and those leaders who took over power after independence destroyed whatever checks and balances their constitutions contained.

The destruction became inevitable because, prior to independence, the nationalist leaders promised good governance and social justice to the public once independence was achieved. Sooner than later it became clear to them that the economic setting of the country could not support such promises. The opposition politicians and parties, having lost out of electoral contests capitalized on these, and began to draw the attention of the ruling parties to those promises their leaders had made in the past. The only way out for the ruling parties and the government was to resort to violent suppression of the opposition, some had their parties outlawed. The excessiveness of the politicians continued unabated and across Africa, in some instances the lawlessness of the politicians provided a justification for military interventions.

Booyesen (2002) while reviewing the performance of the opposition parties in South Africa outlines some factors that have influenced their performance since the end of apartheid: The first factor according to her relates to issues internal to several of the main opposition parties. According to her, the policies of the opposition parties often failed to

differentiate them from each other and sometimes even from ANC. Secondly, she also maintained that “it was precisely the continued growth and sustained legitimacy of the ANC that precluded overall opposition growth”. Thirdly, the possibility of survival through opposition cooperation and realignment was slipping from the grasp of some of the opposition parties. Fourthly, these opposition developments were enclosed in a shift in popular political culture in democratized South Africa. By 1999, the majority of voters believed in strong and effective government as the essence of a democracy that has to transform and deliver.

The argument of Booysen is logically correct, except ANC, no other party in South Africa had enjoyed the support of the majority of the black, also people have built confidence in the party (ANC) having gone through decades of anti-apartheid struggle. If opposition parties have had their distinct policies different from ANC, and capable of providing alternative government, the ongoing conflicts within the ANC would have afforded the opposition parties the opportunities to produce a credible alternative government.

In a rather different scenario, Uddhammer (2007) shows that: in the whole of East Africa, Kenya stands out as the democratically most mature of the three countries. Political opposition has been able to replace the president peacefully once, and it could have repeated the same in the last general election (Uddhammer 2007). This was achieved because the opposition parties in Kenya have organizational cohesiveness and firm base in civil society. That is to say, even though most countries in East Africa and indeed Africa are plural in nature, the situation in Kenya is different because the country has vibrant civil society organizations that have been operating above the tenets of

religion, region and ethnicity. Wherever, civil society movement is vibrant, there is the tendency to have a strong opposition base. The development is quite uncommon in Africa, not in all cases that opposition got into the arena of power, but they were able, within liberalized political environment, to participate in the political process. Obi (2008.9) has argued that:

... opposition in Africa especially within the last two (2) decades, was made up of broad coalitions often drawn from civil society: Labour, professional bodies, religious bodies, student unions, pressure groups and the human rights community. It also included those politicians that had been excluded from power, or had been expelled from, or lost out favour from the power that be within the ruling party.

Despite the proliferation of civil society organizations in Africa, only little has been achieved, most times, they are caught up in the religious/ethnic squabbles, many a times; the ruling parties do label them as such even if their real intentions were not motivated by such sentiments. These sentiments may in itself not be a negative development, but divert the attention of the opposition movement from democratization.

In a situation, where the opposition has been able to overcome the sentiments of ethnicity and religion Obi (2008.13), posited that “the leadership of the opposition political party may be confronted with internal struggles raging from the right to organize and contest for power at the various levels.” In most cases, it has led to factionalism and personalization of political party and activities. He concludes by arguing that:

Opposition politics in Africa is led by political elite that neither want change, nor the transformation of the state. Either way, it is a movement that cannot be separated from the social contradictions in which Africa is immersed (Obi, 2008).

Only few parties in Africa have evolved out of a set of systemic ideas which people willingly aligned with. This might not necessarily be the fault of the political elite, but instead the system which gives them a limited time to form political parties particularly during transition periods. The winning party, more often than not an incumbent party, has continued to win handsome majorities of both votes and seats. Some observers might note optimistically that the winning party's margin has not increased over time. Nor does it appear that the degree of disproportionality between votes and seats is growing over time, if we compare the first and second columns. It should, however, be noted that the percentage of votes going to the winning party includes a number of missing values; these tend to come from less democratic systems, so the data almost certainly understates the level of actual disproportionality. On the other hand, given the region's significant economic problems, the persistence of poverty and the poor performance of governments, it should be viewed as remarkable that incumbents have continued to do so well, and does probably indicate the advantages of incumbency, as the literature has tended to argue.

The most useful and least deceptive variable to assess the strength of the opposition is probably the proportion of seats going to the opposition. The "effective number of parties" statistic is often used instead, but the very large number of independent candidates in some countries, which leads to the anomalous scores for fourth and fifth elections (discussed below), has lessened its usefulness over time. In brief, it is hard to distinguish between small parties and independents, both of which appear to be expanding. To cite just two examples: In the Congo-K elections of 2006, for instance, 63 independents are reported, as well as 56 parties with five or fewer seats (in a legislature of 500 deputies!). In Mauritania, the winning party claims only 16% of the

seats following the 2006 elections, but there are 41 independents, and so on. (Van da Walle 2003).

What, then, can be argued about these second parties? They appear to have gained in strength over time, if just barely, from under a fifth of total seats allocated in the first two elections, to just over a quarter in fourth elections. Still, they remain relatively small, with only 22 of the 137 elections reaching a third of the legislative seats (in comparison, the majority party had 66 % of the seats in 68 elections).

The election statistics presented here correspond to findings by among others, Lindberg (2007) finding that of 21 electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, 11 may be characterized as stable/institutionalizing- of these 11, eight are one party dominant, thus, stable party systems in Africa seem to mean stable one party dominance (Lindberg 2007: 237). From a perspective of democratic accountability, this is problematic. As reported in much of the literature on political dominance in the region, dominance is very often associated with misuse of state resources and authoritarian tendencies (van de Walle 2003, Manning 2005, Randall and Svasand 2002).

In other words, if the only political systems capable of providing mass patronage through their party system as 'electoral machines' are one party systems the question is whether multiparty democracy is really emerging in the region. In countries like Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique – all characterized as either stable or institutionalizing (Lindberg 2007) the dominant party has not been subjected to serious electoral contestation. The increasing degree of horizontal and vertical accountability observed in these regimes exists in the context of one dominant party that has not been subject to serious electoral challenge.

First, as suggested by Van da Walle (2003) the leading party of the opposition is often relatively small compared to the party in government. Even in the region's most democratic countries, the opposition often has fewer than half the number of seats as the winning party: In Benin (2003), 15 seats compared to 31, for instance, in Cape Verde (2006) 29 compared to 41. Since the majority party can often count on the legislative support of smaller non-government parties and independents, these data understate the strength of the majority party relative to the opposition. Moreover, it should be noted in this respect that most of these countries have presidential constitutions with wide discretionary powers for the executive, and no requirement that the parliamentary majority be the party of the president. Yet, this has actually been the case in only a very small number of cases, most notably Niger and Sao Tome, in which successive presidents have not consistently been able to count on a stable parliamentary majority.

Secondly, as argued by Randall and Svåsand (2002), functioning democracies require an institutionalized party system to the extent that voters are able to choose between alternative parties and that they should be able to pass a vote on the basis of the parties' performance in previous elections. Underlining the weakness of African opposition parties, the number of party changes from one election to the next is striking. Lindberg (2006) has compiled the number of parties registered in legislative elections in 44 sub-Saharan Africa countries. While the number ranges from a low of seven (Botswana) to the 100 registered parties in Congo (DRC), more than half of the multiparty democracies in the region are reported to have more than 15 registered parties in legislative elections. In only a handful African countries have the same parties – apart from the incumbent - contested all three (or four) elections since multiparty elections

where reinstated. In Zambia, for instance, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the party that won the first multi-party elections in 1991,) is the only party to have contested all four legislative elections since 1991. In the Gambia, no parties have been represented in legislative elections in more than three elections. Even the relatively institutionalised multiparty system in Senegal has not produced a stable party system to the extent that the majority of the electorally significant parties are represented in consecutive elections.

Thirdly, according to Rakner *et al.* (2007), throughout the region, political parties appear to dominate the political scene. Nevertheless, in countries as varied as Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritania and the recent Uganda multiparty elections, independent candidates have constituted more than 10 per cent of Members of Parliament. In the case of the 1998 elections in Madagascar, independent candidates garnered a higher percentage of the vote (26.8%) than the largest party. In Uganda's 2006 multiparty elections, independent candidates gained the same number of seats as the largest opposition party Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). With 20 % of the vote in the 2004 elections, independent candidates constituted the third largest group in the parliament of Malawi. These totals are of course hard to interpret comparatively. The voting behavior of independent legislators and their relationship to the majority vary both within and across legislatures. The numbers do not tell us much about the role of these independents in the legislature between elections. Candidates may be elected as independents, but eventually join the presidential majority.

The functional difference between independents and parties represented by a single parliamentarian is not entirely clear. Clearly, at least some parties with only one effective

candidate for the legislature are equivalent in political effect to an independent candidacy. The large and apparently growing number of independents in legislative elections through out the region serves to weaken all parties, since it lessens their discretion over candidate selection; at the same time, its effect seems clearly more negative on opposition parties and their ability to contest presidential power. Several distinct individual motivations appear to be at the root of the phenomenon. First, a substantial number of candidates do not think that running as part of a party increases their chances of winning a seat. They choose to run on their own and count on their own prominence within the community and their own resources to win. This suggests that parties often do not provide candidates with additional resources, one reason candidates might prefer to run as a member of a party. Second, a number of independents initially sought to stand as members of a party, but lost a primary, or were not chosen by the party to be a candidate. They disagree with this decision, and choose to run as independents instead, and the party that rejected them can not assert party discipline and convince the person not to run.

Finally, and concurrently with both of these logics, the decision to run as an independent can be part of a strategy to negotiate one's entrance into the winning party after the election, perhaps to buttress the presidential majority. At least some independent candidates believe that winning on one's own enhances the leverage to negotiate a good deal for one's self after the election (Rakner *et al.* 2007). The case of Malawi shows that constitutional provisions (Section 65) intended to strengthen the role of parties by preventing MPs elected on a party ticket from changing party affiliation during the electoral term without having to re-contest their seat may have led to an

increase in the number of independent candidates. MPs may leave their party group and declare themselves as ‘independent’, and MPs elected as ‘independents’ may join an existing party group. Thus, standing as an independent provides individual MPs with incentives in terms of striking bargains with the main party.

In sum, the scholarship on African political parties have increased markedly in the past decade and in particular, we now have a number of valuable case analyses of party systems in many of Africa’s emerging multiparty systems. Nevertheless, systematic knowledge of the party-legislative relations is still scarce and we know little of how opposition parties (and independents) vote in parliament and the level of horizontal accountability. The numeric weakness of the opposition witnessed by the fact that even in Africa’s most institutionalized multiparty system the opposition rarely gain more than 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats, the limited durability of opposition parties and the unclear role of independents in parliament, however, suggest that many legislatures in the region perform a relatively weak function as a check on executive power. What may explain the continued weakness of opposition parties through out the region, not only in the electoral autocracies, but also in relatively democratic multiparty? However, this phenomenon of independent candidates has not gained popularity in Nigeria simply because of the importance attached to political parties.

Based on an analysis of a number of case studies produced on party system development and electoral policies in sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades, three challenges generally appear to confront opposition parties throughout the region: incumbency advantages related to the dominance of the executive, limited access to resources, and the low legitimacy attached to the notion of opposition politics in the

region. Each of these challenges results from both informal and formal mechanisms that serve to weaken opposition parties. Clearly, oppositions are involved in long term attempts to ‘level the playing field’ of formal institutions. They demand independent and well funded electoral commissions, they lobby for constitutional reforms. At the same time, oppositions often accept the ‘tilt in the playing field’; they appear remarkably pragmatic and focus on informal mechanisms to compete in elections.

Discord is almost inevitable among so many opposition leaders, some of whom invariably end up claiming “ethnic” or “regional” legitimacy, which enable them to join a coalition government in the repressive system they pretend to oppose.

2.1.6b Political Opposition in Nigerian Politics: A Review

Nigeria, like other modern states in Africa arose out of the social, economic and political changes in Europe, associated with the rapid national and territorial spread of capitalist social relations and productive forces during the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries. The creation of the national “high culture” contributed to the emergence of states which, guided by the “purposive” political, economic and academic elites of those societies, opened up real promises of a better life for the masses of the people (Gellner, 1983). Likewise, Lissa and Olukoshi (1998:45) state that:

... a major reason given by incumbent Nigerian leaders for the abandonment of pluralism was the urgent necessity to rid the country of the cultural divisiveness which Western-style multi-party politics seemed to be keeping alive and which appeared to sap political and developmental energies in a multiethnic environments.

This was achieved by eliminating political institution which appeared to keep ethnic and regional division alive. The partisan role played by the NPC led federal government in the Western region crisis validates this position. The hope was that the task of achieving

national unity and economic development would be made easier, as if ethnic awareness and diversity were inherently inimical to or incompatible with national unity, democracy and economic development.

The government of Nigeria at independence could not be formed by one political party because of the regional concentration of the parties and the failure of the parties to acquire national status. The implication of this development was that coalition became inevitable (Udofia 1981:43). This coalition was formed by NPC and NCNC. The problem with the opposition parties and indeed the political parties generally was, the ways the political parties were formed, most of them through cultural affiliations. Udofia (1981) has observed that:

In Nigeria, the formation of political parties did not accomplish the task of determining democratic ways of dealing with political process in the country.

One of the ways as he observed was to have an encompassing governing party and opposition. The multiparty system Nigeria practiced in the First Republic was confronted with lack of institutionalized, overlapping and shifting opposition that did not really perform the role of presenting clear-cut alternative policies to the electorate, but rather engage in disruption and destruction of the system.

In the 1960s, throughout Africa, opposition parties as well as opposition activities were regarded as a threat to the stability of the government. One ideal purpose of the opposition party in Nigeria is to help with modernizing process in the same manner as help with modernizing process in the same manner as the governing party. Apter (1965) outlines the roles of an opposition as:

- (1) representation of interest of the groups which have been overlooked by the majority party, (and)
- (2) provision of information which otherwise is unavailable to government about public reaction to particular official policy.

In Nigeria, (particularly in the 1960s) the existence of multiparty system completely negated these roles (Udofia 1981). The obvious weakness in the above opinion is that he did not provide any scholarly analysis to the reasons why the opposition was characterized with these attributes.

In an attempt to explain the reason, Patrick (2001.9) argues that:

...after independence, the political system that emerged in Nigeria, and indeed Africa was neo-patrimonial, that is, based on vertical links of patronage between the political elite and client constituencies.

Contemporary opposition politics in Nigeria is therefore best understood as the exercise of patrimonial power. What this means in specific terms is that, despite the formal political structure in place, power transmits essentially through the informal sector. In a neo-patrimonial system, “political accountability rests on the extent to which patrons are able to meet the expectations of their followers according to well established norms of reciprocity (Patrick 2001).

Party strategy may also be influenced by the origins or history of the particular political party. Based upon the European experience, Epstein (1979) contends that where political parties emerge before the professionalization and insulation of the bureaucracy, parties are more likely to use their control over the bureaucracy and engage in patronage politics. One variation of this thesis is that if a political party had its origins in an effort to gain access to the political system, then the party would not have had access to

patronage at the time that it mobilized its base, and thus it is less likely to engage in clientelism. “According to Shefter (1994), “a party that undertook to win popular support by distributing particularistic benefits through local notables or politicians will not have established such an organizational structure to bind voters directly to the party, and consequently such a party will only be able to maintain itself in office by heeding the demands of the patronage-seeking politicians who are affiliated with it” (Shefter 1994).

The founding ideals of a party may also affect the willingness of politicians to engage in clientelism (Warner 2001). Political parties that emerge from outside the political system are likely to have ideologies that discourage the use of patronage to connect with citizens (Shefter 1994). Left-leaning, universalistic ideologies are expected to be less compatible with clientelism, while sectarian or ethnic parties will encourage clientelistic linkages (Roniger 1994). Chandra (2004) and Berman (1998) also contend that ethnic parties and the salience of ethnicity in politics are built on the quest for patronage.

By themselves, these party-level explanations cannot account for the variance in party strategies in 2003 General elections. The party features they highlight do not vary across the states, while different parties within states are more similar than are parties with the same labels across states.

Other explanations emphasize the institutional context that shapes the strategies of parties and politicians in democracies. Electoral laws such as single member districts personalize electoral competition around the candidate instead of the party compared with many other electoral formulae (Carey and Shugart 1995); voters around the 50% or plurality threshold in particular districts will also be valued differently under majoritarian and proportional electoral institutions. Federalism (Di Gaetano 1988; Mainwaring 1999),

large legislatures (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981), and Presidentialism (Kitschelt 2000; Van de Walle 2003) may also affect linkage strategies through their effects on access to resources, incentives to emphasize party programs, whether the costs of particularistic spending are internalized, and the size of the constituency to which politicians must appeal in order to gain power.

While Nigerian institutional arrangements all encourage particularistic competition, they do not differ among the states and hence cannot explain the variance across them. Each state is a part of the same federal, presidential system, with a bicameral national legislature whose members are elected in single member districts. Each state is led by a governor with strong executive powers who is elected directly, under a geographical distribution requirement for votes, and separately from the unicameral state legislature, whose members are also elected in single member districts.

Most contemporary political explanations of patterns of spending on particularistic goods are built on the link between the type of good and its corresponding electoral return. By their nature, private goods benefit a small number of individuals and can be targeted to core constituents whose support is fairly certain, while one cannot target or exclude non-supporters from enjoying public goods, making these a riskier political instrument than private goods. Political competition and transactions involving private goods are generally classified as “clientelistic,” while those with public goods are sometimes considered programmatic.

For example, Estevez et al (2002) argue that an incumbent’s choice of the mix of public goods in the classic sense, local public goods that can be geographically targeted and private goods, can be analyzed as an investment decision to minimize electoral risk with

the constraint of achieving a minimum electoral return. Testing this theory against data from the Mexican poverty alleviation program PRONASOL, they find that the distribution of “clientelistic,” private goods increases and then decreases with higher levels of modernization as well as for increasing political competition. Their findings echo Scott (1969), who argues that at intermediate levels of development, greater electoral competition leads to more widely distributed benefits. He argues that independence era parties move furthest from symbolic linkages to those based upon patronage where “electoral anxieties are the most intense”

More generally, clientelism may emerge as a particular solution to a commitment problem in democratic politics. Because the exchange of political support for goods does not occur simultaneously, there is a credibility problem that can be analyzed as a prisoner’s dilemma. If the good is offered by the incumbent party first, then a voter could take the good and vote for the opposition. Similarly, voters may support a candidate, only to be left out of the distribution of patronage after the election.

One solution is to develop and exploit political machines or pre-existing non-political social relations that enable clientelistic exchange through monitoring and enforcement. For example, ballots or voting technology may be used to observe or infer voter support; these instruments might be used by party operatives in the context of a political machine who know the precise needs of their clients (Brusco et al 2003; Chubb 1982). In “traditional” settings, clientelistic exchanges may be sustained by a sense of obligation between the parties involved, particularly in small communities (Silverman 1977). The “multiplex” nature of relationships in traditional society (Bailey 1975), in which one deals with the same partners in several linked markets like those for credit and

land, can give patrons much leverage over the political choices of clients as well (Scott 1972; also Cox 1987 on British politics before the development of party discipline in the legislature). Robinson and Verdier (2001) appeal to a social network to connect patrons and clients, as does Keefer (2002) who analyzes a model of policy-making where repeated, face-to-face exchanges enforce agreements between patrons and clients. Geddes (1994, 89) also implicitly assumes that supporters do not have other potential patrons and focuses on the repeated nature of the interaction to solve the prisoner's dilemma.

Clientelistic exchange may also be enforced by the strategic setup of the interaction between a patron and his clients. Where patrons have a monopoly on a valuable economic resource, they may credibly threaten to exclude those clients who do not support the patron (Scott 1972, 125), and this generates a coordination problem among those who prefer to vote out the incumbent (Medina and Stokes 2002, who define clientelism to be this strategic setting of monopoly; Van de Walle 2003). Moreover, incumbent patrons may adopt policies that hamper development in order to perpetuate poverty, to make the threat of exclusion more powerful and to make it cheaper for patrons to stay in power (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 176-7; Robinson and Verdier 2001). Chubb (1981) illustrates this dynamic for Palermo, Italy, while Diaz-Cayeros et al (2001) analyze the Mexican-PRI case.

This dynamic has been identified in Nigeria by Lloyd (1955) and many others for Africa as part of the general characterization of "neopatrimonialism." It was a serious concern in the 2003 elections at the federal level and arguably equally so at the state level. However, we have no specific evidence that the credibility of the exclusion threat

varied among state governments, and all governments encouraged the belief that one must support the ruling party in order to receive personal or collective benefits. Further work is necessary to evaluate this argument for the variance within Nigeria. Apart from the coordination dilemma perspective, underlying all contemporary theories of clientelism is the translation from units of different types of good to electoral support. The study contends that this ignores an important use of clients in intra-party competition and the trade-off between this use and purchasing votes.

The quest for political legitimacy thus requires the fulfillment of particularistic obligations that have nothing to do with the emergence of a public sphere and national identities. The Nigerian state is not much more than a relatively vacuous shell, useful in so far as it permits the control of the resources which it commands, but politically feeble because it is neither institutionalized nor functionally differentiated from society. Similarly there is no self-sustaining civil society because vertical ties remain intimately more significant than horizontal links.

The primary sources of economic crisis and political decay in Nigeria today is the lengthening shadow of the state over every other reaction of society since independence, the state has been the chief arena for the accumulation of wealth and the acquisition of resources, and has been becoming so ever more decisively. Too much of the country's wealth is mediated through government contracts, jobs, development projects and so on. Too little is accessible through an activity substantially independent of the state. (Diamond 1984). As a result, power has replaced effort as the basis of social reward. Hence, a desperate struggle to win control of state power ensues since this control means

for all practical purpose being all powerful and owning everything. Politics becomes warfare, a matter of life and death (Obi, 1981).

Many scholars (O'Donnel, 1986, Mamdani 1988, Olukoshi 1988) are of the opinion that:

.....in most countries, the opposition parties hardly enjoy a level playing field with the incumbents, they challenge official, publicly funded media organizations as well as the various arms/apparatuses of the state, including the security services, are usually deployed against opposition and their supporters.

Even after elections, state apparatuses, including the judiciary are variously used against the opposition to further weaken them. Certain rules are evoked to curtail the activities of the prominent figures in the opposition; some of them are at times implicated in some alleged breaches of national security. With these developments, and with many of the parties relying on handful patrons, usually also their leaders or founders, for the finances they require to carry out their activities, they may run the risk of increasingly becoming susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality and internal structures of patronage.

As Olukoshi (1998) has aptly observed, " many of the opposition parties in Nigeria have been themselves launched as vehicle for key individuals to achieve power or have access to it. In some cases in Nigeria, individuals who have founded or helped to establish new political parties are dissatisfied members of the ruling parties or ruling oligarchy" In many instances the opposition leaders carried their personal rivalries into the opposition parties they have helped to establish. A great deal of energy and time is spent by them staking rival claims and these rivalries have negative influence on collective actions. (Olukoshi 1998.45).The individual rivalries are reinforced by lingering

or resuscitated ethno-regional / religious competition and suspicion. In this context as Olukoshi (1998) and Adejumobi (2000) view it: "internal party democracy is hardly given priority by the main opposition elements except as an instrument in their struggle for individual and group advantage".

From above discussion, one view which is apparent in the literature is one which insists that the existence of an effective opposition in the context of multi-party arrangement is absolutely indispensable to the emergence and consolidation of a stable democratic order. This represents a total reversal of an earlier proposition in and about Africa which treated formal opposition as being potentially obstructive, if not outrightly divisive, not in African way of doing things which is inhibitive of the nation-building project and of the prospect for rapid national economic development.

2.1.7 Political Opposition and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution

The perspective on conceptualizing political opposition within the context of the tradition of western liberal democracy is usually done by extrapolating the role of the opposition in the two main systems of liberal democracy, namely; the parliamentary and the presidential system. Under the parliamentary system, the opposition has a very prominent and clearly defined role. It generally offers critiques of government policies and programmes and presents alternative vistas fully garnished with even a shadow cabinet. Under the presidential system of government, however, the role of the political opposition is encapsulated in the dictum or doctrine of the separation of power.

The doctrine of the separation of power propounded by Montesquieu (1748), states that:

.....When the legislature and the executive powers are united in the same person or in the same body of magistrates, there is no

liberty. Again there is no liberty, if the judicial powers are not separated from the legislature and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative powers; the life and liberty of the subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control –for the judges would be the legislator. Were it joined with the executive power, the judges might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body to exercise these powers.

This doctrine formed the cardinal part of the American constitution, section 235, which says:

The accumulation of all powers, legislature, executive and judiciary, in the same hands whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed or elective may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

Nigeria presently operates a presidential system of government and the Nigerian constitution is accordingly tailored along the broad principles of the separation of powers as espounded by the founding fathers of the American presidential system. The 1999 Nigerian constitution has clearly defined the powers of the three tiers of government accordingly.

Section 4(1) – (9) clearly spells out the functions and powers of the legislature. For instance, section 4(2) says: “The National Assembly shall have powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter.....”

The power of the executive, which is vested in the the President is clearly stated under section 5(1)-(5). Section 5 (1) (a), for example, says. “the executive powers of the federation shall be vested in the President and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him.....” The

powers of the court are stated under section 6(1)-(6). This section, especially subsection (1), vests in the courts all the judicial powers of the federation.

The 1999 Nigerian constitution empowers the INEC to recognize political associations that have met its conditions stated in sections 221- 229 of the constitution as political parties. Accordingly it emphasizes that the positions of the executive and the legislature at all tiers of the government would be filled up through elections to be contested by the INEC recognized political parties. This implies that the 1999 constitution was made to be operational under a multi-party democratic setting. It is within this context therefore that the usage of the word 'political opposition' by the study is located since not all the recognized political parties would be strong enough to capture power, some will be out of government hoping to one day form the national government

2.4 Theoretical Framework

There are several contending theories of political parties. Before adopting a theory for the research there is a need to briefly review some of these theories.

2.4a Group Theory

The early versions of group theory were developed to explain the workings of liberal democracies in terms of the administration of organized group rather than individuals. The intellectual antecedents of the group may be traced to the doctrines of pluralism, especially the writing of Figgis, Maitland, Cole, and Laski, it originated as a reaction against the atomic liberalism of Locke and Bentham, and the idealist socialism of Green and Bosanquet. As the "first swell of the behavioral tidal wave that has since flooded the discipline of political science," it also represented a reaction against the emphasis which traditional political science laid on a formal and static institutional

approach. Further, Bentley is regarded as one of the pioneers of this approach and his arguments in his book, "the process of government" marked the academic relevance of the theory. However, the theory became popular across the globe few decades later when David Truman and other likeminded theorists resurrected it (Ray, 2003).

The group theory postulates that decision-making is the end product of the activity of organized groups. According to this theory, the reality of politics is hidden below the surface of the property constituted and recognized organs through which decisions are articulated. It is hidden in the continuous struggle for power and influence in which groups are constantly engaged. The group is understood by Bentley as not just a collection of individuals, but as a "mass of activity", a patterned process rather than a statue form. As Bentley(1956) defines it, a group is "a certain portion of the men of a society taken, however, not as a physical mass cut off from other masses of men, but as a mass (of) activity, which does not preclude the men who participate in it from participating likewise in any other group activities" (cited in Truman 1964).

The shared attitudes constitute the interest; every group is basically an interest group. Society, according to Bentley, comprises dynamic processes (actions) rather than specific institutions (structures) or substantive contents (values). Society, nations, government, politics, administration; all comprised groups of men, each group cutting across many others. Society itself says Bentley, is nothing other than the complex of groups that compose it. The social system, in Truman's word, is a sort of "Mosaic of groups", in constant dynamic interaction with each other. The dynamics of the interaction process constitute the fundamental facts and the real core of the group approach. The proponents of the group theory view the political process as a never ending stream of

interactions among group which pursue particular interests in competition with one another.

Bentley (1956) regards politics as a high-level activity carried on largely by group. Truman, however, suggests that politics is involved when groups make their claims “through or upon the institutions of government”. Broadly speaking, politics is involved in all the processes in a society leading to the allocation of values through structures of power. Put directly, politics is viewed by the group theory as the continuing process for the adjustment of conflicting group claims through the exercise of power.

What is the role of the government in these endless and complex interactions among groups in society? Presumably, the government is a mediator in the struggle among groups, and the source of rules and restraints. As Truman has observed, “Government’s functions are to establish and maintain a measure of order in the relationship among groups” (Truman 1964). Governments could be distinguished from each other in terms of the mechanisms and processes of adjustment they provide for the purpose of handling the ongoing struggle of political interest groups. The government is the mediator and the umpire. It is a pertinent question how the system keeps on running and does not break down under the weight of the ceaseless struggle and conflict. Surely, the picture being pointed by the group theory does not in any way suggest anarchical or Hobbesian state of nature, because liberal democracy where group theory fits in does provide certain regulative mechanisms through which the compelling interests on the parts of the various groups can be reduced.

Group theory puts more emphasis on economic interest, placing their narrow interest over those of the collective good. Power interest groups are able to privatize

conflict so that other interest groups are limited in their ability to become involved in the policymaking process. The flaw in the group theory is that not all interests in society are equally represented, nor are factions in society randomly distributed across the population as such, it is not appropriate to the study.

2.4. b Class theory

Class theory was the first major attempt to explain political life in terms of socio-political variables. Karl Marx was the first major social theorist to have his work primarily on class model. Marx argued that men enter into social relationships independently of their wills and that their beliefs and behaviours are largely determined by the social conditions in which they find themselves. The most important of these conditions are those which are directly related to economic production, and these relationships tend to determine other aspects of social behaviours and beliefs. To Marx:

.....economic conditions which determine people's social relationships vary from epoch to epoch, as economic conditions change in all previous history, there has been a polarization between oppressors and oppressed. As the oppressors become better organized and more official, they change the economic system to make it even more deplorable (Marx 1778.22).

They must do this; otherwise they themselves would be destroyed by others. This increase in the efficiency of exploitation is the source of progress; it brings about increases in wealth and economic productivity, as well as financing advances in science and culture. However, there is a negative side as well. Social and political tensions increase because the non-economic organization of society fails to change rapidly enough to fit the new economic conditions.

Marxist theory expects tension, conflict and change as necessary for human progress. Conflict between social classes, in particular, is viewed by the Marxist as the

basic source of social evolution. Marx viewed political life as a reflection of the class struggle. He considered each of the participating parties and leaders as representatives of social classes, and he explained their behaviour as resulting from their class interests. In its basic form, Marxist theory has an elegant simplicity, similar to many religious doctrines. It can be readily understood by people who are not professional social scientists. Indeed, Marx and his comrade Friedrich Engels wrote *The Communist Manifesto* precisely to communicate their theory to factory workers. Hence, the theory is guilty of oversimplification. Marx was not concerned with the objections of these theoreticians; he looked at them as having tendencies to obscure truth about society.

Marxism places too much emphasis on economic factors and not recognizing the complex interconnectedness of the world. Marxist theory was developed in the nineteenth century and dealt with the social situation at that time. Marx tried to avoid making explicit predictions about the future, since he felt that our understanding of future conditions would come only after we had experienced these conditions. Social change has proceeded rapidly since Marx's time, however, and many of the problems with social class analysis today come from resistance on the part of some of its political supporters to modifying the model in keeping with recent changes.

Marxist theory is generally weak in dealing with intermediate classes or strata. Marx noted the economic decline of the craftsmen and small businessmen who made up the middle class in the early days of capitalism would lead to an increased polarization between a relatively unskilled factory labour force and a class of wealthy capitalists. Only in scattered references in his later work did he begin to note a new development – the growth of the new middle class. Members of the class are still part of the working class in

the strict economic sense since they earn their living by selling their labour power, but their level of education permits them to earn higher wages and maintain a style of life intermediate between that of the manual working class and that of the upper class. The role of intermediate classes or strata in political life is not easily explained by economic factors. The above theories can not be appropriately used to analyze the work, hence the need consider the third theory.

2.4c Elite theory

Elite theory in politics was advanced in direct response to Marxism. The early elite theorist were conservatives who were opposed not only to socialism, but also to liberal democracy as expressed by any movement which attempted to give the masses of the population a greater influence in political affairs. They argued that elites were necessary and inevitable and that any revolution which pretended to abolish elites would end up by simply replacing one elite group with another. Elite theorists use two basic lines of argument. First, they argue that certain aspects of human nature make elites inevitable. Second, they argue that elites are necessary for any socio-political organization to function effectively.

Elite theory often emphasizes on differences in inherent abilities as a source of elites. All people are not created equal; some are stronger, more intelligent, more artistic etc. Those people who have the most of the particular abilities which a society rewards become the political elites. There are several elite theorists; Pareto, Mannheim, Michels etc. For the purpose of this work, Roberto Michels' work on elite theory, particularly the iron law of oligarchy is adopted. Oligarchy is domination by the few. The iron law of oligarchy formulated by Roberto Michels (1911), suggests that there is an inevitable

tendency for political organizations and by implications all organizations to be oligarchic. Participating democratic structure cannot check oligarchic tendencies; they can only disguise them. Michels advanced a number of arguments in support of his law:

- a) Elite groups result from the need for specialization. Elite members have greater expertise and better organisational skills than those possessed by ordinary members;
- b) Leaders form cohesive groups because they recognize that this improves their chances of remaining in power;
- c) Rank-and-file members of an organization tend to be apathetic, and are therefore generally disposed to accept subordination and venerate leaders.

Michels' iron law of oligarchy states that the necessity for all but the simplest organizations to delegate responsibility internally naturally leads to the development of a cadre of leaders. By virtue of their knowledge and position, leaders are able to manipulate the opinion of followers, or to ignore it. The leadership is free to do so because it possesses a *de facto* monopoly over all these things which contribute to the control of an organization, such as power, status, channels of communication, and money.

The iron law applies to political parties, its scope is universal, "it is the organization which gives birth to the dominion of the delegates over the delegators. "Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels 1962). Oligarchy then is a concentration of entrenched illegitimate authority and/or influence in the hand of a minority, such that *de facto* what the minority wants is generally what comes to pass even when it goes against the wishes of the majority.

What this means is that in the case of democratically structured organizations of either the representative or collective type, the emergence of oligarchy involves two steps:(1) the move from the legitimate to the illegitimate exercise of formal or informal power; and (2) the concentration of illegitimate power in the hands of a minority such that it is able to retain its position over time against the wishes of the majority, whether those wishes are expressed through disgruntled passive resistance or conscious organized opposition.

There are two ways, according to Michels to demonstrate that an organization is oligarchic. One can either show that organization does not have a democratic structure, in which case a minority has formal authority to rule, or one can show that an oligarchy exists despite a democratic structure. This is to say that, before we can say a nominally democratic organization is oligarchic, we must show first that a minority is having illegitimate power, secondly, that the majority is in some way resisting that power and third, and that there is a pattern of the majority being able to overcome such resistance on issues it feels are important.

There are several implications of Michels description of Iron law of oligarchy that are worth nothing and crucial to the study. First, in a collectivist organization where no one has formal power, a minority with informal power could become oligarchic in one or two ways: by successfully exercising formal power (i.e. making/enforcing decisions that they do not have the legislative right to do) or by successfully exploring illegitimate means of exerting influence. In both cases, “successfully” according to Michels refers to the demonstrated ability to circumvent or overcome majority opposition on issues of importance to elite.

A second implication/relevance of the description of oligarchy to the study is that in both kinds of democratically structured organizations depicted in Michels theory, a minority can be oligarchic without intending to be (i.e., without consciously setting out to “take over” the organization), but it cannot be oligarchic without doing something to actively exceed the bounds of its legitimate power. The definition presumes both active use of illegitimate power by the rulers and some kind of resistance by the majority. Even in a situation where hegemonic assumptions that benefit a minority to the detriment of the majority have been internalized by all concerned, such assumptions will at some points be explicitly or implicitly called into question by that majority, and when they are, if the elite that has benefited from the arrogant successfully rises illegitimate means to protect the status quo, that would suggest the emergence of oligarchic.

Lastly, a practical implication of this model is that legitimacy may usefully be operational in terms of the majority’s motivation for going along with the powerful minority. Were one to find evidence that the majority of the masses do what minority wants because; (a) they have been bought over with promise of material rewards; (b) they want to avoid material sanctions; (c) they want to avoid emotional sanctions, and (d) they do not realize that information has been withheld or issue has been kept off the agenda, these would indicate illegitimate uses of power. On the other hand, if the minority gets its way i.e. cause most people agree with it, are convinced by its arguments, or because they identify with people in the minority and want their approval/acceptance, then the minority is legitimately influential and also oligarchic.

The Iron law of oligarchy according to Michels does not promote internal democracy in political parties, as where there is internal democracy there is a broad

participation in the choice of leaders and the selection of candidates. Also in internal democracy, there is there is a prominent role for conferences and conventions in policy formulation. It also dictates that policy making power is concentrated in the hands of party members who are elected and therefore publicly accountable.

Michels argues that political parties are organizations; therefore have tendencies towards oligarchy and at variance with internal democracy. According to this argument, intra-party democracy is cumbersome and leads to inefficient decision making processes which are at variance with the ultimate desire for well organized, structured and institutionalized party systems. This view is further supported by the argument that internal democracy weakens political parties and compromises their ability to compete against their rivals and therefore undesirable. (Durveger: 1954). This means that in order to serve democratic ends, political parties themselves must be ruled by oligarchic principles.

With Michels, the desire to generalise was more pronounced while his investigation was restricted to the social democratic parties; he imposed no clear limits on his study. Michels observed the mass organizations of these social democratic parties, and he was struck by the differentiation within them, between leaders and followers, differentiation caused by such phenomena as the need for organization for electoral battles, the absence of any mass desire to run the parties, and the leaders' enjoyment of their position, which makes them desirous of perpetuating their positons. These phenomena, and corroborating data, which have been collected with zeal and then selected with care, convinced Michels that there is an "iron law of oligarchy", a law with application to all democratic political parties. Parties everywhere are run by a small

group in their own interest. Therefore, Michels argued, they are doomed as instrument of democratic government.

Not many of the scholars of political party who followed Michels shared his judgement that parties ought to be directed by their mass membership; most of them preserved in objective neutrality on the subject of internal democracy. But the iron law of oligarchy continued to be potent even when it was stripped of its value base. Its validity was often assumed for no better reason than that no democratic party is run by one absolute leader or by each individual's adherent, and that all are therefore, presumably oligarchies.

Despite this shortcoming identified with the theory, its application to the study of the travails of the ANPP as an opposition is appropriate. It allows us to view ANPP within the context of an organization that cannot avoid oligarchy and will enable us to have a proper overview of how the strong oligarchic groups have dictated or attempted to dictate the affairs of the party and how it has created a myriad of challenges for the ANPP during the period under study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction:

This chapter discusses, in detail, the methods of data collection and analysis used in carrying out the study. Data collection was largely guided by the research aims and objectives, problems encountered in the process are also highlighted.

3.2 Selection Criteria of the Case Study

At the moment, there are more than fifty registered political parties in Nigeria (INEC, 2009). However, out of this number, only 6 political parties, namely AC, ANPP, PDP, Accord Party and Labour Party and Progressive People Alliance won at least one seat at the National Assembly. Generally, the PDP has more seats in both Houses with a total 78.9%, while the ANPP followed with 12.84%, AC with 5.5%. The other remaining three parties got less than 3% (Anyanwu, 2007.23). By this distribution, the ANPP and the AC were the two major opposition parties. The choice of the ANPP was informed by its presence at all levels of government and the number of seats won by the party which is second to the PDP during the period under review.

3.3 Techniques of Data Collection

For this research, two data collection methods were adopted:

- (i) In-depth Interview and
- (ii) Content Analysis

3.3.1 In-depth Interview

In-depth interview was adopted to interview selected key informants. The method was adopted because of the following reasons according to Rogers and Dominick,(2006):

- (i) It involves a small sample size of the people to be interviewed
- (ii) The method provides detailed background about the reasons why respondents give specific answers. Elaborate data concerning the respondents' opinions, values, motivations, experiences and the feeling of the individual respondents are obtained
- (iii) Questions can be customized to suit individual respondents.

3.3.2 Selected Key Informants

Twenty key informants were purposively selected for interview; they included some of the past and present ANPP national and state leaders, some of the ANPP office holders and activists, former presidential aspirants and some of those who had in the past aspired to contest for some of the executive positions within the party. See appendix (i).

3.3.3 Method of Selection of the Key Informants

The informants were selected purposively through prior studies by the researcher. These prior studies included the vital documents of the ANPP such as the party's constitution as well as the blue-prints of the subsidiary groups like TBO. From these documents certain positions that are crucial to the effectiveness of the party were identified, as such those who had occupied those positions were selected for interview. Also, the researcher's team of supervisors suggested some names of the ANPP stakeholders to be interviewed.

3.3.4 Justification for the Selection

All the informants selected for the interview had at certain point in time played active roles either at the formative, operation or the trying times of the ANPP. For

example, Umaru Shinkafi, Mahmud Waziri and Saidu Dansadau were among those who played active roles in the activities leading to the formation of the coalition of associations which later transformed into the All Peoples Party (APP). They were in a better position to provide information and explanations on why some individuals and groups pulled out of the coalition before the APP was eventually registered as a political party in 1998. These personalities were also instrumental in the APP's alliance with the AD during the 1999 general elections. Through them, we could get the details on the alliance and the reasons why the APP had to play the role of a junior partner in the alliance.

Alhaji Bashir Tofa, Chief John Odigie Oyegun, Alhaji Sani Ahmed Yeriman Bakura and Malam Ibrahim Shekarau are Board of Trustee and National Executive Committee members of the ANPP. These bodies have been at the centre of some of the decisions the party had taken in recent years particularly on the issues of leadership crises, organizing conventions and the government of national unity. Similarly, Sani Ahmed was a two term governor of Zamfara State, now a Senator, still on the platform of the ANPP and Ibrahim Shekarau is the incumbent Governor of Kano. The two personalities by virtue of their privileged positions in the ANPP were able to render detailed information on the activities of the ANPP governors and how their activities have influenced the fortunes of the ANPP between 1999 and 2009.

Senators Saidu Dansadau and Mohammed Aruwa Honourables Farouk Aliyu Lawan, Ahmed Baba Datti were members of the National Assembly. They are therefore adequately placed to provide information on the activities of the ANPP representatives in the National Assembly. More importantly, is how these representatives projected the

image of the party through its ideology and programs on national issues and how disciplined and committed these ANPP representatives at the National Assembly have been particularly when it comes to debating economic policies.

Alhaji Mohammed Boboi, Alhaji Sani Hotoro, Alhaji Kabir Aruwa, Hajia Hafsat Mohammed and Muntaka Rini were State chairmen of the ANPP, they are also NEC members. In fact, Alhaji Mohammed Boboi is the Chairman of All ANPP State Chairmen. They provided information on the challenges facing the ANPP at the state levels including the states where the party is in the opposition. We could also get information from them on the issues such as party finance, institutional constraints ideology, government of national unity and party discipline.

General Muhammadu Buhari is one of the most popular personalities in the ANPP; he was the presidential candidate of the party in 2003 and 2007 general elections. People at the grassroots particularly in Northern Nigeria identify with the ANPP between 2002 and 2009 largely because of Buhari. He has been critical of some elements in the party and has publicly expressed his position on some decisions the ANPP has taken in the time past especially on leadership struggle, internal democracy, politics of co-optation (GNU) and discipline within the party.

There is a category of people in the ANPP who are not professional politicians and did not identify with the ANPP at the beginning of this dispensation and particularly at the formative stage of the ANPP; they are more or less activists and social critics who became integrated into the ANPP mainstream because of Buhari. Through the Buhari Organization, (TBO) these individuals became major stakeholders in the ANPP. Prominent among these people include; Alhaji Sule Yahaya Hamma, Eng. Buba

Galadima, Director General and Secretary General of TBO respectively, while Hajia Hafsat Mohammed is a member of TBO and was the factional Chairperson of the Kaduna state chapter of the ANPP between 2008 and 2009. The activities of TBO within the ANPP cannot be over emphasized, therefore, the information from these individuals who are key figures in TBO would provide explanations on the roles the organization (TBO) has played within and outside the ANPP, particularly when placed within the context of party discipline, and the ideology of the party and the organizational strength of the ANPP. See appendix (ii) for questions for the various informants.

3.4.0 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a systematic, objective and qualitative way of measuring variables (Kerlinger, 2000). The goal of content analysis is to have a fairly accurate representation of any issue. This research uses this methodological approach to examine the perception of the print media on the travails of the ANPP. Four print media were chosen for this purpose namely; New Nigerian Weekly, Weekly Trust, Vanguard Newspaper (weekend edition) and Weekend Tribune from August 1998 to August 2009.

3.4.1 Method of Selecting the Newspapers.

The volume of the papers to be analyzed was such that whether the research problem is broad or narrow in scope the nature of the relevant materials on virtually all the national papers was overwhelming. The researcher was confronted with the choice of reducing the number and editions of the papers to a manageable proportion.

There are about nine national newspapers that circulate round the country on daily and weekly bases. These papers include; The Sun, The Vanguard , New Nigerian , Daily Trust , The Nation, Tribune, Daily Independent, Daily Champion, The Guardian and the

Leadership newspapers. However, the researcher decided to pick the weekend editions of these papers because they review events of the week and give attention to details of events than daily editions. The researcher divided the papers into two pots using geographical region as the criterion; the pots represented North and South regions of the country. The names of these papers were written on pieces of paper slotted into the pots according to their regional base. Pot (A) consisted of the papers published in the North namely; Weekly Trust, The Leadership, The Nation and New Nigerian newspapers. While pot (B) consisted of the papers published in the South namely; Daily Independent, Daily Champion, Tribune, The Sun, The Vanguard and The Guardian. Having done the separation, the researcher used the simple random (lottery) method to select two papers each from the two pots and came up with the four selected papers namely; the New Nigerian Weekly, Weekly Trust, The Vanguard and The Tribune for content analysis.

3.4.2 Hiring and Training the Coders.

The number of coders involved in a content analysis is typically small. A brief examination of a sampling of recent content analyses has indicated that typically two to six coders are usually used (Roger and Dominick, 2006). Four final year students were recruited from the Department of Mass Communication, ABU Zaria. Some members of staff of the same Department facilitated their recruitment; on the assurance that they are familiar with the roles and the responsibilities of a coder as they have been involved in other researches in which they performed a similar task. Also the researcher put them to test and was satisfied with their performance. However they were made to strictly abide by the coding instructions given to them by the researcher.

The coders were introduced to the Chief Librarian in CEDDERT, Hanwa, Zaria, Mal Garba Wada. Subsequently they were given unfettered access to the bound copies of the selected papers for a period of five weeks.

3.4.3 Issues of Interest

The issues of interest were informed by the research problem as well as the aims and objectives of the study. The study's major thrust was on the travails of the ANPP as an opposition party in Nigeria since 1999. As a guide, some variables were drawn to guide the research and to serve as the content research design. The variables are; leadership crises within the ANPP, internal democracy, internal groupings (factionalism), Party programs/ideology, organizational strength, institutional constraints, party finance, government of national unity (GNU) and party discipline.

On the leadership crises variable, the coders were asked to analyze any of the categories in the selected papers that carried leadership crises within the ANPP since when the first protem Chairman of the party, Mahmud Waziri, had problems with some of the founding fathers of the party such as Olusola Saraki, Alani Bankole and others in 1998. They were also to content analyze the crisis that characterized the leadership of the party under Yusuf Ali, particularly the inability of the leadership of the party to organize a national convention to elect substantive national executives members of the ANPP in 2002. More importantly, the views in the papers on several failed attempts to convene a national convention and the eventual court injunctions that prevented the party from holding the convention. The coders were also mandated to analyse the crisis that engulfed the party when Attahiru Bafarawa took over the leadership of the ANPP on a care-taker

basis between 2002 and 2003, particularly, on the expulsion of some prominent members from the party by Bafarawa.

In addition the coders were instructed to concentrate on the leadership crisis that Chief Don Etiebet had grappled with as the National Chairman of the ANPP between 2004 and 2006. More importantly, when two parallel national executive bodies emerged in 2005; one group was led by Etiebet while the second was led by Gen. J.T Useni. Also analyzed was the short period when Governor Modu Sherrif acted as the care-taker chairman of the party after the dissolution of Don Etiebet led national executive committee.

Finally on the leadership crises, the coders were to analyze the series of crises that characterized Edwin Ume-Ezeoke's style of leadership between 2006 and 2009. Emphases were placed on the various misunderstandings and disagreements between the leadership and some individuals and groups within the ANPP over the direction of the party most especially on how best the party could relate with the PDP and the Federal government.

On the internal democracy within the ANPP, the coders were asked to analyze the various decisions taken by the party since 1998 particularly party primaries and other decisions that had over bearing effects on the party. They were to assess how the papers analyzed those decisions, whether they were seen as strengthening the party or making it vulnerable to crisis. They were asked to look out for how the actions of the ANPP have affected the public image of the party and its overall fortunes.

Closely related to the issue of internal democracy, are the party programs and ideology. On this variable, the coders were asked to analyze the actions and the decisions

of the party within the context of the party's constitution and manifesto. They were also to find out whether the ANPP lawmakers and the Governors were guided by the party's ideology and programs in carrying out their constitutional responsibilities.

Finance is crucial to the survival of any organization, political parties inclusive. How a party's resources are generated and who gives the resources means a lot because these are easy ways to determine who controls the party. If the bulk of the resources are gotten from a particular person or group of persons, there is the tendency that the group will have enormous powers and even become more powerful than the party, this is not a healthy development. The coders were instructed to analyze the papers within the context of how and who gives resources to the ANPP. Also, the coders were to put into consideration how the papers rated the ANPP in resources generation and management.

Politics of co-optation is not a new development within the ANPP; the party had participated in the PDP led government in 1999. This participation by the ANPP has featured prominently in the print media since 1999, most papers refer to it as Government of National Unity (GNU), For this variable, the coders were asked to concentrate on the GNU as it affected the ANPP and analyze how the papers had viewed the participation of the ANPP in the Government of National Unity since 1999.

On the organizational strength of the ANPP, the coders were asked to look out for how the papers have rated geographical spread of the party over the years. This strength involved the level of coordination between the national executive body and the state chapters of the ANPP and how often the national body had confrontations with the subordinate units. Lastly on this variable, the coders were to look out for how organized

is the ANPP as an opposition party is outside the state capitals and particularly in the South.

The level of discipline within a party shows the level of cohesion that exists within the party. Discipline in a party can be measured in terms of how often the party officials and prominent members of the party decamp to the rival party (ies). It can also be measured by looking at how the leaders and the followers respect the constitution of the party and their conducts subjected to wide scrutiny. These were the issues the coders were asked to look out for in the selected papers in respect of the variable and how the papers viewed their emergence

Internal grouping within a party , on the surface does not constitute an obstacle to a party's quest towards realizing its goals and aspirations, especially if the overall aims of these groupings is to consolidate the gains been made by the party and to popularize it ideology as well. However, if the grouping exists largely because of leadership failure and weakness in the party, it can bring about lack of unity, incoherence in articulating issues and misfortunes to any party. Such a party could be viewed by the public as not serious and not competent enough to lead the country. The coders therefore were to look for these hints on the variable.

The last variable is institutional constraints; this variable was included in the objective of the research to justify the argument that, the travails of the ANPP as an opposition party in the last ten years might not have been caused by the factors that are entirely internal to the ANPP. The nature of the party system, the character of the various institutions that regulate political actors' behaviours in Nigeria and the overall nature of the Nigerian State can constitute a problem to the survival and the effectiveness of an

opposition party. As such, the coders were asked to analyze how these institutional constraints affected the efficacy of the ANPP as reported by the papers.

The coders were asked to concentrate on the issues that were related to the outlined variables and with special emphasis on the specific areas outlined above.

3.4.4 Coding the information

Coding entails the sorting, sifting and allocation of content materials to the established categories. There are no hard- and – fast rules stating how coding is to be carried out. However, a detailed instruction on how to assign different responses to various code categories, known as code sheet was developed. The instructions on the code sheet were written with the coding units and the objectives of the research in mind.

We used a customized code sheet due to the peculiarity of the research. See the template in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1. The Template of the Code Sheet

	Leadership Crises		Internal Democracy		Party programs		Party Finance		G.N.U		Organizational Strength		Party Discipline		Internal groupings		Institutional Constraints	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
features & opinions																		
interview																		
Editorial																		
Pictures																		
cartoons																		
News																		

KEY: + (postive coverage) - (negative coverage)

However, during the coding, the researcher and the coders were guided by the following rules:

- (i) **Categories.** A central problem in any content analysis research design is selection and definition of categories, the “Pigeonhole” units which content units are to be

classified. The categories for this research are: features/opinions, interviews, editorial, pictures, cartoons and news. Firstly, the choice of these categories was informed by the need for all categories, put together, to generate data of similar quality as the interview method would generate. The researcher made sure that the categories adopted reflected the objectives of the research. Care was taken to ensure that the categories are exhaustive; by clearly defining the variables (conceptual definition outlined in the above template) also, we specified the indicators which determined whether a given content datum falls within the category.

Secondly, as part of the general requirement, which stipulates that the categories be exhaustive, the researcher made sure that all relevant items in the sample of document under study were capable of being placed in a category.

Thirdly, to meet the requirement of mutual exhaustiveness which stipulates that no content datum can be placed in more than a single cell, the researcher operationalised the variables precisely and unambiguously.

Finally, to ensure the independence of categories the researcher made sure that the assignment of any datum into a category did not affect the classification of other data. In order to avoid clumsy classification, we ranked statements in the dailies in stipulated categories.

(ii) **Unit of Analysis:** The specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category is referred to as units of analysis. Simple word or symbol is generally the smallest unit that is used in content analysis research (Holsti, 1969:110).

However, using a simple word or symbol might create some problems that may render the measurement analytical difficult. As a way out, the researcher adopted themes

as his unit of analysis, the adoption of themes as our units of analysis restricted the research to specific areas of the oppositional politics and the problem facing the ANPP between 1999 and 2009.

In selecting the content unit of analysis, two factors were influential. First, which units would best meet the requirement of the research problem? This question was answered in the light of the research assumptions outlined in chapter I. Second factor was which units of analysis would give the most satisfactory results with the least cost of resources? As for the second factor, the research adopted the following as its units of analysis; leadership crisis within the ANPP, internal democracy, party discipline, factionalism, government of national unity, party finance and organizational strength. Subsequently, the selected newspapers were content analysed using the above outlined variables to appropriately categorise them in to either positive or negative values. Negative and positive values of the statements in the papers were determined by reading through the contents of the papers. If a particular statement relating to any of the variables above was considered favourable to the ANPP, it was coded as a positive value, any unfavourable statement against the ANPP was coded negative and placed on the appropriate category.

(iii) **Enumeration:**

The most widely used method of measuring characteristic of content is frequency, in which every occurrence of a given attribute is tallied. In the case of this research, we coded direct statements and indirect observations as either positive or negative in to the appropriate categories. The total sum of the occurrences on each column was undertaken to arrive at the aggregate figures displayed in appendix (iii)

3.5.0 Data Transformation Techniques

For in-depth interview, before the interviews were conducted the interviewees were informed about the research and provided with an overview of the research. The meetings were arranged by prior notices/appointments. Each interview session lasted for an average period of one hour, depending on how the interviewees responded to the questions and how long it took them to discuss the various issues that were raised in the course of the interview. The responses were tape recorded with their permission and later transcribed into notes.

The transformation of the interview began with a careful reading of the transcribed notes to gain overall familiarity with the data from the interviews. A second reading of the notes was undertaken to identify seeming important themes in the data in line with the research objectives. A further reading of the notes was undertaken to establish emerging themes and to place relevant quotes within the different identified themes.

For content analysis, each of the columns (both positive and negative) was counted and recorded appropriately for the four selected newspapers. The figures generated were taken for analysis using the SPSS software. See appendix (iii)

3.6.0 Data Analysis Techniques

A mixed strategy (triangulation) was adopted for data analysis. This was informed by nature of the research problem in which documentary surveys and interviews were undertaken. Each of the methods was adopted and deployed in a complementary manner, so as to bring enormous benefits to the research process. For example, the data on the issue of general public perceptions of the ANPP can largely be effectively gleaned through content analysis of print media. In contrast, an understanding of what shapes

these perceptions can be gleaned through interviews. Similarly, practical problems associated with one method can be compensated for by the use of combined methods.

The data from content analysis were analyzed using SPSS software to produce stack bar charts, through which the relations between the variables were established. The interviews with key informants were used by citing relevant quotations to support certain claims. This was adopted having in mind that a second point of view on a phenomenon creates a triangle, with a view to cross-checking the consistency of findings of one data collection methods with a different method.

On the whole, the data generated from the interviews and content analysis was analyzed using triangulation method; all the relevant issues, research questions and research problem were listed in the form of themes and sub-themes. Inferences were drawn from the content analysis data and interviews to explain these issues, research problem and the research questions in a triangulated method for research reliability and validity

3.7.0 Research Challenges and Limitations

Although data were successfully collected during the field work for this research, the researcher experienced some expected and unexpected difficulties at various stages of the process. This section attempts to capture some of the problems encountered during data collection, how these problems were managed and the possible limitations of the study.

3.7.1 Inaccessibility of the ANPP Official/Politicians

The study had hoped to interview all the founding members of the ANPP, all the former and serving ANPP Governors and all the presidential candidates of party from 1999 to 2009. We have interviewed all except one of the founding fathers of the ANPP, due to many reasons, ranging from ill health and old age, Saraki could not be reached for interview. We have also interviewed a serving governor and a Senator as well as a former governor.

The first candidate to emerge as the presidential candidate of the party, Dr Ogbonnaya Onu could not be interviewed. The researcher contacted him via phone and requested him to give a date to have an interview with him; he declined saying “it is not in my policy to grant interviews to journalists and researchers”. We were by referred by him his personal website: www.ogbonnayaonu.org, to source for his views on the ANPP.

Attempts to secure audience with some prominent ANPP Politicians including the former National Chairman and National Secretary of the party, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke and Saidu Kumo respectively, were futile. The duo avoided me and blocked every access or opportunity for interviews. The staff of the ANPP at its national headquarters Abuja, used bureaucracy to frustrate any efforts to access some vital documents of the party. One of the notable members gave me an appointment to meet with him but decided to switch off his handset (Mobile phone), immediately the researcher notified him of his presence at his compound.

However, the necessary information the researcher would have gotten from the Chairman and his Secretary was adopted from the interviews they had in the past granted journalists and were published in the national dailies without any rejoinder from any of

them. In a related development, some of their close political allies were on hand for interview, see appendix (I). Also, relevant primary data documents and blue prints particularly in respect to the ANPP's financial standing, its involvement in the Government of National Unity were made available by some prominent ANPP members and INEC staff, who pleaded anonymity.

Finally, perfect objectivity is seldom achieved in a content analysis. The specification of the Unit of analysis and the precise makeup of relevant categories are areas in which individual researchers must exercise subjective choices. In the case of the research, we cross checked with others to minimize bias.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORY, TRENDS OF POLITICAL PARTY FORMATION AND OPPOSITION POLITICS IN NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

Modern democracies are legitimized by enlarged participation and government accountability. Thus, they are defined as party democracies. Political parties are the essential links between society and public office as they are representative agencies oriented to give voice to their particular constituencies, present candidates at election and through competitive elections place candidates for public office. This vital institution has a long history in Nigeria and in Africa in general.

Parties in Nigeria, and other Sub-Saharan African countries, are among the oldest political institutions, they represent the “time when politics came” they have their roots and have largely developed in opposition to colonial rule, negotiating or fighting for independence. Differences in such a vast country like Nigeria are notable; nevertheless ideological, revolutionary and machine, nationalist parties developed coordinating various and sometimes very divergent types of groups and associations. Their leadership was represented by a variable mixture of new and old elites with different Local Regional roots and ethnic identity. This chapter looks at how political parties evolved across the various regimes in the country. And also discusses how oppositional politics was played within the context of democratic setting in Nigeria since 1960. However the chapter begins with the analysis of the Nigerian state from colonial to post-colonial.

4.2 The Nature of the Nigerian State: Colonial to Post-Colonial

The nature, institution and performance of the state are obviously a crucial factor in any attempt to evaluate democratic development in any state. Its institution for

governance and for national security, as well as what it does right or wrong or fails to do in the management of the economy and politics will be decisive in the search for a fully democratic state. The evolution and character of the Nigerian state is quite an essential input in understanding the nature and behaviour of Nigerians, particularly political elite. The Nigerian state, in its evolutionary process, particularly in the colonial era, shaped the outlook and provided the orientation of the indigenous political elites that took over the mantle of leadership after the independence. This chapter examines the Nigerian state, particularly the structures and institutions from colonial period to post-colonial period.

4.2.1 The Colonial State

The establishment of British rule in which later became Nigeria was followed by the creation of governmental institutions which conformed not only to the structure of the societies concerned but also to their legal positions. Thus, for example, in the Crown Colony of Lagos, there were executive and Legislature Councils as the central organs of government, and a board of health, which later became a town council at the local level, in the protectorates across the territory. The executive and legislative functions in most cases were entrusted to the High Commissioners, and at the local levels, Native Courts (Authorities) were established. However, one common feature exhibited by the organizations created through out country during colonialism was the existence of central organizations; a superstructure of governments, and local system; an infrastructure.

At its inception, the idea of indirect rule with its concomitant, the Native Court and later Native Authority System, was designed to accomplish the following objectives:

1. to preserve and foster British rule through the traditional institutions

2. to encourage the spontaneous evolution of these institutions in particular directions;
3. to use the Native Authority system as a training ground for the education of the two groups (Flint, 1960:94).

The 'tribal heads' particularly those in the patriarchal stage of social development, were to learn the 'duties of rulers', while educated Africans were to gain experience in civil responsibility before they undertook a larger political responsibility in the central institutions of the country. In Lugard's own words:

"The object of substituting for British rule, in which the Chiefs are mere agents of the government, a system of native rule under the guidance and control of the British staff whether among developed or backward communities, is primarily educative In all alike the endeavour is to present denaturalization, to develop along indigenous lines, to inculcate the principle that the function of the ruler is to promote the welfare of his people and to exploit them for his pleasure, and to afford both rulers and the people the stimulus of progress and interest in life". (Lugard; 1965:223)

Europeans apart, the population of Nigerian could be broadly classified by the colonial authority into two socio-economic groups; educated Africans and illiterate masses under the rule of their chiefs, (Awolowo: 1947:31). The educated Africans formed a small minority of the total population, even of the coastal towns where most of them lived and were engaged in professional jobs. In the above passage, Lugard was referring to the education functions of indirect rule with Lugard to the Chiefs rather than to the educated elements. With the passage of time, administrative policy sought to use the Native Authority system not only in educating the chiefs but also as an outlet for the growing political aspirations of the educated Africans, and as a means where by they might be brought into legislative council.

The first Legislative Council created at Lagos in 1862, its powers were slight and initially extended only to Lagos colony itself, later it covered the entire country. To a large extent, the council was merely advisory and composed of representatives of certain arbitrarily selected interest groups. Nigerians were not included amongst these groups in the first decades. The colonial authorities however refused to recognize the few educated Nigerians who were members of these coastal-based nationalist movements, as true representatives of the masses. Accordingly, they were reluctant to give them representation in the council out of proportion to their small members. The official view maintained that the educated Nigerian/African were a representative of a class alone, and in no sense of the people at large.

This official view arose from two main considerations. First, it was a cardinal principle of British colonial policy that the interest of large native population would not be subjected to the will of a minority, whether composed of Europeans or educated Africans (Lugard: 1962). Thus accorded with the doctrine of native paramountcy and was inseparable from any real concept of 'trusteeship'. Secondly, for the educated few to make themselves of the true representatives of the people, their interest and those of the uneducated masses would have to become more closely identified.

In other words, the educated few had to be brought to acquaint themselves with, and become involved in the life of their people and their representative communities, the governmental infrastructure, and hence the Native Authority system, commended itself to officialdom as the medium for bringing the identity of interests about. Its value in this respect was to allow the indigenous people to take charge of their affairs. For example Lugard clearly stated that:

when the ... (educated) African has qualified in the school of municipal training, and proved his ability to control his own community and improve its conditions, he can claim and rightly be accorded increased representation on the legislative and other councils, and selection by election notes (Lugard, 1969).

Similar ideas were propagated by Lugard's successors in the 1930s and 1940s. In his speech to the Northern Provinces Residents Conference in 1937, Sir B. Baurdillon stressed that the system of Native Authorities had been designed with the definite aim of educating the people of Nigerian politically and administratively, so that they might gradually participate more in the management of their own affairs (Kirk-Greene 1954 p. 321). The same view was expressed by Sir Aurther Richards in his speech to the Nigerian Legislative Council in 20 March 1947:

.... I claim for this constitution that it is firmly based on African institutions and that is built up through village councils and Native Authorities and provincial councils to the House of Assembly and legislative council, In short, I claim that from it can grow a government broad-based upon the people will. The younger and more educated generations can and should find an outlet for their civil ambition by participating in local government first i.e., the work of local councils and Native Authorities (Council debate 1947:p.6).

The colonial experience bequeathed a political economy that emphasized a patronage over production, commerce over industry, and state over civil society and market forces. This has provided the basic for the state – led corruption that subsequently became a hallmark of governance in Nigeria.

From the late 1940s the local anti-colonial movements changed its strategy. Instead of demanding greater participation of the local elite in the colonial enterprise, the movement started insisting on full independence. In this contest, the emerging political parties became adept at playing the sectional card as ethnic and regional champions, thus

failing to offer effective platforms for national political mobilization. They also became detached from the people and their social movements, due to colonial policy and to the lack of strategic vision on the part of some sections of indigenous political leadership. Political struggles became primarily an instrument for securing access to state resources, for particular ethnic and other sectional groups and only secondarily about ensuring that the British kept their promise to grant independence to Nigeria.

This mindset provides the background to the politics of the First Republic (1960-1966), the civil war (1967-1970), and the subsequent alternation of civilian rule and military dictatorship from the 1960s to 1999, which ensured that the military would govern Nigeria for almost 30 of the 40 years of independent nationhood.

Clearly, then, the idea of training Nigerians in democracy and leadership by means of the local government system, had been a constant feature of British policy from the onset. But how far did it achieve its intended purposes in Nigeria will be assessed within the contest of the colonial economy and politics.

4.2.2 Colonial Economy and Politics

The colonial economy, created as an adjunct to the metropolitan economy, was characterized by disarticulation, market imperfections and monopolistic tendencies, monoculturalism, and of course, overdependence on the metropolis for its technological and monetary requirements (Ake: 1981:23). Because of this peculiar relationship to the imperialist economy, two very important and sharply contradictory images of the colonial state have emerged. On the one hand is the “strong” state, the potent bureaucratic agent of oppression that through coercion, indirect pressures and material inducement smashed the self-sufficiency of the Nigerian state. Mamdani (1976:142) presents the colonial state as:

A geographical extension of the metropolitan state Simply put, the colonial state represented an absentee ruling class, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and it performed the functions of the both state and ruling elite in an “independent” notion. The colonial state created structures of the underdeveloped economy at both the levels of production and exchange (it) destroyed entire class.

Being closely linked to the mother country, the colonial state in Nigeria and indeed throughout Africa performed two basic and often contradictory functions. First, it guaranteed the conditions for the extraction of raw materials and the accumulation of capital by the British. Second, it provided, as the essential condition of the first function, a framework of stable political order and offline control over the indigenous population. By the end of the tactical withdrawer of the colonialist (independence), the colonial state had successfully entrenched capitalism, as the dominant economic system. The colonialists handed over power to a set of elites it had in one way or the other tutored to continue opening up Nigeria for capitalist development.

Economic development of Nigeria during the pre-independence era focused on agriculture as the colonial masters’ pre-occupation was to provide raw material in form of Nigerian’s cash crops at the factories of the United Kingdom, Europe and the United State of America rather than creating competition for the indigenous industries, hence the encouragement, is an un processed form, of the export of cocoa, palm produce, cotton, groundnuts rubber and timber.

The same consideration applied to the exploitation of tin and columbite form the Plateau. Where even industrial activities were conceived of, they tended to be based on locally produced raw materials. The first industrial venture of any consequence embarked upon in the country was: the soap and margarine factory established in the 1930s by Lever Brother. Fruit juices and mineral water factories were also established by the

Trustees of the Blaize Memorial Institute in Abeokuta, Kano and Lagos. Later in 1940s the Nigerian Breweries Limited, now plc was set up.

During the decade before independence; 1950 to 1960, the three regional governments, into which the country have been constituted in 1946 and 1950s, encouraged by the sizeable shares of the various Marketing Boards resources distributed to them, proceeded to embarked on more ambitious industrial projects though still comparatively modest by World standard and based to some degree on locally produced raw materials. Such industries include the Pioneer oil mills, vegetable oil mills, and textile mills rubber processing factories, fruits juices and metal products fabrications. Some of the outputs were for the export market but most were for home consumption. Contributions from these activities to the country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or to its balance of payments might not have been significant but an industrial foundation had been laid in which an independent Nigerian could build on.

On the issue of whether the colonialism how development plants for the country, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 provided respectively one millions pounds and 120 million pounds for the development of all the colonies, including Nigeria; in accordance with plans drawn up by the colonial office. It was quite clearer that the scope of work to be carried out was extremely limited having regard to the paltry funds made available. The plans were also drawn up without the involvement of the people in the colonies. What can, however, be described as a significant move in the direction of planning came with the proclamation of the ten-year plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria, 1945-1955.

Like its predecessors, there was very, little contribution by Nigerians in the formulation of the plan. Its covered too wide a span other short coming of the plan, were that demographic data were scanty and no clear indication was given as to what increment in output was being planned and therefore, how the future expenses and costs on the projects were to be met” (Okigbo:1983). These defects were to be remedied by the creation in 1948 of the Office of Statistics and the carrying out of a population census in 1952.

In 1950 the Colonial Office appointed Allan Prest to undertake an estimate of the Nigerian national income. In the 1945/1955 plan there were no set targets “as there was no macro-economic parameters for use in target setting since the national income figures and other aggregates were not available until 1902/1962”. (Okigbo: 1960).

The next development plan during the pre-independence era covered the five years: 1955 to 1960 and was necessitated by the World Bank Mission’s Report in 1954 on the Economic Development of Nigeria and the introduction of a new constitution which created a federal Government and three Regional Assemblies, each with a large measure of autonomy with Lagos as a Federal Territory.

The 1946 – 1956 Plans had to be curtailed by one year to accommodate the 1955 – 1960 Plan. Following the World Bank recommendations, the National Economic Council was created in 1955 and the joint planning council was set up to serve as the official arms of the National Economic Council.

In 1958 the Federal Government created the Ministry of Economic Planning. The 1955 – 1960 Plan like the 1945 – 1955, was essentially for expenditure rather than

production. One very important criticism of all the plans up to 1960 was that the targets set did not involve consultation with the grass roots but was limited to the top.

The British, ruled Nigeria as merchants, shipping to the shores of Nigeria, manufactured goods from various cities in Britain in return for the country's agricultural products such as cocoa, cotton, palm produce, groundnuts etc. These trades were concentrated in the hands of the British companies.

The Colonialists, with little understanding of the cultural uniqueness of the people grouped together people with varied backgrounds and culture thereby creating both horizontal polarization and primordial loyalties which invariably make national integration difficult. More so, the colonial politics of divide and rule, and its strategy of regionalism (introduced in 1946 via Richard's constitution) effectively laid the foundation for various sectional political agitations with disunited indigenous political elite emerging. This essentially turned politics into warfare in the struggle for control and use of state power, a situation in which power is overvalued.

The colonial state also imposed a patrimonial system of administration (indirect rule) on the country. This was targeted at enlisting the elite status group in the service of colonial rule and to contain the political consequences of change. In this case, the political relation that existed were vertical in nature. It was one of domination with subordinate clients jostling for the favour from their patrons. The whole governmental structure during this period was characterized by a military-like chain of responsibility extending from the Governor down to the village (Oyediran, 1988). The Native Authority Chiefs were judged by their loyalty to and dependence upon the colonial networks. No room was given

for opinion dissent, public institutions like bureaucracy, police and army only supported the will of the colonial state and acted as its vehicle of domination.

4.2.3 The Post-Colonial State

The post-colonial state and its leaders are products of the institutions of the colonial regime. It inherited and nurtured the military-like administration which guarantees relationships of domination and control between the leaders and the led, a system of patronage of public offices, the practice of political intolerance and the notion of political opposition being an anathema. The Nigerian state at independence was therefore a 'disabled' state, crisis ridden in many senses, particularly in elite orientation.

Secondly, the Nigerian state inherited a totally dependent economy. A poor and dependent economy could therefore not meet the rising expectations of the masses nor could it secure a good material base for the elite. Power in Nigeria is weakly institutionalized, the fundamental rules of the game are not respected

Like their colonial antecedents, the post colonial economy of Nigeria remains organically tied to the economy of the British, particularly in the first few years of the country independence. The country economy remains disarticulated as the efforts were geared towards meeting the immediate economic demands of the former colonial power which put severe constraints on the expansion of its resource base. The persistence of the conditions of underdevelopment, such as the worsening food crisis, budget deficits and other problems account for the neo-colonial orientation of the Nigerian state.

The indigenous elite (both economic and political elites) in the Nigerian post-colonial state are weak and incapable of transforming its societies, whereas the very jurisdictional-political institutions necessary for governance were instituted by the British

during the colonial rule. The Nigerian state inherited “overdeveloped” vis-à-vis the socio-economic structures upon which it rests. Aptly put by Alavi:

Unlike in the developed capitalist countries where the state has developed in the wake of a single dominant class, and state institutions and power have developed largely in keeping with the requirements of that ruling elites and therefore a “subordinate” to it, we find that in peripheral capitalist countries where the state is everywhere, there is instead, a very considerable accretion of powers of control and regulation over the “dominant” fundamental classes in the hands of a powerful and centralized state; here the fundamental classes do not have any direct control over the state (Alavi, 1979:32).

The excessive enlargement of power of control and regulation that the state has accumulated and elaborated far beyond the logic of what should be necessary for the orderly function of the social institutions of the society over which the post-colonial Nigerian state provides. The “overdevelopedness” is traced to the fact that the post-colonial state originated from and represented primarily, the class forces of the imperial country rather than from internal struggles and development.

At the dawn of independence Nigeria was rated as one of the most important agricultural countries in Africa. Despite the non-involvement of the indigenous people in the management of the country's economic affairs at independence, Nigeria was self-sufficient in food production and was the world leading exporter of some cash crops like cocoa, palm oil etc. Few decades after independence, the picture is radically different. In 1980 only 20 percent of GDP and less than three percent of exports came from the agricultural sector.

Food sufficiency had been lost since in the late 1960s and by 1975 the overall agricultural trade balance had slipped into deficit as cash crop plantations became

overgrown through neglected; and once thriving export commodities had to be imported to meet domestic requirements.

The substantial rise in the export of oil and the almost obliteration of cash crops from the list of Nigeria export commodities coincided with the five years of Sir Abuakar Tafawa Balewa civilian regime (1960 to 1966), nine years of General Yakubu Gowon Government (1966-1975), four years of General Murtala/ General Obasanjo, four year Alhaji Shehu Shagari's administration (1979-1983), two years of General Buhari's administration (1983-1985), eight years of General Babangida administration, (1985-1993), five years of General Abacha's administration (1993 to 1998), one year of General Abdusalam administration (1998 to 1999) eight years of Olusegun Obasanjo administration (1999-2007).

The patterns been shown above indicate that since independence the successive administration could not revive the economy, instead the fortunes dwindled years-in, years-out with growing emphasis on oil as the sole export earring.

Political independence presented only a tactical retreat by the colonist. Its interest, along with those of the local elites are now promoted and mediated by this "over-developed" state. This leads to Alavi second major observation that the post – colonial state enjoys a distinct relative autonomy from socio-economic forces beyond the generally recognised relative autonomy of the capitalist state. This autonomy allows the post-colonial Nigerian state to disperse with the usual mediatory role of the state in advanced capitalist societies, such as political parties and elections. A third major observation in Alavi analysis concerns the pre-eminent role the state in post-colonial

formation. The post-colonial state, advances the interests of the dominant elites participates directly in the production process under the banner of national development.

This flows from the primary functions of the state in post-colonial formations in general and in contemporary Nigeria in particular. The first are, a set of functions that Ziemann and Lanzendorfer (1977) put in order the public of economic reproduction functions which include:

(a) Opening up the national economy to the world market forces through such policies as: import-export substitution, the creation of a conducive atmosphere for foreign capital, membership of regional and international economic and financial institutions. (b) securing internal economic reproduction that is not guaranteed through the national capital based on the home market, for example, promotion of majority import policy etc and to the promotion of the rural and industrial labour force as well as of the independent and non-independent middle strata; through wages policy, policies on food prices and supply, and policies regarding the labour market and labour supply. It is not only in Nigeria that these sets of economic functions are performed; there is a high degree of uniformity across Africa.

The second set of function derived from the first, are the political reproduction functions that reduce to three namely:

1. acting as intermediary in political and the interest of the external elites and their states;
2. guaranteeing the cohesion of the social structure that is continually threatened by its own dynamic; and

3. acting as intermediary in political differences between the growing state bureaucracy and the other classes.

These political reproduction functions have been necessitated by the fragmented and unstable political structure that is itself the outcome of the heterogeneous world market – dependent unproductive process. The overall result is a relative social weakness of the political elite, fractions of elites and other groups in the nation. Because of this, interests are realized, accumulated less and less within the political process and more and more by the state. The state became the actual arena of political struggle and political relations, and this is manifested in a process of increasing concentration of political power in the state apparatus. This is the reason why “in Africa, those at the corridor of power do all they can to get it: A situation has emerged in Nigeria and throughout Africa in which the ruling elite is far less passive about who governs and became engaged in bizarre factional struggle for hegemony through the control of the formal access to state power have tended to because the means of accumulation for the African political elites

The broader implications of this state of affairs are well put across by Ake (1981:129):

.....first, it means a crudely oppressive class rule; because the state and government are too involved in the class struggle and because of the high premium placed in political power the nature of politics is highly authoritarian and the hegemonic faction of the bourgeoisie adopts a siege mentality. Secondly, the existence of crude oppression and the involvement of state and government in class struggle make it more difficult to mask class contradiction and encourage the development of class consciousness. Thirdly, the potential of the state for making the socio-economic formulation more coherent is limited. Fourthly, the tendency to accumulate through the use of state power than through productive activities makes post-colonial capitalism less conducive to the development of provide forces and the increase in supplies.

The political economy of Nigerian is complex and fluid and cannot be reduced to either the conflict of distinct classes or class alliances within or across borders or to the play of “ethnic” forces. In simplest terms, Nigerian state is comprised of layer of working peasants and few rich individuals bringing to make a living and get their limited share of the national cake as best as they can, with a small oligarch at the top. The two layers are linked by patron-client ties by commonalities in religious, ethnic and regional sentiments, by elites that seek to carry the voices of the people into the arena of the ruling political elite’s factional conflicts.

Nigerian state is characterized by an overpowering statism which inextricably intertwines political and economic power. The line demarcating politics and economic has been erased as state power equals wealth and wealth is the pathway to power (Rimer; 1996:143). Economic life has become politicized, and politics is most fundamentally about the distribution of wealth rather than consideration of the public weal. The Nigerian state appears to intervene everywhere and owns virtually everything including access to status and wealth (Ake; 1981. p5).

As a dependent economy, the state is characterized by inequalities within and powerless outside, by political elite without vision or will and a populace not yet awakened to its power. The unwillingness and incapacity of the state to meet the massive expectations placed upon its shoulders have undermined its standing power and legitimacy.

The struggle for the control of state power is organized along class, ethnic, regional, and at times religious lines. A political elite eager to consolidate its hold in privilege, exploit pervasive public climate of “cynicism” to support a “get it while you

can” style of politics. The eminence grise of the army, uneager to rule directly yet drawn to the flame of political context when its corporate and factional interests are threatened, watches from the barracks or step towards to take a seat in the form capturing political power.

These general conditions provide the environment for three trends in changing patterns of power and also conflict, that is, in the nature of conflict coalitions and the forms of the state: the consolidation of a political elite, conflict coalition which, though the specific coalition partners change, has successfully neutralized competing political elite and ideological rivals; the centralization of the state power; and the persistence and even resurgence of ethnic sentiments.

In recent years, a common pattern of coalition formation has been prominent; faction of the national of national leaders constituting the ruling elite; working people and peasants are excluded from effective participation, except as co-opted clients of factional or communal leaders, and radical intelligencia have either been silence by force or paid off. (Asikpo: 1983, Bala 1983).

The political elite; a persistent yet loosely grouped coalition of military and civilian bureaucrats political leaders, intellectual advisers, and a commercial and industrial/national capitalist have shore up its economic base by expropriating a major share of the out bonanza, used the money obtained from oil to buy itself into multi national enterprise through indigenization decrease, and rewarded itself legally through increased salaries and fringe benefits (the Udogi Commission) and through numerous “legal, semi-legal,” and corrupt means such as mobilization payments, unfulfilled

contracts, fraud, misuse of allowances, import license racketeering, and diversion of public investments for private enterprise (Paul and O'Connell: 1999:29)

The cohesion and power of the ruling elites is amplified by the neutralization of challenges to its rule. Two groups have been effectively silenced. The radical lefts, a weak minority of student leaders, and old time populists, have failed almost totally in their attempts to shape the political process under both civilian and military regimes, intellectuals of all stripes, if they were perceived to be critical of government policy (ies) and personnel, were the dominant targets of impression.

Specifically, under Babangida regimes academics were effectively co-opted by being given their "rightful" place in the "Debatocacy" the political debate that the regime had organized as a way of diverting resentment and unrest, some of them were made to head relevant ministries and commissions.

The working class and peasantry have participated sporadically, though often massively and violently in the political life of the nation but have been concerned more with making a living than organizing for political struggle (Anifowose; 1982:84, Peil 1976:24). Their struggle has been at best disorganized, often channeled into culturally based channels, such as religious riots, or diffused by incorporation into vast patron-client networks that also often follow culturally salient cleavages lines. The political relevance of the masses has remained largely dormant and caged.

Economic dependence on the "mono-crop" oil and the increasing coalescence of the political elite has led to the centralization of power. In 1966 the military overthrew a bickering and divisive set of regional elites and used its might to bring secessionist Biafra to heel and keep Nigeria one. The central state's control over the economy and oil wealth

has been strengthened by successive revenue allocation formulas (Oyediran and Olagunju: 1980:12).

There has been an increase in the scope and member of parastatals, the streamlining and unification of the public service following the Udoji recommendations, the take over of marketing boards by the federal governments, and restrictive foreign exchange and trade control (Olurin: 1988:224). A massive bureaucracy to run and service an ever increasing number of states has become powerful and politicized in turn. Regional powers centres have been fragmented by the creation of first twelve and now 36 states, which to a large extent secured independence of the centre from the regional elites.

Another general pattern in the state from colonial to post-colonial is the failure of ethnic sentiments and ties to decline. The reason is straight forward: ethnicity “works” for the masses, and it also “works” for the political elites. Ethnicity works because it is both interested and a fluid identity; it combines within the penumbra of the culturally defined community both realistic calculation of gains and losses and effective affinities for norms, values and style of relations which arise from a different economy, that of affection, and are grounded in the continuities of colonial and post-colonial state forms.

Ethnic identities are reinforced by a capitalist and statist system which encourages the “competition” for materials goods hence for control of the state which governs access to them generates the ethnic feelings among the Nigerian society. “The outcome is a system of clientilistic and ethno-clientelistic networks (Richard: 1981:18) and a ethno-class pattern of political action which distributes goods and resources to those in power and their support groups (Nnoli: 1981:64). Public officials have become prebends; public power being temporary is exploited to the fullest, and the followers are paid off by

rewards which increasingly diminish as one descends down the bureaucratic rank ladder and the patron client hierarchy.

4.2.4. The Military and the Nigerian State

The Nigerian military has been relatively widely studied (Luckhan, 1970, Ruth 1970, Greene, 1971). The Nigerian military coup of January 1966 ended civilian rule. The military regime cited among other things corruption, and apparent lack of respect for the rule of law. At the beginning, the military government put civilian politicians in cabinet positions in order to widen its base of support. A civilian – military diarchy existed from mid 1967 until 1975 because the military government thought civilian help was necessary to mobilize s civilian energies. The military claim to power and legitimacy is based on the assestion that it is the cooperate embodiment of the state.

The Nigerian military, which is highly politicized, often justifies its frequent interventions in government through coup d'at t as a corrective measure for corruption and misrule by civilians, although military rule often turned out to be more corrupt. The military claims to be a force for the restoration of democracy, but its incessant intervention and long stay in power undermine democracy through lack of accountability, disdain for human rights and political freedom, and erosion of democratic institutions.

The power, social status and materials well – being of those who controlled the military during those periods of military rule were enhanced, along with those of their cronies and families. However, military intervention in politics ultimately undermined the cooperate well-being of the military institution itself and led to the militarization of society to the extent that a diktat culture pervaded social interactions. The militaristic culture is still reflected in the behaviour of many elected official under civilian rule, who

often exhibit the intolerance and impatience of their military counterparts, especially in the face of dissent. Military rule also has led to excessive centralization of power. The federation followed the military command structure with the federal government as the highest command.

The oil boom of the 1970s accentuated the centralization of the federation and became a mixed blessing for the country. Huge resources made available by the boom were frittered away through corruption, misplaced priorities and failed policies under the military.

There is one interesting consequence of military rule, especially from the 1980s when it became more personalized, more dictatorial and more sectional. With military rule discredited, forces seeking to restore democracy grew in number and became bolder. The cause of democracy was made more unassailable by:

- the poor performance of the military in economic and environment issues;
- the poor management of social and cultural cleavages;
- an international environment largely hostile to undemocratic rule.

Despite the reformist pretensions, military regimes have proven, in all ramifications, no more capable than the civilian at resolving central challenges of state building and development. The turbulent military intervention of 1960s yielded almost a decade of Gowon's rule. He prosecuted the civil war, and tried to address the problems of nation building and national unity. His regime equally witnessed the glorious oil boom of the 1970s. His inability to return the country to civil rule and lack of proper management of the economy prompted the replacement of the regime with another military rule led by Gen. Murtala in 1975. The regime worked on the psyche of the citizenry by immediately

promising to return the country to civilian rule. The assassination of Murtala Mohammed six months later did not alter the transition program as his successor; Gen. Obasanjo handed over power to a democratically elected President in 1979.

The four-year civilian rule was brought to an end in 1983 by Gen. Buhari, amidst the popular hopes that his regime would correct the corrupt and institutional deficiencies left by the Second Republic. Buhari in response to this maladministration instigated a new era of military dominance that proved more corrosive to state capabilities, economic development, and social stability than its predecessors.

The tenure of Buhari (1983-85), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93), Sani Abacha (1993-89), and to a large extent Gen. Abdulsalam (1998-99), traced a downward spiral of repression, arbitrary rule, economic predation, and the erosion of such central institutions as the military, the bureaucracy, major services, and infrastructure (Osaghae: 1998:12). For example, the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme by Babangida drastically altered the economic setting of the country.

Babangida revolved to arrest the economy's downward slide and to implement fundamental political reforms and within weeks of the coup d' et la he opened a nationwide 'IMF debate' as a popular outlet for discussing the nation's future. The exchange, conducted in the press, electronic media, and other public forms conveyed broad antipathy for IMF and World Bank conditionality (Thomas Biersteker: 1995). Despite the public rejection of the policy, the administration went ahead to implement the IMF policy under a nationalist guise.

The SAP provided some considerable discontents as retrenchments and declining real wages cut across a broad band of society. In mid 1987, as the government was

forming its democratic transition programmes, a series of anti-SAP protest were launched by students, traders and organize labour the demonstrations, which sometimes turned violent, prompted an expedient retreat from the stabilization programme.

In a nut shall, the government managed the adjustment programme through a mixture of domestic political orchestration, compensatory measures and coercion. For elite, the state provided special access to nascent market and illegal activities.

The Adjustment years witnessed a reconfiguration of Nigeria” political economy pattern of distributive politics altered considerably. Economic crisis and ensuing reforms curtailed traditional avenues of public patronage. Government contracts, subsidies, grants, and employment were substantially diminished. There were dispersal of resources among elites and popular sectors. A corresponding shift was the reallocation of ‘rents’ in the Nigerian economy. Direct disbursal and administrative favours were increasingly supplanted by politically influenced arbitrage in a variety of domestic market.

Moreover, state officials fomented growing corruption and sanctioned or organised an expanding realism of illegality. Large scale corruption has undermined economic growth in Nigeria for several years. The unprecedented diversion of resources depleted investible resources and aggravated the burden on the economy.

In a nutshell, coalitions have changed from a political partnership of regional elites to a technocratic– military alliance to an ethnic class coalition. Despite all this, has the nature of the state, then changed, or has the Nigerian state stayed essentially the same since 1960? Have the trends discussed above been but surface tremors which has shaken and shaped the form of the state but not its nature and purpose? There have been differences in organization, style, outlook and performance. The military seems

frequently to have been motivated more than the civilians by considerations of the possible good, though interpreted so as not to harm the interests of the military and largely in terms of national unity. Attempts by the military to leave the political scene, have been largely dismal, except on two occasions: (1979 and 1999).

Generally, the military regimes lacked ideological coherence and a commonly shared political outlook (Balogun: 1985:40). It is precisely the absence of ideology which makes the military nationalistic, since that is their only real political guideline.

The Nigeria military, which is highly publicized, often justifies its frequent interventions in government through coups *de' et al* as a corrective measure for corruptions and misrule by civilians, although military rule often turns out to be more corrupt. The military claims to be a force for the restoration of democracy' though lacks of accountability, disdain for human rights and political freedoms and erosion of democratic institutions.

The power, social status and material well being of those who controlled the military during these periods of military rule were enhanced, along with those of their cronies and families. However, military intervention in politics ultimately undermined the corporate well being of the military institution itself and led to the extent that militaristic culture pervaded socio-political interactions. The militarist culture is still reflected in the behaviour of many elected officials under civilian rule, who exhibit the intolerance and impatience of their military counterparts, especially in the face of dissent. Military rule also led to excessive centralization of power with the federal government as the highest command.

The military has introduced so many changes, within the 30 years they ruled. Some of these changes were planned, some unplanned reorganizing and a times complicating the social structure of Nigeria. For example, the military has in 1966 restructured the regional structure, the federal system by dividing it first into 12, 19, 21, 30 and now 36 states. The viability and the needs of the state have been altered.

4.2.5 The Nigerian State and its Institutions

No less important in determining the state democracy nexus' is the character of the institutions that constitute the core of the state: the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Each of these, in disaggregated form, puts its imprint on the character of the state. The gradual erosion and general weakness of political institutions, brought about by decades of military rule, has created problems of credibility for many of the political office holders and the state's institutions in general.

More than any other institutions, the legislature remains a core determinant of the character of the state. Some of the membership of the Nigeria National Assembly had participated in varying degrees in the previous military regimes. The key offices of the Assembly are being occupied by those who unabashedly dined and wined with dictators.

Like the legislature, the executive arm of the government is tainted with the legacies of the military rule. Many of the people who occupy public offices are those who had benefited immensely from the military rule. Either they are civilian but through their closeness with the military regime, got contracts, jobs etc, or ex military officers who had secured and made huge amount of money from the civilian state. These categories of Nigerian can afford to write their way to public offices.

Like the legislature and the executive arm of the state, the Nigeria judiciary has not escaped the destructive impact of military dictatorship. The course and cause of justice been perverted by the executive under the military, through such brazen assaults as refusal to obey its orders, removal, demotion or non-promotion of judicial officers and the cost of justice has become unbearable for the average Nigerian both in time and money.

No institution carries the responsibility for democracy's survival as does the judiciary. In the inevitable confrontation between the state and citizens, between different tiers of government and between all manners of political actors, it is the judiciary that is the last hope for the resolution of disputes. Yet, like the executive and legislature arms of government, the Nigerian judiciary is tainted by its timid response to, and very often complicity in, judicial malfeasance.

The civil service is the link between the executive and society in the implementation of public policies and programmes. In the Nigerian state, the bureaucracy has remained the only permanent component of the state in about fifty years of oscillation between democratic governance and military dictatorship. From its early beginning as humble servant of the colonialists, committed to serving its law and order and extractive operations, the bureaucracy in Nigeria has become a master in its own right; thanks to permanency. But unlike its colonial progenitor, which at its highest levels was professional, impacting meaningfully on the public process, the Nigerian bureaucracy today is largely content with performing a merely crucial role and even this in a largely unprofessional manner. This ineptitude has been compounded by unabashed corruption and is often quoted as the root of the non-performance of the various governments.

4.3 A Brief Historical Formation of Political Parties in Nigeria

The first modern political party NNDP was formed by Herbert Macaulay to contest Niger Legislative Council Elections in Lagos in 1923. By 1944, Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikwe founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) which later transformed into National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Coleman 1959). The organization advocated greater representation in the Nigerian colonial government. Chapters were established across Nigeria. However, when the British introduced a more democratic and decentralized constitutions in 1951, the NCNC broke up along ethnic lines. The 1951 constitution mandated indirect assembly elections in the three Regions. Lagos was part of the Western Region where the Action Group (AG) emerged. Action Group was an offshoot of Egbe Omo Oduwa, a cultural group formed by chief Awolowo with a view to forgoing Yoruba unity.

The Egbe Omo Oduduwa brought together both traditional and the educated elites in a bid to consolidate Yoruba Unity. At the beginning, it was not a political entity. However, by 1951, when the McPherson constitution introduced democratic elections into various regional of Nigeria, the Egbe had taken firm roots in western region of Nigeria. However, as a cultural organisation, it could not contest elections. A political party was, formed in 1950 and made public, as the Action Group early in the election year of 1951.

In April 1951, Chief Samuel Akinsanya suggested to Awolowo that the party should invite prominent personalities in western region to join the party (Ayoade: 1982). In 1959, the party adopted democratic socialism as its official ideology. It also held federalism to be best form of government for Nigeria.

The Russian revolution of 1917 had the effect of dividing socialism into two. Whereas the communist socialists insisted that there can be no socialism without revolution, the non-communist socialists, arguing the contrary, defined democracy as “parliamentary government based on a structure of contending parties and majority rule under the conditions of universal suffrage and free election. To some extent, these two divisions were to be found in the development of the Action Group ideology of Democratic socialism.

At the beginning, the ideological camps in the party at their initial stages were mainly two (Sklar, 1963:42): the Marxian socialists and the non-communist socialists. The Marxists were led by Ogunbiade-Bmishe and S.G Ikoku and the non-Marxist socialists were led by Awolowo, Bisi Onabanjo, Akinbola and Victor Oyenuga. The view of these two camps formed the cardinal views and ideology of the party (AG) which is known as welfare state, a policy where there would be provision by the government; good drainage, slum clearance, and the provision of pipe-borne water in town and villages.

The second aspect of the welfare state scheme that the party emerged was labour industrial welfare. This was meant to provide the fullest care and happiness of the working population both inside and outside their places of work. It promised to achieve this through social security scheme, up-to-date factory legislation, and creation of full employment, defined as a solution such that the member of employed persons is less than the member of unfilled vacancies.

The influential position and the dogmatic views of Obafemi Awolowo gradually emerged and became dominant in the party just before the federal election of 1959, the

leader of the party started to show the possibility of a transformation of the welfare state ideology into democratic socialism. He argued that “men are inescapably equal at birth and at death”. This equality, he emphasized, is further borne out by the fact that man, in his spiritual essence, is of God. He, therefore, conclude that an earthly creation; political or economic, that does not give equal opportunity to all men is not of God. Whereas welfare state policy of the party had emphasized the quarantee of a minimum living standard for all, Chief Awolowo hinted at the need to guarantee a potential of equality through equal opportunity for all.

The Action Group (AG) kept strictly to its ideology of regionalism, federalism and democratic socialism until January 1966 when the party was banned. The Action Group adhered strictly to its ideology. In fact, its inflexibility on ideology is often cited as the causes of the party crisis of 1962. This implies that the Marxist group never gave up and felt that the unbending positions of Awolowo on the started the cracks within the party and subsequently marked its downfall.

In considering certain aspect of indirect rule in northern Nigeria in particular, at least one significant point emerges. Whereas in the south nationalist criticisms were directed against the colonial system, criticism which sometimes took the form of a demand for independence, in the north criticism was directed to the application of the principles of indirect rule, and only by extension, if at all, to colonialism as such. Thus, if in the south, critical opinion demanded the abolition of the colonial system, in the north, similar opinions were essentially reformists. But there was a disagreement as to what direction reform should take. It was disagreement in such issues which distinguished the early associations which began to emerge, and which eventually become political parties.

The Bauchi General Improvement Union (BGIU) was formed sometime between 1943 and 1944 by Saad Zungur (Dudley 1968:79). He was, at one time, a teacher at the school of pharmacy in Zaria.

When BGIU was started, it took the form of a radical movement directed against the Native Authority and included men like Aminu Kano, who was a teacher at Bauchi Middle school. In order to counter the radical approach of the BGIU, Bauchi Discussion Circle (BDC) was formed (Dudley 1968:83). The BDA was a moderate organisation which comprised people like Abubakar Balewa, Yahaya Gusau etc.

Subsequently, associations began to emerge across the north. These associations include the Youths Social Circle formed in Sokoto in 1945, prominent among its members were Shehu Shagari, Ibrahim Gusau. Later, Kano Youth Association was formed in 1948, the same year Zaria Youth Association was formed.

The constitutional Reforms of Sir John McPherson and the willingness of the above named associations to merge with a view to meeting the constitutional reforms led to the formation of NEPU in 1950. As reported by Dudley:

....NEPU entered the field of practical party politics when at a meeting in Kano on 3rd – 6th April 1951 attended by all branches, some tribal Unions and trade Union organisation” it came out of with a declaration of aims/objectives which was amended in general terms and aimed at the emancipations of the Talakawa, the progressive reform of the Native Authority System and the provision of better welfare services in the north (Dudely 1908:94).

NEPU, within a short period of time, became popular and enjoyed some success at the polls winning some vital political positions in the north. The radical position of NEPU prompted some notable men in the Northern House of Assembly, and who were all members of Jami'iyyar Mutanen Arewa, (JMA) to turn their back to NEPU. At an

emergency meeting in Zaria in 1951, a decision was arrived at that the following day, 1st October, 1951, the organisation, JMA, would transform into a political party known as Northern Peoples Congress. Like Action Group, NPC evolved from a cultural group with a clear intention of protecting the interest of the peoples of the North. The NPC spread rapidly across the length and breadth of the Northern region and also rapidly got the support and sympathy of the aristocratic class.

The resentment against the Hausa/Fulani domination of NPC and in a way NEPU prompted the people of the Middle Belt to begin to advocate for a new party that would reflect the uniqueness of the region. The United Middle belt Congress (UMBC) emerged to provide organisational direction to the demands of the people of the Middle Belt. The historical circumstances surrounding the formation of these parties defined their ideologies, programmes and strategies.

The ideology, programmes and strategies of the first Republic Parties were essentially ethno-regional focusing on protecting and advancing the interests of elites from specific groups. Some strategies of mobilizing support were common among the first republic parties first, the parties engaged in intensive mobilization of the ethnic homeland to ensure its monolithic support at times of elections. Second, the parties tried to widen their political base from the ethnic homeland to include the whole region. Third, the parties ensured that they won all the available seats in their respective regions of ethnic supremacy and consequently controlling the region's governmental power. Forth, the parties used governmental power in the region of their control to eliminate all forms of opposition and to ensure maximum support of the region's population for the party during federal elections. The parties used the pattern of distributing governmental

patronage at their disposal to discourage the constituencies within their regions from voting for the vital parties. Fifth, each of the parties encouraged agitation by minority ethnic groups in regions under the rival political parties against their governments and support of regional sphere of influence, and to ensure electoral support during election. This and many other reasons led to the crises that brought down the First Republic. However, the politics of the first Republic will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.

4.4 Political Party Formation during the Transition to Second Republic

If during the course of your deliberations and having regard to our disillusion with party politics in the past, you should discover some means by which government can be formed without the involvement of political parties, you should feel free to recommend
(Address by Gen Murtala to Constitutional Drafting Commity)

That was General Murtala Muhammed, then the Federal Military Government on the October 18, 1975 addressing the commission set up to see how new political parties would emerge. In some other parts of the world, political parties are permanent institutions. They are as permanent as the society or country where they operate. Not so in many developing countries. In fact in the third world countries especially Africa, they are viewed as divisive, a threat to national Unity. This perhaps explain why the late Nigerian leader, General Murtala challenged Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC), over there decades ago on the possibility of evolving a political system without political parties. However, political parties are indispensable associations in any political system; which is why party formation has become a recurring decimal in Nigeria's political history.

In October 1977, a year after the public debate on the Draft Constitution Assembly convened, its members having been chosen through local government councils in August. In August 1978, the SMC received the proposed constitution which, with 17 amendments, the Head of State promulgated on September, 20, 1978. The following day, a week ahead of schedule, Gen. Obasanjo lunched the next stage by lifting the ban on political parties.

When the SMC lifted the ban on politics on September 21, 1978 Nigerians were watching to see who would emerge as civilian political leaders. FEDECO, on the 28 September 1978, gave the requirements for party formation and eventual registration. The requirements include the following:

- Membership of political parties must be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic groupings
- Names, emblems and motto of parties must not contain ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that activities of the parties are limited to geographical areas of the country;
- The headquarters of parties must be located in the country's capital territory;
- Constitution of political parties must ensure that members of executive committee or other governing body reflected the federal character of the country;
- Members of the executive committee or other governing body shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement of federal character only if the members belong to different states not being less than two-third of all the states comprising the federation;

- The programmes, aims and objectives of the parties must conform with the provisions of the state constitution of fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy;
- No parties must retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of physical force or coercion;
- No associations of any kind shall function as a political party unless registered by the federal electoral commission;

At the end of the period of time given to the public to regroup and form political association, FEDECO announced five political associations that were qualified to be registered as political parties. They included:

- The United Party of Nigeria (UPN)
- The National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
- The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP)
- The Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) and
- The People Redemption Party (PRP).

Since 1979, there has been gradual but steady progress towards ensuring that political parties are discouraged from pursuing mere ethno-regional goals. Significant adjustments in the strategy of post 1979 parties can be identified. During the second Republic, the UPN and PRP, to a very large extent distinguished themselves as parties clearly articulated and nationally focused ideologies (Joseph 1978, Diamond 1982). The NPN is particular, unequivocally committed itself to four “cardinal programmes;” namely (1) free education at all levels (2) free medical care for all (3) integrated rural, developments,

and (4) full employment. The PRP explicitly called for public ownership of key economic sectors in Nigeria. Especially, finance and banking, insurance, oil exporting, and capital goods. The PRP also advocated for the closure of most economic sectors to foreign investments and participation, and federally administered rents control.

The strategies of the Second Republic Political parties were different from those of the first. For example the UPN's strategy was anchored on three basic elements. Firstly, as a result of the new party regulations requiring the political parties to develop a nationwide base, the UPN leader, Chief Awolowo made personal efforts to reach out and recruit top politicians from other ethnic groups to the party. Secondly, the UPN made an unequivocal nationwide class appeal. This strategy was reflected in the party commitment to the "progressive ideology" of democratic socialism. Finally, the UPN undertook rigorous research and planning, which took place on a number of front pages of newspapers, particularly in sponsoring writing of research papers. "The party commissioned several intellectuals who engaged in series of research, writing and theoretical planning that sought to give content to the party's adoption of democratic socialism as its philosophy" (Joseph 1991 121-222).

While the UPN's strategy focused on effective personal leadership of Awolowo's organisational cohesion, research and planning, and a progressive ideological commitment, NPN's strategy was directed towards converging diverse ethno-regional interest for electoral purposes. Based on experience with party politics in the First Republic and considering the constitutional arrangement introduced in 1979, the leaders of NPN recognised that it would be difficult to garner the nationwide support necessary

to rule Nigeria without giving elites from various ethnic groups the opportunity to participate in the party's leadership.

The five political parties that were registered by the military to contest for power in 1979 were from all intents and purposes, a mere reincarnation of domination political parties of the First Republic. It was rather intriguing to note that the leaders of the new political parties were the same leaders of the defunct parties.

For instance, Dr Azikwe was the leader of the NCNC in the First Republic became the leader and presidential candidate of the newly formed Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). Similarly, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Mallam Aminu Kano were the leaders of AG and NEPU in the First Republic were at the helm of the newly established Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) respectively.

The NPN, like the defunct NPU, drew the bulk of its leadership and membership from the North. Its presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who later emerged as the president of the Second Republic was a former leader of NPC in the First Republic.

The Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) led by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, the apostle of "politics without bitterness", was only a breakaway faction of the NPP.

4.5 Party formation during the Babangida Transition Programme

The exercise of political party formation in the Third Republic began with the setting up by the military regime in 1986 of the political Bureau that was charged with the responsibility of conducting a one-year nationwide search for consensus on Nigeria constitutional recommend the introduction of a political system in which only two political parties would be licensed to operate.

The Political Bureau's wide-ranging terms of reference as enunciated by President Babangida were as follows:

- (a) Review Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems
- (b) Identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as a guide to the activities of governments
- (c) Collect relevant information and data for the Government as well as identify political problems that may arise from the debates.
- (d) Gather, collect and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future.

(Report of the Political Bureau 1987 pp. 132).

The military regime adopted this recommendation and then set up a committee to review the 1979 constitution and the findings of the Bureaus. Concurrently, Babangida made clear his own view that the fear being expressed about the likely harmful consequences of the two party option were largely unfounded, and that such danger could be averted by appropriate constitutional and electoral provisions (Constitutional Review Committee: 1988).

Drawing largely on the report of the political Bureau and 1979 constitution, the electoral provision dealt with the number of political parties, their rules, aims, financial and relationship with the National Assembly, as well as the prohibition of quasi-military bodies.

According to section 219;

...no association other than a political party recognised and registered under this constitution shall canvass for votes for any candidates at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election.

Subsequently, on 3 May 1989, the six year old ban on party politics was lifted and Nigerians were urged to form political associations to be vetted by NEC, its membership

must be opened to all, its headquarters must be in Abuja, the Federal Capital, and its name, emblem, or motto must not contain any ethnic, religious, or geographical connotations.

In order to sanitize the political system, certain categories of Nigerians, were banned from participating in party politics, or seeking to hold public office for either for life or certain period of time. Decree No. 25 of 1989 stated that:

... The political history of Nigeria to date is replete with individual acts and political party activities detrimental to the evolution of good governance and assurance of the welfare of the people ... in order to avoid a repetition of the political misdeeds of previous civilian administrations ... it is necessary accordingly to ban or disqualify categories of person from holding public office in Nigeria for the time being.

In addition to the above decree, some senior officers who were participating in the transition programme were banned from participating or holding offices. With this, the stage became set for political association to be formed.

Within a short period, precisely two months, 49 political associations were formed see appendix (iv) for the list of the political associations. The political associations in all purpose and intent reflected, in a way, lack of ideology and adequate preparation on the side of the politicians. Only 13 of these associations actually prepared to be registered as political parties. None of these 13 associations met the stringent conditions given by the NEC. Also they were indicted by NEC of haven involved in fraudulent practices which would not augur well with transition programme.

Against the backdrop of the above development, the then President, Babangida on the 17th October 1989, denied registration to any of the 13 associations and went ahead to

impose two political parties: National Republic Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

In his broadcast to the nation, he defended his decision to establish the two parties by re calling that:

...when government endorsed the recommendation of the political Bureau that a two a party system would best guarantee a stable democratic order for Nigeria, it was in the sincere hope and belief that Nigerian would embark upon the process of forming political associations on the basis of philosophies, policies, issues and programme. Sadly, our expectations were not to be realized this time. The prevailing attitude appeared to be a “founder” and no one wanted to be a “joiner”. Everyone wanted to be a leader of a party, or close associate of the leader ...every “founder” cornered the political association to himself and his small circle of friends and associates, and proceeded to closed “admission rules” that were guaranteed to subordinate “joiners” (Babangida Broadcast is the nation on 7th October, 1989).

Since the politicians had been given opportunities and they had not made good use of them by forming viable political parties that are ideological and issue driven, the only alternative was to impose a two party system on Nigerian with Government playing the most vital roles in providing administrative, finance and infrastructures.

The military government established National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) with the hope that, the parties would:

- (i) Provide a grass roots basis for future growth of the two authorized parties, as well as a mass platform for their emerging leadership;
- (ii) Give equal rights and opportunities to all Nigeria to participate in the political process irrespective of their wealth, religion, geo-political background, and professional endeavours.
- (iii) De-emphasize the role of money in politics.

- (iv) Reduce the element of violence in elections to the minimum level;
- (v) Prevent the recreation of political alliances that characterized 1st and 2nd Republics, and therefore enable Nigerian to operate within new political structures;
- (vi) Promote a new pattern of political recruitment and participation that would enhance Nigeria's stability;
- (vii) Establish institutional structures that would be strong enough to sustain future governments, and stand the test of time, as well as political system that would be operated according to the letter and spirit of the new Nigeria constitution (Broadcast).

The regime erected party structures across the federation and provided grants to the parties. The parties were basically formed to reflect the then existing ideological blocs, the west and the East blocs. However there were fear that the establishment of the two parties would not reflect any ideological tenet instead would automatically polarize the country along north and south dichotomy or Muslim-Christian division.

The formation of the two parties gave little room for the elites to reflect in the political development of the country; also for the fact that the two parties were formed and imposed on the people from above they did not reflect the diversity and the uniqueness of the country.

The ideologies and strategies of the 3rd Republic political parties were similar to those of the 2nd Republic, although there were a few differences. The most important variation is the fact that the Third Republic parties; the SDP and NRC, were created and sponsored by the military government. The formation of the two parties involved “a step-

wise progression” beginning from the ward level reproduced to the national level. (Oyediran & Agbaje 1991:227). The largest of this process according to the government was to encourage community spirit and to build national parties with broad-based organisational structure. The military government created all the necessary administrative, ideological and programatic infrastructure of the parties.

4.6 Political party formation under Sani Abacha

Under General Sani Abacha’s transition programme, party formation was an exercise in futility. Party registration was used successfully to exclude those prominent politicians the government of General Abacha did not want to participate in the transition programme (Interview with Shinkafi: 2009; Adelus. 1998).

Party politics under Gen Abacha assumed a deeper level of skepticism. He continued in the well stage- managed “permanent” political transition started by Babangida. The Abacha era witnessed the formation of five other parties that fizzled out of existence with his demise on June 8, 1998. The five political parties represented the few selected from a total of fifteen associations that sought for registration as indicated below:

S/n	Name of Association	Marks Scored%
1	United Nigerian Congress Party (UNCP)	74.77
2	Congress of National Consensus (CNC)	65.78
3	National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN)	63.32
4	Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN)	57.35
5	Grassroots Democratic Party (GDM)	53.78
6	All Nigeria Congress (ANC)	49.28
7	Peoples Consensus Party (PCO)	48.85
8	Social Progressive Party (SPP)	48.65
9	Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)	43.71
10	National Democratic Labour Party (NDLP)	30.87
11	National Democratic Party (NDP)	26.56
12	Solidarity Group of Nigeria (SGN)	21.01
13	Progressive Party of Nigeria (PPN)	19.01

14	Peoples Redemption Party (PRP)	16.45
15	National Solidarity Peoples Alliance (NSPA)	11.49

Despite the apathy towards the transition programme, a total of 15 political associations, sought registration as political parties out of which five were registered. These were: the United Nigerian Congress Party (UNCP), the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN) and Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM).

The process leading to the formation of these political parties was clumsy, and the larger section of the society was not only excluded, but variously intimidated. The five political parties were obviously what critics described as the ‘‘five fingers of the same leprous hand’’. Apparently because of the manner the parties were working towards adopting the late General, Sani Abacha as their consensus candidate to contest the never materialized Abacha transition programme.

4.7 Political party Formation under Gen. Abdulsalami Transition programme

Barely twenty-four hours after Gen. Abubakar broadcast, politicians like in the past, started mobilizing themselves for the formation of political parties. While many of the associations were big and national in outlook, others were community based with the sole aim of protecting common interest. Some were falling back on old alliances while others were building their associations around personalities.

The Democratic Advance Movement (DAM) was the first to be announced Dr Tunji Braithwaite, a lawyer and second Republic presidential candidate of the defunct Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) was the brain behind the party. He hinged DAM’s cardinal principles on the devolution of power among the six geo-political zones of the country.

Subsequently All Nigeria Congress (ANC) was formed; it was seen as an umbrella for politicians of the conservative mould. Most of its notable leaders had their roots in the defunct Northern People Congress (NPC) of the First Republic, National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of the defunct Second Republic and the National Republican Convention (NRC) of the aborted Third Republic. Alhaji Umaru Shikafi, Mal. Adamu Ciroma, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur and the late Chief Sunday Awoniyi were the leading members in the camp.

The UNCP was founded by Alhaji Isa Mohammed, and Gen, Garba. Among its other leading members were Chief Babs Akerele, Prof. Odungba, Senator Remi, Okunrinboye and Chief Onikepo Oshodi. The impression created by its members when it was launched was that more than 50 percent of its members are from the north.

The People Congress (PC) was an offshoot of the defunct democratic party of Nigeria (DPN). A caucus within the DPN capitalized on Abubakar's new transition to concretize their relationship by forming a political association. The group had allies in the committee of Governors under Babangida regime and metamorphosed into the Peoples Congress (PC). Some of the governors are: Dahiru Mohammed (Bauchi), Rufus Ada George (Rivers), Saleh Michika (Adamawa), Saidu Barde (Katsina) and other prominent politicians such as Tudun Wada and Prof. Iya Abubakar.

The Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) comprised associates of late Gen. Musa Yar'adua's political empire built up years ago. It started with the People's Front (PF), one of the thirteen registered political associations under Gen. Babangida. It later took over the leadership of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was one of the two parties Gen. Babangida foisted on the nation.

The group attempted to participate in Abacha transition but had their ambition scuttled when the PDM was not registered. The chairman of PDM was Alhaji Lawan kaita with Mr. Duben Onyia as secretary.

Egbe Afenifere, a Pan Yoruba cultural organization, had earlier formed the Peoples Consultative Forum (PCF). It is the main political group in the south-Western part of Nigeria. This cultural cum political group has never pretended not to be ethnic based. It shares the view of late Chief Obafemi Awolowo that Nigerian politics cannot but be ethnic based because the country is an amalgamation of hundreds of diverse groups.

A great number of the members of the pro-democracy group, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), that confronted the Abacha administration and asked for the actualization of June 12, 1993 general election also belonged to Afenifere. However, Afenifere was then insisting on a Sovereign National Conference, and the emergence of “true federation”. The groups hoped to participate in the new political dispensation in co-operation with other groups across the country.

The Social Progressive Party (SPP) shares almost the same attributes with the PPP particularly in terms of focus, orientation and history. But more precisely, they differ in terms of membership composition and geographical spread. The former progressive governors of the Second Republic and some former SDP members such as Governor Abubakar Rimi of Kano state, Chief, Sam. Mbakwe (Imo), Solomon Lar (Plateau) and Prof. Jerry Gana, belonged to this group.

New Era Alliance (NERA) was premised on the twin principles of equal opportunity and open competition and is open competition and to committed is the unity and peaceful co-existence of the people of Nigeria.

The aim of NERA was to form a formidable national movement that will accord Ndigbo their pride of place in the formidable national movement that would accord Ndigbo their pride of place in the transition programme. One important observation about NERA was that its membership comprised of the dissolved UNCP.

The Nigerian National Movement (NNM) was another Eastern-based political association that principally centered on some UNCP members in Imo State. Dr. E.J.K. Onyebuchi, ex-UNCP Chairman in Imo state was a member. There were also Dr. J.C Odunna, the former UNCP Assistant National Secretary, Chief Charles Obinna, ex-secretary of Imo UNCP, Dr Ezekiel Izwogu, Chief Otuokere Njak, Chief Tony Uchegbu and host of others.

The National Council of Nigeria (NCN) had its membership mainly in the Igbo-speaking area. It was the first party to emerge in the old Eastern Region after the scrapping of the five political parties by Gen, Abdulsalam.

It aimed at fostering love, peace and unity in Nigeria. Its motto was “truth and Justice.” Chief Irukwu was its proposed Chairman. Also in existence was the National Unity Forum (NUF) formed by Dr Olusola Saraki and his sympathizers. While there was the Akwa Ibom Democratic Movement (ADM) which claimed it was committed to ensuring the restoration of the full democratic rule in Nigeria.

The Imo Democratic Movement (IDM) was floated by former Imo state governor, Late Sam Mbakwe. The Freedom Alliance (FA) was formed and coordinated by Fetus Keyamo.

The Social Democratic Front (SDF) was formed by some Pentecostal Christians as such it had Christian objectives and values. The groups said” the rough and dirty political terrain since independence would be made smooth if church leaders enlighten their followers on the urgent need to participate actively in politics without compromising their Christian faith and integrity (Moses 1998). In a similar way, the Nigeria Renaissance Movement (NRM) was equally planning to have a Christian undertone largely formed by clergymen. According to Apostle, Ayo Omideyi, “the NRM is coming into existence and want to use and hand over government of Nigerian to believers who have the fear of God – Christians who are “born-a new” and renewed Muslims (Ayo: 1998). NRM was to initiate far – reaching policies that mute affect every sector of the life of Nigerians. Among them are food, shelter, light water and energy. But:

.....of the greatest importance are the police and the judiciary ...All the parliaments of the world are useless if the police and the judiciary are grossly inept and corrupt. Every other method to change these two institutions will fall. Only Christian methods based on sound-leaching of Jesus Christ can prevail (Ayo Omedeyi: 1998).

There was also the MEGA party which was formed by several political associations made up diverse interest groups from all over the federation. Membership was drawn from DPN, GDM, NCPN, UNCP, SPP, PDM, ANC and Afenifere. Some of the prominent members included Mal. Abba Dabo, Dr. Kenny Martins, Chief Patrick Uzobuindu, Mr. Sani Charles, and Dr. Juwon Ekundayo.

Democratic Alliance (DA) was made up of activists committed to the fundamental transformation of the Nigerian society, which was originally formed in 1994 as an embryo of a future political party that would be credible and formidable enough to challenge the political elite as well as their military masters for political power.

The Eastern Mandate Union, (EMU) was an amalgam of many political associations in the nine states of the defunct Eastern Nigeria namely: Anabra, Enugu, Imo, Abia, Akwo Ibom, Cross River, River and Bayelsa. Led by Dr. Arthur Nwankwo, Udenta Udenta, Chief Jimmy Imo, Chief Summy Okolo, Chief G.S Agboh among others, the groups aimed to address the marginalization of the East, which according to the group, generates about a so percent of other country's resources. It also aimed to address the problems of inequality, injustice and domination amongst others in the Nigerian polity.

On the 25 of August, 1998, the broad coalition of eminent citizens known as G. 34 transformed into a political association later known as People's Democratic Party (PDP). After the formation of the party, Alhaji, Abubakar Rimi, a leading member of the party, told journalists that, "the slogan of the party, PDP would be "Power to the People".

He said the party is committed to:

- democracy and governance;
- freedom, human rights and social justice;
- true federalism and equity under the rule of law;
- integrity and transparency in the conduct of public affairs; and
- sustainable human development. (New Nigerian News paper, Oct.12, 1998).

Prominent members of the PDP included former vice president Dr. Alex Ekweme, Chief Tony Amich, Alhaji Bamaga Tukur, Mr Olorunfonmi Basorm, Chief Alexis Aniello, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi and Chief Jim Nwobodo. Others were Alhaji Atiku Abubakar,

Guy Ikoku, Alhaji Isa Kaita, Aminu Wali, Dr Chuba Okadibo, Chief Sunday Awoniyi, Chief Don Eliabefbef, David Jemibewon, and Edwin Ume-Ezeoke.

In other to ensure orderliness and a level playing ground, INEC came up with its guidelines on party formation and registration.

4.8 INEC Guidelines on Party Formation and Registration

Decree 17, section 4 (1) of 1998 established and empowered the commission to register political associations that have met the guidelines set by the commission. An application by an association for legislation as a political party that be on the prescribed form and shall be accompanied by the following information and documents:-

- a. a short profile, that is
 - i. when and where the association held its major decisions.
 - ii. evidence regarding the hosting of its national congress or intention to hold such congress;
 - iii. where the congress has been held, including a list of the association's officers and the method of their selection.
- b. Twenty printed copies of the association current constitution, which shall indicate the proposed party name, symbol, emblem and motto;
- c. Twenty printed copies of the association manifestoes;
- d. Evidence of payment of a non-refundable fee of one hundred thousand naira (N1000, 000.00) to the commission;
- e. Every application for registration as a political party shall be addressed and submitted to the chairman of the commission at the commission headquarters. The commission shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the application

2. (1) There shall be multiple political parties in the federation. No association by whatever name called shall function as a political party unless:
 - a. It is first recognised and provisionally registered by the commission;
 - b. Names and addresses of the members of its National, State and Local Government Areas are registered with the commission;
 - c. Its membership is open to every Nigerian citizen irrespective of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic group, sex, or religion;
 - d. It accepts the principles of power sharing and rotation of key political offices.
2. An Association which applied to the commission for registration as a political party shall be considered as being open to every Nigerian if:
 - a. It maintains functional branches in at least 24 states of the federation;
 - b. the name, slogan or motto and the identifying symbols and colours of the Association shall not have any ethnic, religious, professional or other sectional connotation or give the appearance that its activities are confined only to a part of Nigeria;
3. No Association shall be registered as a political party unless:
 - a. It declares its assets and liabilities as well as indicates its Bankers, the sources and uses of its funds;
 - b. Its constitution and rules provide for periodic election on democratic basis, of its executive committees or other governing bodies.
 - c. Its organization at National level reflects the federal character principles while at state and local government area level, it takes into account of geographical group and cultural peculiarities.

- d. It furnishes the commission with its constitution and notifies the commission of any alteration thereof within 30days from the date of making such alterations.
- e. It has natural headquarters in the federal capital territory.
3. Political Associations that have applied for registration may merge before the late date given by the commission for submission of application of political parties.
4. the following restrictions shall be observed by associations seeking registrations as political parties.
 - a. no person below the age of 18years shall be member of a political party.
 - b. no youth club or any form of registered association, Wings and such like shall form part of a political party.
 - c. no member of the armed forces, police, security agencies, paramilitary organs and a member of public service of the federation or of a state or of a local government shall be a member of a political party.
 - d. traditional rulers as defined in chapter ix of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended shall be insulated from partisan politics; and
 - e. no alien shall be eligible to be a member of a political party.
5. Apart from organizational and operational requirements set out above, an association applying for registration as a political party shall, in addition to affirming its commitment to observe, conform to and enforce the provisions of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 1979 relating to the fundamental objectives and directive principle of state policies, circulating unambiguously the

- policies and strategies for tackling the problems inherent in getting the various objectives implemented, in particular.
- a. the government and the people;
 - b. political objectives and the indivisibility of the Nigerian polity.
 - c. economic, agriculture and industrialization;
 - d. health and education;
 - e. internal security and national defence;
 - f. regional, Africa and foreign policy/ relations
 - g. human rights and environmental obligations;
 - h. Nigerian culture and societal ills, ethnicity, statism, corruption, etc.
 - i. women in politics and national development;
 - j. the judicature;
 - k. mass media in national development; and
 - l. scientific and technological development.
6. Every constitution of political association must contain the following:
- a. evidence of its resolution to conform with the principles of power sharing and rotation of key political offices;
 - b. a provision relating to election on democratic basis of its principal officers and members of the executive committee or other governing bodies, periodically and in any case, not later than 4 years from the previous election;
 - c. a provision relating to the discipline procedure of the association, stating clearly the method of expelling an ordinary member, a party or political office holder including a member of a Legislative House.

7. Every Political Association applying for registration shall fill the form obtained from the commission at the prescribed fee. The following information is required in the prescribed form:
 - a. The full name of the Association and its abbreviated form;
 - b. The Association symbols and or the motto;
 - c. a comprehensive description of the identification systems and colours;
 - d. the location, address, and telephone number (if any) of the state and local government area offices of the association.
- 8.-
 - (1) After the closing date for the submission of application by associations wishing to be registered as political parties, the commission shall answer all the applications received and verify the claims of the Political Associations.
 - (2) Any Political Association which, through the submission of false or misleading information, procures a provisional or full registration as a party shall have such registration cancelled by the commission.
9. In accordance with the provision of the established of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the following are binding on all registered political parties in the Federation:
 - (a) every political party shall, at such times and in such manner as the commission may require, submit to it a statement of its assets and liabilities;
 - (b) every political party shall submit to the commission a detailed Annual statement of and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure in such form as the commission may require;

- (c) no political party shall receive external funds from whatever source for election or any activity relating to the party;
- (d) no political party shall hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria and any funds remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the Commission within twenty-one days of receipt, with such information as the Commission may require;
- (e) no political party shall organize, relation, retain or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of display of physical force or coercion in promoting its political interest or objectives;
- (f) the commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and to examine all such books and records, either through any member of the staff any person who is an auditor by profession, and who is not a member of a political party;
- (g) the commission shall carry out such inspections or investigations as will able it to form an opinion as to whether proper books of accounts and proper records have been kept by each political party; and
- (h) the commission or its duly authorized agents shall have a right to access at all times to the books and accounts and vouchers of all political parties and shall be entitled to obtain from the officers of the parties such information and explanation as the Commission or the agents think necessary for the performance of the Commission duties under the institution.

- (10)- (1) At the and of the verification of the claims of the political association the Commission shall recognize and grant provisional registration certificate to Political Associations which have satisfied the requirements of these guidelines
2. Any political Association granted a provisional registration certain under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall be entitled to contest the first Local Government Council Election to be conducted by the commission.
 3. A Political Association recognized and granted provisional registration certificate shall automatically lose its recognition and have its provisional registration certificate withdraw by the commission unless it polls at least 10 per cent of the total number of votes cast in each of at least 24 states of the federation at the said Local Government Council Election provided that for this purpose the Federal Capital Territory shall be regarded as a state.
 11. After the said Local Government Council Election, any political Association which satisfies paragraph 10 (3) above shall be granted certificates of registration as a political party.
 12. Where only one political association satisfies the requirements of paragraph 10 (3) of these guidelines, the commission shall register one other political Association that scored ten percent of the total number of votes cast in the highest number of states of the federation.
 13. Where no Political Association satisfies the requirement of paragraph 10 (3) of these guidelines, the commission shall register two political parties that scored ten percent of the total number of votes cast in highest number of states of the federation.

14. Subject to paragraphs 12 and 13 of these guidelines, where two or more Political Association score ten percent of the total votes cast in equal number of states, the Political Association with the highest total number of votes cast at the election shall first be considered.
15. Any Political Association which fails to qualify for registration as a political party under paragraph 10 of these guidelines shall not be entitled to participate in subsequent elections conducted by the commission, or to canvass for votes for a candidate at any such election.
16. Any political party that fails to abide by the conditions of its registration as contained in these guidelines shall have its registration withdrawn.
17. Political parties registered in accordance with these guidelines shall conform to the following code of conduct:
 - (a) comply with the election laws and rules;
 - (b) co-operate with the Independent National Election Commission;
 - (c) show respect for the right of the voters and right of other political parties to campaign freely;
 - (d) desist from violence and use of inflammatory language;
 - (e) reject the use of corrupt practices, the offering of inducement etc; and
 - (f) assist in ensuring peaceful and orderly voting on polling day.

Before the guidelines were issued out, scores of Political Association were seeking for recognition, however, because of the stringent nature of the guidelines most of the Association merged while others disappeared. The most challenging of the rules was the one requiring aspiring associations to garner at least 10 percent of 36 states to

qualify for permanent registration. Unlike the Babangida and Abacha experiments where the electoral body embarked on compilation of parties' spread and organization, the actual tests of spread, followership and organization was anchored on a December 1998 Local Government Election after an initial short listing.

The Local Government Election was contested by nine accredited Political Associations. Of the 774 local government areas, the PDP won 465 (60%) APP 192 (25%) and AD 109 (152). The Abdulsalam government for obvious reasons of appeasing the western part of the country and to avoid two party structures, had to bend the INEC rules. The AD was registered after the rule requesting the parties to score 10% of total votes in 24 states was watered down. Other political parties like MDJ and PRP did not survive. The three registered political parties. PDP, APP and AD contested the subsequent elections and ushered the country into the Fourth Republic.

4.9 Politics of Political Opposition in the Nigeria's Previous Republics

The politics of opposition in the first Republic was characterized by an alternation and accumulation of two forms of political conflicts: one, the sectional rivalry between regional political elites for control of national resources, was all too familiar. This rivalry has been substantially heightened by the three – armed contest for national political power, culminating in the 1959 federal election campaign, in which the major parties, and in particular the AG used the unrest of the ethnic minorities to make inroads upon the political base of the opposition.

It appears that many of the tools of repression which were articulated under colonialism, and then refined by a new ruling elite following independence, were still being used to consolidate the state against its detractors.

The general point concerning the effect on political competition of “statism”, namely, a state owned or controlled economy supports the assertion that:

The circumstances most favourable for competitive politics exist when the access to violence and socio-economic sanction is either disposed or denied to both opposition and government. The least favourable circumstances exist when violence and socio-economic sanctions are exclusively available to government and denied to opposition. (Dahl: 1971.51)

In Nigeria the inequitable distribution of resources between government and opposition was ensured with the inception of colonial rule. With the composition of a “common authority”, the colonial government developed a highly authoritarian set of institutions, laws and tactics designed to administer the country and repress emerging African associations opposed to its rule. It was this authoritarian apparatus that was transferred from British to Nigeria at independence. In Nigeria, and elsewhere in African, one of the most important legacies of the colonial rule was the creation of institution of governance with a near monopoly of authority and absence of countervailing institutions (Burki 1969:356). The origin and total impact of “common authority”, as well as the nature of its transfer, all suggest that it is the “intended colonial rather than traditional institutions which are critical in understanding post independence political patterns between government and opposition in Nigeria.

The most important aspect of these colonial legacies was not simply the transfer of institutions, as it is often argued, but their nature. The nationalists were bequeathed a legacy designed to provide the government with a monopoly of coercion, sanctions and resources that could be used to maintain law and order, to repress opponents, and ultimately to discourage dissent or politics itself. It is the authoritarian nature of the

institution laws, and the similar ends for which they are used rather than the mere fact of their transfer, which is of more than passing interests.

The civil service which was created under colonial was, for instance, never apolitical being designed to ensure stability and the civilization of British rule. As such, one of its main goals was to control and curtail African politics within an administrative framework, to the extent that early associations appeared threatening, civil service had a army of laws and tactics which were used to stifle and, in some cases, to eliminate political groups. These measures included control over the licensing of public meetings.

The idea that parties, pressure groups and representative organs should become separate arms of governments was never more than a myth. First and last they were adjuncts of the colonial system. When they acted to buttress the regime, political groups were sometimes tolerated and used by the administration as supportive devices, when they threatened as challengers, they were stifled.

At independence, the Nigeria state inherited a centralized administration, regional oriented party and a relatively impotent legislature over five decades five (5) of admittedly authoritative rule had created a certain familiarity with the existing system of government, and a lack of experience with alternative forms of common authority to put in their place. The resources needed to device new-statewide institutions were meager, and in any case there seemed to be more pressing problems which demanded immediate attention after independence.

The legacy of a statist economy helps to explain why the inherited authoritarian apparatus was kept and used so effectively to blunt political opposition, and why it was

so important to retain political power. In both pre-and post independence periods, patronage as well as coercion was monopolized by the state.

During the pre-independence period, the colonial government attempted to create moderate middle class, not only to stabilize its rule but also to guarantee continuity after 1960. This class grew with weak entrepreneurial base was no accident; being tied to the state by virtue of the latter's monopoly over the access to resources, job and other economic reward. Political moderation and economic mobility were thus married, with politics providing access to wealth rather than the reverse. Consequently, losing power has economic consequences which highlighted the essential poverty and fragility of the middle class.

After independence, the economic reason for the relation of political power and the suppression of opposition become extremely important. As Apollo Njonjo has noted:

Political power at independence developed not an indigenous propertied class, but to a social stratum of property centers.... Although these political elite appear wealthy and known for conspicuous consumption, it is in reality poor elite: its wealth in houses, land, etc is mortgaged and dependent on state protection for the loans it had acquired. This further strengthens the rigidity since relinquishing political power would leave a number of this class saddled with debts. (Apollo: 2001).

With political and economic mobility wedded to the rise of an 'indebted middle class', Nigeria in the First Republic developed into what Lim (1971:194) called a "high risk system", where the typical response of office holders is to repress opposition. Consequently, there were good economic reasons to retain the coercive apparatus inherited from the colonial era.

A further legacy of statism in Nigerian even after independent in 1960 was the dependence on the state by one means or another was the most important avenue

available for economic mobility whether for an individual, a group or a district James Coleman and Roseberg here suggested that:

The selective use of patronage to assimilate or control political opposition or to enlist the support of politically dissent elements has extraordinary importance in the new African state because of the statist character of their societies. (Coleman and Roseberg: 1964:665)

Since the colonial government had curtailed the formation of a middle class with an independent enterpreurial base until late 1970s Nigeria's economy was tied to the metropolis. What this meant in terms of legacy was that the private sector was predominantly foreign owned, hence dependent on the state for licence to operate, it could not act as an independent source of power for political dissident in search of employment or other economic goods or for areas seeking development funds.

The oppositional politics of the Second Republic focused substantially on the balance of power between federal government and the states and what the opposition leaders referred to as "abuse of power by the ruling party. The political character of the group formed by the nine governor (mainly of the opposition parties" UPN and GNPP) was inspired by the prominence of the UPN and the GNPP leaders in the assault on the NPN. Awolowo in particular, continued his role as the most notable critic of the Federal government, and although Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim's opposition was less frequent and strident, but nevertheless emerged the perception of solid common ground between the two partners.

During the two-and-a-half years of the second Republic, the strength of opposition forces was tampered by a pair of alliances which the NPN had forged. One a formal agreement negotiated after the elections gave the NPP a share of executive and legislative offices in exchange for its co-operation with the NPN in the National

Assembly. The other a de-facto alignment, drew into the Federal Government's political orbit a growing number of NPP, GNPP, and PRP National Assembly members (mostly senators), who were by law prohibited from cross carpeting to NPN, but who gave it reliable and pivotal support in major legislative confrontations, while also publicly appealing for national unity and decrying the attacks on their party colleagues by the NPN led government.

But the NPP/NPN accord never worked as intended after the initial allocation of key leadership positions. The regular inter-party consultations, through which the NPP expected to be integrally involved in the shaping of national policies, were not forthcoming, and denied this participation the party withheld legislative support on several critical issues, including revenue allocation. As both a result further reinforcement of this lack of cooperation, the NPP's promised share of government appointments dwindled after the inauguration. On the July 1981 the party's leaders gave notice of their intention to end the agreements and the NPN simply called on them to do so with immediate effect (1989:9).

As the formal accord gradually weakened and disintegrated during the first two years, the informal alliance assumed greater and practical importance for the NPN led Federal Government and increased national political significance. Both developments presented a basic party realignment. What was notable about the dramatic announcement by the NPP to terminate its participation in the Federal Government was not simply that the party finally crossed this Rubicon, but that its justification echoed, point for point, the impassioned indictment of NPN abuse of power issued by the nine governors. Just as significantly, the NPP also echoed the tone of their spirited opposition,

condemning alleged abuses variously as ‘fascist’ tendencies, crimes, and hideous atrocities.

The political alliance of the opposition parties in the Second Republic was to a great extent geared toward winning elections. Naturally, the ability of the ‘progressive’ to come to power in 1983 would seem to depend on whether they could successfully forge the election alliance towards which they had been negotiating and struggling with throughout 1982. The road to the union had not been easy. Mutual suspicious persisted, as a result of which the UPN boycotted the inaugural party meetings in Jos, in early December 1981, although the following month they all reached broad agreement in Union on an electoral alliance to challenge the NPN in 1983. This was formally realized in Maiduguri in March, 1982. At the conclusion of three days of meeting, the leaders of the four parties or factions; Awolowo, Azikiwe, Waziri Ibrahim and Governor Rimi, representing PRP agreed to form Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) with Governing Council members comprising the chairmen of the four political parties that merged and the five progressive Governors.

Shortly after the formation of the alliance, the new party began to have some internal problems as a result Ibrahim Waziri of GNPP withdrew from the alliance. The decision of Waziri did not go well with majority members of the GNPP he was eventually expelled and replaced by Shettima Mustapha as the Chairman of the party.

The Alliance was primarily to present a consensus presidential candidate to challenge Shagari’s second term. Ethnic politics again resurfaced to scuttle what seemed to be a well-articulated opposition. However, the failure or the breakdown of the mega-opposition alliance was largely the inability PPA to either pick Azikwe or Awolowo as

the presidential candidate. The effort that would have been geared towards forming a credible and formidable opposition with clear and fixable policies was lost in the process of trying to settle problems within the new alliance. Unfortunately, this development gave the ruling NPN enough time and conducive environment to strategize with a view to winning the 1983 general elections.

In the Third Republic, there was no clear opposition party, just like the transition programme itself was still-born. The initial protests which greeted the annulment of the June 12 June, 1993 presidential election were spearheaded by a civil rights organization known as the Campaign for Democracy (CD). It called for mass protest, boycotts and civil disobedience which received wide support from the generality of the Southwestern part of the country. The government responded to the protests by violently repressing the opposition. Unfortunately for the opposition group, the propaganda machinery of the regime was a formidable one which succeeded eventually in weakening national agitation for the restoration of the results of 1993 elections. Majority of the members of political elite as represented by those who were active in the NRC and the SDP, were more interested in seeking new opportunities for access to power and resources and less on the struggle for enthronement of democracy in the country.

During Abacha's regime, National Democratic Alliance (NADECO), the leading opposition group was started as a loose coalition of distinct organizations that had their autonomous structures and leadership. These organizations include: Egbe Afenifere or the People Consultative Forum (PCF), the Movement for National Restoration (MNR), Campaign for Democracy (CD), the Eastern Mandate Union (EMU) and a host of others (Champion in February, 1995:11). NADECO was the brain child of 49 prominent

Nigerians, among them former military and civilian governors, leading politicians, business executives, intellectuals and human rights activists. Prominent among them were Anthony Enahoro, Micheal Ajasin, Bolaji Akinyemi, Bola Tinubu, Odigie Oyegun, Christian Onoh, Chukwaemaka Ezeife, Arthur Nwankwo, Abraham Adesanya, Bola Ige, Conelius Adebayo, and Idibusi Kanu etc.

In articulating its opposition to Abacha Junta, NADECO built its campaign strategy on efforts at ensuring that the regime was denied local acceptance and international legitimacy. Central to this was its insistence that the resolution of the crisis created by the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 crisis must be the starting point for efforts at restoring political normalcy in Nigeria. Again, the strategy of the NADECO could not work effectively, first because the military regime had labeled the group as a secessionist group, secondly when the military regime Unbanned political activities and gave the go-ahead for politicians to form political associations, some of the prominent members of this organisation opted out to join or form political associations with the hope that the regime might give them the necessary freedom to form political associations.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ALL NIGERIA PEOPLE'S PARTY (ANPP)

5.1 Introduction

The processes that led to the formation of the ANPP (formally known as the APP) were untidy, chaotic and characterized by sectional and personality clashes with almost irreconcilable differences. However, on the second of September 1998, amidst these rivalries, a new political party was formed; this party was the APP. Bola Ige, Umar Shikanfi and Olusola Saraki were the prominent leaders of the groups that fused to form APP. In his words, Ige said: "this is the winning party", the statement was originally credited to statement made by Awolowo on the 23 of December 1982. This prophetic statement had followed his (Awolowo) thought that a time would come in Nigeria when the good people in all political parties would come together in a political association that would restore Nigeria's glory. Bola's Ige said:

..... the APP will grow from strength to strength. God has commented this fellowship. This is the winning party. The All Peoples Party, by the grace of God, will make it good for Nigeria. Nigeria will see a difference.

5.2 The Formation of the All Peoples Party (APP)

On the August 28 1998, representatives of two major political platforms; the Conference of Fused Associations (CFA) and the United Nigeria People Party (UNPP) led by the Umaru Shinkafi and the Southern Leaders Forum (SLF) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) led by Bola Ige.

The two major political groups along with all other like minded Nigerians came together for the formation of virile; broad based and disciplined political party APP. The vision we have for the party, if actualized will keep "our brethren in the military permanently within the origins of their noble provision. This vision is good governance, the type that will be responsible, responsive, acceptable, fair and people oriented. (Interview with Mahmud Waziri.2009)

Some of the 34 component associations that formed part of APP included: All Nigerian Congress (ANC) Peoples, Congress (PC), United Nigeria People Party (UNPP), National Unity Forum (NUF), New Era Alliance (NERA), Democratic Vanguard (DV), Eastern Platform (EP). Under SLF/UDP are: Peoples Consultative Forum (PCF), Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), United Democratic Party (UDP). Others are Edo Professional Movement (EPM), Cross River Profession (CRP), and Eastern like minds form (ELMF) e.t.c.

The first disagreement, though minor was the inclusion of Nigeria in the name of the party to read; All Peoples Party of Nigeria (APPN) as proposed by Iwanyawu but Shinkafi and Bola Ige rejected the proposal.

A cross section of Nigerians spoke, some passionately at the gathering prior to the formation of the APP. Shinkafi for example said; the Associations that came together to form APP were comprised of seasoned politicians who know what it takes to form a formidable and a winning political party. (New Nigerian.September 23.1998)

However others expressed disaffection with the presence of some politicians, arguing their presence would not bring good omen to the party. For example Senator Francis Spanner was not happy with visibleness of Adedibu at the launch. To him: "Adedibu being on the high table is an insult on the integrity of Nigerians. He is here today and there tomorrow" (Spanner 1998). On a similar view, Chukwuemeka Ezeife played down the threat of Arthur Nzerible's ABN to the Party (APP) saying: no body is going to allow any anti party and antidemocracy element in the gathering'. This implies that there would be party discipline.

On the whole, the following were the prominent politicians that attended the launching of the party, classified according to their geo political zones.

<p>North- East Umar Shinkafi, Isa Mohammed, Tanko Yakasai, Sule Ahmed, , Sarkin Tafida, Saidu Barde, Usman Sani Sani, Isiyaku Ibrahim, Dabo Mohammed Lere, Adamu Augie, Bello Mallam Yusuf, Magaji Abdullahi, Saminu Turaki, Buba Aliyu, Musa Hajara, Samaila Mamman, e.t.c</p>
<p>North-Central: Mohammed Lawal, Salisu Motun, Alfred Abah, Ibrahim Dan Musa, Farouk Abdul-Azeez, Joe Garba, Saleh Hassan, Abubakar Saraki, Sha’aba Lafiagi, Nuhu Aliyu, Isiyaku Mohammed Musa Inuwa, Wash Pam, Etc.</p>
<p>North- West: Ibrahim Kashim Imam, Maina Ma’aji Lawan, Abubakar Ashiru, Saleh Michika, David Barau, Ibrahim Shehu Kwatalo, Saleh Michika, Saleh Usman, Ahmed Aruwa, Garba Sadiq, U.J. Maina, Mahmud Warizi, Adamu Aliyu, Dahiru Mohammed, Lema Jabril, Jabril Aminu Iya Abubakar, Abubakar Hashidu, Jolly Tanko-Yusuf.</p>
<p>South- West: Bola Ige, Kola Balogun, Bode Olajumoke, Hammed Kusamotu, Saka Adebite Balogun, Ayo Opatodun, Lai Balogun, Alani Bakole, Isiaka Adeleke, Jelili Amoloye, Tade Ipadeola, Onikepo Oshodi, Wahab Dosumu, Ayo Adebajo, Jacob Adigun, Yekini Adejo, C.O. Marades (Mrs), Segun Agagu, Johnson Akinsolu, Kofowora Akerele. Bucknor, Dosu Ladipo, Olu Falae, Lamidi Adedibu, Bode Olowodoku.</p>
<p>South-South: Samuel Sango, Rufus Ada George, S. Amuse, Jethro Akum, Akpan Isemin, Clarkson Majomi, Pere Ajuwa, Sonny Jackson Udoh, Taribo Sekibo, Florence Ita-Giwa, Anthony Ani, Mfom Amana, Tulu Briggs, Christie Akpan, Joseph Wayas, Peter Odili Okpo-Umanh,.</p>
<p>South –East: Chief Emmanuel Iwanyanwu, Sam Mbakwe, Arthur Nzeribe Pat Abii, Hyde Onugu, Victor Idili, Ogbonaya Onu, Chukwu-emeka, Ezeife, Ifeanyi Ararume, Max Uduagube, Ben Obi, Obinna Nnaji, Okechukwu Arah, Pat Nsobundu, Jonny Ucheaga, Jimmy Imo, Suny Okolo, G.S. Agboh and Ebenezer Ikejina.</p>

Shinkafi said: even though we could not boast of high ranking military officers in our midst, we were blessed with grassroots politicians. (Interview with Shinkafi: 2009).

5.3 The Pulling Out of Afenifere

Leader of Afenifere and the Southern Leaders Forum explained why they pulled out of the All People Party (APP). They accused the APP Chieftains of a lack of desire to ensure that all parties concerned in the negotiation to come together keep to their words. Ayo Adebajo in particular accused the APP leaders of not showing any signs that they would keep to the agreement on fundamental issues such as power shift, true federalism and derivation as a major factor in sharing natural revenue.

Briggs, one of the chieftains of Afenifere said:

Our thinking was that we were forming a party with honourable men, I went in to it with all my mind and honesty, when I tell you, yes, it is yes and my no is no, if one notices that there is lack of truth from the beginning and you are tricked at every turn, you have to rectify it. (Vanguard .24th September, 1998)

The negotiation between southern leaders forum and the All Nigerian Congress (ANC) led by Alhaji Umar Shinkafi men anchored on the agreement that the two groups were equal. It was also agreed that other groups interested in teaming up with the party would come in through either the forum or the ANC. This agreement was breached, according to Adebayo; the disagreement started manifesting with the coming of new associations that joined the APP through the Conference of Fused Associations. The new comers were immediately asking for equality with the associations on the ground.

The new comers, according to Adebajo, eventually wanted to take over the Party while some key decisions were taken without the knowledge of the founding members. One of these groups whose inclusion angered Afenifere often was the United Nigeria Peoples Party. The presence of Sam Mbakwe, Joseph Wayas, and Joe Garba did not go

down well with Ige and Adesanya, who regarded them as military apologists. These were many of the confusions that trailed the party prior to inauguration of the APP.

Olu Falae, from the beginning never wanted to be part of the APP. His complaint was the composition of the party. He said:

From the briefing, I got, again is full of credible Nigerians many of them my friends for whom I have respect. But if you look at its composition, it could not boast of credible leaders from the Middle Belt. This is a structural deformity that I have noticed not only in APP but also in the PDP (The Guardian news paper August 12, 1998).

The above statement contradicted the overall stance of the Afenifere who was not after geographical spread but the credibility and the track records of some members. The pulling out of Afenifere was largely because of the presence of some “discredited politicians” whose interests and past dealings were totally anti Yoruba. Also, their pulling out was linked to presidential politics within the APP. Afenifere had canvassed a prior agreement to make the South West zone produce APP’s presidential candidate. However, some powerful members of the APP like Saraki never wanted that to happen because of his personal interest on the ticket, so he joined forces with the Eastern Mandate to intimidate Afenifere

Ben Obi specifically and openly voiced out his objection to the request by the Afenifere to exclude certain personalities from the APP. He said:

I don’t agree that the people from Southwest should tell those of us from the South East that Chief Nzeribe should not be in the group. No, they cannot dictate to us, they can talk about Bode Olajumoke, and Lamidi Adedibu. We know that Nzeribe is an asset to us.

The agreement to form the APP was reached between the Peoples Consultative Forum (PCF) and the Conference of Fused Associations (CFA) on 28 August, 1998. The agreement did not exclude other associations or groups of individuals. At the meeting

preparatory to the launching of APP, the PCF surprisingly demanded that the APP should reject the membership of the UNPP, NUF, and several individuals. The reason for the request was that they could not be in the same party with the personalities concerned. But the APP refused to accept their requests. Shinkafi explains why the APP refused to accept the PCF's request:

It should be noted for the sake of record that, no serious political party in the democratic world would deny membership to any citizen wanting to join it. Besides, the guidelines of INEC especially require a political association to open its membership to every Nigerian of 18 years of age and above (Interview with Shinkafi.2009).

Adedibu's offence was that he canvassed for the continuation of late Gen. Abacha's regime which Afenifere opposed and saw it as an 'inglorious act'. Olajumoke Bode was part of the Abacha transition programme perceived by the Afenifere purists as a sham, and Nzeribe's action was the immediate reason why the general election result of June 1993 was annulled by causing judicial congestion which precipitated the action of President Babangida. These complaints were already made loud by the Afenifere and we told them to bear with the offenders as we are in reconciliatory environment (Interview with Umaru Shinkafi.2009).

The last straw that broke the camels back was a request by Affenifere and their southern allies that members of the United Nigerian People's Party (UNPP) should not be admitted into the group. The UNPP was made up of mostly former United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) members, NUF, which was masterminded by Dr. Saraki had mostly former Congress for National Consensus (CNC) faithfuls as members. Their offences were that they participated in the discredited Gen. Abacha's transition and were

as such members of the “five fingers” of a leprous hand” which should not be associated with.

These differences among the groups appeared not reconcilable. As Shinkafi put it:

I used all my political skills to convince the aggrieved party members, but I could not convince the Ige led group to come down from their moral high horse. When it became obvious that we could not continue with them, we went ahead to officially launch the APP as political party. However, we were mindful of this acrimonious beginning, so we put in place mechanism to reconcile the aggrieved individuals and groups (interview with Umaru Shinkafi, 2009).

In acrimonious mood the party interim executive members were hurriedly put in place, however, the leadership was given two weeks to conduct elections to elect the substantive members of the executives. The table below shows the first executive members of the ANPP.

Table 5.1 PIONEERING NATIONAL OFFICERS OF THE APP

	Names of Official	Position
A	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN	
	1 Senator Mahmud Waziri	Protém National Chairman
	2 Chief Alani Bankole	Protém Deputy Nat. Chairman
	3 Alh. Haliru, A Kafur	Protém. Nat. Vice Chairman
	4 Chief Omezue A.O. Ekoli	Protém Nat. Vice Chairman
	5 Hon. Shekari	Protém. Nat. Vice Chairman
	6 Sir. S.T.O Giwa Amu	Protém. Nat. Vice Chairman
B	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARY	
	7 Chief Ben Obi	Protém National Sec
	8 N/East Zone	Protém Deputy National Sec
	9 Mr. James Duru Magaji	Protém Asst. Nat. Secretary
	10 Barrister Lionel Jonathan	Protém Asst. Nat. Secretary
	11 Chief Jerry Okoro	Protém Asst. Nat. Secretary
	12 Alh. Ganiyu Akande	Protém.Asst.Nat.Secretary
A	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL TREASURER	
	13 Senator Chief Victor Odili	Protém. National Treasurer
B	OFFICE OF THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY	
	14 Prince Abubakar Audu	Protém Nat. Finance Secretary
C	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL AUDITOR	
	15 Alh. Saminu Turaki	Protém Nat. Auditor
	16 Chief Onyibo Chukwu	Protém Nat. Auditor
D	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL ORGANISING SECRETARY	
	17 Alh. Isiyaku Mohammed	Protém Organising Sec
	18 Chief F. Eluemuno	Protém Asst. Nat. Org. Sec.
	19 Bar. Inuwa Abdulkadir	Protém Asst. Nat. Org. Sec
	20 Chief D.A. Etaluku	Protém Asst. Nat. Org. Sec
	21 Chief Mrs O. Oshodi	Protém Asst. Nat. Org. Secr
E	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL PUBLICITY SECRETARY	
	22 Sen. Remi Okunriboye	Protém Nat. Pub. Secretary
	23 Alh. Saidu Dansadau	Protém Nat. Asst Pub. Secretary (i)
	24 Mr. Mathias Udonyang	Protém Nat. Pub. Secretary(ii)
	25 Mr. Kayode Olowu	Protém Nat. Pub. Secretary(iii)
F	OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL ADVISER	
	26 Bar. Mike Anace	Protém Nat Legal Adviser
	27 Bar. Danladi Bamayi	Protém Asst. Nat. Legal Adv
	28 Dr. Domini Nwangbe	Protém Asst. Nat. Legal Adv
	29 Mr. O. Onadipo	Protém Asst. Nat. Legal Advi

G	OFFICE OF THE NAT SOC. SEC		
	30	Mrs. Sarah Dokotiri	Protem Nat. Social Sec
	31	Hajiya Azumi Bebeji	Protem Asst. Nat. Soc. Secr
	32	Chief (Dr.)Selina Ugwoke	Protem Asst. Nat. Soc. Secr
	33	Mrs. Etamu J. Oluyi	Protem Asst. Nat. Soc. Secr
	34	Hon. J.O. Igo	Protem Asst. Nat. Soc. Sec
J	NATIONAL EX. OFFICIO MEMBERS		
	35	Alh. Umaru Shinkafi	Ex. Officio member
	36	Chief Arthur Nzeribe	Ex. Officio member
	37	Dr. Olusola Saraki	Ex.Officio member
	38	Dr. Joseph Wayas	Ex.Officio member
	39	Chief Lai Balogun	Ex.Officio member

Source: New Nigerian, September 20, 1998

Shortly after the inauguration of the National Officers of the APP, the National leadership, nominated party stalwarts to form National Harmonization teams. The decision by the leadership of the APP to form harmonization teams was aimed at settling disputes among its members in all states (Shinkafi. 2009).

This effort was a commendable one, for an association still recovering from the shock arising from the sudden withdrawal of Peoples consultative Forum (Afenifere) from its ranks, it would be suicidal to allow any further intra-party crisis in its fold, particularly crisis ranging from the selection of the party executives in most of the states. For example, the Lagos Frontiers, Women Forum and Untied Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP as well as New Era were already accusing the All Nigeria Congress (ANC), Democratic Vanguard, Unity 99 and National Unity Forum of monopolizing the posts.

In Kano state, similar situation obtained. The UNPP led by Alhaji Kabiru Gaya picked the gauntlet against Alhaji Magaji Abdullahi –led group for filling the executive posts with its loyalist (Interview with Sen Dansadau 2009).

Many other states across the federation questioned the basis for the selection of its executives which they believed favours some individuals and their groups. These teams were to prepare the ground for the party by reconciling some of obvious disputes amongst its members at the various state chapters with a view to ensuring success for the party at the December 1998 local government elections which INEC used as the yard stick for granting provisional registration to political associations.

TABLE 5.2 THE NATIONWIDE POSTINGS OF THE NATIONAL HARMONIZATION TEAMS OF THE ALL PEOPLES PARTY (APP)

S/no		
1	Benue State H/Team	a) Rev. Hyde Onuaguluchi b) Mr. Gbazuagu N. Gbazuagu
2	Abia State H/Team	a) Engr. Jimmy Asoegwu b) Ms. Linda Chuba Ikpeazu c) Dr. Are d) Dr. Aneze Chinwuba e) Mr. Okey Odunze
3	Ebonyi State H/Team	a) Dr. J.C. Odunna b) Chief Ifeanyi Arorumo c) Barrister Nwanwa
4	Anambra State H/Team	a) Dr. Max Ndauaguibe b) Dr. G. Amuta c) Prince Vincent Ogbulafor
5	Imo State H/Team	a) Dr. Ogbonnaya Onu b) Chief Chris Nwankwo c) Mr. Frank N. Ogbuewe
6	Ogun State H/Team	a) Chief Babs Akerele b) Alhaji Bode Abdullahi c) Chief Semiu Kukoyi
7	Lagos State H/Team	a) Eng. Mufutau Ayorinde b) Chief Niyi Adegbenro
8	Oshun State H/Team	a) Chief Lai Balogun b) Dr. Mohammed Kola Balogun c) Chief Anjorin Ohun
9	Oyo State H/Team	a) Chief Bayo Salami b) Chief Bayo Olagunju c) Mrs. Atinuke Oyawoye d) Mrs. Alege
10	Ekiti State H/Team	a) Dr. Segun Agagu b) Amb. Adeyanju
11	Delta State H/Team	a) Alh. (Chief) Yisa Braimoh b) Chief Emmanuel Ijewere c) Col. Paul Ogbemor (rtd)
12	Delta State H/Team	a) Chief Gamaliel Onosode b) Engr. Moses Kragha c) Chief Sunny Omatseye
13	Bayelsa State H/Team	a) Chief Rufus Ada George b) Chief Ebenezer Isokrari

		c) Chief Levy Braide
14	Rivers State H/Team	a) Chief Pere Ajuwa b) Chief Francis Doukplogha c) Prince Ereh
15	C/Rivers State H/Team	a) Obong Akpan Isemin b) Chief Sunny Jackson Udoh c) Dr. Mfon Amana d) Chief (Dr.) Ime Umana
16	A/Ibom H/Team	a) Mrs. Florence Ita-Giwa b) Mr. Clement Ebri c) Dr. Emmanuel Nsan
17	Ondo State H/Team	a) Otunba Niyi Adebayo b) Chief Bode Olowonporoku
18	Enugu State H/Team	a) Chief Steve Lawani b) Arc. Joe Kyaagba
19	Kaduna State H/Team	a) Major Gen. Joe Garba (rtd) b) Alhaji Ibrahim N. Mantu c) Chief Jethro M. Akun d) Hajiya Jamila Shehu Gwandu
20	Kogi State H/Team	a) Alh. Aliyu Doma b) Alh. Tanko Abdullahi (S/Yaki) c) Alhaji Walid Jibril d) Hon. Hajiya Zainab Oga
21	Bauchi State H/Team	a) Mr. Danbaba Suntai b) Alhaji Abubakar Gidado c) Alhaji Hamza Ribadu
22	Borno State H/Team	a) Senator Hamma Bello b) Mr. Paul Luguja c) Alh. Moh. Kwairanga Matawalle Jada
23	Adamawa State H/Team	a) Alh. Ma'aji Maina Lawan b) Senator Ali Modu Sheriff c) Alha. Abba Gana Terab d) Alh. Waziri K. Mohammed
24	Gombe State H/Team	a) Garba Maidugu b) Khalifa Hassan Yusuf c) Alh. Rukar Abba Ibrahim d) Alh. Usman Albishir
25	Taraba State H/Team	a) Alhaji Adamu T/Balewa- Ajiya b) Alhaji Umaru Ahmed-Majindadi c) Alhaji Ibrahim Aminu Sale
26	Yobe State H/Team	a) Alh. Abubakar Hashidu b) Alhaji Dahiru Mohammed c) Alhaji Mohammed I. Hassan d) Alh. A.Y. Gombe e) Alhaji Sai'idu Shehu Awak
27	Plateau State H/Team	a) Alh. Suleiman Ahmed b) Alhaji Dabo Lere c) Alhaji Suleiman Zuntu d) Alhaji Mukhtar Ahmed Aruwa
28	Niger State H/Team	a) R/Admiral Moh. Lawal b) Dr. Mohammed Gali c) Alhaji Danmusa d) Dr. Alimi Abdularazaq
29	Nassarawa State H/Team	a) Dr. Alex Kadiri b) Chief (Mrs) Comfort Aipeku

		c) A.I.G AHmadu Sheidu
30	Kwara State H/Team	a) Dr. Musa Inuwa b) Alhaji Y. Y. Sani c) Alhaji Moh. Sani Musa
	FCT Team to join Niger Team for Harmonization works in Kwara State	d) Alhaji Musa Tanko Abari e) Chief Emmanuel Nnabuife f) Alhaja Basirat Aji Borisha
31	Kano State H/Team	a) Alhaji Attahiru Bafarawa b) Senator Idris Samaho c) Alhaji Sa'idu Dan Sadau
32	Jigawa State H/Team	a) Ambassador MZ Anka b) Senator Idris Samabo c) Alhaji Hamat Mohammed
33	Katsina State H/Team	a) Alh. Bello Alkali b) Senator Bala Tafidan Yawuri c) Alhaji Usman Sara
34	Kebbi State H/Team	a) Alh. Saidu Barda b) Alh. Ismaila Mamman c) Senator Kanti Bello d) Alhaji Abdullahi Barba Aminci
35	Sokoto State H/Team	a) Enr. Magaji Abdullahi b) Alh. Musa Gammo c) Arc. Kabiru I. Gaya d) Col. Isa Kachako (Rtd)
36	Zamfara State H/Team	a) Alh. Bello Maitama Yusuf b) Alh. Ibrahim Shehu Kwatolo c) Alh. Ibrahim Saminu Turaki d) Alh. Mohammed Alkali
37	FCT Harmonization Team	a) Alhaji Idi Farouk b) Dr. Ademola Adebo c) Alhaji Sa'idu Umar Kumo d) Dr. Tunde Makoju e) Chief Levy Braide

Source: National Secretariat, Abuja: Monday, 14th September 1998

5.4 The APP and December 1998 Local Council Polls

Statistics showed that APP scored more votes than the PDP in most states, although it won lesser seats (INEC Report of 1998). The performance of the APP in states like Sokoto, Kaduna and Kebbi was far below expectation. Some factors were responsible for this dismal performance in these states. Firstly, the party was up against some notable and strong politicians, majority of who were in PDP. For instance, in Kaduna State, the presences of Mahmud Tukur, Ahmed Makarfi, Nuhu Babajo, Musa Bello and Shekari Stephen in the PDP virtually relegated the APP to the second fiddle role in the state.

In Kano, APP had to contend with the Rimi factor with ample support from the likes of Abba Dabo, Usman Alhaji, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso e.t.c. these politicians have grassroots political experience and also enjoy much support of the people of Kano.

The polls from the North-East zone of Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Yobe, Taraba and Gombe could be linked to the political machinery of the Yar'Adua group in the PDP who dominated the political activities of this zone. Therefore, it was not a major surprise to many when the APP failed to make any political mark in this zone.

In South-South and South East geo-political zones, APP had a poor show. Two things stood out as being responsible for the poor performance. The "Consensus plague of the Abacha era was most noticeable in these areas. The APP could not conduct and conclude to its local council primaries in some places. From Enugu state it was reported that while the PDP held primaries to produce candidates for all Chairmanship and Councillorship positions in the 17 L.Gs, the APP Primaries took place in only four Local Governments, other Local Councils were arranged by consensus, meaning that protest votes were recorded.

Whichever way the APP viewed the issue of consensus, many Nigerians drawn at the consensus candidate who gained currency during the Abacha transformation era. While consensus candidacy may not be antithetical to democracy, however, in a situation where there are many contending candidates, they should be allowed to test their popularity. In seeking for consensus, merit and ability often times give way to money and primordial loyalties or sentiments leading, more often than not, to the emergence of unpopular candidate. In most cases, where it happens that way, aggrieved personalities may change their alliance to soothe their intended interests.

Despite the obvious cracks and loopholes in the party prior to the local governments polls, the party still made some marks. Having made its point on the partisan nature of the local government polls, a line of actions thus emerged. That having revealed to the country on the imminent dangers ahead, the APP could go ahead to participate in the transition while expecting a level playing field both within and outside the party.

5.50 The APP's Guidelines for Governorship Primaries of 1998

1. Primaries to choose governorship candidates shall hold through the nation on Tuesday 22nd, 1998, by state congress election, in a public location, designated by the state congress. Primaries shall hold between 9.00am and 3.00pm. All members of the party shall participate and qualify to vote.
2. Three congress supervisors appointed from the National Secretariat shall supervise the entire primaries in a state. They shall make all returns to the National Secretariat. They shall be posted to the states other than those of their origin and place of residence.
3. Zoning: The principle of zoning, federal character and geographical spread shall be respected at all times.
4. Results of Primaries:
 - 4.1 All results of primaries conducted in every state shall be entered only in the officially prescribed forms signed by the National Secretary.
 - 4.2 A candidate shall be declared a winner by simple majority of votes cast.
 - 4.3 a. should there be a tie, a run off shall be conducted immediately between only the candidates who have tied with the highest votes; shall be declared the winner by simple majority.

5. 0 Conduct for primaries

5.1 Congress for primaries shall be called to order by the leader of the National Congress supervisors.

5.2 Accreditation of membership shall be done to ensure strict compliance with the membership register of the ward.

5.3 The NCS shall announce names of contestants and call for presentation of Aspirant's agents.

5.4 Voting shall be by open ballot system and counting should be loud enough to avoid doubts.

5.5 Where candidates are returned unopposed, the said candidate shall be deemed to have been voted for by acclamation of the congress present for primaries.

5.6 All results shall be singed by the aspirant's agents and the returning officers, but refusal to sign by agents shall not invalidate the elections.

5.7 All results shall be announced on the spot by the National Congress Supervisor.

FEES

6.0 Application forms duly signed by the National Secretary shall be obtained on payment of a non-refundable fee of N50, 000.00 in Bank drafts form the state secretariat of APP. INEC fees, different from the above, are paid only by successful aspirants.

Other Requirements:

Every aspirant shall satisfy all conditions by INEC for the election and shall have passed the party screening exercise in the first instance.

In line with the item number above, the party in the 19th December 1998 through Chief Dr. J.C. Odunna, the then National Secretary of the party released the names of the National Congress Supervisors according to geo-political zones.

North– West:

1. Sokoto: Hajia Fatimah Mohammad / Alhaji Gad Shinkafi / Alhaji Garba A. Kaloma.
2. Kebbi: Alhaji Haliru Kafur / Alhaji Sule Ahmed / Alhaji Sani Buhari.
3. Zamfara: Col. Senator Isa Kachako (Rtd), Mallam M.A. Tudun Wada/Hajiya A.N. Bebeji.
4. Katsina: sani Garba Taura/Alhaji Sani Isa/Alhaji Lawan Yunusa Danzomo.
5. Kano: Chief M.O. Nlemigbo/Alhaji Abdu Maghi/Alhaji Hanusu Gambo.
6. Jigawa: Sen. Adamu Augie / Alhaji Isyaku Mohammad Alhaji Umaru Ahmed.
7. Kaduna: Alhaji Ibrahim Saminu Turaki/Abdullahi/Alhaji Magaji Abdullahi/ Alhaji Yusuf Sani.

North- East:

Bauchi: Alhaji Saleh Hassan/Mr. Meden Teneke/Mr. James Bawa Magaji.
Borno: Sen. Mahmud Ahmed/Alhaji Aminu Bamaga/ Sen. A.A. Waziri.
Gombe: Alhaji Ahmed Modibo/Sen. Adamu Bauchi/Alhaji Saidu Dansadau.
Adamawa: Saidu Umar Kumo/Hon. Ishaku Sharah/Mr. Amo Riga.
Taraba: Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf / Ibrahim Modibo/Sani Umar.
Yobe: Alhaji Abba Goma Terab / Muhammad Nur Mustapha/ Alhaji Garba Mohammed Gardi.

North-Central

Plateau: Chief Chekwes Okorie/Dr. Segun Oyefule / Hon. Janet Okwara
Benue: Senator Suleiman Azare/Senator D. Abanida
Nasarawa: Sen. Wash Pam / Hon. Ibrahim Ebbo/Alhaji. Y.Y. Sani
Niger: Chief H.B.C. Ogboko/Comrade Pascal Bafyan/Chief Jerry Okoro.
Kwara: Dr. Alex Kadiri/Ambassador Sani Idokoji/Mrs. Helen Gomwalk.
Kogi: Alhaji Akwe Doma/Ali Abubakar / Bashirat Ajiborishade
FCT: Chief Ben Obi / Alhaji Musa Etudaye / Hon. G.G. Barde.

South-East

Abia: Alhaji Idi Farouk/Bar. Independence Eyinda/Chief G.N. Unwha.
Anambra: Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf/Chief Chris Nwankwo/Chief Sonny Jackson Udoh.
Enugu: Mrs Florence Ita- Giwa/Omeque Tony Ekoh/Mrs Ushie Egbelo.
Imo: Alhaji Shehu Kujaddadi/Chief Alexis Anieto/Chief Ime Idiyang.
Ebonyi: Chief C.Y. Maduabum/Alhaji S.I. Kumoh / Mrs Helen Atte.

South –West

Ekiti: Bayo Olagunju/Alhaji Tunyi Yusuf/Mrs Pele Hassan
Ondo: Chief Anjorin Ohun/Engr Rufus Oyegbile/Alhaji Dauda Adegboyega.
Ogun: Y.O. Gafaru / Pastor Segun Ode Wande / Mr. G.O. Muraina
Lagos: O. Ayorinde/Chief Mrs. C.O. Maradesa/Mrs. Binta Koji.

Osun: Chief Oladosu Oshimowo/Alhaji Ganiyu Akande/Chief N.A> Akinyemi.
Oyo: Dayo Abatan/Mrs Jimoh Akirnrinbola/Dr. Bola Ayanwale.

South– South

Akwa/Ibom: Bayo Oseyemi/GOC Minimah / Chief Dr. Eddy Anyanwu.
Bayelsa: Dr. Reginald Nwankwoala/Alhaji Sule Sayuri/Chief (Elder) Ebri Usani Eteng.
Cross River: Dr. Ademola Adebo/Dr. J.B. Egbberike/Chief Mrs Harriet Onyenucheya.
Delta: Sir, Steve Giwa – Amu/Chief (Dr.) Nya Ejoma Auguo/Mrs Dan Kemebiye
Edo: High chief Dr. Emmanuel Nsan / Chief Dr. Joe Iroegbu/Chief Mrs Remi Kuku.
Rivers: Hajiya Zainab Ogah/Senator J.K. Umaru/Chief Jerry Okoro.

5.51 The APP and December 1998 Governorship Primaries

The three dominant political parties namely; APP, AD and PDP approached the governorship primaries from different strategies. The alliance for Democracy (AD) was to pick the candidates at the caucus of elders. The thinking was that a caucus would save the AD, which had postured as a credible platform.

Advocates of the caucus strategy, cited the embarrassment caused the party by the “emergence of some military policies such as coercion and consensus as witnessed in the December 5 councils polls, especially in Lagos State. But the caucus plea was stoutly rejected at the party’s South-West caucus meeting in Ogun State. But in the end, it was a mix of consensus and open primaries. For the PDP, candidates emerged largely by census in some states like Akwa-Ibom and Lagos states, and open primaries conducted by party representatives appointed by the national executive of the party.

The All Peoples Party (APP) followed the same process. Primaries were conducted by representatives appointed from states, other than theirs, on the basis of the below guidelines drawn and published by the natural executive of the party.

The results from the primaries created a lot of disputes, ranging from lack of internal democracy to lack of transparency and hijack of the primaries by some political oligarch. The disputations led to petitions and protests, and in some cases court actions. These no doubt, made the process untidy and affected the performance of the A.P.P at the polls. The outcome of the elections saw the APP been restricted to the Northern part of country where all the nine States the party won came from.

5.6 The A.P.P Presidential Primaries of 1999

The presidential primaries of 1999 were not different from the earlier primaries conducted during the transition period. There was hardly transparency and neither was the constitution of the party followed.

After the APP presidential primaries, Dr. Ogbonnaya Onu, emerged as the flag bearer of the party. However, the victory was short lived. In what looked as a cheap political horse trading, the A.P.P decided to dump its own candidate and opt for that of the A.D. Olu Falae.

In 1999, the APP, a fairly strong party, had gone into alliance with A.D. since the APP was next to the PDP in terms of electoral strength, it was expected that its coalition arrangement with AD would see APP as a senior partner. It was on the basis of APP's electoral edge over AD that it was agreed that the alliance would go into the elections with the name of A.P.P. This political calculation of the time was necessary in order to present a formidable platform that would successfully challenge the P.D.P.

Consequently, when Dr. Ogbonnaya emerged as the presidential flag bearer of the APP, it was widely believed that there would be no difficulty in choosing between him and the A.D. presidential candidate Chief Olu Falae.

This arrangement did not go down well with some notable members of the party. In a bid to calm down the situation within the alliance and to convince the nation, the then National Chairman of the Party, Senator Mahmud Waziri came out to tell the nation, in a paid announcement on NTA, on the 25th February 1999, that there was nothing unusual in what the party did.

... Pursuant to and in compliance with the terms of the alliance (with the A.D.) the names of Dr. Ogbonnaya Onu of the APP, and that of Chief Olu Falae of the A.D. were forwarded to a meeting of Joint AD/APP Alliance Working Committee for consideration. Thereafter, the joint committee chose chief Falae as the Alliance candidate and his name was accordingly submitted to the INEC, (Waziri, 1999).

The rationale behind the choice of Olu Falae by the joint working committee was never explained to the public by the parties involved, neither has Ogbonnaya Onu ever expressed his reservation on the issue. However, Shinkafi maintained that:

There was a prior agreement between the aspirants of the APP that whoever emerged as the APP candidate would have to face the screening of the bi partisan panel of both APP and AD to determine who would finally emerged .In principle, Onu agreed (Interview with Umaru Shinkafi.2009).

This partly explains why Onu has not made any public statement expressing his reservation on the whole deal but it has continued to be a point of reference as lack of internal democracy and bad leadership within the APP (Interviews with Gen Buhari and Sen.Sani Ahmed Yerima.2009).

Part of the reason why Falae was preferred had to do with the support each candidate might get from their respective zones. There was no comparison between the levels of support Falae of AD would bring to the Alliance with the support Onu would bring from his zone. In the South-East, the PDP at that time had taken a full grip of the area, winning all the states and controlled the majority

in the State Assemblies, while AD was clearly the dominant party in the Southwest. On the reason why Onu was not compensated with the running mate slot, Shinkafi said:

“Against the background that the PDP had captured the East, and our presidential candidate from the West, it was decided that a northerner should be a running mate to Falae, considering the fact that the APP was most dominant in the North. However, Onu was promised to be compensated afterwards” (Interview with Shinkafi, 2009).

The aftermath effects of the alliance left the APP party in disarray particularly when it failed to capture the Presidency and some of the key members of the party had been co-opted in the PDP led Federal government.

5.7 The Transformation of the All People Party (APP) to All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP)

On the 22nd of May, 2002, the National Executive Committee of the A.P.P met at Abuja to formally make public the intention of the party to merge with the UNPP. The merger of UNPP (UNDP) and APP was to capture power from the PDP and more importantly, recapturing lost grounds in the North. The merger was viewed within the context of the opposition party strengthening itself in preparation for the 2003 general elections.

The merger did not enjoy the blessing and support of the major stakeholders, particularly within the UNPP. For instance, the then protem chairman of the party, Alhaji Saleh Jambo, had on the 25th of May granted an interview to This Day newspaper, saying “... the fusion of APP with UNPP should be dismissed “(This Day: 26th, May, 2002). However, in another counter move Etiebet said:

APP/UNPP fusion is irreversible because it was taken at a properly convened and representative meeting of the leadership of both bodies (This Day: 27th, May, 2002)

Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi confirmed the above statement that:

... at the last meeting where decision to fuse was formally taken, Jambo was there ... there were 16 of us; eight from the A.P.P and eight from UNPP. In the APP, you had Yusuf Ali, the national chairman, deputy national chairman, North, deputy National Chairman south, myself (Shinkafi), three A.P.P. governors drawn from North West, North East and North Central. On the UNPP side, there was Dikhomu, Jambo, Don Etibet, Chief Ada George, Isa Mohammed, Chief Edwin Ume-Ezeoke and Alhaji Al-Basua.(Interview with Umaru Shinkafi,2009)

It is not clear at what point Jambo's faction began to dissociate themselves from the merger and over what issues. Despite the protest from the aggrieved factions, the dream of the two parties merging came to pass.

The rationale behind the merger of UNPP with APP was for the two parties to complement each other. UNPP though not registered, was thick upstairs, particularly its composition of mainly retired army officers as the major financiers. But the party lacked the necessary grassroots appeal. The merger with A.P.P. could produce a formidable opposition party, in the sense that what APP lacks, UNPP would offer in terms of money, while the APP would produce the grassroots supports.

On the 27th of May, 2002, the leaderships of the APP and UNPP met at Abuja and officially announced the birth of ANPP, which was as a result of the merger. As part of the changes, the colour and the logo of ANPP changed from green, yellow and blue to green, white and gold. Also the slogan of the party changed from 'APP Justice' to "ANPP – One Nigeria", 'one Nigeria-ANPP'. Directives were also given to state and local

government branches to change their sign posts to reflect the changes. Finally on the merger deal, UNPP was given 12 seats the board of trustee.

The merger talks and the processes were undertaken and concluded when Bafarawa was the Care-taker chairman of the party. His plan was probably to reorganize and restructure the party that was ailing then so that it could be attractive to the public and enhance the spread of the ANPP. On the surface the merger and the restructuring for the few months seemed to have yielded positively, as the new look party attracted some of the most popular names in Nigeria such as Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, former Senate President and PDP Chieftain, late Chuba Okadigbo and a host of National Assembly members mainly from the East to the party.

Many were skeptical of the whole game plan by Bafarawa and whether he really meant well for the future of the ANPP and opposition politics in particular. Some of the founding members of the APP hold the opinion that the so-called reorganization was nothing but an invitation to Augustus Aikhomu, Don Etiebet and Edwin Ume-ezeoke to take over the party, disorganize it and then abandon it (Interviews with Shinkafi and Dansadau.2009).This claim notwithstanding, the personality of Gen Buhari that declared for the party within this period was potentially an added advantage to the ANPP in terms of popularity and grassroots' support.

5.80 Buhari's Membership of the ANPP

My mission is to salvage the nation from its present state of woes and Insha Allah, in 2003, we shall form governments in various states and at the Federal level.....Today marked my two months and two days involvement in politics. So, I am still a recruit (New Nigerian April 26, 2002).

Gen. Buhari made the above statement on Thursday, April 25, 2002, the day he publicly and formally joined politics. Shortly after that, he declared his intention to pursue his political ambition using ANPP as his political party. Incidentally, and perhaps significantly, Buhari chose to formally join politics the same day that Obasanjo made up his mind (publicly) to seek re-election after months of stalling and waiting on God.

Buhari's approach to politics was clearly summarized in his speech on the day he picked the ANPP membership card, he said:

Those who knew me for longtime thought I will not join politics... it is all left to you now... if you elect good leaders, you are better off, if you elect bad leaders, you will pay the price as the case is today. You will have no cause to blame anybody but yourselves. So the ball is now in your court to ensure a positive change for better tomorrow (This Day, May, 2002)

Buhari, no doubt brought vigour and vitality to the ANPP. His popularity among the masses, particularly in the North was to be transformed into loyalty and support for the ANPP. However a cross section of the public was of the view that the General was not ready for Nigerian politics when he declared and probably he was influenced. This assumption holds some element of truth. Eng Buba Galadima explains:

On Buhari's entry into politics, I was the first person to call a meeting of thirteen people in Bashir Dalhatu's house (Abacha's son –in-law). We concluded at the meeting that we must field a candidate to challenge Obasanjo. At the meeting were: Prof. Abdulkadir Dandatu, Sule Hama, Bashir Dalhatu, Wada Nas, Alhaji Kaloma Ali, Dr. Yadudu and others who were considered to be close to the late Gen Abacha. After insisting and reviewing the personalities that could give Obasanjo a good run for his money, we zeroed down on Buhari. It took six months before we could convince Buhari to join partisan politics. He dismissed the idea initially saying: politicians are not honest, not reliable. There is nothing he did not say politicians are. But after much assurance from those close to him, he decided to join politics (Interview with Buba Galadima. 2009).

Obviously, as Buhari was not ready to initially join politics but later convinced, so was he persuaded to adopt a platform that would supposedly encapsulate his mission and vision for the country .This platform became known as The Buhari Organization (TBO).

CHAPTER SIX





AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP CRISES IN THE ANPP AND ITS DECLINE AS AN OPPOSITION PARTY IN NIGERIA: 1999 TO 2009

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the nature of the problems and the dimension these problems have assumed which have dragged the party to its present state and status. This chapter is divided into two segments. The first segment is the presentation of the results from the content analysis of the four selected newspapers and the second part is the analysis of the results from both interviews conducted and the content analysis. In each of the variables, stack bar chart gotten from the content analysis is first presented and subsequently analysed with inferences drawn from the interviews conducted to analyse each of the variables.

6.1 The Struggle for the Control of the ANPP 1999-2009

The struggle for the control of the ANPP as a variable was subjected to content analysis. Across the four papers there is an overwhelming evidence that between 1999 and 2009 there was much more negative effect the struggle impacted on the party than the positive aspect. (See figure 6.1 below).



The leadership of any political party is as political an issue as the organization itself. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness and vibrancy of any political party in respect of its

contributions to a functioning democracy depends heavily upon its leadership. Thus, a party's performance before, during and after elections is determined among other things, by how visionary and acceptable its leadership is. A party can rise or fall on the basis of the nature and quality of its leadership cadre. The issue of leadership in the ANPP since its inception in 1998 is problematic and it has become a jinx. (Interview with Gen.Buhari. 2009). This is so, when evaluating the experience of the party over the years. In choosing its leadership, the party has always faced some challenges, in its internal structure, hierarchy and accountability mechanisms, ethical codes of conduct for both leadership and the party rank and file. The ANPP has not in any way overcome these challenges by institutionalizing transparency while attempting to elect its leaders who by these qualities capable of inculcating viable democratic culture and practice within the party and in the nation at large.

The choice of party leader determines the image as well as the course the party will take. This is more so in the Nigerian party system characterized by oligarchy. In most cases, overwhelming power and influence is concentrated on the party leader or a few of his cronies who hold significant sway over party policies, programmes and selection of other leaders and candidates.

As provided by the constitution of the party, the ANPP select its national leadership through the delegate conference, a form of party caucus in which representatives from the lower branches of the party meet at the national level. According to the party rule-book, these delegates are expected to be elected by party members at the various branches, (States and Local Governments).

Convening a national delegates' conference is usually huge logistical undertaking for the ANPP with limited financial means. Coupled with the acrimony, confrontation and friction that the exercise raises, many stakeholders, particularly the aggrieved one normally resort to some tricks to either disrupt the conferences or prevent some delegates from attending. In less institutionalized party like the ANPP, party positions are usually divided between party elites, usually among its founders, chief financiers or ethnic chieftains in boardroom deals. Delegates' congresses are subsequently mere pomp and ceremony meant to legitimize already agreed upon leaderships positions devoid of any real participation by party members.

The lack of inclusiveness and democratic leadership selection processes without any clear mechanisms for neutral and independent dispute arbitration often have negative consequences on the party's unity and cohesiveness. Consequently, more often than not, intra-party rivalry spills out into open conflict and eventually party splits.

For instance when Mahmud Waziri was leaving as the protem chairman of the party in 1999, there was a controversy on who should succeed him. Each time, the leadership crisis surfaces, ANPP usually losses massively in the ensuing general election, and hardly recovers from the loss.

Leadership crisis is not new to the ANPP. Starting with its first national convention in Kaduna, prior to the convention, there was the problem of the relevance of the protem national executives to organize a convention to elect substantive executives. A consensus could not be reached on who were qualified to organize the convention. As a fallout of its inability to organize a national convention, some had argued that this has largely resulted into series of mistakes the party made, notably the alliance with the A.D

in 1999 which was ill thought and unnecessary (Interview with Gen.Buhari.2009).In that alliance, the then APP was put at a disadvantage position. For here was a party which emerged from the local polls of 1998, as the only potent force that could challenge the P.D.P. it went into the governorship elections with this leadership crisis but still captured nine states as against 21 states captured by the P.D.P and six won by the A.D.

At the second national convention, the damaged control measures were put in place, they worked perfectly. These measures included: not allowing any of the executive members to contest. The compromise of the time gave way to peace and it ended as a convention of bliss because the acting National chairman and his secretary general decided not to participate in the election.

Six aspirants emerged for the position of national chairman of the party. They included former president of the Nigerian Labour congress, Pascal Bafyau, who was knocked off the race by the zoning formular adopted. Others were Alhaji Lema Jibrilu, Alhaji Saidu Barda, Alhaji Yusuf Ali, Alhaji Kanti Bello and Alhaji Umar Ahmed. Three people emerged for the position of secretary general; they included Dr. Josiah Oduna, Chief Ikeobasi Mokelu and George Morghalu. At the end of the convention, Yusuf Ali emerged as chairman while Morghalu emerged as the Secretary of the APP.

On assumption of office, Ali acknowledged that the party was going through a difficult moment. He declared at his inaugural speech:

....as one of the major players in this dispensation, A.P.P could not have escaped passing through some teething problems which are positive foundation in the process of attaining true greatness and total acceptance by the vast majority of Nigerians (New Nigerian1999. p 23.)

This determination was that, with the new leadership, the party was set to regain all lost glories with the ultimate aim of forming government at the federal level after the 2003 general elections.

A lot had changed in the party during his tenure. The party lost a number of its founding fathers. To leave the party were Chief Kenny Martins, Emmanuel Iwanyawu and Saraki. Most of these decampers joined the ruling P.D.P and tirelessly worked against the success of the ANPP at the polls. For instance, Saraki joining the PDP eventually led to the PDP capturing Kwara state.

Also, there were proliferations of factions during Ali's tenure, a situation which indicated that his leadership did not enjoy wide acceptance and neither did he have a strong grip on the party. Attahiru Bafarawa, a long time business associate of Yusuf Ali became visible in the affairs of the party. He was alleged to have persuaded him (Yusuf Ali) to contest even against his wish. "When Ali became the Chairman, he was not a card carrying member of the ANPP; he picked his card here in Kano on his way to the airport" (Interview with Umaru Shinkafi.2009). Attahiru Bafarawa funded the party and was dictating to the leadership. This development did not augur well with the other members of the ANPP, particularly the founding members who engaged in factional activities and infighting within the party.

The Fourth Convention of the party in 2002 climaxed the internal wranglings within the party. The aim of the convention was to elect the new executive members of the party. Many people through various factions became interested in the running of the party, partly because of the way Ali Yusuf handled the affairs of the party. This resulted in the large number of aspirants, these aspirants were combative; each fully armed with

countless campaign slogans, most abusive and directed towards perceived or real “enemies”. On the day of the convention, there came a court order, signed on the 23rd of July 2002, stopping the convention. The court order was obtained by one Obong Usen Bassey Ebong.

The ‘Order’ sought to restrain the ANPP, its National Chairman Alhaji Yusuf Ali and the party’s General Secretary, George Morghalu who were the first three respondents in the matters, by themselves, their agent servant or whosoever from holding the National Congress or Convention of the APP or ANPP or under other name whatsoever until the determination of the motion on notice at the Abuja High court. See Appendix (viii)

Perhaps what appeared to be more worrisome was the circumstance in which the particular court injunction that was served to the chairman of the convention committee, Governor Mohammed Lawal, surfaced. The court injunction was issued and signed on Tuesday, July 23, 2002 and was served to the party only on the morning of the convention. The chairman of the convention committee claimed he was not aware of the court order. In his address at the occasion, Governor Lawal said:

....this morning we were served with an injunction of the court by the National Legal Adviser of INEC restraining us from holding the National Convention of the ANPP until the determination of the substantive suit (New Nigerian, July 2002.p 12).

The questions to ask were: why was the court order hidden? Who hid it? Why did the INEC’s legal adviser decide to choose the day of the convention to deliver the order? Why didn’t he (legal adviser) take the letter to the national secretariat of the party days before the convention? And who was actually behind the whole play?

Judiciary did not fare well; its decision to halt a convention that was underway is a clear evidence that it had been manipulated. Subsequently, the Abuja High Court Judge who gave the order admitted that he was not competent enough to give the order to halt the convention.

One of the contending issues that might have contributed to scuttle the convention was the issue of zoning. One disagreement with the zoning system adopted into the convention was that some interests have been put to a disadvantage while to others; they felt the offices zoned to them have been hijacked. It was part of the controversy that trailed the zoning of the office of national chairman of the party. Originally the party zoned the office of the national chairman to the North, and some political oligarchs within the caucus of the party re-zoned it to the North-West where the then incumbent chairman, Ali, seeking to contest for the same position at the convention comes from.

The number of interests undermined here were more than one. The zoning seemed to have been masterminded by the forces loyal to the incumbent chairman. This arrangement schemed out technically, other contestants for the office from the North at a disadvantaged position.

Besides this, was the calculation that zoning of the National Chairmanship of the party to the North-West meant that the presidential ticket of the party would come from the South. Probably, if the zoning formula had stayed, Buhari who had made his presidential ambition public would have automatically be knocked out of the race. The ANPP Governors were to a large extent blamed for the failed convention. Senator Dansadau is of the opinion that:

...the governors (ANPP) governors were the bigger culprits, having been less honourable in their dealings with other candidates like myself.

The governors have wielded and continue to wield power to the extent that their words are the commands and no one dares go against their collective wish. They have been central to the botched convention. Only two of them (then nine governors) that did not support Yusuf Ali's bid to return, this was against the wishes of the majority of the ANPP (Interview with Senator Dansadau, 2009)

The opinion of Senator Dansadau cannot be glossed over. A week before the convention, the convention planning committee led by Governor Mohammed Lawal of Kwara state undertook a zoning of all party offices among the six (6) geo-political zones. Shortly after, the ANPP's national chairman, Yusuf Ali set up a new committee led by Aliero to further share out the offices allocated to the North-West and the states in the zone. The committee was made up of serving governors namely: Aliero, Bafarawa, Sani Ahmed and Turaki, as well as some ANPP state chairmen from the zone.

Alhaji Yusuf Ali's opponents in the race for National chairman namely, Saidu Dansadau and Wada Nas protested that it was a ploy to sideline them and their supporters out of the race. This hasty move by Yusuf Ali to set up another committee was a calculated attempt not to allow certain politicians take over the leadership of the party.

Dansadau, one of the contestants explains why and how he was schemed out:

The leadership of the party and the governors became scared when they realized that I was galvanizing support from all and sundry in the country...Many PDP stalwarts were willing to defect to the ANPP if I was elected the chairman. To tell you that they were seriously, 2/3 of the funds I got for my campaign came from those in the PDP. So when the PDP led government discovered, that when the convention takes place, I was going to win, they went and sponsored a court order to scuttle the convention (Interview with Dansadau, 2009).

After several attempts to hold a national convention to elect a new set of executive members for the APP, without success and the tenure of the Ali's led executive had expired, the various contending interests in the party agreed that a caretaker committee

should be set up. But contrary to the expectation of the aspirants, Gov. Bafarawa was imposed on the party by the Governors as the chairman, caretaker committee. Regardless the personality of the leadership of the interim committee, the primary duty of the committee was to organize a blissful convention, and reposition the party towards 2003 general election.

Bafarawa had inherited an almost dead party, characterized by negative public perceptions as indicated in **figure 6**, above Yusuf Ali. Ali's tenure was colourless as no major achievements were recorded, although he attempted to make the party fly, albeit without success. During the first few months he took over the leadership of the party, the ANPP leaped in bounds as it soon became a safe heaven to so many political big wigs, who were disenchanted with their political parties, particularly the P.D.P. Several decampments into the party were witnessed. Some of them included the late Chuba Okadigbo, Chief Edwin Ume-Ezeoke, John Nwodo, and host of others. With these arrivals, the profile of the party soon began to rise and sharply so.

Bafarawa's leadership was not without some controversial moments. He masterminded the expulsion of the first proterm National Chairman, Senator Mahmud Waziri and other pioneering members from the party and brought some people from the PDP like Augsutus Aikhomu, Don Etiebet, Ume Ezeoke and so on.

According to Waziri:

Bafarawa expelled us not because he wanted to reposition the party rather he used his position as caretaker chairman of the party to consolidate his closeness and loyalty to the PDP).The love Bafarawa had for the ruling party, the PDP started long before he became caretaker chairman. Immediately Obasanjo was sworn in, the first state he visited was Sokoto state. Upon his return to Abuja, Obasanjo confided in me saying, my God, Waziri, look at this your Governor, Bafarawa; he promised to bring the

Governors of Kebbi, Zamfara and himself to the PDP. (Interview with Waziri, 2009)

The leadership of the party under Bafarawa did little to instill confidence in the mind of the party supporters. He virtually became the major financier of the party as such; he took several decisions without consulting with the party organs. One of such, decisions was the paid advertisement where he, on behalf of the ANPP publicly congratulated Obasanjo shortly after the National Assembly withdrew the 2002 impeachment procedure against the President. In his congratulatory message, he said:

I wish to use this medium to congratulate your Excellency on the withdrawal of the impeachment bid by the National Assembly. In the same vein, I congratulate you on your “colossal achievements” since you took over the mantle of leadership as the president and commander-in-chief of the federal republic of Nigeria (New Nigeria, Nov 22)

He went on to highlight the various areas the President has touched the lives of Nigerians. See Appendix (9). In some areas, he over praised and exaggerated the so called achievements, a circumstance where one would be wondering whether Bafarawa is the PDP chieftain or he is actually the chairman of the largest opposition party, who ordinarily should capitalize on the opportunity as an opposition party to convince the public on the need to see credible alternatives in the ANPP.

Bafarawa, in a bid to personalize the activities of the party decided to restructure the party, amended its constitution and changed the name of the party from APP to ANPP. These changes constitutionally accommodated some notable PDP politicians to hold prominent positions in the restructured ANPP. He imposed Don Etiebet on the party as the substantive National Chairman in another rather not transparent and not credible convention.

Etiebet came in contact with the ANPP after he led a fusion arrangement between a fraction of United Nigerian People's Party (UNPP) and the then All Nigeria's peoples Party (APP). Part of the conditions for the merger then was for the UNPP to head the party as well as getting some other key positions in the new party (ANPP), such as the leadership of the Board of Trustees. Because of these arrangements, Etiebet and Alkhomu became the National Chairman of the party and Chairman of BoT respectively. (Interviews with Waziri, Shinkafi, & Dansadau.2009).

The party under Etiebet had failed to measure up to the status of an opposition party. There were no visible attempts to reposition the party for future challenges. Perhaps the outcome of the April 2003 Polls, made people lose confidence in the capacity of the party to measure up to the standard they had expected from the ANPP as an opposition party. Indeed, not only did the party lose the presidential polls, although in yet controversial manner, its frontiers in the states shrank as it lost three of its nine states; Gombe, Kogi and Kwara, although it gained Kano. The party's presence at the National Assembly also reduced, ditto in several other cadres of governments.

6.1.1 Factionalization of the National Executive of the ANPP in 2004

Factions began to spring up at an alarming rate, because the leadership of the party had lost grip on the party administration and its credibility before the public has been negatively affected as shown in **figure 6** "He (Etiebet) neither goes to the party secretariat, nor does he even call for statutory NEC meetings as provided for in the party's constitution" (Interview with Dansadau, 2009). He was also accused of personalizing the affairs of the party and making some utterances without consulting with

the hierarchy and the various organs of the party. For instance, Farouk Aliyu revealed that:

Etiebet went to the National Assembly, in company of the PDP National Chairman to declare the support of the party for the declaration of the state of emergence in Plateau state without consulting with anybody in the party...the leadership of the party hardly visit various state chapters, particularly in the states where the ANPP is in the opposition (interview with Hon Faruk, Aliyu Adamu, 2009)

This had given the impression that nobody cares about them and has inadvertently given the state party chairmen the license to run the affairs of the party as they wished, most times contrary to the dictate of the ANPP's constitution.

The enormous power and influence been enjoyed by Etiebet began to threaten Bafarawa, who felt he was beginning to lose his firm grip of the party. More so, the two on the surface differed on how to pursue the court case of the 2003 General elections petition case which was been challenged in the court. These variations in interest set the two personalities on collision course yet at the expense of the party.

The party leadership under Etiebet decided to suspend Bafarawa from the party. This move was undertaken by Etiebet to clip Bafarawa's wings, particularly on his lukeworm attitude towards supporting Buhari and his quest to press on with the legal challenge of 2003 general election. But the immediate reason for his suspension was as a result of the petition filed by the then Deputy National Welfare Secretary of the party, Alhaji Muhammed Murkhtar against Bafarawa; accusing him of committing several offences including "funding the some state party chairmen to factionalize the party." See appendix (10)

In response to the above allegation, the National Working Committee hurriedly organized a meeting to suspend Bafarawa. At the meeting, only 16 members were

present, nine of the members endorsed the measure. Meaning, the members that were at the meeting did not form a quorum, as such not in a position to have announced the suspension as provided by the constitution.

In a counter move, 32 state chairmen of the ANPP, other members of the National Working Committee as well as some members of the party's NEC met at an extraordinary session at Abuja to overturn Bafarawa's suspension. See Appendix (xi)

In their resolution at the end of the extra-ordinary meeting, the state chairmen and members of NEC also decided to suspend and remove Don Etiebet from his position as National Chairman of the party for what they described as 'dereliction of duty, high handedness, and anti-party activities; offences, they said, posed serious threat to the survival of the party'.

In addition, the state chairmen also reversed the 'unilateral' decision taken by Chief Don Etiebet to suspend some key members of NEC and five states (including Cross River state chairman of the ANPP), because the decision was taken, according to them, 'without giving the parties concerned any fair hearing' as required by the party's constitution.

They therefore decided that the ANPP Deputy National Chairman, Jeremiah Useni, becomes the new national chairman of the party pending the election of a substantive National Chairman. (See Appendix 11). After pronouncing him the new National Chairman, Jeremiah Useni immediately went and took over the office of the National Chairman at the National Secretariat, while Useni was busy settling down in the office, the "suspended" chairman asked the public to disregard the acting chairman, there were claims and counter claims.

As events moved in quick succession, the party was plunged into a state of confusion. The Governors and BOT members had a meeting and decided among other things, that the sacked National Chairman, Don Etiebet be returned to his position and also nullified the earlier suspension of Bafarawa. Also a reconciliation committee was set up under the chairmanship of Bukar Abba, to mediate a peaceful settlement of all disagreements among the various dissenting factions within the party. Also, they slated the party's NEC meeting for Maiduguri. (See appendix xii).

In a swift move, Useni's led executives had an emergency meeting at his private residence in Abuja and came up with the following communiqué:

-That we in its entirety the scheduling of our party's NEC meeting by the large forum of ANPP governors and Admiral Alkhomu, slated for 26th and 27th November, 2004 in Maiduguri; as was done without the approval and consent of the NEC first and obtained in consonance with the provision of the party's constitution. (Article 14.2 II).

-That we appreciate the efforts by Aikhomu in attempting to resolve the present impasse rocking the party, but we equally urge him to abide by the tenets of the constitution particularly as it relates to the power of the BOT and its limits as enshrined in Article 13.4 (viii) and more particularly Article 13.5 (2) which enjoins the BOT as a body to take decisions based on a single majority members present and voting and not by an individual arrogating the BOT powers solely to himself. (See Appendix xiii)

The communiqué went further to remind the Aikhomu led BOT on its powers and limits by stressing that:

...by our constitution only NEC is the principal executive organ of the party to the exclusion of all others including BOT and national caucus of the party as provided for in Article 13.4 and article 12.2(1), which recognizes the BOT and the National Caucus as merely advisory organs of the party the roles been played by some of the ANPP Governors in this crisis to say the least, is most dishonourable and unpleasant and appeal to them to sheath their swords and work towards an invigorated ANPP for the benefit of the Nigerian people. (See appendix xiii).

Also included in the communiqués is a reminder to the suspended National Chairman and Buhari. It stated that:

...NEC reintegrated its earlier position in suspending chief Don Etiebet, the former National Chairman of the party and calls in all governmental organs, security agencies and members of the party to disregard any orders, directives or any acts whatsoever emanating from him as he has ceased to be the chairman of the party. The party under the leadership of J.I Useni as the Acting National Chairman will vigorously pursue the current effort of our presidential candidate, Gen. Buhari to claim the presidency (his mandate) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that was taken away from the ANPP in the 2003 General elections in spite of the speculation to the contrary. (See Appendix xiii)

This development split the party into two factions. One group led by J.I Useni, had the support of the majority of the state chairmen of the party, and some members of the National Working Committee, while Don Etiebet's group was supported by most of the Board of Trustee members and the Governors (excluding Bafarawa).

The position of the Useni led group showed that the two groups were not ready for resolution and reconciliation, hence, tilting the party towards complete disarray and eventual split. Sign that the split within the ANPP was deepening came when two parallel National Executive Committee meetings were held in Maiduguri and Abuja simultaneously.

The Maiduguri meeting was attended by a majority of the party's initial NEC members including Chief Don Etiebet, five state governors and the Deputy Governor, Kano State, 19 Senators, 22 House of Representative members as well as 15 state party chairmen (New Nigerian, December 3, 2004. p.6). The caliber of the people in the ANPP that attended the Maiduguri meeting, on the surface, gave the impression that Chief Etiebet had the support of the movers and shakers of the party. The meeting was essentially on reconciliatory mission. (See appendix xiv).

However, that did not stop Useni's faction from having its own NEC meeting, the same time at Abuja. In attendance of the meeting included: the then party's National Legal Adviser, General Bashir Magashi, some state party chairmen as well as some members of the National Working Committee. As expected, they remained resolute in their decision that Chief Etiebet remained suspended as the chairman of the party while Gen. Useni would continue in an acting capacity.

A number of reasons were advanced as to why the split and the emergence of two parallel executive bodies. One of the reasons is the believe that the crisis was engineered from outside the party, as part of a grand plan to divert its attention from being a cohesive opposition and from pursuing the petition filed by its presidential candidate, Gen. Buhari with regards to the 2003 elections. According to Sule Hamma:

There are many people outside the party that were interested in precipitating a crisis within the party in order to, if you like, impact negatively on the party... this is the myopic thinking of some people within the ANPP. (Interview with Sule Hamma; 2009)

The second argument is the belief that since 2007 elections was approaching them, the major players decided to adjust to the realities on ground and try to place themselves in position of advantage against real or perceived opponents within the political space. For instance it was believed that Bafarawa had a separate agenda which he oriented towards 2007, by then seeking to steer the party away from the influence of Chief Etiebet and empowering state chairmen of the party who were ordinarily Etiebet's lieutenants to doubt the integrity of his leadership; a fact which underscored their move to suspend him *ab initio*. The ANPP Governors, who have been accused of not giving Buhari the support he needed to prosecute his presidential petition, were generally more oriented towards Etiebet. That was why they sought to distance themselves from the position of Bafarawa

as well as from the tenacious instance of Useni to be acting position. Their overwhelming presence at Maiduguri NEC meeting supported this claim.

Senator Aruwa sees the leadership crisis within the ANPP rather differently. He said “it is a problem between Governors Adamu Aliero, Sani Ahmed and Bafarawa” who according to him “were imported into the ANPP for the advancement of their individual interests and the larger interest of the PDP”. (Interview with Aruwa; 2009) “Aliero and Sani have been working for the Presidency while Bafarawa has however never hidden his relationship with Babangida. Bafarawa wanted a situation where he would dislodge Buhari from the ANPP and pave way for General Babangida to cross over to the ANPP” “from the onset, he prefers babangida to Buhari.” (Interview with Senator Aruwa, 2009). It could be recalled that the day Buhari formally registered for the ANPP at Daura, Bafarawas was hosting Babangida in Sokoto, where he (Babangida) was invited to commission projects in the state.

During this crisis period, all eyes were on the presidential candidate of the party, General Buhari to make public which of the camps or factions he belonged. Many had expected him to remain neutral and seek all measures and avenues to resolve the crisis. Because, he needed the support of the two factions in order to be firm in pursuing his court case.

However, Buhari was widely condemned when it appeared that he was with Don Etiebet. Apparently, those who accused Buhari were referring to the paid advert, in which Buhari appeared to have openly identified with Etiebet. (See Appendix xv)

His position at that time was ill advised and had allowed sentiments to rule his decision. Moreso when at that point in time, Etiebet was also facing antiparty allegations

and strong speculation that Etiebet collected the sum of ₦300 million from the PDP led government to work against his party. (Interview with Sen.Aruwa). Today, Etiebet had gone back to the PDP as a full fledged member. While Buhari is full of regrets to have ever identified with Etiebet as his 'Chairman'. Bafarawa has since apologized to the public for imposing Etiebet on the party, actions coming too late and with no effect.

6.1.2 The Leadership Crises between 2006 and 2009

The state of confusion and rancour that characterized the leadership of the party during Don Etiebet prompted the party's stakeholders particularly the Governors of the ANPP to appoint Governor Modu Sherrif as interim Care taker Chairman to prepare for election to elect a substantive chairman of the party. He was able to organize a convention that brought in Chief Ume-Ezeoke.

No fewer than 4000 delegates took parts in the 2006 National convention of the ANPP that brought Ume Ezeoke to power as the National chairman. These delegates comprised of the five ANPP Governors, National Officers and Presidential aspirants, ANPP members of National Assembly and state chairmen and other chieftains of the party were also mandated to attend. Unlike the previous conventions, more position were to be contested for, including the key posts of National Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Legal Adviser, Publicity Secretary and Auditor of the party.

Before the convention, the "inner caucus" of the party had met and decided that the new chairman would emerge from the South-East of the country. (Interview with Alh Hotoro. 2009). The party did try to persuade some rival candidates to step down with a view to having consensus candidates; however, many resisted the "persuasion" arguing it was a ploy by the Governors to impose certain candidates on the party.

At the end of the screening and persuasion exercises, Ume Ezeoke and Mike Ahamba contested for the position of the National Chairman, while Buba Galadima and Saidu Kumo contested for Secretary General. Eventually, Ume Ezeoke and Saidu Kumo emerged as the National Chairman and Secretary General of the party respectively.

In his acceptance speech/maiden address, Ume Ezeoke said:

The ANPP had travailed, a travail which was marked with leadership crisis and factionalism, bad leadership and distrust, inequality, injustice and above all a massive onslaught of bad press...a new dawn is here (New Nigerian, Sep. 8 2006).

The new Executive did not have financial difficulty while taking off because shortly after the election of Ume-Ezeoke's led national executive body, the National Caretaker Committee Chairman, Governor. Ali Modu Sherrif said, "the committee was leaving behind over N300 million Naira for the new leadership of the party (New Nigerian, Aug.8, 2008). This was in sharp contrast to 55 million Naira debts the caretaker committee inherited from Don Etiebet era. This amount was gotten because the chairman used his influence as a serving governor to appeal to his colleagues in the ANPP as well as elected officers to donate generously.

The convention and the procedure for the election was not without criticism Gen. Buhari was among the first set of high ranking party members to criticize the election, saying "the elections were manipulated and rigged (New Nigerian,Aug 10:2006)." Buba Galadima who contested for the position of National Secretary had accused the governors of "a gang up against Buhari's interests", while Chief Mike Ahamba, a contestant for National Chairman complained of electoral irregularities. It should be noted however, that all these complains came from the T.B.O

Governor Aliero disagreed with T.B.O's accusation saying:

All measures to provide a level playing field for all contestants were put in place by the committee...we also encouraged consensus-building among contestants, and where we could not achieve this, we went for elections. Over 12 positions were contested for in an atmosphere of cordiality among contestants (New Nigerian, Nov: 8, 2006).

These accusations and counter accusations marked another round or phase of division in the party, particularly between Buhari and the Governors. While the Governors might have thought that since they are the lifewire of the party, they should as such be the ones to decide who occupy certain positions in the party, not, T.B.O.

The convention provided a test ground for the shape of events to come as clashes of interests, disagreements, suspicion and conspiracies ruled the air throughout. Ume-Ezeoke, like his predecessor, Etiebet, was formerly in the defunct UNPP. Like what happened in the previous conventions that brought the chairmen of the party to power, some oligarchic groups, particularly the Governors in the party masterminded the imposition of Ume-Ezeoke on the party to the disapproval of TBO.





For over five years, the battle for superiority between T.B.O and the leadership of the party continued until Buhari surprisingly picked Ezeoke as his running mate for 2007 general elections. This partnership only lasted for a short period, immediately after the results were announced and the leadership of the party decided to abandon the court case and joined GNU, the level of suspicion and mutual distrust between the T.B.O and the Ume-Ezeoke led leadership of the ANPP heightened.

The ANPP from the beginning has never had leadership that is devoid of crisis of either image or acceptance. Each of the leaders had either been imposed on the party by the governors or a combination of governors and, external forces. The controversy this imposition often generated usually lasted through the executives' tenure without been

able to project and position the party in its rightful place as a credible alternative. The ANPP spent more time trying to resolve leadership crises than it spent to project the image of the party for electoral success.

6.2 Internal Democracy in the ANPP

The way and manner a party handles its internal affairs not only determines the level of maturity, understanding and acceptability of the leadership, it also determines the impression and perception the public has about the party. The result of the content analysis of the ANPP's internal democracy shows that the general public, within the period under study did not have confidence on the party's ability to subject its decision-making to the generality of the members for scrutiny. Figure 6.2 below shows that the public rated the ANPP below average on the issue of internal democracy.



Developing a democratic political culture does not only concern simply the relations between parties, government, and other elements of society. It also involves the internal functioning of parties. In general, the more consolidated a democracy is, the more its parties function internally according to democratic principles. Internal democracy includes regular terms of service and alternate in leadership positions, the use of two-way communication channels with mid-level and grassroots membership, regular and special party conferences.

As history has shown, democracy in name is an entirely different game to democracy in practice. The existence and strength of a party's internal democratic process can tell us more than its words about the party's fundamentals and its ability to promote democracy.

Internal democracy means that a given party employs democratic rules of the game during all lines of decision making. It is concerned with the extent to which a political party has put in place and follows mechanisms that allow for the party executive to be responsible and accountable to its membership. It also means that in such a party, there is internal political contestation or competition and participation of the members in the affairs of the party.

The challenges that confront the ANPP in terms of entrenching, internal democracy are many; political competition is severely limited when internal democracy is constrained. The leadership exercises strict control over the selection of party officials and candidates for public offices, with the exclusion of the public.

Primary elections are an important test of the extent and degree of democracy within the ANPP and perhaps any other parties. Often time, the process of nominating

party candidates for purposes of contestation of state power during elections is always fraught with controversies and conflict as a result of the way and manner in which these exercises are carried out by the party leadership. The selection process is usually monopolized by few individuals who consider themselves the backbones of the party. Usually, questions arise in; the eligibility and criteria for candidacy; election processes and the procedures for securing nomination as ANPP's candidate; and the type of electoral system used to select party candidates.

Policy development is mostly a centralized and top-down process. Policy documents are mostly drafted by National Executive Committee members; they are then presented at party secretariat for discussion and improvement and then ratified by the same NEC members. Interview with some ANPP stakeholders indicate that members play a minor to insignificant role to policy formulation. (Interviews with Farok Aliyu and Saidu Dansadau 2009). This is contrary to the party's documents such as the manifesto and the constitution that place high emphasis on membership consultation through workshops and conferences to initiate policy development. See appendixes (v&vi).

The pattern lacks exclusiveness of members' views in the development of such crucial party documents as strategic plans, campaign manifesto and party platforms. With this, participatory democracy, a central component of intra-party democracy is thus compromised.

One issue that has dominated the debates among politicians and particularly, the aggrieved ones is the method often adopted for candidate selection. The degree of intra-party democracy in candidate selection is determined according to the inclusiveness criteria of "who can be selected" and "who selects candidates"?

A political system with a higher degree of institutionalization and more stable roots in society can afford to experiment with internal democratization reforms without the threat to organizational survival particularly, where the political culture is expected to be more participatory and more accustomed to the use of direct democracy procedures.

From its inception, the ANPP lacks internal democracy, most times, what has prevented internal democracy from been realized is the politics of cartel or elite oligarchy that is dominant in the party. In 1999, through a procedure adjudged as not transparent and democratic enough, Dr Ogbonnaya Onu emerged as the party's presidential flag bearer, but before then, a lot had happened in the party.

Those who had their eyes on the presidency never supported the alliance talks between AD and APP. While Waziri was going on with the negotiation with AD, other APP top notches including Saraki, Tom Ikimi, Joseph Garba and Ojukwu endorsed Waziri's sack accusing him of not following due process. (Interview with Umaru Shinkafi: 2009). This development propelled another dimension to the alliance crisis. In utter disregard to the alliance negotiations, the nine APP governors met and endorsed Saraki as the party consensus presidential candidate with out any clear procedure for the election. According to the governors, in their five points resolution, endorsed Saraki because of his enormous contributions, both moral and financial, to the party as well as his overwhelming status within and outside the party.

In a counter reaction, Waziri rallied round six presidential candidates from the south, including Iwanyawu, Bode Olajumoke, Gamaliel Onusode, Edet Amana, Joseph Wayas and Rufus Ada George and announced the expulsion of Saraki, Ojukwu and Alhaji Farouk Idi for alledged anti-party activities.

In a way, the governors preferred Saraki because, at a point they had a common vested interest with Saraki; Saraki wanted to monopolize the party and the selection process to favour him, also the governors felt Waziri was too strong for them to control. They were not necessarily supporting Saraki but they had to choose between two evils. They wanted a break from Mahmud Waziri and Saraki wanted to “unmake” Waziri Mahmud. So the interest of the governors was aligned with Saraki’s. Perhaps, the governors thought they would be more comfortable with Saraki so that they could dictate the pace, manipulate the affairs of the party and possibly determine the presidential candidate.

The political elites continued with their maneuvering and intrigues, out of this confusion, Dr. Onu emerged as the presidential candidate when eventually a ‘convention was stage managed in Kaduna.’ The public and more importantly the delegates to the convention were not aware of the criteria that saw Onu as the ‘winner’. The same night Onu was chosen, he was via the same not transparent process dropped for the candidacy of AD’s Olu Falae.

This apparent lack of internal democracy at the formative stage of the party had set a bad precedence for the party as the subsequent primaries i.e. 2003 and 2007 that produced Gen.Buhari as the flag bearer of the party did not fair better.

Mal Agogi has summarized the entire scenario when he said:

The antecedents which preceded Buhari’s candidature in 2003 and 2007 were questionable”. He was on two occasions imposed on the party. His inability to consolidate on his popularity for which he rigged out other aspirants during the primaries was still unacceptable to the entire party faithful (New Nigeria, Nov. 2006).

The situation is also repeated at the state and local government levels. For instance in Kano, the state executive of the ANPP in 2009 endorsed the tenure elongation of the elected delegates of the party in contrast with the provision of the party's constitution; even though the tenure of the delegates had expired since December 2009.

The position of the party's constitution is that:

Three months to expiration of their tenure they should step down and caretaker committee should take over and oversee the conduct of election. (See appendix v).

This constitutional provision was violated, as the state executive decided to sit tight. Where a situation like this exists, there is every likelihood that a dissent voice or group might emerge. As such, a group led by Jamal Bala has emerged within the party chapter in Kano and has written a petition letter to the National headquarters of the ANPP. The petitioner expressed concern over lack of internal democracy within the party and in particular, over the state executive's decision to sit-tight in office while special congress is conducted.

The letter stated:

Article 23(2) of the party constitution on tenure of office states that all officers of the party elected or appointed into party organ shall serve in such organs for a period of four years....In compliance with this provision, the four year tenure of the present state executive members ended in December, 2009.

The letter further added that "under section 4 of the same article, it is further provided that notwithstanding the term of office of the party official shall resign their position three months to the expiration of the term".Impliedly, the tenure of the incumbent executive ended in September 2009, ideally, a caretaker committee ought to have been set up.

When the researcher put the question across to Alhaji Sani Hotoro, the state ANPP chairman, he said:

We are enjoying the support of the people of Kano; the party is crisis free why should we set up a caretaker committee? We don't need it (interview with Alh.Hotoro. 2009).

This means that, the state party executive is not willing to hand over to a caretaker committee, neither is the party executive concerned about the position of the party's constitution on the issue.

The refusal of the party to call for elections into the state organ of the party has to a large extent raised the speculation that the party has resolved that the state Governor, Mallan Ibrahim Shekarau, will be a determining factor on who emerges as the party's gubernatorial flag bearer in the forth coming elections in the state.

Governor Shekarau however, did not deny the speculation of him, being the only determining factor in picking his successor. He said:

....My approach is that I will allow a natural course to take its place. This does not mean that as a member of the ANPP I will not show people this is my choice. I occupy the seat; I know the burden of governance. So I know who the shoe fits. I am a seating governor; I am an active participant in the process that will produce the party's flag bearer. (Interview with Governor Shekarau).

State governors, not only in the ANPP have evolved a characteristic where they hardly differentiate between government and party. This arises because at the state level, the party machinery is not effective; it is the governors that oil the party through funding. They in turn determine who become the party chairmen and other party executive members. In the event of an election, the Governors puts his boys in charge of the party,

these people who are governor's "boys" do whatever the governor wishes in return. In the case, internal democracy has no place.

The Kaduna State chapter of the ANPP has overtime had its leadership been accuse of imposing candidates on the people. Dr. Mohammed Abubakar is the minority leader in the Kaduna State House of Assembly. He said:

The Alhaji Kabir Aruwa led ANPP in Kaduna state has never been following due process in all its dealings with party members. They confiscated the victories of some people and gave them to less popular candidates during primaries.

(Interview with the Minority Leader, Kaduna House of Assembly, 2009)

The imposition of the less popular candidates on the party cost the ANPP victory in Kaduna. Those who were aggrieved abandoned the party during elections. Shortly after the election, the state leadership in annoyance said it had dissolved all the local governments' executives, accusing them of not supporting the candidates of the party during election. This dissolution did not follow the due process, neither were the relevant organs were not consulted before arriving at the decision. In the words of Dr. Mahmud Abubakar:

...We said no, this is too much injustice, no internal democracy. When we blocked the leadership from dissolving the local government excos, they created a caretaker committee for the affected local government, went and opened offices somewhere for the caretaker committees, while they abandoned the real ANPP secretariat. They created an organ, another organ, and parallel to ANPP office at the local government level. This marked the beginning of the crisis in Kaduna state.

(Interview with Mahmud, Abubakar, 2009)

Those who were against the chairman were randomly punished, without following what the constitution of the party says on punishing an erring member.

Muhammed maintained that:

In punishing me, the party did not follow due process...infact was never invited to face any disciplinary panel. I read about my suspension on the newspaper, day before I got my suspension letter...how will you suspend a member without making his offence known to him? In the letter sent to me , it read:...we regret to inform you about your suspension for involving in anti-party activities. The second paragraph of the same letter said; “we are in the process of forming a path-finding and disciplinary committee to investigate you. Their recommendations will be made known to you. (Interview with Dr Mahmud Abubakar, 2009).

This is grossly an act of misconduct, and obvious disregard for the party’s constitution. Usually, you conduct the trial of any erring member, if he is guilty, then you can invoke the relevant portion of the constitution to punish him. This anomaly won’t have happened if the internal organs that ensure fair hearing are effective and adequate consultations made before taken any decision in the ANPP.

It is difficult, because of the chaotic nature of the ANPP, to give a complete inventory of the many ways in which the party has over the years sought to incorporate members within their basic decision-making structures, but is a bit easier to outline some of the primary choices that parties, in any democracy, must make when implementing the more common forms of internal democracy. These choices fall under two main headings according to Scarrow (2005): Selecting party candidates and selecting party leaders.

(a) Election of Candidates

Recruiting and selecting candidate is a crucial task for any party because party’s profile during elections and while in office, are largely determined by which candidates are chosen and where their loyalties lie. The ANPP overtime conducted its primaries through delegate voting. Where controversy lies in the ANPP is that the party does not

have the guidelines to determine the eligibility of those to select candidates (delegates). This has given room for manipulations by party leaders particularly; Governors. The ANPP does not have proper and conventional records of its principal workers across the country. Oftentimes, the most powerful party leaders in each of the states use their influence to nominate delegates for national convention.

(b) **Recruiting Leaders:** Many questions have been asked on who plays what roles in selecting the ANPP National Executives, particularly the National Chairman. The choice of party National chairman is very important for defining the party's course and image. In the ANPP, there are no pre-selection mechanisms, this has most-times made elections of candidates into various positions in the party controversial and has over the years destroyed the image of the party.

The 2006 Electoral Acts, section 75 provides that every registered political party shall give the commission at least 21 days notice of any convention, conference or meeting convened for the purpose of electing members of its executive committees or other governing bodies or nominating candidates for elective offices.

However, despite of all these provisions, the ANPP hardly conforms to these legal codes of internal democracy. The executives of the party caucuses, governors, the monetization of the party nomination process and ill defined screening process for candidates by INEC ensures that ANPP members do not ultimately, in most cases, nominate and elect their candidates in a transparent and democratic ways.

The ANPP, like other major political parties in the country, has claimed exclusive rights over their internal process through court actions. Since the beginning of this dispensation, party primaries for the selection of party candidates, the leadership of the

party virtually appropriated the space and conducted selection, not election. Most times, the party leadership and the oligarchic political elites grossly manipulated the primaries, and in many cases the results of the primaries were contentious and not respected.

Several candidates who did not win the primaries were eventually selected by the leaders of the party, claiming a spurious logic of party supremacy in the “selection” of party candidates to compete for several elections. Once the principle of internal democracy is betrayed in the selection of candidates for elections, is like presenting commodities that the buyers do not need or want, the result is out right rejection and failure at the polls.

6.3 Internal groupings within the ANPP (Factionalism)





It is well known that in established democracies, the chief function of political parties is to engage in electoral combats. Less obvious is the political combat that occurs within political parties. In the ANPP, power resources tend to accumulate in small group, but no one group can monopolize these resources. Therefore, we can expect constant competition over these resources between rival groups. Not only are factions ubiquitous in political parties, but they have proved to be of great consequence for the performance of the ANPP as an opposition party.

The nature and by extention the success of a party is largely determined by the the nature of the factions that exist within the party. Factional competition may decide who ‘speaks’ for the party. That is to say, it is through factional competition that politicians gain, maintain, or loose political power and influence within the party. In the ANPP, the issue of factionalism revolves around three dominant questions. How

structured are these factions? What are functions of these factions? And what are the causes of the factions?

From figure 6.3 above, the nature of the internal groupings that exists in the ANPP is dysfunctional this is because all most of the coverage by the papers carried, mostly, the negative sides of the groupings. Factions that exist in the ANPP are structured or organized around particular individuals and groups. Prominent among these are: the governors faction (forum), the Buhari Organization (T.B.O), the Yerima Vanguard, Abba Sahara Boys and so on.

On the functional aspect of faction, conventionally, it is an expression of democracy. For instance factions may take the form of grassroots revolt against the elite enabling regular party members to engage democratically. As Schwartz (2006) argues, ‘it involves a challenge to the status quo, manifested as a rebuke to the host organization for its prevailing policies, power arrangements or ideological interpretations.’ Each faction that had emerged within the ANPP overtime is authoritarian in structure without regards to the reactions of the electorate or the legal rules and regulations that govern the party.



Ideally, one of the functions of faction is that, it is an integrative mechanism. This is not the case in the ANPP, the factions that exist are divisive because they fight against one another over who should control the party and this has in the process undermined unity of the ANPP and portrayed the negative image of the party to the public.

With respect to the causes of factionalism, the distinction made most frequently is between materially and ideologically motivated factions (Humes 1977.23). A faction sustained by material rewards will be organized along the patron-client model, whereas an ideological faction is more likely to adhere to internally democratic norms. The factions that are traceable to the governors of the ANPP are structured along patron-client relations, while the T.B.O, the integrity groups are tilted towards ideologically motivated model.

Increasingly, intra-party groups in the ANPP are entourages oriented around particular leaders and sustained by the increase flow of patronage to the advertisers, pollsters and lobbyists that form the core of these groups. These groups are sustained by the spoils of office and tend to form and reform every time there is a new development and a new leadership contest.

In the ANPP, there are a number of cliques fighting for the control of the party, and there are sub cliques fighting for the control of cliques, and individually trying to get control of the sub cliques .Group members might agree about the broad principles of how political life should be organized but they often disagree about the details on how to achieve this. Divergent policy preferences are a source of internal conflict in the ANPP which has pushed some party actors to form or affiliate with separate sub-party groups. This development over the years has made it difficult for the ANPP leaders to build a

united party since the burden is on them to manage internal competition and to minimize conflict in order to prevent dissidents from splitting and from joining rival P.D.P.

The activities of all the factions in the ANPP negate the very description of faction as any intra-party combination, clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively as a distinct bloc within the party to achieve their goals (Zariski, 1863). These goals may include some or all of the followings: patronage (control of party and government office by members of the faction), the fulfillment of local, state and federal interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe.

The factions in the ANPP, particularly TBO sees itself not necessarily part of the ANPP, let alone pursuing the goals of the party. In the opinion of Sule Hamma:

Even when the directive came after the 2007 primaries that the factional groups should fuse into the party, TBO did not comply because we see no reason why the organization, that is “seen as better organized, with well defined policies intentions should be subsumed under the ANPP whose leadership is corrupt, self-centered and without vision. (Interviews with Sule Hamman and Hon Farouk 2009).

Factionalism in the ANPP has destabilized intra-party relations and as such sent negative messages to voters. The factionalisms in the party is personalized and are based on clientelism which serves as the central mechanism for mobilization as a rule, hierarchies and chains of command in the groups are vertical. Horizontal links between group members are discouraged. In a statement Buba said: “: TBO is everything about Buhari”,(interview with Buba Galadima,2009) impliedly therefore, the existence of the group is mostly limited by the political life and affiliation of Buhari.

Personalized factions that are common in the ANPP have been encouraged by the decentralization of the party finance. There is no formal and clear way of generating funds for the party. So, if individuals can mobilize funds well enough, they might end up forming an oligarchic group seeking for recognition. Also, the organizational structure of the ANPP has effects on the degree of factionalism of the actions and activities of the party are designed and executed by the elite.

It should not be overlooked, however, that in new democracies like Nigeria, the instability of the party system and the political system as a whole can promote factionalism. Since parties are not yet settled, factional affiliations and alliances can be of greater importance to politicians than party loyalties. Such loyalties can evolve on the basis of shared experiences and identities (Magine, 1995:92). But this development in the ANPP has been taken for granted for long, which has allowed cliques and factions to emerge and be controlled by individual and ambitious leaders to the detriment of the party.

The fundamental question remains; why factions emerge in the first place? Failed expectations lead to polarization and division, but more importantly, and more relevant to the ANPP, the politics of exclusion has produced factions within the party. To compound its problem, the leadership of the party has failed to manage the existence of factions.

The weak organizational capacity and structure of the ANPP has resulted to factionalisation. Each factional group that emerged came with its own unique intention and motive. Prominent among these groups are: The Buhari Organization, the Yarima Solidarity group and the Governors forum.

6.3.1 The Buhari Organisation (TBO)

The history of T.B.O perhaps predates Buhari's entry in to politics also the mission and vision of organization existed even before it became known as TBO. Sule Hamma, is the Director General of TBO, summarizes the history of TBO this way:

TBO has a history, well before 1998, perhaps I should say since 1986. Some intellectuals in Northern Nigeria established a discussion group based in Kaduna on which I was the foundation members. That discussion group was later known as Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) which was opposed to Babangida stay in power beyond 1993.....when Abacha took over, in his maiden declaration, he decided to dissolve all consultative forums by whatever name called. His target was to specifically ban ACF....We changed our name from Arewa Consultative Forum to Policy Analysis Forum and we continued to both intellectually analyse the problem of the country and post articles on the major national dailies. We also continued to push for a particular ideological line, politically with a view to returning the nation to civil rule. When Abacha called for Constitutional Conference in 1994.... we organized a secretariat in Abuja,(in my house) to support the northern delegates to the Conference by researching in to different issues. We held discussions and seminars to prepare them for effective role in the Conference. When Obasanjo took over and began to rule the country the way he wanted, we decided to be more partisan, than mere intellectual....later we drafted Buhari to join us. When he agreed we decided to transform this Forum to become The Buhari Organization (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009).

It is very likely that from the above statement that Gen. Buhari knew little above TBO blueprint and its impact on the party, ANPP he had declared for. Buhari had over the years accepted the contents of the TBO project as an embodiment of his personal vision and ideology for the country. In endorsing the TBO blueprints, Buhari said:

.....in resolving to aspire to the Presidency of our nation, I have a vision and mission. This document, tagged "The Buhari Project", encapsulates my vision and mission, and goes further to elaborate them as they relate to the present state of our nation, its governance and the management of the various sectors of its socio-economy. It is a presentation that lays the basis for a detailed blueprint for governance and development of our nation, what I call project Nigeria, which God willing, I will faithfully implement under my Presidency. See appendix (vii).

The blue print of TBO was never accepted and adopted as part of the ANPP manifesto nor its constitution .The adoption of the blueprint by Buhari as his campaign manifesto made it superior to the ANPP's manifesto and by extension the constitution of the party. This really set the Organization on collision course with the leadership of the party.

The partisan role been played by the T.B.O started after 1999 Chief Obasanjo had assumed the full leadership of the country. According to Sule Hamma, the Director General of T.B.O:

...when Obasanjo took over power and he started to administer the country the way he wanted, we felt that with the way he was going, he would destroy the basic institutions of state, including democratic structure.....at that point in time, we thought that perhaps, we needed to be openly and clearly partisan, than been merely intellectual and political. It was at this point that we drafted Buhari to join us in our effort, and when he did, we felt that we now needed to form our own party or move into a party and take it over with a view to pushing for these ideas by capturing the candidature of the party for elections. That was how Gen. Buhari came into politics and T.B.O came into existence
(Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009)

T.B.O was formed to first and foremost to market the political aspirations of Gen. Buhari while using the ANPP as its platform. This has brought about contradiction and confusion between the party leadership and T.B.O members particularly in respect of the strategy adopted by the T.B.O which is totally different from the manifesto of the ANPP. On the strategy of T.B.O, Sule Hamma said:

T.B.O clearly adopted a strategy of building a mass mobilization, a party that was based on voluntarism as the bases of leadership instead of national coordinator, state director, etc. which the parties usually adopted, we decided to establish what is called state cordinating committee, local government coordinating committee and constituency coordinating committee, as well as national coordinating committee.----Because of the obviously, we became more effective, more focused, and more connected to the

people and enjoyed more confidence of the people more than the ANPP. (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009.)

Clearly there is a divergence between the ANPP mainstream and T.B.O both in terms of orientation and methodology. The leadership of the ANPP became uncomfortable with the arrangement been introduced into the party by T.B.O. The 2003 and 2007 presidential campaign of the General Buhari was based on the principle and ideology of T.B.O not that of the party. See Appendix (vii). This obviously created a problem between the T.B.O and the ANPP, because the party preferred a different strategy both in terms of organization and leadership composition. This contradiction gave rise to confusion and crisis within the party during the electioneering campaign. At a point, people began to see T.B.O as an organization that had come to undermine the supremacy of the ANPP. This assumption by the public was not denied by Sule Hamma when he said:

...The T.B.O became dominant within the party as all campaign issues were driven by TBO. The party felt it was left out, even though the national chairman was the chairman of presidential campaign organization and all the members of the looking committee were members of the campaign organization. ----because they are not used to working for the party, they were not active during the campaign. (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009)

The T.B.O has, by this statement by Sule Hamma, assumed a more prominent, more popular and more active role than the party structure. This, under any circumstance, is a cause for concern and a potent source of mistrust within any organisation.

Senator Ahmed Sani Yerima had his own organization, but with less organizational outreach, aims and less confrontational. The quest for Yerima's organization started when:

....I was going for re-election bid in 2003, Sai Yerima Organization mobilized people to support me in winning gubernatorial elections.

When I decided to run for presidency two additional organizations were created namely: Yerima Bakura Solidarity Association, and Yerima Bakura Movement. All the three combined became Yerima network.
(Interview with Sanni Ahmed, 2009)

The network was more visible in the North-west part of the country, and most visible in Zamfara state. However, it had zonal offices in Kaduna and Abuja. But the organization could not be compared with T.B.O in terms of organizational sophistication.

6.3.2 Governors' Forum

The ANPP governors have gradually and steadily constituted themselves as one intimidating faction within the ANPP. This development was made possible by the leadership style of President Obasanjo. Having closely worked the President Obasanjo and been part and parcel of the systematic strategy by Obasanjo which made the governors the leaders of the party in their states, the ANPP governors formed a bloc and began to dictate the pace and fate of the party. Mahmud Waziri said:

...the governors ganged up and took over the party. Firstly, they decided to change the name of the party from APP to ANPP. Secondly, they started appointing themselves chairmen of the party and thirdly, when Bafarawa was the caretaker chairman, with the support of other ANPP governors, he put people who were originally P.D.P people in the key positions of the party. (Interview with Waziri Mahmud, 2009).

The governors enjoyed more support of the people and the party leadership, they hijacked the party, marginalized the funding fathers, in some instances some of them, founding members were humiliated out of the party by the governors. Having acquired the firm grip of the ANPP, they decided what the party wanted, particularly whom they felt were fit for certain positions. They enjoyed this status unchallenged and effectively restructured the party because they have access to funds.

The activities of the governors polarized the party as, the ANPP politicians who are not friends to the governors or who were not willing to be governors' boys began to align to form groups to checkmate the activities of the governors, this has resulted into the proliferation of factions within the party.

The presence of multiple factions within the ANPP has created a lot of problems for the party, as more enemies have been made than friends. For instance, the overbearing influence and the outspokenness of the T.B.O members have made governors to distance themselves from the group and to ensure that they frustrate the activities of Buhari and T.B.O.

These factions exist within the ANPP because nobody wants to be subsumed. They feel been subsumed, amounts to having lost in their respective quest to actualize their respective and personal goals. Senators Yerima and Dansadau corroborate this notion. "These associations (factions) emerged because of crisis in leadership" (Interviews with Yerima and Dansadau, 2009). Also they emerged in solidarity with a specific personality; unfortunately, the personality they emerged to support often has little influence over them as they became too powerful to be tamed.

6.3.3 Attempts at Merging the Factions

The ANPP has never been unmindful of the damage these factions built around certain personalities within the party can cause. Against this backdrop, the party decided after the 2007 primaries that these groupings such as T.B.O, Yerima vanguard and Bukar Abba's Sahara Team should merge to form a 'pyramid'. At the top of this pyramid is the presidential campaign team chaired by the chairman of the party, with the presidential candidate and some other party stalwarts. Also, there were chairmen of the presidential

campaign teams of the six geo-political zones, and in each of these geo-political zones, the party had presidential campaign team in each state and in each state, the presidential and gubernatorial candidate campaign team is headed by the gubernatorial candidate. The aim of this arrangement was that each candidate would work, first for the presidential candidate and second, for themselves; at the geo-political zone and secondly at the state level. “T.B.O by this arrangement stood dissolved into the ANPP” (interview with Gen Buhari, 2009). Similarly Senator Yerima said:

After the primaries and Buhari had emerged, I obeyed the directives given to us, (presidential candidates) by the party that our campaign organizations to be merged with the party structure to ensure the success of the candidate that had emerged and for the good of the party. Accordingly, I handed over all my campaign structures, including my vehicles to the party. (Interview with Yerima, 2009).

While the two leading candidates for the primaries agreed that their organizations be merged into the mainstream of the party and directed those in charge of these organization to comply accordingly. Others factional groups complied, T.B.O. refused and ignored the call by the party leadership to collapse the structure of the T.B.O into the party.

Sule Hamma explains the positions of the T.B.O which is contrary to Buhari’s position:

....even in 2003, when General Buhari was given the ticket the party decided that T.B.O should be dissolved and integrated into the party, but they have not realized the tradition upon which the organization was built. The party accepted that T.B.O national body should remain to constitute a research department of the ANPP but as point of fact, that never happened and the reason was simple, we realized that the leadership of the party was not comfortable with T.B.O, so they wanted to destroy the organization (interview with Sule Hamma, 2009)

The same thing happened in 2007, the T.B.O was never integrated into the party despite the directives from the party leadership in conjunction with the stakeholders. Buba Galadima is the Secretary General of the T.B.O. He said:

There are a lot of things you people outside the organization don't understand; it was the share fear and massive support of Buhari that made candidates to withdraw, at the same time it was the fear that if he did not get the nomination, the stooges (governors) the party had lined up to contest elections may lose their elections. TBO is for Buhari, not for the ANPP it cannot be dissolved
(Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009)

This implies that Buhari got the ticket first because of his credibility and secondly because of the mobilization capacity and efficiency of T.B.O. This created a feeling that T.B.O members are more ANPP than the non T.B.O members. The utterances of the key members of the T.B.O to the party leadership and the ANPP governors are not friendly. Often times they made these comments without the consent of the Gen. Buhari. For instance, Buba Galadima is of the believe that:

....it was T.B.O that got the tickets for Buhari in 2003 and 2007. Buhari used T.B.O as his platform.....Yerima and Abba were part of the signatories of the governors that signed a memorandum that all the governors should support one of them, not anybody outside the governor's forum. That in return, they will be given a clear state, they won't be investigated by the EFCC. For instance, Yerima paid for all the logistics for Yar'dua's campaign even though he was the chairman of the Buhari campaign organization. Those of us in the T.B.O are the real ANPP members.
(Interview with Buba Galadima, 2009)

It could be remembered that Yerima resigned his position as the chairman of the Buhari campaign organization at the heat of controversy between T.B.O and the party leadership. He said:

....Having handed my campaign structures including vehicles to Buhari's Campaign Organization, I realized that T.B.O does not have the capacity to prosecute the plan of the party, so I left my position as

the chairman of campaign organization. I left not because I was pursuing any other interest, I withdrew because I realized that they were going nowhere, I had to rework my track. (Interview with Sen. Ahmed Yerima, 2009).

T.B.O thought it could ensure Buhari's victory at poll without the support from the governors, whom it tagged as P.D.P in ANPP cloth. The actions of T.B.O had infuriated the governors in no small measures. Governor Shekarau of Kano State summarized the relationship between T.B.O and the governors. He said:

I have no concrete disagreement with Buhari as a person but if you say T.B.O's leadership and some people who see themselves as members of T.B.O, I will say yes, we disagree. The bottom-line of this is that people (T.B.O) capitalized on Buhari's reputation and decided, for no reason to accuse me and my government of fighting General Buhari, just to create bad blood between me and General. Some of T.B.O take cover under the T.B.O umbrella and heighten the tension to the point that there was almost a breakdown in relationship between me and Buhari....These people feed on T.B.O and Buhari's reputation. (Interview with Gov. Shekarau, 2009).

The activities of T.B.O have caused some disaffection across the northern part of Nigeria, where the ANPP has its stronghold. It has affected some key states in the north like Kaduna where the party has a large number of follower ship and supporters. In Kaduna State, people see and interpret results and choices along factions, notably between T.B.O and Buhari on one side and the ANPP on the other.

In Kaduna state, the factional problem confronting the party started before the 2007 general elections when the choice of party's gubernatorial candidate at its primaries, split the party into two factions. While one faction occupies the state secretariat, loyal to Senator Ahmed Aruwa, who incidentally has his younger brother, Alhaji Kabir Umar Aruwa, is the state chairman of the party. This faction supports GNU and has even partnered with the state government. The second faction is sympathetic to Sani Sha'aban,

a former House of Representatives member who actually got the nod of the INEC as the party's flag bearer of the party in the state. Buhari, prior to 2007 election supported Sha'aban against Aruwa. Many believed that Buhari got it wrong in Kaduna state when he openly supported Sha'aban against the more experience and more popular Aruwa.

This development did not go down well with the Aruwa faction which insisted that the national secretariat of the ANPP did not officially write to it about a change in candidature. Subsequently, the Aruwa faction abandoned Sha'aban during the election and also during court proceedings. Dramatically, the national secretariat aligned with Aruwa specifically prompted by Government of National Unity (GNU) motion which Aruwa faction supported. The court case that Sha'aban later instituted against the P.D.P at the election petition tribunal was solely pursued by Sha'aban alone. The national chairman of the ANPP wrote the tribunal to dissociate the party from the petition. See Appendix (16). This action of the national chairman became inevitable after it had accepted GNU at the national level and withdrawn from the presidential election tribunal.

Factionalism has continued within the party in the state since then thereby causing great disunity among the party faithfuls in the state. Some members later in 2009 rose up against the state executive of the party and claimed to have dissolved the Kabir Aruwa-led executive committee, replacing it with another headed by Hajia Hafsat Mohammed, a strong supporter of Buhari, and a member of T.B.O. In assessing the situation of the ANPP in Kaduna State, Hajia Hafsat said:

.....In Kaduna state, the former chairman, Alhaji Kabiru, sold the party to the P.D.P. they went into GNU in the state and collected positions and contracts. Against this backdrop, the chairmen of the party at the Local Government, bestowed with the responsibility of appointing the state chairman met and passed a vote of no confidence on the

leadership and subsequently removed him and other executive members. (Interview with Hafsah Mohammed, 2009).

As expected, the national secretariat of the party declared the action illegal and refused to recognize the new executive led by Hajia Hafsah. Not surprisingly either, General Buhari recognized and identified with the new Executives.

T.B.O as a personalized factional group has, no doubt caused a lot of disunity within the ANPP. Some of the key members are unfortunately not politicians but activists, technocrats and academics with no visible structure across the country to actualize the dream of Buhari, instead, this group of people rely on the hope that the large crowd that normally gather at the rallies is a strong indication and assurance that it might transform into electoral success . This has left Buhari frustrated and disappointed, in expressing his frustration Gen. Buhari he said:





I have discovered that the people who drafted me into politics were not sincere after all. They only wanted to use my name to get appointments for their personal aggrandizement and not to serve the nation or the masses. Of all the several dozens of people that convinced me to join politics, only two or three are still with me today. (Interview with Gen Buhari, 2009).

Factionalism in the ANPP has in no small measure prevented the party from realizing its objectives and responsibility as an opposition party capable of forming the government in the nearest future it has also contributed to most of the ordeals the party has undergone over the years. More so, that these factions are formed by ambitious individuals who were more inclined towards capturing the leadership of party for personal use.

6.4 The ANPP and the Politics of Co-Optation (Government of National Unity)

The content analysis result Figure 6.4 below shows that the issue of government of national unity as it relates to the ANPP attracted a large attention from the public.

However, about 79% of all the categories did not support the ANPP, the largest opposition party participating in the arrangement.



Since the beginning of this political dispensation, the PDP has been regarded as “the all conquering behemoth. With a head start in the council election, Election after election, it was the party to beat and presently it bestrides the entire polity”. Conversely, depleted and disoriented, ANPP’s strength and popularity has been waxing colder and colder since 1999 partly because of loss of identity since the pioneering leadership of the party decided to participate in the PDP led government.

On the point of patronage, co-option implies that opposition parties often have no choice but to be co-opted into government. Generally, opposition parties in Africa suffer from lack of capacity particularly between elections. As a result, they are liable to cooptation and/or marginalization by the ruling party. In a given system where clientelism thrives, co-optation implies that opposition parties often have no choice but to be co-opted into government. This has been made easier by the position of the President who completely dominates decision making and access to resources. Winning his favour frequently becomes the main ambition of opposition politicians who most times seek to join the government once their value as social mobilisers have been demonstrated.

The PDP led government has fully understood and appreciated the fact that the leadership of the opposition parties, particularly the ANPP will always, like mice, never resist cheese. They know the fickleness of the leadership of the opposition parties and how easily they can be swayed by the lure of office: money and power. In Nigeria today, government is everything; it is the government that allocates contracts, fertilizers, employment, etc. based on this, the government that controls the state is paramount, and it’s the party everybody wants to be associated with.

The ruling party has used the strategy of GNU to co-opt the ANPP into the government. This subtle use of “carrot” to get the support of the leadership of the ANPP has succeeded not only in suppressing the opposition to the point of impotency, but also succeeded in damaging the image of the party.

The first problem which had widened the already existing cracks in the wall of the ANPP (APP) was no doubt the dangling ministerial ‘carrots’ President Obasanjo gave the party in 1999. It planted seed of discord, thereby leaving the party in a quarrelsome situation, which the party never fully recovered from.

At first, the names of the three ministerial nominees did not go down well with the leadership of the party. In response, APP wrote to the Senate President disowning the three nominees namely: Usman Sanni, Joy Emordi and Audu Salome. In the letter it stated that “of the three names submitted, two are not party members while the third on is not a ministerial material” (Interview with Sen.Dansadau, 2009). From the Dr Saraki Olusola’s camp, Alhaji Usman Sani had been expelled from the party, along with Chief Emeka and Alhaji Idi Farouk. On the other hand, Mrs Joy Emordi had earlier resigned her membership from the APP. As form Mrs Salome Audu, She was never a card carrying member of the party.(Interview with Sen.Dansadau,2009)

The President took sides with the renegade camp with a view to keeping the party deeply divided and crises ridden. Most of the people giving the appointment from the APP later joined the ruling PDP and worked for Obasanjo during elections. In another move by Obasanjo to further disorganize the APP, he appointed the party’s proterm chairman, Mahmud Waziri as a special adviser (on inter-party affairs). This was a perfect synopsis for chaos; the succession tussle rocked the party. While making his exit,

Mahmud chose Aliyu Akwe Doma as his successor, leaving Chief Alani Bankole, his Deputy in the cold. Bankole took up arms, using the party's constitution as shield. A meeting was convened in Kaduna to resolve the differences. At the end of the meeting, it was resolved that "Alani Bankole should be in an acting capacity for two months, facilitating the convening of a convention to elect substantive party officers within two months (interview with Umaru Shinkafi, 2009). The acting chairman was part of the agreement, he was made to sign an undated resignation letter to safeguard against tenure elongation.

The time spent by the party in trying to reorganize itself in order to overcome the leadership vacuum, had in a way derailed the party and constituted a major setback for a party who just came out of elections haven lost the presidency in a controversial way and ought to have been busy strategizing on how to unseat the PDP in the subsequent general elections.

However, Mahmud's action of resigning from his position as chairman of the party must be commended. In his valedictory address, Waziri said;

...I trust you may be aware that the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief Obasanjo, recently appointed me to serve as a special adviser in his government. The appointment, on the advice of the elders and leaders of the party, has duly been accepted by me and I am due to be sworn in tomorrow and, thereafter, to resume duty immediately. In keeping with the letters of our party constitution, therefore, it has become necessary for me to resign with effect from the end of today's meeting of the NEC and to prepare the platform upon which a new national chairman would be elected. (New Nigeria, July 4, 1999 P.15).

Many politicians, including Gen Buhari, believed that he (Mahmud Waziri) had acted in accordance to the dictate of the party's constitution. Joining the ruling party in Nigeria, Particularly prominent politicians from the ruling party is not a new development in

Nigeria. However, it has never before, assumed a controversial dimension as it has in the ANPP under Ume-Ezeoke. The issue has generated a lot of debates, particularly the legality of some officers' participation in the GNU. How the idea of GNU came about is still not clear to the public.

The party leadership had been at daggers drawn with its presidential candidate in the last two general elections (2003-2007), Muhammadu Buhari over the participation of the party in the Government of National Unity, which in a way prompted the leadership of the ANPP, to withdraw its election petitions from the petition tribunal. The Buhari Organization, TBO, has been a major critic of the party's involvement in the GNU and has been calling on the Ume-Ezeoke led leadership to be sacked. The chairman of the party who is at the centre of the crisis, Ume-Ezeoke believes on the contrary saying:

There was no need for us (ANPP) to go to war because of the election problems. All the countries that had upheavals due to election problems are now turning to GNU after an unwarranted destruction of lives and properties...the ANPP leadership accepted the defeat at the 2007 polls because there was no election in most places. That is a fact. But where is the evidence to prove that in court? None. That is why we have failed.
(New Nigeria, August, 24.2008.p4&5).

In a similar way, the publicity secretary of the party, Emmanuel Unekwu supported the claims of his chairman by affirming that:

Our full support for and participation in the GNU is to prevent massive protest against the PDP and to sustain the country's young democracy by stabilizing it so as not to go Kenyan way (New Nigeria.April,23.2008.p.4)

All verbal and media attacks have been directed towards the chairman of the ANPP Chief Ume-Eze-oke.Many have attributed the party's acceptance to join GNU is the root of the problem in the ANPP, particularly post 2007 general elections.

Alhaji Bashir Tofa, however, differed; He said:

The participation of the party in GNU is not the root of the problem. We know that Buhari was not happy that the party decided to join GNU. However there were divergent views on the participation, the National Executive Committee of the party met and took a decision. NEC is the body that is above everybody and that if it takes a decision; it is binding in the party and members. (Interview with Tofa, 2009).

When the NEC meeting of the ANPP was called to discuss the issue of GNU, the T.B.O was quite under represented; most of them abstained from the meeting. TBO's distance and the "irrelevant" posture it assumed during the NEC meeting and the subsequent negotiation process quickly marginalized the Buhari faction, and was left out in the sharing of the goodies thereof.

While T.B.O has been the major group calling on Eze-oke's removal, all of a sudden, a group known as "ANPP Integrity Group" was formed in Nassarawa State. The group, led by former Deputy Governor of Kebbi State, Alhaji Suleiman Mohammed Argungu, accused the party's leadership of mortgaging the future of the party under the GNU agreement. This group broke away from T.B.O; it has a rather different view of the GNU. Its main grudge against the ANPP is that "the leadership of the party has allocated the bounties from the GNU pact to themselves and their immediate family members." (Daily Trust Aug.22 2007. p1&3).

Making references to the party's constitution, the group alleged that the action of the party's leadership violates the party's constitution, particularly Article 26(VI) which prohibits party members from holding dual offices at the same time and Article 10(i) and (ii) which centres in the principles of federal character, geographical spread at all levels of the party's organization and administration.

Article 26 says:

No member of the party shall hold a party office and any of the under-mentioned political offices at the same time: office of the president, Governor, Minister and Special Adviser, Commissioner and Senator and Legislators at states and National levels, Chairman of the local government and councilor. See appendix (5.)

From the above, the ANPP integrity group asked the National Chairman of the party, Ume-Ezeoke; General Secretary Senator Saidu Kumo and the Deputy National Chairman (South) Ebute Ojon Atuk, to resign from their positions if they are interested to serve in the GNU. The grievance of this group is not only that ANPP had participated in the GNU but, the leadership had decided to allocate the bounties within themselves without extending the olive branch to other interested members of the T.B.O.

Saidu Kumo, one of the party's officials at the centre of the controversy said: "there is nothing illegal in holding dual position. As such, I will not resign as the ANPP Scribe" (New Nigeria August.12, 2008.p5). His argument is based on the premise that "the GNU arrangement is an ad hoc arrangement by the PDP led government which can be terminated at anytime". More so, he added "the ANPP constitution says "don't hold dual offices in party and ANPP led government." (New Nigeria, August 12, 2008)

Saidu Kumo is an experience lawyer and the party's Secretary General; however, his argument cannot go unchallenged. Article 26 of the ANPP constitution has stated it explicitly. See appendix (5).

Secondly, the process leading to the formation of the GNU could not be said to be *ad hoc*. At first, President Yar'Adua officially and public wrote to the party saying:

...I implore your and the leadership of the ANPP to join hands with our administration and the PDP in facing up to the daunting challenges of nation building and transformation of Nigeria into a modern industrialized nation. This imperative should transcend partisan and primordial loyalties. See Appendix (17).

In the letter Yar’dua sent to the national chairman of the ANPP, the phrase “Government of National Unity” was not included. In a bid to make the whole process formal, not *ad hoc*, the national chairman, in his reply to the letter written to the party, said:

I acknowledged receipt of your letter ref: PRES/129 of 5th June, 2007 on the issue of our great party participating in a ‘**Government of National Unity** which you intend to form’The National working committee has studied the contents of the letter and the determination of your Excellency to form an all-inclusive government with a view to moving the country forward.The party has accordingly endorsed Mr President’s idea of Government of National Unity. Towards this end, a six-man committee has been set-up by the party to meet with the president to discuss further on the subject. See Appendix (18).

Immediately President Yar’Ardua replied the above letter written by the ANPP Chairman. In the letter, Yar’Ardua said:

I write to acknowledge the receipt of your letter in response to my earlier one of June 5th, 2007 imploring you and the leadership of the ANPP to join hands with our Administration and the PDP in collectively facing up to the challenge of moving the country forward.....The initial meeting has been scheduled for 11 .am on Tuesday, June 26th, 2007 at the Lagos Committee Room of Trancorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja. See appendix (19).

As a follow up to the above reply, the National Chairman had convened an emergency meeting to discuss the issue, subsequently; the following six people were selected by the party to meet with the Federal government team namely: Ahmed Sani Yerima, Saidu Umar Kumo, John E.K. Odigie-Oyegun, Otunba Stephen Ojo, Hassaini Omar Garba and Emma Eneukwu. The team met with their PDP counterpart to deliberate upon certain issues and conditions, consequent upon the ANPP acceptance to join the government.

Among the issues presented to the federal government team by the ANPP included:

- (a) The review of all privatization (concession of public institutions undertaken between 1st March and 29th May 2007 :)

- (b) Dissolution of INEC and prosecution of erring officials involves in the April General Elections.
- (c) Cancellation of Contracts hurriedly awarded by the immediate past administration.
- (d) Comprehensive review of parts of the 1999 constitution that affects the development of democratic process and
- (e) Electoral reforms including the review of the Electoral Act (Interview with Bashir Tofa, 2009).

The meeting of both the ANPP team and that of the federal government team met at Abuja on the 28th, June, 2007 to finalize the negotiation and came up with the following communiqué:

- (a) Recognizing that from whichever angle it was looked at the 2007 general elections marked a turning point in Nigeria's political history.
- (b) The leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party and the All Nigerian People's Party hereby agree to cooperate, not for the purpose of dissolving their identities or pretending that there are no problems, but to heed the call of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua for a national Consensus in tackling the country's fundamental problems and mobilizing for nation building. See appendix (20).

The two negotiation teams also came up with the following specific communiqué after an extensive deliberation:

- The review of all privatization/concession of public institutions undertaken between 1st March and 29th May, 2007.
- An urgent resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta.
- The cooperation of both parties in the national and state assemblies for the promotion and achievement of the foregoing goals and objectives as well as other issues of mutual and national interest;
- Consequent upon this agreement, the ANPP accepts to participate in the Yar'Adua Administration. See Appendix (20).

Contrary to the position of Saidu Kumo that the whole arrangement of GNU was adhoc, hence no need to resign, the above outline negotiations and communiqués have proved that the GNU followed the normal processes that other GNU world over have been

following. Therefore, Kumo ought to have either rejected the adversirship position or resigned his position as the party's scribe.

It appears that those who took part in the negotiation not only benefited from the sharing of the bounties, some of them had nurtured the idea long before President Yar'Ardua approached the party. According to Senator Yerima:

I was one of the architects of the GNU, and this emerged because of our desire to ensure that there is security, for government to strive....When Buhari called for "mass action, people like me said no, we can't plunge the country into chaos, therefore what we did was that we started talking peace with the government, at an informal level with the aim of establishing a relation. It was based on this that Mr. President wrote to us inviting us and a committee was set up by our National Executive of the party under my chairmanship to discuss with the Federal Government, not PDP.(Interview with Sen Ahmed Yerima,2009).Also see appendix (21)

On how positions were shared and how he has benefited, Yerima said:

Yar'adua asked us to nominate 3 ministers, 3 special advisers and 5 board members of parastatals...these positions were shared according to geo-political zones. Among the zones, positions were shared to states, Zamfara was asked to produce a minister, people from state said since 1999 to 2007, my wife has been coordinating women activities in the state, my exco insisted I should nominate her, my wife rejected, I later nominated my former commissioner...When the president decided to drop our nominees, the agitation came up again that I should nominate my wife, of which I did when I got to Abuja, other National Officers from other part of the country protested that Yarima has nominated his wife, immediately I withdrew her name against the intent of my party at the state level. (Interview with Sen.Ahmed Yerima, 2009)

This has to a large extent confirmed the allegations that the national leadership of the party shared the ministerial positions among themselves without following the necessary procedures. Each benefiting state or geo-political zone was asked to nominate person to occupy the position allotted to them. On the allegation that Ume-Ezeoke coined the

phrase ‘Government of National Unity’ purposely to benefit his personal interest and the interest of those who masterminded the negotiations right from the onset, Yerima said:

...even in the case of Anambra state the exco in the state met and nominated the son of the National Chairman, but he (Ezeoke) showed interest that he wanted his son to be special Adviser and nobody would want to go against his interest because he is the national chairman and has all along played a major role in the GNU (interview with Sen. Ahmed Yerima, 2009).

This again, had raised some questions on ordinarily who in a better position to lead the negotiation on the side of the ANPP. Is it the national leadership or the Presidential candidate?

According to Sule Haruna:

...even if there was any genuine reason for GNU, we felt it would have been the presidential candidate who would be invited to come and discuss with the government regarding the needs for forming GNU. (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009).

Indeed, all over the world where national elections were fought and concluded in dispute, it is not the leadership of the party that is invited, it is the candidate of the party that is invited because he represents both the conscience of the party, the moral authority of the party and he is the representative of the millions of the people of Nigeria that voted for him.

Furthermore in the ANPP’s situation, Buhari was not only representing the party, he was representing alternative to the government of Nigeria because millions of Nigerians who voted him are not even members of the ANPP, they are just Nigerians who because of the personal attribute and character of Buhari voted for the party.

If there was any person to speak for the millions of these Nigerians, in the words of Hamma:

It was Buhari, not the party leadership...because it was him and him alone that mobilized, that endeared them to the party and got their votes and confidence, not their party per se
(Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009).

The leadership of the party basically composed of technocrats, they are people who occupy certain offices in the party, who are paid salaries and allowances. With all intent and purposes, they do not represent the masses of the people that support and vote for the party. Because of this, the National leadership of the ANPP ought not to have been the one initiating the meeting.

More so, the party, PDP and its government have won 85% of the seats in most of the states, even at the national level, if it is true, this victory is genuine, you don't need a government of National Unity. The leadership of the ANPP who smuggled in the phrase Government of National Unity really missed the meaning and interpretation. You establish GNU where your majority is very slim, or indeed you are in the minority legislative and you have majority in the executives. In this case, it is impossible to have stability, and then you go for Government of National Unity. Unless you are saying that you have not won the elections, that your majority is not genuine. In that case you go for GNU, even under those circumstances, you invite the candidates of the different parties that contested the elections, as in the case of Kenyan elections of 2005. "Not the leadership of the party, they are the bureaucrats who are sitting in the offices." (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009).

Whichever way, one looks at it, the party's participation in the GNU has brought setback and loss of confidence to the ANPP as indicated in figures 4 and confirmed by Governor Shakarau . According to Governor Shakerau:

No doubt, the participation of the party in GNU has led to loss of some confidence by some members of the party and the agitation right now is that lets pull out, and any day we have NEC, the issue will be one of the issues to be discussed. This will be so because we have not seen the benefit (disadvantages we have), rather demerits. If we go into elections now, the issue of GNU might be our 'excess load' to carry. People will ask us why we remain with the government that has been associated with failure.Our participation has affected the standing of the party, even if we still maintain our position as the major opposition party, we would have played the role better without joining the GNU. (Interview with Ibrahim Shekarau, 2009, also confirmed by documentary research, 2009).

The participation of the ANPP in the GNU has not enjoyed the support of the public and the masses who in their hundreds of thousands marched out to vote in the 2007 general elections .According to Sule Hamma:

...The invitation was sent to the bureaucrats of the party that are sitting in the office, who have no liabilities of voters or supporters, because they never went out to campaign or mobilize the people.....so if you extend invitation to those people, and you think through them, you get the commitment of the people, no, you are only precipitating an internal crisis within the party with the sole aim of weakening the party (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009).

Since the issue of GNU came up, the relationship between the leadership of the ANPP, particularly its national chairmen, Chief Ume-Ezeoke and General Buhari had gone very bad. It has gotten to a point that the notable politicians who went round the country campaigning in 2007 elections are no longer on talking terms. On the relationship between him (Buhari) and the party national chairman, Ume-Ezeoke, Buhari said:

No, I have no respect for him, neither do I have anything to do with him again...If the party leadership should just withdraw the petition case without going through the constitutional provision of the party, do you think the leadership can receive any respect from any rational Nigerian? The leadership of the party is jinxed right from 1999. (Interview with Buhari, 2009, also confirmed by documentary research, 2009).




The whole idea of GNU was muted out of political greed; this is evident in the manner certain cliques have cornered the available positions to themselves. “It has shown that the crops of leaders in the ANPP are not interested in the party’s progress as an opposition, their interest is personal and self-centered” (Interview with Sen. Dansadau 2009). You can’t blame the PDP for disorganizing the ANPP, instead, “it is the manifesting of African politics, people don’t want to associate with opposition, and they do whatever they can to compromise the integrity of the system.” (Interview with Buhari, 2009).

Truly, a closer assessment at the whole issue of GNU reveals that the leadership of the ANPP is typical of almost all political parties both within and outside the opposition in Nigeria’s political arena today. The nature of the state vis-à-vis the economy and the mindset of the political elite whose psyche is not patient enough to systematically and gradually develop a political system and ideology rather how to quickly access their own portion of the ‘national cake’ thereby undermining the integrity of the party.

6.5 The Organizational Strength/Structure of the ANPP

The effects that organizational strength and spread have on party institutionalization seem straight forward. No party, particularly an opposition party like the ANPP, can develop into a viable party without some form of organizational capacity by which it can conduct its operations.

The result from content analysis in Figure 6.5 below shows that the organizational strength and structure of the ANPP is generally weak and it has steadily declined over the past ten years, as a fall out; it had a negative effect on the public rating of the party.



The analysis of the organizational strength of the ANPP occurs in two distinct levels. On one level, the organizational strength of a party is dictated by a party's degree of penetration into the local, allowing a greater and more targeted capacity for mobilization, recruitment, campaigning, and voter education. On this level, the ANPP appears not to have an adequate level of penetration except in a few states of the North considered to be its strongholds (Interviews with Tofa, 2009, and Buhari 2009).


Lack of grassroots penetration particularly down south has negatively affected the ability of the ANPP in strengthening its relations to local level party supporters and reduces its ability in communicating to the electorate, thus weakening its value infusion and reification. By value infusion, we mean identifying particular cleavages that potentially identify with the ANPP; and also defining the affiliations between party leaders and party members. Reification potentials is the degree to which the ANPP becomes taken for granted as an integral composition of the party system. The party name and symbols becomes commonly associated with certain values, ideology and practices, whether good or bad in nature.

A second level of analysis for organizational strength of the ANPP concerns the structuring and functioning of party decision-making and executing organs. Any party that has adequately defined and adhered to methods of decision-making and task execution is more likely to develop organizational stability than a party where methods of decision-making are constantly up for grabs, thus being vulnerable to personal power ambitions and factionalism.”

Party Organizational Structure Decision Organ

National Level

Executive Organs



The formal organizational arrangement or structure of the ANPP resembles the organizational layout in figure 1. In reality, the lack of adequate finances paired with weakly defined procedural arrangement contributes to significant redefinitions of who and which organs conduct party decision-making. In the ANPP, important policies are often times conceived, drafted, and adopted within the executing organs, involving little or no inputs from the decision-making organs. The governors under the umbrella of governors' forum have in most cases taken decisions concerning the image and the future of the party without going through the organs of the party. (Interview with DanSadau, 2009).

These weakly defined organizational arrangements in some cases have proven ineffective in mediating the highly personalized nature of party factions, resulting in further organizational deterioration. Ultimately, due to these personalized and unmediated cleavages, the party (ANPP) has been reduced from a status as one of the most promising opposition party in 1999 to a party with highly questionable future whose popularity is confined to the north.

The organizational structure of the ANPP and its capacity to expand has been very limited. It has gotten to a level that people nickname it a northern party. The strong

presence of the ANPP in the Northern part of Nigeria is not by coincidence. All the governors the party had produced, since 1999 are from the northern part, likewise most of its National Assembly members. They had over the years established strong presence and follower ship within the region.

On why the party has failed to spread beyond the north, or why the party that had strong presence across the country at its early years is now shrunk to a particular region (North). Many of the stakeholders of the party attribute this to lack of resources. According to Bashir Tofa, “Finance is very important, in terms of organizational structure if you don’t have the needed resource you cannot actualize your vision.” (Interview with Bashir Tofa, 2009)

The ANPP finds it difficult to get itself organized particularly in the states where the party is in the opposition. Most times you find out that it is the little money the party branches from north accrued to the National Secretariat that the secretariat used to manage its affairs. This is usually used as overhead cost, with little or nothing left to put in to developmental and organizational plan, particularly in other regions of the country.

Senator Sani Ahmed located the organizational deficiency of the party to irreconcilable differences that characterized the various political associations that APP was composed of in 1998. He said that:

When the political associations in Nigeria were been formed in 1998, the APP movement the association that formed APP, were dominated by the political class of the North, with the support of the south-west and the south-east. Along the line, Bola Ige’s group was dominant in the West. When the group pulled out, APP became very weak in the west. From the onset the participation of the Eastern block in the APP was not very strong, PDP found it difficult to rig in the North particularly because of the caliber of people there. (Interview with Sen SanniYerima).

The South-South geo-political zone had the strong presence of the APP. APP had more than 2/3 of the house of members in Cross river state, where the governorship election was won by the PDP, giving speculations that the elections were rigged in favour of the PDP candidate. It could be argued therefore, following the position of Yerima, that it was the manipulation of the Federal military government of that period that created a structural deficiency for the APP especially in the south-south geo-political zone.

The structural deficiency of the ANPP has clearly impacted (negatively) on the performance of the party. Because of the weak structure and lack of capacity for the party to reach out to people, there is lack of motivation within the party; also there is lack of internal mechanism for discipline, no clear mechanism for information dissemination which has resulted into lack of mobilization within the party.

This apparent weak organizational structure of the ANPP gives influential individuals the leverage to emerge and become more dominant in the party, more especially if such individuals have organizations that seem to be better organized than the ANPP itself as in the case of T.B.O.

Buhari and the T.B.O do not see the need to develop organizational structure aside the reputation and the popularity of General Buhari. Buba Galadima is of the opinion that:” The problem with the ANPP is not the organizational structure; at least to the best of my knowledge, in most of the states ANPP’s presence is felt, the problem with the party is leadership.” (Interview with Buba Galadima, 2009).The T.B.O believes that the popularity of General Buhari is enough to earn the party the needed geographical and structural spread and acceptance.

General Buhari has his own assets and the worthiest of them is his integrity, which he laboured to build over the years. He is widely believed to be sufficiently fearless, upright, cultured, meticulous, prudent and transparent. These are quite enough qualities that can make any politician to beat others, under normal circumstances. These normal circumstances include: believing in the need to actualize your political goals via structures built around the party not relying on few individuals.

Buhari believes that through his popularity some governors won their respective elections, so by that standard; it is the duty of these people to sell his popularity to the electorate. Secondly, the T.B.O members think that the organization (TBO) is superior to the ANPP and enjoys more popularity, hence there is no need to emphasize on the imperative of the organizational structure of the party. In fact TBO believes that through the organization, the governors that were elected on the platform of the ANPP got their victories.

...Buhari did a lot to enable Shekarau get the ticket in 2003 particularly through our campaign organization. Since he assumed office, he has betrayed us in many ways specifically by refusing to support Buhari financially. (Interview with Eng.Buba Galadima, 2009).

Buhari was helpful in 2003, in efforts to get Governor Shekarau his first term. No one can deny that but it's also important to note that Buhari himself was a product of Kano people's desire to have Sharia implemented in the state. This line of argument has changed, Buhari seems to have given up on the Sharia pursuit, and looked up to T.B.O for any actions. Unfortunately, the prominent members of T.B.O are not seasoned politicians; some of them do not believe that development can be achieved through strict Sha'ria implementation. They are more or less activists who have no structures on ground

to woo voters. A clear example was the pre-election saga in Kano involving Shekarau and the EFCC lists allegedly masterminded by some T.B.O members.





The EFCC list of 2007 involved candidates for different positions under different parties. The list indicted them of corruption. The indicted persons challenged the legality of the list. Buhari's response to the list defeated logic when he said:

“Indicted members of the party would not be fielded for the offices they were seeking” (New.Nigeria.Newspaper, March, 2007 p.32)

Nobody would suggest to Buhari to disregard democratic norms and transparent ethos, however, “he would have treated the list with caution” (interview with Sen. Aruwa, 2009). His position on the controversial list would have stood the test of time today considering the political motive of the list. However, it all appeared to have been the brainchild of the few T.B.O members who were dissatisfied with some ANPP candidates that did that in conjunction with the EFCC. At the end, some of the accused candidates won their election in spite of Buhari's and T.B.O's support. This ultimately dropped the popularity rate and support of Buhari.

6.6 The ANPP's Sources of Income (Party Finance)

Figure 6.6 below indicates that the ANPP is financially weak and most times the party is in dire need of finance to adequately run the affairs of the party. Also, the general public is not confident on the financial prudence and transparency of the leadership of the party.



All the methods of funding political parties practice elsewhere in the world are recognized by the ANPP as enshrined in its constitution. These include party membership

dues, local fund raising by party activists, donations by party members and sympathizers. Others include levies on the salaries of categories of party members occupying offices of state, donations by internal groups etc.

Of the above, the most prominent in the ANPP, in terms of size and frequency are donations made by the state governors. These funds from the governors are most times erratic; depending on the disposition of the governors. The funding structure of parties in Nigeria is clearly biased in favour of the ruling parties because of the role of the state in regulating the economy and allocating resources and absence of separation between the state and the party in power. The ruling party controls many multi billion business organizations; contractors who depend on the state via the organizations to get contracts are reluctant to finance the opposition party, rather they prefer to donate to the ruling party, knowingly well that, if they do donate to the opposition parties, their chances of bidding for contracts and be successful are slow because they will be tagged as the enemies of the ruling party and by extension the state.

The old contention that money must be raised in order for political parties to perform their functions as organizations still holds true for political parties both in mature and new democracies. The ANPP is not different, and like other political parties worldwide it needs money in order to perform its functions such as: to maintain itself as an organization, recruit personnel, win support, hold conventions, manage election campaigns, handle the media, establish political offices to canvass support and get its message through to the electorate across the length and breadth of the country.

The ANPP, like most political parties in Nigeria, lacks membership lists, let alone the expectation that membership fees would be regularly paid. The PDP depends on the

National coffers, logistic and above all the advantage of incumbency to access resources in order to attain its political ambitions. In this circumstance, the ANPP at the National level suffers three major disadvantages: (a) scarcity of resources, (b) uneven access to resources (c) limited outreach and geographical coverage. These factors often tilt the balance of electoral results in favour of the PDP.

Because the ANPP has failed to harness the potentials of its mass grassroots follower ship, it could not generate sufficient resources through other legitimate means. It relies on the financial support from the governors who were often erratic in their commitments. For instance, while Ahmed Sani gave N4million as his campaign assistance, others did not give at all. The little resources at the disposal of the party are often times mismanaged by the leadership of the party (Interview with Buba Galadima, 2009).

Section 78(2) of 2002 Electoral Acts authorizes INEC to examine the account and financial records of all the parties and make such reports public for scrutiny. This is more mandatory as the state gives financial subvention to political parties based on certain criteria and expects to be able to monitor how these funds are spent.

In a report released in June 2005, INEC indicted all the political parties for financial recklessness by not keeping proper records. The ANPP was specifically indicted for having “no proper accounting records despite of the huge inflow of resources to the party.” (Anonymous INEC staff)

The 1999 constitution of the Federal of the Federal Republic of Nigeria basically reproduced the 1979 constitution with the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) having constitutional responsibility to monitor the finances of political parties,

conduct an annual examination and audit of the funds of political parties and publish a report for public information. Section 228 (c) of the 1999 constitution gives power to the National Assembly to provide for an annual grant to the INEC for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them with their functions. Accordingly, the National Assembly approved a ~~₦~~600 million budget for the 30 registered parties in 2003 general election. INEC shared 180 million to all political parties at ~~₦~~6 million each in accordance with section 80(2)(a) of the 2002 Electoral Act: "30% of the grant shall be shared among the political parties in respect of a general elections for the grant has been made," in accordance with section 80(2) (b) of the 2002 Electoral Act, ~~₦~~420 million was shared by INEC to seven political parties namely: the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), People's Democratic Party (PDP), All Progressive Grand Alliance, (APGA), National Democratic Party (NDP), People's Redemption Party (PRP) and United Nigeria People's party (UNPP). Out of this, ANPP got ~~₦~~60 million.

Section 84(3) of the 2002 Electoral Act states:

Election expenses of political parties shall be submitted to the commission in a separate audited return within three months after polling day and such shall be signed by the party's auditors and countersigned by the chairman of the party as the case may be and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit by the signatories as to the correctness of its contents.

In the case of the 2003 election the due date for submission of the audited report of political parties was 3 August after the final polling day of 3 May 2003. "The ANPP and most other political parties violated the deadline." (Anonymous INEC staff). In the case of the ANPP, there were no available records on the exact amount of money spent by both the presidential campaign organization and the party. This reveals that there are

indications of heavy reliance on private funding in all three elections in Nigeria since 1999; more so that the ANPP virtually lacks organizational capacity to generate its own income through legitimate means such as; membership fees etc. The ANPP as the largest opposition party does not have mechanism to enroll members, as such; it cannot appeal to its supporters and members to pay their dues. Funds from the Governors only go to the party only when elections are approaching. The periods in between elections the ANPP is usually broke with no resources to organize seminars, conferences in areas outside its stronghold. This would have created awareness and possibly the conviction among the electorate that it might give a credible alternative in the party.

The 2007 general elections were conducted with 2006 Electoral Act, a hallmark of the electoral reform process led by Obasanjo's Administration. Section 90 of the 2006 Electoral Act states: that the National Assembly may approve a grant for disbursement to political parties to assist them in their operations. These funds, according to section 91(2) (a and b) are to be shared on a ratio (10:90) in favour of political parties that have representation in the National Assembly. However, Citizen Popular Party (CPP) and about 18 other opposition political parties filed a case against INEC on the sharing formula. An Abuja Federal High Court that presided over the case ruled that the money should be shared equally. In response to this ruling, INEC decided to share the funds equally among the parties. This development did not change the financial strength of the ANPP as it still relied mainly on donations from governors, on one hand to keep the party functioning, while on the other hand, Buhari admirers, supporters donated to Buhari's Campaign Organisation to be able to prosecute his electioneering campaign (interview with Buba & Sule Hamma, 2009).

The above scenario made it more difficult and cumbersome for the ANPP to have its finances monitored or regulated. What brought about this disparity? According to General Buhari, “we were very careful not to collect any money from people of questionable character” (Interview with Gen.Buhari, 2009), who are these politicians of questionable character? Perhaps these are the money bags, who have stolen money from the national treasury at one point or the other and who were and still been pursued by EFCC. The Buhari campaign team had its own separate fund raising strategies, different from that of the main ANPP. Each state had its own chapter of the Buhari Campaign Team; they were mandated by the T.B.O to raise funds for the organization but with strict conditions, which says interested donors should send his or her money to some designated bank account numbers, without making it public.

This very condition given by the T.B.O did not enjoy the support of the movers and shakers of the ANPP, particularly the governors. According to Alhaji Kabir Aruwa:

Nigerian politicians love to be shown publicly donating money to parties at any public gatherings, through that they believe they can acquire more popularity and support.” When T.B.O said people should send more to a specific account, we know they were doomed financially.

(Interview with Alh.Kabir Aruwa, 2009).

While some people disagreed with the method adopted by the T.B.O to raise funds for the party, others believe otherwise: blaming the governors and the party leadership for the ANPP poor financial standing.

When the governors began the move to completely takeover the control of the party from its funding fathers, they starved the party of funds; because the founding members are not too rich to dish out money, the fellowship tends to follow the governors who often give them money and other rewards. Also, the governors who control the National Assembly

members from their respective states instructed the Senators and House of Rep. members to follow suit. (Interview with Sen.Dansadau, 2009).

The above observation is quite apt, because gradually and shortly after the 1999 general elections, the governors became the leaders of the party in their states and were dictating to the National Assembly members from their states simply because they sponsored their campaigns and imposed them on the people through stage managed primaries and eventually rigged the elections. In another related development, during the 2003 general election when Bafarawa was in charge of the party's campaign fund raising committee, he was accused of deliberately starving the party organs particularly in the South of funds. "He kept on promising the zones of funds and never gave them anything to prosecute electoral campaign" (Interview with Saidu Dansadau, 2009). This partly explained the poor showing of the party in the zones because the leaders of the party in the zones became so exasperated and disappointed thereby staying at home which allowed the PDP to carry the day.(Interview with Sen.Dansadau,2009)

In 2007, general elections the situation did not change for better.

During the campaign for 2007 elections all the ANPP governors gave us N14millions; Modu Sherrif; (N9m), Yerima (4 m), Abba (1 million), Shekarau did not give us one kobo. One of them invited me to his state, 48 hours to the election, he kept me in one hotel for 24 hours, only for him to send his aide to me with a brief-case containing ₦10 and ₦20 notes, when we counted the notes, and we got 1 million. The same governor had donated ₦300million to PDP campaign. You can imagine what we would have done with ₦300 million if we were given. (Interview with Buba, Galadima, 2009).

The reasons for the governor's behavior might not be far fetched. First, he might not be comfortable with the position of the T.B.O on issues concerning donation mentioned earlier and secondly, he wanted to solidify his position as a state Governor by donating

that huge amount of money to the PDP knowingly well that level of support to the ruling party, he will be regarded as a friend of the Aso Rock.

Leadership crisis which the ANPP had over the years been grappling with is largely responsible for the financial status of the ANPP. “Because no body respects the leadership of the party neither do they accept the authority of the leadership, people are reluctant to generously donating” (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009)

Similarly, investigations by INEC have revealed that,” the past leaders of the party have not been able to properly account for the funds the party had generated in the past 10 years” (Anonymous INEC staff). Confirming this allegation, Hon Faruk Aliyu said:

The party is broke, because the little the party has generated, the leadership cannot account for it. For instance I paid ₦3 million as a gubernatorial candidate, so many other candidates paid several fees; nobody knows how the party spent it.....When on several occasion, Ume-Ezeoke approached me for financial assistance to the party, I did not respond. Moreover, he should ask his son, who is a special adviser to the president to donate to the party.
(Interview with Hon Farouk Aliyu, 2009).

When one puts into perspective all these forces that have accounted for the poor financial status of the party, only little can be achieved by the party, particularly as an opposition party. Alhaji Tofa Bashir Summarized the effect of lack of finance on the ANPP. He said:





Finance is very important, in terms of organization, no matter how well structured the party is, if there is no money, we wont be able to maintain those structures. That is why the activities of the party are less effective particularly in states where the ANPP is in opposition. Even at the National level, the situation is the same. (Interview with Bahir Tofa, 2009)

The inability of the ANPP to access funds independent of the governors has placed a lot of limitations on the party’s performance, achievements and had negatively influenced the level the party could go in convincing the general public

on the capability of the ANPP to provide a credible alternative. Also, the ANPP is way behind the ruling party in terms of its ability to generate funds. Private individuals and organizations who could have lifted the party financially are scared of incurring the wrath of the ruling PDP and by extension the state and are skeptical of the financial honesty of the party leadership.

6.7 Low Level of Party Discipline among the Elected Officials of the ANPP

Figure 6.7 below shows the level of discipline among the elected officials and the executive members of the ANPP as reported by the four papers during the period under review. Generally, the figures have indicted the ANPP as a party with little or no party discipline.



Party Discipline among politicians and party members is a difficult issue to discuss. There are divergent opinions on what constitutes party discipline. The first and perhaps most obvious thing to say about party discipline is that individual members and representatives behave in certain ways because it is in their interest and the interest of the party to do so. A politician follows the party line because they gain some personal benefit as a result, or they avoid sanctions. An individual joins a political party and subjects himself to its discipline because it gives him/her the opportunity to run for office, or the satisfaction of seeing certain policies he supports carried out.

Some elements of cohesion have to exist for discipline to be accepted in the first place. This cohesion may come from shared norms and values, the political culture and so on. Political party (ANPP) is a group formed for the pursuit of substantively national goals, whether is a particular policy or the quest for office for its own sake. Putting the ANPP, under this continuum scale and from figures 7a-d above, the level of discipline of the party is quite low and amazingly embarrassing.

Party leaders and generally, the institution designers at both the state and party levels have not in anyway encouraged discipline. A variety of institutional mechanisms that would have brought about discipline are lacking particularly electoral system, internal party rules, such as candidate selection. When a party leader short changed a candidate, and there is no room for him to express his grievances within the party, he is likely to look for non conventional ways to express his annoyance. In most cases, the leadership and the follower ship have acted in a way likely to erode party discipline, because neither the leadership nor the followers have respected the constitution and the party's stated guidelines for conducting its activities.

There is a consensus that there is a linkage between party discipline and, party switching (Decamping). Switching political affiliation is an indication of party weakness in terms of discipline (interview with Bashir Tofa, 2009). A large number of notable political figures in Nigeria have decamped from ANPP to the ruling party for obvious reason. “People decamp to where victory is guaranteed.”(Interview with Sen.Sani Yerima, 2009). Politicians switch to maximize electoral security, but their rate of movements is most times influenced by the individual’s interest, without any ideological linkage or consultation with the electorate who supposedly voted them in to offices, indicating that party platform doesn’t really count. Secondly, the electoral and party systems in Nigeria encourage extreme individualism and antiparty behaviour by the elected officials.

As for sources of the ANPP’s poor performance in terms of party discipline, two related factors are responsible. Firstly, formal institutions and the party norms prevent party leaders from effectively disciplining its members, while encouraging intra-party competition and individualistic behaviour. Going by the circumstances that surround the election of the party leadership, the party is poorly equipped for the task of maintaining party discipline. Secondly, because there is no internal democracy which allows the rank and file of the party to take part in vital decision-making, the largely uniformed electorate is not equipped either to sanction the elected officials who switch from the ANPP to other parties, by voting them out through recall.

If institutions do not encourage party discipline, attentive voters that value partisan commitments may. But, in the case of the ANPP, the general electorate knows little about his representatives’ behaviour, is incapable of making judgment about his

representatives, and hence has little or no confidence over these politicians. To worsen the situation, the election itself is usually characterized by rigging and other related electoral fraud. Under this situation, the “elected” officials have no respect for the electorate because they won inspite their support. More amazingly, the respect for the party leaders that paved the way for them soon disappeared neither can they control them. This is because it is the highest bidder that got the ticket and the seat as the case may be. Since he paid for the seat, the party leadership deserves little or no respect, since it is his money that has bought, or won him the seat.

Switching political parties by politicians is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. Quite a member of parliamentarians decamped in the First Republic. However, the rate at which politicians; particularly high ranking politicians have abandoned their parties, most times for the ruling parties is alarming. Perhaps, the affected politicians might have found out that when you have nothing to offer the electorate in terms of ideas and problems, the surest way of securing victory is by identifying with the ruling party, more so, in the Nigerian state where the line between the state and the ruling party is blurred if not entirely absent; authority is personalized, offices tend to be appropriated by office holders for personal use, and legitimacy is sustained through the maintenance of complex patron-client networks funded by the state recourses, also, since the state controls all the institutions that can guarantee electoral success, including the INEC. Switching to the ruling party is seen as the surest way of consolidating power, particularly among the elected representatives.

Party discipline within the ANPP particularly among the elected officials and those who were elected on the platform of the party is quite low (interview with

Governor Ibrahim Shekarau: 2009). This lack of party discipline has been exhibited by the prominent members of the party since its inception in 1998. To set the bad example was the pioneering chairman of the party who abandoned the party to join the PDP led government. This singular act has set a bad precedence for others, personal interest is been put above the party. The reference point now is that if the first national chairman of the party, Senator Mahmud Waziri could abandoned the party at it crical moment in 1999 to join the PDP led government, anybody else within the party can as well follow suit.

The inability of the party leaders to respect the oath they took to respect the constitution of the party has in various ways exposed them to the public, lack of discipline within the party. As indicated earlier, if there is discipline, Bafarawa wouldn't have, in his capacity as the caretaker chairman, and more important an ANPP governor, publicly identified with President Obasanjo and the PDP when the National Assembly withdrew the impeachment proceeding against the President. (See appendix 9)

Also in 2003, shortly after the results of the general elections were announced, while some section of the party had rejected the results, Governor Aliero, a governor elected on the platform of the ANPP, was shown on the National Television assisting in the cutting of the PDP victory cake in Abuja. Not quite long ago, Senator Sani Yerima, a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, also elected in the platform of the ANPP joined president Yardua in the rally organized by the PDP North-West to receive some new PDP members in Sokoto who were mostly decampees from the ANPP. This is not only a betrayal of public trust and the party's trust but lack of conscience, vision and party discipline on their side. It is not surprising that some of the ANPP governors and elected officials who publicly identified with Buhari in both 2003 and 2007 general

elections have suddenly abandoned the General to his fate and have become much closer to the PDP than their party, ANPP. They were closed to Buhari during the elections because they wanted to win their seats in their respective states, but deserted the party and Buhari shortly after results were announced. To them, having won their second term bids, there was nothing at stake again in the ANPP, they can do without the party.

Also, some members of T.B.O conducted their activities as if the T.B.O is a parallel body. They show little or no respect for the leadership of the party.

The issue of reconciliatory move orchestrated by the ANPP cannot work because the political interest of the Buhari group and those that are controlling the party are diametrically opposed the two groups differ in objectives, goals, targets and aspirations... (Interview with Bashir Tofa, 2009).

A situation like this, where party members insult one another, even in the media, there cannot be party discipline.

Honourable Farouk argues that there is no party discipline in the ANPP, but blame the leadership for that He said:





Party leaders don't lead by example. They are not disciplined, look at our chairman, vice presidential candidate of our party, who went round the country campaigning with Buhari... he insisted that we should go to court because the party was robbed of victory, in my presence he told Buhari to go to court. The same man withdrew the case without telling Buhari just because his ambition has been realized. Also the party secretary took the Federal Government appointment and refused to resign. Is that discipline? No. (Interview with Hon. Farouk, 2009).

There seems to be a linkage between party discipline and internal democracy; when decisions are taken and implemented based on the whims and caprices of the leaders, to the exclusion of the majority, there can not be discipline. Where this exists, leaders hardly earn the respect of the followers. Also because the leadership of the party is weak and

generally not respected, it lacks the political will to enforce law and get satisfactory compliance from the Governors and other representatives after all they fund the party.

6.8 Lack of Party Identity, Programmes and Ideology

The content analysis of the above variable carried out on the four selected papers indicates that the public has not identified the ANPP with any clear-cut identity and ideology, neither does the party have any distinguishable programs that it attempts to pursue when it accedes to power. No individual or group has made any attempt to enlighten the public on the ideology, and programs of the ANPP.(See figure 6.8 below)



Policy and programme development determines the effectiveness of any party, especially when it comes to the mobilization of a support base and contestation for state power. We found out, through the interactions with the major stakeholders of the ANPP that, the party experience difficulties in developing policies and programme. All the political parties in Nigeria exhibit commonalities in ideological outlook, which is centred around providing education, employment, eradicating poverty and so on, and this presents the electorate with little choice during elections in terms of choosing or voting candidates on the basis of the programs of the party, rather, candidates are supported by virtue of the personality that is dominant in the party.

The ANPP lacks ideological clarity and distinctiveness. As a result, it looks much the same to each other (PDP, AC etc.) and it tends to raise similar campaign issues. Its programmes lack policy substance and are generally a shopping list of promises which are hardly ever fulfilled after elections. The party hardly used its instrument of outreach systematically, given that in many instances, few individual leaders tend to loom larger than the ANPP and as a result the personality cult or oligarchy tends to take over the institutional activities of the party.

Election campaigns tend to revolve around individuals rather than being predicated upon well-defined and ideologically delineated policy positions/proposals. For instance in 2003 and 2007 electioneering campaigns, the party mobilized people for Buhari based on The Buhari Organization blue print which is quite different from the ANPP manifesto. See appendix (iv&v). Buhari confirmed this when he said:

“Through out our campaign, we mobilized voters based on the Buhari programme which centred on three key issues: security, stability and prosperity”. (Interview with Gen. Buhari, 2009).

Consequently, voters chose party and candidate not so much on the basis of its policy proposals but the personalities involved.

The ideology of a party (Identity) consists among other things; the purpose of the party, its future goals (visions) and what it sees as their own role, how to get there or what they can offer society (mission). While the ANPP like most other parties espouse principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms and genuine democracy, it has in practice largely been motivated by a single issue: the removal of the incumbent ruler and its party from power. The ANPP as a party generally does not espouse any distinct and identifiable programmes different from other parties.

As a result of this non-existence of distinct party programmes, it becomes inherently difficult for the law makers under the platform of the ANPP to debate based on the party's agenda. Neither was the party holding regular meetings with them to intimate them with the programmes because it does not have any concrete and distinct policy to deliberate on.

There is a common agreement among the major stakeholders of the ANPP that the ideology of the ANPP is not quite different from that of the PDP. In a developing country like Nigeria the most pressing issues are: how to tackle the issues of poverty and the provision of basic necessity of life that preoccupy the minds of the politicians and their political parties. As a follow up to this, the ANPP adopts a vague populism campaign during elections and pitches its campaign around its opposition to corruption, services for the population and general promises of a better future. Debates about specific policy issues have been virtually nonexistent. This can not really motivate the electorate to see hope and credible alternative in the ANPP.

Part of the low salience of ideology on the side of the ANPP is largely due to the noninvolvement of the civil society organizations in the formulation of the party's policy issues. Ideology and party platforms are not common current among the Nigerian political parties, the ANPP in particular. Parties that are clientelist in the narrowest of senses have little need for the encumbrance of policy positions. "The ANPP is little more than an informal club; it cannot as such afford to develop firm ideological positions on issues" (interview with Sule Hmma, 2009).

Elections and electioneering campaigns are simply not fought over policy positions. In the case of the ANPP, where policies are formulated in the electioneering context, they are more often than not the broadest and crudest form of populism offering unfunded provision of basic necessities of life such as medical care.

Part of the problem lies in the current global confusion over the breadth of the policy spectrum. The left/right distinction had very little echo in the country even at the height of the cold war. All the major parties that led Nigeria to gain independence were more of the western ideologies.

Most of the people interviewed are of the opinion that "most political parties in Nigeria today are not rooted in any distinct set of ideas or ideologies, rather are personality-driven" (Interviews with Gen Buhari, Sanni Ahmed Yarima, Bashir Tofa, Kabir Aruwa, etc). During the 2003 and 2007 general elections, campaigns offered Nigerians scant information on substantive issues by which to compare candidates and their parties. Nigeria's political parties have tended to use violence, intimidation and bribery to leverage voters, rather than build popular support through articulated party

platforms. The ANPP during the period under review, preferred to make broad campaign promises than to offer specifics.

The ANPP from its inception to date has gone through some changes both in terms of structures, partnership, in terms of its focus; the ANPP is ideologically non-distinguishable from other major political parties in Nigeria, this is because of the fact that they were products of the military rule that was encouraged to leave office; hand over power to a democratically elected government. The military themselves helped to midwife the parties that were designed to takeover power so that they could protect the values of the military. Some of which were not necessarily democratic (Interview with Sule Hamma, 2009). Clearly therefore, the parties that came up after 1999 takeover, one of which is the ANPP, can be said to be similar, ideologically with other parties such as the PDP, and AD.

Their ideology was essentially to take over from military government and creates a representative democracy. Generally speaking, they dwell on the same institution the military built and they inherited .The basic ideological posture of the APP when we started it, was to “follow transition programme and thereafter to continue the political process in Nigeria.”(Interview with Umaru Shinkafi, 2009).The timetable announced by the military gave little time for political formation, as a matter of urgency, few like minds politicians met to begin the process of party formation. In the case of the ANPP (then APP):

Few of us met in my house in Kaduna, our main focus was to seize the opportunity of transition to entrench the party that would ensure democracy in Nigeria. (Interview with Umaru Shinkafi, 2009)

This lack ideological distinction notwithstanding, the APP, (as the party was then known), in terms of slogans, in terms of expectations, as well as in terms of personalities that were in the party, one could say that, the party had the potentials of evolving the most peoples oriented and most liberal party with workable programmes. The party has through the years failed to remain faithful to these expectations, as well as the image.

A number of reasons are responsible for this. Firstly, the nature of the Nigerian environment. The Nigerian environment is generally permissive to political treachery, and political subservient to the government in power (interview with Sule Hama, 2009). Secondly, the structure of the party itself which by 200, became, based on the agreement between APP and UNPP which was founded and aligned to Gen. Bagangida (interview with Sen. Dan Sadau, 2009) That agreement has created some kind of confusion, perhaps uncertainty in terms of its constitution, manifestos and its sense of mission as a party. That was also aided by the fact that, the leadership of the party after the partnership was signed came to be those element from the UNPP. For instance, immediately the agreement was signed, the next national convention produced the national executive members of the party who were dominated by people from the UNPP. Ume-Ezeoke became the chairman, while the chairman, board of trustees was Avm Augustus Alkhonmu.

The agreement changed the structures and the orientations of the ANPP, it also, changed its emphasis and its capacity to connect with the follower ship, because the people that took over the ANPP, (those from the UNPP), clearly were more elitist, more fraternal to the people and party that are in power, simply because historically, they belong to the same category. So they don't see any difference between themselves and

those in power. They do not see themselves as people that belong to the opposition party with a clear difference between a ruling party that was fighting certain values and programmes that were distinct from the party in power.

Similarly, the ANPP, between 1999 and 2003 when it had 9 governors and controlled quite a number of Senators and House of Representative members was not able, within this period to build itself to create cohesion with a view to establishing a clear ideological line for the party that was distinct from that of the PDP and to also see itself fighting a mission irrespective of whether it is in control of federal government or not.

Senator Saidu Dansadau, is one of the pioneering members of the APP, he was elected to the National Assembly as a Senator on the platform of the party. He said: “We addressed issues in the National Assembly based on national interest, not on any political ideology” (interview with Dansadau, 2009). This means that technically, there was no forum between the party leadership and its representatives in the National Assembly to assess the party’s position on certain national issues, with the aim of proffering alternatives. Corroborating the position, Hon Datti Ahmed Said: “I challenged the ruling party on the floor of the House based on my own personal policy, not that of the party” (interview with Hon Datti Baba Ahmed, 2009)

Lack of ideological posture of the ANPP has created a gap between the party and its representatives at all levels. Because of this, the party lacks initiatives and it has failed to perform its responsibilities in many aspects. Honourable Farouk has aptly argued the ideological incapacity of the ANPP. He said:

...As a party, ANPP never asked us to criticize and perform our responsibilities as law makers representing an opposition party. Even

now, the situation is the same. You find out that the members on their own...there are members who are interested in opposing; we normally meet to rub minds. ANPP never asked us in the National Assembly to take any particular line of action which we could say it reflected the manifesto of the ANPP. (Interview with Hon.Farouk Aliyu, 2009)

The situation in the present National Assembly has not changed, law makers, particularly those from the ANPP have lost touch with their party, and hence, there are little contributions or impacts from the agenda of the ANPP to members' debates.

...there are no ideologies guiding parties in Nigeria, so whatever one is doing, the role one plays whether in senate, anywhere, is targeted towards national development based on his own perception of the issue....Therefore, all contributions I make in the senate are guided by my own principles (Interview with Sen.Sani Yerima,2009).

The governors of the ANPP saw themselves more like the governors of the PDP, without platform and ideological distinction; they became integrated into the national system of patronage the PDP led government had developed. They operated like in a military setting, taking directives from President Obasanjo. They did not see themselves as ANPP governor; instead they operated without any distinction with other governors. Secondly, they began to see citizens as mere subjects with little or no respect and fear for them. This has over the years, created an identity problem for the ANPP.

Democracy and political party in particular is like human beings, it grows with time, as it is growing, there are certain challenges it must come across and possibly overcome with determination. Lack of ideology that has characterized the ANPP is a challenge, which can be overcome with time if the party is serious, but for now lack of ideology on the part of the ANPP has prevented it from presenting itself as a credible and viable opposition.

Ideological ties form the substance of democracy and party policies, where it is lacking, the operators of the system will be operating without focus. It is rarely a big hole and a shortcoming. Parties in Nigeria find it difficult to develop a realistic party programme and ideologies because they pay less attention to research and statistics.

6.8.1 The ANPP's Performance at the National Assembly

Very often, a party's preoccupation with building its organisation or fighting an election campaign causes it to overlook the critical issue of the party's ability to perform in parliament. While distinctly different to general governance programs, this area of programming is complementary to the important work of developing legislative capacity. The public perception and profile of a party is greatly influenced by the performance of the party caucus or parliamentary group and individual members of parliament. Political strategies adopted by parties both in government and opposition usually have more of an impact on the electorate than many other activities parties engage in outside of an election. A party can generate a favourable impression with the electorate through an effective and credible performance in parliament. A credible record of representing the interests of the electorate in a consistent manner in parliament through promoting certain policy initiatives particularly in opposition and giving innovative and unified leadership is a strong selling point for a party at election period.

In 1999, the composition of the members of the National Assembly was a reflection of the contemporary Nigerian society; well educated, articulate, ambitious for power, fame and affluence and also eager to make a mark. In the House of Representatives over 62% have Bachelor's Degree, 17.7% have Masters Degrees, 5.1% have Doctorate Degrees. At the Senate, 78% of the members have a minimum of a

Bachelor's Degree, 20.6% have Masters Degrees, and only an insignificant percentage has the minimum qualification, which is secondary school certificate (6.6% for Senate and 9.2% for House of Representatives (Anyawu.2007).

Interms of quality and experience, the National Assembly was blessed .There were seven former state Governors in the Senate, four of them elected and three military; one deputy governor, nine former Federal Ministers and eleven former state Commisioners. Also at the House of Representatives, at least one hundred and twenty members had some form of legislative and public service experience. Majority of its members graduated from the local government councils and state assemblies (Anyawu.2007).

The implication of this was that, the members of National Assembly were experienced enough to produce qualitative parliamentary debates either along party based programmes and ideologies or national issues. This prospect was boosted by the alliance between the All Peoples Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD) during the 1999 general eletions.This produced a strong alliance of opposition parties made up of law makers from the AD and the APP.However, this alliance at the National Assembly between the AD and the APP soon brokedown due to due to parochial reasons (Interview with Sen.Saidu Dansadau, 2009).The AD lawmakers perhaps realized the need to protect President Obasanjo,from the South West, the strong base of the AD.As such, AD pulled out of the alliance and gradually tilted towards the Executives on most issues .

The absence of strong opposition party presence at the National Assembly gave rise to the emergence of geo- politically based caucuses and became a basis not for debating national issues and policies rather for sharing offices, Assembly leadership,

committee leadership and committee membership. In all, there were six caucuses in the National Assembly, namely; North-West caucuses, North-East caucuses, North-Central caucuses, South-East caucuses, South-West caucuses and South-South caucuses. Throughout the Fourth Assembly, caucuses replaced oppositional politics and began to form around those supporting leaders and committees members from their respective geo-political zones. This development rendered the activities of the ANPP as an opposition party non effective as the bulk of its members at the National Assembly who were mainly from the North abandoned the party's agenda for geo-political issues.

Abandoning party based issues in favour of the geo-political caucuses, by the ANPP members played into the hands of the ruling PDP. By 2003, most of the vibrant ANPP members did not make it back to National Assembly. Prior to the 2003 general elections, party influence and supremacy had taken root in the new democratic practice. This became obvious in the party primaries where each party invoked powers enshrined its constitution to decide its candidates for National Assembly. This arrangement ensured that the elected National Assembly members did not necessarily emerge through free and fair primary elections but the grace of the leadership of the party. This implied that any incumbent lawmakers deemed 'uncooperative' by the Executives were prevented from returning to the National Assembly. In the case of the ANPP, the President dictated to the leadership of the party on who would be fit enough to return. (Interview with Senator Dansadau, 2009). Also in some cases the executive planted "moles" in the party with a view to preventing the "radicals" from returning to the National Assembly. (Interview with Sen. Saidu Dansadau, 2009).

At the beginning of the fifth session of the National Assembly, more than Two-Thirds of the National Assembly members were PDP and were willing to do the bidding of the Presidency. Immediately the executive capitalised on the 'favourable' atmosphere at the National Assembly to roll out some economic reforms, particularly in the petroleum sector to be debated at the floor of the National Assembly. During this period, some remnants of the radicals particularly from the ANPP attempted to employ the usual tactics but were checkmated by the ruling PDP. They could not produce the much needed opposition activities to the ruling party at the national level which is the focus of this work.

6.8.2 The ANPP and Civil Society Organisations

The ANPP, by virtue of its position as the largest opposition party in Nigeria ought to have been leading the way in organizing the opposition movements. Unfortunately, given the antecedents, the circumstances of its formation, the elitish nature of its origin and the way the party had operated over the years, has not been as effective as expected in a democratic setting. As indicated above, in 1999, the ANPP (then APP) worked closely, though briefly with other opposition parties particularly with the AD. This alliance fizzled out with time and the party became alienated from other opposition parties.

Consequently, the mobilisational, educational and facilitational roles of the ANPP got relegated. "The ANPP has alienated itself from the electorate, other opposition parties and tended to support the ruling party more passionately than even the PDP" (Interview with Hon. Farouk Aliyu, 2009). The inability of the party to bring out a clear

alternative policies to the ones given by the PDP has been severely affected as such lost its integrity.

Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) is a platform that enables political parties, particularly the opposition parties to come together to exchange ideas. The CNPP came into existence as a child of circumstances. Its roots can be traced back to the 7th May, 2002 when the independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) invited all political associations seeking recognition by it as political parties to attend a consultative meeting with it to consider the INEC's proposed guidelines for the formation of political parties. During those consultations all the political associations present rejected the proposed guidelines as undemocratic, unconstitutional, unjust and therefore, unacceptable (Guardian, 8th May, 2002). The political associations consequently endorsed a motion formally rejecting the proposed guidelines. The political associations in attendance resolved to constitute themselves into a new consultative forum of political associations christened Conference of Nigerian Political Parties with the main objectives of eliminating through both political and legal initiatives, all objectionable and repressive aspect of the guidelines for the registration of new political parties.





The CNPP had challenged the INEC and Obasanjo administration in the court of law on many issues, some of which included: placing limits on the number of political parties to be registered, and the removal of some conditions that prevented some political from accessing funds from the INEC. Both of which the CNPP won. It has also been critical of some Federal Government policies and through some national dailies had warned the Federal government on certain policies and proffered alternatives to the government. The

ANPP has never been part of these struggles simply because it has decided to work more with the PDP.

A common view of political parties in general is that they are the political expressions of politicized cleavages in society. Such cleavages cause the development of a network of associations mobilizing supporters on each side of given cleavage (Graeme.2000). In this sense, opposition parties in particular and political parties in general are supposed to work closely and cordially with with the civil society organisations,because opposition parties are in a way a special kind of civil society organization.The ANPP has performed poorly in this aspect.Available records have shown that the ANPP had never during the period the study covered liased with the civil society organizations and other opposition parties to present alternative views to the public on how the country should be run.Despite the presence of many and vibrant civil society organizations in Nigeria,the ANPP has not been able to mobilize or appeal to such associations for support.This is because the actual membership base of these organizations is quite low,under this condition, to assemble a significant vote base ,the leadership of the ANPP must work extra-hard.Considering the organizational capacity and the financial strength of the ANPP,this is time consuming and costly prospect. More importantly, leaders of these civil society organizations have little power to deliver their members' votes. Also, in Nigeria most labour unions depend on the government for salary, while religious bodies such mosques and churches are reluctant to take a partisan political stance.

6.9 Institutional Constraints and the ANPP (the role of the State's Institutions)

The content analysis of the role of institutional constraints on the ability of the ANPP to excel indicates that most of the key institutions in Nigeria constitute an obstacle to the ANPP effectiveness as an opposition party. Some of the key institutions such as INEC, the military, police, anti corruption agencies and so on, are most times used to either intimidate or generally suppress the opposition parties. (See figure 6.9 below)



Institution is seen as the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, law,) Informal (mode of behaviour, corrections and self imposed code of conducts). Together they define the incentive structure of state and specifically economics and politics.

In the Presidential system of government, the executive decides who gets what. This gives rooms for the emergence of neo-patrimonial rule and big men politics, which leaves little room for debate amongst elites and few checks and balances in the executives. Party system, determines the form and substance of political competition among parties that in turn determines the way in which parties organize themselves.

In Nigeria, the state and the ruling party do not only shape political agenda and institutional and economic development, but also monitor, and supervise the activities of public corporations and institutions. The ruling PDP also plays an important role in shaping the relationship between state and society, and between wealthy interests and power.

In fairness to the ANPP, there are elements that have been introduced to the party, not necessarily by the party itself but by the nature of the Nigerian state and more importantly the style of leadership of President Obasanjo. When Chief Olusegun Obasanjo took over power in 1999, he came into office as a hostage to PDP because he had no followership within the party. In realizing that he needed to take full control of the PDP and the governmental structures, he decided to fall back on military strategy. He incorporated all the governors of the federation into a position that they were rulers not servants, as such all decisions that affected their states were with them and through them (Governors). All persons to be appointed by the Federal Government must go through the

Governors. Because of this development therefore, governors who were under the provision of the 1999 constitution intended to be mere provincial leaders became shut up into the position of national leadership, and by so doing, it diminishes the positions and roles of members of National Assembly, as constituting national leadership structure in the country.

The immediate effect of the institutional changes was that the members of National Assembly from various states began to see themselves as ‘boys’ to their governors, a situation which was not intended in the constitution. What the constitution intended was that the National leadership would be National Assembly which is the representatives of the party, constituting national leadership, together with the presidential candidates of the parties.

This arrangement was changed by Obasanjo by elevating the governors to the position of national leadership rather state leaders. This has truncated the issues of discipline, and the need for the governors to be held accountable by the electorate. They became firmly in charge of the party affairs in their respective states.

The governors of the ANPP used their position to hijack the party at the national level and subsequently amended the party’s constitution by inserting two provisions in the constitution, which include:

- (a) At any point in time that a national caretaker committee of the party will be appointed, the chairman of that caretaker committee must be a serving governor.
- (b) Whenever a national convention committee of the party will be set-up, the chairman of the committee must be a serving governor.
See appendix ii.

Clearly, this therefore has shown that the national leadership of the party would be controlled by the governors, the convention of the party both in terms of its agenda, its management, its representation and its preparation would be led by a serving governor. Basically, the governors had constituted themselves into an oligarchic group, determining who became the chairmen and other sensitive positions of the party. This no doubt, had created a lot of problems in the party. They aided Obasanjo by giving him the room to dictate who the chairmen of the ANPP would be, thereby weakening the ANPP.

The military have over the years presided over the political transitions in Nigeria and have carefully teleguided political activities. The process of ensuring that what happened in the First and Second Republics did not happen, the military class ensured that they monitored most of the activities of the political associations during the transition programme, including ensuring where the victory would go. According to Senator Dansadau, he said:

...After the registration of the five political parties, Abdulsalaam was more inclined, more comfortable with the APP, so we were really getting some support from them.. I personally was liasing with some of the major players in the transition government. All of a sudden, certain political maneuvering began; the militarization politics surfaced, the top brass of the Nigerian military (including retired ones), became interested in perpetuating themselves in power, probably in the manner the military did in Egypt, where the retired General would continue to lead the country. This maneuverings changed the disposition of Abdulsalami Administration soft support for the APP. (interview with Sen.Dansadau, 2009)

Ther political arrangements were carefully put in place to appease certain parts of the country. In view of the crisis that engulfed the country as a result of the annullment of the June 12, 1993 general elections.The power that be that time decided, by a way of

maneuvering and masterminded the whole transition programme to favour the south-west and a particular candidate, Obasanjo, to emerge as the President.

Party and politics in the third world countries like Nigeria, is such that government in power always determines who wins election. “When the signs were clear that the PDP had the support of the military, some prominent members of the APP left, including Peter Odili, Ibrahim Mantu and Ogbulafor”. (Interviews with Dansadau, Shinkafi and Buba, 2009). Also, the military ensured that certain key states, particularly the oil producing states were not controlled by the APP. “Federal military government felt that it is unsafe for a new democratic government to have an oil rich state like Rivers and Delta being in the Opposition” (interview with Dansadau, 2009)

Despite these sudden arrangements, the APP got nine state governors after the governorship elections. Having been sworn in, the governors who were to protect and preserve the image of the party, committed political breach of trust by working against the ANPP at the presidential election. According to Dansadau:

...Our governors worked against us. Infact in 2001, late Awoniyi confessed to me in Bauchi that he brokered what he called understanding between APP governors elect to ensure that the PDP won the presidential election of 1999....According to Awoniyi, this was to ensure a kind of peaceful and harmonious working relationship between opposition governors and central government going by the fragility of the county. (Interview with Sen. Dansadau 2009).

The governors stabbed the party, thus their attitude contributed immensely in weakening the APP as an opposition party. They have overtime consistently, systematically, successfully and unfortunately relegated the founding members of the party to the background because they wanted to comply with the structural pertern of the Nigerian

state and its institutions. This is what brought about a lot of disenchantment within and of course, the beginning of factionalism in the ANPP.

One institution that has over the years created an obstacle to the ANPP is the Independent National Electoral Commission. As an institution that oversees the conduct of elections and other related electoral issues, it is expected to be neutral, impartial and non-partisan towards all political parties; regardless their relationship with the Federal government. The electoral body has been accused of colluding with the PDP to either rig during elections, or overturned victory in favour of the ruling party. According to General Muhammadu Buhari:

The electoral body we have in Nigeria is not neutral. We have political INEC that works hand- in- hand with the ruling PDP to rig election and disorganize the opposition (Interview with Gen. Buhari, 2009).

The appointment of INEC chairman and other major INEC officials by the President only to be screened by the National Assembly has directly and indirectly compromised the supposed independence of the Commission. For one obvious reason, even if the President wants to appoint a credible person to head the institution, he cannot appoint his sworn enemy, he has to appoint someone he likes. Between 1999 and 2009, the country had witnessed an INEC that was more or less an appendage of the executive. Sometimes, the INEC made life miserable for the ANPP and other opposition parties. For instance, the INEC tended to hastily implement court orders and sanctions that went against the ANPP, while it dragged its feet on the similar orders that affected the PDP.

Judiciary as an institution has also constituted some stumbling blocks to the ANPP's effectiveness as an opposition party. In most democracies, the court is seldom called upon to determine as between candidates who actually won an election, the reason been that

election rigging in its various forms -illegal voting, falsification of results and other forms of electoral fraud, is generally unknown. The role of the court is to determine whether or not the election is invalid by reason of the unlawful exclusion of a validly nominated candidate, non compliance with the prescribed electoral procedure, or corrupt practices during election such as treating, canvassing at the polling station, intimidation and so on. A decision invalidating an election does not constitute the court an arbiter of who should govern; the choice is simply to be referred back to the electorate in a fresh election.

In a situation whereby the ANPP had to go through several stages of court proceedings in order to get final verdict made the party unsettled and less focused particularly on other important issues that could enhance the electoral fortunes of the party. For instance, for 2003 general elections, the party was made to wait by court to for two and half years before it could get final judgment from the supreme court. Also for 2007 general elections it waited for more than two years before the apex court finally decided on the petitions. Sometimes the courts and judges intentionally frustrated the petitioners by blocking them from physically presenting their evidence in courts. According to Mike Ahamba, one of the legal representatives in the ANPP legal team:

The Supreme Court deceived us by convincing us not to physically present certain important evidence in court, but turned around to blame us of not been able to back our claim with facts (The Leadership paper, Nov.23, 2009. 2&4).

The contention of the ANPP is that, if court was open and impartial in it dealings, it might have reversed the ratio 4 to 3 jugdes that ruled infavour of the PDP in the 2007 general elections petitions. This would have no small measure galvanized the ANPP.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary:

In 1998, when after a protracted military rule, the Nigerian political development took off once again, it was not quite certain that both the military and the political elite would have what it takes to sustain democratic rule, judging from the long military rule which largely was as a result of the inability of the politicians to play by the rules of the game and the military's inability to willingly relinquish power to a democratic government in the past.

General Abdulsalammi Abubakar did set the stage for Nigerians to once again practice democracy by giving the go ahead for political associations to be formed. Nigerians across the various spectrums and the likeminds did come together to form political associations with the hope that provisional registration would be granted them after meeting the initial requirements set by the INEC. Eventually three political parties, namely. The All People's Party (APP), Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the People's Democracy Party (PDP) were given full recognitions and registrations to kick start the experiment towards the Fourth Republic.

While the formation of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) did not involve a large coalition of many associations and various personalities with different and contrasting political records in Nigeria, at the Ikeja Airport Hotel where the 'rainbow coalition of the APP first appeared at the formative stage, it was the inclusion of certain personalities and the name of the party that first sparked off squabble within the party. The coalition disagreed over whether other people like Nzeribe, Adedibu and Bode

Olajumoke were credible enough to be part of the association or not. Secondly; the coalition disagreed over adopting the name All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) for All Peoples Party of Nigeria (APPN).

Without reaching a consensus, the more powerful faction of the coalition simply registered the name All People's Party (APP) and damned those opposed to it. By the time that was settled, a faction of the coalition (Afenifere) had broken away and crisis in the party which became known as All Peoples Party shifted to the unsettled issue of a convention to elect the leadership of the party. At the same venue, a protem National Executive Committee led by Senator Mahmud Waziri was hurriedly put in place. Its mandate was to organize a national convention for the party to elect substantive executive members within two weeks. That convention never held within the time frame, and it became a source of conflict within the party which led to the exit of another segment of the coalition.

It was in crisis that the party participated the Local Government elections of 1998 but struggled to give the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) a good fight in the number of local governments won across the country in that election. "It had more total number of votes cast than the PDP". At the time of Governorship election, more crises erupted, leading to further political migration from the party by those whose interests were injured beyond reconciliation. This also weakened the party and its electoral fortunes crashed as the PDP's dominance confined the number of states the ANPP controlled to nine.

Another crisis trailed the party into the 1999 Presidential election. There was a sharp disagreement over the nature and terms of agreement of an alliance with the A.D.

In the flurry of the confusion, some smart politicians traded off the presidential ticket that set the stage for the final fall of the All Peoples Party (APP).

The APP went into the coalition with the Alliance for Democracy (AD) to contest the 1999 general elections. In the alliance, the APP though controlled more states than the AD but accepted to play the role of ‘junior’ partner, having dumped Dr. Ogonnaya Onu who emerged as the party flag bearer at its first presidential primaries held at Kaduna in 1999 for Chief Olu Falae of the AD. The ANPP eventually lost the general elections to the PDP in a rather controversial manner and it became more disorganized and crises ridden. Firstly, it’s first national Chairman, Senator Mahmud Waziri abandoned the ANPP to take up advisership role in the Obasanjo’s administration. Secondly, the time the party would have used to reflect on its performance at the Presidential election, re-organize and strategize for the future challenges was spent on the resolution of the leadership vacuum and crisis created by Mahmud Waziri’s departure. Since then the fortunes of the ANPP have declined to the lowest level in all ramifications. Leadership turn over of the ANPP is the highest among the major political parties in Nigeria. (Senator Ahmed Yerima, 2009). Between 1998 and 2007, the party had eight national chairmen, namely; Mahmud Waziri, Alani Bankole, Akwe Doma, Yusuf Ali, Attahiru Bafarawa (Caretaker Chairman), Don Etiebet, Modu Sherrif (Caretaker Chairman) and Edwin Ume-Ezeoke. This means that, the party changed its leaders, on the average, every nine months. Most of the party’s national executives were either elected in controversial or staged managed conventions thereby drawing widespread criticism and dismay amongst the members. In 2002, two parallel Executive bodies within the party emerged;

one led by Don Etiebet and the other led by Jerry T.Useni, with each of the rival factions having key members of the party supporting it.

The transformation of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (APP) to All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) has not in any way changed the standings and fortunes of the party. In fact, the condition of the party has deteriorated, it lost Kogi and Gombe States to the ruling PDP, but captured Kano state in the 2003 general elections. Also the ANPP further lost its huge presence across the federation. After the 2007 general elections, the ANPP struggled to retain four governorship seats, namely, Yobe, Zamfara, Kano, and Borno States. While Sokoto, Kebbi and Jigawa States slipped off its hands but won Bauchi State. Within one year the Governors of Zamfara and Bauchi, Mahmud Shinkafi and Isah Yuguda respectively defected to the ruling PDP along with the party's structures and supporters.

Apart from the serving governors, former national leaders, Chieftains and founding members of the ANPP have left the party in their hundreds to either joining the ruling PDP or forming new parties. For instance Chief Alani Bakole is now one of the chieftains of the PDP. Alhaji Akwe Doma has not only abandoned the ANPP, he is now the Governor of Nassarawa State on the platform of the PDP. Alhaji Attahiru Bafarawa who once acted as interim national chairman of the ANPP left the party to form the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP), following a protracted disagreement between him and the then national chairman of the party, Chief Don Etiebet. Alhaji Yusuf Ali who was also a former national chairman of the ANPP as well dumped the party for DPP. Chief Don Etiebet went back to the ruling PDP, where he attempted to contest the governorship election in his native state of Akwa- Ibom in 2007.

Other key members of the ANPP who have left the party included: Dr Olusola Saraki, Bode Olajumoke, Joy Ogwu, Ibrahim Mantu, Vincent Ogbulafor, Kanti Bello, Ken Nnamani, Dalhatu Sarki Tafida, Adamu Aliero, Saminu Turaki, Saidu Dan –Sadau, Peter Odili, Emmanuel Nwayanwu and many others .Some of these personalities have held important positions in the ruling PDP after they had left the ANPP. Ironically, some of those who run affairs of the ANPP now were formally with the PDP. For instance, Augustus Aikhomu, former Board of Trustee Chairman of the ANPP, Chief Don Etiebet and Chief Edwin Ume-Ezeoke, both former national chairmen of the party were formally active members of the PDP. They defected to the ANPP and instantly occupied such sensitive positions in the party.

After the 2007 general elections, a major disagreement ensued between the two time presidential candidate of the party, Gen Muhammadu Buhari and his running mate in the 2007 general elections, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke over the ANPP's participation in the Government of National Unity (GNU). While Muhammadu Buhari and his group were against the participation of the ANPP in the arrangement, the former national chairman, Ume-Ezeoke and some executive members of the ANPP supported the participation of the party in the GNU. This misunderstanding has become almost irreconcilable has impacted negatively on the ANPP's credibility and performance in providing a credible alternative to the current PDP regime.

While this development was viewed as an attempt to subvert the right of the people, the party specifically declared that its presidential candidate in the 2003 and 2007 general elections, General Muhammadu Buhari, was completely on his own because the

party has no evidence and the necessary witnesses to convince the court of law of the rigging perpetuated by the PDP.

Although, the presidential candidate of the ANPP, General Buhari lost the petitions at the Supreme court, the ratio 4:3 of the decisions of the panel of judges gave General Buhari the conviction that if the leadership of the party had supported the petition to the end and the state institutions did not constitute an obstacle to justice and the rule of law, the outcome would have been more favourable to the ANPP.

7.2. Conclusion

It is not impossible for opposition parties to accede to power in any democratic setting; it has happened in Ghana and a host of other countries in developed democracy across the world. The opposition parties were able to achieve this largely because of their ideological commitment, perseverance and high level of discipline been displayed by these parties over the years. The ANPP since its formation in 1998 has been operating in a difficult environment particularly at the national level. This difficulty faced by the party was necessitated by lack of commitment, vision, focus and discipline among its founding members and those who took over the leadership of the party prior to 2003 general elections. There was at the beginning lack of transparency in the running of the affairs of the party as well as some vital decisions taken by the party that had to do with its fortune of the party. Also, the ruling PDP has since 1999 infiltrated and corrupted the ANPP with moles and divisible agents with the primary aim of weakening the party.

The ANPP got it wrong first, on the issue of internal democracy when it failed in 1999 to elect substantive party executives with definite terms of office; instead the party was run on protem basis. This affected the building of its permanent structures from the

ward level to the national level. It was at this point in the life of the ANPP that the political culture of organized and determined oligarchic groups which comprised of the Governors and other influential individuals emerged. These oligarchic individuals acting in concert, laid claims to the leadership of the party and ambushed other interest groups by hijacking the party structures and installing their preferred candidates in to strategic positions of the party at the detriment of the majority members and other groups in particular and the party in general. From then on, the ANPP has been fractured as no discernible and cohesive structure has been put in place nor maintained.

Because of the power that be, in the party (mostly Governors), who had hijacked the structure of the ANPP, internal democracy has been sacrificed for political expediency and parochial interest of those that control the structure of the party. While the country has, to a large extent undergone democratic transformation and some of the institutions might have bowed down to democratic demands, political culture is yet to follow suit and the ANPP as an opposition party has tended to have highly personalized and non-inclusive decision making process and therefore not internally democratic. As such the ANPP has failed to provide democratic functions, first as an agent of democratization in contributing to the deepening and widening of democratic culture and secondly, it has failed to provide credible alternatives to the electorate because those at the helm of the affairs of the party are themselves not credible, not widely respected, as such could not project the image of the party to the larger public.

The organization of the ANPP is mired in parochialism and self interest, so there is no body of principles or ideology holding the politicians together .The only strong bond that binds the politicians together is the extant benefits of, or the hope of accessing

political patronage in political offices. The ANPP generally does not espouse any distinct and identifiable ideology and programs different from other major political parties in Nigeria. The ANPP is characterized and easily recognizable by ethnic, regional or religious affiliation and the social cleavages it represents as opposed to any distinct policy and ideological position. Because of this shortcoming, the ANPP as an opposition party is largely motivated by a single cardinal issue; the removal of the corrupt incumbent ruler and the not too popular party in power. For this reason, greater number of the members of the ANPP driven by political opportunism is willy-nilly forced to coalesce on the umbrella of Government of National Unity. The ANPP's participation in the GNU was neither to serve nor build the nation democratically, it was rather driven by 'tokenism', while the ruling party used it to pocket the ANPP as a major opposition party.

The ANPP is structurally weak and lacks institutional capacity; power is often personalized by the leaders and few of his cronies, mostly governors who use the state's fund to bankroll the party for selfish reasons. Because of the personality cult built around the person of the political leader, there is enormous amount of sycophancy, which blurs realism and distracts the leader from the focal point of articulating leadership challenges. It is this cult of personality around the Governors by the leadership of the ANPP that is responsible for the abysmal failure of the leadership and the resultant crises that the party subsequently faced. There has been failure in leadership training and transformation from one leader to another. For instance, from Mahmud Waziri to Ume-Ezeoke, each of them had fallen for the bait of the Governors and their sycophantic rabble. In selecting the national chairmen of the party, the governors who are instrumental in the selection process, were guided, partly by the fears of 'betrayal' or the hope for a subtle control of

the party's decision making structure, to pick someone they consider amenable to control rather than picking someone adjudged brilliant, better focused and of independent mind.

Immediately the tenure of the chairman expires, or he has been forcibly removed from office, he is regarded as the enemy of the party that had no vision for the party, as such nothing good can be learnt from his experience in office. The time that the new chairman would have used to reposition the party is used to dislodge the policy of his predecessor and pursuing personal vendetta .At the end of the day, his leadership is enmeshed in crises of legitimacy, and his tenure elapsed or forcibly removed from office by the same set of people that imposed him on the party without any effort to instill the culture of discipline in the party, neither was he able build party structures that reflect all tendencies across the country .

Most prominent politicians in the ANPP did not respect the party's manifesto and its guidelines for carrying out the certain activities. For instance, during the 2003 and 2007 presidential campaigns, Buhari set up 'parallel structures' for his campaigns, ran by his close associates who are not seasoned politicians neither did have any major stake in the ANPP. It is this parallel structure that led the presidential campaigns in 2003 and 2007 general elections. This portrays a system where the political elites have scant respect for the political parties as institutions, neither do they have respect the constituted authority of the party and by extension the electorate; they only see the party as convenient tools for contesting elections, (since the constitution and Electoral Acts say candidates must contest on the platform of political parties) only to discard the party once their purpose have been realized. This largely explains why the ANPP tends to be dormant in between elections only to be revived at the approach of the next election.

Because the party is most times dormant, it has failed to harness the numerous avenues of raising funds for the party other than relying on the governors and few other elected officials to donate to the party. There is really no concrete investment in the form of conferences, seminars in the ANPP by the stakeholders with a view to building a strong and virile opposition party.

In a related development, some of the major actors in the ANPP did not really believe that it is possible to contribute to the development of the Nigeria's democratic project without joining the government of the day. They believe that, being in the opposition means one is isolated from the state's resources, far away from the resources is translated to mean being politically irrelevant and stands the risk of losing his teaming supporters once there is no state money to be shared. Therefore, there is lack of patience stimulated by greed among those who had led the party during the period under study.

Conclusively, the inclusion and exclusion dynamics within the ANPP has personalised power in the hand of a small coterie of the party leadership. The centralization of power not only marginalized the rank and file and support base of the party, it also bred a personality cult whereby the party leadership became synonymous with the party and vice versa. The party leaders became the oligarch who is vested with the enormous powers to determine the party's policy, its ideological directions and its over all governance process.

These two tendencies (personalization and oligarchic politics) combined in to a myriad of symptoms of the larger problem that had confronted the ANPP during the period under study; the ANPP is imbued with culture of secrecy as if it is a secrete society (This was made manifest during the interview with some stakeholders of the party). For

example, TBO between 2003 and 2009 virtually operated as a secrete cult within the ANPP. This culture of secrecy worked against internal democracy in the ANPP in some ways: first, the succession of leaders became extremely difficult and highly conflict ridden, second, decentralization of responsibilities and powers to party branches at local levels is severely impaired as this dependent upon the discretion of the leaders.

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Daily Champion (Lagos) February 5, 1995

The Guardian News paper (Lagos) August 12, 1998.

Appendix 1

List of the people interviewed

S/ N	Name	Position held	Place of interview and date
1.	Gen Muhammadu Buhari	Presidenital candidate 2003&2007	Kaduna, 25/08/2009
2	Sen.Mahmud Waziri	First National Chairman	Abuja, 21/11/2009
3	Alh.Umaru Shinkafi	Founding Father and Running mate to Falae in 1998 General elections	Kano, 28/09/2009
4	Alh.Bashir Tofa	Board of Trusty Member.	Kano, 12/08/2009
5	Gov.Ibrahim Shakarau	Kano State Governor(ANPP)	Kano, 22/12/2009
6	Senator.Ahmed Sani Yerima	Serving Senator and former Zamfara State Governor.	Kano, 08/11/2009
7	Chief John Odigie Oyegun	Board of Trustee Member.	Abuja, 22/03/2010
8	Senator.Saidu Dansadau	Founding member and former Sanator.	Abuja, 09/11/2009
9	Hon.Farouk Aliyu Lawan	Former Minority Whip(ANPP)	Abuja, 16/11/2009
10	Alh.Sule Hamma Yahaya	Director General, TBO	Kano, 03/10/2009
11	Eng.Buba Galadima	Secretary General, TBO.	Abuja, 18/11/2009
12	Senator Aruwa Mahammed	ANPP Chieftain, Kaduna State.	
13	Alh.Kabir Musa Aruwa	ANPP State Chairman- Kaduna State	Kaduna, 27/08/2009
14	Hon.Ahmed Baba Datti	House of Rep Member.	Abuja, 21/11/2009
15	Alh.Mohammed Boboi.	ANPP Chairman of Chairmen	Abuja, 14/10/2010
16	Alh.Sanni Hashim Hotoro	Kano State ANPP Chairman.	Kano, 03/12/2009
17	Hajia Hafsat Mohammed	ANPP State Chairman- Kaduna State	
18	Dr Saddik Mahmud	ANPP Minority Leader Kaduna State.	Zaria, 05/12/2009
19	Hon Munttaka Rini	Zamfara State House of Assembly Member and the State Acting Chairman of the ANPP.	
20	Hon.Saidu Abdullahi Adamu	Commissioner, Kaduna State.	Kaduna, 12/12/2009

Appendix 2a
Interview questions for General Buhari

- (1) Why is it that as a presidential candidate you seem to be more popular than the party?
- (2) Is it because of your individual commitment to the party?
- (3) Why is it that there is a divergence between your own principle/perspective of politics and that of the ANPP?
- (4) Before you joined the party, did you give the party any conditions?
- (5) There is an assertion that The Buhari Organization (TBO) is a parallel organization to the ANPP and that it has undermined the party. How correct is this assertion?
- (6) What is your impression of party discipline, particularly within the ANPP?
- (7) Is there any difference between the ANPP and PDP in respect to their manifestoes and outlooks?
- (8) How did you finance your campaigns in 2003 and 2007 general elections?
- (9) As an opposition party, the efficacy and following has depreciated particularly from 2003. What do you think is responsible for this?
- (10) What are the strategies for the ANPP to adopt towards forming the national government in the nearest future?

Appendix ii b

Interview Questions for the ANPP Office Holders and Activists

- (1) What is the ideology of the ANPP?
- (2) Is this ideology different from that of the PDP?
- (3) As a lawmaker elected on the platform of the ANPP, do you at all times pursue issues that will enhance the realization of the party's ideology?
- (4) Do you perceive the invitation extended to the ANPP by ruling PDP to join the Government of National Unity as an attempt to weaken the opposition parties in the country?
- (5) What is your impression of party discipline within the ANPP?
- (6) What do you think is responsible for the performance of the partying 2003 AND 2007?
- (7) To what extent has the organizational structure of the party affected its performance?
- (8) What do you think is responsible for frequent internal crises in the ANPP?
- (9) How have these crises affected the role of the ANPP as an opposition party?
- (10) What is the financial strength of party and how does it generate funds?
- (11) How would you rate the contribution of the ANPP to Nigeria's democratization process and democratic consolidation?

Appendix ii c

Interview Questions for the ANPP National and State Leaders

- (1) How does the ideology of the ANPP differ from that of the PDP?
- (2) Do you think the ANPP has a manifesto that
Is more relevant than PDP?
- (3) Why did your party join the Government of National Unity?
- (4) Do you think the idea of GNU will undermine the position of the
ANPP, as the largest opposition party in the country?
- (5) The party has been having leadership crises and series of internal
Squabbles. How have these impacted on the role of the party as
an opposition party?
- (6) In your own opinion, what are the factors responsible for these crises?
- (7) What is the financial strength of the party and how does it generate funds?
- (8) What is level of organizational cohesiveness of the party?
- (9) How conversant is the ANPP with policy making process, especially at the
national level?
- (10) How innovative is the ANPP in providing alternative policies?

Appendix 3

Content Analysis Frequencies from New Nigerian News paper 1998 to 2009

	Leadership Crises		Internal Democracy		Ideology		Party Finance		G.N.U		Organizational Strength		Party Discipline		Factionalism		Institutional Constraints	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
features& opinion	40	120	22	98	14	95	10	62	12	140	10	53	12	88	13	85	75	18
interview	42	111	24	78	08	84	18	74	15	121	13	40	10	93	18	62	66	12
editorial	09	51	07	42	02	51	07	50	06	34	04	14	04	10	03	18	10	10
pictures	38	93	18	68	04	50	20	35	13	59	10	32	12	50	10	52	14	10
cartoon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
news	39	130	48	152	28	169	10	53	12	133	20	53	33	98	20	81	58	12

Source: Research compiled, 2009

KEY: + (positive coverage) - (negative coverage)

Content Analysis Frequencies from Weekly Trust News paper 1998 to 2009

	Leadership Crises		Internal Democracy		Ideology		Party Finance		G.N.U		Organizational Strength		Party Discipline		Factionalism		Institutional Constraints	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
features & opinions	10	92	12	59	-	-	10	50	18	93	12	53	14	62	13	52	60	10
interview	12	99	13	63	-	08	08	62	32	77	19	50	10	53	20	68	75	14
editorial	02	15	03	05	-	10	02	09	15	32	10	28	10	18	10	18	06	02
pictures	14	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	19	18	25	10	52	18	51	14	08
cartoons	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
news	32	113	19	88	-	21	08	52	13	88	22	69	38	64	21	71	52	14

Source: Research compiled .2009

KEY: + (positive coverage) - (negative coverage)

Content Analysis Frequencies from The Vanguard Weekly News paper 1998 to 2009

	Leadership Crises		Internal Democracy		Ideology		Party Finance		G.N.U		Organizational Strength		Party Discipline		Factionalism		Institutional Constraints	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
features opinions	20	51	10	65	-	-	08	52	20	89	09	51	05	62	18	51	52	08
interview	21	49	20	65	-	28	08	53	17	77	08	49	09	55	14	62	62	10
editorial	05	10	10	18	-	05	-	-	02	15	03	09	-	08	-	10	07	02
pictures	20	50	20	39	-	-	-	-	08	38	10	40	08	38	03	15	-	-
cartoon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
news	28	59	14	53	18	52	19	52	15	59	19	58	32	68	22	68	57	09

Source: Research compiled .2009

KEY: + (positive coverage) - (negative coverage)

Content Analysis Frequencies from Weekly Tribune News paper 1998 to 2009

	Leadership Crises		Internal Democracy		Ideology		Party Finance		G.N.U		Organizational Strength		Party Discipline		Factionalism		Institutional Constraints	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
Features & opinions	12	50	35	62	02	50	10	53	18	72	09	62	09	82	11	54	20	02
interview	09	53	17	52	13	52	09	52	12	62	14	54	14	73	09	62	28	05
editorial	06	10	03	09	06	14	08	18	09	14	09	52	02	18	04	14	03	-
pictures	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	18	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-
cartoon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
news	19	72	12	51	13	52	19	72	11	63	18	58	12	68	14	72	52	12

Source: Compiled by the researcher.2009

KEY: + (positive coverage) - (negative coverage)

Appendix 4

List of Political Associations during the first phase of Babangida Transition Programme

Abuja Unity Front	AUF
All Nigerian Peoples Party	ANPP
All Peoples Party	APP
Association for National Progress	ANP
Black but Beautiful Party	BBB
Brotherhood of Nigeria	BN
Civil Democratic Party	CDP
Democratic Party of Nigeria	CDP
Democratic Peoples Congress	DPC
Federal Republican Party	FRP
Federal Solidarity Party	FSP
Ideal Party of Nigeria	IPN
Liberal Convention	LC
Liberal Movement	LM
Loyalists Movement of Nigeria	LMN
Movement of Nationalists and Dynamics	Monad
National Development Party	NDP
National Union Party	NUP
New Era Movement	NEM
New Generation Party	NGP
New Liberal Movement	NLM
New Progressive Party	NPP
New Vanguard	NV
Nigeria Corrective Party	NCP
Nigeria Emancipation Party	NEP
Nigerian Labour Party	NLP
Nigerian National Congress	NNC
Nigerian Socialist Party	NSP
Nigerian Youth Congress	NYC
Oriental Progressive Party	OPP
Peoples Alliance Party	PAP
Peoples Convention Party	PCP
Peoples Front of Nigeria	PCP
Peoples Improvement Party	PIP
Peoples Liberation Party	PLP
Peoples Party of Nigeria	PPN
Peoples Patriotic Party of Nigeria	PPP
Peoples Solidarity Party	PSP
Peoples Welfare Party	PWD
Popular Democratic Alliance	PDA
Realistic Democratic Movement	RDM
Reformers Party of Nigeria	RPN
Republican Party of Nigeria	RPN
True Party of Nigeria	TPN
United Democratic Party	UDM
United Front of Nigeria	UFN
United Nigeria Democratic Party	UNDP
Wazobia Democratic Party	WDP

Source: NEC.1992

Appendix v

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ALL NIGERIAS PEOPLES PARTY (ANPP)

PREAMBLE:

We the members of the All Nigeria Peoples Party, (ANPP) believing in a sovereign united democratic Nigeria under God, having firmly and solemnly resolved to uphold the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and committed to freedom, social justice, peace, progress and prosperity of the nation, hereby give unto ourselves this constitution for the purpose of effective governance of our Party and for the promotion of its ideals, aims and objectives.

ARTICLE 1

SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

Without Prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria or any other law for the time being in force in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the provisions of this Constitution shall be supreme over any other rules and/or regulations of the Party

ARTICLE 2

NAME:

There shall be a political Party, called, addressed and known as ALL NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (ANPP), hereinafter referred to as the Party.

ARTICLE 3

MOTTO:

The Motto of the Party shall be JUSTICE, PEACE AND PROSPERITY.

ARTICLE 4

LOGO:

The Logo of the Party shall be Maize

ARTICLE 5

PARTY FLAG

The flag of the ANPP shall be green, White and blue, with the logo of the Party on the white section of the flag

ARTICLE 6

SLOGAN

ANPP one Nigeria
One Nigeria Justice

ARTICLE 7

SECRETARIAT:

The registered office of the Party shall be located at Abuja the Federal Capital of Nigeria with offices in every State Capital and Local Government Headquarter.

ARTICLE 8

POLICIES, PROGRAMMES, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

The policies programmes aims and objectives of the Party are as follows:

A. POLICIES AND PROGRAMME

(1) The policies and programmes of the Party the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Accordingly, the Party shall at all times pursue the political, social, economic,

educational and other objectives as well as the fundamental objective and directive principles provided for in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of (1) above, the Party shall in particular, based on the economic situation, vigorously and with a sense of urgency pursue the following specific policies and programmes.

- (i) The attainment of political power through legitimate; democratic and Constitutional means for the purpose of establishing permanent egalitarian society, free from all forms of exploitation, oppressions and corruption.
- (ii) The establishment of conditions and structure which shall guarantee the direction of the socio-economic and cultural- political achievement of a new social order, that ensure-social justice, equality of opportunity, social, economic and political freedoms, institutionalization of general socio-welfare scheme and democracy for all Nigerian.
- (iii) Free universal, compulsory and purposeful education at primary and secondary levels.
- (iv) Free and purposeful education at post-secondary post-graduate levels, provided that such an education conforms to the need for socio-economic development of the community/society.
- (v) The elimination of poverty and want through the establishment, of gainful employment opportunities/centres in nooks and corners of tile country. This includes reviving some vital traditional local skills and direct labour, making it obligatory for the state to, by legislative or executive acts, guarantee social security such as sick, and unemployment benefits, etc.
- (vi) Free and purposeful adult education of all types
- (vii) Free curative and preventive health services for all Nigerians
- (viii) The development of agriculture, commerce and industry by means of integrated rural development aimed at enhancing the standard of life of Nigerian farmers establishment of modern and mechanized farming, easy systems of tenure of land re-organisation and resettlement of rural dwellers into optimum communities, with attendant provision of electricity, clean portable water, decent houses, marketing and storage facilities for farm products, including extended network of feeder and access roads.
- (ix) The provision of full and gainful employment it for all Nigerians who are able and willing work through the continuous and vigorous creation of job-opportunities and to secure for workers of all grades in Nigeria the full fruits and benefits of their labour. This will ensure minimum wages for skilled and unskilled workers, including continuous and consistent improvement of the living standard generally and conditions of service.
- (x) The full promotion of active public participation in the strategic sectors of the Nigerian economy.
- (xi) To emphasize an economic rather than purely political consideration in the industrial development sector and the discouragement of commission based activities such that hamper economic development.
- (xii) The institutionalization of purposeful mobilization of the creativity resources of the people of Nigeria for the establishment of an economic environment in

which opportunity for the fulfillment of life and the pursuit of happiness shall be open to all Nigerians, and a fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the Nation.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aims and objectives of the Party shall be as follows:

- (i) To be the light and vanguard of the entire people of Nigeria;
- (ii) To promote and foster the unity, political stability and national consciousness of the people of Nigeria.
- (iii) To organize branches of the party throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- (iv) To sponsor eligible candidates and canvas for votes for election into a elective offices in all tiers of government.
- (v) To consciously pursue the implementation of the policies and programmes of the party, through those of its members that are appointed in the governments or elected in government, legislative houses and councils throughout the Federation.
- (vi) To evolve, develop and promote economic policy direction which guarantees public participation in and where necessary control of the major means of production, distribution and exchange.
- (vii) To protect the interest of farmers, workers and peasants of Nigeria and faithfully strive to obtain for them the greatest possible return for the labour and where ungainfully employed to enjoy social welfare scheme until employed.
- (viii) To co-operate with Trade Union organizations, co-operative movement and professional bodies with a view of development and maintaining the economic progress of Nigeria;
- (ix) To institutionalize, maintain and foster representative democracy discipline and the strict observance of the rule of law in the Federation of Nigeria;
- (x) To cooperate with any political or other organization whose aims and objectives are in harmony with those of the Party in conformity with the provisions in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To resist and actively condemn all forms of oppression and exploitation irrespective of who perpetuates these evils or where they are committed.
- (xi) To promote social, political and economic freedoms and the general welfare of the people, with a view to ensuring permanently establishment of peace, freedom, dignity of labour, equality, fraternity and happiness for all the people of Nigeria.
- (xii) To foster and defend the freedom of the Press and the fundamental freedom and human rights of all Nigerians and the World in general.
- (xiii) To pursue a dynamic foreign policy aimed at;
 - Mutual friendly and reciprocal relations with other countries;
 - Working for self-determination and democratic freedom for peoples of African descent and all other subjects or oppressed peoples throughout the world.
 - Promotion of the cultural values of black peoples all over the World, and

- Maintenance of International peace, harmony and co-operation.
- (xiv) To work consciously to promote the development of science, technology and local expertise;
- (xv) To do anything ancillary or conducive to the promotion of the aforementioned aims and objectives.

ARTICLE 9

9.1 MEMBERSHIP

Membership of the party shall be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of place of origin or ethnic grouping. To be a member of the party a person shall fulfill all of the following conditions:

- i. The person shall be a Nigerian citizen and has attained the age of eighteen (18) years;
- ii. The person shall lawfully possess a membership card;
- iii. The person shall be registered as a member of the party at the ward level of his Local Government Area of his residence or origin or any other place approved for this purpose by the party;
- iv. The person shall not be a member of any other political party;
- v. The person shall pay the prescribed registration fee;
- vi. The person accepts the aims, objectives, principles, fundamental, values, policies and programmes of the party;
- vii. Application for membership shall be made on individual basis.

9.2 ELIGIBILITY AND REGISTRATION

- i. Any eligible person who desires to be a member of ANPP shall register in the electoral ward of his origin or where he is resident or any place approved by the party for this purpose and be issued a membership card or identification and authentication as party member.
- ii. The party shall in every electoral ward keep a register of its membership.
- iii. Copy of the Register of members in every ward shall be deposited with the Local Government Secretariat of the party for collation and record purpose.
- iv. A copy of the collated Register of members in each Local Government Area (LGA) shall be deposited with the State Secretariat for compilation into a single State Register of members.
- v. A copy of the collated Register of members in each state and FCT shall be deposited with the National Secretariat for compilation into a single National Register of members.
- vi. The membership register shall be reviewed and updated at least once every year to take account of membership renewals, new members, resignations, dormant/inactive members among others.

9.3 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM MEMBERSHIP

- i. Every member shall pay such fees and levies as may from time to time be prescribed by the national Executive Committee of the party or any other body authorized to do so by the National Executive or the National Convention of the party.
- ii. Upon registration, a member shall be deemed to have:
 - a. Accepted to abide by the provisions of this constitution as well as the policies, programmes and ideals of the party;

- b. Accepted to abide by all lawful rules, regulations directives and decisions of the party or any of its organs; and
- c. Accepted to promote the aims and objectives of the party, loyally support its philosophy and refrain from pursuing any cause of action that may be detrimental to or inconsistent with or inimical to the interest of the party.
- iii. Every member shall have the right to actively participate in the activities and discussions of the branch of the party of which he is a member provided such member is a current financial member and subject to any qualification, rules and regulations or provisions of this constitution.
- iv. Every member shall have the right to vote and be voted for into any office or post in the part during any election provided such member is and has been active and is a current financial member subject to any qualification, rules, and regulations or provisions of this constitution.
- v. Membership of the party shall be renewed annually on payment of the prescribed subscription fees.
- vi. Every registered member of the party shall be accorded due recognition.

ARTICLE 10

FEDERAL CHARACTER, ZONING AND ROTATION OF OFFICES

10.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

- a. The principles of Federal Character as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Federal Character Commission Act and of zoning and rotation of offices ad requested by the Electoral Act shall strictly adhered to at all levels of the party’s organization and administration.
- b. The party shall operate a system of zoning/rotation of elective offices, both party and public in accordance with the principles of Federal Character as defined by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Federal Character Commission Act. Accordingly, the Party recognizes the six geopolitical zones in the country as well as equality of states in the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, equality of Local Government Area as the framework for equitable distribution / sharing of all Party and public offices in the method stated hereunder.

10.2 ZONING

- a. The composition of the Executive Committee and administrative personnel of the Party at the Federal level and of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and all federal elective offices in the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out by the party in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and achieve federal balance and promote national unity and loyalty.
- b. The composition of the executive Committee and administrative personnel of the party at the state level and of the Government of a State, its Agencies and all State elective offices shall be carried out by the party in such manner as to reflect equality of Local Government Areas and the diversity of the people within the state, to achieve balance and promote unity in the state.

- c. The composition of the Executive committee and administrative personnel of the party at the Local Government Area level and of the Local Government Council, its Agencies and all Local Government Elective Offices shall be carried out by the Party in such a manner as to reflect equality of wards and the diversity of the people / communities within the Local Government Area to achieve balance and promote unity in the Area.

10.3 ROTATION

- a. The office of the President and the Vice President shall be subject to rotation between the North and South of the Federation; and all other elective offices, both Party and public, at the Federal level, shall be subject to rotation amongst the six geopolitical zones in the country or any other geopolitical configurations as may be decided by the National Convention or National Executive Committee of the Party from time to time.
- b. All elective offices, both party and public, in the state level shall be subject to rotation amongst the Senatorial Districts in the State or any other geopolitical configuration as may be decided by the state congress or state executive committee of the party from time to time.
- c. All elective offices, both party and public, at the Local Government Area level, shall be subject to rotation among the wards within the Local Government Area or any other geopolitical configurations as may be decided by the local Government Executive Committee of the Party from time to time.

ARTICLE 11

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

The party shall operate at the following levels (in ascending order), namely

1. Ward
2. Local Government Area (LGA)
3. State (Including the FCT)
4. National

Each of these levels of the party organization shall have a functioning party secretariat.

ARTICLE 12

12.1 ORGANS

The following shall constitute the organs of the party:

- i. The National Convention
- ii. The National Executive Committee
- iii. The Board of Trustees
- iv. National Caucus
- v. National Working Committee
- vi. State Congress
- vii. The State Executive Committee
- viii. State Caucus
- ix. The State Executive Committee
- x. The Local Government Area Congress
- xi. The Local Government Area Executive Committee
- xii. The Ward Congress and

- xiii. The Ward Executive Committee.

12.2 ADVISORY ORGANS OF THE PARTY

- i. National and State Caucus
- ii. National Legislative Caucus
- iii. Consultative Forum.

COMPOSITION OF ORGANS

The party organs listed above shall be composed as follows:

12.3 NATIONAL CONVENTION

- i. All National Executive Committee members of the party
- ii. All members of the State Executive Committee, including FCT
- iii. The President and Vice President if produced by the party
- iv. Governors and Deputy Governors if produced by the party
- v. Ministers and Advisers appointed from the party
- vi. Members of the National Assembly produced by the party
- vii. Local Government Council Chairmen produced by the party
- viii. The State Secretaries of the party
- ix. 5 delegates from each Local Government Area including Area Council in the FCT.
- x. All members of the Board of Trustees
- xi. All members of the State House of Assembly.

12.4 NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- i. National chairman
- ii. 2 Deputy National Chairmen (one for the North and one for the south);
- iii. 6 National Vice Chairmen (representing the 6 zones);
- iv. National Secretary
- v. Deputy National Secretary
- vi. 6 Assistant National Secretaries
- vii. National Treasurer
- viii. Deputy National Treasurer
- ix. National Organizing Secretary
- x. Deputy National Organizing Secretary
- xi. 6 Assistant National Organizing Secretaries
- xii. National Financial Secretaries
- xiii. Deputy National Financial Secretary
- xiv. 6 Assistant National Financial Secretaries
- xv. National Legal Adviser
- xvi. Deputy National Legal Adviser
- xvii. 6 Assistant National Legal Adviser (Zonal)
- xviii. National Welfare Officer
- xix. Deputy National Welfare Officer
- xx. 6 Assistant National Welfare Officer (Zonal)
- xxi. National Auditor
- xxii. State Chairmen of the party
- xxiii. The President and Vice President of the country produced by the party
- xxiv. State Governors produced by the party

- xxv. Ministers and Special Advisers if produced by the party
- xxvi. 18 Ex-Officio (three from each zone)
- xxvii. The chairman of the party in Abuja (The FCT)
- xxviii. President and Deputy President of the Senate, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House produced by the Party.
- xxix. The ANPP Senate leader, Deputy Senate leader, Whip and Deputy Whip in the Senate.
- xxx. The ANPP House leader, Deputy leader, Whip and Deputy Whip in the House of Representatives.
- xxxi. All Senators produced by the party
- xxxii. One members of the House of Representatives, each from the 36 states of the Federation and the FCT.
- xxxiii. One speaker or a leader in the House of Assembly to represent each geopolitical zone.

12.5 NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE

The National Working Committee shall comprise of

- i. National chairman
- ii. 2 deputy national chairmen (one from the north and one from the south)
- iii. The 6 national vice chairmen (representing the 6 zones)
- iv. National secretary
- v. Deputy national secretary
- vi. National publicity secretary
- vii. Financial secretary
- viii. National auditor
- ix. National legal adviser
- x. National welfare secretary
- xi. The national treasurer
- xii. National organizing secretary
- xiii. National women leader
- xiv. National youth leader.

12.6 ZONAL COMMITTEE

- i. National chairman
- ii. State chairman
- iii. Governors (produced by the party)
- iv. Speakers / minority leaders
- v. Majority leaders
- vi. State chairman
- vii. Two members to represent each state in the zone
- viii. A woman leader in each state
- ix. A youth leader from each state and
- x. Ministers and social advisers from the zone appointed from the party as Ex-Officio members.

12.7 STATE CONGRESS

- i. Members of the state executive committee of the party
- ii. Members of the national executive committee from the state
- iii. The governor and deputy produced by the party

- iv. Members of the national assembly produced by the party
- v. Members of the house of assembly produced by the party
- vi. Chairmen and secretaries of the party in all local government areas of the state.
- vii. Local government council chairmen and their deputies produced by the party
- viii. Federal ministers, advisers and state commissioners from the state appointed from the party and
- ix. Two representatives nominated from each ward by the ward executive.

12.8 STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- i. State chairman
- ii. State deputy chairman
- iii. Three state vice chairmen
- iv. State secretary
- v. Three state assistant secretaries
- vi. State treasurer
- vii. State assistant treasurer
- viii. State financial secretary
- ix. State assistant financial secretary
- x. Publicity secretary
- xi. Assistant publicity secretary
- xii. Legal adviser
- xiii. Assistant legal adviser
- xiv. Welfare officer
- xv. Assistant welfare officer
- xvi. State organizing secretary
- xvii. Assistant state organizing secretary
- xviii. The state auditor
- xix. National executive committee members of the party from the state.
- xx. The governor and deputy governor produced by the party
- xxi. All members of the senate and house of representatives produced by the party from the state.
- xxii. The speaker and deputy speaker and majority leader (where the party is in control) or the minority leader and chief whip (where the party is not in control).
- xxiii. Members of the house of assembly produced by the party
- xxiv. The chairman of the party in each Local Government Area.
- xxv. The women leader
- xxvi. The youth leader and
- xxvii. Three Ex-Officio members.

12.9 STATE WORKING COMMITTEE

- i. State chairman
- ii. Deputy state chairman
- iii. Three assistant state chairmen (Zonal)
- iv. State secretary
- v. Deputy state secretary
- vi. State publicity secretary
- vii. State organizing secretary

- viii. State financial secretary
- ix. State auditor
- x. State legal adviser
- xi. State welfare officer
- xii. State treasurer
- xiii. State women leader
- xiv. State youth leader.

12.10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA CONGRESS

- i. Local government area executive committee members of the party
- ii. National and state congress members of the party from the local government area.
- iii. Councilors produced by the party
- iv. Ten representatives elected from each ward.
- v.

12.11 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- i. Local government party chairman
- ii. Two vice chairmen of the local government
- iii. Secretary
- iv. Assistant secretary
- v. Treasurer
- vi. Assistant treasurer
- vii. Financial secretary
- viii. Assistant financial secretary
- ix. Auditor
- x. Publicity secretary
- xi. Assistant publicity secretary
- xii. Legal adviser
- xiii. Assistant legal adviser
- xiv. Welfare officer
- xv. Assistant welfare officer
- xvi. Ward chairmen of the party
- xvii. Members of the national and state executive committees of the party from the local government area.
- xviii. The chairman and vice chairman of the local government of the LGA if produced by the party
- xix. The women leader and
- xx. The youth leader.

12.12 WARD CONGRESS

All members of the party in the ward.

12.13 WARD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- i. Chairman
- ii. Vice chairman
- iii. Secretary
- iv. Assistant secretary
- v. Treasurer
- vi. Assistant treasurer

- vii. Financial secretary
- viii. Assistant financial secretary
- ix. Publicity secretary
- x. Assistant publicity secretary
- xi. Legal adviser
- xii. Assistant legal adviser
- xiii. Welfare officer
- xiv. National, state and local government area executive committee members of the party from the ward.
- xv. The Ex-officio members
- xvi. The women leader, and
- xvii. The youth leader.

Notwithstanding the above provisions, the state congress of the party may authorize the establishment of any tier of the party organization within the state to suit local needs and circumstances.

ARTICLE 13

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

13.1 COMPOSITION

There shall be a Board of Trustees made up of:

- i. The national chairman of the party
- ii. President and vice president if members of the party
- iii. The senate president and deputy president if members of the party
- iv. The speaker and the deputy speaker if members of the party
- v. The two deputy national chairmen (North and South)
- vi. The National secretary
- vii. One member from each of the thirty-six states and the federal capital territory Abuja.
- viii. The senate leader and the house leader if members of the party
- ix. All former holders of the offices mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) (v) and (vi) of this paragraph who are members of the party
- x. Any other member of the party as may be deemed fit by the national executive committee.

13.2 MODE OF APPOINTMENT / REMOVAL

- i. Members of the board of Trustees specified in paragraph 13.1 (g) and (j) of this ARTICLE shall be nominated by the national executive committee of the party subject to ratification by the national convention.
- ii. Members specified in paragraph 13.1 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (viii) and (ix) of this ARTICLE shall have automatic membership of the Board of Trustees.
- iii. A member of the Board of Trustees may be removed from office by a resolution of the National Convention on the recommendation of the Board of Trustees subject to the reasons for the removal which may amongst others be on grounds of infirmity, insanity, bankruptcy, resignation, expulsion and any other unbecoming conduct.
- iv. In the event of death or resignation or removal of a Trustee from office

- v. The vacancy shall be fill by the Board of Trustee subject to ratification by the national convention.

13.3 GENERAL PROVISION

- i. The Board of Trustees shall have a chairman and two deputy chairmen (north and south) who shall be elected from amongst the members of the Board.
- ii. There shall be a secretary of the Board of Trustees who shall be elected from among the members of the Board.
- iii. The Secretary of the Board of Trustees shall take and keep records of all the meetings and activities of the Board.
- iv. A member of the Board of Trustees representing the state shall hold office for four (4) years and may be eligible for a second term only.
- v. Members of the Board of Trustees can attend the meeting of the national executive committee and the state executive committee but shall have no voting rights except those who are executive committee members.
- vi. The chairman of the Board of Trustees shall summon and preside over the meetings of the Board as well as oversee its general activities and affairs.
- vii. The Deputy Chairman of the Board of Trustees shall assist and advise the chairman and to act on behalf of the latter in his absence.

13.4 FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

- i. The Board of Trustee shall hold all the properties of the party in trust for the party and shall serve as custodian of such assets.
- ii. The Board of Trustees shall be the embodiment of the conscience, soul and sanctity of the party, and shall be the mirror of the highest standard of morality in the party and shall intervene in all disputes and crisis in the party to ensure its stability at all times.
- iii. The Board of Trustee shall regulate its own proceedings, as it may consider appropriate
- iv. The Board of Trustees shall advise as and when necessary on policies, programmes and activities of the Party nation-wide.
- v. All proposals by the national executive committee for the national convention shall be ratified by the Board of Trustees before presentation.
- vi. The seal of the Board of Trustees of the party shall be kept in the custody of the secretary to the Board of Trustees
- vii. The national secretary of the party shall prepare an inventory of all the assets, properties, movable and immovable, real and personal, belongings to the party and shall deposit a copy of the said inventory with the Board of Trustees.
- viii. The Board of Trustee shall carry out all such other activities that may be referred to it by the National Convention or any other body so authorized.

13.5 MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

- i. The meetings of the Board of Trustees shall be held every quarter and/or at any time decided by the chairman of the Board or at the request made in writing by at least one-third of the members of the Board of Trustees provided that not less than 14 days notice is given for the meeting so summoned.
- ii. Decisions at the meetings of the Board of Trustees shall be by simple majority of members present and voting.

- iii. Quorum for the meetings of the Board of Trustees shall be one-third of its membership.

ARTICLE 14

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF PARTY ORGANS

14.1 NATIONAL CONVENTION

1. To ensure strict compliance with this constitution by all party organs and members.
2. To elect the national officers and other members of the national executive committee of the party
3. The national convention shall be the party's supreme authority and shall have plenary powers.
4. Without prejudice to the above provision, the national convention shall have the following functions:
 - i. To evolve, consider, review, approve or abrogate policies, guidelines and regulations to govern the conduct and administration of the party
 - ii. To consider and approve recommendations on the party's programmes and projects
 - iii. To interpret and where necessary amend and revise the constitution of the party.
 - iv. To take all necessary and legitimate actions to ensure the acquisition by the party of political power through the formation of government (or participation therein) at the Local, State and Federal levels.
 - v. Where the party is in power, to guide, advise, and where necessary, discipline members of the party holding political office both at the legislative and executive arm of government, in order to ensure the fulfillment of the party's manifesto and constitution.
 - vi. Where the party is not in power at any time and at any level of government, to critically examine government policies and programmes, to advise or criticize the government as appropriate in order to ensure good governance and the interest of the nation.
 - vii. To receive, consider and take decisions on reports from other subordinating organs of the party.
 - viii. To take all necessary and legitimate actions to protect and promote the corporate interest of the party in all parts of the country.
 - ix. To elect the presidential candidate of the party; to ratify the vice presidential candidate nominated by the presidential candidate.
 - x. To consider appeals from state congresses on nominations of candidates for state and local government elections and to note nominations of candidates for elections as state governor and deputy governor.
 - xi. To generate funds for the achievement of the party's objectives
 - xii. To discipline any erring members of the party
 - xiii. To elect national executive committee members of the party
 - xiv. To exercise all such other powers and authority as vested in it by the party's constitution.
 - xv. To take any other action this, in its opinion is in the best interest of the party in particular and the nation in general.

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The national executive committee of the party shall be the principal executive organ of the party and in that capacity shall:

- i. Summon or convene the National Convention between meetings.
- ii. Discharge all functions of the convention between meetings

14.2 STATE CONGRESS

The functions and powers of the congress in each state of the Federation shall be subject to the overriding authority of the National Convention and shall include the following:

- i. To evolve policies and programmes for the fulfillment of the aims and objectives of the party in the state.
- ii. To elect state officers and other members of the state executive committee of the party.
- iii. To exercise all other powers, authority and functions similar to those of the national convention provided that the functions of the national convention shall override state and local functions.
- iv. To elect candidates for gubernatorial elections and ratify the nomination of a running mate made by the gubernatorial candidates.
- v. To take and ensure the implementation of directives from the National Convention.

14.3 STATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The State Executive Committee of the Party shall be the principal execution organ of the state congress and in this capacity, shall:

- i. Summon or convene the state congress and prepare its agenda
- ii. Discharge all functions of the congress between meetings of congress
- iii. Make recommendations and policies, programmes when necessary
- iv. Implement the decision of the congress.

14.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA CONGRESS

The functions and powers of the Local Government Area Congress in each state shall be subject to the overriding authority of the State Congress and shall include the following;

- v. To elect candidates for councillorship elections into the local government councils.
- vi. To elect 10 delegates per ward to attend the local government congress
- vii. To take and ensure the implementation of directives from the LGA congress.

14.7 WARD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The ward executive committee of the party shall be the principal execution organ of the ward and in this capacity shall:

- i. Summon or convene the ward congress and prepare its agenda;
- ii. Discharge all functions of the congress between meetings of congress
- iii. Make recommendations on policies and programmes to congress and
- iv. Implement the decision of the congress
- v. To nominate 2 members of the party to represent the ward at the state congress.

ARTICLE 15

NATIONAL, ZONAL AND STATE CAUCUS

There shall be caucus at the national, zonal and state levels of the party

A. COMPOSITION

1. NATIONAL

The national caucus of the party shall comprise

- i. National chairman
- ii. 2 national deputy chairmen
- iii. National secretary
- iv. National legal adviser
- v. National treasurer
- vi. President
- vii. Vice president
- viii. President of the senate
- ix. Governors
- x. Speaker of the house of representatives
- xi. Leader of the senate
- xii. Leader of the house of representatives
- xiii. National women leader
- xiv. Other members of the party as deemed fit by the national caucus

2. ZONAL

- i. National vice chairman from the geopolitical zone
- ii. National officers from the geopolitical zone
- iii. State chairmen and secretaries from the geopolitical zone
- iv. Governors
- v. National assembly members
- vi. Speakers, majority/minority leaders from the party

3. STATE

- i. The chairman
- ii. State deputy chairman
- iii. State secretary
- iv. State legal adviser
- v. National officers from the state
- vi. The governor
- vii. The deputy governor
- viii. The speaker of the house of assembly
- ix. Leader of the house of assembly
- x. Local government chairmen produced by the party
- xi. Other members of the party deemed fit by the state caucus.

NB: One person to represent each of the six geographical zones in the country as members at the national level and one person to represent each of the 3 Senatorial District at state level as members shall constitute the caucus.

B. FUNCTIONAL POWERS

- i. The party caucus shall have powers to deal with such matters as may be referred to it by the National or State Executive Committee, and the National Convention or state congress.
- ii. To formulate modus operandi for the regular interaction and consultation among the executive, the legislative and the party at the national, zonal and state levels.

- iii. Adopt party stand on controversial matters before the national assembly.
- iv. Have a final and binding say, unless and until reversed by the national convention, on conduct of party legislators.
- v. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers and functions conferred on the other organs of the party by this constitution, the party caucus shall also have power to deal with any other question or matters in order to promote the interest of the party.

C. MEETING OF THE CAUCUS

The party caucus shall meet as and when considered necessary and decisions shall be by consensus or by two-thirds majority.

ARTICLE 16

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF OFFICERS

16.1 THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN SHALL

- i. Be the head of the party, providing good effective leadership and direction to the party.
- ii. Protect and promote the policies of the party
- iii. Summon and preside over the meetings of the national convention, national executive committee and national working committee,
- iv. Appoint members into ad-hoc and standing committees after due consultations with national executive committee
- v. Authorize expenditure
- vi. Supervise and control all officials of the party
- vii. Have powers to delegate his duties, give lawful directives to all officers, organs, members and officials at all levels of the party and exercise a casting vote.
- viii. Ensure through supervision and strict compliance with the provisions of the party constitution.
- ix. Be accountable to the national executive committee in discharging all the functions and powers stated above,
- x. Lead the presidential campaign team of the party's presidential candidate.

16.2 DEPUTY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN SHALL

- i. Perform the functions of the chairman during his absence
- ii. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the chairman as a result of either death, incapacitation, abdication, resignation, removal, expulsion, or any other cause the deputy national chairman from the same zone as the chairman shall act as chairman pending the election of substantive chairman at the national convention of the party.
- iii. Carry out any other duties that may be assigned by the chairman, convention and national executive committee.

16.3 NATIONAL VICE CHAIRMAN SHALL:

- i. Preside over zonal meetings
- ii. Carry out all duties assigned by the National Chairman or National executive committee.
- iii.

16.4 NATIONAL SECRETARY SHALL:

- i. Supervise the Party's day-to-day administration

- ii. Ensure the implementation of the decisions and directives of the national convention, national executive committee and the national working committee.
- iii. Issue notice, and make effective arrangements for meetings and the national convention, the executive committee, on the directive of national chairman.
- iv. Keep an accurate record of all the proceedings at the national convention and national executive committee meetings.
- v. Render a written annual report on the activities of the party to the national executive committee and a written report to the national convention.
- vi. Carry out all other duties that may be assigned to him from time to time by the national executive committee.

16.5 THE DEPUTY NATIONAL SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Perform the functions of the national secretary in the latter's absence
- ii. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the secretary as a result of either death, incapacitation, abdication, resignation, removal, expulsion or any other cause, act as secretary pending the election of a substantive secretary at the national convention of the party.
- iii. Carry out all duties assigned by the national secretary.

16.6 ASSISTANT NATIONAL SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Keep accurate record of proceedings at zonal meetings, and
- ii. Perform any other duties as may be assigned to them by the national vice chairman of the zone.

16.7 NATIONAL TREASURER SHALL

- i. Ensure that all monies accruing to the party and expenditure thereof are properly accounted for;
- ii. Advise the national executive committee on financial matters
- iii. Ensure that all monies paid to the party are duly receipted for and banked in the approved bank accounts of the party not later than 24 hours after collection.
- iv. Keep a general imprest account the limit of which shall be determined by the national executive committee.
- v. Pay all the monies duly approved by the national chairman
- vi. Prepare and submit a quarterly statement of account to the national executive committee of the party.

16.8 DEPUTY NATIONAL TREASURER SHALL

- i. Assist the treasurer in the performance of his duties
- ii. Act as the treasurer during the latter's absence

16.9 NATIONAL FINANCIAL SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Collect and record all dues, levies, subscriptions, etc belong to the party
- ii. Pay all such monies to the treasurer within 24 hours of collection
- iii. Prepare and submit proposals for raising of funds for party consideration by the national executive committee.

16.10 THE DEPUTY NATIONAL FINANCIAL SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Assist the financial secretary and act for him during his absence.
- ii. Carry out all duties assigned by the national financial secretary

16.11 THE NATIONAL PUBLICITY SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Be responsible for the public relations and publicity activities of the party
- ii. Be the principal image manager of the party

- iii. Advise the party on mass media matters
- iv. Publicise the policies and programs of the party
- v. Responsible for monitoring and coordinating activities of state publicity secretaries.

16.12 THE DEPUTY NATIONAL PUBLICITY SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Assist the publicity secretary and act for him during his absence.
- ii. Carry out all duties assigned by the national publicity secretary.

16.13 NATIONAL INTERNAL AUDITOR SHALL

- i. Audit the books of the party quarterly and submit written audit reports to the national executive committee, as well as prepare and submit annually through the NEC to the national convention an audit report on the accounts and finances of the party for the financial year.
- ii. Conduct other checks on the finances and assets of the party as may be directed from time to time by the chairman, national executive committee or national convention.
- iii. Have the right to periodically demand without notice the books and records of accounts of the party for inspection, examination and auditing.

16.14 THE NATIONAL LEGAL ADVISER SHALL

- i. Be responsible for giving legal advise to the party
- ii. Arrange for the conduct of litigation and defence on behalf of the party, including its organs, officers and officials where the subject of litigation pertains to the party's interests.
- iii. Liase regularly with state legal advisers
- iv. Liase regularly with assistant legal advisers who are responsible for zones.

16.15 DEPUTY NATIONAL LEGAL ADVISER SHALL

- i. Assist the legal adviser and act for him during his absence
- ii. Carry out all duties assigned by the legal adviser.

16.16 NATIONAL WELFARES SECRETARY SHALL

Be responsible for the welfare of the members of the party

16.17 DEPUTY NATIONAL WELFARE SECRETARY SHALL

- i. Assist the national welfare secretary and act for him in his absence.
- ii. Carry out all duties assigned by the national welfare secretary.

16.18 All other officers shall perform duties related to their offices and all assistant national officers shall perform all such duties as may be assigned to them by the appropriate principal officers.

16.19 The functions and powers entrenched in the above provisions shall apply mutates mutandis to all corresponding offices at lower levels of the party.

ARTICLE 17

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS

There shall be in the national assembly a national legislative caucus of the party. There shall equally be a sub-caucus in the senate and in the House of Representatives.

17.1 COMPOSITION

The national legislative caucus shall consist of all ANPP members in the two houses of the national assembly.

Party leaders and whips in the National Assembly, the President of the Senate and his deputy, the speaker of the House of Representatives and his deputy (produced by the party) as ex-officio members shall constitute the executive Members of the National Legislative caucus.

The party's majority or minority leader in the senate shall be the chairman of the caucus whereas the majority or minority leader in the house of representative shall be the deputy chairman.

17.2 MEETING

- i. The national legislative caucus shall at its first meeting decide the date and time of its meetings as well as the quorum.
- ii. A special meeting of the caucus shall be held as and when necessary.
- iii. The party's majority or minority leader in the senate shall preside over meetings of the caucus. In the absence of the presiding officer the party's majority or minority leader in the house of representative shall assume chairmanship of the meeting of the caucus.

17.3 POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The national legislative caucus shall be the forum for discussing and deciding the strategy and modality for effecting the party's position on all legislative matters in the national assembly.

The caucus shall also:

- i. Direct and coordinate the parliamentary activities of the ANPP legislators in the senate and the house of representatives
- ii. Liase with the national working committee and the president (produced by the party) for mutual briefing on legislative matters.
- iii. Strive to promptly resolve differences between the sub-caucus in the senate and sub-caucus in the house of representative to evolve common stand on issues in the interest of the party.
- iv. Refer unresolved differences to the national working committee of the party for prompt arbitration
- v. Submit proposals to the national working committee for improve electoral performance by the party in view of experiences gained and the national assembly.

NB: This provision applies mutates mutandis to the state organ of the party.

ARTICLE 18

JOINT LEADERSHIP MEETING AND CONSULTATIVE FORUM

18.1 The joint leadership meeting shall be composed of the Board of Trustees and the National Executive Committee of the party at the national level and similar bodies at the state level.

18.2 FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

0. The meeting shall deliberate on matters referred to it either by the National Executive Committee or the Board of Trustees.

1. The meeting shall discharge the functions of the National Convention between meetings of the convention of the purpose of nominating candidates for general elections in the event of disqualification of the Party's candidates.
- 18.3 A consultative Forum may be set up as an when necessary to discuss matters of common interest to the Party at a state, senatorial district, federal constituency, local government area, house of assembly constituency or ward.

18.4 COMPOSITION OF FORUM

A Consultative Forum shall be open to:

- i. All Party Officers who are from the area or constituency concerned.
- ii. All holders of executive governmental positions at the National, State and LGA including, Governors, Ministers, commissioners, councils, chairman.
- iii. Members of the National and State Assemblies;
- iv. Elected Councilors
- v. Five delegates from each LGA in the case of State consultative Forum, and two delegates from each ward in case of other consultative forum.

18.5 MEETINGS:

- i. The State Chairman or in his absence, the State Deputy Chairman shall preside at meetings of the Consultative Forum or State level.
- ii. Where neither the State Chairman nor his Deputy is present, a National Officer of the Party or Senator present shall be elected chairman of the Forum.
- iii. At the Local Government level or Ward level, the chairman of the party in his absence the Deputy Chairman shall preside, in the absence of the chairman and his Deputy the Senator, members of House of Representative or House of Assembly present shall be elected chairman of the forum.
- iv. Decisions of the Forum shall be by resolutions and shall have advisory effect.

ARTICLE 19

ANPP ZONAL COMMITTEE

There shall be established ANPP Zonal committee in each of the six geopolitical zones of the country – to develop and maintain a responsive system that can promptly, effectively, efficiently and equitably handle the affairs of the Party in their zones in the area of conflict resolution, as well as mass mobilization of the masses of their zones to our party.

19.1 POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

- i. To promptly handle all cases of conflicts in their areas of jurisdiction.
- ii. To develop a system that can easily appeal to the masses or their areas of jurisdiction.
- iii. To ensure a very strong grassroots based membership drive.
- iv. To assist in the installation of appropriate strategies that can sustain all categories of members within the party.
- v. To assist in the organization of efficient campaign strategy that is truly indigenous so that it can respond to the needs and aspirations of the local communities.
- vi. To arrange and organize in conjunction with National Headquarters the most effective ways, the most efficient utilization of resources at Party's campaigns and rallies in the locality.

- vii. To establish and maintain effective, efficient and responsive planning and research units that can respond to the needs of both the zones and the National Headquarters.
- viii. To respond promptly to all political issues emanating from the opposition parties that concerns the zones.
- ix. To keep the National Working committee informed of all political developments within their areas of jurisdiction on a bi-weekly basis.
- x. To monitor and liaises with all State chairmen, where desirable advise them accordingly.
- xi. Any other duty as assigned by the constitution of the party.

19.2 COMPOSITION

- i. National Vice chairman
- ii. State Chairmen;
- iii. Governors (produced by the Party).
- iv. Speakers/minority leaders
- v. Majority leaders
- vi. National Executive Committee members
- vii. Two members to represent each state in the zone
- viii. A woman leader from each state.
- ix. A youth leader from each state.

19.3 MEETINGS

- i. The ANPP Zonal Committee shall at its first meeting decide the date and time of its meetings as well as the quorum.
- ii. A special meeting of the Zonal Committee shall be held as and when necessary.
- iii. The Party's National Vice chairman shall preside over the meetings of the Zonal Committee, in his absence, National Executive Committee member present shall preside.

ARTICLE 20

MEETING

20.1 CONVENTION CONGRESS

The Convention and Congress of the Party at the National, State and other levels shall be held at least once in 2 years at a date, venue and time to be decided by the National Executive committee.

20.2 EMERGENCY MEETING

- i. Without prejudice to the above provision, the Executive Committee may summon an emergency National, State, Local Government or Ward Congress at any time, provided that at least seven days notice of the meeting shall be given to all those entitled to attend.
- ii. The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Party at any level shall direct the secretary of the organ to summon a meeting of the Executive Committee as the case may be on receiving a request made in writing by at least two thirds of the members of that organ.

20.3 QUORUM

One third of the members of any organ of the Party shall constitute the quorum for the purpose of a valid meeting of that organ; all meetings shall be summoned in writing.

20.4 RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF MEETINGS

- i. All meetings of the various organs of the party shall follow the same or similar procedure as prescribed hereunder. Irregular conduct or meetings shall be unconstitutional and shall accordingly render null and void decisions reached at such meetings.
 - ii. The Chairman of any organ or the party shall preside over the meetings of the organ except in the case of a sub-committee where the presiding person may be appointed by the Executive Committee of the parent organ or from among themselves.
 - iii. All meetings of the Party shall be conducted and recorded in the English Language. However, the Chairman of a meeting may invoke his discretion to allow the use of a local language if in his judgment communication and the peace of the meeting would be thereby facilitated.
 - iv. With the exception of the following listed motions, no motion and amendment shall be entertained at a meeting unless at least seven day's notice of such motion had been given in writing to the secretary or to the Chairman.
 - a. A motion that any subject can referee or be referred to a committee or some appropriate body.
 - b. A motion for adjournment
 - c. A motion proposing an amendment to some opinion already presented at the same meeting.
 - v. Every motion and amendments shall be seconded before discussion.
 - vi. A motion for amendment shall be withdrawn at any time at the request of the mover.
 - vii. In urgent or emergency situations, the Chairman of a meeting shall have the discretion to dispense with the requirement to give notice of motion.
 - viii. Deliberations at a meeting shall be strictly on the subject matters listed on the agenda of the meeting, provided that general issues may be presented or discussed at the end of the main agenda.
 - ix. Except upon a duly notified motion, a fresh deliberation or debate on a matter already concluded shall not be permitted;
 - x. A member shall indicate a desire to speak by a show of one hand, sitting, and shall rise to speak only when called upon to do so by the Chairman.
 - xi. Any member deviating from these rules or from the agenda or a meeting shall be immediately called to order by the chairman or by another member raising a point of order.
 - xii. The chairman of a meeting shall have power to ask an erring or offending member to leave the meeting.
 - xiii. No member shall leave a meeting except with the permission of the Chairman.
 - xiv. "Putting the question" shall follow normal parliamentary procedure.
Voting on any subject at a meeting shall be by a show of hands or by secret ballot.
- iii. CRITERIA FOR NOMINATION**
- a. A candidate for election must be a registered member of the party.
 - b. The candidate shall satisfy the requirement for elections under the country's constitution and the electoral law.

- c. The candidate shall score a simple majority of the votes cast.
 - d. Where in the first ballot, candidates fail to fulfill condition laid down in the (c) above; there shall be a second ballot between the two candidates with the highest votes cast in the first ballot.
- 21.3 Without prejudice to 21.2 above, the National Executive Committee shall make rules and regulations for the selection of candidates in consultation with the State Executive Committee. All such rules and regulations shall take into consideration and uphold.
- i. The Federal character principle and the principle of geopolitical spread and the principle of rotation.
 - ii. All other factors necessary for the total success of the Party at the polls and in government.

ARTICLE 22

FINANCE, BANKING AND AUDIT

22.1 FINANCE

1. The funds of the party at all levels shall be derived from any of the following sources.
 - i. Registration fees
 - ii. Periodic dues (as may be decided from time to time by convention or congress).
 - iii. Levies (as may be decided from time to time by convention or
 - iv. Donation; and
 - v. Any other legitimate sources that may be approved from time to time by the Executive Committee.
2. The National Convention shall be entitled to 15% (fifteen percent) of all income accruing to the party at the state level, provided that nothing in this provision shall prevent the National Convention through its agencies, from generating funds of its own.
3. The National Convention, through its principal organ (The National Executive Committee) shall have the direction to make special grants and donations or grant loans (without interest) to any organ of the party.
4. The budget of the party at any level shall be approved by the appropriate Executive, Committee and authorization of all expenditures therein shall be vested in the appropriate Chairman.
5. A fee, to be known as the registration fee, shall be paid by every member as one of the condition of membership, the fee which shall be the same amount throughout the country, shall be determined by time to time by the National Executive Committee.
6. A financial member of the Party shall be a member who has paid all approved dues, fees and levies payable by an under this constitution.

22.2 BANKING

The party at all levels shall operate bank accounts in financial institutions approved by the appropriate Executive Committee. Withdrawals from such accounts shall be effected jointly by the appropriate chairman as principal signatory and either the secretary or the treasurer as cosignatory.

22.3 AUDIT

- i. Executive Committee to audit all the accounts of the Party and submit the audited Accounts and report thereon to the Party, at least once a year.
- ii. The National Executive Committee shall present an audited Account and Report to the national Convention.
- iii. A statement of the Party's Assets and Liabilities shall be published in accordance with the prevailing laws of the Federation, on the authority of the National Convention.

ARTICLE 23

TENURE OF OFFICE

1. Ad-hoc and standing committees at any level may be appointed and dissolved at the discretion of the appropriate Executive Committee;
2. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, all officers of the party elected or appointed into the Party's organs shall serve in such organs for a period of four years only, and shall be eligible for re-election or re-appointment for another period of four years only, provided that an officer, elected or appointed to fill a vacancy arising from death, resignation or otherwise shall notwithstanding be eligible for election to the same office for two terms.
3. Notwithstanding the term of office of members as provided for in 2 above. The holders of the office of the National Chairman or the National Secretary shall cease to hold office where the President or the Vice President is from his zone that is North/South zones;
4. Notwithstanding the term of office of members as provided for in 2 above, all officers of the party shall resign their position 3 months to the expiration of the term;
5. No member shall serve in the same office for more than two terms or eight years continuously, except a member of the Board of Trustees;
6. No officer at the National or State levels of the Party shall hold another office at any other level of the party, except as provided by this constitution.
7. An Officer shall be relieved of his post at any time if a vote of "No Confidence" is passed on him at a National Convention or a Congress by two thirds of members present and voting.
8. Any officer at any level of the Party who wishes to contest an elective office into government shall resign his Party position at least 2 month before the Party nominations for election.
9. Where an officer at any level of the party either is removed or resigned or dead, his zone or section shall nominate a candidate to the National Working Committee for replacement.

ARTICLE 24

DISCIPLINE OF PARTY MEMBERS

24.1 POWER TO DISCIPLINE

Subject to the provisions of this ARTICLE and the right to fair hearing, the party shall have power to discipline party members. The power shall be exercised on behalf of the party by the respective executive committee of the party at all levels.

24.2 OFFENCES

Offences against the Party shall include the following:

- i. A breach of any provision of this constitution
- ii. Anti-party activities or any conduct, which is likely to embarrass or have adverse effect on the party or bring the party into hatred, contempt, ridicule or disrepute;
- iii. Disobedience or negligence in carrying out lawful directives the party or of the officers of the party.
- iv. Assuming names and titles not recognized by the constitution the party.
- v. Giving wrong information to any organ of the party or unauthorized publicity of a party dispute without exhausting all avenues for settlement or redress within the party.
- vi. Factionalization or creating parallel Party organs at any level;
- vii. Flouting the rules and decisions of the party, engaging in dishonest practices, thuggery, continuously being absent at meetings without reasonable cause, carrying out anti-Party or other activities which tend to disrupt the peaceful, lawful and efficient organization of the party or which are inconsistent with the aims and objectives of the party.
- viii. Carrying arms, offensive weapons or missile at a political rally or procession. Party meetings, party offices or voting centres otherwise than in pursuance of a lawful duty.
- ix. Any other conduct or act prohibited by the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria, the electoral Act, INEC Guidelines or which by the Rules and Regulations of the Party constitute an offence.

24.3 DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE

The procedure for the hearing and determination of complaints or allegation are as follows:

- i. A complain by any member of the Party against a public office holder, elected or appointed, or another member or against a party organ or officer of he party shall be submitted to the Executive Committee of the Party at all level concerned which shall within 14 days of the receipt of the complain appoint a fact-finding or disciplinary committee to examine the matter.
- ii. The Executive Committee concerned shall not create or discuss the complaint or allegation before sending it to the Disciplinary Committee of fact-finding committee.
- iii. The Fact-finding Committee or Disciplinary Committee shall be headed by the Legal Adviser of the Party at that level or any other legal practitioner of good standing.
- iv. The Fact-finding or disciplinary committee shall within 30 days of its Constitution report its findings in writing to the appropriate. Executive Committee after giving the person complained against every reasonable opportunity of knowing the allegation against and reacting either in writing or orally to the said allegation either by himself or by a legal practitioner of his choice.

- v. The Executive Committee concerned upon receipt of the report of the Fact-finding or Disciplinary Committee may within 30 days thereof either ratify or reject the decision of the fact-finding disciplinary committee.
- vi. The Executive Committee of the Party at the level where complain o allegation is made shall have original jurisdiction hear and determine such complaint or allegation provided that the assumption of jurisdiction by such Executive Committee should not breach the rules of fair hearing;
- vii. Where either the complainant or the Party against whom complain is made, makes out a prima facie case of bi intimidation or undue influence or likelihood of same by the Executive Committee seized with original jurisdiction to hear at determine such a matter or a member thereof or where the complaint is against a party organ at the level making impracticable to appoint the fact-finding or disciplinary committee, such complain shall be transferred to a appropriate organ seized with appellate jurisdiction to hear a determine such matter save that in the case of an allegation against the principal officer(s) in the National Executive Committee of the Party making it unjust to allow such principal officer(s) to participate in the appointment of a fact-finding Disciplinary Committee, the National Executive Committee, should exclude such principal officer from the entire arbitral process;
- viii. For the purpose of ATRICLE 23.2 of this Constitution.
 - a. The Local Government Executive Committee shall the adjudicatory body of first instance over complaint allegations from the Ward level;
 - b. The State Executive Committee shall be the adjudicatory body of first instance over complaints allegation from the Local Government level;
 - c. The Zonal Executive Committee shall be the adjudicatory body of first instance over complaints or allegations from the State branch in the zone;
 - d. The National Executive Committee shall be the adjudicatory body of first instance over complaints and allegations from a zone.
 - e. The Board of Trustee shall be the adjudicatory body of first instance over complaints or allegations from the National.

24.4 APPEALS

The right of appeal of an aggrieved member of the party is hereby guaranteed. The procedure for appeals shall be as follows:

- i. Where a member is not satisfied with the decision of any of the adjudicatory organ of the party, he/she shall have the right to appeal within 14 days of the decision of the immediate appellate body in the party as prescribed in this constitution.
- ii. An appeal shall be determined by an organ of the Party is appealed against, the decision or action shall remain in force and binding until the appeal or appeals had been determined. The decision or action shall cease to be binding if the appellate body upholds the appeal;
- iii. An appeal from the decision of the Ward Executive Committee on a complaint originating from the Ward shall lie to the Local Government Executive Committee and thereafter to the Local Government Congress which decision shall be binding on the parties;

- iv. An appeal from the decision of the Local Government Executive Committee, as an adjudicatory body of first instance, on a complaint originating from the Ward shall lie to the State Executive Committee and thereafter to the State Council of Elders which decision shall be binding on the parties.
- v. An appeal from the decision of the Local Government Executive committee, as an adjudicatory body of first instance, on a complaint originating from the Ward shall like to the state executive committee and thereafter to the state council of Elders which decision shall be binding on the parties;
- vi. An appeal from the decision of the Local Government Executive committee on a complaint originating from the Local Government Executive chapter shall lie to the State Executive Committee and thereafter to the State council of Elders which decision shall be binding on the parties.
- vii. An appeal from the decision of the State Executive Committee, as an adjudicatory body of first instance, on a complaint originating from the Local Government Chapter shall lie to the state council of elders and thereafter to the Zonal Executive Committee which decision shall be binding of the parties.
- viii. An appeal from the decision of the State Executive Committee on a complain originating from the State shall lie to the Zonal Executive Committee and thereafter to the Zonal Executive Committee which decision shall be binding on the parties;
- ix. An appeal from the decision of the Zonal Executive Committee, as an adjudicatory body of first instance, on a complaint originating from the state branch shall lie to the National Executive Committee and thereafter to the Board of Trustees which decision shall be binding on the parties.
- x. An appeal from the decision of the National Executive Committee on a complaint originating at the National level shall lie to the board of Trustee and thereafter to the National Convention which decision shall be binding on the parties.

24.5 PUNISHMENT OF ERRING MEMBERS

- i. The Party shall have power to impose the following sanctions on members in accordance with the nature and gravity of their offence.
 - a. Reprimand
 - b. Censure
 - c. Fine
 - d. Debarment from holding office
 - e. Removal from office
 - f. Suspension
 - g. Expulsion from the Party
- ii. Where it is propose to expel a member of the Executive Committee, political office holder, or a member of a Legislative House from membership of the Party, such a proposal shall be submitted to the National Executive Committee, which after deliberations on the matter may confirm or reject the proposal;
- iii. A decision to expel a member of the Party taken or confirmed by the National Executive Committee shall be submitted to the National Convention for Ratification;

- iv. The National Executive Committee shall on receipt of the report of the fact-finding committee make a decision on the matter within fourteen (14) days;
- v. Any member who files an action in court of law against the Party or any of its officers on any matter or matters relating to the discharge of the duties of the Party without first resorting to the avenues for adjudication provided for in the constitution shall automatically stand expelled from the Party on filing such action and no appeal against expulsion stipulated in this clause shall be entertained until the withdrawal of the action from Court by the member;
- vi. Each organ of the party shall have power to remove a party officer or officers as the case may be from office at that level for failing to discharge his/her responsibilities, neglect and dereliction of duty or misconduct during his tenure of office through a vote of no confidence passed against such officer/appropriate organ present at the meeting and voting subject to such officer's right to fair hearing.

ARTICLE 25 COMMITTEE

- 1. The Executive Committees at all levels shall have power to set up standing committees and, where necessary, ad-hoc committees.
- 2. The National Executive Committee shall set up the Caretaker Committee and the National Convention Committee before its dissolution.
- 3. Without prejudice to the above provisions, the Party shall have the following Standing Committees, which shall be subordinate and secondary to the Executive Committee at every level of the party.
 - i. **WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEES**, shall be headed by a Chairman, and shall comprise of a minimum of seven members, including the Financial Secretary and the Treasurer as Ex-Officio and shall advise the Treasurer on ways and means of generating funds and property and investing funds for Party in accordance with the provisions of ARTICLE 22.3 of this constitution.
 - ii. **PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PUBLICITY COMMITTEE**, shall be headed by a Chairman and shall comprise a minimum of seventh members and shall advise the Publicity Secretary and the party on management of information, communication, public relations, propaganda, mass media matter and community affairs.
 - iii. **DISCIPLINARY AND ARBITRATION COMMITTEE** shall be headed by a Chairman and shall comprise of a minimum of seven members to be appointed by the Party Executive Committee members and submit findings to the appropriate Executive Committee for consideration and necessary action.
 - iv. **ELECTION COMMITTEE**, shall be headed b the Chairman, the Party; and shall comprise of six members, and shall advise he Party on legitimate strategies, logistic and modalities for conduct of campaigns to ensure total success at any elections undertaken by the Party.
 - v. **APPOINTMENT COMMITTEE**, shall be headed by the Chairman of the Party, and shall comprise of the party secretary, the chairman board of trustees and three other members of the party and shall advise the elected chief executive on appointments into offices of Government.

- vi. There shall be a **SPECIAL APPEAL COMMITTEE** to be headed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, 2 other members of the Board, 1 Party member from each of the 6 geopolitical zones of the country who shall consider appeals from expulsion of members by the National Executive Committee and in this respect, the Appeal Committee shall have superior powers over the National Executive Committee and its decisions are final.

vii. CARETAKER COMMITTEE

- (A)
 - 1. There shall be a Caretaker at every level of the Party
 - 2. The Chapter committee shall be appointed by the relevant Executive Committee at levels at least three months before the expiration of the term of members of the Executive Committee.
 - 3. The tenure of the Caretaker Committee shall be 3 months and may be extended for another period of not more than 2 months where such extension becomes extremely necessary after a resolution of relevant Executive Committee.

(B) FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE CARETAKER COMMITTEE

- 1. To run the offices of the Party before election of new Executive Committees in accordance with the functions and powers conferred in the Executive Committees at all levels by this Constitution.
- 2. To monitor, supervise and direct the convention or congress committees of the party in the discharge of their function.
- 3. To arrange for the swearing into office of the newly elected Executive Committee members and handover the affairs of the Party to them.
- 4. During an Election Convention to appoint members of the Convention Committee in accordance with ARTICLE 20 of this Constitution.

viii. NATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE

Shall be headed by a Governor produced by the Party and shall comprise the following:

- 1. 6 Senators produced from the Party
- 2. 6 members of the House of Representatives from the Party
- 3. 6 members of the Board of Trustees
- 4. 6 Ex-Officio members, one from each of the 6 geo-political zones of the country.
- 5. The Secretary of the Convention Committees shall be appointed from any of the members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives produced by the party.

ix. AD-HOC COMMITTEE

- a. The Chairman at any level may set up an Ad-hoc committee at any time for a specific purpose.
- b. An Ad-hoc committee will cease to exist at completion of its assignment.

ARTICLE 26

PROHIBITION FROM HOLDING DUAL OFFICES

No member of the Party shall hold a party office and any of the under mentioned political offices at the same time.

- i. Office of the President
- ii. Office of the Vice President

- iii. Governor and Deputy Governor
 - iv. Minister and Special Adviser
 - v. Commissioner and Special Adviser
 - vi. Senator and Legislator at State and National Levels
 - vii. Chairman of the Local Government and Councilor;
- Notwithstanding the provision here-in-before referred to, the NEC or NWC may from time to time assign other duties to any of the foregoing officials.

ARTICLE 27

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE CONVENTION COMMITTEE

The National Convention Committee shall have the following functions:

- 1. To conduct and supervise the National Convention of the Party
- 2. To direct State Executive Committees to set up State Congress Committees for the conduct of elections into the State executive Committees and to monitor the conduct of such elections.
- 3. To carry out any other functions as may be assigned to it by the National Executive Committee.

ARTICLE 28

CONDUCT DURING CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS

28.1 The Party and all its members including candidates at elections shall ensure peaceful conduct of political rallies and processions; accordingly the Party and its members shall carry out campaigns, rallies, processions and participate in elections in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act.

28.2 PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE

- i. The Party or any member thereof shall not organize, retain, train or equip any person or group of persons for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of physical force or coercion or any form of intimidation in promoting its political interests or objectives in such manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organized, trained or equipped for that purpose.
- ii. The Party, a member of the Party or candidate for an election shall not keep or use a private security organization, vanguard or any other group or individuals by whatever name called for the purpose of providing security, assisting or aiding the Party or a candidate in whatever form during campaigns, rallies, processions or elections provided that an officer of the party or a candidate at an election may keep or use a private security or individual for his personal protection during campaign, rallies or processions.

ARTICLES 29

ADMINISTRATION

29.1 The day-to-day administration of the Party shall be carried out by Directorates to be headed by Officials who shall be responsible to the National Secretary of the Party.

- i. The Directorate of Organization shall be headed by a Director of Organization and shall be responsible for the organization of the Party at all levels.

- ii. The Directorate of Publicity shall be headed by a Director of Publicity and shall be responsible for a responsible image of the Party at all levels:
- iii. The Directorate of Administration shall be headed by a Director of Administration and shall attend to personnel and other administrative matters;
- iv. The Directorate of Finance shall be headed by a Director of Finance and shall attend to financial matters.
- v. Directorate of Research and Intelligence shall be headed by a Director of Research, Intelligence and shall deal with research and intelligence matter.
- vi. Directorate of Social Welfare shall be headed by a Director of Social Welfare and shall be responsible for the Welfare of the members of the Party.

29.2 All officials of the Directorate shall be appointed by the appropriate Executive Committee.

29.3 The salaries and other conditions of service of officials shall be decided by the appropriate Executive Committee, which shall have power to employ and dismiss any official.

ARTICLE 30

SEAL OF THE PARTY

- i. The Common Seal of the Party shall be designed and approved by the National Executive Committee and shall be in the custody of the National Secretary of the Party.
- ii. The Seal of the respective Party Organs shall be designed and approved by the appropriate Executive Committee and shall be in the custody of the Secretary of the party at that level.
- iii. The common seal of the party or the seal of the respective party organs shall never be used except by the authority of the party chairman or working committee of the level previously given in the presence of two members of the Working Committee (appointed by the Chairman). The Party chairman shall sign every instruction to which the Seal is affixed, and every such instrument shall be counter signed by the Secretary or his nominee.

ARTICLE 31

GENERAL PROVISION

31.1 AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

The provisions of this constitution shall be subject to amendment, if it is so decided by a majority of two thirds of the financial members of the party present and voting at a meeting of National Convention provided that notice of such amendments shall have been filed with the National Secretariat not less than thirty days before the date of National Convention and circulated not less than 21 days before the date of the convention.

RESIGNATION

1. A member of the Party shall be free to resign his membership at any time.
2. Upon resignation, a member shall be required to surrender property of the Party in his possession to the nearest registered office of the Party and obtain clearance to the effect.

31.2 ELECTION OF OFFICERS

- i. Election of officers of the Party at every level shall be held not later than one month before the expiration of the tenure of members of Executive Committee.
- ii. Voting shall be by secret ballot unless otherwise decided by convention or congress.
- iii. Any candidate who scores the highest number of votes cast at any election shall be declared the winner of that election.
- iv. In the event of a tie in any ballot, there shall be a run-off election between the candidates who tie, until a winner emerges.

31.3 RULES AND REGULATIONS

All organs of the party shall have power to make rules and regulations for the smooth running of the Party provided that such rules and regulations are not in conflict with the provisions of this constitution.

31.4 SPECIAL CHAPTERS

- i. Special Chapters of the party shall be set up as the need arises
- ii. All such chapters shall exist to serve the purpose of membership in special situations.
- iii. All such special chapters of the party shall function independent of other chapter, subject to the provision of his constitution.
- iv. Approval for the establishment of a special chapter shall be sought by a minimum of fifty members of the Party exposed to the special situation after a resolution to that effect has been taken by them.
- v. The National Executive Committee shall examine the circumstances of all such applications and shall have the power to approve or reject the formation of any such chapter.

31.5 INTERPRETATION OF TERMS

Certain terms used in this constitution are defined in schedule one of this constitution.

SCHEDULE ONE

For the purpose of this Party exclusively and in the context of this constitution, the following terms are defined as follows:

1. "At all level" means at the National, State, Local Government Area and Council Ward Levels.
2. "Egalitarian Society" Society in which members of that society, are treated as equal legally, socially, morally and politically and exposed to equal opportunities to develop their inherent potentials as individuals without prejudice to ethnic origin, religion or circumstances of birth or sex.
3. "L.G.A." Local Government Area.
4. "Primary Health Care" Comprehensive health care including basic medical immunization, health education, essential drug supply to health institutions designed for the purpose, environmental sanitation, nutrition, material and child health.
5. "Principal Executive Organs" the National Executive Committee at the National level, the State Executive Committee at the State level and the Local Government Area Executive Committee at the Ward level.

6. “Protein Chairman” the acting Chairman of the Party at any level until the Convention or Congress of he Party at the level elects substantive Chairman.

SCHEDULE TWO

COMMENCEMENT AND CITATION

This constitution shall be cited as the CONSTITUTION OF THE ALL NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY, and shall take effect from this 27th DAY of July 2002.

Appendix 6

MANIFESTO OF THE ANPP

The policy objectives and manifesto of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) may be encapsulated in a slogan summary “**FENDS**”.

The letters of the words stand for the following objectives:

F -----	FREEDOM
E -----	EQUITY
N -----	NATIONALISM
D -----	DEVELOPMENT
S -----	SECURITY

The focus of the party’s “**five point agenda**” is to move the nation forward and away from the decay occasioned by the **indiscipline** in both leadership and followership in our country which has worsened the incidence of corruption, lack of patriotism, government insensitivity and neglect, institutionalized justice, falling standards of education, stalled development, and the dwindling confidence of the citizenry in the institutions of the polity including the judiciary, and steer her into a new era of disciplined, patriotic, knowledgeable Nigerian citizenry striving in unity to attain a well co-ordinated economic and social development of a polity where no man is oppressed.

These objectives will enable the A.N.P.P to plant and sustain true democracy in Nigeria.

Details of the avenues of attainment of **FENDS** are hereunder articulated.

FREEDOM

Although our dear country gained independence from the colonialists since October 1, 1960, it cannot be reasonably argued that the Nigerian citizenry had attained the individual and group freedoms that should be the primary dividend of independence namely, freedom from **tyranny** of leadership, man’s inhumanity to man, poverty and the breach of basic human rights. To redirect the nation the A.N.P.P will pursue a programme designed to attain the following results:

A) Freedom From Poverty

Poverty is a weapon to anti-democracy forces to perpetuate their evil designs as it curtails independence of the individual mind. It also reduces the quality of life of the average citizen who is thereby exposed to hunger, disease and therefore political manipulation. The A.N.P.P will inject sincerity and transparency into existing poverty alleviation programmes by **depoliticizing** same, and will introduce new ones.

An ANPP administration shall not treat poverty alleviation as a means of political patronage, but will apply same to progressively increase the percentage of self-surviving citizens of Nigeria under a well structured economic agenda.

B) Freedom From Tyranny

Tyranny occurs where opportunity for service is converted by an individual or group of individuals to an opportunity for self-aggrandizement, whether political or economic. In order to eliminate tyranny in our polity, A.N.P.P will run an administration that is **sensitive to the rule of law** beginning with the operation of a truly independent electoral process the absence of which the party identifies as the beginning of tyranny in a democracy, and by protecting and respecting the

rights of individuals or groups as enshrined in our constitution and other legislations, by at all times restricting government action to legal limits, by respecting the judiciary institution in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, and by **not shying away from remedying wrongs** occasioned by acts of governance where dictates of law, conscience and morality so demand. **The A.N.P.P will institute system of governance that ensures government's sensitivity to the consequences of its actions**

C) Freedom From Governmental Breach Of Fundamental And Human Rights

The A.N.P.P recognizes freedom of religion, thought and conscience, freedom to hold and impart ideas, right of free speech and to peaceable assembly, right to human dignity, to privacy and other rights under our constitution and the African Charter of Human and People Rights as the basis for the enthronement of true democracy in Nigeria. Consequent upon this, an A.N.P.P government will strive to protect and enforce such rights as a deliberate and strategic policy. In aid of this objective an A.N.P.P government will, in addition to **ensuring the fiscal and operational autonomy of the judiciary**, strengthen and empower the agencies of government that have the responsibility of monitoring, protecting and enforcing these rights. To that effect such agencies like the **National Broadcasting Commission, the Human Right Commission, the Legal Aid Council, Media Houses** both print and electronic, etc will be enabled to realize the respective objectives of their establishment. Where the activities are inhibited by legislative inadequacies, necessary amendments would be initiated in the National Assembly. The Public Order Act, a vestige of past military rulership now being misapplied will be revisited with a view to bringing it into conformity with the Chapter IV of the Nigeria Constitution. The issue of arrest of person without warrant will be specifically addressed by immediate constitutional amendment to clear the issue once and for all as has been done in some African countries. **An A.N.P.P Government unequivocally promises a human rights friendly administration.**

EQUITY

An A.N.P.P. administration would ensure equality of persons, and of the individual and any authority, governmental or otherwise before the law. This will be done by a deliberate programme of restoration of the judiciary as an independent establishment through quality personnel and modern material for the performance of its functions insulated from blackmail and/or intimidation from any quarters whatsoever, by respect for Court judgments and Orders without prejudice to the exercise of the Constitutional right of appeal, by the restoration of the independence and transparency in the electoral process to ensure that those who occupy elective offices do so by the strength of results which are consistent with cast votes, by treating the business class with equal attention and fairness irrespective of political party affiliation, by manifesting positive sensitivity to gender issues and by striving to ensure the ultimate enthronement of disciplined meritocracy. The A.N.P.P believes that only equal and fair treatment of all at all times and in all matters, can guarantee peace and stability in the polity.

Women's Right

An A.N.P.P administration would guarantee equal opportunity for women to develop and compete with their menfolk in an environment free from social prejudices that inhibit social, economic, and political growth of women and/or infringe on their fundamental rights as persons in fact and in the Law. To that effect A.N.P.P in government will address very aggressively and with promptitude the issue of obnoxious widowhood practices in some parts of Nigeria, and the general exposure of women to indignities and economic deprivation by the families of their deceased spouses.

Women will be considered for political or other appointments by merit and free of any gender inhibitions whatsoever, and government sponsorship for sporting and other activities shall be without gender discrimination.

The Child

Protection of the Nigerian child or any child on Nigerian soil from abuse and social deprivations like child labour and hunger shall receive high level of attention from the A.N.P.P in government so that the Nigerian child may develop properly both physically and mentally. The A.N.P.P shall introduce legislations that strictly prohibit the parental or custodian deprivation of a child of opportunity to educational rights.

Nationalism

There would be no doubt in the mind of any objective observer that nationalistic affiliation to the Nigerian nation by Nigerians is today at its lowest. Instead of that, there is an upsurge of ethnic nationalism which is an obvious threat to Nigerian unity and sovereignty. An A.N.P.P administration would pursue with vigour the restoration of allegiance to the Nigerian nation. This will be pursued through the following avenues:

(i) **Enthronement of Social Justice**

The greatest contributor to the apathy to nationalism in Nigeria is the absence of social justice, overt injustice in the polity and the failure of government to exercise the duty of care expected of the father nation for the citizenry as a result of gross insensitivity to individual or group interests and problems, thereby making self-survival the order of the day. These conditions create emotional alienation of the average citizen from the country. An A.N.P.P administration would enthrone social justice as a routine way of doing things through positive sensitivity of government to individual or group interest and/or problems by the due exercise of the duty of care for the citizen whether alive, maimed or dead, within or outside the country and in all spheres of legitimate human endeavours as the only means of arousing the spirit of patriotism and loyalty to the nation, and by avoiding acts of deliberate injustice against individuals or groups.

(ii) **War Against Corruption And Indiscipline**

The A.N.P.P in government will wage a total war on corruption and indiscipline through internal scrutiny of elected and appointed political officers in order to lead by example. A.N.P.P's fight against corruption will go beyond bribery into conducts that induce social decay. To this end ANPP in

government will protect all public officers, who stand against corruption and indiscipline in the course of their duties, against victimization.

(iii) **Rekindling National Pride In The Citizenry**

An A.N.P.P administration will strive to rekindle national pride in the Nigerian citizenry by

- (a) Instilling in the citizens respect for our national flag, and encouraging the use of it in public and in private;
- (b) Restoring the **original national anthem** used at our independence which is more reflective of the national desire and goal of a nation where no man is oppressed;
- (c) Providing better welfare (particularly housing and post retirement obligations) for our uniformed citizenry;
- (d) Providing a final solution to the disgraceful lapses in the payment of pensions and gratuity to retired public servants particularly teachers who are mostly deprived;
- (e) According due respect to our senior citizens who have contributed their quota to the development of Nigeria in their respective spheres of service;
- (f) Carrying out substantial prison reforms with a view to making it more corrective than punitive;
- (g) Building a society practicing attitudinal discipline as a means of eradicating or, at least reducing the ills of the society like corruption, greed, selfishness etc;
- (h) Practicing equity in words and acts of governance; and
- (i) Protecting public officers victimized for acts which are in the interest of the government and people of Nigeria.

(iv) **Foreign Policy**

An A.N.P.P administration will pursue a foreign policy objective that sustains our national pride and integrity, ensures our relevance in world affairs in the community of nations and our leadership role in Africa so that Nigeria would enjoy more respect amongst nations in her international relations in trade sports and international politics. The A.N.P.P adopts for implementation the foreign policy objectives and principles in section 19 of our constitution.

Development

Resources Development & Management

Sustainable development is inextricably tied to good and well-managed economic policy which necessarily leads to social and infrastructural development. The result of good economic management is a developed society which is the vision of the ANPP.

Proper economic management includes giving priority attention to economic resources development, diversification and protection. This assures the nation of a good fiscal standing that will enable the execution of necessary projects.

To this end, ANPP in government will manage with enhanced transparency our foreign exchange earning potentials such as petroleum, solid minerals and other capital yielding

products in other sectors. To this end, ANPP will put in place a policy of exploitation of our various solid mineral deposits by both public and private operators, and improve on our agro based income earning capacity.

Commercialization and privatization of minning operations will be encouraged. Joint Venture arrangements between local and foreign investors will be vigorously pursued.

Fiscal Management

Fiscal management shall be based on transparency and due process.

Within this in place, ANPP in government will provide to attention results in the sectors that are hereunder discussed:

A. Energy

The chaotic state of the energy sector in Nigeria has forced our national economic growth into a state of inertia thereby stalling productivity and creating an unprecedented state of unemployment occasioned by the shutting down of many industries plus the attendant difficulties in setting up new ones.

Conscious that a functional energy sector is the foundation of sustainable development whether in the educational, scientific research, agricultural, industrial or tourism sector of our economy, A.N.P.P in government would prioritize and pursue a very aggressive result-oriented energy policy with a view to improving upon the current state of electricity supply within six months of inception, and achieving at least seventy-five percent steady power supply within two years of inception. The A.N.P.P believes that, with discipline and sincerity in leadership, which the party hopes to institute, and followership, which the party hopes to generate, power outage in Nigeria could be consigned to history after four years of A.N.P.P administration in Nigeria.

In the realization of this objective A.N.P.P in government would direct effort towards diversification of energy sources, and encouragement of private sector participation under mutually beneficial conditions.

B. Health

The A.N.P.P recognizes and adopts the principle that heath is wealth. Consequently A.N.P.P in government will strive to build a healthy nation by pursuing the following objectives:

- (i) Developing a sustainable policy on environmental sanitation at the Federal, State, and Local Government Levels of administration, as an essential element in the fight against di9seases like malaria, and in the creation of a decent environment for the upbringing of our children.
- (ii) Emphasising primary health care which is more of prevention which will always be better than cure. To that end the National Programme on Immunization (NPI) will be sustained with considerable enhancement. Government will sustain both direct and NGO efforts against HIV/AIDS, and monitor more seriously the treatment of persons living with HIV/AIDS to prevent corruptive exploitation by some medicare personnel;

- (iii) Investing in the area of medical technology and infrastructure to enhance diagnostic capability in aid of health-care delivery personnel particularly the doctors who are at the present handicapped by the disgraceful level of diagnostic and infrastructural limitation in the country. This will enhance the quality of health-care delivery within the country and reduce traveling abroad in search of such services by Nigerians;
- (iv) Awarding scholarships to encourage specialization in some aspects of medicine like anaesthetics, neuro-surgery, forensic pathology etc which are in short supply or completely lacking in Nigeria.
- (v) Upgrading the general infrastructural state of our hospitals;
- (vi) Establishing more Specialist Hospitals with diagnostic centres that meet the standards in the developed countries;
- (vii) Improving on the subventions to Teaching and Specialist Hospitals to enable them rehabilitate deteriorating facilities and equipment, undertake proper maintenance and up-grade their capacity in order to provide the type of health care services for which they were established;
- (viii) Reviewing the remuneration and other incentives for the various grades of medical and health personnel in order to improve their morale, and to motivate them to higher levels of performance and commitment;
- (ix) Encouraging State Governments to establish General Hospitals in the Local Government Areas where none exists at the moment, and ensuring the functionality of existing ones;
- (x) Ensuring that all Local Government Areas provide health centres and clinics to bring health care delivery services nearer to the people, especially in the rural communities;
- (xi) Recognizing and encouraging the provision of health care delivery by corporate bodies, industrial establishments, private individuals, voluntary agencies and communities to supplement the effort of Government.
- (xii) Assisting government agencies and communities to provide and maintain portable water facilities in order to improve sanitation and reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases;
- (xiii) Reintroducing health education and schools health services in the states as an integral part of student curriculum and social welfare programme;
- (xiv) Combating the problem of fake drugs in the country by strengthening the National Food and Drugs Administration and Control Agency to improve its operational effectiveness;
- (xv) Encouraging and providing appropriate incentives to enable the local medicine manufacturers meet the nation's basic medicine requirements;
- (xvi) Reviewing the tariff for imported medicine which are not currently produced locally; and

- (xvii) Making sincere effort to prevent industrial actions in our health sector by respecting agreed commitments.

In the achievement of these set objectives the A.N.P.P in government will work closely with the Nigerian Medical Association for professional assistance and advice in decision making.

Education

The A.N.P.P acknowledges and accepts as binding and worthy of implementation the need to pursue the realization of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution in Section 18 under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles which provides that government shall

- (a) Direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities for the citizenry at all levels of governance;
- (b) Promote science and technology;
- (c) Promote free compulsory primary education;
- (d) Strive to provide free secondary education, and free university education;
- (e) Promote the learning of indigenous languages.

The A.N.P.P considers education as a cultural process to raise the worth and dignity of mankind, and believes that education being a lifelong activity taking place within the family, the society and educational institutions, is a mutual responsibility of the family, the society and government in partnership with one another. The realization of the policy objectives and directive principles enumerated above shall be guided by the pursuit of the following objectives in educational development:

- (i) Encourage the active participation of the organized private sector, parents, the community and voluntary organizations in the provision of educational opportunities.
- (ii) Ensure political and moral education for the citizenry.
- (iii) Provide a supportive and conducive environment for learning at all levels of education.
- (iv) Promote equal educational opportunities for all citizens.
- (v) Ensure the regular and prompt payment of teachers' salaries and allowances and ensure payment of gratuity and pensions as and when due.
- (vi) Recognize and actualize the status of teachers as professionals.
- (vii) Support free education of the disabled and their empowerment thereafter.

- Provide increased resources, teaching and non teaching and other infrastructures for mass adult literacy programmes in all parts of the country.
- Include good citizenry as a component objective of our educational policy and curriculum.
- Ensure a continuous improvement and monitoring of the quality of teaching at all levels of education.
- Ensure a free compulsory basic education.

The strategy for achieving the objectives above enumerated shall be focused on articulated modalities on the improvement of the quality content of pre-primary education, primary education which shall be compulsory and free, technical and secondary education which shall be functional, infrastructural improvement of and

establishment of more unity schools which shall admit students with no regards to ethnic origin, religion, gender or class, establishment of more special education institutions and a training programme to provide more teachers to teach in those schools, and the restoration of the past glory of tertiary institutions.

An A.N.P.P government would definitely increase allocation to the education sector in the annual budget from what has so far been the case.

Agriculture

The A.N.P.P recognizes that in the actualization of true independence the ability of a nation to feed its citizenry is primary. To obtain this goal A.N.P.P in government will pursue a programme that will reduce for the average farmer, whether crop or livestock, the financial input for production. The following strategies will be adopted for the realization of the objective of feeding the nation.

- (i) Launching of a war against Hunger campaign to be pursued and implemented with official discipline and close monitoring of the application of Agricultural credits and subsidies;
- (ii) Sustaining the objective of feeding the nation by facilitating the following:
 - (a) Seedling multiplication of seed crops and the development of improved varieties.
 - (b) Development of improved reproductive capabilities in the livestock sector.
 - (c) Accessibility of livestock and seed farmers to livestock feeds and fertilizers at affordable rates. Consequently A.N.P.P in government shall undertake subsidized importation of fertilizer with a target date for self-sufficiency through encouragement by way of incentives, of private sector participation in the local production of quality feeds and fertilizers.
 - (d) Encouragement, by way of incentives, of commercial farming for the purpose of exportation in order to restore the capacity of substantial earning of foreign exchange through agricultural production for which Nigeria was known prior to the oil boom. To this end government will encourage mechanized farming.
 - (e) Construction of more dams and proper maintenance of existing ones to ensure all the year round farming in all parts of the country.

Industrialization

The industrialization process constitutes a fundamental objective in the total range of activities aimed at reducing the country's inter-dependence and economic dependence on foreign countries. Over times, the high hopes in the manufacturing sector's campaign to make significant impact on the economy have not been realized. These are partly believed to be largely due to government investment in this sector through mega industries to the detriment of small scale concerns, and the absence of basic infrastructure and incentives to attract entrepreneurs to venture into the risk usually associated with industrialization.

The party believes that the development of the industrial sector is the only answer to the high cost of essential goods even in areas of food, medicine and textile. In pursuit of that belief, the ANPP in government will, as part of its industrial development policy, do the following:

- Tackle the scourge of power outage which is the bane of our industrial growth.

- Offer incentives to would-be industrial entrepreneurs in the area of import duties, tax and provision of land.
- Protect local industrial growth while insisting on standard quality in local manufacturing.
- Get the export promotion zones function to attract foreign interest in local manufacturing of goods.
- Encourage small scale entrepreneurship in the sector.
- Encourage industrialists through incentives to develop local substitutes for imported raw materials.
- Encourage private sector take-over of the industrial sector under well-defined governmental supervisory rules.
- Encourage of direct foreign investment, and upgrade and modernize industrial capacity for competitive produce.
- The government taking the lead by the way of providing infrastructure.

Communication

The ANPP will continue to improve on communication facilities by encouraging supervised competition in the modernization of the sector through private service providers with the view to providing the cheap and functional telecommunication services through private sector participation.

To that effect, ANPP in government will:

- i) Improve the organization of the nation's telecommunications and postal systems to achieve greater efficiency in their operations.
- ii) Ensure that all operators within the communication sector use modern equipment and comply with approved guidelines and regulations of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), and
 - Encourage private participation and investment in the sector.

Transport

ANPP in government will ensure the effective planning, coordination, modernization and maintenance of the various transport systems, i.e Roads, Rail, Maritime, Air and Inland Inter. The forms and strategy for attainment of the objectives in the sub-sectors will be as follows:

Road Transport

- Road Transport (in view): Embark on a high quality reconstruction of highway of all levels.
- Commence: Programmes of road design and construction aimed at providing six dual carriage cross-cross-by highways to the north and three horizontal highways running from the western border across the country to the eastern borders. This will provide road linkage of all the state capitals in the country.
- Seriously consider private sector participation in highways and bridges construction under control guidelines

i) Rail Transport

- a) Revitalization of Railways system through modernization of existing trucks, procurement of new rolling stock, and improvement of all operational and management techniques.

- b) Construction of a modern gauged railway system across the height and breadth of the country beginning with the Lagos-Onitsha-Port-Harcourt line.
- c) Seriously consider private sector participation in railway service provision.

ii) Air Transport

- Improve and modernization of aviation infrastructure compatible with international safety standard.
- Continued engagement of private airline operators subject to their meeting required conditions and safety.
- Improvement of user-comfort and safety facilities at the airports.

iii) Maritime Transport and Inland Waterways

- Reconstruction and modernization of existing ports to enable them cope with growing traffic.
- Encouragement of Nigerian nationals to participate in international shipping and maritime trade.
- To encourage local manufacture and maintenance of vessels for water transportation.
- Greater focus on inland waterways potentials as an alternative mode of transportation of goods in the country by proper maintenance of existing facilities and routes, and dredging of rivers as a means of exploiting the inland waterway transportation alternative.

Labour

ANPP in government will encourage respect and cooperate with organized labour for the maintenance of stability in working force. Agreements with labour unions will be honoured. The ANPP in government will create jobs through the implementation of the party's economic programme to reduce the level of unemployment in the country.

Ecology

Due to natural causes, and by reason of economic activities as a result oil exploration and other mining activities substantial ecological degradation has polluted rivers, destroyed habitats for aquatic and wild life, and in the process compromised the natural means of livelihood of members of many communities. Erosion menaces have also destroyed villages and devastated roads, farmlands and still threatens to wreck more havoc. Other industrial emissions have created an intolerable and presently uninhibited and dangerously high level of environmental pollution in Nigeria.

The ANPP views this level of environmental degradation as unacceptable, and, if in government would combat the menace through the following strategies.

- a. Ensuring that oil explorers and prospectors abide by internationally accepted environmental protection rules and regulations to protect the neighbourhood in which they are operating.
- b. Ensuring that the communities who suffer environmental degradation are compensated promptly;
- c. Taking steps to prevent deliberately induced degradation, and rendering such criminal acts unprofitable;

- d. Confronting the erosion menace sites as priority projects wherever they exist in Nigeria;
- e. Adopting international standards for controlling industrial emissions.
- f. Strengthening the Federal and State Environmental Agencies to make them more effective.

Housing and Habitat

A.N.P.P in government will strive to provide a housing policy that is common man friendly. The ANPP will also be sensitive to the contradiction in Nigerian habitats presented by slums in our big cities, and to the environment in which students in our tertiary institutions are studying.

Tourism

It is apparent that Nigeria has so far failed to tap her rich tourism potentials. ANPP in government will strive to reverse this trend and develop this country into a tourists' haven by first restoring the confidence of tourists as to their safety in the country.

Privatization

The ANPP believes in the divestment of government from commercial entrepreneurship. But the party rejects the sale of Nigerian industrial and commercial institutions to a few Nigerians masquerading under dubious corporate arrangements at non competitive prices. The ANPP insists that transparency must rule the privatization process which must be carried out in a manner that enables the participation of a greater number of Nigeria.

Revenue Allocation

The ANPP will pursue a revenue allocation policy that will assuage the hurt feelings in the areas of derivation and satisfy the feeling in rest of the country by reconciling the present divergent opinions into a situation where no one is oppressed, or could justifiably feel oppressed.

The ANPP does not encourage intimidation as a way of finding a lasting solution to the issue of revenue allocation.

Youth Development

The youth of the nation constitute both the future of the nation and an important human resource for national development. To this end the party shall adopt measures and programmes designed to produce for Nigeria, a healthy, knowledgeable and patriotic youth by exercising the father-care duty expected of a nation for its youth through policies programmes that enhance the

- (a) Healthy development of the youth through sports, disease prevention and eradication.
- (b) Intellectual development through the provision of functional education in the environment conducive to learning and decency of the mind and body.
- (c) Protecting the youth from exploitation and abuse of any type.
- (d) Development of programmes designed to encourage youths to stay off crime, and
- (e) The establishment of rehabilitation centres to reclaim derailed youths.

Traditional Rulers

The party acknowledges the fact that federalism involves unity in diversity. Therefore in considering the role of traditional institutions and rulers within the context of a republican nation, the party believes that each component state within the federation should feel free to retain and modernize its own peculiar institutions to meet the

legitimate yearning of their people. The A.N.P.P believes that Traditional Rulers, in order to protect their position as fathers of the nation, should not be involved in partisan politics.

Security

The present state of insecurity in the country today is a source of concern to Nigerians both at home and in Diaspora. The ANPP in government will overhaul our security agencies with a view to

- a. Enhancing their operational capabilities in the face of the disturbing rise in the crimes of armed robbery and murders.
- b. Making it more people oriented.
- c. Instilling a sense of pride and commitment in their personnel, and
- d. Enhancing the welfare packages of the police, Armed Forces and other security and other allied organizations as one of its priorities.

Conclusion

People of Nigeria, the above is a summary of our programme of action if elected into government. Support the ANPP to build a nation where no man is oppressed so that with peace and plenty Nigeria may be blessed!!!

ANPP - **ONE NIGERIA**
ONE NIGERIA - **JUSTICE**
JUSTICE - **FENDS!**

Appendix 7

THE BUHARI ORGANIZATION PROJECT NIGERIA

THE BUHARI PROGRAMME

1.0 PREAMBLE

Nigeria today is in dire straits. Emerging at independence from a nationalistic struggle to create a modern state, the country's political development has continued to be plagued by ethnic, religious and social problems, and too often beleaguered by insincere leadership. These in turn have resulted in a painful cycle of under development and poverty.

For Nigeria to attain its full potential, and its rightful place in the comity of nations, it has to emerge as a lust nation that is stable, secure and prosperous. To succeed in this regard there is a need to harness Nigeria's enormous natural and human endowments to achieve political stability, economic prosperity and security. It is clear that for these objectives to be attained the nation will need to have:

- (a) **Stability** - Enduring national unity and stability based on a shared national vision of our common destiny as a nation.
- (b) **Leadership** A consultative leadership dedicated to good governance. A leadership that is prudent, transparent, accountable and God-fearing, with a resolve to build a united society based on our shared national vision and objectives. A leadership that is dedicated to service, is law abiding and above all democratic and responsive.

The key success factor required for national unity and **Stability** is the assurance of equal opportunity to all individuals and groups for open and free participation in the economy in politics and in governance. Indeed the promotion of a continuing all-inclusive national dialogue process is a prerequisite to lasting stability. Despite all the present difficulties, a strong and united Nigeria is the best and most preferred option for all responsible people across the country.

Nigeria today, more than ever is in need of a serious and sincere effort of nurturing a culture of transparent governance. This should be based on an honest endeavour to achieve a national consensus on all the basic aspects of our existence as a nation, united in purpose and destiny Stability can be attained through a dynamic harmony among all sections and segments of the nation in respect of the core issues of our nationhood, including among others:

- Our national values and orientation.
- Resources generation, management and distribution
- Federal character of the country
- Religious and cultural heritage and traditional institutions.
- Land and property rights.

Sincere **Leadership** requires good governance at all levels of authority with unalloyed obligation to the ethos of fairness and accountability It entails a commitment to integrity as well as responsive, just and consultative administration. Beyond these, good

governance must aim at equitable and prudent use of our resources to achieve prosper it
The state of the nation and of our national economy today is increasing for leadership with vision and a grand plan for the systematic development and efficient management of our national assets and national infrastructure, with the key aim of achieving national cohesion, economic well being and growth.

Our nation today must lay emphasis on focusing squarely on our future, on opening a new leaf into our hopes and aspirations. While it is important for us to draw the proper lessons from our recent history as we strive to build a fair and just nation, we must avoid excessively dwelling on the painful aspects of our past in a manner that engenders malice and vindictive pettiness.

Finally, we must acknowledge that any attempt at a serious advancement of our country must entail a careful appreciation of current global as well as internal realities both in the realm of political trends and policies of economic management, in a manner that also protects the basic economic and sovereign interests of the Nigerian nation.

2.0 MY PLATFORM

It is in line with the above outlined principles, in which I firmly believe, that I present my **Platform** in my desire to contest for the presidency of Nigeria under the banner of our party the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). This **Platform** is encapsulated in my **Mission, Vision and Pledge**, which I submit as follows:

My Mission

To achieve:

- Stability - through
 - Provision of equal opportunity to individuals, groups and communities for participation in economic entrepreneurship, politics and governance.
 - Respect for constitutional provisions and doctrines.
 - Promotion of mutual trust, understanding and tolerance.
 - Adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers.
 - Protection of human rights of all citizens, including freedom of religion, expression and association.
 - Respect for national and international agreements.
- Security – through
 - Protection of lives and property of citizens
 - Protection of the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria.
 - Restoration of confidence in government by strengthening rule of law and impartial treatment of citizens.
 - Equitable, fair and judicious distribution of resources.
 - Modesty and transparency in the style of government.
 - Honestly fighting corrupt practices.
 - Creation of jobs as a potent force in the fight against poverty
 - Promotion and practice of civic values
 - Care for the weak, poor and needy.
 - Food security
 - Environmental protection and re-generation.
- Prosperity - through
 - Establishment of financial and administrative discipline.
 - Recognition of and reward to merit.

- Building of Human Capital through reforms in education and healthcare, and strengthened social services.
- Economic liberalization through enabling domestic private sector participation, attraction of domestic savings as well as foreign capital
- Privatization through consultation with the stakeholders to protect national interest, avoid confiscation or forsaking consumer rights.
- Development and rehabilitation of infrastructure and the promotion of maintenance culture.

My Vision

A just Nigerian nation that is stable, secure and prosperous.

My Pledge

I therefore pledge that if elected I will lead a government that is consultative, responsive, prudent, transparent, accountable, dedicated to service, law abiding and above all democratic.

GOVERNANCE

3.0 GOVERNANCE

The persistent deterioration in the quality of governance and pervasive corruption in government and society have led to political instability and weakening of the social fabric. Accordingly, we intend to attack these twin evils of corruption and had governance.

3.1 Objectives

- 3.1.1 Promotion of responsive leadership at all levels of government, with unalloyed obligation to good governance. Government business to be transparent and accountable to the people.
- 3.1.2 A commitment to sincerity, forthrightness, open and consultative administration.
- 3.1.3 Total allegiance to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; respect and protection of democratic institutions and national values. Promotion of the rule of law.
- 3.1.4 Guarantee of the rights and security of all citizens; promotion of national unity through justice and fairness to all.
- 3.1.5 Living a solid foundation for sustainable democratic Nigeria aiming for social stability and economic prosperity.

The overall objectives are designed first to restore Nigeria to its proper position in Africa and the world and so direct all the resources of this diverse people to creating a new society.

3.2 Strategies

- 3.2.1 Re-orientation of government agencies and functionaries towards making them accountable to the people. Citizens to be given every opportunity to contribute in the formulation of government policies and participate in its programmes.
- 3.2.2 An overhaul of administrative procedures and processes with a view to improving efficiency in services and restoring transparency and public accountability, through the development and adoption of improved, credible operational and procurement guidelines. Auditing procedures are to be reinforced and followed.

- 3.2.3 The National Assembly and judiciary to enjoy complete independence in accordance with constitutional provisions. Regular consultations and dialogue to be maintained with all arms and tiers of government, and opposition parties.
- 3.2.4 Reform of the Judiciary and institutional strengthening of the court system for efficient dispensation of justice and a programme for the decongestion of court and prisons.
- 3.2.5 Promotion of a nationwide ethical re-orientation campaign to imbibe self-discipline, patriotism, national unity hardwork, honesty and national pride.
- 3.2. Modernization of the system of administration through appropriate training and re-training of government personnel; maximum utilization of information technology systems.
- 3.2.7 A lean and modest government committed to cutting wasteful spending and unwieldy overheads. Government shall adopt a low profile.
- 3.2.8 Maintaining a level-playing field based on the rule of law, equity fairness and good faith. A zero-tolerance will be the room on corruption and abuse of office.
- 3.2.9 Encourage an effective management of NGOs and advocacy groups for responsible and productive contribution to national development effort.
- 3.2.10 A reform of the electoral system to ensure the process of free and fair elections and to minimize the cost of elections.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY

4.0 DEFENSE & SECURITY

4.1 Objectives

- 4.1.1 Protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.
- 4.1.2 Protection of the lives and properties of all Nigerians.
- 4.1.3 Eradication of internal civil and communal strife

4.2 Strategies

4.2.1 The Military

- (a) Re-orienting the military towards total allegiance to the constitution and democratic values. Restoration of pride, discipline and esprit-de-corps within the military, through intensive military training and depoliticizing programme in military institutions. Recruitment requirements to emphasize character attributes above physical measurements.
- (b) Development of a modern professional army through acquisition of and training on latest technology military hardware and fighting skills, within the economic capacity of the nation.
- (c) Rehabilitation and regular maintenance of military equipment and barracks. Enhancement of welfare of servicemen and their families in terms of remuneration, healthcare and education.
- (d) Restructuring of Defense Industries Corporation with emphasis on intensive research and development, with a view to meeting the basic and future changing needs of the military
- (e) A special programme to be developed on the training of the military for civil duties including maintenance of law and order, disaster relief operations and protection of strategic economic installations.

- (f) Enhanced welfare for n-servicemen. Database on veterans to be developed and updated on regular basis to ensure timely payment of pensions and provide effective post- retirement rehabilitation.
- (g) Military training institutions to be appropriately restructured to meet the demands and challenges of a modern military outfit and the desired objectives of a highly professionalized and depoliticized service.
- (h) Retired officers who could be useful to the armed forces or the wider society would be kept in a register for recall at short notice.

4.2.2 The Police

- (a) Increased recruitment of personnel in reasonable proportion to the population of the country Recruitment procedures to be reviewed with a view to enlisting duly qualified personnel. Background checks to be intensified. Character traits to have greater weight than physical attributes.
- (h) Equipping the police with modern crime fighting facilities, including appropriate communication gadgets, vehicles, forensic and detective facilities.
- (c) Review of tactical procedures and retraining of personnel to meet the current challenges of especially armed robber); assassinations and financial crimes. In addition, special training to be undertaken for control and management of civil disorders and communal strife.
- (d) Strengthening of police intelligence units for timely crime detection and prevention using modern, tested methods.
- (e) Increased surveillance on highways and other high crimes areas. Federal Highway Patrol units, air wing and marine patrols are to be resuscitated, re-trained and re-equipped. Major national highways to enjoy 24-hour patrol
- (f) Welfare of personnel to be accorded high priority through timely and regular payment of fair and equitable salaries and allowances. A life insurance scheme to be launched against death or injury while in active service. Barracks and serviceable equipment to be rehabilitated. Qualitative education and healthcare of personnel and their families to be restored and sustained;

4.2.3 Paramilitary Units and Others

- (a) Border and coastal patrol units to be strengthened through re-equipping and retraining A rapid response search and rescue programme to be introduced, fully equipped to effectively operate under emergency situations.
- (b) Federal Road Safety Corps to be re-equipped and empowered to improve road safety and prevent accidents in joint collaboration with the police. Paramedical units to be established along major highways to provide ready medical assistance to accident victims.
- (c) A “citizen’s watch” programme to be introduced involving traditional and community leaders on crime detection, prevention and control. Citizens to be educated and encouraged to be security alert and responsive. A police crime database and communication system to be developed, equipped and monitored on 24-hour basis to respond to crime alerts in all police formations.
- (d) A national campaign against civil and inter communal strife through promotion of mutual understanding, respect of culture and values of all ethnic groups; the development and gazetting of pastoralism mutes and facilities, dispute resolution initiatives between farming and pastoralist communities.

- (e) Incentives for Nigerians to learn their neighbours' languages in a attempt to promote greater understanding and limit Intel-communal violence.
- (f) State Security Service to be more proactive in detecting and nipping potential civil disorder before it explodes. Intelligence activities in this regard to be enhanced.
- (g) National Intelligence Agency to be more proactive in timely identifying potential foreign threats to national political and economic security.
- (h) An overhaul of the prison system to make it primitive as well as punitive. The welfare of prison officials and inmates to enhanced through re-training of warders, provision of adequate healthcare and basic education for prisoners, to prepare them for a more purposeful life on release. Physical environment of prisons to he rehabilitated and improved.
- (i) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to be availed maximum material and financial support towards a renewed fight against drug trafficking. Mechanisms for speedy trial f suspected traffickers to be identified and applied within constitutional provisions.
- (j) NDLEA links with the international community to be strengthened and the agency's requirements to be adequately funded within budgetary constraints.

ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

5.0 ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

The theme of the government's economic management will be private sector led efforts at wealth creation to arrest the country's economic decline.

The Nigerian economy is today in its worst state since the mid 1980's. Reported to be shrinking at a negative growth rate of 0.90 o per annum, the current predicament of the Nigerian economy is already wreaking serious havoc on the status of our balance of payments, external reserves, and on the value of our national currency.

Should this situation continue, in the face of a high population growth rate presently estimated at 2.8 percent per annum, and a crushing debt overhang, it will portend great danger for the Nigerian economy in the near future. The proportion of our population that is unemployed will continue to rise, per capita income and consumption will continue to decline, and poverty, already at dangerous levels nationwide, will accelerate, with all the attendant consequences of social discontent and national insecurity. Under such circumstances, the Nigerian economy will not even be able to afford the ever growing resources to maintain law and order.

What is required urgently is a drastic improvement in the quality of economic management by reducing waste and minimizing corrupt Practices. Our strategy will aim at growth rates adequate to meet the basic needs of our growing population, continue to service our external obligations, and above all ensure prosperity and self-reliance.

5.1 Objectives

Accordingly our economic objectives will include the following:

- (a) To turn around Nigeria's economy on a path of sustained growth and improved quality of life for Nigerians, with a strong drive towards efficiency, productivity, self-reliance through private entrepreneurship wherever possible.
- (b) Develop a strong public - private sector partnership in which a viable dynamic and responsible private sector works in partnership with the government in an appropriate environment, to create and sustain a strong and dynamic national economy. Government in the main will provide regulation, supervision and control where public interest dictates.
- (c) Create an efficient macroeconomic framework that will enhance non-inflationary growth, enforce fiscal and monetary discipline, achieve diversification through development of the non-oil sectors, promote savings and attract investments into the economy.
- (d) Encourage and facilitate massive investment, by the government as well as nongovernmental sectors, on the nation's infrastructure with the multiple objectives of broadening the nation's economic base, achieving national economic integration, creating wealth and employment and establishing a national culture of maintenance and care for standards.
- (e) Improve national food security by articulating the role of small holders, ADPs and private large scale farming.
- (f) Improve the quality of management of Nigerian's petroleum resources both upstream and downstream, such as to ensure openness, transparency, equity as well as upgrade and rehabilitate the nation's petroleum infrastructure; judicious use of proceeds of this sector to enhance and complement the other real sectors of Agriculture, Solid Minerals and industry. In addition, we intend to see an end to scarcity of petroleum products on the Nigerian market.
- (g) Accelerate development and growth of small and medium scale businesses to provide wider economic opportunities and create employment.

5.2 Strategies

- (a) Pursue a systematic programme of improvement in the efficiency and integrity of government and public sector in general.
- (b) Put in place practical measures to curb corruption and the effects of corruption, as well as to adequately recognize and reward positive value in both the public and private sectors.
- (c) Improve public/private sector interaction, encourage professionalism and the use of Nigerian professionals in both the public and private sectors. Actively promote the use of local Nigerian goods and services.
- (d) Restructure government expenditure to emphasize higher investments in infrastructure, quality education, healthcare and environment.
- (e) Deregulate and liberalize the economy towards active promotion of competition especially in the non-oil sectors, and encouraging manufacturing and export in specific industries; pursue a conscious policy of deregulation and liberalization that pays particular attention to the importance of macro-stability, social equity and social cohesion as the necessary climate favourable for stability and sustainable economic growth.

- (f) Pursue a privatization programme that is consultative with all stakeholders (and particularly with the national assembly and state governments), ensures the use of privatization proceeds transparently and for the public good, la s emphasis on attracting genuine foreign direct investment and on the protection of the public and consumer rights. The programme must guarantee transparency, openness and integrity its hallmarks.
- (g) Ensure professional integrity and probity of depositors, owners, operators and regulators in the financial sector; impose strict discipline on the sector by enhancing the regulators functions of an independent and efficient Central Bank of Nigeria, enhance the integrity of the capital market.
- (h) Support the development of effective credit and financial management culture; fiscal incentives to support entrepreneurs with long term capital for small and medium scale enterprises.
- (i) Establish suitable and effective information centers on the nation’s business, cultural and other sectors to offer efficient dissemination of processed information on all aspects of national endeavour, which will be made available internationally using leading information technology tools.
- (j) A priority programme for the creation and maintenance of efficient infrastructure (power, telecommunication, transportation and water supply), actively promoting private sector participation through deregulation and liberalization of the various sectors.
- (k) Impose strict environmental standards on oil and gas exploration, exploitation and production facilities; protect community and stakeholder rights in the operations of the sector and ensure fair and equitable investments in the infrastructural facilities of oil producing area
- (l) Priority Government investment in education, healthcare, technology and information systems as a means of enhancing the national human development index and achieving long-term self-reliance.
- (m) Promote youth development and empowerment.
- (n) Address rural development and poverty alleviation as a broad multi-sectoral strategy
- (o) Pursue a food security programme with strong emphasis on food production, agricultural processing and storage, livestock development, research and development in the agricultural and industrial sectors, rural development and national poverty eradication.

AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES

6.0 AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES

The Agricultural sector is the largest employer of labour in the Nigerian economy with over two-third of the Nigerian population earning a living from the sectors. It accounts for over 35% of Nigerian population earring a living from the sector. It accounts fir over 35% if Nigeria’s GDP and was the nation’s most important foreign revenue earner before the discovery and exploitation of oil. Yet in the last three decades, windfall earnings from oil sector have encouraged the neglect of agriculture both as the source of our national food security and as a huge export potential. The result has been a drastic decline in output from this sector and

disturbing decline into a state of growing food insecurity, social discontent and dislocation, and frequent conflicts.

What is urgently required in the agricultural sector is effective support, in terms of fiscal and policy actions that will enable the sector to play a dynamic role in the development of the nation's economy, providing the means to achieving food security and a source of rising income for most Nigerians. This nation, with its vast landmass, favourable climate conditions and abundant agricultural resources, must be self-sufficient in food production and be a net exporter of agricultural product. The policy thrust must involve measures that will focus on the mass mobilization of Nigeria farmer to adopt improved agricultural production technologies. Furthermore this action must incorporate a genuine effort at the development of the nation's rural areas where the bulk of our population, and our agricultural potential, reside.

6.1 Objectives

- (a) Increase agricultural productivity to achieve self-sufficiency and security in basic food commodities, livestock, poultry, fish production; boost production of raw materials to feed expanding agro-based industries; and raise production and processing of export agricultural production to enhance foreign change earnings.
- (b) Ease accessibility to farmers of credit and financing; implement policies that will permit genuine long term large scale commercial farming for food production as well as for export.
- (c) Develop a clearly articulate and accepted rural development policy that will be consistent, participatory, sustainable with a goal to equitably raise income and well-being of the nation's rural population, that will redefine a more focused and stable role for the public sectors as well as incorporate participation of the private sector.
- (d) Provide adequate and effective linkage between the farming sector and the agricultural produce market; ensure stable and remunerative income for the farmer, stable and fair prices for agricultural inputs, and protection of farmers from the effects of agricultural inputs, and adequate protection of farmers from the effect of agricultural commodity price fluctuation in the local and international markets.

6.2 Strategies

- (a) Articulate policy on adoptive research (currently lacking in Nigeria) to improve research and extension efficiency, involve private sector in funding and directing.
- (b) Support to research, training and extension programmes on agricultural and livestock technologies as well as adequate and appropriate technology transfer to improve production processing and storage.
- (c) Pursue a vibrant agricultural extension policy that will disseminate proven technology to farmers to increase output and improve standard of living; decentralize extension to the grassroots level for greater efficiency and participation, quality the role of women in various agricultural activities, and provide technical support and training to LGS to develop capacity.

- (d) Revive Agricultural Development Projects (ADP's) through operational re-engineering, Institutional strengthening and involving private sector participation.
- (e) Re-direct the endeavour of local financing institutions with intent to sharpen focus on credit to farmers, rural banking schemes, and participate in revolving fund schemes for supply of agricultural inputs; critically re-appraise externally funded programmes on the sector with a view to imposing greater efficiency and coordination.
- (f) Undertake a rural infrastructural programme as a multi-faceted strategy to include sub-programmes in rural electricity, construction and rehabilitation of road networks, health and educational facilities.
- (g) Articulate and implement a land and water resources development plan that will aim at strengthening and systematic development of river basin systems to develop wide scale irrigation farming, while maintaining a careful and environmentally sensitive balance with other water uses like fisheries, livestock, municipal and rural water supply.
- (g) Develop and promote irrigation farming by providing sustainable and environmentally conscious irrigation infrastructure to boost production and reduce total dependence on nature for performance.
- (h) Promote the setting up and smooth operation of commodity exchange markets and of information centers regarding agricultural commodity produce, their quantity price and quality.
- (i) Implement a carefully reviewed strategic food storage programme that will aim to provide adequate food storage and preservation facilities, establish strategic grain reserves and food distribution networks, improve processing and storage of agricultural products to reduce losses and deterioration.
- (j) A national programme for the development and control of pastoral activities to include the development and protection of grazing reserves and stock routes, livestock healthcare, improved husbandry, as well as education and healthcare for pastoralists.
- (k) Articulate a national plan for sustainable fisheries development that will ensure the rapid expansion and improvement of our marine fisheries, inland fisheries and agriculture resources.

POWER SUPPLY

7.0 POWER SUPPLY

Development of power supply infrastructure in Nigeria has remained depressingly static in the last three decades.

Our power generation capacity is grossly inadequate, our national transmission grid is insufficient even to convey the level of present generation, and the distribution and quality of services is characterized by unreliability, deterioration, decay and dismal performance. The combined installed capacity of the nation's eight major power generating facilities comprising three hydro power stations and five thermal power plants has remained below 6,000MW for about 20 years. Actual generation has steadily declined over the years. Today despite the massive expenditure reported for this

sector in the past three years, the power generated nationwide by NEPA is still below .3000MW. Given our present population, the level of power generation places Nigeria as one of the least in the world in electricity use per capita, even by the third world and African standards. In order to attain a per capita electricity use comparable to countries such as Zimbabwe or even Ghana, Nigeria would need to generate at least an additional 10,000MW.

The national transmission grid has not undergone any significant growth in the past two and a half decades and as a result more than 83% of the country mostly rural areas remains uncovered w electricity. In its present state the national grid can only handle a maximum of 35001MW of power generation. Even though this problem has been recognized since the late 1980s, the plan for the expansion of the grid by constructing additional high tension lines and bulk power substations has remained unimplemented over the years.

Occasional rural electrification programmes nationwide have had only limited success due to the constraints created by inadequate national grid, generation and maintenance capacity.

Nigeria requires an urgent and massive mobilization of investment in the power supply sector. A programme is required that will enable a rapid expansion and improvement of the coverage and quality of electricity supply to the country. This in turn should ensure an uninterrupted, reliable power supply, enhance rural development and stimulate industrial growth.

7.1 Objectives

- (a) To create a police environment that will allow for multiple actors in the provision of public electric power supply in the country and for the participation of private capital investment in the sector on a viable commercial basis.
- (b) To create a regulatory environment for the power sector that will ensure reliable power supply, protect consumer rights and obligations as well as enforce performance standards by the various electricity agencies in a liberalized power sectors.
- (c) Accelerate the development of new power generation capacities in the country and rehabilitate existing power plants.
- (d) Acceleration the expansion of the national grid to expand geographical coverage of the country and improve reliability of bulk supply.
- (e) Improve management efficiency of the nations distribution system, reduce system leakages; improved commitment to customer service and sensitive a national energy conservation and maintenance culture on electricity supply facilities.
- (f) Improve management efficiency to eliminate over-billing abrupt and unjustified disconnections and reduce delays in repair times.
- (g) Encourage and facilitate development of alternative and renewable sources of energy, especially for supply to rural communities.

7.2 Strategies

- (a) Conclude and enact all legislative actions towards reform of the electric power to facilitate its deregulation and liberalization no such legislation is presently in place.
- (b) Ensure an efficient and transparent process of implementation of all relevant legislations for the reform of the electric power sector.
- (c) Initiate and implement a national programme for the restoration of the nation's generation capacity, which will involve full rehabilitation of all existing generation plants. Train and re-train existing staff and produce maintenance tools and equipment.
- (d) Initiate and implement a national programme for expansion of electricity generation, which will involve the establishment of new power generation installations, with the eventual target of an additional 10,000MW of generated electricity. Some of the target projects will include:
 - Mambilla Hydro Power Project
 - Lokoja Hydro Power Project
 - Onitsha Thermal and Hydro Power Project
 - Makurdi Hydro Power Project
 - Zungeru Hydro Power Project
 - Ikom Hydro Power Project
 - Oji Coal Fired Station
- (e) Initiate and implement a national programme for the expansion and strengthening of the national grid, which will involve the construction of additional national grid lines and substations. Targeted project will include at least 10 new 330KV lines, at least 20 new 132KV lines, rehabilitation and upgrading of several other lines and bulk stations spread across the country.
- (f) Introduce effective and sustainable facility management system for new or existing rehabilitated facilities, conduct a national drive for embracing maintenance culture on all
- (g) Undertake as well as encourage and facilitate a national wide programme of electrification of rural areas through extension of bulk power from the national grid or installation of independent off-grid sources of energy such as solar energy.
- (h) Support and encourage development of alternative/renewable sources of energy supply, especially as stand alone impendent sources such as solar energy and bio-fuel system as a long term mitigation to over reliance on fossil fuel and hydro-electricity with their attendant environmental problems.

TRANSPORTATION

8.0 TRANSPORTATION

8.1 Objectives

- (a) Provision of comfortable, safe, affordable and efficient inter and intra mass transit system.
- (b) Provision of an economically viable bulk haulage system by providing a proper balance between road, rail and waterway transportation networks.
- (c) Improve existing highway network.

8.2 Strategies

- (a) Resuscitation and complete modernization of the railway system. Major cities to be connected with high speed rail services over time.
- (b) Bus and taxi services in the private sector to be assisted bus lanes and stops to be incorporated in future city street plans and development.
- (c) Rehabilitation and expansion of wilitervavs transportation, including dredging of channels, provision of ferries and jetties in riverine areas.
- (d) A new hulk haulage strategy to be developed and implemented with a view to encouraging maximum utilization of the railway and waterways. Truck haulage to be regulated with respect to allowable tonnage and road safety towards enhancing the lifespan of national highways.
- (e) Development and commencement of a medium to long term national highway rehabilitation and expansion programme as well as a regular highway maintenance programme. Traffic capacity of major highways to be monitored regularly for timely needed expansion. Selected highways will be dualized and interchanges constructed to reduce traffic congestion and accidents. Dualization of road networks between state capitals to be undertaken.
- (f) A bridge management programme to be designed and implemented to ensure safety through regular monitoring and timely remedial works.
- (j) Rehabilitation of ANAMCO to supply locally produced buses.
- (h) Rehabilitation it maintenance workshops of the Nigerian Railway Corporation.

TELECOMMUNICATION

9.0 TELECOMMUNICATION

Nigeria's telephone infrastructure base still remains one of the most underdeveloped on the African continent. Even with recent developments in digital cellular telephony, the combined installed capacity in Nigeria still places the country barely above the minimum tele-density (of 10 lines per 1000 of population) recommended by the international Telecommunications Union (ITU) developing countries. The country still suffers from poor coverage of telecommunication services, the inefficient monopolistic reign of a single national carrier, a stifling oligopoly of only three digital mobile phone operators, and a total absence of any major initiative extend services to rural areas.

9.1 Objectives

- (a) A phased expansion and development of the infrastructure backbone of the country's telecom sector.
- (b) A phased expansion and consolidation of cellular and other mobile telephone services in the country and make them more accessible and affordable.
- (c) Acquisition of up-to-date information and communication technology development and rapid integration into the global information communication
- (d) Develop and facilitate the required policy and legal environment for the involvement of private capital in the sustainable development, management and ownership of the nation's telecommunication facilities.
- (e) Phased expansion of telecommunication services to the country's rural as well as under-served areas.

- (f) Develop and implement a policy of facilities management and maintenance culture for the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.
- (g) Create a regulatory environment for the telecommunications sector that will ensure reliable services, protect consumer rights and obligations as well as enforce performance standards by the various operators in the sector.

9.2 Strategies

- (a) Accelerated privatization. The fundamental principle will be efficiency in service delivery and national interest.
- (b) Accelerated privatization the establishment and licensing of additional national carriers in the country.
- (c) Expand the operational space by encouraging the establishment and licensing of additional operators in the digital cellular mobile telephone services as may be necessary.
- (d) Ensure the speedy enactment and full implementation of the enabling legislation for the reform and liberalization of the telecom sector this legislation has been long in coming but not yet in place.
- (e) Ensure a transparent, consultative, fair and optimal process of the nation's major telecommunications assets, including NITEL.
- (f) Adopt a public private sector partnership approach on all major telecommunications programmes including privatization/lease of major infrastructure and in formulation and implementation of a universal telecom access policy.
- (g) Initiate and support a national programme of providing access to the World Wide Web and global internet facilities to our educational institutions, governmental and non-governmental institutions and the public at large.
- (h) Implement a sustainable, continuous and comprehensive programme for the extension of telecommunication services to the nation's rural as well as under-served areas.
- (i) Introduce standard requirements for facility management and strict maintenance culture on all facilities to be established under the various programmes.
- (j) Give special emphasis to training, development of know-how and professional skills in the management of telecom facilities.
- (k) Strengthen the National Communications Commission (NCC) in the exercise of its regulatory functions, enabling it effectively enforce the legal requirements regarding efficient and reliable services, carrier obligations, fairness and the protection of consumer rights.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

10.0 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The growth of Nigeria's industrial Sector and its contribution to the economy have continued, over the years to record very poor performance a factor that has basically been responsible for our economy having remained mono-cultural and highly vulnerable to the vagaries of external factors. Rapid growth in the nation's industrial productivity, with the eventual aim of cutting down on imported consumer goods and propelling an export-led growth, is crucial for the resuscitation of our economy.

10.1 Objectives

- (a) To rapidly improve the contribution of the industrial sector to the country's GDP by increasing industrial productivity.
- (b) Create enabling environment, through Consistent policy and development plans that will encourage creation of venture capital and improve access to funding, credits and generally facilitate private sector participation in the development of industries.
- (c) Give strong commitment to the creation and sustainable management of infrastructure required for the operation of industries such as energy and power supply.
- (d) Create avenues of enhancing consumer purchasing power, along with a consistent, favourable and practical tax regime, with the aim of ensuring a healthy consumer market and enhancing domestic savings.
- (d) Articulate a long term, consistent and practical policy for the development and sustenance of small and medium scale enterprises that will lay emphasis on fairness accountability, merit recognition and involvement of stakeholder communities.

10.2 Strategies

- (a) Pursue the enactment of relevant legislative instruments that will enable the necessary reform for enhanced private sector participation in the development of industries.
- (b) Improve quality of management for existing industries; promote linkages with other sectors of the economy.
- (c) Priority attention to the development of infrastructure to industries on viable commercial basis such as special power and / or gas supply schemes to industrial areas.
- (d) A national campaign to encourage Consumption of local industrial produce; discourage expensive consumption of foreign produces and to sensitize the nation's industries toward a new export drive. Implement a deliberate policy of government patronage of local industrial products and services.
- (e) Employ the use of public private partnership approach to the implementation of all programme on industrial facilities their infrastructure.
- (f) Emphasize on the development of local know how, training and manpower development to increase turnover of skilled personnel for the nations industries.
- (g) Improve the criteria for the establishment of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), of linkages between the SMEs, as well as linkage with large-scale enterprises; ensure effective community participation in their development.
- (h) Take advantage of the globalization of production by encouraging/ensuring an applicable and active Nigerian equity participation in foreign enterprises locating in Nigeria.

PETROLEUM SECTOR

11.0 THE PETROLEUM SECTOR

The petroleum sector is crucial to the Nigerian economy. Although contributing only about 13% of the nation's GDP, it accounts for over 60% of foreign exchange. Furthermore as the largest contributor of the nation's energy source, the product from this sector directly affects the lives of all Nigerians, playing a central role on the country's economy and its natural security.

Nigeria is a major world exporter of petroleum and its prominence as a producer of crude oil, and especially gas is expected to continue rising in the coming decades. Over the years, deficient economic management has led to the stagnation of the economy as a predominantly mono-cultural one, with the petroleum sector remaining an enclave activity with limited linkage to the rest of the economy. Poor funding and mistrust between government and other stakeholders frequently impede investment in the sector. The downstream sub-sector, which is still dominated by the government, is seriously hampered by the deplorable states of refineries and other key infrastructure, which have deteriorated over the years.

11.1 Objectives

- (a) Establish a long-term policy of stability and adequacy of funding that will ensure favourable and steady growth of the sector.
- (b) Establish a culture of dialogue and openness between government and stakeholders in the Sector, regarding formulation and implementation of policies in the sector, issues of environmental care, safety, welfare and other affairs of oil-endowed communities.
- (c) Cultivate trust and ensure level playing field in terms of obligations and incentives to operators in the sector.
- (d) Pursue a dynamic and Consistent policy of development of gas and its exploitation and export as an important revenue earner.
- (e) Establish linkages between the petroleum and other sectors with the aim of applying judicious use of the nation's petroleum resources to develop and broaden the structure of the economic.
- (f) Restore the full capacity of the nation's downstream petroleum infrastructure and subsequently ensure strict adherence to standard facilities maintenance requirements.
- (g) Create enabling environment for the extensive participation of the indigenous private sector in operations and ownership of the sector.

11.2 Strategies

- (a) Fair, equitable and effective implementation of terms of obligations with all operators in the exploration and development of the nation's oil and gas resources.
- (b) Establish and efficiently manage operational and funding structures for the care of environment as well as for basic infrastructure, safety and community affairs in the oil producing areas; revamp the Niger-Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to pursue a transparent and efficient management of resources for the development of the region.

- (c) Pursue a high priority national programme of rehabilitation of the nation's downstream petroleum infrastructure refineries, crude/products pipelines, depots, pumping stations, loading and off-loading jetties; establish sustainable facility management systems for their long term efficient operation.
- (d) Restore permanent compliance with the requirement 40-day mandatory petroleum pr (ducts strategic reserve for the nation.
- (e) Provide incentives to attract private Sector investment on refineries, gas and handling and distribution of products; gradually cede the operations of the refineries and other facilities to private operators in the sector, either through divestiture on management contract; create legal and regulatory framework to facilitate the process.
- (f) Strengthen tile regulatory function of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR); correct lapses and weakness in the existing licensing regime of petroleum dealers to curb profiteering, and effectively enforce existing laws regulating marketing distribution storage and selling of products.
- (g) Put in place measures to control vandalization of pipelines, and reduction of favour fuel losses currently up to and beyond 15 when the industry average is only 2%
- (h) Re-examine and strengthen tile regulatory structure of tile sector in general and that of petroleum distribution and marketing sub-sector in particular such as to enforce the e0ieieni performance of all players in tile sector and protect the public and tile consumer.
- (j) Require stringent compliance with environmental laws and standards regarding exploration and production activities by operators in the sector; address crucial environmental issues regarding the Niger Delta area, such as procedure for environmental clean ups and the environmental effects of (al production and gas flaring.

SOLID MINERALS

12.0 SOLID MINERALS DEVELOPMENT

12.1 Objectives

- (a) Regulated exploitation of identified solid mineral deposits to enhance the foreign exchange earnings of the country, while minimizing damage to the environment.
- (1)) Active participation of Nigerians in solid minerals exploitation and related businesses.

12.3 Strategies

- (a) Update of mineral resources data and ifs dissemination to the business community on a regular basis.
- (b) Review and instituting a “developer friendly” regulating framework that will allow for free and open participation of local and foreign entrepreneurs in solid minerals development ventures and export of products.
- (c) Creation of a solid minerals development funding mechanism that will provide entrepreneurs access to capital. Other incentives to be identified and extended to enhance rapid development of the sector.

- (d) Provision of primary infrastructure to mineral development sites with high potentials. Mineral development ventures to commit themselves to the social and economic well being of host communities.
- (e) Environmental regulations to be fully enforced. Mineral development ventures to fully mitigate environmental impacts arising from their activities.

EDUCATION

13.0 EDUCATION

The theme of educational policy will be quality education for development.

13.1 Objectives

- (a) Improved quality of education for all citizens
- (b) Sustainable funding mechanism for education
- (c) Utilizing the gains of research for national development

13.3 Strategies

- (a) Cessation of industrial disputes between government and academic staff unions to curtail disruption of academic calendar.
- (b) Improving the quality of teaching staff through provision of further training opportunities and strengthening the inspectorate system.
- (c) Rehabilitation and expansion of classes, hostels in educational institution to provide decent academic and residential/hostel facilities to accommodate more students and become more conducive for teaching, learning and research.
- (d) Reactivation and re-stocking of academic and public libraries to improve the learning process and inculcate a reading culture on the citizenry through a reorientation
- (e) Efficient utilization of the education tax Fund to attain the desired objective. Other potential finance sources to be explored with a view to substantially increasing funding in education.
- (f) Support for the development and production of indigenous literature, through a deliberated agenda of cultivating a reading culture in Nigerians and rewarding literary talent.
- (g) Attention to be accorded to special education for the handicapped.
- (h) Science and technical education to be accorded special attention. All federal tertiary institutions to qualify for full accreditation in appropriate courses taught. Provision of computer and internet services in federal owned schools, colleges and universities.
- (i) Private sector to be encouraged, with incentives, to finance research activities and products development. Government will make special efforts to direct products of higher education to be relevant to the country's development efforts.
- (j) Curtailment of cultism on campuses.
- (k) States with peculiar problems will be assisted by the federal government to eliminate the efforts of anti-social elements such as cultism and beggary.
- (i) Encourage and promote sporting activities in all schools and institutions as a component of education.

YOUTHS DEVELOPMENT AND EMPOWERMENT

14.0 YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND EMPOWERMENT

14.1 Objectives

- (a) Providing opportunities for youth to realize harness and develop their full potentials.
- (b) Developing a new breed of potential leaders committed to the future sustenance of good governance and dedicated to selfless service to the peoples.
- (c) Access to gainful employment to steer youths away from crime and other social vices.

14.3 Strategies

- (a) Quality o education to be restored and improved upon (see programme on education).
- (b) Technical and material support to youth organisations that are active in the promotion of specific youth development programmes.
- (c) Civic and leadership training retreats to be encouraged nationwide on regular basis.
- (d) Skills development and entrepreneurship programme to be established in close collaboration with the private sector.
- (e) The NYSC scheme to be strengthened as an effective tool for national integration and leadership development.
- (f) Youth award scheme to be instituted to recognize and reward merit, outstanding achievement or other commendable services in the public interest.

SPORTS DEVELOPMENT

15.0 SPORTS DEVELOPMENT

15.1 Objectives

- (a) National unity and harmony among citizens through sports.
- (b) Inculcation of discipline and team spirit in the youth.
- (c) Favourable external image and international respect though sports.
- (d) Economic opportunities and empowerment through sports.

15.2 Strategies

- (a) Gradual disengagement of government and non-interference in sports administration.
- (h) Creating a mechanism for the rehabilitation, future development and management of sports infrastructure.
- (c) Recognition and reward for achievement in national and international competitions including scholarship awards and induction to sports 1 all of Fame.
- (d) Resuscitation of the National Sports Festival.
- (e) Provision of incentives to private sector sponsors of sports competitions, endorsements and promotions.
- (f) Full participation in international competitions and maintaining active membership in major international sports bodies.

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

16.0 WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

16.1 Objective

- (a) Full recognition and protection of the rights of women.
- (b) Equal opportunities and economic empowerment.
- (c) Emphasis on responsibilities, and duties of women.

15.2 Strategies

- (a) Creation of a special law enforcement unit for the prevention and prosecution of traffickers in women.
- (b) Support to NGOs involved in various women related socio-economic development activities.
- (c) Creation of a Center of Excellence for the diagnosis and treatment of women related diseases e.g. (breast cancer, VVF etc.)
- (d) Consultations with women groups in the formulation of policies and implementation of to government programmes.
- (e) A special commitment to the provision of basic education for women.
- (f) Celebration of a mother's Day in recognition of the contributions of women to the growth and development of humanity.
- (g) Commitment to filling minimum positions reserved for women in public offices.

HEALTH

17.0 HEALTH

Health is a fundamental sector for any meaningful human development healthy citizens are more equipped physically and mentally to contribute to the productive capacity of the nation. Therefore good health policies always have direct bearing on the general population and on national productivity.

Nigeria has average life expectancy of less than 50 years. Infant and maternal mortality rates are high. Although it is generally acknowledged that the year 2000 brought major breakthrough in the health sector on a global basis, health services in Nigeria seem to have actually deteriorated since then. In the year 2000, about 150 days of health services (i.e. 410% of service days) of the year were lost nationwide to wages related strike actions. In the 2001 budget the total appropriation to the health sector fell well below the WHO recommended level of minimum 5% of the total appropriation, most of which was for overheads. Unfortunately less than 50% of even this appropriated amount was released before the end of the 2001. Even then these meager resources are not properly managed.

Despite a lot of publicity the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is still yet to be fully operational. All the other aspects of healthcare at federal level viz; primary health care, curative and tertiary care, disease control (and especially the National Programme on Immunization (NPI), and HIV/AIDS control), etc have suffered set backs due to poor planning and ineffective control.

17.1 Objectives

- (a) Support and encourage funding of health care services in the country to a level that, in the least, surpasses the WHO recommended minimum.
- (b) Establish and effectively implement a viable, sustainable policy on drugs and vaccines supply that will ensure reliable supply of safe and efficacious essential drugs and vaccines nationwide.
- (c) Strengthen the regulatory regime in the sector that controls the provision of drugs as well as the professionalism and integrity of agencies and professionals in the health sector.
- (d) Overhaul and improve the primary healthcare network in the country that will ensure equitable and affordable healthcare at grass roots level.
- (e) Strengthen tertiary health care facilities nationwide; support for advancement in diagnostic, preventive, curative and research activities nationwide.

17.2 Strategies

- (a) Instill strict, prudent procedure in the management of funds appropriated for the health sector, as well as from international donor agencies presently reported to be very poorly manage.
- (b) Pursue other financing options for the health sector: rapidly work towards a fully operational Nil IS, properly structured to provide equitable health services to the majority of the populace in a gradual and sustainable manner, with Strong regulatory Support, while government provides for indigent patients.
- (c) Pursue a comprehensive primary healthcare programme that consists of construction of health centers, provision of equipment, sustainable development aspects, health enlightenment, community involvement and strengthening the National Primary Healthcare Development Agency (NPICDA) in the performance of its statutory function of developing and sustaining primary healthcare systems.
- (d) Pursue a national programme for the resuscitation of the tertiary health care level through rehabilitation of facilities, provision of equipment, staff training, orientation and motivation, and establishment of strict maintenance system for the sustainable use of all facilities.
- (e) Improve commitment to effective and sincere management of the National Programme on Immunization (NPI) towards achieving a decline in the prevalence of vaccine immunizable diseases no such decline is recorded.
- (f) Sustain a comprehensive HIV/AIDS control programme through more efficient management, better screening and monitoring of anti-retroviral drugs and through greater efforts on preventive measures such as advocacy, information, education and communication (I EC), behavioural change, etc.
- (g) Improve inter and multi-sectoral collaboration with health related sectors (water, sanitation, agriculture, education, job creation, poverty alleviation, etc); coordinate activities of development partners (multi-lateral agencies etc). Review and coordinate current level of sectoral cooperation and collaboration between health and health-related agencies so as to avoid duplications and waste of resources.

- (h) Improve the efficiency of and sustainability of nationwide drug supply with aspects of effective cost recovery, financial management and fund revolving.
- (i) Encourage and facilitate establishment of effective health management information system, to ease planning, monitoring and evaluation, disease surveillance and policy design.
- (j) Encourage, through incentives, local production of predicaments, hospital equipment and related products to conform to internationally accepted standards of quality.

HOUSING

18.0 HOUSING

18.1 Objectives

- (a) Improved and affordable housing for low and medium income households.
- (b) Effective and sustainable mortgage finance system through increased private sector participation.
- (c) Research, development and promotion of the use of cheaper, yet reasonable quality local building materials.

18.2 Strategies

- (a) Review of the National Housing Fund as may be necessary to allow for greater participation of the private sector in providing and financing home ownership and improvements.
- (b) Resuscitation of mortgage financing institutions and restructuring of the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria to provide low and medium income earners increased access to funds and instill public confidence in the system.
- (c) Support for research and product development of quality and affordable local building materials.
- (d) Completion of all abandoned housing projects based on a realistic financing mechanism.

ENVIRONMENT

19.0 ENVIRONMENT

19.1 Objectives

- (a) Mitigation of all forms of environmental pollution and degradation.
- (b) Effective management of real and potential ecological disasters.
- (c) Observation of natural resources.
- (d) Maintaining a clean, healthy and safe environment.

18.3 Strategies

- (a) Priority policy on the development of an effective management of waste in its various stages of generation, collection, storage, treatment and disposal; including the introduction and support to waste re cycling techniques.
- (b) Enforcement of environmental laws on pollution and degradation especially with regards to oil spillage, logging, bush burning, solid and liquid waste disposal; implementation of environmental monitoring and audit procedures.
- (c) Environmental standards to be set for all public buildings, institutions and facilities for a clean, health's' and safe working environment.

- (d) Effective management and audit of ecological funds to ensure their judicious spending. Emphasis to be on erosion, desertification and flood control and afforestation.
- (e) Creation and preservation of green belts in cities and national parks, backed by appropriate legislation; identification and protection of locations of special environmental interest (wetlands, forests, wildlife sanctuaries etc.).
- (f) Creation and enforcement of zones between industrial and residential areas.
- (g) Formation of national policy and standards for urban renewal and development.
- (h) Promotion and implementation of renewable energy programmes.
- (i) Development and implementation of a special environmental clean-up programme for the Niger Delta, afforestation programme against logging in the rain forest and desertification in the arid zones.
- (j) Effective use of the requirement for Environmental impact Assessment (EIA) as an invaluable proactive environmental protection policy, through a programme that places emphasis on what HA can do, rather than the mere act of conducting it, as is presently the case.
- (k) Formation of all participate policy on integrated rural development.

FOREIGN POLICY

20.0 FOREIGN POLICY

Nigeria's external image has passed through convulsing twists in recent history. Emerging in 1999 from prolong military rule, we have been the focus of high expectation from the international community. Unfortunately, several factors have combined to thwart Nigeria's potential of becoming a leadership model in international economic and security relations both in Africa and worldwide. Nigeria is perceived negatively by several countries on account of the prevalence of corruption; drug trafficking, a high risk business environment, domestic insecurity, weak economy and frequent inability to honour international obligations. The consequences of these have included a stagnated flow of foreign direct investment especially in real and non-oil sector, harassment of Nigerians in foreign countries mostly on unwarranted suspicious, devaluation of Nigerian academic qualifications, etc.

20.1 Objectives

- (a) Pursue policies of mutual coexistence through cultis am m of international friendship and goodwill, guided by our vital national interests.
- (b) Play increasing leadership role in Africa's political and economic development and security arrangements.
- (c) Effectively manage Nigeria's diplomatic relations to project a positive external image for the country.
- (d) Observe conventions and obligations of regional and internal tonal organizations of which Nigeria is a member.
- (e) Focus on Africa, Africans in diaspora and developing world as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy.

20.2 Strategies

- (a) Utilize contemporary information technology and information management methodologies to improve the content, competence and effectiveness of our external information programme, dissemination of the country's economic, cultural and socio-political information.
- (b) Pursue a coordinated initiative through domestic and international cooperation networks to intensify fight against the scourge of international financial frauds, drug trafficking, human trafficking / child abuse.
- (c) Launch a programme of attraction of foreign investment that is centered on improvement of the efficiency of domestic economy eradication of corruption and financial fraud, improvement of internal security and reduction of cost and risks to the business environment. Improvement in the monitoring supporting structures.
- (d) Provide strong military leadership in security arrangement with ECOWAS and Africa.
- (e) Create an enabling environment to Sensitize and encourage Africans in the diaspora to make contributions to the development of Nigeria and Africa.
- (f) Take the lead in speeding up the process of evolution and integration of ECOWAS member states.
- (g) Identify and cultivate the friendship and cooperation of countries that are crucial to the attainment of the country's national objectives especially in the fields of industrial development, investments, trade and technology
- (h) Emphasize economic diplomacy by establishing economic desks in key diplomatic missions to facilitate acquisition of technology and promote trade and investment.
- (j) Undertake systematic promotion of south-south cooperation by pursuing trade, cultural and sports relations especially with selected African, Caribbean and Pacific states and with other African groups in the diaspora.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

22.0 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Science, Engineering and Technology have in the past decades been the critical instruments in uplifting economics around the world. Today technology is the main force driving the global economy. A sound basic education in sciences and technology is a prerequisite to future economic well-being The Nigerian Science, Engineering and Technology environment is characterised by policy and institutional constraints as well as poor infrastructure. Science laboratories and engineering workshops in our universities, polytechnics, technical, vocational and secondary schools are bereft of equipment, or are in a dilapidated state or obsolete. Major industrial concerns are largely import dependant in both machinery and raw material.

The springboard of Science, Engineering and Technology is research. Apart from fundamental research in universities and polytechnics, very little Research and Development is carried out in our industries. Modest breakthroughs in indigenous Research and Development are neither commercialized nor exploited for self-sustaining industrial development and growth.

21.1 Objectives

- (a) Support and emphasize a sound basic education in sciences and technology as a necessary requirement to the acquisition of skills and expertise in engineering and technological services, and the attainment of rapid advances in the agriculture, industry, information, power and energy sectors. Consequently, a careful re-appraisal of higher education content will be undertaken to achieve a shift in emphasis and priorities.
- (b) Support and encourage research activities and the acquisition of production technologies so as to accelerate the growth and development of small and medium scale enterprises across sectors, and provide wider economic opportunities, employment and poverty alleviation.
- (c) Accord priority attention to the development and growth of computer and information technology in Nigeria; accelerate the use of information technology at government level as well as in the educational and industrial sectors with a view to providing better, expeditious and transparent services to the citizenry, achieving improvements in productivity and efficiency.
- (d) Pursue the development and promotion of Nigeria as destination of choice for the computer and information technology (IT) industries worldwide, to enhance domestic and export earnings in software, hardware and other areas of the IT industry
- (e) Support and promote the development of nuclear science and its peaceful applications such as in power, energy, industry, agriculture and medicine.
- (1) Pursue a vigorous national policy on space programme to attain space capability, as essential tools for development.

21.2 Strategies

- (a) Development of simple and basic technologies that will improve the skills in production, processing and storage by small scale and subsistence farmers, and for small and medium scale agricultural and industrial process industries.
- (b) Enhanced acquisition of low and medium level technologies that will boost capacity utilization in targeted industries, especially those in which Nigeria has comparative advantage.
- (c) Establish and promote Small and medium Scale Enterprises (SME) industrial cluster location which specialize in products and technologies for specific industries; provide basic information these locations; provide incentives to support entrepreneurs in these enterprises.
- (d) Establish small businesses information / industrial centers to offer legal, business advisory and technical assistance, as well as promote skill development and information dissemination.
- (e) Support and accelerate the use of information technology in schools, colleges and other educational institutions in the country, so as to serve as important skills to increase employment for the educated unemployed.
- (f) Undertake a coordinated national promotional initiative for the development of computer and information technology aimed at the creation of required infrastructure, technology parks, model cyber cafes at key selected institutions, communication network, private technology providers, IT job opportunities, and controlling the maintenance of standards of quality and training, etc. The initiative

will include an international campaign about the opportunities and facilities available at various locations in Nigeria, to attract large IT industries to set up operations in Nigeria.

- (g) Completion or establishment of centers for energy research at selected institutions across the country; encouraging and funding research programmes in the area of power and nuclear research at educational institutions in the country.
- (h) Pursue the implementation of research, rigorous education, engineering, development, design and manufacture of space related hardware and software including transport and payloads, satellites, telescopes and antennas for a space development programme.
- (i) Identify and enlist local and international cooperation and partners to support and encourage the implementation of the space programme for the purposes of research and application in the development of various sectors of the economy.

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

22.0 CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

22.1 Objectives

- (a) Preservation of Nigeria's diverse culture and heritage.
- (b) Ethical re-orientation of the people, national pride and international prestige through application of our cultural values in all spheres of human activity.
- (c) Enhanced tourism potential through culture.

22.2 Strategies

- (a) Resuscitation of national festival of arts and culture and award schemes for outstanding performance.
- (b) Adequate funding of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments for the collection and preservation of artifacts.
- (c) Research and compilation of diverse cultural values as tools for a campaign on ethical reorientation, national unity and good governance.
- (d) Re-organizing Nigeria's cultural troupes and supporting international tours to promote Nigeria's rich culture and tourism potentials.

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

23.0 TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

23.1 Objectives

- (a) An active and permanent role for the traditional institution in the preservation of our cultural values, peace, unity and socio economic development of the country.
- (b) Preserving the respect and dignity of the institution.
- (c) Emphasis on their role in security matters.

23.3 Strategies

- (a) Traditional rulers to be involved in conflicts resolution and security matters within their domain.
- (b) Regular consultations with traditional rulers in matters directly affecting their communities.

- (c) Involvement in public enlightenment and mobilization of the people on government socio-economic development activities e.g. in education, health, youth and social welfare programmes.
- (d) Serving as special emissaries/envoys of government under special situations.
- (e) According the institution full recognition in the constitution.

INFORMATION AND MEDIA

24.0 INFORMATION AND MEDIA

24.1 Objectives

- (a) Open, credible and responsible information dissemination of government policies and activities.
- (b) Free and responsible press committed to unifying the people and promoting the development of the nation.

24.3 Strategies

- (a) Traditional to a free press in accordance with constitutional provision.
- (b) Regular interaction with the citizenry, government and Press' media to facilitate access to factual unclassified information
- (c) Re-equipping of government print and electronic media to meet current level of technology and attain parity with international standards.
- (d) Extending an ethical re orientation campaign to the media in view of their unique role.