

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION TO
CIVIL RULE IN NIGERIA & GHANA 1960 - 2000

BY

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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CIVIL RULE IN NIGERIA & GHANA 1960 - 2000

BY

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BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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DEDICATION

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
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
This dissertation entitled 'A Critical Analysis Of Transition To Civil Rule In Nigeria And Ghana 1960 - 2000' meets the regulation governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) Political Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.


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
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N.G Esew

ABSTRACT

The intrusion of the military in African politics and their disengagement thereof, has made transition to civil rule integral part of politics on the continent. In Nigeria as well as in Ghana, transition to civil rule was precipitated by the intervention of the military in the democratic process. Irrespective of the duration of the military in power, the military and the civil society have seen the need to put a programme for transferring power to civilians in place.

This study, therefore, is an examination of the nature and pattern of the political transition to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana. Why has it been difficult for the military in Nigeria and Ghana to initiate and execute any political transition successfully? Does the ambition of an incumbent have any impact on political transition?

Our quest to find answers to the foregoing questions provides the stimulus for this study. It is our proposition that (i) given the powerful nature of the state in the allocation of resources, there will be a struggle for power between the military and the political elites for the control of the state policy-making apparatus, (ii) that most political transitions in Nigeria and Ghana are characterized by the desire of the incumbent to remain in power and (iii) the greater the degree of influence of the military in the transition process, the lesser its chances of success.

Secondary sources on the various transition programmes in

Nigeria and Ghana from 1960 to 2000, were collected, collated and then meticulously subjected to systematic content analysis to test the propositions.

The study discovered that there is a relationship between military interest and the outcome of political transitions in both Nigeria and Ghana. That since the state is the major repository of wealth and controls the nation's resources, there will be a continuous struggle between the military and civil society over power. That success of transition to civil rule depends on whom the incumbent wanted to relinquish political power. That the military in their attempt to hand over power to civilians set up similar electoral bodies to oversee the transition programme.

Among the problems associated with the military and political transitions include the insincerity on the part of the military in keeping to transition timetable. In cases where they are kept, the overwhelming influence of the military on the transition, makes the whole process a mockery. The entire transition programme is manipulated overtly or covertly to the advantage of the incumbent; an uneven playing field is, therefore, provided among contestants where the incumbent is an interested party. The thesis concludes with recommendations which could lead to a smooth and successful transition of power from military to civil rule thus: (i) The military should be sincere in their willingness to hand-over power to civilians, (ii) the antieofe to military incursion into politics is good governance. Civilian leaders should therefore, try as much as possible to eschew ethnic

sentiments and tendencies and spread political appointments evenly across the nation.

ABBREVIATIONS

AD:	Alliance For Democracy
AG:	Action Group
AFM:	Armed Forces Movement
AP:	Action Party
APP:	All Peoples Party
APRP:	All People's Republican Party
ASUU:	Academic Staff Union of Universities
BBC:	British Broadcasting Corporation
BTA:	Basic Travel Allowance
CA:	Constituent Assembly
CC:	Constitutional Commission
CCDF:	Co-ordinating Committee of Democratic Forces
CDC:	Constitution Drafting Committee
CDRS:	Committees for The Defence of The Revolution
CDS:	Centre For Democracy Studies
CNC:	Committee for National Consensus
CPP:	Convention People's Party
DAM:	Democracy Advance Movement
DAs:	District Assemblies
DFK:	Development Filosfas Kongress
DPN:	Democratic Party of Nigeria
EC:	Electoral Commission
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EGLE:	Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere
ERP:	Economic Recovery Programme

FEC:	Federal Executive Council
FMG:	Federal Military Government
GBA:	Ghana Bar Association
GDM:	Grassroots Democratic Movement
GDRP:	Ghana Democratic Revolutionary Party
GNPP:	Great Nigerian People's Party
GPP:	Ghana People's Party
HOR:	House of Representatives
INEC:	Independent National Electoral Commission
ING:	Interim National Government
IPSA:	International Political Science Association
KNRG:	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutinary Guards
KNWS:	Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society
MDJ:	Movement for Democracy And Justice
MGSP:	Mother Ghana Solidarity Party
MPS:	Members of Parliament
NAL:	National Alliance of Liberals
NAP:	National Advance Party
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCNC:	National Council of Nigeria And Cameroon
NCPN:	National Centre Party of Nigeria
NCS:	National Council of State
NDC:	National Democratic Congress
NECON:	National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
NEPU:	Northern Elements Progressive Union
NGP:	New Ghana Party

NIP:	National Independence Party
NLC:	National Liberation Council
NNA:	Nigerian National Alliance
NPC:	Northern People's Congress
NPP:	New Patriotic Party
NRC:	National Redemption Council
NSM:	National Solidarity Movement
NUGS:	National Union of Ghana Students
NUT:	Nigerian Union of Teachers
NWPP:	Nigeria Welfare People's Party
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
PAP:	People's Action Party
PAYC:	Pan African Youth Command
PB:	Political Bureau
PDCs:	People's Defence Committees
PDP:	People's Democratic Party
PFPP:	Popular Front Party
PHP:	People's Heritage Party
PMFJ:	People's Movement For Freedom And Justice
PNDC:	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP:	People's National Party
PP:	Progress Party
PPP:	People's Popular party
PRP:	People's Republican Party
SAP:	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDP:	Social Democratic Party

SMC:	Supreme Military Council
TFP:	Third Force Party
TRP:	Theocratic Restoration Party
TUC:	Trade Union Congress
UAF:	United Action Front
UDP:	United Democratic Party
UG:	Union Government
UGCC:	United Gold Coast Convention
UNC:	United National Congress
UNCP:	United Nigeria Congress Party
UNP:	United Nationalists Party
UPN:	Unity Party of Nigeria
UPP:	United People's Party
US:	United States
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTAG:	University Teachers Association of Ghana
YEAA:	Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha.

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1
CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

With the millennium drawing to a close and the commencement of the 21st Century around the corner, there is an urgent need for good governance on the African continent to ensure that she moves abreast with the community of continents in terms of development.

The spate of military intervention in Africa has put political transitions in the lime light. Consequently, political transitions in Africa, particularly in Nigeria and Ghana, have become integral part of the political process.

Political transition in this study is the process by which the military gradually disengages itself from governance in order to make way for a popularly elected civilian government. Pridham (1991: 5) aptly points out that broadly speaking democratic transition runs from the point at which previous authoritarian system begins to be dismantled, through the constituent phase of the new civilian democracy to its inauguration and early operation.

In the latter 1970s and 1960s Nigeria and Ghana pursued elaborate transitions to democracy respectively, which in effect amounted to disengagement from governance by the military. This same elaborateness has characterised current transitions in both countries (Olagunju et al 1993: 2-3). We therefore, have transitions from military rule to competitive party politics as was the case in Nigeria between 1975 and 1979 and again between

1985 and 1993 and in Ghana in the late 1970s and its return to civil rule in late 1992.

The ease with which the military intervene in politics is at variance with the difficulty with which most of them vacate the political scene. Only few military men would therefore drink from the honey pot of power and willingly relinquish the sweet killer (Daily Champion 1999: 14). Momah (1994: 20) succinctly states that since the first African coup d'etat in Egypt on 26th July, 1952, ninety-four other coups have as of 1994 taken place in Africa. To him therefore, in some cases the governments were coming and going faster than Elizabeth Taylor changes husbands. This same situation prompted Ronald Matthews (1966: 7) to remark that:

the life of an African Head of State or Premier could not be called a particularly secure existence as 1965 passed on its way.... It was rare for a quarter of an hour to pass without a new one (coup d'etat) hitting the headlines of the world press.

And by the end of the decade, that is by 1969, the great majority of African Nations that started out at independence with one form of democratic government or another had come under full-blown military dictatorship or some other variants of authoritarian rule (Adebayo Williams, 1995:69).

Transition from civil to military rule has always been sudden, swift and drastic whereas the reverse is often plagued with uncertainties, delays, postponements (Pridham, 1991: 5) and in extreme cases annulments even after elections have successfully been conducted.

Hardly had Nigeria taken her first coup pill in January, 1966 (Garba, 1982: 44; Mainasara, 1982:7; Momah, 1994: 2, Yusufu, 1999: 2) when Ghana too followed closely behind her (Owusu, 1970: 296, Gye Nyame, 1990:1, Momah 1994: 159). Ever since, the military have dominated the political scene of both countries. The effect of the oscillation of government between the military and civilians on the socio-political and economic development of both Nigeria and Ghana has been catastrophic since there is no continuity because of the tendency of succeeding governments to view whatever might have been put in place by the outgoing governments as mischievous.

Nigeria and Ghana were selected for analysis for several reasons. Aluko's work, "Ghana and Nigeria: 1957 - 1970 A Study In Inter-African Discord", provides considerable general information about the two states. Even though they are similar in several important respects, they are still dissimilar in others thereby providing a basis upon which differences in military and political transitions might be explained. Such variations, are pronounced in the system of government federalism and unitary. The major simulator is their location in the same sub-region on the African continent. Both were colonised by the same European power, the British, who bequeathed them with a common official language-English.

Consequently, these two countries were selected because our fore knowledge of their general character suggests that they are suitable for comparative research. This is because as pointed out above, they share both important similarities and differences

which facilitate the task of differentiating their approaches to transition to democracy.

A close examination of politics in post-independence Nigeria and Ghana reveals that, the military have had a preponderent edge over civilians in governance (Movement for Democracy and Justice, 1998: 2; Yusufu, 1999:2, Aye, 1997:3; Obasanjo, 1999 Network News, Jaji) . And as if by design, the coup which ushered the second coming of Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana, was staged on 31st December, 1981 while General Buhari too staged his on 31st December, 1983. Several attempts to consolidate budding democracy in Nigeria and Ghana have been thwarted by the military who have a perverted notion about it: for them any form of corruption, crisis, rigging of elections, disagreement among the opposition, demonstrations...amounts to breakdown of law and order. And rather than pursue the restoration of order within a democratic framework they see military coup as the most convenient alternative (Thisday, May 2, 1999:12-13).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study therefore is an examination of the nature and pattern of the military and political transition in Nigeria and Ghana concentrating mostly on the socio-political and economic factors which have overwhelming influence on the success or failure of political transitions in these two West African countries. Narrowing the problem down therefore, the following questions will be addressed by this study:

- (i) Why has it been difficult for the military in

Nigeria and Ghana to initiate and execute any political transitions successfully?

- (ii) Does the ambition of an incumbent have any impact on political transition?

As Mills (1971: 198) observes about African Society and which equally applies to the countries under study, since the intrusion of the military into the politics of Nigeria and Ghana, they (the military) have increasingly become influential among their political colleagues. Some professional soldiers have stepped out of military roles into other high realms of Africa life. Others while remaining soldiers, have influenced by advice, information and judgement the decisions of men who are powerful in political matters.

Since the attainment of independence, there has been a power game between the military and political elites in civil society.

The political elites fought for and won political independence for both Nigeria and Ghana in 1960 and 1957 respectively.

With the attainment of independence however, the usual means of changing governments in both Nigeria and Ghana has been through coups d'etat. Consequently, military intervention has become endemic in the political history of both countries. Generally, it can be pointed out that in most tropical African countries, the post-independent era has been marred by substantial political turbulence (World Politics, 1963, Jan.: 296).

The military have become such a force to reckon with in the politics of Nigeria and Ghana that they cannot be ignored.

Alubo (1999: 12) attests to this by pointing out that:-

these frequent coups are explained by the unconstitutional role the military has arrogated to itself as messiahs and political watch dogs in the exercise of which the military are the defacto rulers.

That the military have become a third force in the domestic struggle for power cannot be denied. Mills (1971:200) said as men of power, some develop quite arrogant and others quite shrewd drives to influence enjoying as a high value the exercise of power.

The political transitions chartered by the military in both countries have been tortuous and uncertain. Mills (1971: 201) aptly points out that as politics gets into the army, the army gets into politics.... and the military is being made political.

Military intervention is considered an aberration (Yusufu, 1999: 2-3, Obasanjo, 1999: Network News), therefore the need for political transition especially from military regimes to civilian ones cannot be over-emphasized. In the contemporary world, dictatorial and autocratic regimes are isolated and particularly aid donors tie aid to the type of government in power especially in third world countries like Nigeria and Ghana. The way the military packages and implements its political transition programme has a tremendous impact on the nature and character of its successor civilian regime.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of our study are:-(i) To establish a relationship between the military interest and the outcome of political transitions.

(ii) To explore some of the problems associated with the military and political transitions in Nigeria and Ghana. To present a systematic empirical analysis between the military and political transition in Nigeria and Ghana thereby making both substantive and methodological contributions to military and political transition in Africa.

1.4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The importance of the study of the military and political transition in Africa, most especially, in Nigeria and Ghana cannot be over-emphasized for the following reasons:-

First and foremost, the messianic missions of the military have distracted the successful evolution of sustainable democracy, in both countries. There is therefore a strong correlation between military intervention and the epileptic nature of democracy in Nigeria and Ghana.

Next this study will help in charting and promoting an acceptable course for political transitions by pointing out the shortcomings of previous ones in both countries.

Also this work will make available for the first time reading materials on military and political transitions in Nigeria and Ghana in a single text. As at now, there is no single area to which a scholar of military and political transitions can turn to for ready access to all the documentation in the field and this research provides the answer to that. Having paid attention to

minute details, it is our credo that this modest effort of ours will arm the student who may for instance like to study both countries concurrently or discretely.

Besides, it is our intention that an analysis of this nature will establish and highlight the relationship between the military and political transition. It also responds to the call by previous researchers on the need for greater and more indepth analysis of the military and political transitions in Africa.

Finally a good and stable government is one of the basic and fundamental ingredients of sustainable development. It is therefore, hoped that highlighting the ills of military intervention, this study will provide the panacea for good governance and if not completely deter the military from dabbling into politics of both countries will at least minimize it.

1.5 MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRANSITION: A THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION

This study is carried out within the ambit of the power theory.

An obvious aspect of political life is the struggle for and exercise of political power and influence in society (Nnoli, 1986: 3). McCord and McCord (1977 XV) put it more bluntly that wherever people have lived together, one of their primary concerns has been the relative distribution of resources power has always been accorded some people in every group.

Since the military had a taste of political power, there has been a conflict relationship between what "THISDAY" (August 30,

1998:11) describes as political soldiers and political elites in civil society thereby resulting in a power game between the two. Political soldiers can be described as those military officers who have held one political position or the other. These positions could range from the Head of State or Government Administrator, Governor, Secretary or Minister, Ambassador/High Commissioner, District Chief Executive etc.

Having once tasted state power, these political soldiers arrogate to themselves sentinels of governance, so that any time, the political elites falter, they intervene as messiahs accusing the political elites of social ills such as bribery, corruption, nepotism, economic, mismanagement etc.

Since the military have the monopoly over the instrument of coercion, they capitalize on the least opportunity to overthrow an incumbent civilian regime in a coup d'etat. The political elites in civil society knowing fully well that the traditional role of the military is to defend the territorial integrity of the state relentlessly fight back to gain political power of the state as Russell (1940: 99) aptly points out that superior strength is to be found out on the side of the government. The African State can be interpreted as being strong.

In most cases since it is the government that distributes wealth, the military having tasted state power find it difficult to relinquish it by themselves. Consequently, there is a serious conflict between the military and political elites in civil society.

The problem of the study revolves round the struggle for political power between the military and political elites; consequently, power theory is the most appropriate conceptual framework.

Much has been written on power theory because the concept of power is today enjoying revival (Urry and Wakefield, 1973: 1). A lot of work on power theory however, has been on the relationship among/between nations. Since the struggle for power in this context is between groups within the state, the study is going to concentrate on the domestic use of political power.

Before delving into the various proponents of power theory, a few definitions of the concept will suffice. Winter (1973: 2) however, cautions that:-

the word power has acquired many and conflicting meanings that using power as a superficial explanation of everything may in the end mean nothing.

According to Roderick (1977: 36) power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will without resistance, regardless of the basis on which probability rests. Isaak (1981: 18) on the other hand conceives power as the idea of people or groups competing for scarce values with some of them influencing the behaviour of others/and or outcome of decisions. Schultz (1958: 3-9) sees power operationally as the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things.

To Nettl (1969: 17) power is something that causes the

restructuring of action without altering preferences; you are made to do something irrespective of whether it is your preferred cause of action. Thus an act of power does not require an agreement; liking or preference; it merely requires performance. Nettl stretches his definition further by identifying a cardinal feature of power thus:

power is latent rather than manifest. It slumbers and hardly growls in its sleep, but can howl and bite painfully if aroused.

According to Aron (1962: 47) power is the capacity to do, make or destroy. To him, however, the power of a person, or of a collectivity is not strictly measurable because of the diversity of the goods chosen and the means employed An individual's power is his capacity to act but above all to influence the actions or feelings of individuals.

'Power', according to Morgenthau (1973: 28) is the mutual relation of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large. Expatiating this definition, he says that:-

Political power is psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.

Dahl (1957: 40; Roderick, 1977: 40) graphically illustrate the definition of power thus:

A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.

Roderick (1977: 37) quotes Blau's definition of power as the ability of one person or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of with

holding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment in as much as the former as well as the latter, constitute in effect a negative sanction.

Urry and Wakefield (1973: 2) also quoting Parson define power as a facility which enables the fulfilment of functions in and for society as a whole. It is the ability of one man to realise certain objectives against the wishes of another. In brief therefore, power is the over-riding of the wishes of another to realise certain objectives.

It must be borne in mind that there are two conceptions of power (1) power as the ability to influence other individuals and (2) power as the ability to influence collective decision making. It is towards the latter than our study will tilt, because on the seizure of power, the military not only influence but initiate policies that affect the state and the people within.

One of the earliest proponents of power theory is Bertrand Russell (1940: 9) who asserts that the desire for power is one of the infinite desires of man. Illustrating this assertion, he points out that:-

When a moderate degree of conflict is asserted, both individuals and communities will pursue power rather than wealth; they may seek wealth as a means of power or they may forgo an increase in wealth in order to secure an increase in power. Those who most desire for power are broadly speaking those most likely to acquire it.

Put differently in 'This Day' (January 10, 1999: 4) , the will to acquire poweris inherent and natural to man.

Hans Morgenthau (1973) even though, concentrated much on power among nations, something useful can be extracted from one of his major works, Politics Among Nations, for our purpose. He identifies three sources of the impact of power as the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages and the respect of love for men and institution. Of the different types of power distinguished by Morgenthau, two have a bearing on our study: legitimate power and illegitimate or naked power. The former he points out has a better chance to influence the will of its justification for its existence while the latter in short cannot be justified.

He further points out that the basis of all domestic politics is the interplay of the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages.... in ever changing combinations. The struggle for power is an indispensable aspect of human experience and Morgenthau (1973: 34) aptly puts it thus:

it is sufficient to state that the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. (Consequently, he advises that) it would be useless and even self destructive to free one or the other of the peoples of the earth from the desire for power while leaving it extant in others.

He made a vital point by asserting that though it is true that certain social arrangements and institutions have always existed in the past, it does not necessarily follow that they may always exist in the future. The tendency to dominate in particular, is an element of all human association like the defense of an established power position against the attempt to establish a new one.

Elucidating further on power, Morgenthau (1973: 9) stresses that power may compromise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.

Similarly, Bull and Holbraad (1978: 144) emphasize on important dimension of power. Putting it succinctly they point out that it is the nature of power to expand. Quoting from Lord Acton, they further assert that:-

This law of the modern world that power tends to expand indefinitely and..... will transcend all barriers until met by superior forces.

To Markonitz (1977: 17) therefore the struggle for power never really comes to an end.

Chatterjee (1980:16), and Nnoli (1986: 13), have cautioned that power should be used in relational sense. Here in our study, the actors are the military and political elites in civil society. The bone of contention being the seizure, control and consolidation of state power. This was concurred by Presthus (1964: 57) thus:-

men are powerful in relation to other men.... The power of any given individual is in large measure as a result of his ability to manipulate a larger system. The power of the individual must be structured in associational cliques or institutional patterns to be effective.

The achievement of particular objectives by one actor will almost always involve.... power by some other actors whether by threat or promise of rewards. (Chatterjee,1980:14). Similarly

Nnoli (1986: 13) highlighted the relational influence of power by pointing out that: there must be two individuals or classes for power to occur. The one who exerts power is the subject of power and the one over whom power is exerted is the victim of power. Consequently, during liberal democracy when civilians are in control of state power the military become the victims while the civilians became the subjects of power. The reverse is obtained during military dictatorship.

Nnoli (1986: 7) identifies three main characteristics in his definition of politics; seizure of state power, consolidation of state power and the use of state power. Expanding further on the above he points out that:

By seizure of state power we mean the coming into position of dominance in the society of a new ruling class. The nature and interest of this class become the motive force for the re-organisation of the entire socio-economic, political and cultural relations in the society.

In post-independence Africa, the military having the monopoly of force in the state can seize state power at will. TELL (June 28, 1998: 48) stresses that they (the military) arrogate to themselves the prerogative of dictating the acceptable and unacceptable standards of political behaviour among politicians.

The next step after the seizure of state power is its consolidation (Nnoli, 1986: 7). Nnoli uses the seizure of state power by the colonialists to illustrate his point. It is pertinent to exemplify in this study that once the military seize power, most parts of the constitution of that particular country concerned are suspended, (Galadima, 1998: 117, Newswatch Jan. 20,

1986) , Parliament dissolved and the Head of State or Government dismissed from office.

Having thus dismantled the status quo, the nouveaux ruling class, the military, attempt to consolidate their power base by expanding their cultural, economic and social influence in society. This is usually accomplished through the expansion of the population who benefit materially from the system and therefore have a vested interest in protecting and promoting it.

In Nigeria and Ghana, for instance, for the military to consolidate their hold on society, they co-opt members from civil society into their fold by offering political appointments to civilians. With regards to Ghana, the Provisional National Defence Council (1981-92) went a step further by setting up paramilitary structures, (the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs).

With the seizure and consolidation of state power accomplished what follows is its use. Nnoli (1986:11) emphasizes the point that: Once state power is sufficiently consolidated, it is used first and foremost for the benefit of the ruling class.... whether or not any interest will be pursued by the application of state power is totally dependent on the wishes of the prevailing ruling class as decided by the decision-making agency, the government.

Here classical illustration may be the decision of the military ruling class to ban certain politicians from holding public office and participation in politics (Newswatch, December 30, 1991: 25) to set up special tribunals to try people, to

confiscate assets and to privatize and commercialize certain public corporations.

This has prompted Nnoli (1986: 12-13) to give his verdict that:-

At the domestic level, the use of state power even if less obvious than external affairs is more pervasive ... State power is also used to distribute resources in the society because it can also be used to affect the pattern of incentives in the society and therefore, for consolidating state power. If the rulers want more activities in the rural areas than in urban areas and vice visa.

To Makovitz (1977: 16) leaders in a position of great power exercise unilateral control of the inhabitants' opportunities in life.

Moore (1958: 23) observes that at least there are three types of situations that serve to initiate an active search for political power and political centralisation. The first and simplest is the case in which a society undertakes some new set of activities, that by their very nature require a high degree of central co-ordination. A second and much more complex case, occurs when either external shock or internal decay produces a movement for forced re-integration of a society behaviour. The third type.... is found where the rulers of one segment of a loosely ordered system gradually expand their control over the whole system or a substantial part of it. He cautions however, that in the analyses of the evolution of power none of these three may be found in its purest form since there are cases where all these factors are intertwined with one another.

Stretching his explanation further, he asserts that all groups and individuals who seek power are discontented about some aspect of society in which they live. In many cases, the discontentment merely reflects the fact that one person wants power when another person happens to have it.

He further maintains that the creation of doctrine which provides an explanation of what is wrong with the current state of affairs and what should be done to correct this state lies with individuals who seek power.

To Moore (1958: 15) therefore, power is an instrumental value, something that is sought not in its own right but to obtain something else. Very rapidly however, power tends to become an ultimate value. The very fact that power is such a vital instrument in the pursuit of the many other values tends to transform it, in the course of its acquisition from a mere instrument to an end in itself.

McCord and McCord (1977: 72) deviating from the Weberian conception of power point out that power is the differential ability of people to command the obedience of others, to influence them or to secure a high proportion of the resources of their society. Consequently, politically powerful people usually attain wealth and high status. Similarly Dornhoff (1978: 9) regards the person who has power as one who gets how much from the system. And that those who acquire the most goods, services and opportunities are those who have the most power.

To Mills (1956: 9) the powerful are those who are able to realise their will, even if others resist it. No one,

accordingly, can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance powerful.... Not all power, it is true, is anchored and exercised by means of such institutions, but only within and through them can power be more or less continuous and important.

Mills (1956: 10) then emphasizes the point that the political apparatus also opens and closes many avenues to wealth.

The military try to intrude into politics because to have power requires access to major institutions and to have access to these major institutions requires the control of state power, since Ohwona (1991:521) points out that it is at the level of the state that actual political activity takes place.

Putnam (1976: 4) argues that essentially people fall into two groups: those who have significant political power and those who have none. Social goods are distributed by those who possess political power. Consequently, when the military are in power they decide as to what percentage of social goods should be made available to civil society and the tables turn when the political elites are in power. Power over people is often a means to achieve power over outcomes.

The relationship between the military and the political elites in civil society is succinctly brought to light by Dahl (1961: 89) who points out that:-

any group that feels itself badly abused is likely to possess both the resources it needs to halt the abuse and incentive to use these resources at a high enough level to bring about changes.

Political power is made up of several elements: (Wealth, skills, productive capacity), coercive power (control of the army and other security forces, control of public sector, international standing..... (Maphai, 1996: 72).

Power is likened to the proverbial ostrich that would bury the head of its holder in the sand of illusion against the reality of imminent danger (Daily Champion July 7, 1999: 14) .

Winter (1973: 4-5) argues that power over things is of interest in this context only in so far as it leads to social power which to him is the ability or capacity of one person, O to produce (consciously or unconsciously) intended effects on the behaviour or emotions of another person P.

To Howard and Fox (1962: 47) power is the capacity to do, make or destroy. Expatiating on this they argue that the power of a person or of a collectivity is not strictly measurable, because of the diversity of the goals chosen and the means employed. The fact that fundamentally, men apply their power to their fellow creatures gives the concept its true political significance. They conclude their argument by pointing out that:-

an individual's power is his capacity to act,
but above all to influence the actions or
feelings of other individuals.

From the analysis above, the appropriateness of the power theory as a conceptual framework for comprehending transition to civil rule is apparent. However the suitability of the theoretical consideration to the research problem can further be highlighted as follows:

First the theory explains the struggle for power between the military and political elites in post independence Nigeria and Ghana. As observed earlier, since it is the government that distributes wealth, the military having tasted power and been in charge of deciding "who gets what, when and how' find it difficult to voluntarily relinquish it. There is consequently a serious power game between the two.

Next, power theory greatly helps us to understand the behaviour of those in power be they military or civilians. As Morgenthau (1973:9) explicitly states that power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.

Finally our theoretical consideration takes an encompassing view of relationship between those who exercise power and those over whom it is exercised by stressing that the political apparatus opens and closes many avenues to wealth (Mills, 1956:10). Consequently, most of the transitions to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana have failed because of the desire of the military to dominate the state political apparatus and thereby, have power over civilian politicians. They do this by either hanging on to power for long or in situations where they quickly hand power to civilians, they hardly allow these civilian politicians to settle down before they are overthrown again.

1.6 PROPOSITIONS

It is proposed for this study that:

- (i) Most political transitions in Nigeria and

Ghana are characterized by the desire of the military to remain in power.

(ii) The greater the degree of the influence of the military in the transition process, the lesser its chances of success.

iii) Transition from military to civil rule will succeed if only the architects are sincerely committed to it.

(iv) Transition from military to civil rule will succeed if there is an alternative political elite the military want to hand over power to.

1.7 SOURCE OF AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Our study spans through four decades analysing the relationship between military rule and transition to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana. The study relies essentially on secondary sources of data. The choice was based in the credo that the military leaders and the civilian appointees involved in the transition programmes highlighted in the study had already made their views and opinions recorded in the print and electronic media.

Data collected were therefore from secondary sources which included official publications of Nigeria and Ghana governments such as government white papers, speeches of the Heads of State and Government , and IMF Reports.

Other sources consulted included several books and articles and journals and unpublished theses on transition to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana. Besides lots of dailies, and weeklies

including foreign periodicals also served as source of data.

Two major libraries, Kashim Ibrahim Library and Balme Library in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Nigeria and the University of Ghana, Legon respectively, were visited during the study. Also other departmental and faculty libraries in Ahmadu Bello University and University of Ghana, Legon were consulted. The British Council in Kaduna, Nigeria, readily made data relevant to the research available. The contents of the various materials were systematically analysed. Tables were also drawn to facilitate the presentation and analysis of the data.

1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

The scope of the study has three components: time, area and issue.

The time period of the study spans for four decades, from 1960 to 2000. This research is covering such a long period to enable us do justice to it. The starting point, 1960 is aptly described as 'Africa's Year of Emancipation'¹ since most African countries, including Nigeria, shook off the shackles of colonialism that year. Ghana had earlier on in 1957 attained her political independence and become a Republic in 1960. It is also from that year, 1960, that we begin to talk about the emergence of officer corps in the military and African political elites characterizing African self-rule as distinct from those of colonial types in both Nigeria and Ghana. The period also captures the major transitions to civil rule in both countries. After the military intervention in Nigerian politics in 1966, it took thirteen years before they

handed over power to a civilian administration in 1979. In Ghana on the other hand, the military hung on to power from that same year, 1966 to 1969, a period of only three years. As if to compensate for their brevity of stay in power, Ghana's military struck again in 1972 and this time around stayed a little longer till 1979 when the mantle of leadership was handed over to the civilian regime under Dr Hilla Limann. In Nigeria too, the military did not allow the seed of democracy sowed in 1979 to thrive as they swung back to action again in 1983 and stayed in power till May, 1999. In Ghana, the last transition from military to civil rule was in 1992 and the first ever transition from civilian to another civilian government which though not within the context of the study was in December, 2000.

Geopolitically, the study covers two countries, Nigeria and Ghana, in the West African sub-region. Both countries were colonized by the British and consequently bequeathed them with a common official language, English. The political elites in both states worked assiduously in the National Congress of British West Africa for political emancipation of West Africa. They attended similar higher institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Their military also have a common experience having served in the West African Frontier Force. Their officers too attended similar training institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States.

On the attainment of independence, both states adopted the parliamentary system of government. Owing to its size, Nigeria is

thus: Transitions in Southern Europe, South America and Africa.

Chapter Three highlights the various military brokered transitions in Nigeria viz, The Mohammed/Obasanjo Transition and the Babangida/Abacha Transition programmes.

In Chapter Four too, we critically analyse the various transition programmes in Ghana as follows:- Afrifa/Ankran's, and Acheampong/Akuffo/Rawlings Transition and finally transformation of Rawlings from military to civilian president.

Chapter Five draws a comparison between the military and transition in Nigeria and Ghana bringing out the similarities and differences.

Finally, Chapter Six comprises the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

A GLOBAL VIEW OF TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVIL RULE: A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

The democratic wind blowing across the globe in the 1990s did not leave Africa behind. Dele Olowu et al (1995: IX) aptly put it that it is arguable that democracy constitutes both the main buzzword and activity of these times. Stretching this point further they observe that:-

despite the seemingly detached profile of the African continent from the main stream of these global currents, the continent has been drawn into the vortex of the democratic fervent at both empirical and theoretical levels. In the former context, the continent is going through an upsurge that is reminiscent of the heady fifties and sixties when the colonialists had to beat a hasty retreat.

Even though there is a drought of indepth study of military and transition to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana, a lot has however, been written discretely in the form of commentaries, articles, views/opinions in the dailies, weeklies, journals on both countries about the subject. The approach to be adopted for this review of related literature is geo-political. Consequently, there will be a global look at transitions to civil rule in Southern Europe, Latin America and later narrow it down to Africa dwelling specifically on Nigeria and Ghana the geo-political focus of our study. Southern Europe and Latin America were chosen because they, like majority of the countries on Africa, have experienced military coups d'etat and consequently, have planned and executed transitions to civil rule as both countries under study.

2.2 Democratization in Southern Europe

Studies on transitions to civil rule are best-epitomised by Pridham (1991) in his book, 'Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe.' In the book, some of the contributors took a general look at transitions to civil rule in the Southern European Sub-region while others also examined military transitions to democracy country by country. To the former group belongs White head (1991) who wrote copiously on 'Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Perspective.' He identified two main factors which might lead to transition to democracy, viz: internal and external. His contention is that even though the latter is potent, the former takes pre-eminence. The section of his contribution which has a bearing on our study is where he points out that:-

internal processes likely to trigger a disintegration of the authoritarian coalition typically include..... institutional shifts within the Armed Forces involving a return to barracks in order to protect institutional integrity. (Whitehead, 1991:15).

Much as Whitehead dissected the various factors which could lead to transition from an authoritarian rule, with reference to the military, he failed to point out from which officer corps the desire to return to barracks might emanate, and whether such calls are welcome especially by the ruling military elite. Besides, his contribution lacks substance by not substantiating his statement with examples from specific countries. A leaf however, can be borrowed from his observation that the European Community (EC) , now European Union (EU), played a vital role in the process of

transition to civil rule in Southern Europe. Drawing a lesson from the foregoing, neither the regional body of Organization of African Unity (OAU) nor the sub-regional body of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) performs such a role. In fact military dictators are proud to be Chairmen of these organisations.

Writing on Portugal's transition to democracy, Opello, Jr (1991:84) graphically traces the overthrow of the dictatorship established by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1932 by a group of young military officers called the Armed Forces Movement (AMF) in 1974. Even though as expected during the Cold War, and with the strategic position of Portugal to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Opello Jr. 1991: 87), the West tried against all odds to keep Portugal within its ambit. It is therefore, clear from what Opello put forward that these young military officers who took over power did not have any political ambitions for according to him:-

within two years of the golpe de estado a West European-style pluralism democracy had been established.

This characteristics is at variance with those exhibited by the military in Africa who are known for their sit-tightism.

On their own part Verney and Caloubis (1991) concentrate on Greece's transition to democracy in the mid-1970s. Having traced Greece's turbulent history from 1909 to 1974 they quote Stepon (1986: 76-78) who put Greece in the category of 're-democratisation led by military-as-institution. As can be discovered later in this study, the transitions in both Nigeria

and Ghana are initiated by the military with the catalyst provided

by the political elites in civil society. They point out that several factors militated against the colonels' government. Prominent among them is the u-turn made against the regime by King Constantine who launched an abortive counter-coup on 13th December, 1967. Besides, the regime failed to secure the support or even the acquiescence of any of Greece's major parties movements or political figures. Being the custodians of the instruments of coercion, the military are want to depend upon military might as exemplified in the handling of the students sit-in at the Athens Polytechnic. It should be borne in mind that the military in Nigeria and Ghana are not exception. The Abacha government used military might to suppress pro-June 12th demonstrations in Lagos while in the same vein student demonstrations were violently suppressed by the PNDC government of Jerry Rawlings. Verney and Coulumbis put it on record that any examination of the Greek transition must refer to Karamanli's key role as transition manager. They elaborated these contributions as his withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO, his reconciliatory policies toward the dramatis parsonae of the military, he did not want to seek vengeance and this should not be interpreted to mean a weakness on his part or that he condoned the atrocities of the military. Others include his pacific foreign policy towards Turkey and his ability to rally support behind him in the crucial first weeks of the transition. Finally, it was largely Karamanli's personal crusade which ensured Greek's European Community (EC) entry in 1981.

Like other contributors, Story and Pollack (1991) studied Spain's transition from personal dictatorship of General Franco to a constitutional monarchy of King Juan Carlos. Spain's strategic position to the Western Powers as Portugal's, made the NATO get concerned about the type of government to emerge there. Being the era of the Cold War, the United States (US) also did not want to lose grounds to the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) . As with all dictators, General Franco made it his own to delay the crucial decision on his succession as long as possible. Physical decline, however, compelled General Franco to nominate Prince Juan Carlos as his successor. It was Carlos who eventually completed Spain's transition to constitutional monarchy.

Karaosmanoglu (1991) writing on "Democratic Transition in Turkey, commended the military for the fact that even though there have been three military interventions in the political process (1960, 1971 and 1980) , in none of them was the aim of the military the establishment of an authoritarian regime. In a sense therefore, it is possible to discern a degree of convergence between Karaomanoglu and Opello both of whom point out that neither in Turkey nor in Portugal respectively was the intention of the military to perpetuate themselves in power. Karaosmanoglu points this out vividly by observing that all the military interventions had civilian-oriented character and they were regarded by the military as necessary to preserve rather than abrogate the country's democratic institutions. The military therefore, has acted as the guardians of the secular state as well as defenders of democracy. The Turkish army adopts this attitude to politics

because Karaosmanoglu points out that it is highly professional with emphasis on external defence mission.

This point of the military's disinterest in politics in Turkey is concurred by Lombard! (1997) who also points out that military leaders have sought to avoid:

any measure of association with partisan politics fits well with the image of its own place in Turkish society. Enjoying broad public support, the armed forces clearly have nothing to gain by becoming involved, except in most exceptional situations, with the questionable antics of daily political life (Lombard! 1997: 210) .

2.3 Transition to Civil Rule in Latin America

Writing generally on 'The Transition to Authoritarian Electoral Regimes in South America' Petras and Vieux (1994: 5) put it thus:

the transition from military to civilian regimes has bought the introduction of electoral processes, the establishment of electoral parliaments or congresses, and, in some cases greater individual freedom, but these regimes have continued to function within an authoritarian institutional framework and to pursue policies totally at variance with democratic procedures. These regimes practice many of the same institutional policies and political processes began under the military.

It can therefore, be discerned that unlike what pertains in Southern Europe where transition from military to liberal democracy was a complete break from the status quo, from Central America to Chile, the change from military to civilian regimes has been characterized by the continuity of the authoritarian state structures and personnel of the military dictatorship. Put differently, transition from military to liberal democracy is nothing but mirage since a viable democracy depends upon citizens'

feeling free to exercise their rights without intimidation by regime or state power holders. The foregoing condition, Petras and Vieux point out, is absent in Latin America. They argue further that the civilian governments have acquiesced to the power configuration of the military and in most cases have sought to use authoritarian structures to strengthen their position against democratic social movements. They caution that it is a fundamental error to confuse transition to an electoral regime with transition to democracy.

Green (1994) makes similar observation by pointing out that despite the successful transition to democracy, the authoritarian structures developed by Vargas remains in place.

A striking feature about Schuyler's contribution is his pessimism about transition to civil rule in Venezuela. He opines that the initial euphoria which welcomed Venezuela's transition to democracy when her people overthrew the brutal ten-year dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez died down because 35 years later, the people are impoverished and the government burdened with debt, an inefficient economy and political turmoil. An important feature of Venezuela's transition to liberal democracy is the key role played by the business leaders and this was vividly highlighted by Schuyler who aptly points out that business leaders not only work through electoral procedures and political parties, but also enjoy privileged direct access to decision making to achieve their goals.

Schmitter (1976) commenting on transition to democracy in Latin America posits that to the stereotype mind, military rule is

virtually synonymous with political activity in Latin America.

Rouguie (1973) on his part stretching Schmitter's observation further points out that in Latin America the army intervened in politics as a unit and as an institution, therefore, these were coups d'etat and not pronouncements in favour of a daring general or a popular colonel. That being the case, these architects of the coups d'etat did not have the intention of leaving politics so soon. Rejecting elections and rapid return to constitutional normalcy, those responsible for these regimes set their goals more or less precisely and intended to give themselves enough time to reach them. Rouguie's observation about the military in especially those colonies formerly under Spanish rule contrasts sharply with those of Southern Europe, especially Turkey where to retain professionalism, the army intervenes in politics to, as it were clean the Aegean stable and quickly retreat to barracks. Even though Rouguie wrote extensively on transition to democracy in Latin America, he failed to establish the relationship between the long intervention in politics and their professionalism.

Commenting on transitions to civil rule in Latin America Johnson (1964: ix) posits that it cannot be assumed that the armed forces will withdraw from politics until civilians evolve a stable, organised institutions and provide responsible leadership capable of pursuing solutions to the problems of the republics.

Left to McAllister (1961) alone, the military should confine themselves to their traditional roles and provide avenues from social mobility. Besides they should contribute to the transition

from traditional to modern societies through their work in constructing communication systems He however, abhors the situation where generals have employed the forces entrusted to them to make themselves heads of state. The most striking feature of his work is the differentiation among the various civil-military relations as follows:-(i) The Praetorian state (ii) The Gendarmism State (iii) The Garrison State, and (iv) The Civilized State.

The first one to him is characterised by frequent intervention of the military in politics for non-military purposes. It must be pointed out here that to this category should be included the long stay of the military in power. As it is with the case of Nigeria and Ghana, even though there have not been lots of coups d' etat, (Nigeria 1966, 1975, 1993 (Agbese and Kieh 1992: 10-12), and Ghana 1966, 1972, 1981) the military have had an upper hand over their civilian counterparts in governance. The second is found in a situation where a single individual uses a mercenary army to make himself master of the state, imposes social and political order, tames the army and uses it as a gendarmery to maintain himself in power. The main feature of the third is the attempt of the military to militarize not only the state but society at large and the last one is where the ideal situation prevails in a liberal democracy - there is civil supremacy over the military. Even though Mc Allister's study is indepth, he should have elaborated ^{fc} the various transition programmes in Latin America.

Assigning reasons to the frequency of military intervention in Latin American Politics, the pair of German and Silvert (1961) assert that military intrusion in the political power structure always indicates... a relative inability of other social institutions to marshal their power effectively. They however, lost sight of the fact that some of these military incursions may be exported from outside and such may be beyond the powers of the social institutions within the country to avert them. This is to say that external forces may precipitate military intervention in the same way as pressure from the external environment may lead to the demise of a military regime. To restrict the military to barracks they recommend that:-

Latin American countries (should) develop sufficiently complicated power structures and a society sufficiently flexible and integrated (German & Silvert 1961:47).

How this was to be achieved however, was left hanging.

Any review of the literature on transition to democracy without Munck's (1989) work is incomplete. One of his major works titled 'Latin America: The Transition to Democracy' treats the subject in great detail. The most relevant to our study is the fourth chapter in which he painstakingly analyses the principal factors promoting transition to democracy or as he put it factors leading to 'the demise of the dictatorship.' Munck recommends that any critical analysis of transitions to democracy should not lose sight of the relative weight of economic, political and other factors in precipitating this dynamics. And that is exactly what he did in that chapter by putting the transitions to democracy in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile under the microscope.

Besides, he takes time to analyse the contributions of social movements, the labour movements, community movements and human rights movements in the demilitarization process. Much as his work is par excellence, he only mentioned the role played by the Church (most especially the Catholic Church) and students unions in passing. For the records to be straightened, it must be emphasized that these two movements played no small role in the transition to civil rule in Latin America.

2.4 Democratization in Africa

Decalo (1992) points out that pro-democracy pressures in the 1990s are continent wide and consequently no nation is likely to be spared. He was optimistic that there will be spill over effect in some multi-party countries. He describes the wind of democratisation blowing across Africa in the last decade of the 20th century as decolonization from domestic politically hegemonic groups and thus goes further to qualify this process as the second independence. Comparing the geopolitic regions of Eastern Europe and Africa, he hypothesizes:-

that the more African autocracies resembled in their features the discredited regimes in Eastern Europe, the greater the challenge from below for fatal change and a purge of the past.

He then points out that the military being autocratic in nature can in no way offer what they do not have. So his verdict is that the military have fared badly in the democratization sweep-stakes.

His treatment of the process of democratization in Africa though wide in scope is not detailed enough. For example about the

constitutional conference in Benin, how did the various opposition

groups bring down Mathieu Kerekou to his knees and why has Gnassingbe Eyadema been able to hold sway in Togo in the presence of stiff opposition?

On the significance of this political rebirth, Decalo is of the opinion that the new dispensation will provide space for more groups, more modes of political participation and representation than the narrow one of the past.

Among the scholars who have devoted their time and energy to research into transition to civil rule with Nigeria as the focal point is Sam Oyovbaire (1989) who edited ten essays in the "Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretive Essays" and one of the trio who authored "Transition to Democracy in Nigeria: 1985-1993." In the opening chapter of the "Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretive Essays," Sam Oyovbaire points out that the period between independence from colonial administration in 1960 and the military coup d'etat of January 1966, was one of democratic politics. His contention is based on the fact that the first republic was the child of competitive politics. It did not as it were "flow from the barrel of the gun." He gives his verdict that the military intervention of January, 1966 was a conclusive evidence of the dismal failure of democracy. Despite the fact that the major political parties which ushered in the First-Republic were regionally based, he cited instances to buttress the point that Nigerian leaders who emerged in the immediate post-independence era cherished democracy. His argument is that even though the military disrupted the process of

democratization, any time they did so, successive leaders of the military regimes affirmed the right of the country to popular rule and their intention to return to democracy. The indecision of Yakubu Gowon (1966: 75), Ibrahim B. Babandiga's (1985-93) feet dragging and the epileptic nature of Sani Abacha's (1993-98) transition debunks this position. It is Yakubu Gowon's desire to hold on to power that made Murtala Muhammed to overthrow the former's government. In Ghana too, Acheampong's unwillingness to relinquish power eventually led to the uprising of the junior officer' s of the Ghana Armed Forces which led to the collapse of SMC II under Akuffo.

Another contribution which has a bearing on our study isn Cyovbaire's aforementioned book, is by Olagunju (1989). Throwing the search light on Nigeria's Second Republic, he opines that the path to true democracy can only be chartered for Nigeria only when in the transition to democracy, the search for an effective mechanism is based on an understanding of Nigeria's social problems and the limits to which one can go without undermining the nation state which such solutions are intended to forge. It must be borne in mind that even though democracy is a universal concept each nation has to provide the necessary ethos for its survival.

Olagunju et al (1993) in their 278 page book, "Transition to Democracy in Nigeria." is perhaps one of the most detailed analysis of Ibrahim B. Babangida's aborted transition programme. Having briefly defined what is meant by transition, the trio proceeded to dissect Ibrahim B. Babangida's transition which they

described as grounded on Nigeria's economic, political and social

history. Then they took their time to throw light on the background to that transition programme in Chapter 3. The structures put in place like the Political Bureau, the Centre for Democratic Studies and MAMSER also received attention. On the report of the Political Bureau, they point out that it gave much more liberal and expansive interpretation to its mandate than was intended by the administration. Later developments like the annulment of the June 12th Presidential elections confirmed their fears that Babangida's transition programme had limitations by the idea of a time table with a fixed terminal date and which had to pass through what they described as political mine fields and troubled waters. They were reluctant to point out in clear terms that the incumbent had a "hidden agenda."

The importance of democracy to the over all development of a nation made Nigeria host the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Regional Conference on Democratization in Comparative Perspective in 1994. There was much brainstorming during the conference and the papers presented eventually culminated into a book of two volumes edited by Omo Omuruyi et al (1994) . Among the contributors, the paper presented by the pair, Ogbonna and Ofoeze (1994) is relevant to our study. They open their paper by stating without mincing words that Africa was then in a grip of change that it did not author and (consequently) cannot direct it. They thus attribute the cause of the wave of democratization sweeping across the African continent in the 1990s ^ to external forces without paying attention to internal factors

especially, the role played by the internal opposition political elites. Agreed that external factors play a dominant role in democratization especially in developing countries but it must also be remembered that internal forces must be able to direct and control it to suit local conditions. An important point they made and which must be taken seriously for democracy to hold sway in Africa is the weakness of civil society.

Speaking on the topic, "conditions for the success of Democracy in Africa", Essis (1994), points out that there is nothing like perfect or universal democracy. Her contention is buttressed by the fact that even in Athens, the cradle of modern democracy, it excluded women, instituted death penalty for magistrates who fell short of their duties (and) wanted to create ostracism i.e. exile -the ban of any Athenian whom the Republic judged undesirable. She then proceeds further to highlight what she describes as the constraints of democracy thus:-

Universal Adult suffrage, the legal state and scrupulous respect of Human Rights. (On the incessant intervention of the military into African Politics she has this to say) : the raid of the military on the African Political has been frequent these three decades and pustches have been the order of the day everywhere.

Identifying a problem is one thing and proffering solution to it is another. Essis has done well by pointing out the periodic adventures of the military into politics, but how to keep them out of it was left hanging. This is one of the justifications for this study.

The main thrust of Osaghae's (1994) paper titled "Sustaining Democratic Stability in Africa: The Moral Imperative" is the

identification of two factors working against successful democracy

in Africa viz the negative perception of politics and the legitimacy crisis. Besides he echoed the wading of the military into African political waters by pointing out that in many of the countries in Africa, the only real alternative to the party in power is the military. Osaghae therefore, does not see beyond the domestic environment as being a threat to democracy. Democratic stability and economic stability go *pari passu*. And this is a fact which Osaghae lost sight of. A sound economic base is a *sine qua non* for a sustainable democracy and vice versa.

"Africa in the New World Order" is the topic of Olushola's well-researched paper. In it, he describes democratization as one of the issues relevant to the plight of African States in recent times. And unlike Osaghae, Olushola goes further by trying to equate democratization process to an enduring economic development and that this is so central to the determination of the future trends on the continent. Consequently, he advises that democracy has to be a well structured and thoroughly laid out programme of social and political restructuring. According to him, this is one of the reasons why democratization and economic resuscitation go hand in hand. He feels that African countries must regress into authoritarianism because the political leadership are not really ready in the first instance (P. 103) . Stretching the point further, Olushola forges a linkage between democracy and foreign policy which eventually allows for peaceful conduct of international relations among states that comprise the international state system. He concludes his paper by asserting

that there could be no meaningful development in Africa without democracy... (since) democracy creates the enabling environment for the realisation of development objectives in a given country. Such a democracy however, must originate from outside but brewed from within the continent that could be of benefit to the generality of Africans. That democracy forges a healthy coexistence in the international system can be seen from the isolation of dictatorial regimes in the international system.

In the second volume of "Democratization in Africa" which now narrows the papers to "Nigerian Perspectives," Onuoha's (1994) contribution titled "Transition and Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical Debate," attempts to lay bare transition and democratization in Nigeria. Without any background of transition programmes in Nigeria, he expended his energy on Ibrahim B. Babangida's critically examining and analysing the structures put in place by the regime to implement the programme. His paper is rich with copious references. He points out that:-

having announced a five-year transition programme, the government established the Political Bureau which among other responsibilities was to draw up a comprehensive time table for a transition to a democratically elected government. (Onuoha, 1994:24)

In spite of the good ground work done by the government, Onuoha minces no words when he points out that the military by its very nature may not be able to institute democratic culture in Nigeria in spite of its efforts at the transition programme.

This contention collaborates what Decalo (1992) pointed out about the military but at variance with Oyovbaire's position that the military can pursue a democratic course.

Comparing the transition programmes of Mohammed/Obasanjo and Babangida, Ezeani (1992) and Igwe (1992) draw the parallels and similarities between the two. Igwe points out that both regimes employed similar institutions in executing their transition programmes viz setting up (i) Constitution Drafting/Review Committee (ii) Federal Electoral Body and (iii) Constituent Assembly. In terms of duration he observes that Babangida's package was more comprehensive, prolonged and complicated than Obasanjo's. Babangida's furthermore, transcends mere regime transformation from military to civilians and include measure aimed at structural changes in the socio-economic sectors of the economy. What both of them failed to point out was the "Maradonaic" nature of Babangida transition programme as he himself pointed out that his transition programme was a learning process which occasionally had to halt, take stock and then advance. In effect however, it was a ploy to buy time and if possible succeed himself. With Obasanjo, his immediate predecessor, Muhammed, had already promised not to stay in power longer than 1st October, 1979. He therefore, decided to keep strictly to that date since the military had then continuously been in power since January, 1966.

Ezeani (1992) on the other hand views the structures like a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), a Constituent Assembly (CA), a Federal Electoral Body (NEC), State Creation, rejection of socialism in favour of capitalism with skepticism. To him however, Babangida's transition programme is an improvement on the preceding one which he dubbed as "one second photo finish." The

end justifies the means. Even though Obasanjo's transition programme was rather short, it ended successfully while the longer more elaborate one planned by Babangida was nipped in the bud. Olatunji (1992) also traces the political history of Nigeria from independence through the conduct of National Assembly Elections of July 4, 1992. In addendum, he bared his mind on the advantages and disadvantages of the various party systems Nigeria had tried. Much as Olatunji's contribution was well researched, he failed to recommend the type of party-system suitable for Nigeria. Lack of continuity, contributes to the fragile nature of political parties in Nigeria.

On military intervention in Nigerian Politics, Nwabueze (1994) points out in his book, "Nigeria '93: The Political Crisis and Solutions," that all military coups are bad even when their object is to install a group of elected civilian politicians. His verdict therefore is that the take over of government by the military in a coup d'etat must remain a sad event. This is so because according to him, among other reasons, the seizure of the state by the military together with its sovereignty divorces the state from the people; setting it as a counter force against them and their true interest; worst still it involves a break in governmental legitimacy because it erodes the foundations of government and thus of the nation (Nwabueze, 1994 :vi) . The most important part of Nwabueze's detailed analysis of Nigeria's political crises of 1993, which is related to our study, is the 7th chapter titled, "Part played by various political actors in the Prolongation of the Crisis" where he points out that:-

we must salute them for what must be acknowledged as perhaps the greatest achievements in our political life as a nation ... that this is the only really effective means to keep the military out of government of this country (Nigeria) (Nwabueze, 1994: 10)

In their article entitled "Military Disengagement from Africa Politics: The Nigerian Experience, the duo of Agbese and Kieh (1992) stated that three main objectives propelled them to write the paper viz (i) Situating the Nigerian Programme of Military relinquishing of political power within the general literature of military disengagement from politics (ii) Reviewing the modalities and objectives of the 1992 Babangida transition programme and (iii) Investigating the possibility that the then on going transition programme of (1992) would establish foundations for enduring democracy. Having discussed the various models of military disengagement from politics, they proceeded to narrow it down to the Nigerian experience in the first and second republics. From their analysis, they conclude that the expectation that the 1992 transition would mark the final exit of the military from Nigerian Politics were largely unwarranted since to them the conditions which facilitated military coups in the past were still prevalent in Nigeria and besides, the Nigerian State, like her Ghanaian counterpart, remains the principal instrument for private capital accumulation and as such the military's monopoly over the instruments of violence gives them unsurpassed advantages over other groups in seizing political power. What missed the eyes of Agbese and Kieh is that even though the military is the sole repository of the instruments of force, given the proper

orientation they will always succumb to civil authority. The forces will not be directed against the state but be used for her preservation of her territorial integrity.

Another article which has a bearing on our study and one of the most academic and in depth study of democratization in Nigeria has been conducted by Akindele and Ajila (1942) and published in "Democratic Transition in Africa" edited by Caror et al (1992). Even though their research has a broad heading "Democratic Transition in Africa: A Psychological Perspective," going through it, one can stumble on issues bordering the current study. The rarity about their paper is that it discussed the psychological aspects of men which are indispensable to the affinity between democratic political transition in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. Administering questionnaires to randomly selected 1500 sampled subjects from the then thirty-states of the federation on the basis of 50 sampled subject per state and subjecting their data to both descriptive analysis and statistical test of significance using the null hypothesis, they concluded in their own words that their analysis up to that point shows that all four null hypotheses using male/female dichotomy are accepted at $P > 0.05$. At the end of it all, their contention and conviction is that the freedom of the Nigerian or African citizenry from the shackles of the military-civil rulership cycle or unstable political land scape is contingent on the rulership's internalization of the wherewithal of democratic transition, devoid of treating the governed as political robots whose past, present and future could be bargained at will. Good governance can

not by itself keep the military at bay, what they did not recognise is the need also for stable economy and alleviation of poverty.

Having analysed the literature on Nigeria, let's shift our attention to that of Ghana. The post-independence political scene in Ghana has witnessed three transition programmes. The first and foremost was the one which followed the collapse of the First Republic and which was piloted by Afrifa-led National Liberation Council (NLC) government. The period of transition was very brief: 1968 to 1969. The major structure set up to conscientize the citizenry was the Centre for Civic Education besides the National Electoral Commission. Next was Kutu Acheampong's ill-fated attempt at democratization from 1972 to 1978. Like his Nigerian counterpart, Babangida, Acheampong employed all sorts of manipulations against all odds to perpetuate himself in power. As a cover up, he tactically wanted to force a concept of diarchy which he dubbed "Nkabom Aban" (Union Government) . This was however, vehemently rejected by Ghanaians. Fred Akuffo who took over the reins of power from Achemapong in a palace coup was subsequently overthrown by Jerry John Rawlings in 1979. It was he, Rawlings, who eventually in that same year, completed the long transition programme set in motion by Acheampong since 1972.

Hilla Limann had hardly settled down when the military, spearheaded by Jerry Rawlings struck again on 31st December, 1991. Jerry Rawlings there upon set up the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) . He was therefore, on hand once more to organise his second democratic transition which this time around earned him

the ticket to Osu Castle, the seat of government, in Accra via the

people's mandate in the 1992 Presidential Elections.

On Ghana's democratization, something can be got from Gyimah-Boadi (1993) who pointed out in the "Ghana Under PNDC Rule," which he edited that unfortunately, little has been written about the PNDC regime, its policies and outcomes. The first chapter which he himself contributed is relevant to our study even though he overflogged the economic achievements of the regime. He rightly points out that initially the PNDC government did not envisage handing over power to a democratically-elected government because its major political moves, such as the decentralization programme, the search for a moral support base, the district level political reforms and the elections of 1988 and 1989 and the regional fora held in 1990 had all been part of the scheme by the PNDC to perpetuate its autocratic rule and to safeguard the economic programme. According to him therefore, if Ghanaians were likely to give partial credit to Jerry Rawling's PNDC regime for democracy what forces then prompted the PNDC government to join the democratic wagon travelling across Africa in the nineties? Like other transitions elsewhere, two factors: external and internal forced democratization on the PNDC government. Gyimah-Boadi failed to point out that the PNDC government was forced to not only accept IMF loan for economic recovery but also to open up its market. Internally, too the opposition breaking the culture of silence, "fought" the government on all fronts. The PNDC government was left with nothing but to loosen its grip and democratize.

Two articles on the Ghanaian Elections of 1992 in the "African Affairs," first published by Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas (1992) and a rebuttal by Mike Quaye (1995) , have direct bearing on our study. The former titled, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992," was a detailed analysis which traced the genesis of the process of democratization that eventually gave birth to the 1992 general elections which ushered Ghana into her Fourth Republic. According to them, even though up to November, 1992, Ghana's democratization was on the surface smooth, this might neither be attributed to the PNDC nor the opposition. They however, failed to point whom this 'smoothness' should be attributed to. In the latter article headed, "The Ghanaian Election of 1992: A Dissenting View," Mike Quaye (1995) seems to debunk some of the major arguments raised earlier by Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas as can be inferred from the opening paragraph where he points out that the other presentation seems rather pro-Rawlings, while his was to be considered as the other side of the coin, hoping (therefore) to paint a fuller picture of a crucial process of democratization in Africa. What comes out of the two articles is that while Jeffries and Thomas allot some space for Ghana's transition programme towards the Fourth Republic, Quaye concentrates solely on the 1992 elections.

Aryee (1997) is particularly concerned about the actual entrenchment of democracy in Ghana. Consequently, putting Ghana's 1996 General Elections under the microscope, he points out that:-

perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the 1996 elections is that democratic consolidation is significantly enhanced by elite consensus on the rules

of the game The fairness of any elections depends on two in-extricable linked conditions namely of the creation of a level playing field for the lawful activities of all political activities (and) the delinking of government affairs, personnel and resources from those of the ruling party (Aryee 1997: 20-21).

By implication therefore, what Aryee means is that there should be a total break of the government party from the state. The state should therefore, try to grant equal opportunities to both the ruling party and those in opposition. What pertains in Ghana is the near domination of the government-owned papers by the ruling party in election year.

Ninsin's (1989) introductory chapter titled "37 Years of Development Experiences" in the State Development and Politics in Ghana," which he jointly edited with Emmanuel Hansen, is relevant to our study. He briefly highlights Ghana's road to political independence which he describes as path breaking attainment of national sovereignty. To him political independence was achieved prematurely since then the country was, to all intents and purposes, backward politically, economically and socially. Going further, he points out that the colonial purpose of domination and exploitation hampered the growth of more fundamental organs necessary for institutionalizing a democratic life. The overall consequence of this was that the Ghanaian ruling class were unable to assert themselves to a position of effective political dominance. He then proceeds to illuminate Ghana's political and economic vicissitudes since 1957, dwelling more however, on the PNDC government from 1981 to 1992. The State was seen as the only avenue for capital accumulation especially for those he described

as "the nascent national bourgeoisie.

The working class people's confrontation with the PNDC was taken by Yao Graham (1989) in his paper titled "From GTP to Assene: Aspects of Industrial Working Class Struggles in Ghana: 1982-86." Initially, when the PNDC government took over the reins of power in 1981, it did not hide its anti-capitalist feelings. But its courtship (with the IMF) gradually developed into full blown love with the West. Graham consequently, points out that the government's policies and practices increasingly diverted from original promises and quietly the patriotic and democratic elements of the 1988 period were abandoned. The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) hit the working class hard and not only did it reduce their real incomes but their rights, the legitimacy of their interest and organization came increasingly under attack and neo-colonial economic policies were implemented with greater domination and vigour. Much as Graham's work is analytical, he failed to point out in clear terms that the end of the marriage between the working class and the PNDC seriously shook the foundations of the government. With pressure from external creditors and donors coupled with strong domestic opposition the PNDC had no option but to initiate a transition programme which led to Ghana's Fourth Republic in 1992.

An indepth study of the role of the military in the democratization process in Ghana's post-independence era was made by Eboe Hutchful (1973). In his thesis, titled ^Military Rule And The Politics Of Demilitarization In Ghana, 1966 - 69, he articulated the various processes the NLC went through before

eventually, handing over power to Dr Busia's P.P. government. He emphasized the initial over-reliance of the NLC Government on the Civil Service and pointed out that this problem was addressed through the establishment of Committees the most important of which was first and foremost the Economic Committee. Besides this, a Political Committee and a National Advisory Committee were set up. He also highlighted the dilemma usually faced by the military in their attempt to demilitarize and again provided a vivid account of the ethnic politics which nearly tore the NLC apart. His study is important because not only is it one of the earliest attempts at critically analysing the first post-independence transition programme in Ghana but it also brought to the fore that the military itself is not completely devoid of ethnic politics. Much as his work is detailed, little attention was paid to the transition itself. In our study, however, we shall re-examine Hutchful's position and go further to throw light on the various stages of subsequent transition programmes after his study.

Another thought-provoking and well-researched work on the contributions of the military towards the establishment of participatory democracy in Ghana is Mike Oguaye's (1992) thesis, 'The Military And Democracy In Ghana: A Case Study of the PNDC (with Special reference to Defence Committees And District Assemblies) 31 December 1981 - 1990, proceeding on the hypothesis that the military does not come to power in order to ensure democracy and that it is not the most appropriate institution for the attainment of democracy in Ghana, he utilized both primary and secondary sources of data to validate his hypothesis. Writing

extensively on the DCS which later metamorphosed into the CDRS and DAS, he pointed out that much as these were innovational institutions in the democratization process in Ghana, they could better pass for populist democracy than participatory democracy. Oquaye's study is useful in the sense that it enables policy makers to re-examine the role of the DAS to make them more beneficial to the communities they are situated in since they will promote grass-root democracy and the pool of the CDRS could also be fully integrated into the Ghanaian society. Oquaye's study as pointed out earlier is limited to the DCs, CDRS and the DAS while ours will examine the over all transition programme of the PNDC. The next chapter will critically analyse the various transition processes in Nigeria.

In this chapter, we reviewed the literature relevant to our study adopting the global approach. We pointed out that the military intervened in the politics of Southern Europe, especially, Portugal and Turkey without the intention of perpetuating themselves in power. The military in these countries found it expedient to preserve rather than abrogate the democratic structure there. Military rulers in Latin America on the other hand like to perpetuate themselves in power as dictators just as their counterparts in Africa. The military in Latin America too interrupted the democratic process as an institution and not by disgruntled elements within the army.

On transitions to civil rule in Africa in general, we pointed out that the democratic wind of change blowing across the globe is k so strong that Africa cannot be left behind. The literature on

transitions in Nigeria and Ghana were reviewed. It was however, observed that all previous works were limited to specific transitions programmes thus creating a lacunae for our study which takes a wholistic and comparative look at all the transition programmes within the time frame under study.

CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA: THE MILITARY AND TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Democracy is yet to find a fertile ground in Nigeria and the reasons are not far fetched. Nigeria's First Republic was terminated on January 15th, 1966. African Guardian, October, 1986:25; Garba, 1982:45). It was this singular act that ushered the military into the Nigerian political scene and once the military is in power, it should not have any pretenses. It is in power to play politics. (Newswatch, February, 1988:6) Prior to the intervention, the military were confined to the barracks, subjugated to civilian authority and performing their traditional role. After the military had tasted the Biblical forbidden fruit, in this context "political power', their eyes were opened. And since then, they have hung on to power and have ruled the country longer than their civilian counterparts in the 39-year life of Nigeria as a nation (Punch, 1990: October 15).

No military officer had held any political appointment talk less of being a member of either state/national executive or legislature. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe took over from the Queen as the first Nigerian Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Since the first military coup d'etat of January, 1966, however, there has been a struggle for power between the political soldiers and political elites in civil society. In this chapter therefore, it is our postulation that since the state determines "who gets' what, when and how; on the assumption of leadership, the military will like to cling on to state power. Besides the behaviour of the

military incumbent will be examined and it will be established that most political transitions are characterized by the desire of the incumbent to stay in power. We will also examine the proposition that given the execution of political transitions, the greater the degree of influence of the military in the transition process, the lesser its chances of success.

This chapter is divided into six sub-sections viz the causes of the coup d'tat leading to the termination of the First Republic, the Muhammed/Obasanjo transition Programme, Babangida, ill-fated transition programme, Abacha and Abubakar's transition programmes respectively and the examination of the relationship between military and civil society in Nigeria.

3.2 THE DERAILMENT OF CIVIL RULE IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC

January 15th, 1966 marked a turning point in the politics of Nigeria; for since that day, the political structure built on the attainment of independence would never be the same again since military leaders were unwillingly or deliberately called in to assume a wider role than military leadership (Oluleye, 1985:xv). Put differently, Garba (1982:25) observed that the Nigerian Army did not come under political influence until 1965 with the appointment of the first Nigerian General Officer to command the army.

At independence, the Federation of Nigeria consisted of three political regions: the North, the East and the West. (Sklar, 1963:3; Odumosu, 1963:313) and the Federal Territory of Lagos (Odumosu 1963:313) Oluleye (1983:20) opines that the solidarity of

"The British Must Go" among our then leaders quickly got ebbed for

cut throat and unhealthy rivalry for various political motives but all amounting to one thing, struggle for leadership of the country.

Much literature abound on the causes of the first military take over in Nigeria but for the fact that there was interruption in governance before the execution of political transition to civil rule, we would have circumvented it to avoid repetition. We will however, in passing, throw search light on the main factors that led to the demise of the first Republic.

Politically, there was competition among the major ethnic groups over the sharing of the national cake and Oyediran (1979:6) quoting Lloyd (1970) emphatically states that:

Nigeria's problems do...derive in large measure from the tensions which have arisen between the large ethnic groups and that the hostility derives... not from ethnic differences but from competition between peoples for wealth and power.

In the same vein, Garba (1982:23) points out that all (major ethnic) groups have at one time or another made charges of nepotism, tribalism and domination against others. Another political factor leading to the collapse of the First Republic was that all the major political parties were ethnic based. The National Council of Nigeria and Comeroons (NCNC) the Action Group (AG) and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) each having its basic strength in East, West and Northern Legislatures respectively.

(Cyediran 1978:9 quoted) . Oluleye is more frank and put it emphatically thus: these major parties (NCNC, AG and NPC) were

■ tribally based and led. The African Guardian (1986, October 2:3)

supported Oluleye's assertion by pointing out that the major political parties at independence and before it has been ethnic cultural organizations. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello's NPC as betrayed by its very name was a body of essentially primordial Hausa-Fulani interests. Its narrow perception of national purpose was not different from that of Chief Obafemi Awolowo's AG which grew from an ethnic Yoruba Egbe Omo Oduduwa. After the death of Herbert Macauley when the leadership of the NCNC fell to Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the party became literally indistinguishable from the Ibo State Union. Political Parties were therefore, mere ethnic associations posing as champions of various ethnic groups (African Guardian 1986, Oct. 2nd:9).

The Akintola-Awolowo confrontation coupled with the Action Group crisis of 1962 through 1965 (Newswatch, 1988:20; Oluleye 1985:25) was the incident which caused the time bomb to explode. The crisis led not only to the destruction of life and property but also to the breakdown of law and order in the then Western Region. The Prime Minister instead of acting decisively as he had hitherto done, turned a blind eye on the grounds that it was the handiwork of some crazy people in that part of the country (Oluleye, 1985:27).

Luckham (1970:24) summarizes the relationship between the crisis in the Western Region and the collapse of the First Republic thus:

The civil violence in the Western Region set off by the Regional election of October 1965, provided the immediate stimulus for the fall of the First Republic. The 'New Nigerian' (October 2, 1975) in the same vein pointed out that the Federal Government could not

contain the worsening political unrest in the West because it was party to the rigging of the election results. The country was gradually but steadily heading for a path of no return until a group of revolutionary young army officers stepped in on January 15th, 1966.

Mackintosh referred to Western Nigeria as the cockpit of Nigerian politics particularly between 1962 and the time of military take over of power in 1966. (Quoted in Oyediran 1979:20).

African Quarterly (1966:354) exonerates the military by pointing out that the army was insulated from politics until the elections in the West when certain elements in the army were involved in putting down riots. This argument is however wishy-washy for the mere fact that the military had been used in quelling riots does not warrant its taking over of political power if it was really subject and subordinate to civil authority.

Still on the correlation between the crisis and the demise of the First Republic, Nnamdi Asomugha pointed out in the New Nigerian (November, 1993:12) that the events that followed the 1964 elections is now history but suffice it to note that the post-election crisis that ensued eventually led to the death of the First Republic.

Mention should also be made of the 1962-64 Census controversy. This census crisis had political underpinnings because census figures not only determine the numerical strength of each region or state in the federal legislature but also the revenue collected by each region/state from the central pool (Oyediran 1979:16).

Since in terms of land mass, the North far out weighed the West and East put together, the leaders of the South hoped to break the strength of the North through census. This was done by the inflation of the 1962 - 63 census figures. In spite of all this, however, the north still maintained its population advantage over the South. Oyediran (1979:17) paints it graphically thus:

the hope of the South breaking the predominance of the North at the federal level through the census was dashed.

One distinguishing feature of the coup of January, 1966 was that it was the Acting President of the Federation, the Speaker of Senate, Dr Nwafor Orizu, since at the time of the coup the President of the Federation, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was convalescing in Britain (African Quarterly, 1966:354) who announced to the nation thus:

I have tonight been advised by the Council of Ministers that they had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily to hand over administration of the country to the Armed Forces of the Republic with immediate effect. (Ojiako 1979:6).

In accepting the position, the General Officer Commanding the Nigeria Army, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi proclaimed:

The military government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria wishes to state that it has taken over the interim administration of the Republic of Nigeria following the invitation of the Council of Ministers of the last government of the Army to do so (Ojiako, 1979:6).

From that night, 11.50 p.m 16th January, 1966 (Ojiako 1979:6) power, for the first time, changed hands from civilians to the military and since then observed Omende (1999:184) the military have made an impact on the nation's political, social and economic

life. They have contributed both positively and negatively.
The

various military regimes have embarked on a kind of lasting reforms that have transformed the Nigerian polity. In fact there is no way one would talk about Nigerian politics without the military being a constant fixation.

Table 3.1 Showing Civilian Heads of Governments As of January 14th, 1966.

Name	Position Held	Occupational Background
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe	President	Journalist & Businessman
Alh. Sir Tafawa Balewa	Prime Minister	Teacher/Headmaster (N.A. Councillor)
Dr Nwafor Orizu	Senate President	Political Theorist
	Speaker of National Assembly	
Sir Kashim Ibrahim	Governor, Northern Nigeria	
Sir Odeleye Fadahunsi	Governor, Western Nigeria	Teacher
Sir Francis Ibiam	Governor, Eastern Nigeria	Medical Practitioner/Principal
Samuel Marirere	Governor, Mid Western Nigeria	
Alh. Sir Ahmadu Bello	Premier, Northern Nigeria	District Head teacher, N.A. Councillor
Chief S.L. Akintola	Premier, Western Nigeria	Teacher, Barrister & Journalist
Dr Micheal Okpara Chief Dennis Osadebay	Premier, Eastern Nigeria Premier, Mid-Western Nigeria	Medical Practitioner Barrister

Immediately, the military assumed power however the tables turned.

The office of premier was done away with by the military government. It can therefore be said that the coup of January, 1966, brought structural changes to the Nigerian political system.

In place of the Federal Legislature and Executive, were the Federal Military Council and the Central Executive Council (See Appendices I & II) .

Oyediran (1979:82) succinctly points out that during the very dramatic first period of military rule from January, 1966 to May, 1967, there were no politicians associated with government.

Another indelible mark left by the military on the political structure of Nigeria is the abolition of the Regions by Maj-Gen Aguiyi-Ironsi and the unification of the Civil Service in a Unitary Government set up by Decree No 34 (Kirk-Greene, 1971:476).

Galadima (1998:122) paints the picture vividly thus:

With the Unification Decree 34 of 24 May, 1966, Nigeria ceased to be a federation, the Supreme Military Council established regions and placed them under the control and direction of Military Governors appointed by the Federal Military Government.

In the same vein, Joseph (1987:69) observes that during its long stint in power from 1966 to 1979, the effect of rule by the military government was to accentuate the centrality of the State in the nation's economic system.

Major-Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi's regime was moribund since it was overthrown in the Second Coup of July 29th, 1966.

3.3 GOWON AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION

Like his predecessor, Major Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gen Yakubu Gowon was called upon to steer the ship of Nigeria besieged by turmoil.

He was, as it were, unprepared for the task ahead of him. On taking the mantle of leadership however, the first major task that Gowon faced, was that of keeping Nigeria as one country (Oyediran, 1998:88) . Top among his programmes was the abolition of the unitary system of government introduced by his predecessor. In his own words, Gen Gowon said, *inter alia*-

I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time (Layomi et al, 1992:113-119).

Elucidating further, he continued, that a country as big as Nigeria and comprising such diversity of tribes and cultures cannot be administered successfully under a unitarian form of government.

The Unification Decree was thus abrogated by Decree 59 of 1966 which restored the country on Federalism (Galadima 1998:122). Furthermore, he partitioned the country into twelve states (New Nigerian October, 1975:xv). This he did to forge national integration among the various ethnic groups which have since pre-independence days been falling back to congregate on tribal lines for party support. Besides, the Independence Constitution of Nigeria had given enormous powers to the regions at the detriment of the centre which was rather weak. Consequently, to bring about a true federalism, was his *raison d'etre* for dividing the country into twelve states.

Another reason why Gen. Gowon divided the country into twelve

states was to correct the imbalance in the size of the previous regions. As earlier on pointed out, the North is larger in size and population than the other two, East and West combined. To ameliorate this sense of fear of domination of the North by the South, the North was broken up into smaller units. Left to him therefore, there is no need for such things as either the Northern or Southern Elders Fora to be made reference to since the former regions, North, East and West do not in essence exist in the constitution.

In terms of Foreign Policy, Gen Gowon projected and continued to place Africa in the focal point of Nigeria's foreign policy. He therefore, became one of the leading figures in the formation of ECOWAS. His post-civil war foreign policy is aptly described by Ofoegbu (1979:128) thus:

after the civil war, Nigeria undertook to bring together Commonwealth and other African States in order to co-ordinate and if possible harmonize their policies towards a new and more united Europe. This became a new goal of foreign policy.

Broadcasting to the nation immediately after the civil war, General Gowon said among other things that:

We are at the dawn of national Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. This will follow immediately (Layamu 1992:135-137).

It is from this Speech that the popular 3Rs viz Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction was given birth to. It must be pointed out that the policy of the 3Rs was followed to the letter and also successfully prosecuted (Oyediran 1998:88; Muhammadu & Haruna, 1979:46). Ojigbo (1979:25) was blunt

in pointing out that he (Gowon) was effective in his reconciliatory approach.

On the crux of our study which is transition to civil rule, Gen Gowon performed dismally. In his 1966 maiden broadcast to the nation, Gen, Gowon said, "I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged' (Layomu et al 1992:116).

He buttressed his desire to leave office by the following:

I intend to carry out the following: a three-stage plan for return to civil government, starting with the immediate modification or nullification of any decree which assumes extreme centralization- this will ensure a rapid return to the former federal structure of the constitution as basis for further constitutional review (Adigwe 1982:274).

This however, was not be. For even though the unification Decree was repealed, he went back on his words to hand over power to civilians. In his 1974 Independence Anniversary broadcast to the nation, Gen. Gowon said the following:

It is not possible for me at this stage to lay down a firm time table for the handing over of the reins of government to the people as this will depend upon innumerable factors which have not yet been worked out in detail:... It would indeed amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere strictly to that target date. (Ojiako 1979:77).

Reacting to this inconsistency, Daily Times (August, 1975) pointed out that Nigerians were upset and disappointed when on October 1st, 1974, Gen Gowon broke his promise to hand over power to a democratically elected representatives of the people in 1976. The regime was subsequently to be perceived as dictatorial and despotic.

Besides, Gen Gowon was accused of lack of consultation,

indecision (New Nigeria, August 1, 1975) and even neglect (New Nigerian, August 2 (1975)). Moreover, offending Commissioners and Governors were left off the hook. Ojiako (1979:85) therefore, gave his verdict that those discredited Governors contributed immensely to the fall of Gen. Gowon and consequently all in all, Gen Gowon government had lost all the moral authority to govern since January, 1975 and therefore, the end was just as it should be.

Put differently, Ojigbo (1979:15) observed that not only did it (i.e. Gowon's administration) fail to combat corruption, it seemingly, latently, though inadvertently, encouraged it by exonerating allegedly corrupt public officials against whom sworn affidavits had been lodged. "Supply" and "Renewal" contractors, outright thievery of public funds and the twin evils of bribery and corruption ate deep into the Nigerian society and became the norm rather than the exception.

Gen. Gowon's indecision to draw a systematic programme to hand over power to civilians inspired what J. Bayo Adekunle (1979:214) terms, the counter-coup inspired approach to military disengagement from politics. The core of this approach is where a ruling junta has no immediate intention of or are undecided about withdrawing from politics. The incumbents would want to stay in power as long as they could. Soon the tenuousness of these soldiers' rule becomes apparent, which based as it is on "legitimacy" that wanes with time is fraught with most potential insecurity and instability. Even without an added tendency to bask in ill-gotten luxury like the politicians whom they ousted, this

inherent curse of political illegitimacy alone is sufficient to create a big credibility gap for the military rulers. Under these circumstances a counter coup is hatched to effect the passage of power to other hands. It should therefore, be pointed out that General Gowon made no overt effort to hand over power to civilians. He had the feeling that his assignment was yet to be completed. It was this feet dragging that prompted Gen Murtala Muhammed and his cohorts to take over power. When Gen Gowon's regime collapsed, the "Daily Times", (August 2, 1975) expressed the feelings of Nigerians thus:

The lack of political programme for the return to democratic rule has been by far the most disappointing feature of the last government.

Since Gen. Gowon did not identify any alternative political elite to transfer power to, he still remained in office until his overthrow. Gowon's regime and failure to indicate a transition programme therefore, confirms our argument that a military government will find excuses of being in power if it does not identify the political elite it wants to hand over power to.

The initial seizure of power by Gen. Muhammed just like Gowon's is the counter-coup inspired approach. It was from this stage that Gen Muhammed devised the constitutional evolutionary model which will be expatiated later.

The government which replaced Gen. Gowon's is referred to as the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime because when Gen Obasanjo took over as the head of State, on the death of Gen. Muhammed, he did not change the orientation of the regime (Oyediran, 1979:266).

3.4.1 MUHAMMED/OBASANJO'S TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE 1975-79

Gen Murtala Muhammed's regime marked the third military regime in Nigeria (New Nigerian", July 30, 1975; New Nigerian" August 1, 1975). Much has been said about the apprehensiveness of the populace towards Gen Gowon's regime, particularly, the unprecedented rate of corruption to which he paid lip-service. Seizing power therefore, General Murtala Muhammed placed premium on corrective measures. Yahaya (1979:264) put it bluntly that the purification exercise undertaken by the regime was inevitably directed towards the dismantling of the edifice built by the displaced regime.

In a "Thank You And Good Bye Tour' to Imo State in August 1979, Gen. Obasanjo said that the Muhammed-Obasanjo Administration assumed power in 1975 to achieve two objectives:

viz to establish a political system which would give Nigeria an orderly progress, unity and stability and to give a new impetus, direction and dimension to our social life because we were drifting and losing our bearings: (Yahaya, 1979:264 quoted). Put differently, the regime was to give new lease of life and sense of direction to Nigerians (New Nigerian, August 2, 1975).

It is worthy of note that since the military incursion into the political scene of- Nigeria, there had never been concrete and calculated attempts to initiate transition programmes that will culminate in the handing over of power to civilians.

However, in his maiden broadcast to the nation on the third day of his assumption to power, Gen. Murtala Muhammed minced no words when he announced inter alia a review of the political

programme (New Nigerian, July 31, 1975). The two hitherto bodies at the national level, the Federal Military Council and the Central Executive Council were abolished and replaced by three viz the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the National Council of State (NCS) , and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) ('Daily Times' August, 1975) .

The New Nigerian (August 1, 1975) in its editorial, commented on these three bodies thus:

The structure comprising the Supreme Military Council (SMC) , the National Council of State (NCS) and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) suggests a welcome departure from the previous system which concentrates too much power in the hands of one man. The NCS is a novelty which could serve as the meeting ground for the exchange of views on major national issues.

By implication therefore, the new regime was to embark on a national re-orientation with emphasis on probity and accountability and respect of popular opinion in the process of government (Yahaya 1979:264) Gen. Muhammed without wasting time stressed the need for military disengagement from politics thus:

We will review the political situation and make an announcement in due course: ('Daily Times, August 1, 1975).

Standing firm on his words, he outlined the process of democratization in the 15th independence Anniversary broadcast to the nation thus:

I promised in my last address to announce a programme and Government has since then given considerable thought to this matter. . . This is not an exercise that begins and ends in the mere drafting of a constitution. Viable political institutions only emerge from hard experience and practice and the corporate experience of all what matters.. .With this in mind, the SMC has approved a five-stage programme designed to ensure a
A smooth transition to civil rule by those elected by the

people of this country...

Stage I: Creation of new States -April, 1976.

Stage II: States allowed to settle down. Reorganization of Local Governments - Local Government Elections on non-party basis. Establishment of Constituent Assembly to complete its work by October, 1978. Stage III

Preparatory stage for election ie Lifting of the ban on politics in October, 1978; formation of political parties. Stages IV & V: States and Federal Elections

(Daily Times, October 2nd 1975 back page, Ojiako 1979:102; Oluleye 1985:173; Oyediran 1979:20).

With this comprehensive and elaborate plan on paper, Oluleye (1985:173) pointed out that the programme covered all things that needed to be done before the return to civil rule which was firmly put as 1st October, 1979. To ensure the preponderance of the military over civilians, at the Federal level, twenty-five Commissioners were appointed but only eleven were civilians. The other fourteen were members of the Armed Forces and Police. It must however, be emphasized that the politicians as a group never really emerged as a decisive political force in that government. (Oyediran, 1979:265-267). Gradually therefore, from the very first day of the coup, the fangs of the political elites were pulled by the military. Gen. Muhammed reiterated his desire not to stay in office a day longer than the stipulated date of October 1st, 1979.

It is pertinent to point out that the foregoing stages I outlined above place the Muhammed/Obasanjo's transition programme

in the category of constitutional evolutionary approach to

military disengagement from politics.

Commenting on the elaborateness of the programme, The "Daily Times (October 3rd, 1975) had this to say:

Even though the Federal Government could have shirked the onerous responsibility of setting a date for the return to democratic rule, it had enough courage to do so. The four-year preparatory period for the return o democratic rule taken in the announced stages may seem too long in parts.... Yet taken as a whole and considering the processes that are outlined...the time is realistic. If not totally coherent.

And the 'New Nigerian' too observed that for the first time since the January, 1966 coup a serious political programme with a definite time table for restoring power to a civilian administration has been announced.

The remaining part of this sub-section will now examine how far the various stages of the transition programme were followed.

3.4.2 CONSTITUTION DRAFT COMMITTEE (CDC)

Gen Muhammed promised to appoint a Constitution Drafting Committee within the month of October, 1975. Said he in the 1975 Independence Anniversary broadcast to the nation:.,.. "meanwhile a Drafting Committee on the Constitution will be appointed this month and will have up to September, 1976 to complete its work on a first initial draft constitution' (New Nigerian, October 2, 1975).

True to his words, on 4th October, 1975, barely three days after his independence Anniversary speech, the Federal Military Government (FMG) over the week end appointed a 50-man Committee to

draft the country's new constitution (Ojiako, 1979:104). This group of wise men (Oyediran, 1982: IX) was headed by Chief F.R.A. Williams (New Nigerian, Monday October 6, 1975). The membership was however reduced to 49 because Chief Obafemi Awolowo did not honour the invitation.

Critics of the composition of the CDC picked holes by maintaining that:

This all-male caucus, whose members were nominated on their personal merit, no representative of women, workers, students and petty artisans who constitute the vast majority of Nigeria's population... the composition of CDC is clearly an elite of privilege classes that excludes the masses of the working people. (Oyediran 1979:244 quoted).

Even though the membership of CDC was gender-bias, male friendly to be precise, a close examination of its composition reveals that there was also not a single military officer on it. Rather all were civilians chosen from labour unions, politicians, journalists and administrators etc. Among the mandate given the committee included the practice of the Presidential System of Government since the Parliamentary one in the first Republic flopped. Next, it was to establish an Independent Judiciary, free from executive and legislative control to check the excesses of the other arms of government. There was also a provision for Public Complaints Commission (PCC) . The rationale for this particular body was to stamp out corruption which was at its zenith in the previous administration of Gen. Yakubu Gowon. There was the need for the continuation of federalism, elimination of cut-throat political competition based on a system of rule of winner-takes-all, all de-emphasizing institutionalized opposition

to the government in power and the development of consensus politics and government based on community of interests decentralization of power, depoliticisation of census and the formation of genuine and truly national parties (Ojiako, 1979:107) .

Overtly, therefore, one can say that the CDC was given a free hand to draft a more acceptable constitution for Nigeria. Political parties, it must be pointed out, were non-existent at this time and consequently could not be represented on the CDC to articulate their ideology as input to the new constitution.

The CDC was not to act unilaterally but there were possible indications that it was expected to examine differing views on the new constitution and end up distilling a body of political principles and constitutional canons that were coherent in themselves and were likely to produce a viable political system in the Nigerian context. (Daily Times, October 10, 1975).

The Chairman of the CDC, Chief F.R.A. Williams, attested that discussions during the sessions were based on genuine patriotic considerations as distinct from personal differences (Daily Times, September 16, 1976) . The then Head of State, Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, on receiving the Draft to the Nigeria Constitution on September 14, 1976, said the Committee had provided a new foundation for Nigeria by submitting the report on schedule (Ojiako 1979:176).

The Muhammed/Obasanjo regime therefore, made good its promise by setting up a CDC which also lived up to expectation by ensuring that it completed its task on time.

3.4.3 COMMITTEE ON STATE CREATION

The FMG to allay the fears of domination and to address the lopsided nature of the federating components decided to create more states (Oladiran 1979:283). The FGM deemed it expedient not to impose its will on the people but to set up a committee to collate and synthesize demands on state creation. The Chairman of the Committee, Supreme Court Judge, Mr Justice Ayo Irekefe, submitted his report to Gen Muhammed, Head of State, who then announced the creation of seven more states by Decree of 2nd February 1976. (Nwolise 1988:58) thus bringing the total number of states in the Federal to nineteen.

On the Committee of State Creation, Nwolise (1988:58) pointed out that:

although civilian politicians in their antics whipped up new sentiments of "fear of domination" even within one ethnic group thus calling for new states, it can be said that the military by taking decisive action to create more states have enlarged the scope of individual freedom and down-played ethnicity in favour of new statism.

A close analysis of the evolution of the state structures of Nigeria will reveal that from the initial three regions i. e Northern, Western and Eastern including Lagos as a Federal Territory, the Northern Region far out weighed the other Regions in terms of land mass and population. The creation of the Mid-Western Region did not change the status quo ante.

The first major change to federating units of Nigeria was initiated by Gen. Gowon who in a broadcast to the nation, announced a decree dividing the country into twelve states as basis for stability (Ojiako, 1979:47). The north was thus

partitioned into six states and the South including the Federal Territory of Lagos also had six States. In terms of units therefore, the north and the South had equal number of states- six apiece. This according to Gen. Gowon was a sine qua non for the representatives drawn from the new states will be more able to work out the future constitution for the country which can obtain provisions to protect the powers of the states to the fullest extent desired by the Nigerian people (Ojiako, 1979:47).

To further break up the north, Gen Muhammed also added seven states to the twelve created by Gen Gowon. These nineteen states comprised ten from the erstwhile north excluding the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja and nine for the then South.

One of the integral parts of Gen Muhammed 4 - year 5 - stage transition programme had the objective of forging closer ties among the various ethnic groups in the country. This he was optimistic would enable Nigeria to have a stable political system after he had relinquished power to civilians in 1979. General Murtala Muhammed said the states would no longer be identified simply by their geographical locations but would also be given names to erase memories of political past and emotional attachments (Ojiako, (1973:13)).

The Murtala administration did not end up creating States alone, he knew problems would arise aftermath, consequently a six-man Commission headed by Mr Muhammed Nasir (Ojiako 1979:132) was set up to look into boundary problems arising thereof. Gen Muhammed's transition to civil rule was meticulously planned and religiously executed. With the restructuring of the states put

behind him, he concentrated on the local government level, the tier of government closest to the people.

3.4.4 RE-ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

On Gen. Murtala Muhammed's untimely death, Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, the then No 2, ascended the saddle. Oluleye (1985:197) pointed out that although the first six months of the administration were action-packed, aspects relating to return to civilian rule were yet to be fully tackled within the remaining period. The remaining ones were:

1. Creation of Local Government Areas And Elections.
2. Preparation and adoption of new constitution.
3. Organization of genuinely national parties
4. Elections and installation of a civilian government

Lt. Gen. Obasanjo set to work instantly by restructuring the existing local governments and the FEDECO successfully conducted elections there on non-party basis. The re-organization became effective in September, 1976 with the promulgation of the various States, Local Government Edicts (Oluleye, 1985:189). Throwing more light on the reforms, (Oluleye, 1985:190) pointed out that the reforms provide that local government councils be elected either directly or indirectly...the representatives elect their own chairmen subject to government approval and take decisions by majority vote (quoted).

The objectives of the 1976 restructuring were made explicitly clear by Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar Adua when he pointed out that:

the reforms of 1976 were intended to stimulate democratic self-government and to encourage and initiate leadership potentials... in other words local government councils were to be viewed as training ground for democracy (Oyediran, 1979:191).

Nwolize (1988:58) consequently, observed that it was the new Muhammed/Obasanjo military regime that came up with a systematic plan of re-organized local government system as one of its five-stage political action programme announced on October, 1st 1975 and which it followed to the letter.

The Local Government reforms therefore provided for the following:

(i) a uniform Local government system in the country, (ii) a single-tier local government in all states, (iii) democratically (directly or indirectly) elected local government councils and iv) fixed functions for local governments. Nwolize

(1988:59) explained that:

The reforms most outstanding contribution is the vesting of formal authority at the local level in a democratically elected body as the reform envisaged local government system that would train people for democracy.

Sequel to the local Government Reforms, elections were held into the Councils on non-party basis. On the creation of more Local Governments and the subsequent elections, Oluleye (1985:197) pointed out that:

without much controversy, the creation of Local Government was done. Fortunately, no violence occurred as a result and the local elections also went through without rigging featuring. This was a local affair and there were no political parties which could cause tension in case their candidates

* failed.

With the usual violence, acrimony and animosity which usually accompanied elections unheard of in the Local government elections, the Murtala/Obasanjo transition programme was gradually becoming a reality.

3.4.5 THE 1978 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

On October 6th 1977, the Head of State, Lt.Gen Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurated the 223-member constituent Assembly (C.A). Out of this number 203 won their membership in a nation-wide election held on August 31st, 1977 while the remaining 20 were Federal Government nominees (the Nigerian Observer October 6th, 1977, Ojiako, 1979:178, 189, Oyediran, 1979:246-247). To ensure that the membership comprised the actual representatives of their people, the Supreme Military Council (SMC). decided that members of the CA would be elected by the various Local Government Councils (LGCs) which would thus constitute the electoral colleges. The LGCs would have the option of electing representatives from themselves or from outside their ranks (Ojiako 1979:178).

The SMC therefore, did not want to have overwhelming influence on the CA hence it chose only less than 10% of its membership. More over, the Head of State, Lt Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, charged the CA members to stick as much as possible to their terms of reference (New Nigerian October 7, 1977) and also to try beat the deadline which was October 6th, 1978, a year before the proposed hand over. Lt. Gen Olusegun Obasanjo

emphasized that:

Further progress on our political programme depends on the speed and despatch with which this assembly performs its duty (New Nigerian, October 7th 1977).

Commenting on the membership of the CA in an interview with the New Nigerian; Ahmed Kari, a member of the CA said, "My impression of members of the CA generally is, that the country has elected competent and responsible people and there are indications that these members will not fail the nation. (New Nigerian, October 29th, 1977) .

Unlike the CDC which was an assembly of all males, the CA comprised 4 women (New Nigerian September 22nd, 1978). Working assiduously, the CA took eleven months to complete its assignment. It submitted the New constitution that was to lead Nigeria back to civilian rule on October 1st, 1979 to Lt Gen. Obasanjo (Ojiako 1979:195) on August 29th, 1978. The CA was able to accomplish its task within the time frame it was given. Oyediran aptly, pointed out that all the political programmes of the regime has been faithfully implemented. It must be pointed out after the CDC had submitted its report, it was made available for Seminars, Conferences debates and discussions in the mass media all over the country. (Joye and Igweike, 1982 ix).

The CA sat for long and after amendments here and there, approved the draft constitution and remitted it to the SMC for study and final approval (Oluleye, 1985:198). Consequently, it must be pointed out that in the political history of Nigeria, no other process of constitution-making has been as elaborate as that of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Oyediran (1979:182) put it more emphatically thus:

At no time in the political history of Nigeria has the opportunity been given to interested Nigerians to discuss openly, over a period of more than 22 months in the mass media, at various Conferences and Seminars, at Committees made up of representatives of various sections of the country the constitution under which they would be governed.

The FGM believed that the 1963 Republican Constitution failed because it was not comprehensive enough. What the Government forgot was that no constitution can ever be perfect or at best it may appear best on paper, it is its adherence or putting it into practice that matters.

The Constitution having been signed and promulgated by the Head of State on September 21st, 1978 would come into effect on October 1st, 1979. The ground had adequately by been prepared for the game of politics. Ojiako (1979:195) painted the picture graphically thus:

In a broadcast of September 21st, 1978 Gen Obasanjo blew the whistle for the game of politics to begin after 12 years of military rule in Nigeria.

In other words the political activities of the regime had been faithfully implemented and the ban on political activities was lifted on September 19th, 1978 ie after the ratification of the Constitution (Ojiako 1979:267). The New Nigerian on September 22nd, 1978, had its front-page caption, "Ban on politics Lifted". The next section will throw the search light on FEDECO before examining the lifting of the ban on political activities.

3.4.6 FEDERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (FEDECO)

On receiving the report of the CDC, the FMG appointed a 24-

member body to constitute the FEDECO. It comprised 4 women appointed by the FMG. Its primary assignment was to delimit the electoral constituencies for the country, draw up a comprehensive voters' register, spell out criteria for the formation of political parties and finally to conduct the Federal and State Elections. Joseph (1991:154) observed that FEDECO was meant to be an independent agency and in keeping with an unavoidable feature of governmental affairs in Nigeria, it was entrusted with implementing the numerous regulations devised to prevent every imaginable form of electoral misconduct.

3.4.7 THE UNBANNING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

As pointed out above, the Head of State lifted the ban on political activities in his broadcast to the nation on September 21st, 1978. Before doing this however, he had extensively toured all the states of the Federation. The reason d'etre of these trips was to solicit the co-operation of the various interest groups in the nation to make the transition process a success.

Oluleye (1985:199) observed that the country and the politicians were caught unawares. Since they had expected this to be announced in the 1978 Independence broadcast. In order to ensure that the military would successfully hand over power to civilians and retire quickly to their barracks, the Head of State, Lt.Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, had series of meetings with the major identifiable groups in the country. These groups included traditional rulers civil servants, academics and student leaders. Each group was advised to desist from anything that would derail

the transition programme. The various ethnic groups too were not

left behind in his call for peaceful atmosphere during the process. He then went on to warn that:

there is need to remind ourselves and especially those aspiring to rule this country of that fact that no matter how good a constitutional document may seem to be, its ultimate and utilitarian goodness depends on the will, disposition and vision of its operators... the fate of over 80 million people of this country today and of millions yet unborn, depends on the cooperation, understanding and behaviour of these leaders... .With the field prepared and the Constitution Decree promulgated, the ban on politics is lifted with effect from today... With the resuscitation of party politics, I would like to remind all aspirants, participants and indeed Nigerians that the issues which led this country into tragic civil war are not too far behind us, and we must refrain from them. (New Nigerian September 22, 1978).

Oyediran (1979:267) also emphasizes that before the ban on political activities was lifted, the government decided to prepare the minds of the people for this change and to recondition the attitude of public officers for the transfer of power to civilian political groups. The first decisive action taken by the government was the significant withdrawal of military presence in government. A decision in this direction was the reassignment of military governors and military officers holding political office to purely military duties.

Military administrators were appointed to replace the military governors. Unlike the military governors who were solely in charge of political duties as Chief Executive of their respective states and consequently resided in Government Houses, these administrators held dual posts ie as Commanders of their various units and also as Chairman of their respective State

Councils. They were however, not to reside in the official state

houses but in their barracks (Oyediran 1979:168). Besides, unlike the military Governors, who did not have any deputies, the Administrators were to have civilian Deputy Chairmen.

Prior to lifting the ban on political activities (Oluleye 1985:222) and to ensure smooth transition from military to civil rule, the Head of State, Lt. Gen Obasanjo held meetings with religious leaders who were made to impress upon their adherents the need for peace, fairness and love when the ban on politics was lifted (New Nigerian, September 15, 1978). There is this need for religious leaders, this time around, to be actively involved in the political transition programme because, Gen Obasanjo observed that had they played their part actively, some of these pitfalls could have been avoided, referring to the difficult times the country had passed through (New Nigerian, September 15, 1978).

Next, the Head of State met with Senior media executives since they had a prominent role to play in the transition programme by reporting all the happenings in the mass media. At the meeting, Gen Obasanjo urged journalists to refrain from fanning the embers of hatred, sectionalism, tribalism, religious intolerance and the use of indecent language. They should publish to build and strengthen the nation and not to publish to destroy or be damned (New Nigerian' September, 19th, 1978).

Another interest group the Head of State deemed expedient to meet as the count down to lifting of the ban on politics was drawing nearer was that of traditional rulers. In all 38 traditional rulers representing the 19 states of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria were at the meeting and he charged them to ensure that their fatherly role and responsibility in a nonpartisan way to all Nigerians were not impaired ("New Nigerian", September 13th, 1978).

The meeting the Head of State had with Civil Servants was crucial because:

Traditionally the civil service was not partisan and that its main functions were just to assist in the formulation and execution of governmental policies. But in 1966, the advent of the military government changed this tradition and civil servants became the "de facto" formulators and executors of policy (New Nigerian, September 16, 1978).

He therefore advised them that for them to perform their new role under civil rule successfully, there would be need to develop new awareness, orientation, attitude and approach to service (New Nigerian, September 16, 1978).

Turning to University administrators he warned against using University Communities as a hatching ground for violent political campaigns, destruction of political opponents and destabilization of the Society (New Nigerian, September 16, 1978).

3.4.8 FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Political associations began to emerge when political activities were resuscitated.

In order to avoid the mistakes of the past and to enable broad based parties to emerge, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) which had been established previously set the following guidelines among others:.....

Any association which is desirous of being registered

as a political party by the Electoral Commission shall only be considered as being opened to every Nigerian citizen...(and is) satisfied that it has properly established branch office in each of at least two-thirds of the states in the Federation and that officers have been duly elected or as the case maybe, appointed to run the affairs of each branch office. In other words, a political association claiming to operate or to have supporters in a particular state must be seen to possess an effective organization down to grassroots level in such a state. (Ojiako, 1979:193).

The government, it must be pointed out, tried as much as possible to remove divisive structural elements within the body politic.

Daily Times (18th December, 1978) put it emphatically that all political associations must fulfil the guidelines laid down by FEDECO before they can be registered as political parties.

At this juncture we will briefly examine the formation of the major political parties. It must however be pointed out that while the ban on political activities was in force, what politicians did was to group together under the guise of social associations. Cyediran (1979:279) aptly stated that almost all the major parties formed were the product of the activities of these social associations.

3.4.9 UNITY PARTY OF NIGERIA (UPN)

It is not within the framework of this study to trace the roots of UPN; what should however, be born in mind is that it is the first political association to emerge after the ban on political had been lifted. Cyediran (1979:269) put it succinctly thus:

The UPN with Chief Awolowo as the leader was the first political association to be declared a day after the ban was lifted.

Oluleye (1985:199) attributed this head start of the UPN to Chief Awolowo's rejection of the membership of the Constituent Assembly by (CA) because while people were talking at the CA he, Chief Awolowo, had produced a perfected document for his party (UPN) . He therefore, turned deaf ears to the national call and concentrated on the formation of a formidable party to win the elections.

Ojiako (1979:202) made similar observations by pointing out that barely 24 hours after the ban on parties Obafemi Awolowo announced the formation of his party- the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) .

Having met the guidelines set by FEDECO, UPN was registered as a political party (Daily Times, 26th December, 1978).

3.4.10 NIGERIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (NPP) AND GREAT NIGERIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (GNPP)

The NPP was the second major party to be formed and duly registered by FEDECO. It was launched in Lagos on September 22nd, 1978. The Protom Secretary, Dr Omo Omoruyi, disclosed that the Party was fusion of three giant groups that had existed as clubs- Club 19, National Union Council and Council For National Unity and Progress (New Nigerian September 23, 1978). Looking at the space between the time the ban on politics was lifted and the announcement of the formation, one can say that, like the UPN, much underground spade work had also gone in for the NPP when the

ban was still in force.

The NPP could not, however, continue for long as a single party. Oyediran (1979:270) was emphatic when he pointed out that:

the NPP... has split barely two months after its formation. The split came to the open at the party first National Convention which took place in Lagos on November 17th, 1978.

The two factions were led by Alh. Waziri Ibrahim and Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya respectively. While Alh. Waziri-led faction continued with the Convention, the other walked out. Paradoxically, however, this faction which continued the Convention adopted a new name-Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) and the other which boycotted the Convention clung tenaciously to the original name, Nigeria People's Party. Their respective Presidential candidates were Alh. Waziri Ibrahim for the GNPP and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe for the NPP.

3.4.11 NATIONAL PARTY OF NIGERIA (NPN)

The NPN was the third major party to spring up (Daily Times, October 11, 1978; New Nigerian, September 26, 1978). It met the requirements set by FEDECO and was subsequently registered. The watershed of the NPN was an offshoot of the National Movement, an intra CA group (Oyediran, 1979:271 quoted). The interim Chairman was Alh. Makaman Bida.

Oyediran (1971:271) rightly pointed out that the NPN attracted a large number of political notables associated with the dissolved political parties and the displaced Gowon regime. For the 1979 Presidential Elections, Alhaji Shehu Shagari became the

party's flag bearer.

Generally, therefore the process of party formation before the lifting of the ban on politics in September, 1979, took place principally within two arenas; the halls and the meeting rooms of the CA and the private dwellings of former and aspirant politicians.

3.4.12 PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP)

The PRP launched in Kaduna on 21st October, 1978 (Daily Times October 24, 1978) was the fourth major party which was registered to contest the 1979 General Elections (Oyediran, 1979:271). The founding father was Alh. Aminu Kano. Other stallwarks of the party included Mr Sam Ikoku, Alh. Abubakar Rimi, Mr Ola Oni among others (Daily Times October 24, 1978). As usual, the Prominent members of the PRP participated in the activities of the National Movement (NM) but they withdrew when it was decided that the NM be transformed into a political party. The party having passed FEDECO's acid test, chose Alh. Aminu Kano as its Presidential candidate.

3.4.13 OTHER POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

It must be pointed out that besides the five registered political parties (Oyediran 1979: 275), there were other political associations which on the other hand failed to meet the requirements set by FEDECO. Among these were Tunji Braithwaite -led National Advance Party (NAP) the Movement Of The People led by Fela Anikulapo Kuti (Daily Times, October 24, 1978). The Socialist

Party of Workers, Farmers and Youths, Nigeria Welfare Peoples Party (NWPP) and the Nigerian Council (Oyediran, 1979:271) . Dr Kingsley Mbadiwe was reported as defending the number of parties which sought for registration by pointing out that the proliferation of political parties is away of letting out the heat of 12 years of military rule (Daily Times October 24, 1978) . He continued by pointing act that:

they are letting off steam and political awareness that something is happening. It makes the nation vibrate with some energy and activity (Daily Times, ibid).

3.4.14 RE-INCARNATION OF FIRST REPUBLIC POLITICAL PARTIES

To a very great extent, the Second Republic political parties could be said to be the reincarnation of the First Republic Political parties in many dimensions. First, except for the difference in name, NPP could be said to be a replica of the old NCNC, the UPN the old AG, PRP the old NEPU, and the NPN the old NPC. This is so because there was not much variation in terms of leadership. To a great degree, each was a photocopy of the old in terms of ideology. Both NPN and NPC were for conservatives while PRP and NEPU stood for the "talakawa" . UPN and AG embraced Socialist ideals. On the close resemblance between the new and old parties Oyediran (1979:273) had this to say:

The UPN emphasizes the provision of social and welfare programmes as the primary responsibility of the state. It tends to attract former politicians who were members of the dissolved AG.

About NPN and NPC also Joseph (1991:131) remarked that in less than a year, the transition from the former NPC into the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) in 1964 was recapitulated and

then carried forward in the creation of the NPN (quoted).

West Africa (1996 July-August) put it succinctly thus:

The NPN had the NPC as its nucleus, the UPN was a recrudescence of the AG while the NPP and the PRP correlated respectively with NCNC and NEPU.

In terms of geopolitical base, the old and the new were inseparable. The stronghold of the NPN and NPC was the same, North, while the UPN like the AG drew its largest following from the west. The NPP as the NCNC had massive support from the East. Since the new as well as the old drew its following from the same geographic base, there was not much difference in the ethnic composition of the Second and First Republican parties. The former were therefore, the chips off the old blocks.

Even though the Federal Military Government (FMG) through FEDECO, wanted the emergence of broad based political parties cutting across the whole nation, the parties were still ethnically based.

It can therefore be concluded that all the five political parties were essentially led and controlled by politicians who had actively participated in politics before the intervention of the military. The expectation that old politicians would be replaced by a new breed did not materialize and indeed old politicians had also displaced aspiring political groups (Cyediran 1979:275).

3.5 THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS.

There were in all five elections during the 1979 General Election in Nigeria. These elections were relatively peaceful . because the FMG was determined to deal ruthlessly with any

group(s) that would militate against the successful execution of the programme. Joseph (1991:154) aptly points out that:

the moments of crisis during the 1978-9 electoral period were equally significant. What kept them in check was undeniably the fact of military rule.

Besides, FEDECO took certain decisions which were not challenged in the courts because it had the force of the military government behind it (Joseph, 1991:154).

The overall results of the elections are presented in the following tables:

Table 3.2 1979 Senate Election Results

State	Parties				
	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	112832	10932	210101	19574	699157
Bauchi	1188819	28959	323392	127279	39868
Bendel	138332	316511	250194	2055	60639
Benue	146452	14769	332967	-	75523
Borno	1278352	22145	184633	31508	-
Cross River	1161353	77479	310071	-	68203
Gongola	1223121	124707	203226	30708	17830
Imo	1101184	7553	145507	8609	750518
Kaduna	1233824	85094	410888	278305	61807
Kano	135430	13831	233985	683367	-
Kwara	132383	126065	54282	328	1020
Lagos	114480	428573	35730	2556	52738
Niger	171498	13860	175597	8139	207
Ogun	11018	230411	31963	-	207
Ondo	14907	501522	49612	-	6417
Oyo	19472	758696	200372	2497	4397
Plateau	141287	20024	154792	19017	220278
River	146985	20106	153454	30	86138
Sokoto	1305292	34145	571562	38305	-
Seats won out of 95	8	28	36	7	16
Percentage % of Seats won	8.4	29.5	37.9	7.3	16.9

Source: Richard A Joseph 'Democracy And Pretendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise And Fall of the Second Republic 1991, Ibadan Spectrum Books P. 125.

From the table above, it can be deduced that not all the parties fielded candidates in seven states e.g PRP did not contest in Benue, Cross River, Ogun and Ondo NPP in Borno, Kano and Sokoto. Out of the 95 seats at stake NPN and UPN won 36 or 37.9% and 28 or 29.5% respectively.

The party which took the 3rd position, NPP, secured 16 seats or 16.9%. GNPP emerged 4th with 8 seats or 8.4% while the party with the least number of seats won 7 seats or 7.3%.

Three of the parties viz NPN, UNP and NPP won landslide victories in their respective stronghold states: Thus NPP won 699150 votes or 73.39% of the total votes cast in Anambra and 750518 or 14.06% in Imo States. The UPN swept all the States in the former Western Region and the votes accounted for 80.22% of the total votes cast in these States. The NPN too cleared five of the ten states in former Northern Region representing 42.5% of the total votes cast there. The NPN therefore faced stiffer opposition in its home states than the NPP and UPN because of the presence of PRP and GNPP. Despite this, the results still indicate that the basic factor underlying the votes is ethnicity.

Table 3.3 1979 House of Representatives Election Results

State	No of Seats	Party				
		GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	29	-	-	3	-	26
Bauchi	20	1	-	18	-	1
Bendel	20	-	12	6	-	2
Benue	19	-	-	18	-	1
Borno	24	22	-	2	-	-
Cross River	28	4	2	22	-	-
Gongola	21	8	7	5	-	1
Imo	30	-	-	2	-	28
Kaduna	33	1	1	19	10	2
Kano	46	-	-	7	39	-
Kwara	14	1	5	8	-	-
Lagos	12	-	12	-	-	-
Niger	10	-	-	10	-	-
Ogun	12	-	12	-	-	-
Ondo	22	-	22	-	-	-
Oyo	42	-	38	4	-	-
Plateau	16	-	-	3	-	13
Rivers	14	-	-	10	-	4
Sokoto	37	6	31	-	-	-

Source: Richard A. Joseph, 1991 Democracy And Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise And Fall of the Second Republic, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd P 126.

An analysis of the table above shows that the House of representatives elections followed the same pattern as that of the Senate. In Anambra and Imo States, NPP stronghold, the Party won 26 of the 29 seats accounting for 89.7% and 28 out of 30 or 93.3% respectively. What was interesting were the results in Lagos, Ogun and Ondo where UPN scored 100% victory, clearing all the seats at stake, and won convincingly in Oyo, 38 out of 42 or 90.5%, and Bendel 12 out of 20 or 60%. The NPN as usual won overwhelmingly in the following states: Bauchi 18 out of 20 or 80%, Benue 18 out of 19 or 94.5% and Sokoto 31 out of 37 or 83.8%. In Niger State however, the NPN won all the 10 seats available. That ethnicity played a major role in the House of Representatives Elections cannot also be ruled out.

Table 3.4 1979 State Assembly Election Results

State	No of Seats	Party				
		GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	87	1	-	13	-	73
Bauchi	60	9	-	45	2	4
Bendel	60	-	34	22	-	4
Benue	57	6	-	48	-	3
Borno	72	59	-	11	2	-
Cross River	84	16	7	58	-	3
Gongola	63	25	18	15	1	4
Imo	90	2	-	9	-	79
Kaduna	99	10	3	64	16	6
Kano	138	3	1	11	123	-
Kwara	42	2	15	25	-	-
Lagos	36	-	36	-	-	-
Niger	30	2	-	28	-	-
Ogun	36	-	36	-	-	-
Ondo	66	-	65	1	-	-
Oyo	126	-	117	9	-	-
Plateau	48	3	-	10	-	35
Rivers	42	-	1	26	-	15
Sokoto	111	19	-	92	-	-

Source: Richard A Joseph 1991, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise And Fall of the Second Republic Ibadan, Spectrum Books P. 126.

The distribution in this table did not deviate from the previous ones. The NPP as usual won convincingly in Anambra and Imo States. In the former, it won 73 out of 87 seats or 83.9% while in the latter it collected 79 out of 90 seats or 87.8%. The UPN also conquered all the States in the former Western Region by winning all the seats in Lagos and Ogun States. In Ondo and Oyo it won 65 of 66 or 98.5 and 117 out of 126 or 92.9% respectively. In Bendel State, the UPN did fairly well by winning a little over 50% of seats. The NPN also won its safe States of Benue 48 out of 57 or 84.2%, Kaduna 64 out of 99 or 64.7%, Niger 28 out of 30 or 93.3% and Sokoto 92 out of 11 or 82.9%.

Table 3.5 1979 Gubernatorial Election Results

State	Party	Governor
Anambra	NPP	Mr Jim Nwobodo
Bauchi	NPN	Alh. Tatari Ali
Bendel	UPN	Prof. Ambrose Ali
Benuel	NPN	Mr Aper Aku
Borno	GNPP	Alh. Mohammed Goni
Cross River	NPN	Dr Clement Isong
Gongola	GNPP	Alh. A. Barde
Imo	NPP	Mr Samuel Mbakwe
Kaduna	PRP	Alh. Balarabe Musa
Kano	PRP	Alh. Abubakar Rimi
Kwara	NPN	Alh. Adamu Atta
Lagos	UPN	Alh. Lateef Jakande
Niger	NPN	Alh. Awwal Ibrahim
Ogun	UPN	Chief Bisi Onabanjo
Ondo	UPN	Mr Michael Ajasin
Oyo	UPN	Mr Bola Ige Mr
Plateau	NPP	Solomon Lar
Rivers	NPN	Chief Melford Okilo
Sokoto	NPN	Alh. Muhammadu Kanjiwa

Source: Richard A. Joseph 1991, Democracy And Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise And Fall of the Second Republic, Ibadan, Spectrum Books P 127.

From the above table NPP as usual won the gubernatorial

elections in the two states of the Anambra and Imo both of the former Easter Region while the UPN too cleared all the States of the former Western Region viz Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Bendel. The NPN also had the upper hand in the former Northern Region in such States as Bauchi, Benue, Niger, Kwara and Sokoto.

A comparison of the four tables above reveals something peculiar about Kaduna State. It is the only state in which all the five political parties at least either had votes or won a seat in the four elections. It is therefore not surprising that while the State Assembly was under the firm grip of the NPN (it won 64.6% of the seats) the Gubernatorial election was won by Alh. Balarabe Musa on the platform of the PRP.

Table 3.6 1979 Presidential Election Results

State	Total Votes	Candidates				
		Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP)	Obafemi Awolowo (UPN)	Shehu Shagari (NPN)	Aminu Kano (PRP)	Nnandi Azikiwe (NPP)
		% of votes Received	% of votes Received	% of votes Received	% of vote Received	% of votes Received
Anambra	1209 038	1.67	0.75	13.50	1.20	82.58
Bauchi	998 683	15.44	3.00	62.48	14.34	4.72
Bendel	669 511	1.23	53.23	36.19	0.73	8.60
Benue	538 879	7.89	2.57	76.39	1.35	11.71
Borno	710 968	54.04	3.35	34.71	6.52	1.35
C/River	661 103	15.14	11.76	66.40	1.01	7.66
Gongola	639 138	34.09	21.67	35.52	4.34	4.35
Imo	1153 355	3.00	0.64	8.80	0.89	86.67
Kaduna	1382 712	13.80	6.68	43.12	31.66	4.72
Kano	1220 763	1.54	1.23	19.94	76.41	0.91
Kwara	354 604	5.71	39.48	53.62	0.67	0.52
Lagos	828 414	0.48	83.30	7.18	0.47	9.57
Niger	383 347	16.50	3.69	74.88	3.99	1.11
Ogun	744 668	0.53	92.11	6.23	0.31	0.32
Ondo	1369 849	0.26	94.51	4.19	0.18	0.86
Oyo	1396 547	0.57	85.78	12.75	0.32	0.55
Plateau	548 405	6.82	5.29	34.73	3.98	49.17
Rivers	687 951	2.18	10.33	72.65	0.46	14.35
Sokoto	1348 697	26.61	2.52	66.58	3.33	0.92
%		10	29.2	33.8	10.3	16.7

Source: Richard A. Joseph 1991, Democracy And Presidential Politics in Nigeria: The Rise And Fall of the Second Republic, Ibadan, Spectrum Books

The table above did not deviate from the previous ones. The pattern of elections for most of the states of the federation therefore, followed the same pattern. But for a few states, ethnicity was predominant in all the five elections.

3.6 The Exit of The Military From Politics

The heavy military presence was an advantage to the electoral process because it brought about a veiled threat of immediate military retribution should law and order break down (Joseph 1991:156 quoted). Lt. Gen. Obasanjo's final disengagement was around the corner. At the end of the 1979 General Elections, the NPN had control of almost 12 out of the 19 states of the Federation. The NPN not only secured the greatest number of seats in the National House of Assembly Elections, 168 out of 449, its closest rival won 111 seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate it secured 36 seats out of 95 while UPN, occupying the second position won 28 seats. The NPN again got the highest number of votes in the Presidential Election. It obtained approximately 5.7 million votes as against that of nearly 5 million the UPN secured. On the over all performance of the NPN in the elections. Joseph (1991:154) aptly put it thus:

The leading party, NPN, was able to win an impressive spread of votes and positions throughout the country which rendered it either the dominant party or second best in all 19 States of the Federation.

It was not until August 16th, 1979, that Alh. Shehu Shagari, the Presidential flag bearer of the NPN was declared winner of the August 11th Presidential Elections by FEDECO for having met the provision of section 34(1) of Electoral Decree No 73 of 1977 by receiving the highest number of popular votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of the States of the Federation (New Nigerian, August 17th, 1979) .

Lt. Gen. Obasanjo's predecessor, Gen Muhammed, had vowed to the nation not to stay in power beyond October 1st, 1979 a promise which was upheld by his successor. Consequently, remarkable is the fact that since July, 29th, 1975, the FMG had followed its table for a return to civilian rule (religiously) phase by phase (Oyediran 1979:223).

Alh. Shehu Shagari having been declared winner by FEDECO was on 1st October, 1979 sworn in as the first Executive President of Nigeria. This event thus terminated 13 years of military rule in Nigeria.

Mohammed/Obasanjo's transition programme proves our argument that transition to civil rule will succeed, irrespective of the duration, if the initiators identify the alternative political elite they want to relinquish power to. Another point worthy of note is the assiduity and conscientiousness with which Obasanjo steered the transition programme. He wanted the programme to succeed and he saw to it that it did. He did not, at least overtly, have any hidden agenda. On the formation of political parties he did nothing to interfere with it. A remarkable feature of the transition programme was that the incumbent, Gen. Obasanjo, did not exhibit any sign of unwillingness to quit and consequently FEDECO which was mandated to oversee all the elections in the transition process acted without fear or favour. It must also be pointed out that despite their long sojourn in politics, no retired political soldier contested any of the major political positions.

3.7 The Fall of the Second Republic

Much literature abound on the rise and fall of the Seocnd Republic. Consequently, to avoid repetition, this study will like to put on record that as usual disagreement over the results of the 1983 General Elections contributed in no small way to the demise of the Second Republic.

Newswatch (1988 February 2nd) vividly paints the picture thus:

And the elections of 1983 became widely disputed on account of the widespread vote-thefts, it seemed that the Rubicon had been crossed. The election or the rigging of it became the last straw that broke this political camel's back.

Put differently West Africa (August 4, 1996) pointed out that:

Attempts to manufacture victory where support did not exist provoked violence on a large scale, wrangling among political leaders of the various ethnic groups over election results seemed to have alerted the already politicised military that it was time to overthrow the corrupt politicians of the Second Republic.

In the same vein Joseph (1991:183) commented thus:

Quite fundamentally, therefore, Nigeria mid-1983 was faced with the legitimizing of its competitive party system as well as with the more threatening situation that officials of the state itself were losing the capacity to compel compliance with their dictates..In short Constitutional democracy in Nigeria was just overthrown three months after the General Elections of 1983, it had also by then been substantially eroded from within.

The military had ruled consecutively for 13 years ie (1966-1979) while their civilian counterparts had ruled from 1960-1966 and 1979-1983. The Second Republic was moribund. President Alh. Shehu Shagari had just completed his first four-year term in office and had barely commenced the second term when the military

struck again. This ushered in the Gen. Buhari military regime on

31st December, 1983.

When Gen Buhari assumed the mantle of leadership, his major pre-occupation was not to clean the Aegean stable and hand over power to civilians immediately. Larry Diamond et al (1997xv) put it without mincing words that the two officers at the helm of the new regime, Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon, gave no sign of any plan to return the country to civilian rule while ruling with repressiveness and inflexibility out of character with previous military regimes.

This is to justify what Yakubu Muhammed (1988:6) said:

"Once the military is in power it should not have any pretences. It is in power to play politics.

Anthony Akinola (1996:1181) put it emphatically thus:

Gen Muhammadu Buhari who took over the reins of government was not in a hurry to discuss the future of democracy in Nigeria. This was a mis-reading of the mood of Nigerians and he was soon overthrown.

Both Buhari and Idiagbon saw their regimes as a corrective one and set to work immediately towards that direction. Sooner or later however, their government became unpopular. The end of the regime is succinctly captured by Larry Diamond et al (1997 xv) in these words:

Less than twenty-four months after taking office, on August 27, 1985 they (ie Buhari and Idiagbon) were overthrown in a bloodless coup by their Army Chief-of-staff, Gen Ibrahim Babangida.

3.8.1 TWISTS AND TURNS IN BABANGIDA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

Just as Gen Murtala Muhammed did after taking over power from Gen Yakubu Gowon, Gen Ibrahim Babangida spared no time at all in

announcing plans for a return to civil rule immediately he assumed office. Larry Diamond et al (1997 xv) describe Gen Babangida's transition programme as one of the most complex, imaginative and expensive...that has ever been attempted any where.

The Buhari-Idiagbon regime adopted a fire-brigade approach to solving the economic problems facing the country by launching a radically deflationary stabilization programme of economic austerity, coupled with creative attempts to raise more foreign exchange earnings--thus ushering in the second austerity period in Nigeria. Tight fiscal and monetary policies were introduced as public expenditures were reduced, money supply was constrained, interest rates were increased, new taxes were levied and the cost of many social services was passed on to consumers for the first time (Diamond et al 1997:336).

Gen Babangida on the other hand realised the need for political transition and economic restructuring to go parri passu. This has been emphasized by Shonekan (1998:1) among other things thus:

...how to transform our country's economy within the shortest possible time in the face of numerous constraints has come to the fore as two most important issues that rank highest on the list of our national priorities. The other issue of top most priority being how to enthrone a stable democratic polity and reverse the cycle of instability and political turbulence of past years.

3.8.2 Gen Babangida Economic Policies

Like the Political Reforms, Gen Babangida's Economic Reforms were also all embracing. Nigeria's economic problems which Gen.

Babangida inherited take their roots from the early 1980s as result of a dramatic decline in the country's petroleum earnings (Larry Diamond) et al 1997:335 quoted). Alhaji Shehu Shagari's first four-year term in office saw Nigeria's external debt sky rocketing between \$12 and \$16 billion. Much of this debt was short term and derived from private, commercial sources. In spite of the new credit, industrial production began to fall, work stoppages increased, and as petroleum revenues continued to decline, the manufacturing sector was starved of inputs vital for its import-intensive production.

The stringent economic policies introduced by Buhari did not ameliorate the suffering of Nigerians as Diamond et al (1997:337) observe thus:

. . . .The economic policy was not without substantial costs: real growth rates continued to decline, thousands of civil servants were laid off, real wages fell precipitously, urban unemployment sky rocketed and industrial sector activity was drastically curtailed. The economy had been stabilized but at a considerable cost to the Nigerian people both in terms of standards of living and in terms unprecedented levels of political repression.

Consequently, on ascending the throne, not only did Gen Babangida criticize his predecessor's economic policies as austerity without adjustment (West Africa 1985 September 2nd) but also vowed not to abrogate the discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The third period of austerity was ushered in when a National Economic Emergency Decree was promulgated by Gen Babangida in his Independence Anniversary Broadcast to the nation in 1985. He then in his usual characteristic manner threw the debate on whether or

not to go for the IMF loan to the nation. Consequently, two camps

emerged: Those in favour and those against it.

On the former Diamond et al (1997:338) point out that support for an agreement with the fund came primary from prominent indigenous entrepreneurs in the Lagos area, a number of professional economists and the Lagos Chamber of Commerce (while those opposing it came mainly from) organised labour... a number of urban professionals, students, academics and several journalists. One can therefore, discern that on the IMF debate the forces against the collection of the loan far out-weighed those in its favour.

Gen Babangida introduced sweeping economic reforms in the 1986 Budget broadcast on New Year Eve ie December 31st, 1985).

Among the measures announced were the following:

... adoption of a realistic exchange rate Policy, further rationalization/restructuring of the customs tariffs, the adoption of appropriate pricing policies especially for petroleum products and public enterprises. (New Nigerian 1st January 1986).

Directly or indirectly therefore, the value of the Naira had fallen in relation to the Dollar. This by implication meant the satisfaction of the three substantive conditions laid down by the IMF viz major devaluation of the Naira, trade liberalization and a reduction of most (80%) of the government subsidy on domestic petroleum prices (Diamond et al 1997:339) .

Gen. Babangida launched SAP in July, 1986 and among the main features are the following:

a plan to strengthen demand management policies,

liberalize both trade and foreign exchange regimes, rationalize and restructure the tariff system, reduce administrative controls to allow for a greater role in market mechanisms, adopt measures to stimulate domestic production, institute market - determined pricing policies and encourage privatization.

(Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) structural Adjustment for Nigeria, Lagos, Federal Government Printer 1986:8-9).

With this new exchange rate, the Second-Tier-Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) was introduced to auction currency. This was later replaced by way of unification of multiple exchange rates foreign Exchange Market (FEM) (Diamond et al 1997:340).

To reduce government expenditure, government subsidies on fertilizer and petroleum products were withdrawn. The issuance of trade licences were abrogated. Subsidized credits were either withdrawn or lowered while foreign exchange controls were liberalized.

Programmes to boost exports were initiated whilst the existing marketing boards were done away with. To enable unhindered transportation of agricultural products, the Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) was launched to open up the rural areas.

Nigerians, naturally reacted violently to the realities of SAP when the Labour Minister was hackled at a May Day, Rally in Lagos, there was rioting by traders, butchers and the unemployed in Minna, Niger State (Diamond et al 1997:344). These were the first SAP riots.

SAP brought in the much needed respite to the Economy when throughout 1988 and 1989, there were signs that SAP was trying to have the desired effects in some areas of the economy (Biersteker, 1990:346 quoted) The country's balance of payment had been favourable ever since the military resumed power in 1984 and there had been notable increase in foreign exchange reserves. There were exports of substantial growth in domestic production of cotton and cocoa, a general increase in agricultural production, a resurgence of the oil palm industry in the Eastern parts of the country and a dramatic rise in the non-oil exports. The textile industry was described as " a national model of backward integration", reducing a unprecedented 250% increase in output and a 300% increase in total revenue in 1987 (West Africa April 18th, 1988) .

Inspite of the foregoing progress in the economy, especially in the non-oil sector, there was growing evidence that compensatory policy measures necessary for the operation of SAP were not fully implemented. Loans for the Nigerian Agricultural Credit Bank (NACB) intended for farmers were alledgely ending up in the hands of military officers moving into farming for the first time (West Africa 1988 October 31st).

With the economy biting hard, May and June 1989 witnessed what now is popularly known as SAP Riots in which unconfirmed reports claim that as many as 50 lives were lost (Newswatch June 12, 1989). Diamond et al 1997:348-9) aptly observed that :

the Babangida government was severely shaken by the SAP riots of May and June 1989. (That) up till this time it had skillfully managed to guide an ambitious

transformation of national economic policy despite growing opposition to many of its policies. The unrest highlighted a widening sentiment that the burdens of adjustment were not being equally shared by all Nigerians. (E.g) the military as an institution was increasingly identified as one of the principal beneficiaries of the SAP and its leadership was accordingly being called into question along with the programme of economic reforms.

Gen. Babangida descended heavily on the rioters. Academics were targeted and consequently six Universities in the Southern part of the country were shut to forestall escalation of the riots. Besides, he introduced what Diamond et al (1997:349) described as cosmetic measures and a rhetorical campaign designed to shore up the adjustment programme. The carrot was also dangled before the critics of SAP besides the stick. The government for instance, instructed the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) to create more job opportunities for the unemployed. To augment the manufacture and procurement of drugs, foreign exchange was to be made accessible to pharmaceutical companies. The transport sector also got a boost since buses, commercial vehicles and spare parts were to be imported duty-free. To encourage small-scale informal sector business, the People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN) was set up in 1989 to provide loans to individuals.

On the whole, the reform in the exchange rate did not stabilize the economy nor did the donor countries approve it. Rather it resulted in excess demand for foreign exchange thereby forcing the value of the naira to depreciate against other currencies.

Among the economic reforms, and to increase the Local Government share of the national cake, the revenue collection

formulation was appraised in favour of the third tier of government.

As pointed out earlier, Gen. Babangida adopted a two-pronged approach ie the political transition and economic reforms. Having analysed the latter therefore, let's now throw our search light on the former.

3.8.3 THE POLITICAL BUREAU

To show that the economic restructuring and political reforms go hand in hand, Gen. Babangida ended his Budget Broadcast programme on December 31st, 1985 with a political programme for the nation. Just as he approved the restructuring of the economy, most especially, pertaining to the IMF loan, he was not going to impose the political reform on the country, rather there was to be yet another public debate, this time on the country's future political system.

On January 13th, 1986, however, Gen. Babangida announced a transition to a democratically-elected civilian rule by October, 1990 ie within a four-year period. Subsequently, he appointed a 17 member political Bureau headed by Dr Sam Cookey. Among the terms of reference, the Bureau was to develop the outlines of the new government and the transition schedule.

Not only individuals but groups were asked to forward memoranda, newspaper articles, take part in discussion on the air and television. It was to oversee the organization of conferences, seminars and symposia.

Oyediran (1997:71) points out that while some groups and organizations were sponsored to do these things by the Bureau, others paid for their own. Also individuals in the academic and other professional bodies were commissioned to prepare papers on various topics. Thirty-one such copies were commissioned.

The members toured all the nooks and crannies of the country and at the end of their assignment, the Bureau held 149 meetings and received 27 324 contributions from individuals and groups including almost 15000 memoranda, almost 4000 newspaper articles, 1723 recorded cassettes and video-tapes, 2214 papers on debates and conferences, 13729 summaries of debates and interviews and 703 contributions made at public hearings organised by the Bureau (Oyediran, 1997:71 quoted).

3.8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU (PB) AND THE RESPONSE BY THE GOVERNMENT

It was not difficult to recommend the form of government for the nation because of its huge size and heterogeneity. Oyediran (1997:79) put it vividly thus:

The Bureau found out that in terms of responses, a considerable number of Nigerians support the continuation of the Presidential form of government. Presidentialism had an easy ride. This was accepted by the government.

Choosing between bicameral and unicameral legislature, the Political Bureau (PB) tilted towards the latter. The government on the other hand preferred the former and consequently, accepted the 1979 Constitution provision on this regard (Oyediran, 1997:86).

The Bureau recommended that representatives to both the Senate and National Legislature should be done territorially ie each Local Government Area was to be, represented by one parliamentarian while at the State level, the number should be increased from one to three. The government however, did not buy this recommendation.

According to Oyediran (1997:87), on the issue of form of representation whether based on population, territory or functional/interest group-Government flatly rejected the Bureau's recommendation that representation on the basis of territory (ie Local Government) be adopted.

Recommending the appropriate political structure for the country, the PB proposed the adoption of federalism because of the members were not initially united in their positions on the issue, their exposure to the diversity of Nigeria during the various tours changed them to strong federalists (Oyediran 1997:81). This comprised a three-tier level of government - Federal, State and Local which was approved by the government.

For Parliamentarians to make meaningful contribution to the development of the country, the PB recommended the need for high calibre membership of the legislative (Oyediran, 1997:82 quoted).

Two-party system was recommended by the PB and the government subsequently approved and adopted it. On monitoring the activities of Political Parties, the PB recommended the establishment of National Commission on Parties and Elections. This body was also to be responsible for the conduct and organization of elections, Though the government accepted the

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recommendation, she wanted its name be changed to National Electoral Commission (NEC).

On the duration of government, the PB put forward a five-year life span for the Third Republic and three years for Local Government but the FMG reduced the former by one year and retained the latter.

Even though majority of the members of the PB did not want Gen Ibrahim Babangida to change the date he promised to hand over ie 1990, two dissenting voices made the government to shift the date to 1992.

Besides the PB, other structures set up by the FMG included the centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) headed by Prof. Omo Omoruyi. Highlighting the functions of the CDS, Prof Omo Omoruyi said:

We conduct training programmes to reinforce democratic political behaviour. We conduct research into sources of anti-democratic behaviour and attitudes with a view to correcting discovered pathologies through training. (The Democrat June 23, 1993:3).

Gen. Ibrahim Babangida had a firm belief that any meaningful development should commence from the local government level. Consequently, to him, with the strengthening of local governments as the third tier of government, the often repeated argument of neglect will become a thing of the past (Oyediran, 1997:2050; Daily Times, June 15, 1988).

According to Oyediran (1997:211), there were six reform measures actually undertaken during the transition period viz: creation of more local government areas, election into local government councils; strengthening local government autonomy;

structural and institutional innovations, boosting the morale and productivity of local government personnel and anti-democratic tendencies under the regime.

On the creation of more local government areas, the regime increased the number from 301 to 453. The Federal Electoral Commission (NEC) took over the conduct of elections into the Local Government Councils. There were to be between 10-20 Councilors. Since Local government occupied a prime position in the transition programme, the PB had proposed that elections should begin at the local government level and end at the Federal level (Oyediran, 1997:214). It should be pointed out that there had been registration of voters from October 12th to November 30th, 1987. The first of this multi-stage election took place at the local government level on 12th December, 1987. And the secret ballot was adopted. This was the first step of the journey to the Third Republic. The Local Government election at this stage was to be conducted on non partisan basis to enable individuals to be elected on merit. This was to be the acid test of the transition programme because the assumption was that should election at the local level be successful, then those at the state and federal levels would follow suit.

Partisan elections at the local government level were however, held in December, 1990. This time around, the secret ballot gave way to the open ballot system.

(Oyediran (1997:216) points out that after the debut open ballot at the 1990 local government elections, many modifications were introduced. These local government elections, therefore, provided opportunities for correcting

electoral errors of omission and commission in preparation for elections to higher levels of government.

Local government autonomy was strengthened when in his 1988 Independence Day Address President Babangida announced that Local Government Councils would henceforth receive their revenue allocations directly from the Federation Account (Cyediran, 1997:216) and this was entrenched in the 1989 constitution Section 160(4) thus:

Any amount standing to the credit of Local Governments in the Federation Account shall be allocated directly to the Local Government concerned. (Cyediran 1997:216 quoted).

Local Government share from the Federation Account also appreciated thus: 10% to 15% in 1991, Later to 20% to the detriment of States' shares. Besides, the States were to top these figures with additional 10% from their revenues derived internally.

To make them stronger still, the Ministry of Local Government at the State level was done away with and in its stead was to be a Department of Local Government in the State Governor's Office. The function of this new unit was not to control but specifically to guide, advise and assist the Local Governments in the discharge of their functions outlined in the constitution.

As the revenue due to the Local Governments increased, they were to provide some basic needs to their communities. Initially, they were to fund primary education but the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT) went on strike against this decision. Consequently, the government backed down.

The structural and institutional innovations included the following: (Oyediran 1997:219)

1. The Local Government Chairman should be the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of his Council. In this sense, he is accountable both while in and out of office like the Minister and Commissioner in the Federal and State Governments.
2. The Vice-Chairman and Supervisory Councilors should become political heads of their respective departments, members of the Finance and General Purposes Committee and in that position constitute the Local Government cabinet.
3. Councils should not have more than four departments in addition to Personnel Management, Finance, Supplies, Planning, Research and Statistics.
4. Establishment of a junior Staff Management Committee (Under the Chairmanship of the Head of Personnel Management) to determine personnel matters of Council employees between level 01-06.
5. Creation of a Local Government Department in each State Governor's Office responsible for Accounting Codes, and procedure, training, financial Management and Guidelines and circular issued from the Governors office.
6. Appointment of a qualified accountant as Council's internal auditor with functions similar to the Auditors General in the Federal and State Governments.
7. Creation of audit alarm Committees to perform identification functions as those at other levels.
8. Direct election of Local Government Chairmen. Heads of

Departments were to be designated Supervisors and the Office of the Secretary General to be political. 9. Local Governments were to send one and three representatives) to the Central and State Legislatures respectively.

To boost the morale and productivity of local government personnel, the Federal military Government adopted for the first time, Approved scheme of Service for local Government Employees on March 8th, 1988 (Oyediran 1997:221 quoted).

In spite of the foregoing far reaching reforms to local Governments and showing its true colour as a military regime, by Decree 15th of 1989, the President was given the Sweeping powers to dissolve any Local Government during the transition period if he was not satisfied with its management or for any other reasons which he deemed appropriate. By this decree, therefore, the government uncovered its anti-democratic tendencies.

3.8.5 NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (NEC)

The electoral process is usually overseen by a commission and since the civilian regimes in the post-independence era are moribund as a result of incessant military intervention, these electoral commissions wither with the civilian regimes.

It would be recalled that Gen. Obasanjo set up FEDECO to referee his transition programme while Gen. Babangida also set up NEC to supervise his own process of transition.

Decree No 23 of 1987 brought NEC into being. And its composition is as follows: i) Chairman ii) 8 Commissioners appointed by the National Council of State on the nomination of

the President. The first Chairman of NEC was Prof. Ema Ewa (Ema Ewa 1997:127) who later having resigned was succeeded by Prof. Humphrey Nwosu.

The NEC was given wide ranging powers over the entire transition programme. It was to organise, conduct and supervise all elections into all elective offices; to provide rules governing the qualifications to vote and be voted for; to provide guidelines, rules and regulations for the emergence, recognition and registration of parties; to register two political parties and determine their eligibility to sponsor candidates for effective offices, to monitor the organization and conduct of the parties and their financing; to monitor political campaigns, providing the rules and regulations governing the parties; to recommend the amount of funds required for the organization and conduct of the parties and arrange annual examination and auditing of their funds; and to carry out delimitation of constituencies, the registration of voters and the preparation of voters' registers (Ema Ewa, 1997:128).

3.8.6 PARTY FORMATION UNDER GEN BABANGIDA

Any time the military seize power, the action they take among other things include the dissolution of parliament, the suspension of the constitution and the banning of all political activities and by extension, the dissolution of all existing political parties. When the time comes therefore, for political activities to be resurrected, there is the need for political parties to be formed again. Since most past political activities are marred by

violence, the incumbent military government takes all the necessary precautions to avoid politics of violence.

One of the commonest measures taken is that all the parties in the ancien regime are banned forthwith and permanently. This is why the names of the first generation parties like the NPC, NCNC, NEPU or AG are never heard of again as political parties. What usually happens is that they reincarnate under different names.

General Babangida lifted the ban on politics on May 3rd, 1989 and NEC released the document: 'Main Guidelines to Formation of Political Parties' and among the requirements was the payment of N50000-non-refundable by any association willing to be registered as a political party. To avoid ethno-religious politics, each association was to show the spread of its membership. Besides, all constitutions and manifestoes were to be attached to the application. The requirements were made stiff to enable only parties with broad based membership to evolve.

Application forms were to be purchased from July 1st to July 19th, 1989. Only 13 associations could purchase the forms. NEC undertook to verify the authenticity of the information on the forms. This was thorough. NEC deployed its staff to go all over the country and cross-check the claims of the various associations. Through random sampling, NEC was able to establish that all the associations had, in varying degrees made false claims on the extent of their presence in all the nooks and crannies of the country with respect to the number of members and staff as well as offices (Akinteriwa, 1997:185-186).

Besides, NEC discovered that the associations were highly personalized which led to factionalism. Based on this, NEC made the observation that if anything at all, only 6 out of the 13 associations were worthy of being registered as political parties as indicated in the table below:

TABLE 3.7 OVER ALL PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS AS RANKED BY THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (NEC)

ASSOCIATION	MEMBERSHIP		ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION		MANIFESTO	TOTAL	RANKING
	Size	Spread	Size	Spread			
	25.00	25.00	15.00	15.00			
People's Solidarity Party (PSP)	8.70	5.30	9.30	8.10	12.50	43.90	1st
Nigerian National Congress (NNC)	4.30	7.80	9.70	8.50	12.30	42.60	2nd
People's Front of Nigeria (PFN)	5.20	5.20	9.40	7.90	13.50	41.20	3rd
Liberal Convention (CL)	2.50	5.10	9.00	7.20	10.20	34.00	4th
Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)	0.10	0.90	4.20	3.60	9.10	17.90	5th
Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN)	0.50	2.10	3.10	2.90	8.40	17.00	6th
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	0.07	0.30	2.10	1.50	7.80	11.77	7th
Ideal People's Party (IPP)	0.03	0.14	0.94	0.77	7.60	9.48	8th
United Nigeria Democratic Party (UNDP)	0.04	0.17	1.68	1.39	5.80	9.08	9th
National Union Party (NUP)	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	7.88	7.93	10th
National Patriotic Party (PPP)	0.03	0.20	1.10	0.90	4.60	6.83	11th
Patriotic Nigeria Party (PNP)	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.07	3.30	3.46	12th
Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party (NPWP)	0.01	0.02	0.24	0.17	0.00	0.44	13th

From the table above, it can be deduced that none of the 13 associations met up to 50% of the requirements. The first 3 had a mean of 42.57%. Since the first two did not meet the criteria set up by NEC and two parties at all cost must be registered, NEC recommended to the AFRC to select the two parties from the first six. Gen Babangida in his usual characteristic move pulled out a surprise. Akinfenriwa (1997:187) put it graphically thus:

On October 7th, 1989, while politicians waited patiently to know which two of the 6 (of all 13) associations that sought registration would be registered, the President surprised, indeed stunned the nation: He announced the military's decision to deny all the 13 associations and to create instead two new parties - National Republican Convention (NRC) - a little to Right and Social Democratic Party (SDP) a little to the Left.

The politicians therefore, had no option but to regroup under

the umbrella of both political parties. It was these two political parties which eventually produced Alh. Uthman Tofa and Chief M.K.O. Abiola as the Presidential flag bearers for the NRC and SDP respectively during the June 12 1993 Presidential Election.

3.8.7 THE 1991 STATE ELECTIONS

There were primaries for selection of candidates for the 1991 State Elections. To ensure that there was a smooth transition to civil rule, the FMG banned certain category of politicians, who later were termed " old breed politicians' while new breed politicians were encouraged to take up the mantle. Even though overtly these old politicians had been banned Agbese and Anim (1997:238) observed that:

the struggles for nomination in the two parties were carried on under the looming shadows of the influence of the banned politicians. . . .Every one knew. . that many of the new breed voices were those of Jacob' s. Only the hand belonged to Esau.

The primaries could not hold on the initial date of August 24, 1991 because of the creation of new States and local governments. This action, Agbese and Anim (1997:238) pointed out affected the transition time table (and) the creation of new local governments compounded the situation. The primaries were eventually held on October 19th, 1991. During the exercise the two major types of rigging identified were inflation of figures and questionable handling of results by the electoral officers (Agbese & Anim 1997:243).

Protests upon protests against the results of the primaries forced the government to cancel the results of the primaries in 9 out of the 30 states of the Federation on 25th November, 1991.

The States affected were Kogi, Kano, Anambra, Imo, Jigawa, Rivers, Adamawa, Lagos and Enugu. Gubernatorial elections were subsequently held on December 14th, 1991.

TABLE 3.8 THE RESULTS OF THE DECEMBER 14, 1991 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS.

States	Total Votes Cast	NRC Candidate	% of Vote	SDP Candidate	% of Vote	Winni ng Party
Abia	424 495	Dr O. Omu	72.6	Dr S.Eke	27.4	NRC
Adamawa	627 574	Alh. A. Michika	55.6	D.G. Mustapha	44.4	NRC
Akwa-Ibom	1013 092	Isemin A. James	59.0	Etuk E. Samson	41.0	NRC
Anambra	506 305	N. Eriobuna	48.3	Emaka Ezeife	51.7	SDP
Bauchi	1758 216	D. Mohammed	86.7	A. Bulkachuwa	13.3	NRC
Benue	864 444	Prof. I. Ayua	46.7	Rev.Fr.M. Adasu	53.3	SDP
Borno	557 456	Abba G. Terab	48.9	M. Maaji Lawan	51.1	SDP
Cross River	536 474	Clement D. Ebri	53.6	Ntufam M. Ojong	46.4	NRC
Delta	764 499	Prof. E. Opia	37.3	Chief Felix Ibru	62.7	SDP
Edo	507 394	Lucky Igbinedion	48.7	Chief John Oyegun	51.3	SDP
Enugu	761 620	Dr O. Nwodo	60.4	G. Gbazuagu	39.6	NRC
Imo	658 503	Chief E. Enwerem	58.7	Dr Alex Obi	41.3	NRC
Jigawa	359 421	Alh. Buba Aliyu	33.4	Alh. A.S.B. Kudu	66.6	SDP
Kaduna	1186 359	Alh Dab Lere	55.3	Prof A. Abdullahi	44.7	NRC
Kano	579 613	Alh. Kabiru Gaiya	56.4	Engr M. Abdullahi	43.6	NRC
Katsina	568 612	Alh. Barabe Saidu	51.1	U.M. Yar'Adua	48.9	NRC
Kebbi	399 559	Alh. A. Musa	74.3	Alh. Abubakar Koko	25.7	NRC
Kogi	528 378	Abubakar Audu	56.8	Dr Stephen Achima	43.2	NRC
Kwara	436 494	Alh. Salimonu	25.1	Alh. M.S. Lafiagi	74.9	SDP
Lagos	780 620	Chief M. Otedola	54.4	Yemi Edu	45.6	NRC
Niger	499 287	Dr Musa Inuwa	57.8	Alh. Egba Enagi	42.2	NRC
Ogun	410 041	Chief Femi Coker	28.0	Chief S. Osaba	72.0	SDP
Ondo	562 551	A. Ogunlade	33.4	B. Oluamilua	66.6	SDP
Osun	442 851	Adebayo Salami	43.3	Isiaka A. Adeleke	56.7	SDP
Oyo	593 453	Alh. A. Y. Ayoade	42.5	Chief K Ishola	57.5	SDP
Plateau	1309 803	Bagudu M. Hirse	40.8	Fidelis Tapgun	59.2	SDP
Rivers	1836 389	Rufu A. George	52.00	Chief E.Eso	48.00	NRC
Sokoto	587 618	Alh. Y. Abdulkarim	82.7	Alh. Z.S. Magori	17.3	NRC
Taraba	834 635	Dr A.S. Jalingo	42.1	Rev. Jily Ngame	57.9	SDP
Yobe	232 387	Maina A.Sadiq	45.0	Alh. Bukar Ibrahim	55.00	SDP

Source: Diamond et al, 1997:249.

From the table above, it can be deduced that out of the 30 states of the Federation, SDP won 14 while NRC won 16. The Core Hausa-Fulani northern states like Kano, Katsina and Sokoto voted for NRC, the Party which was a little to the right while in the former Western States of Ondo, Ogun, Osun and Oyo the SDP, which was a party a little to the left won. Among them only Lagos went to NRC because of intra-party crisis in the SDP and consequently Agbese and Anim (1997:248) put it bluntly that the man (Chief Odetola) and his party (NRC) had reaped the benefits of the crisis in the SDP. In the House of Assembly Election however, the SDP

defeated the NRC by winning 629 seats as against 543 clinched by the NRC.

3.8.8 THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

The 1992 National Assembly Election oscillated as the other previous elections. Initially, they were to hold in the first quarter of 1992, however, they were shifted once and then they were to hold on July 4th, 1992. Osaghae (1997:256) gives his verdict that these shifts were to have disruptive effects on the National Assembly elections. The initial euphoria and enthusiasm which greeted the renaissance of politics after six years of uninterrupted rule in the post-Second Republic period withered away. Contestants were to successfully scale through primaries conducted on party basis.

NEC demanded deposits of 15000 Naira and 10000 Naira from contestants for Senate and House of Representatives respectively. The parties too squeezed some thing from the candidates. The SDP demanded 10000 Naira and 30000 Naira from prospective House of Representative members and Senators respectively while the corresponding deposits for NRC were 5000 Naira and 30000 Naira respectively.

Apart from these huge deposits, aspirants also had to scale through the scrupulous screening exercises set up by the machinery of the two parties. It was after having satisfied all the requirements that a candidate was qualified to get registered. Osaghae (1997:257) made the following observation that:

even where all these were completed, and the candidate had actually scaled through the primaries, he was still subject to the omnipotent powers of NEC under Decree 48 of 1991 and Decree 6 of 1992.

Just as the main elections were shifted, so were the primaries. They were rescheduled from 16th May to 23 May, 1992 because the voters' register was under review. There was religious crisis in two states: Kaduna and Kano. Consequently, the primaries in both states were held a week later. The main elections were however, held on July 4th, 1992. One could therefore say that candidates did not have time for effective campaign, but this is debunked by Osaghae (1997:260) who pointed out that:

however candidates undertook various forms of campaign ranging from newspaper and radio/television advertisements to rallies in their constituencies...apart from media advertisements, campaign posters displaying the candidates' photographs, party and National Assembly Seats being contested were the commonest campaign features.

Political education was supplemented by NEC and the Directorate of Social Mobilization (MAMSER). This ameliorated the otherwise poor voter turn out as will be discussed later.

The National Assembly Elections were finally conducted on July 4th, 1992; by-elections were however, held in two Senatorial districts in Katsina and Bauchi states while one House of Representatives (HOR) Constituency each in Akwa Ibom, Katsina and Yobe States. Besides these areas where by-elections took place as a result of malpractice, the pre and post elections periods were relatively calm and peaceful.

TABLE 3.9 THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS

State	Senate		House of Representatives Seat	
	NRC	SDP	NRC	SDP
Abia	2	1	12	5
Adamawa	3	-	14	2
AkwaIbom	3	-	18	5
Anambra	1	3	4	12
Bauch	3	-	22	1
Benue	-	3	1	17
Borno	1	2	3	17
C/River	2	1	10	4
Delta	-	3	3	16
Edo	-	3	2	12
Enugu	2	1	13	6
Imo	3	-	18	3
Jigawa	1	2	3	18
Kaduna	2	1	7	11
Kano	1	2	16	18
Katsina	1	2	20	6
Kebbi	3	-	16	-
Kogi	2	1	9	7
Kwara	-	3	-	12
Lagos	-	3	1	14

State	Senate		House of Representatives Seat won	
	NRC	SDP	NRC	SDP
Niger	3	-	18	1
Ogun	-	3	-	15
Ondo	-	3	-	15
Osun	-	3	1	22
Oyo	-	3	3	22
Plateau	-	3	3	20
Rivers	3	-	18	20
Sokoto	3	-	29	-
Taraba	-	3	3	9
Yobe	-	3	1	11
FCT	-	1	3	1
Total	38	53	275	315

Source: Kirk. Greene & Diamond 1997:269.

From the table above it can be discerned that SDP won more seats in both Senate and HOR elections than the NRC: SDP won 53 and 315 in Senate and HOR respectively while NRC managed 38 and 275 correspondingly. This shows that SDP enjoyed a wider acceptance than NRC. In the Local Government Elections too, SDP collected 3765 Seats as against 3360 thus winning a majority of local Councils in 14 of the 21 states while it at the same time produced 315 Chairmen compared to NRC's 274. The State Legislative Elections too produced the same pattern as the other levels of elections. Winning 626 seats to NRC's 541, the SDP secured a

controlling majority in 18 of the 30 states) Osaghae, 1997:267).

In Katsina State SDP lost to NRC in HOR and won 2-1 in the Senatorial elections. In Kaduna State the SDP won the HOR and lost the Senatorial 2-1. The SDP won the only Senatorial seat in FCT but lost the HOR 3-1 to NRC.

3.8.9 THE JUNE 12, 1993 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Gen Babangida had at least on three occasions pledged to leave office at the end of his transition programme just as Gens Mohammed and Obasanjo had done more than a decade earlier. Firstly, on 13th January 1986 whilst inaugurating the PB he had promised that his administration will not stay a day longer than it is absolutely necessary. Secondly in 1987, he said, 1992 will be the final year of disengagement, all things being equal, and thirdly, he reassured in 1991 that, if we have problems in elections, for example in the local government areas, or may be states, subsequently and if we have to cancel one election and try do another-we will try to accommodate them within the transition period (Akinterinwa, 1997:278; Daily Champion August 12, 1991). It must be emphasized that at each of the three appointed times, Gen. Babangida had gone back on his words.

Before delving into the elections proper, however, it is pertinent to digress a little and throw our searchlight on the socio-political environment on the eve of the elections. The year preceding the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election had not been easy for the FMG. In the first instance, on 26th September, 1992, there had been a fatal military aircraft disaster which claimed

the lives of 98 officers from the Nigerian army, 14 from the Navy and 12 from the Air Force (Nigerian Tribune October 1st, 1992) . Besides, there was a serious crisis between Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the FMG which compelled her to sack all University lecturers (The Guardian June 30th, 1993). This prevented any graduation, admission of students or NYSC programme in the entire 1992-93 session. Another incident was the inferno which gutted the Independence Building housing the Ministry of Defence in May, 1993, a month before the Presidential Election,. The socio-political decadence was aggravated by the plight of the National Rail workers who had not been paid for nine months (Guardian, June 10th, 1993).

Akinterinwa (1997:283) pointed out that in politics confusion reigned since most Nigerians were bitterly condemning the Babangida administration: Some particularly for corruption. He further opined that since the creation of the SDP and the NRC in 1997, party politics had been characterized by a breakdown of law and order, thuggery and bitterness.

The race for the Presidency commenced on August 1, 1992 when the parties were asked to nominate their Presidential candidates.

Initially 23 and 40 NRC and SDP candidates indicated their ambition to contest the post. This number however, dwindled as a result of strict conditions imposed by NEC and the two parties. To qualify to contest for the race, NRC and SDP fixed a whopping levy of 500000 Naira and 400000 Naira respectively. Besides those who wanted to vie for the Presidency under the platform of the NRC were required to obtain the signatures of party members from the

existing 589 Local Governments (Vanguard, August 10th 1992). In the final analysis, the SDP and NRC were left with 12 and 9 aspirants respectively.

As an acid test of their popularity and acceptability all the candidates were to contest the primary elections in all the 30 states of the Federation classified into 6 groups of 5 thus: Group 1: Abia, Borno, Delta, Katsina and Kwara Group 2: Anambra, Edo, Jigawa, Oyo and Sokoto Group 3: Benue, Imo, Kaduna, Ogun and Yobe Group 4: Adamawa, Cross River, Kogi, Lagos and Plateau Group 5: Bauchi, Enugu, Kebbi, Ondo and Rivers. Group 6: Akwa Ibom, Kano, Niger, Ogun, Taraba and Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

Starting from August 1, 1992, the States Primaries which were to be conducted on weekly basis, ie every Saturday, from Group 1 through Group 6 was to last till September 5th, 1992.

To emerge as a winner, Akinterinwa (1997:286) summarized the criteria thus: A candidate needed a plurality of votes and one third of the votes cast in not less than two thirds of all the states before he/she could be declared a winner. In the absence of a clear winner, the best two with the highest number of votes were to face each other in a run off election, and the winner to be determined by a simple majority votes. Even though unlike the other previous elections which suffered from inconsistencies, the primaries of the Presidential Election kicked off on the schedule date 1 August, 1992, but owing to malpractice was postponed to three consecutive weeks in September, 1992. These too were marred

and so the FMG was left with no option but to suspend the primaries and authorise the NEC to investigate the allegations by Presidential aspirants against party executives. (The Guardian, October 7th, 1992).

The findings of NEC compelled the FMG to cancel the remaining rounds of the primaries, dissolve the executives of both parties at all levels, disqualify all the Presidential aspirants, order the immediate auditing of the accounts of the two political parties and provide for the establishment of care taker committees to run the affairs of the parties. NEC was subsequently advised to evolve a relatively trouble-free selection process (Akinterinwa, 1997:286).

The NEC set to work and came up with eight alternatives out of which the government chose Option A4 which was a Nigerian electoral method of selecting flag-bearers of the political parties through a modified open Ballot System (MOBS) - Open-Secret-Ballot. Through this method a voter uses his voting by making his choice secretly but casting the vote in the open (Akinteriwa, 1997:287) . This system was to be adopted for the ward, local government, state and national competitions in which only those who win will proceed to the next stage.

To avert any further crisis and to bring the membership of the two parties up to date, they were made to compile the list of their members between 4 and 10th January, 1993. The contestants were screened by NEC the following week. The first stage of the new procedure was to be the ward congresses which were held on February 6, 1993. The ward congress were to elect an electoral

College of 10 members plus the party executives at the ward level. The procedure for nomination was directly closed ie it was open to only registered members of the party. The pictures of the contestants was hung on a board at the polling stations and registered members were to file in front of the picture of their choice. The first ten with the highest number of votes with their executives then went ahead to vote for a Presidential candidate of their choice. The ten elected candidates in each ward, moved on to the next stage of the election which was the local government level.

The election procedure at the local government level was however, indirectly closed ie it was open only to those who were delegates to their respective congresses. All voters were accredited before voting and at the end of the exercise, only candidates with the highest number of votes at the Local Government level proceeded to the State Congresses as the Presidential candidates for the local government level. These were conducted on February 20, 1993.

The primaries at the national level; took place from 27th to 29th March, 1993 for NRC and 27th to 31st March 1993 for the SDP respectively. Both parties had 21 Presidential aspirants each. As usual, all the delegates to the national convention were accredited. Each accredited candidate was to vote for three candidates of their choice and at the end of the day, the first three candidates with the highest number of votes in each party were qualified to proceed to the next round of voting. It was at the end of this second round of voting that the candidate with the

highest number of votes emerged as the Presidential flag bearer of either the SDP or NRC.

The electoral process was therefore very cumbersome and all this was to ensure that a sound democratic system was bequeathed to the nation.

Akinterinwa (1997:288) rightly pointed out that it was on the basis of this Option A4 that Chief M.K.O. Abiola and Alh. Bashir Othman Tofa emerged as the flagbearers of the SDP and the NRC respectively after a very rigorous competition.

The Care taker Committees were dissolved when the national conventions ended. Both parties therefore, elected their executives and immediately set electioneering campaign in motion which lasted from 19th April to 11th June 1993, the eve of the Presidential Election.

The grand finale, the Presidential Election took place throughout the nation on June 12th, 1993. Before the election however, on 10th June 1993, Chief Arthur Nzeribe of Association For Better Nigeria (ABN), had sought an interim injunction restraining NEC from conducting the Presidential Elections on June 12th, 1993 until 1997. NEC turned deaf ear to this and went ahead with the election as scheduled. NEC then started releasing the results of the election on June 15th, 1993. In all the results of 14 states including FCT were released as shown below:

TABLE 3.9.1 JUNE 12 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RATIFIE RESULTS
IN 14 STATES AND THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

	STATE	TOFA	ABIOLA
1.	ABIA	58.96%	41.04
		151 227	105 273
2.	AKWA IBOM	48.14%	51.86%
		199 342	214 782
3.	ANAMBRA	42.89%	57.11%
		159,258	212,024
4.	BORNO	45.60%	54.40%
		128,684	153,496
5.	EDO	33.52%	66.48%
		103,572	205,407
6.	KADUNA	46.36	53.64%
		336,860	389,713
7.	KANO	47.72%	52.28%
		154,809	169,619
8.	KOGI	54.40%	45.60%
		265,732	222,860
9.	KWARA	22.77%	77.23%
		80,209	272,270
10.	LAGOS	14.46%	85.54%
		149,432	883,965
11.	NIGER	61.90%	38.10%
		221,437	136,350
12.	OGUN	12.22%	87.78%
		59,246	425,725
13.	OYO	16.48%	83.52%
		105,788	536,011
14.	PLATEAU	38.32%	83.52%
		259,394	536,011
15.	FCT (ABUJA)	47.84%	52.16%
		18,313	19,968

Sources: i) The Triumph Tuesday June 15th, 1993

ii) The Democrat Tuesday June 15th, 1993

TABLE 3.9.2 JUNE 12TH, 1993 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: PATTERN
AND ORDER OF VOTING ON STATE BASIS

SDP: Abiola/
 Kingibe

States	No of Reg. Votes	% of Voter Turn out Votes	No of SD Votes	% of SDP Votes	% of State in Total SDP Votes National
Lagos	2397 321	43.10	883 965	85.54	10.60
Oyo	1579 280	40.60	536 011	83.52	6.43
Ogun	941 889	51.50	425 725	87.78	5.10
Plateau	1513 186	44.70	417 565	61.68	5.01
Kaduna	1614 258	46.20	389 713	52.20	4.67
Kogi	978 019	49.90	222 760	45.60	2.67
Akwa Ibom	1032 955	40.10	214 787	51.86	2.57
Anambra	1248 226	29.70	212 024	57.11	2.54
Edo	912 680	33.90	205 407	66.48	2.46
Kano	2583 057	12.60	169 619	52.28	2.03
Borno	1222 513	23.10	140 875	45.72	1.69
Niger	1002 173	35.70	136 350	38.10	1.63
Abia	991 569	25.90	105 273	41.04	1.26
FCT (Abuja)	152 686	25.10	19 968	52.16	0.24

Source National Electoral Commission, Abuja

TABLE 3.9.3 JUNE 12TH, 1993 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: PATTERN
AND ORDER OF VOTING ON STATE BASIS

NRC Tofa/Ugo					
Kaduna	1614 258	46.20	356 860	47.80	6.00
Kogi	978 019	49.90	265 732	54.40	4.48
Plateau	1513 186	44.70	259 394	38.42	4.36
Niger	1002 173	35.70	221 437	61.90	3.71
AJcwa Ibom	1032 955	40.1	199 342	48.14	3.35
Anambra	954 680	32.30	167 239	54.28	2.81
Kano	2583 057	12.60	154 809	47.72	2.60
Abia	991 569	25.90	151 227	58.96	2.54
Lagos	2397 421	43.10	149 432	14.46	2.51
Borno	1222 533	23.10	128 684	45.60	2.16
Oyo	1529 280	40.60	105 788	16.48	1.78
Edo	912 680	33.90	103 572	33.52	1.74
Ogun	941 889	51.50	520 246	12.22	1.00
FCT (Abuja)	152 686	25.1	18 313	47.84	0.31

Source: National Electoral Commission, Abuja

Comparing tables A and B above, one can discover that voter turn out was greater in the South than in the North. This, Akinterinwa (1997:292) attributed to the non-seriousness on the part of the NRC Presidential candidate, Alh. Uthman Tofa who could not vote for himself because he ignored the basic requirements for voting.

About the results on the whole with the system of option A4, the election was peaceful and electoral fraud became very difficult if not impossible (Akinterinwa, 1997:289).

Having released the results of 14 states including FCT (Abuja) on 15th June, 1993 (Triumph June 15, 1993, The Democrat June 15th 1993, The Voice June 16th, 1993), thunderbolt struck. On June 16th, the High Court in Abuja ordered the cessation of further announcement of the results (The Democrat June 16, 1993). Besides, Professor Humphery Nwosu, the NEC Chairman, was asked to appear before the National Defence And Security Council (NDSC) to provide the action he would take next following the injunction of the High Court. He told the Council that he would abide by the orders of the Court. On his part however, the Chairman of NEC, Prof. Humphery Nwosu went to Court for the interpretation of Section 19(1) which empowered NEC to see to the conduct of the Elections.

Next, he decided to challenge the right of the Abuja High Court to enter contempt proceedings against the Commission on any of its officers (Newswatch, June 28, 1993, The Democrat, June, 17th, 1993) . On June 23rd, 1993, the AFRC nullified all the relevant Court decisions, suspended NEC and annulled the June

12th, 1993 elections (The Democrat June 24th, 1993, The Triumph June 24th, 1993, The Voice June 24th, 1993).

Consequently, all the elaborate preparation, the huge expenditure and the innovation introduced by NEC, most especially Option A4, came to nought because a powerful corporate group such as the military became threatened by the pace and direction of reform and intervened to nip it in the bud. (Bratton, 1997:76).

3.8.10 THE INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (ING)

Having annulled the June 12th 1993 Presidential Election, and with political turmoil in the land, Gen. Babangida in his Speech to the nation said:

I want to assure you that this administration will not stay a day longer than it is absolutely necessary to accomplish this task (handing over of power) to a democratically elected government (The Democrat, June 17th 1993).

He (Gen. Babangida) promised that by the decision of the ruling military government a democratically elected President would be sworn in for the country come August 27th, 1994. (The Democrat, June, 1993).

In a frantic effort Gen Babangida summoned a meeting with the 30 State Governors but it ended without a conclusive agreement on whether fresh elections were to be conducted or not. (The Triumph, June 30th, 1993). The daily further reported thus:

The SDP governors did not favour fresh elections but instead preferred that the Federal Government rescind its decision and release the cancelled results to the public as well as validate the results. On the other hand, NRC Governors were not united as only a few of them favoured fresh elections.

On the failed elections, Prof Wole Soyinka expressing his views in the "Daily Sketch" (July 5, 1993) opined that Nigerians even now cannot believe that anyone in his rational mind would invite them to go to the polls again after they had peacefully exercised their electoral duties in accordance with the rules set down by the same individual.

It must be pointed out however that Gen Babangida was still bent on handing over to a President-elect elected via elections. Said he:

Any other option (besides fresh election) cannot but be undemocratic (New Nigerian, July 24, 1993).

Gradually opinion divided about the authenticity of the June 12 elections while some sections of the electorate considered it "free and fair", others considered it otherwise.

The supposed winner of the June 12th, 1993 elections, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, however, strongly kicked against fresh election and insisted that the mandate of ruling the country be bestowed on him.

There was a triparte meeting between NEC and the two political parties (SDP and NRC) in which the idea of fresh election was rejected in favour of interim government (New Nigerian, 29th July, 1993). By accepting this position therefore, the political elites failed to press home the mandate given Abiola by the electorate. What was to be the relationship between the head of the interim government and all the democratic political institutions already in place.: the local government level through the State level to the federal legislature?

Expectedly the supposed winner of the June 12th Presidential Election, Chief M.K.O Abiola pointed out that:

whatever shape or form the concept (ie the interim government) might take, it rested essentially on the pretence that the June 12 election did not take place or that if it did, no winner emerged from it (New Nigerian, July 30, 1993).

Even though Alh. Uthman Bashir Tofa, the NRC Presidential candidate and Chief M.K.O. Abiola's opponent, bought the idea of interim government, he warned that it should not be composed of people who would want to perpetuate themselves in power or bring a programme that would be unnecessarily long or unrealistic (New Nigerian, August 2, 1993).

Increasingly it was becoming clear that Gen Babangida was finding it difficult to relinquish political power to civilians. Opinions in the press accused him of having a hidden agenda.

The FMG accepted the Interim National Government (ING) as the possible solution to the political impasse. In his broadcast to the nation to expatiate the concept, the President, Gen Babangida said:

the option of an Interim National Government should . . . be seen for what it is. It is an interim measure and must to that extent, be seen as part of the overall conception of the Transitional agenda of this administration. It is the accepted option given the current dangerous trend towards undue polarization of our body politic. The option seems to us a welcome strategic devise to provide our political system with a cooling off period during which to reflect on the current crisis with the view to putting behind us and move on to nation building. (New Nigerian, August 2, 1993).

The President subsequently, set up and inaugurated a Preliminary Committee under the chairmanship of the Vice

President, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu. Working round the clock, this Committee submitted its report to the government on Thursday August 5th, 1993 (New Nigerian, August 6, 1993).

The President Gen Ibrahim Babangida made his valedictory Speech to the National Assembly on Tuesday August 17th, 1993 and offered to "step aside" and also outlined the function of the ING (New Nigerian, August 18th 1993). Even though it was unnecessary, the Senate voted in Principle to accept the ING. (New Nigerian, August 21st, 1993) . The members of the ING were sworn in on Thursday August 26th, 1993. For full membership see Appendix III.

The ING's mandate was to end in March, 1994 within the period of its tenure, the government would among other duties and responsibilities ensure the success and conduct of the Local Government election in December and the Presidential Election within the first quarter of 1994. (New Nigerian, August 28th, 1993) The Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Ernest Shonekan, resigned his position after 82 days in office. (New Nigerian, November 18th, 1993) The former Head of State, Chief Ernest Shonekan, had described the ING as a child of circumstance, which was conceived in crisis and born into crisis (New Nigerian, November 18th, 1993) This sickler did not live for long.

The New Nigerian, further graphically described the scenario thus:

following this development (ie the resignation of Ernest Shonekan) the Secretary of Defence Gen Sani Abacha, has taken over as the new Head of States and Commander-in-Chief the only Service Chief left behind



by Gen. Babangida has thus assumed the mantle of leadership. As if by accident or design, political power had once again slipped through the hands of civilians to the military. And characteristically of military rule, to carve a name for himself, he dismantled all the political structures put in place by Gen Babangida as if he was not a member of the ancien regime.

Gangera Umar (1998:104) succinctly described the take over thus:

all democratic structures in the country have been dissolved...The National and State Assemblies as well as the Executive Council..with immediate effect. Also dissolved are all the Local governments the National Electoral Commission as well as the two political parties-the NRC and SDP. (See also New Nigerian, November 19th, 1993 first page).

Consequently, the meticulous care taken by Gen. Babangida to ensure that his coup became the last in the political history of Nigeria was brought to nought. This failure of Gen. Babangida's transition further lends credence to our argument that irrespective of the duration of a transition programme, it will only succeed if the incumbents identify alternative political elite they are willing and ready to hand over power to. He did not help matters himself by nurturing 'a hidden agenda' and frequently interfering in the transition time table through intermittent postponements.

It became imperative for Gen Sani Abacha to design his own transition programme and to this we turn our attention in the next sub section.

3.9. GEN. SANI ABACHA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME: THE DILEMMA OF AN INCUMBENT

The political crisis already aggravated by the cancellation of the June 12th, 1993 Presidential Election became uncontrollable

for it was common knowledge that the country was virtually-grinding to a halt (New Nigerian November 24, 1993). On the other hand the nation was at the edge of a precipice (Mid-Week Concord, Nov 19, 1997).

In the midst of this political turmoil and uncertainty, Gen. San Abacha seized political power, dismantled all the democratic structures left behind by Babangida (Mayangbe, 1996:19). This coup, it must be pointed out was greeted with mixed reactions by many Nigerians (New Nigerian, November 20th, 1993). Gen. Sani Abacha aptly emphasised that the then political situation in the country required all Nigerians to offer sacrifice for unity, survival, stability and oneness of the country (New Nigerian, November 19th, 1993).

Having spent two years in the saddle, and in an attempt to create a separate image and character for itself, the Abacha government had tried to cultivate the grounds for popular democracy by putting in place certain transition structures and announcing his transition programme in the 1995 Independence Anniversary broadcast to the nation thus:

Fellow Nigerians, you may recall my pledge that a political time table outlining the transition to civil rule would be made known at the appropriate time. . . in order to establish the foundations of a durable democracy, we estimate that the time required will cover a period not more than 36 months as follows: (New Nigerian, October 2, 1995).

1995 Last Quarter

1. Approval of Draft Constitution
2. Lifting all restrictions on political activities.
- |> 3. Establishment of the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria

(NECON) .

4. Creation of-Transition Implementation Committee
 - National Reconciliation Committee
 - Federal Character Commission
5. Appointment of: Panel for Creation of States
 - Local Government Creation
 - Boundary Adjustment Committee

1996 1st Quarter

January - March.

1. Election And Inauguration of Local Government Councils on Non-Party Basis.

1996 Second Quarter

1. Creation of States And Local Governments
2. Commencement of the Process of Formation of Political Parties.

1996 Third Quarter

July - September

1. Registration of Political Parties
2. Delineation of Constituencies
3. Production of Authentic Voters' Register

1996 Fourth Quarter

October - December

Election of Local Government Councils on Party Bases.

1997 1st Quarter

January - March

1. Inauguration of Party Elected Local Government Councils
2. Consolidation of New Political Party Structures

3. Tribunal Sitting And Conduct of Any Local Government Bye-elections . 1997 Second Quarter April - June

1. Party State Primaries to select Candidates for State Assemblies and Governorship Elections.
2. Screening And Approval of Candidates by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON).

1997 Third Quarter

July - September 1.

State Assembly Election

1997 Last Quarter

October - December

1. Election of State Governors
2. Sitting of State Election Tribunal And Conduct of By elections.

1998 First Quarter

Jan - March

1. Inauguration of States Assemblies And State Governors
2. Party Primaries to Select Candidates for the National Assembly Election.
3. National Assembly Election Campaigns.

1998 Second Quarter

April - June

1. National Assembly Election
2. Primaries to Select Candidates for Presidential Elections.
- i 3. Commencement of Nation wide Campaigns for the Presidential

Election.

1998 Third Quarter

July - September

Presidential Election

1998 Last Quarter

October 1st. Swearing in of Newly elected President and federal Military Government's final Disengagement.

The time frame as Gen. Abacha himself pointed out was 36 months. This long period was to allow the fractured political class sufficient time to sort itself out (New Nigerian December 28, 1995)

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Nigerians were however, skeptical about this time table for it had happened before under Gen Babangida when he changed his promises so many times that when he said, Good morning; people would have to look out four times to ascertain the time of the day before they replied (Obasanjo, 1994:11).

Similarly, Abacha promised in his maiden broadcast to the nation that civilian administrators would be picked to run the States but went back on his words and the states were run by military administrators (TELL, February 14, 1994).

One important feature about Abacha's transition programme was an All-Nigerian Politicians' Summit held in Lagos from December 14th to 15th, 1995.

Mahmud Jega (New Nigerian, 14th December, 1995:3) described it as an important event it promises to be since the idea of All I Politicians' Summit may yet achieve international fame as the

Nigerian contribution to political culture. The key messages at the Summit centred on the need for politicians to bury their hatchets and forge a united front for a lasting democracy (New Nigerian, December 15th, 1995) . It was attended by over 450 delegates including about 80 former state Governors and Deputy Governors and 100 former Senators, about 30 former Federal Ministers several Commissioners representing over 30 political associations (New Nigerian, December 16, 1995). One of the objectives was to dialogue and negotiate the transition programme with the FGM. Consequently, a 21-man Committee was set up for that purpose.

3.9.1 NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF NIGERIA (NECON)

Gen. Sani Abacha set up NECON on December 5th, 1995 and the 8-man Electoral Commission had Chief Dagogo Jack as Chairman (New Nigerian, December 6th, 1995).

NECON released its guidelines on party formation on Monday June 17, 1996, the highlights of which are as follows: i) Party Manifestoes must comply with Chapter II - fundamental

objectives And Directive Principles of State Policy - of the 1995 Constitution, ii) Closing date for the submission of application forms June

19th - July 25th, 1996. iii) Verification exercise commences August 2nd - August 29th,

1996. iv) Parties to pay a non-refundable fee of 8500000.00 (five

hundred thousand naira only).

v) Parties must comply with principles of power rotation/Federal

character. vi) To qualify for registration, parties must be physically

present in the Federal and State Capitals as well as in the headquarters of the Local government councils. vii) Parties are required to have a minimum of 40000 card-carrying- members in states and 15000 for FCT. viii) Parties to declare assets, liabilities and sources of funds, ix) Armed forces, public servants banned.

x) Party youth clubs, units and affiliate associations banned,

xi) Membership open to citizens of the age of 18 and above

irrespective of sex, ethnic, group, religion or circumstance of birth. xii) Discipline, decorum, vision, military, patriotism etc as

watch words. (New Nigeria June 18th, 1996; West Africa 29th July - 4th August, 1996:1179).

A critical analysis of the foregoing activities would reveal that certain category of politicians were to be sidelined in the democratization process, first was the exorbitant non-refundable fee of N500000.00. Few politicians could afford it and those who could not would be excluded from the transition programme.

The NEPU/PRP co-ordinator aptly faulted the mandatory M500000.00 requirement for application forms stating that these demands were too much (New Nigerian, June 20th, 19996) . Alh. Shuaib Oyedokun was however, of a different opinion on this exorbitant fee for to him the amount was in order since people ' would learn to come together by contributing to a central coffer.

Commenting on the guidelines, Mahmud Jega opined that no one

should be surprised if several associations were electrocuted by these regulations. . . since many of them were going to have a hard time meeting all the requirements within the stipulated time (New Nigerian, June 20, 1996)

A total of 18 of the 23 political associations beat the NECON deadline of July 25th, 1996 (New Nigerian, July 26th, 1996). However 7 and of the 18 had agreed to merge into three associations bringing the number of associations now seeking registration as political parties to 14 (new Nigerian, August 30th, 1996).

Having sent its Verification team to authenticate the claims by the 15 political associations, NECON eventually registered these 5 parties:

Table 3.9.4 The 5 Political Parties Registered by NECON

Name of Party	Percentage score	Remarks
The United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP)	74.77	1st
Committee for National Consensus (CNC)	65.78	2nd
National Centre Party of Nigerian (NCPN)	63.32	3rd
Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN)	57.35	4th
The Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM)	53.78	5th

Source: New Nigerian, October 1st, 1996

Overtly, it appeared as if the incumbent, Gen Sani Abacha was aloof from the transition programme. At this stage it can be argued that the Presidential election seem to be the most crucial stage of any political transition. Experience had shown that not until the baton had changed hands from the incumbent to the

successor or the incumbent succeeding himself, transition cannot be said to be over. Gen. Obasanjo's transition programme terminated when political power was transferred to Alh Shehu Shagari; Gen Babangida's long transition was aborted even though right from the grass roots i.e. the local government level, democratic structures had been put in place, the grand finale, the annulment of the June 12th, 1993 Presidential Election brought the whole process to nought.

Consequently, Gen. Abacha's transition proceeded albeit successfully from the first stage- local government elections even on non-party basis to one conducted on party basis to the last but one stage - the National Assembly Election.

3.9.2 THE INCUMBENCY FACTOR AND THE SELF-SUCCESSION CONUNDRUM

Less than a year to the Presidential Election, not a single politician signified his/her intention to run for the race because of the fear of Abacha. Instead, the five political parties fell over each other in a bid to recruit him as their Presidential candidate (Midweek Concord, November 19, 1997).

Yusuf (1994:4) opined that the politicians sought to create and entrench a culture of timidity and fear towards the military. This is perhaps best illustrated by the conduct of certain politicians during the last days of Gen. Sani Abacha regime. These politicians feared to challenge the General in a democratic contest even when he had called for such a contest.

Party formation was teleguided by the government in favour of the ruling class. Consequently, Abacha's transition programme was

not entirely free of government's interference. NECON was mandated

not only to (among other things) monitor the formation of political parties but also to enforce with rigour and stridency guidelines which will ensure that the parties are fully national in character (New Nigerian, December 12, 1995) .

The government, it must be pointed out, did not leave the parties alone but NECON was to ensure continuous dialogue between the government and all parties (New Nigerian, December 12, 1995) This dialogue really yielded dividends when all the five political parties chose Gen Abacha as their Presidential candidate in their various conventions and of which Akinola (1998:568) opined thus:

the readiness with which the future of society can be sacrificed on the altar of greed and personal power is demonstrated in the ridiculous of five political parties, albeit through manipulation, to adopt a single individual (Abacha) as their flag bearer.

It must be emphasized that the policies of Gen. Abacha were such that they could only be implemented through the use of force, since the objective was self-succession, opposition had to be suppressed at all cost (Adebiyi, 1998:23)

He so influenced his transition programme that in his life time, Gen. Sani Abacha was the issue in the politics of the transition programme his regime implemented. His name was used to get a candidate disqualified from contesting election or to get on otherwise not qualified candidate to be free to clinch an elective office...Abacha's name was used as an armour to secure victory by supporters of his self-succession project. (Thisday, December 9, 1998:40) .

One characteristic feature about Abacha's transition programme was the way and manner interest groups, traditional leaders and some youths overtly campaigned and pleaded with him to succeed himself. "The Daily Champion (December 31st, 1998) put it bluntly that Some youths through a dubious sobriquet "Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha' (YEAA) organised a one million-man march to persuade the then Head of State, (Gen Abacha) , to transmute himself into a civilian President come October 1st, 1998.

Opinion moulders and leaders of thought paid for advertisement in the dailies and weeklies for Abacha to shed his military uniform and put on civilian attire and continue living in Aso Rock.

These and other things scared politicians not to come out openly to run against Gen Abacha. The exception however, could be found in M.D. Yusuf of the GDM, Tunji Braithwaite and Andrews Sawa for UNCP (Newswatch, January 19th, 1998:6) The 'Newswatch' again opined that the Presidential field was left without players for over a year after the contest was flagged off and with less than 8 months to go to the polls.

One peculiar thing about Abacha was that in all these moves, never on a single occasion did he bare his mind-to agree to succeed himself or not-until death struck on June 8th, 1988. "Daily Champion' (December 31, 1998:14) put it unequivocally that it was as if he, Abacha, was stuck with a vow of silence characteristically refusing to speak up...All the nation heard of ■ their Head of State was through his agents provocateurs and other

sundry paid sycophants who in any case were not speaking in unison

but in conflicting voices and sound bites.

3.10 INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON ABACHA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The international context of regime transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy is clearly a dimension of some importance (Pridham, 1991:4). Never in the political history of Nigeria had the country ever faced more hostile environment than during the Abacha regime. Among the major causes was the hanging of the environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa. "Tell' (June 22, 1998:14) reports it graphically thus:

Saro-Wiwa was hanged while the Commonwealth leaders were meeting in New Zealand and Nigeria was immediately suspended from the organization. It went further to state that universal condemnation and sanctions came from all sides and old friends like the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada as well as Nelson Mandela's South Africa joined hands to oppose Abacha's despotism.

In the same vein, "The News" (September 25, 1995) also pointed out that:

the Abacha regime had little sleep or peace since hurriedly authorizing that Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues should be hanged. Their execution was condemned throughout virtually the entire world and those held to be responsible were rebuked in undiplomatic terminology by many governments. Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth following a motion moved by Nelson Mandela of South Africa, a country which ironically had benefitted from Nigeria's anti-apartheid commitments. The EU and other Western nations reviewed diplomatic relations and the supply of arms terminated (Ihonvbere, 1996:4).

"New Nigerian" (November 25, 1995) put it emphatically that Western nations therefore placed armed embargo on Nigeria.

Abacha, however, was not at all moved by the hostile

international environment in terms of isolation and sanctions, even sanction on sporting activities by EU (New Nigerian, December 7, 1995) and on the national carrier - Nigeria Airways. (National Concord October 30th 1998). All flights between the EU, other Western nations, mostly the US and Nigeria were therefore cancelled. These measures were aimed at weakening the despotic tentacles of the Abacha regime, but he remained unshaken.

Ihonvbere (196:222) rightly opined that:

the limited sanctions either being implemented or discussed by for example the US and the Commonwealth are not likely to have much effect, (for) most members of the Eu have returned their ambassadors, the initial momentum by NGOS is dying down, and the world media is no longer covering the situation in Nigeria.

As the political situation was being charged, ethnic tension heightened and the political elites sharply divided into two camps: those clamouring and yearning earnestly for Abacha to succeed himself and those strongly opposed to this move. Be that as it may however, death laid its icy hands on Gen Abacha on June 8th, 1998 and since his second in-command Gen. Oladipo Diya had been incarcerated, the PRC met and in its wisdom chose Gen Abdulsalam Abubakar, the successor and new Head of State.

Before Gen. Abacha's death, however, for every discernible mind, it was clear that Nigeria was heading for trouble of an unprecedented dimension...But the worse was yet to come. Every passing day gave way for fresh worries. The signs became evident in the April 25th National Assembly elections... it was noting but a charade, a sham. Even in the euphoria that the now defunct UNCP basked, it was quite clear that the hand at work was that of Esau,

in short, Abacha's grand design to use the politicians and his own

contrived political programme to consummate his subterranean agenda (Champion, December 31st, 1998) . The fall of Abacha and the rise of Abubakar (therefore) gave Nigeria a sigh of relief and the opportunity to start afresh-to go back to the drawing board (Otegbeye, 1998:5).

3.11.1 GENERAL ABUBAKAR'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

On assumption of office, Gen Abubakar too did away with all the previous democratic structures put in place by his predecessor, Gen. Abacha. One school of thought saw this as one of the many ploys of the military to prolong their stay in power since new democratic institutions have to be put in place to execute the new transition. Yet, another school of thought also saw it as a means by which the Abubakar regime wanted to dissociate itself from the former despotic regime. And by so doing leave its foot prints on the sands of time. Before a new government comes to the scene, the preceding government must have thoroughly frittered away the people's goodwill. As such, when the new government comes in, its first task is to dismantle and undo things the previous dispensation had done to alienate the people.

Gen. Abubakar consequently, put new institutions in place to replace the scrapped ones. And it is to these we shall turn to.

3.11.2 INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) AND NATIONAL ORIENTATION AGENCY (NOA).

For a successful transition, most especially from military regime to a civilian rule, there is the need for the conduct of elections via political parties. And the body which supervises elections and the registration of political parties is the Electoral Commission. As pointed out earlier, Electoral Commissions in Nigeria are moribund because of the instability of governments, most especially the incessant military coups.

Gen Abubakar therefore, set up the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under the Chairmanship of Justice Ephraim Akpata. The adjective 'independent', this is the first time it is being used for an electoral commission, presumes that it is going to be free from government interference. It should be pointed out that Gen. Babangida's Electoral Commission (NECON) did not have this adjective and so despite all the decrees shielding it, it could not withstand the injunctions of the courts. The terms of reference for INEC corroborated with those of previous ones set by incumbent military regimes.

On August 21st, 1998, INEC released the guidelines for the transition and its time table as follows: i) Party Formation and Registration: August - September, 1998 (1 month). ii) Voters Registration/Production of Voters' Registers: August-November, 1998 (3 months). iii) Local Government Council Elections: November - December, 1998. (1 month).

iv) Gubernatorial/State Assembly Election: December 1998
 January, 1999 (1 month) v) National Assembly/Presidential
 Elections: January - February
 1999 (1 month). vi) a) Run off Elections for National
 Assembly/Presidential Elections if any, b) Inauguration of Local
 Government Councils nation wide (to be announced on a later
 date) in March, 1999. c) Swearing in of Governors (to be
 announced on a later date in March, 1999. vii) Swearing in of an
 elected President by the Federal Military
 government (FMG) on May 29th, 1999.

Putting Gen Abubakar's transition programme under the
 microscope, it was to last for 11 months i.e less than a year. His
 predecessors Gen. Babangida planned his for five years but in the
 long run it was a fiasco while Gen Abacha too wanted to do it for
 three years but as fate would have it, he did not live to see it
 through. Consequently, one could not exactly say whether his
 transition would have successfully terminated at the end of the
 three years or it would spill over into additional years, extra
 time, so to say. Before his death, the political scene was so
 charged that anything at all could have happened.

Laying all the ill-fated attempts at democracy from the time
 of Gen. Babangida Gen. Abacha side by side it could be observed
 that the military had cultivated the habit of buying time through
 building, dismantling and rebuilding para-democratic structures viz
 electoral commissions, Registration of voters, formation and
 registration of political parties, founding mass mobilization/

education agencies.

Before Gen. Abubakar came to power, all democratic elements had been in place and what was left was the Presidential elections, even that all the five political parties had endorsed the candidature of Gen. Abacha in their various national conventions. He therefore, appeared to be a consensus candidate. The benediction was to be given by the electorate. Similarly, when Gen. Sani Abacha seized power, the only thing left was the actualization of the June 12th Presidential Elections but in both instances, whatever had been put in place by the previous government was thrown over board.

Overtly, Gen Abubakar had no hidden agenda and the political goal posts were firmly stuck to the ground and consequently, any good political schemer could score a goal irrespective of his/her tribe or religion, two potent factors in Nigerian politics.

Out of the 26 political associations which applied for registration (National Concord, October 30th, 1998) 9 were given provisional registration by INEC to participate in the Local Government Elections (Newswatch, December 21st, 1998). Agbese (1998:7) points out that ordinarily, a local election is no big deal. But the December 5th Election was a big deal, a very big deal...because it was a litmus test for the 9 political parties. The Commission's rule is that a party must win at least five per cent of the votes cast in at least two-thirds of the states to be registered as a political party. These nine political parties were as follows. (Newswatch, November 16, 1998). * i Movement for Democracy And Justice (MDJ)

- ii) People's Democratic Party (PDP)
- iii) All People's Party (APP)
- iv) Alliance For Democracy (AD)
- v) Democratic Advance Movement (DAM)
- vi) National Solidarity Movement (NSM)
- vii) The United Democratic Party (UDP)
- viii) Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP)
- ix) United People's Party (UPP)

At the end of the Local Government Elections only three out of the nine above got registered as political parties to contest the subsequent elections.

Ojewale (1998:12) had emphatically stated that:

Opinion polls absolutely got it right. Before the last Local government elections, it had been predicted that only the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the All People's Party (APP) and the Alliance For Democracy (AD) would emerge strong from the nine provisionally registered political parties.

When the December 5th, 1998 Local Government polls were over, the Chairman of INEC, Justice E.O.I. Akpata had this to say:

On December 5th, the Nigerian people took a significant step towards civil democratic rule by electing Chairmen and Councillors to represent them in their respective government councils. In all, the provisionally registered political parties participated in the election. ('The News', December 21st, 1998).

The first election at this stage of the transition programme, even though encountered problems, was adjudged successful as 'The News' succinctly put it:

Nigerians have taken a first step through their votes on 5th December (1998) Council polls. These polls have their imperfections. Yet they also indicate that a certain level of political expression was successful asserted.

It must be pointed out that since the military initiated transition programme in 1976, the pattern has not changed. The usual pattern begins with election at the local government which could be conducted on partisan or non-partisan basis, followed by the state assembly/gubernatorial elections and finally the national assembly/Presidential elections. It has been observed that since there is not much at stake at the local level, election at this stage is relatively peaceful.

3.11.3 JANUARY 9TH, 1999 GUBERNATORIAL/STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

The second round of elections in the Abubakar's transition programme was the Gubernatorial/State Assembly Elections which held on 9th January, 1999. Politicians aspiring to rule their various states, campaigned vigously for acceptance. In the end some of them emerged through direct primary elections, others through consensus arrangement (^NNewswatch', January 11, 1999).

The governorship polls which held in 35 states of the federation were marked by a modest voter turn out. "The Guardian" (January 10th 1999) reported that apathy essentially characterized the Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections throughtout the country although voter turn out at some polling stations was impressive. Polling as reports indicated was generally peaceful and orderly (Thisday, January 10th, 1999). The heightened tension in the Niger Delta area prevented elections to be held in Bayelsa State. It was however, later conducted on 30th January, 1999. TThe Punch' March 29th, 1999) .

3.11.4 FEBRUARY, 1999 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

The last but one stage of the transition programme, the National Assembly Election took place on 20th February, 1999 and all the three INEC registered parties, PDP, APP and AD participated in it.

Agbegbu (1999:13) however opined that the National Assembly Election was characterized by low voter turn out...and the National Orientation Agency (NOA) blamed for not enlightening the electoral properly.

TABLE 3.9.5 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE THREE PARTIES IN THE 1999 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Party	National Assembly	
	Senate	House of Representatives
PDP	59	206
APP	24	74
AD	20	68
TOTAL	103	348

SOURCE: NEWSWATCH March 8th, 1999

From the table above, it can be deduced that PDP won 59 seats from the 109 member senate. This makes it a majority party in the Senate, the Upper Chamber of the Legislature. In the Lower House i.e the Federal House of Representatives too, it snatched 206 out of the 360 seats at stake. This is also a remarkable political victory. The PDP therefore, became the dominant party in both houses of the Legislature.

3.11.5 THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The grand finale of the Abubakar transition programme was the Presidential Election. Prior to this however, the other two parties, APP and AD seeing the performance of PDP so far, it had landslide victories in the Local Government, State and National Assemblies Elections, decided to go into an alliance to brighten their chances. This alliance however, it must be emphasized, was needed to "demilitarize the transition programme (Newswatch February 15, 1999). The alliance scored a political victory before the election because Falae was the joint candidate of the AD/APP Alliance and Falae, an AD Presidential candidate ran on the platform of the APP (The Guardian January 6th, 1999) . At the end of the election, the results showed that Gen Olusegun Obasanjo and Alhaji Abubakar Atiku of the PDP polled 18738154 votes (62.78%) as against Chief Olu Falae and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi of the APP who scored 11,110287 (37.22%). The former, therefore, was declared winner. INEC consequently, had been able to accomplish a deed within three months, something Gen Babangida and Abacha took fifteen years altogether but could not do.

3.12 THE END OF TRANSITION FROM MILITARY REGIME TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

After 15 years of uninterrupted military rule, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over power to President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999 (Newswatch, June 7th, 1999) to mark the end of yet another era and to signal the beginning of another

epoch. From that day, President Obasanjo having received a modified version of the 1979 constitution and the same flag (he handed over to President Shagari) from Gen Abdulsalami opened a new chapter in the democratic process in Nigeria.

Gen. Abubakar's brief transition programme also proves our argument that transition to civil rule will only be successful if the incumbents identify alternative political elites they are prepared to hand power to. When he took over after Gen Abacha's death, there were identifiable political groups which for fear of Gen Abacha had fielded him as their lone candidate. With Abacha's death and the release of Gen Obasanjo, it became clear that the crop of retired military officers could easily be given political power.

In conclusion, therefore, we found out in this chapter that Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi's short-lived administration did not consider any transfer of power to civilians. When Gen Gowon took over the mantle of leadership from him, he initially promised to hand over power to civilians but he reneged on his promise until he was overthrown by Gen. Mohammed. Gen. Gowon did not initiate any transition programme because of his ambition to hang on to power. His attitude thus validates our position that most of the transition programmes in the country under study are characterized by the desire of the incumbent to cling tenaciously to power. Gens Babangida and Abacha's transition programmes also confirm this proposition. Gens Muhammed/Obasanjo and Abubakar's transition programmes on the other hand did not confirm the proposition above since they designed and executed their

programmes successfully. The transition programmes initiated by-Gens Babangida and Abacha again prove our proposition that the greater the degree of influence of the military on the transition programme, the lesser its chances of success.

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FOUR

THE MILITARY AND TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE IN GHANA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As in the previous chapter, this one is going to throw its search light on the various transition programmes in Ghana in the post-independence era. Altogether, there have been four successful coups d'etat in Ghana. The first occurred on February 24, 1966 when the first Republic, under Dr Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) government, was overthrown by a bunch of power hungry soldiers while he was on an important diplomatic mission to express Africa's solidarity with the people of North Vietnam in the face of American aggression against their country ("Africa Events", April, 1992:50). Hutchful (1973:119) points out that an interesting aspect of this first coup is that the conspiracy that resulted in the army coup against the regime of President Nkrumah was actually initiated by the police not the army. The Second on January 13, 1972, (Nugent, 1995:7) when Dr K.A. Busia's government was prematurely terminated, thus ending the Second Republic. Then there was a palace coup against Gen. Acheampong in 1978 (Nugent 1995:6) which brought Gen F.W.K. Akuffo to power. The Junior officers struck against June 4, 1979 to topple the Generals. Dr Hilla Limann led the Third Republic but his government too was not spared. The men in khaki again derailed the democratic process on December 31, 1981. They held on to power till 1992.

Post-independence transition programmes in Ghana have

therefore been initiated by the National Liberation Council (NLC), February, 1966 - October, 1969 which gave birth to the Second Republic in 1969. Acheampong-Akuffo-Rawlings' leading to the Third Republic - 1972 - 1979 and finally the PNDC's in which Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings then won the people's mandate to lead the country in 1992 in the Fourth Republic.

As done previously in the case of Nigeria, the major political structures and institutions put in place by the various military regimes to implement their transition programmes will be analysed.

4.2 THE FALL OF PR KWAME NKURUMAH

Dr Kwame Nkrumah was the architect of Ghana's independence and under his leadership, Ghana, between 1951 and 1957 set the pace and pattern for the winding up of Britain's African Empire (Trevor, 1976:11). For the Convention People's Party's (CPP's) fifteen years of office had left an indelible mark on the minds of ordinary Ghanaians as the government that brought them independence and restored their dignity (Armah, 1974:110, African Events, April, 1992:51). Dr Nkrumah (1980:66) himself, pointed out that on March 6, 1957, Ghana victoriously won her independence from colonial rule and shook the imperialist world by promptly declaring her uncompromising stand for total African unity and emancipation. Afrifa (1966:12) put it bluntly thus:

somewhere down the line, however, he (Nkrumah) became ambitious, built a cult of personality around himself and ruthlessly used powers vested in him.... He

- developed a strange love for absolute power.

Dr Nkrumah himself admitted that the CPP is a powerful force, more powerful in deed, than anything that has yet appeared in the history of Ghana. It's supremacy cannot be challenged (Amonoo, 1981:14). Consequently, Drah (1976:136) emphasises that by 1965, one could say that opposition to Nkrumah regime was virtually absent. In fact there was no opposition whatsoever that is visible.

With the absence of any form of opposition, Afrifa (1966:31) observes that:

a coup d'etat is the last resort in the range of means whereby an unpopular government may be overthrown. But in our case where there were no constitutional means of offering a political opposition to the one-party government, the Armed Forces were automatically made to become the official opposition of the government.

However, reactionary soldiers aided and abetted by sinister forces of capitalism...conspired to overthrow him. (Amonoo, 1981:2) . It must be emphasized here that one of the strongest conventions that Ghana Army inherited from the British was the non-interference in the affairs of civil power. So long as politicians respected the army's corporate traditions, the army was prepared to remain aloof from political issues in the service of its masters. But the ruling party (the CPP) proved unable to observe its side of the bargain. The coup when it came was not so much a simple matter of the army intruding into politics, but politicians thrusting themselves increasingly upon the army. (Trevor, 1976:288).

Nkrumah distrusted the army and Hutchful (1973:70) points out that:

part of this distrust sprang from the threat that could be ultimately posed to the power of the government by an indigenous officer corps in command of largely illiterate troops. The most immediate reason was the troubled political situation in Ghana between 1957 and 1960 and the alledged connections between some of the Ghanaian officers and the government's enemies in the Unity Party (UP), the party of the opposition.

Even though Dr Nkrumah had said that it was not the duty of the army to rule because it had no political mandate, (Trevor, 1976:279) he himself became a victim of a coup d'etat. The army cum police struck on 24 February, 1966 thus bringing to an end fifteen years of Nkrumah's rule. Bediako (1966:10) emphasised that the coup in Ghana is remarkable. .. It came at a time when Dr Nkrumah believed his power over Ghana was at its climax. The military government which was formed after the coup was the National Liberation Council (NLC) and to this we turn.

4.3 THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL AND TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE

In the broadcast which toppled the regime of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the speaker, Gen. Emmanuel K. Kotoka, having announced the coup mentioned inter alia the establishment of a National Liberation Council (NLC), the most powerful organ in the state. It was evident from the composition that power had changed hands from a civilian democratic administration to a military dictatorship, for example regional bodies were established on the same pattern - a mixed membership of army, police and civil servants, the final authority lying with the senior army officer in the Region. (Austin, 1976:107). The NLC comprised the following:

Lt Gen J.A. Ankrah	Chairman (Military)
Mr. W.K. Harley	Deputy Chairman (Police)
Lt. Col. E.K. Kotoka	Member (Military)
Lt. Col. A.K. Ocran	Member (Military)
Mr B.A. Yakubu	Member (Police)
Mr J.E. Nunoo	Member (Police)
Major A.A. Afrifa	Member (Army)

The foregoing military and police officers, four and three respectively, took over the portfolios of the government from the CPP predecessors (Austin 1976:107).

Hutchful (1973:138) emphasised that in spite of the evidence of mass support, the military and police officers of the NLC immediately disclaimed any interest in political power and expressed their desire to hand over power to civilians. Put differently, Drah (1976:139) also observed that when the NLC came to power in 1966, it declared that its duty was a kind of holding operation. That it would only stay in power for some time and hand over to a civilian government. Even though the military junta did not intend to stay in power ad infinitum, Gen. Ankrah, the Chairman of the NLC, declared that until the preparatory work (for the eventual return to civilian administration) has been satisfactorily completed, the Council will not tolerate any form of political activities (Armah, 1974:88).

The longer the military stay in power, the more epileptic their attitude towards the transfer of power to civilians become.

Initially the NLC had wanted to stay in power for only six months¹ but having come to grips with the economy which was in recession,

its attitude to transition changed. On one occasion for

instance, a member of the NLC, Brigadier Ocran, warned that until the NLC had been able to establish an effective machinery of government in Ghana, nobody should be deceived that re-introduction of party politics would be allowed into the country (Hutchful, 1973:144).

Military men are not administrators. Consequently when they seize power they rely heavily on the country's civil service. The case of the NLC in Ghana too was not an exception. They also got support mainly from the parties opposed to the ancien regime. This usually results in a change in the old order as Hutchful (1973:196) unequivocally points out thus:

the coup of 1966. . .marked a dramatic shift of power within Ghanaian society and a significant reconstruction of the distribution of benefits in that society and particularly amongst the several sections of its dominant interests. . . It also restored to political prominence the urban educated elite, traditional rulers and businessmen who had unsuccessfully opposed the CPP in a series of electoral battles from 1951 to 1960.

Put differently, Nugent (1995:20) observes that:

under the umbrella of the National Liberation Movement, Chiefs, established businessmen and social climbers joined forces in an effort to unseat the CPP. They were comprehensively defeated, but the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966 provided the opportunity to turn the tables.

The NLC realising its inadequacies about the art of governance set up the Expediting Committee because compared with military actions which are discharged with alacrity, the civil service with its bureaucratic machinery appeared slow in action. This committee was to follow up decisions of the NLC, and

ascertain to what extent they were being executed and more generally to act as watchdog on public officials (Hutchful, 1973:216 quoted).

The economy of Ghana at the time the NLC took over power was in crisis. Consequently, to revamp it, the NLC relied on the Economic Committee which comprised the Governor, Bank of Ghana, the heads of Ministries of Trade and Finance, the Planning Commission and the Central Bureau of Statistics. The decisions of the Economic Committee, even though advisory, carried weight. It is not surprising therefore, that the committee opposed the prospect of early military withdrawal since it exercised substantial powers within the regime. (Hutchful, 1973:259).

Besides the Economic Committee, the NLC set up the twenty-three member Advisory Political Committee with Mr Justice Akuffo-Addo and Dr K.A. Busia as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively in June 1966 to increase its political sensitivity (Price, 1977:129). This Committee, unlike the Economic Committee, did not move along well with the NLC which had wrestled political power from the CPP and consequently was not ready to share it with anybody.

The dominant class in the country however held a low opinion of the Armed Forces, whom they regarded as rejects from the occupational fields that really counted. This was especially true of the first generation of officers who had risen through the ranks of the colonial army. (Nugent, 1996:22 quoted).

The NLC's transition to civil rule took the usual route via which the military hand over power to civilians viz setting up a

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constitution Commission, a constituent Assembly a conscientization machinery, lifting of the ban on politics, electioneering campaigns and elections and the final handing over power to civilians.

To ensure that the old guards, especially those of the ancien regime were kept in the cooler for some time, an Election And Public Offices Disqualification Decree published on 29 January 1968 barred certain members of the CPP from holding office for ten years (Armah, 1974:110). Initially, there was a blanket ban on CPP activists and employees by Decree 223 even though those affected could appeal to the Exemption Commission. The public however, reacted to this and consequently, a new decree was enacted to amend it. Hutchful (1973:402) opines that:

the NLC was not consistent on the banning of former CPP activists and even though some of them appealed to the Exemption's Commission, while the case was still pending, the NLC came out with yet another decree disqualifying 152 CPP officials for a ten-year period.

4.4 THE APRIL 17, 1967 ABORTIVE COUP

All was not well within the military when the NLC overthrew Dr Kwame Nkrumah. Dr Nkrumah himself was optimistic that there would be a counter-coup to re-instate him as the President of Ghana. In a series of broadcasts to the people of Ghana from Conakry via Radio Guinea's "Voice of the Revolution (Panaf Books Ltd, 1980:54&73) he reiterated thus:

As I told you...it will not be long and I shall be with you once again and we shall together build what the so-called NLC has destroyed. (Thereupon he called on the people of Ghana) to organise now and arise in your mass strength and overthrow these traitors. Take heart. I will be with you again. It won't be long.

The Editors of Panaf Books (1982:65) vividly recounts the ill-fated counter -coup thus:

Then suddenly at 6 am on 17 April 1967 a strange voice was heard on Radio Ghana. It was Lt. Samuel Arthur announcing that the NLC had been overthrown. Lt Arthur with the support of Lt Moses Yeboah and Second Lt. Osei Poku and some 120 men had entered Accra during the night. They had captured the Radio Station, Flagstaff House and entered Christianborg Caste (the official residence of the Chairman of the NLC) . The leader of the 1966 coup, Kotoka had been killed. When Arthur's broadcast was heard in Conakry, the Ghanaian duty officer ran to tell Nkrumah.. as he spoke other Ghanaians came running up. They felt sure that the coup was to restore the CPP government.. If Nkrumah was excited at the news, he did not show it (because) it was too early to be sure.

And truly the counter coup failed. However, it brought about significant structural changes in the NLC. Civilians were assigned more powers. As expected, the Political Committee recommended an early return to civil rule to avert future occurrences. Even though the NLC did not fully buy this idea, a year later it finally committed it self to a firm date for the restoration of power to civilians (Hutchful, 1973:339).

We now turn our attention to the various structures and institutions set up by the NLC towards a successful transition to civil rule.

4.5 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Documents to which some observers had access suggest that the NLC was subjected to incessant pressure to transfer power to a civilain body as speedily as possible, indeed to the very same civilian body which was acting in an advisory capacity to the NLC, ' and now eagerly anxious to receive the reins of power from its

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military idols (Armah, 1974:126).

As earlier pointed out, among the measures taken immediately after the successful overthrow of Dr Nkrumah's CPP government was the abrogation of the Republican Constitution (Austin, 1976:106).

Consequently, before the advent of a new civilian government, another constitution will have to be drawn for the nation. This is exactly what the NLC did. They quickly established a Constitutional Commission (Austin, 1976:9). A decree was thus promulgated establishing a Constitutional Commission (CC) consisting of eighteen prominent Ghanaian citizens. The incumbent Chief Justice, Mr Justice Akuffo Addo, (Austin 1976:108) was appointed its Chairman. Price (1977:131) aptly points out that the CC which had been appointed by the NLC soon after it assumed power, had been quietly getting on with its work ever since.

Members of the Commission appeared to have consulted some of the best constitutions in the world before settling down to serious drafting. The result was a combination of the Whitehall and Washington models, a truly great document with a distinct slant in favour of fundamental freedoms and civil rights. (Armah, 1974:127) . It should be borne in mind that even though the best constitution may fail depending upon its practice, it is good for certain fundamental human rights to be entrenched in it. This is particularly so as the the NLC would not want a repeat of gross abuse of human rights under Dr Nkrumah. On the attainment of independence in 1957, Ghana adopted the Cabinet System of Government with Dr Kwame Nkrumah as the Prime Minister and the Queen represented by the Governor-General as the ceremonial Head

of State. In 1960, when the Republican Constitution came into effect, Dr Nkrumah became an Executive President (Price 1977:101) with no Vice but instead the appointment of a three-man Presidential Commission by the President in the events of his absence or death.

Consequently, with the fall of Dr Nkrumah's government, the Constitutional Commission deemed it expedient to recommend the Westminster model again, since the people Ghana, having experienced a regime of tyranny (Preamble to the 1969 Ghana constitution) do not want a recurrence.

The Constitutional Commission completed its assignment and presented its report to the NLC which found it necessary to give it again to a Constituent Assembly (CA) to deliberate upon it before final approval. The main features of the draft constitution included inter alia a ceremonial Head of State, a 140-member National Assembly and the office of Ombudsman.

Armah (1974:128) points out that after behind the scene manoeuvres, a decree establishing the CA was promulgated on 7 November, 1968. Under revised arrangements announced by Gen. Ankrah on October 28th that year, the Assembly comprised 10 nominated and 140 indirectly elected members (Austin 1976:135 (3); Bever 1996:114). A close look at the composition revealed that 49 members of the Assembly were drawn by electoral devices of sort representing 133 administrative districts; and ninety-one by a number of organisations such as the judiciary, Senior members of the University institutions, the Armed Forces, the Police, the ¹ Trade Union Congress and its affiliated unions, the Civil Service

Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the Bar Association and other bodies (Armah 1974:129 quoted; Price, 1977:132). The composition therefore, cut across the broad spectrum of the Ghanaian society.

Austin (1976:135) put it graphically thus:

A Constituent Assembly of 150 members made up of individuals and representatives of identified bodies was then brought together and, under R.S. Blay (a former Supreme Court Judge as speaker and Nene Azu Mate Kole, as Deputy Speaker drew up a Draft Constitution which duly signed by all the members was presented to the NLC. The Assembly was later empowered by the NLC to enact the Constitution and accordingly on 22nd August, 1969, a new constitution for Ghana was promulgated to usher in the Second Republic.

The new constitution was however, never thrown back to the citizens in a referendum. The NLC considered that the CA was representative enough to draw up a befitting constitution for the nation. Among the resolutions adopted by the CA was that no future civilian government should set up a one-party state as Dr Nkrumah had done previously and that it should be an offence to interfere with the legitimate political activities of Ghanaian citizens. It also included the setting up of a three man Presidential Commission which was to function for a period not exceeding three years. It comprised Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the NLC, then Brigadier A.A. Afrifa and Mr J.W.K. Harley respectively and the Chief of Defence Staff, Maj-Gen A.K. Okran (Price, 1977:134) This triumvirate was to work closely with the civilian executive before power will eventually be transferred fully to civilians. Consequently, it can be seen that even though the NLC was committed to handing over to civilians, it still exhibited some

tendencies to cling on to power. This structure as can be seen later was totally unacceptable to the civilian government of Dr. K.A. Busia and it did all it could to cripple it and eventually kill it. The civilians had to accept this arrangement ab initio because a refusal would have given the military a chance to hang on to power.

4.6 THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

The next stage in NLC's transition programme was the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry into Electoral and Local Government Reform under the Chairmanship of Justice J.N. Siriboe on December 22, 1966, the year Dr Nkrumah was overthrown. One of the objectives of the NLC was the complete overhaul of Dr Nkrumah's political structures consequently, this Commission was set up to see to that.

Among its mandate were the following:

To make recommendations on the division of the country into electoral districts for elections to a future National Assembly and on the qualification/disqualification and registration of electors and candidates (Austin 1976:135).

The Commission worked assiduously and not only held public meetings but also distributed questionnaires throughout the country. As can be seen from the date of formation, it was set up some months after the NLC had consolidated its hold on Ghana. The Commission subsequently, recommended the setting up an autonomous body, a substantive Electoral Commission to oversee the conduct of the forthcoming elections which were to hold later in the year, August 1969 (Lawal, 1985:177). A High Court Judge, Justice V.C.

R.A.C. Crabbe, was thereupon, appointed as the Interim Electoral Commissioner (Austin, 1976:135).

As civilian governments in post-independence Ghana, Electoral Commissions too are shortlived. Each military regime appoints its own Electoral Commission to pilot its transition programme. One of the ploys to prolong its stay in power.

4.7 UNBANNING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The actual transition period was rather brief since the ban on political activities were lifted on May 1, 1969. Then elections were to hold on August 29, 1969 and the NLC was to relinquish power eventually on September 30, 1969.

Even though the NLC right from the on set made it categorically clear that it was not interested in holding on to power and consequently set up modalities for the transfer of power to civilians, the ban on political activities still remained in force. As such there was no way politicians, especially, those in opposition to the CPP could openly congregate. Their appetites were thus whetted when the ban was eventually lifted. Austin (1976:135-138) observes that there arose a plethora of political parties numbering sixteen at the outset. As in most cases however, by the time of the election only five had survived viz Progress Party (PP) led by Dr Busia, the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by Mr K.A. Gbedemah who was exempted on May 1, 1969 from the provisions of April 28, 1969 but who found himself restricted by Article 71 of the Constitution (though he claimed that this

Article had been passed by the Constituent Assembly when no quorum

was present), the United Nationalist Party (UNP) led by Mr Joe Appiah, the People's Popular Party (PPP) led by Mr Willie Lutterdot, which was however banned by the NLC on June 4, 1969 because it was seen as an attempt to resurrect the CPP, the People's Action Party (PAP) led by Mr Imoru Ayarna, and the All People's Republican Party (APRP) led by Dr E.V.C. de Graft-Johnson (Price, 1977:133)

On the sudden upsurge of political parties immediately after the lifting of the ban, Armah (1974:132) put it bluntly that:

Nevertheless, thanks to the maturity of Ghanaian parties came into existence within days of the announcement by the NLC that the three years ban had been lifted.

None of the parties that contested the 1956 election's appeared again in 1969. The CPP was outlawed by a decree (Panaf Books Eds, 1977:48-68) and the opposition United Party (UP) had also been stifled and driven underground with the passage of the one-party state bill in 1964. Specifically Articles IA which was inserted by the constitution (Amendment) Act of 1964 named the Convention People's Party (CPP) as the one national Party (Price 1977:102) . When the ban on political parties was lifted, the opposition of the Danquah-Busia tradition regrouped under the Progress Party (PP) with Dr K.A. Busia as its flagbearer. Mr K.A. Gbedemah, who had fallen out of favour with Dr Nkrumah previously and consequently fled into exile returned home and found the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) which drew its support mostly from the Volta Region and the North. The CPP as pointed out

earlier had been 'killed' and consequently could not resurrect under any pseudo-name.

4.8 THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1969

The actual transition period as noted above was rather short—from May to September, 1969, even though elaborate and sophisticated background planning had been undertaken by various civilian advisory committees (Hutchful, 1973:466). Parties were formed immediately the ban was lifted and they were to organise themselves and mobilize their supporters for elections in September.

After a four-month electioneering campaign, elections to pick a civilian government under the new constitution started on August 29, 1969 and voting was completed on September 1st, 1969 (Lawal, 1985:99). A total of 479 candidates filed nomination papers. (Austin 1976:136). In all there were 2.5m registered voters none of whom lived more than three miles from a polling station. (Price, 1977:135).

TABLE 4.1 THE SPREAD OF CANDIDATES FOR THE 1969 ELECTIONS

Region	No of Candidates
Ashanti	82
Eastern	78
Upper	54
Central	53
Volta	51
Northern	45
Greater Accra	33
Brong Ahafo	30
Western	53
Independents	20

Source: Austin, 1976:136

From the above breakdown, it can be deduced that more candidates contested for the elections in Ashanti Region, 82, than the other Regions. It was followed by the Eastern Region which also had 78. These were two of the regions strongly opposed to the CPP. One of the leading founding members of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) the first political party in Ghana, and who contested against Dr Nkrumah in the 1956 Election, Dr J.B. Danquah, hailed from the Eastern Region. Brong-Ahafo, a newly created Region filed 30 and as many as 20 candidates stood as independents.

TABLE 4.2 THE PARTIES AND THE NUMBER OF THEIR PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES

Party	No of Candidates
P.P.	138
NAL	138
UNP	86
PAP	52
APRP	45

Source: Austin, 1976:136

We observe from the table above that both PP and the NAL were the most widespread parties in the race. Out of a total of 140 Constituencies, both of them filed candidates in 138 constituencies. The UNP, the PAP and most especially APRP were not all that broad based. The last party, APRP contested only in 45 constituencies. This may be due to limited finance at the disposal of these parties.

TABLE 4.3 OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE CANDIDATES

Occupation	No of Candidates
Barristers	80
Medical Practitioners	20
University Lecturers	10
Journalists	8
Former MPS	20

Source: Austin, 1976:136 The table above indicates that legal practitioners dominated the contest. This is not surprising in the politics of Ghana, for since the dawn of colonial rule, men of this profession have been

in the forefront in the struggle for independence before the arrival of Dr Kwame Nkrumah. Medical practitioners have also started veering into politics which is still not attractive to University lecturers and journalists as the table shows. The former MPS were from the opposition party in the first Republic. These had nothing to do with the CPP which had been outlawed. It is also interesting to note that no single military or police officer contested this election.

TABLE 4.4 THE SPREAD OF CONSTITUENCIES

Region	No of seats
Ashanti	22
Eastern	22
Upper	16
Volta	16
Central	15
Northern	14
Brong-Ahafo	13
Western	13
Greater Accra	9

Source: Austin 1976:136 From the spread of seats above, it can be pointed out that the following regions i.e Ashanti; Eastern, Central and Western, had 85 or approximately 61% of the 140 seat National Assembly. The Upper and Northern Region's were allowed 30 or approximately 21% while the Volta and Greater Accra Regions also got 25 or approximately 18%. The constituencies were delineated according to population.

The EC made elaborate preparation for the election by providing more than 8000 polling booths which were opened at vantage points in all the constituencies. In the urban areas, one polling booth was allocated to 1000 voters while in the rural areas the ratio was one to 500 voters (Austin 1976:136).

On the 1969 General Election, Price (1977:135) emphatically states that:

This General Election, which took place on 29 August, 1969 was the first genuine election in Ghana since 1956, when the issue before the Gold Coast electorate was whether or not independence from the United Kingdom should be sought. The so-called General Election of 1965 was of course literally a non-election since nobody voted.

TABLE 4.5 THE RESULTS OF THE 1969 GEN. ELECTION

Party	No of seats won	% of seats won
PP	105	75.0
NAL	29	21.0
UNP	2	1.0
PAP	2	1.0
APRP	1	1.0
Independent	1	1.0
Table	140	100

Source: (i) Price, 1977:135
(ii) Lawal 1985:99

From the table above, it can be deduced that Dr K.A. Busia's PP won a landslide victory with 105 seats or 75% of the 140-seat National Assembly. Following far behind was the NAL with 29 or 21% of the total seats, while UNP, PAP, APRP and an independent candidate secured 2,2,1,1, or 1%, each respectively.

► Price (1977:135) opines that:

the disquieting thing about the result was not, however, the vast majority of seats won by the PP but the distribution of the seats won. The PP won every seat in Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Central Regions, while the strength of the NAL lay in the Volta and the North.

On the whole however, the result was a clear victory for the Progress Party (Panaf Books Eds, 1982:68).

4.9 THE END OF MILITARY RULE

The first military rule ended in Ghana on 30th September, 1969 and Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia was sworn in as the Prime Minister. He had to wait roughly up to a month after winning the elections before he was sworn in and consequently, had sufficient time to select and name his cabinet. There were still traces of military rule under the guise of the 3-man Presidential Commission which appointed the members of the Council of State. This Council of State was to assist the Prime Minister in discharging his duties. It must be pointed out that Dr Busia did not feel comfortable with this arrangement. A way of doing away entirely with military rule must be sought through Parliament in which he controlled 75% of the seats.

4.10 THE DISSOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

The 1969 Constitution had made provision for 3-man Presidential Commission, comprising the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the NLC and the Chief of Defence Staff. It was to work with the civilian government for at most three years when it would eventually withdraw from politics. Dr Busia on assumption of office as the Prime Minister felt his arrangement should be

abrogated. The all civilian National Assembly, therefore, voted for the dissolution of the Presidential Commission. This eventually took effect on 28 August, 1970. Hutchful (1973:432) put it bluntly that the Presidential Commission was ridden with conflict and animosities and its passing away was not mourned by the officers or the government.

Mr Edward Akuffo Addo, the former Chief Justice, was subsequently elected (ceremonial) President for a four-year term (Price, 1977:137). With the departure of the military cum police members of the Presidential Commission and the election of a civilian President, the NLC transition programme was fully completed. The swearing in of Dr Busia as Prime Minister on September 30th and the final dissolution of the Presidential Commission barely a year later confirms our argument in the analysis of transition that provided there is the presence of alternative political elite to whom the military is willing to hand over power to (Hutchful 1973:15), irrespective of the duration of a transition programme.

4.11 THE BUSIA REGIME

Dr Busia regime inherited severe economic problems which started from the CPP era through that of the NLC. The NLC could not reactivate the weak economy before handing over the reins of power to Dr Busia. Price (1977:137) opines that:

Dr Busia reorganised his cabinet on January 28, 1971 reducing its membership to seventeen but he still seemed incapable of coping effectively with the economic and other problems besetting his country. Time and again, his government acted clumsily and apparently without any real consideration of the implications of

his actions.

Cost of living became unbearable to the ordinary Ghanaian. Busia's credo was "Kafo didi" i.e. 'The debtor eats' consequently he sought for rescheduling of Ghana's debts. To make matters worse, the cedi which had stood at \$1.40 in July 1967, was devaluated from \$0.98 to \$0.55 in December, 1971, apparently in the belief that the only consequence of this devaluation would be to price imports out of the market. The situation was aggravated by a drastic fall in the revenue from cocoa the major foreign exchange earner in 1971. Still facing cash squeeze, all earnings attracted a 5% Development Levy (Price, 1977: 135) . This by implication meant a reduction in the take-home-pay of workers.

Ghanaians, it must be recalled, had voted massively for Dr Busia and his PP. Consequently, they expected that his economic policies would alleviate their sufferings but they were disappointed. Opposition and resentment started mounting. Busia thought the best way to alleviate the rising poverty in the Ghanaian populace was to increase the producer price of cocoa and salaries simultaneously. This he did but still inflation made nonsense of these increases since it meant going to the market with 'a bagful of money and returning with a pocketful of goods'. To reduce government expenditure more than 1000 civil servants were dismissed, and he tried to cripple workers by disorganising the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Dr Busia's economic policies affected all sections of the Ghanaian community and consequently alienated the support of the government in the civil service, the university and urban workers. Cocoa farmers were also not spared

since they were forced to accept a system of promisory notes rather than cash for their crop (Hutchful 1973:448-451).

The PP government became oppressive and to clamp down on opposition, he outlawed the Ghana People's Party (GPP) which he thought was the re-incarnation of the CPP in August, 1971. He subsequently, found it necessary to pass a law to ban the restoration of Nkrumah or the CPP (Panaf Editors, 1982:70). The dirty politics of bitterness and acrimony between the CPP and the UP in the pre-independence days was resuscitated.

The military felt slighted and alienated by the Busia regime because the economic policies affected the officers in a personal way since car maintenance allowances were abolished, rents for officers houses were doubled and officers were requested to pay for part of their electricity and water previously supplied free of charge by the government. There were also forced retirement or semi-retirement of some 11 senior officers (Hutchful, 1973:456-457). He lost control over his government which even though had an overwhelming majority in parliament by controlling 105 out of the 140 seat-Assembly, failed to implement the constitutional provision for the declaration of assets by MPs.

Besides his poor economic record, Dr Busia's foreign policy alienated Ghana from the vast majority of African nations. The Panaf Editors (1982:69) emphasize that:

In March, 1971, the Busia government accepted the South African policy of "dialogue" meaning that he was prepared to discuss apartheid and the whole question of the liberation of Southern Africa with the South African government. The majority of African states did not trust the South African government and did not believe that any real progress could be made through a

policy of dialogue.

This stand of Dr Busia's, Hutchful, (1973:449) opines that it offended the nationalist spirit in Ghana and proved deeply unpopular.

4.12 THE FALL OF DR BUSIA

Dr Busia's regime increasing became unpopular both at home and abroad. The military it must be emphasized are not ready to allow civilian governments to falter, make mistakes and learn from them. Once the citizens burst out crying as a result of harsh economic conditions, they interpret it as an open invitation to come and take over power since the means of coercion are in their hands. With the harsh economic condition and the uncompromising stance of the Busia government, in the early hours of January 13, 1972, Lt. Col. I.K. Acheampong, the Acting Commander of the I Brigade led a successful and bloodless military coup d'etat (Price 1977:138) . Just like Dr Nkrumah who was overthrown while he was on his way to Hanoi, Dr Busia too was kicked out of office while he was away in London for medical treatment. Kofi (" Legon Observer; January - February, 1972:1) put it emphatically that:

as far as Col Acheampong's coup is concerned, one would say that it happened and succeeded because the "elite" government of Dr Busia failed to meet the expectations of Ghanaians.

The military have once again wrestled power from the hands of civilians and derailed the democratic train. Dr Busia was not given time to run his full first term of four years in office. He was in power for roughly 28 months ie September, 1969 to January,

1972. To the second military regime in Ghana, therefore, we focus

our attention.

4.13 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL (NRC)

Immediately Dr Busia was overthrown, Lt Col I.K. Acheampong having dismissed the Prime Minister, suspended the Constitution, dissolved Parliament and banned all political parties, announced the establishment of the National Redemption Council (NRC) which would include civilians to put an end to the malpractice, economic mismanagement and arbitrary dismissals which had been characteristic of the regimes of Dr Busia and Dr Nkrumah. The membership of the NRC which kept increasing from 6 as at 14 January, 1972 finally settled for 13 including one civilian-the Attorney General and Commission for Justice (Price, 1977:138).

TABLE 4.6 THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL (NRC)

Rank & Name	Command
Col. O.K. Acheampong	Chairman
Briq. Ashley-Larssen	Chief of Defence Staff
Commodore P. Quaye	Navy
Col. E. Erskine	Army
Briq. C. Beausoliel	Air Force
Col. J.C. Adjeitey	
Lt. Col. Benni	
Maj. K. Baah	
Maj. A. Selormey	
Maj. Agbo	
Maj. Fell	
J. H. Cobbina	

Source: Hutchful Eboe, 1973:462.

The table above amply demonstrates that power had once again

been seized by the military. There was no single civilian in the NRC.

It must be recalled that the first military take over of power was to "liberate" Ghanaians from the dictatorship of Dr Kwame Nkrumah while the second one too came to "redeem" Ghanaians from Dr Busia's oppression. Since it was on a redemption mission, therefore, as soon as the NRC came to power, it repudiated some of the obnoxious policies of the PP government and re-instated the privileges which were withdrawn from the army officers.

Even though, Col. I.K. Acheampong described the intervention of the armed forces as a temporary measure (Price, 1977:139) one thing must be made clear. He did not intend to hand over power to any civilian government. The two major political parties in the country, the CPP and the Danguah-Busia tradition which comes under various names have both woefully failed the nation. Consequently, there was no identifiable alternative group to relinquish power to. This made Agwae Kollabiri (Legon Observer, January 11, 1974:6) sigh that:

But it is in the realm of politics that 1974 in particular will be a very crucial year for Ghana. . . . because our government has made it clear over and over again that it will not hand over power despite the fact that there are signs of preparation to hand over power to civilians in other West African republics ruled by soldiers. . . The government will do a lot of good if it begins to think seriously of civilian rule for Ghana.

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE NRC

Having consolidated himself in power, one of the first problems Col Acheampong tackled was the economy which he pledged to place on a war footing. He therefore introduced sweeping reforms in the economy. He revalued the ailing cedi from \$0.55 to \$0.78 and abolished the 5% Development Levy and adopted the policy of "Yentua" ie (We won't pay) towards debts to UK companies totalling \$166 400 in respect of contracts and servicing of debts entered into before Dr Nkrumah's deposition as being tainted and vitiated with corruption but promised to honour long term debts (Price, 1977:139). Tough economic measures were introduced and he abolished the fixed exchanged rate system and decided to float the cedi (West Africa, July 3, 1978:1271). By this was meant the value to the dollar will change from week to week as circumstances change. Despite these pragmatic measures, West Africa (1978, July 3, 1971) reports that Ghana's economic troubles are far from over. The Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) Programme which advised and encouraged Ghanaians to go back to the land or engage in back yard farming was launched. West Africa (September 11, 1978:1783) emphasises that the 'Operation Feed Your Industries' campaign launched under Gen Acheampong certainly made an improvement in agriculture's contribution mainly with regards to cotton for textiles industry. The cocoa industry, the main stay of Ghana's foreign exchange, was also given a boost with the setting up of a new Ministry of Cocoa Affairs. Price (1977:281) noted that the country became self-sufficient in rice production, and Cocoa production showed a modest increase. He was also able to negotiate

for loans from the West to prop up the ailing economy. Special unnumbered licence system (West Africa, 17, July 1978:1403) was introduced. He advised Ghanaians to rely on locally produced goods since imported ones very scarce, were out of the reach of the common man. Even though there was a remarkable growth in the economy at the early stages of his regime, inflation aggravated the plight of Ghanaians who therefore, became worried and Adali-Morlty (Legon Observer; February 22, 1974:80) advised that the NLC will do itself justice by setting more precise targets of economic well being on the attainment of which they propose to hand over power.

Col. Acheampong was not in haste to leave the political scene and consequently, set it upon himself to transform the country into a self-reliant nation with equal opportunities for all, a task which only the NRC could perform (Price, 1977:280).

On the 5th anniversary celebration of his regime in 1977, Gen Acheampong refused to name a date for return to civil rule...(but a year later) pressure from professionals changed them (West Africa, January 16, 1978:89). He abhorred the party system of government and consequently, mooted the idea of Union Government.

4.15 GEN ACHEAMPONG AND THE CONCEPT OF UNION GOVERNMENT

With strong opposition to his government from the professional bodies and students, Gen Acheampong conceived the idea of "Union Government" which initially meant a National Government formed by all sections of the community - the civilian I population, the army and the police and its cardinal feature was

that it will not operate on the party system ie it is to be a government or political system without political parties (West Africa March 20, 1978:548).

To define the concept in proper perspective, the government set up an Ad Hoc committee under the chairmanship of the Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Justice Koranteng Addow in January 1977, and by October 1977, it had completed its assignment and submitted the report (Legon Observer, January 5-9, 1979:1)

The committee in its report rejected the term "Union Government" and recommended the use of "National Government" in its stead. A blow to the military government was also the rejection of the Triparte Union of Civilians - Police-Army.

The Legon Observer (January 5-29, 1979:1) emphasised that the SMC accepted the report as a basis for the March 30, 1978 Referendum on Union Government and publicly invited a free dicussion on the proposals. It then launched an intensive campaign in favour of the proposal with military leaders and senior government officials addressing public rallies and using the newly-created Ministry of Co-operatives and Consumer Affairs to entice support with supplies of essential commodities. Significantly, the Ad hoc Committee's views on the role of the military and police were played down or distorted. The issues were clearly confused.

The various calls for a vote in favour of Union Government made Prof. Adu Boahen (West Africa March 20, 1978:548) cry out that:

Never in the history of this dear country of ours have we been subjected to such persistent propaganda about any particular form of government as we have been during the last few months.

There were two contending groups - those in favour of Union Government (UG) and who consequently were campaigning for "YES" vote in the referendum and those opposed to UG and who also advised the electorate to go for "NO" vote.

Those in favour were mostly from the government's side. Their position was articulated by Col S.M. Asante (West Africa March 20, 1978:545) that:

The party system has not worked well in the past in Ghana because it was alien to the culture and temperament of the country and her people, and that a non-party structure will be more suitable. (Also that) the doctrine of the strict non-involvement of the military in government is not necessary to the democratic process and that any system which will conduce to stability and enable all sections of the Ghanaian community to contribute actively to its democratic government should be welcome... That in the Third world, communication difficulties, both physical and telegraphic, tend to handicap the effectiveness of political parties... that the multi-party system, which ensures that winner-takes-all-leaves a large portion of the people unrepresented.

(On the modus operandi he pointed out that):

Our experience is that for six years now (1972-78) the country has been governed without parties...The candidates for elections should stand on their own merits and a national movement will be established to which anybody who so wishes can belong or resign from.

On January 27, 1978 however almost out of the blue a People's Movement for Freedom And Justice (PMFJ) was launched to oppose the UNIGOV idea. The leaders of the PMFJ included K.A. Gbedemah, Lt Gen Afrifa and William Ofori-Atta. Others were G.W. Amarteifio, Prof Adu Boahen and Nana Akuffo Addo among others. The SMC,

surprised and nettled by this development refused to allow the PMFJ to hold public meetings and subjected it to harassment by Pro-UNIGOV groups with the connivance of the police (The Legon Observer, January 5-9, 1979:1).

The main trust of the opposition included the following which were put forward by Prof A. Adu Boahen (West Africa, March 20, 1978:548) thus:

That the Ad Hoc Committee among its specific findings was that the Armed Forces and Police as institutions should not actively participate in the new government but should be considered for other roles. The claim that Union Government will automatically ensure political stability since it will comprise all the elements in the society, the civilian, the armed forces and the police is baseless. (That) the political instability that characterised African political life since independence has been caused not by the party political system as such but partly by deep-seated socio-economic factors, partly by the way in which the political game has been played so far but more importantly still, by the fact that some sections of the army have arrogated to themselves the responsibility of policing popularly elected governments while some officers have seen themselves as chosen by God to be redeemers.

He further emphasised that there was no way Union Government would eliminate or even minimise the incidence of coups since counter-coups occur in fully-fledged military regimes. That Union Government as pointed out in the Koranteng-Addow Report is bound to cause national disunity and foster parochialism, ethnic particularism and regionalism.

The opponents of UNIGOV consequently, opted for party political system which is practised the world over and the trend in Africa as is evident from what is happening in Egypt, Senegal and Nigeria is towards and not away from that system.

We consider the position of the opponents as more plausible for it is dangerous to actively involve the military and police in active politics. Besides, the selection of representatives under

the UNIGOV is not only cumbersome but also ambiguous.

The SMC spent a lot of money on propangada and campaign till the eve of the referendum on 29th March, 1978. It did not therefore, come as a surprise when the results released indicated that Ghanaians had voted positively for Union Government.

TABLE 4.7 RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM ON UNION GOVERNMENT

REGION	'YES'	'NO'	TOTAL	WINNER
Greater Accra	118406	113036	231442	YES
Ashanti	148680	199623	348303	No
Central	165113	76386	241499	YES
Eastern	120950	143827	264777	No
Volta	107499	92366	199865	YES
Brong/Ahafo	65613	136457	202070	No
North	210709	48533	259242	YES
Upper	245098	49902	295000	YES
West	190359	50256	240615	YES
Total	1372427	910386	2282813	YES

Total votes cast: 2,282,813

Total No of Registered Voters: 4,497,803

% Poll 50.8%

SOURCE: Ghana Gazette April 21, 1978.

From the table above, it is evident that 'YES' won in 6 out of the 9 Regions. These are Greater Accra, Central, Volta, North, Upper and West while 'NO' won in the remaining three viz Ashanti which recorded the heaviest number of 'NO' Votes, Eastern and Brong Ahafo.

The patterns of voting is given vividly by West Africa (April 10, 1978:700) thus:

The results from the individual constituencies indicate some surprising swings and contrasts in neighbouring places. In the Greater Accra Region, for instance Kpeshie, Tema and Ga registered strong "YES' majority whereas Ablekuma and Osu Klottey were strongly 'No' and Ayawaso and Ada had tiny 'YES' majorities. In the Eastern Region Koforidua voted massively 'No' as did most other places though Krobo had a "YES" majority and Abuakwa and Manya were almost evenly divided. Ashanti

was strongly 'NO' the exception being Atwima Mponua, Amansie Central though not Amansie West or Amansie East) Obuasi, Adansi and Ahafo Ano which gave a 'YES' majority. In the Central Region Cape Coast was strongly 'NO'. Assin was almost evenly divided and Denkyira had a big 'YES' majority. In Volta, Keta voted 'NO' as did Aflao but Krachi had a huge 'YES' majority. Ho East voted narrowly 'YES' and Ho West narrowly 'NO'. Brong Ahafo was strongly 'NO' except for Atebubu with a huge 'NO' majorities in Sunyani and Gyaman. In the Western Region, Sekondi and Takoradi both had 'YES' majorities. The Northern Region was mostly 'YES' with Tamale having a big majority But Gonja East gave a small majority to 'NO'. In the Upper Region Bolgatanga had a very big majority for 'YES' as did Wa; all constituencies in the Region voted 'YES'.

The EC, Justice Abban's whereabouts were however, unknown on the night of March 30, 1978 while the public was eagerly awaiting the referendum results. Later in the evening of March 30, 1978, he was relieved of his post and the Assistant EC, Mr A.M. Quaye replaced him. Justice Abban later reappeared and called on Gen. Acheampong in the company of Archbishop J.K. Amissah, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Ghana, and a Methodist Clergyman, Rev. C.K. Awotwe Pratt (West Africa April 10, 1978:699-700).

The result however, was not well received by Ghanaians and consequently there were strikes by doctors, lawyers, nurses and customs men (West Africa April 24, 1978:818) . The government had earlier on banned three groups opposed to the UNIGOV viz the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice, The Third Force and the Front For the Prevention of Dictatorship in Ghana (West Africa April 10, 1978:700). Thirty-five people including Gen Afrifa, former Head of State, Mr. K.A. Gbedema, former Finance Minister under Nkrumah, were arrested and accused of plotting to overthrow the SMC (West Africa April 24, 1978: 818) . The country was thus

charged. The overwhelming vote of 'Yes' for UNIGOV could not save

the situation.

4.16 THE FALL OF GEN. ACHEAMPONG

In the midst of all this therefore, there was a palace coup headed by Gen F.W. K. Akuffo. Gen I.K. Acheampong was subsequently forced to resign on July 5th, 1978 (West Africa August 7, 1978: 1527) as the Head of State. The Chief of Defence Staff, Gen FWK Akuffo succeeded Gen Acheampong as the new Head of State. West Africa (July 10, 1978:1327) reports it succinctly thus:

Six and a half years after seizing power...Gen Acheampong last week suddenly resigned and handed over power to the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt Gen FWK Akuffo. He also retired from the army. This was however seen as mere changing of the number plate even though the car is the same (West Africa August 7, 1978:1527) .

Gen Acheampong's dilemma was that he could not identify any political group to whom he could relinquish power. He therefore, deemed it expedient to invent a political concept which could embrace all the segments of Ghanaian society. Gen Acheampong's unwillingness to draw up a transition programme confirms our argument in this study that the incumbent military regime will find ways of legitimizing its stay if it does not identify any political group to whom it is willing and prepared to hand over power to.

4.17 GEN FWK AKUFFO AND SMC II.

In his maiden broadcast to the nation, Gen F.W.k Akuffo (West Africa July 17, 1978:1403) lamented that the channel of

communication between Gen Acheampong, the former Head of State, and the rest of his colleagues had virtually broken down and the whole of governmental activity had become a one-man show.... the former Head of State unilaterally varied decisions that had been taken collectively at SMC meeting as well as taking several important decisions without consulting or even informing his colleagues. Among the junior officers, they felt things were going hopelessly wrong with economy: that the UG referendum had been a fiasco and that the concept did not provide a viable way to civilian rule and most important to them the public's respect for the army was plummeting dangerously (West Africa, August 7, 1978:1527) .

4.18 GEN AKUFFO'S ECONOMIC POLICIES

To make the economy turn around, Gen Akuffo abolished the special unnumbered licence system which was subject to abuses like over-invoicing. He then announced that the government's economic programme...was aimed at improving Ghana's economic performance in general and the investment climate in particular (West Africa, July 17, 1978:1403). Consequently, the government appointed a 10-member National Economic Advisory Committee to mobilise informed opinion for the effective direction of the economy. It was charged with advising the government on measures to rehabilitate, resuscitate and stabilise the economy to achieve sustainable growth rate.

As still part of the economic measures, the government decided to prune down its expenditure (West Africa, September 25,

1978:1867) and reduced the Basic Travel Allowance (BTA) for overseas trips (West Africa, August 28, 1978:1714). It also devalued the cedi by about 62% (West Africa, September 11, 1978:1783-92). While tackling the economic problems, Ghanaians kept on prompting Gen Akuffo to outline his transition programme which will eventually return the nation to constitutional rule. Like his predecessors, however, the economic policies could not ameliorate the suffering of Ghanaians but instead they brought untold hardship to them. There were industrial unrests; workers continued to strike and junior civil servants joined them in November, 1978 (Bever, 1996:115) and he was obliged to take sweeping emergency powers to deal with them (West Africa, November 13, 1978:2231).

4.19 GEN FWK AKUFFO'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The various political groups had re-organised themselves and fought assiduously against the former Head of State, Gen Acheampong's concept of Union Government. When Gen Akuffo succeeded him in the palace coup, one of his first pronouncements on transition to civil rule was a great disappointment to many a Ghanaian. Adam ('Legon Observer, September 1, 1978:8) points out that:

In his second broadcast, Lt Gen Akuffo dropped his political bombshell and a terribly disappointing one it was. The SMC had ruled again that it would be disastrous for this country to return to party government and it was their considered opinion that Ghana should have a National Government without Army/Police participation for a transitional period of not less than four years after which they could decide again with all the ceremony and expense which type of government they * wanted.

This position taken by the new Head of State, Gen Akuffo therefore, corroborates what Dr K.A. Busia (Legon Observer, March 31, 1967 supplement: iii-vii) had said before that the lessons of history about military regimes indicate that those who seize power tend to hold on to it and find all kinds of reasons why they should.

In an interview with "West Africa" (August 7, 1978:1525) Gen Akuffo himself reiterated again thus:

As I said in my radio and TV broadcast, the SMC is taking a fresh look at the political situation and will make its thinking known to the public in due course. The future government I can foresee for Ghana is an elected government fashioned out of our political experience.

And as he had said before, he hoped to hand over to a transitional government in July, 1979. It can therefore, be seen that Gen. Akuffo's political agenda did not vary much from Gen Acheampong's. Initially, the latter had opted for an all-embracing government of civilians-military-police. But the Justice Koranteng-Addow Committee which was set to fine-tune the UNIGOV concept advocated for a National Government without the police and army. It should be an all-civilian government with elections conducted to elect members into the legislature on no-party basis.

Gen Akuffo was thus not saying anything different from Justice Koranteng-Addow's recommendations. Gen Acheampong had previously set up a Constitutional Commission which Gen Akuffo said would be reconstituted in order to prepare draft provisions for the constitution of the transitional government. The Commission's draft would then be presented to a Constituent

Assembly to be convened in December, 1978 in the UNIGOV time table (West Africa, August 7, 1978:1569).

When Gen Akuffo took power from Acheampong however, he did not map out any transition programme for the country and Adam (1978:8) rightly points out that what the SMC had done is merely remove Gen Acheampong.

On this development the University Teachers' Association of Ghana (UTAG) (West Africa August 1978:1569) declared that:

the first policy statement by the new Head of State, Lt Gen Akuffo, was too vague to allay the fears and misgivings of Ghanaians concerning the political direction of the new leadership.

In a related development, the Legon Society for National Affairs (West Africa August 28, 1978:1713) observed that:

the non-party system on which the proposed National Government is based is impracticable in a modern, representative democracy.. The Government proposal sought to impose on the country a system of government which denied the people their right of free association and also their sovereign right to determine the type of government by which they would be ruled during the transitional period.

We are also of the view that such types of government would be difficult to operate. The major obstacle to surmount would be the selection of candidates for election. This is one of the many functions of the party system. Consequently, with the absence of parties, there may be several candidates before the electorate that, they would find it difficult to make a choice. How is the leader of such a group going to emerge? And who is going to be in charge of the Executive Arm of government? In sum, the type of government advocated by Gen Akuffo was not going to work. This is one of the ploys used by the military to prolong their stay in

power.

Bowing to pressure from civil society and the Armed Forces, however, the Head of State Gen FWK Akuffo opened up and decided to allow Ghanaians to return to party politics from January 1, 1979 after District Council Elections still conducted on non-party basis (Afrika, Vol. XX, No 1, 1979 11) The Elections were conducted on November 17, 1978, the First in twenty years. (West Africa October 23, 1978:2111). West Africa (December 11, 1978:2471) emphasized that:

his decision to allow Ghanainas to return to party politics from January 1, 1979, was in many ways inevitable: his position in insiting on non-party National Government for four years after elections has seemed more and more untenable.

Abbey, (Africa Vol XX No 1, 1979:11) Ghana's Commissioner for Economic Planning under SMC II, confirmed in an interview in Bonn that:

on July 1, 1979, there would be a return not only to constitutional rule - with the army and police sharing power with the civilians - but to civilian rule without police and army participation. There is a recognition in Ghana of the need for greater involvement and for the government to be handed over to civilians.

The dilemma of both Gens Acheampong and Akuffo was that since the party system had failed in both the First and the Second Republics, a new system of government devoid of the party system must be evolved. That is why the former mooted the Union Government concept. It must be pointed out that but for the First Republic which lasted for only six years, (1960-1966), the Second (1969-72) did not run its full term. If anything at all, it should have expired in 1973. The success of the party system depends

upon tolerance, compromise and trial and error. Any time however, the government is in crisis as a result of this experiment, the military feel that the unity of the state is at stake and consequently, intervene by overthrowing the incumbent government.

4.19 THE LIFTING OF THE BAN ON POLITICS AND THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The ban on political parties was eventually lifted on January 1, 1979 when the Political Parties Decree 1978 - SMC 208 - came into force. It must be recalled that all political parties had been banned on January 13, 1972 when Gen Acheampong seized power from Dr K.A. Busia. For a period of six years therefore, party activities had been silent in Ghana. On the resuscitation of partisanship in Ghana, "The Legon Observer" put it succinctly thus:

As expected, the highly politically conscious Ghanaian has picked up the gauntlet thrown by the SMC and within two weeks of the lifting of the ban, not less than twenty organisations declared their intention to register as political parties. Ghanaian creativity has adorned our political scene with organisations with such interesting names as 'Theoretic Restoration Party', (TSP); "Mother Ghana Solidarity Party (MGSP), "Development Filosofas Kongress' (DFK), and "Combined Politicians Party (CPP)..Of all these (however), the People's National Party (PNP), the "Popular Front party' (PFP), the "United National Congress' (UNC) the Action Party (AP) and Third Force Party (TFP) have registered or come near registering.

On the party registration the Election Commission (EC) set up the following fees: Presidential candidates were initially required to pay C10000.00 (ten thousand cedis). but this was later reduced to C5000 (five thousand cedis). Similarly parliamentary candidates had theirs reduced from C2500 (two thousand five hundred cedis) to

C1000 (one thousand cedis) (West Africa April 30, 1979:772).

In all six political associations met the guidelines set by the EC and consequently, were registered as political parties and contested the 1979 elections accordingly. These were the People's National Party (PNP), The Popular Front Party (PFP), The United National Convention (UNC), The Third Force (TF), The Action Party (AP) and the Social Democratic Front (SDF).

We shall now briefly throw more light on these parties.

4.19.1 THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL PARTY (PNP).

One of the parties to emerge after the lifting of the ban on political parties was the People's National Party. Its founder and leader was Imoru Egala, a CPPist. 'New Nigerian (September 25, 1979:10) put it blankly that: The PNP which had a majority of 71 in the 140-seat parliament directly descended from Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP). The PNP was a reincarnation of the CPP even though it included young breed as candidates for the legislature. These young breed were more adept in socialist ideals than their older counterparts. Jefferies (1980:399) emphasized that the two groups were united by a shared adherence to the memory of Nkrumah, though it would seem likely they remembered Nkrumah rather differently, the young " progressive" being more familiar with his somewhat romanticized image than the realities of the later CPP regime.

Like the CPP of old, the PNP had branches throughout the country and had strongholds in the Central, Western, Upper, Volta, Eastern and Northern Regions. As usual its major opposition came

from the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions.

Even though Imoru Egala was the leader of the party, there was no way he could be the presidential flag bearer since he was disqualified. He therefore, chose his nephew, Dr Hilla Limann, to contest the Presidential elections which he eventually won in the run-off.

4.19.2 THE POPULAR FRONT PARTY (PFP)

The PFP was also among the first to be founded when the ban on political parties was resuscitated. Jeffries (1980:399) put it bluntly that:

the PFP was a direct continuation of the former PP which had ruled Ghana from 1969 to early 1972. It is equally important to note however, that it was not, as some would have liked it to be, an extension or consolidation of the People's Movement for Freedom And Justice (PMFJ) which had led civilian opposition to Acheampong's (SMC) regime and its proposal for a system of Union Government (UNIGOV).

In an attempt to resist the imposition of UNIGOV on Ghanaians, a group of politicians and retired army officers came together to form the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ). This however, incorporated a lot of former PP officials. But it must be pointed out that people from other Second Republican Parties like KA Gbedemah of NAL were also in the fore front of the PMFJ. Consequently, the PMFJ was not transformed into the PFP as vividly described by Jefferies (1980:399) thus:

At a meeting held in Kumasi in December 1978, William Ofori Atta (an ex- PP Minister) and Gen Affrifa (ex-Chairman of the NLC) argued for the formation of a party based on the PMFJ rather than the old PP with its continuing popular image of Ashanti/Brong Ahafo dominance and favouritism. The reluctance of many ex -

PP leaders, however, to accept the possible demotion of status or dilution of ideological purity entailed by their incorporation in a new political entity led to the formation of the PFP on the one hand and the UNC on the other.

The front of the former Danquah-Busia tradition had been factionalised and this caused the party dearly as it afforded the PNP to win the parliamentary elections and most especially the 1979 Presidential run-off.

Like the PNP, the PFP was also a broadbased party despite the fact that its strongholds were Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions.

4.19.3 THE UNITED NATIONAL CONVENTION (UNC).

The founder and leader was William Ofori-Atta popularly known as 'Paa Willie'. He formed the UNC over the disagreement in transforming the PMFJ into a political party. And as noted above, this factionalized the Danquah-Busia front. The UNC won the sympathy of Gen A.A. Afrifa who was the Chief financier and who won an MP seat on the ticket of the party. There were Ewe and Ga coalition of former NAL and PP functionaries who were opposed to the oligarchic tendencies of the PFP leadership, and consequently rallied round Paa Willie. The party had a strong following in the Eastern, Volta, and Greater Accra Regions.

4.19.4 THE ACTION CONGRESS PARTY (ACP)

The military having tasted political power through the 'back door' would like actively to engage in politics. This is exactly what happened in the Third Republic. Gen. Afrifa, one of the architects of the 1966 coup, overtly challenged Gen Acheampong on

the concept of UNIGOV and campaigned for its rejection and when the ban on parties was lifted he joined the UNC and won a Parliamentary seat.

Another military officer, Col Bernasko, a one time Commissioner for Agriculture under Gen Acheampong, and who made his mark in that ministry and later became Commissioner for the Central Region where he also performed creditably, too floated a political party - The Action Congress Party (ACP) which had massive support in the Central and Western Regions. Even though he contested the Presidential Election of 1979, he did not make much impact.

4.19.5 THE THIRD FORCE PARTY (TFP)

The leader and founder of the Third Force Party (TFP) was Dr John Bilson. Since it shared the same ideology with the right wing of the PFP, Jeffries (1980:400) categorically states that:

it must remain debatable whether it was formed because Dr Bilson could gain no reasonably elevated position with the PFP's ranks... impelled him to establish a separate -third force - organisation. The TFP was most notable for the fact that it did not at least openly advocate monetaristic economic policies of the kind which attracted some intellectual sympathy but virtually no electoral support.

The Third Force Party, like the UNC, is also a faction of the old Danquah-Busia tradition.

4.19.6 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SDF)

The Social Democratic Front (SDF) was the party of labour which was supposed to champion the cause and interest of unionised

workers. Its Presidential flagbearer was Dr Ibrahim Manama. Jefferies (1980:401) observes that Dr Mahama, a leading member of the Andani family of the Ya Na Chieftaincy, . . .was also one of the most successful lawyers, rice-farmers and cattle ranchers in the whole of the Northern Region. The SDF despite the fact that it stood for labour which cut across the country, did not appeal to workers. Consequently, its impact was solely felt in the Northern Region where the Presidential candidate hailed from.

All the parties of the Third Republic had one thing or the other in common with either the Nkrumah or Danguah-Busia tradition. And Imoru Egala (West April 30, 1979:74) in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Network Africa aptly put it that:

Well, as I've always said, there are two political parties that are emerging: the old CPP (which is now PNP) and the old PP which is now PFP.

The results of the 1979 General Elections would show that indeed these two, PNP and PFP, were the strongest among all the contesting parties.

Electioneering campaigns began in earnest and the battle line was drawn between the PNP and PFP.

4.20 THE ABORTIVE COUP OF MAY 15, 1979

Just as the various parties were busy campaigning for votes, there was an apparent jolt in the transition programme on May 15, 1979, just two weeks before the scheduled elections. Junior officers, led by Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings staged a coup. West Africa (May 21, 1979:904) described the insurrection vividly thus:

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. . .Between 50 and 60 airmen moved with armed personnel carriers and small arms to attack three targets in Accra...and the leader Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings was arrested.

This abortive coup was to herald a hurricane that would consume the senior officers in the Ghana Armed Forces even though the Army Commander, Major-General Odartey-Wellington denied that the abortive uprising of May 15, (1979) was a conflict between Air Force and the rest of the Armed Forces or between other ranks and Senior Officers. . . (That) it was purely an insurrection by a few misguided individuals. (West Africa, May 28, 1979:959). Dr K.A. Busia (Legon observer March 31, 1967, supplement: iii-vii) had already pointed out that:

Delay in the restoration of power to civilians...increase the danger of breakdown in the military regime.

This is exactly what happened to the SMC government as later developments would indicate. As usual, the coup plotter(s) and executor (s) were to face a military tribunal which was subsequently set up. An important thing to note about the trial was that it was done in public and the dailies kept on reporting what transpired at the trial. Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings aired out what was considered to be the hearts and minds of Ghanaians and public opinion tilted favourably towards him- he was being transferred from obscurity into a hero - a redeemer so to say. Another was that unlike other coup leaders who would, as it were, betray their collaborators and conspirators by mentioning their names, Fit Lt. J.J Rawling never mentioned the name of a single accomplice. He faced the tribunal by himself - a one-man coup so to say. The more the proceedings of the trial were published the more

unpopular the SMC government became. The junior officers of the army re-organised themselves again and were ready to strike.

4.21 THE JUNE 4, 1979 INSURRECTION

While the trial of Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings was still on, the junior officers and other ranks and men of the Ghana Armed Forces struck again on June 4, 1979. It was a bloody battle between the Senior Officers and the Junior Officers but the latter eventually carried the day. West Africa (June 25, 1979:1105) reports the event graphically thus:

The June 4 coup was revolutionary in that it overturned the hierarchy of the Armed Forces. At present nobody above the rank of captain had authority and other ranks mean to guard their armed power....Other ranks rose up against Senior Officers because Senior Officers had massively enriched themselves at the expense of the nation and the Armed Forces' prestige.

Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings was released by the coupists. This successful coup, Commandeered by Capt. Boakye Djan, led to the establishment of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the Chairmanship of Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings.

TABLE 4.8 THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC)

NAME/RANK	POSITION
Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Chairman
Capt Boakye Djan	Spokesman
Major Mensah Opoku	Member
Major Mensah Gbedemah	Member
Warrant Officer Obeng	Member
Staff Sergeant Alex Adjei	Member
Lt Commander Barnor	Member

4.22 THE ERA OF THE AFRC

The rule of the AFRC though brief, June to September 1979, marked an epoch in the politics of Ghana. The citizenry really felt the presence of the government. The 'Legon Observer' (June 8 - 21, 1979:1) observes that:

exactly two weeks to the date scheduled for the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections to usher in a civilian constitutional government, the political atmosphere has suddenly changed with the overthrow of the SMC and the setting up of the AFRC.

The AFRC embarked on a house-cleaning exercise which claimed the lives of three former Heads of State Gens A.A. Afrifa, I.K. Acheampong and F.W.E.K. Akuffo (Okwodu, 1982:123) Besides, five other top military officers (Hanson & Collins 1980:19) were also tied to the stakes and executed. It must be put on record that the Chief Defence Staff, Odartey Wellington died in action -while attempting to quell the uprising.

Efforts were made to sanitize both the rank and file and civil society. Consequently, lots of people who had embezzled government funds had their assets frozen. Prices of goods which were beyond the reach of the common man were forced down with the introduction of price controls which were religiously enforced by the military. Traders who had caused 'artificial' shortages by hoarding had their shops forcefully broken open, the goods sold and the proceeds paid into government chest.

Jefferies (1980:397) put it aptly that the revolutionary role of the military rank and file was in part to carry out vigorous punitive action against the most corrupt elements in the former NRC/SMC government and to check excessively profiteering practices

which had come to permeate Ghana economic life more generally.

Immediately, Fit Lt J.J Rawlings came to power, he unequivocally put it thus:

We wish to assure the nation that we do not intend to cling to power. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council will ensure a smooth transition to constitutional rule as planned. In this way, preparations for elections should therefore go on uninterrupted, (West Africa, June 11, 1979:1013) (He then emphasized thus). But before the elections came on, justice, overdue justice which has been denied Ghanaian worker will have to take place. This I promise you. Some of us have suffered for too long (Legon Observer, June 8-21, 1979 Editorial) .

Consequently, the house-cleaning exercise and the programme for transition to civilian rule proceeded "parri passu". In a virtually unprecedented move, therefore, the new ruler allowed the elections to continue. (Bever, 1996:115).

Jefferies (1980:397) declares that Rawlings announcement that the elections would proceed as scheduled was crucial in consolidating civilian support for himself and his idea of brief period of 'house-cleaning' under the aegis of the AFRC. He cleverly recognised that however, intense the desire for revenge against past exploiters, the civilians' experience of military intervention in Ghana had by middle of 1979, proved economically so disastrous and politically so disadvantageous that few people were prepared to tolerate any further protracted disruption of promise to civilian rule.

The willingness of Fit. Lt J.J. Rawlings to hand over power to civilians as planned endeared himself not only to politicians who were anxiously waiting for the mantle of leadership to change but also to many a Ghanaian.

4.23 THE 1979 GENERAL ELECTIONS

In all six political parties contested the 1979 General Elections. These were PNP, PFP, UNC, ACP, SDF and TFP (Okwodu, 1982:123) Besides some individuals stood as independents. Both the Parliamentary and Presidential Election were held concurrently. There were 140 parliamentary seats at stake. At the end of the day, the PNP won over 50% of the seats, 71, while its closest rival, the PFP, won 30% or 42. The table below shows the results of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.

TABLE 4.9 THE RESULTS OF THE 1979 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN GHANA.

PARTY	REGIONS										TOTAL	%		
	CEN- TRAL	GREATER ACCRA	EASTERN	ASHANTI	BRONG/A HAFO	VOLTA	NORTHERN	UPPER	WESTERN					
			NO OF SEATS WON											
PNP	8	6	11	2	2	11	7	15	9	71	80.7			
PFP	-	1	6	19	10	-	4	1	1	42	30.0			
UNC	-	3	4	1	-	5	-	-	-	13	9.3			
ACP	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	7.1			
SDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	2.1			
TFP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0			
INDEP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.7			

SOURCE: JEFFRIES RICHARD (1980) ARTICLE TITLED GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1979 IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS VOL. 79
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From the table above it can be inferred that the PNP not only

won an absolute majority of seats in the legislature (50%+1) but also won at least two seats in all the 140 constituencies. A feat reminiscent of the CPP victory in the 1956 elections. This shows the PNP as a broad based party. Its closest rival, the PFP won 42 seats or 30%. The stronghold of the PFP, an offshoot of the Danquah-Busia tradition was Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo Regions. In the former it cleared 19 of the 22 seats at stake while in the latter it won 10 of the 13 seats contested. It however failed to win a single seat in the Volta and Central Regions. The breaking away of the UNC adversely affected the PFP most especially, in the Eastern Region. The popularity of the UNC, was not translated into votes. It secured 13 seats in all. The ACP performed well in only the Central and Western Regions. The TFP did not win a single seat while an independent, won his constituency in the Brong/Ahafo Region.

Despite the fact the AFRC instilled fear into many a voter, the turnout was encouraging. As pointed out earlier, Ghanaians had become tired of military rule and were consequently in dire need of change.

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TABLE 4.9.1 THE NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES WON BY EACH PARTY IN THE 1979 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF GHANA

PARTY	REGIONS										TOTAL	%
	CEN-TRAL	GREATER ACCRA	EASTERN	ASHANTI	BRONG/A HAFO	VOLTA	NORTHERN	UPPER	WESTERN	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES WON		
PNP	8	6	11	3	2	11	7	15	10	73	52.1	
PFP	-	-	6	18	11	-	4	1	-	40	28.6	
UNC	-	4	4	1	-	5	-	-	-	14	10.0	
ACP	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	10	7.1	
SDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	2.1	
TFP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
INDEP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

SOURCE: GHANA ELECTORAL COMMISSION QUOTED IN JEFFRIES RICHARD (1980) ARTICLES TITLED 'GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1979 IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS VOL 79, NO 316 JULY, 1980:401

It is seen from the table above that the voting pattern in both the Parliamentary and Presidential Election is similar. The performance of the leading party, PNP, appreciated in the Presidential Election 73 constituencies or 52.1% as against 71 in the Parliamentary. The fortunes of the main rival PFP however, dwindled from 42 seats or 30% in the Parliamentary to 40 constituencies or 28.6% in the Presidential. The PNP again won at least two constituencies in the Presidential election while the PFP did not win majority in five constituencies viz Volta, Upper, Western, Greater Accra and Central Regions. The UNC, ACP, SDF did not improve much on their performances in the Parliamentary Election. The TFP still did not win in any of the 140 constituencies.

Even though the PNP won 73 constituencies or 52.1%, it failed to secure 50%+1 of the total votes cast to win the elections outright. Its Presidential flagbearer, Dr Hilla Limann, polled 35.51% of the votes compared with 29.66% for Mr Victor Owusu his closest rival. The rift between the UNC and the PFP still manifested itself much greater in the Presidential elections. While the former won 14 constituencies as compared to 13 in the Parliamentary, the latter won 40 compared to 42 thereby losing two constituencies which is much translated into votes. One fact was however, established that both the PNP and the PFP were the two parties which were institutionalised and whose candidates exerted...marginal influence on their parties electoral fortunes (Jefferies: 1980:403).

At the end of the Presidential election therefore, since none of the candidates won an absolute majority (50%+1), there was the need for a run-off scheduled to take place on July 9, 1979 between the Presidential candidates of the PNP and PTF, Dr Hilla Limann and Mr Victor Owusu respectively, since the others did not get up to the required number of votes to contest again.

In the Presidential run-off however, Dr Hilla Liman of the PNP polled 1,118,305 votes representing 62% of the total votes cast to defeat Mr Victor Owusu of the PFP who also secured 686,097 or 38% of the votes. Dr Hilla Liman was therefore declared the President elect.

TABLE 4.9.2 THE RESULTS OF THE 1979 PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF.

Region	Dr Hilla Liman No of Votes won	%	Mr Victor Owusu No of Votes won	%
Greater Accra	140 327	72.56	53 073	27.44
Ashanti	144 450	42.31	196 933	57.69
Brong/Ahafo	77 203	38.29	124 496	61.71
Central	115 395	70.97	47 209	29.03
Eastern	128 765	55.80	101 976	44.20
Northern	105 881	66.21	54 033	33.79
Upper	130 688	74.33	45 137	25.67
Volta	149 529	85.57	25 224	14.43
Western	126 067	76.80	38 076	23.20
TOTAL	1 118 305	61.98	686 097	38.02

SOURCE: Ghana Electoral Commission quoted in Jeffries Richards (1980) Article titled 'Ghanaian Elections of 1979' in African Affairs Vol. 79 No 316 July, 1980:404.

It can be deduced from the table above that the PNP established itself as a nation-wide party. It won convincingly in all but two regions, Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo, the strong hold of

the rival PFP. It secured 1118 305 or approximately 62% of the total votes cast while the PFP's Presidential candidate, Mr Victor Owusu, too had 686 097 or approximately 38% of the total votes cast. The PNP like the CPP, from which it took its roots transcended ethnic politics. The PNP therefore, controlled both the legislature and the executive and it seems this has been the trend in Ghana politics. During the First Republic, the CPP controlled both the legislative and the Executive, in the Second Republic too, the PP controlled both Parliament and the Executive and in the Third Republic too, the PNP held sway in both the legislature and the Executive. The gap between Dr Hilla Limann and Mr Victor Owusu widened because Jefferies Richards (1980:401) points out that:

the vast majority of UNC, ACP and SDF supporters. . . turned to vote for Dr Liman who made huge gains or most supporters of the minority parties voted for Limann in Round 2 because they felt ideologically closer to PNP than the PFP or they preferred the prospect of a strong government to the possibility of impasse between an executive President from one party and a legislative majority in another.

Generally on the conduct of the elections, Richards (1980:401) continues that:

they were conducted in a free and fair a manner as might be considered humanly possible under local conditions with the EC drawing on past experience to simplify the polling procedure and to devise a polling technique which was virtually fool-proof against double voting or other fraudulent practices. Neither the SMC nor the AFRC governments openly proclaimed its support for any of the contesting parties; nor did it attempt to pressurize the EC to rig the election results in any way. None of the parties subsequently claimed that the elections had been in any way unfair, on the contrary even the unsuccessful parties praised the work of the EC and accepted defeat superficially at least in good grace.

4.24 THE END OF AFRC RULE AND THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA.

With the successful conduct of both the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, the AFRC spent its last working day in office on Friday September 21, 1979 (West Africa', October 1, 1979:1810) and Monday September 24, 1979, the AFRC's Chairman and Head of State, Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings handed over the reins of power to a democratically-elected President, Dr Hilla Liman, thereby ending another seven years of military rule (West Africa', October 29, 1979:1987). The 'New Nigerian' (September 25, 1979:10) graphically reports it thus:

Ghana became a civilian republic once more yesterday when Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings handed over power to the people's National Party (PNP) government of President Dr Hilla Limann.

In the same vein Okwodu (1982:220) put it succinctly that on September 24, 1979, Dr Hilla Liman of the PNP was sworn in as the first Executive President of the Third Republic to replace the military rulers of the AFRC.

The attitude of both Gens I.K. Acheampong and FWK Akuffo strengthens our position that the military will only hand over power to an alternative civilian political elites it so wishes to. There were identifiable political groups but since these generals were not interested in partisan politics, they failed to conscientiously design a transition programme. Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings' s brief stay in power - three months from June to July 1979, also supports our argument that no matter the duration of the transition period, power will eventually be handed over to an

alternative civilian political elite if only the incumbent military leaders so wish to.

Even though Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings made good his words by transferring power to Dr Hilla Liman, the "Daily Times" (September 25, 1979:3) opined that:

while Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings' house-cleaning exercise might have achieved its objective of ridding the nation of corrupt elements in high places, Ghana's most pressing problem her almost bankrupt economy continue to cry for immediate revitalization. That it turns out will be the greatest challenge facing Dr Hilla Liman...Virtually all the development projects and welfare services have broken down through in competence, corruption, mismanagement and lack of sense of direction.

Corroborating the above, the New Nigerian (September 25, 1979:10) also observes that:

the new regime inherited a serious economic situation marked by soaring inflation, declining agricultural and industrial production and acute shortage of raw materials especially oil and the foreign currency with which to buy them.

It must therefore be emphasised that the PNP government started functioning on a weak foundation even though it was strong since it commanded an absolute majority in the legislature.

4.25 THE PNP GOVERNMENT UNDER DR HILLA LIMANN

As has earlier been pointed out, the economy of Ghana was nose diving when Dr Hilla Limann was handed over the reins of government on September 24, 1979. Be that as it may, however, he had a majority in the unicameral Parliament which by implication meant the PNP was going to have it easy in the passage of bills. I Besides, Dr Hilla Limann operated a presidential form of

government with real executive rather than formal powers vested in

the president (Okwodu, 1982: 124).

The Constitution under which Dr Liman operated had all the features of a good constitution:

"...It guaranteed basic human rights such as freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, political opinions, sex or creed... A Council of State was established to aid and counsel the President and Parliament in the performance of their respective functions; and the office of ' Ombudsman' was to be set up to aid individuals who felt they had grievance against the administration... There is the separation of powers...Ministers are to be appointed from outside parliament (Okwodu, 1982: 124 & 220; 'West Africa', May 11, 1981:1037-8)".

On the assumption of office, President Limann introduced measures that would increase agricultural production aimed at feeding the people and consequently, launched the first phase of the two-year crash programme for agriculture code- named the 'New Deal'('West Africa', May 11, 1981: 1039).

The government made available to farmers 7591 maxi-bags of improved seed rice to augment what they themselves have for cultivation. Extension officers were advised to step up their activities in the fields and assist farmers so that the objective to eliminate rice shortage from the system entirely, during the second cycle of the programme would be achieved...There was also targeted increases in poultry and pig production('West Africa', May 11, 1981: 1039) .All these measures, however, could not turn the economy around, instead the chronic shortages continued and the lines outside the stores became longer. (Hansen & Collins, 1980:13). West Africa'(February 4, 1980:66) put it without mincing words that:

Limann promised to end the commodity shortages and flood the markets within six months...(but)... within a few months (in office) , it became clear that the new government was both unable to resolve or ameliorate the economic problems and unwilling to launch any dramatic ideological campaign which might inhibit the spread of disillusionment. The result was the rapid growth of criticism of the regime amongst the urban groups, within the military and within the PNP itself, with the low-keyed approach of the Limann government being compared unfavourably to the promise and dynamism of Rawlings's revolution...Fit Lt Rawlings himself soon emerged as the most influential of the government's critics.

Despite the modest efforts made by the government in the agricultural sector Benchi-Enchill(1981:8) opines that:

"there have been policy statements but no real mobilization of the people and resources.

Dr Limann, however, refused to dine with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of his social concern for Ghanaians (Jeffries, 1982:307). The plight of the Ghanaian worsened and they yearned for the days of J.J Rawlings and the AFRC.

4.26 THE FALL OF DR HILLA LIMANN.

Besides the economy being unfriendly to Limann's administration, the opposition also gave it a headache and eventually merged to form the All People's Party (APP) .It must however, be pointed out that the failure of various factions and individuals to gain high office in the new party led the A.C.P. to opt out of the merger and link up with some discontented P.F.P. members in a United Action Front (UAF), while other P.F.P. members formed a New Ghana Party (NGP). (Okwodu, 1982:226).

k Dr Limann did not even find peace within his own ruling party, the PNP, which Okwodu (1982:226) pointed out was

an amalgam of political activists from the Nkrumah era and younger recruits to the political arena. Each of these groups could be further divided in terms of personal rivalries, ideological conflicts and regional and local differences... a house divided against itself so to say.

The PNP government had also to contend with ethnic clashes in northern parts of the country especially between the Konkombas and Nanumbas in Bimbila. There were serious succession disputes in Wa and Yendi and these undermined the security of the areas concerned since it resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of property.

The Government found itself at loggerheads with her own press: The 'Daily Graphic' and 'the Ghanaian Times', which hitherto had been under the firm grip of previous governments. It must be pointed out that the new constitution under which the Third Republic operated made provision for the establishment of a Press commission which was made good in July, 1980. Consequently, the editors of both the 'Daily Graphic' and the 'Ghanaian Times' in their attempts to exercise their constitutional rights apparently stepped on the toes of the government which reacted by demanding that four senior journalists should be sacked... (Okwodu, 1982:224).

Brown (1982:67) pointed out that since independence, Ghanaian governments have faced a series of economic and political problems which have threatened to undermine their legitimacy and power. One response employed even by those governments like the present one (i.e the Limann government) , which claims to have no use for ideology has been to identify ' enemies' on whom the blame can be

put or who can be used to divert attention from the problems and provide rallying points for national unity.

It happened that Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings was believed to be one of the 'enemies'. Brown (1982:66) put it bluntly thus:

the government was clearly frightened of Rawlings's influences and of the normative significance of the June 4 Revolution and since at least November, 1979, when Rawlings was accused of anti-government activities and removal from the Armed Forces, there have been numerous indications of government campaign against him.

In the midst of the social economic and political crises, the military struck again on 31 December, 1981 thus prematurely terminating the life of the Third Republic under Dr Hilla Limann. The powerful hand at work was that of Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawlings's and the military government that overthrew the PNP government was called the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) .How 'provisional' the new military government was to be would be known in the subsequent sub-sections.

4.27 THE SECOND COMING OF FLT. LT. J.J. RAWLINGS.

On December 31, 1981, Fit. Lt. J.J Rawlings struck again as pointed out above, terminating the administration of the PNP government of Dr. Hilla Limann. And immediately, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) which was the supreme legislative-cum- executive authority in Ghana was set up (Oquaye,1972:42) under the chairmanship of Fit. Lt. J.J Rawlings. Nugent (1996:40) records the take over vividly thus:

In the small hours of 31 December, 1981, units of the fifth Battalion Reconnaissance unit and Air Force moved to topple the beleaguered government of Dr. Hilla

Liman. By 11.00 a.m the same day, Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings was broadcasting his first declaration of revolutionary intent as prospective Chairman of the newly proclaimed Provisional National Defence Council.

TABLE 4.9.3 THE ORIGINAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE PNDC

Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Chairman	Military
Brig. Nunoo Mensah	Member	Military
Rev. Fr Dr V.Kwabena Damuah	Member	Civilian
W.O.I J.Adjei-Boadi	Member	Military
Mr Joachin Amartei Kwei	Member	Civilian
Sgt Aloha Akata-Pore	Member	Military
Mr Chris Atim	Member	Civilian

Source: Oquaye 1992:49

A close examination of composition of the PNDC above indicates that it consisted of both military personnel and civilians. Besides, the PNDC had both junior and senior military officers, this time around to appease the latter. The predominance of the military over civilians on the PNDC validates Oyeboode's (1990:45) assertion that:

now, as is well known, the political landscape has been dominated since independence by men of arms. Every where they have shot themselves into power.

It also points to the fact that the military were going to play a dynamic role in the revolution which Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawlings had declared.

4.28 THE DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES OF THE PNDC

Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings knew very well that Ghanaians were getting tired of military coups. Even though he had fared well in the days of the short-lived AFRC, not much enthusiasm welcomed him on his second coming. Nugent (1996:40) observed that:

initial reactions to the coup were surprisingly muted

but after some days during which Rawlings elaborated on the motives of the take over, Ghanaians rallied to the side of the regime.

To the PNDC, there had never been a true democracy in the country since the common man had never been involved in the decision-making process because most of the meaningful decisions were taken in Accra by politicians who were beyond public scrutiny once they had secured their election (Nugent, 1996:47). There was the need therefore, to "transfer power to the people" and this was to be done through various 'democratic' structures established by the PNDC. Among these were the defence committees and the restructuring of the District Councils. To these therefore, we turn to in the next sub-sections.

4.28.1 THE PEOPLE'S/WORKERS DEFENCE COMMITTEES

The PNDC proscribed all hitherto existing political parties and since it launched a revolution, there was the need to establish institutional structures to interact with the people. On January 5, 1982. Rawlings broadcast a call for the formation of Defence Committees at the work place and every community. At the time, he described their function as one of defending the revolution. (Nugent. 1996:44 quoted).

Workers were to team up and form Workers Defence Committees in places of work. These committees were to ensure the success of the revolution in every department, para-statal and institution. Besides, they were also to defend the rights of the workers. The Maxim was, 'We No Go Sit Down Make Them Cheat Us Every Day'¹.

Communities, towns and villages were also instructed to form

People's Defence Committees. As the workers Defence Committees, they were also to fight the cause of the 'revolution' and defend the rights of the ordinary citizen. They were to fight against corruption, nepotism, and most especially profiteering and hoarding. Power; as it were, was transferred to the people through these Defence Committees. They were empowered to seize vehicles which charged more than the agreed fares and such confiscated vehicles were designated "People buses/cars/lorries" as the case might be.

These defence Committees were later transformed into Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRS).

Oguaye (1994; Abstract) opines that:

despite the populist enthusiasm engendered by the People's/workers Defence Committees later to be known as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRS), these Committees could not be translated into viable and permanent institutions of political representation and participation.

Besides the Defence Committees, there were the People's Militia whose numbers greatly exceeded the membership of the former. It was placed under the command of retired military officers, who provided recruits with rudimentary training... It was also deployed in the campaign against smuggling,...arrest criminal suspects..and involved in the enforcement of District council levies (Nugent, 1996:155)

4.28.2 THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES . The PNDC had misgivings about the party system consequently,

it tried to break new grounds by setting up what Oquaye (1994: Abstract) refers to as its "democratic edifice" among which were the district assemblies. The members of the various district assemblies were elected on non-party basis- two thirds by the local community and one-third appointed by the government.

Gradually, these assemblies were to be the linch pin of the democratic process which was evolving. The PNDC felt also that the District Assemblies would encourage popular political participation at the grass-roots. The first District Assembly Elections were conducted between December, 1988 and February, 1989.

At the apex of the district was the District Secretary who was a government appointee-political appointment so to say.

Nugent (1996:154) observes that:

one of the distinctive features of PNDC rule was the revival of a quasi-colonial system of administration. A wide range of power was vested in the District Secretaries who were political rather than civil service appointees since 1982. Like the District Commissioner of a bygone era, the PNDC District Secretary wielded almost complete executive authority in his area. He personified the government to his local audience.

The idea of the District Assemblies (DAs) most especially the selection of one-third of the members by the government did not go down well with the opposition.

Aryee (1993:191) considers that the purposes of the DAs established in 1989 and the associated administrative decentralization were to legitimize the power base of the PNDC and to tighten its grip on regional and local institutions and for the perpetuation of its position in power.

4.29 THE PNDCs ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME (ERP)

The PNDC government inherited a weak economy from the PNP administration. To turn the economy around, it undertook a lot of reforms which were in two phases: ERP I and ERP II.

ERP I was "getting the prices right" by which rigid income and prices policies were religiously pursued by the government. ERP II was a continuation of ERP I. Under these subsidies of most products were removed. Nugent (1996:168) put it bluntly thus:

On one side, the PNDC sought to remove the remaining government subsidies on goods and services...

Then the government vigorously privatized some of the state owned enterprises. During this time the government became the lover-boy of the IMF. Since it implemented in full all the conditionalities laid down by the IMF. The impact of the ERP was heavily felt by the broad masses of Ghanaians. The initial 'marriage' between the urban and rural workers and the government thus fell on the rocks. The opposition which had been severely weakened gradually woke up from its slumber.

4.30 THE OPPOSITION AGAINST THE PNDC

The major sources of opposition to the PNDC were the Professional bodies like the Ghana Bar Association and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). Others include the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and radical intellectuals.

The defunct political parties of the Danquah-Busia and the CPP traditions also opposed the regime.

To silence these groups, the PNDC adopted selective strategy

by which it preferred to pick off particular individuals, rather than succumb to arbitrary use of terror (Nugent, 1996:178 quoted).

As the repression of opposition elements heightened by 1989, there developed a culture of silence which even attracted comments from the Chairman of the PNDC, Fit Lt. J.J Rawling. Reacting to this passivity of Ghanaians, Prof Albert Adu Boahen (Nugent, 1996: 163) opined thus:

We have not protested or staged riots because we trust the PNDC but because we fear the PNDC. We are afraid of being detained, liquidated or dragged before CVC or NIC or being subjected to all sorts of molestation.

The opposition however, woke up from its slumber and attacked the government vigorously. Towards the end of the 1980s the wind of democratization had started blowing across the African continent again and Ghana could not be left behind. During this period also western donor countries started tying aid to liberalization and democratization. West Africa (25 June- 1 July 1990:108) points out that some time in the future democratization will become an issue taking into account for granting of aid. And the PNDC government which depended a lot on the IMF and Western donor countries for much needed capital was likely to be weakened if it did not open up. Internally, the opposition intensified its efforts and the following associations or clubs emerged. The New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), the United Revolutionary Front (URF), the Democratic Alliance of Ghana (DAG) , and the Movement for Freedom And Justice (MFJ) . The opposition adopted the attitude of "Ku me Preko" (ie

Kill me at once). They became daring.

The PNDC government was accused of being corrupt and the opposition used this against the regime. The Revolutionary Banner (May, 1990:3) opined that the people of Ghana have recently been told that the PNDC is fighting corruption in its ranks. The PNDC government made the sad mistake of interfering with the activities of churches by calling on all of them to register with the National Commission on Culture. The Main Stream Churches like Catholic, Presbyterian, Anglican, Methodist, Evangelical Presbyterian, among others, defied the Religious Bodies Registration Law. The Churches having being dragged into politics were thus forced to join the opposition against the PNDC government.

A strategy adopted by the pro-democracy campaigners was to take the fight against the PNDC outside Ghana. "African (Concord", August 27, 1990:18) paints the picture vividly thus:

They (the opposition) are angry and ready to do battle. In their armoury are several discrediting statistics about the government of Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings of Ghana... However, rather than demonstrate inside Ghana, the pro-democracy campaigners are mounting their campaigns far away from home in London.

The efforts of the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) must also be acknowledged. With mounting opposition which found it expedient to close its ranks against the regime by presenting a common Front, the Coordinating Committee of Democratic Forces (CCDF) comprising Movement for Freedom and Justice, NUGS, Danguah-Busia Memorial Club, Heritage, Great Unity Club, Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society,

New Democratic Movement, Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards

(KNRG), the ex-Progress Party, the Pan-African Youth Command (PAYC), and the Gold Coast Ex-Service Mens Association (Nugent, 1996:262) .

With this unrelentless pressure, the PNDC had no option but to yield and draw up a transition programme. And this is the subject of the next sub-section.

4.31 THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME OF THE PNDC

It must be pointed out from the on set that Rawlings' s transition has some unusual characteristics...the details of the programme are only known to the government and are revealed piecemeal and as and when it is convenient to the PNDC (Gyan-Apenteng, 1992:60). Nugent (1996:215) also groaned that:

the PNDC aimed to keep the old politicians in their coffins long enough to muster a third force strong enough to be able to drive a stake through their hearts... (The PNDC) needed to keep the opposition guessing about the intentions of the PNDC (Since) it might only be possible to immobilize the opposition bandwagon property if the Rawlings card was played at an early stage. Hence the regime sent conflicting signals. While Rawlings continued to express his reservations about multi-partyism, thereby renewing doubts about his willingness to participate, it was intimated to grassroots sympathizers that Rawlings would indeed stand for election (and win) when the time came.

It was therefore, not until during the 1992 Independence Broadcast to the nation that the Chairman of the PNDC, Fit Lt. J.J. Rawling made the final stages of the transition programme known to the public thus:

- i. The referendum on the Draft Constitution towards the end of April 1992.

- ii. The Lifting of the ban on politics on May 18th 1992.
- iii. Presidential Elections on November 3rd, 1992.
- iv. Parliamentary Elections on December 8, 1992.
- v. Inauguration of the First Parliament of the Fourth Republic
ie handing over of power from the PNDC to the next
government January 7, 1993.

As pointed out previously, the PNDC wanted to break new grounds in representative government since the Presidential and Parliamentary systems via multi-partisanship have failed to work successfully in Ghana in the first three Republics. This therefore, justified the conduct of the District Assembly Elections on non-party basis. Through such elections however, the PNDC, as it were, would gradually transfer power to the people at the grassroots without any reference to the party system. On the District Assemblies, (DAs) Oquaye (1994: Abstract) observes thus:

(that) despite the developmental role that some of them have played and the innovations introduced into the system which have brought simplicity and encouraged mass participation, the Assemblies have not provided the ultimate mechanism for a people' s right to self-government at all levels (because) the PNDC has stifled political pluralism and allowed the operation of only those interest groups which are supportive of its policies.

The DAs were to be the foundation upon which the Regional and National Assemblies were to be built. Besides the DAs, there were to be Regional Consultative Council, (RCCs) which comprised the following: i) The government-appointed Regional Secretaries and their
deputies. ii) District Secretaries
(government appointees)

iii) Presiding members of the various DAs (elected by their members) . The RCCs were to be the electoral colleges to feed the national Assembly in Accra. The PNDC government wanted to shift the centre of power from Accra to the various local levels. The PNDC government consequently set up the following institutions to execute its transition programme.

4.32 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON DEMOCRACY (NCD)

Since the military government had proscribed all democratic institutions, for there to be a successful transition, there was the need not only to sensitize but also to conscientize the vast majority of the citizenry-the masses. Consequently, the PNDC had established the National Commission on Democracy (NCD) headed by Justice D.F. Annan, a PNDC member. Among the terms of reference for the NCD, it was to organise regional debates to collate views from the Ghanaian public to what form of government the people would want (the "People's Daily Graphic, May 18, 1992:1). It was also to take stock and appraise the performance of the DAs.

The NCD consequently, organised debates in all the regions. It completed its task on schedule and presented its finding to the Head of State, Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawlings. The seven-chapter 140-page document was to be used by a consultative body in conjunction with previous constitutions, as the basis for discussions on the content and form of a new Ghanaian Constitution (Home Front, Ghanaian News And Views Vol 10, No 2 May, 1991:1)

The NCD again conducted a survey in 20 out of the 110 districts and found a significant body of opinion in favour of the

PNDC forming a political party of its own (West Africa 15-21. June, 1992:1008-1009).

It is the NCD which served as a medium to re-open discussion on the form and content of democratic structures above the district level. (West Africa March 5-11, 1990:360).

4.33 REGIONAL SEMINARS ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE FOR THE COUNTRY

The main corpus of the NCD report on the future of the country was provided by the public fora held at the various regional capitals (Home Front, Vol 10 No 2 May 1991:1). The first of these Seminars was held in Sunyani, Capital of the Brong Ahafo Region. Initially these Seminars were dominated by the representatives of the DAs and selected organisations sympathetic to the government. With time however, the opposition managed to worm itself into the Seminars. The contributors supporting the government had advocated for a no-party system for the country and of an indirect elections from the DAs to the national assembly. The opposition however, argued against it and capitalized on the symposia to press home their demand for a return to constitutional rule. The report on the regional symposia was completed by NCD by March, 1991.

4.34 THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS

This was established by the PNDC under the Chairmanship of Dr S.K. B. Asante. Among other things, the Committee was to study the report of the NCD and formulate concrete Constitutional

proposals which were then laid before a constitutional Assembly. The Committee completed its work on schedule even though the Speaker of the CA groaned that:

the Committee was given a short time and due to that, unlike the other constitutional experiences, it gave...draft proposals.

Further a number of issues were left for discussion by the CA.

4.35 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (CA)

The CA was meant to comprise 260 members from 110 DAs, different identifiable bodies and groups and government nominees (West Africa 24 February - 1 March 1992: 325) . The breakdown is as follows:

- i) DAs were to elect 117 members.
- ii) 62 identifiable bodies to elect 121 members.
- iii) Government nominees 22.

The 62 identifiable bodies included butchers, beauticians, market women and farmers (West Africa 24 February - 1 March, 1992:325). This broad definition of interested parties was widely interpreted as a device to dilute the influence of the professional bodies which tended to be most critical of the government (Nugent 1996:217) . The Speaker of the CA, Pe Rowland Ayagitan II (West Africa 24 February - March 1, 1992:325) however, defended their inclusion thus:

The farmers and other people mentioned also think. They are not fools. They are the people who educated the lawyers and the professionals... Butchers, beauticians etc may not be conversant with some of the technicalities of constitution making but they are as concerned about violation of human rights or the economic direction of the country as any one else.

When it comes to areas like chieftaincy, land administration and local government those from the rural areas have a lot to tell us than those in professional practice.

Two groups, GBA and NUGS boycotted the CA even though the former sent two memos to it (West Africa 24 February - 1 March, 1992:325). The membership of the CA therefore, stood at 258. The CA completed its sittings and submitted the Draft Constitution to the PNDC.

4.36 THE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION

The 'Daily Graphic'¹ (May 2, 1992:1) declared that the results (of the referendum on the constitution) released indicate a massive 'YES' vote for the draft constitution.

TABLE 4.9.4 THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

Region	Yes	No
Greater Accra	314 572	25 107
Central	269 074	28 735
Volta	399 189	23 243
Eastern	404 379	34 969
Brong-Ahafo	505 530	29 592
Northern	276 387	22 679
Upper West	119 073	6 699
Ashanti	558 264	48 187

* Excludes Sekyere East District

Source: 'Daily Graphic' Saturday May 2, 1992:1 The table above indicates that Ghanaians voted over whelmingly 'Yes', for the acceptance of the Draft Constitution

presented by the Consultative Assembly to the PNDC on March 31, 1992 and published in the Gazette as the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana to come into force with effect from January 7, 1993. The percentage of voters that favoured the adoption of the draft Constitution was 92, while only 7.45 voted against it. The reason for this is not far fetched as 'West Africa' (11-17 May, 1992: 809) points out that:

One interesting aspect of the campaign leading to the referendum was that all the main interested groups, the PNDC, the religious bodies and opposition groups called on voters to vote 'Yes' but for very different reasons. 'Yes', for PNDC would mean endorsement of the constitution and the (controversial) indemnity provisions. (And) to the opposition and religious groups, a rejection would have thrown the whole programme of a return to Constitutional rule out of the window.

The peaceful and successful conduct of the referendum ushered in the next stage of the transitional programme which was the lifting of the ban on politics on May 18, 1992.

Before we go into this however, let us focus our attention on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

4.37 THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)

INEC was established under the Interim National Commission Law (PNDC Law 271). The body as the name implies is independent and not subject to direction or control of any person or authority and will be responsible for the conduct and supervision of the scheduled constitutional referendum as well as Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. (It is also responsible for the registration of voters) and to the review of the boundaries of

electoral areas for public elections, referenda in addition to the

proper storage and use of election materials (West Africa, 9-15 March 1992:408). The first Chairman was Mr Justice Ofori Boateng with Dr K. Afari Gyan as his deputy. Eventually however, Dr Afari Gyan assumed the Chairmanship of INEC.

Having finished the referendum, the next stage of the transition programme was ushered in.

4.38 THE LIFTING OF THE BAN ON POLITICS

As the Chairman of PNDC, Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings pointed out in his 1992 Independence Anniversary broadcast to the nation, the ban on politics which had been in force since December 1981, was lifted on May 18, after the referendum towards the end of April. The "People's Daily Graphic", (May 18, 1992:1) emphatically put it thus:

after 11 years of continuous military rule, the ban on party politics was lifted on May 18, 1992. The lifting of the ban follows the adoption of the Republican Constitution by the people of Ghana.

4.39 THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

Immediately the ban on politics was lifted, INEC drew up the guidelines/prerequisites for the registration of political parties. Among them are the following:

- i) Prospective parties should have officers in at least 2/3 of the districts in the country ie parties should be broad based, ii) names and addresses of founding members should be provided.

- iii) Party symbols should be those never used before by any previous party. National symbols should also not be used,
- iv) Each Parliamentary candidate was to pay a non-refundable deposit fee of 1 million. The registration period was to last between 31 and 37 days (People's Daily Graphic; May 18:5)

An interesting thing however, happened prior to the lifting of the ban on politics. In far away United States of America (USA), the Ghana Democratic Republican Party (GDRP) was launched. According to the leader, Kweku Danso, the GDRP did not have a choice but to launch the party outside Ghana in the US since Rawlings and the PNDC had banned all political activities in Ghana and the PNDC has a history of stamping out and eliminating all opposition forces and individuals ("West Africa' 20 - 26 January, 1992:119).

When the ban on politics was eventually lifted however, the leadership of the GDRP did not even apply for registration with INEC.

While the ban on politics was in force, there was no way the politicians could overtly form political parties. What they did under the circumstances was to found clubs and associations which they intended to transform into political parties as soon as the ban was lifted. Thus, the following clubs emerged in the 1980s, (it must however, be pointed out that the two traditions in the political history of Ghana ie The Nkrumahists and the Danquah-Busiahist became the rallying points of the clubs). i) The Danquah-Busia Memorial club.

- ii) Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society (KNWS)
- iii) Heritage Club with Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah as the Patron Saint.
- iv) Kwame Nkrumah Youngsters' Club and the v) National Co-ordinating Committee of Nkrumahists (NCCN).

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the Nkrumahists were more fragmented than the Danquah-Busiahists who having learnt their lesson from their defeat in the 1979 Elections closed their ranks. This division in the Nkrumahist family was attributed to the PNDC which knowing and fearing that the resuscitation of the CPP will inhibit the ambitions of the PNDC, decided to penetrate it through co-optation.

Then, there was the Eagle Club which wanted to present Fit Lt. J.J Rawlings as its Presidential flag bearer in the November, 1992 Election even though he had not come out openly to declare his intention to contest or not.

The campaign period was very short- May to November, 1992.

Eventually, the Danguah-Busiah Club metamorphosed into the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which like its ancestors PP and PFP, drew its following mostly from the professions and business community with its nerve centre being the Akan speaking areas of Ghana. Prof Adu Boahen became its Presidential candidate with Alh. R.I. Alhassan as his Vice.

Our Heritage Club changed to the People's Heritage Party (West Africa, 8 - 14 June, 1992:956) with Lt Gen Emmanuel Erskine as its Presidential aspirant. Alh. Ibrahim Manama was his running

As earlier pointed out, one of the reasons why the Nkrumahists failed to present a common front was the generation gap between the Revolutionary Guards ie the younger generation and old brigade. Even the latter could not unite to come up with a unanimous candidate. Ephson (1992:956) describes the schism among the triumvirate of messrs K.A. Gbedema, Kojo Botsio and Dr Hilla Liman thus:

A meeting at the home of Mr Gbedema in the evening of May 28, agreed that the United Nkrumah family should float a party with the name National Independence Party (NIP) with the hen and chicks as the symbol and the motto "United and Service" . The three were to meet on May 29 in Mr Gbedema's house to sign a press release to that effect. After waiting for three hours on May 29 without Dr Limann appearing, an emissary was sent to his residence.

There, the emissary met Dr Limann addressing a press conference, launching his own party, the People's National Convention (PNC) . THE symbol of hen and three chicks and colours of red and white was the same as decided the previous day at Gbedema's house... In the evening of the same day, Messrs Gbedema and Botsio issued a press statement stating that Dr Limann's press conference was unauthorised and a unilateral action and expelled Dr Limann from the Nkrumah family and its party. The activities of the triumvirate over the May 29-31 week end really drove many Nkrumahists into the camp of our Heritage.

In the final analysis, Dr Limann stood for his own party, the PNC, in the Presidential race while Kwabena Darko bore the flag of the NIP with Prof Naa Afarley Sackeyfio as his running mate and the only woman contestant.

Another Nkrumahists, the NCCN decided to go its own way by transforming itself into the NCP and choosing K.N. Arkaah to contest the November Presidential Election.

As expected, the Eagle Club turned into Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) Party. It was led by Capt (Rtd) Felix Nii Okai but it presented Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings as its Presidential Candidate.

On party formation for the Fourth Republic, the ruling PNDC had a head start as vividly pointed out by Nugent (1996:219) thus:

While the fledging parties of the opposition had to wait until August before they could complete the formalities, PNDC officials were covertly campaigning through the country under the guise of conducting normal government business.

Therefore, there emerged a third force in Ghanaian politics when the Rawlings government cleverly removed the 'P' from the 'PNDC' and formed the National Democratic Convention. The government of the PNDC under the chairmanship of Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawlings had a foresight by establishing political blocs in the CDRs and the 31st December Women's Movement under the patronage of the First Lady, Nana Kanadu Agyeman Rawlings. Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings inevitably was its Presidential candidate.

Eventually, three political parties, in a coalition viz the NDC, the NCP and EGLE Party adopted Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings as a common Presidential candidate and K.N. Arkaah who should have borne the flag of the NCP, became his running mate. (Nugent 1996:229-230) Five political parties were registered by the INEC and these were the NPP, the NIP, the NDC, the PNC and the PHP. A synthesis of these parties indicate the surgence of the Danquah-i Busia tradition actualized in the NPP, the fragmentation of the

Nkrumahists epitomized in the NIP, PCN and PHP and a third force in Ghanaian politics represented by the NDC. As pointed at earlier, however one of the siblings of the Nkrumah family, tied its apron strings to the NDC - the party of the ruling military government.

4.40 THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The 1992 Presidential Election preceded the Parliamentary Election since the General Elections were conducted in two phases. The Presidential in November and the Parliamentary in December.

Not surprisingly, the results of the 1992 November 3, Presidential Election showed a massive voter turn out because it is the first in thirteen years. It was contested by five political parties viz. NDC led by J.J. Rawlings, NNP led by A. Adu Boahen, PHP led by E.A. Erskine, PNC led by Hilla Limann and NIP led by Kwabena Darko (The Mirror', November 7, 1992: 'People's Daily Graphic' Nov.4, 1992:1).

A meeting between the INEC and the representatives of the registered political parties agreed that only the symbols and names of the candidates should be on the ballot papers ("People's Daily Graphic", October 9, 1992:1) .There is no way names alone could be used since majority of the electorates are illiterates and to cater for independent candidates such were obliged to select from a number of symbols to be provided by INEC. ► Nugent (1996:232) points out that:

when the election results were declared by INEC, the four opposition parties entered a state of shock. The results gave Rawlings 58.3% of the national vote thereby obviating the need for a second round of polling.

TABLE 4.9.1 THE NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES WON BY EACH PARTY IN THE 1979 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF GHANA

PARTY	REGIONS										TOTAL	%		
	CEN-TRAL	GREATER ACCRA	EASTERN	ASHANTI	BRONG/A HAFO	VOLTA	NORTHERN	UPPER	WESTERN					
			NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES WON											
PNP	8	6	11	3	2	11	7	15	10	73	52.1			
PFP	-	-	6	18	11	-	4	1	-	40	28.6			
UNC	-	4	4	1	-	5	-	-	-	14	10.0			
ACP	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	10	7.1			
SDF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	2.1			
TFP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			
INDEP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			

SOURCE: GHANA ELECTORAL COMMISSION QUOTED IN JEFFRIES RICHARD (1980) ARTICLES TITLED 'GHANAIAN ELECTIONS OF 1979 IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS VOL 79, NO 316 JULY, 1980:401

From the table above it could be seen that the popularity of Fit Lt. Rawlings had not waned. He won over 50% of the votes in all the Regions of Ghana but Ashanti, the stronghold of the Danquah Busia tradition. In all, he collected 2327 500 i.e 58.3% of the 3 989 020 at while his closest rival Prof. Adu Boahen had 1213 073 or 30.4% of the votes cast.

The opposition parties accused the NDC of rigging the election. In a post-election interview with 'West Africa' (16-22 November, 1992), Prof. Adu Boahen lamented thus:

I was of course initially shocked, but as events kept on unfolding, I became convinced that the results are no reflection of the voting that took place in the country, but rather a reproduction of a pre-determined, computer programmed result and therefore I became happy because I'm convinced I won the election.

The NPP published its evidence (of winning the elections) in a substantial dossier entitled 'the Stolen Verdict' (Nugent, 1996:235). Foreign Observers included the Carter Centre of Emony University, the Commonwealth and OAU Observers groups. Much as these also admitted that there were real difficulties over the register which they said contained many dead people, despite the attempt at cleansing and a number of duplications, errors and omissions, they were of the opinion that the election was not only free and fair but also "free from fear" ('Daily Graphic', December 28, 1992:5).

The Executive Chairman of INEC, Mr Justice Ofori Boateng, also pointed out on the cry of foul by the losers that where the

parties own authority representatives had unanimously certified that the elections were free and fair and impartial, foreign observers by political parties had also said the same, it was not easy to fathom the basis of the accusations ("The Mirror", November 7, 1992:1). We share the same view with the Executive Chairman of the INEC because he did what was humanly possible to ensure that the elections were free and fair.

Right from the on set however, it must be emphasized that the playing field was not even for both the NDC, the party of the ruling government, and the four opposition parties. The opposition parties had advocated for an interim government to oversee the elections but this was turned down by the ruling PNDC, it therefore became a player and a referee at the same time. A group of politicians for instance called on various political parties and independent bodies in the country to consider as a matter of urgency convening a national conference to draw up what they call "an acceptable agenda" for the country's transitional process since according to them the time table for the return of the country to constitutional rule is the work of the PNDC and not as to be expected that of INEC (People's Daily Graphic, April 27, 1992:5).

Another advantage of the NDC was that prior to the lifting of the ban on politics, it had structures like the CDRS and other revolutionary organs of the PNDC era which undertook...assignments in the rural areas (Aryee, 2000:49) . The opposition on the other

hand had very limited time to campaign.

The personality of Rawlings also contributed immensely to the success of the NDC in the presidential election. Nugent (1996: 246 quoted) put it emphatically thus:

The PNDC Chairman still enjoyed a formidable reputation for personal honesty, whereas many opposition figures were tainted by corruption of the past.

4.41 THE 1992 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

The Parliamentary election was boycotted by the opposition and Nugent (1996:24) paints the picture vividly by pointing out that:

having gambled and lost, the opposition parties were forced to reconsider their options. Their belief that the (Presidential) election had been rigged drove them in the direction of a boycott of the parliamentary poll which was scheduled for 6 December, 1992. . . The opposition parties considered that the cards were stacked too decisively against them and so they resolved not to participate without substantial concessions from the government. In particular they demanded a new voters' register, the introduction of identification cards, the replacement of INEC by a genuinely independent electoral commission and a guarantee that Rawlings would not preside over the election.

It must however, be pointed out previously the five political parties viz the NPP, NIP, NDC, PNC and PHP had by noon on Friday October 3, 1992 paid 1 million for 1000 candidates to contest the parliamentary Election in December. However, sequel to the controversy which surrounded the November Presidential Elections, the opposition parties boycotted it and their deposits refunded to

them (People's Daily Graphic, 8 December, 1992:1).

The polls were therefore, contested by the Progressive Alliance comprising the NDC, the EGLE Party and the NCP and some independents. It should be recalled that these three parties forming the Progressive Alliance presented a common candidate, Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings against the other four contestants in the November Presidential Elections. TABLE 4.9.6 THE RESULTS OF THE 1991 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

Party	Number of seats won	%
NDC	189	94.5
NCP	8	4.0
EGLE	1	0.5
INDEPENDENT (S)	2	1.0
TOTAL	200	100.0

The above shows that with the absence of the opposition in the december, 1992 Parliamentary Polls, the legislature of the Fourth Republic was overwhelming dominated by the ruling PNDC's party - NDC. It must be pointed out that since the three parties had already formed the Progressive Alliance, the parliament of first government of the Fourth Republic was more or less a single party.

The Fourth Republic was inaugurated on January 7, 1993 thus bringing the 11 year rule of the PNDC to an end and ushering in a new democratic dispensation.

A close examination at the transitional programme of Fit Lt.

J.J. Rawlings lends credence to our proposition that transition will succeed irrespective of the duration if its architects are committed to relinquishing political power.

In Ghana's experience however, the architects of the transition were not prepared to hand over political power to an alternative power elite, ie the opposition, they were still interested in political power and so even though the actual transition period was very brief, May to November, 1992, the incumbent saw to it that it succeeded. Since power was still going to remain in their hands. This also supports our proposition that most transition programmes will be characterized by the desire of the incumbent to remain in power.

4.4.2 CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA?

Since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in Ghana, there have been two more general elections. The first one was in 1996 when the first term of the office of the President, F It. Lt. J.J. Rawlings expired. In the 1996 Presidential Elections, Fit. Lt. J.J. Rawling's Progressive Alliance (PA) defeated the candidate of the Great Alliance (GA) J.A. Kufuor on the ticket of the NPP and E.N. Mahama of the PNC. The incumbent, Fit. Lt. J.J Rawlings won 57.4% of the total votes cast (Aryee, 2000:41) and so the need for a run-off did not arise. In the parliamentary Election too, the ruling, NDC won 133 ie 66.5% of the 200 seat - Legislature while the major opposition party, the NPP won 61 or 30.5%. (Aryee,

2000:43) .

Ghana has made a steady progress in the consolidation of democracy. The maximum term of office of Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings expired in 2000, having ruled for two terms of four years each. He was therefore, not qualified to present himself again as a candidate for the 2000 Presidential Election and he handed over the baton to his Vice, Prof Atta Mills. In the ensuing elections in December 2000, the opposition NPP defeated the ruling NDC in the Presidential Election but it had to go into run-off since the winner, J.A. Kufuor, had less than 50%+1. In the Presidential run off however J.A. Kufuor of the NPP defeated Atta Mills of the ruling NDC, while in the Parliamentary Election also the opposition NPP turned the tables against the ruling NDC. The new government of the NPP therefore commands a majority in the 200-seat Assembly.

Ghanaians have voted for a positive change and besides, this is the first time since independence that they have voted to change a government via a free and fair election. The previous changes have been through coups d'etat. Ghana has therefore, come a long way from the political chaos of 1992 to relative stability and harmony in 1996 (and 2000) and its aftermath (Anebo, 2000:18).

If there should be a sustained democracy for the next four years in Ghana, a giant stride might have been taken in the right direction.

In this chapter, we attempted to highlight the various

transition programmes from military to civil rule in Ghana. We discovered that the NLC government which was set up after the first military coup d'etat, did not intend to stay in power for long. Consequently, it started its transition immediately. This first transition programme was successful because it confirms our proposition that transition to civil rule will succeed if there is an alternative political elite the military wish to relinquish power to. The second transition programme which lasted for seven years had lots of political minefields because the initiator, Gen Acheampong did not want to hand over power to civilians. His successor, Gen Akuffo, was however, compelled to open up but his inconsistency led to intervention by the junior officers of the Ghana Armed Forces. The AFRC government led by Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, which ensued, completed the transition set in motion by Acheampong/Akuffo within three months. The third transition initiated by PNDC government under Fit Lt Rawlings was characterized by the desire of the incumbent to succeed himself because he did not identify any alternative political elites he was willing to hand over power to. The second and third transitions to civil rule in Ghana therefore, confirm our proposition that:

- (i) transition to civil rule will only succeed if there is an alternative political elites the military want to hand over power to.
- (ii) transition will fail if the military have an overwhelming influence on the transition programme.

CHAPTER FIVE

FACILITATION AND INHIBITION OF TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE IN NIGERIA AND GHANA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will return to some of the issues raised in chapters 4 and 5 and through an assessment of the Nigerian and Ghanaian experiences, we will be able to compare their transitions to civil rule and by so doing, we can unearth the forces which facilitate or inhibit transition to civil rule in these two countries under study.

The comparison of transition programmes in Nigeria and Ghana is going to adopt the institutional approach i.e the comparing of institutions established by the various military regimes to implement their transitions. Since the study spans through four decades (1960 - 2000), the chronological approach should have been more appropriate but even though the first military coups d'etat in both countries occurred the same year, 1966, the duration of the regimes differ. For example in the case of Ghana, the NLC having seized power in 1966, handed it over to civilians in 1969, while in Nigeria, the military clung tenaciously to power from 1966 to 1979 i.e a period of thirteen years. The soldiers in Nigeria therefore, stayed a decade longer than their counterparts in Ghana after the first coups d'etat of 1966.

The next wave of militarization in Ghana occurred barely A three years after handing over of power to civilians in 1972. The

civilian regime of Dr K.A. Busia had an initial life span of four years ie from 1969 to 1973 but it was cut short in 1972. This time around, the soldiers stayed longer, seven years, since there was a palace coup and a counter coup. The Third Republic was ushered on September, 1979. That was the government of Dr Hilla Limann and his PNP.

In Nigeria when the soldiers handed over power in 1979, they permitted President Shehu Shagari to complete the first term of four years and no sooner had he commenced the second term than he was booted out of office on December 31, 1983. From that time, the military were in power till May, 1999, a period of fifteen years which saw the seat of power changing hands four times. First it was Gen Buhari who terminated the Second Republic. His dictatorial regime was overthrown by Gen Babangida who ruled for 8 years before he "voluntarily" stepped aside in August 1993. The mantle of leadership fell briefly into the hands of chief Ernest Shonekan, whose government, the Interim National Government, (ING) a child of necessity, did not find its feet before it was kicked out by Gen Sani Abacha who was in power from 1993 to 1998 when death laid its icy hands on him. Power then transferred to Gen Abubakar. It was he who eventually handed it to Gen Obasanjo (Rtd) to usher in the Fourth Republic since the Third Republic never saw the light of day with the annulment of June 12 Presidential Elections in 1993.

Ghana's Third Republic lived for only two years in its initially allotted four years. The military were at hand again on December 31st, 1981 and this marked the beginning of their longest reign in Ghana. That was the government of Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings's PNDC purported to be "provisional¹ and his second appearance on Ghana's political scene. In the ensuing transition, Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings won the December 1992 Presidential Elections and succeeded himself to commence the Fourth Republic. Since then, Ghana has however, had held two elections in 1996 and 2000 respectively. The last one was won by the opposition NPP.

We now focus our attention on the agencies set up by the military governments in Nigeria and Ghana to implement transition to civil rule.

5.2 ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

An electoral Commission is the linch pin of the democratic process. It is the arbiter in the transition programme (New Nigerian January 22, 1997). In Nigeria however, this important agency has assumed lots of names. First it was NEC which conducted the 1964 Federal Elections and the 1965 regional polls which led to the western regional crisis (New Nigerian, August 20, 1998:1) and the first military intervention.

The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime changed the names, appointed Chief Michael Ani as the Electoral Commissioner (West Africa 30 April 1979:772). And it was FEDECO which oversaw and implemented

the Mohammed/Obasanjo transition programme. When the military regime of Gen Babangida felt the need to 'transfer' power to civilians, he set up a new electoral body and called it simply National Electoral Commission, going back to its original name in the First republic.

Gen Babangida having stepped aside and with the collapse of the ING, Gen Abacha became the Head of State, instantly changed the name of the electoral body from NEC to National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) and appointed Justice Ephraim Akpata as the Chairman (New Nigerian November 3, 1998:1) .

One wonders why the change in name from one to the other. The answer may not be far fetched. Each military regime would like to be different from the preceding one and the easiest way to do is to rename agencies and institutions inherited from the previous regime. And the Electoral body seemed to have suffered most from this.

In Ghana where there have been only three major transition programmes, the electoral body has not experienced much of these changes in name. First it was Electoral Commission during the NLC regime, the name did not change in the Acheampong -Akuffo-Rawlings transition (1972 - 79) Then in 1992, the PNDC renamed it Independent National Electoral Commission (West Africa 10-16 February, 1992:254) with the Chairman as Mr Justice J. Ofori Boateng initially (West Africa 9-15 March, 1992:409) and now Dr Afari Djan.

Even though the electoral body has changed in name more times in Nigeria than in Ghana, the functions are virtually similar. In both countries, the Electoral Commission among other things performs the following functions: i) To delineate constituencies for elections

ii) To set down guidelines for formation of political parties,

iii) To register political parties

iv) To register, review and produce authentic voters' registers.

v) To produce voters registration identity cards. vi) To produce voting materials like ballot papers, boxes etc. vii) To release monies to parties where they are funded by the government. viii) To conduct elections at all levels of government. ix. To clear candidates for elections.

In 1979, FEDECO acting without fear or favour (West Africa 30 April, 1979:773) conducted elections in Nigeria which culminated into the Second Republic. The campaign period was long - 10 months from October 1978 to July 1979 and the duration of the election proper too, long. West Africa (August 6, 1979:1407) opines that:

the fact of holding of five elections on successive Saturdays with the same electorate and the same parties (is a great achievement but they have attracted none of the attention in the world's media.

The meticulous way the whole transition was planned and executed by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime made West Africa (August

13, 1779:1447) point out that:

never in the history of Africa have so many people been consulted so thoroughly about how they wished to be governed...the programme for the return to constitutional rule was most carefully worked out.

This good work of FEDECO was nearly marred by the interpretation of what was meant by "one-quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the states" i.e approximately thirteen States to win the Presidential Election outright. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the eventual winner of the 1979 Presidential Election however received a quarter of the votes in twelve States and less than a quarter in the thirteenth State where he had the majority of the votes (West Africa August 27, 1979:1533). FEDECO nonetheless, as a way out, gave ordinary interpretation of what makes two-thirds of nineteen states and a quarter of two-thirds i.e. one-sixth of the votes cast in the thirteenth State and declared Alh. Shehu Shagari winner and President-elect. ("West Africa", August 20, 1979:1491; August 27, 1979:1533) The first transition from military to civilian rule therefore, supports our proposition that the transfer of political power will only succeed if its architects are sincerely committed to do so.

During the transition period of Gen Babangida, the electoral body to oversee it was NEC. It had all the powers vested in an electoral body. Even though NEC successfully conducted all the elections at the various levels of government - Local Government, State Assemblies and Gubernatorial, including those of Senate and

House of Representatives, the ultimate of it all, the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election has been the most controversial election in the political history of Nigeria. Two days prior to the election, i.e on Thursday June 10, 1993, the Association For Better Nigeria (ABN) took the NEC to an Abuja High Court and restrained it from conducting it. This action in the words of the "Daily Times" (June 16, 1993:10) almost threw a spanner in the works of NEC. The NEC however explained that by virtual of Section 19(1) of the Presidential Election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provision) Decree 13 of 1993, it could go ahead and conduct it ("Daily Times" June 18, 1993:1).

It therefore, promptly stepped in to reassure prospective voters about the nullity of the Court ruling ("Daily Times; June 16, 1993:10) and went ahead to conduct it the result of which it started releasing. As at Tuesday June 15, 1993, there had been a collation of results from 14 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) , Abuja; and Chief M.K.O. Abiola took the lead in 11 states and Abuja ("Daily Times", June 16, 1993:1) On that same day, however, there was another interim order by yet another High Court which restrained it from announcing the result. To make matters worse, Prof Humphrey Nwosu, the Electoral 1 Commissioner, ("Daily Times"; June 16, 1993:1) in a statement said inter alia that:

NEC was once again on Wednesday served with a writ of summons through the Hon Attorney General of the Federation to show cause why the Commission should not

be charged for contempt of the order of the said Abuja Court for conducting the Presidential Election on Saturday June 12, 1993...In view of the foregoing therefore the Commission has decided as follows:

1. To challenge the right of the Abuja High Court.
- 2.
2. To file an appeal to the Court of Appeal together with a motion for accelerated hearing challenging the jurisdiction of the said court to entertain the suit and the motion.... In the light of the developments, the commission has, in defiance to the court injunction and other actions pending in the courts decided to stay action on all matters pertaining to the presidential election until further notice.

The Abuja judge declared that the June 12 Presidential Election was illegal (while NEC made an appeal in the Court of Appeal Kaduna ('Daily Times', June 23, 1993:1)).

There was a counter development. A Benin High Court granted an interim injunction compelling NEC to release the authentic results of the Presidential Election held on Saturday June 12, 1993 (Daily Times, June 18, 1993:3).

A motion was also filed in an Ikeja High Court for the Prosecution of the leaders of ABN (Daily Times June 24, 1993:3).

In view of the legal wrangling the Federal government suspended NEC and declared the June 12 presidential Election null and void. A spokesman of the Federal government Daily Times June 25, 1993:1) said among other things that:

In view of the spate of litigations pending in various courts, the Federal military Government is compelled to take appropriate steps in order to rescue the judiciary from intra-wrangling.

This action of the Federal Military Government brought to nought all the efforts made by the Babangida administration to hand over power to civilians. Gen Babangida's transition also as pointed out in Chapter 3, validates our argument that transition will only succeed if the incumbent is willing to hand over power to an alternate political elite(s) it is interested in.

General Sani Abacha's NECON too did not accomplish its task. Like its predecessor NEC, it conducted all the elections but the Presidential. And even though pressure was mounted on Gen Abacha to succeed himself, he kept his card close to his chest until his death on June 8, 1998. Nobody ever knew his intentions.

The electoral body which successfully conducted elections leading to the Fourth Republic is INEC put in place by Gen Abubakar. Like Gen Obasanjo in 1976 - 79, Gen Abubakar was sincere in his desire to hand over power to a "civilian" regime. The political elites have grouped and regrouped since the regime of Gen Babangida. INEC conducted the five-stage election crowning it with the Presidential Election which was won by Gen Olusegun (Rtd) . He did not teleguide it. Gen Abubakar gave INEC a free hand to discharge its functions. His attitude towards his transition programme further buttresses our point that the duration of transition does not matter but the desire of the incumbent to relinquish political power to a desirable alternative elite.

Turning to Ghana, the NLC set up NEC to oversee its

transition programme which it discharged successfully. The NEC right from the on set made it categorically clear that it was not interested in entrenching itself in power and put in place the modalities to transfer power to civilians immediately. The NLC therefore, did not interfere with the activities of NEC and allowed it to function within its jurisdiction. This is similar to Gens Mohammed/Obasanjo's government's attitude to its transition programme. And even though the military had hung on to power longer in Nigeria than in Ghana at that time, both transitions being the first ever from the military to civilians were successfully and peacefully executed because of the genuine determination on the part of the incumbents to leave the political scene for the military to return the barracks.

In the case of Ghana, there was an alternative political elites comprising those opposed to Dr Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP government. On the contrary in Nigeria, the old guards of the ancien regime still regrouped to receive power from the Federal military Government.

During Gen Acheampong's regime, he also maintained the name ^sNEC but his attitude to his transition programme could be compared to that of Gen Babangida' s. Gen Acheampong was in a dilemma for both major political groups in the country, the CPPists and the Danquah-Busiah tradition had failed, the former in the First Republic and the latter in the Second Republic. He was *T* therefore, left with no option but to introduce innovation of

military-police-cum-civilian administration. This was unacceptable to Ghanaians even though a plebiscite proved otherwise. He never allowed the NEC to perform its functions without fear or favour and during the aftermath of the Referendum on UG, the Electoral Commissioner (EC) Justice had to go into hiding for fear of his life. In such circumstances, there was no way a transition could be successfully carried out since the incumbent was interested in maintaining the status quo ante. It would be recalled that even though Gen Babangida was interested in retaining political power, he did not come out overtly for it. That is why he was accused of having a 'hidden agenda'¹.

Fit Lt Jerry Rawling's first transition was managed by NEC, the name consistently maintained by the NLC, SMC I & II and the AFRC. And unlike in Nigeria where Gen Abubakar's SMC dissolved all the electoral structures inherited from the Abacha regime, the AFRC retained those bequeathed to it by the SMC II since it promised not to interfere with the transition programme which was in advanced stage. The AFRC therefore, having seized power on June 4, 1979 handed it over to the civilian administration of Dr Limann on September 24, 1979. The AFRC did not dismantle the NEC it inherited from SMC II but allowed it to finish its work because it was not interested in political power. The NEC therefore, conducted the 1979 parliamentary and Presidential Elections without any pressure from the military government. This also lends credence to our postulation that the success of any transition

programme depends upon the willingness of the architect(s) to genuinely hand over power to an alternative political elite.

The second transition programme engineered by Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings was in 1992. This time around however, the name of the electoral body was changed to the Independent National Electoral Commission as its Nigerian counterpart under General Abubakar. Even though there was a change in name, its functions, outlined above, virtually remained the same. The adjective "independent" is there to protect the body from unnecessary interference not only from the government but also from other groups and individuals as happened under Gen Babangida when interference from the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) marred what would have passed for one of the freest and fairest Presidential Election - the annulled June 12 Election.

From the foregoing however, exempt from group, individual and governmental interferences, the electoral bodies in both Nigeria and Ghana have actually lived up to expectation. In both countries, the electoral bodies have often been headed by men with proven integrity and accountability. Men with innovative ideas like Prof Humphrey Nwosu of Nigeria who experimented with a lot of voting procedures which would curtail if not completely eliminate electoral fraud, hence his coming up with Option A4 which has already been explained in Chapter 4.

5.3 INSTITUTIONS FOR PUBLIC ENLIGHTENMENT

One of the features of military rule is the suspension of political activities and outright banning of political parties. For the military to return political power to civilians therefore, there is the need for the resuscitation of political parties and activities. Before this is done however, since the populace have lost the political fervour with the presence of the military there is the need to rekindle their interest in politics. This is usually done through the establishment of mass oriented institutions. These however, assume different names in Nigeria and Ghana even though fundamentally their functions are almost similar

In Nigeria during the Gen Babangida transition programme, he established the Political Bureau which was to come out with a blue print for the transition. (Tunji Olagunju et al, 1993:111). Besides, he also set up the Centre for Democratic Studies the responsibility of which was to enlighten the public to exercise the political rights in the democratic process. In Ghana too, during the transition programme put in place by the NLC, the Centre for Civic Education (CCE) was established under the Chairmanship of Dr. K. A. Busia who toured the nooks and crannies of Ghana and addressed durbars of Chiefs, the people and students. (Smock & Smock, 1975:246). The opposition therefore, accused the ruling NLC of giving Dr Busia a head start in politicking because of his position in the CCE. This was due to the fact that while

the ban on politics was still in force, Dr Busia was given the opportunity to meet the Chiefs, and people and address them. Their minds were gradually made to tilt towards him. He was seen as leader who might succeed the military government and the 1969 elections proved the critics right.

During the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime however, Obasanjo did the conscientization himself. He toured the whole country and met with opinion moulders including the traditional and religious leaders, top civilian governments professional bodies and appealed to them not to repeat the mistakes which led to the civil war in the past.

Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings on his Second orchestrated transition set up the National Commission on Democracy. Besides collating news on the type of governments suitable for Ghana, the NEC was also used to test the popularity of the PNDC and its possibility of winning the 1992 elections should it form its own political party.

5.4 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

In both countries, the military regimes undertook some administrative reforms sequel to the transition programme. The Muhammed/Obasanjo government restructured the country into 19 states and introduced local government reforms. A uniform system of local government administration was evolved for the whole federation. The Gen Babangida administration built upon this and I created more states and more local governments. Gen Sani Abacha

also did the same. The objectives of these reforms were to bring the government closer to the people and also enhance development.

In Ghana too the number of regions remained the same from the NLC, SMC I and II and the AFRC. It was the PNDC which created two Regions out of the former Upper Region; Upper West and Upper East for effective administration and bringing government nearer to the people. The District Councils were restructured and these formed the basis of the District Assemblies process under the PNDC.

Since Ghana is a unitary State, the tiers of government are the Central Government in Accra, Regional Governments in the ten regional capitals and the District Councils. The last were to be the watershed of democracy. Election at this level is usual non-partisan just like local governments under the military in Nigeria. The Chief Executive of the district however, is a government appointee. Consequently, his loyalty to the government cannot be denied.

In Nigeria the breaking of the federation is necessary to allay the fears of one geo-politic unit dominating the other. At the time of independence, the North alone had a larger land mass than the West and East combined. But with the creation of more states this has been masked.

5.5 ECONOMIC PERFORMS

Political and economic reforms go parri passu. In most cases, the military cite the mismanagement of the economy as one

of the reasons for overthrowing a civilian government. When they are in power therefore, the military usually undertake some economic reforms. More often than not however they tend to dine with the IMF. In Nigeria, Gen Babangida threw the IMF debate open and even though majority of the populace are against the loan from IMF virtually all the conditionalities laid down by the IMF were followed. Similarly, initially when Fit Lt. J.J. Rawlings came the second time he was bitterly against the IMF but eventually he was faced with the reality that without external funding, there was no way he could revamp the economy, consequently, he had no option but to 'dine with the IMF' (Nugent, 1976:10) and this brought untold hardship to Ghanaians. It must be pointed out that no civilian government could have successfully implemented the IMF policy as the PNDC did and survive it in Ghana.

It's always the desire of the military to make life better for the average citizen before they leave for the barracks but in most instances these policies have yielded little or no dividends. The citizenry rather became worse off.

5.6 CONSTITUTION MAKING

Even though the collapse of a particular civilian government may not be attributable to the constitution per se, on the seizure of power, among some of the measures taken instantly is the suspension of the constitution. For there to be a transition from military to civil rule therefore, a new one has to be drawn.

Constitution making is one of the measures adopted by the military to buy time. In Nigeria as well as in Ghana, the drawing of a constitution passes through stages. In Nigeria under Muhammed/Obasanjo, Babangida-Abacha-Abubakar regimes, the first stage was the setting of a constitution Drafting Committee which examines the failed constitution juxtaposing it against those of other countries.

The NLC in Ghana too did the same. Then the next stage is the composition of a constituent Assembly to examine closely the propositions of the CDC. The CA may finally return the draft constitution to the military government which may in its interest decide to make some amendments. The constitution finally comes into effect on the day the civilian government is sworn in. Alternatively, after the government had made the necessary amendments, it may choose to throw it back to the electorate in a referendum on the acceptability or otherwise of the Draft Constitution. This exactly what happened under the PNDC. In the ensuing referendum, as noted earlier, Ghanaians voted overwhelmingly in acceptance of the Constitution.

On the membership of the CA, the usual practice is that it is made up of government appointees and elected members. The interest of the government must be protected and so government appoints people who can defend it in the CA.

In both Nigeria and Ghana the US system of government and that of Britain have been experimented. On the attainment of

independence both countries adopted the latter which did not work. In the Second Republic, Ghana still adopted the West Minister model and failed again. Nigeria on the other hand opted for the Presidential type but that also did not work even though Nigeria seems to be more at home with the Presidential than the Parliamentary type.

The PNDC in Ghana however, decided to blend the two systems by which ministers can both be elected from the legislature and outside it. Even though critics point out that ministers chosen from Parliament may be neglecting their constituencies due to pressure of work, government on its part argues that such ministers are likely to defend its policies on the floor of parliament. The position of the critics is weak because in the Cabinet type of government, all, the ministers including the Prime Minister are also members of the legislature. And in Great Britain which is the cradle of this system, the members of the Executive are able to combine their work effectively and are able to create time for their constituencies.

5.7 CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE

Civil society, especially the political elites, exercise a lot of influence on transition programmes. The dawn of any military government means the dislodgement of the group of politicians hitherto in power. And as it happens in most cases, the new military regime may not have anything to do with the

regime it overthrew. Since in most developing countries the state is the repository of wealth, members of the opposition start having a taste of affluence. Under such circumstances however, those close to the military government usually want them to cling on to power and consequently would advise them against handing over power to civilians.

Civil society is therefore divided into those who are the beneficiaries of military regime and those who are not. Naturally, former would prefer the military to remain in power while the latter would want the military to quit to barracks.

The civil service is mostly empowered during military regimes. This is because soldiers are not administrators. Consequently, they rely on civil service for the effective running of the country. To civil servants then, the military should continue to be in power in stead of relinquishing it.

The acquisition of power is central to the proximity to state resources and its dissipation. This has been the bone of contention between the military and political elites especially in most developing countries. The military initially had not tasted political power and consequently were subservient to civil authority. Having tasted it however, they feel they should seize it again once their corporate interest is threatened.

5.8 FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

In -terms of party formation during the post-independence era, in Nigeria the state seemed to be more involved than her Ghanaian counterpart. This was more evident in the Gen Babangida's transition when political parties, viz the People's Solidarity Party (PSP), the Nigerian National Congress (NNC), The People's Front of Nigeria (PFN), the Liberal Convention (LC), the Nigerian Labour Party (NLP) and the Republican Party of Nigeria (Olagunju et al, 1993:214) failed to meet the guidelines set by NEC to coalesce into two parties as recommended by the Political Bureau. The AFRC was left with no option but to proscribe them and establish de novo two political parties the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Besides, the parties were funded and secretariats built for them in all local government areas throughout the country. This was to avoid a situation where wealthy individuals would hi-jack the parties. Olagunju et al (1993:215) points out that an elaborate programme was subsequently worked out whereby top civil servants were deployed to each of the two parties to oversee membership recruitment into them and to organize elections for their executive committees at the ward, local government, state and national levels. In the case of Ghana, the government with the exception of the PNDC, had never got deeply and actively involved in the formation of political parties talk less of funding them and building structures for them. In Nigeria, like Ghana too

politicians of the ancien regime have been banned from participating in politics. In Ghana however, this was manifested more in the transition sequel to the Second Republic than other transition. In this transition, most functionaries of the erstwhile CPP were banned, some for a period of ten years from taking part in politics. In Nigeria on the other hand, Gen Babangida's banning of politicians was not one-sided but it affected both the opposition and the then government. Those who were initially banned were later unbanned (Olagunju et al, 1993:207). He simply wanted to encourage new breed of politicians to emerge since the older breed had not proved their mettle. The inconsistency in his transition however, did not spare this action too. Consequently, old breed politicians were banned and later unbanned in both Nigeria and Ghana however, there is no way the old breed politicians could completely be excised from politics. For even though they were overtly banned from actively participating in politics, covertly they paid the piper and consequently called the tune. A case in point is that of Imoru Egala, who having been disqualified 'made' his nephew, Dr Hilla Limann President of the Third Republic of Ghana. Olagunju et al (1993:207) note that an immediate effect of the unbanning was that the most prominent and politically ambitious of the disqualified persons came out of their closets, cast off their "God father" role and became active protagonists in the political process and in party politics.

Under every Ghanaian government the population has observed that some ethnic groups have benefitted at the expense of others. Smock & Smock (1976:323) stress that:

Nkrumah particularly towards the end of his tenure favoured the Akans. Political control was balanced towards the Ewes and Gas during most of the NLC period and towards the Akan (again) in the Busia period, the struggle between the two blocks was not clearly resolved under the NRC. (The pendulum swung in favour of the Akans again during the Limann regime and the PNDC/NDC regime tilted it in favour of the non-Akan group) . This continuing battle for dominance with its pendulum swinging between the Akans and the non-Akans creates considerable tension and impedes the search for legitimacy. Exclusion from power on ethnic grounds breeds alienation and accompanying rationalization for resorting to extra constitutional means to topple the incumbent administration.

Since Nigeria practises a federal system of government military regimes have tended to interfere negatively in the effective operation of federalism. All appointments at all levels of government emanate from the federal government and as in the Ghanaian situation, appointments under military regimes may not likely favour all the ethnic groups in the country.

In Nigeria and in Ghana ethnicity plays a major role in politics for in plural societies of all kinds, persons tend to seek out members of their own groups and prefer their company. In Ghana, it is Dr Kwame Nkrumah who made some commitment to transform Ghanaians into national citizens but these efforts did not succeed and his successors have not been similarly motivated (Smock & Smock, 1973:313-321).

In Nigeria most of the parties formed in the transition programmes under study are ethnic and regionally based the exception to this may be the PDP which is broad based.

Unlike the situation in Nigeria, religion is not important in Ghanaian politics. The answer to why religion has counted for so little in Ghana as a source of social identity and as a focus of communal loyalty seems rooted in Ghana's traditional religious tolerance and a sense of the relativity of religions beliefs (Smock & Smock, 1975:307) In Nigeria however, we have religious groupings corresponding more closely to ethnic divisions: Hausa identified with Islam and Ibo for instance identified with Christianity or on a wider perspective an outsider may identify the North and South with Islam and Christianity respectively.

In assessing the forces that facilitate or inhibit transition from military to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana, it is important to distinguish between Mohammed/Obasanjo and Abubakar's of Nigeria and that of Kotoka/Ankrah/Afrifa's and the first coming of Rawlings of Ghana and those of Babangida and Abacha of Nigeria and Acheampong/Akuffo and the second coming of Rawlings. Olagunju et al (1993:231) observed that even though Babangida planned one of the most elaborate and expensive transition programmes in Nigeria, and set up those institutions and agencies critical... to the transition, Mohammed (2000:15) points out that his failure to register any of the civilian political associations and the imposition of two parties on the polity with ideological

ambiguity/confusion were meant to frustrate the evolution of a credible transitional agenda. The imposition of the ban on certain categories of politicians, the old breed and money bags and their unbanning sent contradictory signals on the political actors. The arbitrary extension of hand over dates, cancellation of Presidential primaries and the annulment of 1993 June 12 Presidential Elections show the lack of commitment of the military junta to hand over power to civilians.

Moti (2000:1-2) gives his verdict on Babangida's transition programme thus:

Desirous of extending his stay in office beyond 1990, the year in which he has promised to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian President, Babangida deliberately manipulated his eight-year transition programme (the longest in the history of transition programmes in Nigeria) to extend his stay. This gave rise what popularly became known as the 'Babangida hidden agenda', a euphemism to the General's intension to either perpetuate himself in office or succeed himself as a civilian President. The various forms of these political maipulations earned Babangida the nickname "Maradona" which stuck.

Abacha who took over power from Shonekan did not do better. His insincerity to hand over power to civilians became a mystery until his untimely death. He too had over bearing effect on his transition programme, and it is no wonder that it failed.

On May 29, 1999, Gen Abdulsalam Abubakar handed over the mantle of leadership to Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thus the first government which took over from the military which had ruled from 1993 was headed

by former military officer, Obasanjo, just as that of Ghana. It is hoped that Obasanjo's rule may provide the much needed cool off effect after a long period of military rule.

The major constraints against the success of a transition is the attitude of the military. The military, insincere in their approach adopt all sorts of manipulatory tools like money, the media, rumours, anonymous literature, government machinery (Moti, 2000:9-11) to prolong their stay in power.

In both countries the military have exercised their supremacy over political elites who lobby them for appointments as Commissioners, Ministers, Board members etc. They, the civilians in turn take directives and instructions from the military personnel in government (Galadima, 1998:121).

Acheampong of Ghana loathed multi-party politics and consequently wanted to introduce "a Union Government" of military police-civilian Administration in Ghana. He therefore, never initiated any transition programme which would eventually lead to an all-civilian government. In Nigeria too, Gowon never initiated any transition programme.

Rawlings's second transition programme was full of uncertainties. Nugent (1996:716) put it plainly thus:

During the transition period, the tactics of the PNDC were actually extremely simple. They consisted, first, of an attempt to dictate the terms of the transition as closely as possible. The government was acutely aware of the perils if the opposition gained control over the agenda, at the same time, the PNDC contrived to withhold the time table for each successive stage in

the transition process, so that the opposition should not have uninterrupted view of the road ahead.

Rawlings too had a lot of influence on the 1992 transition programme like Babangida and Abacha controlled theirs in Nigeria. Even though all three were hesitant in declaring their intentions to contest for the Presidency in their transition programmes. Eventually Rawlings 'bowed' to pressures from the Progressive Alliance. Babangida, on the other hand, had to step aside reluctantly while despite the so many calls from civil society and his adoption by all five parties as their Presidential candidates, Abacha kept mute until his death.

The first transition programme in Ghana span over three years. Immediately the NLC assumed office in Ghana, it made clear that it was not interested in perpetuating itself in power. What helped matters was that there was a political elite, opposed to the CPP, which the NLC wanted to hand over power to. This also validates our proposition that the military will hand over power to political elite it wants to relinquish power to. Consequently, at the end of three years, the NLC concluded its transition programme. To make for gradual transfer of power fully to civilians, the NLC created a triumvirate which was to work with the civilian government for a maximum of three years. This was however, abrogated by the all-civilian legislature of the Second Republic.

In Nigeria, as in Ghana too, Abubakar's transition to civil

rule compares with that of Rawlings ■ s in 1979 even though the latter was shorter. Abubakar succeeded Abacha, set up democratic structures and a transition programme in 1998 which he successfully executed in 1999. Rawlings's too, taking over power from Akuffo on June 4, 1979, continued the latter's transition programme which terminated in September when he handed over power to Limann. These two transition programmes prove our proposition that transition to civil rule will succeed if the architects are truly committed to it.

In this chapter we tried to compare and contrast transition to civil rule in both Nigeria and Ghana and we conclude that there are similar institutional structures to facilitate transition programmes in Nigeria and Ghana. On party formation however, in Nigeria the military have had more preponderent effect especially during Babangida era than Ghana.

In both countries we deduced evidence to validate our propositions that: (i) most transition programmes in Nigeria and Ghana are

characterised by the desire of the incumbent to remain in power. (ii) the greater the degree of influence of the military in the

transition process the lesser its chances of success iii) transition from military to civil rule will succeed if only

the architects are sincerely committed to it and (iv) transition from military to civil rule will only succeed if

there is an alternative political elite the military want to hand over power to.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this study, we tried to assess the experience of Nigeria and Ghana and to compare the way and manner transition to civil rule was orchestrated and managed. We generated evidence from content analysis of published and unpublished works to demonstrate that there is a tacit relationship between the willingness of the initiators of transition and its subsequent success or otherwise having examined from the perspective of power theory, our thesis is that transition to civil rule will only succeed if the incumbents identify any alternative political group they are willing to relinquish power to.

6.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Nigeria and Ghana were former colonies of Great Britain and consequently had lots of things in common during the colonial days and after that are bequeathed with common languages: English. The military in Nigeria share common heritage with their Ghanaian counterparts in the West African Frontier Force and in the post-independence era have been attending similar training institutions in Great Britain, US and India.

Even though Ghana attained political independence earlier in 1957 than Nigeria (1960), both countries adopted the Westminster model as a system of government. They were however, not spared the

securge of military coups d'etat that ravaged the African continent in the 1960s. The military struck first in Nigeria in January, 1966 and that of Ghana in February of the same year. The Federal Military Government (FMG) under Gen Aguyi-Ironsi did not last long when he was overthrown by Gen Gowon in a counter coup d'etat. Gen Gowon was also ousted by Gen Mohammed. The military stayed longer in power than the NLC of Ghana. The military hang on for thirteen years in Nigeria while their counterparts in Ghana returned power to civilians after three years i.e to Dr K.A. Busia. In Nigeria it was Alh Shehu Shagari who received the reins of power from the military.

The second wave of militarization came earlier in Ghana than Nigeria. Gen. Acheampong overthrew Dr Busia's government in 1972 and set up the SMC I. Acheampong himself was pushed aside in a palace coup in 1978 and Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo came to power and formed SMC II. The junior officers rose up against senior counterparts and having subdued them, appointed Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings the Chairman of the AFRC. Like in the first wave, the military did not stay in power for long because Gen. Akuffo had already started the process of handing of power over to civilians. The elections in progress were continued uninterrupted.

When Gen Buhari dislodged Alh Shehu Shagari in the second Republic, he did not have the intention of handing over power to civilians and his dictatorial regime 'compelled' Gen Babangida to seize power. He set up the AFRC but his indecision and

unwillingness to leave power through the annulment of the June 12 1993, Presidential Election made him step aside. The ING which succeeded him did not live long before Gen. Abacha brushed it aside. He too was not straight forward in his transition programme until his death. Gen Abubakar who stepped into his shoes set up the machinery for transition and handed over power to civilians in May 1999 even though the winner of the elections Gen Obasanjo was a former military officer.

In Ghana, when Fit Lt J.J. Rawlings took over power again in 1981, it took him eleven years before he organised a transition which transformed him into a civilian President.

We observed that similar electoral bodies -Electoral Commission were set up to oversee the transition and election procedures. The electoral body however, as if to get it immune may assume different names. This all-important body has however, never been free of government interference. Individual and groups may at times use the courts to interfere with the functions of the electoral commission. This was more exemplified in the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election in Nigeria.

Considering party formation, when the military are in power, they place a ban on all political activities. Consequently, what usually happens is that the political elites tend to congregate to form social groupings where they articulate their political ideals. It is this social groupings which facilitate the formation of political parties immediately the ban on them is

lifted.

The ineffective management of the economy has been one of the major reasons why the military intervene in politics. In Ghana during the First Republic under Nkrumah, besides his dictatorial rule, the economy hit Ghanaians hard as a result of the shortage of foreign exchange to purchase foreign good. Consequently, the military were welcomed as saviours when they struck. The economy did not improve during the regime of Dr Busia and the queues for essential commodities became longer - the soldiers struck again. When Dr Limann too assumed office, he could not turn the economy around and therefore, the military had to step in once more. In Nigeria too, especially in the Second Republic, it was the introduction of austerity measures and the mismanagement of the economy which invited the military onto the political scene. This does not imply that the military perform better in terms of the management of the economy. When the NLC overthrew the CPP government under Dr Nkrumah in Ghana, it could not completely alleviate the economic problems of Ghanaians. The same thing applied to the SMC I under Acheampong who initially was welcomed with bumper harvest in the agricultural sector and with his 'Yentua' policy, before he left office however the Ghanaian economy was in a deeper mess.

Similarly in Nigeria, Buhari's autocratic measures did not bring about much relief to Nigerians whose economic plights worsened under Gens Babangida and Abacha.

In Nigeria, transitions to civil rule are well articulated. The one by Gen Babangida in Nigeria span through a long period and it was well elaborated - perhaps to buy time, since he was insincere through postponements of elections and rescheduling of the date of handing over to a civilian administration. In the Ghanaian case, the last transition in the period under study was shrouded in uncertainty with the incumbent unveiling each stage to his advantage.

In the analysis of the transition to civil rule in Nigeria and Ghana, we were guided by power theory because of the struggle between the military and the political elites over the control of the decision making apparatus and the resources of the nation. We able to draw the following conclusions from our study (i) That most transitions in Nigeria and Ghana are characterized

by the desire of the military to remain in office. (ii) That the military have an over-bearing influence on

transitions programme hence their inability to succeed, iii) That transition from military to civil rule will succeed if only the military are committed to it and (iv) That transition to civil rule will be successful if there is an alternative political elites the military want to hand over power to.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

We would like therefore, to make the following recommendations:

For a transition to civil rule to succeed, both the military and civil society have important roles to play. The military incumbents must be honest in their willingness to hand over power to civilians and consequently, in setting up democratic structures for transition, they should select men of proven integrity and capability and not government cronies.

Civil society, especially the political elites must also know that politics is a game and consequently its rules must be obeyed. The practice of winner-takes-all must be eschewed. It is this which makes the section that enjoys under military rule to encourage them to hang on to power and also encourages those in opposition to seek extra-judicial means to come to power. We agreed with Anebo (2000:81) that:

the (democratic) process like a child taken its first faltering steps on the road that leads to adulthood, is a gradual and tortuous process. It may from time to time fall. But each fall should serve as a new experience and provide the challenge that eventually leads to the realization of adult life. Patience, tolerance and fair play among all stake holders are essential ingredients.

Civil society should reckon that the military is now a force to reckon with in politics. During the first transition in Nigeria as well as in Ghana, no military personnel vied for a political office but now, in both countries, former military

leaders have shed their military uniforms to win general elections to become Presidents. Fit Lt Jerry Rawlings of Ghana did it first in 1992 and Gen Olusegun Obasanjo also in 1999. Former political soldiers are now active in politics.

The antidote to military incursion into politics is good governance. Civilian leaders should therefore, try as much as possible to eschew ethnic sentiments and tendencies and spread political appointments evenly across the nation. It is only when an ethnic group feels marginalized as happened under Dr K.A. Busia when no single minister was chosen from the Volta Region, that such a group will be antagonistic to the government and find ways of overthrowing it to address the imbalance.

The military should also realize that their traditional role is to defend the nation against external attack and this remains to this day. Should they be forced, as it were, to trespass into politics as it happened in Ghana in February 1966 when the military became the only institution that could face Dr Nkrumah and his CPP since all forms of opposition had been eliminated or when the survival of Nigeria as a nation was seriously threatened in January, 1966, they should not try to perpetuate themselves in power. The military are never administrators. Military rule is an aberration.

There is no perfect constitution. A constitution can therefore, work if it is made to do so. Consequently, a situation where constitutions are suspended and re-written whenever the

military take over power should be discouraged. This is one of the ploys to buy time. Our constitutions must be made to grow. The same thing applies to political parties. Those parties which fought for political independence are made to atrophy. If anything at all, it is the politicians and not the parties per se that usually fail. That culture of belonging to an established political party is therefore, absent in both countries, even though the political traditions are there as Danquah - Busia, the CPPists in Ghana and NPC, NCNC and AG in Nigeria.

Finally, it is recommended that further studies should be made on the consolidation of democracy not only in Nigeria and Ghana but in Africa as a whole.

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APPENDIX I COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL
MILITARY COUNCIL JANUARY, 1966 i. Head of the Federal Military
Government And Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces. ii. Chief of Staff
Supreme Headquarters iii. Chief of Staff
Nigerian Armed Forces iv. Head of the
Nigerian Navy v. Head of the Nigerian
Airforce vi. Military Governor, Northern
Province vii. Military Governor, Eastern
Province viii Military Governor, Western
Province ix. Military Governor, Mid-Western
Province

APPENDIX II COMPOSITION

OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

- iii. Head of the National Military Government and Supreme
- iv. Commander of the Armed Forces. Chief of Staff Supreme
- v. vi Headquarters Chief of Staff Nigerian Army Military Governor,
- vii. Eastern Province Military Governor, Western Province Military
- viii. Governor, Northern Province Military Governor, Mid-Western
Province Administrator of the Federal Capital of Lagos, lead of
- *> • h the Nigerian Navy, tead of the Nigerian Airforce nspector
- xi) . iGeneral of Police sputy-Inspector General of Police.
- *ii) D<

APPENDIX III The Membership of the

Interim Federal Executive Council

1. Head of Interim Government - Chief Ernest Shonekan
2. Secretary for Defence - General Sani Abacha
3. Agriculture & Natural Resources - Prof Jerry Gana
4. Commerce & Tourism - Chief Bola Kuforiji-Olubi
5. Communications - Alh. Dapo Sarumi
6. Education & Youth Development - Prof Abraham Emogie.
7. Finance - Alhaji Aminu Sale
8. Administrator (FCT) - Maj-Gen Gado Nasko (Rtd)
9. Foreign Affairs - Chief M.T. Mbu.
10. Foreign Affairs - Alh. Saidu Isah (Hon Sec of State)
11. Health & Human Services - Prince J.A. Adelusi - Adeluyi
12. Internal Affairs - Chief E.S. Yusuf
13. Industries - Chief I.S. Kogbara
14. Information & Culture - Comrade Uche C.
15. HAG and Secretary for Justice - Mr Clement Akpangbo.
16. Petroleum & Mineral Resources - Chief Dan Etiebet (Hon Sec. of State)
17. Petroleum & Mineral Resources - Engr Ibrahim Ali (Hon Sec of State)
18. Labour & Productivity - Prince Bola Afonja
19. Power & Steel - Alh. Dr Hassan Adamu
20. Power & Steel - Alh. D. Ayandipo (Hon Sec of State)
21. Police Affairs - Alh. Abdullahi Mahmud Koki

22. Science & Technology - Prof Bartholomew Nnaji.
23. Transport & Aviation - Alh. Bashir Dalhat
24. Water & Rural Development - Alh. Isa Mohammed
25. Works & Housing - Mr B. Gemade
26. Chairman National Planning Commission - Prof Sam Aluko
27. Establishment & Management Services - Mr Innocent Nwoga.
28. State & Local Government Affairs - Alh Sule Ungwuar Alkali.
29. Secretary to the Interim National Government - Alh Mustapha Umara
30. National Assembly Liaison Officer: Senator George Baba
31. National Assembly Liaison Officer: Sag Ogbaghodo

Source: New Nigerian August 27, 1993: 1&5.

APPENDIX IV

The Constituent Assembly Ghana Government Nominees

1. Mr Justice Hayfrom-Benjamin
2. Mr Justice S.E. Brobbey
- 3 . Mr A. A. Munufie
4. Mrs Joyce Bamford-Addo
5. Odeefuo Boa Amponsem
6. Prof. Kwame Arhin
7. Brig. David Asare
8. Dr Abubakar Alhassan
7. Nana Araba Abladzewa
10. Mr Stephen Krakue
11. Mr R. Atta-Kesson
12. Togbui Anipati IV a.k.a. Dr Joe Geke
13. Dr C.P. Imoru
14. Mr Amonoo-Monney
15. Dr Joe Abbey
16. Mr T.A. Adzoe
17. Dr Paul Duffuor
18. Mr Cletus Appul Avoka
19. Mr George Kuleape
20. Mrs Angelina Domakyaareh
21. Mr David Hammond
22. Mr Kwesi Nkansah