THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF LIBERIA

DIGITIZED

BY

DAHIRU MOHAMMED LERE

476903

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POST GRADUATE SCHOOL, AHAMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZAARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA.

FEBRUARY, 2000

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis titled "THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT", is a product of my independent research work . No part of this work has been submitted to any institution for any academic award. All references made in the work have been dully acknowledged.

Dahiru Mohammed Lere		2/3/2009
NAME OF STUDENT	SIGNATURE	DATE

DIGITIZED

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled 'The role of Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) in conflict resolution: A case study of the Liberian conflict by Dahiru Mohammed Lere meets the regulation governing the award of the degree, Masters of International Affairs and Diplomacy of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Supervisor _____ Date 3-3-2000

Head of Department _____ Date 22-02-05

HEAD OF DEPT.

External Examiner _____ Date _____

Dean Post Graduate School _____ Date 28/2/05

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to :

My wife, Halimattu-Sa'adiyya and children-Hafiz, Fatima, Mubarak and Mariya. May the almighty God continue to guide and protect them.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT

The process of undergoing post graduate program is often met by a series of difficulties mainly arising from age, workload and many added responsibilities that were hitherto absent during the first degree. God in his infinite mercy has a way of making things otherwise complicated resolve themselves. The decision to enroll for this degree was informed by my desire to fulfill a natural obligation of seeking for knowledge. God has ordained that Mankind should travel as far as SIN in the search to know. Iam chanced and I have the capacity. Despite schedules, it is with pride and total submission to the will of God that I acknowledge the conclusion of this exercise.

The program has been a worth while venture that I will live to remember for the rest of my life. I pray that what has been learnt will serve the good of Mankind.

This thesis will be incomplete if I fail to acknowledge the role played by individuals and groups that have contributed in no small measure the accomplishment of this exercise. My supervisor, Dr. Paul Pindar Izah is a wonderful intellectual who throughout the program has exhibited tendencies of maturity, wisdom, accommodation and tolerance. He read this thesis time and again and ensured that it is worth presentation. To Dr. Izah, I remain indebted and very grateful.

The Head of Department of Political Science, Dr. Andrew Owhona was also very helpful in the course of this study. Apart from ensuring that we understood his lectures, he supervised over the MIAD program with a lot of professional competence. Little wonder therefore it is that we had a good time through out the program, and

the rush for the course by hundreds of people from all walks of life is a further testimony to the recognition and acceptance of what Ahmadu Bello University can produce.

I am grateful to Alhaji Danjuma Adamu who made a comfortable Guest House available for my use through out the program in Zaria. To all those who have contributed in one way or the other in the making of this study possible, I remain very grateful and indebted. May the almighty God reward them all abundantly.

Finally I am particularly grateful to my beloved wife Hajia Halima Mohammed for her understanding for my absence during this program. Indeed her understanding and support gave me further encouragement for the program.

Dahiru Mohammed Lere
February, 2000.

ABSTRACT

The Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) was put in place in1975 with the aim of facilitating the integration of the West African sub region.

ECOWAS was primarily focused on economic integration and was desired to play limited political roles due to fear of domination by weaker members.

Before the coming into being of the Community, The organization of African Unity, (OAU) was responsible for the resolution of conflicts within the continent. However, recent experiences within the continent tend to suggest that ECOWAS as a sub regional body has been most effective in the resolution of conflicts within the West African sub region.

ECOWAS through the establishment of a peace monitoring group ECOMOG has been able to resolve the ravaging civil war in Liberia, leading to the establishment of a Democratically elected Government. The sub regional body through its activities has further participated in similar operations in Sierra Leone and brought about peace.

The thesis has thus realized that the politics of regional economic integration is incomplete and unrealizable as long as political parameters are excluded. Put the other way, politics and economics are inseparable. It is not possible for ECOWAS to realize any economic goal without the necessary political intercourse.

The involvement of ECOMOG in Liberia was therefore a political decision necessary for the return of peace to the war turn country. The decision led to the seize fire and restoration of peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TITTLE PAGE	(i)
DECLARATION	(ii)
CERTIFICATION	(iii)
DEDICATION	(iv)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	(v-vi)
ABSTACT	(vii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS	(viii-x)

CHAPTER ONE
(INTRODUCTION)

1.01:	BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM	1 – 2
1.02	THE RESEARCH PROBLEM	2 – 4
1.03:	OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	4
1.04:	RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS/PROPOSITIONS	4 – 5
1.05	METHODOLOGY	5 – 7
1.06	RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY	7 – 8
1.07:	SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS	8 – 10
1.08:	ORGANIZZATION OF THE STUDY	11 – 12

CHAPTER TWO

(LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS)

2.01:	INTRODUCTION	13
2.02:	LITERATURE	13 – 22
2.03:	CONTENDING APPROACHES AND THEORETICA FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	22 – 37
2.04:	CONCLUSION	38

CHAPTER THREE

(ECOWAS AND POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION)

3.01:	INTRODUCTION	39
302:	FORMATION OF ECOWAS	39 – 41
	(i) Lagos treaty of 1975	41
	(ii) Fundamental principles of ECOWAS	42 – 44
	(iii) Organization	45 – 46
3.03:	AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ECOWAS	46 – 60
3.04:	POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES OF ECOWAS	60 – 66
3.05:	ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSTACLES	67 – 70
3.06:	ECOWAS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION	70 – 72
3.07:	CONCLUSION	73

CHAPTER FOUR

(ECOWAS AND THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT)

4.01;	INTRODUCTION	74
4.02:	HISTORY OF LIBERIA	74 – 79
4.03:	BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT	79 – 87
4.04:	ECOWAS AND THE FORMATION OF ECOMOG	87 – 96
4.05:	ECOWAS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT	97 – 103
4.06:	ECOMOG AND THE WARRING FACTIONS	103 – 114
4.07:	PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONFLICT	115 – 119
4.08:	RETURN TO PEACE	119 – 120
4.09:	CONCLUSION	121 – 122

CHAPTER FIVE

(SUMMARY OF RESEARH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS)

5.01: SUMMARY 123 – 133

5.02: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 134 – 136

CHAPTER ONE

1.00: INTRODUCTION

1.01: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

> "Conflict resolution, peace-keeping and peace-making are at cross roads. The fact that conflicts violent or not today occur within rather than between states has dramatically hanged the role of peace-makers and peace-keepers".[1]

So many crises that have pre-occupied the attention of the international community towards the end of the 20th century were those fought within national boundaries as against international boundaries. Conflicts of this nature differ from the traditional wars between and among nations.

Through out the 1990s, the world saw the reoccurrence of such internal conflicts that had serious consequences on life and property. Some of the obvious ones include Bosnia to Somalia, Chechnya, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Angola, to Kosvo, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

[1] "Thinking about peace and peace making in Africa" in Sorbor, G.M. and Vale, P. (ed) out of conflict from war to peace in Africa. Nordiska Africa institute, uppsala, 1997 pp 30

In each of these conflicts, the prominent cause is the desire to expand access to state power and resources, translated in form of hate arising from ethnicity, in which millions of people lost their lives. The Liberian conflict just like similar ones resulted in the almost total destruction of all available infrastructures, and productive capacities of the people. It required the intervention of the sub-regional peace keeping force before the war came to an end. The peace recently blowing through Liberia is a result of the resolution of the intractable conflicts that resulted in the lessening of tension between the various warlords and faction leaders.

No meaningful integration, democracy and promotion of human rights would be achieved under an atmosphere of rancor and war. The resolution of the Liberian conflict could thus be the first step in the search for a more vibrant society.

The ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) which translated the decisions of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict was thus a peace keeping formation charged with the task of monitoring the return of peace to the war zone. Our area of study is thus the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberia Conflict.

1.02: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The relevance of ECOWAS and its practicability as a sub regional force came into focus at the commencement of the Liberian civil war. The decision to establish the peace-monitoring group under the sub regional structure has become an issue of academic debate. The role,

relevance, successes and limitations of both ECOWAS and ECOMOG in the resolution of especially the Liberian conflict has become a critical issue within academic and public policy circles. Before the formation of ECOWAS, it was the OAU that was charged with the resolution of conflict between and among African states, as well as domestic conflicts that attracted international attention like the Nigerian civil war. Has ECOWAS success shown that a smaller regional group is more effective in resolving local conflict?

Some of the questions raised by the research include among other things – what is the level of success achieved by ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian crisis? What were the problems encountered in the peace-making exercise? Is it possible to sustain ECOMOG as a standing military formation that will be charged with the responsibility of addressing such sub-regional issues and conflicts?

In the Liberian war, hundreds of thousands of innocent lives were lost due to the lust for power by a few elite who wanted to rule the country by all means. The class character of the elite that constituted the pre-war ruling class was typical of the African rulers. There was mass poverty, economic and political depravations. Vast of the population were not carried along, thus making room readily available for discontent and ill-feelings such as ethnic and tribal loyalties. By the time the war broke out, warlords emerged basically on tribal basis. While the war was being fought, ECOWAS stepped in and tried to get the warring factions settle their differences through peaceful negotiations in order to avoid wanton destruction of life and property.

Now that the war is over, the major question raised by this study is – Has ECOWAS succeeded in bringing back peace to the war torn Liberia? To what level? What are the problems and consequences? The study will attempt to answer these and other questions as they arise.

1.03: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objectives of this study are as follows:

(i) To critically study the role which ECOWAS/ECOMOG played in the resolution of the co0nflict.

(ii) To study the relevance or otherwise of ECOWAS as a sub regional body, with a view to understanding its military, Economic, Political and social capabilities within the realm of West African states.

(iii) To attempt to proffer suggestions on prevention of future reoccurrence.

(iv) To stimulate more research into the Liberian civil war and make necessary recommendations in relation to regional integration and peace keeping.

1.04: RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS/PROPOSITION

The study is built on the following propositions that:-

(i) With effective and meaningful political control, peace-making and peace-keeping could play a significant role in the resolution of both internal and external conflicts in West African sub region and Africa in general.

(ii) The conflict in Liberia, which led to wanton destruction of life and property, was a consequence of struggle for the control of political power by the elite fractionated along ethnic and tribal lives.

(iii) Under the auspices of ECOWAS, the monitoring group (ECOMOG) played a critical role in the resolution of the Liberian conflict, and,

(iv) Enforcement of peace in Africa could be the necessary panacea for the continent's economic, political and social development.

1.05: METHODOLOGY

The data for this research will be collected from secondary sources such as magazines, newspapers, journals, books. These materials will be subjected to a systematic critical content analysis. These secondary data will be supplemented by primary data which are available in the libraries of ABU Zaria, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru (NIPSS). The Nigeria War College, Abuja, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, (NIIA) Lagos as well as the Ministry of Defense, Headquarters, Abuja and ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja.

Data is also generated through the conduct of personal interviews on few of the soldiers who participated in the peacekeeping operation, as well as some staff of the Defense Ministry. Fundamentally therefore, our major primary source of data apart from the above, is official pronouncements of ECOMOG field commanders, the statements from the then military government spokesmen on the Liberian conflict.

Attempt to administer questionnaires proved rather hectic and impossible since it was difficult getting at the relevant people who could provide useful information on the conflict.

Our interview questions however centered on understanding the genesis of the conflict in Liberia which led to the full scale war fought over a period of seven years. The questions centered on the nature of the Liberian state in relation to the people. The ability of the government to provide employment, physical infrastructures and other means of economic improvement. This was intended to gauge the economic well being of the citizenry the relation to individual and group perception of state and citizenship. Were there meaningful and reasonable transformation in the lives of citizens? How much was the ruling elite before the conflict relating to the citizenry? Was it typically as is obtained in most dependent postcolonial states in West Africa or Africa in general.

The questions attempted to explore also the relevance of ECOWAS as purely that of economic integration and its recent involvement in political cum military matters through peace making and peace keeping.

In a nutshell, the questions attempted to assess the new role, which ECOWAS is assuming, beginning from the Liberian conflict. How well the mission was achieved especially when placed against the backdrop of the heavy causalities and billions of Dollars expended in the management of the war.

Through out the study about 9 soldiers were interviewed, 5 of which are other ranks while 4 are officers ie second Lieutenant to Lt. Colonels. The interview schedule contained structured and unstructured questions bearing in mind that the respondents cover both the rank and file as well as the officers' corpse. Apart from the nine soldiers interviewed, 6 officers of the Defense ministry were also interviewed. 5 staff of the ECOWAS Secretariat were also interviewed among whom was the Executive Secretary of the community. In toto, 20 people were interviewed in order to add to the primary information that is critical in the conduct of this study.

The interview is intended to evaluate the performance of the monitoring group in relation to the conflict. The impact of the war on the Liberian economy and society generally to a large extent informed the decision of West African State to step in.

1.06: RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is relevant in the sense that any attempt to understand how conflicts can be resolved or managed in the age where local conflicts do a lot of damage before international community became aware.
to avoid wars than to resolve wars.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The study also intends to provide data on ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the Liberian conflict for the uses of international relation practitioners, intellectual community and policy making organ of state. The findings in this research may serve as guide to forestalling and

management of similar conflicts that is ravaging all over Africa and parts of Europe.

The research shall also express the dangers of ethnic and tribal extremism and its dire consequences to economic, social and political development of Africa, and explore the relevance of stronger sub regional and regional groupings in Africa especially as deterrence and in the settlement of such and other conflicts. The study is therefore intended to contribute to the knowledge of conflicts in West Africa, using the Liberian case study, and methods as well as strategies of managing and settling such conflicts.

1.07: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The study covers the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian civil war. The war, which became full blown in 1990, was a product of many factors, which have to a large degree been evident even before 1990.

The decision to set up a peace monitoring force came up later when the destruction to life and property became serious and all attempts to resolve the conflict through negotiations and round table efforts became futile. Effectively therefore, the scope of the study covers the period between 1990 and 1997 when peace was achieved and the subsequent disarmament and conduct of elections in Liberia.

The scope of the study in therefore concerned with the role-played by ECOWAS through the monitoring group in the management and resolution of the Liberian conflict between 1990 – 1997.

Given the scope of the study, a lot of limitations abound. Prominent in the list is the inability of the researcher to physically visit Liberia and carry out necessary assessment and conduct interview on victims and parties in the conflict. This has to do with weak economic base to facilitate the necessary journeys.

Another major constrain was the inability to lay hands on vital information, especially from military formations and ministry of Defense. So many information that would have been vital are classified as "TOP SECRET' thus making it difficult to access relevant facts on the conduct and resolution of the conflict. In many instances, the soldiers are not prepared to answer some questions asked in relation to the war in the name of incompetence, while those competent could not be reached, where they are reached, information supplied is grossly in adequate.

One other serious limitation is time. A proper understanding of the conflict in Liberia requires an in-depth investigation into the political economy of Liberia decades before the commencement of the war. Narrowing the investigation to a period of seven years may end up revealing more about the actual combat and politics of resolution at the detriment of the genesis of the crises. Time is therefore of essence.

The objective social, economic and political condition which the Liberian elite and masses found themselves in to a large extent shaped and defined the very social structure of the Liberian society before the war. A country that is by and large a creation of the American abolishment of slave trade requires in-depth historiographical exposition if correct perspective of events is to be properly comprehended.

Another problem revolves around generalization. Though ECOWAS membership comprises of all independent countries of West Africa, the decision to set up the peace monitoring group though a collective resolve by the community, the actual contributions of men and materials came from between 4 to 5 countries ie Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Senegal. Many reasons are responsible for this. It is therefore certain that very few countries under the leadership of Nigeria partook in the exercise.

Despite these obvious limitations however, the research employed various strategies to ensure minimization of impact arising from. All information's obtained were carefully scrutinized and placed within proper context to avoid ambiguity. The nature and class character of the leaders of the conflict and contending parties was used as criteria for analyzing the social, economic and political basis of the conflict.

1.08: ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is conducted in five chapters. Chapter one is introduction to the thesis and therefore theoretical. The chapter provides the basis under which the study is conducted beginning with the background to the problem, after which the research problematic was clearly stated. The objective of the study as well as hypothesis and propositions are drawn in this chapter.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The methods of data collection, aggregation, interpretation and analysis are also contained under methodology in the chapter. Relevance of the study in literature and scope and limitations encountered in the conduct of the research are also spelt out in the chapter. The chapter is concluded with the manner in which the study is arranged and organized. Chapter two deals with review of relevant literature and theoretical framework of analysis. Both chapters one and two are theoretical, chapter three studies ECOWAS and conflict resolution. The history of formation of the community as well as its roles in the resolution of sub-regional conflicts is treated under this chapter. The attempt here is to study in details the formation and activities of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in the resolution of sub-regional conflicts.

Chapter four deals with a brief history of Liberia and the brewing of the conflict, its nature, spread and consequences as well as the necessity and nature of information in the Liberia crisis. The chapter concludes with an attempt to explain the criteria and nature of resolution of the conflict.

476903
J2
6377.W4
Dah

Chapter five is the last chapter in the study. It summarizes the research finding, concludes and proffer far reaching recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.00: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

2.01 INTRODUCTION

In chapter one, attempt was made to put in perspective major introductory tools of the study. Chapter two forms the concluding part of the theoretical aspect of the study. Relevant literature is reviewed while the theoretical tool of analysis is clearly described and analyzed.

2.02: LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflicts in Africa have assumed worrisome proportion. The preoccupation of sub- regional and regional organizations such as ECOWAS, OAU has since shifted from the central focus of economic advancement of the regions to conflict resolution in form of peace-making, peace keeping and other forms of mediation.

This is despite the fact that Africa's refugee population constitutes one half of the global total. Recent survey has identified that about 72[1] communal groups in Africa are at risk of involvement in future conflicts as a result of victimization. Such findings, which in the aggregate account for slightly less than half the population of the

[1] Vraalsem, T. 'Thinking about peace and peace making in Africa' In Sorbo, GM & Vale, P. (ed) Out of conflict from war topeace in Africa (1997) Nordistica Africainstitutet, Uppsala page 22

region, suggest that the incidence of future conflicts may equal, or even exceed what has been experienced in the past.

Zartman[2] in his book 'Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa' argues that conflict refers to the underlying issues in dispute between parties. Resolution on the other hand points to the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict. With the agreement of the parties, resolution of any conflict is an almost accomplishment.

Zartman's position on conflict and conflict resolution despite its simplistic tone appears rather loose. To reduce the issue of conflict resolution to simple concensus by parties in conflict attempts to negate other important variables in the crisis. As it is with the Liberian conflict for example, agreed that the war was fought by contending interests within the Liberian polity, the urge to fight and ability in sustaining the conflict was partly due to support from abroad. Funds, arms, ammunitions and even men were drafted from outside Liberia to fight on the side of various camps. Peace and peace making in Africa emerge as issues of the greatest importance in recent years. They have become issues that are not only the concern of Governments. They are not matters of intra or inter state affairs in abstract sense. It involves the well being, and life and death of millions of people.

---

[2] Zartman, IW. Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa: Macmillan publishers page 8-15

Vraalsen captures the situation more when he argued that any successful attempt to resolve conflicts and make peace in Africa must be a genuine recognition of, and respect for, the identity of the peoples of the continent, their traditions and their proud cultural heritage. To this should be added an intimate knowledge of the historical facts as well as an understanding of the prevailing social and economic condition on the continent as fashioned by centuries of colonial domination and oppression[3]

The impression that the western world holds on Africa is that of peoples in distress, hunger and disease. A continent marginalized in both economic and political sense. This derogation opinion as painful as it is reveals the ignorance of the magnitude of the nature of conflicts in Africa. Conflicts like the ones in Africa are obtained in both Eastern and Western Europe. The preference to recognize Africa's problems as basically African further aggravate the degree and intensity of conflicts in the region.

In his piece titled "Peace Making as an instrument for the maintenance of International peace and Security," Onoja[4] cited Mediation as a tool regularly employed by the United Nations Organization (UNO) to resolve conflicts. This position portents to indicate that mediation as perceived and adopted by the UN is the only or, superior methodology put in place or found to be the solution

[3] Vraalsen, T. (1997) opcit page 23

[4] Onoja,L. (1996) Peace keeping and international security in a changing world. Mono expressions ltd, Jos page 121

to conflicts within or among nation-states. The flaw in this opinion is that mediation most often than not has failed in resolving disputes in the international arena.

On the other hand, Boutros – Ghali[5] sees peace making as the action to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means, and that it comes into play when all preventive diplomacy fails. Peace making and preventive diplomacy are seen by Ghali as radically different. It is the contention of this piece however that the two are similar in nature and content. Peace making is simply an extension of preventive diplomacy. It may not therefore be right to subsume the two as any significantly different.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The Boutrous-Ghali thesis failed to take into cognizance that in a situation where there is the pressing demand for action to prevent conflicts and provide peace and security, it is relevant to take into consideration the unnecessity of haste, due to the fact that the issues in contention are of great political sensitivity. Patience and gradualism are important prerequisites in the management of conflict resolutions.

The ability of the United Nations to resolve conflicts in African Countries is increasingly becoming shaky may be due to its technological, political and economic backwardness. The Somalian, Rwandan and Angolan examples are cases in point. The concept of multi- lateral diplomacy adopted by the UN is shabby and does not produce positive results in African experiences. Over reliance on the

5. See Ghali-Boutrous (1992) 'An agenda for peace, Unity Nation New York City

judicial process as an instrument of peace making through international court of justice further reduces the gravity and reality of conflicts in Africa with the Liberian inclusive.

Bennett submitted that

'*The promptness of collective security viewed the UN chapter as a method of controlling war in a world of sovereign states. Experience has brought disillusionment with the capability of balance of power system to kmaidntain peace. The world was not ready to surrender enough natural sovereignty to make possible the establishment of a world Government, even one with limited powers. The idea of collective security seem to provide the bridge between the crumbling world of past centuries and the kind of ideal world yet to be created*"[66]

Vraalsen correctly punctuates Bennet's opinion on the UNO and its mediatory note when he argued that

"*It is increasingly apparent that the UNO can not address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional and sub-regional organizations some times have a comparative advantage in taking a lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts*"[77]

The role of ECOWAS in the mediation of the Liberian conflict clearly underscores this fact. The UN is often dictated by the wishes of few members of the Security Council led by the USA. They define the interest of the organization as regard ragging conflict., America is finding it unnecessary to commit resources to the resolution of conflicts in African countries especially where it has no political and especially economic interest. The Liberian conflict is a case in point.

[6] Bennett, L. (1980) INTERNETIONAL ORGANIZATION 2ND edition Prentice hall inc. page 114
[7] Vraalsen (1997) opcit page 31

The experience in most African countries during the postcolonial era is that of social disorder and political violence. Autocratic rulers unfit for governance have come and gone,[8] while many countries have suffered negative growth and further impoverishment of a rapidly growing population. This negative and utterly destructive development trend has to be broken and reversed.

Involvement in peace making and peace keeping requires continued co-ordination. The importance of open lines of communication between the parties in dispute and those attempting to resolve the disputes must be ensured.

While discussing the nature and forms of current conflicts in Africa, Zartman opined that they emerge mainly from the developing nature of African states.[9] That as African states are being born and shaped, the stakes for the players are high and clear, but the rules of the competition have not been established, and limits of controls on the conflict are still part of the stakes.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Zartman's categorization of African states as 'developing' weakens the very foundation of the basis of his analysis of the major African questions. African states are not developing per say. The reality is that they are underdeveloped. It may be safe therefore to imagine that the conflicts in the region are directly related to the stake of the

[8] Ibid page 35
[9] See Zartman, W. opcit page 56

players and rules of the game appears very derogatory to the African personality.

Alilou, Abdulrahaman[10] while commenting on the Liberian crisis vis-à-vis the ECOWAS peace moves initiatives submitted that despite the inability of Niger Republic to contribute materially to the peace keeping operations in Liberia, the Nigeriens were unanimous in the belief that there can be no development in Africa in the midst of conflicts. This point of view was made known through a statement issued by the African and Middle East department of the Ministry of External Affairs and Co-operation in Niamey. The statement went further to affirm that

> *"Niger Republic which stand for peace and justice has always – supported resolutions and decisions of ECOWAS and other sub regional, regional and international organizations, aimed at restoring peace and tranquility in the world at large and Africa in particular"*[11]

Adam, EL – Back contend that armed intervention by ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict was worth the cost in the interest of conflict prevention and the arrest of genocide in West Africa. He submitted further that this has something to do with the fact that ECOWAS is composed of states with widely differing outlooks, who sank their differences, which are however mutually enlightening in the interest of the humanitarian cause. The differing outlooks are an asset in the context of a purely humanitarian intervention which eschews all political manipulations, he concluded by submitting that there is the

[10] See ECOWAS Publication (1996) opcit page12.
[11] Ibid page 13.

need for ECOWAS to create a West African Observatory to identify zones of conflict and initiate high-powered negotiations to pre-empt them. Adams' point of view in respect of the profitability of ECOWAS involvement in Liberia fell short of what was obtained on ground. The intervention was not preventive as it came about purely as a result of the break out of hostilities. On the issue of arresting genocide, hundreds and thousands of lives were already lost before and even during the intervention.

While appreciating the historical congruity of many West African States, who by the way were partitioned into what Adam refereed to as nation states with the advent of colonial conquest, it may amount to an over exaggeration to define West African States as having "widely differing outlooks". The differences between these nation-states are more politically inclined to the scramble and partition of Africa by colonial exploits in the 19th century.

As in the Liberian conflict, literature available points to the fact that peace keeping took precedence over negotiated settlement. Contentious however in the politics of the intervention is the issue of the intervention is the issue of neutrality of ECOWAS.

This thinking is reasonable especially when measured against the fact that only 4-5 members of the community actually participated in the peace keeping venture, with Nigeria footing almost all the bill. Nigeria alone spent well over $3 billion[12] U.S Dollars in financing

[12] Kiplagat, BA 'African Governments- African conflicts' IN Sorbo GM &Vale, P. (ed) (1997) opcit

ECOMOG operations in Liberia. It also contributed more than 90% of the entire troops sent to the war front in Liberia. It is therefore difficult for either ECOWAS as a body or any member state for that matter to counter or even oppose the point of view of the Nigerian State. It is strongly speculated that the inability to restore peace in Liberia earlier than 1997 was borne out of President Babangidas' disdain for Mr. Charles Taylor who had upper hand in the conflict in terms of military strength and support of the majority of the Liberian people. This allegation is to a large extent substantiated by Taylor's control of the largest chunk of Liberian land mass when compared among the other war lords. Secondly, the performance at the polls also adds credence to the allegation.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Vogt[13] in her book "Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG" argued that ECOWAS intervention in Liberia went a long way in saving the country from total destruction. She commended the contribution of Nigeria of more than 12,000 troops which was approximately 90% of the total troops that served in Liberia. Advancing Vogt's position, Ridely submitted that despite its shortcomings, the ECOMOG peace keeping operation in Liberia was the best example in regional conflict resolution. He went further to argue that the possibility of setting up a similar outfit in other parts of Africa is very slim due to the enormous financial implications of the venture. ECOMOG according to Riddly[14], succeeded in bringing about cease-fire among Liberian warring factions. This to a large extent helped in curbing the excesses

[13] Vogt, M. The Liberian crisis and ECOMOG. NIIA, Lagos page 28

[14] See SPENCER, m. AND Sesay,A. in 'Accord' An international review of peace initiatives. Volume 1 The Loberian crisis (1990-1997) page 62

of waste of human beings as experienced in Rwanda where more than 500,000 people were killed within a span of two months.

Yomie Johnson on his part argued that without the timely intervention of ECOWAS in Liberian conflict, Liberia would have been turned into a massive grave yard[15]. To wrap up the debate on the desirability of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, Togba, M.A[16] submitted that the leaders of Africa have acknowledged that democracy is a precondition for peace and stability in the African continent.

CODNTENDING APPROACHES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The focus here is directed toward providing a theoretical tool of analyzing the Liberian conflict and its resolution. Various concepts and approaches to the study of international relations and need for relations among states are examined; after which a suitable tool of analysis is adopted in the interpretation of information in this thesis.

Need for Relations between States:

There is hardly any agreement on the history of the evolution of modern states. Puchlar argued that it dates back to the 16th century. He argued that its emergence was largely the product of the related supersession of central government over feudal decentralization and state autonomy over transcendent religions and secular authority

[15] Johnsn, PY The Guns that liberate must not rule. Page 42
[16] 'The Dove' (Magazine of ECOMOG in Liberia) Volume 3, February, 1995-February,1996, page 13

[17]This position is corroborated by Palmer[18] that the feudal political groups at mediaeval Europe had a weak central authority and deficient legitimacy to assume the status of modern state. Conflict resolution in modern state is difficult despite advancement in communication co-operation. Conflict, competition and rivalries between both the feudal and the traditional political units existed before the advent of modern state. It was in 16 and 17 centuries that saw the demise of the feudal system, and the emergence of central cohesive authorities and sovereign political units. This development granted control of territory and resources to the rulers of modern states.

Conflicts among nationalities or nation-states is obtained mainly due to reasons arising from territoriality and need for internal cohession. Though the state is the main actor in international politics, they do not in themselves act or react in international relations, it is the men that act on behalf of the state.

Whenever men interact in goal seeking pursuits, a political interaction comes to life. This interaction people enter into results in friction the result of which is war.

The environment is a fragmented entity with distinct units of varying sizes, these units interact politically, socially, economically, culturally, ideologically and even militarily. Where there is satisfaction or dissatisfaction of political actors motivate political

[17] Puchala, DJ (1997) International Politics today London Harper and Row publishers page 28
[18] Palmer, RR(1957) A history of the mordern world. 2nd edition New york: A . Knopf page 114.

actions leading to conflicts and wars. This position is reflected in the following manner:

> *'Consequence or compatibility between their values or the values of their..... societies used the external environment. This means that nations negotiate, bargain, entice, threaten or fight in order to nurture or preserve the kind of world they would like to live in"*[19]

This interaction becomes political behavior of nation's within the international system, and it becomes known from the actions of those that represent the state. It is the political behavior of the nation-state that becomes its interacting medium in the international system. All state behaviors are essentially that of people who act on its behalf. It is what prevails in form of human behavior of those at the commanding heights of the economy and polity that determines the social, political and economic mix in any society.

All interested are matched by their capabilities. Conflicts within nation states that take the form of ethnic wars as the one in Liberia are basically conflicts that have to do with interest of specific classes within the nation states.

Contending approaches to the study of international events and diplomacy are many and are briefly discussed in this section for theoretical purposes. Though the discipline is new in relatively, two or more distinct approaches are identified. The traditional /classical approach which was popular in the beginning and later came the behavioral/scientific approach. The contest between the two approach

in determining the best way to study international events has been tasking. These approaches make up the principal schools under which several others like the analytical behavioral, descriptive historical normative, scientific, systemic etc emerged. The traditional/classical approach is seen as descriptive historical and legalistic. It allows for looking back at the history of state and give intuitive explanation that leads to the prediction of its behaviors.

Here, international events are loosely and isolately studied with the hope that reason or explanations of international actions would come from actions of the actor (state).

Aaron Raymond, Stanley Hoffman and Ifars Morgenthau are some scholars from the traditional school. Hoffman and Aaron are known to take history to describe international system and use sociology to explain why actors behave the way they do. Morgenthan is particularly known for his realistic perspective which he used to explain politics. He argued that constant contest for the acquisition and display of power is necessary for the security and survival of nations and their national interest. This position is supported by Puchala when he argued that

"Power is the link between motivation and action in international politics because power is the capacity to act"[20]

---

[19] Puchala, DJ(1971) opcit page 15
[20] Ibid page 350.

On the other hand, the behavioral/scientific approach attempt to established a pattern of concurrent behavior through an explained relationship that could be used for prediction.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The approached aims at producing –

"

> *Sets of generally valid and logically consistent propositions that explain the outcome of the interaction between and among political actors"*[21]
>
> *Unlike the classical school, the scientific school focuses on the individual (the human behavior) and not the state as the most suitable tool of analysis for explaining the interactions of states. They argued that the traditional school is too implicit and relies on intuition in assessing situations thus throwing away objectivity accepting opinion rather than fact*[21].

The significant difference between these schools lie in the method of analysis and not the substance. Knorr and Rosenau are of the opinion that when these approaches are brought together, they help rather than impede the analysis of international politics. They contend further that:

"*There are important ways in which the traditional and the scientist can facilitate each other's work inside of their differences*"[22]

There has been no agreement among scholars as to what determines the policies of actors in international affairs. It is argued that the internal conditions of individual actors which include personal idiosyncrasies of the decision taken, interest of the business class in the society, military institutions, various trade or pressure groups,

[21] Ibid page 359.
[22] Knorr, K. and Rosenau, J N (ed) (1970) Contending aapproaches to international politics (Prenticehall Press, New Jerssey0 page 3

rival political groups, nature of the state bureaucracy or ideological orientation among many other things have definite consequences on the policies of states and actors in internal and international relations. Sharp contradictions lead to conflicts and wars, as was the case in Liberia and many other countries.

Every actor in international relation struggle to gain the satisfaction of her interest in the same playing ground with others, but it is the interests and capabilities of others that determine what the state gets from the international system.

The 'Rational Actor Model/Theory views decision making as that 'rational activity pursued by skilled men and women fully aware of the relevant facts and enjoying the time to scrutinize all possible options before selecting the correct one[23] Explaining the model further, Allison, G.T argued –

> *Human affairs, like the natural world, were, and ought rightfully to be the subject of study and analysis according to the scientific criteria of rational argument and inference from established data. Understanding the relations between human beings, they believed ought to be subjected to the kind of treatment as these other natural phenomena"*[24]

This seeks to maximize organizational process model, by considering the different organs of Government each with its own goals and procedures, aimed at sustaining the organization. Such organizations are seen to have long life and have their operating procedures.

[23] Calvert, P. (1986) The Foreign Policy of New states: Whyeatsheaf books, Great Brittain page7.
[24] Ibid page 8

Another is the bureaucratic politics model. This has the individual as the unit and not the organization. Calvert submits –

> *"Each individual, therefore has the objective of maximizing his own job satisfaction and sense of achievement, and he does this by competition with other individuals within the organization of which he forms a part"*[25]

These pre-theories bring a set of five explanatory variables to explain the making foreign policy. These include the policy maker's personal idiosyncrasies, namely, his values, talents and experiences. This helps in distinguishing his behavior and decision from those of others. Then the role variable, which concentrates on the position the decision maker occupies. The major problem with pre-theorists is that they are too deterministic and have little or no room for rationality, choice and purposefulness.

Another tool that could be used to study international relations and conflict is the elite theory. At the forefront of this paradigm are Wright, C., Gaestano, M. Pareto, V. The theory states that the society is triangularly structured, and the elite occupies the thin apex of the triangle. They are directly in control of the state and share common interests and experiences among themselves.

The elite class occupies the brightest political position, highest military and bureaucratic positions, big businesses and other such high level positions. As a result of their common exposure, they share common interests in preserving power, so they use all means foul or fair available to hold it. They control the populace by communicating

to their ideals packaged as the interest of the nation. They manipulate values and reward without any consideration to public opinion.

Because the elite are few and their interests same, the theory went on to suggest that their actions and reactions domestically and internationally are swift. They have an easier bargaining and negotiating opportunities. According to Puchala –

> *"Elite members in a given country are likely to share perceptions of threat, perceptions of international – states hierarchy, and perceptions of structure and process in the international system. Therefore, as a group, an elite may be conservative with regard to preserving the world status – quo. Reactionary with desires to restore past conditions or revolutionary with aspiration to make the world come over into conformity under their utopian images"*[26]

A developed version of the Elite theory is the 'Pluralist Model' by Laxwell, Dahl and Almond. The major line in between is that despite the prominence of the elites in the two models, the pluralists argued that elites are not unified. That there is no cohesion or unified interests among them. Rather than one pyramid of the society, several ones are erected but still placing the elite variously at the top. The multiplicity of the pyramids came as a result of – "the numerous social, economic, political and cultural sectors and interests typical in modern state[27]. They may be differentiated as a result of different professional orientations each seeking recognition and struggling to protect their professional (personal) interests. The different groups

[25] Ibid page 8
[26] See Puchala (1997) 0pcit page 40
[27] Culvert,P (1986) OPCIT PAGE 40

are therefore exposed to some levels of conflicts and subsequently compromises.

The elite models are monistic, while the pluralists are not as flexible as the monistic ones when it comes to actions and reactions in world affairs. Peter Calvert observes that 'much of the actions with which we are familiar in foreign policy field are relatively little concerned with real actions and real outcomes"[28]. He calls this model the 'Dramatic Actor Model' and from it sees policy making as public performance. His unit of analysis is the individual whose purpose is to present, in the role society assigned him the best possible performance. He argues that the stage for the performance is the international system which is already in existence. Clavert sets the U.S invasion of Grenada in 1983 as a typical of the dramatic actor model. The over dramatization of military strength has more messages to the rest of the world than the occupied territory. The rational choice theory on the other hand focuses on individual actor within a political setting. The model is constructed on the basis of classical microeconomics and that people are rational maximizers of their satisfaction[29]

Scholars were quick in welcoming this theory. It is praised for its wide applicability, explanatory power and other active influential contributions to political theory. Abrahams, R. believes that the future of political analysis lies in this theory.Economic interest now

[28] See Culvert (1986) ocit page 12
[29] Posner, RA (1983) The Economics of Justice. Harvard University Press, London page 3

unites individuals from different locations of the world, and one spreading with amazing speed. Fluidity of capital combine with aggressive mobility to globalize economic interest without regard to bounded space thereby creating what Henderson and Castells call 'Placeless power and powerless places[30]

All theories, models, discussed so far reflects the thinking within the Bourgeoisie school. There has been a lingering ideological contest between the bourgeoisie and Marxist schools. While the bourgeoisie school sees the development of interdependence as just a progressive economic development because modernity has turned the world into a global village. Marx, according to Maclean, thinks it as value system programmed or action and then applied to an external socio-economic distortion of real relations[31]

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Another theory/paradigm for the study and understanding of international relations especially as it relates to conflict and conflict resolution is the Marxist political economy approach. This is a jump away from the Bourgeoisie school discussed earlier.

The theory essentially explains the social relations of men from economic perspective. Marx's rigorous analysis explains all human relations in terms of the struggle for material acquisition between and among themselves. He argues that the superstructure of a society is

[30] Henderson, J. and Castells, M. (ed) (1984) Introduction to J. Henderson & M. Castells. Global restructuring and territorial development, London

[31] Macleans, J. 'Interdependence on trail. Barry, J. &RJ Willet, P. (ed) (1984) Frances printers, London page 143.

based upon materialism with social relations of production determining the stage of societal historical development. In contribution to the critique of political economy, Marx wrote:-

> "*In the social production of their lines men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relation of production which corresponds to the definite stage of their material productive forces. The sum total of these economic relations constitute the economic structures of society the real foundations of which arises the legal, political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of consciousness, the mode of production of material life which conditions the social, political and intellectual life in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but on the contrary, it is their social being that determines their consciousness*"[32]

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The Marxist tool insists that the contradictions in the society be taken seriously and addressed on their own terms and right. Social formations must be taken seriously and on their terms so that they may be possibly new or unique realities not necessarily shadow limitations of things that have been elsewhere[33]

To push his point further, Marx argued that the state in any society is an instrument of the ruling class, and that the modern state is but a committee for managing the affairs of the whole Bourgeoisie.[34]

This clearly explains the nature of crisis in African countries where the ruling class is not developed. The tendency to fall back to trivial

---

[32] Marx, K. and Engels,P. Contributions to the critique of political economy. Moscow publishers, 1979
[33] Leys,C. (1973) 'The overdeveloped post colonial state revolutions: ROAP No 5 padge 43.
[34] Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) opcit page 486

loyalties like ethnicity and fighting wars along such lines is pre-eminent.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

In the same vein, Ralph Miliband argued that in a capitalist society, the ruling class owns and controls the means of production and then uses it s economic power as its instruments for the domination of the society[35]This position usually focuses on the nature of class that rules, that is, the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie and the mechanism that ties this class to the state and the relationship between the state polices and attendant class interest[36]. The Marxist political economy model utilizes the methodology of historical materialism in the analysis of social phenomena. It emphasizes the dynamic character of historical method in analyzing social issues different from the conventional bourgeoisie methods.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIB
RECEIVED
26 APR 2005
ZARIA NIGERIA
Ahmadu Bello Unive

Engels wrote –

> "*For draletical philosophy, nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything. Nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher*[37]

The political economy approach is anchored on dialectical and historical materialism. The tool is appropriate in the study of relationships. Lenin argued that the great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready things, but a complex of processes in which apparently stable no less than their

[35] Milband. R. (1973) The state in a capitalist society. Open University press set books, London page 4.
[36] Ibid page5

476903
J2
6377.W4

mind images in our heads, the concepts go through an uninterrupted character of everything.[38] The framework of analysis to be used in this study despite the suitability of the Marxist political economy tool is the linkage approach. The framework of analysis in this study is the linkage approach. The theory focuses attention on the links between politics and the international arena. In other words, it means ways of conceptualizing relationships between variables operating within the domestic system and variables within the environment.[39]

Linkage theory is based on the interplay between domestic and international political processes (i.e. link between internal and external variables). For instance, the intensity of conflicts in Liberia led to the concern by other West African countries and thus the decision to collectively move in as a sub region through the monitoring group with the aim of restoring peace in Liberia. Rosenau posits that national political systems like all organized human groups are conditional by and respond to environment[40]

The theory further suggests that –

> *"Political analysis would be greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability or instability, functioning of institutes and goals of national political systems to variables in other external environment are systematically developed"*[41]

---

[37] Engels,F. (1969) opcit page 17.
[38] Armstrong, J. (1976) Ideology, Politics and Government of the Soviet Union: An Introduction Fredric Prager publishers, New York page 27.
[39] Reynolds, PA (1988) Linkage politics in international relations Massachussets USA page 288
[40] Roenau, J. (1969) opcit page 381
[41] Ibid page 440

Through the linkage approach, the Liberian crisis which raged from 1990-1997 could be situated within historical context and factors that gave rise to the formation and establishment of the ECOWAS peace monitoring group (ECOMOG). The approach will link the two important variables in our study.

The approach further emphasizes on the fact that there is a linkage between domestic processes and the external environment or situation towards which policies of state are directed[42] Two important characteristics are observable. First is the link between the domestic or preferably internal situation and external environment. This can comfortably explain the relationship between the Liberian crisis and ECOWAS intervention. The approach on a second note can be used to identify the extent to which particular forces can positively or negatively affect the foreign polices of states.

Bernard Cohen tried to focus his linkage perspective on what he calls 'Super polities[43] By this concept he means the USSR and the USA. He explained their link based on the cold war era. This made him to divide the whole world into two, the West led by the USA and the East led by the USSR. He saw different state in the West and East being used as pawns in the linkage process between two 'super polities'. This however is apparently overtaken by events since the cold war is no more.

---

[42] Ibid page 46
[43] Agubamah, E. Nigerian Freign policy objectives

Leary on the other hand analyzed linkages between underdeveloped nations and developed ones and maintained that national and international phenomena are indeed connected particularly in the change we observe in the underdeveloped countries. He argued further that the underdeveloped nations are unequally linked to the developed nations. These links are in form of military, trade, politics etc.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

In the case of this study, the linkage is among underdeveloped nations of West Africa, who to a great extent have pulled recourses together to save a member from apparent extinction resulting from war. The approach also posits that unequal links between countries are not restricted to the relationship between developed and underdeveloped but could also be obtained among the underdeveloped countries.

The selection of the linkage approach in the conduct of this study is predicated on its holistic view as a theory, and the fact that it fits appropriately in the attempt to comprehend the relationship between the conflict and its resolution mainly from outside. Northedge shed more light on the linkage approach when he argued –

> *"Restricted by pressures originating within the country the internal political situation. There is virtually nothing existing within the borders of the state which does not have some influence on posture its government assumes din international affairs"*[44]

The linkage approach is made of compartments i.e. input-output linkage pattern with the intellectual sub-divisions called analytical

process of linkage theory.[45] There is the policy input which is the sequence of behavior that originates from within a polity and either culminate or are sustained by its environment. There are policy inputs which are those behavioral sequences within a polity to which outputs give rise.

On the other hand, there are environmental outputs which are those sequence of behavior that originate from the external environment of a polity that are either terminated or sustained within the polity. There are environmental inputs as well.

Rosenau tried to show the pattern of links between polities in the input and output linkage pattern. The pattern according to him are penetrative process, reactive process, emulative process and fused linkage[46]

The role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian conflict is best in circumstance understood and studied applying the linkage theory. The tool provide a better understanding of the linkage between various forces at conflict in Liberia ie domestic factions and the link which informed the decision of ECOWAS to intervene militarily through the ECOWAS peace monitory group (ECOMOG). Giving the framework of analysis, a well-focused research is inevitable.

---

[44] Northedge, PS (1986) The Foreign policy powers Fabers and fabers page 21
[45] See Rosenau,J. (1969) opcit page 46.
[46] Ibid page 46

2.04 CONCLUSION

Throughout the chapter, attempt was made to review relevant works similar to our area of study, and bring forth some contending approaches in relation to theoretical framework of analysis.Next chapter discusses ECOWAS in relation to conflict resolution.

CHAPTER THREE

ECOWAS AND POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

3.01: INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, attempt was made to review existing literature relevant to our area of study and provide appropriate framework under which this research is built. Contending theoretical approaches were briefly analysed before the selection of framework of analysis. This chapter attempts to study ECOWAS in relation to conflict resolution in the West African sub-region.

3.02: FORMATION OF ECOWAS

The scramble and partition of Africa in the 19th century by the colonial powers was through primarily intended at curving areas of influence and enhancement of protectionism by these powers resulted in the creation of smaller nation states. These states took little or no consideration of the cultural, social and environmental similarities peculiarities of the various African peoples. What was more relevant in the partition was geographical contiguity in some cases.

The spread of various colonial states in Africa gave rise to many spheres of influence and attachment. This has since remained an entrenched colonial legacy in the continent. The end of the second world war marked a period of political transformation in Africa. The beginning of independence and efforts put in place by emerging

nationalist through nationalist movements derived popular appeal from African elite who wanted to partake and replace the white man in the commanding heights of both political and economic decision making of their various new found nation states.

From the colonial era, there has been an atmosphere of competition, suspicion and exclusion. The immediate post-independence era marked a period of increased nationalism with each African state adopting individualistic approach to economic development. From this approach, grew the perspective under which the character of African countries and their leadership steered the sheep's of state.

The African economies were basically made to be principally suppliers of raw material and buyers of manufactured goods. There is therefore a mismatch of domestic demand and supply thus leading to a heavy structural dis-equilibrum. The heavy dependence on the external sector for economic growth seriously hindered development process in Africa. It was against this backdrop that attention began to be focused more on regional integration as alternative strategy to growth and development.

Through regional cooperation, it was anticipated that the resources of the participating countries would be pooled together, leading to the fusion of the tiny national markets in order to provide larger markets

and enterprises that would take advantage of economies of scale that would promote technology in the region.[1]

In the 1970s therefore, developing countries would realized that their economic and social development as best guaranteed through formation of groups in order to enhance the strength of their resources and the ability to bargain better with their former colonial masters for example.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

(i) LAGOS TREATY OF 1975:

The Lagos treaty was signed on May, 28th 1975.[2] The signing of the treaty formally signified the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) The founding members of the organization originally thought of the organization as more than an economic cooperation but more of an economic community. ECOWAS was as at time of endorsement of Lagos treaty comprised of sixteen West African States viz – Benin, Burkina Fasso, Cape Veide, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.[3]

476903

[1] ECOWAS: "Achievements, challenges and future prospects" A publication of ECOWAS Executive Secretariat pp 10.

[2] ECOWAS BRIEFS' published by the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS 6, King George V Road, Lagos Nigeria.

[3] 'The Economic Community of West African States: Information Brochure" published by ECOWAS. 60 Yakubu Gowon Creseent, Asokoro, Abuja 1998.

(ii) FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECOWAS:

The community is founded on some principles that are termed fundamental. Some important items among these principles are

(1) Equality and independence of member states. Like any international organization, this principle of equality and sovereignty of member states is always tops on the agenda. At least in theory this has kept such organizations a float, but in reality, the question of equality of members in the organizations is absent. This is due to so many factors ranging from economic, social to political forces.

It is for example a political fallacy to equate the impact, relevance and role played by the United States of America to that of a small African country like Togo. While the fact is appreciated that both the presidents of the USA and Togo are heads of their respective countries, their hold on the UNO vary tremendously.

The same thing could be applied to ECOWAS. The weight which a country like Nigeria pull in the community could be more than what a country like Mali is pulling. This boils down to many factors

such as the monetary and financial contributions which the two countries make and their role both military, strategic and otherwise in the suitainance of the community. The principle of equality of member states is therefore a mere provision.

(2) Another fundamental principle of ECOWAS is solidarity and collective self reliance. To a large degree, the concept of solidarity is being addressed to some extent by member states, while collective self reliance has since become unrealizable due partly to strong attachment with former colonial authorities.

(3) The 3rd principles of ECOWAS is non-aggression between member states. Though all out wars between member states of the community has been avoided all through, some scarmishes here and there are being experienced at various times. The protracted among is the one between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea.

(4) Maintenance of regional peace, and stability. To some extent, the community has succeeded in addressing regional peace and security. The cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone are issues in point. But for the intervention of ECOWAS, the conflict

in Liberia especially would have been worse catastrophic than it was.

(5) Peaceful settlement of disputes. Attempts have been made in the past at settling disputes peacefully. Recent cases in Liberia and Sierra Leone also began with initiatives at mediating the contending parties with a view to resolving the conflict. It was largely due to the inability of the mediatory role to bring peace and an end to the mayhem that led to military action.

(6) Promotion and protection of human right. On this principle, the community has been rather silent while the last principle is.

(7) The promotion and consolidation of democracy. This very principle was put to test recently in the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah as President of Sierra Leone after routing the decedents that carried out the military coup.

In a nutshell therefore, the community's fundamental principles remain as they were in 1975. The level of which the principles are adhered to however varies with time, limit and space.

(iii) ORGANIZATION

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) like many other similar organizations is structured in such a way as to ensure proper evolution of policies and implementation by relevant organs.

At the peak of the community is the Authority of Heads of state and Government, which is the highest policy making body of the community. The assembly is comprised of Heads of States and Governments of the member-states. Next to the Authority of Heads of states and Governments is the council of ministers.

The membership of the council of ministers is mainly comprised of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Ministers of Economic Development of member states. The council meets more often than the Assembly which meets once annually except there is the need to meet more than ones. The council of Ministers sets the agenda for the meeting of the Assembly of Heads of states and Governments. Other organs of the ECOWAS are the community parliament (yet in-active); the Economic and social council; the community court of justice, the executive secretariat; the fund for cooperation, compensation and

development; West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and the specialized technical commissions.[4]

3.03: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ECOWAS

ECOWAS is primarily to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, ensure economic growth, foster relations among members state and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.

The lofty aims of the community as made palpably clear in the 1975 treaty are the following[5] viz-

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

(i) that they were convinced that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their states for effective economic cooperation largely through a determined and concrete policy of self reliance.

(ii) that they recognized that they must achieve "progress towards sub-regional economic integration 'and that an essential requirement of this was 'an assesment of the economic potential and interests of states" and

(iii) they affirmed as their "ultimate objective the achievement of "accelerated and sustained economic

[4] Ibid.

development of their states and the creation of a homogenous society in West Africa leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons".

Article 2 of the 1975 treaty further contains the aims of the community as follows[6] -

"It shall be the aim of the community to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in all social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

The same treaty sets out the cardinal objectives of the community as[7]

---

[5] ECOWAS: achievements, challenges. Optic page 8.

[6] Ibid page 9

[7] Ibid page 10

(a) the elimination between member states of custom duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of importation and exportation of goods;

(b) the abolition of quantitative and administrative restriction on trade among member states;

(c) the establishment of a common custom tarriff and a common commercial policy towards third world countries.

(d) the abolition as between member states of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital;

(e) the harmonization of the agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects in the member state notably in the fields of marketing research and agro-allied industrial enterprises;

(f) the implementation of schemes for the joint development of transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in these fields;

(g) the establishment of fund for cooperation, compensation and development, and;

(h) such other activities calculated to further the aims of the community as the member states may from time to time undertake in common.

The community was expected to lead to the establishment of free trade zone through a custom union and common market. The aims and objectives of ECOWAS indeed covers a wide scope of activities, but as mentioned earlier, the community was envisaged to play more economic roles than political, social and even military.

The 1975 treaty was however soon to be found weak and not in tune with the growing sophistication of the global economy and polity. This led to the revision of the treaty in 1991.

Some of the weaknesses of the Lagos treaty include among other things viz

- the treaty made no provision for political cooperation, regional peace and security to meet the challenges of changing times. There was therefore the need to provide these in the treaty. Accordingly therefore, there is the sudden realization that the economics and politics of integration are inseparable. The two are dialectically related and linked.

- accordingly, the community adopted a protocol on non-aggression in 1978, which was followed by another

protocol on mutual assistance in defence matters in 1981.[8] Another important weakness of the Lagos treaty was the absence of binding effect of the decision of the Authority and the Council. The decisions are binding only on institutions of the community. Decisions are not binding on the member states themselves.

This renders the community rather inactive. In addition; the community was further ineffective because a lot of the ECOWAS protocol were not drafted and translated into domestic laws.

Article 3 states the aims and objectives of the community as follows-

(1) The aims of the community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic unions in West Africa in order to raise the living standard of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

[8] Ibid page 11

(2) In order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of this treaty, the community shall by stages ensure:-

(a) the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programes, projects and activities, particularly in goods, agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters;

(b) the harmonization and coordination of policies for the protection of the environment;

(c) the promotion of establishment of joint production enterprises;

(d) the establishment of a common market through:

(1) the Liberalization of trade by the abolition, among member states, of custom duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition among member states, of non-

tarriff barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the community level;

(2) the adoption of a common external tarriff and a common trade policy vis a vis third countries;

(3) the removal, between member states of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment;

(e) the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common policies in the economic, financial, social and cultural sectors, and the creation of a monetary union.

(f) the promotion of joint ventures by private sector enterprises and other economic operators, in particular through the adoption of a regional agreement on cross-border investments.

(g) the adoption of measures for the integration of the integration of the private sectors, particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote small scale enterprises.

(h) the establishment of an enabling legal environment;

(i) the harmonization of the national investment codes leading to the adoption of a single community investment code;

(j) the harmonization of standards and measures;

(k) the promotion of balanced development of the region, paying attention to the special problems of each member states particularly those of land locked and small island members;

(l) the encouragement and strengthening of relation and the promotion of the flow of information particularly among rural populations, women and youths organizations and socio-professional organizations such as associations of the media, business men, workers and trade unions;

(m) the adoption of a community population policy which takes into account the need for a balance between demographic factors and socio-economic development;

(n) the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development, and

(o) any other activity that member states may decide to undertake jointly with a view to attaining community objective.[9]

It is glaring from the above therefore that the general aims and objectives of the community were expanded in the revised treaty. The expansion has brought out very clearly the knity gritty of what the group sets out to achieve in both short and long run.

The revised treaty also contained an expanded version of the fundamental principles of the community. Article 4 of the revised treaty submits the following-

The high contracting parties, in pursuit of the objectives stated in Article 3 of this treaty, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

(a) equality and inter-dependence of member states;

(b) solidarity and collective self reliance;

[9] ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATE: REVISED TREATY. Published by the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria. Page 6.

(c) inter-state cooperation, harmonization of policies and integration of programs;

(d) non-aggression between member states;

(e) maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness;

(f) peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, active cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a pre-requisite for economic development;

(g) recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provision of the African charter on human and peoples' rights;

(h) accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development;

(i) recognition and observance of the rules and principles of the community;

(j) promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each member state as envisaged by the

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY
KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY
Ahmadu Bello University
476903
J2
6377.W4

declaration of political principles adopted in Abuja on 6th July, 1991; and

(k) equitable and just distribution of the costs and benefits of economic cooperation and integration.[10]

A fundamental improvement in the principles of the community could be traced within the specific provision which states clearly the promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each member states as envisaged by the declaration of political principles adopted in Abuja on July, 16th 1991.

In order to ensure the realization of the aims of the community and fundamental principles behind its establishment and existence, Article 5 of the revised treaty dealt extensively on general under takings by members. The article specifies as follows:-

(1) member states undertakes to create favourable conditions for the attainment of objectives of the community, and particularly to take the necessary measures to harmonize their strategies and policies, and to refrain from any action that may hinder the attainment of the said objectives.

[10] Ibid page 7.

(2) each member state shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislative and statuary texts as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this treaty.

(3) each member states undertakes to honor its obligations under this treaty and to abide by the decisions and regulations of the community.[11]

A very significant land mark in the revision of the ECOWAS treaty is the expansion of chapter ten that deals with cooperation in political, judicial and legal affairs, regional security and immigration. Article 56 specifically states the following:-

(1) in pursuit of the integration objectives of the community, member states undertake to cooperate on political matters, and in particular, to take appropriate measures to ensure effective application of the provision of this treaty.

(2) the signatory states to the protocol on non-aggression, the protocol on mutual assistance on defence, the community declaration of political principles and the African charter

[11] Ibid page 11.

on human and peoples rights agree to cooperate for the purpose of realizing the objectives of these instruments.[12]

Under same chapter ten, the crucial area of our concern in this study which was rather in-active prior to the revision i.e REGIONAL SECURITY was expanded and treated in Article 58. In relation to regional security, the community expanded the following viz-

(1) member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region.

(2) in pursuit of these objectives, member states undertake to cooperate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts, paying particular regard to the need to:

(a) maintain periodic and regular consultations between national border administration authorities,

(b) establish local or national joint commissions to examine any problems encountered in relations between neigbouring states;

[12] Ibid page 35.

(c) encourage exchanges and cooperation between communities, township, and administrative regions;

(d) organize meetings between relevant ministries on various aspects of inter-state relations;

(e) employ where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, mediation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes;

(f) establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace keeping forces where appropriate;

(g) provide, where necessary and at the request of member states, assistance to member states for observation of democratic elections.

(3) And that the detailed provisions governing political cooperation, regional peace and stability shall be defined in the relevant protocol.[13]

[13] Ibid page 36.

It is clear therefore that the revised treaty of ECOWAS is a step ahead of the Lagos treaty signed in 1976. The revised treaty encapsulated more pressing contemporary requirements of the sub-region. The revised treaty has tended to expose to the fore the strategic importance and relevance of the political ingredients of sub-regional and regional integration.

3.04: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES OF ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS as was mentioned earlier was established to specifically attend to the economic integration of the West African sub-region. Growing eventualities and the apparent inseparability of economies and politics, has made it necessary that the community play more positive political roles in order to actualize the economic objectives.

IBRAHIM LIBRARY

During its fourteenth extra ordinary session of the authority held in Abuja on the $4^{th} - 6^{th}$ July, 1991, a major review of the political role of the community was carried out. The authority considered the many dramatic and fundamental changes taking place in the international political and economic landscape, particularly the replacement of totalitarian administrations by democratically elected governments, and the introduction of market oriented economies.

During the extra-ordinary session, the authority also considered the wave of popular expressions of demand for political pluralism

sweeping throughout Africa.[14] It was noted that an increasing number of countries were now accepting political pluralism and making necessary adjustments to the body politics to accommodate change. The assertion for fundamental human right of people was further noted by the Assembly. The Heads of State and Governments therefore reaffirmed their common belief in the emerging political realities and agreed to subscribe to a declaration of political principle.[15]

Determined to consult among each member state on a more regular basis and harmonization of approaches to and strategies for dealing with all international economic and political issues with a view to adopting common policies and enhancement of international negotiations, the authority declared full adherence to the following principles in order to enhance the prospect of advancing economic cooperation and integration in a political environment of peace, security and stability:

1. We reaffirm the provisions of the protocol on non-aggression adopted on 22 April, 1978 and our commitment to securing peace and maintaining stability in the ECOWAS sub-region by promoting increasingly better relations among ourselves, strengthening good neighbourliness and ensuring conditions in which our peoples can lie in freedom under the law and in true and

[14] ECOWAS BRIEFS: Declaration of ECOWAS political principles: Department of Information, Executive Secretariat 6, King George V Road, P.M.B. 12745 Lagos, Nigeria.
[15] Ibid.

lasting peace, free from any threat to or against their security.

2. We reaffirm our determination to refrain in our mutual relations, as well as in our international relations in general, from any threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any member state.

3. We reaffirm also our determination to settle all disputes among ourselves by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger the peace, security and stability of our sub-region.

4. We will respect human rights and fundamental freedom in all their plenitude including in particular freedoms of thought, conscience, association, religion or belief for all peoples without distinction as to race, sex, language or creed.

5. We will promote and encourage the full enjoyment by all our peoples of their fundamental human rights, especially their political, economic, social, cultural and other rights inherent in the dignity of the human person and essential to his force and progressive development.

6. We believe in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic process in the forming of the society in which he lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and promote in each of our countries, political pluralism and those representative institutions and guarantees for personal safety and freedom under the law that are our common heritage.

7. We reaffirm our determination to speak with one voice under the aegis of ECOWAS on all international issues which touch and concern the vital interest of our development and prosperity. We will therefore resist any attempt by forces outside our sub-region to undermine the expression of our collective will and determination.

8. We rededicate ourselves and reaffirm our collective determination to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy and effective realization of the aims and objectives of enshrined in the ECOWAS treaty and

related instruments and to fulfill in good faith all our obligations under them.[16]

The declaration of ECOWAS political principles is a clear break through from the earlier economic bias preference, which after two

[16] Ibid.

decades of existence has failed to play meaningful development role in the sub-region. This is mainly due to the attempt which hither to tried to isolate and divorce economics from politics. The political declaration is more or less a result of a new realization.

On the economic front, ECOWAS is primarily an economic integration. Centrality to the ECOWAS protocol is the need to open up frontiers through the enhancement of free movement of ECOWAS citizens. The treaty recognizes citizens of member states as community citizens and accordingly has endowed them with certain rights and privileges including the right of entry, residence and establishment. As a result member states have undertaken to recognize these rights in accordance with the provisions of protocols relating to the exercise of such rights.[17]

The treaty emphasises on free movement as it especially affect short visits of up to 90 days. The treaty seek the abolition of visas and entry Permits, and specifies the following-

> "Any citizens of the community wishing to enter the territory of any of the member states shall have a right to enter the territory of that member state without having to present a visa and may remain there for a period not exceeding ninety days"[18]

---

[17] ECOWAS BRIEFS: opening up frontiers: free movement of ECOWAS citizens. Published by the Executive Secretariat 6, King George V. Road, Lagos Nigeria.

[18] Ibid

Another important economic attribute of the protocol is trade liberalization within the sub-region. The protocol seek to among other things foster intra-community trade. The focus here is to integrate the sixteen West African markets for goods, capital and labour so that the community can advance harmoniously as one region in its search for sustained economic growth and development. In 1987, ECOWAS Authority directed that both the member states and the institutions of the community accorded topmost priority to the promotion and development of intra-community trade.

The effect of the launching of ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme is that all non-tarriff barriers to intra-community trade, which have been clearly identified, are being removed over a four year period by each member state. The specific rate at which these non-tarriff barriers will be removed is determined by individual member states. The important point was that by 1st January, 1994 every non-tarriff barrier should have been eliminated throughout West Africa on community originating goods. The program comprises the following-[19]

- Consolidation of customs duties and charges of equivalent effect and non tarriff barriers.

- Immediate liberalization by unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts.

[19] Ibid

- Gradual liberalization of industrial products originating from member state.

- Gradual establishment of a common external tarriff.

- Establishment of a common investment code.

Other major economic issues are the ECOWAS telecommunications priority program which seek to provide member states with reliable and regular means of communication in order to promote inter state trade, as well as the reduction of the regions dependence on the outside world by developing inter state communication links, and assisting members to improve upon their national telecommunications networks.

On the other hand, the ECOWAS monetary cooperation program. The primary focus of this program is the integration of individual national markets for goods, capital and labour so that the community can advance harmoniously as one region, in its search for sustained economic growth and development. This call for acceleration of monetary cooperation among member state.[20] Towards this end, the ECOWAS travellers cheque was launched recently in Abuja, Nigeria.

[20] ECOWAS BRIEFS: The ECOWAS monetary cooperation program. Published by ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. 6, King George V. Road, Lagos Nigeria.

3.05: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSTACLES

> "ECOWAS has performed beyond expectation amalgamated our region into one community acting with one voice and one objective. But unfortunately, we have spent so much time bringing peace and not putting enough emphasis on economic issues"[21]

The above statement is a paradox in the sense that the community is seen to have achieved much in an area where less emphasis was hither- to placed.

Aside from obvious success/achievements received by the community since its reception, there have been a lot of limitations and obstacles that could be said to be responsible for some of the lapses of the sub regional group.

One major obstacle is the lack of political commitment which basically revolves around incompetent leadership among respective West African leaders. A lot of the members of the community hardly pay their statuary financial contributions to the group.

This seriously hamper the ability to pursue both economic and political programs with necessary zeal.

---

[21] General Abdulsalami Abubakar in "West African Bulletin" published by ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Abuja. October, 1998.

Secondly, there is high degree of suspicion and fears of domination by stronger members. This makes cooperation rather difficult. Linguistic differences arising from colonial rule is central in perpetuating this set back.

Another snag is related to constructive sovereignty.[22] In any international cooperation arrangement, and certainly in the case of regional integration groupings, the member states have to surrender a measure of their national sovereignty. In ECOWAS, the treaty, protocols and conventions have to be ratified by member states before they enter definitively into force. It has been an uphill task getting these legal instruments ratified.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Other major handicaps are hostile environment, inadequate funding as well as the inability of the community to implement acts and decisions. Despite the handicaps, the community has been able to record some achievements. The survival of ECOWAS from 1975 to date is one major achievement. Despite the devastating pitfalls and failures, the group has survived, and infact performed some considerable roles within the sub region.

Another major achievement is in the area of review of the ECOWAS treaty hither to left a lot of gray area and was emphatic more on need for economic integration in near isolation of political integration the

[22] ECOWAS: Achievements, challenges and future prospects. ECOWAS Executive Secretariat opiate page 20

review attempted to ratify this and other short falls with the hope that the community would play more glaring role in the integration of the sub region.

The decision by the Authority during the Banjul May, 1990 submit to establish an ECOWAS standing mediation committee to look into dispute and conflicts among member states was a landmark decision in the life of the community. This particular decision gave exception to the involvement in the Liberian conflict through the setting up of ECOWAS (This is the central thesis of the research and is dealt with in details in the next chapter).

ECOWAS has also achieved some infrastructural developments within the sub continent. This could be seen as a shift paving way for a possible major economic development. In the last two decades road transport sub sector has also enjoyed major growth. New roads have during the period been constructed linking member nations. Some of these roads include among others – trans-coastal high way Lagos – Nouakchott which is up to 4,767km and run through Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d'ivore, Liberia, Sierra Leone,

Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania.[23] The trans-saharan highway Dakar N'Djamena which covers up to 4,63 km and runs through Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria to Tchad.[24]

---

[23] Ibid page 35
[24] Ibid page 38

Achievement in the telecommunication sub sector is however not much. Equally is the case with agricultural relations among member states. Despite the odds some achievements have actually been recorded.

3.06: ECOWAS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Economic Community of West African States, as explained earlier in this study was established with the main objective of fostering economic integration of the West African sub-region.

The fundamental short sight which sought to exclude the relevance and strategic importance of political unity is responsible for the inability of the community to realize even the set economic agenda. The fear of domination and probably consumption by stronger member states more than any thing else led to the unfortunate inactivity.

It is not also totally out of place to posit that as at the time of the formation of the community, there was relative peace in the sub-region, and therefore incidence of either external or internal aggression was rather very low.

Member states were therefore not threatened both internally and externally. The emphasis was thus on non interference in the internal affairs of member states and the need to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states. Unfortunately events unfolding themselves within the region during the late 1970s, the 1980s

especially in the early 1990s have tilted towards serious crisis within national boundaries and among nation states.

Due to reasons mentioned above, ECOWAS has not featured prominently in the resolution of any major conflict within its membership before the 1900s. The only major crisis within the sub region was the Nigeria civil war of the late 1960s.

476903

The inability of ECOWAS to get involved in political matters is now referred to as a major weakness of the 1975 Lagos treaty. The treaty actually made no express provision for political cooperation and regional peace and security.[25]

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The eruption of crisis in Liberia awakened members to the realization that economics of integration and the politics of integration are inseparable twins.[26] Not only can not one be embraced without the other, but regional peace and security are simply too critical to be entrusted entirely to the OAU. As a result therefore, the community adopted the protocol on non aggression in 1978 followed by another protocol on mutual assistance in Defence matters in 1981.

Despite these two earlier protocols, the treaty maintained its traditional approach of 'cautious optimism' on matters relating to internal conflicts especially. The most important revision is that which emphasised on cooperation in political, judicial and legal

[25] Ibid page 10
[26] Ibid page 11

affairs, regional security and immigration treated in Article 56, under chapter ten of the revised ECOWAS treaty of 1991.

In a nutshell therefore, ECOWAS involvement in the resolution of conflicts within the West African sub region began fully with the Liberian war which became full blown in 1990 and resolved in 1997. The second outing of the community was in Sierra Leone where Ahmed Tijjan Kabbah was reinstated after he was flushed out in a coup by military junta. Despite the costs in human and material resources to the community, the Liberian case is seen as an African miracle in peace keeping. A feat not achieved even by the so called super powers in similar conflicts within Africa.

On the Sierra Leone's reinstatement. The successes of the peace monitoring group is another major African achievement and an indication that more could be achieved if African leadership is more inward and purposeful. The routing of the junta rebels and reinstatement of the elected government clearly teaches the advanced capitalist countries an African strategy in the resolution of African conflicts.

ECOWAS also played a critical role in the maintenance of peace in Guinea Bissau. Though the Guinea problem was not as intense as the two earlier ones, ECOMOG's presence in the country had a positive consequences on the willingness of the contending elite to resolve their problems.

3.07: CONCLUSION

The chapter attempted to take an overview of ECOWAS. Its history, aims and objectives in relation to the attainment of its economic and political role and show how far the community has been able to realize these objectives. The chapter also briefly treated the success and obstacles the community faces in its drive to the actualization of its aim and fundamental principles. This is intended to underscore the state of the union in relation to its practical relevance to the peoples of the region.

Finally, the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution was discussed with the aim of introducing the central thesis of the study which is exhaustively treated in the next chapter ie chapter four.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECOWAS AND THE LIBERIA CONFLICT

4.01: INTROUDCTION

In the last three chapters, attempt was made to provide correct theoretical basis of conducting this study. The last chapter especially treated ECOWAS and its activities in the last two and a half decades. This chapter studies the Liberian conflict in greater details.

4.02: HISTORY OF LIBERIA

Liberia is the first independent African country. It was created in 1822 with the assistance of Black Americans belonging to the American Colonization Society, a religious and philanthropic organization.[1] The society was known in the area of assisting liberated slaves who intended to return to Africa as well as those slaves freed en route America.

Anthropological and other evidences on the other hand suggests that the territory currently called Liberia has been inhabited for the past four million years, though little is known about these early inhabitants. It is not also certain whether any of the contemporary inhabitants of Liberia are direct decedents of the early settlers.[2]

---

[1] Diop, A.Y. 'A conflict rooted in history' in the West African Bulletin, No 5 published by the Executive Secretariat, Lagos November 1997 page 13.

[2] Umoder, G.E. 'Brief History of Liberia' In The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at Regional Peace Keeping. Gabumo Publishing Company Ltd, Lagos page 11

Like many people of the West African coast, the Liberians are also believed to have originated form the hinterland of Africa around the present day Mali.

It is strongly believed however that in the four centuries after 1400 AD, larger waves of immigrants arrived in Liberia. From Sierra Leone came the Va, from Ghana the Mano. These group were followed by the Kpelle and Belle, the Kissi and the Bassa and the De. From Ivory a Coast came the Krahn and the Grebo and in their turn came the Gio and the Mandigo.[3]

Reason for the massive migration in literature remains an assumption as many factors among which were the will to escape from the restrictions of Islamic social system and the attraction towards the salt as a sure guarantee for the study supply of valuable salt.

Towards the end of 1821, negotiations with tribal kings had commenced preparatory to the signing of a treaty in exchange for land with goods. The earlier settlers on the Liberian soil were joined by thousands more towards the middle and end of the 1800s.
Diop submit that the territory occupied by American Liberians and the Congos was purchased from the local chiefs. He argued that in July, 1847 independence was declared in the territory based on the United State model.[4]

---

[3] Ibid page 13
[4] Diop, A. Y. 1997 (opcit) page 13

Liberia's capital, Monrovia, was named after the then American President, James Monroe. As more groups arrived, new settlements were springing up and expansion of territories was equally taking place. By 1938, the settlement decided to unite within a self-governing 'commonwealth of Liberia'. This development was vehemently resisted by the British and French who asked their traders not to pay taxes, duties and thus refused to recognize the new status.

In 1847 a constitutional convention was held which laid groundwork for the establishment of the modern Liberian State. A constitution was adopted based on the American model. The declaration of Liberian independence was signed on July 26th 1847.[5]

By the 1974 census provisional figure, the population of Liberia was put at about 1.5 million people, and by 1990 the figure had raisen to about 1.8 million people. The growth of the population is 3.4 per cent.[6] Current estimates have however put Liberia's population Strength at about 3.4 million people[7], with a population density of about 46 persons per square mile.

The principal ethnic groups that make up present day Liberia are the Kpelle, bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo and Mano. In all about 16 languages are spoken in Liberia, while English is the official lingua Franca. Liberians are predominantly Christians with some Muslims.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

[5] Umoden, G.E. 1992 (opict) page 16
[6] Ibid page 17
[7] Diop, A.Y. 1997 (opcit) page 18

Ethnically the population consist of people of local tribe origin who are decedents of Africans that have returned from various sectors of the Americas in the 1800s and some descendents of Congolese who sought refuge in Liberia in route American and Europe as slaves after the abolition.

Apart from the 16 major languages spoken, there are about 30 tribes whose diversities are factors that strengthen the life of Liberia. On the administrative horizon, Liberia is divided into 15 political sub-divisions, nine Counties and six territories. The territories are located within the various counties, whose administration is by their superintendents on behalf of the President, and to a large degree enjoy some independence in the area of finance and administration of the units.

Some of the territories are

(1) Bong with a population of almost 200,000 people;
(2) Grand Bassa and Rivercess Territory with about 125,000 people; Rivercess Territory has about 28,000 people;
(3) Grand Cape mount has almost 56,000 people;
(4) Grand Gedel has a population of about 72,000 people;
(5) Lofa has about 180,000 people;
(6) Mary land and Kru cost Territory. Mary land county has about 65,000 people, while Kru coast territory has a little over 27,000 people;
(7) Monsterado, Marshall Territory, Bomi territory and Gibba Territory. Montserrado county including Gibbi territory has

about 357,000 people; Marshal territory has 20,000 people while Bomi territory has 62,124.

(8) Sinoe and Sasstown territory. Since county has 77,639 people while sasstown territory has about 10,000 people.[8]

After independence, the Americo Liberians wielded tremendous political and economic power in the country until in 1980 when Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrew violently the Government of President William Tolbert. Before Tolbert, William Turman ruled Liberia from 1934 – 1971. There was a deliberate policy to widen the gap between the indigene tribes and the Elitist Americo – Liberians. This was a party policy, but President Turman at some point began to introduce some measures aimed at improving the living standard of the local people.

Throughout, the average Liberians did not benefit from the economic development programs of the State. There was widespread dissatisfaction, which gave rise to the formation of opposition political groups. The Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) was led by

Gabriel Mathews, the Movement for Justice in African was led by Nah Tipoteh Toghba and Amos Sawyer.

The Samuel Doe's coup as violent as it was did not seem to address the yearnings of the indigenous groups against marginalization, as the Government was absolutely dominated by members of his ethnic

group, the Krahns, who made up only about 4% of the Liberian population.

To consolidate his firm grip on political power, Doe organized an election in 1985 in which he won with about 51%. This further increased the tension within the Liberian society, and by 1989, another coup was staged by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia headed by Mr. Charles Taylor. Troops loyal to Doe did put a lot of resistance which in actuality resulted as the final stroke that broke the camel's back and thus the beginning of killings and destruction in Liberia. Hostilities broke out and Liberia became increasingly ungovernable to Samuel Doe who by the middle of 1990 was restricted to within the Presidential Mansion in Liberia before he was captured and killed by troops, loyal to Yormmie Johnson. Yormie Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front (INFL) was a splinter from the main NPFL led by Charles Taylor.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

4.03: BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

As explained earlier, the Liberian nation is composed of people who speak different languages and held different beliefs. History also reveals the fact that migration into what is today referred to as Liberia began much earlier than the coming of the ex slaves. As it was with many indigenous African groups, there was high level of primitivity amongst the people. The ex- slaves were thus at upper pedestal by the level of their exposure in the American and thus stood higher than the local groups.

---

[8] Umoden, G.E. (1982) opcit pages 19 - 27

This domination was both in economic and political spheres and transcended the 1800s up till the third quarter of 1900s. The unending disaffection culminated in the rise of the Master Sergeant who stroke in 1980 and very violently.

From the preceding discussions, it is clear that Liberia occupies a strategic place in the contemporary political history of Africa. Aside from the fact that it is the first independent country in Africa where the Euro American model of Democracy was put to use when all of Africa was under the dungeons of colonial rule.

Until 1980, Liberia was ruled by a one party system, which has been in power since 1887. Liberia did not experience the European system of colonization. It was a good case of what is referred to as 'Black on black' domination[9] and imperialism.

The Americo-Liberians have waged several wars against the indigenous people with the aim of dominating them. These groups of Liberians constitute only about 5% of the total population. Nevertheless, they controlled both economic and political power in the country almost to the exclusion of the majority. Sesay argued that 11 out of 19 Presidents Liberia had since the 1800s were actually born in the United States of America.[10] Accordingly therefore, they paid no attention to the sensibilities of the indigenous Liberians especially

[9] Amadu Sesay 'Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis' in The Liberian crisis and Ecomog: A bold attempt at Regional Peace Keeping – Gabumo Publishing Company Ltd, Lagos 1992 page 29.

with regards to their customs and laws. The Americo-Liberians are the main inhabitants of Monrovia and other coastal areas. More than any other administration, it was the Government of William Tubman who, as is already shown attempted to involve some measure that will benefit the indigenous population. Despite Tubman's 'reforms' the indigenous Liberians were absolutely out of favors.

Most of the Liberian Elite were restricted to few families or less than 2% of the total population. The Americo-Liberians controlled both the expressiions and any vehicle for political participation in the country. The press was under very tight control of the State. Government machinery was personalized and reduced to the level of family affairs. All sensitive appointments in Government went to family members.

During the reign of William Tubman, all other arms of Government ie Legislature and Judiciary became functionally extension of the presidency. Government machine and finances were personalized to the extent that any expenditure of up to $25 had to be signed by the Presidnet in person. At the tail end of his regime in 1971, President Tubman had effectively became 'Authoritarian' complete hold over the society was facilitated and ensured through the use of elaborate network of security agencies; the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Special Security Service (SSS) and the most powerful and ruthless National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).[11] Enemies of Government were decisively crushed in the intent of the 'state'.

---

[10] Ibid page 30.
[11] Ibid page 34.

A major cause of the outbreak of hostilities in Liberia was the Domestic socio- economic inequalities found within the country. Despite its size, Liberia was wealthy due to the abundance of some minerals deposit found in the country. Diamonds, rich forest reserves and rubber as well as fertile land for agriculture. Due to the character of the ruling class, the west and America was conffident and foreign investments were attracted. It was estimated that there was more than $500 million American investment in Liberia as at 1972, a year after the death of President William tubman.[12] Liberia was listed as a middle income country despite the fact that gains from these investments were not evenly spread among the Liberian population. Less than 2.5% of the Americo-Liberians controlled well over 60% of the nation's wealth and were thus richer while the majority of the nation was in poverty. This situation was graphically captured by some scholars in a book titled 'Growth without development' viz

> "The inequalities were so obvious that the former American Secretary of States – Henry Kessinger described the country in 1976 as a 'depressing, appalling slum"[13]

The Poor State of the masses of Liberia could be traced to the character, attitude as well as the relationship between the ruling Americo-Liberian elite and the multinational corporations (MNCS) operating in the country. The privilege families provided the local managerial personnel within Liberia. The MNCS were given free

[12] Ibid page 36.
[13] Clower. R.W. et at Growth without development E Vanston: North West University Press 1983 PP

hand to operate through unnecessary concessions. This contributed in the worsening of the economy as the MNCS were let loose. While they reap from the economy they contributed very little in the infrastructural development of the country. This scenario created frustration and agitation to bring an end to the seeming endless exploitation. The indigenous elite did not find the free hands given to the MNCS funny. Criticism sore. The rice riot of April 1979 was a significant turning point in the country of Liberia. Governments decision to increase the bag price from $22 to $30 was responsible for the riot. This was interpreted as an attempt to increase the profit margin due to MNCS.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The mass demonestration was led by Baccus Mathews of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL). Attempt by the state to stop the mass action by persuading mathews failed. Instead, Government clamped down on the PAL, killing its members and destroying its properties. Officers of the alliance were rounded up and jailed. Officials of MOJA' were not left alone as well. They were charged as follows –

> "Unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously and traitorously conspire, contrive and combine with drivers other evily disposed persons to seize power and control by force and to overthrow the legally constituted Government of the Republic of Liberia"[14]

All arrested men were released on the eve of the July 1979 Monrovia Summit of the OAU, and in fact PAL was registered as a political party thus bringing to an end the reign of one party state in Liberia.

---

46 - 77

[14] New Africa (London) June 1977, 24 and G.E. Saigbe Boley, LIBERIA: The rise and fall of the first Republic, 1171.

This gave birth to the formation of the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP). Both the PPP and Mathews were yet arrested following a failed demonstration against the regime of Tolbert in March 1980.

These and other major national issues fuelled the military coup which violently not only ended the Tolbert administration, but brought an end the 133 years[15] of the Americo-Liberian domination of the political economy of Liberia.

It is widely believed that both the PPP and MOJA led by their elite played a very tremendous role in the political education of the coup leaders.

The 1980 coup which brought Sergeant Samuel Doe to power was a culmination of the age long desire by the indigenous Liberians to take over the realms of political leadership of a country they had numerical strength over the descendents of the ex-slaves. Doe was thus the first indigenous Liberian to rule the country since 1847. Leadership of both the PPA and MOJA dominated the Doe's cabinet in the beginning of the life of the administration.

The romance was however short lived when the second in command to Doe was executed on treason charges. More than anything else, this event scared the opposition that had earlier thought of making the government with the half literate Master Sergeant. They therefore withdrew from the Government.

Within a short span of time, the Liberian currency began to nose dive. The Dollar was devalued. The economy badly needed corrections, but the regime hardly understood this, and therefore failed to take corrective measures. Not long after taking over power, the corrective regime of Doe began to degenerate and was performing worse. The government was accused of –

> "The misuse of state resources alongside an arrogant contempt for minimal standards of human rights, state terror, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, secret and public executions and the willful destruction of private property, wrongful dismissals, wanton raiding and raping, systematically organized to thoroughly intimidate the populace.[16]

Attempts to return the country to civil rule was foiled by Doe in 1984, and by October, 1985 an election was organized in which Doe returned himself as elected. Opponents in the election were accordingly harassed and decisively dealt with. Popular protests by students and other groups were mercilessly suppressed by the Army.

As the excesses of the administration grew out of hand, politicians and other opposition members were forced to either live in exile or be exterminated. Thomas Quiwonkpa was a top member of the group that ousted Tolbert. He attempted to take over power in 1985. The move failed and the consequences of course was his life and the lives

---

[15] Ibid page 63.
[16] West Africa 9 – 15 July 1990, 2066

of more than 3,000 women and children mostly of Gios and the manos ethnic groups[17]. It was the failure of this coup that gave rise to Charles Taylor's insurgence. Taylor was believed to be very close to Thomas Quiwonkpa. It was while he was in exile in Ivory Coast that Taylor recruited young Liberians mainly from his native county who were already tied of the excesses of Samuel Doe.

Taylor was believed to have slipped into Liberia with his men and launched an attack on the security posts in Nimba county. Within six months, from the first attack, Taylor took control of about 75% of the Liberia's land mass including some strategic ports of Buchanan and Gbarga which was to become the Headquarters of the NPFL. Doe was forced to retreat to the Presidential Mansion within Monrovia.

Before the decision of ECOWAS to mediate in the Liberian conflict, the USA reluctantly offered to and later intended to grant safe passage to Samuel Doe to any country that offered him political asylum. Doe however rejected this offer. The war in Liberia formally seized the attention of ECOWAS in May 1990 during its Banjul Summit at the Gambia. The Authority –

(i) Expressed concern over the situation in Liberia;
(ii) Called on parties to agree to an immediate cease fire, and to stop the unnecessary destruction of life and property and;

[17] Amadu Sesay 1992 (opcit) page 46.

(iii) Appealed to all parties to accept the holding of elections as a means of returning the country to peace and harmony.[18]

4.04: ECOWAS AND THE FORMATION OF ECOMOG

The conflict in Liberia was no doubt a major crisis which if left alone in the hands of Liberians, the consequences on the entire sub region would have been disastrous.

The nature of nation states in Africa as has been identified earlier is such that the partitioning did not take into consideration similarities of differences in cultures and traditions of people as a tool for demarcating natural boundaries. What was important was simply the curing of areas of influence among the invading colonial armies.

In the West Africa especially, natural boundaries are strictly a colonial creation for its exigencies. A good example to boutress this point of view is using the case of Nigeria and its borders. In the North West where the country borders Niger Republic, the people along the border lives from both divide speak the same language ie Hausa and share column cultural heritage. The same thing applies to North East around the Cameroon border. Both people dominantly speak Fulse, and in border with Tchad along Ngambaru, Kanuri is the language of the people.

[18] Amadu Sesay 1992 (opcit) page 48.

Similar is the case with the South Western Borders and Shaki, Badagary, Seme. The peoples in these areas are Yoruba speaking and share common or similar culture heritage. The Committee were simply divided by colonial armies.

The same case applies to most West African Countries. The Liberian Border with Ivory Coast, with Sierra Leone and Guinea has similar problems. It is therefore difficult to curtail major resurrections in these areas due to age long historical identity.

The internationalization of the Liberian conflict was therefore necessary in order to prevent the possibilities of spreading to neighboring countries and by implication, the entire sub region. It was due to this that other nations of the sub-region got involved and participated in peacekeeping operation. The war was at the beginning fought on low scale.

The break down of law and order, which led to the indiscriminate killings of people including foreigners, formed the watershed of the internationalization of the Liberian crises. Charles Taylor for example enjoyed tremendous support from Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Libya. Both the rebels and Doe sought for external support in order to execute the war.

The rebels adopted a tactics of Kidnapping, holding hostage and killing of foreign national which was as a result of break down of

discipline as the war progressed[19]. It was argued that about 3,000 foreigners were held by the NPFL alone as at august 1990[20]. Most of these foreigners were Nigerians.

Specifically, the citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea were marked for elimination by the rebel forces. Charles Taylor was reported to have said that he would kill a Nigerian or a Ghanian for every Liberian killed by ECOMOG Forces.

Another factor behind the sending of the Peace Monitoring Force to Liberia was the Mass Movement of refugees from Liberia to the neighboring Countries. Increasing insecurity and hardship forced people to move out of Liberia. Neighboring countries had to contend with the impending humanitarian crisis arising from the Liberian conflict. Out of the over 600,000 refugees that left Liberia, about 141,000 were in Nigeria[21].

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Ordinary Liberians helplessly called for international assistance on the realization of the magnitude of the crisis. Even the United Nations Mission in Liberia was attacked by Government forces in 1990. This was directed at members of some ethnic groups who took refuge in the Mission. There was no respect for diplomatic immunity in

[19] Osisioma Nwolise "The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis and its effects on West Africa" in The Liberian crisis and Ecomog: A bold attempt at Regional Peace Keeping. Gabumo Publishing Co Ltd Lagos 1992 page 59.

[20] Ibid 60.

[21] Ibid page 59.

Liberia. The situation was very grave and called for urgent international intervention. Even Journalist were killed.

Equally attacked were embassies and foreign nationals killed. This threatened international peace and security. Fear, mounted high, and the United Nations was not willing to step in to save the situation, while West African Nationals were humiliated, raped and killed daily. The situation was definitely uncontrollable and therefore necessitated the decision of ECOWAS to send in the Peace Monitoring Group to protect its citizens.

Charles Taylor as the main rebel leader accused Nigerians especially for not only the war but also the excesses of Samuel Doe. Taylor specifically asserted –

> "I think that good sense will prevail and the American people and the Congress and the Bush administration will realize that this is and always will remain an internal conflict. The problem is Samuel Doe. Doe murdered our people for 10 years. Washington and Nigeria must take some responsibility for this. Where did Doe get his weapons from?"[22].

The war continued to go degenerate and Liberia was already lawless. ECOWAS leaders therefore decided to evolve an international solution to the crisis, as laws and order have since broken down and there is no authority in Liberia.

From August 6th – 7th 1990, the ECOWAS Mediating Committee leaders comprising General Babangida (Nigeria) who was the prime mover, Dauda Jawara (the Gambia); Jerry Rawlings (Ghana); Lansana Conte (Guinea); Joseph Momoh (Sierra Leone) as well as foreign Ministers of Togo and Mali agreed to establish and despatch without further delay to Liberia without further delay ECOMOG with Ghana's General Arnold Quainoo as the Commander[23]. The mandate immediately was to keep peace by Separating the three warring factions, and ensure a return to normality[24].

ECOMOG forces were further asked to open up the routes to enable the much needed food, drugs, clothing, and other needs to be transported into Liberia to assist the starving elite people and refugees. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was seen as a land mark departure from the practical of African Countries seeking solutions to their problems from outside Africa.

Liberia, which had been on the boil from incursion for nearly sometime was confronted with mediation Committee which was set up in May 1990 to bring the warring factors together. The cease fire and establishment of an ECOWAS cease fire monitoring group for Liberia stated the following in clear terms[25] viz-.

---

[22] Charles Taylor, quoted in The Guardian, August 5, 1990 page A3.
[23] Osisioma Nwolise 1992 (opcit) page 63
[24] Ibid page 63
[25] "Decision A/Dec.9/5/90 of the Authority of Heads of State and Government relating to the establishment of the community standing mediation committee" See ECOWAS DECISIONS ON ON THE LIBERIAN CRISIS SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL, English Edition Vol. 21, 1992 page 5.

Mindful of Article 5 of ECOWAS treaty establishing the Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and functions…

Gravely concerned about the armed conflict existing in Liberia and the wanton destruction of human life and property and the displacement of persons occasioned the said conflict; considering the massive damage in various forms being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation;

Deeply concerned about the plight of foreign nationals, particularly citizens of the Community who are seriously affected by the conflict, considering that law and order in Liberia have broken down;

Determined to find a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict and to put an end to situation which is seriously disrupting the normal life of innocent citizens in Liberia;

Convinced that the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee established by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States at its thirteenth session held from 28 to 30 May 1990 in Banjul provides an appropriate mechanism for resolving the situation, and therefore decided the following-:

Article I: Cease Fire

1. The standing mediation committee acting on behalf of the authority of Heads of State and Government, hereby calls on all the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate cease fire as a contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security throughout Liberia.
2. The parties to the conflict shall:
   a. Cease all activities of a Military or Para-military nature, as well as act of violence;
   b. Surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the ECOWAS cease fire Monitoring Group (ECOWAS);
   c. Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials;
   d. Refrain, pending the establishment of an Interim Government until a new Government is set up as a result of democratically conducted elections, from any activity which might prejudice the establishment of such Interim Government or the holding of general and presidential elections;
   e. Release all political prisoners and prisoners of war;
   f. Respect, unless otherwise suspended to facilitate the administration of the country by the Interim Government, the constitution of the Republic of Liberia adopted on 6th January, 1986;

g. Fully G' operate with the ECOWAS standing mediation committee, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and ECOWAS cease fire monitoring group for the effective maintenance of the cease fire and the restoration of law and order.

3. The Interim Government shall unban all political parties and facilitate the return of all refugees and political exiles.

It was the initiative of ECOWAS towards addressing the Liberian war which was already getting out hard that during the Banjul meeting, a final position on the formation and activities of the peace monitoring group (ECOMOG) was carried at.

Article II of December A/DEC-1/8/90 clearly states the nature and character of cease of fire monitoring group in the following manner[26].

1. In order to arrive at a peaceful and lasting settlement of the dispute, ECOWAS shall establish, under the authority of the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and under the command of an ECOWAS member state, a cease fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to be composed of military contingents drawn from the member states of

ECOWAS standing mediation committee as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone.

2. The cease fire monitoring group shall be under the command of a free commander appointed by the Committee. He shall be entrusted with powers to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease fire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia.
3. The cease fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) shall be assigned the function of assisting the ECOWAS standing mediation committee in supervising the implementation and in ensuring the strict compliance by the parties with the provisions of the cease fire through out the territory of Liberia.
4. The cease fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) shall remain in Liberia if necessary until the successful holding of general elections and the installation of an elected Government.
5. The Executive Secretary shall establish rules and regulations for the cease for monitoring group (ECOMOG) after consultation with the Chairman of the Authority.
6. The Executive Secretary is hereby authorized to appoint a Special Representative and other supporting staff for the operations in Liberia. The

[25] Ibid page 7.

Special representative shall work in close collaboration with the force commander and assist in carrying out the ECOMOG operations in Liberia.

The expenses relating to the operations of ECOMOG was to be drawn from the special emergency fund created by Decision A/DEC.3/8/90 of the ECOWAS standing mediation committee[27]. Contrary to the provision of Article III of the decision in question; ECOMOG operation was funded mainly by Nigerian Government. The decision therefore gave a go ahead for the immediate commencement of ECOMOG's operation in Liberia, while appealing to the international community to assist in resolving the contentious issues aggravating the conflict. The ECOMOG was more or less finally put into life as a response to the blond both in Liberia.

Led by General Babangida of Nigieria, ECOWAS succeeded in mobilizing a force of about 3,000 soldiers made up of 900 soldiers from Nigeria, 800 from Ghana, 500 from Guinea, 350 from Sierra Leone and 105 from the Gambia[28].

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

[27] Ibid page 8.
[28] Bisi Olawunmi "Liberia: Peace at last, An ECOWAS success story" in The WEST AFRICAN

4.05 ECOWAS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) arrived in Liberia on August 24, 1990[29], commanded by Lt. General Arnold Quinoo of Ghana. One of the immediate assignment of the group was to evolve the conveyance of a National Conference. The conference was held between 27-31 August in which Amos Sanyer was elected as the Chairman of the Interim National Government of Liberia. The national conference of all political parties, the independent National Patriotic front of Liberia and various Liberian interest group was held at Kairaba Conference center in Banjul, the Gambia.

All parties and interest groups in Liberia except NPLF participated at the Banjul conference; whose opening session was chaired by Dawda Jawara, the then President of the Gambia. The conference was also attended by the representatives of the Secretary General of the OAU and UNO. Jawara explained to the conference the neutrality of ECOMOG in the Liberia conflict.

The conference decided that a Government should be organized in conformity with the constitution of Liberia. The country republican form of government was maintained with separate and co-equal branches viz Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. The conference

---

[29] BULLETIN NO 5 November, 1997 page 10.
[29] Ibid page 11

further took particular note of the total break down of law and order and the collapse of the Government of Samuel Doe[30].

Accordingly, under the aforementioned partial suspension of the contribution, the conference decided that

(a) An Interim Government of National Unity be established under the contribution of Liberia.

(b) The Interim Government shall continue to exist until a Government elected by free and fair election has been installed; and

(c) During the life of the Interim Government, the constitution of Liberia shall continue to be in effect except for the rectinent suspended praetors dealing with the re-organization of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches[31].

The conference elected people into the Interim National Government as follows:

Executive Branch	
President	Dr. Amos Suayer
V. President	Rt. Rev. Ronald J. Diggs
Interim Legislative Assembly	
Speaker	Reserved for Mr. Charles Taylor of National Patriotic Front of Liberia

[30] Interim Government of Natural Unity of Liberia' Final communique of the National Conference of all Liberian political parties, Banjul, The Gambia 27th August, - 1st September, 1990 page 31.

Deputy Speaker	Reserved for Mr. Prince Johnson of Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

The National conference decided that the Interim Government shall assure full powers for the government of the state as provided for in the constitution of Liberia. In addition, the National Conference mandated the performance of such primary functions as may be required to return the country to normalcy, these functions include, but are not limited to the following[32]

(a) The adoption of ECOMOG to maintain law and order.
(b) Facilitation of resettlement refuges and other displaced Nigerians.
(c) Initiation of power of national reconciliation.
(d) Creation of independent national electoral commission.
(e) Establishment of national commission for resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
(f) Establish commissions/bodies that would enable Liberians participate in the running of Government.

At the conference, it was further decided that the ECOWAS mediation committee be endorsed, and called on NPFL to lay down their arms and participate in the formation and running of the Interim National Government. It was further decided that in order to ensure fairness at

---

[31] Ibid page 31.
[32] Ibid pp 31

the polls, the President and Vice President of the Interim national Government were not eligible to contest any election.

The conference also decided that the Interim Government enter into a status of forces agreement with ECOWAS to define the relationship between ECOMOG and the Interim Government, and that the Interim Government within a reasonable time, should open discussions with respect to the establishment of a new armed forces for Liberia.[33]
The Interim Legislative Assembly of 30 members was set up in which the NPFL though had boycotted the conference was allocated six seats. This overture of peace did not go well with Charles Taylor, and therefore refused to participate.

Despite cynicism from the some quarters, ECOWAS and ECOMOG proved critics wrong by staying inform for about seven years in Liberia.

The capture and assassination of President Doe in a brutal assasination by forces loyal to Prince Yormie Johnson of INPFL, while on a visit to ECOMOG Headquarters on September 9th 1990 was seen in some quarters as an end to the Liberian conflict. This was however not to be due to an already aggrevated ethnically polarized Liberia. The killing of President Doe was only the beginning of actual hostilities ECOMOG began to contain factional fighting as early as October, 1990.

The OAU extra ordinary season in Bamako, Mali on 27th and 28th November, 1990 was specifically aimed at bringing together all factions in dispute to sign seize fire agreement. This could not be achieved. Another attempt was at Yamoussoukro on February 13th 1991[34] agreement was signed but could not hold.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY
RECEIVED
26 APR 2005
ZARIA NIGERIA
Ahmadu Bello University

While the crisis escalated, the ECOWAS leaders did adopt various strategies while diplomatic efforts continued. On the other hand, ECOMOG forces were consolidating on ground, taking control of large portions of the hinterland.

During the first few months in Liberia, ECOMOG had already secured the surrender of 30,000 fighters, 20,000 guns and over a million ammunitions. This contributed immensely in the preliminary stages of the management of the conflict.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Records available confirmed that the management and restoration of peace in Liberia by West African countries was paid in cash and blood. Apart from the influx of refugees into economic crisis ridden West African countries, many veterans became more or less incapacittated after fighting in Liberia. This is a great human price paid for the sake of returning peace to war turn Liberia. Materially, Nigeria alone, contrary to the decision of the mediation committee and Assembly of Heads of State and Government that ECOMOG operation was to be funded through an ECOWAS trust fund, spent

[33] Ibdi page 32
[34] Bisi Olawumi November, 1997 (opcit) page 11

476903
JZ
6377.W4
Dah

over three billion U.S Dollars in the peace making venture in Liberia.[35]

To a large degree however, the price paid when compared in relativity to the cost in human lives averted was not too much. In some quarters even in Europe and America, the ECOWAS success in the management of the Liberia war was seen as a case study in regional peace making. Africa has shown in clear terms some of its inherent capabilities have for centuries remained unexploited, and is clear pointer to the fact that Africa could be innovative and self-reliant.

As part of the management technique used in Liberia, ECOMOG was decided to be left on ground for a while to supervise the disarmament and restructuring of the Liberia armed forces. This was however recently opposed by Charles Taylor after winning the election in 1997. Despite diplomatic tangle and worsening military situation in Liberia, ECOWAS member countries contributed troops and set Sierra Leone as the meeting point before maturing into Liberia.

An important aspect of the peace keeping was the high state of morale on the part of the ECOMOG forces, despite the initial delay they faced in Sierra Leone before matching to Liberia, which critics argued was due to the threat to kill by Charles Taylor of NPFL.

The pioneer field commander, Lt. General Quainoo argued that though he was ready to face up the challenges of restoring peace in

[35] Ibid page 34

Liberia, he would rather want a seize fire agreement endorsed before matching to Monrovia.

On arrival in Liberia, ECOMOG met a hostile environment, as even the Government forces had already lost control of all the ports. Another source of worry was the execution of hostilities between troops loyal to Taylor and the break away INPFL led by Prince Johnson. The two rivals were locked in battle for control of the ports.

4.06: ECOMOG AND THE WARRING FACTIONS

After arrival in Monrovia, coupled with the high degree of hostility on ground, ECOMOG had no option than to contain the odds. The hostilities between forces of NPFL and INPFL was in top gear was at its peak and did not subside. Despite the hostilities, Prince Johnson was at hand and welcome the troops.

Records available suggest that Prince Johnson with more or less tired of the war and was ready for peace as at the time the ECOMOG troops arrived. This was shown not only by his singular presence at the port to receive the peace-keeping force, but through his utterances. Prince Johnson was certain and that ECOMOG had the capacity to call a truce. He gave the force assurance of his support.

'Operation Liberty' is the code name for the operation. The ECOMOG forces captured Free port and consolidated hold by pushing Taylor's men away. A more grip of the Monrovia municipality was held by ECOMOG. Also captured during the early

days of the operation was Payne Airfield from the troops loyal to Taylor after almost two weeks of ceaseless battle.

The ECOMOG administrative Headquarters and field officers became behive for refugees who as part of attempts to situate ECOMOG firmly on ground, officials arranged different visits to areas not very contradictory to the mission of the peace keeping force. For example, Prince Johnson's Caldwell Headquarters was visited by ECOMOG leadership and discussions held.

476903

Mr. Charles Taylor on the other hand was definitely the major problem to the ECOMOG. There was no discussion held with Taylor, and therefore there was a very big communication gap between the peace keeping force on the one hand and the NPFL on the other. Mr. Charles Taylor was only reached by American and British embassies on the other hand, ECOMOG did not have any meeting with President Samuel Doe, until his terminal appearance at the ECOMOG Headquarters just before he was captured by the INPFL forces of Prince Johnson.

The only contact ECOMOG had with the Presidential mansion was after the killing of President Doe, where Doe's second in command in the Interim Defense Council and Deputy President was in charge. General Nimley assured ECOMOG of his support and those of his men, but complained of lack of food and drugs in the mansion. At the time of the meeting, the General was helpless and could not proffer any suggestion on how to bring the war to an end.

At the Banjul meeting of October 1990, both the armed forces of Liberia (AFL), Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL) were in attendance. Also in attendance at the meeting was Hassan Koromah who represented the interest of Muslim groups in Liberia. Though a seize fire agreement was signed, it was not respected.

Charles Taylor, seeing that he had upper hand in the conflict, was not prepared to honestly talk peace on Liberia. His inability to attend peace meetings even on neutral grounds were informed by fear of possible apprehension by Nigeria especially or ECOMOG given his strained relationship with the two.

It is true to note that for example, the ECOMOG derived its inspiration from the perspective of resolution of conflict as a perpetual means of addressing fundamental human objectives and aspirations of survival, rather than from the narrow individual index of power.[36]

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

As has been mentioned earlier, the NPFL was essentially made up of Gio and Mano ethnic groups had its origin from the attempted coup of General Thomas Quinwokpa of 1985. The ethnic groups did suffer a lot of reprisal from President Doe. The NPFL was well armed and equipped with heavy ammunitions.

There is a linkage between bilateral intervention began by the USA and multilateral intervention led by the ECOWAS. Charles Taylor's

[36] Ibrahim James: 'ECOMOG UNDER ATTACK' in The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at Regional peace keeping. Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd, Lagos page 123.

rejection of all forms of intervention, bilateral or multilateral led to the imposition of sanctions against him and the NPFL through an ECOWAS decision A/DEC.8/7/92.

The resolution of the Authority of Heads of State and Government included other things that the community and its member states shall spare no effort to bring the conflict situation in Liberia to an early end.

Article 3 of the resolution states

> "*Unless Charles Taylor and the NPFL comply fully with the implementation of the Yamoussoukro accord, the Authority shall impose comprehensive sanction against Charles Taylor and the NPFL controlled area of Liberia, and any other party that fails to comply with implementation of the program*"[37]

on the invitation of General Gnassingba Eyadema, parties in dispute including Dr. Amos Swayer met on February 27th 1991. The meeting provided a unique opportunity for the 3 leaders to reconcile with one another and engage in friendly dialogue. They agreed to cooperate fully with ECOWAS and to refrain from taking any action that might be prejudicial to the arrangement being made to ensure the successful convening of the conference in March in Monrovia.[38]

At the Yamoussoukro meeting of 29th and 30th June 1991, which had Ibrahim Babangida (Nigeria); Dawda Jawara (The Gambia); Gnassingba Eyadema, (The Togo); Blaise Campore (Burkina Faso); Dr. Amos Swayer (Interim Government of Liberia); and Mr. Charles

---

[37] DECISION A/DEC.8/7/92 relating to sanctions against Charles Taylor and the NPFL in official journal of the ECOWAS, volume 23, July 1992. Page 25.

[38] 'Joint Declaration of the Liberian Situation 1st March, 1991' in official journal of the ECOWAS Vol.21 1992 page 22.

Taylor, (Head, NPFL). It was decided at the meeting that Mr. Felix Houghouet Boigny in his capacity as Doyen, to launch an urgent appeal to Dr. Amos Swayer and Mr. Charles Taylor to accept cease fire as a preliminary to national reconciliation.[39]

The meeting further decided that international negotiation Network of Jimmy Carter, former President of United States be involved in monitoring of the electoral process. At the end of the meeting, the Heads of State and the two Liberian protagonists expressed their satisfaction at the outcome of the meeting, and extended their most sincere thanks to the President of Ivory Coast for the welcome.

At the meeting of 29th July 1991 also in Yamoussoukro, the committee reviewed developments on the Liberian conflict, the committee agreed on the need to reinforce and consolidate in Liberia and congratulated both the Interim Government and the NPFL for maintaining cease force in conformity with their commitment during the last meeting in Yamoussoukro in June 1991.

The Committee further recognized the vital importance that the necessary conditions of security on the ground be created so as to reinforce the confidence of the parties and create the necessary atmosphere conducive to the holding of free and fair elections[40]. The Committee further agreed to meet and reassess the situation after.

---

[39] Out come of deliberations of the meeting held in Yamouskro on 29 and 30 June 1990 in official journal of ECOWAS Vol. 21 1992 opcit page 22.

[40] Final communique of the first meeting of the Committee of fire on Liberia, Yamoussoukro, 29th July, 1991 in ECOWAS official journal Vol 21 opcit page 22.

Accordingly therefore, another meeting was held on the 16-17 September, 1991, with the five members of the group on Liberia as well as the representatives of the ING of Liberia and NPFL as well as the representative of International Negotiations Network. The meeting agreed to remodel and reinforce ECOMOG to meet the increasing challenges of peace keeping. Members who promised to contribute troops were requested to honor their pledge.

The Yamoussoukro II further acknowledged the maintenance of cease fire by the warring parties and urge them to uphold it. The meeting also welcomed the agreement of the parties to implement under ECOMOG supervision, the encampment of their troops in designated locations and their disarmament, and the arms and ammunition would be deposited in appropriate armories also under the supervision of ECOMOG[41].

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

On the electoral process, the two parties agreed to set up five member election commission for the urgent and supervision of the elections to be held in Liberia. The parties also agreed to set up a five member ad hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes arising from the electoral process as provided for by the Liberian constitution[42]. Between Yamoussoukro II and III Senegal and Guinea-Bissau had sent in their troop contribution to ECOMOG as earlier promised.

---

[41] Final communique on the send meeting of five on the Liberian crisis held in Yamoussoukro 16-17 September 1991 in "ECOWAS Official Journal" Vol. 21 (opcit) page 24.

At the Yamoussoukro III meeting, the Committee recalled resolution regarding encampment of troops and requested the parties to evolve practical modalities for the implementation of that accord, and a program of implementation of all major areas of restoration of peace. The Committee renewed its mandate to ECOMOG to ensure that the program is smoothly and speedily implemented.

This program envisaged the implementation of within 60 days of all the modalities for the establishment of the necessary conditions of peace and security on the ground in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties as well as create a proper atmosphere conducive to the holding of a free and fair elections.[43]

At the end of Yamoussoukro III a program of implementation was already put in place by the Committee. The program is as follows:-

1.	ECOMOG Mission:	To cover the whole of Liberia. - Supervise the encampment and Disarmament of all warring factions.
2.	Preliminary Accepted conditions	- ECOMOG shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Territory of Liberia. - All warring factions will Willingly abandon their fighting portions and move

[42] Ibid page 24.
[43] Final communique on the third meeting of five on the Liberian crisis held in Yamoussokro 29-30

into designated camps.

- During the period of encampment and disarmament, eminent persons of the INN will visit Liberia in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties.
- All parties concerned will recognize the absolute neutrality of ECOMOG and demonstrate their trust and confidence in it.
- Some weapons would be Inadvertently lost and would Lost and would therefore need To be located and recovered.
- There would be some obstacles And possible minefields that would be neutralized.
- All entry points into Liberia Will be monitored by ECOMOG troops.

3. Tasks
- Eliminate external threat to allow the encampment and disarmament program to be smoothly and effectively

October, 1991 in "ECOWAS OFFICIAL JOURNAL" Vol 21 opcit page 26.

carried out.

- Monitoring of all possible Avenues of approach into Liberia by Patrols and static guards.
- Search in conjunction with administrative authorities to recover hidden or lost weapons.
- Strategic installation with need static guards.
- Security will be provided to all VIPs and where freedom of movement is established such security will not be necessary for local dignitaries[44].

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The Yamoussoukro III expected that ECOWAS Military program could be completed within 60 days as follows

D- Day - Issue orders

D- Day + 7 - Confirmatory recce completed of all encampment areas and forward patrol bases.

- Border guards in place including buffer zones along Sierra Leone/Liberia border.
- Road blocks and check points

removed in collaboration with administrative authorities.

- Reception centers for encampment open.
- ECOMOG patrol commence.
- NPFL encampment + documentation.
- Reviewing, creating and storage of weapons at designated points completed.
- Resettlement program commences.
- Robertsfield International Airport reactivated.
- Consolidation of border areas in collaboration with the administrative authorities.
- Appropriate light Air detachments deployed in Liberia (including helicopters).
- Routine patrols continue.
- Permanent presence and monitoring of all airports and seaports.
- International flights into Robersfield commences.

[44] See Yamoussoukro III in ECOWAS Official Journal Vol. 21 opcit page 27.

- No movement of heavy weapons belong to ECOMOG where not necessary.

D- Day + 60 - Assignment completed by 14th January 1992[45].

Despite all efforts and expectations of the Yamoussoukro accord, peace could not be achieved in Liberia as earlier as expected, until much later in 1997. Despite the apparent successes of ECOMOG, the peace-keeping force faced a lot of problems especially at the formative years.

The formation of ECOMOG is traced to ECOWAS mediation Committee as explained time and again in this thesis. The decision was not viewed with required support from the Fracophone West African Countries especially. At the forefront of this opposition was Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo. Their reason was closely linked to a protocol of ECOWAS relating to the appropriation of such a force and what organ is responsible for the establishment. The protocol is thus:-

> "According to the 1981 protocol Relating to mutual assistance as defense, the Authority of ECOWAS is the only organ to authorize the creation and movement of the ECOWAS force"[46].

Reasons such as financial constraints on the part of franco- phone countries informed their opposition. Another reason touted was the

---

[45] Ibid page 28-29.

[46] A/SP3/5/81 Protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence done at Freetown, 29 May 1981, Nigerian Treaties in Force 1970-1990 Vol 4 Lagos, Federal Ministry of Justice, 1990 page 898-908.

fear of domination by Anglo phone West African countries especially with the involvement of 2 West African super powers ie Nigeria and Ghana.

Nigeria's romance with the Government of President Samuel Doe also casted doubt on its neutrality in Liberia conflict. This to a large degree informed Mr. Charles Taylor's love lust with the peace keeping force which was both humanly and materially dominated by Nigeria. This distrust brought to the open the crisis of impartial arbiter in the conflict and therefore created a crisis of confidence.

This fear was further aggravated by the fact that either by commission or omission, the decision to move ECOMOG into Liberia coincided with the time and NPFL and INPFL Laid siege or the Presidential Mansion.

Charles Taylor's threat to deal with ECOMOG soldiers was not an empty one as he made good of it. ECOMOG troops were indeed attacked by Charles Taylor at the free Port area and the casuality mounted. Despite the attack by Charles Taylor ECOMOG was able to establish effective control of a zone in Free Port of Monrovia through which thousand of refugees were evacuated. Attacks by Taylor led to reinforcement of troops. On the other hand, the attitude of Prince Johnson to ECOMOG was rather ambivalent[47].

[47] M.A. Vogt The Problems and challenges of peace making: From peace making to peace enforcement page 155.

4.07: PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONFLICT

The deployment of peacekeeping force under normal diplomatic atmosphere assumes the existence of cease-fire. In the case of ECOMOG and the Liberian conflict, ECOMOG moved into Liberia when cease-fire agreements were disregarded by virtually all parties in dispute.

As a tension diffusing force, ECOMOG attempted stabilizing the conflict situation in Liberia by encouraging the warring factions to de-emphasize hostilities and move to conference table in search of solution to the crisis.

ECOWAS has shown greater initiative in the evolution of strategies on coping with the Liberian conflict. The crisis provided a pointer to possible future trend of events in Africa. ECOWAS evolved a consensus to continue the ECOMOG operations despite initial concern by Franco phone West African States.

The initial preoccupation of ECOWAS at the inception of ECOMOG was the evacuation of innocent civilians that were trapped. The declaration of war on ECOMOG by Charles Taylor on arrival in Liberia began to re focus the attention of the force.

It was clear that the peacekeeping role assigned to ECOMOG by the mediation committee was just one among many other roles it was

expected to play. The peacekeeping force was deployed into an active war zone and was made a party to the dispute from the beginning[48].

The adoption of "limited offensive" strategy by ECOMOG should also be viewed within the perspective of the complete paralysis of social order in Liberia. The Liberation of the central power plant and the main water works from the rebel forces and their reactivation as a first step towards the return of normally and peace was one major objective actualized.

It has been urged that if ECOMOG's objective was to neutralize rebel forces in order to allow the installation of a pre-determined government, the offensive action would not have been discontinued after the achievement of these minimum objectives.[49] It was further argued that Taylor would have long been posted to the hinterland and neutralized.

The concern of ECOMOG was limited offensive bearing in mind the desire to approve earlier allegations of the NPFL's leader that the neutrality of the peacekeeping force was to question. Ones any limited objective leading to the use of force was achieved, the rebels are left alone. ECOMOG had limited mandate in that regard and that is to prevent transfer of arms and ammunitions. Successes of the peace forces were more in form of Naval task forces.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

[48] The problem and challenges of peace keeping making: from peace making to peace enforcement. Page 155.

[49] Ibid page 156

Literature on the civil war is unanimous in consenting to the facts that the limited offensive strategy employed by ECOMOG has greatly achieved success in the area of checking the excesses of the parties in conflict. Prince Johnson was successfully kept within a small fraction of Monrovia. The armed forces of Liberia on the other hand was already demoralized since the assassination of President Doe and therefore did not control any terrify even within Monrovia.

Charles Taylor remained in control of over 80% of Liberia. The factions were forced to accept cease-fire deals due to the enforcement strategy of ECOMOG. ECOWAS was ofcourse calling the shots.

Of importance to note is that the limited offensive was not aimed at concluding the Liberia crisis on the battle field, or designed to provide protection for ECOMOG and the general other communication organization in Liberia.

The NPFL accepted cease-fire in late 1990. Its offensive was mainly with ULIMO led by Alhaji Koromah. The enforcement discontinued immediately Charles Taylor accepted seize-fire. ECOMOG's role had to revert to peace keeping. The focus of the peace process now moved away from the battlefield to the conference table. Charles Taylor was the last to agree to negotiations. His consent was obtained at the Lome submit in February 1991.[50]

---

[50] Ibid page 159

The mandate of ECOMOG was now restricted to monitoring, provision of essential services, security to the Interim administration, observation of election and policing duties. The skirmishes between NPFL and ULIMO in a number of occasions did threaten the upholding of the Lome and Geneva conventions. The creation of buffer zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone was not observed as such. Accusations all were pointed towards Taylor while he urged that the upheaval caused by ULIMO was exposing his men to danger as such he could not sit by and watch.

Part of the crisis then was that while ULIMO was busy causing uproar, ECOWAS had failed to give it the necessary recognition as a force which it was after. ULIMO more or less represented a remnant of Doe's forces and some elements within the Khran ethnic group.

Hostilities went high again in 1992 May, when 6 Senegalese soldiers were killed by NPFL at a border town. At the July summit of ECOWAS in Dakar, hard line was agreed to be taken should Taylor fail to allow the implementation of Yamoussoukro accord.

Apart from General Arnold Quainoo who is a Ghanaian all other ECOMOG field commanders were Nigerians. Quainoo was the first commander between June – October 1998. Immediately after General Quainoo came the 'enforcer' Major General Joshua Dogonyaro between October 1990 and February 1991. It was during Dongonyaro's tenure that skirmishes, which gave rise to peace enforcement, were prevalent.

The third field commander was Major General Rufus Kupolati, Major General Ishaiya Bakut was the 4th commander. He assumed office from 4th October 1991, and was replaced by Major General John Shagaya. Others are Major General John Inienger, Timothy Shelpidi, Victor Malu and Cyril Eweze.

After a series of peace meetings, another was held in Geneva to confirm and revive Yamoussoukro to accord. A program of implementation was put in place commencing April 30 when ECOMOG operation began and terminated by June 1992 when encampment and disamanent as well as documentation of all weapons were computed. This did not make much impact on Mr. Taylor however.

4.08: RETURN TO PEACE

Years after the deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia, the only serious impasse created was the refusal of the NPFL. The refusal to adhere to resolutions of the group on Liberia and the Authority of Heads of State and Government protracted the armed conflict longer than necessary. It was apparent that Charles Taylor was not prepared to accept anything short of ruling Liberia especially when he realized that he had control of over 80% of the country.

The two pronged approach and diplomatic efforts adopted and ECOMOG forces continued consolidation and security and taking control of large tracts of the hinterland which gave way for the

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

deployment of troops to the interior beginning December 14th 1995. This was a follow up to the aborted accords including the one signed in Abuja which became the linchpin for the successful transition from near anarchy.[51]

Its disarmament program witnessed the surrender of 30,000 fighters, 20,000 guns and over one million ammunitions.[52] This political and military resolution gave way for peace in Liberia.

The conclusion of the peace process in Liberia was capped by the holding of presidential election and installation of a president. The election was adjudged fair by the independent observers. Mr. Charles Taylor won the presidential elections with an estimated 75% votes victory, which is by far more than 51% required by the constitution of Liberia. Other candidates that contested the elections included Dr. Togba –Tipoteh of Liberia for Liberia Peoples Party. Mr. Henry Boima Fahnbullela on the platform of the Reformation Alliance Party; Mr. Gabriel Bacchus Mathews of United Peoples Party; Mrs. Eillen Johnson Sirleaf of the Unity Party.

Other contestants were Alhaji G. Koromah of ULIMO-K for the all Liberia Coalition Party; Mr. Cletus Sabge Woterson of the Alliance of Seven Parties; Mr. Henry Moniba, a candidate of the Liberia National Democratic Party and George Boley of the National Democratic Party.

---

[51] Bisi Olawunmi: "Liberia peace at last, an ECOWAS success story" in West African Bulletin Nos November, 1997 page 12.

[52] Ibid page 12.

4.09: CONCLUSION

ECOWAS has succeeded in Liberia, a similar situation which saw super power USA failed in Somalia. It has emerged as the most virile of sub-regional groups in Africa and ECOMOG is a case study in regional peace making.[53] It was argued that Africa has demonstrated its capacity for self-reliance and innovation.

Despite the uneasy calm that typifies Liberia after the war, a proper reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction program would let matters resolve themselves in a matter of time. Security concern will remain a priority in years to come.

While the summit of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS in Abuja on August, 29 1997 noted that there was the need for ECOMOG to remain in Liberia in order to consolidate the peace achieved already. The summit however made it categorically clear that the tenure and duration of the force was at the instance of the Liberian Government and the ECOWAS.

With all certainty therefore, it is not out of place to assert that ECOWAS more than anything or anyone contributed most in the resolution of the Liberian conflict between 1991-1997. General Abacha in his address to the meeting of nine on Liberia in Abuja on May 21st, 1997 echoed the views of observers when he noted that-

---

[53] Ibid page 12.

> *"ECOMOG has opened up new fields of cooperation and laid a foundation for what could evolve as a permanent framework for greater security cooperation within over sub-region"*[54]

The troops have finally withdrawn from Liberia in mid 1999. ECOMOG is at the moment in Sierra Leone, and arrangements are underway to transform the force into a United Nations peacekeeping force.

On the sub regional relevance of the group, General Abacha further asserted-

> *"I might add that after Liberia, this force could transform into the nucleus of a sub regional permanent peace keeping force"*[55]

[54] Ibid page 12.
[55] Ibid page 12.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY:

This chapter summarizes the findings as well as the theoretical and policy implications arising from the study. The Liberian conflict has been seen as a product of historical and structural circumstances, and not peculiar to Liberia.

The nature and character of the various settlements within the present day Liberia, which was traced back to earlier than the 14th century, coupled with the pattern of settlement of the Americo Liberians and other ethnic Congolese form the basis of communal relations in Liberia. The clan character of the Americo Liberians who from the 1800s have dominated the political economy of Liberia at the expense of the indigenous Liberian population that constituted more than 84% of the population informed the nature of social, economic and political relations within the country.

Aside the fact that Liberia was a creation of American petty bourgeios elements on their routine 'humanitarian' mission was never colonized, and this stood more or less like an Island among many countries scrambled and partitioned into colonial territories by imperial Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and few others.

The study observes that through out the 1990s, the world saw the reoccurrence of such internal conflicts that had serious consequences on life and property arising mainly from hate bordering on ethnicity and scramble for control of political power. It has been observed that the Liberian conflict was though fought along ethnic lines, had a serious link with the character of the elite, especially the Americo-Liberians who dominated completely the indigenous Liberian segment and failed to open up even a little.

Through out the study attempt was made at applying the linkage theory in understanding the basis of the conflict. The theory places primacy on events leading to certain actions or responses. On the other hand, the theory upholds further that certain actions eventually lead to occurrence of certain events. The focus of this study is the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian conflict based on the formation, monitoring and training of the ECOMOG monitoring group The ECOMOG.

The ECOMOG which translated decisions of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis was initially aimed at peace keeping, but as the battle negotiation went on, the force had to play some enforcement functions in order to bring back warring factions to round table and in some cases cause compliance.

The relevance of ECOWAS and its practicability as a sub regional force came into focus at the commencement of the Liberian civil war.

The formation of ECOMOG to a large degree questions the relevance of OAU in the resolution of disputes in the African continent.

The research therefore questions the rationality behind the establishment of the Peace Monitoring Group, problems experienced during the mission and the end result of the exercise.

During the war, thousands of lives were lost while hundreds of thousands were forced to flee into safety in neighboring countries thus bringing about humanitarian crisis in the affected countries. The study suggest that ECOWAS moved into the Liberian conflict, which though was entirely an internal problem in order to save lives and property as well as to prevent possible spread of the crisis to neighboring countries, which could potentially set the entire sub region into arms conflict.

The study therefore proposed that with effective political control, peace making and peace keeping could play a significant role in the resolution of both internal and external conflicts in Africa. Though the war, which led to destruction of life and property, was a consequence of struggle for the control of political power by factions led by elite, the monitoring group has played a critical role in the resolution of the war. It is further contended that enforcement of peace in Africa could be the panacea for the continent's economic, political and social development.

Methods adopted for data collection is the available material technique of data collection. Both primary and secondary sources were consulted. Interviews and questionnaires were administered as well. The second section of the study covers the review of literature and theoretical framework of analysis. Most literature consulted on conflicts and conflict resolution in general and the Liberian conflict in particular pointed to the fact that for peace to be reached and maintained in war turned areas, the intervention of forces is important in resolution. In most cases the mere presence of peace keeping or enforcement forces serve as deterrence to the warring or contending forces in dispute.

Conflict and intervention in Africa refers to the underlying issues in dispute between parties while resolution on the other hand points to the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict. It has been observed therefore that resolution of any conflict is an almost accomplishment.

The study has come to the realization that peace making in Africa must emerge as issues that are not only the concern of Government or matters of intra of inter state affairs in abstract sense, but involves the well being and life and death of millions people.

Despite the derogation thesis within the western public policy opinion and intelligentsia on Africa, peace making attempt indigenous to the continent has so far proven more successful than all those put in place by the advance world.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

Peace making in Africa, the ECOMOG case has been able to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful and other means. This has shown despite the size, resources and strength of the United Nations Organization, it has been unable to bring peace in similar situation in Somalia, Angola and even Rwanda. The concept of multilateral diplomacy put in place by the UN is therefore shabby and not relevant in the African experiences.

It is further established that the UN can not address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. The relevance of full regional groups is thus very pertinent.

Crisis in Africa it was observed is mainly as a result of social disorder and political violence. Autocratic rulers unfit to rule have plunged a lot of new States into deep confusion resulting in arm struggle, which claimed millions of innocent lives.

Conflicts among nationalities or nation states occurs mainly as a result of reasons arising from territoriality and need for internal cohesion. When ever men interact in goal seeking pursuit, a political interaction comes to life. This interaction people enter into result in friction that in some cases end up in war.

The research also observes in strong terms that the interaction of nations' political behaviors within the international system are the actions of those that represent the state, thus the political behavior of

the nations state that becomes its interacting medium in the international system.

It is also observed that there are many contending approaches and perspectives from which international events such as the Liberian conflict could be understood and explained. Two, however stand out glaring ie the traditional/classical parading in and behavioral/scientific approach.

The need for regional cooperation, it was observed, more than anything else gave rise to the formation of ECOWAS. However, the founding fathers of the organization had thought of ECOWAS as principally an economic integration agency that has little role within the political development of the Sub-region.

This opinion has therefore resulted in rendering ECOWAS a weak community. It is observed by the study that the fear and need to protect independence and preserve sovereignty of smaller States against the domination of bigger ones within the group gave rise to the emphasis on economic integration function for the community.

The community observed in strong terms that the attempt to isolate economics from politics resulted in the inability of the community to achieve even the economic agenda set aside by it.

It is clear therefore that the Lagos treaty that gave life to ECOWAS was very faulty and counter productive. This realization became more glaring in the face of globalization and the increasing connectability between politics and economics, more so when definite political

matters that hindered attainment of economic objectives began to stir the community in the face.

The study has also come to the conclusion that the fundamental principle of the community, which spelt out the concept of equality and independence of Member States, might be responsible for some of the major failures of the community. In theory, it might be right to limit that all member States are equal, but in the practice of either contributing to sustain the integration, some have the capacity to do more than others. This is exemplified by the role of Nigeria and Ghana for instance in sustaining the ECOMOG and in the execution of the Liberian peace agenda.

This research has observed that the Lagos treaty of 1975 was full of lapses that have to a large degree hindered the community from realizing its objectives. This came to the notice of the leadership of the community and member States glaringly in the early 1980s and 1990s when it was realized that the economic integration component of the community was far from been achieved and the community was handicap in addressing some problems of instability that bordered on heavy loss of life and property in some member States.

This gave rise to the revision of the treaty in 1991. The revision, without necessarily eroding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member States was able to put some reasonable political role in the hands of the organization/community. This facilitated the effective control of the Liberian conflict and the involvement of ECOMOG

troops in reinstating Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone after the Military Coup that ousted him. Equally was the case with the deployment of troops to Guinea-Bissau.

As a sub-regional outfit, ECOWAS has touted its desire to see free movement of nationals of member countries without the use of visas and other restrictions and attempted trade liberalization, which has so far not been very successful.

On the other hand, the ECOWAS Monitory Cooperation program which has been on since 1975 did not go beyond the recent adoption of ECOWAS traveler's cheques in early 1999.

The study has observed that current conflicts in Liberia had roots from the nature of migrations into the area, which predates 1400. A large wave of migrants consisting of the Vai, the Mano, Khran, Grebo and the Gios and mandigos arrived. As soon as the ex-slaves were settled, negotiations on land began the indigenous tribal Kings and leaders of the ex-slaves. Land was purchased from the indigenous Kings, and on those levels, the Americo-Liberians were settled.

By 1847, a constitutional convention was held in which ground work for the establishment of modern Liberia was done. A constitution was adopted based on the American model, and independence was declared on July, 26th 1847. The study also confirms that the population of Liberia as at the fall of 1989 was put at about 3.4 million people, and the country is divided into 15 political sub-

divisions, nine counties and six territories. The territories enjoy some degree of independence in administration and finance.

The domination of the majority indigenous Liberian tribes by the far wealthy and better educated Americo-Liberians more than any other factor watered the embers of hatred and thus the escalation of the war. The domination was pure and total. It was economic, political and even social. The indigenous Liberian did not have any say at all in Liberia despite their historical claim of the area and convincing number over the ex-slave.

This domination was evident in the past that until in 1980, and since 1887, Liberia was ruled by only one party and all Presidents were Americo Liberians. On the economic front, more than 95% of wealth in Liberia were owned by less than 2% Americo Liberians.

The local population was in absolute poverty, while a few parties in alliance with the MNCs were reaping and exploiting the vast resources of Liberia. The situation was frustering to the indigenous people and led to agitation for a change.

The coup of 1980 was a product of series of demonstration staged against the Government of William Tolbert. It was initially seen as the culmination of the long desire by the indigenous Liberians to take over the realm of political leadership of a country they had a comfortable numerical superiority.

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

The research further observes that the Government of Samuel Doe was soon to loose favor and steam from people who earlier support it. The politics of Doe became more or less as destructive as earlier Governments and not too long began to wage war on all ethnic groups perceived as opposition.

Attempt to return Liberia to civil rule in 1984 was rigged by Doe. Opposition to this war decisively dealt with and an estimated 3,000 men, women and children mostly of the Gio tribe were killed by Samuel Doe.

The killing of General Thomas Quinmakpa was believed to have culminated into the decision by Mr. Charles Taylor to begin arms insurrection coming in from the Ivorian border. The conflict was much as thousands of innocent lives were lost and therefore necessitated the involvement and intervention of ECOWAS through the ECOMOG in 1990.

The intervention of ECOMOG was said to be due to the desire to save ordinary Liberians who were helplessly killed and dehumanized by the factions in dispute. Foreigners were not left out of this attack. Mr. Charles Taylor especially targeted Nigerians for extermination.

By the end of 1990, Liberia had already become lawless. Government had already broken down. It was on the realization of this that an ECOWAS mediation committees comprising of leaders from Nigeria,

Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea and Togo agreed to establish a monitoring group without further delay and send to Liberia.

The monitoring group was mandated to intervene and keep the peace by separating the three warring factions. The forces remained in Liberia until in 1999 when it was finally pulled out. Both the mediation committee and the Authority of Heads of State held series of meetings aimed at bringing peace back to Liberia.

An Interim National Government led by Dr. Amos Swayer was put in place with representative of parties in dispute as members. The NPFL led by Taylor however failed to participate due to the high suspicion for Nigeria.

From August 1990 when ECOMOG landed in Liberia till 1997, series of peace keeping and enforcement were carried out as a result of which there was heavy toll of causality on both the Monitoring group and on the side of the rebels. The thesis however is comfortable with the opinion, which suggests that the price paid by the group, is not too much when compared with the loss of lives averted. ECOMOG has played a positive role in the Liberian conflict and could be said to be responsible for the reinstatement of peace in the country.

5.01: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The future role of ECOWAS in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa requires a more resolute stance on the part of the leadership of the sub-regional body.

Based on the theoretical postulations, findings and analysis of the successes and failures of ECOWAS in peace keeping as a necessary relevance which the community is now setting to achieve, it is important to note that, while the study proposes among others that

(i) With effective political control, peace making and peace keeping could play a significant role in the resolution of both internal and external conflicts in Africa.

(ii) Enforcement of peace in Africa could be a Panacea for the continent's economic, political and social development.

In a nutshell, ECOWAS has succeeded despite all odds in the resolution of the conflict in Liberia, the reinstatement of Democratic Government in Sierra Leone and in deterring outbreak of conflict in Guinea Bissau arising from intra class friction among the ruling class.

Informed by the theoretical tool of analysis adopted in the conduct of this study, it is suggested that the basis of sub-regional integration in West Africa should not necessarily be based on economic

consideration and limited to economic spheres alone. There is an intricate link between politics and economics.

On a final note therefore the thesis is concluded with the following issues:-

476903

1. Regional integration is beneficial to all members of the alliance and could pave way for a genuine political and economic development of the member countries.
2. The cries for independence and sovereignty of member States is purely an attitude of the few ruling elite who do not take into account the context of the people of their countries and the sub region in general.
3. ECOWAS has played a tremendous role in the resolution of the Liberian conflict, and despite the heavy financial and material cost of the endeavor, it is argued that the exercise is worthy when placed against the backdrop of the number of innocent lives saved by the intervention.
4. That ECOMOG represent an ideal peace keeping force which should transcend its ad hoc status to a standing nature. It is concluded that with an ECOMOG in place, the incidence of senseless wars in the sub region will drastically reduce.
5. It is also concluded that there is the need for an African high command to be charged with the responsibilities of peace keeping and enforcement at the continental level.

As a result of the implications arising from the study, the following recommendations are put forward. The study has observed that

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIBRARY

ECOMOG is predicated on the desire to resolve the conflict in Liberia through peace keeping and enforcement.

It is necessary to strengthen the peace monitoring group and make it a permanent force to be deployed to any area where conflict arises. The existence of ECOMOG as a standing force has the capacity to reduce the preponderance of ethnic and class conflict in the sub region as it will serve as a deterrent force.

West African leaders must be prepared to truly integrate without necessarily surrendering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their individual States. West African leaders must also learn to be truly democratic by doing away with autocratic tendencies that leads in sit tight postures.

Governments in the sub region must also learn to show neutrality in conflict such as the one of Liberia. This neutrality is essential in winning the confidence of the parties in dispute and goes a long way in solving problems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Brucan, E. The Dialectics of World Politics. The Free Press,, London, 978,
2. Kechane, R. & Nye, J. Power and Interdependence. World in transition. Little Brown Company, Boston Toronto 1976.
3. Marx, K. The Poverty of Philosophy; Foreign languages press, Peking 1978.
4. Knox, K. 7 Trager, F.(ed Economic Issues and National security: National security Education program. Regents press, Kansas, 1977.
5. Falola, T. "Should Nigeria be in OPEC"? Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1979.
6. Tanzer, M. The Political Economy of International Oil and the developing countries. J.W. Arrowsmith Ltd Winterstoke Road, Bristol, 1989.
7. Deutsh, K. An analysis of International Relations. Prenticehall, New Jerssey, 1978.
8. Macridis, R.C. (ed) Foreign Policy in World Politics. Prenticehall Inc. New Jerssey, 1986.
9. Aluko, O. (ed) The Foreign Policy of African states: Hadder and Stoughton, London, 1977.

10. Bobrow, D. et-al Understanding Foreign policy Decisions: The Chinese case. Macmilllan publishers, London, 1979.
11. Sorbor,G. &Vale,P.(ed) 'Thinking about peace and peace making in Africa'-Out of conflict from war to peace. Nodiska Africa institute, Uppsal, 1997.
12. Zartman, IW. Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa: Macmillan publishers, London, 1997.
13. Onoja, L. Peace keeping and International security in a changing world. Mono expressions ltd, Jos, Nigeria. 1996.
14. Bennet, L. International Organization 2nd edition. Prenticehall inc. 1980.
15. Puchalla, JD International politics today, London. Row publishers, 1997.
16. Palmer, RR A history of the modern world, 2nd edition, New York, 1957.
17. Knorr, K. & Rosenau, JN (ed) Contending approaches to International politics. Prenticehall press, New Jerssey, 1970.
18. Posner, RS The Economics of Justice. Harvard University Press, London, 1983.
19. Henderson, J. & Castells, M. (ed) Introduction to J. Henderson & M. Castells. Global restructuring and territorial development, London, 1984.

RECEIVED
Ahmadu Bello University

20. Leys, C. The Over developed Colonial state revolutions: ROAP No 5, 1973.
21. Reynolds, PA Linkage politics in International relations. Massachussets,USA, 1988.
22. ECOWAS 'Achievements, challenges and future prospects' A publication of ECOWAS Executive secretariat.
23. Umoden, G.E. The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace keeping. Gabumo publishing company Ltd, L agos 1992.