THE PLACE OF ISLAM IN SHAPING FRENCH AND BRITISH COLONIAL FRONTIER POLICY IN HAUSALAND: 1890 - 1960

BY

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is the place of Islam in the shaping of French and British border policy. The period covered extended from the first attempt at drawing frontier between British and French spheres of influence with the Anglo-French declaration of 5th August 1890 to the attainment of independence by the two countries in 1960.

The issues raised concerned the control of the frontier by the colonial powers, especially the movements of scholars and pilgrims who, for reason of their religious duties had to travel and to cross the frontier in a direction or another. The colonial powers tried to check these movements because colonial administrators came to Hausaland already equipped with stereotypes vis-a-vis the Muslims in general and those of Hausaland in particular. Both of them had experienced Muslim resistance elsewhere, in Algeria and Morocco for the French, and in Sudan and India for the British. To that background was added the widespread idea drawn from the Crusades, that a Muslim was always waiting for an opportunity to slaughter the infidel. This led the two colonial powers to be obsessed with the "Muslim plot" and Mahdism and therefore to interpret any slight disturbance or unrest, as a plot against the Europeans, engineered by Mahdi agents and supported by local Muslims. Consequently, these disturbances and discontents, mostly due to the harshness of the colonial regime, especially on the French side of the frontier, were ruthlessly dealt with. Where the British used persuasion and concession, the French developed coercion and harshness, making people to flee to the British side.

Whereas rivalry developed between the two colonial powers, during the conquest of Hausaland, as soon as the frontier was demarcated, the French began to seek for

cooperation with the British, to monitor the movement of "undesirables", basing their action on the conviction that only the British colony was a real threat for their regime in Niger, as far as Muslim activists were concerned.

But the British didn't consider the need for cooperation with the French because they expected no danger from Niger territory. Instead they concentrated all their attention on the "road to the Mahdi": The East (Sudan and Hejaz).

Only when they felt fully concerned with the situation in "French territory" that they reacted, as in 1917 with the Kaussan revolt in Ahyar. But as soon as the danger was discarded they came back to their first preoccupation, i.e. watching the Mahdi messengers.

As a whole, Anglo-French cooperation developed in ups and downs according to circumstances. But it allowed the two colonial powers to handle adequately the crises: Alfa Saybu and Satiru (1906); Kaussan (1917); Tassawa raid (1927); Mahammadu Tambari (1931), and the Hamallism (1947-50). It was only during the second world war that serious crisis occurred between the colonial powers, especially between 1940 and 1943, when Vichy - France controlled Niger territory. Immediately after the war, the political changes reduced the efficiency of colonial powers policy towards Islam.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.U.	Ahmadu Bello University.
A.D.	Anno Domini, Christian Era.
A.H.	Anno Hijrao; Year of Hijra.
A.H.A.K.	Arewa House Archives, Kaduna.
A.N.N.	Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey.
A.N.S.	Archives Nationales du Senegal.
A.N.S.O.M.	Archives Nationales, Section d'Outre-Mer (France).
B.C.E.H.S. A.O.F.	Bulletin du Comite d'etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise.
B.I.F.A.N.	Bulletin de l'Institut Fondamental (formerly Francais) d'Afrique Noire.
B.S.O.A.S.	Bulletin, School of Oriental and African Studies.
B.S.S.	Borno, Sahara and Sudan.
C.	Circa, around.
C.A.D.	Centre of Arabic Documentation (Ibadan).
d.	died.
e.g.	exampli gratia, for example.
F.A.S.S.	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.
H.O.D.	Head of Department
i.e.	id est, it means.
I.R.S.H.	Institut de Recherches en Sciences Humaines.
J.A.H.	Journal of African History.

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
J.H.S.N.	Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria.
JO-AOF	Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise.
J.O.R.N.	Journal Officiel de la Republique du Niger.
Kadcaptory	Kaduna capital territory.
Kanoprof	Kano Province File.
Katprof	Katsina Province File.
Maiprof	Maiduguri Province File.
M.A.R.A.	Manuscrits Arabes et Ajami.
n.	note.
N.A.K.	National Archives, Kaduna.
n.d.	no date.
N.E.P.U.	Northern Elements Progressive Party.
N.H.R.S.	Northern History Research Scheme.
No.	Number.
N.P.C.	Northern People's Congress.
op. cit.	opere citatum, in the work quoted already.
O.W.A.C.	Office of West African Council.
p.	page.
P.E.R.O.	Political and Economic Research Organisation.
pp.	pages.
P.P.N.	Parti Progressiste Nigerien.
R.D.A.	Rassemblement Democratique Africain.

S.N.P.	Secretary (Secretariat) to the Northern Provinces.
Sokprof	Sokoto Province File.
U.D.N.	Union Democratique Nigerienne.
U.K.	United Kingdom.
Vol.	Volume.
WAPIC	West African Political Intelligence Centre

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my handwork. It has not been presented elsewhere for the award of any degree. All sources of information and quotations are duly footnoted and acknowledged in compliance with academic traditions.

Signature 

Date 16/12/97

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PREFACE

This work analyses some developments in inter-communities relations during the colonial period. The colonial frontier disrupted or tried to disrupt the coherence and homogeneity of Hausaland, waved by a long historical process which ended by bringing together various peoples through the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate.

The first chapter examines the ethnic, economic and political factors that waved these relations, which, at the end, came to give Hausaland a kind of identity in spite of its close relationships with some areas like Borno, Gurma territory and Zarma - Songhay zone.

The second chapter analyses the impact of the jihad on northern areas and how it affected the polities of Adar, Ahyar and the right bank of the river Niger. The jihad brought all these areas into the Sokoto zone of control and developed a sense of unity and identity under the bound of Islam despite the non-muslim enclaves, and the revolts noted here and there, especially after the death of the Shehu in 1817. But to the end of the 19th century, the Sokoto Caliphs had lost control over some territories and even the central administration failed to maintain a real control over the Emirates. Also, the caliphal system had generated many malcontents who expressed rebellious attitudes through Mahdism and other challenges to Emirates or even to the central administration at Sokoto. This situation was exploited by the colonial powers.

The third chapter analyses the imposition of colonial rule and the hot debate raised by the 19th century legacy, namely the influence of Sokoto in the north or the relations between Damagaram and Machena; the boundary had to be drawn

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INTRODUCTION

The first diplomatic act as far as Niger-Nigeria frontier is concerned was the Anglo-French declaration of 5th August 1890, which drew the famous Say-Barwa line, as that demarcating French and British spheres of influence between Niger and Lake Chad. From that time onwards, the frontier underwent mutation from a fluid concept into a concrete reality. This frontier evolved on the grounds and was finally set up definitely in 1910. It crossed the ancient polities which were thus split between Niger and Nigeria.[1]

Many studies have been carried out on the frontier between Niger and Nigeria,[2] as well as on the economic aspects of the relations between the two countries.[3] But the researchers have failed to interest themselves in the cultural factor which was very important in these relations, taking a part in shaping the policy of colonial administration in both colonies.

Hausaland is here considered as defined by Abdullahi Smith i.e. "The country roughly bounded by a line running from Azben southwards as far as the north-eastern corner of the Jos Highlands, thence westwards to the great bend of the Kaduna River, thence north-west to the valley of the Gulbin-Kebbi and thence north-eastwards to Azben".[4]

As far as Hausaland is concerned, the tradition of travelling for learning or performing the haj (pilgrimage) was well established long before the colonial era. One of the most important aspects of French and British policies was to check these movements of learned men, especially the French who thought that Islamic influences came from the British colony of Nigeria, with Sokoto as centre of diffusion of Islamic

ideas. This fear of Islam on the part of the British and the French can be explained by the fact that the conquest of Hausaland took place during the period of Islamic revivalism; with the Mahdism in Sudan, the resistance of Abdel Kader in Algeria and Muslim resistance through the Ahmadiya movement (founded in 1889 by Mirza Gulam Ahmad) in India. It thus became apparent that the contradiction between the colonial powers' eagerness to hinder this tradition of movements and the population's desire to pursue the "old way of life" would inevitably lead to a situation pregnant with crises, and the frontier would be a motive of preoccupation for both the populations and the colonial authorities.

The study of the place of Islam in the shaping of French and British Frontier polity means that we will focus not only on the cooperation between the colonial powers especially to deal with "vagrant mallams" or "undesirables" but also on how the learned class of Hausaland tried to find a solution to the new challenge coming from abroad - colonialism. How each of the groups (those who chose to resist through revolts and migrations and those who collaborated) justified its action towards the masses they were supposed to lead? How far did the frontier policy cut off the old parenthood relations and the old political or religious ties? These are some questions that justify this study.

It is worth noting that, apart from the religious relations, other factors, mainly demographic and economic, shaped the relations in these areas. But our focus will be on Islam and the role it played in the area, especially during the colonial period. Since the attainment of the independence of African countries, politicians as well as researchers, focussed all their attention on the development of their own countries and "restricted most human activities, including intellectual pursuits, within their boundaries". A long

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extract from Asiwaju sets out the idea:

> One terrible effect of colonial partition on Africans, has been the establishment of different colonial educational systems and the introduction of official language barriers and a general cultural alienation of the Western-educated Africans one from another even in areas along state boundaries where the educated elites on both sides have the shared background of a common African culture. One manifestation of this alienation was the colonisation and eventual nationalisation of African intellectual efforts.[5]

Many of them (researchers) have even focused their attention on their ethnic communities or their area. This approach is by now more and more given up because it is discredited.[6] For instance, early Nigerian historians have been sharply criticized for limiting their studies to a region or ethnic group; their approach was denounced as a "tribal" one and the one making for disunity instead of unity,[7] the African countries are looking for. Also, we cannot understand thoroughly a process, which came out of a long history of a wide area, in considering only a part of this process or this area. This was rightly put by Abdullah Smith in these terms:

> One result of the subsequent division of the Savannah-lands into French and British colonial areas has been to confine research behind frontiers which were transcended by the movements in question. This has obscured the general pattern and the

> essential inter-connected nature of the movements and has therefore distorted our view of them.[8]

So, we cannot understand the evolution of Islam in Niger without constant references to Northern Nigeria.[9] The colonial administrators, notably the French, understood very early this fact as it will be seen later on.

Many scholars who studied the history of Hausaland, either from Niger or Nigeria, used only "their" archives and libraries, and the use of "foreign" archives and libraries, even by those who dared it, was very limited because of the linguistic barrier. Yet, historical research in our area can be developed only when we are current with what is produced on each side of the border. To do this necessitates efforts to be made to transcend the linguistic barrier, through both collaboration and the learning of each others' official languages. Our aim here is to try to pave the way, in going beyond the physical or linguistic barriers to have a better comprehension of the historical process.

This study tries also to provide empirical data on case studies of frontier question, the religious factor in frontier studies being superseded by ethnic and economic considerations. But we have tried to avoid discussion of the colonial styles of administration (the traditional dichotomy between direct and indirect rules) for two main reasons.

The first reason is that discussions of colonial systems are outdated. As put by William Miles:

> (African scholars) argue that discussions or analyses of the differences between French and British colonialism tend to

> obfuscate the more important reality: the evil of the colonial system. British or French, colonialism was economic exploitation based on racial domination: this more than any minor differences between direct and indirect rule, is what counts. How archaic-and amoral-to quibble over colonial "styles".[10]

The second reason is that British system itself became rather a direct system from 1915 as argued by some writers: "The system of rule was indirect only in the name. The position in which native officials found themselves rendered the administration direct".[11] Any way, in the case of this study, colonial powers showed that they had to unite against the Africans and they expressed the dichotomy (colonizers against colonized, Whites against Blacks) by the fact that as soon as a European was killed, the colonial powers on each side of the frontier felt terribly concerned.

The conceptual framework of this work is to be loyal to the tradition of continuity. The concept of continuity refers to "uninterrupted connection" and must be here comprehended as a common commitment of African people to minimise the effects of the colonial system, which hindered the movements of people, goods or ideas. It considers therefore the colonial period as a parenthesis in African history, even though it has been a "terrible parenthesis" as put by Ki-Zerbo. According to Aime Cesaire "colonisation is chaos, for it separates and divides both in space and time", hence the artist ... has to restore" the double continuity that has been broken by colonialism: continuity with the world and with ourselves".[12]

The second concept we will deal with is the concept of bay'a. In Islamic history

this concept which means allegiance to an Imam or Caliph, is important because it drew the frontier of Islamic states and separates the Dar-al-Islam from the Dar-al-Harb. According to the Islamic conception of state, the bay'a is "exclusively personal promise of obedience and fidelity" to the Imam or Caliph.[13] Through this concept, as applied to Sokoto's relations with Adar and Ahyar, one can see if we can bring these polities into the Sokoto Caliphate. For instance, the Raudal-Jinan reports that Sarkin Ahyar, Muhammad al-Bakri (1797-1809), paid a visit to the Shehu at Sifawa in 1808 and gave him bay'a. He was the only ruler of the Sudan to do this.[14] But we will discuss this question later.

Another concept of interest for us is that of Islamic policy and more especially that of "Muslim plot". We prefer to term it "Muslim plot" myth, to show that it was the colonial powers' policy of surexploitation which gave rise to revolts; not the hatred of Muslims towards Christians per se. The religious factor in all the events we will analyse, is, we assume, superseded by the material conditions of people and by how the Europeans worsened these conditions of material life.

The colonial period began in Sokoto in 1903 with the defeat of the Sokoto Caliph, Attahiru Ahmadu at the Sokoto battle of March 15th 1903, and the appointment of a puppet ruler, called Sultan by the British, Attahiru Aliyu, known as Attahiru II (1903-1915). This period heralded administrative reorganisation which fitted well the Europeans intention to exploit economically the country.

The colonial conquest was not only the transfer of rivalries from Europe to Africa, it was also the transfer of capitalist mode of production. And as put by Marx:

> The directing motive, the end and aim of capitalist production

> is to extract the greatest possible amount of surplus value, and consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest possible extent.[15]

So, the so-called islamic policy was only a means to attain that target. Thence contradiction could always arise from their policy. Also, the revolts that developed during the colonial period, far from being "fanatical" as termed by the colonial powers, were always the result of vexations, surtaxation, forced labour and all kinds of surexploitation; some times coupled with food scarcity. Some French administrators recognised this fact. Thus, an ex-governor of French equatorial Africa wrote:

> The colonies might cost nothing to the metropole and might find the necessary resources for their organisation ... Civil servants' salaries, supplied assigned to Police, justice and public works, all what is necessary for the administration, industrial equipment, might be purchased by the colonies themselves, i.e. by direct or indirect taxes on natives ... The native is pressed to pay tax in cash, pressed to pay tax in nature, he must assure compulsory public works, deliver at low price food products. This system, naturally, has everywhere alienated the native from the European, when it has not changed him into a rebel. How can a native see this European without hatred?[16]

So, the concept of revolt, must be considered in its real perspective and significance, meaning "a movement of strong protest against, or refusal to submit to, some

condition, practice etc."[17]

The transborder relations between Niger and Northern Nigeria developed through two channels:

The first channel and the most important in the history of these relations was that between the peoples, the communities across the border, involving trade, marriage, travelling for learning or pilgrimage, erecting mosques, or even as religious messengers. The control of this channel will shape all the Islamic and border policy of the French. The latter tried seriously to curtail these movements, especially those of "Muslim plotters". During the first years of colonial regime (1900-1910) these movements of people had been very difficult to deal with because the frontier was not well demarcated as the negotiations went on. In 1904, for instance, the Kel Gress Tuaregs used the colonial powers against each other to gain the control of their territory of Gobir Tudu. They lost this territory when they migrated to Chad in 1901 and 1902.[18] So, during this period we cannot talk about "frontier policy" for it was only in 1910 that the frontier was definitely settled.

The second channel was the colonial dynamics itself, i.e. the relations entered into by the British and the French, especially to deal with all kinds of sedition or resistance and to assist each other to quell eventual unrest. As early as 1905, the British Government entrusted the Secretary of State for Foreign Office to enter into contact with the French in order to have their opinion on the Senussi movement's influence in Africa, "the interests of the two powers in regard to this matter being very closely allied".[19] The French, as knowledgeable in African affairs, especially this Senussi question, gave a very

heartening answer to the British:

> The natives of the French possessions on that coast were but very lukewarm followers of the Prophet. They were child-like people, and, beyond the amusement afforded to them by the daily salaam or prayer which entailed a considerable amount of shouting and gesticulation, their religion meant but little to them. For these reasons (there is not) much to be feared in those districts from the fanatical tenets of Senussism.[20]

In 1906, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, forwarded to the British, some information he got from Colonel Gouraud, Commandant of Chad Territory, relating to the presence in Fort-Lamy (now N'Djamena) of a false Prophet whose action would be linked to the Senussi movement. Even though the false Mahdi was arrested and exiled in Congo, Commandant Gouraud warned the colonial powers to be ready for any eventuality.[21]

This fear of Muslim activities brought the colonial powers to be close and prepared the grounds to cooperation in the colonies.

But before entering into the 20th century, the societies of Hausaland witnessed changes and events that led to some degree of unity of the area. Before the 19th century jihad, the economic and political relations, the migration of people and even the ecological changes tried to give Hausaland a kind of personality and coherence. Close relationships developed between the different states of the area so as to make people to think of Hausaland as an entity replacing more and more the concept of Hausa states. In this study, some areas which were not traditionally considered as parts of Hausaland,

as for example, the right bank of Niger (Gurma area and even Liptako), and the Zarma territory, are included because of the close ties they have had and continue to have with Hausaland. In fact, we use here the term Hausaland because there is no other word to render the reality and cover the area of study.

Also, the jihad of the 19th century made the entities to be closer: the Zarma territory of Dosso area developed relations with Kebbi; the Fulani Emirates of the right bank of Niger, maintained very close relations with Gwandu; the Tuaregs of Ahyar remained tied to Sokoto. Even the communities which were generally associated with the tawaye as the Kebbawa, Gobirawa and Katsina had changed their policy at the end of the 19th century and had developed cordial relations with Sokoto as we will see it.

It is along these lines that we carry out this work. As stated by J.L. Triaud when studying the Senussiya, "This study places itself in the confluence of African history, colonial history and Islamic history".[22]

As a whole, the developments of the 19th century would have influence on the events of the 20th century, especially concerning the establishment of the frontier and the monitoring of Muslims activities. These developments will be fully discussed in the corps of the thesis.

1. Methodology and Assessment of Sources:

Even though history has its own method, the historian's methodology is becoming more and more an interdisciplinary one. The interdisciplinary method is useful because it fits well into all kind of research and it integrates "the total knowledge" in the quest of the truth. Even though Jean Vansina argued that "There is no such thing as 'absolute

historical truth'",[23] this methodology allows researchers to come nearer to the truth. First of all, we must bear in mind that in human relations the economic factor and in general the material life is determinant. As Engels put it: "According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life".[24] This is why in our analysis, we will always take into account, the conditions of material life of the populations concerned with the unrests and how the colonial administration worsened them.

The reconstitution of any historical process needs to be based on relevant sources. For this work, two kinds of sources have been used: the oral and the written sources. The use of oral sources generated hot debate in the past and their relevance to any historiography had been considered as doubtful, especially when it came to establish an historical chronology. Yves Person, for instance, wrote "Unless there is proof of contrary, I consider as null and void, the duration of reign established on the basis of oral traditions".[25] These "writing-fetishists" as Ki-Zerbo termed them, considered that only history based on written sources could be called history and that argument was one of the arguments some Western historians used to deny any History to Africa.[26] But this debate is today outdated and many historical works based on oral tradition are of great value. For the treatment of oral datas, we have in mind the method recommended by Stephen Baier: "During field research oral evidence was subjected to the same kind of critical scrutiny that historians normally apply to documentary sources. This involved cross-checking, testing informants to see if they knew what I already knew, looking for synchronisms between written and oral information, and a critical examination of

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informants motives and the social context of their testimony".26bis

As far as our area is concerned, climatic conditions and human negligence had proved to be pernicious to the written documents. Also wars and movements had disorganized the deposits of the documents. The colonial powers, in many cases, caused the destruction as in Zinder (Damagaram), for example, where, in the early 20th century, the colonial administration seized the Sultan's archives and destroyed them.[27] In the same Kingdom (Damagaram), there is a tradition that when Barma Mustapha, a nephew of Sarki Ahmadu, Dan Bassa, succeeded as Sultan, he destroyed much of the correspondences and other papers belonging to the Sultanate.[28] Many archival materials suffered destruction or transfer to remote places.[29]

The main Archival deposits we worked on as far as Nigeria is concerned are the National Archives and the Arewa House Archives (both in Kaduna), the Sokoto History Bureau and the Waziri Junaidu collection (both in Sokoto). The Waziri Junaidu collection is essentially composed of Arabic manuscripts, not fully catalogued. Other Archival materials can be found in N.H.R.S. in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. As far as our topic is concerned, interesting items were found in Waziri Junaidu collection, Sokoto, especially letters exchanged during the 19th century. Even though these correspondences are dated for many of them during the Wazirate of Muhammad Buhari (1887-1910), they give relevant information on the relations between the Caliphate and the Tuareg chiefs and also the Caliphate and the people of Gobir, Katsina (Maradi) who were considered by many writers as "rebels".[30] Through these correspondences,[31] it appears manifest that, as a writer put it: "between the different powers of the area, the state of belligerence was

the exception not the rule despite the jihad, and that commercial and human relations were always enhanced by the ones and the others".[32] We found also in Waziri Junaidu collection, two little works, one titled Majmu ashab Amir al-Muminin Muhammad Bello written by Waziri Gidado bn Lema, the Waziri of Bello (1817-37). The aim of the book was, as stated by the author himself, "to mention the companions, friends and helpers of the Commander of the Faithful, Muhammad Bello, before the hijra and thereafter" and also "his teachers, viziers, workers and representatives, and something about him during his Caliphate". In this book we can find that Bello's relations covered a wide area and was important with the Tuaregs. The second book, titled Bastal-Fawa'id wa Taqribul Maqasid, written by Waziri Abdel Kader Gidado, the Waziri of Abubakar Attiku (1837-42) and Aliyu Babba (1842-59). He died the same year Aliyu Babba died. The work is divided into three "books": The first mentions the great erudites of the generation of the Shehu; the second the following generation and the third, the third generation. As far as our work is concerned, the Bastal Fawa'id can throw more light on the participation of the Ulama of Hausaland in the jihad and the state of learning in the area, including the Tuareg region.

A very important book, written by Waziri Junaidu after his journey to Agades in 1963 where he accompanied the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, can be found in Kaduna Archives. This book, titled Rihla ila Agades, is catalogued under the reference A/AR51/3. A very important introduction to this book shows the blood relations between the jihad leaders, especially the family of the Shehu, and some Tuaregs of Ahyar. It shows also the relations of marriage between the Sokoto jihad leaders and some Tuareg

women. We have found in Waziri Junaidu's collection two letters written to Muhammad al-Bakri (1797-1809), the Ahyar Sultan who paid allegiance to the Shehu by the Morocco Sultan Mulay Suleman (1792-1822). In one of the letters, that addressed to Muhammad al Bakri, it appears that for the Morocco Sultan the Shehu was under the jurisdiction of Ahyar and the jihad itself developed in Ahyar. This comprehension is perceptible through the word the Morocco Sultan used: "(your letter) informed us about the condition of the pious erudite, Master Uthman b. Muhammad b. Salih who established the minaret of Islam in your town".[33]

In the National Archives also we found an important treatise by the Shehu, answering the questions sent him by a Tuareg scholar. This treatise is titled Al-Ajwibah al-Muharrarah'an al-As'ilah al-Muqarrarah fi wathiqat shi-Summas. In this treatise the Shehu gave answerers to 13 questions he was asked by a Tuareg alim, Shisummas ben Ahmed. Among other things, Shisummas asked "the rules concerning waiving the obligations of commanding right and forbidding wrong when one's command is not obeyed". The Shehu told him, in his answers that all what he had to do was to forbid or to command, mentioning the rule regarding what he was forbidding or commanding. This treatise by the Shehu is catalogued under the reference NAK H/AR1/2 or P/AR2/20 item 132.

The Burdon collection contains many important items of which is a copy of the Raudal Jinan, translated into English by Burdon himself. Its reference in NAK is O/AR1/23 Burdon Box 2. Many other copies can be found under other references such as O/AR1/26 translated into English and Hausa/Roman manuscripts; O/AR2/71 translated in

Hausa/Roman manuscript of 97 pages; O/AR2/80, in Hausa/Roman manuscript 72 pages. The Rautal-Jinan concerns "the wonders and miracles of the Shehu" but contains important information on Shehu's relations with the Gobir rulers; the evolution of the conflict between the Shehu and these rulers, and evolution of the Shehu's career until he founded the islamic Umma in Gudu, overthrowing the Sudan kings.

The Tanbih al-Ikhwan, reference NAK O/AR1/20, with 24 folios translated into English by Harris, and composed c.1811 by the Shehu, concerns the analysis of the state of learning and Islamisation of Hausaland, and the justification for the jihad. In this treaty, there is the letter written by the famous Egyptian scholar Muhammad al Suyuti (d. 1505) to the Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Sattafan and to Katsina Sultan Ibrahim Sura.

Another manuscript, al-Kash-fu-wal Bayan, with reference Kadcaptory O/AR1/7, 26 pages, was translated into English by H. Harris, and it was written by Gidado ben Lema. It concerns the life and works of Muhammad Bello. The importance of this book for our work is that it gives insight on Bello's administration and also Bello's activities and relations with other areas. For instance, from this book we learned that Muhammad bello carried raids against Adar and against Gura in Arewa country and that Bello made raids in the country of Kebbi twelve times.[34] There is another translation of al-Kash-fu-wal-Bayan by Umar Faruk Malumfashi.

The Raudat-al-Afkar, written by Abdulkadr b. Al-Mustapha in 1824 is another work of importance. The real title of the book is 'Akhbar Hadhihi al-bilad al Hausiyya wa-al-Sudaniyya (popularly known as Raudat-al-Afkar). There is a translation into Hausa in Hausawa da Makwabatansu I, and there is also a translation by Ahmed Muhammad Kani.[35]

The Raudat-al-Afkar, like the Infaq al-Maysur, appears to be a first hand source of information on the jihad and its aftermath. It is useful for our work for it gives insight in the development of the movement that will lead to the jihad and the different problems the Caliphate dealt with after the Shehu and also after Bello (d.1837). It gives also information about the pre-jihad times namely the campaigns organised by the Sarakunan Gobir, like Soba (1704-1780)[36] who campaigned in Zarma and Gurma countries, Maradi and Adar.

In the Northern History Research Scheme, we found two important documents. One, Majmu an rasa'il amir al'Muminin Muhammad Bello wa amir al-Muminin Abubakar Attiku, contains 29 letters from these Caliphs to Emirs and different communities. Five of these letters are related to our topic. These are letters sent by Muhammad Bello or his successor, Abubakar Attiku to Tuareg communities of Adar and Gobir Tudu. These letters were sent to give advice (as that sent by Muhammad Bello to Jelani) and to recommend peace between the Tuareg communities and also to remind them of their bay'a (allegiance) to Sokoto.

The second manuscript is the Tahdhir al Ikhwan, written in 1814 by the Shehu. The Tahdhir al-Ikhwan is a treatise on Mahdiyya, to answer to a letter written by a Tuareg Community in Maganga (Ahyar) where one Hamma claimed to be the Mahdi. The leader of the community, one Yusuf b. Ahmed wrote to the Shehu to seek advice. The letter is contained in the treatise. The reference of the Tahdhir al-Ikhwan in the NHRS is K 5/10.

In Institut des Recherches en Sciences Humaines (IRSH) Niamey, we found many correspondence letters from the Sokoto jihad leaders to people in Adar and Ahyar. The

most important correspondence letter we found is the one written by the Shehu to the Kel-Ferwan community especially to the chief of that community one Ibrahim al Tuarequi Kel Ferwan. It bore the number 1805 that shows the time it was written. Its reference in Mara (IRSH) is No. 56. The content of this letter, which will be analysed later on, drew resemblance with the letter addressed by the Shehu to Yakub of Bauchi.[37] There is another series of letters addressed to each other between the Caliphs of Sokoto, Muhammad Bello (1817-37) and Abubakar Attiku (1837-42) and the chiefs of Adar and the Kel-Gress. The reference of these correspondences is MARA No. 185. It's a series of 20 letters on sundry matters.

Through the analysis of the colonial Archives in Kaduna, Sokoto History Bureau and Niamey, it appeared that the Islamic policy was not coherent and the data on Islam and Islamic policy were themselves gathered with great caution only during the crises which were termed "Islamic plot". The so-called French Islamic policy for example, can be perceived through the Serie 4 E: politique Islamique in National Archives Niamey. This series contains summaries of Intelligence Reports or general measures against the Muslims, but most of its information were very negligible monthly, quarterly or annual reports. The colonial administrators were not current of the different developments of Islamic nature and they made many errors of appreciation on the Muslim attitude and activities. For instance, revolts occurred when the reports speak about the pacifist attitude of the populations.

The Niamey Archives are, until now, not fully catalogued and there is some times change of references that mislead the researcher. In Kaduna Archives, there is no series

dealing with Islam and Islamic policy. The researcher has to go through the Provincial Files and the summaries of Intelligence Reports to glean information on the British Islamic policy.

2) Literature Review

Even though much work has been done on the jihad and its aftermath, few if any, dealt with Sokoto's relations with the north, and still more scanty analysed the influence of the 19th century legacy on the relations between Niger and Northern Nigeria during the colonial period. The theses by Y.T. Gella[38] and Saka Balogun,[39] were limited, the former to the Caliphate of Bello (1817-1837) and the latter to the relations of Gwandu with its emirates. They therefore left a large area (both in space and time) uncovered. Also, their approach was that conceiving the relations from the centre to the periphery and aimed at showing how the centre conceived and implemented its policy towards that of the periphery. It's perhaps important to have a northern point of view.

The literature concerning our area can be divided into three main items, if we do not take into account the writings of the jihad leaders. The first group is that of scholarly books dealing with the Niger-Nigeria frontier, the treaties over it,[40] or the transborder movements of peoples and goods.[41] These works emphasized the fact that the frontier failed to curtail the movements of people and goods.

The second group deals with the study of precolonial political entities and the relations between them. The principal theme of these works is the political development, the formation of the communities, the emergence of the ruling classes and their collapse mainly with the jihad. Most of these works showed that the ancient political entities are

now split between Niger and Northern Nigeria.[42]

The third group deals with the colonial period in all its aspects and generally treats some Islamic aspects of the colonial policy. The colonial period is well covered in recent studies, but only few works are interested in Islam during the same period.[43]

The jihad movement had been studied in two important works after Abdullahi Smith had drawn scholars' attention on the study of the Sokoto jihad.[44] The first work was by Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, Longman 1967) based on Arabic documentation and the second was by Bello Alkali; A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in the 19th Century (M.A. ABU 1969) based mainly on oral tradition. These two works had paved the way in the double view point of chronology of the jihad and the value of local documentation in African history. Because of these works, the chronology of the jihad and its achievements are fairly well-known. As far as our topic is concerned, the two authors showed the tradition of intermingling of people and ideas in our area, emphasizing the fact that all the developments which took place in Hausaland had repercussions and connections in the north. In the introduction, Last showed the relations between the peoples in reporting the traditions that the Zamfarawa are descended from a Katsina father and a Gobir mother, while the Kebbawa are ascribed a Songhay father and a Gobir mother. Last showed also the place taken by the Tuaregs in the jihad and during the caliphate of Bello. The work by Muhammad Bello Alkali, showed the tradition of cooperation and alliance between the Zarma-Arewa people and Kebbi. He, for instance, showed that Kebbi and Zarma-Arewa people were in a state of alliance from 1817 to colonial period.[45] Despite all its merits this work by Bello Alkali seemed to stress

the "perpetual war analysis" instead of showing the Islamic transformation and other impacts of the jihad on the area.

Djibo Hamani, in two important works and an article emphasized the relations between Sokoto on one hand and Adar and Ahyar on the other. In his first book, L'Adar precolonial (1975) he tried to bring to light the role played by the family of Sarkin Adar in the jihad and how the ruling family of Adar was plit on Sokoto or anti-Sokoto lines. He did the same analysis in his article "Adar, the Tuaregs and Sokoto: relations of Sokoto with the Hausa and Tuaregs during the 19th century" (1979) and in his Le Sultanat Touareg de L'Ayar (1989). But if he showed the relations between Bello and some Kel-Gress Sheikhs, he failed to show the role these Sheikhs really played in the jihad.

Yaro Thaba Gella, in his thesis, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello (1817-1837) Towards the States of Borno, Adar, Ahir and the West (1986), analysed the policy of Muhammad Bello towards Adar and Ahir in terms of economic relations. The religious activities were carried out only to strengthen these economic ties.

In his work, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A Study in the Use of Religion for Political Domination in Sokoto and its Environs 1900-1960 (M.A. 1987), Simon Majuk showed how the Sokoto Native authorities sided very early with the colonial powers and tried to justify all British acts towards the people. Before the British conquest, he argued, a position was taken in Sokoto, to side with them instead of resisting the invasion. Two other works are important for our topic. The work by Kimba Idrissa, la formation de la colonie du Niger: 1880-1922. Des mythes a la politique du "mal necessaire" (Paris VII, 1987, 5 volumes) and the one by Andre Salifou, Colonisation et

Societes indigenes au Niger: de la frir du 19ᵉs au debut de la seconde guerre mondiale (Toulouse 1977, 2 volumes). These works contain important primary sources from the Archives of Dakar (Senegal) and France. They therefore allow us to draw information from these sources, what would be otherwise impossible for us. As it will be seen these primary sources will be quoted in some parts of our work.

The place of our work in all the literature on the topic is that it doesn't focus on a colony or a particular colonial power. It focusses on two colonies (Niger and Northern Nigeria) and on the movements of people across the frontier. It therefore tries to lay a bridge between researchers of Northern Nigeria and those in Niger as well as between the studies of the 19th century and those of the 20th century.

FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

1. Gobir see Abdullahi Rafi Augi, The Gobir Factor in the social and political history of the Rima Basin, c.1650 to 1808 A.D., Ph.D., A.B.U., 1984, p.4;

Kebbi: see Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in 19th century, M.A. A.B.U., 1969, p.299;

Katsina: see Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina (1400-1883) The Emergence and Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment of the Emirate, A.B.U. Press, 1981, p.3;

Borno: see M.N. Alkali, Kanem-Borno under the Sayfawa: a Study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, Ph.D., A.B.U., 1978, p.xx;

Daura: see Gazetteer of Northern Provinces, p.29;

Damagaram: see A.R. Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger), 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanic Kingdom, Ph.D., University of California, Los-Angeles, 1970, p.104;

Sokoto Caliphate: see Gazetteer of Northern Province, vol.1, p.49.

In fact Niger and Nigeria are colonial creations. As for Niger, it had been subject to many administrative modifications.

1st It was created by the integration (fusion) on 20th December 1900 of the "Territoire Militaire de Zinder" (created on 23rd July 1900) and the "cercle du Djerma" (created on 11th October 1900) and the whole was called "Troisieme Territoire du Haut-Senegal-Niger". It became "Territoire Militaire du Niger" on 7th September 1911.

2nd Detached from the Haut-Senegal-Niger on 4th December 1920, it was called "Territoire du Niger" and boosted into a colony on 13th October 1922 inside French West Africa. In French system, the difference between a "Territoire Militaire" and a "colony", is that the former was administered by military officers to deal with all kinds of resistance, to "pacify" the country before it was transformed into a colony, which now brought the administration under the civilians and the beginning of its economic exploitation called "mise en valeur". Even the terms used to call the administrators changed: whereas the military officers were named Commandants de cercle, the civilians were termed Administrateur des Colonies.

3rd In november 1929, the Tibesti, which, until that date was part of Niger, was handed over to French Equatorial Africa to be integrated to the Chad colony.

4th In 1932, the colony of Upper-Volta, created in 1919, was considered by France as not economically viable and was split between Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Sudan (now Mali).

5th In 1947, Upper-Volta was reconstituted and it took back its former cercles of Fada Gurma and Dori which had been integrated to Niger in 1932. So, Niger had its definite configuration only in 1947. In this work only this configuration is considered except otherwise stated.

As for Nigeria, it was not even called by that name until 1914 when the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Provinces was united with the Protectorate of Northern Provinces to become the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria: see E.

Ituen, Nigeria's Foreign Relations: A Study of the Factors Influencing Nigeria's Foreign Relations After Independence, Ph.D Political Science, St. Louis University, 1970, p.6.

When the African states attained independence (1960 for most of them), the question of the frontier generated a hot debate in the first OAU Summit in Addis-Ababa in May 1963. Most of the Heads of States and Governments of whom Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (who led Nigeria delegation) recognized the Uti possidetis, Uti possideatis (As you have, as you shall have) principle as the one that will determine the African states frontier policy. For on frontier conflicts and question in Africa at that period, see: B. Boutros Ghali, Les Conflits de Frontiere en Afrique, Editions Techniques et economiques, Paris, 1972, 142 pages.

2. Thom Derrick: The Niger-Nigeria Borderlands: A Politico-geographical Analysis of Boundary Influence upon the Hausa, Ph.D. Michigan, 1970; J.R. Prescott, The Evolution of Nigeria's International and Regional Boundaries 1861-1971. Copyright 1971; Fourage (G) Frontiere Meridionale du Niger: de la Ligne Say-Barwa a la Frontiere Actuelle, These Toulouse 1979 2 volumes; J. Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960, London, Longman, 1970; Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1967, 3 vol.

3. See Kimon Valaskakis and Pavel Turcan, Les Problemes du Developpement Economique du Niger et du Nigeria Tome I, L'Approche macroeconomique, CRDE Montreal 1971; J.D. Collins, Government and Groundnut Marketing in Rural Hausa Niger: the 1930's to the 1970's in Magaria, Ph.D., John Hopkins University, 1974.

4. Abdullahi Smith "The Early States of the Central Sudan" in History of West Africa, Vol.1, ed. by Ajayi and Crowder, London, Longman, 2nd edition, 1976, p.178.

5. Asiwaju, A.I. ed. Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa's international boundaries 1884-1984, University of Lagos Press, 1984, pp.10-11.

6. See the critique of this approach as far as Nigerian researchers are concerned in Lidwien Kapteijns, African Historiography written by Africans, 1955-73: The Nigerian Case, Ph.D. Amsterdam, 1977.

7. ibid, p.50.

8. A. Smith "A Neglected Theme of West African History: The Islamic Revolutions of the 19th Century" in G. Kwanashie and ed., A Little New Light, p.145, note 4.

9. It seems that the same problem was experienced by Bivar and Hiskett, M. when writing their "Arabic Literature of Nigeria to 1804: a provisional account" BSOAS, Vol. XXV, Part 1, 1962. They included Niger because it was very difficult to write this account without constant references to what is today Niger Republic. See their note 2.

10. W.F.S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Niger and Nigeria, Cornell University Press Ithaca and London, 1994, p.11.

11. P.K. Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu Emirates Under British Rule, 1900-1949, Ph.D. Ibadan, 1974, p.277.

12. Quoted in Lidwien Kapteijns, African historiography written by Africans op. cit., p.24. On continuity see also Whitaker, C.S., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-66, Princetown University Press, New

Jersey, 1970.

13. Y.T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello (1817-37) towards the states of Borno, Adar, Ahir and the West, Ph.D., A.B.U., 1986, p.13.

14. Raudal-Jinan Burdon translation NAK O/AR1/23 Burdon box 2.

15. K. Marx, Capital vol.1, chap. 3.

16. Victor Augagneur (G.G.F.E.A. in 1920), Erreurs et Brutalites Coloniales, Paris Montaigne 1927, p.201 my translation.

17. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.

18. Sokprof 2/2/31 86/1904 M. Charles Orr, Report in a tour to the Asbenawa District in the North of the Province.

19. SNP8 98/1908 Senussi Movement copy 174 92/1905 Downing Street to Under Secretary of State Foreign Office, dated 30th September, 1905.

20. SNP8 98/1908 Senussi movement, Ambassador of Britain in Paris, Francis Bertie to the Marquess of Lansdowne K.G., Secretary of State, Foreign Office, Paris, October 18th 1905, no.44 Africa.

21. SNP8 98/1908 Leon Bourgeois, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France, to British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, Paris, March 31st 1906.

22. J.L. Triaud, Les Relations Entre la France et la Senussiya (1840-1930) quoted in Savadogo Boukary, Le Hamallisme en Afrique de l'ouest apres Shaykh Hamahoullah, Universite de Paris I, 1992, p.7.

23. Quoted in W.F.S. Miles, Hausaland Divided op. cit., p.18, note 14.

24. Engels F., When writing to Joseph Bloch, 22nd September 1890 quoted in Maurice

Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist anthropology, Cambridge University Press 1977, p.221, no.5.

25. Quoted in Vincent Monteil, L'Islam Noir, Seuil, Paris 1964, p.15.

26. See Lidwien Kapteijns, African Historiography written by Africans op. cit., p.24.

26bis. Stephen Baier, An Economic History of Central Niger, Oxford 1980, p.7.

27. Andre Salifou, Le Damagaram ou Sultanat de Zinder au 19°s. E.N. 27, 1971, p.16.

28. Dunbar, A.R., Damagaram (Zinder Niger) 1812-1906: The History of a Central Sudanic Kingdom Ph.D., U.C.L.A. 1970, p.121, note 60.

29. In Say, for example, the archives and books of Alpha Maman Jobbo are said to have been destroyed by rain which infiltrated in the earthen ware pots that contained them; nothing remained (Hassane Baka, oral communication). The colonial archives in Say were destroyed when the stock-keeper, Dodo, put fire to the house of the Resident, in order to destroy proofs of malversation. This was in the night of 7th to 8th April 1905. All the Archives were burnt; nothing remained. See Archives des Etudes Nigeriennes no.16 Niamey (Say, Dosso, Konni) 1912-1957, p.9.

In Hadejia in 1921, the written records of Garin Gabas, were destroyed by fire. See Palmer S.M., p.134; In Kaduna, some documents were destroyed by fire in Sardauna's house in the night he was murdered see C.L. Temple, Native Races and Their Rulers, p.xi, note 3; In Sokoto Waziri Abbas (1928-48) destroyed some papers left in the Sultan Muhammadu Tambari's Palace, after the latter's abdication in January 1931, see NAK Sokprof C22. A Tarikh on the history of Dallol Boboye, written in Arabic, Zarma and Fulfulde was destroyed by fire c.1948, see Boubou

Hama, Historie traditionnelle des Peuls du Dallol Boboye not dated.

During the 19th century, archives deposits suffered from wars and migration. According to Barth, all the Hausa documents except the Kano Chronicle, had been destroyed by the jihadists, see Barth, I, 474; In 1830, the Kel-Gress and Itessan Tuaregs attacked the Ahyar Sultan Muhammad Guma (1828-35) at Koup-Koup in Damargu; it was a complete disaster and all the archives with the Sultan were destroyed, see Y. Urvoy, Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central, 1936, p.190; The Tarikh Es-Sudan reports that during the third year of the reign of Caliph Aliyu Babba (1842-1859), the Gobir Sultan attacked Salame and devastated it completely, carrying away the books of Abdulkader dan Tofa see Tarikh Es-Sudan, p.342; The Archives of the Sefawa are believed to have been destroyed in the sack of the Birnin Jadid (or Birnin Kafela) organised by the Waziri al-Haj Bashir b. Muhammad Tirab in 1846 see Centre of Arabic Documentation: Research Bulletin, vol.III, no.1, January 1967, p.131; The early Archives of the Shehu were destroyed in 1846 when Kukawa was put to the sack during the revolt of Mai Ali; The Shehu materials post-1846 were destroyed by Rabih in 1893 see ibid; As is well known, Shehu al-Kanemi had accused the jihad leaders of destroying books in conquered towns. This accusation was considered so serious that Bello thought it was imposed on him to answer and dismiss it, see E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, Kano, 1922, p.103; The papers of the Royal Niger Company were burnt by Sir George Goldie see Louis Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa, 1968, p.v, note 1; The Ahyar archives were destroyed during the Kaussan revolt of 1917-1920, see H.T. Norris,

The Tuaregs, Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel, 1975, p.167. More recently, a book written about Sidi Mahmud al Baghdadi and the Khalwatiyya in Ahyar, was destroyed by the termites see Hamani Djibo, Le Sultanat Tuareg de l'Ayar, 1989, p.200.

The movements of population and forced transfer were also among the causes of the desperation of written documents. The very good example of this, are the archives of Segu (Mali) which were seized by Archinard in 1894 after the occupation of this town and the flight of Seku Ahmadu. A total of 511 volumes were seized and constituted the Colonel Archinard collection at the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris see C.A.D. Research Bulletin vol.III, no.1, January 1967; About the middle of the 19th century the property of Nuhu Sarkin Daura including papers was seized by Damagaram see Palmer, S.M., p.132; The Machena Chronicle is believed to be in Damagaram for Zinder people took it with them after the sack of Machena in 1896, see SNP17 12168 Bornu Province-Bornu Emirate-Machena District Assessment Report 1919.

During the colonial period, in 1912, a French agriculturalist engineer, Georges Reynard de Gironcourt toured in the Niger bend area and collected many Arabic manuscripts. Their number is said to be 223. When he visited Sinder (Western Niger) in June 1912, he found an alim called Alfa Isifu Kalilu, who had studied for 8 years at Sokoto. Alfa Isifu arranged for copies of works of Sokoto literature to be made for the French traveller see Sudanic Africa: A journal of historical sources vol.3, 1992, p.115. The French Ministry of Colonies was so

pleased with this work that Alfa Isifu was awarded the French distinction of Palmes academiques see ANN. cercle de Niamey: Fiches des marabouts uncatalogued, n.d. It is believed that some archives of the Shehu were saved and could be found in Damagaram. See CAD Vol.III, no.1, January 1967, p.131, note 1.

30. Some authors, for example, spoke about "Gobirawa die-hard" to show their fierce opposition to Sokoto see H.A. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.188.

31. The important correspondences as far as our topic is concerned are in the Files No.1, and No.VII in Waziri Junaidu collection, Sokoto.

32. Hamani Djibo, Le Sultanat Touareg de l'Ayar E.N. 55, IRSH 1989, p.25 my translation.

33. Rihlah ila Agades by Waziri Junaidu.

34. al-Kash-fu-wal-Bayan folio 22.

35. Ahmed Muhammad Kani, The Life and Works of 'Abdalkadir b.al-Mustapha: A critical edition of his works and historiographical approach, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1987.

36. This duration of Soba's reign is given by Ahmed M. Kani op. cit., p.253, note 1.

37. AHAK BSC/1.

38. Y. T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of Caliphate of Muhammad Bello (1817-37) Towards the States of Borno, Adar, Ahir and the West, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1986.

39. Saka A. Balogun, Gwandu Emirates in the 19th century with special reference to political relations 1817-1903, Ph.D. Ibadan 1970.

40. See footnote 2.

41. Collins (J.D.), Government and Groundnut Marketing in Rural Hausa Niger: the 1930's to the 1970's in Magaria, Ph.D. John Hopkins University, 1974.

42. See footnote 1.

43. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A Study in the Use of Religion for Political Domination in Sokoto and its Environs 1900-1960, M.A. History A.B.U. 1987; Omar Bello, Ulama and Colonialism in Nigeria, 1995.

44. See A. Smith "A Neglected Theme of West African History: The Islamic Revolution of the 19th Century" in G. Kwanashie and al. ed A Little New Light, Gaskiya Corporation Ltd., Zaria, 1987.

45. M. Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in the 19th Century, M.A. ABU, 1969, pp.156-160-300.

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES OF NIGER AND NORTHERN-NIGERIA

In this chapter we aim at giving an overview of the factors which laid the basis of relations between the communities during the centuries, but especially the 19th century. The factors which will be considered are ethno-cultural, economic and political. Cultural factors include the travelling for learning, pilgrimage, construction of mosques etc. Even though the jihad will be especially concerned with in another section, some references to it can be found in this chapter.

For the sake of convenience, we divide the region into three main areas which presented some coherence and close North-South relations.

a) The Western Zone: Predominantly of Zarma-Songhay culture with Birnin-Kebbi, Leka and during the 19th century, Gwandu and Dosso as main centers. This zone witnessed before the 19th century and especially during the 19th century, the migration of Fulani and constitution of Fulani enclaves more particularly in Gurma and Dallol areas.

b) The Central Zone: Comprising Kano, Katsina, Adar, Ahyar and Sokoto (in the 19th century) representing an area with close relations. Through the Ahyar-Adar-Sokoto-Kano corridor, the economic, ethnic and cultural ties give the area its coherence.

c) The East: Zone of Damagaram, Muniyo, Borno, culturally Kanuri where the centres like Birnin Gazargamo and Kulumfardo (before the 19th century) and Gure and Kukawa played an important role. This zone was known in the Kanem-Borno history as Yeri.[1] The

homogeneity of these respective zones doesn't mean that they had no relations with each other or the others. All Hausaland, taken as an ensemble, represents some homogeneity of culture, especially after the jihad.[2]

I.1. The Demographic Relations

These relations constituted the basis on which other relations (economic or political) were built.

a) The Western Zone: Before the 19th century, which witnessed great movements of populations and infiltration of Fulani and Tuaregs, this zone was inhabited by the Zarma and the Kebbawa whose Songhay background was important. In fact the Kebbawa were classified among the Hausa as "Banza Bakoi" which meant that they were not originally Hausa. Traditions had it that the Kebbawa descended from a Songhay father and a Katsina mother.[3] Also, according to Bello Alkali, the present Kebbawa are a mixture of Hausa and Songhay. These references to Songhay people can only be explained by the migration southwards of people of Songhay origin into the area of Gulbin Kebbi as early as the 11th century.[4] These migrations had economic reasons for they came to the area as fishermen, but they finished by establishing themselves in the area, constituting a community to welcome the new immigrants. The similarity of geographical conditions made migration and settlement very easy, and the roles of the Dallols[4bis] in the economic life of the area were also important a role in the movements of population. According to Augi "all such historically important centres of population as Jinju, Beibei, Yelu, Bana, Kawara Debe, Matankari and Dosso were all located along the dallols".[5] So, the migration of Songhay princes after their defeat by Morocco army in the Tondibi battle of March

1591, into the Kebbi area, was only a continuation of Songhay people's movement to the south. The Sorko (Sarkawa) migration from the area of Tillahery into the Gulbin Kebbi, appeared to have continued from the 11th to the 15th centuries.

During the jihad of the 19th century, this ethnic factor would play an important role in strengthening Kebbi's alliance with Dosso. There was also blood relations between the Kanta family of Kebbi and those of the little principalities like Jinju. This family relations had facilitated the spread of Kebbi influence over Dallol Fogha through friendship and cooperation between the rulers of Kebbi and those of Jinju.[6]

Fulani were another element in the ethno-demographic analysis of the area. In the 18th century, because of Tuareg pressure on the Fulani, the latter migrated from Say-Lamorde area and came to stay in the Dallol Bosso. Some Gorgabe and Diallobe groups came to join them later.[7] But the occupation of Dallol Bosso area by Fulani in great number was a 19th century development. Some Wodabe groups, because of wars, famines and the peasants' pressure, migrated from Borno to Sokoto area and whence to Dallol Bosso.[8] Boubou Hama, quoting Sokoto sources, reported that some Fulani groups, known as Foulmangani, coming from Manga in Borno, stayed in the Dallol Boboye area, thence some of them migrated to the Tamu region where they are today known as Foulmangani or Foulmanganibe.[8bis] At the end of the 18th century the Fulani were, according to some sources, between 5,000 and 6,000 in number, scattered between Lamorde on the right bank of the Niger river and the Kalla mountain in Dallol Bosso.[9] These Fulani would play an important role in the jihad of the 19th century.

The similarity of agricultural and pastoral practices throughout the region "seemed

to have encouraged the migrations and settlements of people between different sections of the area. Such movements and interaction ... have played an important role in giving the region its historical unity".[10]

The relations between Kebbi and the Songhay were emotionally regarded since the support the former gave the latter after the Tondibi battle (March 1591) when the Sa'adian Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur began the conquest of the Sudan. Askia Nuh came to Dendi, close to Kebbi to organise the resistance with the support of Kebbi. When Mahmud Zarqun, the successor of Judar Pasha in Songhay was killed in a campaign in Hombori, his head was cut off and sent to Askia Nuh who forwarded it to Kebbi where the Kanta exhibited it in a market place at Leka.[11]

The defeat of Kebbi before the Ahyar prince Agabba led to a migration of Kebbawa to the North (Adar) where they founded Bilbis and Garkawa wards in Tawa (Tahoua).[11bis]

b) <u>The Central Region</u>: Comprises the area of Hausa states through Adar and Damagaram to Ahyar. Even though many peoples and languages can be recorded, the Hausa, as a commercial language, was and still is the lingua franca between Tuaregs, Fulani and Kanuri. So, the Hausa culture dominated this area and the process of "Hausaisation" of the other peoples continues. The dynamism of Hausa culture is an important element in the process of integration of non-Hausa people like Tuaregs, Fulani or Kanuri. Barth reported, also the hospitality of Hausa people. Speaking about the Hausa country, he stated that it was "among all the tracts that I have visited in Negroland, I had found the most agreeable for a foreigner to reside in".[12] This predisposition of Hausa people to welcome various people had contributed not only to the immigration of

peoples into Hausaland (for example the Wangarawa and North Africans) but also to the "Hausaisation" of many waves of immigrants. The central region was important because it witnessed the most important North-South movements of peoples, through the centuries, due to desertification, famines, droughts etc. or transaharan trade. This area had a long tradition of welcoming foreigners who, by the 19th century, when the jihad started, were already well integrated in the Hausa country. It was the case for the Fulani who entered Hausaland during the reign of Yakubu, dan Abdullahi Burja (1452-1463) if we believe the Kano chronicle. So, to those who considered the Fulani as "aliens" in Hausaland, Hiskett answered: "it is extreme to speak of them as "aliens" after nearly three centuries of settlement in Hausaland. In any case such a description arises from an exotic concept of national frontiers and ignores the cultural unity of the Muslim Sudan".[13] Abd'Allah ben Fodio claimed that the Fulani, especially his ancestors, came in the Konni area before the Hausa and the Tuaregs.[14] They arrived around 1450 in this area, led by one Musa Jakolo who wanted to perform the Hajj. Like Musa Jakolo many people from Western Sudan travelled through this area and many of them stayed in Hausaland. Katsina, for example, was the shelter for people and their rulers from Fezzan. Traders from even Croatia arrived and stayed in Kano.[15]

As far as the peoples of the present Niger territory are concerned, their immigration into Kasar Katsina was put by Bala Usman as follows:

> Relations with the peoples to the North would have become closer over the centuries with the southward shift of the Hausa-speaking people of the Abzin like the Gobirawa, the Tazarawa, and even

> groups of the Tuaregs ... These migrations of the people of the Abzin also led in the early seventeenth century, to the establishment of the town of Illela by a group under Tambari Illela, who came to be one of the senior Sarakuna of Katsina, entitled to three beats of the tambari (kettle-drum) at his installation.[16]

The movement of population from north to south has been continuous. The most important example was that of the Gobirawa[17] and the Tuaregs who migrated to Kano and Katsina, where they participated in the kola trade.[18] In the second half of the 17th century, there came increasing waves of Tuareg migrations into the Rima basin, especially its northern frontiers i.e. Adar, Konni and Gobir Tudu.[19] In that movement some Abzinawa families built Kwakwazo (later Goronyo District of Sokoto). But, according to Barth, a great exodus of Tuaregs took place in the late 17th century, taking "the great part of the inhabitants (of Agades) to the neighbouring towns of Hausa, chiefly Katsina, Tasawa, Maradi and Kano".[20] Other migrations of peoples of Tuareg origin, included those of Tuaregs who came to Kano area as traders or caravan-drivers, and stayed in the towns like Kura, Kano itself and had many settlements in Zamfara and Katsina. The Tuareg community was so important in Kano, that during the reign of Emir Abdullahi b. Ibrahim (c.1856-83) a representative of Sarkin Abzin came with a letter requesting him to stay in Kano area, as a permanent resident, "so as to collect taxes from the people of Asbin on behalf of the Sultan".[21] He was granted the permission and took residence at Fagge and the title of Tambari.[22] The famous Muslim ruler of Kano, Muhammad Rumfa (1463-1499) was said to be of Abzin origins.[23] The great trader and scholar Umar Falke's

family was from the North. Umar Falke's ancestors came to Kano from Tasawa around 1689.[24] The Kel-Gress Tuaregs, driven out from Ahyar by the Kel-Ewey, c.1740, left Ahyar and made their way southwards to stay in southern Adar, in Gobir Tudu. Since the conquest of Adar by Ahyar prince Agabba after he defeated Kebbi in 1674, many waves of migration of Tuareg came from Ahyar, some to stay in Adar, like the Lissawan, others to go south, like the Itessan and Kel-Gress. These two groups would play a great role in the jihad movement.

The Tuaregs also occupied areas in Zamfara, where Barth found their settlements in all the towns. The town of Kurfi for example, in Zamafara, is said to have been established by Abzinawa before the settlement of Gobirawa in Alkalawa.[25] They even held the office of Magajin Gari.

What explained the shifting of Tuaregs southwards was essentially the degradation of the climatic conditions, resulting in droughts and famines. In the late 1690's, for example, famine occurred in the Tuareg country and Borno where it lasted seven years.[26] During the 18th century, the 1740's and 1750's witnessed a drought which "struck the entire Sudano-Sahelian belt in West Africa, and was more severe than any drought until 1969".[27] This drought was also reported in Futa Toro, where it lasted three years "killing many".[28] These famines acted as "demographic pump" which repeatedly drove people from the arid lands.[29] The famine which struck the Sahelo-Sudanian belt around 1746-47[30] seemed to have concerned Kano for Sarkin Kano Muhammad Kumbari (1731-43) was reported to be "active in collecting jiziya from the Kasua Kurmi, so that the market was nearly killed".[31] He collected taxes to such a scale "to make even the mallams pay".[32]

In Kano history it was not customary to impose taxes on the scholars or mallams since the late fifteenth century when Muhammad Rumfa's charity towards Islamic religion brought many of them into Kano from all parts of Hausaland.[33] But due to its riches, Kano could welcome important number of immigrants and communities.

This population movement in Hausaland created a consciousness of unity and nationalism. This consciousness was shown by the jihad leaders who always talked about "our country" or "our sudan". Abdullahi b. Fodie, described himself as "Abdallah ben Muhammad ben Uthman, the Turudi by lineage, Hausa by province and by country".[34]

c) The Eastern Region: Comprising Damagaram, Muniyo, Damargu, Borno, a zone culturally dominated by Kanuri language. Kanuri had long been the lingua franca in Borno.[35] In describing the process of populating the south-eastern Niger Republic, Maikorema Zakari wrote: "be it in Mangari, Kazal or Kutus, our informants told us that the Sao were the first inhabitants of the area, and therefore the ancestors of most of the people residing there". That So or Sao population covered also a great part of Damagaram. They were, for instance, the first inhabitants of the Tsotsebaki states where they arrived in the Miriya basin to grow wheat.[36] But the most important Kanuri population of the Damagaram area was that of Koyam who arrived during the 17th century, after the sack of their capital Kulumfardo by the Imakitan Tuaregs in 1689. Many of Kulumfardo scholars proceeded to the West[37] and founded reputed schools or even principalities. The formation of political entities in the Damagaram area for instance, was linked to the arrival of waves of migrants from Borno. Malam Yunus, a learned man from Kulumfardo, is considered by Damagaram tradition as founder of the

sultanate or at least as the ancestor of Damagaram ruling family. He came from Borno to Damagaram Takaya c.1736.[38] Another Muslim scholar, Goni Mamadu, left Kulumfardo in 1689 and travelled westward to found a reputed Quaranic school at Illela in Damagaram. He is said to be the ancestor of the Duguzawa who founded the chieftaincies of Mazamni, Zarmu, Jigawa and Gidimuni.[39] According to the Mirya Girgam the ancestors of the Tsotsebaki, of Yemenite origin, lived in Birnin Gazargamu, then in Kulumfardo and later in Ganuwa.[40]

The Muniyo mountains were the refuge for the Dagara, a Kanuri sub-group who left Borno during the 16th century, as reported by Urvoy.[41] The process of populating the south-eastern present day Niger was therefore accompanied by the establishment of principalities "in a land of territory north of the original Hausa states extending as far west as Arewa and the area which became Gobir."[42] In some cases, refugees could dictate a policy for the expelling power for they can be "a dangerous source of retributive action". It may have been to prevent refugees from causing trouble for Borno that this state "endeavoured to bring Hausaland under some tributary obligation, after Borno immigrants, apparently refugees, had established themselves in Kano.[43] This movement might have been a remote matter for the first Sarkin Kano, who sent "gaisuwa" to Borno was Abdullahi Burja (1438-1452).[44] In fact, during the reign of Abdullahi Burja's predecessor, Dauda dan Kanajeji (1421-1438), Dagaci, "a great prince, came from south Bornu with many men and mallams".[45] Also, an ethnological note on Borno stated that "the Jukun people of today claim affinity not only with the early rulers of Bornu but with the peoples of Upper Niger and Songhay, and sometimes with Gobir and Damagaram".[46]

But the migration which far marked the Damagaram area by "the Borno seal" was that of Koyam. They not only founded dynasties, the most important of which was the Lawana of Malawa, but also founded reputed schools and enhanced considerably the level of learning. Some traditions of the area stated that the word N'gurbaye, term by which the region around Gudumaria (Kulumfardo area) is also called, would be a name for a sub-group of the Koyam people, who lived in the area long before the foundation of the Koyam Zawiya of Kulumfardo.[47] The latter was founded during the reign of Mai Ali b. Umar (1639-71).[48]

As for the Tuaregs, their movement in the vicinity of Borno was due to droughts and famines in Tuareg country adjacent to Borno during the reign of Mai Dunama b. Ali (c.1704-1722); Mai Muhammad b. al-Haj (1737-1743); Mai Dunama Gana (1747-50).[49] These famines were very serious for the Tuaregs migrated in great numbers into the area administered by the Galtima (Machena, N'guru). They were so important that an official was appointed to be their representative near the Galtima, the Jongoma (Jongo - campement).[50] These Tuaregs, despite their importance in the economic activities of Borno, would be a thorny problem in Borno's administrative policy.

To the north-western Borno, the areas of Muniyo, Damargu and Machena have had populations with close ethnic relations. For instance, a report on Borno reads: "The racial designation of the ruling Machena family is Walu, a term which is generally accepted in Borno as equivalent to Bedde, while on the other hand there is a Walu tribe now in Damagaram who seems to have no connection with the Bedde and who are perhaps akin to the well known tribe of the Dagira of Muniyo.[51]

Another population which could be found in Western Borno, were the Agura. These were pagans under the authority of Daura. Their country was a triangle formed by a line joining Guerki, Dungass, Magariya and Malawa.[52] These Agura were numerous in Gumel.[53] According to some sources, the early immigrants who inhabited Daura followed the river Maradi from Lake Chad.[54] The inhabitants of Kanem Bakashe (northern Katsina) are supposed to have been hunters and warriors from Borno region.[55] The migration of people of Borno origin went far to the West, for Abdullahi b. Fudie during his campaign in Gurma (1810), met an old man at Fada Gurma who claimed that his ancestors came from Borno.[56] More recently, a researcher from Burkina Faso, gave a confirmation of the relations between Borno and some population of Gurma. After travelling in Borno area he wrote: "From my sojourn in Borno borderlands (Bune, Machina, Gure, Maine, Nguigmi, Kanama, Geidam and N'Guru), I had the satisfaction of being called Beri-Beri and of hearing this legend my grand-father used to tell me".[57]

In the Dallol Mauri, traditions of Borno immigrants are present. Arewa traditions claimed that the name Arawa (sing: Ba'are) came from Ari, a Borno prince who came in the area of Dallol Mauri and married the daughter of the local chief (Baura) who bore him two (twins) boys who are the ancestors of Arawa. According to Garba Na-dama the traditions of Bornoan origin of the Arewa dynasty can be explained by the war between Borno and Kebbi in the 16th century when the Borno Mai sent against Kebbi a force of 100,000 men. This force was defeated by Kebbawa and it is possible that some of Bornoans chose to remain in the area instead of journeying back to Borno.[58]

The relations of the Gobir area with Borno dated back to the 14th century for the

Mazumawa of Gobir stated that they were under Borno's suzerainty before Gobir took control of the area. As far as the Muniyo and Damargu are concerned, many Borno mai had their mothers or wives from these regions and many of them died there, fighting the So or fighting each other.[59]

The number of the Fulani grew in the Tsotsebaki states and Damagaram with the political events of the 19th century.[60] Many of them claimed to come from Sokoto or Katsina.[61]

The influence of peoples of Bornoan origin, in the peopling of Damagaram, Muniyo, Damargu and Tsotsebaki areas was one of the features that led to the emergence of political entities and also to the establishment of reputed Quranic schools.

I.2. The Economic Relations

The economic relations were and still are one of the most important features in inter-communities dealings. They are so important that they were preoccupied or drew the attention of the researchers to this day.[62] This aspect of Niger-Nigeria's relations overshadowed all the others to the extent that when one speaks about Niger-Nigeria relations, the first idea is on economic grounds, showing therefore the impact these relations continue to have on people's consciousness. Various aspects of these economic relations (commerce, grazing grounds, agricultural opportunities, transaharan and savannah-sahel trade) forged very solid networks through kinship, or partnership during the centuries.

It is significant to note that the large markets of our area, Kano, Jega, Sokoto (19th century), Fada Garma, Wagadugu are all approximately of the same latitude, i.e. the 12th

parallel.[63] Abdel Kader b. Al-Mustafa, in his Raudat al Afkar written in 1824, divided the land of Sudan between Upper, Middle and Lower sections. He put the Upper section as lands of Borno, Ahyar, Zabarma and Songhay. The Middle section is the Hausaland (Hausa Bakwai and Banza Bakwai) and the Lower section the country of Baibai (pagans).[64] These Upper and Middle sections are today the most important parts of Northern Nigeria and Niger. What is important in this section is that it can show the interest, different polities in the south had in the north and these different interests explained more clearly the importance given to the North, not only by the jihadists particularly Bello (1817-1837) but also by British colonial power. It was only the French policy to cut off the economic ties between the North and the Hausa states to the south that helped to develop the idea that Sahara was an intolerable and "impassable" desert. In pre-jihad times, the trade routes and the control of Ahyar and Adar were the most important stakes in the Hausa states policy implementation. The Sokoto Caliphate also, did attempt at the control of these roads and states, a very great concern.[65]

I.2.1. The Western Region: The zone of Kebbi and Western Niger, was dominated by the activities in the Dallol around the Fogha salt. It had also great interest in the Gwanja kola-trade for the routes to Salaga in Gwanja passed through this zone, especially Jega, Dosso, Say, Torodi, etc. The route that was the main caravan route, before the insecurity and famines reduced its importance, was "the Sokoto, Giwai, Dosso and Say route," between Salaga and Kano.[66]

Another important route, in the 19th century that brought cattle and kola from Say and Salaga and salt from Rafin Foga (in return for clothes and food supplies) passed via

Giwai, Dumega, Lema, Kwaido, Duchin Kura to Sokoto and Godabawa.[67] The Zarma region was concerned with this commerce in two ways. First, cattle was bought at Sansanne-Hausa and brought to Salaga as reported by early colonial administrators:

> The kola traders sometimes do a double exchange, proceedings first to Say and Sansanne-Hausa to buy cattle in exchange for clothes and skins and thence to Salaga with the cattle to buy kolas. This is only feasible by following the more northerly route.[68]

The second reason is that in the Zarma country high way robbers lived on the caravan-routes. In 1891, when Monteil met the Zarmakoy Alfa Atta (1890-1896) of Dosso, he was warned against the high robbers: "Surtout fais bien veiller de jour et de nuit, car tous les voleurs et coupeurs de route de la region se sont donne rendez-vous a Dosso a cause, de la presence de la caravane Haoussa" [I urge you to be very vigilant by day and night for all the thieves and high robbers had taken their rendez-vous at Dosso because of the arrival of the Hausa caravan].[69] Monteil himself noted "le pays ne vit que de l'exploitation et du vol", (This country lived merely on exploitation and theft).[70]

As for the Dallol, these rich valleys of Dosso-Arewa areas, which during the 19th century and even before, had been a matter of jealousy and convoitise for the population of other areas, their importance was thus brought out by Rafi Augi: "Most of the major historical developments which occurred in the region have been associated with the Dallol".[71] Also, most of the clusters of settlements in the western zone are located along the Dallol. The grazing opportunities they gave had been the most important reasons for wars between the Fulani and the Zarma in the 19th century.[72] Sometimes cattle from a

distance came to graze in this area. Barth reported that the Katsina Fulani sent their herds of cattle to pasture "in the far-distant grassy and healthy grounds of Zaberma".[73]

The Western region developed its economic relations on the salt trade. This commerce was rather local for Bello Alkali argued that "Kebbawa participation in international trade was limited in view of their lack of exchange commodities".[74] This statement was only valid for the 19th century context, when the jihad wars disorganised Kebbi's economy. Barth, for instance, reported that Birnin Kebbi "was a centre of trade even in gold till it was destroyed by the Fulani... when a great deal of gold and silver is said to have been found among the ruins".[75] The area of Kebbi-Dendi also supplied the Songhay area of Gao with foodstuffs since the 15th century.[75bis]

As for the salt, Imam Umoru reported that about 20,000 donkeys were involved in the transportation of Fogha salt into Hausaland every year.[76] This salt was important in the social life of Hausaland for the European reports stated that a Hausa man's consumption of salt is thrice that of a European because only salt can make his poor food (the beans soup) consumable.[77] The Fogha salt was of much better quality than the bitter salt of Bilma.[78] So, it was fully appreciated on Hausa markets. When Kebbi was a powerful polity, i.e. before the 19th century jihad, she controlled the salt-work and trade. For the security of this trade, the Kanta of Kebbi appointed an official, Sabaru, since the 1650's to protect roads to Konni and Ahyar against the raids by Gobirawa and Zamfarawa.[79] This shows that Kebbi was involved in the transaharan trade. The rivalry between Kebbi and Borno on Ahyar expressed itself in the involvement of the two powers in Ahyar dynastic crisis in 1601. This political action had economic motives. Kebbi

probably imported arms from the North for its army. It is learnt that Muhammad Kanta's sword, preserved at the Kanta Museum in Argungu was made in Germany, according to its trade-mark.[80]

I.2.2. The Central Zone: This was centred around the Hausa states and their northern partners especially Ahyar and Adar. Sokoto, founded at the beginning of the 19th century (1809) would play a role as capital of the Caliphate, in the economic activities of the area.[81] But before the 19th century, the economy was the concern of great powers like Gobir, Zamfara, Ahyar and the great markets like Kano and Katsina. The north-south exchanges developed between Ahyar-Adar and Gobir, Zamfara and Kano. Through Ahyar, Hausa states imported European commodities, horses and salt. The salt caravan is the most ancient tie between Ahyar and Hausaland. The Kano chronicle stated that salt came to Gobir, brought by the Abzinawa, during the reign of Yakubu dan Abdullahi Burja (1452-1463). Salt export to Hausaland became more important during the 18th century when Borno lost the control of Bilma salt mines to the Tuareg of Ahyar, during the reign of Ali b. Haj Dunama (1755-1793).[82] By this time Katsina was "of the leading cities in the Western Sudan with a considerable reputation as an important market and a seat of learning and culture".[83] Salt had been the main means of exchange at this period owing first to its importance in the region and second to the fact that cowry currencies were not available, for cowries first came to Hausaland in the times of Sarkin Kano Sharefa (1703-1731).[84] The fact that the Kano chronicle raised no doubt for the provenance of this salt, shows that the Bilma salt was the most common in Hausaland. The salt caravan was so important in Ahyar's life that the Sultan of Ahyar is reported to accompany it annually to

Sokoto (in the 19th century) and it is said that the caravan sometimes numbered ten thousand camels.[85] Caravans also carried copper from Takedda in Ahyar into Hausaland. Ibn Battuta (1304-1367) reported in 1354 when he visited Takedda that "The copper is carried from Takedda to the city of Kubar which city is in pagans country".[86] The camel itself, as an essential animal of transport had certainly been sent to the south for that purpose. The Kano chronicle states that Sarkin Kano Abdullahi Burja (1438-1452) was the first to own camel in Hausaland.

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For their armies, Hausa dynasties imported horses from the north which suited their ambitions better than the camel, as noted by Henri Lhote, [camel] "is the perfect instrument of a raider, but not that of a conquering warrior, founder of empires. It is the mount of a brigand not a soldier".[87] Sarkin Zamfara Yakubu dan Babba had exchanged an Abzin horse for 25 slaves.[88] This high price gives an insight into the scarcity and value of Ahyar horses in Hausaland. Ahyar horses were known in Hausaland as Dan Bagzam. In 1354 Ibn Battuta bought a female slave at 25 mithkals at Takedda whereas a horse cost him 100 mithkals.[89] In the time of Barth's travel in Muniyo (1853), he found that the Munioma Kosso (1831-1854) of Gure, had bought an Abzin horse at 700,000 shells (i.e. the value of f50 in Barth's time), which the traveller considered too much.[90] The importation of horses from Ahyar was important in the second half of the 19th century, when the Shehu of Borno made an embargo on horses, by instructing the Kachella Manzo of Borsari to prevent the exportation of horses from Borno to Hausaland.[91] Kano might have imported great number of horses from Borno and Ahyar for it is reported that she had the largest cavalry force of the Caliphate.[92]

Another element in these relations was the commerce of slaves. Hiskett argued that the Wangarawa who some sources credited with the introduction of Islam into Hausaland, came actually as middle-men to operate the slave trade in the country between Hausaland and the Niger bend or in search of gold, and that their missionary activities were secondary.[93]

Ahyar people, not only brought commodities into Hausa states but also involved themselves into production. They for instance invested heavily in craft production in Kano and Kura.[94] They also installed their slaves in large domains to farm. On his way to Kano from Katsina, Barth was stricken by the importance of Ahyar people's domains. He reports: "it is astonishing how much property is held in these fertile regions by the Tawarek of Asben and to what consequences this may eventually lead everybody will easily conjecture".[95] Travelling in Zamfara, he remarked that Itesan Tuaregs had settlements in all the towns of Zamfara.[96] These different activities created skillful people involved in commerce. One of them was Muhammad Boro whom Barth met at Agades. Muhammad Boro of Adar extraction, organised the salt trade and became an official at Agades, as Sarkin Turawa. He was Sarkin Turawa of Agades before 1850 and owned many estates and a large family, throughout the Sokoto Caliphate and Tuareg country. He had residences in Kano and Zinder, as well as in Sokoto and Agades.[97]

The pattern of movements of people and goods developed before the 19th century but it was in the 19th century that these movements developed due to the foundation of the Sokoto Caliphate, implying a securization of trade routes and the developments of the market. The jihad leaders entered into specific agreements with the Sultans of Ahyar and

Adar, mostly to keep open and secure the trade routes. One of the most important issues discussed between the Shehu and the Ahyar Sultans Muhammad al Bakri (in 1808) and his brother Muhammad Guma (in 1809) was the security of trade routes.[98] Bello (1817-37) developed commerce with Ahyar and Adar and the Sard-al-Kalam reports that during the crisis between Bello and Abdesalam of Kware, the latter plundered a caravan sent by the former to buy salt. It reads: "..until it happened that my servant was sent with 20,000 shells to buy salt with some of our camels, and they passed by his town, and they robbed them of them and seized all that they had of their property".[99] These economic ties between Ahyar-Adar and Sokoto influenced the friendly attitude between the Sultans of these areas and those of Sokoto especially Bello.[100] Even the selection of the place to be the Capital of the Caliphate showed the commitment of Bello to the trade. Sokoto is situated on high ground near the confluence of the Rima and Sokoto rivers at the point where the Gobir-Kebbi and Adar-Zamfara trade-routes intersected,[101] and on a site which marked the border of the once main states of the Rima basin, Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir.[102]

The Hausa states were not only clients of the north. They also had products of vital importance for the north. Zamfara for example, had participated in this commerce and had developed into the principal exporter of grains to the desert people.[103] Zamfara was one of the greatest producers of grains. Imam Umoru's report reads: "I saw some bins in Talatar Mafara, Zamfara, which were said to store 2,000 bundles each, and they were for the rulers. In Zamfara, I also saw certain rulers who farmed 7,000 bundles, and I heard it say that Galadima Anka's farm, gandu produced 20,000 bundles".[104] Since the

time of Leonus Africanus, he wrote that Zamfara was rich in grains, rice, anil and cotton.[105] When the city of Birnin Zamfara was sacked by the Gobirawa about 1762, the commerce was diverted to Alkalawa up to 1808.[106]

Katsina was the metropolis of transaharan trade during the eighteenth century before being superceded by Kano. During the 16th century, Katsina's commercial importance was reflected by its appearance on the 1608 Mercator Projection of Judocus Hondius of Amsterdam.[106bis] After Kano had developed into a very important centre of trade, traders and people whose economic interests were linked with commerce migrated from Katsina area to Kano.[107] Very ancient were the commercial activities in Kano. The Kurmi market was established by Muhammad Rimfa (1463-1499) and Sarki Abdullahi Burja (1438-1452) was the first to own camels in Hausaland. These commercial activities were accompanied by progressive islamisation for it is said that from the 8th century onwards, most of the traders that travelled the transaharan trade were muslims.[108] The fact that Sarkin Kano Muhammad Rimfa was the first prominent muslim ruler and the one who established the Kurmi market is not a vague coincidence. As a writer put it "the mosque and the market have been a natural pair over much of the islamic world, paving one another's way in the spread of the civilization; interested equally in this world and the next."[109]

The jihad of the 19th century would provide conditions for the improvement of the trade as we will see later. So, at the end of the 19th century the principal north-south corridor of trade and transhumance extended from Agades through Damargu, Damagaram, and terminated at Kano.[110] The migration southwards from Ahyar of

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Agalawa and Tokarawa, of Tuareg extraction, who came to Kano and its environs and monopolized the kola trade side by side with Kambarin Barebari was one of the most important economic impulses of the pre-colonial period.

I.2.3. The Eastern Region: Which comes to include Borno and all its North-Western Provinces called Yeri, i.e. all the areas to the South-east of present Niger Republic. The area of Damagaram participated in both regions' activities (the central and eastern regions). Politically, Damagaram was until the second half of the 19th century a "bornuese province" whereas economically, Damagaram rather turned towards the Hausa states, especially Kano. The growth of Damagaram was a 19th century phenomenon. This is why Damagaram, apart from a very short period of economic activity, had almost no proper personality of its own, being only an entrepot in transaharan trade. Her importance was far from that of Kano, or even Katsina before the 19th century. Damagaram had had yet, some important families whose tradition and reputation in commerce went beyond Hausaland: The Guenaba family and the Malam Yaroh family. Zinder also sheltered some Borno officials who participated in the transaharan trade.[111] The commercial importance of Damagaram was only due to the shift east-wards of the transaharan route to Kano. This shift of transaharan routes was mainly the consequence of the jihad, when Katsina was superceded by Kano, "as the main southern terminus of the transaharan trade."[112] Zinder, the capital of Damagaram, became therefore the "gate of the Sudan" for the Borno Empire. Before the 19th century Zinder was a hamlet, and even the transfer of the seat of the kingdom from Ci-Anza to Zinder took place around 1812.[113] But even after this date, its role remained peripheral since its rulers were "more

like religious leaders than political ones".[114] Also, up to that period, Damagaram was under the tutelage of Miriya, the Tsotsebaki state. It was only with the defeat of Miriya by the Damagaram, during the reign of Sarkin Miriya Muhamman Toro (1837-1857) that Damagaram developed into a polity of some importance.[115] After that Barth stated that "its commercial importance has of late become so great that it may be called "the gate of the Sudan"".[116] But Borno's presence even at that period, was imposing, and Zinder's importance was, according to Barth, based only on the power of Borno", which it serves to connect more directly with the north".[117]

This account of the development of Damagaram is necessary for dating the influence of Damagaram on the economic life of the area. Also, it can give insight into relations between Damagaram and Borno, for Malam Yunus, the founder of the Damagaram dynasty was a Faki from Kulumfardo, who left his koyam zawiya when it was sacked by the Tuaregs in 1689.

Before the emergence of Damagaram, the area was dominated by the Tsotsebaki states. Giovani Anania, in his Universale Fabrica del mondo overo cosmografia (1st edition 1573) named the Tsotsebaki amongst the most important African Kingdoms of that period.[118] These Tsotsebaki states (Miriya, Dungas, Washa) witnessed the immigration of Borno communities for political as well as economic reason. Even Borno's expansion to the west is explained as a policy linked to the more and more important influx of people of Bornoan origin and also the riches of the Hausa states and the need for slaves. The Borno Mai installed a Kanuri community in the Tsotsebaki area to grow wheat since the 16th century. At the end of the harvest the wheat was conveyed to Birnin Gazargamu on

camels.[119] That situation remained unchanged until the 19th century, for Barth reported that "Wushek is the principal place for the cultivation of wheat in the whole western part of Bornu".[120] Miriya also developed gardening since the time of Sarkin Miriya Ibil (d.1817) when date-palms were probably introduced and Miriya got the name of "Garin ruwa da dabino".[121] The introduction of the date-palms was an indication that Miriya played a role in the trans-saharan trade.

The different communities of the eastern zone participated in the economic activities by different means. The Kanuri, as salt-workers exploiting the large salt deposits stretching from Gidimuni to Yamia (Maine), the Hausa as peasants and craftsmen, the Tuaregs as caravan-drivers and suppliers of cattle and the Borno Mai as regulators of the security and settlers of problems between pastoralists and farmers. For instance, when the Tuaregs became a major threat in the Muniyo area, the Borno Mai installed Kazelma Saimi, a fugitive Mandara prince, at Birnin Gafata in Muniyo as his representative.[122] His function was only to deal with the Tuaregs.

The Tuaregs lived in Damargu (Imuzzurag and Kel Ewey) and other Tuaregs Kel Nugur moved from Kura (in Kano area) to Damagaram seeking grazing grounds and millet.[123] The community of Tuareg caravan-drivers especially the Kel Ewey was so important in Zinder that an official called Manzo was appointed to be their representative near the Sultan of Damagaram. At the end of the 19th century, Gouraud found a community of 4,000 to 5,000 inhabitants in Zengo (Zinder).[124]

Borno participated also in the transaharan trade for a long time. In the time of al-Yakubi (891 A.D.), the region of Mir in Kutushi (Kutus north Gure) was the main centre

of slave trade.[125] The main trade routes from Borno to Tripoli passed through Mao, N'guigmi, Wudi (Garumele), Baruwa and several other hamlets.[126] The second route linked Borno with Agades through Kelle and Tanut.[127] But during the reign of Mai Ali b. Haj Dunoma (c.1755-1793) Borno lost the control of the important Borno-Kawar-Tripoli trade route and the Bilma salt mines to the Tuaregs of Ahyar.[128]

As for Damagaram, two important routes linked her capital Zinder to Borno. The Northern route through Zarmu, Majia, Gure and Girsilek; and the Southern one through Miriya, Gushy, Machina, Bundi, Zurrikulo, Borsari, and Geydam. This latter route was the most frequented, even though longer. It was more secure.[129]

The 19th century Damagaram was economically dominated by the figure of Malam Yaroh, a wealthy wholesaler of Bornoan extraction. He was a great erudite, a rich merchant and a diplomat.[130] Abdallah his ancestor was, it seems, an Arab from Misr (Egypt) who came to Birnin Gazargamu where he died. His son Musa also died at Birnin Gazargamu. After that, Abdu, father of Malam Yaroh, left Birnin Gazargamu to go to Kulumfardo. Abdu and his family were not only great merchants but also great erudites. The Damagaram Sultan Suleiman (d.1842) asked Abdu to come to his capital Zinder; he invited him as a Faki not as a merchant. Malam Yaroh came with his father in Zinder and was sent to Agades for Quranic studies. After that, he immersed himself in the transaharan trade and became a rich merchant with two agencies in Kano and Tripoli.[131] The Kano agency was in the hands of the junior brother of Malam Yaroh, Malam Abdu who stayed in Chediyar - Gamji quarters of Birnin Kano. Malam Abdu established a close economic relation with the Emir of Kano, the Caliphs of Sokoto and the other Emirs of

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Zazzau, Katsina, etc. Malam Abdu became very close to the Emir of Kano Aliyu (1894-1903) who gave him a big house in Birnin Kano, a large farm and all the 500 slaves who worked in.[132] Malam Abdu entered into contact with another great merchant Malam Abande, whose son Hamidu married Balkissu, daughter of Mallam Abdu. He also entered into relations with Alhasan Dan Tata and Maikano Agogo, and other rich merchants. The son of Maikano Agogo, Amadu, married Tassuma, another daughter of Mallam Abdu.

Malam Yaroh spread the use of Maria Theresa dollars in Damagaram.[133] The activities of Malam Yaroh which extended into Damagaram territory and developed in Kano, in a period when Damagaram and Kano's relations were mainly based on conflicts, fitted the remark of J. Anene that: "In the Central Sudan , merchants tended to be internationalists, indifferent to the political fortunes of states ... The peoples of the Central Sudan ... completely divorced trade from politics".[134]

I.3. The Political Relations

By political factor we aim at showing the role the different polities which developed in Hausaland played in the intermingling of peoples, creating therefore the conditions of giving Hausaland its basis of unity. As already said, most of the polities which marked the history of Hausaland are now split between Niger and Nigeria.[135] Relations between these political entities had imposed on their peoples the tradition of movement, intermingling, through commerce, marriage, and even war, in the sense that slaves were taken and peace was sought for through alliance and tribute. So, there were two levels of relations:

- The peoples relations which involved contacts between peoples of different ethnic

groups and social status. Anene, for instance, argued that "the Hausa cared little who their masters were and were utterly indifferent to political frontiers as long as they were allowed peacefully to manufacture and peddle their trade goods".[136]

- The official relations which involved the states themselves and the ruling classes through wars, tribute, trade, marriage, etc.

I.3.1. The Western Zone

The Western Zone witnessed the predominance of Kebbi for a long period (c.1516 - 1674). Since the revolt of Muhammad Kanta against his Songhay overlord in 1516, Kebbi began to rise as a Central Sudanic power and was only for some times superceded by Gobir. Kebbi disappeared from the political scene only with the sack of its capital Birnin Kebbi by the jihadist in 1805. Even after that, the Kebbi factor was present in the banner of the Tawaye raised by Argungu.

The Songhay political influence on Kebbi was established during the reign of Sonni Ali (1464-1492) whose power, if we believe the Tarikh El Fettash, extended to "the country of Kanta".[137] During the reign of Askia Muhammad (1493-1528), he appointed Alkali in his Empire, from Kebbi to the Mali frontier.[138] But from 1516 onwards, Kebbi's attempt to secure her independence was more and more successful. Songhay tried many times to re-establish his authority over Kebbi, but the latter resisted and scattered Songhay army. Thus, during the reign of Askia Muhammad Bunkan (1531-37) the Kanta inflicted a crushing defeat on him. The Askia's army was scattered.[139] And in 1553, an altercation between the Kanta and Askia Dauda was settled peacefully,[140] which is a proof that Songhay no longer tried to impose its authority on Kebbi by force. Kebbi became so

strong that in the middle of the 16th century, she led on her own, an expedition to Ahyar, an expedition that led to war with Borno, Ahyar's suzerain at that time. That occurred around 1561. Kebbi failed to control Ahyar, that very strategic region that was an important commercial cross-roads for routes leading west to Songhay and south to Hausa states,[141] but it controlled Adar and it is reported that Sarkin Dare (in Adar) sent many presents to kanta Ahmadu after his accession.[142] Ahmadu succeeded Muhammad kanta in 1554. During the reign of Sarkin Kebbi Dauda (c.1589-1613), Kebbi immersed herself in Ahyar crisis which arose in 1601. The Sultan of Ahyar Yusuf was deposed by his cousin Ibn Mubarak. Four months later, Yusuf was restored by the Ahyar people backed by a Kebbi army.[143] Ibn Mubarak fled to Katsina and Kano, gathered an army from these states and Borno, returned to Agades where he defeated Yusuf at the battle of Insamme. Yusuf returned to Kebbi which backed him again with an army which allowed him to defeat Ibn Mubarak and his supporters and kept him in prison until he died.[144] In this intervention Borno failed to control the transaharan routes through Ahyar, and Kebbi's influence became considerable in Ahyar's affairs. According to Djibo Hamani:

> during the 16th century, Kebbi, which extended her domination on the Konni country and Adar in the North, and her influence on various other areas in Zamfara, Arewa and Gurma, became the principal military power of the Hausa country, capable of fighting victoriously Songhay as well as Borno.[145]

The intervention of Hausa states in Ahyar crisis of 1602-1603 has as consequences the spread of the Hausa language in Agades and the migration southwards of Tuaregs.[146]

Kebbi began by imposing her domination over the little neighbouring polities before engaging in real foreign policy. Traditions recorded at Tsibiri (Arewa country) and Argungu had it that Zarma, Arewa and Dendi people were vassals of the Kanta of Kebbi before the jihad. The ethnic relations had enhanced the political influence of Kebbi on her neighbours and cooperation to solve political crises was developed. The 19th century traveller Barth wrote that "in their former times ... the whole of Gurma, with all the Songhay places as far as Tera, were subjects" to Kebbi.[147] Kebbi rulers intervened in the Arewa tribal warfare to support Takasaba and Beibei against their rivals.[148] Inversely Arewa didn't miss any opportunity to intervene in Kebbi politics, as for example, when the Sarkin Kebbi Muhammad dan Giwa (c.1718-1725) was to be deposed for oppression.[149] Muhammad dan Giwa was expelled only after the new ruler Samaila supported by Zarma and Arewa forces, engaged him, in a battle at Ambursa.

During the time of Kebbi, all her rulers attention was directed towards Ahyar and the west. If the Ahyar region, through Adar and Konni was strategic economically, the Kebbi policy in the west was a continuation of her relation with Songhay and the defiance to the Morocco Sultans. In fact, Kebbi backed the resistants to the Moroccan invasion of 1591, led by Askia Nuh, a Gao prince who took refuge in Dendi. In doing so, Kebbi affirmed her presence as a serious threat to the ambitious policy of Sultan al-Mansour (1578-1603). In 1594, al-Mansour wrote a letter to Kanta Dauda (1589-1613) to prevent him from sheltering the Songhay princes, but especially to demand the allegiance of Kebbi.[150] According to the Moroccan Sultan, as Amir al-Muminin, he had the right to demand that allegiance, and he even argued that Kano and Katsina were eager to make

him their submission had it not been prevented by the presence of a hostile Kebbi.

Kebbi stood therefore as a stumbling stone between Morocco and Borno. She prevented a direct clash between the two "universalist" empires ruled by two ambitious sultans. The whole of Hausaland was theoretically under the influence of the two islamic based empires (Morocco in the West, following the steps of Songhay,[151] and Borno in the East). According to al-Mansur (1578-1603), he had "threaded on the cord of obedience all the lands of Sudan between the Atlantic ocean in the Far West and Kano which borders on the Kingdom of Borno".[152] Borno traditions stated that "nobody knows the limits of the Monarch's land"[153] and the Mai Idris b. Ali was described as "the commander of the faithful, the vice-gerant of the lord of the world".[154]

Before the conquest of Songhay by Morocco, Songhay emperors themselves had nourished the ambitions of extending their control over Hausa states. Urvoy thinks they were successful for he reports that Songhay emperors used to meet Borno Mai in the vicinity of Daura, in their touring. He argued that these tours by Gao emperors in the eastern frontiers of Hausaland were the manifestation of their domination of the Hausa of the West.[155] But this assertion was corroborated neither by the Tarikhs of Timbuktu nor by the Kano chronicle.

Locally, the policy of Kebbi (as of her rivals Zamfara and Gobir) aimed at controlling the main trade-routes through Adar and Ahyar and the salt deposits of Fogha. In the 16th century, for example, a Zamfara ruler, Taritu dan Kigaya was said to have raided the Zabarma country.[156] And in 1674 when Sarkin Zamfara attacked Kebbi, the latter got assistance from her Adar-controlled territory, for a contingent of Adarawa is said

to have been on Kebbi side in the battle.[157] The conflict between Kebbi and Zamfara had as stake the control of trade routes. In the beginning of the 18th century, Sarkin Zamfara Baba dan Muhammadu is said to have employed 100 mallams to pray for the success of his wars against Kebbi.[158]

The harassment of Kebbi-Konni-Adar-Ahyar routes by Zamfara and Gobirawa led Kebbi to appoint an official, Sabaru in the 1650's to guarantee the security of the routes. Gobir also interferred in the Kebbi-controlled area of Zabarma and even far beyond in Gurma. Sarkin Gobir Soba dan Muhammadu (c.1704-c.1780) sacked the Gurma and Borgu areas when he was at Magale near Tsibiri in the beginning of the 18th century.[159] The Raudat-al Afkar also reports that Soba attacked the country of Zabarma and besieged its people for three years.[160] But until her defeat before the Ahyar prince Agabba in 1674, Kebbi dominated the Western and Central zone. Urvoy situated the frontier between Kebbi and Songhay in the Dallol Mauri.[161]

So, for a long period, the political scene of Hausaland (more especially western and central zones,) was dominated by kebbi. The intervention of Kebbi was symbolized by her domination on Konni and Adar and her implication in the Ahyar crises. When Kebbi imposed her domination on the Konni area, a new title was created in her aristocracy, the Kokani, whose function was to be a channel between the Sarkin Kebbi and the people of Konni. Kebbi had therefore influence even on the political scene of the central region.

The decadence of Kebbi began with Kanta Maliki (1661-1675). During his reign the Ahyar prince Agabba defeated Kebbi and severed the state of Adar from Kebbi's control. But before that decadence Kebbi had, through her relations with the Songhay exiled

prices, formed a network of relations which allowed her to form an alliance during the 19th century. In fact, Levtzion argued that the Kanta of Kebbi, the Songhay of Dendi and the Tombo of Hombori seemed to have formed an alliance which extended inside the Niger bend to Bandiagara and Jenne.[162] This tradition of alliance would prove to be very useful for Kebbi when she decided to resist the jihadists.

It was only in 1674, when Kanta Maliki (1661-1675) was defeated by the Ahyar prince that Kebbi's frontiers were pushed to the south. It is said that Agabba defeated Kanta Maliki at Barata near where Dundaye now stands.[163] This area constituted the frontier between Kebbi and Ahyar. In the north-west, the frontier of Kebbi, as we have noted it earlier, was in Dallol Mauri.

The Kebbi factor would be important during the jihad era and far beyond.

I.3.2. The Central Zone

Before the 19th century, the nature of political relations between the different polities is difficult to establish because of lack of data. The scant information may yet allow us to draw the main lines of these relations. Our main source of information, the Kano chronicle, concerned itself with the history of Kano and, peripherally the Hausa states. The political scene was, it seemed, dominated by katsina, Kano, Gobir and Ahyar, one after another. Katsina began to rise as a local power between 1514 and 1554 when she resisted the Songhay's attempts of conquering her. In the opening of the 17th century, Katsina gave her aid to Borno in supporting Muhammad Ibn Mubarak in the Ahyar civil war (1601-1603). Meanwhile, Tuaregs from Ahyar continued to move into Kasar Katsina. It is even said that "the territory of Katsina once reached as far north as

the southern gate of Agades"[164] and that a Katsina prince, Rumba-Rumba, conquered the town of Sawata, a walled town south-west of Agades.[165]

Kebbi also interferred in the political scene of the central region as we saw it above. It is, for instance, reported that the Kanta of Kebbi imposed a tribute of 4,000 cowries on each family, in these regions of Konni and Adar.[166] The history of Konni symbolises the intervention of Kebbi and Gobir in this area. Konni traditions have it that the kingdom was founded by a Kebbi prince named Kanni who failed to accede the throne of the Kanta and fled from Kebbi.[167] Tilho reports that Sarkin Gobir Babari (1741-1770) imposed a tribute of 100 or 110 horses on Sarkin Konni Mahaman Damka (c.1754-1772)[168]

The Raudat-al-Alfkar shows the struggle between Gobir and her rivals (especially Katsina and Ahyar) for the control of territories like Adar. Many sarakunan Gobir were killed in these wars and at that time the capitals of Gobir were situated on what is today the frontier between Niger and Nigeria (Goran Rami, Hisatau, Birnin Naya etc.). Sarkin Gobir Soba (c.1704-1780) besieged Maradi for seven years and he was killed in a war in Adar.[169] Another sarkin Gobir, Dan Gudi (1770-72) was killed by Ahyar forces in the battle of Bubu (a river).[170]

It seems that all conflicts between the polities of the central zone centred around the control of the trade routes, which shows the importance of these routes for the economy of Hausaland. There were also movements of people which had political consequences. Some rulers, by a methodic policy, attracted people to their kingdoms. For instance, in the time of Sarkin Kano Muhammad Yaji, an eighteenth century ruler, "there was no trouble ... Many men came and settled in Kanoland in his reign".[171]

there were wars between Abzin and Zamfara in 1685, and many other encounters during the 18th century. The main target was the control of Adar.[175] There were also clashes between the Tuaregs and Gobirawa in c.1689, the reason being probably Gobir's attacks on Konni, then Ahyar-controlled territory.[176]

It was to reduce the belligerence between states, that some of them resorted to skill diplomatic means as for example, marriages between princes to strengthen political relations. Garba Na-dama reported a tradition that when the Gobirawa settled in the area north of Zamfara, Sarkin Gobir Babari (1741-1770) gave his daughter in marriage to an ardo of the Fulani but the latter declined to marry her. So, Babari gave her to the leader of the Abzinawa and accompanied the husband with the title of Sarkin Abzin with the privilege of sitting on the same mat with Babari.[177] A sister of the same Ibrahim Babari had married a Zamfara King, which had allowed Babari to live at the palace in Zamfara.[177bis] Another case of marriage to strengthen relations was the one contracted by the Kanta of Kebbi with the daughter of the Ahyar Sultan, during the expedition of 1516. After his revolt against Askia, he came with her to Birnin Kebbi. Makulo (by name) disliked to live together with the Kanta's first wife and decided to leave Birnin Kebbi and she went to the place which became Gungu.[178] The Habe King of Daura, Sarkin Gwari Abdu, married the daughter of Sarkin Miriya Ibil (d. 1817). When he was besieged by the Fulani, he retired to Miriya where he stayed for nine years.[179] The Zarma-Kebbi alliance able leader, Yakubu bn Nabame (1849-1854) married, to reinforce his alliance with Arawa of Nassarawa, the daughter of Chippa, brother of Mai-Arewa Yaji of Nassarawa. This marriage has as issue Muhammadu Ba'are, Sarkin Kebbi (1859-60).[180] Jinju traditions have

it that Sarkin Kebbi Tomo, gave his daughter Dango in marriage to Ahmad Baba. The marriage produced 10 children including Ibrahim, the founder of the ruling dynasty of Jinju. His grand-son Adde, helped Usman dan Fodio in the jihad.[181] Sarkin Adar Al-Mustapha married the daughter of Sarkin Gobir Yakuba (1789-1795) and consequently, the former gave the latter his aid during the war between Gobir and Katsina in 1795.[182] The members of Gobir aristocracy were said to be in "the habit of marrying many wives, sometimes as many as 1000 wives".[183]

During the 19th century, the most important marriages which had political implications were those of the family of Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-66). Dan Halima founded Sabon Birni and gave his sister in marriage to Ahmadu Zaruku, the Sokoto Caliph.[184] The son of Ahmadu Zaruku by that marriage, Muhammad Maiturare, himself married a Kel-Gress chief daughter, Hawatan who bore him Muhammad Tambari.[185] The Caliph Muhammad Bello (1817-37) himself married two Tuareg women, one the daughter of Malam Agali, Fatima by name and another, named Maze, daughter of another Sheikh Tuareg Muhammad.[186] Bello also made one of Sultan Yunfa's wives, Katembale, to become his own when Alkalawa was sacked and Yunfa killed. Their sons (Mualedi and Fodio) would play a role in Gobir-Sokoto relations.

I.3.3. The Eastern Zone

The influence of Borno on Hausa or Tuareg states developed through two main channels.

First, the "radiation" of people of Bornoan origin, especially learned men in west and north-west of Borno to stimulate or create the conditions of the emergence of

political entities. The examples of Damagaram, Muniyo, Miriya, Machena, and Kutus are eloquent.

Second, the use of military force to consolidate Borno's political influence on states already developed into some power in Hausaland. But it is worth noting that Borno's influence was more cultural than military and even its military activities were tainted with islamic consideration, for Nur Alkali reports that "the Borno army were referred to as the Muslim forces rather than the ethnic term Kanuri, and the military expedition of the Mai were referred to as holy wars".[187]

The people of the eastern region were and still are of Kanuri culture, be they Kanuri, Damagarawa, Tsotsebaki, Dagra and in some degree, even the Fulani. The political influence of Borno in what is today Niger territory went far back to the 13th century for the Arab writer Ibn Yakut (d.1220) reported that the Sultan of Kawar was dependent on Zaghawa king.[188] These Kawar people were muslims since the time of al-Yakubi (d.891) who noted also the cosmopolitan character of the population (of Bilma) and its relations with the Sudan.[189]

The relations of Borno with the Tsotsebaki area went far back to the 16th century when the Mai installed a Kanuri community in Miriya area to grow wheat. Many of the polities of this area between Damagaram and Muniyo, were founded by people, especially learned men of Bornoan origin. The most important of them, Damagaram, was founded according to local traditions, by one Malam Yunus, a Borno prince who lived for long in the Koyam Zawiya of Kulumfardo until it was sacked by Imakitan Tuaregs in 1689. He then came to Damagaram where he found other people, more particularly the Hausa.[190]

The Muniyo was unified into a single polity at the end of the 17th century by a Mandara prince, Kazelma Bundi Sayemi. That prince who fled from Mandara after he failed to accede the throne, was installed in Birnin Gafata by the Borno Mai to deal with the Tuareg on the northern fringes of the Empire. He was the representative of the Mai.[191] In doing so, the Mai consolidated his authority on the area and also assumed his duty of guaranteeing security to the population.

The dynasty of Kutus was founded by a Borno refugee, in the second half of the 17th century. His name was Jiwadamina Attari Gumsumi Aisami. The Tsotsebaki states witnessed many waves of So immigrants and it is even reported that a migration, under the leadership of one Malam Kaday, brought a group of Kanuri from Kanem to the Tsotsebaki area.[192] As a whole, the area of Tsotsebaki, Machina and Damagaram has been *Bornoan province since remote times, as a report reads: "Imaria or Mirria near Yamia and* Machina is the ancient capital of the Damagaram region, a Sudan capital mentioned as early as 891 A.D. by the Arab writer al-Yakubi as a slave market. It is evident that in about 1470 A.D. Ali Dunamami was master of this whole region with its towns like Machina, Yamia, and Mirria, and the region to the north known as Kutushi, famous for the wells made by the races who formerly inhabited the region..."[193]

According to the Miriya Girgam, the ancestors of the Tsotsebaki, of Yemenite origin, lived in Birnin Gazargamu, then in Kulumfardo and later in Ganuwa, as we saw it above. The contribution of learned men in Borno to the political and cultural influence in the west and north-west made the people of these areas conceive the relations with Borno, not as a domination (in military sense) but as a source, of culture. Therefore, the

reference to Borno was above all a reference to Islam and Islamic culture, not to a militarily imposing empire. The Borno Empire became, by its constant reference to Islam a structure with "an ideologically dominant center which sought and usually obtained deference more for its cultural and moral superiority than for reason of effective bureaucratic control of its peripheral units".[194]

Some experiences of learned men founding states, had not been conclusive as in the case of Umar Ibn Uthman. This learned man went on pilgrimage and from Medina to Baghdad where he stayed six months studying. When he returned to Borno, he established a school at Diffa, north of Damasak, where he taught his disciples "sciences and politics." This experience had no time to do with him a political leader when he was summoned back by Mai Ali Gaji to Birnin Gazargamo to become his Imam.[195] He was the ancestor of the Masbarma family.

Politically, Borno entered Hausaland politics through Ahyar. In 1532, Borno aided Ahyar Sultan to overthrow Songhay domination. By that time its influence had reached far beyond its metropolitan zone to Hausaland.[196] But it was only later in the 17th century that the Borno Mai appointed a Galtima to strengthen political and economic relations between Borno and Hausaland. The first Galtima, Mai Mahintami, was appointed in 1630 by Mai Umar.[197] The installation of the Galtima really strengthened the relations of Borno especially with Damagaram and the Tsotsebaki states, for it is stated that the tribute which was sent to Borno through Sarkin Daura, was sent henceforth through the Galtima even though the Tsotsebaki chief Abdullah (1627-1672) is said to have objected to the intermediary between him and the Mai.[198] The Galtima began his office

by assuring the security of the population of the North-Western fringes of the Borno Empire by dealing with the Tuaregs who threatened this security. Residing in N'Guru, the Galtima was in charge of the western part of the Empire. To strengthen his relation with the most likely rebellious province, Damagaram, one of the 19th century Galadima, Umar (1826-1865) married the sister of Sarkin Damagaram Ahmadu Kuran Daga, who bore him Ibrahim.[199] This was a very important "real politik" for between 1865 and 1900, Damagaram's force was growing whereas Borno's strength was decreasing and its control over Damagaram became more and more lax, as we will see it later. This system of Galtima maintained Borno's influence on kingdoms like Muniyo and Kutus, and even Damagaram, where Borno used to send troops to re-establish its authority as in 1846 when Mai Umar (1837-84) sent his brother Abdurahman to restore order and Borno's authority on Damagaram. Borno also settled disputes in Damagaram over the office of the Sarki. Ann Dunbar reported one of the numerous cases where Borno immersed itself in Damagaram politics:

> The most effective control Bornu ever exercised over Zinder and its territory occurred following the wars between Ibrahim and Tanimu over the office of Sarki. During this period in the late 1840's and early 1850's, residents were placed in Zinder to keep an eye on the situation.[200]

When Barth travelled through Muniyo in 1853, he noted a loosening of relationships between Muniyo and Borno, but Richardson was told by the Muniyoma Kosso: "What Kuka does, I do; as what Stambul does, so does Tripoli".[201]

Borno's influence in the North and North-West was age-long and this was carried through cultural influence and rarely military expeditions. The policy of posting of representatives as the Galtima prevented the Mai from interfering directly in the affairs of the "provinces" and only the jihad disorganised these relations which ended finally with the colonial conquest.

I.4. The Islamisation of the Niger-Northern Nigeria Area

It is widely accepted that the introduction of Islam into Hausaland took place in the time of Sarkin Kano Yaji dan Tsamiya (1349-1385). It was introduced by the Wangarawa who commanded the Sarki to observe the time of prayer.[202] But long before that, Islam reached our area through Kawar oases. The Arab writer Al-Yakubi (d.891 A.D.) reported:

> Au dela de Zawila, a quinze jours, de marche, on rencontre la ville du Kawar. La il ya une population musulmane de toute provenance, en majorite berbere, assurant la traite ds esclaves". [Beyond Zawila, 15 days march, one finds the town of Kawar with a cosmopolitan Muslim population, in majority berber, carrying the Sudan [Black slaves] trade).[203]

Also, traditions have it that the Arab conqueror Uqba Ibn Nafi reached Kawar in 666/67 A.D. and imposed a tribute of 360 slaves per annum, on the Kawar region, "cutting off one of the fingers of the local ruler as a lasting reminder".[204] By the 15th century the much of the Rima basin had witnessed the spread of Islam.[205]

Three main channels of penetration of Islam into Hausaland[206] are considered:

- The Northern channel through Ahyar (Agades) whence came some great scholars like al-Maghili in Katsina (1490) and Kano or one of the most important brotherhoods: the Qadiriya.[207] The importance of this channel laid on the transaharan trade. From the 8th century onwards, most of the traders that travelled the transaharan trade routes were Muslims.[208] As stated by Sultan Muhammad Bello (ruled from 1817 to 37) "Islam was introduced to this land by traders and travellers".[209] The region north of Hausaland and (Ahyar) was reported for its learning and its being on the transaharan and pilgrimage routes. As Hunwick put it:

> In the region to the north of Hausaland, the principal early centres of learning seems to have been Tagidda (or Takedda, near Azelik in Niger), a complex of villages about 100 miles North-West of Agades. Again this area was visited by al-Maghili, and Timbuktu scholars passed through it on their way to the pilgrimage.[210]

- The Western channel was dominated by the Wangarawa. According to the Kano chronicle "The Wangarawa came from Melle bringing the Mohammedan religion. The name of their leader was Abdurahman Zangaite".[211] Sheikh Abdurahman Zangaite is said to be accompanied by 3,636 erudite scholars. They came to Kano in the reign of Yaji dan Tsamiya (1349-1385).
- The Eastern channel was dominated by Borno. Since the 15th century, immigrants from Borno, including learned men came to Hausaland principally to stay in Kano and Katsina. For instance, in the time of Sarkin Kano Dauda dan Kanajeji (1421-1438), "Dagachi, a great prince, came from south Bornu with many men and mallams".[212]

Considering our area as an ensemble, considerable mobility of learned men was recorded. John Hunwick noted: "There seems to have been considerable mobility of scholars between the Air region, Bornu and Hausaland by the 17th century, and also between these regions and Timbuktu in the west, and Fez, Tlemcen, Tripoli and Cairo in the north".[213] This mobility brought scholars from remote areas in Hausaland for learning. For instance, Sheikh Abdullah b. Abdel Jalil, the founder of the Koyam Zawiya of Kulumfardo, came to Ahyar and studied under one Ahmad-al-Sadiq (d. between 1670-1680). Another scholar Ahmad al-Yamani even came from Arbaji on the Blue Nile to study with Ahmad al-Sadiq.[214] Boubou Hama reported a tradition that Kanem people crossed the Dallol Boboye with their donkeys charged with Qur'anic books.[214bis] It is also reported that a 17th century Hausa historian, Baba Goro ibn al-Haj Ahmad taught in Timbuktu.[215]

Even though Islam was accepted by most of the Hausa rulers a long time ago (14th century for Kano, 15th century for Katsina, 16th century for Kebbi and 17th century for Zamfara) it had firmly taken roots largely in the 17th century. This is observable in the place taken by the scholars in the social and political life of these kingdoms. According to Wakar Bagauda, there were about 3,000 mallams in Kano during the time of Mohamma Rimfa (C.1463-1499). While Muhammad Korau and Muhammad Rabbo are stated to have been the first muslim kings of Katsina and Zazzau respectively, "Muhammad Rimfa is regarded as an Islamic reformer".[216]

As far as Katsina is concerned, its Sarki Muhammad Korau (C.1445-95) made some islamic reforms to consolidate the religion and, Sarkin Katsina Karyagiwa even

implemented the hudud of the shari'a on a person who claimed false prophetship in Katsina. The famous scholar Dan Marina (d. Circa 1655) praised the Sarki in a poem for this act.[217] In the beginning of the 16th century two eminent mallams from Timbuktu came to Katsina. The latter received much of its islamic influence through Ahyar. The famous scholar al-Maghili came to Katsina from Ahyar (where he stayed in Takedda and taught the great scholar al-Aqib al-Annusammani (d. c.1548-9)".[218] When al-Maghili moved to Kano, he left in Katsina a mosque which he had built, the Gobarau mosque, and one of his disciples Dan Timku as qadi of Katsina, where he died in 1529. Al-Maghili wrote a treatise for political guidance for the Sultan of Kano Muhammad Rimfa (1463-99).

According to some authorities the Muwatta of Imam Malik Ibn Anas was first introduced in Nigerian area from Agades to Katsina where one Malam Kisko became the most famous scholar of the book.[219] In Kebbi aristocracy,, the 16th century witnessed the appearance of two islamic officials, Limamen Leka and Limamen Ciki. In Zamfara the first Zamfara ruler who bore a Muslim name was Aliyu dan Daka c.1670's. So, the acceptance of Islam by Zamfara rulers was a 17th century phenomenon.[220]

Islam was firmly established in Ahyar by the 15th century for it is reported that the first Sultan, Yunus (1405-1424) belonged to the Sherif family of the village of In Sattefen in Adra of Ifoghas. The Sultan of Ahyar was, after all, an Imam (amir al-Muminin).[221] One of the successors of Yunus, Alsu (1429-1471) wanted to conform to the islamic law and he sought advice of the Ulama of Islam concerning the jiziya of horses exacted by Tuareg people in charge of road safety, from the merchants. The Ulama answered that there was no harm in exacting that jiziya.[222] Ahyar Sultans therefore had relations with Islamic

world and at the end of the 15th century, the famous Egyptian scholar al-Suyuti (d. 1505) wrote a letter to Ahyar Sultan Muhammad Settefen (c.1487-94) and his brothers Muhammad and Umara and to the Sultan Ibrahim Sura of Katsina, enjoining them to respect he shari'a and be just rulers.[223] Sultan Muhammad Bello (1817-37) reported that in Ahyar there were so many mallams and holy men that God alone can count them.[224] When Ibn Battuta (1304-1368) visited Takedda in 1354, he witnessed an emissary of scholars who re-established peace between the Sultan of Takedda Izar and one of his neighbours, Sultan al-Takarkuri.[225] So, mallams and holy men played an important role in the political life of Hausaland, more especially in giving prayers for the success of their rulers in wars. Thus, Agades mallams, in 1760's, gave assistance to the sultan against Gobir and he defeated and cut off the head of Sarkin Gobir Dan Gudde (1770-72).[226] Ahyar traditions have it that an ancestor of Malam Jibril named Dan Barewa, made charms, in 1674, for Agabba to facilitate his victory on the Kanta.[227]

Sarkin Zamfara Baba, before attacking Kebbi in 1715, assembled one hundred mallams to pray for his success.[228] The famous Gobir ruler Bawa Jangwarzo, successor of Dan Gudde, defeated Maradi after he got prayers from the Shehu. But the most important event showing the influence of scholars in Hausaland politics was the peace between Kano and Katsina. During the reign of Sarkin Kano Shekarau (1649-1651), peace was made between Kano and Katsina by three mallams. Shehu Ataman, Malam Lawan, and Liman Yandoya. Shehu Ataman even warned the rulers: "In future whoever is the aggressor between you shall never prevail, if Allah wills till the day of judgement".[229] Urvoy situated this peace between Kano and Katsina in 1650.[230] Sarkin Katsina

Muhammad Jan Hazo (1671-1684) defeated Kwararafa, thanks to the prayers of Dan Masani family.[231]

The progress of Islam and the emergence of a scholarly elite in Hausaland had two important consequences for the rulers in the area: The first consequence was that the rulers had a set of rules to which more and more people became attached, and could allow them to rule efficiently. But the second consequence was that the people had a gauge for measuring the performance and the legitimacy of their rulers. The contradiction in the government system between the inherent attitude of the rulers to abuse and to be corrupted, and their religious obligations to be right and conform to the Muslim law (al-Imam al adl) under the supervision of the scholars, led to a conflict between the rulers and the scholars. So, since the 18th century, the Ulama in Hausaland became more and more critical vis-a-vis the ruling class, more especially they were worried about the religious practice of their rulers. As Djibo Hammani put it: "What characterized the Hausaland at the end of the 18th century was, in addition to political competition between the Hausa states, a religious dynamism in which were engaged certain mallams who lived away from royal courts and contested (even though peacefully), the anti-islamic behaviour of their rulers".[232] The rulers naturally could not allow these challenges go on without trying to stop them. In such a conflict, sometimes, before the 19th century, Sarkin Konni Muhaman Damka killed 40 members of the Torobe family and took many of them as captives. At that occasion, one of the ancestors of Usman dan Fodio, Muhammad Sa'd, moved out of Konni with his followers and settled in Maratta (Galmi area). But only the 19th century would witness overt and violent conflicts between the

mallams and the rulers. Before the 19th century, in Hausaland, only malam Jibril dan Umoru tried twice to wage a jihad in Tuareg country and Gobir but he failed and was expelled. On the two occasions he found consolation in the pilgrimage. Djibo Hamani called this period (the 18th century) "period of the breaking of equilibrium in favour of Islam".[233] Malam Jibril dan Umoru appeared therefore as "the breaking point" between the pacific attitude of the 18th century mallams and the active attitude of those of the 19th century. Usman dan Fodio represents the typical mallam of the 19th century in the sense that he waged with success a jihad and reformed considerably the society in Hausaland. The contradiction between the rulers and the Ulama became acute in Gobir state probably due to the number and the reputation of the Ulama.

In Borno the history of Waldede and al-Jarmiyu and the Mai Umar, probably Umar al-Makaddas (c.1626-1647)[234] symbolised this contradiction between the rulers and the Malams. The history of the two Borno Malams, one of whom (Waldede), travelled as far as Agades and Timbuktu in search of knowledge, commenced when they began preaching and having followers among whom were "certain chiefs amongst the chiefs of Sarkin Bornu Mai Umar".[235] The Mai finally killed al-Jarmiyu, a Tuareg who lived in Kulumfardo alongside with Waldede. According to Infaq-al-Maisur, Kulumfardo had been founded during the reign of this same Mai Umar.[236] But according to Maikorema Zakari, Kulumfardo was founded during the reign of Ali b. Umar (1639-1676).[237] Kulumfardo was a center for the diffusion of knowledge and culture, especially after its sack by the Tuaregs in 1689 when the "Koyam" Ulama dispersed throughout Hausaland. But it seems that before the dispersion, some influential Malams led migrations from Kulumfardo. For

instance, the Limamen Kona of Zaria claimed to descend from one Sheikh Jibrilu who migrated with a party of Malams from Kulumfardo to Kona and later Zaria. That migration took place in 1662 A.D.[238]

All these elements show that Hausaland was not a pagan area when the jihad started, and Usman dan Fodio was born and grew in an islamic society where Islam had deep roots. Even though the Shehu, in his Tanbih al Ikhwan, said that "the government of a country is the government of its Sultan without contradiction, if he is a Moslem then the country is a Moslem country, and if he is a heathen the country is a country of heathen", this rule didn't apply to Hausaland more especially the Hausa states. In Gobir where the jihad started, Bawa Jan Gworzo, according to traditions, "was a noted scholar who studied in such places as Agades and even Katsina".[239] And it is even said that Bawa Jan Gworzo employed the Shehu to teach his children.[240]

Also the Shehu during his preaching tours was challenged by some scholars of repute, as for instance one al-Mustapha Goni in Zamfara, who confronted him on the question of gathering men and women together.[241] Infaq al-Maysur reported that the Shehu wrote over 50 works in the criticism of some class of the Ulama.[242] The Ulama were divided into two main groups: The Ulama al-Su who were corrupted and the Ulama al-Din or Ahl al Dhikr. In Gobir court for example, some of the mallams were the most terrible enemies of the Shehu, for example, Imam Maitaguwa who urged the Gobir king to take energetic action against the jihadists,[243] whereas another mallam of the same Gobir court, Sherif Baba joined the Shehu.[244]

In Gobir, the village of Marannu, in the region of present Sululu (north of Goronyo)

was associated with a great Sheikh, Malam Ali Jibbu who is believed to be a teacher of Muhammad Fodio, the father of the Shehu.[245] Ali Jibbu is also believed to be the teacher of Malam Jibril dan Umoru.[246] The Gobir Tudu, especially the Galmi area was associated with another Sheikh and teacher of Malam Jibril dan Umoru, Malam Issaka. This man was of Zarma origin (he came from Zarmaganda) and he wrote a book on his country of origin. The references to this book are contained in a work by Malam Jibril titled Tab-Kirath. Malam Issaka and Malam Jibril dan Umoru died in the same area, i.e. in the vicinity of Arewa (near Dogarawa) in Gobir Tudu.[247]

As far as the Gobir area was concerned, the movement that prepared the jihad was that of malam Jibril dan Umoru who tried twice to wage a jihad. But in Ahyar, since the 17th century, a member of the Iberkoreyen class, confederation of Attawari, called Hada-Hada, tried a jihad. During the reign of Sultan Al-Tafrij (1621-1654) Hada-Hada and his people revoked their allegiance to the Sultan and called for the reformation of the faith. But another alim called Muhammad Ibn Tighna took the defence of the Sultan. The jihad finally ended in migrations of some people from Ahyar to the south.

Malam Jibril dan Umoru prepared the Shehu jihad. He tried twice to wage a jihad but failed and after each attempt he undertook a pilgrimage. Malam Jibril was in his time, considered as the most learned man of the Central Sudan.[248] The Shehu himself recognised the contribution of Malam Jibril in the reform he undertook and wrote: "I wonder whether we would have been guided to the right path, had it not been for this Shaykh. For the destruction of custom contrary to Islam in our Sudanese country was initiated by him and it was completed by us".[249] When Malam Jibril came back from his

second pilgrimage in 1786-87, he brought a "flag of victory" to the Shehu and he is said to be the first person to pay allegiance to the Shehu.[250] Usman dan Fodio emphasized the role taken by his teacher and said: "I am but a wave of the waves of Jibril".[251] According to Djibo Hamani, Malam Jibril died during the reign of Bawa Jan Gworzo (1771-89) and his tomb is in Galmi area (now Arewa village). When the jihad started, his son Muhammad left Adar and went to Gudu to support the jihadists. Muhammad ben Jibril arrived Gudu on the 18th June, 1804 in company of Malam Agali and other people from Adar.[252]

As far as the Western Niger Republic is concerned, its Islamisation, if we agree with Delafosse, was carried out by Askia Muhammad (1493-1528). In 1499-1500, Askia Muhammad came to Ayoru to meet and defeat a son of Sonni Ali who took refuge in the area and tried to found an independent kingdom. Askia Muhammad even descended the Niger river on this occasion, until beyond Say in 1504-1505 and made raids on Borgu (now Benin) and Bariba countries.[253] It was during these expeditions that Askia Muhammad is said to have appointed Kadi (judges) in all the large cities of his Empire from Kebbi to the Mali frontier.[254] He also installed Ulama families in N'Dunga to facilitate the expansion of Islam. When the town of Gao was sacked by the Ulliminden Tuaregs in 1770, many Songhay families, especially muslims, fled to the south and it is possible that their installation in Zarma country, contributed to enhance the islamisation.

All these factors gave the area a sense of homogeneity and the advent of the jihad, would enlarge the socio-cultural area that colonial administration at the end of the 19th century would find difficult to deal with.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

1. Maikorema Zakari: Contribution a L'histoire des populations du Sud-Est Nigerien: Le Cas du Mangari (XVI-XIX S) E.N. 53 Niamey 1985 p.54.
2. See Omar Bello, The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello (1781-1837) As revealed in his Arabic writings, more especially Al-Ghayt al-Wabl fi sirat-al Imam al Adl. Ph.D. London, SOAS p.128.
3. Murray Last Sokoto Caliphate Introduction, p.lxv.
4. Bello Alkali; A Hausa Community in Crisis, op. cit. p.44.

4bis. Dallol is a Fulfulde word by which these valleys are known. In Hausa language, any of them is called rafi i.e. valley (pl. rafukka).

5. A.R. Augi, The Gobir Factor in Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, Ph.D., A.B.U., 1984, p.39, vol. 1.
6. Saka A Balogun, Gwandu Emirates in the 19th Century, op.cit. p.19.
7. Alain Beauvilain, Les Peuls, du dallol Bosso, E.N. 42 Niamey 1977, p.54.
8. ibid p.2.

8bis. Hama Boubou, Histoire Traditionnelle des Peuls du Dallol Boboye, n.d., p.169.

9. See Jean-Paul Rothiot: Zarmakoy Aouta: Les Debuts de la Domination Coloniale dans le Cercle de Dosso 1898-1913, Paris VII 1984, p.48.
10. A.R. Augi, The Gobir Factor, op. cit. p.39.
11. J.O. Hunwick "A little-known diplomatic episode in the history of Kebbi", JHSN, V.4, 1971, pp. 575-581.

11bis Salifou Nahantchi, pp.25-134.

12. Barth, quoted in Bovill Z.W. The Golden Trade of the Moors 2nd edition, Oxford, 1968, p.221.

13. M. Hiskett "A Critical Introduction to Temple's Native Races and their Rulers 2nd edition, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968.

14. See Thomas Hodgkin Nigerian Perspectives, p.241.

15. John Lavers: Katsina and the Outside World: Adventures in the Historiography of Birni and Kasar Katsina: Katsina Seminar, May 1992. One of these Croatians who stayed in Kano, around late 1560's or early 1570's, Vincenzo Matteo, informed Giovani Lorenzo d'Anania about the life in that country.

16. Y. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina pp.29-30.

17. See A. R. Augi, The Gobir Factor p.5 and p.116.

18. P.E. Lovejoy, Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900, A.B.U. Press Ltd., 1980.

19. A.R. Augi op. cit. p.310.

20. Barth, I, 371.

21. Bawuro M. Barkindo "Relations between Kano and the Republic of Niger's Regions of Asbin (Ahir), Maradi and Damagaram (Zinder): Perspectives for evolving a more viable Transborder Policy between Nigeria and Niger" in Asiwaju A.I. and Barkindo B.M. ed. The Nigeria-Niger Transborder Co-operation 1993 pp.123-141.

22. ibid.

23. Isa Alkali Abba "The Niger Factor in the Implementation of Kano's policy on Almajirai" in Asiwaju A.I. and Barkindo ed op. cit. p.390-396.

24. Abdullahi Mohammed: A Hausa Scholar-Trader and his Library Collection: The Case Study of Umar Falke of Kano, Ph.D. Illinois, 1976, p.36.

25. Garba Na-dama, The Rise and Collapse of a Hausa State: A Social and Political History of Zamfara, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1977, p.198.

26. Stephen Baier, An Economic History of Central Niger, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980.

27. ibid. p.30

28. W.A. Brown, The Caliphate of Hamdullahi c.1818-1864: A Study in African History and Tradition, Ph.D. Wisconsin, 1969, p.19.

29. Stephen Baier: op. cit. p. 33

30. See W.A. Brown op. cit. p.19

31. Palmer S.M. p. 124.

32. ibid.

33. Halil Ibrahim Said: Revolution and Reaction: The Fulani Jihad in Kano and Its Aftermath 1807-1919 Ph.D. Michigan, 1978, p.193.

34. M. Hiskett, Tazyn al Waraqat p.84

35. Kiyari Tijani, The Dynamics of Administrative Change in Precolonial Borno, Ph.D. A.B.U. 1980, Vol.1, p.161.

36. Saley Maman: Contribution a L'etude de L'histoire des Hausa: Les Etats Tsotesbaki des Origines au 19°s: These de Doctorat en Sciences Sociales Bruxelles, 1994, p.44, Vol.1.

37. On the Wanderings of the Koyam after the sack of their Capital see Dr. A.

Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu (translated from German) Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968. A great part of Schultze's information come from Tilho.

38. Saley Maman, Contribution ... op. cit. Vol. 1, P. 118, note 4.

39. ibid p.122

40. ibid p.165

41. Y. Urvoy, Historie de L'Empire du Bornou (IFAN) Paris 1949, p.51.

42. Stephen Brock Baier, An Economic History of Central Niger Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p.18.

43. H.J. Fisher, "The Eastern Maghreb and the Central Sudan" in Cambridge History of Africa vol. 3 ed Roland Oliver Cambridge 1977, pp. 232-330.

44. Palmer S.M., p.109. But this perspective of Borno's relations with Hausaland is questionable. See Bala Usman "A Reconsideration of the History of Relations...".

45. ibid.

46. Sokprof 3/2 99 Ethnological note on Bornu Emirate Circular No. 3/K8807/3 dated 21st January, 1929, from SNP to Resident Sokoto.

47. Tilho, Documents Scientifiqus de la Mission, pp.403-404, note 1.

48. Maikorema Zakari, Contribution a L'histoire des Populations du Sud-Est Nigerien, op. cit. p.55

49. Kiyari Tijani, The Dynamics of Administrative Change, op. cit. vol. 2, p.586.

50. ibid, p.585.

51. SNP17 12168 Bornu Province - Bornu Emirate - Machena District Assessment Report by G.J. Lethem, A.D.O. 1919.

52. ibid.

53. ibid.

54. Palmer, S.M. p.138.

55. Y. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.58.

56. ANNC937 Documents Emanant ds marabouts ou ecrits par eux.

57. Raphael Lompo quoted in Boube Gado, Le Zarmatarey... EN45 1980, p.104.

58. Garba Na-dama, The Rise and Collapse of a Hausa State op. cit., p.249.

59. Palmer, Bornu, Sahara and Sudan, p.156, et al.

60. Saley Maman, Contribution a L'etude de L'Historie des Hausa op.cit., vol. 1, p.45.

61. ibid, p.146.

62. Apart from the studies on the Frontier Problems and some articles in various journals the only works on Niger-Nigeria's relations have economic preoccupation:

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113. Ann R. Dunbar op. cit. Appendix IV, P.257. But according to Andre Salifou Suleman Dan Tintuma was enthroned in 1809 and lived few months in Ci-Anza before he transferred the capital to Zinder. See Mamam Saley contribution op. cit. vol. 1, p.252.

114. Ann Durbar op. cit. Appendix I, p.249.

115. Maman Saley, Contribution a L'etude de L'historie des Hausa op. cit. p.269, vol.1.

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124. G. Gouraud, Zinder-Tchad, Paris Plon 1944, p.87.

125. Palmer, Bornu, Sahara and Sudan, p.109; Andre Salifou situated Mir at around 380

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126. M. Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno, p.159.

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128. Kiyari Tijani, The Dynamics of Administrative Change op. cit. Vol.II, p.586.

129. Maikorema Zakari, Contribution a L'histoire des populations du Sud-Est Nigerien, p.130, n.2.

130. He played an important role, during the colonial conquest in helping the French gain the confidence of local chiefs. This role fitted the analysis by M. M. Tukur that merchants, in Hausaland helped the colonial conquerors by serving them as spies and messengers. See M.M. Tukur, The Imposition of British Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate and neighbouring states, 1897-1914: A reinterpretation of colonial sources, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1979, p.92, n.210. See also Philip Atsu Afeadie: The hidden hand of overrule: political agents and the establishment of British colonial rule in Northern Nigeria 1886-1914, Ph.D. York University, 1996.

131. All the information on Malam Yaroh are taken from: Andre Salifou: Malam Yaroh un grand negociant du Soudan Central au 19eS. November 1971 Bro 793 IRSH. Niamey.

132. Andre Salifou, Malam Yaroh op. cit.

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paid the right to coin the Maria Theresa dollars from the Vienna Treasury, made them for her colony of Erythrea with the intention of founding her economic position in the area of Ethiopia, Arabia, and Yemen where this currency was largely used. Britain also had coined these dollars from 1936 to 1961, but in 1962, Austria took back the monopoly of the currency. Andre Salifou got these information from Pr. Jean Tubiana. See Andre Salifou, Malam Yaro.

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135. Gobir see A.R. Augi p.4: Kebbi see Bello Alkali p.299; Damagaram see Andre Salifou 1977, p.485, n.60; Katsina see Bala Usman p.3; Borno see Nur Alkali p.xx; Daura see Gazetteer of Northern Provinces p.29; Sokoto Caliphate see Gazetteer of Northern Provinces p.49.

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CHAPTER II

THE JIHAD AND ITS IMPACT ON AHYAR, ADAR, DAMAGARAM AND THE WEST: 1804-1890

In this section we aim at showing the relations the Sokoto caliphate developed with the areas of the West (River Niger Zone), Ahyar, Adar and Damagaram and its dependencies. It is worth noting that these relations, as developed by the Sokoto Caliphate during the 19th century would determine considerably the manner the scholar and the people considered themselves bounded to the same destiny and developed cooperation especially in opposing colonial powers.

One of the features of relations between the jihadists and these areas was the blood and personal relations the jihadists and especially the Shehu family had with the north, particularly Ahyar. Also, the Shehu, born in Gobir Tudu (Maratta) on the 15th December, 1754, grew in this area where Tuaregs (Kel-Gress and Itessan) as well as Hausa coexisted with the Fulani, all as the talakawa of Gobir rulers. The role played by Tuaregs in the Jihad wars and in the administration of the Sokoto Caliphate will be fully considered. Also, in the Western area (Say, Gurma, Birnin Gaure) the role Fulani enclaves played in the jihad and the formation of Emirates will have proper attention.

II.1. The Place of the Sokoto Jihad Leaders in Hausaland:

Blood Relations and Religious Connections

The Shehu and his clan Torobe had many kinds of relations with Ahyar people for example, including blood relations. Bello, in his Infaq al-Maysur wrote: "It is said that we

are related to those nobles (Ahyar people) through our grand-mother Fatima, who is said to be from the descendants of the pious erudite Abdussamad the son of the saint scholar Alhaj Ahmad bn Tarqib who is known as alfila ni".[1] Bello informed us that the grave of this Abdussamad exists in Agades and is to be visited at a cemetery called Ajuh, by the west of Agades, alongside with that of other saints.[2] Also, one of the Shehu's uncles and teachers, died in Agades, returning from a pilgrimage, on Friday, April 18th, 1793.

The Shehu's relation with Agades were also intellectual. Not only that his most influential teacher malam Jibril dan Umoru was of Agades origin but even the Agades period of Shehu's intellectual history was very important. He visited many mosques which were at that period the principal centres of learning. In the Assode mosque, there were many books and ulama through whom academic issues were known, more particularly history and shari'a.[3] When he was in search of a Qamus al-Muhit (dictionary), he found it in the Abatal mosque. He came back to Degel with the Qamus. The Shehu also spent much of his time, when in Agades, in the Teggidan Tazamak mosque, where he studied with many ulama among whom was the famous Sheikh Waddirfan.[4] For this reason it was called Shehu's mosque.[5] This Agades period and the connection the Shehu had developed in the Ahyar region with the Tuareg scholars, can explain why the Tuareg community seemed to have been privileged in correspondences between the Shehu and his adherents, especially as far as the north was concerned. For instance, we have no record of correspondence between the Shehu and the Hausa of Adar or Ahyar, or the Zarma of Dosso, nor the Hausa of Damagaram. But we recorded at least five Tuareg communities which entered into contact with the Shehu, as a whole or through some of their members.

The first community was that of the Watsakawa, the group of Malam Jibril dan Umoru. Even though this community evolved in Adar (Watsakke, area of Buza) it is of Tuareg origin for it was one of the twelve Tuareg tribes that traditions said had accompanied Agabba when he moved from Ahyar to take command in Adar around 1722. This community was important because, first, the Shehu's teacher, Malam Jibril came from it and second, when the jihad started, the son of Malam Jibril Muhammadan, alongside with others went to join the jihadists, on the 18th June, 1804. Bello reported: "We were delighted at their coming."[6]

The second community was that of the Kel-Gress. This community was and still is in Gobir Tudu (Madawa area), close to the scene of the 19th century events. The most important of its members who was involved in the jihad was Malam Agali, known in the Raud al-Jinan as Shehu Malam Mujahidu Ba'Asbini. According to a tradition recorded by Djibo Hamani in 1973, Malam Agali was from the Iburubak clan of the Kel-Gress. His role in the jihad will be shown later.

The third community was that of the Kel Ferwan. The evidence of its relations with the Shehu is a letter sent to the Kel Ferwan by the Shehu in which he exhorted them to reform Islam in their country. This letter will be analysed later. These relations explained why they accompanied Sultan Muhammad al Bakri in his war against Katsina during the jihad.[7]

The fourth community was that of the Iberkoreyen, from the Attawari tribe, whose alim, Muhammad Jelani would wage a jihad in Azawagh and Adar between 1814 and 1820. It was said that since a long time the relations between the Shehu and the Jelani

community, especially the intellectual class, were known. They were in the Shadawanka area (Adar) before the jihad started and they developed relations with the Shehu "circle".[8] But the chief of the Tuareg Kel Denneg at that time, Amenokal Kattutu ag Muda, discarded the eventuality of being dispossessed of his power by the scholars. The development of the events would prove him wrong.

The fifth community was that of Tuareg community of Maganga, in Ahyar which had written to the Shehu around 1814 to do allegiance to him but more especially to seek advice on the issue of the Mahdi. One of their men, called Hamma, proclaimed himself Mahdi. It was to discard that claim and give a large view on Mahdiya that the Shehu composed his treatise, the Tahdhir al Ikhwan in 1814. The false Mahdi was finally killed.[9]

There were also individuals, who contributed in a manner or another, to the development of learning and the advent of the jihad. For instance, it is said that the Katsina flag-bearer, Umoru Dallaji had his early education with one Malam Muhammadu Ba'Asbine, who was certainly of Ahyar origin.[10] In the Gambarawa ward of Birnin Katsina, was the family of one Malam Muhammadu Batasiye (from Tasawa) whose father, Malam Muhammadu Bakone (from Konni) had moved to Tasawa from the west, whence they moved to Birnin Katsina to establish a reputation as scholars.[11] So, when the jihad started in February 1804, the jihadists army was composed of many ethnic groups, as recorded by Abdullahi ben Fudie in his Tazyn al-Waraqat:

"We are an army victorious in Islam
And we are proud of nothing but that,
Tribes of Islam - and Turubi is our clan,

our Fulani and our Hausa all united.

And among us other than these, certain

tribes joined together.

For the help of God's religion - made

up the union"[12]

But what shows the place taken by some ethnic groups of Hausaland in the jihad, came from the Raud al-Jinan which reports one of the visions of the Shehu. The Shehu was told: "You are given the best of every house in the three races, the Fulani, the Hausa, the Asben".[13]

As for the western part of present-day Niger, the Zarma country through some Fulani families, entered into contact with the jihadists in Gobir only during the jihad wars. Before that period, Zarma and Fulani were kept aside from the movement.[14] Only when the jihad began to be victorious, that some people, particularly Fulani, sometimes without any Islamic background, took the opportunity of that, to enter into contact with the jihadists to be recognized as "flag-bearers".[15] But it was very likely that the Shehu had some connections in the area between Sokoto and Masina. It is reported that he gave Ahmad Lobbo a tuta or ensign, and even a "small band" to raise the standard of revolt in Masina. Ahmad Lobbo could have come to the Shehu when the latter was at Sifawa.[16]

When he began his preaching, the Shehu journeyed through some Hausa states and sent letters to those people whom he could not visit. Also, some people wrote him in order to seek advice on some issues of the faith or to do him allegiance. We have only scanty data on correspondences between the jihad leaders and the communities of Ahyar,

Adar, Zarma country or Damagaram. What is certain is that the prolific jihadists didn't miss opportunity of corresponding with other peoples, more especially Ahyar people who were strategically important in the life of the Hausa states and where there were, according to Bello, "mallams and holymen ... in such number that God alone could count them".[17] But only three letters came to our notice between the Shehu and the Tuareg communities of Ahyar.

The first letter was written by the Shehu to the Tuareg community of Kel Ferwan more especially to one Ibrahim al Tuariq. It can be found in IRSH, Mara number 56 Niamey. It contains at the bottom the date of 1805. It was therefore written during the period when the Shehu sought here and there, aid and assistance against his enemies. What is important in this letter was that the Shehu commanded this community "to be always in relations with the Muslims, on the Muslims side" and also "to wage the jihad for jihad is an obligation for all Muslim".

This letter shows the main weaknesses of the Tuareg society in relation to Islam. The Shehu knew that Tuareg society needed a reform and he seemed very well knowledgeable about the Tuareg society what he could not get without very close acquaintances with Tuareg peoples. It can explain why, during the visits paid him by Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Bakri in 1808 for one month at Sifawa, and Sultan Muhammad Guma a year later, the Shehu insisted on the necessity of reform of mentality and religious practice in Tuareg society.[18]

The second letter was from a Tuareg Mu'alim called Shi-Summas ben Ahmed, to the Shehu. We have only the answer given by the Shehu to this letter. Shi-Summas ben

Ahmed, asked the Shehu 13 questions on the duties of the Ulama. It conformed with tradition of Ahyar people who, at any time, sought advice from the more learned Ulama of Islam on some difficult issues. The Shehu answered these questions in his treatise al-Ajwibah al-Muharrarah an al-As'ila al-Muqarrarah fi Wathiqat Shi-Shummas. This treatise can be found in the National Archives, Kaduna.[19] In his answer, the Shehu, as he said himself, gave for each question, all what was known on the subject, taking his information from great erudites.

This Shi-Summas seemed to be the one we found in the list of the companions of the Shehu, made by Abdulkadir Gidado in his book Bastal Fawa'id wa Taqribul Muqasid. In this book, his name is Al-Hajj Shi-Summas al-Tuarequi. He certainly had relations with the Shehu before the jihad and joined him when the jihad started.

The third letter is that from the community of Maganga in Ahyar, especially from one Yusuf b. Isamat to the Shehu. It was written to pay allegiance to the Shehu and to raise the issue of the Mahdiya. The Shehu, as we said it earlier, wrote a treatise to dismiss the claim of Hamma and the false Mahdi was put to death. The Tahdhir al-Ikhwan can be found in the NHRS K5/10. The letter is contained on pages 3 and 4. The fact of putting to death the false Mahdi indicates that Shehu's religious, if not political, influence in the area was strong. As for the relations with western Niger, there is evidence that correspondence letters were sent by the Shehu, especially on the eve of the jihad wars. It is reported that two manuscript copies of the Shehu's Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan were found in Say or Sinder.[20] It should be Sinder which was an important market-place visited by traders of Hausa states. The diffusion of this document was done most likely, through

traders. Say was not a big centre before the arrival of Alfa Mamman Jobbo there between 1812 and 1816. It explains why Say didn't play any important role in the Jihad wars. Also Sinder was on the roads to Masina before Say became, in the 19th century, a centre of the trade routes between Timbuktu and Gwandu. It seemed that the Wathiqat had had a large diffusion to invite people to join the jama'a, especially those people to whom the Shehu didn't pay a visit,[21] what was the case in the western Niger.

The immediate successors of the Shehu, Muhammad Bello (1817-37), Abubakar Attiku (1837-42) and Aliyu Baba (1842-59) continued this tradition of receiving letters for advice to brethren and to answer questions on legal issues.

II.2. The Participation Of Ahyar, Adar, Zarma Country And Damagaram In The Jihad, Up To The Death Of Bello (1837)

The death of Bello (1837) constituted a very important date in the history of the Sokoto Caliphate not only because he in fact largely organised militarily and politically, this caliphate, but also because after him, the sign of decline became perceptible. His immediate successor, Abubakar Attiku (1837-42), "described himself as a goat which could not carry the load of a camel, meaning Bello".[22] The events proved him right for he was killed in an encounter with Gobir in Katuru. As for Aliyu Baba, Barth described the lamentable conditions "of his caliphate and around 1845 "the situation had reached such a dangerous extent that the leading Ulama had gathered in Sokoto's mosque with a view to deposing Aliyu b. Bello for his "inefficient" handling of the affairs of the jama'a".[23] The reign of Bello was therefore the "end of an era."

Even though the history of the jihad began when the followers of the Shehu paid

him allegiance in Gudu on February 21st, 1804, this movement passed many stages in its development.

1) He preached and organised the Ummah (community). The organisation of the Ummah was done through hard preaching and writing, through education of men and women. Even the titles the jihadists gave to their works showed their commitment to education: Bayan - expounding; Diya - guiding light; Irshad - counselling; Najm - guiding star; Nasiha - advice; Ta'lim - educating; Tanbih - drawing attention to.[24] According to Ismail, this literature of the jihad "gave the jama'a a sense of identity that cut across the region and the tribe".[25] The Tazyn al-Waraqat gives an idea of the composition of the jihad army and throws more light on the multi-ethnic nature of the jihad. It stated that the common people and the nobles came to the Sheikh. So, there is no foundation for Urvoy's argument when he wrote: "The Dan Fodio followers were essentially Fulani, his like, motivated by racial pride as much as religious fanaticism".[26] He continued in the same way and sided more and more with the racial theory: "All the Fulani of the country came immediately around Dan Fodio even the pagans (Bororodji). This shows well the social and racial character of this war".[27]

2) The Hijra: It was imposed by the insecurity in Gobir territory. As the Prophet in Medina in 622, the Shehu became, after the flight to Gudu on 21st February, 1804, a religious as much as a temporal leader. The community, as soon as it was installed in Gudu, fulfilled the obligation of paying allegiance to the Shehu, for in the Masa'il Muhimma (compiled in March 1803) the Shehu wrote: "It is haram (forbidden) for the believers to remain without swearing allegiance bai'a) to a leader".[28] In fact the Shehu's

power was based on the bay'a the Ummah paid him. The Shehu stated that from the moment his people gave him bay'a, he had all the legitimacy and therefore declared: "I have taken to myself the rule of every ruler in these lands, except of him who has come to me".[29]

In the Islamic theory of authority, there is no difference between church and state, "nothing belongs to Caesar, all belongs to God". The bay'a would shape all the policy and found all the legitimacy of the caliphal authorities. The authority didn't need to impose its administration on a definite territory. The bay'a being exclusively personal promise of obedience and fidelity.[30] So, when the Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Bakri b. Muhammad al-Udala visited the Shehu at Sifawa in 1808 and paid him bay'a, this became a basis for the Shehu's successors to consider Ahyar and its dependencies (i.e. Adar) as being under their jurisdiction. That bay'a was reaffirmed by the successor of al-Bakri, Muhammad Guma. It was confirmed with Bello (1817-1837) and Abubakar Attiku (1837-42). Thus, Abubakar Attiku, writing to the Tuareg leaders of the Kel Gress and Itessan tribes said: "If they use the word bay'a, to obey me becomes compulsory on them".[31]

3) The Jihad Wars: The present Niger-Nigeria frontier passed through the kingdoms where the jihad wars were the most acute: Konni, Adar, Gobir, Katsina, and Borno. According to the Infaq al Maysur, the two first towns to be taken by the jihadists were Konni and Matankari in June 1804. These jihad wars began after the Gobir king attacked the jama'a. On several occasions the war therefore was a defensive one, as recommended by the Islamic doctrine. It was to prepare the resistance against the rulers who persecuted the Moslems that they decided to recognize the Shehu as leader of a holy war.[32] What

angered the Gobir sultan was the emigration of people to join the Shehu, some of them with their people and some by themselves alone. Even some of the Gobir army deserted to join the Shehu.

The jihad began in Konni territory, for the Konni Sultan Sofo Na Shinkafa was among those who made raids upon the jihadists. The jihad found Konni in a dynastic crisis and jealousy between the Sultan and his Dangaladima, Shuaibu. The Sultan Sofo Na Shinkafa was slain at Kwarre (Kore) and many Konni people taken as captives. After the capture of Konni the Shehu was sent 30 female captives (Kuyanga) as booty.[33] The Dangaladima Shuaibu was immediately appointed Emir of Konni being therefore the first Emir to be appointed by the jihadists.[34] He had to pay tribute to Sokoto and it is reported that he sent half the zakkat to Sokoto.[35] Shuaibu's policy of conversion to Islam was firmly resisted by the Azna of Konni who had and still have their main religious centres at Massalata and Dada-Garka. The Azna said themselves to have entered into an agreement with the Shehu, which allowed them to continue their religious practices in paying jiziya to the jihadists. The Shehu himself is said to have given great consideration to their divination. Konni traditions have it that the Shehu himself made the Azna to compete for the title of Sarkin Tsafi (the Azna chief). The ancestor of the present Sarkin tsafi of Massalata won the title.[36]

It seems that between the jihadists and the Azna there was a modus vivendi (agreement) that allowed the two parties to stay in peace even though they were of different religions. These Azna therefore gained dhimmis status vis-a-vis Sokoto. Omar Bello suggested that dhimmis status was accorded to Azna in Hausaland because of the

need of revenue and the absence of the Ahl-al-Kitab.[37] This, dhimmi status did not include mixed marriage or consumption of their food,[38] but according to Konni traditions the Shehu took the Azna in high esteem and in their part, the Azna called themselves Aznan Shehu [39] what can express a better political submission to Sokoto? In fact, politically, Konni was under the jurisdiction of Sokoto, and was supervised by the Sarkin Yaki of Binji and to the end of the 19th century by the Marafa of Godabawa.[40] It is worth noting that another change of Emir occurred during the crisis between Muhammad Bello and Abdes-Salam in 1817. It seems that Sarkin Konni chose to side with Abdes-Salam against Bello and the intercession of Aliyu Jedo was to no avail. So, Bello appointed another member of Konni dynasty, who came to him.[40bis]

The relations between the sarkin tsafi (Azna chief) and the Sarkin Konni are very ambiguous. This ambiguity manifests itself till today, through the tradition that the two chiefs cannot be at the same place together and if they do so, one of them must die in the year.[41] But above all it was a "veritable gentlemen's agreement" which took place between the jihadists and the Azna. The Sarkin Konni represented the political power engaged in international relations and imposing himself on the population whereas the Sarkin Tsafi represented the religious power controlling the activities of farming and the divination on the earth.

II.2.1. The Western Region (Kebbi-Zarma, Arewa-Gurma) from the Beginning of the Jihad to the Death of Bello: 1804-1837

In this section we aim at showing that a great part of what is presently western

Niger Republic, was part of the Sokoto Caliphate and was administered by Gwandu. The Fulani of the area, took the opportunity of the jihad wars to solve material problems, for example, the acute question of grazing grounds in the Dallol.[42] Whereas in the other areas (Bauchi, Kano, Katsina, Daura etc.) the Shehu developed relations with the leaders who would be flag-bearers during the jihad, in the western region, especially in remote areas as Zarma and Gurma zones, some learned men, most of whom were Fulani, entered into contact with the Shehu only when the jihad wars were finished or at least when the jihad cause became ascendant.

The principal centres of activities were Dosso which accepted the leadership of Kebbi to challenge the jihadists. Birnin Gaure where one Bubakar Luduje, a Fulani cleric, with the aid of Gwandu, tried to impose his rule on the Zarma and Say where an independent alim known as Alfa Mama Jobbo stayed and created a kind of Zawiya with no political ambitions. Before the arrival of Alfa Maman Jobbo, the area of Say was inhabited by the Gurmance.

a) Say

This town is linked to Alfa Maman Jobbo. As many other scholars who came into Hausaland from the west, Saliha Abubakar Alfa Maman Jobbo came to Say on his way to the holyland. Before he came to Say the Gurmance inhabited the area and it is now commonly accepted that he was not the founder of Say. But the town got all its fame from his installation there, between 1812 and 1816.[43] It is difficult to state exactly the time Say was founded nor who founded it. It is only reported that Say was rather a hamlet when Alfa Maman Jobbo came. Traditions have it that a Gurmance king,

Yenhamma (1771-1780) reached Say pursuing his opponents. This gave the idea that Say existed at that period.

The Gurmance were so identified with the right bank of the River Niger that this bank was called Gurma; according to Dioulde Laya, from Debo Lake to the Kebbi river the territory on the right bank of the River Niger witnessed the movements of population and also wars between the Gurmance, the Fulani and the Tuaregs, the latter pushing others more and more south. That situation was acute in the 19th century with the intense migration of Fulani in the area. Urvoy noted, for instance, that "a la fin du 19 siecle la region comprise entre la Sirba et le Goroubi etait saturee, des Peuls" [at the end of the 19th century the area between SIRBA and Gorubi was saturated with Fulani].[45]

Alfa Mamman Jobbo is said to have been born at Bamba, Kooro-Gounga or Jenne. The traditions are very vague on this matter.[46] His nickname Jobbo came from the habit he had to retire on a hill (called Jobbo) for his wird. He got his early religious training with his father with whom he studied the Qur'an. Only one of his early teachers is known: Alfa Banjaguri who is said to be from Tirga (now Mali). Alfa Maman Jobbo is said to have left Gao c.1815 to perform the hajj.[47]

We can infer that two important elements gave Say its importance.

1) The waves of Fulani migrations from the west, more especially Masina who would populate all the right bank of the river Niger and would take a great part in the political events of the 19th century. These migrations began since a long time but became intensive at the end of the 18th century. Each group of migrants wanted to conquer and be master of a piece of territory for his own. Bittin Kobe, coming from Bitti (near Gao)

occupied Lamorde Bittin Koji; Ferobe coming from Kunari with Gelajo, founded a new Kunari; Torobe, coming from Futa Toro, founded Torodi.[48] The migrants from Kunari introduced a new element in the area: firearms - Barth reports that almost all the Fulani of Kunari had firearms. They contributed in creating a force which could be used by the Gwandu authorities in their campaigns in Gurma. Gelajo, who founded the new Kunari with his capital at Uro-Gelajo, helped the Gwandu authorities with his horses (cavalry) and guns against the Gurma capital Botu.[49] Khalilu Abdullahi conquered Botu, thanks to this aid.

2) The installation of Alfa Maman Jobbo in Say was another. He arrived there between 1812 and 1816,[50] and therefore he stayed in an area already under the jurisdiction of Gwandu. In fact, according to jihadist literature, many expeditions were led by the jihad leaders, more especially Abdullahi ben Fudie and Bello, on the right bank of the River Niger, the Gurma territory. Between 1811 and 1848, many expeditions were despatched against Gurma. In many of these expeditions the Gwandu forces passed through Say. The first two expeditions into Gurma territory were led by Abdullahi ben Fudie, the one in 1809, after the fall of Alkalawa, the second in 1810 or early 1811. According to Abdulkader ben Al-Mustapha "in the 6th year of hijra the armies of Islam crossed the river and conquered towns and fortresses and returned prosperously and enriched with spoil."[51] Abdullahi ben Fudie, in his Tazyn al-Waraqat, stated that in the Gurma area great opposition came from Tanda and that the expedition of 1809 took place with the aid of Zarma people.[52] For this expedition the Muslim army didn't go through Say, but through Sunga where it crossed the river. Say at that period was rather a mere

hamlet and didn't raise any economic or strategic interest. The army led by Abdullahi in 1809 in Gurma territory conquered Tanda, Tana, Komba and the island of Paasi.

The second campaign against Gurma took place between the end of 1810 and the beginning of 1811. In this expedition also, Abdullah ben Fudie noted Zarma participation. He wrote: "I sent word to the people of Jarma and they collected together waiting for me. When I came up to their companies they became the vanguard of my army, and they travelled to the lands of Sambalghu from Gurma beyond the river and conquered them".[53] This second expedition passed through Say. Traditions in the area have it that Abdullahi went to Gurma through Birnin-Gaure, Kirtashi, Say, Jongwore and Sambalgu.[54] Abdullahi crossed the river at Sunga.[55]

Muhammad Bello also led an expedition to Gurma in 1811, according to the Tazyn al-Waraqat. His road is not well-known but he probably followed the footsteps of his uncle, Abdullahi.

So, when Alfa Maman Jobbo came to say, the area was already under Gwandu jurisdiction. All the right bank of the River Niger, from Say to Dori through Diaguru and Tera, was the jurisdiction of Gwandu. Alfa Maman Jobbo therefore didn't have any intercourse with the Sokoto authorities nor Gwandu. He imposed himself as an alim of repute and his reputation had nothing to do with his being a representative of Sokoto or Gwandu. Ambassador Ahmadu Umaru, a knowledgeable informant, asserted that there is no evidence (either through written document or oral traditions) to prove that Say, more especially Alfa Maman Jobo was appointed as representative of Gwandu.[56] Urvoy was responsible for the idea that Usman dan Fodio appointed Alfa Maman Jobbo as his

representative on the right bank of Niger from Labbezenga to the "W".[57] Some authors even argued that Alfa Maman Jobbo entered into relations with Usman dan Fodio in 1805 but no concrete evidence was given.[58]

Alfa Maman Jobbo never exercised political power, but only religious influence on the people who inhabited the area before he came. His installation also brought immigrants from various parts of the country into Say. Fulani, Zarma, and Hausa clustered round Say and recognized the religious influence of Alfa Maman Jobbo. The Hausa community of Say was divided between merchants, students and teachers of Quranic schools.[59]

The relations between Gwandu and Say developed after Alfa Maman Jobbo died around 1835.[60] During the reign of the son and successor of Alfa Maman Jobbo, Bubakar known as Modibo (1833-1860), the Say rulers wanted to conform the model of the time, in being appointed and therefore legitimised by Gwandu rulers. Alfa Maman Jobbo being the "uncrowned king", his successor decided to enter into the Gwandu orbit. The relations between Say and Gwandu developed when Bubakar Modibo of Say (1833-60) and Khalil Abdullahi of Gwandu were in power and it is reported that Khalil of Gwandu received the peace agreement (or allegiance) from Kunari people through Bubakar Modibo in 1833.[61] Henceforth the Gwandu Emirs made Say a stopping place in their conquest of Gurma. Following the footsteps of their father Abdullahi in 1811, his sons and successors Muhammad Kalil in 1836 and Haliru in 1848 passed through Say to conquer Gurma.[62] Many expeditions were sent against Gurma capital Botu, the last one taking place in 1848.[63] In 1835, Gurma people inflicted a serious defeat on the Muslim army and the

next year (1836) Kalil Abdullahi raised an army which the Sokoto Caliph Muhammad Bello (1817-37) reinforced with the Silsibbe and all the Konni Fulani.[64] The Muslims defeated the Gurma army at Koyanga killing 367 men.

Economically, Say was on a junction from Gurma, Yaga, Songhay and Dosso area.[65]

From the time Gwandu and Say ruling families entered into contact, their relations became very close. The Gwandu family even gave to the Alfa of Say, a copy of hand-written Qur'an by Abdullahi. This copy is kept to this day in Say and is read in the time of distress (famines, drought, calamities etc...). It is called Dogo.[66] The Alfa of Say, Bubakar Modibo took interest in opening communication between the Masina Shaykh Ahmad al-Bakkai and Sokoto through Gwandu reviving therefore the old relationships between Sokoto-Gwandu axis and Masina.[67] But Say rulers were so proud of their title of Alfa (alim) that they never took the widespread title of Emir. They are called Alfa or Alfa Ize (son of Alfa in Zarma language) to this day.

Say had an authority which was recognized in the Liptako, Torodi, Yagha and the western part of Zarma. In all these regions when a chief died the Alfa of Say enthroned his successor.[68] This is a long tradition and Urvoy reports that Say had supervision on N'Dunga whose ruler had a Khadi near him appointed by Say. The latter had also the power of appointing the chiefs of Karma and Bubon for whom it was not necessary to go to Gwandu. In 1854, Barth even reported an envoy of Say, collecting tax on the Fulani in the Gao area, on behalf of the Say Emir, Alfa Bubakar (c.1833-1860).[69]

The role of Say would become important with the development of the situation in the Dallols, more especially after 1854 as we will see it later.

b) Birnin Gaure

The key figure in the history of Dallol Bosso during the jihad movement was the family of a Fulani cleric, Bubakar Luduje. His ancestor Ali Anna, came from Masina in the different waves of migration of the 17th and 18th centuries. Before the jihad, the Zarma area was the theatre of conflicts between Zarma people and the nomads namely Fulani and Tuaregs. The jihad in this area appeared therefore as a continuation of such conflicts.[70]

Ali Anna, the ancestor of Bubakar Luduje founded Gaure in the beginning of the 18th century and stayed there for 44 years. His grandson, Bubakar Luduje taught the Qur'an to the Fulani as well as Zarma children. As soon as the jihad started in Gobir, Bubakar Luduje entered into conflicts with the Zarma. The first wave of fighting in the Dallol Bosso (Birnin Gaure area) is said to have taken place within two weeks of the jihad of the Shehu in Gobir.[71] This simultaneity of events showed that close relations had been developed between the Jama'a of Shehu and the Fulani clerics of Birnin Gaure. As put by a writer: "it is probable that Bubakar Luduje had made contact with the Fulani mallams of Gobir, including Uthman, or possibly studied under them during this period".[72] Birnin Gaure was the earliest Emirate founded in the North-west of what would be the Sokoto Caliphate. Its foundation was dated between 1804[73] and 1809.[73bis]

According to Jean Paul Rothiot,[74] when the jihad started, some Zarma chiefs from Sokorbe, Kalla, Dosso and Kiota, accepted in the name of Islam, the leadership of Bubakar Luduje; but the latter proved to be very harsh especially when he killed in a treachery, 600 Zarma nobilities. This act provoked the revolt of Zarma people who burnt his town

Gaure (or Garure) in 1808. He fled to Gwandu, Sokoto and later Say.[75] He left Say in 1817[76] and wandered between Sokoto and Gwandu until 1820[76bis] when he died. His son and successor Abul Hassan came back to the Dallol and founded a new capital: Tamkalla.[77]

The rise of Bubakar Luduje as leader in the Dallol Bosso had different interpretation according to sources referred to. Bello Alkali, for example, wrote: "when the wars of the jihad began the leader of the Fulani of Dallol Boboye, Abubakar Luduje, travelled to Usman dan Fodio and was appointed Lamido Zarma with authority up to Tillabery region".[78] Dioulde Laya argued that the Emirate of Birnin Gaure dated from the expedition led by Abdullahi b. Fodio in Gurma in 1809. When returning from the expedition, Zarma muslims paid him allegiance and he appointed Bubakar Luduje, Emir of Zarma. In the Sokoto manuscripts of this period the terms Amir Jabarma, Amir Jarma and Amir Dallol appeared.[79] Speaking to Bubakar Luduje, Abdullahi dan Fodio outlined the limits of Tamkalla Emirate: "The boundaries of your state towards Gwandu are "Dogon Datchi" on the eastern bank of Dallol Mauri, on the west at Sansane Hausa, on the north at Tounfalis and on the south at Tanda".[79bis] The situation in the Dallols was relatively calm all the time the Shehu was alive and Bubakar Luduje expelled from his capital Garure. Until the death of the Shehu, Kebbi respected the aman truce it signed with the jihadists in 1807. But after 1817 Kebbi raised the banner of tawaye (rebellion) and brought into its orbit, the Zarma of Dosso and the Arewa of Tsibiri, especially. When the jihadists killed the Sarkin Kebbi Samaila Karari in 1831 and defeated Zarma-Kebbi coalition at Zagora in the same year, the balance of power was in Gwandu's favour. This

situation gave Gwandu the opportunity of controlling Kebbi-Zarma areas and for almost 20 years Kebbi and its allies were left with no initiative.

c) The Other Emirates of the Right Bank of the River Niger

When the jihad started, the most important religious personality on the right bank of the River Niger was Alfa Sory Beldo Hore, installed at Tirga. He never stayed at Neni contrary to what scholarly literature argues. He was the teacher of alfa Maman Jobbo, who came and stayed at Neni after he sought and obtained permission from Alfa Sory Beldo Hore. Alfa Sory visited Sifawa to secure a peace agreement and a flag. But instead of being appointed himself, he preferred to remain a purely religious leader and agreed on the appointment of his nephew, Useini Muhammad Tako, as the first Emir of Lamurde Bittimkoji.[80] According to Hassane Baka, Alfa Sory didn't travel himself to Sifawa but sent a delegation under the leadership of Usman Tako and the latter was appointed Emir of Bittimkoji, being therefore the first Emir appointed by the jihadists on the right bank of the River Niger. This development took place in 1806.[81] He received as insignia, a turban, a sword and a flag.[82] His capital was at Tirga where Alfa Sory Beldo lived and died.

After Usman Tako, the Fulani of Torodi (the Torobe) in 1810 through Mu'adh, and those of Liphako in 1809 through Ibrahim Sa'id, got in touch with Usman dan Fodio to seek for prayers and appointments. They were given flags, swords, and spears as a token.[83] The Emirate of Kunari was established c.1833 by Gelajo after he fled from Hamdallahi where he led a revolt (1824-1825) against Ahmad Lobbo. Gelajo was resettled by Gwandu authorities who established for him, the Emirate of Kunari.[84] The

establishment of Emirate of Kunari, was also an attempt by Muhammad Bello (1817-37) to stir up opposition to the Hamdallahi authorities who revoked the bay'a they made to Sokoto after the death of Shehu.[85]

The Emirate of Youri was cut off from that of Lamorde Bittim-Koji. The Emir of Lamorde, Shuaibu Maman Jawwa (1846-1873), owing to his satisfaction with the charms given him by an alim of repute, Nuhu Ali, decided to give him eight villages (Damari, Gauki Balma, Gorubanda, Warkere, Petadiuga, Saga-Gurma, Timere and Yuri) to administer them for himself.[86]

d) The Situation in the Rikon-Kebbi (Zarma-Arewa-Kebbi Zone)

When Birnin Kebbi was taken by the jihadists in April 1805, the Zarma of Dosso were already in conflicts with the Birnin Gaure Fulani led by Bubakar Luduje and the capital of Arewa Matankari was already conquered by the jama'a since June 1804.

Since the time of his preaching tours, Usman dan Fodio's support in Kebbi area came from the Fulani nomads of Dallol Fogha and the dynasty of Jinju who claimed descent from Ahmad Baba.[87]

One of the most important effects of the jihad in Arewa was political unification. Before the jihad Arewa had known no central leadership, but only a series of independent principalities which split at any political crisis, as for example, at the end of the 18th century when one Baba, a son of Sarkin Arewa, evinced from Matankari came to Runkundum area to found a new sarauta. But some- time after this sarauta itself split and the Runkundum became three chieftaincies: Takassaba (with the villages of Beibei, Giwaye, Gesheme), Katarma (Dumega and Nassarawa) and Lido.[88] The jihad and the

different developments linked to it, would favour the emergence of a centralised power in the Arewa.

As for the Zarma people of Dosso, the jihad had as consequence, their separation with the western Zarma (N'Dunga, Kure, Kollo) who were allied to the Say-Gwandu axis. The second consequence was political. When the jihadists defeated the Kebbi-Zarma coalition at Zagora in 1831, they imposed their domination on the area for over 20 years (1831-1854). The jihadists disturbed the mechanism of succession to the throne of Dosso. Before the jihad, seven families (in Zarma: Fu) succeeded each other to the throne. In 1831, the jihadists appointed Bukar Sanda from Tombokire instead of a prince from Kwarategi whose turn it was.[89] Bukar Sanda is said to be a learned man. Even the title of Zarmakoy, disappeared and was replaced by that of Amiru (Emir). Bukar Sanda reigned as a Gwandu protege from 1831 to 1854. He collected the tribute (albarka) and brought it each year to Gwandu.[90]

So, the alliance between Kebbi, Zarma and Arewa, apart from ethnic and historical background, was, above all, to deal with prevailing danger. Each of the parties felt the threat of Gwandu domination and the Zarma and Arewa decided to seal their faith to that of Kebbi. The latter, owing to the death of the Shehu and the outbreak of various revolts in the caliphate (Abdes-Salam at Kwarre, Banaga dan Bature in Zamfara) revoked the truce (aman) signed with Sokoto in 1807 and raised the banner of tawaye in 1817. So, the alliance between Kebbi and Zarma-Arewa began at this period. Before entering into alliance with Kebbi, Dosso was reluctant until the Sarkin Kebbi sent warriors and master masons in Dosso to erect a wall for the protection of the town. Kebbi also helped Dosso

against raids by Tuaregs and its wars against the Fulani of Boboye (Dallol Bosso). It is worth noting that Dosso was not at that time the capital of Zarma, for according to Andre Salifou, only during the reign of Zarmakoy Alfa Atta (1890-1896) and Attiku (1896-1902) Dosso became the definite capital of the Zarma kingdom.[91] Also, the alliance against the jihadists was led in Dosso, not by the Zarmakoy, at the time a Gwandu protege but by a prince, Dauda who was also a cleric of some repute.

The jihadists wanted to supervise the Arewa country and they installed Aliyu Jedo, the Sarkin yaki at Binji to deal with all kinds of trouble Arewa country could stir up. It is reported that Arewa paid tribute to the Sarkin Yaki, which amounted to 100 cowries per family.[92] But revolt occurred in Arewa especially in relation with the tawaye led by Kebbawa. In 1832, for instance, Muhammad Bello (1817-37) had to lead an expedition against Takassaba, the capital of Runkundum and soon after him the Emir of Gwandu, Muhammad b. Abdullahi led another expedition, which shows that Bello was not fully successful. The Emir of Gwandu forced Sumana, the Takassaba ruler to flee to Beibei.[93] The principal figures of the resistance to the jihadists were Samna Karfe of Tchibiri (in Arewa); Dauda Bugaram a prince of Nikki (Dosso) and Yakubu Nabame (Sarkin Kebbi 1849-54). In Arewa Tchibiri exercised leadership on the other chieftaincies especially on matters affecting relations of Arewa with Sarkin Kebbi. Relations with Kebbi, as far as tribute or defence were concerned, were carried out through the Samna of Tchibiri.[94]

There was on the Arewa-Zarma frontier, a little emirate with no great political significance: Jinju. The founder of this emirate is said to be one Adde, who was the descendant of one Ahmad Baba.[95] Jinju traditions have it that Adde entered into contact

with the Shehu when the latter was at Degel, before 1800, and was told by the Shehu: "spread your religious power over the west, and here we rule over the east."[56] Adde was later confirmed Amir Jinju when he went to Sokoto in c.1814 and was given a garment (riga), a turban (rawani) and an over-coat (al-kibba) as a token of appointment. Adde reigned from 1810 to 1845. But Jinju was a very small emirate to take a significant role in the general pattern of relations between Gwandu in one hand and Kebbi coalition on the other. Thus, in 1854, when Barth decided to pass through Jinju, the Emir of Tamkalla advised him "to avoid this place, which only of small size, and not strong enough to follow a certain line of policy, was open to the intrigues of friends as well as enemies".[57]

II.2.2. The Jihad In Ahyar-Adar and Gobir

Areas Up To The Death Of Bello (1837)

What is important here is how the jihad affected the areas of Ahyar (where the jihad wars didn't take place), Adar (through the exportation of jihad by Muhammad Bello) and Gobir areas where the Gobir and Katsina dynasties took refuge after they were toppled by the jama'a.

a) The Role Of Ahyar In The Jihad

Even though Ahyar played an important role in the Shehu's intellectual training and the Shehu developed correspondences with some Ahyar communities, Ahyar Sultan kept aside from the Shehu affairs until the fall of Alkalawa, on the 3rd october, 1808 which showed that the jama'a was the winning side. Even though Bello reported that the Shehu and Muhammad al-Bakri developed an uninterrupted correspondence, the latter visited the former only in 1808 when the Shehu was at Sifawa. This was a consequence of the

jihadists' victories.

Two important victories by the jihadists changed the pattern of relations in Hausaland. The fall of Birnin Kebbi on the 13th April, 1805 and the fall of Alkalawa on the 3rd October, 1808. These victories strengthened the jihad armies and their confidence in the divine mission of the jama'a. From that time the jama'a became the winning side and the Tuareg attitude, consequently, changed, shifting more and more to the Shehu. Even the Kebbi Fulani moved to Shehu only after the fall of Birnin Kebbi when they saw the Muslim cause to be on the ascendent.[98]

Muhammad al-Bakri, the Ahyar Sultan (1797-1809) went to the Shehu at Sifawa and paid him bay'a (allegiance). According to Muhammad Bello, he stayed there "up to a month, observing and absorbing the ways of the Sheikh". Al Bakri played an important role, not only militarily but also in the historiography of the Sokoto Caliphate. The information he supplied Bello with, has been very important in writing the Infaq al-Maysur. He showed his knowledge of the people of Bilad al-Sudan, and indicated the coptic origin of the Gobirawa. Muhammad al-Bakri was also the instigator of a new title; that of Sarkin Sudan, title given to Bello by Shehu at his suggestion.[99] The Ahyar Sultan promised to give all necessary aid to the jihadists, to reform Islam in his land, but he died prematurely in the jihad wars in Borno.[100] Before his death, he helped the jihadists in the war against Katsina. In fact in 1807, when Sarkin Katsina Maremawa Muhammad died, the Sultan of Ahyar and his Kel Ferwan were in Katsina area waging war in the Shehu's side and Muhammad Bello reports that after the appointment of Magajin Haladu "the Ahyar Emir and Umoru Dallaji stood against him, and killed him". Al-Bakri and his Kel

Ferwan warriors, waged the jihad in Katsina through Borno where he died in 1224 A.H. (1809). When in Adar, before going to Sifawa, Muhammad al-Bakri commanded his subject to repent and to cease their hostilities towards the Muslims, not to go in war against them.[101]

When he returned to Agades, al-Bakri wrote to his neighbours about the ways of the Shehu and what he saw and knew. The most important ruler to whom al-Bakri wrote about the jihad in Hausaland was the Morocco Sultan Mulay Suleman (1792-1822) who replied in two emphatic letters. Al-Bakri sent his correspondence to Mulay Suleman through a Sheikh, called Usman b. Muhammad b. Mansur, a virtuous, learned and sufi man from the people of Tuat.[102] He was probably the one who brought back the answers and found al-Bakri already dead. In his replies (in two letters, one for the Ahyar Sultan and the other for the Shehu) the Moroccan Sultan seemed to understand that the Shehu's jihad occurred in Ahyar.[103] For instance, he wrote: "(Your letter) informed us about the condition of the pious erudite, Master Uthman b. Muhammad b. Salih who established the minaret of Islam in your town."[104] The Morocco Sultan also sent a seal to al-Bakri,[105] which also seem to show that the Ahyar Sultan wanted to be recognized as a Muslim ruler. Mulay Suleman knew about Ahyar tradition of learning and he called al-Bakri: "our brother in Allah's cause, the descendant of Sultans and great Caliphs".

From the time Muhammad al-Bakri travelled to Sifawa and paid allegiance to Shehu, Ahyar region and its dependency of Adar became part of the Caliphate, or we can say they came under the suzerainty of the Shehu. From that time, the nature of al-Bakri's power changed; it became a power of the jama'a even though no flag had been awarded

to the Ahyar Sultan and no war had been waged in the area. Two important elements transformed this power into a power of the jama'a.

The first, there was the bay'a (allegiance) paid by Muhammad al-Bakri to the Shehu. The bay'a is a personal promise of obedience and fidelity to an Imam of the Muslim Community even if the latter had not established his influence over a determined geographical territory, which was the case with the Shehu at that period.[106] The Raudal-Jinan reports that after the hijra the Shehu said: "I have taken to myself the rule of every ruler in these land, except of him who has come over to me.[107] The Ahyar Sultan, in travelling to Sokoto, confirmed his power and gave him some legitimacy in the eyes of Ahyar ulama, and legality towards the Shehu.

The second element was the number of ulama who accompanied the Ahyar Sultan to Sifawa. There were numerous scholars with al-Bakri and he went with them to Sifawa to show the Shehu his commitment to Islam. The Shehu respected Ahyar people because of tradition of learning in this area. Muhammad Bello reported in the Infaq-al-Maysur that "there were mallams and holymen in the country of Ahyar in such numbers that God alone could count them".[108]

Between the Shehu and the Ahyar Sultan, there was an exchange of promises to help each other in the way of God. The promises and demands from the Shehu would be reiterated to Muhammad Guma Nasiredin, the successor of al-Bakri, when he visited the Shehu a year later. The Shehu promised spiritual and military aid to Muhammad Guma in his effort to preserve the shari'a. The Shehu said: "I shall continue to pray against whosoever contradicts you that He should protect me and you from those who are

opposed to truth, the supporters of falsehood and followers of passion. Whenever you invite my jama'a to jihad against a group that contradicts you in religious matters or hinders the execution of Allah's laws or His rights they will answer your call and come to your succour until you subdue the crisis. Allah willing".[109]

But the Shehu since then, granted some autonomy to Ahyar Sultans for Bello reported: "He withdrew the hands of his viziers from the affairs of their people and left them to administer themselves". The Shehu also requested for the safety of trade routes and the transfer of Suzerainty to him of some territories close to Sokoto. The Ahyar people responded in the affirmative and submitted.[110] This shows clearly the nature of the relations entered into by Muhammad Guma. The transfer of Suzerainty was also reported by Johnston: "During his (Guma's) visit a treaty had been negotiated whereby the new Emir had undertaken to keep open the trade routes and to transfer Suzerainty to Shehu, of certain northern towns which the Tuaregs had hitherto controlled".[111] And Johnston concluded: "In this way the distant oasis of Air and the intervening region of Adar had become parts of the Empire".[112]

The jihad leaders asked the Ahyar Sultan to reform Islam in his land and to improve the Tuareg way of life especially concerning the impeachment of rulers without any reason. But the jihad leaders were very careful not to offend Ahyar mallams. Bello addressed them in very polite terms: "Our aim in this speech is but counselling and warning you. You know your conditions better ... You are more appropriate since you know your affairs and conditions better than us. The owner of a house knows its nooks and corners better" and Bello even awaited reciprocity from Ahyar mallams: "You should

also not hesitate to counsel us because believers are the guardians of each other; they exhort each other to righteousness and disapprove what is evil".[113]

From what we saw we can infer that all the relations the jihad leaders developed with Ahyar were through correspondence. It was only when Al Kalawa fell that the Ahyar Sultan al-Bakri, decided some Tuareg communities, particularly the Kel Ferwan to engage physically in the jihad. Speaking about Muhammad al-Bakri, Bello wrote: "Whenever I remember him, our friend, tears of grief come to my eyes. My heart is filled with sorrow. To the end of my life I shall remember him. My friends, mourn for his loss and be sorrowful, but of death it is no use complaining".[114]

In the crisis between Muhammad Bello (1817-1837) and Abdes-Salam, Ahyar played an important role diplomatically and militarily. Bello reported in the Sard-al-Kalam, concerning Abdes-Salam: "The Emir of Air (Ahir) wrote to him, and the brethren Ahmed and Hassan, sons of the Figi (Doctor of Law) Ahmed Akki, and they advised him most wisely, but he did not accept it".[115] When Muhammad Bello and Abdes-Salam engaged in military confrontation, the Ahyar Sultan Muhammad Guma sent a contingent to Muhammad Bello and the latter crushed Abdes-Salam easily.[116] This military reinforcement arrived Sokoto on 27 of Safar, i.e. mid-January, 1818.[117]

b) <u>The Jihad in the Adar Region and its Immediate Consequences</u>

Since the defeat of Kebbi by the Ahyar prince Agabba in 1674, Adar became a province of Ahyar and the ruling dynasty in Adar, founded by Agabba c.1722, was a branch of that of Ahyar. But the Tuaregs living in Adar (Lisawan, Itessan, Kel Gress etc.) who were involved in the appointment of Sarkin Adar, had some independence towards

Ahyar and were not fully responsible before the Ahyar Sultan. They were also very close to the southern polities, namely Gobir (on the territory of which Kel Gress stayed), Zamfara (where they bought grains and pastured their herds), Kebbi and others. With the advent of the jihad, the Tuaregs sided with Gobir not only because of close relations developed before, but also because Gobir seemed to be the winning side for some mallams, and chiefs considered that the "Shehu's people were not capable of anything against them because most of his followers were poor people and knew nothing of war, at all".[118] Nevertheless, some Tuareg ulama chose to go with the Shehu and they played an important role in the jihad.

In the time of the Shehu's hijra, Adar was ruled by al-Mustafa. He is said to have told his children: "a light will reveal itself in the south" and that they had to go and join it.[119] He therefore went to Gudu to see the Shehu and left his two sons Muhammad and Ahmed Bida with the Shehu.

Traditions have it that Shehu Usman dan Fodio had toured Adar preaching: "Shehu dan Fodio, returning from Toro had been welcomed east of Tawa by the women. He thanked them for their gallantry and blessed them. The men, once reached by the news came before and paid him allegiance. Many Tawayawa, horsemen or bowmen joined the Shehu's army for ever."[120] But no written document of the jihadist literature mentioned Shehu as having preached in Adar. These traditions show the frustration of Adar people for not being visited by the Shehu. At the time the jihad started Adar was in political crisis. The throne went from hand to hand particularly between al-Mustafa and Hamidin. Everyone wanted to be backed by an exterior force in the tradition of Ahyar where Hausa

states and Borno used to interfere in the dynastic crises. The Adar dynasty split into two branches: one led by al-Mustafa joined the Shehu's side whereas the other, under Hamidin, junior brother of al-Mustafa, went with Gobir. The dynastic crisis prevented Adar from giving great support to the Shehu. And the important role fell on some individuals, more especially Tuaregs of Adar - Gobir Tudu frontier who played an important role in the jihad. Most of these individuals were ulamas, the most important of them was Sheikh Malam Mujahidi Ba'Asbine known as Agali. A tradition recorded by Djibo Hamani stated that Agali was from the Iburubak clan of the Kel Gress tribe.[122] He was with the Shehu since Degel, before the hijra. When the Gobir army plundered Gimbana, Agali was "greatly upset and infuriated at the news".[123] Agali also conveyed a letter from Muhammad Bello to the Shehu in a critical period, when Yunfa was planning to raid Degel.[124] During the hijra, Agali, who carried on his camel all the Shehu's documents, "called on the Tuaregs to assist Shehu in his plight, and defend him from what his enemies might do to him".[125] Agali strengthened his relations with the Shehu family in giving his daughter, Fatima in marriage to Muhammad Bello.[126] When the jihad war started, he led a contingent of Adarawa of whom Muhammadan, the son of Mallam Jibril bn Umar, to Gudu, where they arrived on the 18th June, 1804. Muhammad Bello reported: "We were delighted at their coming".[127]

The Tuareg chiefs sided with Gobir whereas the Ineslemen (learned men) were with the Shehu. In March 1806, in the battle of Fafara (Zamfara) between Namoda and the Gobir alliance, Adar Tuareg chiefs came with Gobir. Sarkin Adar Hamidin himself came to Fafara leading the Adar army, Amenokal (chief) Zodi led the Kel Gress and Agumbulu

Azzawa, replacing Agumbulu Assadik killed at Alwassa in November 1805, led the Itessan. They all had been defeated by Namoda at Zurmi. At the same period, some Kel Agalal Tuaregs from Tajaye came to seek peace with the Shehu. Bello accused them of duplicity.[128]

Apart from Gobir, Adar Tuaregs had relations with Kebbi which was another enemy of the jama'a. It is reported that Sarkin Kebbi entered into contact with some Ahyar and Adar Tuaregs through the chief of Alwassa, Gududu, who was a friend of Agumbulu Assadik, the Kel Gress chief and Sarkin Adar Hamidin. Before the encounter at Alwassa, the Adar army and the Kel Gress joined the Gobir and Kebbi armies at Dagawa near Alwassa. The Kel Gress chief, Assadik was killed,[129] but the jihadists lost over one thousand men and most of them learned.

When Muhammad al-Bakri decided to go to the Shehu in 1808, he did that against the advice of Adar Tuaregs especially the Lissawan.

To bring the Tuaregs definitely on Sokoto's side, Bello tried to export the jihad movement in Adar through one Attawari alim, Muhammad Jelani. This jihad of Muhammad Jelani occurred after the death of Shehu (20th April, 1817). Its importance in Adar-Sokoto relations is that it allowed Bello to interfere more and more in Adar's affairs and to have a relief since the attention of the Tuareg nobles turned towards Jelani who proclaimed a jihad in their territory. The Tuaregs used to harass the Caliphate of Bello and it is reported that the latter had set "aside special days to offer special prayers against the Tuareg brigands".[130]

Whereas for the Imajeghen (noble Tuaregs) the Shehu's jihad was a somewhat

remote matter, far from their territory, the Jelani jihad was domestic. They therefore preoccupied themselves with this internal event and, Bello through Muhammad Jelani, tried to reform the Tuareg society, particularly concerning their settlement and their islamic practices.

Muhammad Jelani was born in c.1777 in Azawak, north of Adar. At thirty, he was the most famous erudite of Azawak. Between 1809 and 1814 he fortified at Kureya (east of Tawa)[131] and prepared his movement of reform. The noble Tuaregs knew that Jelani developed relations with the Shehu's "circle". But the Amenokal of the Kel Dinnik, Kattutu ag Mudda, never thought that the Ibarkoreyen (Jelani's clan) could dare to dispossess him of power.[132]

When Jelani began to preach he gained some success. Rumours developed that Jelani was a wali and the Amenokal decided to check the matter. He sent Imam Isuf ag Samatu to investigate. The Imam gathered at Shadawanka, an Assembly of all the Kel Dinnik erudites. For three days, the scholars questioned Jelani on Islam, the foundations of a theocratic state and many other questions. Jelani defeated them and the Imam Isuf ag Samatu decided to side with him. The Imam addressed the Assembly in these terms:

"In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. Al-Jelani I follow you in the new way you want to pave, for you will be the one who will save Islam, relegated to the background in our area. I ask all Muslims to follow you".[133] Jelani knew that he had the support of the Sokoto authorities and his first action took example from the Shehu. He wrote a letter to all Tuareg chiefs which reads:

"I can no more accept that Islam be abandoned like that. I proclaim that there is

only one God and Muhammad is His Prophet. I will wage the jihad to the Imajeghen (Kaffirs). There is much injustice with the Imajeghen aristocracy".[134]

The Tuareg chiefs tore the letter and answered him in a very crude language. Jelani began the conquest of Adar and Azawak and between 1814 and 1821, he was the most powerful figure of the area north of Sokoto. He is said to have imposed a tribute of 50 cowries on each individual.[135] The Jelani regime was very harsh and lacked pragmatism. Yet, Muhammad Bello (ruled from 1817 to 37) tried through many letters,[136] to temper his energy and gave him advice on how to deal with the nomads. But Jelani's manner in handling the matter caused problems and his rigidity about the application of the principles of Islam, got him numerous enemies. He was finally defeated by coalition led by a Timisgidda Tuareg, Ibra ag Alwali, around 1821. According to Murray Last, the Jelani jihad was part of the Sokoto jihad because of the intervention of Bello and also because the Jelani war opposed pro and anti-Sokoto elements.[137]

In 1821, when Jelani was defeated, he took refuge in Sokoto together with his supporters, the chiefs of Kolloma Dawaki, the chief of Kalfu Nabirni, Sarkin Adar Malam and his brother Yakuba and many other anonymous supporters.[138] Jelani reappeared in the Gawakuke battle of Tuesday, 29th March, 1836 on the Bello's side. Some of his followers returned to Adar and Azawak, but he, himself, died near Sokoto in Dundaye district.[139] Jelani was recorded in Sokoto history as the one "who worked for the splendour of Islam".

The war which Bello engaged in with Gobir made him to have a close watch on the northern regions of the Sokoto Caliphate. But the real domination of Bello over the

southern part of Adar began after the Gawakuke battle (March 1836), when he defeated Ibra ag Alwali, who at that time imposed on Adar, the Sarkin Gobir Ali and the Sarkin Katsina Rauda, the two latter having been even killed. From that time Bello became the Adar suzerain, having even the power of appointing Sarkin Adar. According to Francis Nicolas, the first Sarkin Adar appointed by Bello was the Sarkin Adar Yakuba.[140] He sent as tribute to Sokoto, each year, a camel and the Sokoto Caliph, in his turn, sent him a rich cloth.[141] Clapperton reported that Adar paid to Sokoto, tribute "in bullocks, sheep, camels and a coarce kind of cloth of cotton"[142]

Being the Adar suzerain, Bello granted permission to Kel-Gress Tuaregs to settle in south-eastern Adar, and to assure protection to Adarawa peasants from attacks by the Ulliminden (north-western Tuaregs). The Kel-Gress chiefs had right to take "a measure of millet" on each family for the protection they provided. This policy was implemented by Bello only when the Kel Gress proved to be a military force which he could use against the Gobirawa. According to Francis Nicolas, the villages which fell under Kel Gress supervision were Buza, Jibale, Takassaba, Laba and Mansala. The Sarkin Adar Yakuba accepted the fact.[143]

Before 1836, the territories controlled by Sokoto were those transferred to the Shehu by Muhammad Guma in 1810 when he visited him. These territories were taken from the Sarkin Magori and Sarkin Mambe. The Shehu gave these territories to two great Sheikhs of the Tuaregs: Sheikh Wassahar and Sheikh Ammudur Shibo. These Sheikhs were the most influential of the Kel Gress and this act shows Shehu's commitment to religious matters. Two important reasons led the Shehu to undertake this policy.

The first reason was to reward his helpers among the Tuareg ulama. The second was to appoint in this area, rich in distinguished warriors, new authorities who owed their power to him only and became therefore his representatives, "his eyes and ears" in this always threatening region.[144] These ulama dealt directly with Sokoto and the Sarkin Adar had nothing to say in their undertakings.

Bello also had some physical control over Adar, and the Kash-fu-wal Bayan reported raids carried out by Bello in Adar during the rainy season c.1817. Also, Last reported that in April 1824, when a band of Tuaregs sacked a town in Adar, Bello introduced an edict ordering all the Tuaregs of the tribe involved out of the area.[145]

In all the correspondences addressed to them, Sokoto reminded the Sheikhs that they owed their situation to their religious devotion to the jihad and that if they failed to perform these ideals they should be removed.[146] When Sheikh Wasshar died, Bello, without referring to anyone, decided to hand over the territories to the son of Sheikh wasshar, Mahmood. He only wrote to Sarkin Magori to inform him that the territories were handed over to Wasshar's son Mahmood to render justice.[147]

c) The Katsina and Gobir Dynasties' Movements to the North

In February - March 1808, Umoru Dallaji became the master of Katsina town and the dynasty of Gidan Korau, led by Magajin Haladu, wandered to the North and the Sarki ended his life in a well at Tsirkaw.[148] Finally, Dan-Kassawa (1816-1830) installed himself in Maradi and tried to reconquer the Birni. Two important points are to be made here:

The first is that in going to Maradi, the Gidan Korau dynasty only shifted to the northern Katsina but did not abandon its territory for Maradi and Tassawa had been

integrated to Katsina since the 18th century.[149] According to Bala Usman, Maradi was abandoned in the late 18th century owing to wars with Gobir.[150]

The second is that long before the jihad, the Maradi area was a shelter for exiled princes.[151]

When the jihad was at its peak and the Hausa dynasties toppled by the jihadists, three important dynasties migrated to the north and found refuge in Maradi area. The Gidan Korau dynasty of Katsina, the Gobir dynasty after the fall of Alkalawa (3rd October, 1808) and the Kutumbawa of Kano. All these dynasties have even today their descendants in the Maradi area.[152] The Katsina dynasty in Maradi, the Kutumbawa, descendants of Sarkin Kano, Alwali, are in Maradu (few kilometres west of Maradi town) and the Gobir dynasty in Tibiri (near Maradi). All these dynasties wandered for some times in the area before taking permanent residence there. The Katsina dynasty, for example, under the leadership of Dankassawa, went even to Damagaram where it stayed for some time before coming to Maradi and beginning to harass the jihadists.

As for the Gobir dynasty, it scattered after Alkalawa fell and Sarkin Gobir Yunfa killed. Salihu dan Babari, the leader of Gobir princes, fled to Adar whence he returned only in 1812/13 to raise the banner of the revolt against Sokoto.[153] According to Habu Magaji of Maradi, after Alkalawa the Gobir princes led by Salihu went to Dakurawa. The Fulani pursued them and killed Salihu.[154] After Salihu, Gwanki dan Kura Gado founded Gawon Gazau (5 kilometres east of Sabon Birnin) and began to harass Sokoto in 1818. He died in 1820-1821 and Ali dan Yakubu was appointed. Ali was disappointed by Gobir princes when he signed a truce (aman) with the Fulani and the war-party of Gobir princes

appointed his Dangaladima Jibon ta Uba as Sarkin Gobir at Maradi.[155] The Gobirawa repudiated the aman in 1835.[156] At that period, Tsibiri became the capital of the resistant Gobir and, Sarkin Gobir Ali, having been killed in the Gawakuke battle, Mayaki was appointed. He gave Tsibiri its reputation.

Before this period, since the death of the Shehu on the 20th April, 1817, the Caliphate was confronted by a series of revolts and Gobir profited from this state of insecurity to harass the Caliphate despite the ribats established by Muhammad Bello. On Tuesday, 29th March 1836, Muhammad Bello (1817-37) decided to have a final show-down with the Gobirawa and attacked them at Gawakuke. Sarkin Gobir Ali dan Yakubu (1821-1836) and Sarkin Katsina Rauda (1830-1836) were killed whereas their Tuareg allies led by Ibra ag Alwali scattered.

Since the early days of his caliphate, Bello tried to check the revolts and all kinds of harassment from the north (be it Tuareg aggression or Gobir attacks) by establishing ribats as strongholds to deal with all kinds of challenge of military nature. Apart from Wurno, the ribat of Bello,[157] other places like Isa and Lajinge were given ribat status to deal with the tawaye.

To reconcile himself with the Gobirawa, Bello even posted his sons by Katembale,[158] to the ribats on the frontier with Gobir.[159] He put Fodio in charge of the ribat of Lajinge, thinking that he would be able to reconcile the Gobirawa with the Fulani. It is even said that Fodio had been chosen by the Gobirawa, but he was finally to be removed for disgraceful behaviour.[160]

The Kash-fu-wal-Bayan reports that Bello conducted 47 raids during his Caliphate,

12 of which were against Kebbi and some against Adar.[161]

When Bello died (Thursday, 26th October, 1837) his successor Abubakar Attiku described himself as "a goat which could not carry the load of a camel".[162]

As far as the Gidan Korau dynasty was concerned, its relations with the Emirs of Katsina, far from being based only on conflicts, were also hinged on economic and social preoccupations, more especially when we consider these relations regarding the populations of the two areas. Even at the political level, we can attest to the fact that the wars between the two Katsinas, did not constitute very important factor of relations until the reign of Dan Mari (1836-43) in Maradi; it was not a perpetual fact after, and the two Katsina were not every time at each other's throat.

Two important points are to be made:

The first, the Katsina dynasty was not a pagan one, but a syncretist which was overthrown by Muslim clerics in majority Fulani. This is shown by the tradition of learning developed in Katsina since the 15th century. The conflict between the Gidan Korau and the Caliphate was largely political.

The second point is that the Gidan Korau dynasty had support in Kasar Katsina, as well as in Birnin Katsina itself. This is what facilitated its raids, particularly as regards that of Dan Mari (1836-43). Even the Dallazawa, after the period of serious threat and the first generation of rulers, recognized the Gidan Korau dynasty and called them Sultans of Katsina or Amir Katsina in addressing them. Moreover, many people who were dissatisfied with their Emir, fled to Maradi, and, even the Emir of Katsina, Saddiku (1836-44), fled from Katsina and joined the Gidan Korau dynasty and engaged in the tawaye.

When the Gidan Korau dynasty, under the leadership of Dan Kassawa (1816-1830) established itself in the Maradi area in 1819, this had two important consequences developed for the area:

The first consequence was the installation in the area of Maradi of one of the leading mallams of Birnin Katsina al-Haj Babba who chose to follow the Gidan Korau dynasty and to seal his faith to that of the dynasty. Traditions differ on the time Mallam al-Haj Babba arrived Maradi. Some informants claimed that al-Haj Babba was with Magajin Haladu when the latter left Birnin Katsina, whereas others argued that he came to Maradi only after the installation of Dan Kassawa there.[163] Be it as it may, this al-Haj Babba was the ancestor of the present Imams of Maradi. They still continue to perpetuate the tradition of learning in Maradi.

The second consequence is that the installation of the dynasty led to the gathering of people here, the clearing of the forest, and the emergence of large and often fortified villages.[164] The installation of Dan Kassawa in Maradi area was in itself a victory over the Dallazawa, for their representative in the area, Mani Asha, was killed and beheaded by the Anna of Maradi valley before Dan Kassawa agreed to lead the resistance. The intervention of the Anna in a conflict presented hitherto as religious must incite the researchers to put the problem in a more adequate perspective. Their act was more of a revolt against exactions than for religious reason. The attitude of the Katsina population towards Maradi rulers was fully demonstrated in the famous conflict between the Katsina Emir, Saddiku (1836-44) and Sarkin Maradi, Dan mari (1836-43). After Umoru Dallaji died in June 1836, his son Saddiku was appointed Emir of Katsina and he began to harass the

people of the areas who had joined the tawaye, and that made more people to flee to the north. In his struggle against Saddiku, Dan Mari got support from the ulama of Matazu, some warriors from Maska and in Birnin Katsina itself, from "some of the mallaman Gambarawa".[165]

It is said that Dan Mari got the support of Katsina people by bribing them, sending them gift secretly. When he planned to attack Katsina he entered the town secretly, in the night and stayed in the house of one Bature for several days. Dan Mari attacked Katsina while Saddiku was waiting for the answer and the support from Sokoto. The latter summoned all the Eastern Emirs (Zamfara, Daura, Kano, Katsina, Missau) to assist Katsina against Maradi.[166] Saddiku made his people pray before the attack at Karofi, to enable him catch Dan Mari, but this was not the case. Dan Mari was wounded and died at Maradi a few months later.[167] The Maradi army lost in that encounter, including many of its great warriors like Dubori and Gulbi. Dan Mari avenged them by killing about 3,000 men and women among the prisoners.

The resistance of Dan Mari to the Caliphate armies was praised by his singer as follows:

"Riga fara dari da talatin

Kore guda ya basu shuni".[168]

All this took place in 1843. When Saddiku went back to Birnin Katsina he promised a mortal punishment to the people who accommodated Dan Mari. He in fact heard it said that the majority of Katsina people, especially the scholars and wealthy persons, supported Dan Mari. The scholars of Katsina city, knowing the intention of Saddiku, consulted each

other and prayed so that Saddiku should be removed from the Emirship. As a matter of fact, Saddiku was dismissed from office in 1844 by the Caliph. Once removed from office, Saddiku himself joined the tawaye, and alongside with Katsina (Maradi) rulers and Gobir King Mayaki (1836-1858) made raids into the Caliphate as in Gora where Saddiku killed the Sokoto Galadima, Habu dan Doshero.

II.2.3 The Effects of the Sokoto Jihad on Borno's Relations with its North-Western Provinces up to the Death of Shehu al-Kanemi (1837)

According to Andre Salifou, "dans le Damagaram, l'influence des Peuls de Sokoto a ete pratiquement nulle" (in Damagaram the influence of Sokoto Fulani had been really null).[169] Yet, Sokoto jihad concerned really the Tsotsebaki area even though its effects were checked by the Borno mai. In fact, when the jihad started in 1804, Usman dan Fodio proposed the flag to the Tsotsebaki king Abdullahi (1800-1806), but the latter declined to take it, arguing that being a Borno ally, he could not accept the offer. He therefore travelled to Birnin Gazargamo where the mai presented him with a flag, making him the Sarkin Yaki (war chief) of the West. This flag is until now conserved in the Washa Palace.[170] The Shehu's army launched an attack on the Tsotsebaki capital, Babaye, in 1806, but the attack was not successful. A second attack by Umoru Dallaji occurred in the same year and the aggression was defeated at Karmashi. So, the jihadists made a coalition of two armies, one under the leadership of Malam Issaka of Daura and the other led by Umoru Dallaji from Katsina. The Tsotsebaki King Abdullahi (1800-1806) defeated them and took much booty.[171]

So, the Damagaram area was through the Tsotsebaki states, concerned with the jihad and only the Borno-oriented policy and the strength of the Tsotsebaki chief Abdullahi, prevented the area from entering into Sokoto orbit.

Until the jihad, relations between Borno with Damagaram were that of suzerain to vassal. But the war between Borno and the Fulani weakened Borno's ability to maintain control on the north-western territories.[172]

When Shehu Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi replaced the Mai as a political leader, he was confronted by several attempts of local Borno leaders to ignore his growing authority. One of them, Malam Fanamy, the leader of the Manga people who maintained their loyalty to the Mai not to the Shehu, killed even a hundred Shua Arabs loyal to the Shehu. Malam Fanamy was recognized in the Mangari (Manga country) as an extraordinary person who superseded the Shehu in knowledge and charms.[173] On 13th May 1824, the Shehu al-Kanemi decided to crush decisively, the manga resistance and led an important army of 14,000 men into the mangari. The Manga submitted peacefully and their leader, recognized by the Shehu as an outstanding scholar, was spared.[174]

In 1828, the Shehu al-Kanemi had also to crush a revolt in Hadejia. He summoned all Borno vassal states, including Damagaram and Muniyo, to participate in the siege of Hadejia. Only Gummel refused to answer the call and its capital was sacked after Hadejia was defeated.[175] Also, when Galadima Umar revolted in 1830, the Shehu also crushed him easily with the aid of Damagaram and Muniyo, alongside with the other Emirates under the tutorship of Borno. From that time, Damagaram and Muniyo were severed from the Galadima tutorship and had to deal directly with Kukawa, the new capital

founded by Shehu al-Kanemi in 1814.[176]

So, although the jihad in Borno had loosened its control over the North-Western Provinces, tribute or gaisuwa was forwarded to Borno from Damagaram until 1893.[177] And before Shehu al-Kanemi died in 1837, he had already crushed all the revolts against him and gained for himself the allegiance and recognition the North-Western Provinces (Damagaram, Muniyo, Manga, Hadejia, etc.) had for the Sefawa dynasty. Shehu al-Kanemi was succeeded by his son, Umar, who consolidated the dynasty and whose long reign (1837-81) allowed him to eliminate the remnant of the Sefawa dynasty and organise a military strength capable of dealing with all kinds of challenges.

II.3. The Movement of Population Linked to the Jihad

The movement of population in the period before the colonial era was partly a consequence of famines or wars. What we are going to analyse here, were the movements linked to events of islamic nature. Even though migrations of islamic nature can be noted before the 19th century, our focus will be on the repercussion of jihad on the population movement. For a long time, movement of for the pilgrimage,[178] had not only contributed to populating our area, but also to strengthen the islamic faith by the Fulani and Wangarawa from the west, whose waves of migrations always brought new elements who tried to revive Islam. Many of them settled in Hausaland, without proceeding to Mecca and many others, returning from the holy land stayed in that area, instead of proceeding to their original territories.

But large-scale movement of population occurred mainly with the jihad because of the insecurity which developed. Just before the jihad wars, the Shehu, in his Wathiqat

ahl-al-Sudan, urged people to flee from Hausa rulers' territory; for flight is obligatory from a heathen territory to the dar-al-Islam. This Wathiqat had had a wide distribution, for two authentic manuscripts of it were collected from "Say or Sinder" (now Niger Republic).[179] That sermon urged people to migrate into the Sokoto area, close to the Shehu, more especially after the Shehu had moved to Sokoto in 1815. Abdullah ben Fodio reported that the common people and the nobles came to the Shehu. Even before the hijra, some Hausa rulers were reported to have said "If ye do not disperse this assembly ye will have no dominion; they spoil your land by gathering the people together unto them and forsaking you".[180] Immediately after the hijra (21st February, 1804), the movement of people to the Shehu was widespread and, Abdullah ben Fodio reported: "Then the Muslims began to emigrate and follow us and to come, some of them with their people, and their property, and some with their people only, and some by themselves alone".[181] Even some of the Gobir soldiers deserted and joined the jama'a. These migrations continued and even became more serious, for the Hausa rulers, under the instigation of Gobir king, began to killed the Muslims. When the jihad wars started on 18th June 1804, a company of muslims from Adar, reached the jihadists, coming together with Malam Agali and two others. The Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Bakri ben Muhammad al-Udala, himself came to the Shehu to assist him in the jihad as he promised when he visited the Shehu at Sifawa in 1808. Al-Bakri came and stayed in a village near Katsina. He came together with a group of Ahyar Muslims, probably the Kel-Ferwan, who "were in sympathy with the aims of the Shehu".[182]

The Shehu himself tried the exportation of the jihad in giving Ahmad Lobbo, an

ensign, tuta and forces to raise the standard of jihad in Niger bend (Hamdullahi). These forces returned to Sokoto only after the Shehu died, to participate in crushing the tawaye which ensued.[183]

Political and economic reasons brought Adar people into Sokoto area. When the jihad of Muhammad Jelani began, the state of war and insecurity made people of Hausa as well as of Tuareg origin to migrate to Sokoto where the Caliph Muhammad Bello had a reputation of protecting and securing people. As reported by J. E. Philips: "Many of the local Adarawa people came from nearby settlements looking for security; but many other immigrants came from great distances".[184] The people who were not satisfied with Jelani's regime, left Adar and Azawak and sought refuge in Sokoto. The first to take their refuge in Sokoto were the Lissawan, when Jelani defeated Sarkin Adar and his Kel Gress ally Zodi at Bagai (1817 or 1818).[185] But Jelani's regime declined rapidly and Jelani himself was defeated at Tudun Fama in 1821 by the coalition of his enemies. He fled to Sokoto and according to Djibo Hamani, he was accompanied by Sarkin Kwallama Dawaki and Sarkin Kalfu Nabirni. These Adarawa were very numerous and they were granted the district of Dundaye, near Sokoto and a chief was appointed for them by the Caliph. This chief, called Sarkin Adar, was Ahmed Bida, a descendant of al-Mustafa, Sarkin Adar of Illela in the beginning of the jihad. This Sarkin Adar of Dundaye was one of the most important chiefs of Sokoto during the reign of Muhammad Bello.[186]

Harris explained the immigration into Dundaye like this: "About 1819 Muhammad Mai Chinna came from Kwonni (French Territory) with his brothers Ahmat and al-Muhtari and sought permission from Bello to settle and build a walled town ... With the building

of Dundaye a great immigration of Adarawa commenced, and all the other towns in the District were built in the eighties and nineties".[187]

Adarawa inhabited many of the wards of Sokoto and Gwadabawa. As for Sokoto, for instance, Saleh Abubakar reported that "there were in all no less than seventeen quarters/wards which were said to have been settled by Adarawa",[188] and the present Niger Republic's towns of Tawa, Keta, Bagai, Illela and Kalfu are the towns whence these people came. The immigration of Ahyar and Adar people into Sokoto was a continuous phenomenon but it was enhanced by the jihad. It was:

> part of the general southwards shift of population from Adar into the middle Rima valley but in the case of Sokoto, this immigration had been encouraged and guaranteed by the close association which had developed early in the jihad between the leaders of the jihad and a faction of the Adar ruling house and the economic interdependence which underlay and sustained Sokoto- Adar relations.[189]

A tradition recorded in Tawa recently told us that the "Tawayawa (people from Tawa) who followed Shehu had their quarters west of the Caliph's palace to Kofar Kware and had their market-place called "El Doli". Others, at the end of the jihad installed themselves at Gwadabawa, and all benefitted from the protection of the Caliph".[190] Long after the jihad, during the reign of Caliph Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-1866), he encouraged the migration southwards to populate the area between Wurno and Birnin Konni.[191] Also, the policy adopted by the Marafa of Gwadabawa was aimed at facilitating the installation of

new immigrants. It is reported for instance, that the Marafa of Gwadabawa granted every new immigrant Ba-Adare (man from Adar) with a house, a freed female slave (wa-hayya), a house and a bin of corn for his food.[192]

Some Sokotawa also migrated to Tawa. The most important of them was one mallam called Ibrahim, who came to Tawa in 1850 and founded some wards like Samawa, Tugulawa or Ibiki.[193] It is reported that some Fulani called "Farfaru" came to Tawa under the leadership of one Gingasa and established their ward in Bilbis and Kurfeyawa.[194]

Also, owing to the constant warfare between Argungu and Sokoto, many shepherds, being constantly raided, migrated to Damagaram in the east.[194bis]

II.4. The Sokoto's Influence In The North and North-West From The Death Of Bello To The European Conquest: 1837 - 1890

In this section we aim at showing the developments which took place after the death of Bello, especially in relation to maintaining the cohesion of the Caliphate. The military skill of Muhammad Bello contrasted almost radically with the not very fighting spirit of his successors.

In the west, Abdullahi b. Fodio died on 8th July 1829, and his son and successor, Muhammad, tried to maintain the cohesion of that part of the caliphate with more or less success, especially in his wars with Gurma. But what really favoured Gwandu, in its relations with Kebbi alliance was the death of the Kebbi ruler, Samaila Karari in 1831 and the flight of his son and successor, Yakubu Nabame into hiding to Arewa. It was only in 1849, when the coalition of Zarma and Arawa under Yakubu Nabame, defeated the jihadists at Mera,[195] that the jihadists cause began to decline.

Among the Zarma population the jihad created a division between the resistant Zarma (Dosso, Dendi) and those Zarma polities which sided with the Gwandu cause (N'Dunga, Kure, Kollo, etc.). On the Gurma bank of the river Niger, Gwandu secured the support of all the Fulani Emirates (Say, Kunari, Torodi, Bittim Koji, etc.). In the Dallol Bosso, only Birnin Gaure and the insignificant emirate of Jinju constituted the "Gwandu enclaves" in Zarma, Arewa territory.

In 1854, the Kebbi coalition, defeated the Fulani of Dallol Bosso and sacked Tamkalla, the capital of Luduje family.[196] Barth, while visiting the town of Tamkalla in August 1854, reported that "not only was the wall which surrounded the place in a great state of decay, but even the house of the governor himself was reduced almost to a heap of ruins".[197] After the fall of Tamkalla, the Emir Abul Hassan fled to Ari Kanasu (1854-1856) and whence to Kollo where he was killed in 1865.[198] In fact, Abul Hassan replaced his father Bubakar Luduje after the death of the latter in 1820.[199]

It is said that when the coalition led by Kebbi took Tamkalla in 1854, the roads to the western Emirates were closed to Gwandu, especially those roads crossing the River Niger which Kebbi forces controlled. For this reason, Gwandu appointed Say as the overseer of its affairs in the other western Emirates.[200] But according to Ahmadu Umoru, a very knowledgeable fellow, there is no evidence of appointment of Say by Gwandu as the overseer of the western Emirates. He gives as evidence, inter alia that the Emir of Lamorde, Bittim Koji Shuaibu Maman Jauwa (1846-1873) was directly appointed by Gwandu.[201] But this fact occurred before the fall of Tamkalla (1854). In fact, reference was made to Shuaibu, because his accession took place after a crisis that necessitated

outside intervention. Around 1846-48,[202] the succession to the throne of Lamorde Bittim Koji brought two contestants in existence: Lena Senu and Alfa Shuaibu. Both of them looked for outside support. Lena Senu got the support of Birnin Gaure because his brother Yero Ali Boti, married the daughter of Abul Hassan, Emir of Birnin Gaure. Alfa Shuaibu also was backed by Say for the same reason as he married the daughter of Alfa Modibbo b. Muhammad Jobbo.[203] Finally, Shuaibu was appointed by Gwandu, because he was a better scholar. But this crisis showed that the control of Say on the right bank of the Niger was not undisputable.

In his relations with Gwandu, the Emir of Birnin Gaure acted through the Magajin Gari of Gwandu, who was the Kofa for the Emirs of Gurma and Birnin Gaure inter alia.[204]

Kebbi, the leader of the tawaye in Gwandu, sealed an alliance with Dosso which Kebbi helped militarily against the Tuaregs and the Fulani. At the end of the 19th century, Kebbi's protection was so important for Dosso that it became a dependency of the former. All the travellers of the end of the 19th century in this region witnessed the dependency of the Dosso Zarmakoy on Kebbi. When the French Cazemajou asked for a treaty from the Zarmakoy of Dosso, the latter replied that only the Sarkin Kebbi of Argungu could enter into such an undertaking. In fact Cazemajou obtained the treaty from the Sarkin Kebbi, Samaila, on the 19th January, 1898.[205] In this treaty also, Samaila integrated Dosso and Arewa into the territory of Kebbi. Before Cazemajou, Monteil experienced the same attitude from the Zarmakoy of Dosso in 1891.[206] Hourst even reported that Dosso paid a tribute to Argungu.[207] The relations between Kebbi and its allies were reinforced by tradition of marriage, as for example, the marriage of Kebbi ruler Yakubu Nabame (1849-

1854) with the daughter of Chippa, the brother of Mai-Arewa Yaji of Nassarawa.[208] These relations between Kebbi and its allies would be an important feature of negotiations concerning the frontier.

What characterized the conflicts in Gwandu-Kebbi area was the early introduction of firearms in the region, changing therefore the traditional pattern of warfare. The Fulani of Kunari who came into the area with Gelajo around 1833, came with firearms and Barth reported in 1854 that all Kunari Fulani had firearms. Also in 1871, the Gwandu Emir al-Mustafa paid a visit to Kontagora and Bida and received from Nupe, many guns. But it was especially the coming into the area of Gwandu and Kebbi of people from Masina, by Al-Bouri N'Diaye and Shehu Ahmadu in 1893-94 which caused difficulties to Kebbi. These bands sided immediately with the Fulani and devastated the Zarma country before proceeding to Sokoto where some of them stayed.

Gwandu maintained close relationship with its emirates until the close of the century. For instance, when the Sokoto Caliph Abderahman (1891-1902) decided to attack Argungu in 1892, he summoned all his Emirates and Monteil reported that the emirates of Liptako, Yagha, Torodi, Say and Kunari sent contingents under the leadership of Ibrahim Gelajo, the Emir of Kunari.[209]

In Sokoto area itself, the death of Bello in 1837 was felt as a big loss for the caliphate. In fact, his successor, Abubakar Attiku met with important challenges especially the tawaye and the settlements of Tuareg disputes in the area of Gobir Tudu. As for his relations with the Tuaregs, the correspondences Abubakar Attiku developed with them give information on the Sokoto-Tuareg relations, particularly the Kel Gress and Itessan and

on the Tuareg themselves. He reported that when he was installed as Caliph, they sent their message of condolence and bay'a, as they did when Bello acceded the throne. So, Abubakar Attiku warned them: "If they use the word bay'a, to obey me becomes compulsory on them". And, following the path of the Shehu, he continued: "But I am not liable of appointing and impeaching (their kings). I let their leaders of Itessan to consult themselves on who can be beneficent to them and then to bring him to me for confirmation".[211] In another letter sent to the same communities, especially the Itessan, Abubakar Attiku complained that they were incapable of uniting themselves and he tried to bring under the leadership people suitable to the community and respectful to Islamic faith. But he was not successful. - 476225

It seems that the Caliphate of Abubakar Attiku (1837-42) was respectful to the tradition of religious devotion and gave great importance to the leaders who respected Islamic faith. Thus, in a letter he wrote to Mahmood Ibn Wasshar, he ordered him to maintain the standard of Islam in his fief and if he failed to do so he would be removed.[212] In fact, the Majmu al-Kulafa'i reported that "Attiku was indeed harsh to all evil doers, he imprisoned them and beat them".[213]

But Attiku's efforts to maintain the cohesion of the Caliphate failed and he was particularly incapable of handling, adequately, the Gobir question. He finally died at katuru (after a war with the Gobirawa) on 24th November, 1842. He warred against Tibiri and Chikaji with the help of all the eastern Emirates but was not successful.

Aliyu, son of Bello, was appointed after Attiku. He reigned from 1842-1859. The point to make here is that after Bello (d.1837) the Sokoto Caliphs were weak whereas the

Gobirawa had strong rulers, with long reigns: Mayaki (1836-1853) and Bawa dan Gomki (1858-1883). So, Gobir threatened the Sokoto town itself for it is reported that Caliph Aliyu was the first to make gates of iron for the gateways of the town.[214] The Tarikh es-Sudan also reports that during the third year of the reign of Aliyu Babba (1842-59), the Gobir King fell on the village of Salame and devastated it completely, carrying the books and concubines of Abdel-Kader bn Tofa, then at Sokoto.[215] Aliyu carried raids against Madarunfa and Tibiri but they were fruitless. Even though it is said that Aliyu carried out 20 expeditions during the 17 years of his reign, Barth, who travelled through the area in the middle of the 19th century, gave a very disastrous image of both Aliyu and his Caliphate. Talking about the tawaye in Aliyu's time, Barth wrote: "The spirit of independence broke out more strongly under his (Attiku's) successor, Aliyu, a son of Bello by a female slave, who ... does not appear to have inherited many of the noble qualities of his father, and, least of all, his war-like spirit, and hence the lamentable condition in which I found this extensive kingdom".[216] After the Gobirawa raid at Salame in 1845, "the situation had reached such a dangerous extent that the leading ulama had gathered in Sokoto's mosque with a view to deposing Aliyu b. Bello for his "inefficient" handling of the affairs of the jama'a.[217] Caliph Aliyu stationed spies in the towns gained by the Gobirawa tawaye and he also was very anxious to maintain the security of trade routes, particularly between Ahyar, Adar and Sokoto. The Tarikh es Soudan reports that Caliph Aliyu sat seven days (day and night) to investigate matters of a caravan pillaged by Adar people.[218]

But the most important political event during Aliyu's reign, as far as Ahyar-Sokoto

relations were concerned, was the impeachment of Ahyar Sultan Abdel Kader (1836-1849 and 1853-57) who was replaced by Ahmad Rufa'i (1850-1852). The two Sultans (Abdel Kaader and Ahmad Rufa'i) had commitment to Sokoto for Abdel kader was the son of Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Bakri (1797-1809) and Ahmad Rufa'i the son of Muhammad Guma (1809-1818).[219] Abdul Kader sooner understood that he could gain his throne only with the backing of Sokoto. He therefore turned merchant and transferred his residence to Katsina, where his father sojourned and waged jihad wars on Umoru Dallaji side. In the company of the Emir of Katsina Muhammad Bello (1844-1870), he paid a visit to the Caliph Aliyu in 1853, taking to the Amir al-Mumimin many presents, namely burnuses and 13 horses of Tuareg breed. The Caliph gave him in return, a number of tobes, 3,000,000 shells and 260 slaves. Sultan Abdel Kader stayed two months in Wurno defending his cause before the Caliph.[220] Finally, Caliph Aliyu summoned the Itessan to Sokoto and ordered them to appoint Abdelkader again, what they did.[221]

The Abdul Kader's case shows the place taken by Sokoto in the appointment of Ahyar and Adar Sultans, as reported by Last. Even vis-a-vis their population, it is said, the rulers of Ahyar and Adar, as well as the various clan leaders, needed their appointment to be sanctioned by Sokoto in order to be accepted as legitimate.[222]

The perpetual intervention of Sokoto in Ahyar's affairs caused resentment from Tuareg nobles who were supposed to play a great role in Ahyar's affairs particularly concerning the appointment of the Sultans. Thus, Richardson reported the feeling of a Tuareg noble, Ennour, who told him that he hated the Fulani "on account of their attempts on the independence of the Kel Ewey, and their perpetual intrigues at Agades".[223]

In listing the people who died under the Caliphate of Aliyu Babba (1842-59), the Tarikh-Es-Sudan reported that two Adar Sultans died and the Caliph had a part in their inheritance in the form of achura, well-known in Ahyar history.[224]

Until the end of the 19th century, the bay'a paid by the Ahyar Sultan Muhammad al-Bakri in 1808 had never been removed for the European traveller Ervin de Barry, noted in 1877 at Agades the intervention of the Sokoto Caliph in Ahyar's affairs namely to recommend peace between factions of Tuaregs. Also, when Caliph Abdurahman (1891-1902) decided to attack Argungu, he summoned all his Emirates, and he in fact got support from Kel Gress and Lissawan from Adar in his show-down against Argungu in 1891.[225]

Caliph Abdurahman also ordered the Konni Emir Yahaya (1891-1898) to welcome the Cazemajou mission which crossed Sokoto in 1898 and help them proceed to Zinder. After the accession of Attahiru Ahmadu to the throne on the 13th October, 1902, Sarkin Adar Yusuf, wrote a letter of congratulations to the Caliph as it was the tradition.[226]

If the relations between Sokoto, Ahyar and Adar were peaceful, those between Sokoto and the exiled Katsina and Gobir dynasties were, at least for all the first part of the 19th century, full of conflicts. As far as Gobir was concerned, its able leaders Mayaki (1836-1853) and Bawa dan Gomki (1853-1883) had in front of them somewhat weak caliphs, after Bello (d.1837). Sarkin Gobir Mayaki entered into alliance with Sarkin Katsina (Maradi), Dan Mahedi (c.1847-1851) and after him Dan Baura (c.1851-1853), to harass Sokoto. He even joined forces with Sarkin Damagaram, Ibram (1843-1851) to attack Daura.[227] In passing through the ribat of Isa, in 1853, Barth ridiculed Aliyu Karami,

in charge of the ribat. "He bears the pompous title of Serkin Gobir "lord of Gobir" although almost the whole of that country is in the hands of the enemy".[228]

The Caliphate of Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-66) tried to weaken Gobir in creating opposition among Gobir princes. Around 1864, Dan Halima, who was the Dangaladima to Bawa Dan Gomki (1853-1883) revolted. He sought and obtained the permission to found Sabon Birni in Sokoto-controlled zone. He was welcomed by the caliph and an aman established between them. Dan Halima gave his sister Hawa in marriage to the Caliph to strengthen the ties.[229]

But Sabon Birni brought only a brief relief to the Caliphate, for Dan Halima revolted against Sokoto and Caliph Mu'adh (1877-1881) attacked Sabon Birni twice. He fought but failed to capture it despite a siege of nine days there.[230] Mu'adh died on 26th September, 1881.

The successor of Mu'adh, Umar b. Ali (1881-91) found the situation so difficult that he wrote to the traditional allies of Sokoto, the Kel Gress Tuaregs, requesting for horses from their Tabl Warzagane. The latter answered that the horses were with his son in campaign but he would send them after their return. Warzagane went to say that whenever Umar wanted to fight the unbelievers, he might invite him.[231] The Kel Gress also watched on behalf of Sokoto, the movement of Gobir forces and we found a letter in which Warzagane informed Waziri Bukhari (1887-1910) that the Gobirawa intended to attack Sokoto via Gwadabawa.[232]

Other Tuareg groups in Gobir area were the Teyemawa and Tegamawa. They played an important role in the jihad. When the jihad started, the Tegamawa sided with

Gobir, whereas the Teyemawa, a Kel Gress sub-group, accepted the Shehu's call.[233] Even the Tegamawa submitted to the Shehu after the fall of Alkalawa in 1808, but rebelled soon after, as they were liable to the destiny of the Gobirawa. The Tegamawa chief, Tambari Mahaman who rebelled was finally killed at Dan Tapki, by one Ibro Maikake, sent by the jihadists from Katsina. The father of Tambari Mahaman, Tambari Gabka was appointed "Governor of Gobir" "by the Shehu", probably during the aman with Gobir between 1821 and 1831. But the Gobirawa dismissed his pretensions and his family remained only on the leadership of the Tegamawa until colonial period. They had their fief at Mayara and commanded the eastern Kornaka.

The Teyemawa were the companions of the Gobirawa as far as traditions can take it. They moved here and there between Adar and Gobir and finally they stayed at Sabon Birni where their Tambari Alkali died. Before he died he entered into alliance with the Caliph Ahmadu Rufa'i (1867-1873) near whom the successor of Alkali, Amoa, even lived for some time. The colonial period found Amoa on the throne of the Teyemawa and confirmed him because his family helped Colonel Peroz en route for Zinder.[234] Amoa was appointed chef de canton at Kornaka, fief of the Teyemawa.

The Katsinawa of Maradi were another thorny problem for Sokoto. The weakness of their rulers after Dan Mari (1836-43) made them enter into alliance with Gobir rulers Mayaki (1836-1853) and Bawa dan Gomki (1853-1883).

The raids by Maradi on Katsina Emirate had also economic motives. The density of population in Maradi area and the state of insecurity had rendered the agricultural production very insufficient and population had to rely on raids for its material life. So,

"every year, as soon as the harvest was gathered, the Habe assembled to raid the rich towns of the south land".[235]

As put by a writer "pendant une longue partie du 19 s, le role de Maradi fut avant tout politique et militaire: la region, reputee peu sure, fut tenue a l'ecart des grands courants d'echanges transsahariens qui firent la fortune de Kano et Zinder etroitement liees aux villes d'Afrique du Nord". (For a great part of the 19th century, Maradi fulfilled above all, political and military role: the area, because of its reputation of insecurity, was kept aside from the very important transaharan exchanges that made the wealth of Kano and Zinder which had very close relations with the cities of North Africa).[236]

Maradi fulfilled its military role until the end of the 19th century. So serious was the danger from Maradi that the Katsina Emir Muhammad Bello (1844-1870) had thought of abandoning Birnin Katsina to build a new town but he was prevented to do so by Sokoto. The Maradi raids affected even Kano area, for it is reported that Dambatta in Kano emirate was given ribat status in c.1820's and operated against Damagaram and Maradi.[237]

The alliance between Maradi and Gobir continue to harass Sokoto until the accession of Sarkin Maradi Mazawaje (1880-1883) who broke the alliance and offered submission to the Caliph Umar (1881-91). But he was eventually deposed, and he fled to Sokoto.[238] He was considered as a traitor to the Maradi cause and was replaced by Malam (1883-84) who continued the struggle against the Caliphate.

In 1897, division occurred among Maradi dynasty when there was, it seems, a conflict with Gobir. Madawachi was made Sarkin Katsina at Maradi whereas Mijinyawa

moved to Tassawa, where his supporters appointed him Sarkin Katsina. In 1899, when Commandant Lamy launched an attack on Tassawa, Mijinyawa fled to Nigeria. From 1897, two Katsina (Maradi) dynasties developed separately and this is true to this day.

The conflicts between the resistant Katsinawa and the Emirs of Katsina didn't hinder considerably, the transaharan trade. Even though each of the parties tried to disrupt the communication in the area of its enemies, the general impression was that "all the governments had an interest in keeping the major border routes open and movements by large caravans across hostile border were permitted".[239] Therefore, the relations between the Katsina Emirs and the Gidan Korau dynasty was not based only on war. Many correspondences we have come across show that economic and social relations received great consideration from Maradi, Katsina and Sokoto. After a long series of conflicts, realism prevailed not only because the belligerants were really tired of fighting each other, but also, because the generation in power both in Katsina and Maradi, was remote from the events which created these bad relations. The Maradi rulers at the end of the 19th century were certainly these Katsinawa born and breed in Maradi area who had only psychological emotion towards their ancient territory. The Caliphs and the Emirs on their part, developed a worldly life, away from the cardinal principles of Islam and from the ideals of the jihad leaders. As a matter of fact, after Dan Fodio's death and in some instances even before, "deviation from Islamic models and from the Shehu's instructions developed rapidly and grew apace".[240] We must bear in mind that Abdullahi dan Fodio, in 1808, proceeded on the pilgrimage because he observed that many of the jihadists were in the army for worldly affairs.

The correspondences exchanged between the Sarakunan Maradi and the authorities of Katsina, and Sokoto, concerned not only political matters but also social and economic preoccupations. During the second half of the 19th century, especially the two last decades, exchange of friendly letters took the pace on conflict. For instance, in 1888, when Sarkin Maradi, Dan Gulbi (1888-1889) acceded to the throne of Gidan Korau, he sent a letter to Caliph Umar b. Aliyu (1881-1891) informing him of his accession to the Sarauta and sending the Caliph a woman, called Anfana, from Maradi, whom the Caliph Umar wanted to marry since the time of Sarkin Katsina (Maradi), Massalatchi (1884-1888) but did not get. Dan Gulbi showed in very emphatic terms, the relations between Maradi and the Caliphs of Sokoto.[241]

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Sarkin Katsina (Maradi), Massalatchi (1884-1888) wrote to the Katsina Emir Musa b. Umaru Dallaji about constructing a road through Karofin Kura in order to exchange people ransomed through it instead of taking them through Damagaram road which was far and unsafe. He also promised to send him whatever he needed from his kingdom and whenever he need it.[242] Sarkin Katsina Abubakar ben Rauda and the Caliph Umar (1881-1891) exchanged letters about a boy called Dan Ubandawaki Madugu, who disappeared and the Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) was asked to send him back whenever he saw him.[243] The colonial administration therefore found an atmosphere of peace between the two Katsina and, accordingly, people from Maradi fled the harshness of the French and took refuge to the south.

II.5. Borno-Damagaram Relations Between The Death Of Shehu Muhammad al-Kanemi To The European Invasion: 1837-1900


It seems that the al-Kanemi dynasty had had no difficulty in being recognized as suzerain instead of the Mai, by the Damagaram rulers. Unlike the Manga people who continued to recognize the Sefawa dynasty after Muhammad al-Kanemi became the real ruler of Borno, and were crushed in 1824, the Damagaram Sultans might have accepted with some indifference the state of affairs in Borno. This was because the period of jihad in Borno corresponded with the time the Damagaram emerged as a centralized political power. This development can be perceived through the installation to Zinder of one of the first Damagaram rulers. According to Andre Salifou, Suleman dan Tintuma, who acceded the throne in 1809, lived some months in Ci-Anza before moving to Zinder, being the first ruler to move there.[244] Also, at this period, the most important political power in the area was the Tsotsebaki states not Damagaram which was in a somewhat tributary status vis-a-vis the Tsotsebaki. It was only during the reign of the Tsotsebaki king of Mirya Mahaman Toro (1837-57) that Mirya was defeated by Damagaram once for all, and all the successors of Mahaman Toro would rule under the control of Damagaram.[245] So, when the Damagaram emerged it was already under the jurisdiction of Muhammad-al-Kanemi who was the de facto ruler of Borno.

One of the features of Borno-Damagaram relations under the Shehu was the use of physical force to deal with any act of insubordination. Unlike the Mais who developed the religious myth of Amir al-Muminin, and were obeyed without any need of using military force, the Shehu showed through their relations with the tributary states, that they

owed their position not to their religious position but their military skill strength.

After the death of Shehu al-Kanemi, he was replaced by Shehu Umar (1837-1881) who, in 1841, sojourned 43 days in Zinder and changed the Damagaram ruler Ibram (1822-1841) with his brother, Tanimun (1841-43).[246] In 1846, Shehu Umar sent his brother Abdurahman to humble the same Ibram (1843-51) who disregarded the orders of Borno not to attack the Fulani.[247] During the first expedition against Damagaram in 1841, Shehu Umar wanted to give a religious label to his action and erected a mosque in Zinder before withdrawing.[248] The war between Ibram and Tanimun over the office of Sarki led Borno to place residents in Zinder in the late 1840's and early 1850's, to keep an eye on the situation.[249]

Though the jihad in Borno loosened the control on its north-western provinces, tribute or gaisuwa was forwarded to Borno from Damagaram until 1893.[250] It was Rabih's invasion of Borno which would give the lethal blow to Borno-Damagaram relations. In fact, on May 10th 1893, Rabih entered Kukawa, completely evacuated and sacked it before installing himself at Dikwa.[251] The Shehu Hashimi fled to Zinder. Other important princes like Maina Ibrahim, Maina Abba and Maina Bukar Sanda also went into hiding in Damagaram. This domination of Borno by Rabih completely severed Borno from its north-western dependencies. The Sultan of Damagaram Ahmed Kuren Daga (1893-1899) took this opportunity to enlarge his territory and undertook military campaigns mainly against Muniyo and Machena, the tributary states of Borno. As for Machena, a report reads: "Prior to the chaos created by Rabih, it had always paid tribute to and been considered as part of Borno. When the Borno dynasty was broken, and its kings exiled, the chief of


Njimi
ZINDER
Machena
Nguru
Gashua
Gazargamu
Kukawa
HADEJIA
KATAGUM
KANO
MISAU
JAMAARE
BORNO
Dikwa
Gujiba
Bama
Duto
MANDARA
SOKOTO
Kalam
Gombe
Madagali
Mora
Mubi
Shelleng

Damagaram invaded Machena and forced it to pay tribute".[252]

So, in 1895, the Damagaram Sultan Ahmadu (1893-1899) invaded Machena carrying off the then Mai (of Machena), Mele Idrissa and installing his younger brother, Abba. In 1900, on the French occupation of Damagaram, Mele Idrissa returned to Machena and his brother Abba left. Mele's son, Ngabarama became Mai.[253]

Shehu Sanda Kura, on his passage from Zinder with Foureau and Lamy, ordered Machena to again give allegiance to Borno but Damagaram expelled Ngabarama in 1901 and installed Gwoje, a man of Damagarama family.[254] Gwoje paid tribute to Damagaram until 1903 when the payment was stopped by the British Resident, Mr. Hewby, who protested formally on February 8th 1903, to the French authorities at Zinder, against any attempt on the part of the Sultan to levy taxes on Machena.[254bis]

The Muniyo suffered the same fate as Machena. The process of integrating Muniyo into Damagaram began with Damagaram Sultan Tanimun (1851-84). It is worth noting that, while Damagaram was a Bornoan province, Muniyo was part of the area "where the mais exercised their direct control over the peoples".[255] So, in attacking Muniyo, the Damagaram began to swallow "Borno proper".

The Muniyoma Muhammadu (1868-70) who refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of Damagaram was executed. His successor, Musa (1870-74) was brought alongside with his family into Zinder and assigned forced residence. He was released only in 1903 by the French who installed a military post at Gure to protect him from Damagaram.[256] The successor of Musa, Hadji (1874-1876) feeling himself very powerless in the face of Damagaram preferred to resign and flee to Gambaduwa in the south where he still lived

when Tilho crossed Muniyo in 1907.[257]

After conquering Muniyo, the Damagaram Sultans attacked the symbol of their submission to Borno: the Galadima. The Sultan of Damagaram, forty days after he overran Machena, sacked Nguru and forced the Galadima Mamadu Kellumi to flee. The latter was however captured at Borsari by Sarkin Shanu Sule of Damagaram and after many humiliations was executed.[258] He was accused of being in communication with Rabih. From this period onwards all the three Galadima before colonial installation (Kyari 1895-97; Ibram 1897-99, and Gambo 1901-1902) were Damagaram appointees and ruled under Damagaram tutorship.[259]

In the north-east of Borno, the suzerainty of the Shehu had suffered no challenge. The assertion of Barth, that "the ruler of Borno has restricted his real dominion within the border of Komadugu"[260] was contradicted by the evidence that N'guigmi area continued to be under the suzerainty of the Shehu until 1903 when a French officer, Lieutenant Plomion found an envoy of Kukawa exacting taxes in N'guigmi. To check this Borno influence, a military post was installed at N'guigmi on 7th December, 1904.[261]

II.6. Damagaram Relations With Sokoto And Kano: 1837-1900

Only scanty data has come to our notice on the relations which Damagaram developed with Sokoto or even Kano. Even these scanty data deal with the two last decades of the 19th century. Evidences were recorded concerning Sokoto's interferences in Damagaram dynastic crisis, particularly during the reign of Caliph Umar (1881-91). But even before that date, it is reported that Damagaram Sultan Suleman dan Tintuma, made a Tsotsebaki chief, Muhammad Koso (1817-21) to flee to Sokoto and replaced him with

his brother Maynasara who was exiled in Daura. This event took place in 1821.[262] But what occurred between 1880 and 1885 concerned Damagaram dynasty itself. In fact, in 1880, being very old, Tanimun of Damagaram (1853-84) made Kiyari, junior brother of Suleman (known as Yakudima), close to him, a kind of deputy-king. This act angered Suleman who entered into overt rebellion against his father. He therefore proceeded to Sokoto where he was welcomed by the Caliph Umar (1881-91) who gave him slaves, horses and a large village to supervise. According to Ann Dunbar "he spent one year at Sokoto before his father died".[263] After Tanimun's death in 1884, Caliph Umar, as he had promised Suleman, sent him back with an escort to Zinder. Suleman was proclaimed Sarki at Dambarto,[264] and was confirmed by Shehu Hashimi (1885-93). Suleman thus became Sultan with the intervention of Sokoto, his Borno overlord only recognized the fact.

The relations between Damagaram and Kano were both of commerce and conflicts. According to traditions recorded in Kano by Andre Salifou, the Damagaram Sultan Ahmadu Kuren Daga (1893-99) warred the Kano Emir Aliyu (1894-1903) because Caliph Abdurahman (1891-1902) asked him to do so. Abdurahman wanted Aliyu to be replaced by his cousin, one Sarkin Shanu.[265]

But since that period, Islam manifested itself as seeking unity between the people and between the polities. This was done by the Senussiya through one of its envoys, Muhammad Sunni who had travelled throughout the Sultanate of Damagaram preaching unity and peace between the Muslims in the face of threat of European invasion.[266] Muhammad Sunni arrived in Damagaram some time before the Gezawa war between Kano and Damagaram (December 1897 - January 1898). This Senussi envoy founded a

zawiya (lodge) at Jajiduna in Damargu in 1896. It seems that the Sultan of Damagaram didn't lend an attentive ear to the Senussi discourse, but he sent word to Kano requesting that caravans be permitted to pass. On April 30th, 1898, Emir Aliyu (1894-1903) answered a court reply before informing Sokoto.[267]

In May 1898, when Damagaram authorities were discussing about the killing or not of Captain Cazemajou there were two views: Malam Suleman (The Kadi) and malam Yaro (the famous 19th century wholesaler) wanted the Sultan to let Cazemajou to continue his journey. But the Arabs, especially Sherif Guenaba who was representative of the Senussiya in Zinder wanted him to be put to death. It is reported that one Malam Mahaman Marina arrived from Kano and exerted influence upon the Kaigama and urged that the Europeans be put to death. His view prevailed.[268] A year after, Ahmadu Kuren Daga himself was killed by the French on the 16th September 1899. He was replaced on the throne by a young man aged 18, Ahmadu Dan Bassa.

The most important conclusion we can draw from this discussion is that the Jihad tried and in fact succeeded in bringing many people and large areas together under the bond of Islam. The Sokoto jihad bound the people of this large region politically and religiously giving them the feeling of self-sufficiency. The colonial administration, to impose itself needed all that background annihilated, because its basis was that of a racial and cultural superiority. It is evident that the situation was pregnant of crises.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II

1. Waziri Junaidu, Rihlah ila Agades NAK A/AR 51/3.
2. ibid.
3. ANN C937 Documents Emanant des Marabouts ou ecrits par eux. See also Waziri Junaidu Rihlah ila Agades op. cit.
4. Djibo Hamani, Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la berberie op. cit. p.336.
5. The Sardauna of Sokoto financed the erection of a modern mosque on the place called "Massalacin Sardauna". People used to pray for rain in this mosque. The last time prayers for rain took place as far as we know, was on Friday, 19th July, 1996.
6. E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani op. cit. p.55.
7. See Djibo Hamani Au Carrefour op. cit. p.347; H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs op. cit. p.147.
8. Alfarouk Rissatan, Introduction a l'histoire, de l'Azawagh Nigerien Niamey 1991, p.87, n.3.
9. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and its diffusion in the Sahel, Warminster 1975, p.145, see also Hawsawa da Makwabtansu I, p.16.
10. Y.B. Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.104.
11. ibid, p.73.
12. M. Hiskett, Tazyn al Waraqat p.110 see also Ismail Balogun, The Life and Works of Uthman dan Fodio. Academy Press Ltd., Lagos, 1975, p.38.
13. NAK O/ARI/23 Raud al-Jinan Burdon Box 2, English Translation.

14. According to A.M. Kani, It took about 30 years for the movement to transform itself from a reformist into a revolutionary socio-political movement. See A.M. Kani The Life And Works Of Abdal Kadir b. Al-Mustapha: A Critical Edition Of His Works and His Historiographical Approach, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1987, p.4.

15. See M. Bello Alkali op. cit. p.146.

16. W.A. Brown, The Caliphate of Hamdullahi c.1818-1864 A Study In African History And Tradition, Ph.D. Wisconsin, 1969, p.17.

17. E.J. Arnett op. cit. p.10.

18. See Waziri Junaidu Rihlah ila Agades: see E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani.

19. NAK $H/AR_1/2$ or $P/AR_2/20$ item 132.

20. A.D.H. Bivar "The Wathiqat Ahl-al-Sudan: A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad" J.A.H., 2(1961), pp.235-243.

21. F.H. El-Mesri "The Life of Shehu Usman dan Fodio before the Jihad" JHSN, Vol.2, no.4, 1963, pp. 435-448.

22. Omar Bello, The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello (1817-37) As revealed in his Arabic writings, more especially Al-Ghayt al-Wabl Fisirat al-Imam al-Adl, Ph.D London, SOAS 1983, p.67.

23. A.M. Kani, The life and works of Abdul Kadir b. al-Mustapha op. cit., p.70.

24. O.S.A. Ismail "Some reflections on the literature of the jihad and the caliphate" in Bala Usman ed. Studies in the history of the Sokoto Caliphate, p.166.

25. ibid.

26. Y. Urvoy, Histoire des populations du Soudan Central 1936, p.274, my translation.

27. ibid.

28. F.H. El-Mesri "The life of Shehu Usman dan Fodio before the Jihad" op. cit.

29. Raud-al-Jinan Burdon Box 2 NAK 0/AR1/23.

30. Y.T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello op. cit., pp.14-15.

31. Majmu al-Rasail Amir al-Muminin Muhammad Bello wa Amir al-Muminin Abubakar Attiq.

32. For the details on the beginning of hostilities see The Tanbih al Ikhwan B.A. Harris translation NAK O/AR1/20 and also: Hausawa de Makwabtansu I.

33. Raudal Jinan Hausa/Roman manuscript Kadcaptory O/AR2/71, p.21.

34. Djibo Hamani. Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie, op. cit., p.341.

35. Y. Urvoy, Histoire des populations du Soudan Central 1936, p.294.

36. Degel Na-Akka, Sarkin tsafi of Massalata, April 1985, see also Henri Raulin "Un aspect historique de l'animisme et de l'Islam au Niger" Journal de la Societe des Africanistes XXXII, 2, 1962, pp.249-274.

37. Omar Bello, The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.175.

38. ibid, p.175, note 4.

39. Degel NA-AKKA Azna chief of Massalata April 1985.

40. See Y. Urvoy, Histoire des population du Soudan Central op. cit., p.294.

40bis. Hausawa da Makwabtansu, pp.29-31.

41. See Henri Raulin "Un aspect historique de l'animisme et de l'Islam an Niger op. cit.

42. M. Hiskett "The 19th century jihads in West Africa" in Cambridge History of Africa,

Vol.5, pp.125-169. See also Urvoy op. cit., p.97

43. Scholars didn't agree with the time Alfa Maman Jobbo came to Say. Dioulde Laya: 1816 see "Migrations et integrations politique dans le Gurma oriental; exemple de Folmangani" Journal des Africanistes, 61, (2) 1991, pp.65-90; Boube Gade: 1812 see Le Zarmatarey: contribution a l'histoire des populations d'entre Niger et Dallol Mawri EN45 Niamey 1980, p.204; Djibo Hamani, 1812 see "Les personnalites celebres"; Moulaye Hasane 1825 see Systeme de transmission du savoir religieux en Afrique sub-saharienne; exemple du commentaire caranique a Saayi (Say - Niger), Paris IV, 1994, p.73.

44. Dioulde Laya,"Migrations et integration politique dans le Gurma oriental op. cit. The left bank of the River Niger was known as "Hausa"

45. Urvoy (Y) Histoire des populations du Soudan Central, p.70.

46. See Hassane Moulaye: Systeme de transmission du savoir religieux en Afrique sud-saharienne: exemple, du commentaire coranique a Saayi op. cit., p.15.

47. ibid, p.27.

48. Dioulde Laya "Migrations et integration politique..."

49. ibid.

50. See footnote 43.

51. Raudat-al-Afkar translated by Harris NAK O/AR1/1: Hausawa da Makwabtansu I, p.12.

52. M. Hiskett, Tazyn al-Waraqat, p.127.

53. ibid.

54. Oral evidence Ambassador Ahmadu Umoru Niamey November 1995.

55. Dioulde Laya Migration et integration politique...

56. Oral evidence, Ambassador Ahmadu Umaru Niamey November 1995.

57. Urvoy, Y. Histoire des populations du Soudan Central, p.76.

58. Alhassane Koussanga Cisse; L'Administration francaise dans la region de Say (Niger) de 1895 a 1927 Maitrise Paris III, 1975, p.27.

59. Moulaye Hassane, Systeme de transmission du savoir religieux.. p.54.

60. In fact the date of Alfa Maman Jobbo's death is uncertain: Urvoy (Y) in his Historie des populations du Soudan Central gives the date of 1840 (p.76); Moulaye Hassane (op. cit.) gives 1835 as the date the successor of Mamman Jobbo began his reign (p.84); Boube Gado, Le Zarmatarey - gives the date of 1836 (p.197).

61. SAKA A Balogun: Gwandu Emirates in the 19th Century, p.120.

62. Dioulde Laya "Migrations et integration politique..."

63. ibid.

64. ibid.

65. Boube Gado, Le Zarmatarey: Contribution a l'histoire des populations d'entre Niger et Dallol Mawri E.N. 45, Niamey 1980, p.197.

66. Moulaye Hassane, Oral Communication.

67. C.C. Stewart "Diplomatic Relations in Early 19th century West Africa: Sokoto-Azaouad-Masina correspondence" in Bala Usman Y. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate, pp.408-429.

68. ANN Say 16-2-4 Rapport annuel 1903 cercle de Say.

69. Barth III; 178; 484; 522.

70. M. Hiskett: "The 19th century jihads in West Africa" in Cambridge History of Africa, Vol.5, ed Flint 1976, pp.125-169.

71. Saka Balogun, Gwandu Emirates op. cit., p.113.

72. ibid, p.111.

73. ibid, p.98, n.3.

73bis. Dioulde Laya, "Migrations et Integration Politique..."

74. Jean Paul Rothiot; Zarmakoye Aouta: les debuts de la domination coloniale dans le cercle de Dosso 1898-1903, Paris VII, 1984, p.60.

75. ibid, p.60

76. Dioulde Laya Migrations et integration politique...

76bis. ibid, but Moulay Hassane op. cit. gives the date of 1826 as that of his death.

77. Jean Paul Rothiot: Zarmakoye Aouta... p.62.

78. M. Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in the 19th Century, p.227.

79. Dioulde laya "Migrations et integration politique..."

79bis. Hama Boubou, Histoire Traditionnelle des Peuls du Dallol Boboye n.d., p.75.

80. Saka Balogun, "Gwandu Emirates in the 19th century op. cit., p.119, see also Hassane Baka, Contribution a l'histoire des migrations et de la mise en place des populations Peul de la rive Gurma du fleuve Niger, entre Lamorde et Say du 17^{e} au 19^{e} siecle Maitrise Universite Nationale du Benin, 1992.

81. Hassane Baka, op. cit., p.56.

82. ibid.

83. See Saka Balogun, Gwandu Emirates in the 19th Century op. cit., pp.118-121, see also Hassane Baka op. cit., p.51.

84. Y. T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello op. cit.

85. ibid, p.199.

86. Hassane Baka op. cit., p.62.

87. M. Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis op. cit., p.225.

88. J. Paul Rothiot: Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., pp.47-48.

89. ibid, p.60.

90. ibid, p.62.

91. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes indigenes au Niger: De la fin du 19 S au debut de seconde guerre mondiale, Toulouse 1977 2 volumes, Vol.1, p.111.

92. M.H. Piault, Histoire Mauri: Introduction a l'etude du processus Constitutif d'un Etat, p.127, see also M. Bello Alkali op. cit., p.223.

93. M. Bello Alkali op. cit., p.220.

94. ibid, p.258.

95. See Muhammad Hambali Jinju: A note on the history of Jinju, Lagos 1972. This Ahmadu Baba cannot be the famous Ahmad Baba of Timbuktu who was deported to Morocco and died at Timbuktu on 22nd April, 1627. For more details on Ahmad Baba see Mahmoud Zouber, Ahmed Baba, de Tombouctou (1556-1627) sa vie, son ceuvre Paris, Larose 1977.

96. Muhammadu Hambali Jinju op. cit., p.10.

97. Barth III, 541.

98. M. Bello Alkali op. cit., p.146.

99. Last M., The Sokoto Caliphate, London, Longman 1977, p.100, note 41.

100. Djibo Hamani: Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie op. cit., p.351.

101. ibid.

102. This description is from Waziri Junaidu see his Rihlah ila Agades NAK A/AR51/3.

103. See the two letters in Waziri Junaidu Rihlah ila Agades.

104. Waziri Junaidu, op. cit.

105. Barth reported the use of seal by Ahyar Sultan when he was in Agades. See Last, The Sokoto Caliphate op. cit., p.47, note 12; Also it is reported that Bello gave his seal to Muhammad Guma, Sultan of Ahyar see NAK K2443.

106. On the concept of bay'a see Y.T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello (1817-1837) towards the States of Borno, Adar, Ahir and the West, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1986, p.13.

107. NAK Raudal Jinan O/AR2/71.

108. Arnett, E.J. The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, p.10.

109. Waziri Junaidu Rihlah ila Agades.

110. ibid.

111. H.A. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.91.

112. ibid.

113. Waziri Junaidu Rihlah ila Agades.

114. Arnett, E.J. op. cit., p.96.

115. NAK Kadcaptory O/AR1/8 Sard-al-Kalam translated by Harris H.G., p.24 see also Hausawa da Makwabtansu I, p.34.

116. ibid.

117. The date of mid-January 1818 is from Djibo Hamani op. cit., p.324, note 1.

118. E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, p.47.

119. Djibo Hamani, Contribution a l'etude de l'histoire des Etats Hausa: L'Adar precolonial (Republique due Niger) E.N. 38, 1975, p.148.

120. Nahantchi Satifou, Monographie de la ville de Tawa (Tahoua) des origines a 1945 Maitrise Niamey 1989, p.45.

121. See Raudal Jinan NAK O/AR2/71.

122. Djibo Hamani, Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie op. cit, p.340.

123. F.H. El-Mesri "The life of Shehu Usman dan Fodio before the Jihad" JHSN II, 4, 1963.

124. ibid.

125. Arnett, E.J. The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, p.49.

126. Majmu Ashab amir al-Muminin Muhammad Bello.

127. Arnett, E.J. op. cit., p.55.

128. Djibo Hamani, Au Carrefour du Soudan op. cit., p.348.

129. ibid, p.343 see also M. Bello Alkali, A Hausa community in crisis op. cit., p.150, note 50.

130. Y.T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.375, quoting Murray Last , The Sokoto Caliphate, p.112.

131. F. Nicolas: Tamesna, le Ulliminden de 'lEst ou Touareg Kel Dinnik, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1950, p.58.

132. Alfarouk Rissatan, introduction a l'histoire, de l'Azawak Nigerien, Maitrise Niamey 1991, p.87, no.3.

133. ibid, p.89.

134. ibid, p.93.

135. F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.57.

136. See for example, his Jumal-min-al-mabani nasa'ih-li-Muhammad-al-Jaylani. N.H.R.S. P56/2, 5 pages.

137. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p.111.

138. Djibo Hamani, Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie op. cit., p.371.

139. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and its Diffusion in the Sahel, Warminster 1975, p.158.

140. F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.59.

141. ibid.

142. H. Clapperton, Journal of a second expedition into the interior of Africa, p.216.

143. F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.59, see also Urvoy, Histoire des populations du Soudan Central Larose 1936, p.297; Djibo Hamani mentioned the villages of Mambe, Buza, Gushi, Game, Gidan Bado, Fadakke and Kwamma. See Au Carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie op. cit., p.360.

144. Djibo Hamani, Au Carrefour du soudan op. cit., pp.360-361.

145. M. Last op. cit., p.73, see also p.74, no. 59.

146. Letter from Abubakar Attiq to Mahmood ibn Wasshar, Niamey IRSH Mara no.185 letter no.8.

147. Niamey IRSH Mara no.185, letter no. 13.

148. Habu Magaji IRSH Maradi Oral Evidence see also Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.122.

149. NAK SNP/17 K2076, p.7.

150. Y. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.131.

151. The ward head of Maradawa quarter in Maradi town, was a descendant of a Rano prince called Bara who came to the area with his brother Wagaza. He left Rano, because he failed to be elected Sarki. Wagaza will play an important role in the relations between the exiled Sarki Dan Kassawa (1816-1830) and the local population see Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.133, also, Habu Magaji IRSH Maradi; Oral evidence. Traditions have it that at Hissatau near Gidan Rumji are the descendants of Karbogari, and that a Borno prince came to the Kanembakashe area. Habu Magaji oral evidence. May 1995.

152. During the colonial period, a descendant of the Kutumbawa dynasty called Attahiru Sarkin Kano born in Maradi in 1872, declined the offer to be appointed village head of Maradu (a village few kilometres south-west of Maradi) because he considered the office very low for his status. See ANN 4E 1.5.

153. A.R. Augi, The Gobir Factor in Social and political History of the Rima Basin op. cit. vol.2, p.515.

154. Habu Magaji, Oral evidence Maradi May 1995. Habu Magaji said that Salihu had

been spitted; that is why spit-meat is forbidden in Tibiri and Sabon Birni to this day. But according to Augi (vol.2, p.515) Salihu was publicly executed at Wurno. Augi wrote also (p.518) that, it was Sarkin Gobir Ali (1820-1836) who made Dakurawa his first base before moving to Birnin Kunya.

155. A.R. Augi, The Gobir Factor op. cit., vol.2, p.521.

156. Y. T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.106, no.55. But according to Augi (vol.2, p.520) hostilities resumed in 1831-32.

157. Bello was so identified with Wurno that he was buried there and in the Sokoto dynasty each child whose name was Bello was called Mai-Wurno the well-known example being Muhammad Bello Mai-Wurno, son of Attahiru Ahmadu, who fled to the Blue Nile before the British. The date of the foundation of Wurno is not clear; Hogben and Kirk-Greene gave the date of 1822; Arnett said that Clapperton died at Wurno in 1827; Johnston wrote that around 1828 Wurno replaced Magarya as the principal ribat and it became important after the 1835 revolt of Sarkin Gobir Ali. See for information on ribats J.E. Philips; Ribats in the Sokoto Caliphate: selected studies 1804-1903, Ph.D., U.C.L.A. 1992; on Wurno see p.235.

158. Katembale was the wife of Yunfa taken as captive in 1808 and married by Bello. She bore for him two children, Fodio and Mualledi. See Last M . The Sokoto Caliphate, p.115.

159. J. Ed. Philips, Ribats in the Sokoto Caliphate, p.235.

160. ibid, p.231.

161. NAK O/AR1/7 Kadcaptory Kash-fu-wal Bayan by Waziri Gidado.

162. Omar Bello, The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.67.

163. See Emmanuel Gregoire, "Reseaux Marchands, accumulation, espaces economiques transfrontaliers" Rapport 2 Islam et Commerce December 1991.

164. F. Fuglestad, A history of Niger op. cit., p.25.

165. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina op. cit., pp.149-150.

166. NAK P/AR11/1 Mas'ala fi quissat allati waqa'at bayan Amir Maradi Dan Mari wa Amir Katsina Sadiq.

167. Y. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.152.

168. NAK P/AR11/1 it means "130 white gowns were coloured by a unique colorant".

169. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes au Niger op. cit., vol.1, p.293.

170. Saley Maman, Contribution a l'etude de l'histoire des Hausa. Les Etats Tsotsebaki des origines au 19 S. Doctorat en Sciences, Sociales, Bruxelles, 1994, 2 volumes, vol.2, p.273.

171. Tilho, p.429.

172. R.A. Dunbar, op. cit., p.x.

173. Zakari Maikorema, Contribution a l'histoire des populations du Sud-Est Nigerien: le cas du Mangari (16 - 19 S) EN53 Niamey 1985, p.143.

174. ibid, p.143.

175. ibid, p.124, no.3.

176. Zakari Maikorema op. cit., p.145. For the Foundation of Kukawa in 1814 See Louis Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty of Bornu, Columbia University, Ph.D. 1968, p.62.

177. R. Ann Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The History of Central Sudanic Kingdom, Ph.D. University of California 1970, p.125.

178. See Umar al Naqar, The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa, Khartoum University Press, 1972.

179. A.D.H. Bivar "Wathiqat ahl-al-Sudan: A manifesto of Fulani Jihad". J.A.H. II, 2, 1961, 235-243 See also Tanbih-al Ikhwan NAK 0/AR1/20 translated by H.G. Harris, folio 7.

180. Tanbih al-Ikhwan.

181. ibid.

182. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and its Diffusion in the Sahel, p.147.

183. W.A. Brown, The Caliphate of Hamdullahi c.1818-1864, p.17.

184. J. ED. Philips, Ribats in the Sokoto Caliphate, p.255.

185. F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.57.

186. H.A. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, p.127.

187. P.G. Harris, Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer, p.136.

188. Saleh Abubakar, Birnin Shehu, the city of Sokoto: A social and economic history c.1809-1903, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1982, p.40.

189. ibid, p.41.

190. Nahantchi Salifou, Monographie de la Nille de Tawa (Tahoua) des origines a 1945, op. cit., 46.

191. H.A. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, p.153.

192. Nahantchi Sakifou op. cit., p.46.

193. F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.53.

194. Nahantchi Salifou op. cit., p.25.

194bis. SOKProf S.2909 Reports no.20 for November 1904 by H.R.P. Hillary.

195. Jean-Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoy Aouta op. cit., p.62.

196. Saka A. Balogun, Gwandu Emirates in the 19th century with special reference to political relations (1817-1903), Ph.D Ibadan 1970, p.231; but Bello Alkali op. cit., p.263 gives 1856 as the date of the sack of Tamkalla. But if we take into account the description given by Barth in 1854 of Tamkalla the date of 1854 seems more accurate.

197. Barth, III, 583.

198. J.P. Rothiot, Zarmakoy Aouta op. cit., p.63.

199. Moulaye Hassan op. cit. gives the date of 1826; Dioulde Laya (op. cit.) gives 1820.

200. Saka A. Balogun op. cit., p.231

201. Ambassador Ahmadu Umoru, Oral evidence Niamey November 1995.

202. Hassane Baka, Contribution a l'historie, des migrations... op. cit. gives 1846 as that Shuaibu was appointed (see p.62) but Saka Balogun gives the date of 1848 see Saka Balogun the place of Gwandu in the Sokoto Caliphate" in Sokoto Seminar Papers, pp.278-295.

203. Oral evidence, Belko Soumana, Lamorde Bittim Koji November 1996.

204. P.G. Harris Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer, p.189.

205. M. Bello Alkali op. cit., p.298.

206. P.L. Monteil, De Saint-Louis a Tripoli par le Tchad p.205.

207. In Gerard Fourage, Frontiere meridionale du Niger op. cit., p.261, vol.2.

208. She bore him Muhammad Ba'are, Sarkin Kebbi c.1859-60.

209. Monteil P.L. De Saint-Louis a Tripoli par le Tchad p.235.

210. No 210.

211. See Majamu al rasa'il Amir al-Mumimin Muhammad Bello wa Amir al-Mumimin Abubakar Attiq.

212. IRSH Niamey Mara no. 185, letter no.8.

213. Malam Aliyu Sokoto, Majamu al Kulafa'i, Kadcaptory O/AR1/12.

214. ibid.

215. Tarikh es Soudan translated into French by Houdas, p.342.

216. Barth, III, 117.

217. Ahmad M. Kani, The Life and Works of Abdel-Kadir b. Al-Mustapha, p.70.

218. Tarikh Es-Soudan op. cit., p.358.

219. See Genealogy of Abzin Sultans by Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan, p.452.

220. Barth, III, 564.

221. Tarikh es-Soudan, p.350.

222. Y.T. Gella, The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.370.

223. J. Richardson, Narrative op. cit., p.38.

224. A. Es-Sadi Tarikh Es-Soudan p.361; The achura was 1/10th of the inheritance given to every Sultan in whose territory the succession took place. In Niger achura was suppressed effectively by the law no. 60-29 dated 25th May, 1960 see J.O.R.N. number 9, dated 1st July, 1960, p.373.

225. ANN 17-1-10 Cercle de Tahoua.

226. Backwell, H.F. The Occupation of Hausaland letter no. 75.

227. A.R. Augi, The Gobir factor op. cit., vol.2, p.526..

228. Barth, III, 103.

229. This marriage would have as issue Muhammad Maiturare, the famous Marafa Gwadabawa see Last op. cit., p.116.

230. NNAK Kadcaptory O/AR1/3 Tanis-al-Ikhwan.

231. Waziri Junaidu Collection Sokoto, Vol.IV, 53.

232. ibid, Vol.IV, 69.

233. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate p.112 see also note 85 of the same page.

234. ANN Cercle de Maradi: Rapport de tournee effectuee par l'eleve administrat moncocut dans l'Est et le Nord, de la subdivision de Maradi du 28 aout au September, 1941, uncatalogued.

235. NAK SNP/17 K2076 History of Katsina.

236. Emmanuel Gregoire Rapport 2 Islam et Commerce ASP, December 1991, p.6.

237. J. Ed. Philips, Ribats in the Sokoto Caliphate p.384 and p.390.

238. NAK/17 K2076 History of Katsina; see also Urvoy (Y) Histoire des populations Soudan Central, p.284.

239. Y.B. Usman, The Transformation of Katsina, p.201.

240. M.G. Smith quoted in F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.44.

241. NAK G/ARLO/Vol.I/2.

242. Waziri Junaidu Library, Sokoto, Vol.IV, 72.

243. NAK G/ARLO/Vol.I/12.

244. Quoted in Maman Saley, Contribution a l'etude de l'histoire, des Hausa, op. cit., vol.I, p.252.

245. On these developments, see Maman Saley, contribution a l'etude... op. cit., vol.I, p.270.

246. Andre Salifou, Le Damagaram ou Sultanat de Zinder au 19 S. EN27 Niamey 1971, p.52.

247. Barth, II, 602.

248. Tilho, p.368.

249. Ann R. Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) 1812-1906: The history of a Central Sudanic Kingdom Ph.D. University of California 1970, p.124.

250. ibid., p.125.

251. Zakari Maikorema, Contribution a l'histoire des population des Sud-Est Nigerien op. cit., p.176. But Adeye R. gives the date of 3rd April, 1894 as that of the sack of Kukawa by Rabeh see his Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906. London, Longman 1971, p.171.

252. SNP15 Acc No. 385/B1, Anglo-French boundary. His Excellency to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Zaria 12th January, 1905.

253. SNP 17 12168 Bornu Province - Borno Emirate - Machena District - Assessment report on. 1919.

254. ibid.

254bis. SNP15 no.385/B.1.

255. M. Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno under the Sayfawa op. cit., p.xx.

256. Tilho, Documents scientifiques, p.414.

257. ibid, p.414.

258. Benisheikh A. "The 19th Century Galadimas of Borno" in studies in the history of pre-colonial Borno ed. by Bala Usman and N. Alkali, pp.140-155.

259. ibid.

260. Barth, II, 261.

261. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit. vol.I, p.478, no.53.

262. Saley Maman, Contribution a l'etude, de l'histoire, des Hausa op. cit. vol.1, p.253.

263. R. Ann Dunbar, Damagaram op. cit., p.57.

264. ibid.

265. Andre Salifou, Le Damagaram ou Sultanat de Zinder, op. cit., p.99, no.2.

266. Ann R. Dunbar op. cit., p.78.

267. M. Last op. cit., p.203.

268. R. Ann Dunbar op. cit., p.83.

CHAPTER III

THE INSTALLATION OF COLONIAL REGIME AND THE BEGINNING OF FRONTIER POLICY: 1890-1910

In this section, the importance of the 19th century developments in the cultural or even physical resistance to the colonial penetration will constitute the issue of discussion. How the population of the area, imbued with Islamic ideas could react before the Christians? How could the Kebbawa or Maradawa, who, for a long period, had contained the Sokoto forces or even scored victories over them, could accept the domination of an even foreign element? What would be the reaction of the people when a demarcation line would serve as a notice that they were in foreign country and that they have to abandon even their farms and to go to one side or other of that line? To what extent did the colonial powers take into account the reality on the grounds, to minimise this disruption of old order and pre-existing relationships?

III.1. The 19th Century Legacy In The Demarcation Of The Frontier

As is well known, the first draft of Niger-Nigerian boundary, based on the Anglo-French declaration of 5th August 1890, was a line drawn from Say on the River Niger to Barwa on the Lake Chad, the two localities being today located in Niger Republic. When it came to be recognized on the grounds, a debate on the issue of the influence of Sokoto in the area arose. Britain and France engaged in an argument about the influence of Sokoto, the Britain basing their argument on Barth's information. According to Barth, he obtained from Caliph Aliyu (1842-59) information on his two principal objects: "one of

which was that he might give me a letter of franchise, guaranteeing to all British merchants entire security for themselves and their property in visiting his dominions for trading purpose, and the second, that he might allow me to proceed to Timbuktu and facilitate my journey to that place (...) by his own paramount authority".[1] This information by Barth was the mainstay of British claims not only over Sokoto but also over its dependencies in the north. Barth also reports the bay'a the Ahyar Sultan paid to Usman dan Fodio and he reported that in Gao area, a representative of the Alfa of Say (a Vassal of Gwandu) exacting taxes on the Fulani.[2] So, the British sustained their claims on the basis of these pieces of information. As for the French, their claims were based on Monteil's travel and the treaties he signed with the Sarkin Kebbi Samaila (1882-1915), the overlord of Zarma and Arewa territories[3] and with the Caliph Abdurahman (1821-1902)[4] in 1891. Monteil had already signed treaties with some dependencies of Sokoto in the West, especially Say (on the 24th August 1991) and Kunari (12th August 1891). So, France based its claims on these pieces of information. But owing to the fact that France didn't want to get into diplomatic trouble with Britain in colonial matters because of its policy to isolate Germany in Europe, it was easily agreed that a convention would be signed by which a circle of 100 miles radius north of Sokoto should be traced giving to Britain all the portion of Hausaland inside this radius. The convention was signed on 14th June 1898. So, Britain used in her negotiations with France, the political and religious influence of Sokoto, especially concerning the western part of the frontier (Sokoto, Gobir, Katsina), whereas on the eastern part of the frontier, the Damagaram and Borno influences had raised hot debate. In Sokoto area the Islamic factor played greater role

than military one whereas in Damagaram's relations with its neighbours the military aspect took the precedence over Islam. The Damagaram rulers never claimed religious leadership whereas all Sokoto's political act was, in reality or fiction, given religious motive. So what was the reality of the Sokoto Caliphate at the eve of colonial penetration?

In Islamic theory there is no separations between religions and politics (church and state), "nothing belongs to Cesar, all belongs to God". Also, as a writer put it, "the basis of an Islamic state is ideological not political or ethnical and the primary purpose of government is to defend and protect the faith, not just the state".[5] In Sokoto history, this principle had been implemented by the Shehu, as regard his relations with Ahyar, for Bello reported: "He withdrew the hands of his Viziers from the affairs of their people and left them to administer themselves".[6] But administrative and military factors brought great challenges to the Sokoto Caliphs after the Shehu. Bello went beyond this theoretical issue and engaged in administrative duty through Rissalat to Emirs and also in military campaigns to impose the caliphal authority on the areas under the jurisdiction of Sokoto. He defeated militarily many (if not all) of those who were reluctant to obey the caliph. This military orientation given by Bello, even though imposed by circumstances, had two important consequences in Sokoto history.


First, it came to mean that the Sokoto Caliphal authority was also military not just religious and therefore the Caliphal authority didn't impose itself on those peoples not militarily subdued.

Secondly, his successors might have to continue the same policy if they wanted to

be respected and considered as "true Caliphs". Even the great Ulama of Sokoto conceived it in that way, thence, their attempt to depose Caliph Aliyu ben Bello (1842-59) after many setbacks in the face of the Gobirawa. The Ulama gathered in the Sokoto mosque with a view to deposing him for "his inefficient handling of the affairs of the jama'a.[7] This military orientation prevented the Sokoto Caliphs from attempting any serious alternative to solve the political conflict which opposed them to dynasties that could not be really styled as animists.

When Barth travelled through the Caliphate in the middle of the 19th century (1853-54) he gave a military description which was lamentable. That was more so at the end of the century when the Europeans prepared to invade Hausaland. Since the reign of Caliph Umar (1881-91), it is said, there was "the loosening of ties between the centre of the Caliphate and the Emirates",[8] and the defence of the Caliphate relied on some individuals who rose as strong military leaders. The typical case was the Marafa of Gwadabawa, Muhammad Maiturare who had contingent of Abzinawa immigrants with firearms who were loyal to him.[9] He defended the Caliphate against the Kebbawa.[10]

In the last decade of the 19th century, the Caliphate was really weak. In the western part, Gwandu Emirate was weakened by a balance of power which was in favour of Zarma-Kebbi alliance, under an able leader Samaila (1882-1915). The Gwandu Emirs, who were characterized by their short reigns[11] were weak and the defence of the territory relied on the central administration at Sokoto. And the Sokoto rulers at that period, Umoru (1881-91) and Abdu (1891-1902) failed to reduce the strength of the Kebbi alliance. Despite this situation, Gwandu considered all these areas of Kebbi, Zarma,



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Arewa and Dendi, as being under its jurisdiction as reported by Urvoy.[12] Until the end of the century the SYSTEMS OF COALITION OPERATED: Kebbi controlled its Zarma and Arewa allies and Gwandu conserved its religious and political influence on the Fulani Emirates (Say, Kunari,Torodi, Yagha, Birnin Gaure, etc.).

The control of Kebbi over certain areas was undisputable and the 19th century travellers witnessed the fact. For instance, Zarmakoy Alfa Atta (1890-1896) of Dosso told Monteil in 1891 that he needed Sarkin Kebbi's assent before signing any treaty with him;[13] the chief of Giwaye in Arewa gave him the same answer;[14] when in December 1897, Captain Cazemajou wrote to Zarmakoy Attiku (1896-1902) of Dosso[15] from Karimama about a treaty, Attiku told him to go directly to Argungu[16] and Hourst even noted that Dosso paid tribute to Argungu.[17] This influence of Kebbi would manifest itself especially during the occupation of Zarma country by the French as we will see it later.

As for Gwandu, Urvoy reported that as all black empires, it had a centre (Gwandu) but no circumference.[18] It imposed its power on Emirates constituted of Fulani enclaves among Zarma (Birnin Gaure) or Gurma (Say, Lamorde, Torodi, etc.) The last manifestation of the influence which Gwandu exerted on these Emirates was during the campaign which Caliph Abdu (1891-1902) organized against Argungu in March 1891.[19] All these emirates sent contingents to the Caliph and Ibrahima, the Emir of Kunari led the contingents of Say, Kunari, Yagha, Liptako, and Torodi to help his overlord.[20] When the Voulet-Chanoine mission passed through Say in 1899, the Say Alfa, Kaka Ize (1898-1912) sent a letter to Caliph Abdurahman to seek advice. We have no information about the answer he got but he is said to have guided the mission to Sansane - Hausa. It is also reported that Say used

to send tribute to Gwandu at least for 10 years after the conquest of Niger territory by the French.[21] *During the period of Kebbi's weakness, i.e. between 1831 and 1849, even* Arewa people paid tribute to Gwandu, which amounted to 100 cowries per family. That tribute was collected by the representative of Sarkin Musulmi at Binji.[22] Even the Tuaregs of Imanan used to pay irregular tribute to Sokoto.[23]

In the northern part of Sokoto, the most important feature of Sokoto influence was the submission to Sokoto of Adar and even Ahyar through the Sultans since the time of the Shehu. Also, the presence of the Kel Gress and Itessan Tuaregs in Adar-Gobir Tudu area, regulated relations of Adar with Sokoto for they exacted zakkat on some Hausa villages on the basis of the right granted to them by Muhammad Bello (1817-37). They also secured this fringe of the Sokoto Caliphate; their presence as Sokoto allies explained why there was no attempt at challenging Sokoto from Adar.

As for the Ahyar Sultan, it is said that he used to pay a visit to Sokoto every year, carrying a symbolical tribute of a sheep.[24] Until the end of the 19th century, Sokoto had control over these northern polities, more especially Adar and Konni. The Sarakunan Konni, for example, used to send annually half the zakkat taken on millet production to Sokoto.[25]

Since the Sarkin Konni appointed by the jihadists, after their victory on this town, Shuaibu (1804-1813) to the reign of Adam dan Ibrahim (d.1893) they had always inclined towards Sokoto in their loyalty. His successor Yahaya dan Ibrahim (1893-1898) was deposed by the Marafa of Gwadabawa and replaced by Maliki Mainassara, a direct descendant of Shuaibu (1804-1813) as he claimed it himself.[26] In fact, at the end of the

19th century, the Marafa Muhammad Maiturare was the overseer of the northern territories, namely, Arewa, Konni and Adar. Until the installation of the colonial administration in the area the Marafa's influence was undisputable, for in 1904 the Acting Resident, Sokoto, Charles Orr, recognized that the Marafa administered the whole of the northern portion of Sokoto Province.

The Kel Gress and Lissawan Tuaregs from Adar came to help their overlord the Caliph Abdurahman (1891-1902), when he summoned them in 1891.[27] So, it was against all that background that the Sokoto Caliphs considered their authority as imposed on all these areas. For instance, Caliph Umar (1881-1891) had, in two treaties he secured with the N.A.C. Limited, referred to himself as "The King of the Muslims of Sudan".[28] His successor Abdu (1891-1902), in a treaty with the Agent-General of the R.N.C. in 1894 stated: "Asben, Adamawa ... are included in my dominion".[29]

But the most important reference to the northern frontier of Sokoto, as far as we know, is a fragment of letter addressed by Sidi Muhammad al-Kunti of Masina to Ahmad Lobbo of Hamdallahi, in which the Kunta Sheikh gave the frontiers of Sokoto as follows: "Northwards it reached Kaukau/Gau-Gau (Gao) and Humbori and the border of Mushi (Mossi) and it extended eastwards to near the land of Sunar on the border of al-Yaman (Adamawa) and north to Bornu al-Akradi, to Agades and to Aqazar".[30] This frontier was defined in c.1825/26. The frontier was seriously considered, for when Masina forces were sent in the pursuit of Gelajo in 1833, they turned back at the Behelede river, which marked the frontier between Masina and Sokoto.[31] At the same period that the Masina-Sokoto frontier were defined, Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi wrote to Bello (1817-

1837) and proposed to him the frontier between them as follows: "Between our two kingdoms are the pagan Bede tribes, on whom it is permissible to levy contributions; let us respect this limits; what lies to the west of their countries shall be yours; what lies to the east shall be ours; as for Muniyo, Damagaram and Daura, they will continue to be the Vassals of the Sultan of Borno, who in return, will surrender to you all his pretensions to Gobir and katsina".[32]

At the end of the 19th century, these pieces of information hadn't been taken into considerations, certainly because they were not available and also because the treaties secured by European travellers were given more importance. Also, the consideration of geo-politics in Europe, especially France's willingness to side with Britain in her everlasting animosity with Germany, led her to do many concessions to Britain, especially on some important territories in the Pacific. So, the negotiations and rectifications had been done without consideration to local condition, at least in the beginning. The Sokoto Caliphate, for example, had been used blindly by Britain, as it was described by Barth who, most of the time, reported official views. But recent studies show that Britain could legitimately claim the possession of some territories north of the circle, as for example, Tawa (Tahoua) or the region of Imanan whose Tuareg inhabitants paid, episodically, tribute to Sokoto.[33]

At the beginning of the colonial era, reports had it that the influence of the Sarkin Musulmi, head of Muslims "extends to Timbuktu and in the north as far as Agades".[34] Captain Moll, who seemed to be current about the situation in West Africa, in his position both as a French citizen and member of Boundary Commission, informed Lugard that "from Agades, 350 miles to the north, to Timbuktu, 600 miles to the west, the selection

of every king must be confirmed by Sokoto and is invalid until so confirmed".[35] During the colonial period, Governor Clifford even compared the Sarkin Musulmi's position to that of a King - Pope.[35bis]

The convention of 14th June, 1898 constituted a major inconvenient for the French, that it confined them to what the then British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury called "the sand and the bush and the waterless wastes" whereas the "greedy Britain" took for itself "Sokoto, Bornu and the splendid route of navigable Niger and the fertile Benue valley". So, France wanted to have a watered route allowing her to go from west to the Lake Chad without being constrained to cross British territory. All the French missions sent after the convention of 14th June 1898, to recognize the frontier on the grounds were forced, because of the shortage of water in French side, to pass through british territory, which raised many diplomatic frictions.

Another convention was signed on 8th April 1904, which could give France its route to the East. But before this convention was signed, many developments occurred.

One of the features of the relations between the colonial powers and the "native chiefs" with whom treaties were signed, was that these chiefs tried to integrate the colonial phenomenon itself into the scheme of pre-colonial politics. This is more perceptible in Kebbi area where the Sarkin Kebbi Samaila (1882-1915), owing to his old enmity with Sokoto, tried to get support from the French to crush definitely the Sokoto forces. It was this hope that led him to sign a treaty with Gazemajou, on 19th January 1898, placing thereby his kingdom under French protectorate. This Treaty shows the limits of Samaila's kingdom.

Article 1: Ismail, King of Kebbi, declares putting his kingdom under French protectorate.

Article 2: The Kebbi country includes: 1st) The Kebbi proper; 2nd) The Zarma; 3rd) The Mauri (Arewa); 4th) The Dendi of the left bank of Niger and all the territories that Samaila and his successors would acquire.[36]

Taking account of this Treaty, Samaila (1882-1915), sent a letter to his Vassal the Zarmakoy of Dosso, Attiku (1896-1902), "beseeching him not to entertain any evil plan against the French".[37] The letter arrived in Dosso on December 14th, 1898, after that town had been occupied by the French in November. But all his attempts to get the French take side with him failed. He therefore began to call Zarma and Arewa people to cross to him,[38] as we will see it later.

The new convention which was signed on April 8th 1904, included a disposition which considered the frontiers of the 19th century. This disposition was: "it is agreed that in those portions of the projected lines where the frontier is not determined by trade routes, regards shall be had to the present political divisions of the territories".[39] When it came to be understood that Britain had to hand-over some territories like Maradi to France, Lugard, the then High Commissioner of Northern Niger, tried to convince the Secretary of State that it was an error. His main argument came from the Sokoto legacy. He argued: "Maradi is one of the original seven Hausa states, formed by an emigration from Katsina and is an integral part of Northern Nigeria". Lugard continued:

> It must be remembered that portions of the territories of chiefs in the British sphere have been assigned to foreign powers in just the same way that a portion of the Zinder (Damagaram) fell

to Nigeria (of which indeed the whole was an integral part.

And he concluded: "The cession of territory of Sokoto, the head of the Mohammedan faith will no doubt have an injurious effect among the Mohammedan States".[40]

In Adar-Gobir-Katsina area, ,the uncertainty of the frontier between 1898 and 1906, had created trouble and insecurity in a zone which seemed to be a "no man's land". Also, owing to the absence of real administration, the 19th century conflicts continued to characterize the relations between the "ancient" enemies. In Adar-Gobir Tudu area, the 20th century opened with conflicts between the French and the Tuaregs (Kel Gress and Itessan). Colonel Peroz who was appointed Commandant of the territoire militaire du Niger, with residence in Zinder, travelled through Adar in company of the Commandant Gouraud. To reduce the strength of the Tuaregs and their power in the area, the French gave two fierce battles to the Tuaregs and defeated them: The first at Zangebe on 13th April 1901, and the second at Galma on 18th June 1901. For this reason, the Tuaregs embarked on a great exodus in 1901, proceeding to the east, alongside with the Tuaregs of Damargu, whose chief, Musa was defeated and killed by the French from Zinder, on 19th July 1900. His capital, Tanamari was sacked.[41]

The Tuaregs migrated to Kanem thinking to find and stay in a territory where the French could not perturb them. But the French overtook them and, together with their Senussi hosts, they were defeated in December 1902 at the Senussi zawiya at Bir-Alali. They therefore decided to come back to their original home. Meanwhile, the French who had in reality no right on this area, had already began to administer it. The area was under the British according to the convention of 14th June, 1898 but the French thought

that they had to administer the area, because they defeated the Tuaregs and the British showed no interest in coming there.[42] So, they took the command of Gobir Tudu from the Tuaregs and gave it to their protege, Magaji Abdullahi with residence in Kiara. Also, the Hausa peasants took over the farms and began exploiting them.

Magaji continued to pay taxes to the French until the arrival of a British force. But what prevented the British from taking the administration of Gobir-Tudu was that Colonel Elliot, the British Boundary Commissioner, warned the Resident Sokoto, Charles Orr, that "he expected to find Maradi to be French". [43] Many incidents however, occurred, which even took a diplomatic turn. For instance, the Foreign Office wrote to the Colonial Office to request the High Commissioner to make enquiry and obtain evidence of French interference in areas under British suzerainty. These areas were Gidan Bado where the French had a military post, Tahoua, Mogar etc.[44]

In July 1903, when the Tuaregs appeared on the Gobir Tudu scene, coming from Kanem, Magaji Abdullahi, knowing the threat to his position, tried to take them by surprise. He launched an attack on the Tuaregs who nevertheless, easily routed him with heavy losses (400 to 500 Gobirawa were killed against 12 Tuaregs).[45]

We must bear in mind that these territories controlled by the Abzinawa were those granted to them by Muhammad Bello (1817-37) for their religious repute or for the aid they gave him against the Gobirawa. The French took these territories and gave them to the Gobirawa for the same motives, i.e. because the Gobirawa helped them against the Tuaregs and for their journey to the East. But in doing so (giving back the territories to Gobirawa) the French not only turned the clock of history back, but also erased one of

the most important evidences of Sokoto presence in the area.

To settle the matter, the Resident of Sokoto, Major Burdon, summoned all the parties to Sokoto in September 1903. He sentenced Magaji Abdullahi to deportation and allowed the Abzinawa to resume authority over all the Gobir Tudu. That was done by the British, against the will of the Marafa of Gwadabawa (the overseer of the northern territories of Sokoto) who was party to the Hausa peasants, but the British wanted to get the confidence of the Abzinawa, to settle them and side them against the French. Magaji Abdullahi escaped from Sokoto and proceeded to Sabon Birni.

In the Galmi area also (Gobir Tudu), Charles Orr investigated the matter of three villages: Galmi, Gunfara and Kaura. He concluded that they must be under the ownership of Abzinawa instead of Adarawa claimants and he handed them over to the Abzinawa accordingly. Sarkin Musulmi Attahiru II, following the steps of Bello in 1836, sent words to Sarkin Adar that he might give the towns (five in all) up. In so doing, the Sarkin Musulmi, even though acted more as British Vassal than as Adar suzerain, expressed the continuity of relations and reasserted the 19th century legacy in the solving of territories problems.

This 19th century legacy expressed itself in many other ways, in relation to the partition. When Mayu, a Tuareg chief from Lawai, had been driven out of his town by Sarkin Adar Attu in 1904, he fled to Sokoto for protection and the Marafa of Godabawa, under the instruction of the Sultan gave Mayu a territory in Goronyo district, where he stayed.[46] The Sarkin Adar Attu also sent to demand Zakkat from several Konni towns (Sajai, Sauna Goma, Kadaibadai) near the boundary but in British sphere.[47]

Another area where the 19th century legacy expressed itself in frontier matters was the area of Maradi and Sabon Birni.

In Maradi area, Kauran Assau, an influential military figure in the area spent all the last decades of the 19th century fighting Maradi and Tibiri. This state of affairs continued and, in 1904, while the British and the French tried, the former to maintain Maradi in their sphere and the latter to gain it, Kaura Hassau and his "hereditary enemies" continued the policy of the 19th century. Until this period, Kaura Hassau and the Sarkin Maradi Kure (1898-1920) disputed the control of the area, the former being supported by Katsina Emirate, the latter being the heir of the resistance. In February 1904, the Sarkin Katsina, Maradi Kure (1898-1920) and his ally Sarkin Gobir Tibiri, Almu dan Kurna, attacked Kaura Hassau near Madarunfa and were defeated with a reported loss of 100 people. While Almu dan Kurna returned to Tibiri, Sarkin Maradi Kure sought refuge for a time in Sabon Birni.[49] It seemed that Kaura Hassau wanted to replace Sarkin Katsina Kure with his own protege, one Dankassawa.[50] Kaura Hassau posed a challenge to the British themselves in writing to, and threatening the town of Chafe with raids if he was not paid tribute.[51] But the coalition of Maradi - Tibiri finally made Kaura Hassau flee from his town. He arrived in Katsina on 29th June 1907, and wrote a letter to the Acting Resident Palmer requesting for permission to live there.[52]

Another "trouble-maker" in the area was Balarabe, the ex-sarkin Gobir of Sabon Birni. At the end of 1904, a change occurred in Sabon Birni. Balarabe, who was hitherto the Sarkin Gobir (of Sabon Birni) was deposed by his brother Umaru who made himself Sarkin Gobir.[53] Balarabe harassed Sabon Birni and on 19th August, 1907, he launched a

decisive attack from Uban Jada in French territory. Between Balarabe and Jari (successor of Umaru) 7 days fighting occurred before Jari succeeded in driving him out of his town. He fled to Ubanjada. Jari requested from the British authorities that a small constabulary of 5 men be posted at Sabon Birni,[54] until the French authorities put Balarabe under arrest.

In the eastern part of the frontier, relations between Damagaram and its southern neigbours particularly Machena raised a lot of debate. The French wanted to be given the whole of Damagaram, which they believed, included Machena and N'guru but the British made them abandon these claims. The French based their pretensions on the tribute paid by Machina to Zinder between 1896 and 1903. The French military columns also tried to gain the territory of Gumel, whose Sarki Ahmed showed them good disposition owing to his parenthood with the Sultan of Zinder.[55] Then French also tried to give their seal to the Sultan of Kano but the latter declined to take it owing to his loyalty towards Sokoto.[56] But all these French attempts to gain territories in the south of Zinder failed. The convention of 8th April, 1904 severed a large part of Damagaram. According to Ann Dunbar, on the southern part Damagaram about 150,000 persons and 570 villages covering a space of 900 km^2 went to the British.[57]

III.2. The Transfer Of Power To "More Capable Hands"

The British as well as the French followed the same lines of policy concerning this transfer of power.

1) They based their legitimacy on the right of conquest.

2) They disorganized the Sarauta System both in stirring opposition between

the rulers and the ruled, showing therefore that they were backed by the local populations, and in appointing peripheral princes or some times even people with no pretension to the throne.

3) The manipulation of the religion.

III.2.1. The Right Of Conquest

Before imposing its domination on Northern Nigeria, the British colonial administration gave two fierce battles against the most important cities of the caliphate either for their wealth (Kano) or their place in the caliphal system (Sokoto). In October 1902, the Magajin Keffi, Dan Yamusa, Zaria's representative in Keffi, revolted, killed the British Resident Moloney, and fled. Lugard therefore declared all who received the Magajin Keffi, the enemies of the British.[31] Sarkin Kano, Aliyu (1894-1903) took no notice of this threat and welcomed and treated the Magajin Keffi with honour. The British forces attacked Kano on 3rd February 1903. After conquering Kano, they proceeded to Sokoto where the newly installed Caliph Attahiru Ahmad tried to give battle on 15th March 1903, but was easily routed.

As for the French, before imposing their domination on the Tuareg-controlled territory of Adar and Gobir Gudu, they gave the Tuaregs two fierce battles and defeated them: at Zengebe on 13th April 1901, and at Galma on 18th June 1901.[59]

After defeating the old ruling classes, the colonial powers announced their policy and asserted their rights. Lugard in Sokoto in 1903 as Peroz in Tamaske in November 1901, followed the same lines of policy.

In his second speech in Sokoto, on 21st March 1903, Lugard gave a parallel

between the present situation and that of the beginning of the 19th century:

"The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British".[60]

Lugard made Sokoto rulers understand that, from the right of conquest, come all the others, as for example, the definition of the policy on land and taxes. He continued therefore: "The Government will, in future, hold the rights in land which the Fulani took by conquest from the people, and if Government requires land, it will take it for any purpose. The Government hold the right of taxation".[61]

Since 1902, Lugard prepared British public opinion to this transfer of power. This opinion was reluctant to use force, since Britain suffered many reverses in South Africa against the Boers at the end of the 19th century. But Lugard insisted on the urgent necessity of this transfer. "The misrule of the Fulani had rendered them so hateful to the bulk of the population, who would welcome their overthrow".[62] Thence, he concluded: "The time had come for the transfer of the suzerainty to the more capable hands of the British, who, fortunately, for the country, were ready to undertake it".[63] Having taken the control of the country by use of force, the British tried to get the support of the local population, especially the ancient Habe dynasties overthrown by the Fulani. In that way, the British expressed their self-satisfaction by rendering historical justice. Thus, the Resident Sokoto, Major Burdon, in 1903 expressed this self-satisfaction in emphatic terms: "The representatives of the original Hausa rulers are very pleased with us for having avenged their defeat on the Fulani".[64]

It is even said that Palmer, a pro-Habe administrator, was the advocate of the policy of reinstatement of old Habe dynasties. It was Temple who strongly opposed it.[65]

The French had almost the same kind of relations with the populations and the events. After defeating the Tuaregs, Colonel Peroz summoned them at Tamaske, on 2nd November 1901, to dictate to them, the new policy and especially the new game's rules. He began by asserting French rights of conquest: "You took the right to rule over this country by means of war. You lost it by means of war. God's will shall be".[66]

As Lugard had done in Sokoto, Colonel Peroz prevented the Tuaregs to exact taxes on Hausa villages as they had done hitherto. "Know that no Tuareg other than Ahmattaza[67] had right on an Asna village and you cannot levy tax on the villages and if you try to levy tax, you will be punished as thieves".[68]

The French imposed on the Tuaregs and Gobir-Katsina chiefs very heavy tributes, which might show their submission.[69] The French also expressed self-satisfaction in the same way as the British. In 1901, Joly, the Commandant de cercle Tahoua wrote:"This region accustomed with the very harsh Tuareg domination accepted ours as a deliverance".[70] Few years later, another Administrator, Lieutenant Peignol, wrote (in 1907): "The Hausa have accepted with readiness the white men who delivered them from Tuareg yoke".[71] Nevertheless, the harshness of French regime will be the most important cause of migration into British territory. After imposing themselves, the French reorganized the sarauta.

III.2.2. The Disorganisation Of The Sarauta System

The colonial powers appointed as Emirs, whoever supported them and took

advantage of animosity among every ruling family to appoint peripheral princes or even those who had no claim to the Emirship. The most important element was collaboration with them. In Niger territory one of the most important cases was the Zarma ruling family of Dosso who, through collaboration with the French, raised their polity from an insignificant chieftaincy in the 19th century to the status of a province. As a writer put it: "The Dosso chieftaincy was before the coming of the French, a little principality as any other and all its importance came from the collaboration the sons of Kossom developed with the colonial powers".[72]

The colonial powers instigated animosity between the princes and exacerbated the struggle for power, as a writer put it: "For every Emir that was on the throne, there was a rival prince usually who had previously failed in his bid to occupy the throne, who would seize any available opportunity to take over. Lugard exploited this situation by offering Emirship of every conquered Emirate to any of the princes who agreed to collaborate with them".[73] In Katsina for instance, the Dallazawa dynasty was replaced with that of Umorun Dumuyawa, with the appointment of Muhammad Dicko as Emir of Katsina in 1906. He was appointed in reward of the help he gave the British to erect a fort in Katsina.[74]

In Daura, the Habe dynasty represented by Malam Musa, was reinstated to power instead of the Fulani Emir, Magajiya Murne (1905-1906) who became District Head of Sandamu with the title of Sarkin Fulani. He was even shortly afterwards deposed.[75]

Whereas, during the 19th century, Sokoto Caliphs were the source of all power and had maintained the right of appointing or impeaching, now the Caliph himself whom the

British reduced to a Sultan, had to be appointed by a foreign power and as any other Emir, the Sultan was given a "letter of appointment" in the tradition the British brought from India. This "letter of appointment" thus reduced thus the Sultan from "the King of the Muslims of Sudan" to the status of a "Warrant Chief". Sokoto itself was reduced to the status of the Capital of the Province where the Resident was the most important authority. Lugard even told the Sultan: "You must not fear to tell the Resident everything and he will help you and advise you".[76]

This transfer of power was well expressed by the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Abbas (1903-1919) who said in 1903, in humble manner to the Resident: "The country is yours, you have put me to shepherd it".[77]

In Katsina, where Lugard arrived on March 28th, 1903, Emir Abubakar who was in power had to be re-installed to make him understand that he was henceforth responsible not to the Sarkin Musulmi but to the High Commissioner; and "the sword which Korau had used to slay Sanau (centuries earlier) was then taken by Lugard as a symbol that power had now been transferred to the British".[77bis] It is commonly admitted that British exercised indirect rule i.e. exercised their authority through native rulers. Yet, the British and the French defined in the same way the role which native chiefs had to play in the administrative machine. In his political memoranda Lugard wrote: "There are no two sets of rulers - British and native - working either separately or in cooperation, but a single government in which the native chiefs have well-defined duties".[78]

In his "circulaire au sujet des chefs indigenes", dated 15th August 1917, the

Governor General of French West Africa, J.V. Vollenhoven, wrote: "[The rule which determines the attribution of native chiefs must be as follows: they have no power of any kind, because there are no two kinds of power in the cercle: The French authority and the native authority. There is only one! Only the Commandant de Cercle rules; only him is responsible. The native chief is but an instrument, an auxiliary]".[79]

But differences of approach really existed between the French and the British, on colonial matters. The main, as far as native authority was concerned was that, as put by Hiskett "The British in Hausaland came to regard the traditional Islamic establishment as an ally; there was not ... the distance between the British and their Muslim subjects in Northern Nigeria that continued to exist for many years over the border in French territory".[80] The policy of assimilation by French could leave no place to native initiative either in administration or elsewhere. Thus, the Commandant de Cercle was, as defined by Fuglestad, "the local chief administrative officer, law-maker (in the sense that he could interpret local customary law as he wished), judge, police chief, military commander, prison superintendent, tax-collector, chief medical officer and much more".[81] Also the French colonial policy was characterized by centralisation: a single structure, a single hierarchy, a single set of rules.[82] So, as a British Officer summed it, "there are too much machinery and too much paper".

III.2.3. The Manipulation Of The Religion

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The manipulation of religion is defined by some authors as "essentially , controlling the action of a person or group without that person or group knowing the goals, purpose and method of that control and without even being aware that a form of control is being

exercised on them at all".[83]

The Europeans, long before the colonial era, were aware of the place Islam had in African societies more especially sub-saharan Africa. This appears in the 19th century travellers' attitude to take Muslim names once travelling in Hausaland.[83bis] Nevertheless, Barth's caravan was attacked in Ahyar and the assailant said explicitly that "he was only come against us as christians".[84] The French traveller L.P. Monteil didn't take a Muslim name but reported his experience as follows: "[I always took off my shoes before entering a mosque; in a respectful attitude that I assisted to the salam (prayer) ... my attitude always disarmed the most intolerants]".[85] Monteil travelled through Hausaland between 1891-1892. Captain Gabriel Cazemajou, the famous leader of the Mission Cazemajou, who was killed in Zinder by Sultan Ahmadu Kuren Daga in 1898, wrote in his Journal de route: "[Today (28th February 1898) is the end of Ramadan, the Aid-el-Kebir (sic). I slaughter a bullock; I distribute linen cloth to my men ... I went yesterday to pay a visit to the Konni chief. The conversation only theological showed them that I am a faithful and I wanted always to bring the conversation on this subject (theology) to make them understand that I am far from being a 'Kaffir' (infidel) ... They all agreed with what I was saying and I think this visit will dispose the population more favourably towards me]".[86]

In Northern Nigeria, Lugard, in his speech in Sokoto (21st March, 1903) reassured the Muslim population that "Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion ... Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us".

As for the French, Lieutenant-Colonel Peroz, writing to Gouraud the then Commandant, de Cercle of Tawa (Tahoua), advised him: "your speeches and letters [to

native chiefs] will be studded with religious maxims and name of God".[87] The Lieutenant-Colonel himself, as he told Gouraud to do, studded his speech to the Tuareg-chiefs at Tamaske with many references to God and even concluded his speech by:" I ask God to bless you and make you understand the law that He, dictated me today and He transmitted you through my mouth". And his final word was: "God bless us and forgive our sins".[88] Lugard, also ended his speech at Sokoto with a religious formula: "Oh God, save our Master Muhammad". And following his conviction that the securing of the goodwill of the chiefs was necessary to the administration he aimed at carrying through them, Lugard tied the Emirs to their religious conviction in making them swear to an oath as follows:

> I swear in the name of Allah and of Mahomet His Prophet to well and truly serve his Majesty King Edward VII and his Representative the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria.
>
> To obey the laws of the Protectorate and lawful commands of the High Commissioner and the Resident, provided that they are not contrary to my religion. And if they are so contrary, I will at once inform the Resident for the information of the High Commissioner. I will cherish in my heart no treachery or disloyalty, I will rule my people with justice and without partiality. And as I carry out this oath, so may Allah judge me".[89]

Another aspect of the manipulation of religion in British Northern Nigeria was the association of the Resident of Sokoto to many if not all the religious manifestations. Paul

Marty reported: "In Sokoto the British Resident used to pay visits with great pomp and ceremony, in company of the Sarkin Musulmi to the venerable grave of Sheikh Usman dan Fodio on the anniversary of his death, as he assisted the great Muslim feasts".[90]

In the same way but sometimes with no reference to the official policy, missionary activities developed, through distribution of the Holy Bible written in local languages. The 19th century travellers had already experienced the distribution of the Holy Bible in Arabic, as for example, Clapperton to Muhammad Bello in 1826 or Barth to his friend Ibrahim Adama in 1857.[91] In the French colony of Niger, a member of British church, from Scotland, travelled through northern Niger from Menaka (Mali) and paid visit to all the scholars of Filinge area, distributing them saint images and passages of the Holy Bible in Tamajek.[92]

Lugard expressed his fear of Islam even through the conscription for he instructed officers to watch the rank and file closely and to prefer Hausa-speaking pagans in the recruitment.[93]

So, since its very beginning, colonisation shaped the mind of its agents to deal adequately with one of the most important challenges in Hausaland: Islam.

This manipulation of religion, as practised by the French and British, fits the definition which Bala Usman gave of the manipulation as we saw it. Even in their personal relationships with the natives, the British, for example, "insisted on being called Bature (plural turawa) which literally means 'European', rather than Nasara (or Anasara) christian".[94]

Considered as a whole, this transfer of power coincided with the passage of the

frontier from a fluid concept during the Sokoto caliphate (because it could not be established at a given place) to a concrete reality (because the colonial powers defined the frontier geographically and demarcated it. From that time the control of the frontier could be effective. This period therefore began the frontier policy.

III.3. People And Their Chiefs: Their Reaction

To Colonial Conquest: 1890-1906

The violence which accompanied the colonial conquest, put the population of Hausaland into panic and shock. They took time before engaging in any active initiative and their first reaction was to take refuge in the cultural stratum, awaiting a deliverer, a Mahdi. This explains the flowering of Mahdist ideas of which some scholars, sometimes with very disputable knowledge, took advantage and led people or incited them to migration to the East, following the old tradition in Hausaland, developed especially after the jihad.

III.3.1. Mahdist Manifestations At The End Of The 19th Century

During the 19th century, tradition of migration developed in Sokoto literature and it is said that Muhammad Bello (1817-37) indicated the road to the Mahdi. The successor of Bello, Abubakar Attiku was so worried about the exodus of the population that he is said to have issued a proclamation declaring that the time of the hijra had not come.[95] In the second half of the 19th century, there were sporadic waves of migration and it is reported that Emir of Kano, Muhammad Bello (1883-1892) sent a letter to Maryam bint-al Shaykh informing her that people from all directions of Hausaland passed through his region, saying it was time to leave Hausaland.[96] In these Mahdist manifestations some

people distinguished themselves and opposed the Emirs, forcing the latter to sometimes take military action against them. In these events the influence of Sudanese Mahdiya was important. For instance, during the reign of Emir of Kano, Bello (1883-1892) and Caliph Umoru (1881-1891), one cleric, Malam Yamusa Dingari or Modibo Dingari (Yamusa), on the receipt of the news of the Mahdi from Sudan, which was not accepted by the Sokoto authorities, collected a large following, proposing to go to the Mahdi. This following consisted mainly of bush Fulani and Habe from Maradi who were mostly illiterate.[97] The Sarkin Musulmi ordered the Emirs of Hadejia, Missau, and Katagum to scatter them, which they did. Malam Yamusa was sent to Sokoto as a prisoner until the death of Sarkin Musulmi Umoru (1891) when he was released and he died in Bauchi.

In 1895, one Malam Abubakar known as Mai Jaki sent his son to Hayatu who was with Rabeh in Borno, in connection with the Sudan Mahdi. Mai Jaki duly received his flag, and began his adherence to the Sudan Mahdi. Mai Jaki went to Karawa (Marusa) and Marusa dan Karu told the Emir of Katsina, Abubakar "Ga wuta kasheta tunda wuri". (Here is fire, you have to put it out early). After Marusa himself failed to deal with Mai Jaki, the Katsina Emir Abubakar sent 500 men against him and he was finally killed at Sirika, his head and standard sent to Sokoto and all the captives sold into slavery.[98] His son malam Musa dan Maijaki would be a thorny problem for French and British colonial powers especially in connection with Tassawa raid.

About 1896, one malam Muhammadu Dan Baba, came to Katsina town from Damagaram and became a pupil of Alhaj Balarabe (a son of al-Haj Bakogayi). In 1904 he settled at Dan-Ashita and between 1904 and 1909 he used to visit one malam Abdu Mai-

Gada at Dingari (Kano) from whom he is said to have learned the Mahdism. Dan Baba was considered as responsible for the spread of Mahdism in Katsina. He acted as an opposition to the Emir of Katsina and in 1914 he left Katsina territory rather than obey the order of the Emir to come to Katsina to give an account of his teaching.[99] Malam Muhammadu dan Baba was succeeded at Dan Ashita by Mallam Salihu, also from Damagaram.[100] Damagaram also had relations with the Mahdiya through Hayatu's son Malam Said who had a special Jekada to Damagaram, Malam Musa.

In the Sokoto area itself the development which would lead to Satiru revolt of 1906, began around 1894. Mahdist ideas and opposition to Sokoto caliphs developed there.[101]

The development of Mahdist ideas among the local mallams can be explained by the failure of the Sokoto jihad to establish a rightly guided caliphate. In fact, the Sokoto jihad leaders had in mind the ideal society and the just ruler (al-Imam al-Adl) and they aimed at re-creating in their area the society of the Rightly-guided Caliphate.[102] The concrete conditions on the ground prevented the jihadists to fulfill that aim. After Bello (1817-1837) the Caliphs were not fully committed to Islam and at the end of the 19th century, one "Umar b. Muhammad al-Bukhari had to write a book to awaken his brothers in the caliphate and warn them of the consequence of their departure from (the ideals of the jihad movement)".[103] Umar b. Muhammad Bukhari stated: "When I say the disintegration of our religious and temporal affairs, which is the consequence of our lack of striving upon what has been prescribed on us, such as jihad, executing the Hudud and applying the shari'a as well as other inadequacies such as lack of consultation (failure) to

give the right of others (...) as well as (failure) to observe the right (of others) and other weaknesses such as plotting one against the other among blood relations and brothers in Islam".[104] Some of the Sokoto Sultans themselves distinguished themselves in anti-Islamic practices.[105]

So, this idea of a "not achieved goal" influenced the spread of Islamic revivalism in Sokoto Caliphate, and some mallams, not related to the Caliphal system or princes who failed to succeed to the throne (for example, Hayat ben Said) tried to go back to the ideals of the jihad through the Mahdiya.

Another event of Islamic nature even though not related to Mahdism, was the coming of Tijani from western Sudan in the Sokoto Caliphate. Their leader, Sheikh Ahmadu, driven out of Segu by the French, proceeded to the East and finally died at Makulki (Sokoto area) on 16th December 1897. His followers helped Caliph Attahiru to challenge the British at Burmi in July 1903 and when the latter was killed they scattered. The son of Ahmadu Sheku, Madani installed himself in Hadejia "eight months after the capture of Kano".[106] The Madani community, settled in Dakayawa (Hadejia) and Madani would be the leader of the Tijaniya sect in a wide area, including Damagaram and Manga areas. The attention Madani received can be perceived through this report: "Sarkin Kano is believed each year to give him a horse if he sends to him and Sarkin Zaria presents him with the same or its equivalence in cash. From Azare and from French territory, Damagaram, Guri, and even Agades he is credited with receiving presents".[107]

The importance of the Dakayawa community would be enhanced when sporadic anti-colonial movements would develop during the first decade of colonial administration

and a close watching would be mounted on the Tijani settlement.

So, with the installation of the colonial powers, non-violent Mahdism[108] developed, encouraging migration instead of fighting. People therefore decided to evacuate Hausaland and go to the East. Hausaland had become "Kaffir land". It seems that the teachings of the Shehu influenced this attitude. In fact, the Shehu, in his Masa'il Muhim ma, written in 1803, urged people to flee from unbelievers' rule, acquire arms and defend themselves.[109] Another type of migration in the time of colonial imposition was that from French to British territory. Mainly because of the harshness of French administration, people "escaped" from French into British territory.[110]

III.3.2. Passive Resistance To Colonial Conquest

In this section we aim at showing the passive resistance derived from the tradition of Mahdism and migration, in Gwandu, Kebbi, Adar, Katsina, Damagaram, Muniyo, etc. Gwandu refers here to the Gwandu proper and its dependencies of the West, especially the Emirates which developed in Zarma and Gurma areas. As for Kebbi, the expression rikon-Kebbi should be more appropriate, for it refers to the Kebbi Kingdom as defined by Samaila (1882-1915) in the Treaty he signed with Cazemajou in Argungu on 19th January 1898. The motto for the migration to the East, before the French, was provided by two leaders who had fled from the western Sudan between April 1890 and January 1891. They entered Zarma area around 1894 and established their base at N'Dunga.[111] They sided with Gwandu in the conflict between Gwandu and Argungu but they had no time to take roots in Zarma territory because they were pursued by the French and their epic ended in Northern Nigeria where their leader Ahmadu Sheiku died at Makulki on 16th

December 1897. The remnants of his followers were signaled at Hadejia and Burmi where they fought the British on Attahiru's side and after his death, proceeded to the East with his son Mai-Wurno to stay in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. One of them, Alfa Hashim, stayed in Medina where he died in 1930 as a great Sheikh of the Tijaniya order.

Passive resistance here concerned not only the people (through migration) but also the rulers, who tried to attract people from one territory to another, but without using any violence against the populations or the white men. They used the emotional feelings to achieve their goals. In the western part of the Sokoto Caliphate, the rulers were very resentful about the partition of their territories between the British and the French. Sarkin Kebbi Samaila (1882-1915), for instance, is said to have lost 70% of his territory to the French and the Sokoto Caliph lost 35 to 40%.[112] Samaila therefore lost much revenue from the rulers of Zarma, Dendi, and Arewa. Even after Dosso and Arewa were occupied by the French, two princes, Agargi and Dauda, from Lido, came to Argungu to seek investiture as was done before. Sarkin Kebbi invested Dauda, the son of Zaurey, ancient Sarkin Lido. Samaila advised Dauda to entertain good relations with the French.[113] A prince of Nikki, Sayo, son of Dauda Bugaram (the distinguished warrior who fought the Fulani), in conflict with the French protege, Aouta of Dosso, preferred to leave Nikki for Kebbi with numerous Zarma supporters. The Colonial powers accused him, alongside with the Magaji of Kiota, of being a Kebbi agent. Sayo is said to have invited people to refuse to pay tax and to emigrate into Kebbi. He was finally arrested, tried and sent into exile at Filinge and then to the Damargu town of Jajiduna, together with his accomplice Magaji,[114] in 1903.

The Sarkin Kebbi himself thought of crossing over to the French and be united with his former subjects. He even transferred his over 1,000 heads of cattle to the French and the British considered that as the "first leg of his intention to defect".[115] What prevented him from doing so was the unwillingness of the French to cooperate with him despite many attempts he made to acquire their friendship. He sent many messengers to Dosso but the French avoided to alter their relations with the British in entertaining such undertaking with him.[116]

When Samaila shaped his mind that the French avoided relations with him, he embarked on inciting Zarma and Arewa people to cross to him. He even gained some success for two princes from Arewa (Alu and Maidoka) encouraged their people to cross to Samaila and the latter appointed them Mai-Arewa of Kangiwa and Mai-Arewa of Tulun-Dabaga respectively.[117]

The loss of territories to the French (6,000 square miles for Sokoto and 1,500 square miles for Argungu[118]) made the British and the French fear that the Sultan of Sokoto would create troubles on their common border. But Major Burdon reported that even though the Sarkin Musulmi felt this deprivation deeply, in gratitude to the British, he took the line that he must do nothing to cause trouble between the British and their "brothers, the French".[119]

The loss for the Sarkin Muslumi touched not only territories but also his income which was reduced from £25,000 to £250 a year.[120]

The French, aware of the danger which Sokoto represented for their administration of Niger territory, tried to satisfy the ethnic group they considered as having most close

relationships with Sokoto - the Fulani. In January 1899,,the son and successor of Birnin Gaure ruler Abul Hassan (d.1865), Bayero, who was driven away by the Zarma, and lived in Sandire, wrote a letter of submission to Laussu, the French Commandant of Dosso post. In February 1899, the Resident of Karimama (who was the superior Commandant of the area) Cornu, appointed Bayero "Fulani chief of all the Zarma area under the nominal suzerainty of the Zarmakoy with the right to refer directly to the French post".[121] The reason for this concession to Bayero were simple; to bring the Fulani together to prevent them from leaving French country and take refuge in Sokoto.[122]

In the early 20th century the French administration complained about the influence of Sokoto and Kebbi on French populations. In January 1904, the Commandant de Cercle Niamey reported: "The Mauri (Arewa) escapes our action because of its distance, its situation of frontier, and the efforts of British native chiefs who cannot make up their mind to abandon their pretensions on their brethren they feel going away from them under the impetus of political and international events".[123] In 1905, the Commandant of the Region de Niamey, reported that "some British native chiefs, especially the Sarkin Kebbi, hindered the actions of the chiefs recognized by us and who are devoted to us".[124]

Samaila, thus, tried and in fact succeeded in creating difficulties to the French in inciting people to cross over to him. Also the Sarkin Arewa of Beibei threatened to invade his southern neighbours and it made it necessary for the British to send a patrol in the area to protect "their populations".[125] This Sarkin Beibei (Sumana) had many time, asked the French to help him against "Sokoto Fulani" but the French refused.[126] To check the influence of Sokoto and Kebbi on "their" population, the French asked Aouta of Dosso to

establish an Intelligence Service in British territory.[127]

On the right bank of the River Niger, the people resisted the colonial conquest mostly by migration. In Say, for instance, there were traditions that Say populations might migrate to Gwandu in case of crisis: "Once the first white man treads the sand of Say, populations had to proceed to Gwandu".[128] Accordingly, Say and its area were evacuated during the military conquest, i.e. many people proceeded to Gwandu, only the ruling class remained.[129] Say therefore resisted spiritually through migration and non-cooperation even though a prince of Say, Kaka Ize, helped the French as guide for the Voulet-chanoine column from Say to Sansan-Hausa (1898-1899). For this reason and other services offered to the French, he was appointed Alfa of Say by the French, instead of his cousin Muchi whose turn it was.[130]

In Uro-Gelajo, the populations deserted their village and took refuge on the left bank of the River Niger in N'Dunga and Hamdallahi.[131] The Tuaregs, under the leadership of a Fulani scholar assembled in Diaguru to wait and see. The Fulani of Wuro-Gelajo migrated en masse to the left bank of the Niger, because of the news they got about the massacres perpetrated by the Voulet-chanoine column in Torodi area. Others left the area to avoid coexistence with the infidels.[133] The French in Say, wrote to the Zarmakoye of Dosso not to welcome Ibrahim Galajo who led the migration of Wuro - Gelajo people. The Zarmakoye complied with the directions.[134] These movements of populations before the French, led some Fulani into Northern Nigeria, especially the area of Hadejia.[135] This had certainly relations with the installation of Madani, the son of Ahmadu Cheku in that area in 1903.

Another aspect of passive resistance of Say was that, in spite of French opposition, traditions recorded that Say Alfa, Kaka Ize, continued to send secretly, tribute to Gwandu.[136]

Migrations as resistance developed in the central region (Adar, Katsina, Gobir) where people fled before the French conquest. In 1902, for instance, in the Gangara region, south of Tassawa, an abortive revolt broke out and was followed, according to British sources, by an exodus southwards of about 5,000 persons.[137] They were under the leadership of Kauran Gangara Abdu, who met Lugard at Katsina on March 28, 1903 and sought permission to stay in British territory. Lugard arranged with the Emir of Katsina that they should build a town in British sphere if the Boundary Commission stated that their home was in French territory. The migrants, ancient Katsinawa resistants, finally rebuilt the town of Dankama, where, as is well-known, the expelled Katsina Sarki Magajin Haladu, retired with his court. Abdu became District Head of Dankama and was also known as Kauran Dankama. He died in 1922 and the leadership of the community fell to his son Jibril.[138] In the same Katsina area, towns such as Kaga and Jibiya-Maje were founded by immigrants from French territory, who left the French side of the border around 1903.[139] It is reported that the immigration of Maradawa into the neighbourhood of Katsina and Kano during 1907-1908 period, were estimated to have exceeded 20,000.[140] The migration was so important in some parts of British colony that the French thought it feasible to send village Heads from French territory to collect taxes on immigrants into British zone. This measure, which began to be carried out was, however, severely checked by British Government and these villages Heads were forbidden from entering

British territory for "such an offence".[141]

In the same period, there was a migration northwards, not of commoners but of an important Emir, Aliyu of Kano (1894-1903). The Emir, Aliyu's case is important here for two main reasons:

First, because he gave the British the pretext to attack Kano when he sheltered the magajin Keffi Dan Yamusa. He was therefore supposed to prepare for a physical resistance to the British; this was more so when one considers that he had the charge of the wealthiest emirate of the caliphate. He failed to do so and preferred giving up the Emirship and jumping into the unknown.

The second reason is that, he migrated to the north, in disregard to the old jihadist tradition of migrating to the east. He was also aware of the hostility of the territories he had to travel through more particularly Gobir and Katsina (Maradi).

Emir Aliyu acceded the throne in 1894 after a period of trouble and civil war in Kano. When he was appointed Emir of Kano, he is said to have removed all the candidates for the Emirships, some of whom found refuge in the territory of Kano's "traditional enemy", Damagaram. In fact, when in February 1903 Aliyu fled from Kano, it was from Zinder (Damagaram) that one Abdu Tukur came to contest the Emirship.[142]

For a while, Emir Aliyu contemplated on giving up the idea of resisting the British and had shaped his mind to migration.[143] He was among those who supported the idea of evacuating Hausaland before the white man. Even his senior counsellors were not ready to resist the British, especially after they saw the manner the French sacked Zinder and killed the Damagaram Sultan Ahmadu Kuren Daga on September 16th, 1899. Emir

Aliyu was prevented by his senior brother, Waziri Ahmadu, from entertaining any idea of resisting the Europeans, as for example, in mending the walls of the city.[144]

When the British attacked Kano on 3rd February, 1903, the Emir and many of the members of his court were in Sokoto to pay their respects to the Amir al-Muminin Attahiru Ahmad who acceded the throne on 13th October, 1902. From Sokoto Aliyu asked for and got introduction letters from the Caliph and Waziri Muhammad Buhari to the three Sarakunan Gobir: Umoru (Sarkin Gobir of Isa); another Umoru (Sarkin Gobir of Tibiri) and Balarabe (Sarkin Gobir of Sabon Birnin).[145]

Emir Aliyu proceeded to the north with a few armed retainers, six of his wives, ten camel loads of Maria Theresa dollars, disguised as a merchant and on a famous Arab stallion.[146] Some sources argued that Aliyu was encouraged by Caliph Attahiru to prepare the resistance to colonial powers in the northern part of the Caliphate.[147] But he was captured by the Sarkin Gobir of Tibiri who handed him over to the British who exiled him first to Yola and later to Lokoja where he died in 1926.

In recommending Emir Aliyu to the Sarakunan Gobir, the Caliph said that Aliyu came as a friend (Amana da Aminci) and might be treated accordingly. This act of Attahiru showed that the Caliph considered the 19th century contradiction (between the Caliphate and the Gobirawa) as secondary in relation to the current challenge. Thus, he conformed to the muslim political theory that "in the face of a common enemy cooperation between the established authority and the rebellious groups is not only desirable but a duty".[148] But the Sarkin Gobir of Tibiri, in handing-over Aliyu to the British, after humiliating him, gave the 19th century enmity more importance to the

current events, contrary to Caliph Attahiru's belief. He didn't appreciate correctly the situation, or did it intentionally to gain the favour of the British who could help him reconquer his territory. But this act got him no benefit for his territory (or a large part of it) of Gobir Tudu was given to the Tuaregs in the same period by Major Burdon as we saw it. Finally, Gobir was reduced to Tibiri and its environs. This situation shows that the Sarakuna of Hausaland tried to integrate the colonial phenomenon into the scheme of the 19th century developments.

The second personality who embarked on migration was the Caliph Attahiru Ahmad himself. His case symbolized the end of the Sokoto Caliphate, being the last Amir al-Muminin elected according to the tradition inherited from the jihad. This end fulfilled the jihadist tradition that the Caliphate should last a century. This century was covered, from the installation of Usman dan Fodio as Amir al-Muminin at Gudu on 21st February 1804 to the assassination of Attahiru Ahmadu by the British in Burmi on the 27th July 1903.

When Caliph Abdurahman (1891-1902) died on October 10th 1902, and Attahiru Ahmadu was elected (13th October 1902) it seemed that the Sokoto officials and more especially the intellectual class led by the Qadi Abd'Allah b. Ali, had given up the idea of fighting the invaders and chose the solution of submission or migration. Recent studies[149] showed that the Ulama of Sokoto engaged in a very sound debate over the line of action to take to protect Sokoto people from being under unbelievers' rule. It seems that the Ulama resorted to the Shehu's writings such as the Masa'il Muhimma for guidance and to draw inspiration through analogy. The Masa'il was written by the Shehu in March 1803 when Gobir King Yunfa banned propagation of Islam and wearing of hijab by muslim

women. It therefore urged muslims to flee from unbelievers' rule, acquire arms and defend themselves.[150] The debate on the Hijra raged between two main groups: pro-hijra were Zubairu (Emir of Adamawa), Aliyu (Emir of Kano) and Attahiru himself; against the hijra was Muhammad Ahmad, Marafa of Gwadabawa, brother of Attahiru and a powerful figure of the Caliphate at the end of the 19th century. He believed that decisions might be taken under certain circumstances. But according to some sources, before the fall of Sokoto, the issue of the hijra had already been discussed and migration was well prepared for.[151] Be it as it may, Attahiru's hijra hinged on the old jihadist belief of meeting the Mahdi in the East, during the time of crisis, and the unwillingness of the Sokoto officials to give up their properties and honour and jump into the unknown.

Two important reasons especially make Attahiru's case important for our study:

First, he showed through people who followed him that he was still the legitimate and rightful Amir al-Muminin, ridiculing therefore the puppet Sultan Attahiru Aliyu (Attahiru II), who, as reported by Burdon in march 1903, "had found it difficult to obtain recognition and obedience from his people".[152] And as a result there was a state of anarchy in the Sokoto Emirate.[153]

After the debacle (15th March 1903), Caliph Attahiru proceeded east accompanied by the Alkali Abd'Allah b. Ali, the Ubandoma, the Madaki of Kano, etc. He carried with him, as a token of his legitimacy, the traditional insignia of the Caliphate, consisting of the sword of Sarkin Musulmi Bello, his water jug (shantali) and the flag. Attahiru II had to content himself with the sword presented to him by Lugard after his installation, which together with the signet ring of Sarkin Musulmi Bello, constituted the new insignia of the

Sultanate.[154]

Caliph Attahiru's journey resulted in the depopulating of Hausaland as shown by a passage by the Acting High Commissioner Wallace in 1905. "Whole villages and towns were deserted "en masse" the inhabitants wishing to join the Sultan mostly with the idea of journeying to Mecca. Captain Crozier who had been out from Zaria with a small detachment ... says 'on my return, for 21 miles, I passed through the followers of the ex-sultan, who consisted for the most part of poor people and the same distance ahead of the place I returned from, was crowded with people".[155]

We have only scanty data on the number of people from the French territory of Niger who were with Attahiru. We know only that one Malam Musa, the son of Sarki Tazar (Tassawa), alongside with his wife Nana and their son Kalifa, joined the Caliph Attahiru in his hijra to the east.[156]

The second reason is that the consequences of the Attahiru hijra would be very heavy for the British, not immediately, but for all the colonial period. When Caliph Attahiru was killed at Burmi (27th July 1903), his son Muhammad Bello known as Mai-Wurno proceeded East in company of about 25,000 people to settle on the Blue Nile in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. He founded the town of the same name (Mai-Wurno) in 1906.[157] According to some sources the main ethnic groups which were found in Mai-Wurno were: Fulani 71%, Hausa 16.4% and Songhay 7.7%.[158]

Until Mai-Wurno died in 1944, he was considered as the most serious threat to the British rule in Nigeria and even in Sudan. The threat he constituted for the British in Nigeria, made the latter to pay their attention to the east and neglect the cooperation with

the northern French territory whence almost no danger was to be expected. The French, for their part, shaped all their islamic policy in Niger territory on the hypothesis that "only from Nigeria danger is supposed to come".

Another kind of passive resistance which developed during the first years of colonial administration was the policy of uncooperation with, the lying to, and the misleading of the conquerors. In a work published in 1918, C.L. Temple devoted a whole chapter to what he called the "anatomy of lying".[159] In June 1902, the Commandant de Cercle Dosso reported the same attitude in French territory but explained it by the fear of the colonial administrators: "The Djerma (Zarma) behave towards the French with fear and awe which make them twist the truth. For instance, during the census, no true information has been given by the natives ... Our patient explanations failed to convince them".[160]

All these methods were experienced before the use of the physical force, through sporadic revolts which would develop especially from 1906, and which the colonial powers would invariably term as "Mahdists" or "Muslim plot".

III.3.3. Active Resistance To Colonial Installation: The Beginning Of The "Muslim Plot" Myth: 1900-1906

Since the time the military columns were sent to recognize on the grounds the frontier between French and British spheres, they met with fierce opposition from the local population due to their harshness and the weight of their needs (food, transport, water supply, etc.) in an area where these needs were already scarce. The military column which showed cruelty along the frontier in its march to East was especially Voulet-

Chanoime mission. Its orders were: 1) to recognize on the grounds the areas the new frontier (drawn from the convention of 14th June 1898) passed through and, 2) try to go into the region east of the Lake Chad. The scarcity of food and drinking water in the French sphere gave the officers in charge of the columns a very sadistic temper. In Sansan-Hausa where the column entered Niger territory it killed 101 persons and advanced on its bloody road as described by a writer: "From Gaya, the column left behind it a blood trail, particularly to the detriment of people of Koma, Zabori, Jinju, Lugu, Birnin Konni and Koran Kalgo; in Birnin Konni it had a thousand killed and captives and Voulet ordered 80 women and girls to be hanged to the walls of the city; in Koran Kalgo 150 women and children were summarily executed on the order of Captain Chanoine".[161] The important case on which to insist here is Birnin Konni. It is worth noting the interference of Sokoto (through the Marafa of Gwadabawa) in the relations between the Konni chiefs and the French missions.

When the mission of Cazemajou passed through Konni in 1898, the chief of the place was Yahaya (1893-1899). It seems that he had been instructed by the Caliph Abdu (1891-1902) to offer service to the French, to facilitate their passage.[162] He therefore entertained the column during all the 17 days it stayed in Birnin Konni. But after Cazemajou had left Birnin Konni, the Marafa of Godabawa, accused Emir of Konni Yahaya to have helped the infidels and dismissed him.[163] Yahaya was replaced by his junior brother Muhammadu (1899-1904) in February 1899.[164] When the Voulet-Chanoine mission came to Birnin Konni, the Caliph through the Marafa of Godabawa seemed to have given the same order as given to Yahaya a year earlier (to welcome the French) but

Konni Emir Muhammadu (1899-1904) disregarded that order, under the influence of his alkali, and closed the Birni gates.[165] That act irritated the French officers.

We traced these events to show the harshness of the French conquest and the ambiguity of Sokoto policy in the North during this critical situation when Sokoto's Emirs wanted help the most.

In the opening of the 20th century, there were many manifestations of peoples' disgust vis-a-vis the colonial administration. These manifestations were termed by the French "complot musulman" i.e. "muslim plot" , a concept derived from their experience of the conquest of Algeria and Morocco where the Muslims, without proclaiming themselves Mahdi, opposed them a great deal.

As for the British, their experience in colonial conquest of Africa and Asia was almost everywhere opposed by Mahdism: Muhammad Ahmad in Sudan in 1881; Mirza Gulan Ahmad who founded the Ahmadiya movement in India in 1889; Sayyid Muhammad b.Abdallah Hassan in Somaliland (d.1920).[166] So, the British were prepared to term every hostility and to see in it the hand of the Mahdi. Also, the fear of the Muslim has deep roots in European history. As a writer put it: "In Europe it had been the custom for many generations to equate Muhammedan with fanaticism and it was popularly supposed that any true Muslim was only waiting for a suitable opportunity to slaughter the infidel".[167] The Europeans came to Hausaland with all that background. It explained why every act of rebellion was ruthlessly quelled. As for the chiefs, they were deposed and sent into exile. In December 1904, for instance, Sarkin Tambawel was deposed because he was

accused of tacitly encouraging his people to resist the establishment of Hawkers' licenses.[168]

But 1906 seems to be the year of revolts and unrests which preoccupied the French as well as the British. It was also at that period that cooperation between the two colonial powers developed, especially to deal with the Muslim or Mahdist plotters. For instance, a letter was addressed on 28th April 1906, by Philips, a British Officer in Hadejia to the closest French Officer to inform him that an important muslim force, coming from Kanem was said to be proceeding through N'guigmi and that British forces under Captain Hassel routed the Senussists.[169] Early in April (5th April 1906), Lieutenant Colonel Gouraud, Commandant of Chad, wrote from Fort-Lamy to the Commandant of Zinder, informing him that in Chad, the general situation was peaceful and that the movements which developed in the West (Zarma area of Niger territory) had had no echo there. Only, a fanatic, who announced the next coming of the Mahdi who would drive all the white men out of the country, was arrested.[170]

As we have already seen, the Mahdist ideas spread before the coming of the colonial powers. So numerous were the claimants to Mahdism in Northern Nigeria, for example, that Lethem said: "Wherever you look under every bush and tree, there is a Mahdi".[171] It is even said that one of the reasons for the conquest of Northern Nigeria was to prevent the spread of the Mahdist movement to the region.[172] Even a pagan from Konni territory declared himself Mahdi, in about 1899-1900. He got many supporters among the Fulani and the Hausa. Mai Rago, as he was called, was killed after a force was sent against him by the overseer of the area, the Marafa of Godabawa.[173]

In the Western Niger territory, until 1903, intense migrations into Northern Nigeria was the main form of resistance. The "muslim plot" myth appeared, as far as Niger territory is concerned, in a political report by Lieutenant-Colonel Noel, Commandant of Troisieme Territoire Militaire, du Niger, dated August 1903. According to this officer, "from Sokoto was taking shape, a vast muslim plot against colonial domination".[174] In May 1905 an alim (marabout) from the village of Tidirka, Aman Bery, preached the revolt against the Zarmakoy Aouta (1902 - 15th April 1912) and "his friends" the French. Aman Bery predicted that the "Annassara" will not last long in the area.[175] He was eventually arrested and sent into jail.[176]

But the most serious threat against the French in Western Niger, at this period, came from a blind marabout called Alfa Saybu. In 1905, he announced the end of Christian rule and the extermination of the Christian by a Muslim army to appear on the day of the Aid al-Kebir, i.e. around February 1906.[177] This tradition was confirmed by a colonial report which reads: "Saybu on the southern area of Dosso and his disciple chief of Karma tried to assemble fanatic bands to attack Niamey, 11th day of Muslim month, date announced by Saybu as that fixed by religious revelation, for our destruction".[178]

Ardant du Picq extended the concept of "Muslim plot" to the whole of our area: "At the end of 1905, was prepared silently in the region of Zinder, the Sokoto, the Middle Niger and among the Tuaregs of the two banks of River Niger, a vast Muslim movement. (But) the assassination of two garde-cercle at Kobkitanda, a Djerma village fanaticized by an old blind marabout (Saibu) launched prematurely the insurrection, what allowed us preventing it from degenerating into a holy war".[179]

Alfa Saybu was considered as a great alim, illuminated (wali) with super natural powers. He is said to have the habit of showing his friends "innumerable cavalry troops which, repeating Allah Akbar, rushed on the Christians".[180] He made many preaching tours, secretly and tried to contact people who were the most likely to help him. In September 1905, for example, he was in Say area inciting people to fight the Europeans. He also sent letters to people to whom no visit was paid (Say itself and Karma for example) to inform and seek help.[181] The Alfa KAKA Ize of Say refused to support him. The hostilities began when, in December 1905, two constables and two Dogarai sent to Kobkitanda to levy taxes (the populations had refused to pay taxes) were attacked, the two constables were killed.[182] The repression was ruthless.

In this case, the populations nursed hatred against the Europeans as well as against Aouta, the Zamakoy of Dosso (1902-1912) who used his influence with the French to monopolize for his family, the throne of the Zamakoy whereas the election was rotative between the 7 "Fu" (houses) of the descendants of Bukar, ancestor of Dosso Zarma. From Auta onwards, the throne of Zarmakoy was settled in the family of Kossom (d. 1865).[183]

Alfa Saybu developed correspondence with Sokoto, especially Satiru and it is said that a certain malam came from Sokoto and played an important role on Alfa Saybu's side during the Zarma revolt.[184] Was he the envoy of the Mahdi, Malam Musa, who was supposed to appear from the East?[185] Malam Musa was said to be a great learned man of Kano who travelled between 1904 and 1906 through Sokoto, Dahomey (now Benin), Gold Coast and Togo with 'mysterious letters" foretelling the appearance of the Mahdi and the imminent extermination of the Christians.[186] It is worth noting that there was a certain

malam, Musa, who was a lieutenant of Jibril Gaini who fought the British in Burmi in 1902. There was another leader by name Ya Musa, the Imam of Dutsi (in Kano area) who welcomed the Sudan (Mahdi) messengers and gave the signal for the Hijra to El-Obeid (1882-83). Only when he was arrested, his followers from Damagaram and katagum (like Jibril Gaini) established Burmi.[187] The evocation of this Malam Musa showed that there was some connection between the Alfa Saybu revolt in Zarma territory and the different unrests that developed in Northern Nigeria early in the 20th century.

Whereas Alfa Saybu, known in northern Nigeria as Mallam Shu'aibu Dan Makaho, planned to attack the French in February 1906, the population of Kobkitanda attacked and killed two constables who came to collect the taxes on 8th December 1905. Alfa Saybu disagreed with this act and told them: "We are not ready".[188] The French administration reacted violently and Alfa Saybu had to flee into Northern Nigeria. In looking for him, many crimes were committed as reported by Rash: "The French and the Djermakoye men looked for him every where in the Dallol and beheaded all the blind men to bring the heads to the administrators for identification".[189]

It is said that Saybu known as Dan Makaho (blind man), had passed through Birnin Kebbi and Gwandu "at which latter place he collected a party of supporters which he took with him unobserved to Satiru".[190] He even confided that Emir of Gwandu had promised him assistance.[191]

When Alfa Saybu arrived in Satiru, between January and February 1906, he found an ebullient town. He became the second personality after Malam Issa and when the latter died on 17th February, Malam Saybu Dan Makafo became the leader of the revolt.

When the British overcame the revolt he was tried for the murder of two French in Dosso[192] area (Kobkitanda) and hanged at the market-place of Sokoto on 12th March 1906.

The Islamic factor expressed itself in these events in two fold.

First, the continuation by Alfa Saybu of the struggle against the Europeans in Northern Nigeria, i.e. British territory, showed that he neither considered the Muslim Hausaland as divided, nor established a difference between the French and the British as conquerors and infidels.

Second in accepting Alfa Saybu as the leader of their revolt after the death of malam Issa, on 17th February 1906, the Satiru people manifested this unity of Muslim Hausaland and the community of faith between the people of French territory and those under British rule in Northern Nigeria. They reaffirmed the unity of the Dar-al-Islam.

Even the British, in hanging Alfa Saybu, showed that above all, they avenged "their brothers" the French and the latter thanked them for this act. A report for 1905 reads: "Letters of thanks were received for the avenging of the death of the two French Officers by the execution of Makafo".[193]

The fact that Satiru revolt occurred in February 1906, the time Alfa Saybu projected to attack the French, shows that there was some connections between the two areas. The Say Emir, Alfa Kaka, followed the same policy as the Sultan of Sokoto, the loyalism and it can be conjectured if he had not been given advice to do so by the Sokoto officials. But there is no indication for that. Only a mallam from Karma is said to have received in 1905 from a mallam who came from Hausa (Sokoto) a letter engaging the Muslims not to take arms against the French.[194]

The contradiction in the attitude of the British vis-a-vis the Sultan of Sokoto is clear. They reduced his power to a status of Emir under the supervision of the Resident and as such he took an oath of serving loyally the British as any other "warrant chief". But they made him curse Satiru in his position of Amir-al-Muminin and the British officials were reported to have said: "There was tremendous political advantage to be gained from the open condemnation of he false prophet by the acknowledged head of his religion".[195] The Sultan therefore shouldered many responsibilities, according to the wishes of the British. The two acts of the Sultan (on the investigation of the British) recalled the acts of his ancestor Usman dan Fodio who, after heavy losses at Alwassa (1805) cursed the place,[196] and in his book Tahd hir al Ikhwan condemned openly one Tuareg man Hamma, from Maganga in Ahyar, who claimed to be the Mahdi.

This contradiction of British administration would manifest itself during the whole colonial period, for, from time to time, they made him issue proclamations on his position of Amir al-Mumimin but remembered him always that he was "British-made". During the year 1906, the French and the British, because of what they suffered in Zarma country and Satiru, "opened the eyes" on all what was related to the "Muslim plot". In his report of January 1906, the Commandant of Niamey told his subordinates to tour constantly in order to "contend with the influence of the marabouts our natural enemies". He noted the Kobkitanda and Karma events as proofs "that the marabouts are in Africa our most dangerous opponents".[197] In October the same Commandant noted that the clerics of his region especially in the cercle of Djerma, entertained close correspondence with those of Sokoto, the centre of fanaticism.[198] That year, the Ramadan was celebrated in Western

Niger territory with a hitherto unknown fervour. Very active propaganda was noted in the area implicating even some Sherifs of Mecca who sent a letter telling people to do sacrifices and the village of Dunzu for example, took notice of the letter and sacrificed a ram on June 22nd 1906.[199] In his 4th quarterly report, the Commandant of Niamey was very anxious as to Sokoto propaganda in the area. He wrote: "The Sokoto is a centre of Islamic propaganda and the close and continuous relations developed by the populations on the two sides of the frontier entertain a state of mind of which we have to be anxious".[200] He therefore suggested the manner to handle the problem: "it is a question of frontier police and the watching of marabouts". At the same period in Adar region, one Sidi Mohammed who was accused of seditious propaganda was arrested.[201] This state of fear of "muslim plot" made the French and the British to be very vigilant and allowed the French to prevent an outburst of revolt in Zinder (Damagaram).

As we already saw it, Sultan Ahmadu Dan Bassa acceded the throne very young at the age of 18, after the defeat and killing by the French of Ahmadu Kuren Daga on 16th September 1899. Since November 1903, information and documents given by an official of the Sultanate, Bellama, to the Commandant de Cercle, Captain Bloch, indicated that Sarki Ahmadu was in regular correspondence with the Senussi[202] and that he had as religious adviser the "more fanatical" marabouts".[203] In 1904 and 1905, reports by French administrators showed that the Sultan Ahmadu was increasingly subject to "religious fanaticism".[204] His advisers were namely Sherif Fadel, Chetima Mamadu and malam Gapto for whom, "as fanatics, to fight the infidel was an act of piety".[205]

Sultan Ahmadu Dan Bassa opened correspondence with his neighbours, especially

Kano and Satiru where preparations for fighting the infidels were taking place. A letter was sent to the Emir of Kano, through a messenger, Mahaman Sala, and the Emir answered orally: "Tell the Sultan to prepare because we are going to fight the white men".[206] According to Ann Dunbar, the letter was addressed to the Vizier of Kano, Siddiku and the answer arrived at Zinder on March 8th 1906, as follows: "The Vizier said that the Europeans from Hadeja and Katagum had all left for Sokoto and that they will be killed because there were many powerful malams in Sokoto".[207] At that time Sultan Ahmadu had already received the answer from Mallam Issa of Satiru, who wrote a very emphatic letter to thank the Sultan and Malam Yaro (the 19th century Damagaram wholesaler) for their gifts and to give advice for the future undertaking. The letter arrived in Zinder in November 1905. It reads:

> To put in the hands of Sarki Ahmadu and Malam Yaro. I call the name of God. God is alone and I do my prayer by the Prophet of God. This letter comes from the slave of God, Malam Issa, son of Malam Makaho, who lives in the country of Sokoto. I am the commander of all those who do salam (prayer). I am the one who will kill all the miscreants by the God's order. I swear that no one commands except God. I am the one who will kill all the miscreants as I will stop their breathing. My first word is finished. Greetings.
>
> I am Malam Issa son of Malam Makaho.
>
> Really, I am more than everybody and it was bestowed upon me to

be more than everybody. A great man is son of a great man.
This is Emir of Damagaram Ahmadu and Malam Yaro. God will
give you all what you ask for, with man who does no harm.
I inform you that me and all the others, are in good health.
After this, I have seen your messenger Adoum Dan Dakoko with
5 cows, 50 coins of 5F that you sent me as alms, and two mantles
and two pieces of cloth sent me by Malam Yaro. I pray God for
you, to live long. Its God who told me to be ready.
I have seen your letter. I also answer for the affairs of
Mahadi who comes to you. You have to stand for the jihad in
five months. I tell you to repair all the mosques. In all
the mosques, you have to say "No one commands except God"."
After the prayer you have to say the name of God, to thank
(to be grateful to) God; no one commands except God; God
is great.
After these words, I will send you all my words after the
salam of Tabaski (Aid-El-Kebir). Send me "bagaruwa"[208] sticks.
All the malams of Sultan Ahmadu, Mamadu Chetima, Sherif Heddin,
Malam Gapto, I greet you.
The hand that writes is blind. It is the 20th of Ramadan. Ends.
The man who obeys has told the truth".[209]

The messenger to Malam Issa, Adoum, was a kola trader. In addition to the letter

he brought back, Adoum brought from Malam Issa, charms for Sarki Ahmadu, Malam Yaro and for those who were committed to kill the white men.

Sarki Ahmadu also summoned from Kano, one Malam Sherif, known as sorcerer to consult him. Malam Sherif announced that the Sarki "had to wait before attacking the Europeans, either the Aid-El-Kebir or the beginning of the rainy season".[210]

Unfortunately, the plot was discovered and the plotters were arrested (16 arrests between March 30th and June 20th, 1906). Sarki Ahmadu was tried and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in Dabou in Cote d'Ivoire. The Sultan was replaced by Bellama, a former palace slave and it is reported that this appointment had provoked an exodus into Nigeria of some 3,000 persons.[211] What was it that angered the Sultan Ahmadu and made him set a plot against the French who appointed him in 1899? It seems that this question finds its answer in the different transformations the sultanate experienced with the colonial administration. Apart from heavy taxes levied on Damagaram,[212] the French severed some provinces from Damagaram, the most important being the Muniyo where the French installed a military post on 29th September 1903, and reinstated Mai Musa as king of Muniyo who became therefore independent from Damagaram.[213] In October 1903, the Commandant of Zinder, Captain Bloch complained that the maintenance of the Sultan cost too much, that he was a hinderance to good administration and it was necessary to consider the possibility of "debarking" him.[214] Knowing all these developments, Sarki Ahmadu was also aware of the weaknesses of colonial powers, as shown by different attempts of revolt in Central Sudan.

This plot is of interest to us, because it drew Damagaram into the area where

Islamic factor manifested itself. The French would therefore watch Damagaram seriously as they kept an eye on all the suspected areas. The integration of Damagaram into our area of study was well expressed by the Governor General of French West Africa, Ponty, who, in September 1906 spoke of "a great anti-European Muslim movement" which extended from Niger (River) to Chad (Lake).[215]

The Damagaram plot might have disturbed the British, for a great part of that kingdom, something like 150,000 people partitioned into 570 villages covering an area of 9000 km^2 were given to the British by the Anglo-French Boundary Commission.[216] Also, in the Annual Report for 1904 we could read:

"The population of North Bornu is reported to have increased by fully 50% in the last 18 months and is still increasing. There has been much immigration from Damagaram. Mr. Vischer remarks that he could find no one with a good knowledge of the country, the usual reply being 'I have just returned from Damagaram".[217] This unity of ethnicity and faith made the British feel very concerned with the plot in Damagaram. Moreover at that period, the Emir of Hadeja showed very unfriendly attitude towards the British. In April 1906, Lugard decided to crush the Hadeja spirit and sent troops which devastated the town, killing the Emir, three of his sons and 400 anonymous.[218]

After these different attempts of opposing colonial domination, three series of measures would be taken by the French and the British: The reward of native authorities who showed loyalty towards the white men, the cooperation between the colonial powers and the development of Intelligence to watch Islam.

a) <u>The Reward For Loyal Native Chiefs</u>:

After the crushing of the Satiru revolt in March 1906, the Sultan of Sokoto, Attahiru Aliyu (1903-1915) was awarded a C.M.G. for his key-role in the quelling of the revolt. Also, the Marafa of Godabawa, Muhammad Maiturare, subsequently secured the office of Sultan as a result of these events, for some scholars have argued that he was installed as Sultan after the death of Attahiru II in 1915, as reward for his participation in crushing the Satiru revolt.[219]

Inversely, measures of discipline were taken against those native rulers who showed sympathy with the rebels. For instance, the Emir of Gwandu Muhammadu Aliyu (1901-1906) was deposed on 20th March 1906 and sent to exile at Zungeru.[220]

As for the French, they rewarded especially the Alfa of Say, Kaka Ize, who refused to support the revolt led by Alfa Saybu in Zarma territory in 1905-1906. His Emirate, Say, was raised to a status of Province and enlarged with some cantons (districts). From 1907 to 1912, Say was a Province but this status would be revoked in 1912 with the accusation of plot levelled against Kaka Ize and his incarceration.[221]

b) <u>Cooperation Between The Colonial Powers</u>:

Whereas suspicion and rivalry characterised the relations between the French and the British in Hausaland during the installation and the demarcation of their frontiers,[222] the events of 1905-1906 brought the two colonial powers into a state of cooperation, to deal with their common enemies: <u>The Mallams</u>. The colonial report of 1905 gives an idea of the improvement of this relation:

"Relations with the French have been very cordial and the G. G. of French West

Africa (M. Roume) took the opportunity of the fighting at Sokoto to suggest a closer cooperation between the officials on the frontiers of the two countries, who will, in future, inform each other of any native feeling and other matter which may have an effect across the frontier. Letters of thanks were received for the avenging of the death of the two French Officers by the execution of Makafo. The Governor of Dahomey and the officers in high command in Zinder district have been not less anxious to show their desire for cooperation, and I need hardly say that it has been reciprocated by the Governor of Northern Nigeria".[223] But that proposition of Roume seemed not to have been implemented for, his successor, William Ponty, renewed the proposition of cooperation in August 1907 with very concrete measures to deal with the "muslim plotters". His project was in five points:

1) To establish an Intelligence branch to watch the movement of all suspected individuals from one colony to another.

2) The establishment in the colonies of the two nations of the same regulation regarding the marabouts; the basis of this regulation could be the one adopted in the colony of Haut-Senegal-Niger.

a) A marabout must have an official permit before going to seek for alms. The route to follow is indicated beforehand.

b) It is forbidden for him to go away from this route and at each check-point he must show his permit and it is also forbidden to travel with an armed suite. If the marabout refused to conform these prescriptions, if he uses violence, if he spreads false news or he incites people to rebel, legal action is taken against him.

3) An understanding on the method of repression of the offences committed by the marabouts.

4) To communicate each other all information which could be relevant to the other.

5) And, in the case of disturbances (troubles) a military cooperation.[224]

As in 1906, the British should have agreed with the necessity of cooperation even though their attention was drawn to the pilgrims' road to Sudan whence came Mahdist influences and Mai-Wurno's envoys. The French therefore continued with the burden of coercive measures against "muslim agents". Circular-letters from the Governor General of French West Africa (10 February 1906, 27 February 1906, 18 April 1907) continued to be heaped on the Lt. Governors, ordering them to conduct census in each colony, of religious personalities both those who stayed permanently or temporarily.[225]

c) <u>The watching of islamic activists</u>

Intelligence in general was developed by the two colonial powers early in their spheres and political agents played important role in the conquest and even administration of colonies.[226] In Dosso area, for example, Aouta, who was instated as Zarmakoye in January 1902, was a political agent.[227] He was charged by the French colonial administration with establishing an Intelligence service inside British territory to watch the muslim "activists".[228] As put by a writer, "One of the first acts the French accomplished whenever they establish themselves was to set up and organise a veritable intelligence service, for which were employed "political agents" but also various kinds of persons (interpreters, servants, soldiers spouses, prostitutes etc.) to keep the administration fully informed".[229] The same source of recruitment was identified by the British: "The British

used what they termed 'political agents' - usually men closely associated with the British officers, such as messengers, cooks, or even stewards".[230] Colonial powers also recruited for their intelligence, people with great knowledge of their area, especially the Malams, the princes, and the traders. In April 1902, for instance, a Hausa mallam called Malam Barau provided information on the political situation of Kano, to Alder Burdon, who forwarded it to Lugard.[231] In French territory, mallams were used as "political agents" at Say, where a school master of Arab origin, Zine Abiddine, informed the administration on the behaviour and spirit of the marabouts of the town;[232] and in Zinder where Malam Falalu was used by Governor Brevie to watch on the people who migrated to Nigeria.[233] Another mallam from Zinder,

Malam Abdu, son of Malam Chetima Capto, born in Zinder in 1878, who went to Nigeria with his uncle Barma Mustapha (the mother of Malam Abdu, Baba N'Do, was a grand daughter of Sultan Tanimun (1853-84) became political agent for the British. Malam Abdu's status even improved from that of simple political agent (supplying information on French territory of Niger) to that of Treasurer (Ajiya) and even District Head of Machena.[234] Colonial administrators also used princes, as the French did with Aouta, and the British who used Barma Mustapha, a prince from Zinder[235] as political agents.

But from 1906, the use of political agents would have been considered as a crucial matter. In 1907 it is said that "from Zinder 80 secret service men are employed by the French who walk the country for news".[236] At the same period, the Resident of Sokoto Temple, observed: "There is however the greatest possible necessity for an "intelligence" staff in each province, to remind the Native Administration that it was under supervision

and also at times to assist the Native Administration".[237] They would play a role in watching islamic activists.

Alongside with the recruitment of political agents, the size of the constabulary was also increased. In Northern Nigeria for instance, by 1902, the civil police was increased to 150 men (50 in 1900); in 1906 the police strength sharply increased to 30 officers and 1180 other ranks.[238]

Also, every individual who had a piece of responsibility in the colonial machinery had to play a role in checking the "muslim plotters". The Sultan of Sokoto, for example, after the Satiru revolt and the official reward of C.M.G., was very zealous in tracking the activists, and it seemed that he was more anxious than the British themselves for their protection against fanaticism. After Satiru, it is said, Attahiru II "employed a large secret service staff to keep him informed of the activities of different preachers".[239] In late 1906, one Malam Yahaya of Wurno was arrested on the orders of the Sultan "because he was preaching publicly in hamlets surrounding Wurno".[240] In 1909 one blind man, Malam Musa, was arrested and detained for merely travelling about Maradun, Talata Mafara , Moriki and other districts. There was no charge against him other than "he preached something".[241]

When a slight disturbance, caused by Mallamai who refused to pay tax, occurred in Gusau District (at Samri), the Resident of Sokoto himself led a patrol there and arrested 21 mallams.[242]

On August 18th 1909, a man, who was said to have been instructed by the Sarkin Kebbi, Samaila (1882-1915), set fire to the Resident's house. The colonial powers

considered the possibility of sending troops there, but feared either fighting (owing to the warlike spirit of the Argungu people) or flight to French territory.[243] They finally renounced the idea of sending the send troops.

As for the French, their policy of checking influence from abroad was founded on the conviction that Niger Islam was harmless unless under the influence from abroad. It therefore fell on the colonial administration to protect "Niger Islam" from the influence of "internationalist muslims, sectarists and illuminated" and "to prevent Islam in this area from becoming a ferment of revolutionary nationalism, a political party or a state in the state".[244]

On July 18th 1906, the French Newspaper Le Temps insisted on the necessity for France, to occupy definitely Djanet (Algeria) and Bilma to break completely the Turk's hope to install themselves there.[245] In 1907, the French formed a military post at Bilma, to keep a watch on the trade routes on the East, between Tripoli, Ahyar, Wadai and the country round Lake Chad.[246] That was a strategic act for not only it blocked the road to South) for the Turks from Tripolitany but also it allowed the French to exercise a close watching on transaharan routes. In fact, according to the Commandant of Zinder: "The most dangerous individuals concerning Muslim propaganda are undoubtedly the merchants and the caravan-drivers who crossed from Tripoli to Kano. On them we must exert active watching".[247]

In Western Niger colony, the position of Say was a source of anxiety. Say was on the road taken by all the religious messengers travelling from Sokoto to the West, following according to colonial administration, "the uninterrupted trail of Fulani

population stretching from Northern Nigeria to Masina".[248] For this reason, secret service agents were placed along this road and as indicated by Duranthon (Commandant of Say in 1913), "our role consisted to prevent the maraboutism from spreading".[249] He therefore installed secret agents in Youri and Lamorde to watch people from Dori, Gothey and Tillabery who journeyed there and back. In Say and Botu, secret agents watched merchants from Kano, Zinder and other areas of Nigeria. The going and coming of "muslim activists" disguised as merchants was a matter of great concern to the French, and the Governor General of French West Africa, Ponty, thought that "the political watching of Islam is above all the watching of muslim personalities".[250]

The suspicion towards Sokoto was permanent but especially was reinforced after a study of Islam in Niger Territory. In fact, the revolts of 1905-1906 incited the Governor General of French West Africa to undertake the study of Islam in these countries. At Dakar itself, the Federal Government set up an office in charge of Muslim affairs in 1906 and the two first responsibles of this office had been formerly in service in Algeria. A circular-letter dated 26th March 1906, from Governor General Roume to the Lt. Governors fixed the objectives of the study of Islam in French West African countries as follows:

- To investigate the centres of influence whence emanated the recent manifestations of fanaticism which developed in various places of "our African possessions".
- To investigate the motive of this proselytism and the general measures to put an end to it without hindering the freedom of public worship for the natives, muslims and non-muslims.[251]

In his report after the mission, Robert Arnaud, the officer in charge of the work, accused the Qadriya as having played a role in the 1905-1906 events in Niger territory. He wrote: "Whereas the loyalism of Say Tijaniya remained firm, during the rebellion in Djermaganda in 1905, the Qadriya of the Dem (Sokoto) tendency were the mainstay of the revolt".[252] Arnaud's conception was simple: spiritually, he thought that Islam in Africa must be only a religious faith without all its revolutionary dispositions, and privileging tendencies to fatalism, resignation and passivity,[253] on the grounds, he suggested to put an end to the free movement of "Vagrant marabouts, coming from everywhere, pretending to carry messages from holy land and engaged in occult missions".[254]

The region of Say was privileged, owing to its relations with Sokoto. We must bear in mind that the Alfa of Say, Kaka Ize played a role in the conquest of the area by being the guide of the Voulet-Chanoine column in 1899 from Say to Sansan-Hausa; he refused to support the revolts of 1905-1906 in Zarma area and was rewarded for the two acts. For the first act, he was appointed Emir and for the second, his Emirate was boosted to a status of a Province in 1907. But suspicion developed afterwards owing to his relations with Sokoto. Since the occupation of Say in 1897, the colonial administration showed itself very anxious about the relations which Say developed with Sokoto. The Governor of Dahomey, of which Say was a cercle at this period, said: "to occupy Say absolutely, we must divert Ahmadu's attention to prevent him from giving Sokoto his hand".[255] It is also said that Say continued to send, secretly, his tribute to Sokoto until 1912, when Alfa Kaka Ize was considered as conspirator by the Resident of Say, Taillebourg, who arrested and incarcerated him. Before he was dismissed, Alfa Kaka Ize entertained close relationships

with one Malam Belgore from Ilorin. After the arrest of Kaka Ize, Malam Belgore refrained from coming to Say.

The colonial administration became annoyed with all that was reported about Islam. At Dogon Dutsi (Dosso cercle) for example, the call to prayer was forbidden after 6 p.m. as "it disturbs the Europeans' rest".[256]

In 1909, the French tried to hinder the progress of Islam through education, more especially the teaching of French language, whose diffusion might not only compromise the progress of Arab culture but also disorganise Quaranic schools.[257] In 1911, the Governor General of French West Africa decided to substitute French language with Arabic in native courts and in all administrative messages to or from the natives. He instructed the Lt. Governors to inform their natives that "in future, their requests which would not be written in French could have no answer".[258] The colonial administration began therefore to draw the natives' attention that "La France c'est d'abord la langue francaise" (France is above all French language), as the French historian, Fernand Braudel summed it.

The watching of Islam concerned also the pilgrimage. When, for instance, the British issued 66 passports for intending pilgrims in 1910, the French accused them of encouraging the exodus of their population to Mecca. The British themselves became careful when several letters were intercepted between 1910 and 1916 in Northern Nigeria, with pilgrims.[259] One of the letters warned the Muslims in Nigeria about the coming of the Mahdi to deliver them from the infidels while another one denounced mallams who were working for the colonial government especially in their schools.[260]

So, the revolts of 1905-1906 in French and British territories made the colonial powers to give Islam a proper attention. But unlike the British, who sought conciliatory attitude in rewarding the loyal rulers, especially the ruling class whose interests were intimately linked with those of the British, the French perpetrated coercion and suspicion, having in mind the warning of Georges Hardy: "Before Islam, Africa was only rude; with Islam it will for centuries, become mad".[261] When in 1910 the frontier between Niger and Nigeria was definitely settled, the "Muslim plot" myth was already being tackled. It would shape all the future policy of colonial powers, with more or less importance according to the circumstances.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

1. Barth, III, 105.
2. Barth, III, 178, 484, 522.
3. See Monteil P.L., De Saint-Louis a Tripoli parle Tchad, pp.205, 224; 233.
4. ibid, p.243.
5. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A Study in the use of religion for political domination in Sokoto and its environs 1900-1960. M.A. A.B.U., p.19.
6. See Waziri Junaidu Rihlat ila Agades.
7. A.M. Kani, The life and works of Abdel Kader b. al-Mustapha op. cit., p.70.
8. Abubakar Sokoto Muhammad, A social interpretation of the Satiru revolt of c.1894-1906 in Sokoto Province M.Sc. Sociology, A.B.U., 1983, p.124 quoting Last.
9. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p.125.
10. Abubakar Sokoto Muhammad, A social interpretation of the Satiru revolt op. cit., p.125.
11. Uvroy (Y) gives Aliyu (1860-64); Abdulkadir (1864-68); Hanafi (1875-76); Abdullahi Bayero (1897-98), Bayero Aliyu (1898-1901) among others. See Histoire des populations, du Soudan Central op. cit., p.101.
12. ibid, p.100.
13. Monteil P.L., De Saint-Louis a Tripoli par de Tchad, p.205.
14. ibid, p.124.

15. According to Andre Salifou, Dosso became the capital of Zarma Kingdom only with the Zarmakoye Alfa Atta (1890-1896) and Attiku (1896-1902) see Colonisation et Societes indigenes op. cit., Vol.1 p.111.

16. J.P. Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit.,p.73.

17. G. Fourage, Frontiere meridionale du Niger op. cit., vol.2 p.261.

18. Urvoy (Y) op. cit., p.100.

19. For the date see Monteil P.L., op. cit., p.250.

20. Monteil P. Louis, De Saint-Louis a Tripoli op. cit., p.235.

21. Saka A. Balogun, Gwandu Emirate in the 19th century op. cit., p.397, n.3.

22. Marc-Henri Piault, Historie Mauri op. cit., p.127.

23. Fourage G., Frontiere meridionale, du Niger op. cit., vol.2, p.259.

24. ANN 17-1-3 Monographie du Cercle de Tahoua dont celle des secteurs de Tamaske et Guidan Bado faites par l'adjudant Brescon du 1er Aout 1901.

25. Urvoy (Y) Histoire des populations du Soudan Central, p.294.

26. ANN 17-1-4 Monographie du cercle de Tahouaparle Lieutenant Peignol 1907.

27. ANN 17-1-10.

28. Abdurahman J. Doi, Islam in Nigeria, Gaskiya Corp. Ltd., Zaria 1984, p.71.

29. J. Anene, The international boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960, London, Longman, 1970, p.268.

30. C.C. Stewart "Diplomatic relations in early 19th century West Africa: Sokoto-Azaouad-Masina correspondence" in Bala Usman ed. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate pp.408-429.

31. ibid. Despite our effort we failed to trace the location of the Behelede river.

32. quoted in Dr. A. Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu, Frank Cass and Co.Ltd 1968 p.259.

33. Fourage G, Frontiere meridionale du Niger op.cit. Vol.2 p.259

34. Sokprof 56 Northern Provinces Annual Report 1927

35. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911 no.409;

35bis Sokprof 5/1/c9.

36. Jean Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op.cit. p.73

37. U Bello Alkali, A Hausa community in crisis op.cit, p.300

38. Jean Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op.cit, p.90

39. S.E. Hertslet, The map of Africa by treaty Frank Cass and Co.Ltd 1967, 3 Volumes, Vol 2 convention no. 251, 8th April, 1904 p.819

40. Sokprof c115 International boundary 1903-1904; Extract from High Commissioner's confidential despatch to Secretary of state dated 2nd May 1904.

41. Andre Salifou, colonisation et Society indigenes op.cit, Vol.1 p.88

42. Sokprof C115 International boundary, confidential no.11/1903 from Resident Sokoto to H.E. the High Commissioner Northern Nigeria, Sokoto 17/11/1903.

43. ibid; Colonel Elliot also warned the Resident Sokoto that the position of the frontier as shown by the Boundary maps "cannot be considered definite and final till approved by the British and French Governments". See Sokprof c.115 International Boundary Conf. from Resident Sokoto to H.E. The High Commissioner Northern Nigeria, Sokoto 22 October 1903.

44. See Sokprof c.115 Precis of minute paper by H.E. to Resident Sokoto.

45. Sokprof 86/1904 Report in a tour to the Asbenawa District in the north of the Province, Sokoto 27-3-1904. From Acting Resident Charles Orr to H.E. the High Commissioner Zungeru.

46. Sokprof S.2909 Reports - Sokoto Province; Report No. 21, December 1904 by H.R.P. Hillary.

47. ibid.

48. ibid.

49. Sokprof c.115 International Boundary; Conf. No. 3/1904 From the Acting Resident Sokoto H.R.P. Hillary to H.E. The High Commissioner Northern Nigeria, 29-4-1904.

50. ibid.

51. Sokprof S.2909 Reports - Sokoto Province, Report No. 21, December 1904. In fact it is even reported that Kaura Hassau personally slit the throat of a former Sarkin Chafe who refused to pay the "traditional" tribute to Maradi see R.W. Hull, The Development of Administration in Katsina Emirate Northern-Nigeria 1887-1944, Columbia University 1968, p.65. He also threatened the caravan route.

52. SNP 15 No. 387/B.3. Letter from Mr. Palmer reporting flight from Maradi of Kaura Hassau, June 30, 1907.

53. Sokprof S.2909 Report No. 21, December 1904.

54. Sokprof 86/1907 Annual Report No. 3 for 1906.

55. G. Fourage, Frontiere meridionale du Niger Vol.2, op. cit., p.303.

56. ibid.

57. Ann R. Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) op. cit., p.104.

58. Mahmud Modibo Tukur, The Imposition of British Domination op.cit., p.52, No. 129.

59. On the French Conquest of Niger see General H. Gouraud Zinder- Tchad: Souvenirs d'un Africain 1944; J.F. Rolland, Le grand Captaine 1976.

60. P.K. Tibenderana, Sokoto Province Under Colonial Rule 1903-1939, A.B.U. Press Ltd., 1988, p.263, Appendix I.

61. ibid.

62. A.E. Afigbo "The Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1900-1918" in History of West Africa ed A. Ajayi and Crowder, London 1974, Vol.II p.429.

63. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911 No.409, 1902.

64. ibid Report No.437, 1903, p.174.

65. M. Hiskett, Introduction to Temple's Native Races and their rulers, 2nd edition, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968.

66. ANN17-1-2 Arrete No.58, du 2 Novembre 1901. Convention reglant la situation des Touaregs et de l'Adar 10 pages.

67. Ahmattaza was the Lissawan Chief (with his base at Keita) who helped the French in their conquest of Adar and got transport for them to proceed east. This attitude of the Ahmattaza, who also welcomed Ulliminden slaves who, profited from colonial administration to flee from their masters, gained him enemies. These various offences to the Ulliminden would be very ruthlessly avenged during the Kaussan rebellion of 1916-1917. In February 1917, the Ulliminden, armed with

guns and helped by Kaussan elements sacked Keita and killed the then Ahmattaza, Affadendam.

68. ANN17-1-2 Arrete No.58.

69. French imposed as tribute on:

Tibiri (Gobir): 50 donkey loads of grain
10 sheep
15 Nupe cloth
1 buce?
1 grow horse.

Kiara (Gobir Tudu): 50 tons of corn per annum, occasionally, horses and sheep.

Maradi: 5 huge camels per annum
12 fine horses " "
12 bulls " "
60 sheep " "
20 loads of guinea corn monthly
5 Nupe cloth (wawa) every month
"and if not, 50,000 of what you have heard already" [i.e. bullets].

Sources Sokprof c115 International Boundary: Captain Murricks and Captain McLacklan's reports; Translation of Arabic letters from French officers to these chiefs. Precis of minute paper from SNP to Resident Sokoto.

73. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern-Nigeria op. cit., p.59.

74. Sokprof C1 D.O. Argungu Smallwood to Resident Conf. No. AC46/5 dated 2nd May 1945.

75. NAK His/42 History of Daura.

76. M. Modibbo Tukur, The Imposition of British Domination, p.225.

77. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911, No.437 Report 1903, p.173.

77bis. R.W. Hull, The Development of Administration in Katsina Emirate, Northern-Nigeria 1887-1944, Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968, p.101.

78. F.D. Lugard, Political Memoranda.

79. Journal Officiel de l'AOF 1917, pp.486-492. The text is: "La regle qui determine les attributions des chefs indigenes doit etre la suivante: ils n'ont aucun pouvoir propre d'aucune espece car il n'ya pas deux autorites dans le cercle: l'autorite francaise et autorite indigene; il n'yen a qu'une! Seul le Commandant de cercle commande; seul il est responsable. Le chef indigene n'est qu'un instrument, un auxiliaire".

80. Quoted in W.F. Miles, Hausaland divided: Colonialism and independence in Niger and Nigeria, Cornell University Press Ithaca and London 1994, p.277.

81. Quoted in W.F. Miles Hausaland divided op. cit., p.97.

82. W.F. Miles Hausaland op. cit., p.95.

83. Y.B. Usman, The manipulation of religion in Nigeria today, Zaria, 1987, pp.11-12.

83bis. Arabic names assumed by the explorers: Hornemann: Yusuf Ibn Abdallah; Dixon Denham: Al Rais Khalil; Clapperton: Abdallah; Alexander Laing: Al Rais;

Richardson: Yakub; Barth: Abdellkarim; Edward Vogel: Abdal Wahhab.

84. Barth, I, 254.

85. L.P. Monteil, De Saint-Louis a Tripoli parle Tchad p.175 my translation.

86. Capitaine Cazemajou (G.) Journal de route B.CAF No.6 1900, p.208 translation mine.

87. Quoted in Idrissa Kimba, La Formation de la colonie du Niger: 1880-1922 Des Mythes a la politique du "mal necessaire", Thesis Paris VII 1987, 5 volumes, vol.1, p.443 my translation.

88. ANN 17-1-2 Arrete No.58 translation mine.

89. See S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria op. cit., pp.94-95.

90. Paul Marty, L'Islam et les tribus dans la colonie du Niger Paris 1930, p.345 my translation.

91. Vincent Monteil, L'Islam Noir Seuil 1964, p.193.

92. ANN 15-2-31 Rapport politique annuel du cercle de Niamey 1929.

93. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p.220.

94. John Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, University of California Press, 1973, p.53.

95. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study of Shaykh Said b. Hayat, p.88.

96. M. Al-Haj, The Mahdist Tradition in Norther Nigeria op. cit., p.96.

97. A.H.A.K. K4983/Vol.II Tassawa Raid, From Resident Borno to SNP n.d.

98. A.H.A.K. K4983/Vol.III Tassawa Raid; Conf. No.30/1927/Vol.III/31 From Resident Zaria Province to SNP, dated 25/1/1928 Enclosure: History of Malam Abubakar

(alias Maijaki).

99. A.H.A.K. K4983/Vol.III Tassawa Raid; Conf. 7/1927/25 From A.D.O. i/c Katsina Division to Resident Zaria Province, Mani, 26th December 1927.

100. ibid.

101. See Abubakar Sokoto Muhammed, The Social Interpretation of the Satiru revolt op. cit.

102. A. Smith, A Little New Light, selected Historical Writings of Abdullahi Smith, p.136.

103. Daniya Usman Abubakar, The Politics of Tradition and Change in Northern Nigeria: The Case of the Sokoto Sultans 1903-1988, M.A. Sokoto 1989, p.22.

104. ibid.

105. Colonial Reports have it for example, that Sarkin Musulmi Umoru (1881-91) showed a tendency towards fetish practices and employed one Malam Maidoguwa as his confident. At a meeting of the Waziri, Magajin Gari, Sarkin Yaki, Alkali and various mallams it was decided to depose him, but at that time rumours of a British advance were already being received and it was considered impolitic under circumstances to change their leader; he died not long afterwards and was buried without Islamic rites. On the accession of Sarkin Musulmi Abdu, a formal purification and redeclaration of the Islamic faith were considered necessary. See Sokprof S.0821 Report by C.A. Wordhouse (staff grade) A (i) Sokoto January 1931.

106. Kano was taken in February 1903. So, they arrived at Hadejia around September 1903.

107. A.H.A.K. File No.15113 The Tijani Settlement Near Hadejia. Report by H. Abrahall,

D.O. Northern Division of Kano Province, n.d.

108. On non-violent Mahdism termed as "new-Mahdism" see G.F. Tomlinson and G.J. Lethem History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria 1927, p.66.

109. See Omar Bello, editor and translator, Ulama and Colonialism in Nigeria 1995, p.1.

110. F. Fuglestad gives a speculative figure of 2 to 3 million people who migrated from French to British territories up to the 1920s. See F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.109.

111. Saka Balogun, Gwandu Emirates in the 19th century op. cit., p.408.

112. M. Modibbo Tukur, The imposition of British domination op. cit., p.207.

113. J. Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.157.

114. ibid, p.358.

115. M. Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis op. cit., p.322.

116. On the messengers Samaila sent to Dosso see J. Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.89-90.

117. M. Bello Alkali op. cit., p.318.

118. For these figures see Gazetteers of Northern Provinces, Vol.1, p.49.

119. SNP 7/6 81/1905 Sokoto Province Annual Report 1904 by Resident Major Burdon, 31/12/1904.

120. Sokprof 33/151/1904 Notes on Tribute in sokoto Province from Resident Sokoto, 7th March 1904.

121. J. Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.88 my translation.

122. ibid, p.89.

123. ANN 15-2-3 Cercle de Djerma Poste de Niamey Rapport politique Juin 1904 du Capitaine Commandant le Cercle. my translation.

124. ANN 15-2-4 1905 Region de Niamey Rapport semestriel du chef de Bataillon Commandant la region my translation.

125. Gazetteers of Northern Provinces, Vol. 1, p.47.

126. G. Fourage, Frontiere meridionale du Niger, op. cit., p.322, n.33.

127. Jean Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.405.

128. Moulaye Hassane Oral Communication.

129. Cisse Alhassane Koussanga, L'administration francaise dans la region de Say: (Niger) de 1895 a 1927 Maitrise Paris III 1975, p.78.

130. ANN Say 16-2-14. Enregistrement inextenso des rapports periodiques relatifs aux affaires musulmanes Say, 16/2/1913, A. Taillebourg.

131. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., p.94.

132. ibid.

133. ibid, p.94, note 4.

134. ibid, p.95.

135. ibid, p.94, note 4.

136. Saka Balogun, Gwandu Emirates op. cit., p.397, n.3.

137. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911, Report No.409 for 1902.

138. It seems that Abdu married a Fulani woman probably to strengthen his relations with the Emir, the evidence for that is that his son, Jibril, said that his mother was

Zinder: 50 bags of cowries per month

500 cattle per month

2000 sheep per month

8000 loads of grain after harvest

10 horses annually.

Tuaregs of Damagaram: 1500 cattle per annum

600 loads of grains.

Market Taxes: 200 Francs per month.

Sources: Sokprof c115, idem.

On the Kel-Gress: 40 fine camels as impot de guerre (war tax)

80 bulls per annum

1000 sheep per annum.

(N.B. in 1904 the tribute on the Kel-Gress was reduced to 30 bulls and 500 sheep by Lt. Colonel Noel).

On the Ulliminden: 40 fine camels as "war tribute"

80 fine bulls per annum

1000 sheep per annum.

Source: ANN17-1-2 Arrete No.58 du 2 Novembre 1901.

N.B. A donkey = 2 loads; an ox = 3 loads; camel = 5 loads.

70. ANN17-1-1 Monographie du Capitaine Joly, 1901, p.18.

71. ANN17-1-4 Monographie du Cercle de Tahoua par le Lieutenant Peignol 1907.

72. Jean-Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoy Aouta op. cit., p.66, my translation.

a Fulani see Katprof 1/1/2 Dankama District.

139. Katprof (FED) 1/1/1 Jibya District.

140. J. Anene, The international boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1960 London, Longman 1970, p.282. As late as 1939, a report on population of Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu divisions reads:

	Abzinawa	Maradawa	Adarawa	Zabarmawa	Arawa
Sokoto	1,771	92,485	39,240	18,052	21,566
Gwandu			7,143	7,606	7,908
Argungu				14,911	20,717

Source: Sokprof 5452 Annual Report Sokoto Province 1939

Report by E.J. Douglas D.O. i/c Gwandu Division.

141. See Sokoprof 265/1922 Sokoto Province Annual Report for 1922.

Conf. No.09526/92 Chief Secretary's Office, Nigeria,

Lagos, 22 June 1923.

To Secretary Northern Provinces.

142. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911, No.409 1902.

143. See his letter to Waziri Bukhari in M. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule.

144. M. Modibbo Tukur, The Imposition of British Domination op. cit., p.54.

145. Sokprof 25 Correspondence file VII: letters from Caliph Attahiru and Waziri Muhammad Buhari to:

- Sarkin Gobir Isa Umaru: Nos. 125 and 129.
- Sarkin Gobir Tibiri Umoru: Nos. 124 and 126.

- Sarkin Gobir Sabon Birni Balarabe: Nos. 127 and 128.

146. Kanoprof 5992/S.I. Correspondence between General Foulques who captured Aliyu at Tibiri in 1903 and Senior D.O. H.A.S. Johnston 1954.

147. ibid.

148. M. Al-Haj, The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria, p.181.

149. Omar Bello ed and translator, Ulama and Colonialism in Nigeria 1995 (Risala ila-l-Mu'Asirin).

S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A Study in the use of religion for political domination in Sokoto and its environs 1900-1960, M.A. History, 1987.

150. Omar Bello ed and translator, Ulama and Colonialism op. cit., p.1.

151. Isa Abba Alkali quoted in Al-Amin Abu Manga "Resistance to the Western system of education by the early migrant community of Mai-Wurno (Sudan)".

152. Quoted in P.K. Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu Emirates op. cit., p.156.


153. ibid, p.157.

154. Sokprof c10 Sultan Muhammad Tambari: Notes on visit of H.E. to Sarkin Musulmi on November 24th 1931.

155. SNP716 388/1905 Report on the Rising of Jihad led by the ex-Sultan of Sokoto culminating with his death at Burmi April - July 1903.

156. Sokprof c9 Sultan Muhammad Maiturare; Sokoto Fulani followers of ex-Sarkin Musulmi Attahiru, Marafa's list of people in Egypt.

MAP 2 THE WESTERN BOUNDARIES OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE C.1804-1837



Adopted From Y. T. Gella Ph.D Thesis P. 263

MAP1 the Western boundaries of the Sokoto Caliphate C. 1804-1837

157. See for all information in that question: see History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria by G.J. Lethem and G.J.F. Tomlinson 1927.

158. ibid.

159. See Al-Haj Mahmood Yakubu: Au aristocracy in political crisis: Zamanin siyasa in the Nigerian Emirates Ph.D. Oxford 1991, p.34.

160. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., pp.108-109.

161. G. Fourage, Frontiere meridionale du Niger op. cit., vol.2, p.291 my translations.

162. R. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.208.

163. Mahaman Alio, Introduction a l'histoire du Kwanni, des origines a la penetration coloniale, Maitrise Niamey 1985, p.60.

164 This date is taken from the oral evidence: "The white men came 70 days after Yahaya was dismissed". Voulet-Chanoine reached Konni on 9th May, 1899.

165. ibid, p.61.

166. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., pp.65-66.

167. Mansfield quoted in Asma'u Garba Saeed op. cit., 195.

168. Sokprof S.2909 Annual Report No.1, Sokoto Province by Major Burdon for December 31, 1904.

169. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1347.

170. ibid, p.1347; see also NAK SNP8 98/1908 Senussi Movement; letter from French Minister of Foreign Affairs to British Ambassador in Paris 3/4/1906.

171. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., p.226.

172. ibid, p.224.

173. Sokprof C17 Conf. No. C29/1927/115 dated 4th March 1928 From Resident Sokoto to SNP.

174. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes: les populations, du "Niger occidental" et leurs reactions face a la colonisation (1896-1906) E.N. 46 Niamey 1981, p.146 my translation.

175. The same idea developed in Northern Nigeria. Temple reports: "They (the natives) would, when talking to each other, compare the white man with the locust; a terrible visitation indeed, but one of rare occurrence and short duration", quoted in Al-Haj Mahmood Yakubu: An Aristocracy in Political Crisis: Zamanin Siyasa in Nigerian Emirates, Ph.D. Oxford, 1991, p.34.

176. ANN 15-2-4 1905 Territoire Militaire du Niger, Region de Niamey: Rapport semestriel du chef de Bataillon Commandant la region de Niamey.

177. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., p.149.

178. Telegramme from Commandant of Niger Territory to Governor of Haut-Senegal-Niger dated 15 January 1906. See J.P. Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.385.

179. Ardant du Picq, Une population Africaine les Dyermas, p.499, Larose, 1933.

180. Archives Nationales, Paris, quoted in Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., p.149.

181. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., pp.149-150.

182. ibid, p.151.

183. See Kimba Idrissa op. cit., p.148.

184. R. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.220.

185. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., p.174.

186. ibid.

187. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., pp.116-117.

188. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societies op. cit., p.151.

189. Quoted in Idrissa Kimba op. cit., p.153, No.1 my translation.

190. R. Adeleye "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906" J.H.S.N., Vol.VI, 2 June 1972, pp.193-214.

191. ibid, p.199, No.3.

192. In fact two French soldiers, one of whom was a lieutenant, were killed during the revolt of Kobkitanda.

193. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911, Report No.516 for 1905.

194. ANN Fiches de renseignements sur les marabouts, cercle de Niamey, uncatalogued n.d.

195. R. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge" op. cit., p.206.

196. Bello Alkali, A Hausa Community in Crisis op. cit., p.154, No.61.

197. ANN 15-2-7 Rapport Politique Janvier 1906.

198. ibid, Rapport politique Octobre 1906.

199. ANN 15-2-8 Region, de Niamey. Rapports politiques et administratifs trimestriels 1906.

200. ANN 15-2-8.

201. ANN 17-3-1-3 Rapport du Captaine Laforgue Commandant le cercle de Tahoua sur la tournee effectuee du 26 Avril au 1 Mai 1906.

202. The Senussiya was founded by Muhammad as-Senussi, born in Tush, (Algeria) who lived in Mecca From 1830 to 1843. It was in Mecca he founded the first zawiya (Senussi lodge) in 1837, after the death of his teacher Ahmed b. Idriss. About 1841, he left the Hedjaz and settled in Cyrenaica where he founded more zawiyas by 1843. They rose from 22 in 1859 to 100 in 1884. See Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., p.20.

Muhammad b. Ali-es-Senussi died in 1859 and was succeeded by his son Muhammad Senussi El-Mahdi, who himself died on 31st May 1902. At that period the Senussi tried to contain the advance of French in Kanem and their zawiya in Kanem (Bir Alali) was taken by the French on 19th January 1902. The French considered the Senussiya as a dangerous pan-islamic sect which preached the Holy War against the Europeans. This conception was developed as consequence of the study of Henri Duveyrier, Les Touaregs du Nord Paris 1864.

It is worth noting that Senussi emissaries, the most famous being Muhammed Sunni who founded a zawiya in Damargu (Jajiduna) in 1896, circulated in Hausaland and "had converted to their views the compact and fanatical group formed by the Foulbes of Sokoto (but) came afterwards across the Tijani of Say, who prevented them from continuing their journey (1880-1890)". He came to Kano in the time of Emir Aliyu (1894-1903) and distributed many "tarika".

See SNP6/4 98/1908 Notes on the History of Senussism and its relations to the African possessions of Foreign powers part III, 1905 to 1907.

Appendix: The characteristics of Senussism (translated from the Journal Officiel

de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise of 12th October, 1907.

See also: H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and its Diffusion in the Sahel, Warminster 1975.

203. R. Ann Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) op. cit., p.110.

204. ibid, p.111.

205. Commandant de cercle, Captain Bloch quoted in Andre Salifou, "La conjuration m manquee du Sultan de Zinder" in Africa Zamani No.3, Yaounde, December 1974, p p.69-103 my translation.

206. ibid.

207. Ann R. Dunbar, Damagaram op. cit., p.114.

208. Acacia nilotica.

209. Ann R. Dunbar Damagaram op. cit. Appendix I my translation (from a French translation).

210. Andre Salifou, "La Conjuration manquee du Sultan de Zinder" op. cit.

211. F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.74.

212. See footnote 69.

213. Andre Salifou "La conjuration manquee..." op. cit.

214. Andre Salifou "La conjuration manquee..."

215. R. Ann Dunbar op. cit., p.112.

216. ibid, p.104.

217. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports for 1904.

218. Andre Salifou, "La Conjuration Manquee du Sultan de Zinder" op. cit., p.77, no.15.

219. Abubakar Sokoto Muhammed, A Social Interpretation of the Satiru Revolt c.1894-1906, M.Sc. Sociology 1983, p.215.

220. ibid, p.224.

221. Cisse Alhassane Koussanga, L'Administration Francaise dans la region de Say (Niger) de 1895 a 1927 Maitrise Paris III 1975, p.180.

222. For these frontier problems between French and British see Boderlands in Africa ed. by A.I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi 1989 especially: chapters 19 and 13.

223. Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports, Report No.516 for 1905.

224. ANF Paris S.O.M. G.G. AOF au Ministre des colonis Dakar 19/8/1907, pp.8-10 quoted in Idrissa Kimba, la formation de la colonie du Niger: 1880-1922. Des mythes a la politique du "mal necessaire". Paris VII 1987, 5 volumes, Vol.1, pp.452-53.

225. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., Vol.1, p.453.

226. See on these questions for Northern Nigeria Protectorate P.A. Afeadie, The Hidden Hand of Overrule: Political Agents and the Establishment of British Colonial rule in Northern Nigeria 1886-1914, Ph.D. York University, 1996.

227. Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et societes op. cit., p.140.

228. Jean-Paul Rothiot, Zarmakoye Aouta op. cit., p.405.

229. Andre Salifou, "La conjuration manquee du Sultan de Zinder" op. cit., p.82, no.27.

230. Sa'ad Abubakar "The Northern provinces Under Colonial Rule" in Obaro Ikime ed. Groundwork of Nigerian History Ibadan 1980, p.460.

231. P.A. Afeadie, The Hidden Hand of Overrule op. cit., p.41.

232. ANN 16-2-14 Say.

233. ANN Cercle de Zinder Fiches de Renseignerments: marabouts et personages influents n.d. uncatalogued.

234. Malam Abdu was Ajiya (treasurer) in Machena, Northern Borno from 1912 to 1918. But he was tactless and had poor relations with his District Head. In 1918, Malam Abdu was deposed for repeatedly imprisoning innocent traders and confiscating their goods. See P.A. Afeadie, The Hidden Hand of Overrule op. cit., p.183. But according to French sources, Malam Abdu was dismissed for not having reported the death of two natives assassinated in his District. The French sources stated that he was District Head of Machena. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment and after accomplishing his term, he was expelled into Niger territory in 1920. See ANN cercle de Zinder Fiches de renseignements: marabouts et personnages influents n.d. see also Maiprof 2/1 321 Mallam Abdu (late political agent) District Head Machena Deposed June (1909-1918).

235. Barma Mustapha was a Zinder prince who fled the French capture of Damagaram in 1899 and sought refuge in Sokoto Caliphate. In 1902, he participated in the Lower Borno Mission, a British military expedition which captured Bormi, Bauchi and Yola. In 1903, Mustapha was domiciled at Kachellari, near N'guru in Western Borno. Resident Hewby found him to be a excellent political agent, and he was accordingly employed in 1904 (Afeadie pp.34-35) note 21. His epithet was "Zanna Mattam" (Noble Mustapha). He later returned to Zinder, and was installed as sultan in 1922 - see F. Fuglestad: A History of Niger op. cit., p.87.

236. SNP6 C81.

237. SNP613 182/1907 Resident Temple to Acting High Commissioner, Sokoto.

238. Ahire P. Terdoo, Policing Colonization: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria 1860 - 1960, Ph.D., Cambridge, 1985, p.96.

239. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria: A study in the use of Religion for Political Domination in Sokoto and its environs 1900-1960, M.A., A.B.U., 1987, p.155.

240. ibid.

241. ibid, p.156.

242. Sokprof. 152p/1913 Synopsis of events in Sokoto Province from 1906 to 1912.

243. SNP6 124/1909 Argungu Political Situation. Conf. No.32/9 Resident to H.E. the Acting Governor Norther Nigeria, Sokoto, 6/10/1909.

244. Mission Robert Arnaud in Idrissa Kimba.

245. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1345.

246. SNP6 C81/1907 Intelligence Report for 1907. High Commissioner Girouard to Secretary of State for Colonies Enclosure No.3 to despatch Northern Nigeria Confidential Report of 30th September 1907.

247. ANN Zinder Rapport sur la situation de l'Islam Zinder 2 Trimestre 1912 my translation.

248. ANN 16-2-14 Say.

249. ANN 16-2-14 Say.

250. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1139.

251. ibid , p.1136.

252. Mission Robert Arnaud Rapport No.4, Kandy 22/11/1906. my translation.

253. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.1, p.450.

254. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1137.

255. Alhassane Koussanga Cisse op. cit., p.27 my translation. Ahmadu refers here to Ahmadu Satiru, Emir of Say in 1897.

256. A.H.A.K. File No. 11096, Vol. II, Summary of Quarterly Intelligence Reports for 1929.

257. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1138

258. Journal Officiel de l'A.O.F. No. 335, Samedi 13 Mai 1911 circulaire No. 29C au sujet de l'emploi de la langue francaise dans la redaction des jugements des tribunaux indigenes et dans la correspondence administrative Dakar le 8 Mai 1911.

259. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism op. cit., p.205.

260. ibid.

261. Quoted in Alphonse Gouilly L'Islam en AOF Paris, Larose 1952, p.249 my translation.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FRONTIER POLICY FROM 1910 TO 1939: EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO "NATIVE" CHALLENGES

In this section we aim at showing the different crises that led colonial powers to have a close watching on the scholars and develop trans-border cooperation to deal with them. Despite the traditional suspicion between the French and the British, suspicion that took its roots in the willingness of each of them to win the leadership in the 19th century Europe and that worsened with the "scramble" in Africa, the two colonial powers, looked towards one another for help as soon as a native challenge occurred. Above all, "colonialism was economic exploitation based on racial domination".[1] Moreover, early in the colonial period, the two colonial powers tried to make the natives understand that Europeans are friends. A report of 1914 reads:

"Relations with the French Officers at Dosso and Gaya have been most cordial. On several occasions they have given valuable assistance in preventing undesirable persons from settling near the border. The natives are beginning to realize that the two European Administrations are friendly, and cannot be played off one against the other".[2]

Also, the feeling of superiority and the contempt they shared for the "negro" brought them closer.[3] So, the colonial powers reacted to natives challenges with racial background.

On the ground, Islamic activities were checked by the zealous colonial administrators who took pretext of any slight proof to impose drastic measures. In 1912, for instance, the pilgrims were refused passage in Niger territory because of war between

Turks and Italians. Also, in the same period, through the trans-saharan trade, the Senussi from North Africa flooded the Northern Niger territory (Ahyar area) with Muslim correspondences, announcing the "extermination of the white men in near future" or inviting people to give money to the scholars.[4] When the first world war broke out, almost immediately after the Turko - Italian war, the colonial powers were a state of mind very fearful of muslim peril.

IV.1. The First World War and the Question of Islam on Niger-Nigeria Frontier 1914-1919: The Kaussan Rebellion

The war broke out in Europe as a result of a build-up of a system of alliances in Europe at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. The alliances consisted of two groupings, known as Allies (France, Britain, Russia and later Italy) to what was known as Central Empires (Germany, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires). As soon as the war started, the Allies took conservative measures against all those capable of creating trouble. They immediately arrested the Turkish citizens and placed them under "discreet but close watching". These were the Syrians, Lebanese, Druzes and Armenians. All correspondences were censored and all newspapers coming from countries not in alliance with France were seized. They met some obligations to any native who desired to travel to take a laissez-passer and they forbade them to leave French West Africa.[5] In October 1914, the Sublime Porte at Constantinople transformed the war into a jihad, by issuing a Fetwa on 29th October 1914.[6] The Allies decided to counter-act. The British decided to mobilize the support of all muslims within their empire.[7] The French also decided to instigate issuance of proclamations by the great muslim erudites

to present the Ottoman Emperor as a prisoner they (the allies) had to liberate from the Germans.[8] But all this preoccupation proved to be baseless for in this area of Hausaland relations with the Ottoman Empire was rather a remote one, as its being a party to the war had no great effect on Muslim authorities, as reported by British and the French.

The British in 1914 reported: "The subsequent participation of Turkey in the war had no effect on chiefs or people. The Sarkin Musulmi stated that he had never had any dealings with the Turks and wished to have none. He issued a circular-letter to his chiefs, warning them against lying messengers from the Turks and the Germans. Similar warnings were issued by the Emirs of Gwandu and Argungu".[9] The Sarkin Musulmi seemed to have definitely sided with the British, especially against the Turks and it is said that "The Sarkin Musulmi is on the watch for any Arabs or natives arriving from North Africa who might lend themselves for the purposes of German or Turkish intrigue", and when one unfortunate "suspect" arrived in Sokoto from Timbuctu area, on his way to Mecca, "he has been sent back under escort for handing over to the French Authorities".[10]

On 16th November 1915, a man called Abubakar, was arrested by Emir of Gwandu. The man was said to have been sent by the Sultan of Turkey together with 39 others to Nigeria "in order to ascertain whether it was true as reported to the Sultan that the people of Nigeria were embracing paganism".[11] The man was sent by the Emir to the D.O. Gwandu who forwarded him to the Resident. Afterwards the Resident, thinking that there were suspects among the Alhazai, made the Sarkin Musulmi, Sarkin Gwandu and Sarkin Argungu to call out all the Alhazai and "now each Division has a register of Alhazai".[11bis]

On the French side, the Governor General of French West Africa reported in 1915: "With reference to the declaration of war from the Ottoman Empire, it has had no effect on the Muslims notables, who do not appear to have any sympathy with the party in control at Constantinople, which they know to have sold out to Germany".[12] This attitude of the Muslim authorities in colonial empires, reassured the colonial powers and it tended to blunt their vigilance. Nonetheless, the war created disturbances in Northern Nigeria as well as in Niger territory.

In Northern Nigeria, apart from letters which were intercepted from the pilgrims between 1910 and 1916, unrests were reported in Kontagora Province (Kiama district), in Kano, in Borno, Bauchi and Muri Provinces[13] and in Sokoto itself where the British even sent two companies and canons in 1915.[14]

In French Territory the war arrived in very bad conditions. In 1914, the Commandant Madawa reported famine and disastrous pastures and recommended in his report to foresee the diminution of taxes. He also reported that about 30 villages migrated, mostly into Northern Nigeria.[15] In Gobir area (Maradi division) the Commandant complained that he could take no action (exacting taxes or conscription) because the immediate consequence should be migration to Nigeria.[16] The people were worried especially about the conscription, which was carried "through the use of methods reminiscent of slave hunting".[17] In Tawa cercle for instance, troops were sent to villages which resisted recruitment. The village of Gwaram was burnt; in Gahe, three resistants were killed; the rest arrested; in Barzenga the resistants were arrested; the village of Bazazzaga (Konni district) was razed to the ground.[18] The Commandant Madawa also

reported disturbances in Wulliminden country (Tuareg area) and stated that these tribes were "worked out by Muslim messengers from outside".[19] He, at the end, recognised that the number of people who migrated into Northern Nigeria was too much, too considerable to try to bring them back by formal procedures. The Resident Katsina, however, tried to expel some of them but the Resident Sokoto let the Sarkin Musulmi do as he liked and the latter was not eager to send them back.[20] To the contrary, the Marafa of Gwadabawa was accused by the French of a plot to make people, more especially the Sarakuna, to migrate into Northern Nigeria. He even arrived to convince Sarkin Konni, Maliki (1904-1907) to proceed to Northern Nigeria but Maliki came back soon after. The Marafa was helped in his attempts of drawing people from French into Northern Nigeria, by a marabout named Balarabe who came from Darfur into the Konni area. Balarabe was finally expelled by the French in 1914.[21]

The French policy during the war was very harsh, especially concerning taxation. The French imposed more taxes during that period and Finn Fuglestad argued that "it seems fairly certain that the rate of pool tax doubled between 1914 and 1915 and that it trebled during the period 1906 to 1916 as a whole".[22] And, as a consequence of surtaxation and conscription the number of migrants was considerable: "officials in Zinder guessed at the startling figure of one hundred thousand".[23]

Whereas the French imposed surtaxation, the British conceived a method to drive into their purse, individual voluntary contribution to the war. They called this war Fund, the Prince of Wales Relief Fund. In 1914 when the Fund started in Sokoto, "the Sarkin Musulmi spontaneously offered £1,000 from his own purse".[24] The Emir of Gwandu,

unable to give money, compensated this inability by offering religious assistance. For it was reported that he "has been holding weekly services in the mosque to pray for the success of His Majesty's Armies".[25] Afterwards, the native Treasuries took the charge of paying contributions for the War Fund.[26] In 1915, the Resident Sokoto reported: "The attitude of people towards Europeans remained friendly as usual. In fact, I think since the outbreak of the war it has been more friendly than before".[27] Only in February 1915, when there was a call for carriers, rumours spread that there was a compulsory military recruitment. But the Sultan of Sokoto issued a proclamation denouncing this alarms as false and it immediately subsided.[28]

The Sarkin Musulmi also played a role in returning refugees from French territory. In Sokoto Northern Districts, a total of 225 refugees who fled the military service were returned by the Sultan and his Dogarai.[29]

The year 1915 was that of loss for the British whose three most important native chiefs died: The Sarkin Gwandu Haliru on 24th March; the Sarkin Musulmi Muhammadu Attahiru on 14th June, and Samaila of Argungu on 7th September. According to Tibenderana, this year (1915) "marked the ebb of Emir's authority under the British administration".[30] These disparitions reduced the efficiency of native authority in a moment where the British needed this efficiency the most.

With the outbreak of the war, cooperation developed instead of suspicion between the French and the British. The important factor which consolidated that cooperation was not only the physical threat from Germany but also the use Germany made of the Ottoman Empire's influence in Muslim countries against the Allies. Germany made some

great ulama from Constantinople or even some times Black marabouts of repute to issue proclamations inviting people to stand against the infidels. For instance, in August 1914, one Muhammad Dam who labelled himself Grand Marabout Musulman issued a proclamation to the people of Central Africa inviting them to fight the French and the British.[31] But the most zealous in that anti-allies propaganda were the Senussi who sided with the Turks in their war against Italy, shortly before the Great War.

The objectives of the Senussiya were reported to be the unification of Muslim Africa by progressive steps and the making of a united Muslim empire, purified and respectful of the authentic teaching of the Prophet.[32] According to one of his followers, Sidi Muhammad es-Sanussi, nourished the ambition of becoming Sultan of North and Central Africa and Caliph of the Arabs.[33]

The Senussi agents had some influence in Northern Niger, for since November 1914, in Tuareg country around Timbuktu there were reports of anti-French propaganda by some mallams who announced that all French were killed and exhorted people to rebel.[34] In fact some troubles were raised by the Kel Ataram Tuaregs under their Amenokal Firhoun, who was sent into exile at Timbuktu but escaped in February 1916 and declared holy war against the French.[35] According to Andre Salifou, campaign against the French was carried out by Firhoun together with some Turk emissaries.[36] Firhoun was nevertheless forced to flee southwards because of French pressure.

On 28th April 1916, the Governor General, Clozel, set up a Committee for Muslim Affairs, "committed to give its advice on the solution to be found to the questions of Islamism and Muslim natives of French West Africa".[37]

Two scholars from Niger Territory, El Hadj Sliman from Agades and Malam Laminu from Zinder were members of this Committee.[38] But the Committee failed to prevent the Kaussan rebellion.

As all the other regions of Niger, Ahyar witnessed the harshness of French administration, particularly during the war. Also, other factors made Ahyar people to feel more seriously the sufferings of the colonial regime. As a writer put it: "From 1906, Ahyar witnessed a succession of disasters and calamities: disruption of caravan traffic, taxes on persons and animals, exceptional drought in 1910, epidemics and famines, massive requisition of camels for the conquest of Tibesti in 1913-1914, disarmament of the Imajeghen (Nobles Tuaregs). All these elements combined to place Ahyar in a situation of serious crisis".[39] It seemed that the rural population of Ahyar (those outside Agades) suffered more of this crisis for the rural population, particularly the mallam class helped the rebellion. For instance, when Kaussan took over the town of Agades in December 1916, people noted the domination in number of Ineslemen (mallams) "coming from the bush,"[40] i.e. rural mallams.

So, above all, it was not religious motives only which led to the revolt. It was harsh colonial policies and economic hardship. But the Senussiya used Kaussan to take advantage of that situation to stir up trouble.

The Kaussan rebellion is important for our study for two main reasons:

First, it symbolized the most important threat to colonial rule, founded on religious ground and reaffirming the unity of Islamic Hausaland. The Senussiya even though it was under Ottoman and German manipulation, showed that it could be a physical threat to

the colonial powers. The conquering march of the Senussi had as objective, the conquest of these areas from Ahyar to Kano. This was revealed in a letter written by Kaussan in October 1916 to his two uncles El Haj Musa and Adembar, chief of the Ikaskazen staying in Niger territory. The letter reads: "Know that the Turk Government and the German are waiting for us at Kano (where they got before us)".[41] In his correspondences, Kaussan labelled himself as "Commandant of Senussi Army".[42]

The Senussiya took advantage of the war, to manifest all its ambitious programme of ruling over Muslim countries. Francis Nicolas reported: "In February 1917, Kaussan and his brother El-Mokhtar sent letters to the Kel Dinnik chiefs and distinguished persons, to the marabouts, to incite them to the insurrection ... telling them that Agades will fall immediately; after that the holy war will extend to Nigeria and all the infidels will be driven away from the Muslim countries".[43]

The second reason is that cooperation developed between the French and the British as soon as the revolt broke out. In the face of the Senusi danger, the French thought that only the British could be their natural allies and the British themselves felt very concerned about the Tuareg revolt.

Before looking at the islamic background of the two leaders of the revolt (Kaussan and Abderahim Tagama), let's have an insight on the activities of the Senussiya in our area.

The Senussiya appeared, as far as Niger territory is concerned, in Kawar (Bilma oases) around 1870 when a zawiya (Senussi lodge) was founded in the village of Chemidur by one Sidi Mahamat Safi.[44] The latter returned to his country and was replaced by one

Sheikh Brahim Machruf who founded another zawiya at Bilma and who finally resided at Zinder with Sultan Tanimun (1853-1884). But the most important Senussi envoy was Sheikh Muhammed al-Sunni who travelled through Damargu between 1896 and 1898 and founded a zawiya in Jajiduna in 1896. He tried but unsuccessfully, to bring the Damagaram Sultan, Ahmadu Kuren Daga into the brotherhood.[45] Muhammad al-Sunni is said to have pushed his mission to Gidan Bado in Adar.[46] The Senussiya also reached Ahyar around 1870 and founded many mosques and schools at Agades, Ingall, Iferwan, etc.

Shortly before the war of 1914-1918, the Senussiya sided with the Turks in their war against Italy in North Africa (1910-1912). So when the great war occurred, it was through the Senussiya that the Ottoman Empire and its ally Germany, wanted to exert their influence on Sub-Saharan Africa. The Ottoman Empire and the Senussi were said to be in contact with some Hausa states like Kano, where Muhammad Sunni is said to have come during the reign of Sarkin Kano Aliyu (1894-1903) and "to have distributed 'takardas' among the Arabs and to a less extent, among the Hausa and Fulani".[47] The Ottoman Empire also was said to have maintained an agent at Kano.[48] It is against that background that Kaussan said he was going to Kano after defeating the French in the Sahara.

Kaussan ag Muhammad Wan Tiggidda was among the Immuzurag Tuaregs who, after their chief, Musa Mai Damargu was killed by the French and his capital Tanamari sacked on 19th July 1900, decided to migrate to the East and went to Kanem. Between 1901 and 1902, therefore, the Immuzurag took the road to Kanem and Kaussan was

among them.[49] Kaussan went to Guro (now Chad) where in 1909, he joined the Senussiya but he became rather "a leader of a private army which offered its services to the Turks or to the Senussiya".[50] He entered into the services of the Senussi leader, Sidi Ahmed Sherif who appointed him Commandant of the Ennedi which role he played for nine months and was expelled by the French. He went to Darfur but left Darfur on 22nd August 1911 because he was in bad odour with the Darfur Sultan, Ali Dinar.[51] Kaussan had also connections with Egypt and the near East (Syria) where one of his brothers, Bulhan stayed and got married. The son of Bulhan, Sherif Musa, long after his father's death, came from Egypt to help Kaussan in the siege of Agades. The Egyptians and the Turks were said to have provided the money for the journey.[52] Sherif Musa was finally killed in the Agades events and Kaussan himself had to flee northwards where he was killed on 5th January 1919 in Murzuk.[53] Ibrahim, one of the brothers of Kaussan, chief of Gangara, remained loyal to the French.[54]

According to British sources, Kaussan's rebellion had connections with the Mahdiya. In fact, it is reported that Sherif Musa came to Agades alongside with one Hajj Shuaibu, a Marua Fulani who spoke Hausa, Fulfulde, Kanuri, Zarma and several other languages besides Arabic. This Hajj Shuaibu was "the man of the Turks" and he and Sherif Musa were said to have received letters from Abderahman of Ondurman to Kaussan and to Western Emirs. They left Ondurman about April or May 1916.[55] They travelled through Marua, Hadejia (where the Emir advised them not to travel through Damagaram, to avoid the French, and gave them the services of one Malam Umaru to facilitate their journey to Agades) Gummel, Kazaure, N'gawa, Katsina and north to Agades.[56] After the collapse

of Kaussan's attack on Agades and the death of Sherif Musa, Hajj Shuaibu fled to Ingall west of Agades, thence to Zarma territory and Sokoto, thence via Kano to Bauchi, to Dumbulwa, to Marua and finally to Khartoum, which he reached about April 1918.[57]

These connections made the British to give the Kaussan rebellion a wide extent and to conceive the Dumbulwa affairs as part of it as we will see it.

Abdurahim Tagama was Sultan of Ahyar when he entered into overt rebellion against the French and joined the Kaussan side. He acceded the throne in a situation where the French showed their dissatisfaction with the Agades Sultans. Urvoy reported: "The Agades Sultan, Usman, was favourable to us but had no authority. His ancient rival Ibrahim ed-Dasuki retired in Sokoto region ... As he was more energetic than Usman, the latter was deposed by us on August 1st 1907, and replaced by him. But Ibrahim proved to be unsatisfactory and was shortly afterwards replaced by Tagama, son of his brother Bakary".[58]

According to a tradition recorded by Kimba Idrissa at Agades: "Tagama studied in Borno and Kano. He was in Kano when he was summoned here to take over the throne. He is a great Muslim and a great marabout".[59] If it was so, Tagama was an eye-witness of many events of Mahdist nature or so labelled, which took place in Northern Nigeria during the period he stayed in Borno and Kano. It also explained why focus was made on Kano in many of the correspondences from Kaussan's group. Tagama had certainly connections in Kano apart from many Tuaregs who were settling there since the pre-colonial period. But according to the same tradition: "It was once he became Sultan that Tagama had been converted to the Senussiya by one Sidiku an Arab marabout from Ghat,

who stayed in Agades".[60]

When Kaussan arrived with his men in Agades in December 1916, Tagama wrote to the Lissawan of Keita more particularly to Sheikh Sani and Agali and the Kel-Aghlal, ordering them to leave the proximity of the infidels and join them in Agades with their wives, children and properties. He ordered that as suzerain of Adar as he showed it himself in quoting a Quranic verse: "Oh! croyants! Suivez Dieu, suivey Son Envoye, suivez aussi ceux a qui appartient le commandement" (Oh! Faithful! Follow God, follow His Messenger, follow those to whom He gave command).[61] But the Lissawan of Keita preferred to be loyal to the French and as a punishment Keita was sacked by a group from Kaussan's men alongside with the Wulliminden, in February 1917 and the Keita chief Afadendam was killed.

But what worried the colonial powers most was the relations Kaussan was supposed to have developed with the British Emirs among whom was the Sultan of Sokoto himself. In May 1917 an enquiry was carried out in Ahyar ordered by the Commandant Laforgue, in order to confirm or invalidate the rumours that "Kaussan, during the Agades siege addressed letters to the Sultans of Nigeria and especially Emir of Kano".[62] Two eye-witnesses of the Agades events implicated Kano, at least as regard the rebellion. One Tahiru stated: "A message had been sent to the Kano Sultan to inform him about the events which would take place". And another witness, Massadu, gave precision: "Zinder people were all arrested; they had to serve as guides when (Kaussan) would proceed to Kano".[63]

The commandant in charge of the Territoire militaire du Niger was very anxious

about the implication of Kano in these events and would like to inform the British. That was why he ordered the enquiry. Even the Sarkin Musulmi, Muhammad Maiturare (1915-1924) was said to have been informed of the "plot". As a writer put it: "The French ... mentioned in particular that according to information in their possession, the Sultan of Sokoto was constantly in touch with Muhammad Kaussan and had promised the latter co-operation if the Senussi could enter Sokoto".[64] Sere des Rivieres reported that Senussi elements installed in Northern Nigeria, organised convoy to supply goods to Kaussan and his troops, but the convoy was intercepted by the French in Gudumaria area.[65] This shows that some people in our area felt very concerned with the "Kaussan affairs" and Kaussan himself tried to give his revolt an Islamic label. In fact before shooting, the resistants cried: "La illaha illala jihadi fi sabil Allah".[66] The Islamic connection therefore played a role in making Kaussan and his group to seek assistance from their brethren in Northern Nigeria. In the same way the British considered this revolt in the "French Sahara" as a serious matter and decided to assist the French in two ways: military assistance to crush physically the revolt and preventing rebels from immigration into Northern Nigeria.

1) <u>The Military Assistance</u>

Lugard was Governor General of Nigeria when the revolt started in December 1916. He received on 23rd December 1916, a Telegram from Dakar, informing him about the invasion of French sahara by the Senussi. Lugard in fact, knew that the Senussiya was at war with themselves for its chief, Muhammed Sherif, under the pressure put on him by the Turks, declared a jihad against the allies in 1915.[67] Lugard was in panic and he proclaimed a state of emergency on 3rd January 1917. What made Lugard to be in such

a panic was that the threat came whence he was waiting for it the least. All British attention was drawn along the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan road. Had the attack come from Sudan through Adamawa or Chad, Lugard would have found it quite normal. In no one of their records as far as we know, did the British consider the northern French Territory as being a threat to their security. The Senussia therefore took them by surprise. It was more so when some British thought that the Senussi didn't preach open revolt: "it is not revolt which the chiefs of the Senussi preach, it is emigration. For, in their eyes, emigration is the sole means whereby true believers under Christian Yoke may return again to Islam".[68]

So, to help the French quell the revolt, the British decided to send two military columns to Niger to take position more especially in the areas inhabited by the Tuaregs to prevent southern Tuaregs from either rebelling or helping the rebels. This was done by Lugard very rapidly: "As soon as Lugard received the official request for assistance from Dakar (on 8th January 1917), he ordered four companies with artillery to move into Niger".[69] They were assigned the role of protecting the areas of Madawa, Tawa and Maradi. The Kaussan force was reported to be of between 5,000 and 8,000 well-armed rebels.[70]

Lugard even proposed to the French to send them aircrafts to crush easily the rebellion but the French refused. They didn't want their "natives" to be impressed by British technology.[71] This created a somewhat bad climate, awakening the old suspicion between the two colonial powers, and finally after four months sojourn in Niger territory, (mid-January to mid-May) the British withdrew from southern Niger and returned to their

respective bases in Nigeria.

2) Expulsion of Rebel Tuaregs from Northern Nigeria

Between February and March 1917, numerous Tuaregs with their arms crossed the frontier and stayed in Hadejia and throughout the frontier zone.[72] As we have pointed out, Madani, the chief of the Tijaniya order, who came to the area around 1903, lived in Hadejia,[73] leading the remnants of western Sudanese driven away by the French. Ahmed Madani, as reported by Chatelain, gained his first adepts in Niger territory in 1916, when he sent his cousin Ahmadu Ali to Zinder where the latter appointed four moqadems among the new converts.[74] It was probably for this reason that the Tuaregs immigrated into Hadejia. But the French insisted to Lugard that these Tuaregs be expelled. Lugard therefore ordered the expulsion (with military force if necessary) of all Tuaregs of Northern Nigeria.[75] In a letter from the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, No.25, dated 15 January 1917, all the Residents of Northern Nigeria were ordered to refuse permission to remain in Nigeria to all camel men and camels from French territory, unless they were in possession of permits from French authorities.[76] During all that period, the Tuaregs were tracked throughout Northern Nigeria and negotiation and even confusions (to distinguish rebel Tuaregs from non-rebels) developed between the French and the British authorities.[77] In November 1917, a rebel Tuareg named Mohammed, chief of the Wulliminden Sherifai, tried to take refuge in Sokoto. He was arrested by the Sarkin Musulmi and deported.[78] In June 1917, a thousand Tuareg camels were requisitioned and sent to Niger territory.[79]

The British tracked the Tuaregs not only to help "their brothers the French", but

also because they thought that only Tuaregs could bring Senussi propaganda into Northern Nigeria. The Governor of Nigeria Graeme Thomson expressed this view (later on in 1927) in a correspondence with the Governor General of French West Africa. The letter reads: "With regard to Senussist activity in general, I would first of all give you my opinion that in this region of Africa, it is precisely the Tuareg tribes and those communities dependent upon or similar to them that form the nucleus of a Senussist faction. These communities are not strongly represented in Nigeria and their members are rather visitors on temporary business than residents in the country".[80] The Governor showed especially his fear of Tijaniya or Mahdism. He continued: "In general propaganda in the name of the Tujani fraternity or in the name of the Sudan Mahdi and his son Abderahman, this sect is much more likely to obtain, adherents in Nigeria than in the name of the Senussi brotherhood".[81]

This view of the Governor General influenced all the orientations of British Islamic policy and it was in fact shared by most of the British administrators. This explained why as soon as the Kaussan rebellion was quelled the British directed their attention on their everlasting subject of anxiety: the East. Knowing that henceforth the Senussiya and the Tuaregs would be seriously watched by the French, the British had no more of worry from the North. They therefore neglected the cooperation with the French and the exchange of Intelligence lost its momentum, whereas during the revolt even local rulers organised intelligence services.[82]

In Niger territory itself, the crushing of the revolt was ruthless. The commandant de cercle of Madawa, Captain Sadoux, in charge of the suppression of the Wulliminden,

reported: "I have now 207 prisoners among them 51 Imajeghen (Noble Tuaregs) ... On 8th April I executed the 207 prisoners. It remained for me to take the booty: 700 camels; 15,000 cattle; 4,000 sheep and goats".[83] Captain Sadoux laid the conditions of submission as follows:

- To reside in the Tawa zone in a radius of 80 km. This strategy by the French allowed them to prevent the remaining rebels from the roads to move to the south and make them to starve in the bush.
- Payment of fines of 1,000 camels.
- Disarmament: all arms (guns, swords, arrows, etc.) must be given to the colonial administration.[84]

This revolt and especially the repression which ensued, led to the exodus of at least 30,000 Tuaregs into the Emirates of Kano and Katsina.[85] Many letters from Senussi personalities were found with the prisoners. That led the French to interpret the revolt as a Senussist one. And as a writer put it: "This false interpretation of the event led the French troops to exterminate all the Muslim clerics of Agades. More than 100 marabouts who met in the mosque were massacred in March 1917 when they had disclaimed responsibility in the events in a letter they addressed to Colonel Mourin".[86]

Ahyar tradition presented Kaussan more as a war chief than a man of religion and the mallams of Agades even reproached him for not having respected the shari'a and considered as doubtful, the implication of the Senussiya in these events.[87] But the situation of the war, the Kaussan background and the letters, not forged, discovered on the prisoners were a proof that the Senussiya had a hand in these events, perhaps without

playing the role which colonial administrators thought it did. What was central in this revolt as in all the others we have seen above, was the outcome of economic, physical and cultural domination, coupled with a succession of droughts and famines faced by the people. Finn Fuglestad wrote: "Naturally, the Great Famine of 1913-1915 was chiefly, due to drought. But (...) drought causes famines when reserves are low, recuperative powers are weakened, outside relief is difficult to obtain and transport and communication are defective. In all these ways the attitude and policy of the French made the famine more general, more intense and more prolonged".[88] Even in Northern Nigeria, especially Kano area, where Tuaregs used to immigrate in the time of difficulty (famines), the famine was so acute in 1914 that people "died like flies on every road".[89]

The revolt in Ahyar led the French to reverse their pro-Islamic policy based on the conception that Islam is a culture between paganism and European culture in its stage of development, and has the merit of having a set of rules as opposed to the rather changing rules of the pagans.[90]

In this Kaussan rebellion, Northern Nigeria was concerned not only at the colonial authorities' level but also at the symbolical level of the islam. The Sarkin Musulmi and some Emirs, namely those of Kano and Katsina were not indifferent to the development. Kano was involved for two main reasons:

The first reason had to do with the Tuareg population which inhabited Kano area since the pre-colonial period. One of the weaknesses of Senussi movement was that they tried to get support only from Tuareg population. For instance, all the letters dispatched by Kaussan were addressed to the Tuareg communities, apart from those addressed to the

rulers. They wrote to the Tuaregs of Damargu,[91] to the Lissawan of Keita[92] and to the Kel Dinnik.[93] It seems that the Emir of Kano himself was informed only to allow those who wanted to join the rebels to do so.

The second reason is that Abderahim Tagama studied in Kano and had certainly some connections there. He hoped to get help from them. The installation of immigrants in Hadejia had to do with this region being the abode of the Tijaniya.

As for the Emir of Katsina, a tradition recorded in Agades has it that Tagama had connection in relation with Emir of Katsina who made charms and sent them to Agades through emissaries and Tagama informed him about the plan.[94]

The Sultan of Sokoto for his part was unlikely to be in contact with the Agades events, considering the role he played in crushing the Satiru revolt, which, as a matter of fact, won him the throne.[95] Sultan Muhammadu Maiturare (1915-1924) "says he is not in favour with the fanatical leaders and propagandists, who have left him alone since he wrote to the last one who approached him addressing him as the devil. This was the Cairo correspondent".[96] The Sultan of Sokoto seemed to have sealed his fate with the colonial administration. But every Muslim who tried an overt resistance against the colonial powers wanted to give this resistance an Islamic dimension, and wanted therefore to gain at least an implicit support from the Amir al-Muminin, if not an overt help.

In a report by a Lt. Governor of Niger territory, Choteau, the attitude of Sultan Maiturare was described as an inertia vis-a-vis different propaganda dished out, more especially by the Tijaniya from Hadejia. Part of the report reads: "Maiturare disinterested himself with the spiritual aspect of his office. As the Katsina Resident put it 'Maiturare

considers himself now as an Emperor and no longer as a Pope'".[97]

But some meagre information, brought to light some years after the Kaussan rebellion, tried to indicate that the sultan had knowledge of the plan. Arnett, the Resident of Cameroons Province reported (in 1928): "(When) information was received ... that Agades had fallen and that a column of rebels was marching on Madawa and Sokoto, the sultan remained unshaken in his conviction that no move would be made against Sokoto territory. There can be no question that the Sultan was pretty well informed of Kaossen's affairs and of the local situation in the Agades region".[98] It is also reported that during the Agades events the Sultan had received three messengers carrying suspicious letters from abroad. He nevertheless took the precaution of informing the Resident about the envoys but avoided to disclose the bringing of letters. Also, when the Resident wanted the so-called envoys to be brought before him, they were said to have fled.[99]

One Malam Jari, a renowned fortune-teller, reported that when he came from Egypt in 1921, Sarkin Musulmi, Maiturare, summoned him secretly to his house and asked him about the "news of the road to Mecca". Malam Jari stated that the Sarkin Musulmi was preparing to go East.[100] Also, Captain Andre, in charge of Intelligence and Muslim Affairs, near the Governor General of French West Africa, reported that in 1922, the Sokoto Sultan sent a flag of jihad to Hamahoullah (chief of Hamallist movement in French Sudan) saying "I think Nioro people will act in Sudan as we are going to act here".[101]

With these scanty data we cannot draw the conclusion that the Sultan of Sokoto was "on the Kaussan's side" for his attitude during the Satiru crisis and in the beginning of the war showed that he had definitely sided with the British. The latter were so

satisfied with his attitude (particularly in regard to Islam) that they recommended in 1922 that the succession be settled on Maiturare's family, in order to keep members of Bello family, whom they thought, were tied to Mahdism, from power.[102] But what remained a permanent deal was that the different unrests in our area created a psychological problem to many Muslims (among whom was the Sultan himself) who had to make a choice between their religious conviction and the loyalty to the British. Also, during the whole colonial era, the question raised in Sokoto during the caliphate of Attahiru I (resistance of flight) had found no answer for even though some of the Sokoto officials chose to cooperate with the British, there was always this feeling that "we missed our way" which gave Attahiru's shehada (martyrdom) its essence. That was more so for the Sultan Maiturare who was said to have argued that "decision has to be taken under circumstances" during the Sokoto debate. It seemed that during all his reign he tried to strike a balance between cooperation and opposition; he cooperated overtly but made underground opposition, if one can give credit to the information discussed above. But, on the whole, "native" officials' attitude was that of loyalty to colonial administration.

The consequences of the Kaussan rebellion were numerous, especially for the scholars of French territory, who suffered the restriction of movement and some of them migrated into Northern Nigeria, the most important case being that of Malam Haidu, Mugadam of the Qadiriya who retired to Fagge Quarters of Kano. He is presented as one of the most illustrious Niger scholars of his time.[103] The vagrant mallams that Arnaud considered as "political emissaries of muslim groups from abroad" were very seriously watched; as also were the pilgrims. In 1919 Lt. Colonel Lefebvre, Lt. Governor of Niger

wrote that "The marabout remains in the Territoire Militaire (Niger) our principal enemy" and he added about the pilgrims: "The pilgrims coming from Mecca are always very severely watched. They are reported from post to post and are closely observed during all their journey through the territory".[104]

As for the British, as soon as the Kaussan rebellion was quelled, they came back to their principal preoccupation, "the road to the Mahdi". But by 1923, "the fear of Mahdism had ceased to trouble the British" when Palmer discovered a Mahdist community at Dumbulwa.[105] This put the British into panic.

IV.2. The Mahdist Community of Dumbulwa: 1923

What was called the Mahdist Community of Dumbulwa in Fika Emirate, was a group of mallams centred around Said b. Hayat, a great grand-son of Caliph Muhammad Bello (1817-1837). When Palmer discovered this community he immediately linked it to the general scheme of conspiracy against the colonial presence. So, the discovery of the Dumbulwa community awakened the old devils of anti-Muslim feelings on the part of the British.

This Dumbulwa affairs is important for our study not only because Said was a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio (d.1817) but also because it involved many people from Niger territory, the followers of Said. Two elements have to be recalled concerning the human geography of the area where Dumbulwa emerged.

The first is that during the 19th century, large parts of Daura, Gumel and Hadejia were under the suzerainty of Damagaram, until the Convention of 8th April 1904 severed them from Damagaram. As we already saw it, these portions of Damagaram are said to

represent 150,000 people, inhabiting 570 villages, covering 9000 km^2.[106] Also, many waves of migration into the area were reported during the first years of colonial installation, from the north. This movement of population implied that any event which took place in the area had a connection with the North.

The second element concerned the people who welcomed the Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu at Burmi. In the Annual Report for 1902, we read: "(The ex-Sultan) arrived at the town of Burmi, on the confines of Bornu. Here was a colony of aliens, who, coming from the north, and probably of Tuareg origin, had settled there, and had received the remnants of Mallam Jibrella's army after his defeat by Colonel Morland in March 1902".[108] The town of Dumbulwa itself is said to have been founded by a slave of Mallam Hayatu (father of Said), one Yerima Jibo, after the fight of Burmi.[109] But actually, Dumbulwa was founded by Said.[110] Also, among the Ansar (followers of Said) were many people from Damagaram. Besides, the Dumbulwa affairs and the Kaussan rebellion at Agades were, in the colonial administrators' mind, two elements of a large scale plan orchestrated from the East by Germany and the Turks, through West African students in Al-Azhar or West African pilgrims. In fact German students of African languages were employed during the war (1914-18) in the German Intelligence service in a special African branch. The head of this branch was one Herr Frobenius, who travelled widely in West Africa. Frobenius was said to have employed in Nigeria, shortly before the war, a Wadaian living in Nigeria and a Lokoja trader as his instruments in his endeavour "to open a way" to Bilma and Kawar country north of Chad.[111]

Another piece of information obtained by the British to link the Dumbulwa affairs

to Kaussan's rebellion was that when Haj Shuaibu and Sherif Musa were travelling to Kaussan, Haj Shuaibu visited Malam Said b. Hayat at Dumbulwa. Haj Shuaibu was also known in British records as a Mahdist, especially engaged with the Tuareg revolt and he was said to have visited Nigeria thrice between 1913 and 1923.[112] Many people were noted, most of them studying in Al-Azhar, who were employed to carry letters in Borno region, by the Germans. As a matter of fact, letters were sent to Mallam Mahaman Sumami, chief of N'guigmi (French Territory) in 1923, at the period the Dumbulwa community was discovered. Also, letters were intercepted by Palmer, some even talking about 2,000 rifles to be delivered from French territory.[113] The letters to N'guigmi were carried by one Haj Ibrahim Ali, a Tubu from Borno, who was in Al-Azhar from 1914 to 1919 or 1920 when he went back to the Chad region bearing books and letters.[114]

All these enquiries, carried out by the British officials in the East, led them to conclude that the Dumbulwa affairs, the Kaussan rebellion were parts of a large scale scheme of overthrowing the Europeans in Africa, on the instigation of Germany and Turkey.

Muhammed Bello Mai-Wurno also was in regular communication with Nigeria through messengers and he even transmitted messages from the Sultan of Istambul. One such message from Istambul through Mai-Wurno declared that the rule of the Europeans in the West would cease after 33 years, as the Mahdi would appear in the West at the end of this period.[115] Mai-Wurno also was said to have forwarded an autograph letter from Abdal Rahman (son of the Sudan Mahdi) to Said, through one Shamaki Umr who arrived at Dumbulwa five days before Said was arrested. The letter told Said that in a matter of

27 days, he would be master of the world.[116]

It is against all that background that Palmer acted when he "discovered" the Dumbulwa Community. Even though Said disclaimed all responsibility in the "plot" against the British, he failed to convince Palmer that the Mahdism he preached was not the violent one. In fact, report showed that there were two types of Mahdism: The violent one which called for the physical resistance against the invaders and the non-violent one which developed fairly after the crushing of the revolts.[117]

What was shocking to the British was that they were taken by surprise by this community of Dumbulwa for colonial reports show that the troubles had ceased. In 1921, for instance, the Resident Sokoto, Edwardes, reported: "There is no fear of any rising because the people can stand a good deal of oppression and because from their point of view the Sultan has appeared to have the support of government".[118] But after Palmer discovered the Dumbulwa community and intercepted letters, the Mahdiyya became for him and for all the British in Nigeria "a political problem of the first importance".[119] Palmer established very easily the relations between the Sheikh Said and some Damagaram Fulani who brought horses to the Sheikh and he stated that very many of them have been adherents of the Mahdiyya.[120]

One of the most important things which complicated the relations between the British and the Muslims was that Palmer (a kind of paranoiac anti-Muslim) was Resident of Borno, the "natural" way of Mahdism. He had the conviction that the Western Sudan Muslims had the reputation of being fanatical.[121] Also between 1922 and 1923, many activities of seditious nature, more especially correspondences, flooded Northern Nigeria

from Sudan. For instance, a memorandum from the Secretary Northern Provinces to Resident Sokoto reads: "... about the middle of May 1921 two seditious circulars were posted from Khartoum to a large number of native notables throughout the country. The first which was signed by the "Society to promote the Deliverance of the country, was an attack on the Gezira Aulia Irrigation Scheme and on the development under British auspices or with British capital".

The second signed by "The Society to defend the Faith in the Sudan" was of a "fanatical" tone and referred to British policy throughout the Middle East and in the Sudan in particular, as being directed against Islam.

It concluded with a call to a jihad".[122]

The SNP thought that these circulars had reached Nigeria considering their very wide distribution. In the same period, he sent to the Resident Sokoto an extract from a letter addressed to him by Senior Resident Webster on leave. The extract reads:

"2. Three of the brothers of the chief of Sheikh Talaha (Mai-Wurno) in Senaar are at present travelling in the Hedjaz and joining with other malcontents in fomenting anti-British feeling, their ultimate avowed object being to oust the British from Nigeria.

3. They stated that the Egyptians are to rise in the Autumn and eject all foreigners and that as soon as this is done, they will lead a jihad into Nigeria. Three emissaries are to be sent ahead to prepare the way, one it is said to Bornu, one to Kano and one to Sokoto".[123] These different letters awakened the somewhat blunted vigilance of Palmer and he believed that "There was a conspiracy between the Egyptian nationalists, Sayyid Abderhman of Sudan and Sheikh Said in Nigeria to overthrow the British simultaneously

in both areas".[124]

The Dumbulwa community was composed of many contingents, one of them being from Damagaram. The most important people of this Damagaram contingent were Al Haj Abjara, Dabo Mo Gelodi, Liman Juli and Jauro Ibra. Most of them were Fulani and they played various roles at Dumbulwa, as for example, Liman Juli who fulfilled the office of Imam.[125] Some of them even maintained relations with Said long after his deportation.[126]

After Sheikh Said was arrested on 16th March 1923, one of his followers, Malam Dabo Mai Rakuma (Dabo no Gelodi) founded a settlement at Kauish, to the North of N'guru, some three miles inside French territory. It was reported that Mahdist Fulani were collecting round him and the settlement had a population of 2000 people. The report continued: "The nearness of Kauish to the frontier makes it a potential source of danger to this country, and the French authorities are being asked to investigate".[127] In fact even after Said's arrest and deportation to Buea, inflammatory letters continued to circulate in the area where he stayed and along the corridor of Mahdism, stretching from the Blue Nile to Sokoto. In 1924, for instance, two letters were discovered in Borno written by one Sheikh Sidi Ahmed to the Muslims. In one of the letters addressed to Imam Abdullahi son of Imam Arabu of Marua, it is said: "Our purpose is to obtain the sovereignty of the land between Egypt and Malawi (Melle-Upper Niger)". In the second letter he wrote: "Tell the Muslims that I shall send to them a Mahdi".[128] Moreover, Said himself was reported to have said that when Isa appeared then, "my standard will arise and I shall rule over the lands of my fathers".[129]

These rumours of plot in Northern Nigeria echoed in Niger territory for 1923

witnessed some measures taken by the Governor General of French West Africa. At the beginning of that year, the Governor decided to study Islam in Niger and he invested Captain Andre in charge of Intelligence and Muslim Affairs with a mission in twofold:

The first was to enter into contact with the British and investigate with them the possibility of exchange of Intelligence and be in touch with the Intelligence Department (The G.G. French West Africa had written to the Governor General of Nigeria for this purpose).

The second aspect of the mission was to check the information that reached the Lt. Governor of Niger colony and which stated that some ebullition developed in Northern Nigeria and prepare for setting up a secret service in Niger colony.[130]

In his report after the mission, Captain Andre recommended that the transit agent in Kano be given the mission of collecting information on behalf of the French and that a Consul de France be appointed at Lagos. But these proposition met no agreement because Chatelain, administrator in Niger, after a tour of Maradi, Tassawa and Kano, reported that only Madani of Hadejia could be a real danger for Niger colony.[131]

In fact, Madani developed his relations with Niger colony through his envoys into Damagaram area. But his relations became very close with a Tijaniyya Mukaddam in Gure area, Mallam Abba Chilloum of Kolori Kollo.[132] The son of Madani, Umoru, even married Hadiza Kugu, daughter of Mallam Abba Chilloum in 1930. Madani even showed a desire to migrate into Niger colony in 1931 and he was said to have instructed Mallam Abba Chilloum to look for a suitable place for the Dakayawa community to settle, "as the community was tired of the English".[133] So, it is evident that by 1923, Madani was already

a threat to Niger colony, in the eyes of the French.

At the end of 1923, the Governor General French West Africa issued a circular letter No. 199 dated December 7th 1923, prescribing to the Lt. Governor to check carefully the import of books and publications in Arabic.[134] At that period also, another threat coming from Europe worried the colonial administration: The Bolshevism. What worried the British especially as far as Islam was concerned was that Palmer thought that the Senussiya and Tijaniya members were used by agitators "for the purpose of spreading quasi-Bolshevik propaganda".[135] The spectre of Bolshevism appeared when in December 1924 the Secretary Northern Provinces forwarded to the Resident Sokoto a copy of a note communicated to His Majesty's Government by the Belgian Embassy regarding an alleged campaign by the Soviet Government in British as well as in foreign colonies.[136] It was stated inter alia that three million gold-roubles had been placed at the disposal of a committee for this anti-European propaganda. The governments concerned declared themselves eager to cooperate against these Bolshevik propagandists. The Soviets also tried and perhaps really used pilgrims in their attempt at distabilising the colonial powers. In one of the reports on pilgrimage, the British Agent in Jedda reported that "The Bolsheviks maintained a large staff out of all proportion with the amount of work a normal Russian Agency of Consulate would have to attend to in Jeddah".[137] He argued that "they are making use of their position here to get into touch with the leaders of subversive movements in other countries".[138] But even in the case of anti-Bolshevik cooperation, the British and the French, as far as the Niger-Nigeria frontier was concerned, failed to take any serious measure against the Bolshevist propaganda. On the

contrary, they maintained suspicion between them, in 1926, for example, the A.D.O. Argungu suggested "the formation of a Local Corps of Guides for work, in the case of hostilities with the French, all along the western border with French Territory".[139] Nevertheless, this development had no time to take route, as an event, which brought very close cooperation between the British and the French occurred: the Tassawa raid.

IV.3. The Tassawa Raid: 5th June 1927

In the afternoon of June 5th 1927, a group of 11 men armed with swords, bows and arrows, attacked the post of Tassawa. A French official in charge of Public Works Department was killed and two policemen as well as three of the attacking party were also killed. The men who seemed to have religious motives as well as grievances against the French, came from Hamis, a village in British territory, but close to Tassawa. This raid is important to our study for two main reasons.

The first reason is that it took place in Tassawa, a region which more or less symbolised the resistance to the Caliphate and to the French. During the 19th century, Tassawa, alongside Maradi resisted the attacks of Katsina Emirs and even constituted a threat to Katsina Emirate. When the Emir of Katsina, Saddiku (1836-1844) himself moved to Tawaye in 1844, he went into the Tassawa area, at Gazawa, where Barth met him on February 3rd 1853.[140] Tassawa became even a twin capital of Gidan Korau when in 1897, Mujinyawa, a prince of Maradi migrated there and was appointed Sarkin Katsina by his supporters, for he left Maradi after a dynastic crisis against the Tassawa. This symbolized resistance against the French because its Sarki Mujinyawa refused to recognise the *suzerainty of Ahmadu Dan Bassa, the French-appointed Sultan of Zinder in 1899.*[141] The

chief of the French column, Lamy, therefore sent a military force to Tassawa in 1899 and Mujinyawa fled to British territory where Lugard allowed him to settle and repopulate Dankama, the famous town where Sarkin Katsina Magajin Haladu migrated with his court after he was expelled by the Fulani in 1808.[142]

The second reason is that the raid led to a close cooperation between the French and the British because of its international character. Whereas Kaussan rebellion and the Dumbulwa affairs were rather domestic matters to each of the colonies, only with a threat to expand or with connections to the other, the Tassawa raid was a perfect application of "Islamic Internationalism". The party left British territory to attack and kill in French territory. It reminded the colonial powers of the threat of organised "plot" between their "natives". So, both colonial administrations felt deeply concerned about the issue and did all they could to give a memorable lesson to those who dared this act so as to serve as a deterrent to those who would master-mind future "plots".

Immediately after the raid, movements of population were noted. Knowing the harshness and the sadism with which this act would be punished, the population preferred to refer to its traditional mode of resistance" migration. The Sarkin Tassawa himself, Barmu, very confused, proceeded to Katsina to seek asylum. But the D.O. Katsina advised the Emir of Katsina to urge Barmu to return to prove his innocence as his flight could be regarded as evidence of his complicity in the attack. After some demur Sarkin Tassawa, Barmu left Dankama on 8th June 1927 for Tassawa.[143]

1) <u>Mallam Musa the Leader of the Raiders: His Career</u>

Numerous Mallam Musas studded the British Mahdist records.[144] Even in the

Tassawa raid there were two Musas. The Malam Musa alias Kallamu, leader of the raid and another Musa who lived in Hamis. The latter was arrested in November 1927 at Kazaure[145] whereas the Malam Musa alias Kallamu failed to be arrested. This Malam Musa was said to be 60 to 65 years old and was born in Kanambakashe and he is said to have Kambarim-Barebari (Tassawa) marks.[145bis] He was at Burmi in 1903 and also with Said b. Hayat at Balda in Mandara.[146] It is possible that he was the Malam Musa who was with Jibril Gaini who fought the British in Gombe Emirate until the latter was arrested in 1902 and exiled to Lokoja. The said Malam Musa then led the movement of opposition at Burmi.[147] But most of his career, Malam Musa did it with Said b. Hayat. He is said to have been one of the most ardent adherents of Malam Said and his messenger to Damagaram. His father was associated with Sarki Barmu (of Tassawa) before the latter's deposition.[148] Malam Musa was among the Malams who had been secretly expelled from Gamda in Katsina by the Emir of Katsina about 1918 and had gone to Madobi in Kano and others to Borno.[149] He went probably to Madobi in Kano for he was reported as carrying letters from Malam Mahaman of Madobi to Said b. Hayat, letters which were found in Dumbulwa in 1923.[150] In fact, the hand-writing of a document found in Malam Musa's possession (especially with one of the raiders killed, called Musa) bore a remarkable resemblance to that of the three letters from Malam Muhammad Dan Baba to Malam Said. He stayed between Madobi and Dumbulwa until in 1922 when he disappeared westwards from Borno. But he is said to have left Dumbulwa in October 1923 after Said's arrest.[151] He wandered between Birnin Katsina (where the Waziri was his kinsmen) and Kwargom (*near Tassawa in French Territory*). It is reported that "He was touring the Katsina villages

for about four months".[152] He was in these areas when the raid occurred.[153] Malam Musa had also connections with the Tuaregs, particularly the Kel Ewey. In fact, after the raid, rumours developed that Malam Musa had been killed in the raid and this confusion gave him the opportunity to go into hiding among the Tuaregs, first at Walalewa and then at Tanamari, capital of the Immuzurag in Damargu[154] not far from the Senussi zawiya of Jajiduna. One of the Tassawa raiders, Malam Bature, arrested at Karasua (Borno) on 23rd October 1927, stated that Malam Musa announced the coming of the Mahdi and that he (Malam Musa) was a Prophet of Allah.[155] Mallam Bature added: "Malam Musa said he intended to attack Tassawa and if he was successful they would then attack Damagaram and thence Maradi and then he would be strong enough to attack Katsina and then Zaria".[156]

2) The Interpretation of the Tassawa Raid and the New Measures Taken by the Colonial Powers

The Native Authorities at Sokoto and the British didn't agree on the interpretation to be made of the Tassawa raid. For instance, G. J. Lethem, Acting Secretary Northern Provinces in a confidential address to Chief Secretary Lagos, wrote:

"The view has however been taken in Sokoto ... that the raid can only be regarded as an isolated incident not properly to be connected with general religious movement"; whereas in the Lt. Governor's opinion, "that is quite impossible to regard the present incident as isolated from the general tide of islamic movement".[157] Also, in his correspondence with the Governor General of French West Africa, the Governor of Nigeria, Graeme Thomson, wrote:

"I understand that the statement of the more important of them (the raiders) Malam Bature, points quite definitely to religious and anti-European fanaticism as having been the mainspring of the attack".[158]

The French in their part, considered the event as a "fait divers", i.e. insignificant matter and concluded: "il ne me semble pas que le mouvement puisse avoir de suite" (it is unlikely that the movement should continue).[159] But at the local level, the French in Niger colony were very embarrassed, for they could hardly understand how their "brothers", the British failed to foretell such a plot against the French in their territory. The chief of the raiders, Malam Musa was not even in British police records.[160] The British therefore seemed to have been negligent in the matter of watching the islamic revivalists. But the fact that the attack originated in British territory made the British to be very zealous in cooperating with the French not only to hunt and track the raiders but also to demonstrate force and even punish the native authorities who gave proof of failure. The two most important cases were the Sultan Barmu of Tassawa and the Wazirin Katsina, Haruna.

1) Sultan Barmu:

His responsibility in the Tassawa raid was not established. All what the French reproached him for was that he did nothing to help them. But some indications can throw more light in the Barmu's attitude towards the French. Between June and August 1923, Administrator Chatelain, travelled through Maradi, Tassawa and Kano to evaluate the situation in relation to Mahdist propaganda. When he talked to Barmu about Mahdism, Barmu answered: "The Commandant de cercle knows that no one could tell such things

before me and if anyone dares to talk about such matters, in this country, he would be brought before me here".[161] After the raid, the Lt. Governor Brevie, said about Barmu and the District Head of Tassawa Tazar Gay: "We thought they were loyal and intelligent, and failed to watch them; since the time they gave us proof of loyalism they have changed and even abused of their powers".[162] The Lt. Governor of Niger, Brevie, took the decision of suspending Barmu from office, decision No. 537 dated 15th September 1927. A year later, Barmu was exiled to Nara (now Mali) for 10 years with a pension of 3000F per annum.[163] He died at Nara in 1930.

As we noted above, Barmu proceeded to Katsina after the raid, followed by many people, seeking asylum from the Emir of Katsina his "hereditary" enemy. In taking this decision, Barmu showed that, the enmity of the 19th century was a local matter and the actual danger diminished all previous resentment. He expressed the Islamic factor fully since he repeated the act of Mujinyawa who sought asylum in Katsina when Lamy sent a column against him in 1899.

What can explain Barmu's resentment vis-a-vis the French, apart from the issue of colonial domination and all its accompanying vexations, was that, on 21st February 1927, Tassawa lost her status of a capital of cercle (province) in favour of Maradi. It should have angered Barmu, for the leader of the raiders, Malam Musa, after the raid, is reported to have exclaimed in the market of Tassawa "Na fushe ma Barmu haushi" (i.e. I avenged Barmu).[164]

Alongside with Barmu, disciplinary measures were taken against Mani "chef superieur des peuls" (i.e. the supreme chief of the Tassawa Fulani) who cut off the

telephone wires, and Tazar Gay District Head of Tassawa. Mani and Tazar Gay were exiled for a year in Niamey where Tazar Gay died on 25th January 1929, and Mani died in 1933.[165] Another official, but of Katsina Emirate, would also suffer a disciplinary measure: The Wazirin Katsina who was dismissed from office.

2) Wazirin Katsina, Haruna

Like Malam Musa, the leader of the raiders, Waziri Haruna was born at Kanembakashe (near Tassawa) and seemed to be relative to the Sarakunan Tassawa, for his mother is said to be the daughter of Sarkin Tassawa, Mujinyawa.[166] He fled from Kanembakashe to Dankama after he interferred with the wife of the Sarkin Tassawa. On his arrival in Dankama he paid homage to Mohaman Dicko, who was then not yet Emir, and resided at Mani. He finally went to Mani where he acted as Liman under Mohaman Dicko. When the latter succeeded Abubakar as Emir in 1906, Haruna accompanied him to Katsina.[167] Since the time he was Imam of Dicko at Mani, "his house was thronged with people from the Tassawa region seeking money or its equivalent".[168] It is said that the Waziri was deeply involved in the Tassawa raid and he was a relation to Malam Musa who lodged in his house during his long stay in Katsina. The Colonial administrators worked on two hypotheses as to the reasons which made the Waziri to involve himself in such an enterprise.

The first hypothesis which had no foundation was that it would lead to his own aggrandisement as a result of disgrace into which he expected the Emir of Katsina would fall. It was very unlikely that the fall of the Emir of Katsina should be beneficial to the Waziri who was not of Katsina (Nigeria) royal family.

The second hypothesis was that his involvement was due to a large scale intrigue among the older representatives of the dynasties (the Habe against the Fulani Emirs), promoted by some outside agency, possibly of Bolshevik origin.[169] This hypothesis also was baseless. All that could be attributed to the Waziri, apart from his Tassawa origin, was his knowledge of the existence of the religious devotees in Katsina, not unconnected with the Tassawa raiders, which the Waziri failed to divulge. He was finally, for these reasons, deposed from office, on the 11th June, 1928 and appointed District Head of Kaita.

As these cases show, the Tassawa raid changed the pattern of relations between the colonial administration and both the native authorities and the Muslim clerics. In Niger colony, Lt. Governor Brevie, reinforced the watching measures, using as his tools the influential marabouts as in Zinder, for example, where Malam Hassan and Malam Chetima entirely devoted to the French, received instructions to identify the suspicious strangers and present them to the authorities.[170] The Magaria area where mahdism had adherents was carefully watched.

As for the British, the Tassawa raid made them take measures not only against the negligent chiefs but also against the vagrant mallams. In a circular-letter sent by the Secretary Northern Provinces to the Residents, it is stated:

"His Honour (Lt. Governor) approves however more definite measures being taken against "Mahdist agents" or itinerant mallams who may conceivably be vehicles of religious or other disquiet. The best way of dealing with these persons is by prosecution in the Native courts, and it should not be impossible to find a suitable charge against such

persons, who, where they are not, actual potential disturbers of the general peace, are at least vagrants, whose exigent mendicancy is public nuisance. Failing the possibility of formulating charges, the native authorities should order such undesirables to leave their territory".[171] It was also decided to organise a march of combined forces (French and British) on the frontier. The objective of that march was defined by Palmer, when addressing the Emir of Katsina:

"As a sign that Government will not tolerate crime and disorder, troops will march along the frontier from Katsina to Gummel. they will be met by officers and troops from the French side. It will thus be manifest that the British and the French are at one in determination to preserve peace".[172]

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The Lt. Governor of Northern Nigeria, Palmer, toured in middle August 1927 and had interview with the Emirs of Kano, Katsina, Daura and Gummel. A special warning was addressed to the Emir of Daura in the following terms: "In the matter of Tassawa raid, you have not made real attempt to obtain and give information which would result in the raiders being caught. Further, you have allowed dangerous teaching to go on without anything being reported and people such as Yan Tubu have been left alone without any control and without any chief visiting them or taking trouble to know what they were doing. I warn you that you must show yourself fit for your position and be zealous and active in stopping disorder. I advise you now that you should reveal everything you know".[173] The Emir of Katsina, fully concerned with the raid toured his Emirate to warn people against the vagrant mallams and especially to tell them that henceforth, preaching publicly was forbidden and if someone was caught for such an offence, he might be

rapidly brought to the court of the Emirs.[173bis]

What motivated Palmer to recommend the combined forces march? The Foreign Office had opened, through the British Ambassador in Paris, a discussion on the question of religious unrest and propaganda in North Africa and particularly as it affected those French Territories which adjoined Nigeria and the Sudan. The gist of the Memorandum sent to Lord Crowe (Ambassador at Paris) for Communication to the French was the existence of inflammable material in the Sudan, French Equatorial and West Africa, Nigeria, animated by messianic sentiment.[174] The British Government asked for closer liaison between local British and French officials.[175] These demands found the French already disposed for such undertaking, for they had new of agitation coming from the East, since 1925. In fact, in a confidential report dated 5th February 1925, from the Governor General of French West Africa to the Lt. Governor of Niger, he transmitted him a despatch dated 12th January, from the French Minister for Colonies informing him about "a plot" which developed against the French and the British in Wadai, Darfur and Darkuti. The Governor General asked the Lt. Governor of Niger to investigate and send him all information relating to this "plot".[176] So, here and there, the need for cooperation existed and the Governor of French West Africa and that of Nigeria exchanged correspondences on that matter and instructed their local subordinates to cooperate.[177] Thus, it was only after the Tassawa raid that contacts had been established between the French and the British as to the issue of cooperation on frontier matters, since 1917. Even on the local level, many officials expressed the desire for cooperation as for example, the Commandant Cercle Niamey who suggested that frequent encounters be organised between the French

and the British Residents from Dosso and Sokoto, to which encounters could participate the Commandant of Niamey.[178] As for the British, Lethem, the Secretary Northern Provinces, had already suggested, after his Journey to the East (Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia) in 1925, to the Governor the establishment of Intelligence exchange with the French to keep an eye on waves of agitation from the North.[179]

It was a real willingness of cooperation in the face of the danger of "Islamic plot", which bothered the colonial powers. The Governor General of Nigeria therefore, by Conf. K6950/12 dated 4th May 1928, instructed all the Residents of Northern Provinces to cooperate with their French counterparts on matters concerning religious propaganda and similar Intelligence.[180] So did the Governor General of French West Africa to the Lt. Governor of Niger who forwarded the instructions to the frontier administrators.[181] As put by Administrator Niamey, the Tassawa raid made the French-British relations to be very close.[182]

But, despite all these expressions of desire for cooperation, the everlasting suspicion between the colonial powers lingered on. For instance, in his Confidential K6950/12, dated 4th May 1928, concerning cooperation with the French, the SNP, J. M. Fremantie, warned the Residents: "You should exercise considerable caution and discretion in what you communicate to the French. The range of subjects will naturally be restricted to matters of common interest and will not include Nigerian domestic politics".[183] Also, during the combined forces march, especially from Kalmallo to Sabon Birni, the A.D.O. in charge of Sokoto reported his impressions of the French attitude towards the march as follows:

"Only one French Official was met, namely, Mr. Cohezy, the Commandant Konni. He spent one night at Kalmallo with us and one at Sabon Birni. Our personal relations were extremely cordial and Mr. Cohezy announced his intention of paying a short visit to Sokoto early in the year.

On the other hand, I feel strongly that his general and unexpressed attitude was not intempered with suspicion and that he suffers from the popular gallic obsession that we are a nation of hypocrites, in other words, that we are making the Tessawa incident a suitable opportunity for familiarising the troops with the terrain adjacent to the boundary".[184]

But despite the suspicion, cooperation continued, mostly because the raiders were not all arrested and also because of another event, the Clements murder.

IV.4. The Clements Murder: 3rd March 1928

A month after the Tassawa raid, in July 1927, Mr. Thurley, an A.D.O. at Minna was attacked by a "religious fanatic" as were termed all those "natives" who dared take any action against colonial powers. When he thrust at Mr. Thurley's left arm with a spear, the aggressor, one Umaru alias Allahbamu, said: "nine barden Mahadi, ba hakka ni ke so ba", i.e. "I am the outrider of the Mahdi; this is not what I desired".[185] The aggressor appeared to have been of Katsina origin and was brought to Minna as a slave, before he got his freedom. He studied little before his act with one Sherif Bukr of Muno Duku in Borno. This malam had some "Mahdist" literature, including that denouncing christian rule.[186] Allahbamu was found guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

But the act which preoccupied the British and the French together was the murder

of a British railway foreman, one Mr. Clements, on the road near Kuria, seven miles south of Kaura Namoda. He was, it is reported, wounded to death by "two apparent fanatics".[187] The attack took place on Saturday, 3rd March 1928. The A.D.O. Gusau, B. E. Sharwood Smith noted that "the attitude of the chief and the villagers of Kuria was unsatisfactory", insisting on the attitude of the Village Head of Kuria which was "far from satisfactory".[188] The manner Kuria people acted "suggests subversive influences remaining Kuria at present".[189] As soon as the murder occurred, D.O. Katsina reported: "all precautions taken, Emberton executive Katsina states proceeding Maradi immediately warn French authorities".[190] On 6th March, the Administrator Maradi by letter No. 50, sent his condolences to Resident Sokoto and announced that he began the investigation since March 11th on the areas of the frontier from Jibya to Sabon Birni.[191] But the Resident Sokoto answered that "it would appear probable that this is an act of attempted robbery or sabotage rather than fanaticism".[192]

Measures were taken against some native authorities who proved to be unsatisfactory. Many of them were dismissed from office, and even the villages suffered. Madora Amadu, Village Head of Kuria gives an idea of the measures taken against him and his people: "When I was dismissed, the whole town of Kuria was fined. Everything I possessed was taken. All the chickens and guinea fowls of the town were taken".[193] Another native chief dismissed was Umaru, Sarkin Katsina Gusau. The Sarkin Katsina Gusau was dismissed and sentenced to three years imprisonment, during the visit of Lt. Governor, Mr. C. W. Alexander, to Sokoto in March 1929. The charges against him were:

1) Permitting undesirables to reside in the neighbourhood of Gusau without reporting

to this country for such a purpose in 1928 from Tunis, and their visit ended with the murder of Mr. Clements, and it was accidentally discovered that in 1927 the raid on Tassawa was the result of the instigation of another party of Arabs from North Africa".[198]

In February 1928, one Abdu Turki appeared in Sokoto with a large sum of money, some said f100,000 in "English paper money" and five gold cups intended as a present for the Sultan of Sokoto, should he consent to support an effort to cast off European domination".[199] A party of five persons (Abdu Turki, Muhammad ben Nila, Abdul Mejid, Ahmet, and Mohammadu Muhtari) was said to have been sent to Nigeria in 1928. Between 26th February and 2nd March, they were reported in the villages close to Kuria.[200] One of them, Muhtari, was reported to have said that he and his companions were sent to Nigeria to solicit for the assistance of Hausaland in a war to destroy European power. Muhammad ben Nila on his part, stated that they did not follow the southern or trans-saharan route from Tunis to Nigeria but came via Egypt - the Nile - El Fasher - Wadai - N'guigmi - Damagaram - to Katsina and that they had been 12 months on their journey. They therefore would have left Tunis in February 1927.[201] Muhammad ben Nila stated that the raid on Tassawa in June 1927 was the result of instigations by a party of their people who came south via Bilma and Ghat to urge the natives in this country (Niger colony) to attack Europeans. Abdu Turki was said to have joined Kaussan at Faya in Chad in 1916. He seemed to have fought on Kaussan's side and left Agades only after Kaussan had been defeated.[202] During the world war (1914-1918), the Turks and the Italians seemed to have invested heavy sums of money in carrying out anti-European propaganda in Hausaland, even though many of the propagandists were not

Turkish or Italian envoys.

Between the British and the French cooperation went forth and regular summaries of events were sent to one another. The example of this cooperation was the surveillance that led to the arrest and handing over to the French of Fona who wanted to commit subversion in the area on behalf of the Senussi.

IV.5. Fona: An Emissary of the Senussiya: 1916-1929

Fona was the chief of Kel Tafidet tribe of Ahyar Tuaregs.[202bis] When the Kaussan revolt started, he joined it and became one of the most zealous adherents of Kaussan. When the latter was defeated in March 1917, after 81 days of being master of Agades, Fona fled to the north (Tripolitan territory) and wandered from there to Chad and tried to make contact with the Hausaland, particularly Kano. He focussed on Kano because it was the terminus of the transaharan trade, the Kel-Ewey, his kinsmen being the principal caravan-drivers. He arrived Kano in June or July 1927, where he met his kinsmen the Tuaregs of Ahyar and Damargu. He came into Northern Nigeria through Mao in Chad as a servant of a Tuareg merchant who had a travelling-document from the Mao authorities. At Kano, Fona was accommodated by Malam Abdu, a Damagaram merchant, and brother of the famous 19th century wholesaler Malam Yaro.[203] Fona told people in Kano, more especially the Tuaregs that he was sent by Sherif Sidi Abed to tell the Muslims that at the end of the rainy season, Sherif Sidi Abed would come to fight the white men and that Sidi Abed had a considerable army.

According to Fona, Sherif Sidi Abed would conquer all the territories where his envoy of the 19th century Muhammad Sunni had pitched his flag. These territories were

Bilma, Agades, N'guigmi, Zinder, Tanut, Kano, and Tawa, through Madawa where Sidi Muhammad Sunni stopped. These pieces of information by Fona were said to have had great impression on the Tuaregs,[204] and when he decided to return to the North, he was given by his kinsmen, eight camel-loads of goods.[205] Fona might have been in contact with the Tassawa raiders. Two elements showed that.

1) He was in Kano or around Kano when the Tassawa raid occurred, for he was reported to have been in the area in June-July 1927.

2) The leader of the Tassawa raiders, Malam Musa alias Kallamu, was said to be in communication with two big mallams: Fona and Sidi Rabeh (Sidi Abed) who were at a place to the north of Zeila (Murzuk region). This information was obtained from one of the raiders, Malam Bature.[206] Also, after the raid, Malam Musa alias Kallamu, first took refuge in Walalewa, a Kel-Ewey town near Tassawa, and later at Tanamari,[207] the capital of Damargu Tuaregs (Immuzurags) and not far from the famous Senusi zawiya of Jajiduna.

Fona was reported in Kano again in June 1929, when he brought a letter to Sarkin Kano Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953) requesting for help in kind for the refugees. The letter was said to have come from the defeated Senussi driven out from Tripolitany by the Italians.[208] The Emir of Kano had given him no countenance and that the attitude of the Kano Emir confirmed the British in their opinion that they might have the same interest with the Native Authorities. The report on the affairs reads: "The attitude of the Emir of Kano appears to have been scrupulously correct and it may be accepted that he and his kind realize that they have no more to gain than the British Government from countenancing communities hostile to other European powers in North Africa".[209]

On the 16th of July 1929, the Administrator of Zinder was informed that Fona was in Kano and he forwarded the information to the Resident Kano province. Fona was immediately arrested and on 27th July, he was handed over to the French on the frontier of Zinder and he was incarcerated at Zinder the day after.[210] Fona was, afterwards, transferred to Niamey where he died on 19th December 1929 of pneumonia.[211] After Fona's arrest and death, some Tuareg chiefs who used to go to Kano yearly, refrained from doing so in 1930. These chiefs were Tchuara the Kel Tafidet chief and Madugu the Kel Nabaro chief. The Lt. Governor Niger colony, Choteau, concluded that they used to go and take orders from Fona who entered Kano under false identity.[212] Fona was also in contact with some Mahdist marabouts in the magaria area where it was discovered that one Mahdist, Malam Akrual (from Dungas District) of Agades extraction, had paid a visit to Fona at Kano. Because he was carefully watched, he tried to proceed to Nigeria.[213]

In the same line of controlling movements of people, to hinder the desire of "undesirables" to forment trouble, the colonial administrators felt greatly concerned about another religious institution: the pilgrimage.

IV.6. The Pilgrimage as a Factor in British and French Frontier Policy

The study of the pilgrimage during the colonial period is important for our topic for two main reasons:

The first reason is that, it was undertaken by lower classes and discouraged by the Sultan of Sokoto. In this case, the Sultan of Sokoto and the colonial powers shared the same attitude even though they did it for different reasons. But the pilgrimage expressed

the islamic resistance for, since a long time, the institution of pilgrimage had been in Hausaland, and more particularly in the Sokoto Caliphate, a form of resistance to the misconduct of the Caliphal authorities. Abdallah b. Fodio was the first alim to try to undertake pilgrimage as a revolt against deviation from Islamic principles (in 1807). This was the first act of revolt in the Sokoto Caliphate.

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The second reason is that in the matters of pilgrimage, cooperation between the French and the British failed to be close. The French from Niger territory had their attention turned towards Nigeria, whereas the British looked for the danger from the East and therefore all their attention was drawn to that direction. Also, whereas the French administrators thought that pilgrimage made the "natives" have "bad relations" with pan-islamic activists, for the British the liberty of pilgrimage was part of the promise made by Lugard in 1903 that, "Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion". The French's fear of pilgrimage took its roots from the Western Sudan (Senegal, Mali, etc.) where they met with many difficulties owing to some natives having performed the Haj.[214] So, in Hausaland, the French tried to oppose a long tradition of travelling to the East and accused the British of favouring the exodus of their population to Mecca.

The Western as well as the Central Sudanic populations were very zealous in performing the Haj and the people from Tekrour (in Senegal) were so numerous in the East and of such ancient tradition that the term Tekrour or Takrir came to design all Western and Central Sudanic Black pilgrims.[215] The pilgrimage recorded by Arab sources concerned mainly the ruling classes: Mali King Mansa Ule (between 1260 and 1270) Mansa Musa (June 1324) and Askia Muhammad (August 1497).[216]

The tradition of pilgrimage also developed with the Borno ruling dynasty (the Sayfawa). As a writer put it: "Our records show that not less than twenty rulers of the Sayfawa performed the Hajj and some of them such as Mai Dunoma Humeni and Mai Ali al Tair performed the haj four times each in their time".[217]

In our region, the period between 1674 and 1768 witnessed the performance of many pilgrimages in Ahyar.[218] Some Ahyar princes performed the haj some times with numerous people. In 1681, for example, the Ahyar prince Akanfaya son of Muhammad al-Mubarak (1654-1687) made his third pilgrimage. An account dated 1674, when Akanfaya performed his second pilgrimage reads: "There died great number of pilgrims from Tripoli state during the journey to Mecca that year. Those who returned said in their account to have seen a son of Agades King, entirely negro who made the pilgrimage at the same time with a retinue of 400 persons".[219] Another Ahyar prince made the pilgrimage in 1710 and this information was obtained from two Fathers of the Catholic Church sent to Borno by the Sacred Congregation for the propagation of the Faith with whom the Ahyar prince became friendly. The information reads:

"On 17th October 1710, Father Carlo wrote that they would accompany the prince to Accades, gate and key of the Negro Kingdom".[220]

But during the 19th century no pompous pilgrimage took place in Hausaland, the political scene being occupied by the Sokoto Caliphs who were, from Bello (1817-1837) to Abdurahman (1891-1902) unwilling to travel the East.[221] As far as the Sokoto Caliphate rulers were concerned, only two abortive attempts of performing the pilgrimage were recorded, that of Abdullah b. Fodio in 1807 and that of Modibbo Adama in 1841.

population eastwards were recorded especially at the end of the 19th century, which witnessed not only the widespread of the belief in the appearance of the Mahdi, but also the European conquest, the two phenomena leading to the exodus to the east in the form of Hijra. With the colonial invasion, migration eastwards became a form of resistance especially when Sultan Attahiru I gave the example and when his son Mai-Wurno founded a village on the Blue Nile in 1906.

As far as the Sokoto Sultans were concerned, the conquest and the installation of the colonial regime left them unchanged in their attitude towards the pilgrimage. They even found another pretext to their unwillingness to perform the hajj. In 1928, Arnett reported:

"A further point which I think deserves record in this history and which has an important influence on the movements here recorded is the discreet but constant discouragement of Haj by the Sultan of Sokoto. Their view has been that Moslems of Sokoto and neighbouring countries are fortunate in living in a land which has been blessed by the holy presence of Khalifa Shehu Usman dan Fodio and that a visit to his tomb at Sokoto excuses the devout from further need of pilgrimage".[228] When in 1923, Mai-Wurno wrote to Sarkin Musulmi Maiturare (1915-1924), asking him to send gifts to Mecca and Medina, he received no answer. Mai-Wurno yet had argued that it was because the Sultans of Sokoto neglected sending gifts to the holy land that the Hausa were despised there: "The very dogs are esteemed above them (Hausa) because of their destitution".[229] Before 1923, the brother of Mai-Wurno, Bunu, wrote in 1915 to the Sultan exhorting him to join him in the Sudan. This letter was ridiculed by the Sultan and his overlords the

British. The report by Arnett reads:

"One letter of the vague religious type exhorting the Sultan to leave the land of the Kafiri and join the writer and others in a holier land in the east caused amusement. As the Sultan's scribe said, it was laughable for the writer to expect the Sultan to leave the power and wealth of his great Sarauta to go and live on charity".[230]

The Sokoto Sultans therefore, never troubled themselves by the duty of pilgrimage nor by the conditions in which their subjects performed it. Sokoto itself never took importance in the affairs of pilgrimage. They left it to Kano. The trading caravans which departed from Kano were the most secure company for pilgrims and it is said that even pilgrims from Borno, "travelled westwards to Hausaland, to join Kano caravan rather than traverse the desert to the east in less organised groups".[231] Two main routes were followed by the pilgrims in our area.

The route Gao - Tawa - Zinder - N'guigmi - Rig - Rig - Mao. This road was mainly frequented by people from Western Sudan (Senegal, Mauritania, Mali etc.).

The other route began in Kano and went through Maiduguri to Fort-Lamy (now N'Djamena) or to Ati via N'guigmi - Rig - Rig - Mao. This road was frequented by people from Central Sudan (Niger, Nigeria).

When the colonial powers conquered the area, one of the most urgent measures they took, especially the French, was to monitor or even discourage the pilgrimage, because, as put by a writer: "They were ... conscious of the fact that the Hajj was one form of creating global solidarity among all Muslims".[232]

To control efficiently the pilgrimage, the colonial powers began to register the

intending pilgrims and granted them permits, more especially in French countries. In Niger territory, for instance, colonial records show that this census began in 1910 when only one pilgrim from Maine-Soroa was recorded.[233] The colonial powers also organised official pilgrimage with officials as supervisors to prevent the "natives" from falling into the hands of pan-islamic propagandists of which the Hedjaz was studded. The British issued very easily travelling documents to their intending pilgrims, whereas the French were very reluctant to do so. In 1910, when the British issued 66 passports at Sokoto to intending pilgrims, the French were very irritated by this laxity and accused the British of favouring the exodus of their populations to Mecca.

The French, on their part, imposed very harsh formalities, for the pilgrimage. Before getting the pilgrimage permit, the intending pilgrim had to fill a form for obtaining an Identity Card, a certificate of good character, a certificate showing that he possesses sufficient resources both for the pilgrimage and for sustaining the life of his family at home, a passport and money for his eventual repatriation.[234]

But the pilgrimage policy of the Europeans, like all other aspects of their policy, changed as events allowed. For instance, after the Kaussan revolt, the surveillance measures against Islam were reinforced and the pilgrimage to Mecca was strictly regulated. Every pilgrim had a checking-form with seven kinds of information he might supply to the French on his return from the hajj:

1) The route followed to Mecca and coming back;

2) Length of sojourn in Holy land;

3) Incidents occurred on the road of which the pilgrim was witness;

4) Information on the political situation of the countries he travelled through;

5) His travelling documents (to see the visas of the countries he crossed;

6) The state of mind and the mentality (of the pilgrim himself).[235]

The number of pilgrims who performed the haj independently to the official channels, shows the harshness of the French measures. Between 1921 and 1939, for example, only 591 Muslims performed the Haj[236] in French West Africa, whereas the Muslim population according to the 1936 census consisted of six million souls.[237] As for Niger territory in particular between 1910 and 1939, the period in which pilgrim records were kept except in 1911 and 1912 when no pilgrimage permit was granted, only 87 devouts performed the haj.[238]

In Nigeria, Palmer, who travelled to the East, was alarmed by the number of pilgrims who migrated to the East. Between 1913 and 1918 alone, the number of pilgrims who left Nigeria through the port of Suwakin was about 24,683. Out of this, only between 5,000 and 10,000 returned to Nigeria. The majority stayed in the Sudan,[239] which worried the British. Some of them sent letters only to greet relatives but the British considered them as seditious. So, the British policy about the pilgrimage was turned towards the three areas of Hedjaz, Cairo (Al-Azhar) and Sudan especially when another British official, Lethem, travelled in the East in 1925. He reported on pilgrimage and propaganda activities in the East. All his observations are contained in his History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria (1927). He suggested some measures to be taken to develop intelligence in these areas in order to prevent pilgrims from being under Mahdi or Bolshevik influence and also measures to make the pilgrimage sojourn very brief.[240]

He also recommended exchange of intelligence with the French.

The British were also worried about the "considerable amount of Mahdist literature" which reached Nigeria by the channel of the pilgrims. "In a letter dated 21 September 1923, the Resident, Borno, reported a statement that unless a man had a Mahdist "ratib" (prayer book) in his pocket, he could hardly get a drink of water on the roads east of Darfur".[241]

Another problem which preoccupied the French and the British was the Bolshevik propaganda in the Hedjaz. The British considered that the disproportion between the staff which the Bolsheviks kept in Jeddah and the normal work of an Agency there, was "very good grounds for suspicion".[242]

Apart from the officials who travelled to the East to check pilgrims' activities, returning pilgrims also, especially Native Officials who performed the Haj were used by the British to draw information from the East. The most evident case was that of ex-Wazirin Katsina, Haruna, who returned from pilgrimage in 1929. The ex-Waziri reported (to the British) a conversation he had with Abdurahman, the posthumous son of the Sudan Mahdi, who, he stated, asked him why were the people of Hausaland, apart from the Fulani, entering into the Mahdist "Tarika". The ex-Waziri also gave the British, a list of Nigerian Mallams who went to Jesirat Aba, an Island in the White Nile and the place of pilgrimage to Abdurahman, without going to Mecca, and of others who went there after the pilgrimage, all of whom were returning to Nigeria as Mahdist propagandists.[243] The ex-Wazirin Katsina also reported a Tijani revivalist called Al Haj Ismaila Baadare (probably of Adar origin) a native of Gwadabawa who, he stated, was travelling to Nigeria from the

Sudan exhorting people to leave the Mahdist "Tarika", for the true Mahdi, as he said, would appear from among the Sherifs of Fez.[244] Measures were taken by the British to deal with all these peoples.

But the real influence of pilgrimage on native mentality is questionable. The conditions in which pilgrimage in fact took place left no place for the native to bear sedition. As Gouilly put it;

"Busy in a veritable whirl, drawn here and there, chided, relieved of his valuables by the rogues, fleeced by the landlords, the restaurant owners and the guides, being a butt for various robberies of his own travelling companions, the unfortunate pilgrim has neither the leisure, nor the heart set on listening to mysterious slogans, receiving instructions that nobody really thinks to give him".[245]

In 1929, the French and the British engaged in polemic on pilgrimage, the French accusing the natives of British territory (Nigeria) of inducing natives from French Territory (Niger) to leave their homes and proceed on pilgrimage. In his correspondence with the Governor General of Nigeria, the Governor General of French West Africa, enclosed a report from Zinder (Niger colony) which reads:

"To avoid submitting to prescriptions imposed by various circulars concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca, some natives leave their homes under the pretext of going to Nigeria and thence they undertake the travel to Mecca most of the time guided and dragged by natives from the British colony. This state of affairs raises some serious inconveniences, for among our natives who allow themselves to be tempted by a fraudulent departure on pilgrimage, many don't have sufficient resources to assume, in normal conditions, the cost

of their journeying back to their original country and end by finding themselves in financial difficulties in Mecca".[246]

The Secretary, Northern Provinces, G.J. Lethem, who answered to this accusation on behalf of the Lt. Governor Northern Provinces, wrote:

"... it is not uncommon for natives of French West Africa as indeed also of British Protectorates in West Africa other than Nigeria, to come to Nigeria and there join some pilgrim party proceeding to Mecca. These parties are often led by some old pilgrims who may have done the pilgrimage several times. There are a good many reasons, principally that the routes are easy through Nigeria, via Fort-Lamy, that such pilgrim parties to which a pilgrim may join himself are easily found in Nigeria, that the pass issued has been regarded as having some value, that it is known that Nigerian pilgrims receive assistance at times from His Britannic Majesty's agent at Jeddah, whereas the French authorities there used to refuse to give any help unless the person was in possession of proper French passport. Commonly, the persons from other colonies sojourn some time in Nigeria and often paying taxes appear as ordinary natives of Nigeria. If they cannot obtain the full Mecca pilgrim pass they can always obtain permit to cross the frontier and they can so accompany the pilgrim parties".[247]

Lethem also announced the new measures taken by the British to limit the deliverance of pilgrim passport to non-Nigerian natives:

"... with the gradual improvement of the pilgrim passport system, now only issued on the certificate of a native chief and a District Officer, it will become increasingly harder for a native of French West Africa to pass as a Nigerian pilgrim".[248]

But all these matters and other aspects of frontier policy, were fully discussed when the Lt. Governor Northern Provinces undertook a tour of French West Africa in April 1929. Mr. H. Palmer, once in Niamey, discussed with the Lt. Governor Niger colony, Brevie, on matters concerning exchange of information between neighbouring Administrators and Residents of frontier provinces. A part of his report reads:

"It has been the custom in the past for administrators on taking over a station to notify the Resident vis-a-vis in writing of their assumption of duty.

"Mr. Brevie and I agreed that this courtesy does not go far enough for practical purposes, and that it was desirable that Administrators and Residents should not only perform this courtesy, but also actually exchange visits, at which they could co-ordinate, when necessary, cooperation between local medical, veterinary and other services".[249]

It was decided also to exchange maps showing cercles, divisions, etc., once a year, "so that we knew whom to address in frontier matters". The arrangements were: Gure and N'guigmi exchange with Borno Province; Maradi with Katsina (Zaria Province), Konni with Sokoto; Dosso and Dogon Dutsi with Argungu (Sokoto). This cooperation, more particularly between Konni and Sokoto was important when it came to handle adequately, the movements of Sultan Muhammad Tambari who fled to French territory in February 1931. The deposed chief was therefore another element of frontier policy.

IV.7. <u>The Deposed Officials and the Frontier Policy:</u>

<u>The Case of Sultan Muhammad Tambari (1924-1931)</u>

Before the Sarkin Musulmi, Tambari, many minor chiefs or officials crossed the frontier once deposed, but the one who tried to raise trouble, if we believe the colonial

reports, was Waziri Macido. Waziri Macido (1912-1925) was the son of the famous Waziri of the end of the 19th century Muhammad Buhari (1887-1910). Macido was made Waziri by Sultan Attahiru II (1903-1915) in 1912. He was Waziri during the reign of Muhammad Maiturare (1915-1924) and a misunderstanding with Sultan Muhammad Tambari (1924-31) led to his deposition in 1925. When dismissed, he retired to Gandi (near Sokoto) for three years. From this village, ex-Waziri Macido was reported by the French authorities as trying to stir up trouble in French territory. Whereas the British had nothing to report on ex-Waziri Macido, the French dumped on them reports on how the ex-Waziri tried to incite their natives to revolt. The French even reported that the ex-Waziri's conspiracy concerned "the whole West Africa" and that he was party with some scholars, particularly the famous Tijaniya leader Muhammadu Salga of Kano.[250] The French authorities at Dosso, for example, reported ex-Waziri Macido as carrying a vigorous anti-European propaganda among the French natives, in 1928. And they finally connected the ex-Waziri Macido to the Tassawa raid.[251] These allegations by the French were the signs of fear and their everlasting conception that the natives of Niger territory were "harmless Muslims" and could try nothing unless "worked out" by exterior agents. The British Intelligence reported nothing on the activities of the ex-Waziri but the French allegations founded only on suspicion, led the British to transfer the ex-Waziri to Kaduna in 1929 to be carefully watched. Finally, on the accession of Sultan Hassan (1931-1938) the ex-Waziri "was restored to favour and was made qadi-l-qudat in 1931 after the dismissal and death of the qadi".[252] Macido finally died as qadi on 16th April 1933.

But the most important official of Sokoto who gave cause for anxiety to both the

French and the British on frontier matters was the Sultan Muhammad Tambari. The study of Muhammadu Tambari's trek to French territory will show us not only the degree of cooperation between the French and the British, but also the fear his staying in French territory raised to the Sokoto officials themselves. Consequently, they became more zealous than the British, in taking serious measures for deportation against Muhammad Tambari.

Muhammadu Muhammad Ahmad known as Muhammadu Tambari had an important northern background. His father, Muhammad Ahmed, known as Maiturare, the famous Marafa of Gwadabawa and overseer of the northern territories of Sokoto by the close of the 19th century, was the son of Sarkin Musulmi Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-1866). The latter's policy in the North led to the foundation of Sabon Birni when he sheltered Dan Halima, the rebellious Dan Galadima of the Sarkin Gobir Bawa dan Gomki (1858-1883). As we have already seen, Dan Halima gave his sister in marriage to Caliph Ahmadu and their son was Muhammadu Maiturare. The latter himself sealed his relations with the Tuaregs, more especially the Kel Gress, in marrying a Kel Gress chief's daughter, Hawatan, who was the mother of Muhammadu Tambari. After Maiturare's accession to the throne in 1915, his District of Gwadabawa was divided into two portions: the eastern and more densely populated portion with the town of Gwadabawa was given to his eldest son, Muhammadu Tambari with the title of Sarkin Gobir and the western part to his second son, Amadu, with the title of Marafa and headquarters at Tangaza.[253]

Muhammad Tambari was therefore the Sarkin Gobir of Gwadabawa until his accession to the Sultanate in 1924, after the death of his father, Muhammadu Maiturare

(1915-1924). But his appointment as Sultan was recommended as early as 1922, owing to Palmer's feeling that Bello's family was too much tied to Mahdism and therefore succession had to be kept in Maiturare's (Attiku's) family.[254] Muhammad Tambari therefore began his reign in 1924, not as a sarakunan karaga's choice, but as a British nominee. So, since at the beginning he was opposed especially by Waziri Macido, the Magagin Gari and the chief Alkali Samaila.[255] Waziri Macido and the Magajin Gari infact supported Hassan (of Bello family) who was then Sarkin Baura of Denge. The animosity between the Sultan, Muhammad Tambari and the Waziri led to the deposition of the latter and the appointment of Adili in 1925.

As for the Sultan's relations with the British, they remained cordial, first owing to the great respect in which the British took his father and, secondly to the fact that his responsibility was involved neither in the Tassawa raid nor in the Clements murder. The first offence which he committed, as far as his relations with the British were concerned was, it is said, when he refused to shake hands with Lady Thomson who was on a visit with her husband Graeme Thomson, Governor of Nigeria (1925-1931) between March and April 1928, arguing that it was improper for a Sarkin Musulmi to shake hands with an infidel woman.[256] But his relations with the British deteriorated in 1930, most importantly because of his association with wizards and the opposition showed him by Sokoto people especially the officials.[257] He was also certainly slandered to the British by some zealous agents.[258] The British therefore decided to take action and, on January 10th, 1931, Sultan Muhammad Tambari was accorded an interview by C.W. Alexander, the then Lt. Governor of Northern Provinces. The Lt. Governor addressed the Sultan in a rather harsh manner:

"The Governor cannot tolerate or support against the will of the people administration that is not for their good".[259] The Sultan denied the accusation of associating with wizards and even offered to take an oath before the Lt. Governor. At one point, it is reported, the Sultan got up from his chair and prostrated himself on the ground saying "I repent, I repent".[260] In doing that, the Sultan expressed the transfer of power, or to put it more clearly, the lack of power. After this humiliating interview the Sultan abdicated on 14th January 1931, and proposed, if permission was granted, to retire to Birnin Konni in French Territory.[261] The British put Muhammad Tambari under house arrest. But he escaped on 6th February 1931 and, instead of fleeing to the East as the Fulani tradition entertaining consistently showed in the myth of the road to the Mahdi, he proceeded to the north into French territory. He arrived at Birnin Konni where he asked the Administrateur to be permitted to settle there. The Administrateur immediately contacted Sokoto to investigate.[262] The Resident Sokoto thanked the Konni authorities for their cooperation.[263] The deposed Sultan of Sokoto was sent to Niamey to be consulted adequately by the authorities of the colony. Andre Salifou argued that during his stay in Niamey, he and his retinue, left in complete indifference the Muslim circles of the area, including those of Say.[264] Muhammad Tambari had a retinue of 294 persons of whom only 16 were registered as being from Niger colony.[265] The migration of Muhammad Tambari into French territory led to the resignation of his three sons who were District Heads of Gwadabawa, Kadasaka and Tangaza who followed their father to the north. They were replaced by the brothers of Tambari.[266]

The Sokoto Political Officers, the Resident and the D.O., for a while, felt great

relief with the Sarkin Musulmi being far away. The D.O. stated: "I think that the further away the ex-Sarkin Musulmi and his sons are from Nigeria in general and Sokoto in particular, the better off we shall be".[267] The Resident Sokoto shared this view.[268] But the Lt. Governor Niamey explained to the British authorities "that no regular authority supports the compulsory measure taken to make ex-Sultan live at Niamey. He finds great material difficulties in living at this place".[269] So, the Governor General of Nigeria laid the conditions on which the ex-Sultan should be permitted to return to Nigeria. These conditions were:

1) That he returned as a private individual.
2) Special ordinance would be enacted in assigning him residence in Northern Provinces of Nigeria, probably in town in more southerly district, distant from Sokoto.
3) A pension no less than f240 per annum would be granted to him.
4) Government would not propose to prosecute him for criminal or any acts committed when he was Sultan.
5) Complaints regarding property would be fully investigated by Senior Officer or Officers designated by the Governor.[270]

When the Lt. Governor of Niger colony forwarded these conditions to the ex-Sultan, the latter refused them, especially that concerning compulsory residence in area remote to Sokoto. He asked the Lt. Governor of Niger to be permitted to settle in Madawa but the Governor of Niger refused. It is reported that both the Resident of Sokoto Province and Sultan Hassan (1931-1938) were opposed to the ex-Sultan living at

Kaduna, "but they are still more opposed to the idea of his dwelling in French territory anywhere near the frontier".[271]

Sokoto officials also opposed the idea of the ex-Sultan being allowed to settle near the frontier of Sokoto. The Waziri, the Magajin Gari, the Ubandoma and Madawaki held a meeting and carried out some propositions: "They are afraid of trouble being caused in Gwadabawa area if he settles in Konni. But they agree that he stays in French Territory as it is his wishing. If he wants to stay in Dosso or Dogon Dutsi, frontier with Argungu, yes. But, Konni, frontier with Sokoto, no". They added for the attention of the Resident: "If he does not agree with these propositions, we ask you to help us and send him to southern areas far away to allow us to live peacefully with our people".[272]

The British considered the eventuality of offering a pension of £200 per annum to induce Muhammad Tambari to reside permanently at Niamey. But finally, the ex-Sultan decided to return to Nigeria and he left Niamey on 2nd November 1931. He crossed the frontier between Konni and Illela on Tuesday, 5th November, in company of 294 persons and on 20th November, he was sent to Kaduna to be dealt with.[273] He was finally exiled to Wukari in Benue Province, where he died on 30th January 1935.

Meanwhile, the Emirs, in a meeting they held on 18th November 1931, expressed their disapproval of the ex-Sultan's flight into French Territory. The Emir of Gwandu said: "His flight into French territory was unworthy for a chief of his position" and the Emir of Kano added: "it was a shameful thing for him to have gone into French territory".[274]

Being an ex-Sarkin Gobir of Gwadabawa, it was normal that they feared trouble which he could stir up, in settling in Konni area. He could also be used as a tool by the

French to cause difficulties to the British. The Waziri of Sokoto, Abbas (1928-48), expressed that fear, as reported by the Resident: "you will doubtless recall that the Waziri expressed nervousness at the continued residence of the ex-Sarkin Musulmi in neighbouring French territory, giving as his reason that he feared that he would stir up trouble between the French authorities and ourselves".[275]

When the colonial administration found some letters from chiefs in French territory to the Sarkin Musulmi, Tambari, it connected his movement to the north to these relations.

In fact, many Sarakuna of Niger colony addressed letters of greetings or other matters to Muhammad Tambari. Waziri Abbas even destroyed some of the documents, probably implicating the Sarkin Musulmi or some Sokoto officials.[276]

The letters came principally from the Kel-Gress Tuaregs, certainly owing to Tambari's mother being of Tuareg extraction; but also from Sarkin Tawa, Mahaman dan Salifou (who wrote four letters to the Sultan),[277] Sarkin Katsina (Tassawa) Barmu dan Kulodo; the Sarkin Damagaram, Abdullahi dan Ahmadu; Muhammad Raji a Malam of Katsina (Maradi) court who wrote on behalf of Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) and even sent charms to the Sarkin Musulmi against sorcerers.[278]

Some phrases used by the Sarakuna in addressing the Sarkin Musulmi induced colonial administrators to think about a conspiracy against them prepared by the Sarkin Musulmi with the support of French territory chiefs. The Sarkin Katsina (Tassawa) Barmu wrote: "I like not those who are not of our religion be it known to you". We must bear in mind that Barmu was dismissed after the Tassawa raid (5th June 1927), the colonial

administration in Niger thought that he was implicated. The Tambari of the Kel-Gress Alhamin, son of Tambari Ali Haidara said: "I am with you in this world and the next". Tambari Abubakar, son of Zodi, qualified the Sarkin Musulmi as "Lord of the earth" and stated "I swear by Allah and His messenger I am with you in this world and the next. May Allah assist you in your plan and grant you victory over your enemies".[279] Sarkin Tawa (Adar) Mahaman dan Salifou wrote four letters to the Sarkin Musulmi, Tambari. In the second letter we read: "I am praying Allah to assist us against our enemies" and in the last one he said: "May Allah *confound* your enemies".[280]

All these indications and many others supplied by a political agent, one Al-Haj Jari, confirmed the colonial administration in its conviction of a plot by the Sarkin Musulmi Tambari.[281] For all these reasons, the colonial administration reversed its policy of keeping the succession in Muhammad Maiturare's line [282] and appointed Hassan, a Belloite as Sultan in 1931. And the Resident added that until Tambari's regime was forgotten, there is extremely little chance of a member of the Attiku house being put forward.[283]

As for the relations between the French and the British concerning the Sarkin Musulmi's trek, the debate arose again after the death of Muhammadu Tambari on January 30th 1935. It was said that he left properties in Niger colony especially a motor with Sarkin Dosso and another motor at Niamey.[284] Letters therefore were sent to French authorities at Niamey to investigate. The Lt. Governor (Acting) of Niger answered that he gave instructions to his subordinates at Niamey and Dosso to go through the matter.[285] The Commandant de Cercle Dosso answered that the motor was in a state of wreck and the parts were assembled for only any investigation. He added that the vehicle was in the

care of nobody,[286] whereas the Sultan, Tambari talked about the Sarkin Dosso to whom he had left his car.[287]

Sultan Tambari's case closed for a time the period of collaboration between the French and the British on frontier matters, especially as far as Islamic activists were concerned. When the second world war started in 1939, suspicion again developed, in fact more serious with the establishment of Vichy regime in French territories and in France itself in June 1940. Intelligence gathering intensified between the two countries, each of them preparing even for an eventual attack from the other. The war ended with the emergence of a new elite, the western-educated "natives" who wanted to play a role on the political scene and whom the colonial administrators thought could use Islam to attain their targets. Almost at the same time, after the war, the threat posed by a new islamic sect, the Hamallism, became serious. So, the combination of Hamallism-western-educated elites, would be the main concern of colonial powers after the war, especially their movements and influence across the frontier and their implication for politics through political parties.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

. William F.S., Miles, Hausaland divided: Colonial and Independence in Niger and Nigeria, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994, p.11.

:. Sokprof 581/1914 Annual Report Sokoto, Gando and Argungu Divisions, 1913 No.10

Argungu Division: report by E.A. Brackenbury, Assistant Resident.

:. For instance, the British believed that "lying and pilfering" were "the chief failings of the negro". See P.A. Afeadie: The hidden hand of overrule op. cit., p.200; In 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris, the British Secretary for Foreign Office, Arthur James Balfour, is reported to have said: "... although it is true to say that all men within any one nation are created more or less equal, it does not necessarily follow that a man from Central Africa is equal to a European". See Asma'u Garba Saeed op. cit., p.264; The French ideologue, Jules Ferry said "Nous avons des droits sur les races inferieures" (We have rights on inferior races).

:. Territoire Militaire du Niger, rapport politique du 1er Trimestre 1912 Zinder, 18th April 1912.

:. ANS Dossier 1961 piece 37: mesures prises en raison de l'etat de guerre Janvier 1915 - Juin 1915 in Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1139.

:. P.J. Andre, L'Islam etles races Tome 2: Les rameaux, Librairie Paul Geuthner Paris 1922, p.74, see also Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., p.215. It is interesting to note the claim made by the Ottoman Empire in 1890. In a note

presented to the British and French Governments on 30 October, 1890 following the Anglo-French Declaration of 5 August, 1890 the Porte outlined its definition of the Tripoli hinterland and therefore its own claims in the interior.

"The line of that zone (of hinterland of Tripoli) descends towards Bornou (from the southern frontiers of Tunis) passing to the west of Gadames and of Arger Tuareg and including the oases of Djebads and of Agram. It then passes between the frontiers of Sokoto and Bornou, to join the southern frontier of Cameroun and following towards the east the line of the watershed between the basin of Congo and that of Chad, in a manner to include the territories of Bornou, Baghirmi, Wadai, Kanem, Wanyanga, Borku and Tibesti leaving in our possession the main caravan routes that go from Murzuk to Kuka by the oases of Yah, Kawar and Agadan". See John E. Lavers: "The Diplomatic Relations of the Sokoto Caliphate: Some Thoughts and a Plea", Sokoto Seminar papers 1975.

7. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study, op. cit., p.215.

8. ANN Serie 4E Accord Subsidiaire uncatalogued n.d. Proces-Verbal des la Seance de la Commission des Affaires musulmanes en date, du 14 November 1914.

9. Sokprof 3335 Annual Report 1914 Sokoto Province by Arnett E.J. Resident.

10. Sokprof 3335.

11. Sokprof 3336 Annual Report 1915 Sokoto Province, Gwandu Division.

11bis. Sokprof 3336 Annual Report 1915.

12. Donal Gruise O'Brien "Towards an 'Islamic Policy' in French West Africa 1854 - 1914" in J.A.H., VIII, 2, 1967, 303-316.

13. Idrissa Kimba, La Formation de la Colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1555.

14. ANN 12-2-4 1916 Madaoua, Rapport Politique 2 Trimestre 1916.

15. ANN 12-2-2 Madaoua Rapport Politique 4 Arimestre 1913.

16. ANN 12-2-4 Rapport Politique 3 Trimestre 1916 Madaoua.

17. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Howard University Press, 1982, p.187.

18. ANN 12-2-4 Rapport Politique 2 Trimestre 1916 Madaoua.

19. ANN 12-2-4.

20. ibid.

21. ANN 12-2-3 Cercle de Madaoua, Rapports Politiques Trimestriels 1914.

22. F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.83.

23. ibid, p.94.

24. Sokprof 3335 Annual Report 1914 Sokoto Province by E.J. Arnett.

25. ibid.

26. In 1916, for example, the annual contributions were: Sokoto - f8,000; Gwandu - f3,000; and Argungu - f300. But from 1916 the contributions were treated as an interest bearing loan to the Nigerian Government instead of free gifts. See Sokprof 555/1918 Annual Report No.14 for the Sokoto Province for the year ending 31st December 1917.

27. Sokprof 3336 Sokoto Province Report No.12 for year ending 31st December 1915 by Resident Arnett.

28. ibid.

29. ibid.

30. P.K. Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto op. cit., p.277.

31. ANN serie 4E Accord Subsidiaire uncatalogued. The Proclamation was intercepted in October 1915 by the Lt. Governor of Gabon and sent to Paris for analysis.

32. Idrissa Kimba, La Formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1533.

33. ANN Serie 4E 2-1 Correspondence diverse 1916, Le Colonel de la Parouse Attache Militaire de l'Ambassade de France en Angleterre a M. Le Ministre de la guerre. Etat-Major de l'Armee, Section d'Afrique Londres le 25 Mars 1916.

34. ANN 4E Accord Subsidiaire uncatalogued n.d. Proces. Verbal de la reunion de la Commission des Affaires Musulmanes en date du 14 November 1914.

35. F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.94.

36. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.1, p.581.

37. Arrete No.443 du 28 Avril 1916 in Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1140.

38. ibid, n. 36.

39. J.L. Triaud "Hommes de Religion et Confreries Islamiques dans une societe en crise, l'Air aux 19 et 20 Siecles: Le cas de la Khalwatiyya" Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 91, XXIII-3, 1983, 239-80, p.254, n. 56. In fact Kaussan besieged the French Post of Agades from 13-12-1916 to 3-3-1917.

40. ibid, p.257.

41. Idrissa Kimba, La Formation de la Colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1537 my

translation.

42. His seal bore the formula: "Mutassarif li-Wadi Fezzan qumanda 'askar Sanusi" See J-L. Triaud "Hommes de religion ..." p.256, n. 64.

43. Francis Nicolas, Tamesna: les loullemmeden de l'Est ou Touaregs "Kel dinnik" Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1950, p.92 my translation.

44. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1573; but according to Andre Salifou the zawiya of Chemidur was founded in 1863 see Colonisation et societes indigenes vol.1, p.156, n. 71.

45. R. Ann Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) op. cit., p.109.

46. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie, vol.4, p.1573.

47. J. Smaldone: Historical and Sociological Aspects of Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate, Evanston, Illinois 1970, p.133 see especially SNP8 98/1908 Senussi Movement, Summary of Information on the Progress of since 1902.

48. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., vol.1, p.100.

49. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.1, p.589.

50. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs op. cit., pp.164-165.

51. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.1, p.599.

52. G.J. Lethem and G.J. Tomhinson, op. cit., p.33.

53. Some authors argued that Kaussan was killed by the Turks who were very angry with his setback in Agades see F. Nicolas, Tamesna op. cit., p.99, see also Urvoy (Y) Histoire des populations du Soudan Central, p.196, note 1.

54. F. Nicolas, Tamesna, op. cit., p.97, note.

55. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study, op. cit., vol.2, Confidential C42, Report on Mallam Said's conspiracy, H.R. Palmer, 2/12/1923.

56. ibid.

57. ibid.

58. Y. Urvoy, Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central, op. cit., p.195.

59. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1577, my translation.

60. ibid.

61. ANN 12-3-1 Cercle de Madaoua piece No.6, my translation.

62. ANN quoted in Kimba Idrissa, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1567.

63. ANN 2-7-2 Affaire Tegama, deposition des temoins.

64. Osuntokun (J.) quoted in Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.4, p.1559.

65. E. Sere des Rivieres, Histoire du Niger 1965, p.226. But Kimba Idrissa thought this information to be baseless. See La formation op. cit., vol.4, p.1568.

66. Oral evidence recorded by Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.4, p.1577. This reports us to the time of the jihad in Hausaland when the Tanis al-Ikhwan reported that: "The Fulani repeated Allah Akbar three times; the Gobirawa beat their dreams" see Tanis al-Ikhwan NAK Kadcaptory Item No.3 O/ARI/3, p.2.

67. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1559.

68. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and its Diffusion in the Sahel. op. cit., p.165.

69. F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.97.

70. ibid, p.96. But, J-L. Triaud spoke about only 200 persons see "Homme de Religion" op. cit., p.256.

71. Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.4, p.1562.

72. ibid, p.1564.

73. Urvoy (Y), Histoire des Populations du Soudan Central op. cit., p.117, see also A.H.A.K. File No. 15113. Tijani settlement near Hadejia.

74. AHAK K4682/Vol.II Confidential No.503 A.G.I. of 17th July 1930: "Questions Musulmanes: Tijanisme a 11 grains" Lieut-Governor Niger to Governor General French West Africa.

75. Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.4, p.1565.

76. NAK SNP8 181/17 Tuaregs - Arrest in Daura see letter from Gower Resident Kano to Lt. Governor Kaduna No. 53/17U, dated 5/11/1917. Even before the Kaussan rebellion, orders were issued by British authorities to return fugitives but it was given the precision that "This order to return fugitives is of course only during the war, and refers only to persons trying to escape enlistment". See Sokprof 3336 Annual Report 1915 Sokoto province, Conf. No. 282 P/1916 Chief Secretary Lagos to Resident Sokoto.

77. SNP8 181/17 Tuaregs - Arrest in Daura.

78. Sokprof 555/1918 Annual Report No.14 for the Sokoto Province for the year ending 31st December 1917.

79. Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.4, p.1565.

80. AHAK K4682/Vol.1 Islamic Propaganda. External Intelligence General - Re-Exchange of Intelligence with French, No.20286/35 Governor Nigeria to Governor General French West Africa, dated 19th December 1927.

81. ibid.

82. For instance, in 1917 the District Head of Machena organised intelligence in French Territory to know the whereabouts of the revolt and inform the Resident Borno. He therefore sent envoy to Jajiduna, the most ancient Senussi zawiya in Damargu (created in 1896). The secret service agent reported that all the unrest in the North was due to intrigues on the part of one Sidi Mahdi, an individual from Constantinople or somewhere to the West of it. See SNP8 7/1917 Telegram from FoulKes, Acting Resident Bornu to SNP Kaduna dated 13th January 1917, No.103.

83. ANN 12-3-1 Report by Captain Sadoux, Commandant Cercle Madawa on the submission of Wulliminden Tuaregs. Tawa, 4 June 1917.

84. ibid.

85. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs op. cit., p.167.

86. Idrissa Kimba, op. cit., vol.4, p.1579. In 1918 in Abeche (Chad) 118 mallams were massacred in cold blood in revenge for the murder of a French man see History of Islamic Politics propaganda Appendix A.

87. J.L. Triaud "Hommes de religion et confreries islamiques dans une societe en crise, l'Air aux 19 et 20 S - Le cas de la Khalwatiyya", Cahiers d'etudes Africaines, 91, XXIII-3, 1983, 239-280.

88. Finn Fuglestad A History of Niger op. cit., p.90.

89. ibid, p.91.

90. See Donal Cruise O'Brien "Towards an 'Islamic Policy' in French West Africa 1854-1914" JAH VIII, 2, 1967, 303-316, see also Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.1 et 4.

91. ANN 12-3-1 Rapport du Capitaine Sadoux piece no.5.

92. ibid, piece no.6.

93. See F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.97.

94. Idrissa Kimba op. cit., vol.4, p.1568.

95. See Abubakar Sokoto Muhammad, A Social Interpretation of the Satiru Revolt op. cit., p.219.

96. Sokprof C112 Foreign Political Propaganda: From Resident Sokoto to SNP Secret No.5/22 dated 27/4/1922.

97. AHAK K4682/ Vol.II Islamic Propaganda - Lt. Governor Niger to M. le Governeur General A.O.F. No.503 A.G.I. "Questions Musulmanes: Tijanisme a 11 Grains", dated 17 July 1930.

98. AHAK K4682 Resident Cameroons Province to SNP C/10/1928 dated July 30th 1928.

99. ANN 15-2-20 Niamey Rapport Politique du cercle de Niamey 4e Trimestre 1917 Niamey, 20/1/1918.

100. Sokprof C22 Clements Murder - Summary.

101. AHAK K4682/Vol.II Islamic Propaganda; Conf. 106 AP/2 The Governor General French West Africa to Lt. Governor Dakar 20th January 1930.

102. Sokprof 3/1/C9 Report on Political Condition in Sokoto Province, March 1922, by

H.R. Palmer; Sokprof 3/1/C14 (Secret) Lieutenant-Governor to Resident Sokoto, H.R. Palmer see also Tibenderana P.K. The Administration of Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu Emirates ... op. cit., p.292.

103. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1140, no. 37.

104. Lt. Colonel Lefebvre; rapport du 3 Trimestre 1919 in Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1141.

105. C.N. Ubah, "British Measures Against Mahdism at Dumbulwa in Northern Nigeria, 1923: A Case of Colonial Overreaction".

106. R. Ann Dunbar, Damagaram (Zinder, Niger) op. cit., p.104.

107. No 107.

108. Northern Nigerian Colonial Reports; Report No. 409 for January - December 1902.

109. AHAK File No. 11096 Vol.II, Summary of Quarterly Intelligence Reports for 1930: Report for Quarter ending 31st March 1930.

110. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., vol.1, p.242.

111. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, 1927, p.57.

112. ibid, p.82 see also Confidential C42 Report on Malam Said's Conspiracy in Asma'u Garba Saeed op. cit., vol.2, pp.65-70.

113. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, p.10. It is worth noting that at the beginning of the century, in 1902, political agents reported to the British that Emir of Kano Aliyu (1894-1903) was supplied ammunition by the French in Damagaram see P.A. Afeadie, The Hidden Hand of Overrule op. cit., pp.148-149.

114. See History of Islamic Political Propaganda, p.33. The books and letters were given

him by one "Pacha in Alexandria" who gave him 1,000 rials and had to give him more after the mission. ibid.

115. AHAK File 11096/Vol.II Northern Provinces: Summary of Intelligence Reports for Quarter Ending 31st March 1930.

116. See Ubah, C.N. "British Measures Against Mahdism in Dumbulwa" op. cit.

117. See on this "New-Mahdism" History of Islamic Political Propaganda op. cit., p.66.

118. Sokprof C126 Sokoto Native Administration; Confidential Report on Sokoto of 26/10/1921, dated December 5th 1921.

119. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., vol.1, p.333.

120. ibid, p.243.

121. ibid, p.281.

122. NAK Sokprof C112 Foreign Political Propaganda; Memorandum (Secret) No. 86/13 dated January 28th 1922, SNP to Resident Sokoto.

123. Sokprof C112 Confidential 72, SNP to Resident Sokoto dated 16/1/1922.

124. Asma'u Garba Saeed, A Biographical Study op. cit., vol.1, p.377.

125. Asma'u Garba Saeed op. cit., vol.2, Appendix I.A.

126. As for example, Dabo whose son Ko'a gave his daughter in marriage to Abubakar Gumi on the intercession of Sheikh Said in the early 1950's see Asma'u Garba Saeed Appendix I.A.

127. AHAK File No. 11096 Summary of Intelligence Reports for quarter ending 31st March 1930.

128. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, p.17.

129. ibid, p.72.

130. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1142.

131. ibid, p.1145.

132. Mallam Abba Chilloum was of Kanuri extraction, born in Zinder c.1863. His family originated from Borno. He was of scholarly descent. He was marabout of Zinder Sultan Ahmadu Dan Bassa. When the latter was exiled after the 1906 events in Zinder, Mallam Abba Chilloum came to Kolori-Kolo to found a Tijani school of repute. He is said to have received his "Wird Tijani" from one Malam Faki, marabout at Kuka. His influence went beyond the frontier and many of his 24 daughters married scholars of repute in Borno, one of them (the daughters) Adiza Kugu even married the son of Madani, Umoru of Dakayawa (Hadejia) who would become Sheikh after the death of Madani. See ANN 4E 1-4 Colonie du Niger. Cercle du Manga marabouts et personnages influents 1913-1947.

133. AHAK File 15113 Tijani settlement at Dakayawa; Memorandum from Kano Resident to Secretary Northern Provinces, 1st August 1931.

134. Andre Salifou Colonisation el societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1142.

135. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, p.18.

136. Sokprof C112 Foreign Political Propaganda; Conf. 533/5 dated 10/12/1924.

137. Sokprof C15 Reports on Pilgrimage to Mekka No. 547M (30/9) dated June 1st 1927.

138. ibid.

139. Sokprof C163 Intelligence Reports 1921-48: Conf. 61/ 1925/10, Argungu 19th November 1926 A.D.O. i/c Argungu to Resident Sokoto.

140. Y. Bala Usman, The Transformation of Katsina op. cit., p.161, Note 136.

141. Idrissa Kimba, La Formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.1, p.387, No.1.

142. See KATprof (FED) 1/1/2 Dankama District; see also Northern Nigeria Colonial Reports 1900-1911; Report for 1902 No.409.

143. Sokprof C17 Conf. C5/1927/11 D.O. i/c Katsina to Resident Zaria Province, 12th June 1927.

144. See AHAK File No. 11096 Summary of Quarterly Intelligence Reports for 1930. See also AHAK K4983/Vol.IV Tassawa raid.

145. Sokprof C17 Teleg. Kaduna to Resident Sokoto T.K.4983/Vol.2/345 dated 1/12/1927.

145bis. AHAK K4983/Vol.IV Tassawa raid: Conf. K4983/Vol.IV/584, Lieutenant Governor to Chief Secretary to the Government Kaduna, 26 March 1928 Enclosure 3.

146. Sokprof C17 Resident Sokoto to SNP.

147. Kimba Idrissa, Guerres et Societes op. cit., p.151, no.1.

148. AHAK K4983/Vol. IV Tassawa Raid: Conf. No. K4983/Vol.IV/584 Kaduna, 26 March 1928, Lieutenant-Governor to the Chief Secretary to the Government. Enclosure 4 Conf. C68/151 January 26 1928, from Resident Bornu to Lieutenant Governor Northern Provinces.

149. Sokprof C17 Secret H.R. Palmer to Secretary 25/12/1927.

150. Sokprof C17 Secretary to Resident Sokoto T.C. K4983/43 dated 29/6/1927.

151. AHAK K4983/Vol.IV Tassawa Raid. Conf. K4983/Vol.IV/584 Lieutenant Governor to Chief Secretary Lagos, Kaduna 26th March 1928, Enclosure 4.

152. ibid.

153. Sokprof C17 Memorandum Conf. No.K4983/Vol.2/276 dated 22/10/1927.

154. Sokoto History Bureau C312 Conf. 8486/16 SNP to Sokoto Province, Mahdists suspected of advocating the killing of white people 17/12/1928.

155. Sokprof C17 Conf. no. C68 2nd November 1927 from Resident Borno Province to SNP.

156. ibid. Statement of Bature.

157. Sokprof C17 Memorandum Conf. no. K4983/Vol.2/276 From SNP to Honourable Chief Secretary Lagos, 22/10/1927.

158. AHAK K4682/Vol.1, Islamic Propaganda - External Intelligence no. 20286/35 Government House 19/12/1927.

159. AHAK K4682/Vol.II Minister of Foreign Affairs (France) to British Ambassador in Paris dated 17th May 1928, forwarded by the Downing Street to SNP in Conf. No.09 374/Vol.II/1313 dated 13th July 1928.

160. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1146.

161. ibid, p.1145 my translation.

162. ibid, p.1150 my translation.

163. ibid, p.1147 my translation.

164. Sokprof C17 Report by Superintendent of Education.

165. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes, vol.2, p.1147, no.46.

166. AHAK 4983/Vol.III Tassawa Raid: SNP to Resident Zaria with copy to D.O. Katsina.

167. AHAK K4983/Vol.4 Tassawa Raid Conf. No. K4983/Vol.4/584 Lieutenant Governor Palmer to the Chief Secretary Lagos, Kaduna 26th March 1928 Enclosure 3

Assistant Commissioner of Police to H.H. Lt. Governor.

168. Sokprof C17 Palmer, Lt. Governor to Chief Secretary Lagos, 25/12/1927.

169. AHAK File No. 11096 vol.II Summary of Intelligence Reports for 1929; Quarter ending 31st December 1929.

170. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes op. cit., vol.2, p.1150. It is worth noting that Malam Hassan acted as a political agent on the installation of the colonial administration. Among other pieces of information, he informed the French about the "plot" of Ahmadu Dan Bassa in 1906. See ANN ID2 4bis n.d. uncatalogued; His son Malam Falalou seemed to have played the same role for he was reported to have travelled to Nigeria in 1925, on a mission by Governor Brevie, which seemed to be "Historical research on the emigrants of Northern Nigeria "See Cercle de Zinder: Fiches de renseignements: marabouts et personnages influents n.d.; when Malam Hassan died in Zinder on 30th April 1937, a little pension was given to his family for "political reasons". See ANN Cerce de Zinder, Fiches des renseignements sur les marabouts; letter no. 268 Zinder from Commandant de Cercle Mathey to Governor Niger, Niamey dated Zinder 26th October 1938 registered Au Cabinet on 1st November 1938 under no. 6405 F/AP.

171. SNP 17/1/715/137 SNP to Resident Adamawa dated 30/7/1927 quoted in Muhammad A-Al-Haj, The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.213.

172. SNP17/1/715/177 dated 16/8/1927 quoted in M. Al-Haj idem, p.212.

173. NAK Sokprof C17 Memorandum Conf. K4983/Vol.2/276 dated 22nd October 1927, SNP to Honourable Chief Secretary Lagos.

173bis. Katprof 2/1/1914 Proclamations by Emir of Katsina - copies of 1926-30.

174. Sokprof C17 Memorandum Conf. K4985/121 SNP to Resident Sokoto 26th July 1927.

175. ibid.

176. ANN 4E 1.6 bis Mahdisme Conf. No. 163 APA objet. Complot au Ouadai G.G. AOF a Mr. Le Lt. Governor Niger, Zinder, Dakar February 5th 1925.

177. See Letters between the Governors: No. 20286/35 dated 19/12/1927 and No.32. APA dated 2/3/1928 in AHAK K4982/Vol.I, p.91.

178. ANN 15/2/1929 Rapport politique annuel du cercle de Niamey 1927.

179. Lethem G.J. History of Islamic Political Propaganda Appendix F.

180. AHAK K44682/Vol.II, Islamic Propaganda: External Intelligence.

181. See Letters from Administrateur Birnin Konni to Resident Sokoto dated 5th August 1928, no. 102 in AHAK K4682/Vol.II Islamic Propaganda.

182. ANN 15/2/1929 Rapport Politique annuel du cercle de Niamey 1927.

183. AHAK K4682/Vol.2 Conf. K6950/12 dated 4th May 1928.

184. Sokprof C17 Tassawa Raid; B.E. Sharwood Smith A.D.O. i/c Sokoto to D.O. dated 20/1/1928 Secret and Confidential.

185. Sokprof C25 Case no. 23/1927 In the provincial Court of Niger Province held at Minna on the 21st Day of September 1927 before H. Morgan-Owen Resident: Rex Versus Umaru alias Allahbamu. M.N. 38.

186. Sokprof C25 Conf. no. K5241/52 SNP to the Honourable Chief Secretary, Lagos, 9th November 1927.

187. Sokprof C21 Clements - Murder of, 1928 Teleg Standard Smith from Katsina to Resident Sokoto received 5/3/1928.

188. Sokprof C21 Clements - Murder of, Conf. C2/I/28 Kuria, 6th March 1928, A.D.O. Gusau to Resident.

189. Sokprof C21 Teleg Standard Smith from Katsina to Resident Sokoto received 5/3/1928.

190. ibid.

191. Sokprof C21 Clements - Murder of, Administrative Maradi to Resident Sokoto no.50, dated 6th March 1928.

192. Sokprof C21 Conf. C6/1928/55, dated 31st March 1928, Resident Sokoto to Mr. L'Administrateur Maradi.

193. Sokprof C22 Statement of Madora Amadu ex-village head of Kuriya.

194. Sokprof C23 Umaru ex-Sarkin Katsina Gusau 22/5/1931.

195. Sokprof C17 Tassawa Raid: June 5th 1927, Superintendent of Education's Report.

196. Sokprof C21 Clements -Murder, Information of L.L.H. Thomas, Medical Officer, Gusau.

197. AHAK File 11096/Vol.II Northern Provinces of Nigeria: Summary of Intelligence Reports for the quarter ending 31st March 1930.

198. ibid.

199. ibid.

200. Dan Asdai (26th - 28th February), Dan Isa near Kaura Namoda (28th - 29th) Banga (1st March); Kaura Namoda (2nd March) see AHAK File 11096/Vol.II.

201. ibid.

202. ibid.

202bis. Fona was in fact Agolla (chief) of Kel Ewey from the village of Auderas in north west of Agades, see Sokprof C17 Teleg no.3C Administrateur Konni to Governor Niger, 29/6/1927.

203. Sokoto History Bureau C312 Islamic Propaganda; Conf. No. 14C Commandant de cercle Zinder to Governor Niger, Zinder dated August 11th 1927.

204. ibid.

205. ibid.

206. Sokoto History Bureau C312 Conf. K8486/16 SNP to Sokoto Provinces. Mahdists suspected of advocating the killing of white people, 17th December 1928.

207. ibid.

208. AHAK File No. 11096 Summary of Intelligence Reports for quarter ending 30th June 1929.

209. ibid.

210. AHAK K4682/Vol.2 Bulletin Trimestriel de Renseignerments 3 Trimestre 1929.

211. AHAK K4682/Vol.2 Governor General of French West Africa to Governor General of Nigeria No. 290 AP/2 Compte-rendus du 4^{e} Trimestre 1929 sur le Mahdisme et le Senussisme. Dakar 29 April 1930; Bulletin Trimestriel des Renseignements No. 4 Annee 1929.

212. ibid.

213. ibid.

214. For instance, One Commandant de cercle (Satadugu) in Mali reported: "We must congratulate ourselves on the political point of view, that no Muslim from this cercle (province) had performed the Haj to the Prophet's grave. I came to observe that performing pilgrimage gives in these regions, to the pilgrim an halo which does with him a prestigious person; if the man is ambitious, the pilgrimage makes him to be an agitator. This was the case with the marabout Fodi Ismail Tounkara, from Koussari (cercle of Kayes) who when he returned from the pilgrimage of Mekka (1910) preached the holy war on the banks of the river Senegal", quoted in Umar al Naqar; The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa, Khartoum University Press 1972, p.123, see also on the pilgrimage in West Africa:

- J.S. Birks: Across the Savannah to Mecca: The Overland Pilgrimage Routes from West Africa, C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., London 1978.
- John A. Works: Pilgrims in a Strange Land: Hausa Communities in Chad New York, 1972.
- M. Nur Alkali: "Some Contributions to the Study of the Pilgrimage Tradition in Nigeria", Annals of Borno, Vol.II, 1985, pp.127-138.
- G.J. Lethem and G. Tomlinson, History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, Lagos, 1927.

215. Umar al-Naqar, Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa op. cit., p.92.

216. Umar al-Naqar op. cit., pp.9-21. In Medina, Askia Muhammad bought plantations and houses for the Songhay people on pilgrimage. A manuscript discovered in Medina reads: "Je, soussigne, l'humble Askia Muhammad, declare avoir achete aux

environs de Medine les terrains (plantations des dattiers, habitations) destines a mes descendants directs, aux Maliens, ensuite aux Africains et enfin aux Ansars, c'est-a-dire aux habitants, de Medine".

Signe Askia Mohammed

Medine le 23 Juin 1497.

See ANN C937 Documents emanant des marabouts ou ecrits par eux le Directeur de la Medersa de Say a Monsieur le President de l'Assemblee Nationale Niamey, Say le ... Juin 1963.

It is said that the famous Tijaniya Sheikh, Alfa Hashim (ben Ahmed b. Sa'id, nephew of al-Haj Umar), lived in a house which was part of this property (of Askia) until 1930 when he died. See Umar al-Naqar op. cit., p.21.

217. M.N. Alkali "Some Contributions to the Study of the Pilgrimage Tradition in Nigeria". Annals of Borno, vol.II, 1985, University of Maiduguri, pp.127-138. The Arab writer Al-Makrisi (1364-1442) reported that around 1242 Kanem people journeying to Mecca, gave money in Cairo to the Qadi Ilm al-Din b. Rashik who erected a Madrasa which bore his name. Kanem people sent money there almost every year. See al- Makrisi (1364-1442) in J.M. Cuoq, Recueil des sources Arabes concernant l'Afrique Occidentale du 8 au 16s, Paris editions du CNRS 1975, p.390.

218. In Agades chronicles (Y. Urvoy 1934) only this period witnessed pilgrimages. No other mentioned before or after see J.L. Triaud "Hommes, de religion" op. cit., p.243, note 15.

219. Girard, Histoire Chronologique du Royaume de Tripoly de Barbary quoted in

Hamani (Djibo) Le Sultanat Tuareg, de l'Ayar op. cit., p.235, note 2 my translation.

220. John E. Lavers "Katsina and the Outside World; Adventures in the Historiography of Birnin and Kasar Katsina", Katsina Seminar, May 1992. The two Fathers finally died at Katsina in August 1711, because of the bad water.

221. Umar al-Naqar (op. cit., pp.78-79) reports that the first Sokoto Sultan to perform the Haj was Abubakar III (1938-88) who travelled to Mecca on the insistence of Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, in 1963.

222. ibid, p.58.

223. Umar-al-Naqar op. cit., p.59.

224. The al-Kash-Fu-Wal Bayan reports that Bello conducted 47 raids against the rebels. NAK O/ARI/7 Kadcaptory Kash-Fu-Wal Bayan by Waziri Gidado translated by H. Harris.

225. J.L. Triaud "Hommes de religion et confreries islamiques dans une societe en crise, l'Air aux 19 et 20's" op. cit., p.247, note 30.

226. Paul E. Lovejoy, Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900, A.B.U. Press, 1980, p.72, n.30.

227. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria, p.33.

228. AHAK K4682 Extract Secret from Resident Cameroons Province to Secretary Southern Provinces C/10/1928, dated 30th July 1928.

229. Sokprof C112 Conf. 1/18/1923 Sokoto Headquarters Nigeria N.P. December 6th 1923. Acting Senior Resident Sokoto to SNP. Letters from Sudan to Sokoto.

230. AHAK K4682 Extract Secret from Resident Cameroons Province to Secretary

Southern Provinces C/10/1928, 30th July 1928.

231. J.S. Birks, Across the Savannah to Mecca: the Overland Pilgrimage Routes From West Africa C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., London, 1978, p.10.

232. M.N. Alkali "Some contributions to the study of the pilgrimage tradition in Nigeria" Annals of Borno, Vol.II, 1985, pp.127-138.

233. ANN 4E9-7. Gouverneur Niger to Governor General French West Africa, 142/P.S. Service de Surete Pelerinage a la Mecque, dated 20/7/1944.

234. ANN 4E 9-14. Rapport Brouin sur le pelerinage Niamey 31st January 1947.

235. ANN Agades Colonel Mechet Commissaire de Government General, du Territoire Militaire du Niger. Note circulaire no.231, A.I. aux Commandants de cercle et de subdivision Zinder le 22 Mai 1919 quoted in Idrissa Kimba, La formation de la colonie du Niger op. cit., vol.5, p.1889.

236. ANN 4E-9-12 Etat statistique des Pelerins partis a la Mecque a titre prives de 1921 a 1944 inclus.

237. ANN 4E-9-12 Notice au sujet du Pelerinage a la Mecque par voie de terre, des Musulmans de l'AOF. Direction generale des Affaires politiques, Administratives et sociales AP/5.

238. ANN 4E-9-7 Governor Niger to Governor General French West Africa no.142/P.S. Service de surete Pelerinage a la Mecque, 20/7/1944.

239. NAK Sokprof C35 "Report on Palmer's Journey to Egypt".

240. History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria 1927 Appendix F.

241. ibid, p.14.

242. Sokprof C15 Reports on Pilgrimage to Mekka, British Agency no.547 M. (30/9) Jeddah, June 1st 1927.

243. AHAK File 11096 Northern Provinces: Summary of Intelligence Reports for 1929 quarter ending 30th September 1929.

244. ibid.

245. Alphonse Gouilly, L'Islam en Afrique Occidentale Francaise Paris, Larose, 1952, p.195 my translation.

246. AHAK K4682 Bulletin des renseignements du 1er Trimestre 1929. Governor General AOF to Governor General Nigeria no.564 AP/2, 17 June 1929 my translation.

247. AHAK K4682 Conf. K4682/253 dated 4th October 1929, SNP to the Honourable Chief Secretary Lagos.

248. ibid.

249. AHAK K4682 Conf. K4682/266 dated 23rd November 1929.

250. For reports by French see AHAK K4682 Bulletin de renseignements politiques 2 Trimestre 1928; K4682 Bulletin des renseignements politique 3 Trimestre 1928, Governor General AOF to Governor General Nigeria.

251. ibid.

252. J.O. Hunwick, Arabic Literature of Africa Vol.II The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa E.J. Bril 1995, p.193.

253. Sokprof 3336 Sokoto Province Report no.12 for the year ending 31st December 1915 by Arnett.

254. P.K. Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto ... p.292.

255. Sokprof C126 Sokoto Native Administration Conf. no.16/1925/1 Resident to Lt. Governor Northern Provinces at Gusau: Political Situation in Sokoto, 21/6/1925.

256. P.K. Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto op. cit., p.297.

257. See letter of Sarkin Musulmi Muhammadu dan Muhammadu (i.e. M. Tambari) to Resident Sokoto, complaining about the Waziri Abbas, Sunday, 23rd August 1929 in Sokprof C126 Sokoto Native Administration.

258. See The Information on Muhammad Tambari given the British by one Malam Jari, an ex-government courier in Sokprof C22 Clements murder - Summary.

259. Sokprof S.0821 Notes on an interview accorded to the Sultan by His Honour at Sokoto, 10th January 1931.

260. ibid.

261. Sokprof S.0821 Memorandum Conf. no. W1/1930/59 Sokoto 14th January 1931. D.O. to Resident Sokoto Province (at Argungu) Sarkin Musulmi, resignation of.

262. Sokprof S.0821 Colonie du Niger, cercle de Konni no.45, L'Administrateur to Resident Sokoto Konni, 6th February 1931.

263. Sokprof S.0821 Conf. Sokoto to Konni, 7th February 1931.

264. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes Indigenes au Niger op. cit., vol.2, p.1152.

265. Sokprof C10 Sultan Muhammad Tambari; see list of followers; SNP to Resident memo no.14350/432, 13th April 1932, see also letter from Muhammad Tambari (in Illela) to the Resident received on 5/11/1931.

266. Sokprof C48 Gwadabawa, Gada, Danchadi and Tangaza Districts affairs; paraphrase

of code wire to SNP, 17/2/1931, and Conf. 15/1931/3 dated 24/2/1931 from Resident Sokoto to SNP.

267. Sokprof C48 D.O. to Resident 5/4/1931.

268. Sokprof C48 Conf. no.15/1931/9 Sokoto Resident to SNP Kaduna, 10/4/1931.

269. Sokprof C10 Sultan M. Tambari, Conf. 14350/233 SNP to the Honourable Chief Secretary Lagos, 22/10/1931.

270. Sokprof C10 Sultan M. Tambari Tel 14350 Lt. Governor N.P. to Governor Niamey, 3/9/1931.

271. Sokprof C10 Sultan M. Tambari Conf. 14350/233 SNP to the Honourable Chief Secretary Lagos, 22/10/1931.

272. Sokprof S.0821 Sokoto officials to Resident.

273. Sokprof C10 Conf. C34/1930 Resident to SNP dated 20/11/1931.

274. ibid.

275. Sokprof C22 Clements Murder, Resident to SNP.

276. Sokprof C22 Clements Murder, Summary.

277. In his letters to Muhammad Tambari he called himself Sarkin Adar whereas in Adar history, the only Sarkin Adar was and still is the descendant of Agabba staying now in Illela (Niger Republic).

278. It is worth noting that Muhammad Tambari associated with wizards and sorcerers. They became so influential in Sokoto politics and life that the Resident Sokoto thought a proclamation was necessary to expel them from Sokoto. The proclamation was made in August 1930, but shortly afterwards, one of them, the

most notorious one, Anglo Boka from Nassarawa (French territory) reappeared in Sokoto. See Sokprof S.0821 Sarkin Musulmi; statements by waziri and chief Alkali.

279. It is even said that Sarkin Musulmi sent 28 mallams in retreat (Khalwa) to help him obtain his wish, i.e. to drive the white men to the sea. See Sokprof C22 List of mallams said to have gone into retreat.

280. All these letters can be found in Sokprof C22 Clements Murder (2).

281. The plot was said to be the killing of 12 white men and to drive the white men from Nigeria see Sokprof C22 Summary.

282. As a justification to this change of policy the British began to denigrate the Attiku line. For instance, the Secretary, Northern Provinces, wrote in 1934: "The general opinion among natives of the Moslem provinces is that the Atikawa always make bad chiefs and the Bello family good chiefs" to what the Resident Sokoto added". The above is quite true and the Bello rulers are also considered to be luckier, i.e. famines coincide with an Atiku descendant and vice versa". See Sokprof C31 Conf. no.15157/27 dated March 6th 1934, SNP to Resident Sokoto, Confidential handing over notes Sokoto Province with the commentary by the Resident Sokoto (17/3/1934).

283. Sokprof C31 Conf. 10/1932/20 dated 25/2/1934.

284. Sokprof C10 Sultan M. Tambari conf. C159/369 from Resident Benue Province to Resident Sokoto Province, 19th February 1935.

285. Sokprof C10 Affaires politiques no.27 AP. L'Administrateur en chef des colonie, Lt. Governeur p.i.du Niger to the Chief Commissioner of Northern Provinces Kaduna,

7th May 1935.

286. Sokprof C10 L'Administrateur Commandant le cercle de Dosso to Resident Sokoto, no.113, Dosso, 13th May 1935.

287. Sokprof C10 Conf. 159/369 Resident Benue to Resident Sokoto, 19th February 1935.

CHAPTER V

NEW ELEMENTS IN FRONTIER POLICY:

POLITICS AND HAMALLISM: 1939-1960

During the war, the frontier would be a matter of greater concern because of suspicion and even animosity between the British and Vichy France, and also because European powers had thought that Islamic revivalists would take the opportunity of the war to stir up trouble. On the other hand, the mobilisation of French officers for the necessity of war, provoked a shortage in the staff and the watching of Islam became therefore very lax. In Niger colony for instance, 53% of the French political officers were mobilised for the war.[1] As soon as the French were crushed and the vichy regime installed in southern France, the British in Nigeria began to send secret agents into Niger colony to report. The District Heads along the frontier (Gada, Tangaza, Godabawa, Zurmi, Sabon Birni etc.) were very zealous to supply intelligence reports to the Sarkin Musulmi Abubakar who conveyed it to the Political Officers. It seemed that the secret service organised by the Sarkin Musulmi was more efficient than that of the British as far as Niger colony was concerned. Dogarai and District Heads were sent to collect information or even market gossip from French territory, especially on military matters.[2] As for the French, the defeat before Germany rendered them very suspicious more especially vis-a-vis the Muslim revivalists who they thought could create trouble. So, even though they were aware of the existence of a Tijaniya branch, called Tijaniya "eleven beads", or Hamallism before the war, it was during the war that they dealt with it seriously. As is well-known, this branch of tijaniya was called Hamallism after the name

of one Cheikh Hamahullah b. Muhammad b. Umar, born c.1883 at Tishitt in Mauritania and whose family came to Nioro in French Sudan (now Mali). He was the disciple of one Sheikh Sidi Muhammad b. Abdallah who came from Tuat (Algeria) to settle in Nioro in 1900. This Sidi Muhammad was considered as one of the spiritual heirs of the founder of the Tijaniya order, Sheikh Sidi Muhammad al-Tijani (1737-1815). But this branch of Tijaniya developed mainly with Sheikh Ahmad Hamahullah b. Muhammad whence colonial administration called it after his name: Hamallism.

Two main differences can be traced between the Omarian Tijaniya (i.e. introduced by Umar al-Futi of Masina) and Hamallism:

1) On religious grounds, the hamallism went back to the original teachings of Sidi Ahmed Tijani who recommended the recitation eleven times of the Jawharat al-Kawal (the jewel of perfection) whereas the Umarian Tijaniya recited it twelve times[3].

2) On the political scene, the leaders of Umarian Tijaniya tended to be conformists, to manage with the colonial powers whereas Hamallists always opposed the colonial administration. It is worth noting that almost all the measures the French took against the Hamallists, were taken on the instigation of the old Tijaniya members. According to Gouilly, the Qadiriya and Tijaniya saw in the Hamallism a movement that would expand to their detriment and prevent them from getting important revenue, and as a social danger that would sap the customs, disintegrate the established authority, favourise the emancipation of the women, the youth and the slaves.[4] Whence they accused them, without any care of contradiction, depending on the time, of all possible and imaginable tendencies, charging them with pan-Arab and Bolshevik feelings before 1940, pro-British

sympathies during Vichy regime, pro-Germany after the liberation, xenophobic passions in all times.[5]

The first clashes between the French administration and Hamallists occurred in French Sudan (now Mali). Incidents attributed to Hamallism occurred in July 1923 at Nioro, July 1924 at Kiffa; February 1930 at Kaedi and August 1940 at Assaba (all in Mali).[6] As far as our area is concerned, Hamallism reached Niger colony through two channels: The activism of the Hamallists themselves, more especially before 1947 (the reestablishment of Upper Volta) when the cercles of Dori and Fada Gurma were parts of Niger. The cercle of Dori witnessed the emergence of the principal chiefs of Hamallism in Niger colony: Regimiya Savadogo, Abdulaye Dukure and Al-Haj Abubakar alias Seku Ramatulaye, who lived in Wahiguya (now Burkina Faso).[7] They were adept in their activities in our area more especially in the regions of Tera, Tillabery and even Niamey. The second channel was through the action of French administration itself, in deporting into Niger Territory some Hamallist "agitators" who therefore spread the doctrine in Niger territory.[8]

In 1935, the Governor of Niger colony, in his circular no.60 AP dated March 1st 1935, prescribed to the cercles to make enquiries about this "new religion" and, in the same year, the watching of religious personalities was reinforced. Two marabouts, Attouta from the Logomaten Tuaregs of Tera and Mohammed El Fazzi from Tawa area were reported to be "closely watched".[9] To reduce the acuity of Muslim problems, the colonial administration tried to reconcile the Hamallist, with their "brother-enemies" the Qadiriya and Tijaniya. The Senegalese leader of Tijaniya, Seydu Nuru Tall, was given this mission

of reconciliation. In 1938, he undertook a journey through French West Africa and, in Niger colony, he visited the cercles of Niamey, Dosso, Konni, Gure and Tawa, "semant partout la bonne parole" ("telling everywhere the word of God").[10] But this process of reconciliation and conciliatory policy of the French administration towards Islam was stopped by the outbreak of the war. As soon as France was defeated, the colonial administration took a slight pretext to crush the Hamallists and therefore prevent them from "fomenting trouble." The opportunity was provided by what was known as the Nioro-Assaba affair.[12] Sheikh Ahmad Hamahoullah was arrested and his zawiya razed. When he was arrested on 19th June 1941, Sheikh Hamahoullah was sent to the Montlucon jail (France) where he died on 16th January 1943 of pneumonia and heart breaking.[13]

The first Hamallists were recorded in Niger colony in 1930,[14] in the western part of the colony. But Hamallism progressed considerably during the war and shortly after, when it would concern Northern-Nigeria, as we will see later.

Alongside the watching of Hamallism, the French colonial administration also continued to monitor the pilgrimage and other religious activities. In a circular-letter to all the Governors of the French West African colonies, dated 28 September 1941, the Governor General informed them that the circumstances of that time could not allow the organisation of official pilgrimage and that they had to discourage individual journeys to holyland, for the natives could be "worked by foreign powers".[15] A year after, the Governor of Niger colony, Jean Toby, in a circular number 339APA, dated 18 September 1942, instructed the Commandants de Cercle to pay great attention to contain Islamic influences coming from aborad. To do so efficiently, he suggested to them to make use

of native chiefs and religious leaders loyal to France, to help them in watching vagrant mallams and pilgrims. In 1944, the Governor insisted on these measures to be taken and added that particular attention had to be paid to returning pilgrims "who, during their sometimes long journeys, and a capricious itinerary, had acquired xenophobic conceptions to what their title of Haj added value on our populations".[16]

The relations between the French and the British on the common border suffered the situation in Europe. As soon as the French were defeated and the establishment of the Vichy regime, had taken place, relations between the colonial powers became very acrimonious, especially when a pro-German Governor, Brigadier General Falvy was appointed in Niger on the 8 December 1940. He "considered Nigeria to be enemy territory, closed the border and stationed sizeable military detachments ... in the frontier zone". These detachments which spent their time patrolling and digging trenches along the border, were responsible for a number of malpractices which led to more exoduses.[17] Falvy also sent "secret agents" into Nigeria to "spy".[18] It is reported that 27 agents were sent by the French in Niger, on the border to pick up market gossip[19] and two parties of soldiers in Sokoto and Gusau for espionage.[20] The French forbade their natives to cross into British territory.[21] This was very seriously felt by the population as a report reads: "The people of French territory told me that they know the habit of the French to prevent crossing the border but this time it's very serious since the soldiers stay on the frontier from Subahin to Ishai whereas in the past they stayed only to noon".[22] Bunu Gada reported "No one can cross, they guard the roads". The French even resorted to alms and prayers to God. The Commandant de Cercle Maradi, for instance, gave Sarki Dan Kulodo

money to give to the disabled and give prayers to God to bring His mercy.[23] In Agades, colonial reports show one Liman Ahar leading prayers for the victory of the French,[24] in 1940. The French also avoided official contacts with the British as reported by the Chief Secretary Lagos: "No contact with Governor Niamey who has not replied suggestion unofficial representative be sent discuss economics".[25] Despite all these restrictions, Agades Sultan continued to have intercourse with Sokoto owing to his numerous herds being there. In 1942, a colonial report has it that it was difficult to check the Sultan's activities in Sokoto and it could not be exactly stated if these relations had family or political motives.

The British in Nigeria decided to retaliate these measures taken by Falvy in Niger colony. In December 1940, they decided on the establishment of an organisation whose role was "to collate, classify and publish political and economic intelligence covering the whole of West Africa, inclusive of Free French and Vichy-controlled territories, and to coordinate the methods of obtaining such information".[27] The form of such intelligence was divided into internal and external, the latter applying to Frontier Provinces only. It was explained that "since the work will necessitate the employment of agents, etc., funds will be provided and representatives of a specialist organisation will shortly be visiting the areas concerned and will place their services, in an advisory capacity, at the disposal of Residents".[28] A Research Officer was installed in Kano, where the West African Political Intelligence Centre (WAPIC) was domiciled. He had to be sent the external intelligence. So, henceforth, the British in Northern-Nigeria had two channels of intelligence gathering in Niger colony: The Native Authority Channel developed by the Sultan and his District

Heads and the modern British organisation. There was also the Free French mission installed in Nigeria, under the leadership of Commandant Tulenges who visited Sokoto from Lagos in December 1940 and again on 9 January 1941, with a view to getting in touch with French army officers and others in Niger colony. But the officer commanding troops at Birnin Konni wrote to Commandant Tulenges interdicting him from entering French Territory.[29]

So, the Niger-Nigeria frontier became a stake of war between the Vichy-French on one hand and the British and Free French Mission on the other. This situation discarded both cooperation and Muslim threat, the latter more particularly because no Muslim Power was party to the war as it was the case in 1914-1918. Many Muslim clerics took advantage of this laxity in watching Muslim activists, and crossed to British territory, as for example, one Garba Modibo who, at the end of 1941, after a Hamallist rising in the District of Yaga (cercle of Dori) left Dori suddenly and was later discovered at Kangiwa (Nigeria). It was only in 1944 that the French informed the British of the presence of Garba Modibo in their territory.[30] The Governor of Niger colony also reported that in July 1944, 21 persons left Dori cercle to join Garba Modibo at Kangiwa. In fact relations between the French and the British improved in 1943. The Annual Report of Sokoto Province for 1942 reads: "Bad relations with Vichy France continued until the Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa in November. Before then, the four hundred miles of international boundary, which constituted the Sokoto salient into French Niger colony, were repeatedly subjected to frontier violations and incidents; and these often ended in bloodshed and loss of property. An atmosphere of tension and unrest existed in

frontier villages, where the inhabitants fell at the mercy of the Vichy armed frontier guards ..."[31] But in 1943 relations improved and became more and more friendly due to the shifting of colonial administration from Vichy to De Gaulle's side.

During the war, the attitude of French African Muslims was considered as correct. According to a report of 1944, they had been loyal to France. The role of the Senegalese Tijaniya Sheikh Seydu Nuru Tall had been decisive. He toured the French colonies shortly before the war (he came to Niger in 1938) and during the war, preaching fidelity to France.[32] He was considered by the French administration as the leader of Umarian Tijaniya in West Africa and when the two great Moqadam of Tijaniya in Zinder, Malam Chettima Mamadu and Mallam Abba Tchilloum died in 1945, the Governor of Niger colony Toby sent a Telegramme - offering condolences to Nuru Tall.[33] But as soon as the war ended in 1945, the French resumed their negative attitude towards Muslim clerics and the watching of Hamallists became a prime concern. For instance, the Governor of Niger colony sent a letter to Governor Nigeria requesting that Garba Modibo be sent back to Niger. The Niger Governor in addressing Nigerian authorities, prepared them psychologically to share his idea about Hamallism and present it as a great danger to be dealt with. He wrote: "The doctrine preached by Sheikh Hamallah is primarily tainted with xenophobia. It is a revolutionary social-musselman movement which would rapidly lead to a disintegration of the indigenous social and familial organisation".[34] Even though the British considered Garba Modibo as harmless, the pressure exerted on them by the French induced them to advise Garba Modibo, alias Amadu Modibo to return to Niger and in march 1945, the Resident Sokoto Province reported: "Amadu Modibo announced his

intention of returning to French Territory in one month's time".[35] The cooperation between the French and the British concerning particularly the "handing over of undesirables" resumed really in 1944. In August 1944, the Resident Sokoto Province received from the SNP, minutes of the West African council which reads: "The Minister emphasised the desirability of close personal contact between the French and the British officers in all spheres of administration. He referred particularly to the handing over of undesirables who cross from one territory to another. It was, he said, for Governments to instruct their District Officers on general lines as to how far they were to use their discretion. In major criminal cases the full extradition procedure would probably have to be used and cases involving important political personages should of course be referred to the Governor".[36] From that time onwards, collaboration between the French and the British resumed fully and the "muslim plot" myth appeared again especially with the advent of political activities after the war. All French Islamic policy immediately after the war was focussed on the Hamallism. The spread of this doctrine in Niger territory was described by Michel Frerebeau as from West to East: "In Niger, Hamallism existed before the war, but in a sporadic manner, but this movement, taking the old ways of penetration from West to East by Kaya, Dori, through Tera and the river, will soon take such a proportion that in the beginning of 1947, alarm was given by the commandants of Western region of the territory". He added: "starting from Dori the new doctrine reached the cercle of Tillabery, then reached by the way of the river, the District of Lamorde at the very gates of Niamey. The movement spread in oil stain to the Districts of Torodi and Say and contaminated Kirtachi and the Districts of Karma and Birnin Gaure".[37] In his

report for 1944, the Governor of Niger colony wrote that six Hamallists were arrested "pour exces de paroles et de gestes" (for too much talking and gesticulations).[38]

The watching of Hamallists would become very close with their involvement in the post-war political parties. As far as Niger colony was concerned, the first political party to be created was the Parti Progressiste Nigerien (P.P.N.) founded on 12th May 1946, and officially recognised by Arrete No. 701 dated 17th June 1946. When the Federal party, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain was created at Bamako in October 1946, the PPN became the local section of the R.D.A. The latter tried to use Islam as one of its tools, aware of the fact that it was only around Islam that some durable ideals could be formed.

As for Nigeria, the fear of Islamic propaganda appeared again also immediately after the war. The British fear began with the pilgrimage, which according to them was an occasion of bringing back propagandist literature into Nigeria. In June 1945, for instance, the Lieutenant-Governor, Northern Provinces, instructed his Residents to make enquiry and find out any propagandist literature originated from a pilgrim.[39] Their enquiries proved to be fruitless.[40]

The first report on Hamallism as far as we know, appeared in the second Bulletin issued by the Officer of the West African Council, Accra in December 1949. This Bulletin did not mention any Hamallist in Nigeria, but reported that on the French side the hotbeds of Hamallism were Say (cercle de Niamey) and Gaya (Dosso cercle) and that the Governor General of French West Africa paid great attention to Muslim affairs and corresponded with the Governor Nigeria on these issues.[41] In 1950, however, a despatch

from the Chief Secretary Lagos to SNP reads: "There is very little evidence of any Hamallist activity in Nigeria as yet. Only 4 suspected Hamallists are known to have entered the country and none of these has committed any act which might be termed subversive".[42] But the despatch drew attention to the need for watching of Hamallism: "The reason why the movement (Hamallism) has to be watched is that the R.D.A. is known to be working hard on what is left of it, following the normal communist line that Marxism and Islam are on common ground and if these efforts are successful, Hamallism may become a renewed menace not only in French West Africa but in Nigeria".[43]

In fact between 1946 and 1956, the Hamallists endeavoured to play an important role on the political scene. They joined en masse, the political parties particularly the R.D.A. As for Niger colony Fin Fuglestad argued that "Hamallism contributed to the politization of many parts of the west (of Niger territory), and thus paved the way for the first political party in Niger after 1946" and that "the strongholds of Hamallism ... became P.P.N. bastions after 1946".[44] When the Hamallists engaged in politics, the epithets used against them by the French colonial administration changed from xenophobic and intransigent to demented and fanatics with a revolutionary way.[45] From the time the R.D.A. and Hamallists became allied, Nigeria would be interested in the Hamallist for two main reasons:

The first reason is that the control of this Muslim Tarika by a political party namely R.D.A. meant that the latter would use the former for purpose of propaganda in the interior as well as the exterior of its "territories". More so, when some R.D.A. leaders stated that "The R.D.A. was pledged to fight for the freedom of all African colonial

territories". Accordingly, the Paris branch of the R.D.A. for instance, organised a reception for Nigerian students travelling via France to the U.K. in 1950.[46]

The second reason was that Nigeria would be the refuge of prosecuted Hamallists and also those carefully watched by the French administrators, some of whom thought that Hamallism was Fulani in origin.[47]

Attempts were made by the R.D.A. to penetrate the welfare union of Natives of French Africa in Lagos and circulate its Newspaper "Reveil" (Awakening) and to convince Nnamdi Azikiwe, when he paid a visit to Paris, on the virtue of Pan-Africanism. It was even said that there was a group in Kano in touch with the R.D.A. members in Niger Territory.[48] This group was composed of three persons around whom all "subversion" was organised. One Tissa Liman of Bilma origin, who was working for the Christians and lived in Fagge (Kano), who was supposed to be the channel of information between Niger politicians and their supporters in Kano. Tissa Liman worked during the war (1939-45) for the British and supplied information to British political agent, Vlassis, and helped him make contact with De Gaulle's followers in Vichy-controlled Niger colony.[49] The second was one Musa Gros, a driver, who was in 1948 "body guard" of Diori Hamani the leader of the P.P.N. R.D.A.[50] This Musa Gros had connections in Nigeria for he was the motor driver of Sultan Muhammad Tambari for three years and left him when he was deported to Wukari. Musa Gros left Wukari on 21st February 1932.[51] The third person was a cook working for SCOA, named Yakubu whose house was used by natives of French territory once in Kano.[52] According to the Secretary Northern Provinces comments: "probably the traffic is one way at present but it would provide an easy way of introducing subversive

literature into Nigeria. The police are going to keep a careful watch on Tissa Liman".[53]

The British were not aware of the development of Hamallism in their colony. When they spoke of four suspected Hamallists, who entered the country, they showed a great lack of information. For instance, Hamallism was found in Kaura Namoda and Gusau in 1946-1947 and in Gwandu Emirate in 1951. The Emir of Gwandu, aware of the threat, "warned them (Hamallists) not to attempt to stir up opposition to the established authorities".[54] The Hamallists caused trouble in Gusau where their mosques were demolished on the order of Sultan of Sokoto.[55]

In Niger colony, to gain the support of Hamallists, the R.D.A. leaders began the manipulation of the religion. They used Islamic symbols in their meetings and propaganda. Their ideas were expressed in Quranic words. The meeting began with the Fatiha and ended with the invocation of God and His Prophet.[56] The R.D.A. also tried to gain the sympathy of Malams of great repute. They, for instance, approached the influential cleric of Zinder, Malam Falalu, the son of Malam Hassan and grand-son of Malam Suleman, but he refused to join them and immediately informed the Sultan.

In Tawa cercle, at the same period, the commandant reported some people from the area (Barmu) carrying pictures of Hamani Diori with the inscription "Le Seul defenseur des croyants" [the only defender of the faithful].[58]

The clashes between the colonial administration and the coalition of R.D.A.-Hamallists began in 1948 when, on the instruction from the R.D.A., the Hamallists sabotaged the "greniers de Prevoyance".[59] On the 13th of July 1949, the Hamallist mosque at karegoru (near Niamey) was demolished on the order of French colonial

administration.[60] Two important Hamallists were considered as dangerous for the security of colonial powers in Niger: Ali Gati from Karegou and Ali Sadu from Jaguru. The former was sentenced to 5 years exile and 10 years interdiction of sojourn in Niger territory. He was exiled to Widah in Dahomey (now Benin) on 17th December 1949.[61] As for Ali Sadu, he was forbidden from: arbitrating judicial affairs, wandering and teaching. Colonial reports noted about Ali Sadu: "He had the dangerous reputation to be very learned".[62] Another Hamallist colonial administration accused of being messenger between Nigerien and Northern-Nigerian Hamallists was Sumaila Jibrilla, a Songhay from Kolman in Tillabery cercle. He was said to be a disciple of Abdulahi Dukure and he spent some years in the British colonies.[63]

The British therefore decided to watch Hamallists agents who would try to cross the border for propaganda activities. In a correspondence dated March 29 1950, the Government of Nigeria instructed political officers to seek information from French Niger and Chad, particularly in connection with the activities of the R.D.A. and the Hamallists. These pieces of information might concern movement of (R.D.A.) agents across the border; effort to establish "cells" in British territory and French administrative action against the movement. On religious ground, to report the entry of Tijani missionaries from French Territory, Hamallist activities; approaches made to Nigerian pilgrims by nationalist or religious movements particularly communist-inspired bodies based in Egypt and Sudan; and the introduction of subversive agents under the guise of returning pilgrims.[64] But the correspondence warned the British officers vis-a-vis the French, reflecting the old tradition of suspicion: "Unless officers are entirely satisfied of the integrity of their opposite

numbers in French Territory ... no approaches on security matters should be made to French Officials".[65] In French West Africa the departmental officers were resentful at the overshadowing by politics of all other activities: "With the administration, they complained, it was "toujours la politique" (always politics).[66]

The fear of Hamallist activities was reinforced when, at the end of 1953, (November and December) the Western Niger witnessed the coming back from Nigeria of Hamallists who followed Ali Gati in Firni (Nigeria). During the two months, 350 out of 450 Hamallists returned to Niger Territory. One of them, Siddo Gati, brother and follower of Ali Gati, had an interview with the Emir of Lamorde Bubakar Diallo, on 6th November 1953. He explained that his brother Ali Gati, wanted his followers to come back to Niger and stay, because they found very harsh conditions in Nigeria. The Emir of Lamorde accepted their return under the conditions that they kept quiet and abandoned the Hamallist activities.[67] It is worth noting that when he was sentenced to five year exile and 10 years interdiction of sojourn the latter sanction concerned not only Niger territory but also North Dahomey and the cercles of Fada Gurma and Dori.[68] In 1953, the British authorities threatened him with arrest if he failed to leave Firni where he resided, in a matter of weeks. Another cleric from Yaga (Dori), Boubakar, was warned in the same terms.[69] This was an indication that the British authorities had begun the watching of Hamallists efficiently owing surely to the threat they began to feel. Meanwhile, Hamallism continued its expansion in Niger territory and areas hitherto not connected with Hamallism witnessed its appearance. In 1953, it was reported that another centre of Hamallist activities had developed in Tondikandia (Division of Filinge) under the

leadership of a Fulani from Lamorde, Lagare Baba Sadi. But the centre was of minor importance.[70]

It is worth noting, some political developments which took place especially between 1946 and 1960. In 1946, the Constitution of the French Republic (IVth Republic) set a French Union comprising not only the French citizen, but also the overseas French departments and the colonies; the colonized, owing to their integration into the French Union gained French citizenship and were no longer therefore submitted to Indigenat code. Many offences attributed to Muslim clerics (charlatanism, trouble of public order, seditious propaganda, travelling without permission etc...) were punished by the indigenat code. When they gained French citizenship, they had rights as any other Frenchman and at this period, the political parties in Africa under French rule, were, through the R.D.A., affiliated to French Communist Party in National Assembly where Africans were allowed to send delegates. This affiliation to Communist Party in France, developed the ideas of Human Rights, freedom of opinion, press etc. In that period therefore, the local assembly members (after the loi-cadre of 1956, local assemblies were established in each colony of French West Africa) began to defend the Hamallists in the name of freedom of opinion.[71] All the problems between Niger political leaders began when the leaders of R.D.A. decided on the 18th of October, 1950, to separate themselves from the French Communist Party. Djibo Bakary who was already engaged in trade-unionism (syndicalism) and was since 1948, suspended from his post of teaching for having refused a transfer to Dahomey, showed his disapprobation of this separation from French Communist Party. He therefore tried to found a new party representing the former ideals of R.D.A. and called it Union

Democratique Nigerienne (U.D.N.-R.D.A.). The members of P.P.N.-R.D.A. called Djibo's Party U.D.N. RDAK (the K meaning Kominform) and this encouraged colonial administration, in the context of cold war in Europe, to conceive and see Djibo Bakary as a Communist. Djibo Bakary's U.D.N. was founded on April 16th 1954. From that time on, owing to the close relations developed between the U.D.N. and N.E.P.U. in Nigeria, the colonial administration and the leaders of all other parties which backed by the French colonial administration, developed the fear of danger coming from the South (i.e. Nigeria). What determined the relations of Djibo Bakary with Kano, was that his party was East-oriented one and the Hausa people were its principal force. Owing to the fact that the Western Niger was occupied politically by the R.D.A., Djibo believed "nous avions le terrain libre a l'Est du territoire" (we have a vacant ground in the East of the territory). So, Djibo Bakary wanted to consolidate his Hausa aura in coming closer to Nigeria. More especially, his interest in Zinder (Damagaram) made him focus his attention on Kano, where the leaders of NEPU, particularly Aminu Kano, seemed to be ideologically closer to him than the feudalistic N.P.C. The Hausa factor in Niger politics began to operate early in the colonial administration, as for example, in the transfer of the capital from Zinder to Niamey in 1927. Fuglestad stated: "The Hausa were also "suspect" in the eyes of the French because of their Northern Nigerian, i.e. British "connection". This shift of emphasis is in a way symbolized by the transfer of the capital from Zinder to Niamey in 1927, officially because of the shortage of drinking water in Zinder which did indeed create a real problem".[73] Djibo Bakary therefore used the same Hausa factor but in another perspective, i.e. to secure votes. Barkindo reported evidence that the Niger-

Sawaba was founded in Kano, in the house of Al-Haj Adado in the Fagge ward.[74] In Kano history, the Fagge ward symbolized the migration of people of Niger origin into the area.[75] The fact also remains that Aminu Kano's NEPU had considerable support in Fagge District, being composed of immigrants from the North (Damagarawa, Agadesawa etc.).[76] Also, like the U.D.N., Sawaba of Niger, the NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union) was founded (on August 5th 1950) as an opposition to N.P.C. (Northern People Congress founded in 1948 but fully transformed into a political party on October 1st 1951), the latter based initially in Zaria, and then later in Kaduna, and the former in Kano.[77] The opposition to NPC reflected the ancient opposition between the Sokoto people adherents of Qadiriya and the Kano people who cherished the Tijaniya. Kano was associated with the Tijaniya, since the conversion of Emir Abbas (1903-1919) to this Tarika during world war I and this conversion, according to Paden, "symbolized the dissolution of Kano dependence on Sokoto".[78] Emir Abbas was initiated into the Tijaniya by one Abdulwahab Ujidud who came to Kano through Agades, Tawa and Katsina[79] where he finally died on 12th February 1924.[80] This Ujidud had converts in all the areas he traversed and when Ibrahim Niass of Senegal came to Kano in his zeal to unify the Tijaniya, in the 1950s, he reported that "many respected people from Bornu and Maradi came to meet me at Kano"[81] Zinder and Maradi became therefore a kind of Kano hinterland, religiously speaking and Djibo Bakary measured the political benefit he could make from this situation. On political ground, Djibo's conception of African unity corresponded to Aminu Kano's pan-Africanism. In August 1958, for instance, Djibo Bakary is reported to have said to exploit "toutes les possibilites d'harmonie pour sauvegarder l'unite Africaine"

(all the possibilities of understanding to safeguard African unity).[82] Like Djibo, the NEPU leaders had a pan-Africanist outlook with a gradual implementation of goal.[83] On the other hand, the leaders of the parties attached to traditions (NPC) or to the colonial administration (PPN-RDA) showed no enthusiasm for African unity. Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto for example, considered the idea of pan-Africanism as "premature" because he said "our own homes are not yet consolidated".[84] Houphouet-Boigny the leader of the federal R.D.A. said on September 14th 1959: "L'avenir de la Cote d'Ivoire n'est pas en Afrique, mais dans la communaute francaise" (the future of Cote d'Ivoire is not in Africa but in French Community).[85] Diori Hamani, speaking about the Niger-Nigeria boundary on December 18th 1958, in proclaiming the Republic, considered it as "a great handicap".[86] Boubou Hama, one of the great leaders of PPN in Niger and President of the National Assembly talking about African unity even ridiculed the idea. He argued: "L'unite Africaine? Elle ne se fera jamais, comme ne s'est jamais faite l'unite de l'Europe l'unite de l'Amerique ou de l'Asie... l'Unite Africaine est simplement un slogan dont se servent les ennemis de la communante pour torpiller l'oeuvre francaise et faire echouer le marche commun" (African Unity? It will never be made, as has never been made European unity, American or Asian ones... African unity is simply a slogan used by the enemies of the community to torpedo French action and wreck the common market). The French-backed P.P.N. therefore tried to show Djibo Bakary as an anti-French agent and committed to engage in any action which tended to sabotage French interests. So, Djibo's relations with NEPU were seen with great suspicion. When Djibo Bakary sent representatives to various forums organised on African confederation (like in Ibadan where

he sent Mamany Abdulaye, a Damagaram member of the U.D.N., Sawaba, in March 1959) French Government instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs to send a message to these Governments which invited the Nigerien politicians, informing them that the external relations were exclusively French Government concern.[88] What Paris suspected was a plan of secession of Northern-Nigeria and the formation of an "Islamic Republic of Nigeria" which would group around Northern-Nigeria, Niger and Chad.[89] This fear of merger was also founded on the fact, well-known to French colonial administration that Djibo Bakary "found his staunchest allies among the local traders and among the adherents of various Muslim brotherhoods, especially the Tijaniyya".[90] Recent studies actually showed that there was an idea of merging the two countries. It is reported that during the famous DE Gaulle referendum in 1958, Djibo Bakary came to Kano where he consulted the NEPU leadership on what stand to take. He was advised to declare separate independence for his country. The meeting also discussed possible merger of Nigeria and Niger after both had become independent".[91] Djibo Bakary, accordingly, campaigned for "No" and sought for separate independence of Niger, not excluding "a possible future federation with Nigeria".[92] The commandant of Tawa therefore wrote that Djibo Bakary might be considered as a fanatic agitator, crafty and dangerous. His party's implantation might be fought against, discreetly but with the ultimate determination.[93] Accordingly, when the DE Gaulle referendum occurred on 28th September 1958, the colonial administration weighed with great expectation the favour of "yes". Senator Borg, whom Houphouet-Boigny sent especially to Niger to help the R.D.A. secure votes, gave his idea in particular and French fear in general about Djibo Bakary: "It should be stupid to think

that we, the French, could let Niger go. If we lose Guinea, we lose (only) wealth. It can be replaced. But if we lose Niger, we lose (also) Algeria. We open the road to Nasser. We make possible the constitution of a great Muslim state from Lagos to Algerian borders ... Djibo Bakary is not only an international communist agent, he is (also) a fanatic Muslim adept of the Senusiya sect. He is in connivance with Nasser and Nigerian leaders instigated by the British. All of them dream to build a great Muslim state stretching from the Ocean to Algerian and Libyans confines including the Hassi-Messaoud and Edjele regions where petrol and saharan gas pour".[94] The French were so alarmed with the "Djibo question" in Niger that "there were even French troop movements from Algeria into Niger at the time of the referendum".[95] The "yes" votes secured over 300,000 against just over 100,000 for Djibo's "No".[96] Djibo had yet used all his means, including making people swear on the Qur'an that they would vote "No" and consulting Gurmance witch-doctors.[97]

The NEPU for its part, represented the interests of the dispossessed in the face of the NPC which was feudal and NEPU therefore declared itself "diametrically opposed to the interest of all sections of the master class" and "hostile to the party of the oppressors".[98] The NPC infact had a symbiotic relations with the Emirs[99] and as its patron the Sultan of Sokoto.[100] For this reason, the NPC leaders labelled the opposition party (NEPU) as "hidden" forces working against the progress of Islam".[101]

Since the constitution of NEPU as an opposition party, persecutions fell on its members, especially those members of Tijaniya brotherhood. All troubles caused or allegedly cause by the Tijani Muslims were handled very severely by the Native

Authorities. In Sokoto Province, the most important unrests, occurred in Gusau and Kaura Namoda areas. In 1949, the Sultan of Sokoto ordered the destruction of mosques at Gusau and Kaura and based his order on the Shehu's book Thya al sunnah.[102] Another incident between the Yan wazifa (Tijani) and the other muslims occurred at Gidan Maizabo (Sokoto Province) when the Tijani were reported to have been prevented from calling to the prayer. The result was that 5 people were murdered, many were injured and over 200 imprisoned. This was around the Ramadan feast on 8th of May 1956. The Sultan of Sokoto held a meeting at Tambawel on 24th of July 1956 with the Sarakuna of Gwandu, Argungu and Yauri all with their councils, to examine how to deal correctly with the Tijaniya problems.[103] This unrest awakened the somewhat blunted vigilance of colonial administration towards the watching of islam. In the same period, in July 1956, the Divisional Officer, Sokoto reported a Tijani adherent keeping correspondence with Kaolack (Senegal) through Konni. He wrote: "M. Yahaya, who lives in Darna Tsolawo in Godabawa District is the local yan wazifa Mukkadem and went to Kaolak last year. The interesting thing about him is that he is said to collect parcels of pamphlets and tracts at Birnin Konni Post Office every fortnight or so; and these are said to be sent to him direct by Ibrahim Kaolack".[104]

In the 1950s, Tijaniya was not only present in Kano, but even in Sokoto Province where numerous representatives of Ibrahim Niass of Kaolack had to be found and many had made (sometimes many times) the "pilgrimage" to Kaolack. These often created problems for colonial administrators. In Argungu Al-Haj Ibrahim Dan Godiya created trouble in May 1956 and July 1956. He even conspired alongside with Magajin Garin

Argungu against the Emir, Malam Maman of Bakura, who fled to French Territory after May 1956; at Birnin Kebbi Malam Mahammadu brother of Emir of Gandu. Others were, at Funtua Al-Haj Alti who was in high esteem at Kaolack; Maman Bagobiri at Gusau; Malam Hanafi in Gwandu; Alhaj Balarabe at Jega alongside with one Abdulmumin who was a violent preacher and habitually cursed the Sultan and his ancestor, Usman dan Fodio; Malam Jafaru in Katsina; Liman Dan Magaji in Kaura; and in Sokoto town itself one Malam Jodi aspired to drive out the Sultan and replaced him.[105] It was said that the Sultan of Sokoto himself used agent-provocateurs in Bungudu, Gusau, Kaura Namoda districts in order to incite Tijani demonstration and identify the leaders whose arrest followed.[106] At that period, in July 1956, an Arab from French territory, Sherif Mahmoud, toured Northern Nigeria preaching and collecting tribute for the Tijaniya.[107] All these events confirmed to the NPC and the British administrators that the Tijaniya (and therefore NEPU) were the agitators and needed close watching. In other disturbances which occurred in March 1957 the Sultan condemned severely the Tijani and even wrote a letter to the District Heads authorising severe handling of the Tijani arrested.[108] Some Tijani members of NEPU were arrested in Sokoto Province and prosecuted on the orders of the Sultan for "mixing ... politics with religious teaching".[109] In his interview with Thomas Hodgkin on the 6th July 1956, the Sultan of Sokoto denied any organised connection between religions and political parties.[110]

The colonial administration and its allies went even a step further in associating NEPU with communism. As a writer put it: "The other system used to discredit the NEPU by the colonial government was to associate the party with communism and thereafter

mount a powerful anti-communist propaganda to brainwash the people that communism was against the interest of Islam".[111] Orders were issued to Native Authorities to dismiss and henceforth not to give any employment to an active communist.[112]

The NEPU established its connection in Britain with the British Labour Party Parliamentarians[113] whereas NPC forged close relations with the British Conservative Party and the NPC labelled itself "The Conservatives of Northern Nigeria".[114]

It seems that the NPC never tried to establish relations with the parties in neighbouring French territories. Its leaders were very anxious to maintain their relations with the commonwealth.[115] The NPC therefore took no notice of the evolution of political situation in French countries. Concerning the Referendum of September 28 1958, which took place in French West Africa and which had a great significance for African people, the Nigerian citizen commentator was right when he wrote: "Concerning the recent events which involved French territories ... Nigeria has been too busy with its internal affairs to pay them a great deal of attention".[116] The only event which draw the Northern Nigeria authorities attention to the North was "the French atomic tests in the sahara". When receiving Lord Perth, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs in August 1959, the Sardauna of Sokoto submitted the question of Nigeria's security and British responsibility to assure it. He showed therefore how these tests threatened the security of Nigeria: "The sahara is close to our homes and every year we experience the cold harmattan wind bringing with it the dust of the desert. It is but natural that we should show our feelings and I think I am right in saying that never before have the common people of this Region been so concerned or so united about something that is to happen outside its borders".[117]

Only for the anniversary of Niger Republic proclamation in December 1959, that Sardauna sent his representatives, his Minister of Internal Affairs, Malam Shehu Usman Galadiman maska and the Magajin Gari of Sokoto, Malam Aliyu Gummi.[118] They reported to have enjoyed a good welcome.

With the issuing of the loi-cadre in 1956,[119] Niger's evolution, might have been closer to Nigeria. In fact, the elections which came after this loi-cadre were won by Djibo Bakary, leader of the leftist Sawaba Party, and in 1957 he became the Prime Minister of Niger. One could think that Djibo would develop closer relationship with Nigeria, but he and his Sawaba party had, it seems, tried nothing to strengthen their relations with Nigerian authorities. It can be explained by the fact that external relations was the prerogative of France.

The implication of having Africans in the highest level of administration had meant that the colonial administration was concerned only with French interests in Niger and not with the Police duties. The Africans therefore had to concern themselves, as one of their duties, the watching of external threats. They in fact did nothing in this field for they had always considered this policy as repressive.

Another element that blunted the vigilance of politicians was that the Hamallist threat itself declined. Its protector, the PPN-RDA also adopted a low profile due to the formation of new parties and new affinities. As for the decline of Hamallism, Finn Fuglestad stated: "... after 1950 both the PPN and Hamallism declined, the latter to the profit of yet another, but more orthodox branch of the Tijaniya, the Nyassist "sect" whose instigation was Ibrahim Niasse, a renowned cleric from Senegal".[120] The spread of the

"Nyassist sect" in the hotbeds of Hamallism can appear as an anachronism for since 1937 when he visited Kano for the first time, Ibrahim Nyass developed relations with the Tijani of the eastern and central regions of Niger territory (Zinder, Maradi, Agades etc.) whereas Hamallism was essentially a western affairs according to Fuglestad. The old branch of the Tijaniya, which had nothing to do with Hamallism spread in Kano area (with Malam Salga), Hadejia (with the Madani family) and Gure (with Malam Abba Tchilloum) as their leaders. Evidence shows that the Malams of Kano had very close relationships with those of Damagaram and Maradi and during one of his numerous visits to Kano, Ibrahim Nyass stated: "many respected people from Bornu and Maradi came to meet me at Kano".[121] So, the central and eastern zones were very eager to support the orthodox Tijaniya.

The fact that Hamallism was superseded by the old branch of the Tijaniya can be explained by the reconstitution of the Upper-Volta in 1947. The great Mukkadems of Hamallism were Alhaj Bubakar alias Sheku Ramatulaye who lived in Wahiguya (now Burkina Faso), Regimiya Savadoyo and Abdulaye Dukure. Before 1947, they were Niger natives for the cercles of Fada Gurma and Dori, and were integrated into Niger when Upper Volta was divided up between (1932 and 1947).

With the reconstitution of Upper Volta in 1947, the Hamallists from Niger territory were severed from their Mukkadems and looked for another horizon and turned certainly towards Nigeria whence came the ideas and the knowledge.

Another factor of decline of Hamallism in favour of the orthodox Tijaniya was the return in 1953 from Nigeria of Ali Gatti's followers who promised the chief of Lamorde to keep quiet, as we saw it above. It is very possible that they abandoned Hamallism for

the orthodox Tijaniya. Any way, neither Hamallism nor other Muslim sect had challenged the colonial administration overtly after 1950. The Muslim Community was so peaceful that the Government of Djibo Bakary, 1957, decided to conceive a project of the first "Medersa" in Niger, which was to be located at Say. It is fully stated that this Medersa should be "under the authority of the Government Council and the immediate control of the Vice-President of the Council, Minister of Internal Affairs".[122]

After the Referendum of 1958, the PPN-RDA won the majority and Diori Hamani replaced Djibo Bakary as Vice-President of Government Council (i.e. Prime Minister). The new authorities decided to finish with the Sawaba Party and Diori Hamani issued a decree No. 59-174 dated 12th October 1959, interdicting the activities of the Sawaba. Djibo and his adherents were persecuted and most of them went into exile in Ghana, Guinea and Mali. No one of them, as far as we know, had come to Kano. It can be explained by the fact that even NEPU's position at that period was not safe in Nigeria. This attitude of Djibo and his adherents showed that the Francophone factor was more important than the ancient relations even though the fact of going to Ghana contradicts this statement. Djibo and his adherents were perhaps fearful of the relations Diori Hamani waxed with the Northern Nigerian authorities. For instance, when Niger acceded to independence on August 3rd 1960, Shehu Shagari, Minister of Economic Planning, accompanied by Shehu Abass, Secretary to the External Affairs, attended the ceremonies.[123] Inversely, when Nigeria proclaimed its independence on October 1st 1960, Diori Hamani himself, accompanied by Noma Kaka, a member of Niger Assembly, participated in the celebrations.[124]

The most important conclusion we can draw from this chapter is that Islam had been used as a tool of propaganda by political parties. But owing perhaps, to the fear of persecution from colonial administration or the fear of Islam itself, the political parties exercised great cautions in their religious manipulations. They failed, for example, to engage themselves by any promise to the Muslims as to the type of the society they wanted to set up. The period after the war saw more and more, the process of superseding of colonial administrators by black politicians and the democratisation, especially in French countries, limited the repressive action of the colonial administrators on Muslims. But the gap was already large between an introvert Northern Nigeria and a French-looking Niger.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

1. Andre Salifou, Colonisation et Societes indigenes au Niger op. cit., vol.2, p.1154.
2. See Sokprof. C5677 Intelligence beyond frontier 1940.
3. On these questions see Savadogo Boukary: Le Hamallisme en Afrique de l'Quest apres Shaykh Hamahoulla, Universite Paris, 1992 DEA.
4. Alphonse Gouilly L'Islam dans l'AOF Paris, Larose 1952, p.160.
5. ibid.
6. Alphonse Gouilly, p.138.
7. ANN 4E 1.8.
8. Gouilly A. op. cit., p.146.
9. Andre Salifou op. cit., vol.2, p.1153.
10. Andre Salifou, ibidem.
11. See Savadogo Boukary: Le Hamallisme en Afrique de L'ouest op.cit., p.22, n.63.
12. In August 1940, two tribes, the Lughlal and the Tenouajib, fought on the Sudan Mauritanian frontier. This event was interpreted by the French as the beginning of a Hamallist insurrection and was dealt with accordingly.
13. Andre Salifou op. cit., vol.2, p.1152; Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.3.
14. Savadogo B. op. cit., p.68.
15. ANN 4E 9-6 Colonie du Niger 1941. Le G.G. a M. Les Gouverneur des colonies du groupe, No. 1305/D.5, 28/9/1941.
16. ANN 4E 9-6 Teleg lettre circulaire No. 215/APA, dated 17 June 1944. Gouverneur du Niger a Tous cercles et subdivisions.

17. Fugleshad F. A History of Niger op. cit., p.139.

18. ibid.

19. Sokprof. C5752 Secret No. 5752/45 Resident's Office Sokoto to Kano Research Officer, 10/2/1941.

20. Sokprof. C5752 Secret No. 5752/53 The same to the same 24/2/1941.

21. Sokprof. C5752 Report by Mahammadu Bakanu to Sarkin Musulmi 25/7/1940.

22. Sokprof. C5752 From Abdu Dogari to Sarkin Musulmi 26/7/1940.

23. Sokprof. C5752 From Sarkin Zamfara Zurmi Muhammadu to Sarkin Musulmi 22/7/1940.

24. ANN 4E 1-1 Colonie du Niger cercle d'Agades Marabouts et-personages influents 1920-1940.

25. Sokprof. C5752 Co/1/27 Chief Secretary to Resident Sokoto 29/7/1940.

26. ANN 4E 1-1 Colonie du Niger cercle d'Agades Compte-rendu des recherches du mois de juillet 1942.

27. Sokprof. C5752 WAPIC Secret 37987 Chief Secretary Lagos to Resident Sokoto 24/12/1940.

28. ibid.

29. ibid, Secret No. 5752/18 Resident Sokoto to the Research Officer Kano 13/1/1941.

30. Sokoto State History Bureau So/500 Tijjanism Conf. 1554/182 SNP to Residents Sokoto, Katsina, Kano. Translation of a letter from the Governor, Niger Colony to the Governor of Nigeria dated 27th October 1944, Kaduna 29th November 1944.

31. Sokprof. 6014 Provincial Annual Report 1942 by Commandant Carrow Senior

Resident.

32. Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.67.

33. ANN uncatalogued No. 11APA/CP Governeur du Niger a Seydou Nourou Tall 2/1/1945.

34. Sokoto State History Bureau File No. So/500 Tijanism Conf. No. 1554/182 extract in SNP to Resident Sokoto 29 November 1944.

35. Sokoto History Bureau So/500 Tijjanism Conf. 6207/12 Resident Sokoto to SNP March 15 1945.

36. Sokprof. 5653 Vol.III Frontier Intelligence Circular No. 27135/48 SNP to Resident Sokoto, Kaduna 15 August 1944.

37. In Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.45.

38. Quoted in Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.23.

39. Arewa House Archives 4682 No. 4682/449 SNP to Residents, Kaduna, 27 June 1945.

40. See the same file 4682.

41. Arewa House Archives 41248 Anglo-French Relations Vol.I Second Bulletin of OWAC, Accra, December 1949.

42. AHA 41248 Security 122/3 Nigerian Secretariat Lagos to SNP 29 March 1950. Appendix II.

43. ibid.

44. Fin Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.132.

45. Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.23.

46. AHAK 41248 Anglo-French Relations Vol.I.

47. Archives de Etudes Nigeriennes No.13.

48. AHAK 41248 Anglo-French Relations Vol.I.

49. ibid, Kano No. 331/7 8/11/1948.

50. ibid.

51. Sokprof. C10 Sultan Muhammadu Tambari Memo No. 14350/432 dated 13 April 1932, SNP to Resident Sokoto.

52. AHAK 41248

53. ibid.

54. Omar Bello, The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello op. cit., p.135.

55. ibid, see also Asma'u op. cit., p.495.

56. Savadogo Boukary op. cit., p.55.

57. ANN Zinder Fiches des renseignements surles marabouts, uncatalogued.

58. ANN 17-1-10 R-Malfeittes Recensement 1950, p.95.

59. Savadogo Boukary p.54, The "greniers de Prevoyance" were the bins where corn was stored in provision of famine or drought. They were initiated after the 1932 great famine.

60. ibid, p.66.

61. Archives des Etudes Nigeriennes, No.13, p.16, see also AHAK 41248, No. 52426/256.

62. ANN 4E 1-8. Subdivision de Tera 1944 Fiche des renseignements surles marabouts.

63. ANN 4E 1-7 Colonie du Niger cercle de Tillabery le 17/11/1943.

64. AHAK 41248 Anglo-French Relations, Vol.1 Security 122/3 Nigerian Secretary to SNP.

65. ibid.

66. Secret Annexe to third Bulletin issued by the Office of West African Council, No.52426/256 Nigerian Secretary to SNP 16 June 1950.

67. ANSOM C2230 d-2 Revue des evenements du 4 e Trimestre 1953.

68. ibid.

69. ibid.

70. ibid.

71. Boukary Savadogo op. cit., p.24.

72. On all these questions see: Finn Fuglestad: A History of Niger 1850-1960, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

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73. Finn Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.125.

74. Barkindo Bawuro M. "Relations between Kano and the Republic of Niger's Regions of Asbin (Air), Maradi and Damagaram" in A.I. Asiwaju and Barkindo ed The Nigeria-Niger transborder cooperation 1993, pp.123-141.

75. On the history of Fagge see Fage, M.D. "A socio-economic history of Fagge since 1903" M.A. (Hist.) Dissertation 1988.

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77. On these questions see: Duddley B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, C.S. Whitaker Jr. op. cit., Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968.

78. John N. Paden: Religion and Political Culture in Kano, University of California Press, 1973, p.69.

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80. AHAK file 15543 Pseudo-Tijani Missionaries in Nigeria. Enclosure to Conf. 1/24 dated 16/2/1924 from Resident Zaria to Secretary Northern Province.

81. John Paden op. cit., p.110.

82. Mamoudou Djibo, Les Transformation politiques au Niger op. cit., vol.1, p.313.

83. C.S. Whitaker Jr., The Politics of Tradition op. cit., p.408.

84. Daily Times of Nigeria, January 19 1960, p.1.

85. Mamoudou Djibo op. cit., vol.1, p.313.

86. ibid. In fact Diori's policy towards Nigeria was largely dictated by the Hausa factor. For instance, during Nigerian civil war (1967-70) Diori is reported to have said to a meeting on the crisis that "while he sympathised with the plight of 'les pauvres Biafrans' if Niger made any overt move toward greater recognition, his people would not allow him back in the country" see Abdullahi Mahadi, The Roles of Neighbouring Countries in the Nigerian Civil War, Zaria 1986, D.T. 32.

87. Mamoudou Djibo op. cit., p.313.

88. ibid, p.81.

89. ibid, p.80.

90. Finn Fuglestad "Djibo Bakary, The French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger" op. cit.

91. Barkindo, B.M. Relations Between Kano and Niger Republic's ... op. cit.

92. ibid. But some sources accused also Djibo of wanting to create "a greater Niger" because of his frequent visits to Gao in French Sudan (now Mali) where he contacted Songhay people; and in North Dahomey (now Benin) where he supported the politicians from the North "who threatened to secede and join Niger if the North did not get a fairer share of the territorial budget". See F. Fuglestad "Djibo Bakary, The French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger".

93. Finn Fuglestad, A History of Niger, p.181.

94. Quoted in Idrissa Kimba, Guerres et Societes op. cit., p.207, Note 7. my translation.

95. Kaye Whiteman "A Favourite Son Betrayed" in West Africa No.3742, 8-14 May 1989, p.724.

96. ibid.

97. F. Fuglestad, "Djibo Bakary, The French and the Referendum..."

98. In Irving Leonard Markovitz Power and Class in Africa, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1977, p.161.

99. Al Haj Mahmood Yakubu, An Aristocracy in Political Crisis: Zamanin Siyasa in the Nigerian Emirates, Ph.D. Oxford, 1991, p.12.

100. Duddley B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.143.

101. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.196, Note 92. Quoting the Nigerian Citizen of 3rd April 1957, p.1.

102. Sokoto State History Bureau File No. So/500 Tijjanism: Translation of Sultan's minutes on page 26 of File No. NAW/244, 3/8/1949.

103. Sokoto History Bureau So/500 Tijjanism No. SM/74/S.3, Sokoto 25/7/1956.

104. So/500 Tijjanism, C.22 D.O. i/c Sokoto Resident 29 July 1956.

105. ibid, O.138 Secret Tijani Tarikha, Kaduna, 15th August, 1956.

106. ibid.

107. ibid.

108. Duddley B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, p.189.

109. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.249.

110. Sokoto State History Bureau C312 Islamic Propaganda. C312/122 Sokoto, 6 July 1956 notes on visit of Mr. Thomas Hodgkin.

111. S.E. Majuk, Islam and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.250.

112. Sokprof. 8382 Sec. 206/S.1/65 Acting Civil Secretary to all Residents; Communists

in the service of Native Authorities 22nd June 1955.

113. Al Haj Mahmood Yakubu: An Aristocracy in Political Crisis op. cit., p.170.

114. ibid, p.187.

115. For instance when the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Kwame N'Krumah visited Northern Nigeria in January 1959, the Sardauna in one of his speeches said: "... he (N'Krumah) was also sufficiently great in mind to realise that in doing so (in leading his people to independence) there was neither need nor justification for breaking the close bonds of friendship forged with the people of Britain and its Commonwealth" see Nigerian Citizen No.699, Saturday, January 31, 1959, p.1.

116. Nigerian Citizen No.697, Saturday, January 24 1959.

117. Nigerian Citizen No.761, Wednesday, August 26 1959; for this problem, Nigeria broke its diplomatic relations with France in January 1961. Afterwards Niger and Dahomey, whose interests were represented by France Embassy, became not represented and only at that time they endeavoured to "open" embassies in Lagos. France interests were meanwhile represented by Mr. Louis Noe, Ambassador of Holland in Lagos, see Le Temps du Niger No. 196 du Vendredi 6 Janvier 1961, No. 198, du Lundi 9 Janvier 1961 and No.205 du Mardi 17 Janvier 1961.

118. Nigerian Citizen No.794, Saturday, December 19 1959.

119. The loi-cadre was a measure taken by French Administration in Paris to initiate Africans to the administration of their country. Local Assembly had to be elected and the party that won majority in this Assembly (which had limited powers) had to nominate the Prime Minister. Another element of the loi-cadre was that from

that time, the territories (colonies) had to move separately from the others i.e. the federal frame was broken and each colony (territory) developed by its own.

120. F. Fuglestad: A History of Niger op. cit., p.132.

121. John N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, University of California Press, 1973, p.110.

122. J.L. Triaud "L'Islam et l'Etat en Republique du Niger (premiere partie) in Le Mois en Afrique 16° annee (192-193) December 1981 - January 1982, pp.9-26.

123. Le Temps du Niger No.68, Jeudi 4 Aout 1960.

124. Le Temps du Niger No. 112 du Lundi 26 Septembre 1960.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The 19th century witnessed two major events in Hausaland: the jihad of Shehu Usman dan Fodio in the beginning of the century and the colonial conquest at the end of the same century. These conquest and the establishment of colonial domination were grafted on the 19th century legacy and the whole episodes produced a society full of contradictions: contradiction between the local rulers and the ruled; between the foreign rulers (Europeans) and the local ones and, between these two dominators and the people. The people themselves were not homogeneous and were divided into rich and poors, freemen and slaves. Each of these groups wanted to play a role in the new situation. The intellectual class, the mallams, were theoretically supposed to guide them especially in handling the new challenge: colonialism.

The colonial powers found in Hausaland, particularly in Northern Nigeria, a centralized political and judicial system that they used in their administrative policy.

Long before the advent of colonial rule, the Emirate system was no longer that inherited from the jihad leaders and there was a restoration of the sarauta system.[1] All the evils, the jihadists accused the sarakuna of Hausaland of, and for toppling them, were found in the Emirate system at the end of the 19th century. At the end of the 18th century, the sarakuna of Hausaland were accused of being oppressive rulers and of mixing Islam with shirk (fetishism). In the same way, at the end of the 19th century, the Emirs and the Caliphs had already betrayed the ideals of the jihad and ruled as did Hausa rulers. The Mahdist manifestations of the end of the 19th century were the signs of crisis of

confidence between the rulers and the ruled. Humble mallams expressed their discontent in leading people in movements of migrations, mainly towards the East. The authorities themselves understood very easily the matter and quelled these discontent ruthlessly.

One of the major developments in the colonial conquest was the partition of Hausaland into French, British and German territories. Between the French and the British, the first attempt at drawing a frontier was by the Declaration of 5th August 1890 which drew a line from Say on the River Niger to Barwa on the shores of Lake Chad. Many changes and rectifications took place before the frontier was finally settled, where it now is and the agreements were signed and ratified only in 1910-1911. The consequence of that policy of colonial powers was the separation of people who, for centuries had been close and had a consciousness of unity. This unity, forged during the centuries, was particularly strengthened by the 19th century jihad which brought people together under the control of Sokoto. How dramatic was the issue of cutting off people and trying to administer them separately, by the different colonizers and through different methods? The main issue of the debate was how the Islamic factor influenced the relations between the French colony of Niger and British Northern Nigeria. Relations during the colonial period were tinged with the 19th century legacy. For instance, the chapter of strife between Kebbawa and Sokoto was closed only in 1934, when the Sultan of Sokoto, Hassan (1931-1938) visited Argungu in response to the visit paid to Sokoto by Sarkin Kebbi, Sama (1882-1915), in 1907.[2]

In fact one of the major changes in political sphere in the 19th century was the formation of the Sokoto Caliphate which covered a large area and was paid bay'a by the

Sultans of Ahyar and even by Masina.[3] This bay'a paid by Sultan Al-Bakri (1797-1808) to the Shehu would be the basis of Sokoto's claim on Ahyar and until the end of the century, Sokoto Caliphs placed Ahyar in their orbit, as for example, Caliph Abdurahman (1891-1902) who, in a treaty with the Agent-general of the Royal Niger Company in 1894 stated that "Asben, Adamawa ... are included in my dominion".

As far as Sokoto's relations with the north were concerned, it seemed that the Attikawa carried out, more than the Belloites, a northern policy. Abubakar Attiku (1837-42) himself wrote many letters to the Tuaregs especially the Kel-Gress to remind them of their allegiance to Sokoto and bring peace among them.[4] His son, Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-1866), created an opposition in Gobir dynasty in sheltering Dan Halima and allowing him to found Sabon Birni as twins capital of Gobirawa in 1865. The son of Ahmadu Zaruku, Muhammad Maiturare (1915-1924) before he was appointed sultan in 1915, was the overseer of the northern part of the Caliphate, superseding the Sarkin Yaki of Binji during the last decade of the 19th century. He was the most important figure of the Caliphate, as far as the defence of the Caliphate was concerned. He owed this position mostly to the employment he gave to his Tuareg allies, of whom he had a contingent armed with guns and loyal to him. The son of Muhammad Maiturare, Muhammadu Tambari fled to Niger territory when he abdicated in January-February 1931. He also developed close correspondences with chiefs in French territory which made the British and the Sokoto officials angry with him.

When the British conquered Nigeria, they found a society easy to rule because of the political and administrative structures and literacy developed mainly with the jihad.

It was this situation, coupled with the shortage of British staff that led to what was known as indirect rule. In fact the British took-over the Royal Niger Company's administration whose charter, granted in July 1886, was revoked in 1899 and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria proclaimed on January 1st, 1900. The French, on their part, instead of making commercial advance, "sent military columns which terrified the populations and created a panic which resulted in "psychosis of French rule". Their administration was direct and they elaborated an indigenous code which allowed abuses, embodying in every French man in the colonies, all the powers (disciplinary, justice, compulsory public works etc.). In each French citizen there was France.

Before imposing their domination, the colonial powers defeated physically, the ancient ruling classes in British as well as in French spheres. The scholars failed to agree on what step to take, some suggesting emigration whereas the others preferred the taquiyya (unheartedly cooperation). The ulama who defended the position of leaving Hausaland which, according to them, had become a kaffirland, finally migrated with Caliph Attahiru (1902-1903) and many of them, comprising Attahiru himself, suffered martyrdom at Burmi on July 27th 1903. This position was represented by the Alkali Abdallah b. Ali who was imputed the responsibility of Attahiru's Hijra.[5] The Sokoto officials and Ulama who chose the taquiyya were led by Muhammad Buhari, the Waziri of Sokoto (1887-1910). These various responses to the colonial conquest from the ruling classes themselves put the masses in confusion and many humble people preferred to join Caliph Attahiru in the hijra. This hijra would shape all the British Islamic policy for when Attahiru was killed, at Burmi, his son, Muhammad Bello, known as Mai-Wurno, led the

remnants of his father's followers, about 25,000 people, to the Blue Nile, in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where he founded a community almost under the tutorship of Abderahman, son of the Mahdi of Sudan. Mai-Wurno founded this community around 1906. This situation coupled with the fear of Sudan Mahdism, made the British to focus all their attention towards the East, whence the danger was supposed to come.

After the first battles for the conquest of the area, engaged by the British and the French against the resistances in Hausaland, it became evident for them that only Islam could help to stir up trouble in their respective colonies. This conviction came not only from their respective experience of conquest elsewhere in Muslim countries, but also from the fact that the first resistances in Hausaland took Islamic forms of expression. In Western Niger in 1906, Alfa Saybu fought the infidels and at the same period in Sokoto (at Satiru) one Malam Issa proclaimed himself Mahdi and resisted arrest. These events made the colonial powers to "open the eyes" awaiting for Muslim plotters. But until that period (1906) relations between the colonial powers were tinged with suspicion and even hostility, the feelings that resulted from economic competition in the area, particularly around the rivers and Lake Chad. So, before engaging in cooperation to deal with Muslim plotters, it was through competition (economic then political) that the French and the British came into contact in Hausaland.

As soon as the revolts occurred however, the colonial powers kept the competition aside and worked for cooperation against their common enemies: the "Mahdist agents" and "Muslim plotters". In 1906, at Sokoto, the British hanged Alfa Saybu to avenge the killing of two French officers in Zarma territory. The French thanked their "brothers" for

this act.

An attempt of periodisation was made through the events which brought cooperation very close between the French and the British or events which involved people on both sides of the border. The year 1906 witnessed the first organised attempt at ousting the infidels from Hausaland by a series of revolts stretching from Western Niger through Sokoto to Damagaram and Hadejia. These events occurred when the frontier was not even settled definitely and the only border policy we can speak of in that period was the attempts made by the colonial powers to side with local populations living on the border, with them or to argue that the area they claimed was part of the state the convention gave them.

But when the revolts occurred, the European powers sought the cooperation of each other, especially the French tried to get the cooperation of the British to check the movements of "vagrant mallams" and prevent them from carrying messages from abroad into Hausaland. But the British, owing to the support they got from Native Authorities especially in quelling the Satiru revolt, adopted the policy of siding more and more the Sokoto officials with them. They rewarded largely the Native officials who showed loyalism to them, the most important of them being the Sultan Attahiru II who was awarded a C.M.G.

As for the French, they also rewarded the Emir of Say, Alfa Kaka Ize (boosting his canton of Say into a Province in 1907) but they adopted the policy of repression and therefore sharpened their repressive measures concerning the movements of scholars. The British didn't lend an attentive ear to the French proposition of cooperation despite two

correspondences addressed them by the Governors of French West Africa: Roume in 1906, and William Ponty in 1907.

After the 1906 revolts, no other challenges came to trouble the colonial powers until the first world war. This can be explained by the close watch exerted on the "trouble-makers" but also by the fact that the repression developed fear among the population, the native chiefs whose loyalty was not sure were removed and the political agents completed the task.

When the war broke out, the Muslim opinion leaders in British as well as in French colonies expressed their independence vis-a-vis the Turks and showed their commitment to side with the colonial powers. So, the latter were somewhat surprised by the outbreak of the Kaussan rebellion in the "French Sahara", besieging Agades French post for 81 days. The colonial powers reacted promptly, Lugard even proposing to send aircrafts to quell easily the Senussi rebels.

This Kaussan rebellion was the event which really led to close cooperation between the French and the British. The latter sent three military columns into Southern Niger, to prevent the Southern Tuaregs either from rebelling or from giving assistance to the rebels. They also expelled armed Tuaregs who took refuge in Northern Nigeria.

But as soon as the Kaussan rebellion was quelled, the British came back to their traditional position of watching "the route to the Mahdi". The French, after crushing ruthlessly the revolt and imposing heavy fines on the Tuaregs rebels, exerted a close watching on the Senussiya and its agents. Whereas the revolts of 1906 in Satiru and Kopkitanda (Western Niger) were local, the kaussan rebellion was an attack master-minded

from the exterior by the Senussi and carried out under the leadership of local Senussi agents. But as we saw it, the socio-economic conditions, more than the religious factor, determined the rebellion in Ahyar.

But the colonial powers, making their conclusions on intelligence reports, some times of doubtful agents, even linked the Kaussan rebellion to Mahdism. When Palmer discovered the Mahdist community of Dumbulwa in 1923, enquiries made revealed that Kaussan had relations with Said ben Hayat and that two people who came from Ondurman in Sudan, by name, Sherif Musa and Haj Shuaibu, visited Said b. Hayat at Balda before joining Kaussan in Agades. The Dumbulwa affair had connection with Niger territory, not only because of its so-called relations with Kaussan, but also because many of Said's followers came from Niger territory. This Dumbulwa affair certainly echoed in French West Africa for, in December 1923, the Lt. Governor of Niger colony, Jules Brevie, decided to undertake the study of Islam in Niger to see how far it was influenced from abroad, especially from Nigeria. The officer in charge of the study, concluded that only the leader of Hadejia, Tijani settlement Madani, could be a danger for the French. When the Tassawa raid occurred in 1927, it was a great surprise for the French who had discarded all eventuality of unrest, Sultan Barmu of Tassawa having assured them of the pacifist attitude of the population. The fact that the raid was carried out into French territory by the "fanatics" from British colony, the British concerned themselves with it as well as the French themselves. Severe measures were taken against officials who failed to do their duty: Sultan Barmu of Tassawa was dismissed and exiled to Nara in French Sudan (now Mali); Waziri Haruna of Katsina who seemed to be informed of the plot and

refused to report, was also dismissed; the Emir of Daura was seriously warned for his failure to watch the mallams. Very harsh measures were taken to monitor the movements of mallams and a march was organised by the French and the British along the border to intimidate the population and especially to show "that the British and the French are at one in determination to preserve peace".[7] In Katsina the Emir toured his principal towns to warn people against public preachers and to order them to bring to his notice any offender who dared to preach publicly.[8]

Very close cooperation developed between the two colonial powers, after the Tassawa raid and a French official remarked that "the Tassawa raid made British and French cooperation to be very close". The British engaged in the research of Tassawa raiders and sent agents on the pilgrims road to look for the Tassawa aggressors.

Another attack occurred shortly after the Tassawa raid; Mr. Clements a foreman, was killed at Kuria near Kaura-Namoda on 3rd March 1928. The village of Kuria suffered harsh measures because the inhabitants observed an unsatisfactory attitude. The Village Head was dismissed. The French sympathised with the British in this occasion and as soon as the murder occurred, the Administrateur de Cercle Maradi began the investigation.

The year 1928 is important because it began a somewhat continuous cooperation between the French and the British especially exchange of Intelligence on religious matters. Not only that the Tassawa raid and Mr. Clement's murder encouraged this cooperation, but a British official, G.J. Lethem, after a journey to the Hedjaz advocated the exchange of Intelligence with French. Also, in 1929, H.R. Palmer, the Lt. Governor of Northern Nigeria travelled through French West Africa and he was in Niger in April

1929. He discussed with the Lt. Governor of Niger colony, Jules Brevie, sundry matters and insisted on the exchange of Intelligence Reports. These reports were exchanged through the Governor of French West Africa and the Governor General of Nigeria. But even at the local level it was suggested that the Residents of frontier provinces exchanged with their French counterparts (Administrateurs de Cercles) information on important matters according to a period they agreed on. These reports were exchanged quarterly. That close cooperation became fruitful as early as 1929 when Fona, a Kel Tafidet Tuareg who fled after the Kaussan rebellion, returned to Kano area sent by the Senussiya to try to stir up trouble. He was arrested by the British and handed over to the French who imprisoned him in Niamey until he died.

It was also fruitful for the British, when it came to handle the Muhammad Tambari case. When Sultan Muhammad Tambari abdicated in January 1931 and escaped house arrest to proceed to the North on 6th February 1931, he found the Administrateur of Konni in a state of mind very cooperative with the British. As soon as the ex-Sultan called on him, the Administrateur wrote to the Resident Sokoto to investigate and meanwhile refused him permit to settle in the area the ex-sultan asked for. The cooperation allowed the colonial powers to handle without any difficulty, the ex-sultan's case. But Muhammadu Tambari's episode closed for a time the cooperation between the French and the British for, after his death in January 1935 in Wukari (Benue) and the investigation in French colony of Niger about the vehicles he was said to have left, no other exchange of Intelligence on religious matters, as far as we know occurred, until the outbreak of the war.

The first three years of the war (1940-43) were those of animosity between the British and the Vichy-controlled territory of Niger. A General was appointed as Governor of Niger colony on 8th December 1940, and he took very harsh measures of control of the frontier, making soldiers to patrol and even dig trenches in case of invasion. The British on their part, set up various organisations to gather Intelligence in French as well as in British colonies. Two of these organisations interested themselves with Niger territory: WAPIC (West African Political Intelligence Center) and PERO (Political and Economical Research Organisation). These organisations used secret agents to gather Intelligence from Niger colony and enter into contact with anti-Vichy French administrators. One of these agents, Muhammad Karfe of Fagge (Kano) even reached Agades and entered into contact with the French Commandant de cercle but he was arrested and sent into custody in Bilma.

But relations improved from 1943 when De Gaulle was recognized as the paramount authority over French West Africa, instead of the Vichy regime. The two colonial authorities therefore resumed cooperation and attention was immediately drawn to "Muslim plotters" for the French signalled to the British presence in Nigeria of "undesirable mallams" from Niger colony and asked for their extradition.

In French West Africa, the war gave pretext to the French to crush a movement called Hamallism, a Tijaniyya branch whose leader Sheikh Hamahoullah b. Muhammad, was arrested following minor troubles, and sent into jail in France where he died. The fear of this sect would shape all the French "post-war" policy towards Islam. This fear was reinforced by the emergence of political parties which were supposed to use Islam

for political ends. As a matter of fact, Hamallists engaged in politics and the first political party in Niger, the PPN (Parti Progressiste Nigerien), created on 12th May 1946, sided more and more with the religious groups, especially the Hamallists. The French warned the British against this sect and the use that could be made of it for political propaganda in Nigeria.

The British began to take Hamallism as a serious matter when disturbances occurred in Gusau and Kaura Namoda in 1949, and were attributed to Tijaniyya. Also, the Tijaniyya supported NEPU against the British-sided NPC, heir of the Emirate system, and which called itself the "conservatives of Northern Nigeria". NEPU and UDN-Sawaba of Niger developed relations especially because Djibo Bakary wanted to secure Hausa votes. In African politics the Sawaba of Niger, like NEPU was in favour of panafricanism, with gradual implementation of goals. When the two colonies acceded to independence in 1960, the two parties favourable to the colonial powers (PPN-RDA in Niger and NPC in Northern Nigeria) secured power whereas NEPU and UDN-Sawaba were in opposition, the UDN of Niger was even banned in October 1959.

This study tried to raise some issues regarding the impact of colonial domination on African societies. The main issues of debate are the frontier policy of the colonial powers as far as controlling or containing Islamic influences or "Muslim plotters" are concerned, and the responses of the intellectual classes to the situation of colonial domination. This issue is interesting for it can show how the intellectual class conceived its responsibility as such and how the colonial powers tried to prevent this class from performing its role in a situation of crisis. Two major factors weakened the role the

mallams class could play in this situation of colonial domination.

The first was that very early, during the colonial period, the caliphal authorities sided with the British, preventing therefore the intellectuals from any authoritative basis or backing of action against the colonial powers. In fact before the colonial conquest, the Sokoto Caliphate had many enemies (run-away slaves, people in revolts and many others disgusted with the caliphal system for a reason or another) some of whom took a large part in the conquest of the Caliphate as reported by a British author:

"Our West African troops, with the exception of the West India battalions at Sierra Leone and a few Gold Coast Fantis, are all Moslem of the hinterland. I have heard the stories of some of these men, and they were much alike. Often they are the sons of the less esteemed wives of some northern ruler, proud of their birth, or persons who, having fallen from places of dignity through intrigue or misfortune, disdain to work or trade. Thus they come south, being already skilled in arms, to enter the service of the British Government or the Royal Niger constabulary".[9]

So, many among the intellectuals and humble classes, identified their interests and took their party. Many mallams were reported to colonial powers by other mallams. The colonial powers gained the support of the great opinion leaders and rewarded them with posts in the colonial administration (particularly as scribes in French side). Those who failed to enter British or French administration, led revolts. The third group is that of mallams who fought the Europeans on religious grounds. So, this lack of unity on the part of the religious authority, weakened the resistance.

The second fact was the lack of clear consciousness on what to do after ousting the

Europeans. Many wanted to come to the status ante (the situation before the colonial conquest). Kaussan, for example, tried the mobilisation of Tuaregs only, if we refer to the letters he addressed to the people in the area. Fuglestad argued that there was a reactionary dimension to the Tuareg revolts for they "aimed quite simply ... at reestablishing the situation which prevailed before the coming of the French".[10] Andre Salifou on the other hand, thought that the rebels of 1916-1917 represented the first generation of Nigerien nationalists. Evidence show that Kaussan was only used by the Senussi as a tool to stir up trouble in French Sahara and he labelled himself as "Mutassarif of the Fezzan Valley, Commander of Senussi army" and he made no mystery of his being an envoy of Sidi al-Abed, the Sheikh of the Senussiya in Fezzan.[11] So, presenting him as nationalist is questionable especially if we take into account that he began his prowess in Kanem where he served the Turks and the Senussiya.[12] Nationalism cannot be applied to an ethnic-based movement manipulated by an exterior force.

One cannot properly speak about an Islamic policy in French colony of Niger. It was argued that the French favoured Islam in the first years of installation in Niger especially in freeing the Ineslemen Tuareg from the Imajeghen.[13] But what can be drawn from evidence is that the French took measures only according to the situation and no coherent policy was carried out by the colonial powers.

The British tried to side definitely with the Native officials. In 1922, they went a step further in trying to keep the succession to the sultanate only to the Attikawa, arguing that Bello's family was too close to the Mahdiya. This policy secured the post of Sultan to Muhammadu Tambari(1924-1931) who finally was forced to abdicate and henceforth

the Attikawa began to be denigrated as unlucky and unpopular. The British carried our therefore very incoherent policy coupling repression with reward. Also, the British views towards Islam had many biases because of doubtful reports supplied to them by political agents and also very often misleading conception and interpretation of Muslim activities by some Islamic paranoiac like Palmer. The importance attached by Palmer to the Mahdist phenomenon, as Resident of Borno and, as the Lt. Governor of Northern Provinces had been for a great part been based on misconceptions of mahdism, and the relevance of pilgrimage or Arabic literature which entered Nigeria.

The French didn't have a Palmer "but the colony of Niger deserved a great deal of attention for it operated as an antenna" with a function to gather information on the developments of Islamic movements in the East (Lake Chad area, Nigeria, Sudan) and to report to Dakar for measures to be taken if necessary. Another function of Niger colony was that of "colonie penitenciere" (jail colony) "to which officials were exiled whenever they made themselves "undesirables" elsewhere".[14] Muslim activists also were exiled in Niger colony especially Bilma, Agades or Damargu, and tried therefore to spread their sects in the area as for example in the case of Hamallism which arrived in Niger through exiles.

In Northern Nigeria, the British exiled their "undesirables" to the "pagan countries" as in the case of Muhammad Tambari who was exiled to Wukari in Benue Province. The case of Tambari showed how far the interests of the Sokoto officials were linked to those of the British. The Sokoto officials themselves opposed the Tambari's eagerness to stay in Konni territory because they feared he would stir up trouble against the British. But

infact, the choice of the Native Authorities to side with the British against their own people and give up their Islamic duty of Muslim leaders to become colonial auxiliaries, was the result of a long process. At the end of the 19th century the Caliph and the Emirs had already betrayed the ideals of the jihad leaders and were no longer legitimate in the eyes of many. Instead of facing their responsibility and fighting the infidels, (i.e. the British) or migrate (as Attahiru I has done), many officials preferred to manage and became auxiliaries of the British. These attitudes were signs of crisis and showed that the dynasties had completely divorced themselves from the basis of their power: the waging of war to defend themselves and their community against external aggression, according to the shari'a. The British rewarded them, not only in leaving them in power but also in preparing their descendants to take over after independence, through political parties.

The elites of the post-war politics were mostly, the offsprings of royal families with western-education. These neo-traditional elites expressed the continuity in managing with the British administration to gain the control of the country after British withdrawal. In Northern Nigeria, the NPC represented these neo-traditionalists whereas the NEPU was considered as an opposition party which used the brotherhoods namely, the Tijaniya to stir up trouble.

In Niger, the PPN-RDA represented a French-sided party who at the end came also to represent the neo-traditionalists when the French attempted to set up a purely chiefs-controlled party failed. Djibo Bakary was considered as a fanatical Muslim who wanted to open the road to Nasser and form with Nigeria, an Islamic Republic. This preoccupation of colonial powers in Niger brought them to fight the U.D.N.-Sawaba in

Niger to the bitter end.

The western-educated elites, heirs of the emirate system, had the backing of the government and the latter took pretext of slight disturbance to handle NEPU adherents ruthlessly. So, the colonial system, preferred to hand-over the power to those from whom it took it. Even in Niger, where there was no established rulers as powerful as in Northern Nigeria, the French managed to hand-over the power to the neo-traditionalists, and in 1959, for example, not only the Sawaba was already banned but also 70% of the legislators were kinsmen of chiefs.[15]

As for the relations between the populations, the continuity is perceptible through the relationship developed between people of remote areas, as for example, Alfa Saybu with Satiru or the Sultan of Zinder with Malam Isa. Kaussan asserted that he was going to Kano and U.D.N.-Sawaba of Djibo Bakary developed relations with NEPU of Aminu Kano. This continuity also was expressed as soon as independence was attained. The Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, visited Niger three times between December 1960 and July 1963. In July 1963, the Premier visited Agades region and most of the places where the Shehu stayed and spent his life as student. He visited the Sultan of Agades in return "for the visit of one of the late chiefs paid to Shehu Usman dan Fodio at Sokoto". The Sardauna decided to rebuild the Shehu mosque "as an additional link between our peoples who are Muslims and who are already linked by history". He concluded by saying that his visit to Agades gave him opportunity" to know more about the great Shehu Usman dan

Fodio".[16] The Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sardauna of Sokoto left

no ambiguity about himself being the heir of, and following the steps of the Shehu: "My great-great-grand-father came to Agades on foot; I came in an easier way, in a Land-Rover".[17] The population of the Niger Republic, welcomed Sir Ahmadu Bello, not as the Premier of Northern Nigeria, a title which meant almost nothing to them, but as the Sardauna of Sokoto. Diori Hamani reported: "Our populations came spontaneously from the most insignificant hamlets to welcome the Sardauna of Sokoto".[18]

When the Nigerian civil war started, these relations were once more reaffirmed through the involvement of Niger Republic, both officially and through the engagement of humble Niger people in the federal army. It is against this background, that the stability of the Niger-Nigeria frontier can be appreciated.[19]

Also, of all the countries neighbour Nigeria, it is a truism to say that Niger Republic has maintained the most cordial relations with Nigeria. The explanation to this fact goes back to the relations developed for centuries, especially during the 19th century when the jihad brought together many people under the bound of Islam.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI

1. See on these questions: Abdullahi Mahadi's The State and the Economy: The Sarauta System and Its Roles in Shaping the Society and Economy of Kano, with particular reference to the 18th and 19th centuries, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1982; 2 volumes; Abdullahi R. Augi, The Gobir Factor in Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, Ph.D. A.B.U., 1984.
2. Sokprof C1. Emir of Argungu - succession 1945.
3. C.C. Stewart "Diplomatic Relations in Early 19th Century West Africa: Sokoto-Azaouad-Masina Correspondences" in Sokoto Seminar Papers ed Y.B. Usman, pp.408-429.
4. See Majmu an rasa'il Amir al-Mumimin Muhammad Bello wa Amir al-Mumimin Abubakar Attiku by Abdulkadr Gidado.
5. Omar Bello, Ulama and Colonialism in Nigeria, 1995, p.8.
6. No 6.
7. M. Al-Haj, The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria op. cit., p.212.
8. Katprof 2/1/1914 Proclamations by the Emir of Katsina - copies of 1926-1930.
9. Harold Bindloss, In The Niger Country, London, 1968, pp.297-8. Quoted in P.A. Afeadie; The Hidden Hand of Overrule: Political Agents and the Establishment of British Colonial Rule in Northern Nigeria, 1886-1914, Ph.D. York, 1996, p.34.
10. F. Fuglestad, A History of Niger op. cit., p.105.
11. See J. L. Triaud, "Hommes de Religion ..." op. cit., p.256.

12. H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs op. cit., p.165.

13. F. Fugleshad, A History of Niger op. cit., 105.

14. ibid, p.110.

15. I. Leonard Markovitz Power and Class in Africa, Prentice-Hall, New-Jersey, 1977, p.164.

16. For all these information, see NAK PRE/3, Vol.II, Premier's Tour Outside Nigeria, especially leave in Niger Republic; see also Waziri Junaidu Rihlahila Agades.

17. Nigerian Citizen No.1154, Wednesday, July 24 1963.

18. Temps du Niger No.955, July 22nd 1963 my translation.

19. More recently, about 1990 political parties in Niger adopted slogans already used by some Nigerian political parties see Appendix I.

Appendix I **Parties Slogans in Niger and Nigeria**

Slogan	Nigeria	Niger	Significance
Alheri	D.P.N.	P.S.D.N.	
Amana	Action-Group	U.D.P.S.	Confidence
Aminci	N.P.N.	U.D.P.	Friendship
Haske	U.P.N.	Newspaper (first private)	Light
Nasara	P.R.P.	M.N.S.D.	Good luck
Salama	N.P.C.	P.U.N.D.	Peace
Sawaba	N.E.P.U.	U.D.F.P.	

Note: Concerning Nigeria's parties and slogans (except D.P.N. a recent party) see Dahiru Yahaya:" Colonialism in Africa and the Impact of European Concepts and Values: Nationalism and Muslims in Nigeria" in Islam in Africa ed. Nur Alkali and al. Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 1993, pp.197-98. In Niger, apart from the Sawaba well-known, the others were founded recently around 1990:

U.D.P.S.: Union Democratique pour le Progres Social

P.S.D.N.: Parti Social-Democrate Nigerien

U.D.F.P.: Union Democratique des Forces Populaires.

M.N.S.D.: Movement National Pour la Societe de Development.

P.U.N.D.: Parti Pour l'Unite nationale et la Democratie

U.D.P.: Union Pour la Democratie et le Progres.

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O/AR1/5 Tanbih al-Ikhwan by Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

O/AR1/8 Sard-al-Kalam by Sultan Bello. See a translation in Hausawa da Makwabtansu I.

O/AR1/23 Raudal-Jinan written by Usman Gidado.

O/AR1/19 Kitab Majmu Manaqibi by Abdulkader b. Gidado.

O/AR1/12 Majmu al-Kula fa'i by Malam Aliyu Sokoto.

D/AR49/6 Majmu iradir Ah-shab Amir al-Muminin Muhammad Bello.

P/AR2/20 al-Ajwibat-al Muharrarah an al-As'ila al-Muqarrarah fi wathiqat Shi-Shummas.

P/AR11/1 Mas'ala fi qissat allati waqa'at bayn amir Maradi Dan Mai wa Amir Katsina Sadiq.

P/AR10/1 Mas'alat Madarinfa.

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A/ARL1/Vol.I/58 Tabl of Kel Gress Warzagane to Sultan Umar b. Ali 1881-1891.

A/ARLO/Vol.I/45 Amir Adar Yusuf Ibn Amir Adar Wassar to the Sultan Attaher b. Ahmed.

C/ARLO/Vol.II/130 Emir of Hadejia Muhammad ben Harun (1885-1906) to Waziri Buhari (1887-1910) informing him that Sultan of Damagaram intended to attack him. But he sent spies to Damagaram region to watch the movement of troops.

C/ARLO/Vol.I/37 Emir of Kano Muhammad Bello (1873-1891) to Waziri Muhammad Buhari informing him about 21 men taken by Tuaregs but released by Sultan of Ahyar Al-Haj Bulku. Al-Haj Bulku also proposed his aid to Kano against Damagaram.

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Nigerian Citizen No. 692 Wednesday, January 7, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 697 Saturday, January 24, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 698 Wednesday, January 28, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 699 Saturday, January 31, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 705 Saturday, February 21, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 711 Saturday, March 14, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 712 Wednesday, March 18, 1959.

Nigerian Citizen No. 754 Saturday, August 1, 1959.

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Nigerian Citizen No. 772 Saturday, October 3, 1959.

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ORAL SOURCES

Because of financial constraints, we could not conduct oral interviews in a very wide area as we wished to do it. Therefore, our interviews are very limited.

Names	Age	Occupation	Place of Interview	Date of Interview
Habu Magaji	b.1933	Assistant Researcher IRSH Maradi	IRSH Base Maradi	28/04/94
Ambassador Ahmadu Umoru	66 years	Ambassador (retired)	Niamey	11/11/95
Hajiya Hawa Mahaman	60 years	-	Niamey	14/02/95
Malam Cisse	61 years	Marabout	Niamey	11/08/95
Souleyman Soumana	52 years	Marabout	Lamorde Bittimkoji	20/11/96
Belko Soumana	50 years	Arabic School Teacher	Lamorde Bittimkoji	20/11/96
Sarkin Maroka Saley dan Taido	70 years	-	Dan Isa (Maradi)	10/05/96
Dan Tomo Umaru	66 years	Court Drummer	Sarkin Katsina (Maradi) Court	4/05/96
Al-Haj Kankiya	70 years	Civil Servant (retired)	Kaduna	14/02/96
Al-Haj Bala Katsina	b.1930	Secretary Emirate Council	Katsina	6/05/96
Abba Tsoho	55 years	Dyer	Katsina	7/05/96

Dan Masanin Katsina Mahaman	80 years	-	Katsina	6/05/96
Al-Haj Dan Sadaka	b.1919	In charge of pilgrimage	Maradi	12/03/96
Malam Dan Akali	60 years	Maroki	Tsibiri (Maradi)	12/05/85
Alu Arzika	53 years	Emir of Konni	Birnin Konni	20/03/85
Makada Dan Jari	60 years	Court Drummer	Birnin Konni	20/03/85
Malam Gondari	55 year	Marabout	Birnin Konni	21/03/85
Tsahara Ahmadu	60 years	-	Na'dabar	10/9/84
Bubakar Sohway	90 years	-	Malbaza-Burgum	11/9/84
Malam Issa Kaka	71 years	Marabout	Bazaga (Konni)	10/4/85
Abdulkarimun	60 years	Azna Chief	Dadagarka	10/4/85
Dagel Na-Akka	70 years	Azna Chief	Massalata	11/04/85
Matsahi Dan Nahantsi	67 years	Farmer	Massalata	11/04/85
Tanko Goje	90 years	Farmer	Dibissu	12/04/85
Guni Issa	65 years	Guni (Village Head)	Cerasa	12/04/85
Alassan Garba	70 years	Farmer	Dadagarka	10/04/85
Malam Ibrahim	70 years	Marabout	Kamba	20/11/95
Al-Haj Sani	67 years	Marabout	Godabawa	30/04/96
Waziri Junaidu	97 years	Waziri	Sokoto	28/09/96