

**A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
UNDER THE MILITARY REGIMES: 1966 - 1998**

BY

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DEDICATION

I dedicated this work to three of my friends, Joseph Mamman, Felicia Samuel and Kehinde Abdulrahman, who died before the completion of the work.

May their gentle Souls Rest in Peace.

Amen.

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
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that it is a product and record of my own research. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree. All quotations are distinguished by quotation-marks and the sources of all information are specifically acknowledged by means of references.


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
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CERTIFICATION

This Thesis entitled "A critical Appraisal of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under the Military Regimes: 1966-1998", by MAINA WILLIAMS APIKINS meets the regulations governing the award of the Degree in Master of Science (M.Sc.) (International Relations) at the Ahmadu Bello University and was approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.


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
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Finally, my supervisor, Dr. Hudu A. Abdullahi, had contributed immensely to the successful completion of this work. His patience, encouragement and co-operation ensured that this work was completed, and for all these, I am most grateful.

Actually, any contribution this thesis might make is the collective efforts and supports of so many Institutions and individuals, many of whom I have not been able to mention here for the constraint of space. However, any fault, omission and the manner in which ideas were expressed in this work, are entirely my responsibility.

ABSTRACT

The Nigerian Military began its involvement with governance on January 15, 1966; by May, 29, 1999 Nigeria had been through six Military Regimes, and collectively, the Military had governed Nigeria for a total of about 28 years.

Over the years, there had been consensus on the broad Foreign Policy Principles outlined by Prime Minister Balewa at Independence. While there was a national consensus in support of these broad Foreign Policy Principles, each of the Military Government over the period of 28 years gave its own elitist interpretation to these principles. Thus, from the appraisal of the different Military Regimes under the period of study, Nigeria's Foreign Policy can be classified into five phases or epochs viz:

- The period of uncertainties;
- The Post war and Naira Diplomacy (Diplomacy of Prestige)
- The period of radicalization.
- The Adventurist and populist period (Economic Diplomacy);
and
- The Combative or Abrasive period.

Each of these phases concurred with Military leadership styles and the exigencies of the time.

It is generally recognized that the involvement of the Nigerian Military in governance has done more harm than good, resulting into negative impacts and consequences. It is not, however, true that there had been no progress or achievements recorded since the first Military Regime in 1966. In the field of foreign policy for instance the Military had impacted positively. It is as such that the Military phenomenon has become very central in the analysis of the Nation's Foreign Policy and National image abroad.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.U.	=	Ahmadu Bello University
A.D.B.	=	African Development Bank
ADC	=	Aid De Camp
AEC	=	African Economic Community
AFRC	=	Armed Forces Ruling Council
ANC	=	African National Congress
APPA	=	African Petroleum Producers Associations
AU	=	African Union
C.B.N.	=	Central Bank of Nigeria
C-C	=	Commander in Chief
CHOG	=	Common Wealth Heads of Government
CHOGM	=	Common Wealth Heads of Government Meeting
CMAG	=	Common Wealth Ministerial Action Group
ECOBANK	=	Economic Community of West African States Bank
ECOMOG	=	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	=	Economic Community of West African States
FESTAC	=	Festival of Arts and Culture
FIFA	=	Federation of International Football Association

FNLA	=	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GCON	=	Great Commander of the Order of the Niger
IBB	=	Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida
ICJ	=	International Court of Justice
IFC	=	International Finance Capital
IMF	=	International Monetary Fund
ING	=	Interim National Government
INTERPOL	=	International Police
Jaw-Jaw	=	Dialogue
LNG	=	Liquefied Natural Gas
LT. COL	=	Lieutenant Colonel
LT. GEN.	=	Lieutenant General
MNCS	=	Multi-National Corporations
MPLA	=	Progressive Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NADECO	=	National Democratic Coalition
N.I.I.A.	=	National Institute of International Affairs.
N.P.F.L.	=	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
N.P.N.	=	National Party of Nigeria
OAPEC	=	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

OAU	=	Organization African Unity.
O.I.C	=	Organization of Islamic Countries
OPEC	=	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
P.F	=	Patriotic Front
P.R.C	=	Provisional Ruling Council.
R.U.F	=	Revolutionary United Front
S.A.D.R	=	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
S.A	=	South Africa
S.W.P.O	=	South West African Parliamentary Organization.
S.A.P.	=	Structural Adjustment Programme.
S.M.C	=	Supreme Military Council
T.A.C	=	Technical Aid Corps.
U.D.I	=	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
U.M.E.OA	=	West African Francophone Countries Economic and Monetary union
U.N	=	United Nations
U.N.I.T.A.	=	National Union For the Total Independence Of Angola
U.N.T.A.G.	=	United Nations' Transition Assistance Group
U.S.A	=	United States of America
U.S.S.R	=	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

W.A	=	West Africa.
W.B	=	World Bank.
ZANU	=	Zimbabwe African National Union
Z.A.P.U	=	Zimbabwe African Progressive Union

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO MILITARY INCURSION IN NIGERIA'S POLITICS.

From a mere aberration five years after independence, it became recurrent and before long, military regimes became a fixture. Since 1966, when the military came to power, it has mutated, changing form and duration, thus becoming a norm rather than an exception.

As corrective regimes, military governments are similar, but in approach, they differ significantly. Specifically, some are benign, others are draconic and some fall in-between. Intermittently, and for twenty-eight years, the military called the shots in Nigeria's political history; hence as a result, professionalism was relegated, coups gained currency, careers and lives were wasted. Significantly, they became part of the problem; thirty-four years ago, i.e. in 1966, some army majors and other officers killed some civilian politicians and senior military officers in a coup d'état. In that coup, Sir Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, the first Prime Minister; Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto and Northern Premier; Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, the Federal Minister of Finance, and Chief Samuel Akintola, the Premier of Western Region, were brutally killed. In addition, Brigadier, Zakari Maimalari, Colonels Kur Mohammed and Abogo Lagema lost their lives.

Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu led the coup, and in his address to the Nation, he stated why they struck. According to him, they intervened to wipe out

corruption, nepotism and to elevate Nigeria.¹ Although, the first Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and other top officials were killed, the coup failed.

In Lagos, General Aguiyi Ironsi, the then highest-ranking military officer, quelled the revolt. With some loyal officers and Men, Ironsi routed the coupists, and in Kaduna, Nzeogwu was on one limb. With little or no logistics, a fresh supply was blocked, as both Kano and Lagos, where the coup had failed refused his orders. After several emissaries and assurances, Nzeogwu laid down his arms, went to Lagos and was arrested and detained.

There after Honourable Nwafor Orizu, the Senate president, met with some Ministers and handed power to General Ironsi. Six Months later, there was a counter-coup. and in that counter- coup, General Ironsi was killed and LT-Colonel. Yakubu Gowon, the highest-ranking Northerner, succeeded Ironsi. He ruled for nine years, through the civil war and the oil boom, terminating in 1975.

Young and inexperienced, Gowon relied on the civil servants, and they became very powerful. Permanent secretaries dictated the tune while ministers and political appointees watched. Awash with petro-dollars, Nigeria went on a spending binge beyond her shores. In 1974, Gowon in a national broadcast rescinded his promise to hand-over to the civilians in 1976. This angered some politicians and military officers, and later in July 1975, Gowon was toppled in a bloodless coup. Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed emerged as the new leader. Laced with revolutionary rhetories, he flushed out deadwoods and bad eggs and in the exercise; all sections of the country were affected. With dispatch, Murtala drew up his

transition, itemized his priorities and promised a hand over date of 1st October 1979. However, Murtala was murdered in a coup. The ringleader was Lt. Colonel Bukar sukar Dimka.

Ill- motivated and badly planned, the coup was unpopular from day one. Like Nzeogwu's, this attempt failed, as Olusegun Obasanjo, a Lt.General and Murtala's second-in-command assumed control. Generally, he stuck to Murtala's transition and kept his vision drive. On October 1, 1979, power was handed over to an elected president, Alhaji Shehu Aliyu Usman Shagari.

For about five years, there was lull and as the Military retreated to the barracks, politicians had a field day. Tainted by corruption, and political thuggery, politicians provided the excuse and the Military grabbed the chance and bounced back. By December, 31, 1983, the second Republic fell, as a coup staged by some senior officers was relatively peaceful, and successful. Heraldizing the charges, Brigadier Sani Abacha reeled off a litany of woes. According to him, unemployment was high, infrastructure had collapsed, hospitals became "mere consulting clinic".² In spite of this, he lamented, politicians revelled in squander- Mania and to hold the drift, they sacked the inept government of Shagari.

Afterwards, Muhammadu Buhari, a Major- General, became the new leader. This regime was a two-man affair, Buhari and Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, his second-in-command, ruled alone, to the chagrin of others; others were sidelined and a crack emerged. Twenty Months later, in 1985 to be precise, they were removed by their colleagues. Again, Abacha brought the bad tidings, citing lack of consultation and

insensitivity as reasons why they struck³. Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida, who was then the chief of Army Staff, became the Head of State. With his Machiavellian tactics, Nigeria under his leadership joined the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C) and restored relations with Israel. For this reason and others, the press descended on him and called him names; human rights, Christian and Muslem groups were unsparing.

In addition, the structural Adjustment programme (S.A.P.), an austerity measure he introduced made him unpopular. Under S.A.P., Nigerians were generally impoverished; in the political realm, politicians were also frustrated over series of banning and shifting of hand over date, politicians were fed up. On August, 28, 1994, due to serious domestic pressures, Babangida reluctantly stepped aside leaving an Interim National Government (ING) led by Ernest Shonekan. Abacha was the Secretary of Defence, he controlled the armed forces and in the event of death or resignation, the I.N.G. Decree said, the most senior secretary would succeed Shonekan. At that time Abacha fit the bill and from the decree, the I.N.G was vulnerable, and on November 17, 1994, Abacha shoved it aside and ascend the throne. He held on to power and planned to succeed himself. To give his plan legitimacy, he contrived a transition programme asking politicians to partake. Immediately political associations sprang up. The government teleguided the chosen parties, thus determining who won what position. Geared towards self- succession, Abacha was undecided, but the signs were there. Over these exercises, most politicians, especially the big- guns, saw a hidden agenda and became apathetic to

the transition programme. Abacha was on a final climax to succeed himself when he died on June 8, 1998. Two days later, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the chief of Defence Staff, became the Head of State.

From the foregoing, Nigeria has had seven Military Regimes and has been under Military rule for twenty-eight years out of the forty years of her existence as a sovereign and independent Nation. This thesis therefore seeks to critically assess or appraise the Military and Foreign policy issues in Nigeria from 1966- 1998. In this vein, the most trying Foreign policy periods like, the pre-civil war, the civil war and the post civil war days under Generals Ironsi and Gowon; the radical and nationalistic era under Generals Murtala/Obasanjo regime of the late 1970s; the Diplomatic maneuverability of the Dikko affair under Generals Buhari/ Idiagbon; the periods of "concept of Medium powers" and "Economic Diplomacy"⁴ under General Ibrahim Babangida's regime, and the heady days of pro-democracy activism and international sanctions during the Abacha era, shall be examined and appraised in this research.

1:1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

Foreign policy is a necessary activity engaged in by each sovereign State in the international system because no State is an island unto itself, nor can any State be insulated from the actions of others whether favourable or adverse. Bilateral and multilateral inter-State relations have therefore become part of the basic ingredients of contemporary international relations⁵ Each State in the international system has to

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fashion out a policy that appears to possess a single will and purpose towards the external environment in a way that national interest is best protected and served.

A country's Foreign policy is the extension of its domestic philosophy and psyche;⁶ hence in discussing Nigeria's Foreign policy, one needs to examine the inner workings of the society in order to appreciate what would pass for Foreign policy

Any serious observer of Nigeria's domestic scene since independence will come away with the conclusion that the Nation has been at war with itself. Can any embattled country occupied by internal conflicts at home, find time to develop a meaningful relationship with his neighbours?

Since de-colonization, our country has been bedeviled by internal strifes most of which are our own making. The root cause of it is the rickety federation, which the British patched together to serve their own imperial interest. It was held together by the railway lines, which run from Northern hinterland to the southern seaports for the evacuation of tin-ore and Farm produce to Mother England.

Before the British left us in 1960, we seemed to have settled on the idea that we could build a nation out of this structure. No sooner had they left our shores, a civil war broke up. The most optimistic amongst those who fought for independence tried to keep the country together; but no matter how hard they tried, a new problem always arose. It was either elections were rigged, annulled and results unacceptable; or one tribe felt short-changed in the scheme of things and it wanted out. Or, it was the Military's interventions in politics, and it went on further on too many occasions,

to scuttle the Federation beyond recognition. Looting of public wealth became an art, while the poor remained at the receiving end of cruelty and wanton oppression.

Hence, the Foreign policy of Nigeria and the substance of Nigeria's interaction with other countries have to be affected by a complex interaction of a horde of factors inside and outside her national frontiers. In this complex interaction, the domestic process, which is an imperfect fusion of a variety of conflicting interest; and the external stimuli, which requires a response in a single voice, tremendously affects the foreign policy of Nigeria, as it will of the Foreign policy of all Nations.

The diverse interests or factors of social, economic, cultural and political relevance in Nigeria that come to bear negatively on the conduct of its Foreign policy, can be considered as the domestic constraints. This basically includes the issues that have come to define the political process as the struggle for Nation building intensified.

Thus, this research will appraise Nigeria's Foreign policy under the military regimes, from 1966 - 98 respectively.

Nigeria as a Nation was introduced to the international community forty years ago (1960) by Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in a very moving address to the United Nations General Assembly in New-York.⁷

In that historic and famous speech, according to Joe Garba, Nigeria's fundamental foreign policy principles were broadly outlined as follows:

1. The defence of Sovereignty, independence and Territorial integrity.

2. The Nigerian state shall promote African Unity; and the political, Economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa;
3. To promote all other forms of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states;
4. To combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.

From the foregoing apart from accepting the fundamental principles of the United Nations' Charter, Nigeria was to work towards the emancipation of the Blackman in Africa and Diaspora. Nigeria would work assiduously for international peace and security; the deceleration of the Arms race and the downplaying of the cold -war. Nigeria wanted the United Nations, through its specialized agencies, to enhance food security, health and general well-being of the entire human race, and make our planet a more conducive place for human habitation. ⁸

The Foreign policy of many African countries has always been Afro-centric, that is, it has always centred on Africa. This was equally the case for Nigeria, because both the government leaders and the oppositions (critics) were united on the principle that Africa be the centerpiece of Nigeria's Foreign policy. The reason for this according to Rufai Ahmed Alkali, an international relations' scholar has to do with Nigeria as a geo-political entity. Several geo-political factors, and circumstances would seem to make this responsibility imperative for subsequent governments in Nigeria. Parts of these are that Nigeria has the largest population in Africa and it is blessed with enormous natural resources, compared with other African countries.

Nigeria has managed to live through the ages according to the dictates of its founding fathers; her fundamental foreign policy principles have remained the same since independence, but there has been some shifts in styles, priorities, emphases and perceptions which eventually determined the choices open to the military juntas (Foreign policy elites) of the various Military regimes under study and shaped their foreign policy decisions. The *raison d'être* for this research is therefore to appraise these *modus- operandi*, shifts in styles, priorities, emphases and perceptions of the various military regimes on Foreign policy issues under the period of study.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM:

Nigeria had been under the military dictatorship (governance) for twenty eight (28) years out of the forty (40) years of her existence as a sovereign and independent Nation; how has the Military leadership conducted her foreign affairs? This study therefore intends to critically appraise Nigeria's Foreign policy under the military Regimes, from 1966-1998.

In this vein, the major foreign policy focus, styles, emphases, priorities and perceptions of the various Military regimes under the period of study will be assessed.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

The hypothetical research questions that underline this research include the followings:

- (i) Our primary Foreign policy pre-occupation remains the defence of our National interest. We are aware that in International Relations, only National interest

remains permanent; accordingly, our Foreign policy priorities must be the cultivation and development of relationship with those countries with the capability and goodwill to help us protect and promote our National interest. How successful are the various Military regimes in this regard?

(ii) Since independence, Nigeria has pursued a consistent policy of friendly relations with all countries in the world, especially fellow African countries to which we have demonstrated solidarity through material assistance and man-power development programmes. We have made these enormous trade-offs not only in Africa but also globally in the true spirit of African brotherhood and collective security of the world. To what extent is this pursuit successful under the various Military regimes under the periods of study?

(iii) Our philosophy of peaceful co-existence has greatly influenced our contributions to world- wide peacekeeping operations. To what extent has the different Military regimes under the periods of study maintained this philosophy in our foreign policy pursuit?

(iv) From the underling objectives of the Foreign policies of the various Military Regimes under reference; how did they serve as a means to foster and facilitate support measures with international organisation like ECOWAS, O.A.U. the United Nations e.t.c.

(v) What are the fundamental factors that influenced and affected the shaping, making and implementations of the Foreign policy choices and decisions of the different Military regimes?

(vi) Did idiosyncratic factors influence the Foreign policy decisions of the different Military Juntas under the period of study?

These hypothetical questions will be addressed in this Research.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:


This study is important especially as it appraise the Nigeria's Foreign policy under the Military Regimes from 1966-1998. The study is also very relevant as it examines the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Nigerian State under the Military governance. The genesis being rooted on the philosophy that shaped Nigeria's Foreign policy since de-colonization.

The study will expose certain domestic and External factors that influenced the shaping, making and implementation of Foreign policy under the different Military regimes in reference.

This study is also very significant because it will examine how Nigeria's Foreign policy regulated her external behaviours, particularly within the West African sub- region, at the O.A.U, the U.N. and with other international institutions. Finally, it is sincerely hoped that the Research findings will contribute immensely to knowledge and open up new field of inquiry.

1.5 THE SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY.

This Research will cover the Nigeria's Foreign policy from 1966-1998; that is, the Foreign policies of Generals Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala/Obasanjo, Buhari, Babangida and Abacha Military Regimes.



The envisaged problems of this study are the same to Research of this type. Foremost, the data that may be readily available for this research will be mostly those of the newspapers, Magazines, seminars papers and published and unpublished theses.

Finally, other envisaged constraints in carrying out this research could be expressed in terms of finance, time and space. These are typical to the problems of conducting researches of this nature.

1.6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: -

The primary source of data for this study is drawn from already written materials of renowned scholarship. In other words, Library research method of data collection is used. That is, Materials found in Libraries, Journals, Newspapers (Nationals Dailies), Magazines, and seminar Monographs, Published and unpublished theses.

In sum, I shall utilize a content analysis of secondary sources.

1.7. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS: -

This work will be Organised in five chapters; chapter one discusses in an introductory manner the Military's incursion Nigeria's politics; the historical background to Nigeria's Foreign policy; the Research problem; the research questions; the significance of the study; the scope and limitation of the study and the Research Methodology.

In chapter two, Literatures related to the area of study will be meticulously reviewed. Similarly in this chapter, the Elite Theory, which is adopted as a theoretical framework of this study given its relevance, will be discussed.

Chapter three will critically appraise the foreign policies of all the Military Regimes under the periods of study; while chapter four will look at analytical overview of the factors that influenced the Military Regimes' Foreign Policies and the impacts on the Nigerian State: from January 15, 1966 -June 8, 1998.

Chapter five is the final chapter, thus it will contain the summary conclusions of the Research and some relevant recommendations and future prospects.

END- NOTES.

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CHAPTER TWO

2.1. THE THEORETICAL FRAME WORK:

In the quest for a comprehensive conceptual scheme within which the research problem, the data collected will be analysed comprehensively in this thesis, the Elite theory will be employed.

The Elite theory originated from central and Western European countries as a critique of Democracy and socialism.¹ It was suitably adopted in the United States of America by a number of political theorists to explain political processes, as they existed in their country. The origin of the theory, which came under active discussion of social scientists in the United States in the fifties –political scientists (Lasswell), Economists (Schumpeter) as well; as sociologist (C. Wright Mills) can be traced back to the writings of a number of European thinkers particularly Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, both Italians, Roberto Michels, a Swiss-German and Jose Ortega y Gasset, a Spaniard.²

The Elite theory is used to describe that group or class, which values predominate in the society. The theory is based on the idea that every society irrespective of time and place consists of two broad categories: -

- (a) A Minority that possesses the qualities necessary for its accession to full social and political power, and;
- (b) The non –elite, that is, the vast masses of people who are destined to be ruled.³

The Elites are heterogeneous group, thus, for virtually every activity and every corresponding sphere of social life, there is an elite; there are elite of soldiers,

elite of lawyers, elite of academics, elite of industrialists, elite of Gamblers as well as of prostitutes to mentioned but a few. There is however, an important factor that differentiates these various elites, apart from their respective skills and talents:- Some of them have more social weight than others because their activities have greater social significance. Thus, the more readily identifiable Elite in modern developing societies like Nigeria are those of Business, Politics, diplomacy and the higher civil and Military Service.

In general, it appears that where social differentiation is extensive as in Nigeria, elites are many and specialized. The division of a country like Nigeria into groups and strata is therefore paralleled by its re-unification around a symbolic center, or core, that signifies the common and enduring characteristics of the differentiated whole. The shape of this centre is determined by the complexity and variety of the whole. In this way a society like Nigeria consisting of a multiple or multitude of individuals and ethnic groups can act in concert despite its moral, occupational, and technological diversity and can maintain the sense of unity necessary for collective achievements.

In every differentiated society like Nigeria, there are patterns of beliefs and values, shared means of communication, major social institutions and leading individuals or group concerned with the maintenance and development of the society and its culture. Thus, as far as this thesis is concerned, the leading elements in Nigeria under the period of study are the Military Elite; under the period of study, they help to keep the society in working order, by focusing attention and co-

ordinating diverse foreign Policy activities and protect the collectivity from external jeopardy.⁴

This in essence means that Nigeria's Foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her National interests. Unfortunately, what constitutes the country's National interest was not clearly articulated, hence all the military Regimes merely premised their foreign policies on their World perception of what they considered as Nigeria's interest. In other words, their Foreign Policy perceptions, styles, priorities or directions were largely influenced by their personal and class interests.

The character of the fraction of the Military juntas (elites), which gained ascendancy at any point in time, dictates the nature and character of the Nigeria's foreign policy and National Interest. Our concerns in this thesis were the Military governing elites, which ruled Nigeria from 1966-1979 and 1983- 1998 ,by a mixture of force and cunning; it was force however which predominated. This characterization is asymmetrical to the collegiate style of government through the Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.), the Armed Forces Ruling council (A.F.R.C.) and the Provisional Ruling Council (P.R.C) of the Generals Ironsi /Gowon, Murtala/Obasanjo, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha's Military regimes respectively. The S.M.C., the A.F.R.C., and the P.R.C., were the highest decision making bodies of the various Military Regimes under the period of study.

Thus, the application of this approach to this research is to explain the political processes of Foreign policy formulation and implementation, as they existed in

Nigeria during the respective Military Regimes under reference. Hence, the pre-occupation here is to situate the Military juntas (military elites) in Nigeria within the context of Elitism, as “the selected few or the minority whose values predominated in the society, or those who governed”, or better still, in the words of Thomas Dye, “those who determined what government chooses to do or not to do”.⁵ A great deal of significance is therefore attached to the capacity and willingness on the part of the governing Military elite to formulate foreign policy for the Nigerian State devoid of public’s inputs. The Military elites monopolise power and enjoy the advantages that power brings with the instrumentalities that are very essential to the vitality of political organism.⁶

Hence in the field of foreign policy pursuit, the distinguishing characteristic of the Military elite in Nigeria under the period of study is their aptitude to command and to exercise political control. They differed significantly in their Foreign policy approaches; there is the psychological as well as the sociological reasons for these differences. Some relationship can be established between the changes in social circumstances and individual characteristics. Consequently, new interests and ideals are formulated and pursued in the spheres of foreign policy. For instance, while General Yakubu Gowon embarked on what Hudu Abdullahi, referred to as “Diplomacy of prestige”- (money Diplomacy), Generals Murtala Mohammed /Olusegun Obasanjo pursued a radical and dynamic foreign policy with Africa as the center piece; the General Buhari’s regime pursued a Foreign policy on the platform of what Gambari coined as “concentric circles of interest”, while during the

General Ibrahim Babangida's Military regime it was an adventurist and populist foreign policy, under the platform of "Economic Diplomacy", and during the General Sani Abacha's regime it was the "Area- boy Diplomacy", better still called, "combative Diplomacy".

From the foregoing, it is very important to emphasize that the Military juntas of the respective regimes under study may differ in their Foreign policy emphases or approaches; but to some certain extent, they are dissimilar in their foreign policy formulations. This assertion was corroborated by General Olusegun Obasanjo in his speech at the Launching of "Diplomatic Soldiering", when he declared that Foreign policy making in any military Government resided in Dodan-Barrack, (Aso-Rock) as the case may be. In another sense, this meant that, Foreign policy making all Military regimes resided in the seat of power, where, the commander -in-chief was. This therefore confirmed my elitist claim of the Foreign policy formulation of the various Military regimes under the period of study.

The Ministry of External Affairs and its Minister under the Military Regimes were thus reduced to a mere "Instrument of input and instrument of execution".⁷ Thus it is noteworthy that the Heads of the various Military Regimes under study were in ultimate sense, their own foreign Ministers, but none- the less, there existed the position of foreign Minister, as do Foreign Ministry.⁸ This was lucidly buttressed by Joseph Garba when he declared thus: "We members of the "Junta" had agreed among ourselves about structural changes in how decisions would be made in the new government. The supreme Military council (S.M.C) would be come

supreme in deed as well as in name, and new Head of State would be the most senior member among selected officers".⁹

The above expression or view can be generalized to all the Military Regimes in Nigeria under the period of study. Thus, in other sense, all the military Regimes had caucuses (Junta) who actually determine foreign policy pursuits.

At the swearing in ceremony of the Armed Forces Ruling council (A.F.R.C) on February 13,1989, General Babangida told the new members of the elite body that: "You are to uphold and defend any decision taken in this council irrespective of your individual view on it during deliberations" he said, "Decisions taken in this council are not ascribed to any individual member or ethnic group, they are entirely those of the council for which you must bear full responsibility...¹⁰

This view again props my choice of the elite theory as a theoretical framework of this thesis. This model is therefore very relevant to this work because it concurs with the crux of the Elite theory, which opined that, the persons who exercise a major influence on, or controls the formulation and implementation of political, economic and social decisions are the elites.

The nature of the command structure of the military is another inspirational guide for the adoption of this conceptual scheme; this is commonsensical, because foreign policy issues are sensitive, thus, during military Regimes under the period of study were confined to a few (military elite). Besides there were restrictions on open debates and disagreement.

The elite-military bodies charged with repository of power for the governance of the country determined amongst other things the foreign policy focus for Nigeria at a particular point in time in Nigeria's political history. My use of the elite theory as a theoretical framework for this thesis titled "A critical appraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy under the military Regimes: 1966-1998," is therefore justifiable because as observed by Roberto Michels in his "Iron Law of Oligarchy".

The majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined to submit to the dominion of a small minority," "Elite leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life... More and more functions have to be delegated to an inner circle of "military" Leaders and, in course of time, the members of the civil society are rendered less competent to direct and control them, as a result of which the officers acquire great freedom of action and a vested interest in their new position. They cling desperately to their new powers and privileges, and become almost irremovably.¹¹

The suitability and relevance of the above assertion to the Nigerian situation under the military governance from 1966-1998, made the adoption of the Elite Theory as a theoretical framework for this thesis very necessary.

2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

There are volumes of literatures and studies on the military and governance in Nigeria, but there are specifically few which had captured all the military Regimes and the different styles, emphases and roles they adopted and played in the making and implementation of foreign policy in Nigeria under the period of study. Ray Ofoegbu, a renowned Nigerian theorist in his article titled "foreign policy and military Governance in Nigeria. 1966-1979," assessed Nigeria's foreign policy under

the military in systemic categorization. He categorized the period covered by each military government as follows:

The first military government of General Ironsi (January 1966-July 1966), the second military government of General Yakubu Gowon (August, 1966-July 1975) and the third military government of Generals Murtala/Obasanjo (August 1975-October, 1979).

According to Ray Ofoegbu, the first Military government of General Ironsi did little in the field of Nigerian Foreign policy, because in its very brief tenure it inherited and continued with the late Prime-Minister, Tafawa Balewa's conception and style of foreign policy pursuit. Hence Ray posits that:

All that it did in the area of Foreign Policy was largely to reassure all Nations about Nigeria's commitment to all previous international obligations and commitments, plead with foreign investors to continue investing in Nigeria; to close Nigeria's regional offices overseas and to stop the regions from sending economic commissions abroad.¹²

Furthermore, he argued that in spite of the aforesaid efforts, the military regime of General Ironsi failed to realize and secure the needed confidence and trust from the civilian population; to buttress his point further, he said;

It must be mentioned categorically that it succeeded in restoring command communication to the Nigerian Armed Forces, but failed to realize that in spite of this, confidence and trust were lacking and fears and rumours from the civilian population reinforced the lack of confidence and trust within the armed forces. Consequently, the government was thus unable to undertake a review of foreign policy and to reassure the other nations that the domestic situation in Nigeria had sufficiently stabilized to enable Nigeria operate effectively in the international system.¹³

From the foregoing, it is lucid that the military under General Ironsi, impacted or achieved little in the area of foreign policy as buttressed by Ray. However, a rational view at the very short period of the General Ironsi's regime and the socio-political circumstances surrounding his take over of government would exonerate him of non-performance in the area of foreign policy.

In assessing Nigeria's foreign policy under the military government of General Yakubu Gowon, August 1966-July, 1975), Ofoegbu opined that, this period was the most significant; that during this period the military gained tremendously in the area of foreign policy for the Nigerian state. To expatiate his view further on this commendation, he posits that,

The first major rethinking of foreign policy occurred during the second military Regime. It affected the three main circles of Nigeria's foreign policy, namely the common wealth, the World and Africa in that order. Nigeria's relations with Britain, its awareness of the problems of southern Africa, the British entry into the European Economic community and the Nigerian civil war, severally and jointly caused this rethinking on foreign policy.¹⁴

Hence, Ofoegbu was assertive when he said; Nigeria's rethinking about Africa underwent changes during the Gowon's Regime. To support this position, a clear reference was made to the Nigerian Development plan for West Africa. Furthermore, to explicate the above eulogy, Ofoegbu stated that:

The second Military government in Nigeria normalized relations between Nigeria, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zambia. These were the African countries, which had recognized Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. This foreign policy initiatives went a long way in re-uniting the Organisation of African unity, thereby saving it from another source of internal division that would have assumed perhaps, more permanent divisive dimension.¹⁵

Consequently, Ofeogbu gave a deserving credit to the General Gowon regime's diplomatic skills in initiating reconciliatory moves and rethinking into Nigeria's foreign policy especially in normalizing relations with the four African countries that recognized Biafra during the civil war and ending the stalemate in relations with the Eastern Bloc, especially the Soviet Union. I concur with Ofeogbu's assertion and conclusions, most especially if the merits of the Regime's association and eventual relationship with the Eastern Bloc, especially the Soviet Union is objectively considered in the interest of Nigeria's existence as a corporate entity at that material time.

Ambassador Bolaji Akinyemi, a renowned Nigerian Diplomat and an international relations' scholar in his appraisal of Nigeria's Foreign policy under the military; in his article titled, "The military and foreign policy", he assessed in retrospective effect the fundamental changes that took place both in style and content of Nigeria's foreign policy from August, 1966 under General Yakubu Gowon, through 1975 to 1979 under both General Murtala Mohammed and Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo.

Akinyemi viewed these changes in Nigeria's foreign policy deductively and inductively, that is, from the general issues to particular issues in the area of Nigeria's foreign policy. He traced the numerous splendid foreign policy achievements of the Generals Gowon and Murtala/Obasanjo Regimes. Hence, according to him,

The years after the civil war through 1975 witnessed significant steps' in the fostering of political and Economic relations between Nigeria and other African states. Apart from the Monetary aids to several African and Caribbean countries; there was also the signing of the African Caribbean and pacific/ European Economic community convention in Lome, Togo, and the Signing of the Treaty for the Economic community of the West African states, in Lagos.¹⁶

Commenting on the changes in Nigerian foreign policy from the purview of the Angolan crisis. Akinyemi observed that;

The way and manner the Angolan crisis was handled contained indications of changes in emphasis, perception, style and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy.¹⁷

According to him, firstly, a bad foreign policy was rapidly changed to a better one; secondly, there was an attempt to wait for an O.A.U., consensus to emerge before changing the policy. Nigeria was prepared to stake out a position and lobby to create an African consensus around that position. Thirdly, Nigeria was prepared to confront the United States over an African issue, an unprecedented act for Nigeria. Fourthly, the very open grant of financial and military aids to MPLA., marked a radical departure from past practice where such aids were small and secretly given.¹⁸

Akinyemi opined that, under the Military Regimes of Generals Yakubu Gowon and Murtala /Obasanjo; that is, from the period after the civil war through 1975 to 1st October, 1979, Nigeria became very strong internally due to the idiosyncratic changes in the leadership character and improved domestic economy. Thus, Nigeria could pursue issues at the international level with the maximum domestic props to actualize her purposeful foreign policy aspirations. This view re-echoed Gambari's and Izah's positions, that domestic factors have been the major determinants of a viable foreign policy in Nigeria.¹⁹

Thus, in an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy under the Military in the aforesaid period, Akinyemi opined that the Military had impacted positively on Nigeria's foreign policy. He praised the several foreign policies which were initiated by the Military aimed not only at improving Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours, but also at reaching out to Africa and the world in general.

Joseph Garba, an Ambassador Plenipotentiary, in one of his books, titled "Fractured History", wrote extensively on Nigeria's Foreign Policy, National interest and global goals, under the Generals Murtala /Obasanjo regime. In explicating the Murtala/Obansajo regimes foreign policy, he argued that;

When the Murtala/Obasanjo regime came to power in 1975, it set out to reverse the previous trend in Nigeria's Foreign Policy. Not only was Nigeria no longer to straddle the fence on international affairs, its role in the world in general and in Africa in particular was to become recognized and respected by all... it also won her friends abroad and endeared the government to the generality of all Nigerians.²⁰

It is very important to note that some domestic reforms and the radical foreign policy of the Murtala/ Obasanjo regime were anti-West, thus, synonymous to the positions of the "Underdevelopment theorists" which are captured in words like "de-linking" and "South-South co-operation." ²¹

Ambassador Garba was of the view that the Murtala/Obasanjo regime's foreign policy juxtaposed sharply with the foreign policy of previous civilian and Military governments, and on the strength of comparative evaluation, it has proven to be the most effective and beneficial to the Nigerian state. Joseph Garba was the Commissioner of External Affairs, that is (minister of External Affairs) in the Murtala/ Obasanjo regimes, and commenting on the regime's foreign policy, he once wrote that:

Murtala Mohammed made it clear to me from the beginning that he wanted a very activist foreign policy. Nigeria he said must be visible in the world, and he was not going to have a foreign Minister who stayed at home. He said flatly that if the situation demanded it, I should plan on spending one week out of every two aboard. My travels became ever more frequent, and in time both the Nigerians who admired what those travels achieved and those who did not, came to see them as a symbol of our government's thrust in foreign policy ²²

Writing on the Military's impacts on Nigeria's foreign policy; professor Jide Osuntokun, of the History Department, University of Lagos, in an article titled, "Nigeria's Foreign policy during the Babangida Years" With a particular reference to the General Buhari's regime, he posits that; "The Buhari's regime embarked on severe expenditure cut-back; wage freeze was imposed and stringent measures were introduced in the Nation's external financial requirements"²³

According to Osuntokun; the consequence of these policies at the domestic level was the intolerable Economic situations. There was shortage of consumer goods and for the first time in the history of Nigeria people had to queue for the so-called "essential commodities" such as rice, vegetable oil, sugar and other imported commodities; While at the international level the consequence of these policies was a strained relationship between Nigeria and the Paris and London Clubs, and the Britton woods institution (I.M.F.and W. B) ²⁴

Similarly according to Osuntokun.

The un- diplomatic attempt to kidnap Umaru Dikko, one of president Shagari's erstwhile Ministers, on the streets of London, soured relations between Nigeria and Britain²⁵

Thus, Osuntokun concluded that, the Buhari's regime Foreign policy was unadventuristic; this according to Birai propelled General Ibrahim Babangida to impress on the Nation when he came to power that ;

The conduct of Nigeria's Foreign policy under him will be transformed ²⁶

In his maiden address to the Nation, while seeking legitimacy for his new government, General Ibrahim B. Babangida castigated his predecessor's style of foreign policy; he said.

Nigeria's Foreign policy in the last 20 (twenty) Months has been characterised by inconsistency and incoherence; it has lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood on matters of international concern to enable other Nations relate to us with seriousness. Our role as Africa's spokesman has diminished because we have been unable to maintain the respect of African countries²⁷

The meanings deduced from the above quotation, corroborated the views earlier expressed by Osuntokun; hence, overwhelmingly, I concur that the General Buhari's Regime foreign policy was uneventful and unadventuristic. Never the less, in the history of Nigeria's relations with Britain, the Paris and London clubs, and the Britton woods institutions, the Buhari's regime had made a mark- negative or positive.

George Obiozor, a political analyst, in one of his works titled, *Nigeria, Africa and the Black world*", appraised the impact of Military on Nigeria's Foreign policy with particular reference to the Babangida's regime. He considered Nigeria's foreign policy actions in and towards Africa and the Black world from 1985 when General Babagida came to power. He critically appraised the Babangida's Regime Foreign policy in relation to Africa with particular concern to the adoption of "Economic Diplomacy" as a Foreign policy formular. Consequently, he is of the view that;

The adoption of Economic diplomacy as a new additional plank and instrument of Nigerian Foreign policy, as it relates to Africa specifically, Economic Diplomacy was expected to open up business opportunities for Nigerians in other African countries, help, formalize existing informal commercial links and established new channels.²⁸

Obiozor continued that, Economic Diplomacy represented;

One aspect of Babangida's administration response to the changed Economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. It was meant to ensure that the country remained a key and relevant player in the African terrain. Africans with investible capital were encouraged to come to Nigeria to seek out business opportunities ²⁹

Thus, Obiozor upheld fervently the view and belief that, the Babangida's Foreign policy of "Economic Diplomacy" had added tremendous weight to Nigeria's Foreign policy under the Military governance.

However, other scholars have dis-concurred with Obiozor's view. For instance, Agene Oga, commenting on Babangida's Foreign policy of "Economic Diplomacy" was of the view that;

"Nigerian rulers have allowed for the consolidation of neo-colonialism and in effect subverted the very meaning of sovereignty by which the concept of foreign policy derives its significance"³⁰.

Oga Ajene's assertion seemed to concur to what Alaba Ogunsanwo called; "Standing before a court of perpetual enslavement which patriotic knowledgeable experts are bent on Forcing down our throat", ³¹.

None-the-less, the myriad of applauses given to the Ibrahim Babangida's regime in the field of foreign policy by many scholars is yet to be substantively dis-credited.

Apart from "Economic Diplomacy", there were other important and controversial foreign policy issues successively championed by the General Ibrahim Babangida's regime; these include the followings:

- (a) The membership of the Organisation of Islamic conference (O.I.C.) (Nigeria became a member during the Babangida's regime.)
- (b) The normalization of relationship with Israel, which was severed in 1973.
- (c) The inauguration of the Technical Aid Corps (T.A.C.)

(d) The establishment and sponsorship of ECOMOG.

The image of the positive performance of the Military in terms of Foreign policy issues in Nigeria were very clear in some of the literatures reviewed. Many theorists saw the Military Leadership in the field of foreign policy as dynamic, self-sacrificing, progressive and modern Nation builders.³²

These views were however opposed by some scholars in respect to the General Sani Abacha's Regime; hence in reference to this Regime, no such popular consensus existed. Some scholars have described the General Sani Abacha regime's Foreign policy as combative and conservative. The proponents of the combative and conservative views made impressive cases out of fact, Logic, and statistics. The Abacha's regime Foreign policy is juxtaposed to what Birai referred to as.

Adventurism in a world of increasing Inter-dependence and rapid Changes³³.

Commenting on the General Sani Abacha regime's Foreign policy; Ayo Dunmoye, in his celebrated Lecture on "Globalization" described the Abacha's Foreign policy as retro-active and retrogressive, because according to him;

Globalization has brought to fore the stark reality that no Nation can be an Island unto itself and that for a state to Survive, and to be heard and respected, it needs a populist Foreign Policy strategy to effectively pursue its national interest ³⁴.

Birai corroborated this view when he said;

Interaction between and amongst Nation-states is inescapable within the international political system. And in addition, no state can isolate nor insulate itself from the favourable or adverse consequences of the actions of others. ³⁵.

The unfortunate political and socio-economic situations during the Abacha's administration which attracted international condemnations and the subsequent sanctions on Nigeria, confirmed Dunmoye's and Birai's assertions as commonsensical expressions. The consequence of General Abacha's Foreign policy was Nigeria becoming a pharo-state. No wonder there's popular consensus that the Military under General Abacha impacted negatively on Nigeria's Foreign policy.

Scholars have spent much ink and time debating whether the Military in Nigeria played basically a progressive or a conservative role in the modernization of the country's Foreign policy to meet with the changes at the international system. Most of these scholars seemed to agree that the Military in Nigeria were typically the proponents of change in the field of Foreign policy. Thus, the army according to Ebere is;

The vanguard of Nationalism and social reform; it is the most cohesive and disciplined element in "the new elite class," whose impact on society is predominantly revolutionary³⁶

In the 1960s and 1970s it was fashionable for political scientists to claim that in Nigeria and other developing polities, the Military was the ideal institution in the optimum position to implement a dynamic and beneficial foreign policy, and socio-Economic developments. After twenty-eight (28) years of Military rule in Nigeria, one can sustain this declaration in terms of the Military's impacts on Nigeria's Foreign Policy since de-colonization.

In sum, from the facts available and in particular from the over view of the issues discussed, "Nigeria's External Relations (Foreign policy) constitutes an area where the Military can be said to have tremendously achieved a degree of success. To what extent is this statement a truism? The curious drive to provide a response to this question prompted this study titled, "A critical appraisal of Nigeria's Foreign policy under the Military Regimes: 1966- 1998".

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 APPRAISAL OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MILITARY REGIMES: 1966 - 1998

INTRODUCTION

One of the most serious issues that confronted Nigeria at independence was the struggle for de-colonization, that is, "the wind of change" that had begun to sweep through Africa. Therefore the position of Nigeria and her reactions towards the decolonization process is a significant measure in an appraisal of her foreign policy pursuits from the 1960s onwards.

Since decolonization in 1960, the Nigerian state has persistently retained as part of the primary objectives of her foreign policy the critical questions of independence, territorial integrity, Economic prosperity and the advancement of freedom and justice for the black race in Africa and in the diaspora, as outlined by the prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in his famous address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960. These were the main constituents of what came to be known as Nigeria's national interest, precepts that were used to mobilize Nigerians and other foreign nationals in the arena of international politics. These precepts also formed the bases and genesis of Nigeria's participation in the United Nations system, the formation of the Organisation of African Unity, the joining of the Non-aligned movement, the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and her fervent commitment towards the decolonization struggles in Africa.

We shall therefore consider and appraise Nigeria's foreign policy under the Military Regimes in focus at three levels, viz: Global, African, and the West African sub-region.

3.1 THE PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE GENERAL AGUIYI IRONSI'S REGIME: JANUARY 1966 - JULY 1966.

On the morning of 15th January 1966, the "five majors", as major Kaduna Nzeogwu and his colleagues, majors E. Ifeajuna, D.Okafor, C.I Anuforo and A. Ademoyega, who planned and executed the coup came to be known struck¹. The lingering crisis which followed the violent National elections of 1964/5 provided the immediate grounds for the intervention by the young, idealistic officers who wanted to "stamp out tribalism" and fight the "enemies of progress" - the ten presenters and feudal Lords. But bad planning, sabotage and lapses in execution made the bloody coup abortive; however since the leaders of the Federal, Northern and Western Regional Governments had been killed as explained in chapter one of this study; it plunged the country into a deep crisis.

Under the prevailing circumstances, it was easy for General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army whose links to the coup remain a matter of speculation, to receive political power from what was left of the Federal cabinet as they voluntarily handed over the reins of power to him.

In his inaugural speech on 16th January, 1966, Ironsi alluded to this 'voluntary' transfer of power, and to the temporary nature of his government, as he declared thus: "The Military Government of the Republic of Nigeria wishes to state that it has

taken over the interim administration of the Republic of Nigeria following the invitation of the council of ministers of the last government for the Army to do so"².

He stated the purpose of his Government as,

Maintaining law and order and essential services..... until such a time when a constitution is brought out according to the wishes of the people³.

The regime also committed itself to a corrective agenda, which included preservation of the unity of the Country, eradicating regionalism, tribalism, corruption and dishonesty in public life, and accelerating economic development. Being the country's first military leader with no precedents to learn from, General Ironsi was said to have been too politically naïve and experienced, and perhaps, also too military to respond properly to the exigencies of the crisis situation in which he found himself⁴. His rather simplistic perception of national unity, through the unilateral introduction of the unitary system of Government and the abrogation of Nigeria's Federal system of Government by Decree 34 of May 24, 1966 was a case in point. According to him, decree 34 was meant to remove, "the last vestige of intense regionalism, and to produce that cohesion in government structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount objective of the National Military Government, nationally and internationally"⁵.

We shall begin this chapter properly with a close look at Nigeria's foreign policy in the General Aguiyi-Ironsi's regime. One significant development under the leadership of General Ironsi in the field of foreign policy was the unprecedented Ambassadors' conference held in June 1966 in the Nigeria's capital city of Lagos. The

major purpose of the Conference was to re-examine the premise and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy. Amongst other things, the conference re-dedicated Nigeria to the "emancipation of all African territories still under foreign domination and the eradication of racial discrimination"⁶. In this vein, the General Ironsi's regime terminated diplomatic relations with the fascist Leadership in Portugal over the Rhodesian issue in June, 1966; a relation that was closely nursed and maintained by the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's government despite the government's posture towards decolonization on the African continent. No wonder scholars like Gordon Idang had said that "Nigeria's foreign policy at independence lacked content and consistency"⁷.

The African - centredness of Ironsi's regime foreign policy was clearly articulated by the General himself shortly after he came to power;

In the whole sphere of Nigeria's external relations, the government attaches the greatest importance to our African policy. We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the majority of opinion in the civilized World looks up to us to provide responsible leadership in Africa; and we realize that we shall be judged, to a very large extent by the degree of success or failure with which we face up to this challenge which this expectation throws on us. We are convinced that whether in the Political, Economic or cultural sphere, our destiny lies in our role in the continent of Africa⁸.

Hence during the General Ironsi's regime, liberation of Africa from the last vestiges of colonial and racial domination, and the development of the different countries and continent as a whole were the major pillars of the African Policy. Nigeria's foreign policy was pre-occupied with liberation of South Africa and other Southern African White-ruled territories like Rhodesia now Zimbabwe and Namibia

as well as of Portuguese-ruled Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao-Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde, which were the last colonies on the continent.

General Ironsi also maintained cordial relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East. As observed by Birai;

There was, ... that following the January 15, 1966 Coup, rumours to the effect that President Nasser of Egypt and other Arab leaders were preparing to break relations with Nigeria because of their anger on the death of the Prime Minister and the Northern Premier, the Sardauna of Sokoto⁹.

The significance of the rumours lay in the fact that, the potentiality of influence of religion in Nigeria's Middle East Policy was difficult to deny. Indeed General Ironsi sent a large delegation of prominent Northerners on a hastily arranged tour of the Middle East capitals to reassure Arab leaders. General Ironsi also maintained cordial relations with Britain, America and other Western European Countries. The International Organizations like the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-aligned Movements and other international for a remained a major channel for the initiatives on liberation, but bilateral material assistance to liberation movements and other diplomatic channels also grew in importance.

It is note-worthy that domestic problems did not allow the Ironsi's regime to articulate and pursue any serious foreign policy other than maintain policies inherited from Balewa. According to Joe Ofoegbu, "the brief six months period of the first Military Regime illustrated vividly that no state which is extremely disturbed and is unstable at home can be effective in international relations"¹⁰. Never-the-less,

General Ironsi impacted meaningfully in the arena of foreign policy as he stopped the practice of sending regional economic missions overseas, and closed down regional consulates abroad, this was in line with the provisions of the Unitary System of Government he introduced. The political crisis of 1966-70, especially the civil war, made the General Gowon's regime only a little better than the General Ironsi's at the initial stage, since most external relations hinged on the crisis.

3.2 THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD AND NAIRA DIPLOMACY (DIPLOMACY OF PRESTAGE): THE GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON'S REGIME: JULY 1966 - JULY 1975.

General Yakubu Gowon assumed office at the climax of a deep national crisis. In addition to the continuing furore over the abrogation of the Federal System of Government, the counter-coup resonated in the Northern region in the form of renewed genocidal killings of the Igbos and Easterners. The Military Governor of Eastern region, colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, also refused to accept Gowon's accession to power; he insisted on knowing what had happened to General Ironsi, whose assassination was not officially announced till 14th January 1967, and that Brigadier Ogundipe, the next most senior military officer, should take over the reins of power. Faced with such complex situation, Gowon-sought for an acceptable political arrangement, thus to increase his popular support, he released chief Obafemi Awolowo and other top politicians who had been in prison or detained since the coup of January 1966 and suspended the Unitary Decree. The vicious circle of crisis Nigeria entered culminated into a civil war from July 1967 to January 1970. During this period Nigeria's domestic politics crumbled; Nigeria, in the words of

Alkali, "became the object and target of foreign policy"¹¹. Thus, from July 1966 to the time the war began, General Gowon continued with the Foreign Policy of his predecessor. At the instance of the war, the Gowon regime concerned itself with the mobilization of local and international support and resources to fight and win the war of unification; to maintain Nigeria's territorial integrity, and national sovereignty.

Significantly, because of the war situation and subsequent development necessitated by it, the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria was refocused and limited to prosecuting the war and consolidating national reconciliation. We shall hereby consider General Gowon's Foreign Policy at the global, continental and sub-regional levels.

The civil war turned out to be protracted, and ranged on for thirty Months largely because of foreign involvement and support for Biafra. In the courses of the war, South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and France gave adequate support to secessionist - Biafra through Gabon and Ivory Coast. Gowon was un-daunted and he declared thus in a broadcast:

If it were possible for us to avoid chaos and civil war merely by drifting apart as some people claim that easy choice may have been taken. But we know that to take such a course will quickly lead to the disintegration of the existing regions in condition of chaos and to disastrous foreign interference¹².

The French supplies of arms, which averaged 300 tons per week in September - October, 1968, gave the life-line to a practically defeated Biafra. External support also neutralized the devastating effect of the decision by the Federal Government

under General Gowon to change currency notes at the height of the war in January, 1968.

The external support and sympathy obtained by Biafra was partly the result of vigorous campaigns by relief organisations like Oxfarm, the Red-Cross and Caritas, which had pro-Biafra sympathies. But it was more the result of a well organized and effective propaganda machinery headed by Uche Chukwumerije, who in the 1990s became Federal Minister of information under the General Ibrahim Babangida's administration; and co-ordinated externally by the Geneva-based Mark Press. The war was presented as a genocidal one waged by the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who had declared a jihad to exterminate Igbos from the face of the earth (the massacres of the Igbos in the North, as well as the strategies of economic blockade and starvation pursued throughout the war, seemed to lend credence to this). In Italy, for example, pro-Biafra sympathies were very strong, and Ojukwu protested in letters to the Pope and the Prime Minister over the sale of arms by "catholic" Italy to the Muslim Northern Nigeria to be used in killing the "Catholic" Igbos of Eastern Nigeria. Thus, according to Garba.

The Italians were made to believe that colonel Ojukwu's secession attempt..... represented the manifestation of 'the very progressive, intelligent, Westernized and hard working Roman Catholic Igbos' to live their own existence in peace and prosperity, free from domination and annihilation by the 'backward Hausa/Fulani Muslims of the North'; Not a few Italians often saw a parallel between Nigeria and the Sudan where Christians of the South were in conflict with the Muslims of the North¹³.

The same picture was painted by the Igbos, and had more or less same effect, all over the World. For instance, despite the historical links between Britain and

Nigeria, the United Kingdom Government and of course United States of America refused to give maximum support to the Federal Military Government during the war. This situation, as Sam Oyovbaire noted in an article, revealed beyond reasonable doubt the direct relationship between the existence of colonialism, racist regimes and satellite Black African 'States', which according to him, act as bridge-head for imperialism, on one hand, and the national interests of this country on the other¹⁴.

General Gowon was abandoned by his 'traditional friends' at the dearest time of need; thus, he came face to face with what former Prime Minister Balewa realized much late that "for as long as parts of Africa suffered under the humiliating yoke of colonialism and apartheid, our (Nigeria's) independence would not be complete"¹⁵.

The war experiences (the behaviour of the Western Countries) clearly exposed the diabolical role of the Western European Countries and the United States on the African Continent, thus, breaking the myth of traditional allies. It forced Nigeria to look for and received soviet Military and diplomatic aid to fight the war. The extent of the soviet's support was paraphrased by Ahmed Alkali, from a statement by the then Nigerian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kurubo, after the war, thus:

The Federal victory is due more than any other single thing, more than all other things together to the soviet assistance¹⁶.

After the war, General Gowon's first visit outside Africa was in November 1971, when he visited Israel as a member of the organisation of African Unity's Peace Mission. In June 1973, General Gowon paid a three-day state visit to Britain as a fitting - climax to the process of normalizing relations. In November, 1973 he

attended the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York; earlier in that year, he paid a visit to soviet Union and on his return announced that Nigeria's most ambitious industrial undertaking, the Iron and steel complex at Ajaokuta was to be built by the Russians, and hundred of Nigerian engineers begun to be trained in the soviet union in steel technology.

The Russian assistance during the war must have been very substantial because when the Russian Ambassador was returning home at the end of his tour of duty immediately after the war, he was not only welcomed and dined by the Head of state, but was also decorated with a High National order.

Hence, one of the major "gains" of the war in the field of foreign policy was a closer ties with the soviet union, China and other Eastern European Countries which came to Nigeria's rescue when Britain and other West European countries refused to sell heavy weapons – (heavy field Guns, Bombs and aircrafts) to the General Gowon's government to fight Biafra. Britain's refusal to play a more supportive role also led the Federal Government under General Gowon to down play the relevance of the commonwealth in its foreign policy relations. The war thus, had important implications and consequences for post-independence politics in Nigeria. In sum, the international context within which the war was fought produced mix of forces which led to fundamental changes in Nigeria's foreign policy. It led to improved relations with the Soviet Union (soviet bloc) and a review of relations with Britain, the rest of the Western bloc and African countries. To this extent, the civil war marked a

watershed in the development of Nigerian's foreign policy. Consequently, this answered one of the hypothetical questions advanced in chapter one of this study.

At the continental level, Nigeria under General Gowon remained committed to the Organisation of African Unity, (O.A.U). In 1969, at the Organisation of African Unity's summit in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, inspite of the warring situation at home- (Nigeria), General Gowon declared:

We have no choice but to commit ourselves wholly to the struggle against racial oppression and colonialism¹⁷.

After the war, and thanks to the oil boom, General Gowon pursued a vigorous regional and African Policy; vociferation against colonialism and Nigeria's determination to support liberation movements towards the emancipation of the African people became central in the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations, the Commonwealth Conference, diplomatic shuttles and Gowon's itineraries around the World. When the war ended in 1970 the General Gowon's National Second Development Plan (1970-1974) stated Nigeria's foreign policy objectives as follows:

- a. The promotion and protection of National interests;
- b. The promotion of the total liberation of Africa;
- c. The promotion of international co-operation;
- d. The promotion of a just World Economic order; and
- e. The respect for international Law.

The Gowon's regime maintained these foreign policy principles and objectives which set the tone, content, style, direction and focus of Nigeria's role in international politics.

In 1971, at the Organisation of African Unity's summit conference, General Gowon urged the Organisation to commit itself to liberating at least one territory in three years. This perhaps stimulated Okoi Arikpo, the then Federal Commissioner of External Affairs to tell an Organisation of African Unity's Council of Ministers that, given arms, Amilcar Cabral was capable of liberating Guinea-Bissau from imperial Portugal in two years. Thus, it can be said with some certainty that after the civil war, General Gowon turned his attention increasingly to Pan-African and World Affairs. He visited several African countries. The burgeoning Federal financial might and prestigious undertakings were largely the consequence of the oil boon which tremendously increased Federal Revenue. The oil boom encouraged heavy spending on prestigious projects, which included financial aid to various African countries.

According to Akinyemi, Nigeria gave aid to the following African countries for various purposes:- Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe', and Mozambique at independence; Mali, Ethiopia, sierra-Leone and Somalia for drought and natural disasters; and Niger, Sudan, and Zambia for other purposes¹⁸. Reacting to Gowon's prestigious spending, some scholars and diplomats considered it as a national waste; Joseph Garba, for instance opined that, Nigeria's economic fortunes so changed after the early 1970s that the potentials for new stature and forceful initiatives was far greater than before. Gowon misunderstood the implications of this

new potentials, thus Nigerian Foreign Policy under him seemed to become one handout after another. According to Garba, "Gowon seemed to believe in dramatic personal largesse", the case of Grenada will serve to illustrate this point. For reasons unfathomable by many, Gowon decided to pay official visits to two obscure countries in the Western Hemisphere following the commonwealth conference in Kingston, Jamaica early in 1975. In Grenada, a tiny impoverished Island of about 90,000 people about 15,000 miles from Nigeria, he paid the salaries of all the civil servants. A Nigerian police contingent was also sent to train the Grenadian police at our expense, and a soft loan of 5million Dollars was promised to Mr. Eric Gairy, the Grenadian, Prime Minister¹⁹. The Guyana's government also benefited from General Gowon's largesse, the salaries of its civil servants were paid.

As regard the Angolan crisis, three liberation movements had well-established claims to recognition by the Organisation of African Unity, (O.A.U) in the struggle to drive the Portuguese out of Angola. The Gowon's regime also recognized these liberation movements. In the preceding May of that year the Organisation of African Unity had recognized a "provisional Government of Angola", and General Gowon had sent a message of congratulations to the leaders of the three component's parties thus:

We in Nigeria rejoice with you on this happy occasion and salute your wisdom, patriotism, statesmanship and realism in reaching agreement for the common good of your fatherland. The event which you are celebrating today is of great importance not only to the Angolan people who have sacrificed so much, but also to Africa and indeed all lovers of freedom, justice and human dignity throughout the World²⁰.

Yet inspite of the war experiences and the renewed vigour, in actual fact, Nigeria's foreign policy remained very much weak even in the area of decolonization, where national and international concensus had been built. In southern Rhodesia, for instance, General Gowon refused to commit the Military to fight the Ian Smith's regime. Instead he insisted on negotiations and similar political solutions. Neither did he give any materials nor military support to the frontline states of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana who tremendously suffered the scourge of the Southern African imbroglio. Even in the Angolan debacle, Gowon could not come out openly to support any of the movements. This indecision was resolved only when General Murtala Mohammed took over power in July 1975.

Some of the possible explanations for this stand or lack of it was that, from the domestic point of view, Nigeria had just emerged from a civil war that shook the very foundation of this Nation, destroying the National economy, greatly taxing the military capability and morale of the Nigerian Armed forces. From the international context, it may be argued that since the war of liberation, specifically the Rhodesian case, was not an open conventional warfare, but rather a guerrilla and tactical warfare, massive military deployments would not be favourable to both the Nationalists and the Frontline states. That, infact would lead to a full-scale war with the racist South Africa, with the probable result of internationalizing the war; similarly, the supports of Tanzania and Zambia to the Republic of Biafra against the Federal Military Government during the civil war may also be a possibility. The "in-action" of the Gowon's regime may also be incompliance with United Nations' and

the Organisation of African Unity's principle of non-interference in the territorial concerns of other nations.

However, apart from this genuine concern, Gowon, despite the very bitter lessons of the civil war, was primarily motivated by the desire to avoid confrontation with Western capitalism. General Gowon confessed Nigeria's dependency and insisted that Nigeria's development could be attained only by remaining in the system of World capitalism, thus Nigeria's subservience was given a new root²¹.

As Alkali has rightly observed, although trade patterns between Nigeria and the soviet Union, and Eastern Europe generally improved, Nigeria's economy remained in-extrically woven into the international monopoly capitalism, with multinational corporations playing the dominant economic roles-production and distribution in Nigeria. Consequently, an independent and meaningful Nigerian Foreign Policy and concrete contributions in the African liberation struggles became abysmal. And until General Gowon was overthrown in July 1975, Nigeria's role in continental politics was guided by Gowon's personalized interest subsumed by the interests of Western and American diplomacy.

The desire to live together in Nigeria was so strong despite the fragile basis of its unity as to be tested by a thirty-month civil war. The civil war affected the relationship between Nigeria and the Middle Eastern Countries, (as it does with Eastern bloc and Western European Countries).

Between 1967 and 1970 when the country fought a civil war, Nigeria's Middle East Policy was faced with two opposing dimensions. Egypt an important Actor in

the Arab – Israeli conflict, alongside the rest of the Arab World, sided with the Federal Military Government. The second dimension was that Israel, opted to side with the Biafran Rebellion. It took the semblance of the extension of the Middle East conflict into Nigerian domestic political process.

For the Arabs, the civil war provided an opportunity to demonstrate and dramatized their friendship with, and interest in the survival of the Nigerian Federation. Israel on the other hand, chose to side with the Biafran rebellion thereby explicitly helping the balkanization of the Federation. Thus, the Nigeria-Middle East relations was underpinned by what Birai referred to as “Latent conflicting religious undercurrent, divergent regional perspectives and intense political schism”. This made it an onerous task for the Federal Government to have a balanced and objectively realistic policy in the interest of the Federation and its citizens.

The major issue therefore that affected Nigeria’s relations with the Middle-East countries during the civil war period, was the extent to which the government of each country supported the Federal government of Nigeria or sided with the Biafran rebellion.

However, the total support given to the Federal government by all the Arab States and particularly the active role played by Egypt, on the one hand, and the total support given to the Biafran rebellion by the state of Israel, on the other hand, were simply more than a coincidence. As much as it was dictated by many factors, including the state of relations between the Arabs and the state of Israel, the attempt by the Biafran leadership to project the war to the international community as a

vehement resistance against the Hausa-Fulani's Jihad backed by Arab and Islamic interest, may have been significant factors.

In this vein, the main issue that dominated Nigeria's relations with the key actors in the Middle-East crisis – Egypt and Israel, during the period of the civil war, was the involvement of both in the civil war. The New Nigerian Newspaper, vividly captured the extent of the opposing involvement of Egypt and Israel in the Nigerian civil war in one of its editorials thus:

No country gave as much help to the Federal Government's side during the civil war as Egypt. Not even the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. Nasser's co-operation with Nigeria was total and unconditional even though he had a hostile Military situation in his Eastern Front. In contrast, the Israelis tried to subvert this country by helping the rebels²².

In fact Professor Olajide Aluko asserted that:

The involvement of the Israelis on the side of the secessionist regime during the civil war from July 1967 to January 1970 whipped up strong anti-Israeli feelings in Nigeria, while the Egyptian Massive material military and moral help to the Federal Military Government substantially contributed to the pro-Arab stance of Nigeria over the Middle – East conflict²³.

Surprisingly, despite the support and the widely held believe in Nigeria that the Israelis had stepped up their Military aid to the secessionists during the war and intense Arab support, Nigeria did not break diplomatic relations with Israel. Instead, while receiving the credentials of the new Israeli Ambassador to Nigeria in October, 1969, two years into the civil war, General Gowon only expressed the hope that the

Ambassador will give an "accurate interpretation" of the situation in the country in order to improve understanding between Nigeria and Israel²⁴.

The then Israeli Foreign Minister – Mr. Abba Eban, was however to provoke anti-Israeli feeling in Nigeria immediately the war was over. On 19th January, 1970, the Ambassador openly expressed disappointment with the collapse of the Biafran Rebellion despite all Israeli efforts to sustain the succession to victory. He declared, *inter alia* that,

Israel had exerted itself to such an extent in providing aid to the former secessionist regime that if another dozen or twenty countries had done so the result of the war would have been different²⁵.

The reaction and response of almost all the Newspapers in Nigeria was simply unanimous. They called for the immediate expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador from Nigeria and the closure of their embassy in Lagos. This simultaneous reaction from the print Media was in consonance to the non-compliance by the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations' principle of non-interference that governs diplomatic culture. However, as observed earlier, the Federal Military Government did not declare him *persona non-grata*, the government only summoned the Ambassador to the Ministry of External Affairs where he was presented with a subtle protest statement.

Again all the Newspapers in Nigeria reacted in unison; the inadequacy of the Gowon's government reaction as expressed by many Newspapers was summarized by the New Nigerian Newspapers as, "a show of naivety"²⁶. However, as Birai has explicated, the action of the Federal Military Government should be seen in the

context of the complications inherent in the country's Middle-East Policy due to the multiple effects of conflicting religious interest in the matter. According to Birai, Nigeria's relations with Arab countries and with Israel were simply not the kind of relations the country had with other countries of the World over. The historical issues that underlined the relationship at independence were such that placed Nigerian leaders in difficult position on what is rational and desirable as against what domestic sensitivities could allow.

Even after the bloody Military Coup that terminated the first Republic, the restructuring of the Federation by the Military Leaders, and the civil war, Nigeria's Middle-East policy between 1967 and 1973 was still characterised by a calculated cautious attempt of the Federal Government to strike a balance between conflicting perspectives that were rather a canker-worm effect of the hand-over from the first Republic.

I concurred with Birai in his view that, it was not therefore unexpected that the Government of General Gowon was unable to sever diplomatic relations with Israel even after the subversive and pervercious statement of Mr. Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador in Nigeria referred to earlier. However, that Nigeria for example did not sever diplomatic relations with France, China and the African Countries that gave defacto recognition and, moral and material support to Biafra, may also explain why diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Israel was not severed. Others have argued that General Gowon could not take a unilateral declaration of expulsion against the Israeli Ambassador because, being a Christian he revered the Zionist

state. However, the later assertion cannot hold in the face of later event that precipitated the Camp-Davids Accord. (In 1973 General Gowon severed diplomatic relations with Israel in compliance of the Organisation of African Unity's mandate as a consequent of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict).

At the West African sub-regional level, the Gowon's regime considered the role played by some African leaders to solve the crisis during the war; thus Gowon saw the need for these governments not to be replaced by forces hostile to Nigeria. The Military leadership therefore began to look at the security of Nigeria as being closely linked with the internal political situation of our African neighbours. Consequently, General Gowon began some prestigious moves to befriend and influence the Neighbouring countries. For instance he ceded part of Nigerian territory (the Bakassi area) to his old times friend Ahmadu Ahijo, the president of the Republic of Cameroon; General Gowon gave aids to Chad, Niger, Sierra-Leone, Senegal and Mali for natural disasters. As mentioned earlier, West African countries like Guinea - Bissau, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Burkina Faso have also enjoyed from General Gowon's financial aid.

Nigeria under the General Gowon's regime financially backed the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It can be said with much fairness that without General Gowon's avid enthusiasm, the Economic Community of West African States wouldn't have come to being at the time it was created. Apparently because of personal understanding and friendship between Gowon and General Gnassingbe Eyadema, the President of Togo, Gowon had

conceded the headquarters of ECOWAS to Togo. Reacting on this issue, Garba remarked thus:

One of the things that had bothered us increasingly about Gowon's style was the personalization of Nigeria's Diplomacy²⁷.

Even though it was a common knowledge that Nigeria was the principal financier of ECOWAS, paying a third of its budget, the Headquarters was being given away to Togo, a situation reviewed by the radical and dynamic Murtala/Obasanjo regime on accession to power.

At the sub-regional level, with the creation of ECOWAS, Nigeria's Official support for the regional Organisation as an instrument of collective self-reliance began. Thus, General Gowon and his predecessors have continued to re-emphasized the country's commitment to the spirit and principle of ECOWAS. And interestingly enough, ECOWAS is becoming a model for regional integration schemes in the entire African continent.

3.3 THE RADICALIZATION OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE GENERALS MURTALA MOHAMMED/ OLUSEGUN OBASANJO'S REGIME: JULY 1975 - OCTOBER, 1979

On July 29, 1975, General Gowon was deposed by the Armed Forces in a blood-less coup, while he was in Kampala attending the Organisation of African Unity's summit meeting. Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed, Inspector of Signals in the Nigerian Army and Federal Commissioner for Communications in the General Gowon's administration, became the new head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

In his maiden broadcast to the Nation on July 30, 1975, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed accused the Gowon government of elitism, insensitivity, inaccessibility, leaving the country to drift and having become, since the end of the civil war, characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline, and even neglect²⁸.

Major General, Joseph Nanven Garba, Nigeria's Foreign Minister from 1975 to 1978 under the General Murtala/Obasanjo's regime, and now Nigeria's Ambassador Plenipotentiary in one of his chronicles asserted that:

The years 1975 to 1979 will not only go down in Nigeria's history as a time when the main actors in government had a strong National commitment and shared objectives, but one in which the country also had sufficient Economic resource to pursue its national interest with vigour. In addition Nigeria had assumed its proper place in the comity of Nations and laid a rightful claim to a role in African Leadership which in turn would strengthen its voice in World affairs²⁹.

Furthermore, Garba posits that, "Murtala Mohammed made it clear to me from the beginning that he wanted a very activist foreign policy. Nigeria he said must be visible in the World..."³⁰.

Neither Murtala nor Obasanjo was a Foreign Policy neophyte. In their previous appointments as commissioners in the Gowon's government, they had been exposed to international issues. Murtala's interest in African Affairs, particularly his strong support for an African High Command was well known. Hence according to Garba, when he (Murtala) ascended the throne of power, it was no surprise that he wanted a change from Nigerian Foreign Policy as practiced in the Gowon's government in which they have participated; he indeed championed the change. His role in the re-direction of Nigeria's Foreign Policy agreed with the popular view that,

Heads of state everywhere in the World are in any ultimate sense, their own Foreign Minister. This view also re-emphasized the relevance and significance of the theoretical framework adopted for this research.

But change for its sake was not enough, Murtala decided on a full-scale review of Nigerian Foreign Policy and its conduct. His government appointed a panel with wide-ranging terms of reference headed by a renown scholar, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. The Panel thereafter produced a report which included not only an over-all review of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence, but also projected for at least the following decade some objectives, priorities and strategies³¹.

Nigeria's foreign policy under the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime was characterised by a new sense of direction especially in Africa. The government's action in Angola epitomized this new orientation and emphasis. Henceforth, Africa became the centre-Piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. According to Garba;

Nigeria could not consider itself truly independent while African peoples were still subjected to Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. Nor could Nigeria tolerate complacently the daily humiliation of our fellow Africans in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa^{32a}.

Political analysts and observers could hardly have missed seeing the obvious change in both substance and style in Nigeria's Foreign Policy consequent of the government's pragmatic reactions on both domestic and international issues. The government's new-found influence in the international community had shown itself in several other arenas. The vagaries of Nigerian Politics are such that, having retired

Dr. Taslim Elias as Chief Justice of Nigeria's Supreme Court, General Murtala would then order an all-out effort to secure for the same Dr. Elias a position on the international court of Justice at the Hague, hence as a result of the government's deft diplomatic footwork, Dr. Elias became the President of the World Court.

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (N.I.I.A.) had sadly been on death's door virtually since its birth at independence; both Murtala and Obasanjo had been members of the Governing Body before July, 1975, and saw its potentials. Thus, soon after Joseph Garba's appointment as Commissioner of External Affairs, he received a pre-empt order from the Chief Foreign Policy architect of the regime (Murtala) to appoint Bolaji Akinyemi as the new Director General of the institute.

Further to this Joseph Garba posit thus:

After my discussion with General Murtala, I decided in my own mind that I would carve out new role for N.I.I.A. Henceforth its research staff could examine a myriad of problems which I would present to them in an unceasing stream, and write position papers accordingly... I found the institute responsive and effective, additionally because it provided a forum for foreign dignitaries^{32 b}.

Accordingly Garba asserted that:

With all this energy and commitment around, morale was high. People looked forward to a new policy and to restructured institutions to launch it from. Our over-heated economy was coming under control, and we knew we had the resources to pursue a dynamic course. When Angola, our first challenge came, we were ready³³.

This background has therefore positioned us to critically appraise the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime Foreign Policy, and as usual, we shall look at this at three levels beginning with Africa.

In furtherance to the Murtala/Obasanjo regime's Afrocentric character of Foreign Policy, there was an unprecedented independent and meaningful foreign policy; and concrete contributions in the African Liberation struggles became paramount. The radical, progressive and Revolutionary foreign policy of the Murtala's regime captured the imaginations of Nigerians and the attention of the African Leaders. General Murtala Mohammed told the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) extraordinary Summit Conference in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia on 11th January 1976 that; "Africa has come of Age". Expounding on the Angolan debacle, the new Nigerian Head of State and Chief Foreign Policy architect, condemned in totality the diabolical role of Western and American imperialism on the African continent³⁴. The mishandling of Crisis of the imminent Angolan independence by the West and the United States in particular, handed Nigeria the Foreign Policy issue that catapulted it to the centre stage, and not just Africa's stage. Nigeria under General Murtala took a firm stand counter to that of the West, and produced for Angola and Africa precisely the government that the Americans opposed. That they opposed it for the wrong reasons, out of a profound failure to understand Angola's or any Third-World Country's Nationalism; and that Nigeria acted precisely in aid of Angolan and African Nationalism, laid the basis of one of the main thrusts and one of the main tensions in Nigeria's relations with both African and Western Countries in the years there-on.

The Murtala's Government recognized the late Augustino Neto's Movineto Popular a Liberaca'o de Angola (M.P.L.A) as the true representative of the Angolan

peoples, and extended tremendous Military assistance including Monetary aid - (about ₦13.5 million) to Angola; Murtala also launched diplomatic support within the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U) for the MPLA at the O.A.U Extraordinary session on Angola in Addis-Ababa. According to Garba, "Nigeria opened a round of quiet lobbying efforts on behalf of the MPLA. We targeted a few key countries and invited their Foreign Ministers to come to our embassy to discuss Angola matters"³⁵. Hence, Nigeria became deeply involved in the Angolan quagmire.

In the struggle to drive out the Portuguese out of Angola, three Liberation Movements had well-established claims to recognition by the O.A.U. The consensus reflected in the Report of the OAU conciliation commission on Angola, published in October, 1975 had as its principal recommendations that, "a Government of National Union" be immediately formed by the three Liberation Movements for the purpose of leading Angola into independence. All the three liberation movements had mainly ethnic, rather than national bases of support. These movements are MPLA, UNITA and FNLA, they were heavily supported by foreign powers. The respective leaders are Augusto Neto, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto.

The invasion of Angola by the South African troops from the Cunene River prompted the spontaneous urge to recognized the MPLA, as explicated by Joseph Garba, Nigeria's External Affairs commissioner thus:

I found with him (Murtala) at the Dodan Barracks, Brigadier Obasanjo, Brigadier T.Y. Danjuma, and M.D. Yusuf. The excited talk focused on South-Africa's invasion of Angola, Murtala turned to me, exclaiming in voice full of contempt for South-Africa's move, that we (Nigeria) would recognize the M.P.L.A with immediate effect³⁶.

The dramatic effect of Nigeria's recognition was very important, Murtala, though usually sensitive to diplomatic nuances, was intransigent, shouting, "We must recognize the MPLA now. The Americans must be behind this, and any further delay will just give them an advantage. We want surprise"³⁷. Consequently recognition of the MPLA followed immediately with full dramatic effect. In this vein, Garba posits that:

Once we accorded recognition, things moved with what came to be thought of as Murtala-esque speed. An outright grant of twenty million dollars was made to the MPLA Government; Military hardware from Rifles to Migs, supplies from clothing to composite rations, were sent in ever-increasing quantities. Nigerian "radicals" and slumbering political correspondents had a field day, and anyone, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, whose perspective reached beyond dramatic effect in the immediate days ahead, and who asked about a quid-pro-quo for Nigeria's lavish support, was derisively overridden³⁸.

At the OAU Extra-ordinary summit on Angola in Adis-Ababa, General Murtala was the third to speak, the mere introduction of him caused a tumultuous reaction in the large Hall. His forceful delivery of an already tough speech chilled the anti-MPLA forces, and certainly reverberated far and beyond the hall and even the continent. Hence, according to Garba, Nigeria had certainly asserted new Leadership, but in the process did annoy those countries accustomed to having their own Leadership automatically accepted on such matters as the liberation struggle.

The Murtala's government efforts on behalf of the MPLA had escalated, the government's preoccupation had intensified, culminating in a delegation going to

Luanda led by the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant – General Obasanjo, ostensibly to attend the fifteenth anniversary of the MPLA's struggle, but infact to open Nigeria's cornucopia to the new government. The government promised to give them everything from C - 130 Aircraft to fresh meat, and even took on the Gulf oil company on their behalf. Part of the package agreed to also included Nigerian Airways Flights direct to Luanda, in order to give Angolans an air outlet. From the beginning these flights were to run at a loss - there were not that many Nigerians flying to Lagos. Nigerians know how chaotic our air travels is, and to divert one aircraft for the Angola route meant additional trade-off and hard-ship at home. This Aircraft flew almost empty every time. It was not until 1978 before the government authorized Nigerian Airways to withdraw from the route.

When General Murtala was murdered on February 13, 1976, General Olusegun Obasanjo, his Chief of Army Staff, assumed office, as Head of State. Garba Observed that;

With Murtala's death Angola had, for him and the rest of us, fallen into a new perspective. In retrospect, ... I believe that our Angolan Policy was a right one. It provided the first litmus test of our new approach to Nigeria's foreign relations. For the first time, Nigeria took a highly - principled stand on the issue of central concern to African nations³⁹.

According to Garba, the question was not one of good guys and bad guys in Angola, Nigerians, more than most Africans knew of ethnic and historical complexities, and resisted ideological labels. It was a question of South-Africa and, therefore we were prepared to incur the anger of a number of countries which had taken our friendship for granted over it.

It is significant to re-emphasized here in line with the theoretical framework adopted for this study, that the Ministry of External Affairs was not the locus of action in Murtala's regime foreign policy pursuits, but the Military Leadership itself. This again re-asserted the relevance of the theoretical framework to this research.

The Rhodesian Crisis was another event that tested the African-ness of Nigeria's foreign policy under the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime. The future of Rhodesia has been Nigeria's pre-occupation even in the first Republic, providing the Balewa's government with its first foreign policy role in Southern Africa. This was sequel to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime-Minister on 11th November, 1965, that black majority rule would never occur in his life time. Nigeria's Prime - Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa has been given appropriate credit for his initiative in calling a commonwealth conference in Lagos to deal with the problems of Rhodesia. Not only was it the first commonwealth conference held outside London, it was the first step in a commitment that successive governments especially the Murtala/Obasanjo government, took up and expanded in 1975 forward.

It is important to remember that at the OAU Extra-ordinary summit on the Angolan issue, Africa was sharply - and equally - divided into two groups which were dubbed "reactionaries" and "progressives". With the victory of the "progressives", after the Angolan independence, in which Nigeria's leadership role was unassailable, many African countries wanted to be seen as "progressive" and thought Rhodesia would give them the perfect opportunity.

In view of Ian Smith's continued intransigence, Africa had come to accept that the armed struggle was the only way to achieve independence and majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. In this vein, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had accorded recognition to all the liberation movements that emerged, and was striving to get them unite under the banner of the ANC. Hence, at the beginning of 1976, the four presidents who then constituted the leadership of the Frontline States, - Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Seretse Khama of Botswana, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, met in Lusaka to resolve the serious leadership crisis among the parties. The aim was to reconcile Nkomo, Muzorewa and Sithole, so that the war efforts then gathering momentum could be intensified. Robert Mugabe and his ZANU forces were also emerging as a separate force and would have to be reckoned with.

It was to get a clearer picture of this confused situation and to find ways through which Nigeria's assistance could be more effectively channeled to the fighting forces that General Obasanjo, the Head of Nigerian Military Elite decided early in 1976, to send Joseph Garba, Nigeria's External Affairs Commissioner to visit the Frontline States. Garba was also commanded to visit Mozambique to look into arrears of possible assistance to the young Republic. Thereafter, the Nigerian Military elite decided to give 1.6 million dollars to Mozambique.

Sequel to Garba's visit to the Frontline states, Nigeria devised some further means of supporting the struggle, such as direct aid to the fighting cadres in the field. Nigeria's immediate concern was the fighting men prosecuting the war in the field,

and as a start, Nigeria provided the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) Dollars immediately as direct aid to the freedom fighters. The active front was based in Mozambique, hence the Nigerian Military Leadership decided to channel this sum through the Mozambiquan government; thus, a cheque for this amount was later duly presented to the Mozambiquan Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano, who later became the president of his country by Joseph Garba, in Mauritius during the OAU summit in June 1976.

The leadership of the Liberation Movements reacted immediately, they charged that, this gesture though generous and unprecedented, would further alienate the political leadership from the fighting men. They claimed that no revolutionary war could succeed without political and ideological guidance, which only they - the incumbent leadership, could provide. Nigeria was later accused of trying to create a third force. However, there is no doubt that this action jolted the Liberation leaders; because later when they attended the Geneva conference in 1976, they appeared more willing to compromise, and did form the Patriotic Front (PF).

The Military leadership in Nigeria were the first to publicly recognize this new accord; Nigeria immediately sent words to its observer delegation at the conference to invite both Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the joint leaders of the new Patriotic Front to come to Nigeria. The Nigerian Military elite wanted to know what equipment they would need to intensify the armed struggle. The joint leaders of the Patriotic Front honoured the invitation and came to Nigeria. General Obasanjo was in high spirits when he addressed them stressing the need for unity and an early

merging of both their forces. He concluded the rather stern lecture by telling them that if they were not going to live up to the spirit of the agreement, they should both draw their pistols and kill each other there and then; they both laughed and pledged their commitment to the agreement and to the Patriotic Front ⁴⁰.

Nigeria intensified her efforts both within and outside Africa to get diplomatic and material support for the newly United Front; Nigeria also channeled financial and material assistance to the Patriotic Front; and continued with other approaches. At the United Nations, the Nigerian Leadership sought every opportunity to raise the issue of the Zimbabwean independence at the General Assembly and the Security Council. At the London Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of States and Governments, Nigeria succeeded in making Zimbabwe the dominant issue. According to Joseph Garba, all these activities helped to produce a situation in which even Ian Smith knew that he could not hold on to power much longer. The intensification of the armed struggle by the Patriotic Front forces particularly the ZANU Forces operating from Mozambique had compelled the white minority regime to fall back on the old defence of what Garba described as "protected villages". Simply put the lives and properties of the white settlers in outlying areas were no longer safe as things were no longer at ease.

Through Nigeria's diplomatic efforts, it became manifest that pressure from the Americans was succeeding in moving a reluctant British government towards meaningful consultations and concrete proposals. It was in these circumstances that the British government published what became known as the Anglo-American

Proposals in September, 1977. These contained constitutional arrangements that would lead, in a step by step approach, to eventual majority rule in Zimbabwe. In analyzing the content of this proposals, Garba opined that, apart from the usual provisions for a transitional government with all the paraphernalia of courts and security, there was still very great emphasis on protecting the rights of the write minority. This attracted strong African criticisms.

In as much as the Nigerian Military elite disagreed with many aspects of the proposals, they also found some major points interesting which could form the basis for resolving the crisis. On this basis it is hoped that Nigeria, in collaboration with the Frontline States and the Patriotic Front could ensure not only a peaceful transition to black majority rule in Zimbabwe, but also that its independent government would be committed to the liberation of the rest of Southern Africa. Nigeria also offered to help train, at her own expense, a new Zimbabwean Army.

Joseph Garba, the Nigeria's External Affairs commissioners stressed that in agreeing to give these proposals a chance, the Nigerian government never compromised its commitment to the armed struggle. Nigeria indeed continued to give substantial financial and material assistance to the liberation forces. In this vein, Garba posits thus:

"I recommended to our government to consider that direct assistance from the Federal Military government be given to the Patriotic Front to enable it to purchase immediately all necessary materials to properly equip the freedom fighters in training camps before they are infiltrated in Zimbabwe. I would recommend that an

initial grant of five hundred thousand (500,000) Dollars be made immediately, Obasanjo agreed"⁴¹.

When the liberation movements petitioned the Nigerian government through Nyerere to assist them with the means to transport their cadres who had undergone training in camps in Tanzania to Mozambique. The Nigerian government acted swiftly by sending two Airforce C - 130 Aircraft to Tanzania to carry out the airlift. The Military elite in Nigeria, taking account of all imponderables, anticipated that completion time should be no more than two weeks, but alas, two months later these planes were still in Tanzania and had even joined by a Nigeria Airways 707 Aircraft which had had to be withdrawn from its international route to assist.

So committed was Nigeria to help the war effort that when between 1st - 7th September, 1977, General Obasanjo paid a state visit to the three Frontline States deeply involved with the war - Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zaire, Nigeria included in the delegation, Major-General Gibson Jalo, whose assignment was to visit the training camps in the various countries and assess their requirements.

General Obasanjo's discussions with the Frontline Presidents centred on the Anglo-American proposals. Both Nyerere and Samora Michael supported them and pledged to do all they could to ensure that they were implemented. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York a month later, General Obasanjo spelt out Nigeria's position in clear, lucid and unequivocal terms:

.....Our view is that in spite of obvious defects and wicknesses mostly of an ambiguous nature, the proposal may well deserve to be given a chance. Having said this, however, I consider it imperative to sound a note of warning that Nigeria will never be a

party to any solution in Zimbabwe that could be remotely interpreted as a sell-out of the six million people of that land. Our objective is the unequivocal surrender of power by the minority of the population. We have therefore naturally condemned all manoeuvres such as the frantic search by the rebel regime for a so-called internal settlement as totally unacceptable⁴².

Once the proposals were announced there was intense agitated diplomatic activities, thus the negotiated solution now seemed to be on the right track, and Nigeria did everything in its powers to help maintain the solidarity of the Frontline States which was fragile, and help the success of the on-going negotiations, as she pursued the agreed strategy for the integration of the fighting forces and increase her support for intensifying the armed struggle.

On March 31, 1978, when President Carter of the United States arrived Nigeria for a four-day official visit; reciprocating Obasanjo's visit to the United States. The Nigerian government was determined to produce concrete agreements with the American President on Zimbabwe. Nigeria therefore invited the Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States on substantive discussions on the matter. The Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana responded, and at a two-day meeting, all aspects of the Zimbabwean problem were successfully discussed. Noting that unprecedented occasion, Garba posits thus:

Looking back on those few days, too frenetic for reflection at that time, I can see how our (Nigeria's) new direction and style were in full gear then. Not only was the presence of the additional Foreign Ministers unheard of in formal bilateral meetings, the Candour of the substantive discussions was striking⁴³.

Nigeria was very desirous to see a free and fair election conducted in Zimbabwe; thus it propped the view that the Zimbabwean people should choose

their Leader rather than imposing a leader on them. To demonstrate this commitment, Nigeria engaged in all constructive dialogue on the political future of Zimbabwe both inside and outside Africa, even with Ian Smith himself. Nigeria did all it could to help resolve any serious differences that might torpedo the proposed All - Parties Conference under the aegis of the Anglo-American proposals, thus, she tried to persuade the internal leaders like Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Reverend Sithole to abandon their agreement with Ian Smith and join the Patriotic Front at the proposed conference, which was to help work out the final processes for a transitional government in Zimbabwe, a best option for a peaceful settlement of the political struggles. However the internal leaders saw the all - parties conference as a trick to impose Joshua Nkomo on Zimbabwe, thus, they expressed their non-challancy to participate in the conference.

Nigeria's major concern was the people of Zimbabwe and the post independence stability of that important African country. She had no tasted in the internal ranglings and certainly had no intention of imposing a leader on them.

As the liberation war continues, Ian Smith, Joshua Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda were desperately searching for a peaceful way of solving the Zimbabwean quargmire; consequently they arranged to meet in Zambia and invited Nigeria to participate, in recognition of the enormous resources, Nigeria was devouting to the liberation of Zimbabwe. General Obasanjo expressed his misgivings about the outcome of any meeting with Ian Smith, but allowed Nigeria's participation purely because of his believe that any opportunity for moving forward ought, not to be lost.

Nothing was made firm in view of the absence of Mugabe; Nigeria was delegated to brief Mugabe and invite him to the next meeting. In this vein, Mugabe was invited to Lagos and briefed accordingly. General Obasanjo reminded him of how vital it was to avoid a leadership crisis between him and Nkomo at that crucial time.

Later, President Nyerere leaked the top secret contacts with Ian Smith and Nigeria was accused of organizing a secret meeting with Ian Smith of Rhodesia. President Nyerere thereafter called for a meeting of the Frontline States to discuss what he termed a very serious matter. At that meeting, Nyerere was in full command, he insulted Nigeria and Nigeria was put to the defensive. At the end of the proceedings, a resolution was passed forbidding any African state or any member of the Patriotic Front from having any contact with Smith's regime. The misrepresentation of Nigeria by Nyerere in the whole process was stemmed from his view that Nigeria's active involvement in the Southern African situation was a threat to his dominant position as the doyen of the Frontline Presidents.

In the final analysis, the Lancaster House Conference which bore the Zimbabwean independence in the later part of the 1979 was not far-fetched from the Anglo - American Proposals endorsed by Nigeria. At the climax of the election exercise, the results were announced and Mr. Robert Mugabe, Leader of ZANU emerged winner in a landslide victory, it shocked the world particularly United States, Britain and South Africa, but then that was the reality.

As regard the struggle against Apartheid, Nigeria has never wavered in the condemnation of South-Africa and its apartheid policies. Nigeria has made friends

with countries with whom she has nothing in common; she has conversely made enemies of erstwhile friends all on account of their attitude towards the South-African question. The military leadership have formulated economic policies that have some times been detrimental to our own development because of our commitment to the eradication of apartheid.

Nigeria's posture against apartheid could be explained on the understanding that on one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian, hence anything that affects the right of the black people to live peacefully and freely on their continent affects Nigeria. Nigeria has struggled in the United Nations and other international fora in order to ensure that pressure was brought to bear against South Africa and suspend cultural, Economic, educational and sporting links with her. Nigeria believed that if the commonwealth is truly a free association of Nations containing a wide variety of races, there was no place in it for a racist regime, thus the expulsion of South Africa was welcomed.

In his speech at the OAU Extra-ordinary Summit in January 1976, in Addis-Ababa, General Murtala Muhammed Posits thus:

First we call attention to the diabolical role of Apartheid. The main elements of that criminal doctrine are too well known to this Assembly to necessitate any detailed analysis. Suffice it to say that the whole rationale behind this doctrine which the United Nations Organisation had aptly condemned as a crime against humanity, is the perpetual subjugation of the African in order to create a paradise on earth for the white. When I contemplate on the evils of apartheid, my heart bleeds and I am sure that the heart of every true blooded African bleeds. When we talk of these evils, we are assured of "sympathy" of the Western Countries, but when we call for sanctions to end this shame of Western civilization, Suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes more

convincing in consideration than the lives, liberty and well-beings of Africans⁴⁴.

In the same vein, General Obasanjo spelled out Nigeria's continuing commitment in lucid terms when on January 14th, 1977 speaking at a Dinner organised for president Kenneth Kaunda, he said:

The Nigerian Government and people are totally committed to the cause of freedom and respect for human dignity in Southern Africa, not simply for its own sake, but because we are convinced that African freedom is a sacred duty that must be done⁴⁵.

Furthermore, he stressed that:

..... in the pursuit of this objective, we shall not consider any sacrifice too great nor any weapon to mean to hasten the end of all oppression and injustice in Southern Africa and to ensure the total liquidation of Apartheid, foreign domination and economic exploitation⁴⁶.

The most innovative manifestation of Nigeria's more active commitment was what came to be known as the Southern African Relief fund – a Relief Fund for South Africa set up by the Federal Military Government with a Board of Trustee Chaired by the Governor of Central Bank to which Nigerians gave their contributions.

In June 1996, the United Nations Security Council affirmed in Resolution 392, that apartheid, seriously disturbs international peace and security. In view of Nigeria's irrevocable commitment to the eradication of apartheid, a Nigerian – Ambassador Leslie – Harriman, a Permanent Representative at the United Nations was appointed the Chairman of the United Nations Committee Against apartheid which was hosted in Nigeria. Series of Seminars were organised by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (N.I.I.A) on the promptings of the Government.

Several recommendations were proffered, one of the recommendations implemented was the famous Federal Government's clampdown on the Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the Nationalization of Barclays Bank and later the British Petroleum. These actions were some of the recommendations from the conference.

At the opening of the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid in August, 1977, General Olusegun, the Head of the Military elite, in his speech declared inter alia:

.... We are compiling information on all those Governments who pretend to be Africa's friends but allow themselves to be used as weapons laundry for South Africa -all for limited Economic advantages. We are mounting a surveillance on all those enterprises who depend on our raw materials and markets, but continue to help our enemies. Such enterprises must decide now to choose between us and our enemies and all that goes with their choice. We have a festering sore on which these flies have landed and are feeding in full glare of the World. And when we move to destroy these flies, no one should complain⁴⁷.

He went on;

Foreign contractors who are known to have links or connections with South Africa are already barred from taking part in any tenders of any kind or nature, for any transactions of construction work in Nigeria. An Economic intelligence Unit has been set up to ensure successful implementation of this policy directive⁴⁸.

The conference had higher level of attendance than any previous such conference meetings. The African liberation Movements were represented by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe of Southern Rhodesia; Oliver Tambo of the ANC of South Africa; and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO. Nigeria's External Affairs Commissioner was the President of the Conference.

One serious issue that dominated the conference was the question of Nuclear collaboration and Arms transfer to South Africa, thus a new focus on the growing external support for South African Military and security forces came to bare. Various discussion groups were set up to find ways to stop this collaboration. The most important outcome of these discussion was the recommendation to set up the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, whose work was to inform the world in the minutest detail about the South African Military and Nuclear capability and the complicity of the countries assisting them.

The Lagos Conference not only succeeded in anticipating the ways to bring international pressure to bear on the Apartheid regime, it even produced some action. On 4th November, 1977, the security council passed RESOLUTION 418, imposing a mandatory embargo on the export of Arms to South Africa; and for the first time designating the racial situation in South Africa a "threat to international peace and security". It thereafter set up an unprecedented committee of all council members to monitor and supervise the embargo⁴⁹. In many ways, the conference marked a turning point in the struggle against apartheid, galvanizing for the first time, people at the grass root far and wide.

Nigeria with other countries have been active in the international campaign to isolate South Africa in the field of sports. This campaign reached its climax during the commonwealth Heads of Governments (CHOGs) meeting in London in 1977 when Nigeria succeeded in pressurizing the conference to adopt the Gleneagles Agreement. Under the agreement, all commonwealth Governments undertook to

actively discourage sporting links with South Africa. Nigeria had earlier, in 1976 withdrew from the 1976 Montreal Olympics Games as a commitment of her stand on Apartheid.

Nigeria's avid commitment to the liberation movements in Southern Africa was the most important aspect of her drive for total human dignity on the African continent. It was clear to the military leadership in Nigeria that no amount of international pressure alone could persuade the intransigent South African Leadership to change their apartheid Policies. What was essential was a combination of international and internal pressure. It is in the light of this that Nigeria's irrevocable commitment to the assistance of the liberation movements in South Africa will be comprehended.

At the global scene, Nigeria's post - independence policies of non-alignment or ideological neutrality appears increasingly feable. Thus, I posit with a sense of truism, without fear of any contradiction, that most Nigeria's extra-African relations have since colonial times been with the Western European Countries. However, the military era, particularly the period between 1970 - 1979, saw a widening of relations with the Eastern European countries and particularly the United States of Soviet Russia, better still called, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The beginning of this relationship had been discussed under the General Yakubu Gowon's regime.

Sonni -Gwanle Tyoden, observed that there was evident expansion of Nigeria's relations with the former Soviet Union in the 1970 - 1979 period. According

to him the most glaring area in this relations was the Military Relations. The Soviet Military attaché in Nigeria were mainly concerned with the on-the-spot training of the Nigerian Airforce Men and the maintenance of the Mig Fighters and illyushin Bombers that were Nigeria's major combat planes before 1980⁵⁰.

With the accession to power of General Murtala in 1975 and the government's new approach to African liberation, there was a convergence of views between the Military leadership and the Soviet Union. The Russian commitment to, and material support for the liberation movement in Africa is well known. The Russian had for years supported the MPLA in the Angolan struggle for independence, thus, when the military elite in Nigeria decided to support the MPLA in the struggle for decolonization of Angola, they appeared to be on the same side with the Russians.

In 1976, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, showered encomium on Nigeria's Africa Policies, particularly Nigeria's support for the MPLA, when he invited the Nigeria's External Affairs commissioner to the Soviet's permanent Mission for discussion immediately after a session of the United Nations General Assembly. Their discussion covered all contemporary issues on Africa as well as Soviet - Nigeria bilateral relations.

In 1977 when Nigeria decided to contest for one of the non - permanent seats on the security council, the soviet union did not only support us, but helped to mobilize the other socialist countries to our support as well. The visit of Joseph Garba, the head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to Moscow in December, 1977

strengthened the good bilateral relations between both countries. In this vein, Joseph Garba opined that;

.....Nigeria stands to gain a lot from a technical co-operation with the soviet union. Their execution of our National oil pipe line in record time and with ruthless efficiency shows that when projects are properly planned and well negotiated, the soviets fulfill their side of the bargain. Their support for the liberation movements in Africa will continue, and for this alone, African countries ought to be grateful⁵¹.

On the other hand, Nigeria's relations with the United States of America have swung from cordial to merely correct. Just as the United States of America has always felt that she had global responsibilities, so does Nigeria feel that she has continental responsibilities. Thus fundamental differences in the perception of events on the continent of Africa often creates tension.

The United States - Nigerian relations were to plunge into disarray over the Angolan crisis in 1975. The U.S. liaised with the South African apartheid government and encouraged it to invade Angola. It was the South African invasion more than any thing else that persuade African countries, particularly Nigeria to massively throw her weight and support behind the MPLA. Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government and its full scale diplomatic campaigns for support for Angola within and outside Africa led to a very serious disagreement between Nigeria and the United States. Consequently relations between the two countries reached their lowest ebb during the Angolan crisis. Indeed on three separate occasions the General Murtala's regime bluntantly refused to approve visits to Lagos by American Secretary of State - Henry Kissinger.

However, as Joseph Garba rightly observed, the realities of bilateral Economic relations outweighed political and diplomatic disagreements in the Nigeria / United States relationships. American Technology had a role to play in Nigeria's Policies of rapid Economic development. Nigeria, with a lot of oil to sell, had become the second largest supplier to the United States. There was therefore a mutual interest in developing strong bilateral economic co-operation.

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime during the years 1975 - 1979 set up a U.S. - Nigeria Joint Economic Commission, an idea sponsored by Don Easum, the American ambassador in Nigeria. After the exchange of visits between General Obasanjo who succeeded General Murtala, and President Jimmy Carter, a series of meetings at high governmental levels took place to discuss ways to intensify economic cooperation between the two countries. But working on our Economic relationship could not automatically ease the tension in our political relations. The Military elite in Nigeria were happy with the election of Mr. Jimmy Carter as American President. In the word of Nigeria's external affairs commissioner, "whatever Americans think about President Jimmy Carter, we had no doubt that he was a humane man whose deep religious convictions and concern for human rights provided at last a moral pivot around which American attitudes towards the Third World would revolve during his presidency Down the line, he had involved Andrew Young as Ambassador to the United Nations. This, at the onset, was popular with African countries. Young's relaxed and friendly manner and the fact that he was black, gave him easy access to many African Heads of State. It was this changed

atmosphere, created by Jimmy Carter's election that opened the way to improved relations between Nigeria and the United States"⁵².

When Ambassador Young visited Nigeria, his meeting with the Head of the Military elite marked the turning point in relations between Nigeria and the United States. At this junction it is important to emphasize that, although Nigeria is a non-aligned country, but her National interest and determination to initiate rapid economic and social development makes it impossible to avoid working with the government and people of the United States of America.

The Nigeria - United Kingdom (Britain) relationships; Nigeria achieved her independence from Britain through peaceful constitutional conferences rather than Armed Liberation struggle. This more than any thing else has been responsible for the warm, and even sentimental feelings among Nigerians towards Britain. Towards the ending of 1975, Nigeria's Potentials as an economic power and vast market in Africa was very evident, and British businessmen invested heavily in the Country. The Queen of England was due to visit Nigeria in October 1975, as a fitting climax to the process of normalizing relations when Gowon was removed from office in July 1975.

General Murtala Mohammed made Africa and Africa's liberation its central concern. General Mohammed first area of disagreement with Britain, came over Rhodesia and Angola. It was at the height of this disagreement that the abortive coup in which General Murtala Mohammed tragically lost his life took place. The ring leader of the coupists, colonel, Buka Suka Dimka, went straight to the British High

Commission after assassinating Murtala. Once the news of Dimka at the British High commission became known, the Nigerian Public particularly the students who were already incensed by the murder of General Mohammed and the alleged involvement of Britain in the abortive coup were outraged. Consequently, there ensued a spontaneous demonstrations on the premises of the diplomatic Mission of Britain resulting to some minor damages.

In the event, Anglo-Nigerian relations deteriorated further, when Gowon was implicated by the perpetrators of the abortive coup, Nigeria asked Britain to extradite him so that he could answer some charges against him; the British Government turned down the request. Nigerians then started clamouring for a break in diplomatic relations with Britain. The Military Leadership set up various committees to examine the consequences of doing so. The Foreign Affairs Commission under General Garba collated these reports and looked very scrupulously at the political, Economic, cultural and defence (security) implications of a breach in diplomatic relations, and advised that rather than go for an outright break, the best interim solution would be to reduce the level of Nigeria's diplomatic representation in the United - Kingdom. Nigeria also deliberately delayed the appointment of a new British High Commissioner to Nigeria as long as Possible, up to a year. Nigeria did not appoint a resident High Commissioner in London until 1979. The implication of these actions and in-actions were that there was no serious high level diplomatic contacts between the two countries.

Seemingly, the British government's refusal to permit the British Museum to lend the Ivory Mask which became the official symbol of the Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) organised by Nigeria in 1977 heightened the tension. This famous Fifteenth Century Benin Ivory Carving had been stolen from Nigeria in the infamous British expedition to Benin in 1898.⁵³

During the years, Anglo - Nigerian relations remained cool in the Economic field. Trade and Economic co-operation continued, Manpower training continued in England for Nigerians, both civilian and Military personnel. The new activist Foreign Policy of Nigeria which made Africa its centre piece led to further strains in British - Nigeria's Political relationship; there was disagreement between the two countries on the question of independence for Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The acquisition of majority shares in Barclays Bank and the take over in August, 1979 of the assets of British Petroleum were economic measures the British never expected the Nigerian government to take against their interests in Nigeria.

General Obasanjo in his time as Head of State, struck the right note in his dealings with the British. He strove to make Anglo-Nigerian relations as beneficial to our country as to Britain. He never visited Britain during his term of office and discouraged his officials from doing so unless when absolutely necessary. In 1977, he almost pulled Nigeria out of the commonwealth, a move that may have been politically expedient at that time but was definitely wrong strategically.

The gains of Nigeria - British relations has through history been one - sided to the vantage of Britain. To the British it was business as usual, while to Nigeria,

National interest languished. Thus, summarily I concur with the views of Garba when he posits that:

No one is saying that Britain's historical ties with Nigeria should be forgotten. But let Nigerians also remember that Britain had many colonies, among whom are such nations as Canada, India, and even the United States. None of these feel compelled, despite their warm historical feelings, to tailor their policies to suit Britain's interests over their own, nor to Make pilgrimages to or through London on every possible occasion. I feel that our governments must strive in its relationship with Britain to emphasize equality of stature when we deal with each other, but most of all, the centrality of our national interests⁵⁴.

Conclusively from the fore-going, the super powers seemed to have re-aligned the wheel of Nigeria's non-alignment because post-independence policies of non-alignment or ideological neutrality appeared increasingly feeble to the point of nought. Hence, the inevitable interaction with the super powers and the wider international community.

At the West African sub-regional level, the Generals Murtala/ Obasanjo's regime continued with the Gowon's policy of friendly relations with neighbouring African states. With this trend, Nigeria took a mediating role in African and West African conflicts, reconciling warring factions. During this period also, Hudu Ayuba, observed rightly that Nigeria's support for a progressive foreign policy in West Africa was exemplified by the decisive step she took against the remnant of colonial vestiges in the liberation struggles of Guinea - Bissau and other countries. Nigeria under the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo's regime also facilitated the Gowon's policy on ECOWAS. This West African and African-oriented policy have since remained a cardinal programme of successive administrations⁵⁵.

3.4 THE RADICALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE GENERAL MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S REGIME; 31ST DECEMBER, 1983 - 27TH AUGUST, 1985.

President Shehu Shagari was not given enough chance to provide the good government he promised. In spite of the optimism that had been inspired by the president's apparent new resolve, the widespread disaffection caused by massive corruption, election-rigging and brutal police repression remained undiminished and was accentuated by the worsening economic condition of the country. Hence, three months after the second administration was inaugurated, the Military intervened again and brought the second Republic to an end.

Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, who was announced as the Head of the new Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, made his first broadcast to the Nation on New year's day of 1984, he said the Military had intervened "in order to put an end to the serious economic predicament and the serious crisis of confidence now afflicting our nation"⁵⁶. He promised that his government would give a new impetus and better sense of direction to the economy, and bring all corrupt officials, and their agents to book.

As usual, we shall consider the General Buhari's regime foreign policy on three platforms, viz:- West Africa, Africa and Global.

Within the sub-region some of the realistic policies initiated by the previous administration were maintained. This led to the expulsion of more illegal aliens, and the closing of borders to check-mate smuggling and sabotage. This came at the heel of further religious violence by Islamic fundamentalist followers of Maitatsine. The

riot started in Jimeta, near Yola, in Adamawa State; and the trouble really started when the police moved in to make a pre-emptive arrest of members of the proscribed sect who had been congregating in Yola. The Sect offered very stiff resistance, resorting to rampaging, killings and burnings. The riot was brought to an end only with the intervention of the Army Brigade based in Yola.

Investigations after the riot revealed that substantial proportion of the rioting fundamentalists were aliens, the Buhari's regime then ordered immigration officers to take greater action to monitor the movement of aliens in Nigeria and to stem the influx of illegal immigrants. This course of action was dictated not only by security reasons but also by economic considerations.

Aliens were accused of smuggling and other forms of economic sabotage; they were alleged to aggravate the unemployment situation by taking jobs that would otherwise have been available for Nigerians. Consequently, on April, 15, 1985, the Buhari Military Government ordered an estimated 700,000 illegal immigrants to leave the country on or before May 10, 1985. The Government declared that if they failed to leave the Country on the expiration of the dead-line, it would be constrained to take necessary steps to ease them out of the country.

Residence Permit for aliens would in future carry a special Seal to cut down on forgeries, while identity cards would be introduced for Nigerians. This measure it was hoped, would distinguish Nigerians from aliens. The contract for supplying the identity cards, was awarded to a U.S.A. company at the cost of 56.3 million Naira

⁵⁷. However, the identity cards plan was not put into effect then; it was still being considered in the year 2001.

The mass expulsion of aliens and the closure of the Land Borders caused a serious strain in the relations of Nigeria with its Neighbours, especially its ECOWAS partners. The General Buhari's government faced intensified criticisms, particularly from ECOWAS member nations, and the government was quick to point out that the expulsions were neither indiscriminate nor xenophobic; that only those who had no valid permit for staying in Nigeria were affected by the expulsion. There-on, the General Buhari's government managed to articulate an aggressive Foreign Policy Posture in line with its claim to be an off-shoot of the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo's regime. However, the realities of the Economic situation made its posture less adventurous than that of the previous Military regime. The major difference between the two regimes with implications for Foreign Policy was that in contrast to the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, the General Buhari's regime was very unpopular with majority of the people.

Thus, even though some of its policies were well received at home, it could not match the wide acclaim that had added to the vibrancy of Foreign Policy in the previous regime. Support for its policies was muted; but it also dealt decisively with the threats from the Republics of Chad and Cameroon, by stationing Military Contingents along the borders with those two countries.

At the continent level, the Buhari's regime maintained the policies of the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime but with less vibrancy and assertiveness. The Regime

kept Africa as the centre piece of Foreign Policy, and vigorously attempted to redress the slackness of the previous civilian administration of president Shagari. As usual, South Africa and Namibia were at the top of the Foreign Policy Agenda of the regime, and the American and Western Countries' Policy of constructive engagement was opposed even more vigorously than in the Shagari's regime.

Monetary and other contributions to the Liberation Movements vide the O.A.U. Liberation Committee were restored. The Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Gambari, was delegated to undertake a tour of the Front Line States to reassert Nigeria's commitment to the Liberation struggles. The General Buhari's government policy on South Africa received a great boost with the appointment of General Joseph Garba, the exuberant external affairs Minister under the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo, as the Country's Permanent representative to the United Nations. There after Garba was appointed Chairman of the anti-apartheid Committee, in view of Nigeria's avid commitment against apartheid, a heinous crime against Humanity.

In the case of the Western Sahara and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the Buhari's regime gave defacto-recognition to the polisario as the legitimate government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. The government in a statement had stated that the occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco is colonization and that the area needed to be decolonized. That the case of the Western Sahara was a case of de-colonization was obvious, for it was a struggle against a new attempt to recolonise her by Morocco; an attempt that calls for condemnation by all those concerned with the liberation of Africa. Nigeria cannot be talking of liberating

Africa and at the same time condoning even tacitly, the recolonization of an African People by an African State.

It was in line with this concept that the General Buhari's Policy on the Western Sahara could be properly understood.

At the global scene, some of the realistic negotiations initiated by the previous regime were maintained. At a press conference in Lagos, General Buhari said that his government would set up Tribunals to try corrupt politicians and that his government would also contact the INTERPOL, if necessary and utilize diplomatic means to secure the return of any Nigerian accused of embezzlement. He said this in reference to three prominent politicians of the previous civilian administration of Shehu Shagari, who escaped the Nigerian shores and sought sanctuary abroad, notably Britain, where Dr. Joseph Wayas, the Senate President, Dr. Umaru Dikko, Former Minister of Transport and Aviation, and Chief Adisa Akinloye the National Chairman of the National party of Nigeria (N.P.N.), stayed.

The flight of Umaru Dikko and Adisa Akinloye rankled, and the Military government of General Buhari declared them "wanted men" and was determined to bring them back to Nigeria to face investigations. On July 4, 1985, Dikko was Kidnapped from his Bayswater residence in London at gunpoint and the following Night was found drugged and unconscious in a crate labeled "Diplomatic baggage" at Stansted Airport in Essex, London. The Nigerian Airways Plane in which the crate was to be loaded was impounded while the Plane's pilot and seven members of his crew were detained. The Buhari's government denied any complicity in the

abduction, but there were certain unconfirmed reports that the General Buhari's government engaged the services of some Israelis with a sum of 10 (Ten) billion dollars to carry out the abduction. The then Nigeria's High Commissioner to Britain, Major-General Hannaniya, returned to Lagos and the British Diplomats were asked to leave Nigeria in reprisal. The Dikko affair marked the lowest ebb to date since the Murtala and Abacha's era in the tide of Anglo-Nigerian relations.

The General Buhari's government introduced stringent measures to deal with the Economic problem, since, financial indiscipline and gross mismanagement of the Economy were given as reasons for the Military coup. In this vein, the government continued negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international creditors, and adopted various stabilization and adjustment measures short of devaluation of the Naira. The I.M.F. had insisted on devaluation of the Naira as a pre-condition to grant a Loan, which the government found politically unpalatable, preferring recourse to belt-tightening and other measures or programmes from within the country for revitalizing the Economy. The relevance of the Bretton Woods institution was therefore dis-emphasized as a panacea, and there was deadlog in its negotiations with the Nigerian Military Leadership.

Summarily, at the global scene, the General Buhari's regime found itself unable to pursue the assertive policy of Generals Murtala/Obasanjo, it was largely handicapped by colossal debt trap. Nevertheless, the regime made bold statements about the need for a new world Economic Order, however, these statements lacked substance, as Osaghe has rightly observed that;

The continued decline of oil price and the inability of OPEC to do much to change the situation, and the Counter - Trade and other alternative economic arrangements into which Nigeria was forced, could not bring about the much desired autonomy of action, under the General Muhammadu Buhari's regime⁵⁸.

3.5 THE ADVENTURIST AND POPULIST FOREIGN POLICY (ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY): THE GENERAL IBRAHIM BABANGIDA'S REGIME; 27TH AUGUST, 1985 - 26TH AUGUST, 1993.

When General Babangida came to power and assumed the unconventional title of Mr. President, a title un-usual for a head of Military junta; it was an indication that his leadership may change in a fundamental way the business of governance in Nigeria, including of course the conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. Specifically the president gave an impression that the conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy under him will be transformed⁵⁹.

As observed in chapter two of this thesis, the castigation of his predecessor's style of foreign policy while seeking legitimacy for his new government, gave a lucid signal on what fellow country men were to expect under General Babangida in the field of Foreign Policy.

From August, 1985 to 1993, the Military regime of General Ibrahim B. Babangida took several important Foreign Policy decisions and initiatives in a manner that was different and reflective of an underlying intention to transform the Nation economically based on a new social and political order through an evidently populist posturing of a regime with a long term agenda.

As in previous appraisals, we shall look at IBB's foreign policy at three levels: Viz, the West African sub-region, Africa-continent-wide, and the larger international society (Global).

At the West African sub-regional level, good neighbourliness and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) remained the fulcrum of Foreign Policy. Hence, soon after taking over power, the Babangida's regime had to take a decision in respect of whether to continue to keep Nigeria's borders with her neighbours closed or to open them immediately. In pursuit of a good neighbourliness policy, the borders closed for long periods under the General Buhari's regime were re-opened. The piloting role of Nigeria, which is the single largest contributor to the ECOWAS budget, has been accorded due recognition. Nigeria provided Land in Abuja for the new ECOWAS Headquarters building as well as 5 million naira towards the total cost of the project (estimated at about 15 million naira)⁶⁰. Nigeria also mediated, with varying degrees of success, in the seemingly intractable Chadian crisis, the border clashes between Mali and Burkina-Faso, and the disputes between the Leaders of Togo and Ghana.

The border clashes between Nigeria and Cameroon which led to the death of five Nigerian soldiers during the Shagari's regime, had made relations with the Republic of Cameroon un-cordial. By December, 1987, president Babangida paid a visit to that country at the invitation of the Cameroonian President, Mr. Paul Biya, who had visited Nigeria in 1983, a few Months after assuming office. General Babangida admitted, during his visit that there had been problem between the two

countries, but pointed out that even between brothers, there are misunderstandings. He stressed that Nigeria and Cameroon are brothers and will remain so; he recommended, sincere and brotherly dialogue, as the solution to any problems that might arise. Nigeria, according to Babangida, was ever ready to demonstrate that she is nothing but a very good neighbour. Both leaders pledged to take necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of border skirmishes by organizing joint patrols at the borders and instilling in their people the need for co-operation and co-existence⁶¹. However, this pledge never worked as the Bakassi conflict reduced it to nought.

Relations with one of Nigeria's neighbours, Equatorial Guinea, passed through a stormy spell. The presence of South African "technical experts" in Malabo provoked protest from Nigeria. Equatorial - Guinea declared that the "experts" had left, but later, protested to the United Nations (UN) that Nigeria was meddling in its internal affairs. Nigeria asked that country to withdraw the "scathing remarks" and "distortions" contained in Malabo's letter to the U.N. Secretary General. In his letter to his Equatorial - Guinea counterpart, General Nwachukwu, the Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister said that Nigeria had no territorial ambitions in Equatorial-Guinea, adding however that, in view of the confirmation of the presence of South Africans in Malabo,

The Nigerian government had the right to be legitimately concerned about the threat of its security, especially in the light of the widely known destabilisation acts and armed attacks of the South African government⁶².

On July 13, 1988, Equatorial Guinea apologized to Nigeria for the false accusation.

During the Babangida years, Nigeria played an important role in the West African sub-region by initiating a multinational drive for a lasting solution to the conflict in Liberia. It devolved on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to come to the rescue. Two problems arose here; to begin with, the ECOWAS had no instrument for conflict resolution within member states; secondly, the O.A.U. explicitly forbids interference in the internal affairs of member states and upholds respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and for its inalienable right to independent existence⁶³.

President Babangida bore these constraints in mind when he attended the 13th summit of ECOWAS in Banjul, Gambia. There he supported a proposal move by Sir Dauda Jawarh for the establishment of a five - Nation mediation committee that would thenceforth resolve political conflicts in the sub-region. This led directly to the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) a military body set up to keep peace in war - turned Liberia.

The ECOMOG force moved into Liberia in August, 1990 with a strength of 2,500men. The contingent was later increased significantly. Nigeria contributed the largest number of troops as well as finances for the upkeep and logistics of the operation which also had soldiers from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra-Leone.

ECOMOG is a foreign policy issue that involved tremendous amount of trade-offs of scarce resources by Nigeria at a time the Nation was stocked neck-deep into the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

However, whatever were the arguments against Nigeria's role in ECOMOG, the government of General Babangida had good reasons to justify the country's role in the Liberian crisis. Nigeria's role was seen as the fulfilment of the country's

manifest destiny as a brother's keeper in an hour of dear need, and besides, it was not a unilateral involvement to enforce a pax Nigeriana, but a collective decision by ECOWAS to enforce cease fire in the intractable civil war⁶⁴.

Indeed, according to General Babangida, Nigeria's leading role in ECOMOG is,

One of the roles assigned by the constitution that in ECOWAS as in the Liberian crisis there is no discrepancy between our declared historical objective at the National and international levels. Nigeria has evolved to the point of acceptance of the fact that, and the reality that the conduct of our international relations and Foreign Policy may indeed involved certain contractual Military objectives beyond our borders. This is more so on issues and areas that can distablise the Political, economic, security and social facets of our National life and enhance peace and stability in sub-region, Africa and the World⁶⁵.

Thus, in this vein, General Babangida noted with satisfaction the role of ECOMOG and the fore sight of Nigeria as follows:

By and large our efforts gained the support of other African leaders and we were able to bring out a stable Liberia. After Liberia, then was the rebel attacks in Sierra-Leone. The Nigerian Military Personnel assisted the Sierra-Leone government forces in its war against the dissident Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The fact that we put a stop to this kind of thing and put our stamp of authority there is what has never happened in the history of regional peace keeping in the World⁶⁶.

On the larger plane, Nigeria did a lot to reactivate - ECOWAS which went into a rapid decline in the early 1980s. Nigeria continued to carry the bulk of the Organisation's budget (its average annual contribution was 33.3%), maintain its secretariat, host its summits more than any other member, chair the organisation when no other country was willing to do so and provide various forms of support to members including, most notably, oil concessions and financial aid⁶⁷.

Nigeria under the Babangida years also championed the restructuring of ECOWAS in other important spheres. For instance, in 1990 a comprehensive trade liberalization scheme involving a staggered relaxation of the restriction on the free movement of unprocessed goods, handicrafts and industrial goods was adopted. This very well complimented the minimum agenda for action, which entailed signing the protocol on the free movement of persons, goods and services, as well as implementing the ECOWAS' insurance scheme. As part of the moves towards Monetary Union, ECOBANK and the West African Clearing House were established. Despite these significant strides, the growth of ECOWAS continued to be retarded by the separatism of the Francophone countries and suspicious of Nigeria's Big-Brother gesture⁶⁸.

At the African, continental level, the reaction of Nigeria to the Libyan - American conflict resulting in the air raid of Tripoli just before the 1986 Kuru Conference on the "Goals and Conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy until the year 2000", organised by the Babangida's regime, in which the "Akinyemi Doctrine" of consultation was exposed, was also another indication of how far the General

Babangida's style in Nigeria's Foreign Policy and diplomacy can go. The Akinyemi doctrine of consultation stated thus:

We must not and cannot allow states which of their free will adopt policies that lead to crisis to assume that Nigeria will automatically be dragged into that crisis⁶⁹.

The Kuru conference was designed to fulfill General Babangida's promise of consulting the people on major issues, in this case, Foreign Policy provides for a new interpretation or redefinition of Nigeria's national interest in a dynamic World. In his opening address at the Kuru Conference, President Babangida made clear his regimes commitments to Nigeria's leadership role in Africa and beyond, insisting that, Nigeria's words and actions can no longer be ignored in the World Scene, adding that he "has faith in Nigeria and its innate capacity to influence the international scene"⁷⁰.

At the continental level, the O.A.U. remained the major channel of the traditional commitments to eradication of apartheid in South Africa, Liberation of the entire continent from colonial rule, and the advancement of Unity. General Babangida became the O.A.U. Chairman in 1991 when Nigeria hosted the organization's summit.

The African Primacy in Nigeria's Foreign Policy scheme under General Babangida's regime was demonstrated in 1986, when Nigeria led thirty-two other African Countries in boycotting the commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, Scotland, in protest at Britain's reluctance to apply comprehensive sanctions against South Africa's Apartheid regime. Nigeria under Babangida also continued to function as an

honorary Frontline State and its financial contributions to the Liberation Movements were steadily maintained from both private and official donations to the South African Relief Fund and the Namibian - Solidarity Fund. In 1989 for example, the Babangida's regime gave SWAPO the sum of 1.5million dollars and the ANC got 1 million dollars.

During the Babangida years, Nigeria contributed the largest contingent to the United Nations' Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia made up of Police Monitors from twenty-one (21) countries. Through Nigeria's efforts Namibia gained its independence on March 21, 1990⁷¹.

The release of Nelson Mandela from jail after twenty-seven years and the subsequent negotiations to end apartheid were celebrated in Nigeria as a major victory. Nigeria under General Babangida continued to play a leading role in the search for a peaceful settlement; evidence of this was its inclusion in F.W. De Klerk's diplomatic shuttle across Africa during the negotiations. General Babangida welcomed him on a state visit to Abuja in April, 1992. However, full diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa was not restored until in January, 1994. It was no surprise therefore that Dr. Nelson Mandela, the deputy President of the A.N.C., stepped on Nigerian soil on May 13, 1990 for Four-Day visit barely three Months after he was released from South-African prison in which he had been incarcerated for twenty-seven years. Mandela was received like a visiting Head of State; he paid glorious tributes to Nigeria for its contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle, and addressed the Commonwealth Ministerial Conference at Abuja which

coincided with his visit. He was awarded the Great Commander of the Order of the Niger (GCON), one of Nigeria's highest honours.

In addition to Nigeria's commitment to Liberation, she played a crucial role in the formation of, and signing of the treaty for, the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991, as well as the establishment of a Conflict Resolution department in the O.A.U. It also made donations in cash and kind to several countries, to make good its image at the international scene; for example, it assisted Zimbabwe when that country had to host the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. As O.A.U. Chairman, in 1991, General Babangida strongly articulated the demand for reparations to be paid to Africa by the former colonialist for the ravages of slave trade and exploitation. But the reparation movement initially champion by General Murtala and later by M.K.O. Abiola, turned out to be no more than a fleeting intellectual pastime.

Nigeria's most notable African Policy innovation was the introduction of the Technical Aid Corps scheme (TAC), an old idea which was developed when Professor Bolaji Akinyemi was External Affairs Minister, but which became operative in October, 1987. The Technical Aid Corps was conceived along the lines of the Peace Corps in the United States; the Scheme involved the secondment of Nigerian graduates and professionals (trained manpower) like Doctors, Lawyers, Teachers and others, to various less endowed African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to work. The Nigerian Government entirely bears the financial burden of the "ambassadors of Peace" many of whom have created a good image for the country abroad and earned the encomium of the United Nations Organization⁷². In sum, the

programme greatly boosted the country's status as a major contributor to African development.

At the global level, there was in the late 1980's a rapprochement in Anglo-Nigeria relations despite the boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games, the imposition of a visa requirement for Nigerians visiting the United Kingdom, the Dikko affair and the divergent and conflictual perceptions by both countries on the role of sanctions to combat apartheid. Nigeria was involved in negotiations with the Paris and London clubs of the rich Western Nations over its debt rescheduling. Britain is an influential member of these clubs, and the British Banks plays a key role in the Nigerian Economy. Britain has substantial business and industrial investment in Nigeria, and has therefore, no less stake than Nigeria in the maintenance of cordial relations. The then British Prime - Minister, Margaret Thatcher, said during her brief official visit to Nigeria on January, 7, 1988, that "Nigeria matters to Britain and I hoped that Britain matters to Nigeria"⁷³. That official visit signalled the reconciliation between both Countries, engineered and managed since 1986 by Nigeria's skilful man at the court of St. James, Ambassador George Dove-Edwin.

By and large, at the global scene Nigeria maintained its pro-Western Posture in trade and other socio-economic and political relations. Its debt overhang and the structural Adjustment Programme, whose success depended partly on external funds, reinforced this slant. Indeed, debt rescheduling, procurement of more credit lines and promotion of Foreign investment were the main themes of the so-called "Economic Diplomacy", which was vigorously pursued by the General Babangida's

regime. Nigeria remained a committed member of the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which continued to peg member countries' production quotas in the bid to shore up oil prices in the World Market.

In 1987 however, largely to strengthen the use of oil weapon by African countries, following the example of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and as part of 'Economic Diplomacy', Nigeria joined Algeria, Angola, Benin, Libya, Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo to establish the African petroleum Producers Association (APPA); Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Zaire and Equatorial Guinea joined in later years. The main objective of APPA was to promote cooperation among member states in Hydrocarbon exploration, production, refining, Petrochemicals, Manpower development and acquisition and adoption of Technology. APPA never became any serious strategic benefit to Nigeria, since member states found it difficult to reconcile their divergent interests. OPEC therefore remained Nigeria's main collective platform for employing the oil Weapon under the General Babangida's regime⁷⁴.

Nigeria also remain committed to the U.N., the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement, through which positions on major global issues were perused and articulated. Nigeria was also committed to the Bretton Woods Institution(s), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular, which provided the loan to engineer the structural Adjustment programme as a feature of the Babangida's Economic Diplomacy. This agrees with General Nwachukwu's declarations in his

address to Nigerian Ambassadors and Foreign Policy experts in June 30, 1988 on the “Dynamics of Foreign Policy” when he posited that;

The present reality demands that we take a new look at our foreign policy. We must do away with rhetorics and concentrate on concrete issues; Nigeria’s foreign policy strategies, he said, should therefore aim at facilitating support measures with the international systems for our domestic economic policies. Consequently, by bringing national economic problems into the focus of our Foreign Policy, the necessary harmonisation of the administration’s domestic and Foreign Policy would be achieved⁷⁵.

In October, 1989 at the commonwealth summit in Kuala Lumpur, Nigeria’s Chief Emeka Anyaoku was elected the Secretary-General of the commonwealth. Earlier, on September 19, 1989, General Joseph Garba, Nigeria’s permanent Representative at the United Nations, was elected President of the General Assembly. These two international events were globally seen as significant diplomatic successes and a boost to Babangida’s Foreign Policy.

Still on global issues, under the General Babangida’s regime, Nigeria became a full member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (O.I.C.). For the benefit of precision, Nigeria became the newest and forty-sixth (46th) member of O.I.C. in January, 1986, having been an observer since the inception of the organisation in 1969. However, as noted by Birai, the Babangida’s government refused to deny or confirm the story of Nigeria’s full membership of the O.I.C., but as the rumours freely circulated, it became a controversial issue, and the controversy intensified with the Number two man in command in the political leadership hierarchy of the General Babangida’s regime, Commordore Ebitu Ukiwe, confirming that the matter was not discussed in the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) the highest elitist

ruling body in the Country⁷⁶. Ukiwe posited that, Nigeria did not apply to join any international Religious organization. Soon after that statement, General Babangida in an elitist style unilaterally sacked Ukiwe and retired him from military service, thus Ukiwe lost his enviable position and job.

Thereafter, General Babangida inaugurated a committee to consider the implication of Nigeria's full membership of the O.I.C; again in a Machiavellian and Elitist style, General Babangida labouriously and elaborately tried to justify the full membership. Accordingly, he told the committee in an imposing manner that he saw the O.I.C as a means of mobilizing support for the battle against racism and colonialism, as well as advancing the interest of our nation; he continued that, its business is strictly international co-operation and struggle for economic development and self-reliance.

Six years after the O.I.C controversy, that is, on May 4, 1992, General Babangida formally restored diplomatic relations with Israel. Diplomatic ties were broken between Nigeria and Israel for two decades based on an O.A.U decision in October 1973. The restoration of ties with Israel came after a long and cautious process of covert and overt contacts between the two countries at various fora and levels. The resumption of political ties between Nigeria and Israel was a major foreign policy achievement for the Babangida's regime, considering the historical opposition of the conservative Northern Muslim Aristocrats. While the diplomatic break between the two countries was a watershed in Nigeria - Israel relations, the restoration of ties after two decades has become an even more significant event. It

was not only a Nigerian decision but a decision attributable to many factors. In other words, the break was simply a reluctant response to an OAU collective decision, while the restoration was necessitated by many factors of domestic and external conditions⁷⁷. While showing Nigeria's concern to the endless conflicts in the Middle East, especially the Arab – Israeli conflict, General Babangida blamed the international community for failing to resolve the conflict, and urged both Israel and Palestine to consider the peace option within the United Nations Resolution 242⁷⁸.

Prior to the full restoration of ties between Nigeria and the state of Israel there have been some significant events that are note worthy. For instance, in February 1988, General Babangida attended the burial of Emperor Hirohito of Japan; during the occasion he met with the Israeli President. But government officials were quick to stress that the meeting was purely at the instance of the Israeli President⁷⁹. Nevertheless, earlier in October 1987, the then Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi had met with his Israeli counterpart at the United Nations. This meeting was severely criticized by a section of the Nigerian Press which saw the meeting as a move to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, some of them called for the outright removal of Professor Akinyemi.

In January, 1988, Akinyemi was dropped by Babangida as the Minister of External Affairs, an action Professor Birai described thus:

That tended to confirm public opinion that Akinyemi was on his own frolic as far as the meeting with the Israeli Foreign Minister was concerned⁸⁰.

However, the development between Babangida and the Israeli President Chian Herzog, in Tokyo in February, 1988, a month later, explained that Akinyemi left the cabinet for different reasons. As rightly observed by Birai, it is very interesting to note that the Government of Babangida never denounced the Akinyemi - Peres meeting. Infact if anything;

President Babangida personally initiated rapprochement between Nigeria and Israel early in the life of his administration and he instructed Bolaji Akinyemi from 1985 to respond to the overtures the Israel at every U.N. General assembly session⁸¹.

Also in January 1989, General Babangida gave an explicit hint that obviously indicated a positive review of Nigeria - Israeli relations while on a state visit to Ghana. Asked by the Ghanaian Press whether his government was contemplating closeness with Israel, General Babangida responded thus:

"The circumstances that brought about non restoration are fast dying away and the situation may be different as time goes on"⁸². And responding on the same issue while on another state visit to Egypt, on January 29, 1989, Babangida cited the emergence of the state of Palestine as "one of the most significant development in the international arena today". This was followed by an official visit to Israel by General Ike Nwachukwu who replaced Bolaji Akinyemi as Minister of External Affairs. The reciprocal visit by Mr. David Levy, Israeli Foreign Minister and also Deputy Prime Minister was rescheduled four times but eventually took place on the 3rd May, 1992. Birai observed rightly, that the visit to Nigeria by Mr. David Levy, was the final stage in the process of normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel. This came after two

The oppositions aside, the decision of the General Babangida's government to restore diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Israel, remained a very historic issue in the diplomatic history of Nigeria. Seemingly, I concur with Professor Birai in his conclusion that,

It was a decision that fits into the style and conduct of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's foreign policy⁸⁸.

All this should not be taken to suggest that the *international community* was all the time supportive of Nigeria in the Babangida years. The country's emergent image as a major channel in the World drug trade led, among other consequences, to the decertification of the country by the United States, resulting in a blockage of aid, and placing of an embargo on direct flights between the United States and Nigeria. This was a *major foreign policy problem*, but a more serious problem with the international community, especially the United States and other Western Powers, arose over the scuttling of the democratic transition process (June 12 issue). The Western powers lent material and other capacity building forms of support to the non-governmental organizations and pro-democracy movements which spearheaded the stirring of civil society and force General Ibrahim Babangida to step aside; at one point, Vice-President Augustus A. Akhometu referred to pro-democrats as lackeys of foreign powers, which were sponsored for subversive activities⁸⁹. The anti-Militarism in the Babangida's regime and the Abacha's regime thereafter, was also encouraged by the favourable and supportive international opinion and direct criticisms and opposition to Military regimes by the Western Powers.

3.6 THE COMBATANT OR ABRASIVE FOREIGN POLICY (AREA BOY DIPLOMACY) THE GENERAL SAINT ABACH'S REGIME : NOVEMBER 27, 1993 - 8th JUNE, 1998.

The hostility towards the General Saint Abache's regime and its incessant harassment both domestically and externally accounted to a large extent for its *Foreign Policy* being largely *reactive*, *ambivalent* and *incoherent*. The Regime concentrated its energies mostly on consolidating its hold on the country and bridging the rifts within the international community to isolate it and *Foreign Policy* was made to serve the need of this struggle for survival and consolidation. Thus, the actions in the foreign based dissidents and war veterans against them became a major preoccupation of foreign policy. The survivalist imperative also partly explains why the Abacha-led Saint Abacha's government pursued *Isolationist Policy* aimed at diverting attention away from the internal crisis and tension. Distraction came by way of the 'false' allegations of Western companies who were accused of a conspiracy to destroy Nigeria's relations with South Africa and the border war with Cameroon over Bakassi (a couple of cases in point). In a previous appendix of other Military Regimes (1993-1998) it appears that General Saint Abacha's regime's *Foreign Policy* at the *domestic* level and *international* levels.

At the West African sub regional level the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) remained the main focus. Although it was less active than it had been in the previous years, this was partly due to the Francophone countries deeply preoccupied and preoccupied with the aftermath of parallel Economic Union

the *West African Economic and Monetary Union* (WAMU) focused on further

announced the verdict, the British Foreign Secretary had spoken of the growing cruelty of the Nigerian government in late June, 1995; and Lady Chalker, Minister for Overseas Development, had suggested that the Head of the Military junta, General Abacha might not be welcomed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) if he did not set out a credible programme for the return to democracy. These criticisms of Nigeria in Britain led to a warning in mid-July by Nigeria's Oil Minister, Dan Etete, that British oil interests could be in danger. (The statement was however quickly withdrawn). In August, 1995, the British Prime Minister and the United States' President made a joint complaint at the treatment of the alleged coup plotters, amid-growing calls for international sanctions against Nigeria.

In response to these expressions of concern in the Western Europe, the Abacha's Government sent delegations to explain its view point to several countries, including the U.S.A. and Britain. When the delegation of "Peace" visited Britain on September 21, 1995 it was received by Prime Minister John Major who pressed for clemency for those sentenced to death. The next day, a report by the commonwealth Human Right Initiative called for sanctions if General Abacha did not begin a transition to civil rule; the Amnesty international had in its earlier Report highlighted the draconian, authoritarian and repressive measures of the Abacha's regime. To ease the pressure particularly from the international community, a transition to civil rule programme was announced by General Abacha which was to terminate by 1st

October 1998. Many people were disappointed over the three-year period of the transition, which was seen as unnecessary too long.

In a continuous face-off with the General Abacha's regime, the United States and other Western countries actively encouraged and supported opposition groups in Nigeria as well as those based abroad, and sometimes through their diplomatic missions in Nigeria issued statements which amounted to gross interference in Nigeria's internal affairs. On November 9, 1995, the CHOGM began in Auckland, New Zealand; the situation in Nigeria was on its Agenda, hence afterwards, urgent pleas for clemency were sent from the Auckland summit, and President Mandela notably sought to secure a reprieve by "quiet diplomacy" rather than through Economic Sanctions. Amidst the ranging argument as to the best way to exert pressure on the Abacha junta, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the environmentalist and his eight followers were hanged. The news sparked an outrage both in Nigeria and across the cosmos; there were outrage at the executions, at the dubious (Kangaroo) trial procedures that had led to the verdict, and at the Abacha regime's contemptuous disregard for humanitarian opinion especially with the commonwealth. The executions reinvigorated the opposition against the Abacha's regime at home and abroad; but local criticisms was soon moderated because of some Nationalistic support champion by Chief Tom Ikimi, Abacha's Foreign Affairs Minister, for the regime's response to outside condemnation, especially the call for economic sanctions against Nigeria. This came particularly at the time the commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting was in progress, with the Nigerian delegation under

Chief Tom Ikimi in attendance. In that meeting a decision was taken to suspend Nigeria from the membership of the commonwealth. The organisation had also decided to expel Nigeria altogether if it had not made sufficient progress within a time to be stipulated, towards compliance with the commonwealth Modus-vivendi on Human Rights and Democracy laid down at the Harare CHOGM, in 1991. Thereafter various sanctions were ordered by the Western Countries, including a tightening of Britain's hitherto mild arms embargo and the outright banned of Nigerian Military Officers and their families to travel to Europe. But it was recognised that only an oil boycott would put real pressure on the General Abacha's regime. This was not a near prospect, but the United States' Vice-President said, on a state visit to South Africa in December, 1995, that the oil boycott was not ruled out. (However, this was never implemented).

One of America's Multinational co-operations in Nigeria, the Shell Petroleum was strongly criticised by the Humanitarian and environmental groups supporting the Ogoni Protests and Mourning Ken Saro Wiwa, but the MNC denied all the blame. However, the company's close link with the General Abacha's Government, especially its strong link in the oil industry in Rivers State, were well known. The company proceeded to conclude the final stages of its long-discussed contract for the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Plant in Rivers State; the contract was finalised with the Abacha's Regime in January, 1996.

The Abacha's Government response to the Western actions were two-folds; on one hand, it invoked the non-interference clause of the United Nations and other

international organisations to oppose the undue interference, and sought to rally the support of other third world countries, especially the “Pariah” States – Iran, Libya and Iraq, which were also at the receiving end of the “Western conspiracy”. On the other hand, as during the civil war, the country searched for alternative allies in the Old Eastern Bloc and the Arab countries. But major channels of its (Nigeria) global policies remained the United Nations Organisation, (U.N.O), and for major policies Nigeria remained committed to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which a former Nigerian Foreign Affairs and Petroleum Minister, Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman, was Secretary General.

When Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations, it fell back on organisations like the moribund Non-Aligned Movement. However, it is suffice to note that from the time Nigeria was suspended from the commonwealth, there was intense diplomatic maneuverability master minded by General Abacha and hatched by his vivacious and vociferate Foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Tom Ikimi. The Abacha loyalists in Nigeria and abroad have passed encomiums on Chief Ikimi for the role he played in the resolution of the diplomatic impasse between the Abacha’s regime and the commonwealth. The intense diplomatic pressure mounted by Nigeria on the commonwealth led to the dual visits of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) on the Harare Declaration to Nigeria. In a meeting with the second CMAG Team in Nigeria, Chief Tom Ikimi had said, Nigeria was never in breach of the Harare Principle on Democracy and Human Rights and Good governance for which Nigeria was suspended; thus the meeting was an opportunity, or offer an

excellent opportunity for the commonwealth to exercise its mandate and reduced the impasse that has gone on for too long.

According to Ikimi,

Nigeria has inter alia, defended the independence of the judiciary, equal rights for all and promote sustainable development and alleviation of poverty. Further more Nigeria has been at the fore front of providing assistance for small commonwealth countries, particularly in the sub-region” He continued that “since our suspension cannot be based on the violation of the Harare principles, we consider the immediate and unconditional recession of our suspension a sine-qua-non for the restoration of mutual understanding and cooperation between Nigeria and the commonwealth⁹⁷.

Ironically, from the time Nigeria was suspended from the commonwealth to the time the suspension was lifted, the country remain pro-Western, and the United States, Britain, France, Canada and Germany remained its major trading partners. In the next chapter, we shall analyse in overview, the factors that influenced the Military Regimes’ Foreign Policies and their implications or impacts on the Nigerian State under the period of study.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE MILITARY REGIMES' FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE IMPACTS ON THE NIGERIAN STATE: JANUARY 15, 1966 -JUNE 8, 1998.

In this chapter, an analytical overview of the impacts of the Military on Nigeria's Foreign\ Policy under the period of study will be demonstrated, and the factors that influenced such foreign policies will be highlighted. Specifically, I wish to show how these factors influenced the Military Regimes' Foreign Policies and foster the actualization of Nigeria's national interest in its interactions with other Actors in the international system. Attempt at this postulation will be made of all the Military Regimes under the period of study for analysis and comparison as the case may be.

The first established military regime in the political history of Nigeria was that of Late General Aguiyi Thomas Ironsi. It is not necessary to repeat here how General Ironsi came to power, for that had been discussed in chapter three of this work. It may be argued that in those early days, General Ironsi and his Boys did not know what to do with state power. They were highly in-experienced; thus General Ironsi ruled and made decisions that were the reflections and promptings of those that surrounded him. Policy efforts were expended on internal conflicts rather than on the vigorous pursuit of any significant foreign policy.

It was glaring that General Ironsi's view of the political situation at that time was very narrow and this helped to accelerate the crisis that consumed the General and others. Never-the-less, history has recorded that General Ironsi's major

contribution in the field of Nigeria's Foreign Policy was his summoning of his Ambassadors from their diplomatic post in Africa for six days of dialogue and consultations on the review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy in Lagos. This forum was dubbed "the ambassadors conference"¹. The meeting was to be the start of a series of ambassadorial gatherings leading to a comprehensive review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, the first of its kind since Nigeria's decolonization in 1960. In the conference, the decision to begin with an assessment of the Federal Government's interest in Africa was explained by General Ironsi thus:

In the whole sphere of Nigeria's external relations, the government attaches the greatest importance to our African Policy. We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the majority of opinion in the civilized world looks up to us to provide responsible leadership in Africa; and we realize that we shall be judged, to a very great extent, by the degree of success or failure with which we face up to the challenge which this expectation throws on us. We are convinced that whether in the political, economic or cultural sphere, our destiny lies in our role in the continent of Africa.²

Seven weeks later, General Ironsi was dead, a victim of Nigeria's second military coup in less than seven months, and the country slipped to the brink of anarchy. Aspiration for leadership in Africa had to be abandoned, as the formulation and execution of a coherent foreign policy became impossible under conditions of domestic chaos. Hence, it can be said with out fear of any contradiction, that General Ironsi inherited Alhaji Tafawa Balewa's conception of foreign policy, with no fundamental shift until the General Gowon's era. However, one thing note worthy is that General Ironsi emphasized Nigeria's active role in the continent as a prerequisite

to attaining its aspiration of greatness. The regime did not last long enough to demonstrate any particular foreign policy priorities.

There is no basis of comparing the General Ironsi's regime foreign policy with that of General Gowon's; but if we should, the General Gowon's regime was more remarkable in the field of foreign policy. Let us now see how remarkable the Gowon's regime was in the field of foreign policy.

Several scholars have asserted that the general Gowon's regime stood out clearly as the most benevolent military dictatorship that had ever been established in Nigeria. The General ruled with the fear of God and even when under severe pressure from his junta members, he never failed to care about whose horse was gored. Through out his period, the conduct of state affairs was handled with a lot of consultations. Infact one of the points against him when he was removed from power was that he was too soft for the liking of some of his junta members.

As earlier discussed in chapter three, the civil war period presented Nigeria with one of the biggest challenges of survival in its history. The inevitable involvement of foreign powers put our diplomatic skills to test. As the civil war ensued, General Gowon established a policy framework for the conduct of international relations, and Africa emerged as the central focus of Nigeria's civil war diplomacy. The basic strategy which prevailed until the end of the conflict in January, 1970, was defensive, aimed at limiting Biafra's penetration of the international system. Nigeria the "giant" of Africa, ironically found itself tied to a foreign policy that depended in large measure on the willingness of other African

government to maintain a solid front of diplomatic support as a means of discouraging intervention that would foster Biafran independence.

Unlike the Congo crisis a few years earlier, the Nigerian civil war did not polarize Africa or seriously intensify tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union; nor did it bring an influx of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. To comprehend official reaction to the conflict in Nigeria, black Africa's richest and most populous country, one should be aware of the federal Government's role in international affairs prior to Biafra's secession on May 30, 1967. Diplomacy after all is a cumulative process, and Nigeria's previous behaviour influenced foreign reaction to the civil war. General Gowon's experience during this earlier period also helped shape his effort to control the degree of external involvement in the domestic conflict. The traumatic experience of the civil war taught, Nigeria a cardinal lesson in diplomacy; that in international politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies, but permanent interests. Despite her close relationship with the West, particularly Britain, following her colonial history, and later, membership of the common wealth, Nigeria received "cold shoulder" treatment from the allies.

The main kernel in Nigeria's foreign policy making culture has been how to enforce the principle of self-determination in a way that focuses on the ever-changing systems of management needs and conflicts. Domestic issues and needs obviously have predominated the essential inputs of Nigerian foreign policy mechanisms. These issues have ranged from emphasizing Nigeria's unique position as a people to self-assertion as an important member of the African confraternity.

Several scholars have regarded the General Gowon's era as the golden age of Nigeria's foreign policy. This is without doubt because most, if not all, of the country's major foreign policy landmarks were achieved during this period. It was during this period that Nigeria raised her voice loud enough and was heard and listened to particularly on regional and sub-regional (Africa and West-African) matters. This was because of its large population, military might in Africa, potential large markets for industrial goods, strategic importance and its leadership role on the continent. During the General Gowon's regime, Nigeria played an active role in the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U), General Gowon became its chairman, Nigeria became a leading member in both the non-aligned movement and the G-77, Nigeria sent troops for peace-keeping operations in Lebanon and other troubled spots.

These achievements brought a deal to Nigeria both positive and negative. In the negative sense, the country earned ridiculous envy and outright hatred from sister nations that it had assisted financially, politically or militarily. Most countries particularly Franco-phone Nations suspected Nigeria and in some instances collaborated against her³.

On the positive side, is the fact that Nigeria became overnight as to say, a power in Africa - (regional power). On the global scale, she was consulted on virtually anything concerning Africa.

The Soviet assistance to Nigeria during the war led to a diversification of Nigeria's external relations; thus after the war General Gowon cultivated a different foreign policy approach. There was a flourishing soviet - Nigeria understanding, but

the Africanist policy was viewed from Nigeria's emerging economic power. The accompanying respect garnered from the offshoot of oil-wealth made Nigeria to cultivate new friendship amongst its immediate neighbours and other regions far and wide. Flaunting its stupendous wealth, it sold oil with concession to West African states, and with this mobilized itself as an emerging power in the region.

Corresponding with its emerging power was its role as a big brother. Under General Gowon, Nigeria used financial incentives to get agreement on the creation of ECOWAS; provided Angola's movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) party ₦20 million grant. It wrote off ECOWAS debt at creation and still contributed 32% of its annual budget; it established a eighty million pound Nigeria Trust Fund with the African Development Bank (ADB) for soft loans to African States; it provided Niger - Republic with electricity from the Kainji-Dam; it built the presidential palace at Lome, Togo, and donated fifty thousand naira (₦50,000.00) to the ruling party in Conakry, Guinea. Enough of this extravagance and diplomacy of prestige had been discussed in chapter three of this study. As mention earlier, what all this paternalism did to Nigeria was to invite flattery and sycophancy; Nigeria was a diplomatic *santaclaus*, an every day Father-Christmas. But on the critical and weighty issues of colonialism and apartheid, the power of Nigeria was not felt⁴.

In the world of Ayo Akinbobola, an international relations' expert, This is perhaps why the era of Balewa up to General Gowon has been referred to as an era of reactivism in foreign policy concern then lacking adequate initiative on multi-faceted areas of foreign policy concern then⁵.

This opinion may differ from the opinion of other scholars, but then, individuals are entitled to their opinions.

Dulled by its stupendous oil wealth, praised by the Western countries as an emerging world power in the African regions, Nigeria became a darling to the West as the international monetary fund (IMF), began to take full control of its economic foreign policy. In this vein, Osaghae and others submitted that, the over-all effect of the oil boom on the standard of living of the masses of the people was negligible, especially in the rural areas. That the over-all effect of the boom discouraged the expansion of productive capacity, and encouraged the expansions of opportunities for rent-seeking in the public sector; that, it was the Bourgeoisie a loose coalition of elites – military officers, political office holders and commission agents of foreign capital who were the main beneficiaries of the oil boom. Thus, according to Dudley;

..... with no constituents to conciliate and no electorate to be accountable to the effect of the oil boom was to convert the military political decision-makers and their bureaucratic aides into a new property – owning, rentier class, working in close and direct collaboration with foreign business interests with the sole aim of expropriating the surpluses derived from oil for their private and personal benefit ⁶.

Never – the – less in sum, I joined several scholars to submit that in the field of foreign policy, the General Yakubu Gowon's regime contributed positively, as it laid the foundation of foreign policy dynamism in Nigeria stage-managed by his idiosyncrasy. This view is supported by Joseph Garba's submission in which he gave pass-mark to the General Gowon's foreign policy. In his words, Garba posit thus;

“Gowon’s handling of the country’s foreign policy had been effective and positive”⁷.

On a comparative bases, the General Gowon’s foreign policy was less radical and evolutionary than the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo’s foreign policy. Let us now consider how much radical and revolutionary the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo’s foreign policies were.

The General Murtala Mohammed’s regime kept the *modus vivendi* and practices of the previous regime, but placing emphasis on African issues, - the O.A. U. charter and the eradication of colonialism and Apartheid. However, barely two months after taking over power, it set up a committee to review - Nigeria’s foreign policy; the committee was headed by a renowned economist, professor Adebayo Adedeji, former Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Executive Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The committee produced a tangible report which included not only an overall review of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence, but also projected for at least the following decade some objectives, priorities and strategies.

The Murtala’s regime declared commitment to the eradication of apartheid and the liberation of Southern Africa was reflected in the following issues. First, Nigeria’s rejection of the policy of dictation from the United States on Angola, secondly, her financial and Diplomatic support to M.P.L.A; thirdly, the Nationalization of British petroleum for selling oil to south-Africa, an action which sped up Zimbabwe’s independence⁸. Right from independence, Nigeria had

concerned herself with the campaign for African Liberation. Nigeria has been very vocal in the proceeding of the O.A.U. liberation committee based in Dar-es-salam. However, it was only during the regime of General Murtala Mohammed that the policy campaign for African liberation received a boost. One of the first steps he took was to confer de-facto recognition on the pro-marxist M.P.L.A. faction of the Angolan liberation struggle and to warn south-Africa to keep off limits of the Portuguese ruled territory. This total and radical departure from Nigeria's meek, pro-western stance demonstrated by Prime Minister Balewa and General Gowon shocked the Western world, especially the United States which, for years, had hobnobbed with Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA) party.

General Murtala Mohammed's radical address to the O.A.U summit in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in which he strongly attacked the united states, drew the ire of the then U.S. secretary of state, Dr. Henry Kissinger who made it very clear that the united states would not tolerate Nigeria's open hostility. General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated by some pro-Western agents in the Nigerian army, not quite one month after that O.A.U address.

When General Obasanjo took over, he was no less virulent and radical. The General even went a step further to hit at the soft underbelly of the Western powers by nationalizing the entire oil and banking industry. He continued with the pro-M.P.L.A policy and stepped up the issue of independence for Rhodesia. The stewardship of General Joseph Naven Garba as foreign minister during this time was

most remarkable for its zeal and forthrightness. No wonder scholars like Akinbobola and Bukarembé posited that, it took the emergence of the Generals Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo to usher in what they called, “the golden era of Nigeria’s foreign policy”. The entrance of the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime, according to Akinbobola “changed the pendulum of Nigeria’s complacency on foreign policy issues for serious activism and pro-activism”⁹. Thus, rather than remained reptilianly patronising to the West in their socio-economic demonisation of Nigeria, the Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime comically displayed what it means to be independent politically, and reject the continuous foreign dictation on matters concerning Nigeria’s foreign relations.

Expressing a similar view, Okwudiba Nnobi remarked thus;

The foreign relations image created by the Military Regime of Generals Murtala/Obasanjo, seemed to be informed by racial affinity, political unity and a non surrender to Western flattery¹⁰.

Yet, according to Nnobi, economically, the country still maintained an apron-string foreign policy – a situation where foreign dictation ruled the Nation’s economic sphere, as economic relations were still overwhelmingly with the West and the domestic economic life was still dominated by foreign private capital. Thus a question worth asking is; Did the progressive and radical shifts engineered by Generals Murtala and Obasanjo in foreign policy do anything to Nigeria’s image abroad? Nnobi did not think so; he posits that, Nigeria remained substantially tied to the economic apron-string of the Western powers, especially America. Moreso, the policies did not threatened the domination of foreign capital, and also did not

articulately propose to be an anti-imperialist struggle for economic emancipation, and they remained isolated policies of the regime that set them, without any emerging pattern¹¹.

Similarly, Alkali Ahmed Rufai has observed that despite the apparent radical posture taken by the Murtala's government, there were some problems. According to him, in October, 1975, Joseph Garba, Nigeria's external affairs commissioner stated that it was the western powers that were "behind the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa". He admitted that though Nigeria provided aid to the Liberation movements through the O.A.U. auspices, it was not realistic to put a target date for final decolonization of Africa. And that "any action that can be taken lies entirely in the hands of the so-called superpowers"¹². The danger of this admission according to Alkali, showed that "Nigeria was hesitant to embark on a radical stand in anti-imperialist struggle"¹³.

Also, despite the radical posturing by General Obasanjo at the formal level, he was much less timid when confronted with the realities of the multinational corporations (MNCs). Barely after addressing the United Nations in 1977, General Obasanjo had dinner with the American Business community in the United States. He told them that Nigeria is essentially a "trading post economy". He praised American corporations as a living proof of the "critical nature and contribution of Science and Technology". He assured the American MNCs of the Federal Government's protection. He concluded his address with the conviction that "the

history of industrialization in Nigeria will not be complete without an American Chapter"¹⁴.

From the foregoing, it appears that Nigerian Foreign Policy under the General Obasanjo's regime lacks coherence, content and direction. At a Lagos conference for Action Against Apartheid, Obasanjo vilified the West and enunciated anti-colonial and anti-imperialist philosophies, but face to face with the backbone (base) of the MNCs he was "idealistic, capitalistic and apologetically compromising"¹⁵. The views expressed by Nnobi and Alkali above are cogent, but may not be popular in the face of the popular acclamation given to the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime policy by radical scholars in Nigeria and Africa. In this regard, Otubanjo posits thus:

..... Shehu Shagari's regime inherited a foreign policy which was very popular with the people as well as being object of respect in the international system ¹⁶.

This view underscores the positivism of the impact of the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime on Nigeria's foreign policy. By a way of an overview, we may summarise the main thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy under the first three military regimes discussed above i.e. Generals Ironsi, Gowon and Murtala/Obasanjo) as a more militant approach to the liberation of south Africa and other countries under colonial tutelage, the assertion of Nigeria's role as a black redemptionist and Africa Leader, positive neutrality - involving the diversification of relations to the Eastern Europe and a vigorous challenge of Western global hegemony, and the promotion or advancement of regional integration. Thus, compared to the conservative Balewa's regime, the military regimes were more adventurous, pragmatic and populist in their

approach, and this meant less reliance on what Osaghae referred to as “the legal instrumentalities of international organizations”¹⁷.

The emergence of oil as a major weapon of foreign policy strengthened this orientation. Another major factor and reason for more adventurous policies, especially in the post-civil war period, was the relative peace and unity in the country which tremendously modified the effects of the regional cleavages on foreign policy making. Efforts were also made to strengthen the structures of foreign policy formulation and management and improve the quality of policies, hence the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (N.I.I.A) became the think-tank of foreign policy and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies at Kuru, also emerged as a major actor in policy formulation. Although these led to a positive improvement in the logic of policies, but Osaghae observed that the policies formulated still suffered from incoherence and discontinuity.

Whatever opinion that may be expressed, negatively or positively, wrongly or rightly about the military’s impacts on Nigeria’s foreign policy; the very popular opinion is that Nigerian foreign policy underwent major positive and sometimes dramatic transformation during the first thirteen consecutive years (the first phase) of military rule discussed and analysed in this chapter. In general, the transformations were part of the efforts by the military to redeem the country from the failings of the first Republic. But the changes were not always the result of deliberate policies. For example, the oil boom of the 1970s, which enabled the country to pursue more assertive policies and actualize its manifest destiny, was a

matter of circumstances. Similarly, the civil war was in this trend; it marked a turning-point in Nigeria's relations with Eastern European countries. Be it as it may, successive military regimes in the period consciously set about asserting Nigeria's position in the West African sub-region, Africa and the rest of the world.

Let us now consider the second phase of the military regimes' foreign policy after the abortive second Republic.

After the civilian inter-reg-num, came the General Muhammad Buhari's regime. The regime inherited a weak and further deteriorating economy. It was therefore pressed by this unhealthy economic situation to adopt a posture variously described as a more shrewd, cautious or more timid, in its consideration of foreign policy options. Hence, benign, neglect and passivism rocked the foreign policy action of the government. The Buhari's regime lack of initiative in foreign policy matters made the country to lose her image in the international scene. It was lucid that the government's foreign policy was predicated on a charged environment marred with crisis which sharpened political contradictions and brought the end of the regime. No wonder on accession to power, General Babangida criticized General Buhari's foreign policy as unimaginative and lacking initiative. General Babangida posits thus;

"The ousted military government conducted our external relations by a policy of retaliatory action. Nigeria became a country that reacted to given situations rather than taking the initiative as it should, as it had always been done"¹⁸.

The General Buhari's regime embarked on a severe expenditure outback and foreign exchange budgeting. It also introduced strident measures in the nation's external financial requirements. Major government projects involving huge foreign exchange commitments were rephrased to reduce the pressure on the external sector.

The General Buhari regime's view of foreign exchange budgeting required finance for structural adjustment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the regime was unwilling to fulfill three of the Fund's conditionalities. These were trade liberalization, removal of subsidies on petroleum and devaluation of the Naira. As a result of this, there was a stalemate in the talks. The General Buhari government's view on these issues was that trade liberalization did not make sense for a nation whose balance of payment disequilibrium is a function of its propensity to import while the removal of subsidies on petroleum products was seen as inflationary, since it will jack up transportation cost and in turn increase the prices of products.

To contain the shock, which may arise from Nigeria's neutrality on the IMF conditions, General Buhari introduced "Counter trade", using commodities as main medium of exchange. This policy of counter trade was regarded by the Western European Creditors - the IMF, the London and Paris clubs as against their interest and a move which may soon be copied by other developing economies. The consequence arising from Nigeria's government action was observed in New swatch magazine, writing on the Paris club that;

The club embarked on international black-mail against Nigeria in the international financial market, as a passive measure¹⁹.

Consequently the Buhari's regime was pressed with the need to maintain pre-existing import level against the background of falling oil prices. Thus, in 1984, the Buhari's government requested for a loan of N1.6 million from the Saudi-Arabia, the balance of N2.6 billion the Shagari's regime had requested, but the IMF working through the United States' government prevailed upon Saudi Arabian government to frustrate and block the loan, 20. This was a sabotage on Nigeria's strategic interest.

Strategically, Nigeria sought to restore its self-respect and the right to autonomy in its foreign policy decisions. Evidently, the General Buhari's regime refused to succumb to all pressures arising from the West. For a start, the diplomatic maneuverability on the Umaru Dikko affairs soured relations with Britain, this led the minister of External Affairs Ibrahim Gambari to observe during the fuss that, Nigeria has nothing to loose or gain from Britain,²¹.

The General Buhari's regime pursued her foreign policy on the platform of what she coined as "concentric circles of interests". Foreign policy emphasis was shifted to the domestic environment, followed by the sub-region (West Africa), the continent (Africa), and finally the global international environment. Ibrahim Gambari the initiator and originator of the theory, was set to achieve this goal, despite the pressure mounted by the West, ensuing from their hatred of the economic policy of counter trade.

Africa still remained the centre piece of the government's foreign policy pursued through Gambari's concentric Circles. ECOWAS was given a focus, but the expulsion of illegal aliens most of whom were ECOWAS citizens caused friction with

Nigeria's immediate neighbours; decolonization of South Africa was pursued, as was the liberation of the Saharawi Arab democratic Republic (SADR) from Morocco.

Generally, the regime emphasized state regulation as opposed to complete free market, even though the government agreed with the IMF on the need for fundamental reforms, evident in the Mass retrenchment of workers. Unfortunately, because of the nation's dependent economy, the government lacked firm anti-imperialist base that would have sustained some of the progressive elements of the foreign policy and even pushed the country to a major restructuring of its economic and political relations with major Western powers.

In sum, although the General Buhari's government seemed to have come with a mission, it soon fell into doldrums due to misapplication of well-intended policies. Even though professor Ibrahim Gambari, the Minister of External Affairs had come fresh from the Institute of International Affairs with his pet-theory of "concentric circles of interests", there was so much infighting in Nigeria to allow for any serious attention to foreign policy. The fact of the matter is that the General Buhari's regime, like that of General Ironsi was too brief to have any meaningful foreign policy. Thus compared to the Generals Murtala/Obasanjo's and Ibrahim Babangida's foreign policies, it was a dismal failure.

Now let us consider in analytical overview the impacts of the General Babangida's regime on Nigeria's foreign policy. When General Babangida assumed the presidency in 1985, he indicated that some changes in the emphasis and conduct

of foreign policy were to be expected. Detail of this has been discussed in chapter three of this study.

A critical review and analysis of the major foreign policy issues pursued by General Babangida clearly reveals the paradox of the nature of foreign policy in relation to the immortality and incompetence of the nation-state. In the ceaseless dialogue between the forces of change and continuity, the domestic situation and the external environment constrain or facilitate the extent to which a nation's foreign policy and diplomatic style can be changed in response to the dictates of national interest²².

Although General Babangida promised and did pursue an activist or rather an adventurist and populist foreign policy, the substance of Nigeria's foreign policy remained rather within the broad objectives set by Prime - Minister Balewa at independence. This view is true with all the military and civilian regimes in Nigeria, hence the realism in Izah's position of the continuities in Nigeria's Foreign Policy.

There are however lessons to be learnt from General Babangida's activism and adventure in a World of increasing interdependence and rapid changes. The objective of this analytical overview of General Babangida's foreign policy is to see the extent to which the style of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomacy changed under him and to demonstrate the positive or negative impacts of such style of foreign policy on the Nigeria's state.

The General Babangida's period which lasted for eight years was long enough to see the development of a coherent and conscientious foreign policy. On

assumption to power and promising to a new and dynamic foreign policy, General Babangida set the parameters for the prosecution of the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria in a rather pro-active fashion. He defined Nigeria's interest as "National Security Interest". Akinyemi corroborated this view when he posted thus:

Nigeria's National Interest can be identified as predicated on Nigeria's military, economic, political and social security. Anything that will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security must be seen as being their national interest. Anything that will promote Nigeria's National Economic growth and development is in the national interest. Anything that will make Nigerian politically stable is also in the national interest²³.

In the early period of the General Babangida's regime, the foreign policy was mostly a gimmick which was tinkered with by Bolaji Akinyemi, his foreign Affairs minister, who came with his own pet theory of the "concert of medium powers". In reality, there was no differences between this and the conference of non-aligned nations, or the group of 77. No wonder it made no significant positive impact on Nigeria's foreign policy.

When the regime of General Babangida's adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) "Economic Diplomacy" was initiated by General Ike Nwachukwu, the then foreign affairs minister who succeeded Akinyemi to backup the policy of SAP in order to achieve its objective. Thus, it was a major instrument for the pursuit of strategic goals and advancement of Nation Economic Interest in the International System. In this vein the objective of Economic diplomacy was stated thus:-

"It is imperative that national interest, economic interests are elevated in foreign policy priorities along with political and other considerations..... today,

polities and economics have become interwoven that relations among nations are by and large determined by economic consideration" ²⁴.

The administration sought through the adoption of economic diplomacy, to integrate economic objectives into foreign policy perspectives, with a view to facilitating the realization of the goals and objective of the Structural Adjustment Programme. In effect, the adoption of economic diplomacy meant that the nations foreign policy instruments were being enlisted and mobilized to advance the course of supporting national economic recovery, especially by attracting investment in the country and promoting Nigeria's non-oil exports in the international market.

Apart from the vigorous pursuit of bilateral economic relations, the administration's economic diplomacy also took cognizance of the place of multilateral economic co-operation and roles which multilateral economic instruments could play in furthering Nigeria's economic goals. Thus, considerable emphasis was placed on advancing the frontiers of economic co-operation between Nigeria and member countries of the ECOWAS, the O.A.U, the South-South Commission and the Group of 15.

The critics of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and General Babangida's foreign policy of economic diplomacy have asserted that the regime's major mistake in terms of foreign policy was the fatal devaluation of the Naira without any serious negotiation with the IMF and the World Bank. The immediate impact of that devaluation was on Nigeria's debt and imports, and consequently on the standards of living of the people.

In a critique of the General Babangida's policy of economic diplomacy and SAP, Eleazu Uma, believed that there were social forces involved in the propagation and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The implication of their positions further reveals the ruling class perception of foreign economic relations seeking alliance with international capital as comprador-Bourgeoisies. They exert and advance their interest on economic matters such as trade, investment, tariff and legislation affecting them. In this circumstances our interest agrees with what Ajene Oga called "Neo-colonialism", in his analysis of the structure of the economy under the General Babangida's regime. He noted that;

Nigeria's rulers have allowed for the consolidation of neo-colonialism and in effect subverted the very meaning of sovereignty by which concept foreign policy derives its significance²⁵.

On the General Babangida's economic diplomacy, Agene's assertion seems to agree to what Alaba Ogunsawo referred to as "standing before the High court of perpetual enslavement which patriotic knowledge-able experts are bent on forcing down our throat"²⁶.

Similarly, in their examination of the political economy of Nigeria's foreign policy with reference to Nigeria's external debt as at the end of 31st October, 1985, Alkasum and others examined the hallowness in the General Babangida's regime diplomacy of debt payment. They further observed that, "Nigeria's relationship with the rest of the world is reduced to diplomatic meeting with Britain and other Western Government, as the January 1986, visit of the minister of External Affairs showed.

According to them, it turn out taking budget to the very countries that got us into the debt we are, for approval has not bore any fruit"²⁷.

From the foregoing, we understood that there has been continuity in Nigeria's foreign and economic policies endorsed by the ruling elite, which has its roots in the former metropole. This made Tyoden Gwanle, to observe that, all that is embedded in Nigeria's foreign policy theory and practice is a surface gyration since independence²⁸.

However, I hasten to discoucur with Tyoden Gwanle's views, because I think his claim is not an exclusive position; this is in the light of some positive developments that has manifested in the parlance of Nigeria's foreign policy; besides Nigeria has enjoyed favourable international reception especially during the General Babangida's years. For instance General Babangida visited either privately or officially such important countries as Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the U.S.A., Japan and the Yugoslavian Federation to mentioned but a few. Apart from visiting these countries, he was elected chairman of the O.A.U., and this made him to make visits to several African countries. His regime received support from friendly multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the African Development Bank (ADB)²⁹.

Nigeria also scored several first during the General Babangida's regime. For instance chief Emeka Anyaoku, a distinguished Nigerian diplomat was elected the first African Secretary - General of a multi-racial commonwealth, in a keen battle against a former Australian Prime minister. General Joseph Garba, a former minister

in Nigeria beat all others in our region, to the elective post of President of the 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. Mallam Yahya Aliyu was elected to the Executive Board of UNESCO in Paris. Professor Obasi, another Nigerian was re-elected secretary - General of the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, Prince Bola Ajibola, former Attorney General of Nigeria was elected to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to complete the unexpired tenure of late Dr. Taslim Elias. Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman was elected secretary General of OPEC. Even the present Head of State, General Obasanjo nearly became secretary-General of the United Nations.

However, there were four major foreign issues that stood clearly tall during the period of General Babangida; basically for the reasons of their controversial nature. The regularization of Nigeria's status to full membership of the O.I.C in 1986 and the restoration of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Israel are inseparable from each. The inauguration of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC) and Nigeria's leading role in Liberia through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are also related not in the same way as the first two but because they are initiatives of strenuous consequences on the nation's deplorable economy that needed to be turned around through a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Thus, while O.I.C and Nigeria-Israel relations were controversial because of their religious coloration and dimensions, TAC and ECOMOG were controversial because they were seen to be economically unrealistic given the state of the economy under

General Babangida, as they involved tremendous amount of sacrifice of the nations human and material resources at a time the nation was stacked in SAP.

General Babangida's strong conviction, vision, and the courage to take high political risks had an underlying positive effect in the conduct of his government in the arena of foreign relations. This was also evident in his domestic political agenda. The O.I.C. membership, the restoration of ties with Israel, and the ECOMOG were foreign policy issues that carried with them high political risks.

The direction of change in Nigeria's foreign policy under General Babangida's can be seen or conceived in the General's confirmation of the general consensus that the substance of Nigeria's foreign policy has remained a matter of continuity rather than changed. He made this observation, some years into his regime when he said thus:

For the thirty years of Nigeria's independence certain specific imperatives have governed the conceptualization and conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. Although emphasis may have been placed here or there as may be dictated by the circumstances of the time and style of leadership differs, the real substance of our foreign policy objectives has tended to resolve around those principles which we hold tenaciously in the conduct of our foreign relations³⁰.

A review of the major foreign policy issues pursued as discussed in chapter three; and the manner of Nigeria's diplomatic activities under General Babangida in a circumstances of dynamic international environment and the need for domestic transformation in the polity, would vividly reveal the positive effects or impacts on the nation's foreign policy and diplomacy.

The transition in Nigeria attracted considerable attention because of the country's "superpower" status in sub-Saharan Africa. Although General Babangida's bold economic reforms were applauded by the Bretton-woods Institutions and Western Creditors, Western governments were not oblivious to the domestic skepticism about the convoluted transition to civil rule programme.

The reactions to the annulment of the election were immediate; the United States and most Western Countries immediately slammed limited sanctions on the country. Detail of this had already been discussed in chapter three of this study. The threats to impose further sanctions and other interventionist and provocative pronouncements, especially by the United States, were a major source of encouragement to the Pro-June 12 movement. At one stage, there were strong rumors of a possible Noriega-type or Haiti-type of direct intervention by the United States, and many ordinary followers of the movement pinned strong hopes on such an intervention, but because Nigeria is not a "banana republic" subsequent government's action succeeded in persuading many countries to relax their tough stance against Nigeria (as reflected in the return of ambassadors withdrawn at the height of the crisis).

The General Babangida's regime had a two-fold response to "foreign intervention". Firstly, it tried to arouse the deep nationalism and resentment of imperialist intervention for which Nigerians are well known, by constantly reiterating that the crisis was a Nigerian affairs. As he said in his 26th June 1993 broadcast:

KASHIM IBRAHIM LIE

The presidential election was not imposed on us by the United Nations or some global police men of democracy. It was a decision embarked upon independently by the government of our country. The action by..... foreign countries is most unfortunate and highly regrettable. There is no where in the history of our country or indeed of the Third World where these countries can be said to love Nigeria or Nigerians any more than the love we have ourselves and for our country³¹.

However, as General Babangida's discovered, this strategy could only succeed if the government was popular. Secondly, the regime adopted the old cold war tactic of playing off one camp against the other. In the same broadcast, General Babangida's appreciated the "patience and understanding" of France, Germany, China and Russia, and condemned those who regarded themselves as policemen of democracy. This strategy also failed as the sustained harassment by the United States in particular overcame whatever support was forthcoming from these other countries. But other scholars have argued that as with previous military regimes, there was little or no coherence in the foreign policy initiatives. This they said was even more serious in the General Babangida years, as the foreign policy arena greatly reflected the confusion and political turbulence in the domestic scene. For example, the minister of External Affairs was changed five times, (Akinyemi, General Ike Nwachukwu, Rilwanu-Lukman, again General Nwachukwu and Mathew Mbu). The critics of the General Babangida's foreign policy were hostile towards the ECOMOG initiatives which many saw as an extension of General Babangida's personalization of the country's affairs. But greater concern was the wastage of the country's dwindling resources and huge losses of soldiers and weapons in the protracted war in Liberia. Nigeria was the chief financier of ECOMOG, the exact size of Nigeria's

total expenditure was however not known, but it was believed to have been a major waste-pipe for the country's revenue from 1990, – the windfall from oils sales during the Gulf War is believed to have been wasted on Liberia. An estimated ₦470 million, following the original overall ECOMOG budget of N500 million, but other estimates puts Nigeria's total expenditure at over ₦2.8 billion³².

Thus as Margret Vogt has rightly opined, domestic hostility, the Management of the country's resources in the name of ECOMOG and the apparent complication of the intractable civil war in Liberia due to ECOMOG's intervention cast a shadow over what was without doubt a pioneering and commendable foreign policy initiatives³³.

The personalization of Nigeria's affairs by General Babangida abroad was also heavily criticized. For instance, many people criticized the General for his unilateral contribution of Two Million United States Dollars from public fund to establish a Graduate school of International studies at the University of Liberia which was named after him. General Babangida also funded the construction of the trans - African Highway linking Liberia with Sierra-Leone, and supplied weapons to the Samuel Doe's government in the war against Charles Taylor's NPFL long before ECOMOG was initiated³⁴.

Inspite of the foreign reactions to the annulment of June, 12 presidential Polls, I conclude this analytical overview of the General Babangida's foreign policy by subscribing to the popular view that Nigeria's foreign policy during the Babangida's years was quite eventful and positive. Although its cardinal points-National interest,

Afrocentricity, good neighbourliness and greater integration in the West African sub-region remained basically unchanged the period witnessed certain experiments and bold initiatives which reinforced the country's claim to being a power in Africa. Hence, there is no doubt in my mind that the General Babangida's years were successful years of Nigeria's foreign policy. Comparing to the situation before the advent of the Babangida administration (that is, the General Buhari's regime) and the period following it, (that is the General Abacha's regime) shows in dramatic relief the success of the General Ibrahim B. Babangida's regime in the international arena. The situation until the annulment of the presidential election in 1993 was so positive (Good) that if a decision as to widening of the United Nations security council had been taken, Nigeria under General Babangida would have easily been chosen as the African representative. Unfortunately, the Pandora box opened by General Babangida was to be unwisely use used by his less competent successor - General Sani Abacha. Let us now consider the analytical overview of the Lt. General Sani Abacha's regime foreign policy.

The General Sani Abacha's foreign policy is a one line battle of self defence. It was a nation at war with itself. The Pro-Democracy activists were able to woo and win the support of the industrialized western nations which imposed economic sanctions on the country. For a time, it looked like Nigeria had no friends left in the world, it lost all its friends in the comity of Nations. It was a most trying period for Nigeria's diplomacy.

The disastrous operation of the Abacha years when Chief Tom Ikimi, his foreign minister ran our foreign policy down, and Nigeria became a pariah state, she was suspended from the Commonwealth and treated like a leper even in Africa and the rest of the world; it was a great departure from the expertise with which Nigeria's foreign affairs was managed during the General Babangida years.

Under the General Sani Abacha's regime, a dark veil fell on Nigeria's Foreign policy relations. It was a period of 'Area - boy' diplomacy. A period Akinbobola described as when Nigeria's Foreign Policy "descended to the abysmal level of a failing policy"³⁵.

The General Abacha's regime is likely to go down in history as the most harassed government in Nigeria's post-independence history. The harassment which came from within and outside the country involved intense opposition and hostility towards the regime from its very beginning gave it little or no room for any serious reflections on, or coherent response to the complex problems facing the country. The authoritarian prism through which most actions of the regime were regarded overshadowed its underlying though poorly articulated nationalism and inward looking character, which brought it close to the General Buhari's regime of old. The nationalist approach to the economic crisis which led, among other things, to the abrogation of liberalization policies in 1994 and an adamant attitude to Western creditors; the attempts to "sanitise" the country, which seemed to be targeted at the 'sacred cow' elites; and the involvement of key actors of the Buhari's regime (including General Buhari himself) in strategic aspects of administration were some

of the manifestations of this. But the basic and more serious problems – harassment from abroad, suspension from the Commonwealth, and the political crisis accentuated by the regime's increasingly tough posture, unemployment, retrenchments, inflation, insecurity of life and property remained, and were in many ways even got worse. Besides, there was a lot of skepticism about the true intentions of the crusade.

The General Abacha's regime continued to face hostility, this was largely due to the lingering economic decline and the political crisis, both of which were complicated by the determination of the Western powers to isolate the regime. As a response to the lingering Economic crisis, the Abacha's regime responded to the desperate situation with a number of pragmatic measures whose mainstay was the abrogation of liberalization policies as announced in the 1994 Budget speech. Apart from the populist intensions, the decision to abandon Market forces and return to a state controlled economy was strongly influenced by Sam Aluko, the old Nationalist and Welfarist Professor of Economics, who chaired the powerful Economic intelligence unit in the Head of state's office³⁶.

The abrogation of Market reforms meant of course that the General Abacha's regime took on the Western Creditors – the I.M.F., the World Bank and the rest-headlong. This was at the expense of debt scheduling and new trade credits, which the regime tried to circumvent by paying for most imports with cash and later adopting a refurbishing counter-trade policy called commodity exchange³⁷. The resolution of the debt overhang seemed a distant hope as the Paris and London clubs

insisted on a return to market reforms and an I.M.F agreement as their condition for rescheduling. The reluctance of the General Abacha's regime to agree to these was aptly stated by Anthony Ani, Abacha's new finance Minister, who appealed to the I.M.F to leave Nigeria alone; he asserted thus "The I.M.F should not force any condition on Nigeria as we are finding our own solutions to our problem"³⁸.

The regime however demonstrated a remarkable level of fiscal discipline relative to the General Babangida's regime and managed to keep budget deficits low; the government also maintained the policy of paying for imports directly in cash as much as possible, and sought to reduce the dependence of both the Federal and State governments on external loan. In the face of increased hostility towards the regime by Western powers, the African Development Bank (ADB) became an important source of alternative stabilization funds for the country. However, disagreements with Western non-regional shareholders who attempted to take over control of the Bank led the General Abacha's government to cancel most loans already secured³⁹.

As the opposition to the Abacha's regime gathered momentum, there were agitations for the resignation of the military regime and the restoration of the cancelled presidential election, and chief Abiola was pressurized to assert his "Mandate". What followed was an explosion of civil society which against all expectations, surpassed in scope and intensity the riots and violent protests that followed the annulment of the election in 1993. One major factor that concerned us here, was the tremendous support and encouragement the ostensibly pro-democracy groups and protests received from the international community, especially the

United States. The success of the Pro-democracy campaigns hinged increasingly on the amount of Foreign support they mustered. The foreign support included the granting of political asylum to "dissidents", anti-military sentiments, imposition or threat of imposition of more sanctions, and direct and covert material support to the pro-democracy groups. For example, NADECO declared illegal by the Nigerian government, was granted recognition by a Resolution of the United States House of Representatives and by several Western governments which dealt directly with its leaders and granted them asylum, and received financial aid from the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States, among others⁴⁰.

Meanwhile, chief Abiola who had remained under ground, made good his self-declaration as president by getting 'sworn in' in a brief ceremony at Rowe-Park in Lagos, on 11th June, 1994. In his Proclamation, Abiola called on the General Abacha's regime to resign; he 'directed' sacked civilian governors to take over in the states, and the National and State Assemblies to reconvene. He was immediately declared a wanted person by the Nigerian police.

In its bid to arrest the drift towards anarchy and paralysis, the Abacha's Government adopted a more hard line position by increasing Militarization; it cracked down heavily on the pro-democracy groups and labour Unions. The clampdown on opposition elements within the country forced many of them to flee abroad, hence they took the pro-democracy aluta to the international arena, and it was from there that much of the opposition of the General Abacha's regime came to be mobilized, with the active support of the foreign governments. The campaign

involved the lobbying of several governments, notably those of the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, the Scandinavian Countries and South Africa, to impose more sanctions and exert other pressures on the regime. The United Nations' various agencies, the Commonwealth, International Human Rights Organizations and International Conferences were also used as platforms to press further for the isolation of the Abacha's regime. The groups claimed responsibility for the isolation of Nigeria in the international community and the imposition of sanctions on the Abacha's regime; the increasing international isolation of Nigeria, the Afro-American led initiatives on Nigeria, the FIFA's boycott of Nigeria and the South African initiative on Nigeria have all been possible because NADECO has kept the flame of the struggle alive and burning⁴¹.

There can be little doubt that NADECO and other Foreign based opposition groups were very successful in getting the World to focus attention on the Nigerian situation; but it is significant to emphasize here that their campaigns for sanctions against Nigeria were unpopular at home (Nigeria) and denied them support among home-based activists and ordinary people who believed sanctions would make their already precarious economic situation worse.

General Abacha's hardline posture against the opposition could be comprehended in the context of his strong desire to deal decisively with the threat of opposition elements who were being actively encouraged by the international community. It was fairly obvious that sparing the Ogoni activists out of deference to international opinion would encourage the anti-government elements, which would

become more powerful and daring, and pose a threat to its own survival an invitation to anarchy. In other words, the killings were part of General Abacha's attempt to silence the opposition and assert control over the country.

The isolation that followed the Ogoni killings and the threat of further sanctions had some positive effects, in that, the General Abacha's regime became more sensitive to the democratic imperative, and initiated a review of the country's external relations towards the Eastern Bloc.

In sum, during the General Abacha's regime there were some realities which have sparked off interest about Nigeria's image abroad; Nigeria was in a political battle with the Concert of Pan-European powers. In that battle, propaganda has been deployed against Nigeria's image. Propaganda has been used to disparage our search for viable political institutions; to cripple our quest for economic development; to erode our sovereignty; and to rattle our self-confidence. Our experiences according to Chinweizu, illustrates Marcus Garvey's point that Propaganda can defeat and destroy a people even without open warfare⁴².

The image that Pan-European Propaganda has foisted on Nigeria under the General Sani Abacha's regime was that of a den of Swindlers, drug traffickers and assorted criminals, who dwell under the boot of military despots that brutally suppress democracy; a police state that wantonly violates the freedom of the press and the Human Rights of its citizens; an authoritarian, anti-democratic Monster that is stubbornly out of step with the civilized World; an incorrigible villain that should be made an international Pariah for disregarding the wishes of the leaders of

civilization. That tendentious image makes me wonder; no wonder, there was frantic diplomatic efforts by the Government's officials to right the image of the country and to mitigate the country's isolation. Diplomatic maneuvers were made to normalize relations within the commonwealth, these were mainly through negotiations with the Committee of Foreign Ministers (Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)) set up specifically to monitor developments in Nigeria. In this vein, there were series of diplomatic congregation between CMAG and Government Officials, in a related development, General Oladipo Diya Posited thus:

"Over the years, our country has operated with distinction as a responsible and respected member of the international community. Consequently, Nigeria has come to cherish her membership in a number of international organizations and institutions. We belong to the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-15, the O.A.U., and our sub-regional organization, ECOWAS. We have been one of the pillars of the new commonwealth of Nations and have made historic contributions therein. Since the sad events of last November, the commonwealth has had difficulties justifying the action it took against Nigeria. consequently, inspite of our repeated request, the association is yet to make a definite pronouncement on the matter"⁴³.

He continued that;

However, it has been well recognized that in all our dealings in the international fora, we have discharged our responsibilities and our roles creditably. We have stood for peace and justice in the World, and fought with vigour the twin evils of racism and apartheid in our continent. This is in keeping with our cherished belief that all

Nations on earth, big, small, rich or poor are sovereign entities, which must all be allowed to take charge of their destinies⁴⁴.

Within this trend of thoughts, other Abacha loyalists have argued that the General should be credited for the consolidation of the achievements of the General Babangida's foreign policy on Liberia and Sierra-Leone (ECOMOG) i.e. ensuring a lasting solution to the Liberian crisis. This effort led to the emergence of a democratically elected government in that beleaguered country. According to the loyalists, General Abacha should also be credited for carrying out similar assignment in Sierra-Leone where the Military Junta that seized power from a democratically elected Government has been flushed out by the ECOMOG Peace-keeping force led by Nigeria.

However, in comparison to the General Babangida's era, in which many Nigerians were elected to serve on many international organizations, during the Abacha years no Nigerian, according to Professor Osuntokun, could run for the Post of a dogcatcher and expect to be elected in any international forum⁴⁵.

The combative foreign policy employed by General Abacha gave the impression, rightly or wrongly, that Nigeria did not really care what the international community thought of her, was not really in need of friends and partners in the international system and was not keen on promoting trade, attracting investment or improving technical co-operation with other part of the Western World. The continuous assertion of sovereignty and the vigorous, if not rude rebuff of those countries, which were seen as interfering in the internal affairs of Nigeria, became the paramount pre-occupations of the Nation's Foreign Policy under General

Abacha. Consequently, economic diplomacy gave way to what Nnamdi Obasi, described, rightly or wrongly, as "bolekaja diplomacy", all the elaborate foundations for better economic relations with other countries, so painstakingly laid down by the General Babangida's regime during the Foreign Ministership of General Ike Nwachukwu were abandoned to crumble and decay⁴⁶.

After five years of ignominious relegation as a Pariah Nation, General Abdulsalami Abubakar who succeeded General Abacha after his sudden death was prompted by the need to shed Nigeria from its Pariah status to embarked on what can be termed a peripatetic Diplomacy. What is interesting in the Foreign Policy of General Abacha's successor was that it demystified the official thuggery that had characterized the General Abacha's regime, while it pursued the issue of sanctions with the required decorum.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION:

Military intervention and rule are regarded as both an aberration and a key indicator of political instability. This perception underlines the problem-solving, stability - restoring and nation - saving roles assumed by the so-called corrective Military regimes. As discussed earlier, the Post independence Political history of Nigeria has largely been one Military intervention in politics as well as the modes and consequence of this intervention:- Coups, counter - coups, a civil war and Military governance. From the foregoing discussion, it has been established that the Military has ruled the country for twenty - eight years, that is, the period covered by this study, and did much in the pursuit of the country's foreign policy and external relations. It is as such that the Military phenomenon has become very central in the analysis of the Nation's Foreign Policy and national image abroad.

Since independence, there has been a national consensus in support of the Broad foreign policy principles and objectives enunciated by Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; each of the governments at the national level over the time gave its own interpretation to these broad foreign policy objectives, according to its own level of emphasis to each of them.

A Foreign Policy must be stable and constant. The changes in leadership do not necessary mean that the National interest of the Nation changes. The National

interest is basic and constant. The changes reflected in the national interest are changes which are in response to changes in the value preferences of the leadership. Emphasis must be put in the fact that it is because national interest has been taken or exhibited in the form of personal interest by the Leadership that question have been asked whether the interest which State pursue are actually the nation's interest or the leaders' interest. This question therefore underscore the relevance of the Elite theory adopted for this study. It is along this trend of thought, that Ibrahim Gambari submitted thus:

Nigeria's foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the Masses of the people; rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles¹.

Hence according to Gambari, the country's Foreign Policy have reflected the needs and aspiration of a national elite of Military, business, bureaucratic, and traditional ruling groups. Never very cohesive, this national elite is deeply divided along characteristics such as ethnic, regional, religious and ideological lines. Hence the history of Nigerian Foreign Policy has been to some extent related to a search for national consensus behind the major outlines of the country's externally projectable goals and objectives.

Olusanya and Akindele have correctly asserted that the over-riding objective of any country's foreign policy is to promote and protect that country's national interests in its interaction with the outside World and relationships with specific countries in the international system². Interaction between and amongst Nation

states is inevitable within the international political system. No state can isolate nor insulate itself from the favourable or adverse consequences of the actions of others. In today's World of the 21st century, the consequences of globalization is not only seen in terms of increasing interaction and inter-dependence amongst the various countries of the World but also in terms of the vulnerability of a developing country like Nigeria to a direct pattern of one-way international relations in which it face all kinds and manners of political, economic, socio-cultural and technological marginalization.

Globalization has brought to the fore the stark reality that no National can be an Island unto itself and that for a state to survive, and to be heard and respected in the international political system, it needs a consistent strategy to effectively pursue its national interest. Foreign policy is therefore about the strategy designed by a country and the means available to it for the pursuance of its national interest. In this case, the link between the domestic processes, that is, the sources of Foreign Policy, and the external environment, towards which it is directed, becomes clear. The domestic processes and external environment can therefore both constrain or facilitate the effectiveness of a country's foreign policy and diplomacy. These have been demonstrated in chapters three and four of this study.

The aims and objectives of the foreign policy of a nation-state like Nigeria are thus the product of endless dialogue and interaction between the domestic processes and external pressure; the result of this gives the objectives of foreign policy a perennial quality. The point to make here according to Birai is that, we should not

hope in fear that changes of government, in the ideology, or even domestic renovations, will change the way in which a country conducts its foreign relations or if it transforms its manner of diplomacy, it will do same to its substance³.

5.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Military ruled the country for twenty-eight years out of the thirty-eight years of her political independence covered by this study; and it did much to shape and re-shape her foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign policy under the period of study underwent major and sometimes dramatic transformations. There were marked differences between each of the Military Regimes discussed, in the tempo of their foreign policy. This had to do partly with the prevailing internal and external circumstances and partly with the idiosyncrasies or orientations of the Military Leaders.

Thus, compared to the Balewa and Shagari's administrations, the Military regimes were more adventurous, pragmatic and populist in their foreign policy approaches. Hence, from the fore going discussions and by a way of summary, Nigeria's foreign policy under the period covered by this study can be divided into five phases or epoch.

- a. The period of uncertainty;
- b. The Civil War and Naira Diplomacy; (Naira Diplomacy)
- c. The radicalization of Foreign Policy;
- d. The Adventurist and Populist Foreign Policy;(Economic Diplomacy)
- e. The Combative and Abrasive Foreign Policy.(Area Boy Diplomacy)

The General Aguiyi Ironsi' era was the period of uncertainty and conservatism in Nigeria's foreign policy. As I have earlier discussed, it was a period in which Nigeria's foreign policy was based on full cooperation with the West especially Britain, our former colonial Master. This was partly because Nigeria was a relatively new and inexperienced Actor in the World arena and partly because domestic politicking could not define effectively our National interests. General Ironsi was pre-occupied with finding solutions to the domestic problems in his brief reign.

The second epoch of our foreign policy deduced from our general discussion above was the civil war period and Naira diplomacy. The lessons and experiences of the civil war produced a swift adjustment and focus of Nigeria's foreign policy. The refusal of Nigeria's traditional friends (the Western Countries) to support her especially with the supply of arms during the War forced General Yakubu Gowon to turn to the then Soviet Union, thus marking a Watershed in Nigeria and Soviet relations in particular and Nigeria and Eastern Europe relations in general. The petrol dollar, (Monies gotten from the sales of crude oil) was used for prestigious projects to be-friend Nations, as large sums of Nigeria's Naira was given to countries as gifts and financial aids, hence the term Naira Diplomacy or Diplomacy of prestige⁴.

The third epoch of Nigeria's foreign policy discussed above was the period of radicalization of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. This era is probably remembered most for the dynamism and Afrocentric character of foreign policy pursued by the regime. It was a period of liberation struggle in many Southern African states like Angola,

Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself. The swift and equivocal recognition and support the regime accorded the MPLA in Angola, which ultimately defeated forces backed by the United States and other Western Powers was later extended to Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, south-Africa and all Blacks and oppressed people any where in the World.

The Brush-off the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime gave the United States and the West in the face of the United States led Western support to South-African-backed UNITA, brought Nigerian support to the fore-front of African and the World more than ever before. During this era, there was an increased attempt to extend Nigeria's de-linkage from the West, and encourage the South-South co-operation and a call for a New International Economic Order. This was part of Nigeria's emergent radicalism and assertiveness in the World System. Within the United Nations General Assembly, Nigeria became a permanent member of the committee against Apartheid and chaired the committee for several years. During this period, Nigeria openly supported several liberation movements and nationalized the Barclays Bank and the British petroleum to spite Britain.

The General Buhari's regime was generally regarded as an off-shoot of the Murtala/Obasanjo's regime. The regime also pursued a radical foreign policy, as was evident in its strained relations with Britain following the attempted abduction of Alhaji Umaru Dikko (Diplomatic Baggage) and its radical deportation of illegal aliens and the swift recognition of the Palisario movement, the Sharawi Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR) from Morocco. However, economic problems forced the regime be cautious especially in its dealings with Western Nations.

The fourth epoch of Nigeria's foreign policy deduced from our fore-going discussions was the Adventurist and populist foreign policy pursued by General Ibrahim B. Babangida (IBB). During this era, Nigeria's active role in international affairs paid off. The government sponsored Nigerians to seek elective posts at the international levels, and Nigerians were elected as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and President of the United Nations General Assembly respectively; General Babangida himself chaired the O.A.U. for a year. General Babangida befriended the Western Countries and the Bretton - Woods Institutions. He introduced a new initiative of Economic Diplomacy, he reconciled Nigeria with Israel and took Nigeria to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C). Besides this he established the Technical Aids Corps scheme (TAC), and the ECOMOG Policy in Liberia was unprecedented. Even though the intervention in Liberia had a colossal cost to the Nation, it brought Nigeria a lot of respect internationally. The projection of Military Power outside our territory and doing it successfully introduced a new dimension into our Foreign Policy. It brought the Defence and Foreign Policy Affairs closer together and demonstrated that Nigeria under a strong Leadership was ready to pay the cost of being a regional power. This is important for our relations with our neighbours and our role in the West African sub-region. The O.I.C. affair, the Nigeria-Israeli rapprochement and the Technical Aids Corps Scheme were controversial; despite their controversial nature, they broke new grounds in the field

of foreign policy in Nigeria. No wonder the era was termed Adventurist and populist as far as foreign policy is concerned⁵.

The fifth epoch of Nigeria's foreign policy was the combative foreign policy approach adopted by the General Sani Abacha's regime. The aggressiveness which characterised the country's foreign policy during the Abacha's regime seems to be more of symptom of siege mentality than a manifestation of rational reflective assessment of Nigeria's enlightened interest. The annulment of June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections created a new foreign policy problem for the country. Sanctions were imposed by some Western Countries to compel the Military to leave power. If anything, Nigeria's foreign policy was to respond to the pressure from abroad and not to exert pressure abroad. This situation worsen during the Abacha years as further sanctions from the Western European Countries were imposed on the country following the execution of the Green party activist - Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni Men. With allegations of Human rights violation, Nigeria was over night, almost became an outcast; she was suspended from the Commonwealth.

Since the Ogoni episode, Nigeria has been clearly on the defensive on the international scene. Worried about the diplomatic onslaught against Nigeria, Tom Ikimi, Abacha's Foreign Affairs Minister said on his return from the Commonwealth Conference in New Zealand after Nigeria was suspended that the Nation's foreign policy thrust would be reviewed to make it more relevant to the present circumstances. This led to the diversification of relations with Eastern European countries and the Pariah States. (China, Japan, North-Korea, Iraq and Iran to

mentioned but a few. Thereafter the Abacha's regime resorted to bickering and confrontation, a result of which is a combative and abrasive foreign policy which subsequently isolated Nigeria from the comity of Nations.

Nigeria contested the suspension and sent a powerful delegation to London to argue its case. Since then, the CMAG and the military leadership have traded words on how best to resolve the issue. Normalities could not be effective before General Abacha suddenly died on June 1998. Never-the-less, Abacha's exploit in Liberia and Sierra-Leone under the auspices of ECOMOG was a credit which were nearly overshadowed by Nigeria's suspension from the commonwealth. (Peace was finally restored in Liberia and a democratic rule restored in Sierra-Leone through the instrumentality of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force).

The General Abacha's foreign policy was also distinctive in the sense that it challenged the powers that controlled major decisions on the World scene. The imperialist and neocolonialist interests were threatened as Nigeria under Abacha turned its attention towards South-South co-operation.

In conclusion, let me state that changes in leadership style and the exigencies of the time can only affect the foreign policy of a Nation in respect of areas of emphasis and priorities because as the Nation grows it holds tenaciously to the principles that guide the conception and definition of its national interests. This has been demonstrated above in regard to Nigeria's foreign policy⁶.

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From the preceding discussion we can therefore deduce that; the foreign policy of a nation-state is resistant to change, yet the need for change and the way and manners or style of Leadership in the conduct of a country's diplomacy in the pursuit of its Foreign Policy objectives may define and sharpen the focus of a Nations' interactions with the rest of the World. The rapidity and number of regimes and leadership changes that have occurred in Nigeria have only left an 'amazing case of continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy⁷.

In other words, the substance of the Nation's Foreign Policy objectives generally has not changed. Whatever differences that exist therefore cannot be attributed to changes in substance but rather in the emphases placed on the specific objectives as well as the style adopted by a particular regime in executing the objectives. Different Military regimes have emerged in Nigeria, and inspite of their different orientations and leadership styles, the conduct of Nigeria's Foreign Policy has been publicly proclaimed by them to be guided by the same principles enunciated at independence.

The image of the Nigerian soldier as a symbol of gallantry is not in dispute. Perhaps because of the legendary heroism and the penchant for adventures the Nigerian soldier has remained a permanent item on the continent's agenda. Over and over again the Nigerian soldier has done the Nation proud in wars and peace-keeping operations. However, the unconstitutional role of "Guardian Angel" - Messiah the Nigerian soldier has arrogated to himself must be re-examined and checkmated by appropriate legislation. This view is reasoned from our contention

that the professional statutes of our Armed Forces strictly forbids them to play political roles except as voters.

Military governments are without exception, authoritarian and undemocratic, and operate within a framework of what Nwabueze termed "Lawless autocracy, that is to say, a government not limited by law"⁸. Thus it is my fervent belief that the worst civilian regime is by far better than the best military regime.

Never-the-less, under the period covered by this study, there is no doubting the fact that the military had impacted positively on Nigeria's foreign policy and helped to a great extent to project positive image for Nigeria abroad; thereby paving way for the Nation to occupy a place of respect and honour in the comity of Nations. This conclusion is unmindful of the Abacha's turbulent era and Nigeria's isolationism in the comity of Nations. The above summary have focused on the major additive inputs or impacts of the military to Nation building and foreign policy.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

From the fore-going discourse, it is lucid that no country aspiring to play a major role in international affairs can ignore the fundamental prerequisites for a sound and viable foreign policy. These are; a Nation's economic potentials, its political structures and institutions, its military might, and the citizenry. In the Nigerian context any role we hope to play in the future, either in the West African sub-region or on the continent, or on the global scene, will to a very large extent depend on the combined effects of these factors.

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There should be a clear guidelines for the formulation of the Nation's foreign policy, it is important and essential to avoid the facile but sterile course of making foreign policy styles by coining slogans like "Non-alignment", and "Afrocentrism"; foreign policy options should be based on sound principles that would take into consideration Nigeria's domestic needs. It is in this trend of thought that professor Bolaji Akinyemi, a former foreign Affairs Minister, remarked that; There should also be no disputing the fact that we have responsibilities to Africa. There should also be no disputing the fact that Africa has responsibilities to Nigeria. If we say that Africa is the centre-piece of our foreign policy, we mean that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimate interest of Africa collectively and each African state, individually. This also means that Africa and African states should identify with and defend Nigeria's interests. If we owe a responsibility to stand up for and respond to Africa, we owed an obligation to be consulted when the situation allows for consultation and a lot of situation allow for consultation⁹.

A country of Nigeria's size and potentials can not formulate and execute a credible policy for the future without first laying a solid political and economic foundation at home. The problems of economic development and the provision of a better standard of living for our people will become the preoccupation of foreign policy. It has been realized that unless we begin to concentrate on a better management of our own human and financial resources, there is no way that we can pursue any foreign policy objectives with conviction and success.

As is well known, the country's large population, its tremendous wealth and resources, highly developed man-power and infrastructure, and a resilient democratic culture distinguished it from most other underdeveloped countries in Africa and the third world, and formed a basis that the country would become a model to other countries. But it is often forgotten that despite its enormous advantages over other third World countries, Nigeria is a typical peripheral formation whose autonomy of actions and initiatives is limited by the circumstances of its location within the global economic system. Admittedly, it surpassed several other peripheral countries in challenging the domination of the global system by the Western Capitalist Nations, but its status as a rentier state made it different from the others in degree rather than in kind¹⁰. Thus while Nigeria preserves and exercise some sphere of influence in the Africa-centred foreign policy, owing to regional and sub-regional pressures, its policies seem marooned by the economic domination of the West.

Our heavy dependence on petroleum as the major pillar of our national economy is highly undesirable and has, at times, rendered us incapable of formulating independent foreign policies. Our development as a nation and the consequent rise in the standard of living of our people will to a large extent, depend on a proper management of our external economic relations. The Western Countries who possess the technology and the financial resources we need, will, in my opinion continue to feature prominently in our foreign relations. In this vein, we will need to formulate realistic policies to create a climate to attract foreign technology and

financial investment. No amount of ideological posturing will produce the results that we need.

The objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy have not changed since its first formulation, but the implementation by the various leaders has suffered a set back. Hence, the consideration of these crucial factors will give Nigeria an active foreign policy. The skills of the operators of Nigerian foreign policy must be enhanced; there must be a sustainable commitment in the devotion of adequate resources for the implementation of foreign policy; the government of the day must be popular and acceptable to the citizenry, to enable it get the maximum domestic support for its foreign policy pursuits. Nigeria's political leaders must involve career diplomats and intellectuals in the processes of evolving a new foreign policy orientation for the country.

Nigerian diplomats have to possess such qualities as good temper, political will and loyalty, and have to be truthful to the objectives for which they are sent. They must think of the National interests as defined by the government's policy directives. They should among other things, be able to execute instructions faithfully, respond adequately to the sediments of the host country, be able to recognize and assess their host's interests and desires and respect the customs and traditions of the host country. They must not be arrogant. In this regard, the General Buhari's regime's attempted abduction of Umaru Dikko from Britain, and Chief Tom Ikimi, Abacha's foreign minister's combative approach to foreign relations were scored low as they lacked diplomatic decorum.

In order to enhance her diplomatic influence in Africa and the third World, Nigeria must sustain her policy on finance and Technical assistance to African and third World Countries. However, the country's leaders should guide against Naira Diplomacy, because should our oil resources (the source of the Naira) dry out after sometime, the policy built on a policy of extravagance, stupendous and indiscriminate distribution of our financial resources would collapse like a "house of cards"¹¹. A near analogy of this situation was the glut in the oil market caused by Western conspiracy and the resultant recession in the global Economy which drastically affected the economy of our country and the finances of government.

For the next decade or so, we do not need to change our foreign policy Goals. What we need to change is our ways of implementing these goals. In this regard we need to know now, that we are no more the economic giant of Africa. The present economic crisis and Nigeria's indebtedness to International finance capital means that there seems to be little hope of assertiveness in the diplomatic arena. But we still remain one of the Military giants of Africa. We have to sustain consistently the new era in our foreign policy since 1990 in projecting our military force beyond our borders to settle political conflicts with tremendous success; thus showing to the World that Africans can maintain peace and order in their regions.

In this new millennium, for Nigeria to be able to sustain a dynamic and leadership role in Africa, she must consolidate her economic and political base. Hence, there should be conscious move towards redirecting the country's economic efforts along more productive lines. Nigeria must ensure political stability and rapid

economic and industrial development. She must promote African self-reliance if she is to succeed in achieving her African aspiration.

A dynamic foreign policy can only be achieved when democratic social forces continues to oversee and take complete charge of the economic, political and social institutions in Nigeria. This is one of the recommendations that many participants subscribed to at the all Nigeria foreign policy conference, Kuru Jos, in April 1986. I wish to upheld this recommendation.

For Nigeria to remain relevant in the unfolding World order, it must strive always to be the centre stage of international politics. The way to achieve this is to conform with internationally accepted norms of civilized behaviour. It is obvious that the military could no longer be left out of governance, because as Allison Ayida observed; Nigeria no longer has a ceremonial army. We are building a large modern army of well trained, self-conscious and intelligent young men which will not be content to be relegated to the barracks. The military leadership in the new set up is of necessity obliged to conceive an interventionist role for itself. The constitutional settlement must take in account of this new and crucial factor¹². I concur with this view.

The traditional roles of the military are; defending the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, freedom, Wealth and people of Nigeria from external aggression; plus the protection of the Nation from internal disintegration by aiding law-enforcement authorities in maintaining law and order when necessary. These traditional roles are said to be economically non-productive to reduce what is called,

the military extractive ration. That in addition to their war - making and security-tendering functions, some countries' constitutions enjoins their soldiers to carryout certain development tasks such as rural reconstruction, mass literacy campaigns, para-medical missions, agricultural extension services, road and bridge construction, city beautification projects, and population resettlement schemes.

For example in Burma, Indonesia and India, the military maintained their own economic enterprises ranging from manufacturing plants to department stores - steel productions, shipping, cement manufacturing, to mentioned but a few. The object here is to enable the military performs its traditional duties, but they also carryout economic development works in addition to developing a pool of trained managers available for public and private enterprises. Nigeria could copy from this example by making proper legislation to effect it.

Nigeria is a heavily indebted Nation. The implication of Nigeria's debt crisis puts the country between pursuing her African objectives radically or resorting to the Western style democracy of high political realism. This had affected Nigeria's leadership position in the continent. Already Nigeria has displayed a sign of Diplomacy of compromise in view of her indebtedness to the Bretton-Woods Institutions and the Western Countries. We must note that external debts exerts a heavy burden on our economy which has a drastic effect on the sectors of the economy and shapes foreign policy pursuits.

Nigeria and African countries and indeed the developing World must learn from the Japanese success and the Malaysian experience in rural and agricultural

development. This suggestion is proffered because the Nigerian Economy is dependent on the developed countries of the North. Consequently, Nigeria's foreign policy, is predicated on the dictates of the West. In view of the urgent need for a foreign policy that is responsive to the multi-faceted phenomenon of globalization, a return to General Babangida's policy of Economic Diplomacy has become even more crucial to foreign policy in the 21st century, not only for Nigeria but also for all countries of an increasingly marginalized Africa. The adoption of this policy by the Babangida's regime, therefore will always be acknowledged not only as a necessary complement to the structural Adjustment programme (SAP) which was engaged at the time, but indeed as a visionary step, pointing the new direction towards which foreign policies of African countries must be steered in the 21st century if we are to reposition the continent as a significant bloc in the global system.

No condition is permanent, the only thing that is permanent is change. change is indeed a fact of life. For individuals as well as institutions and countries, every thing is dynamic and nothing is ever static. All must adapt to changing circumstances in order to ensure their survival and relevance. In the forty-one (41) years of her existence as a sovereign entity, Nigeria has changed. Africa has changed and the World has changed. I have earlier discussed the changes in the foreign policy priorities, emphases and directions of the various military regimes under the period of study. The over-arching challenge for the government and people of Nigeria is to adapt themselves to the changing fortunes of the country, develop the Nation's capacity to manipulate the sub-regional and continental environment in order to

serve national interests. There is need for all of us to deepen our understanding of ourselves as a people, re-new our commitment to the rule of law and good governance and take bold and constructive steps to bring sanity to our country in an uneasy World.

We as a people should strive, to seek, to find and not to yield to no one in our collective determination to build and preserve a united, democratic, peaceful, secure and prosperous Nation. We must keep the faith in a Nigerian destined to be a leader in the African continent, a beacon of hope for the black race and a responsible and valued member of the international community.

Nigeria should continue to project her leadership image and regional power status particularly in the West African sub-region. In doing so however, emphasis should be laid on multilateral diplomacy. In this regard, Nigeria's security and survival should be seen as inextricably bound up with those of her neighbours, and efforts should be made to foster peaceful co-existence among ECOWAS members. It should also be a policy goal for Nigeria to expedite the process of economic integration in the West African sub-region. ECOWAS should be the starting point for Nigeria's external economic relations. It seems to me that too much importance is presently attached to our economic relations with the European community which have produced no real economic benefits for us. Thus, we should as a matter of deliberate policy, explore areas of more concrete and mutually beneficial cooperation with our West African neighbours. Nigeria should devote more energy and resources

stable political institutions, a vigorous and well-managed economy, with the armed forces equipped to defend her interests in Africa and there-about, and a foreign policy predicated on the pursuit of her just and legitimate interests, Nigeria should be able to speak with a clear and unequivocal voice in the continent and in the World at large.

It is a common knowledge that, a principal objective of Nigeria's foreign policy is the defence of its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. A country that is known to be weak and unable to defend itself will definitely be taken lightly and perhaps bullied by reckless and ambitious neighbours. No country can hope to pursue an independent and vigorous foreign policy unless it is sure that it has the capability not only to defend that policy but also to defend its vital interests. Nigeria's other foreign policy objectives of peace, economic progress, and social development will be in vain unless she is able to defend those interests when ever they are threatened. An effective and disciplined armed forces is, therefore, a guarantee for the successful pursuit of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives.

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