

PRESS COVERAGE OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE JOURNALISM IN
NIGERIA (2013/2014)

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DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this Dissertation titled PRESS COVERAGE OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE JOURNALISM IN NIGERIA was carried out by me in the Department of Mass Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. That the information derived from literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and in the list of reference. No any part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree in this or any other Institution.

ABUBAKAR SHEHU

.....

.....

Signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This Dissertation titled PRESS COVERAGE OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE JOURNALISM IN NIGERIA by SHEHU ABUBAKAR meets the requirements, regulations and a standard governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (M. Sc) in Mass Communication of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and it is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

To Almighty Allah for His blessing and grace upon my life and knowledge

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To the spirit of my grandfather, late sheik Abdulummin Nadamau Saminaka whose scholarship has been an icon to the grandchildren in pursuing their academic endeavours, to my brothers: Muhammad Shehu and Ahmad Shehu, also to my sisters: Rahmatu, Sakina, Binta and Ruqayya Shehu.

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency by *DailyTrust*, *Leadership*, *Vanguard* and *Punch* newspapers and examines its implications for conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigeria. The objectives are to determine the consistency of the newspapers' coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency with conflict-sensitive journalism and the framing of identity and motive of Boko Haram. The study also examines the treatment recommendations offered by the newspapers and the areas of salient emphasis. The study combines content analysis and in-depth interview methods to obtain relevant data. Framing theory was adopted. Findings reveal that Nigerian journalists are not fully adopting conflict-sensitive journalism in their reportage. It also shows that the identity of Boko Haram is Islamist sect with the motive of establishing an Islamic state. It indicates that the major solution is fighting the insurgents and the perceived risk is the collapse of the economy. The study concludes that the coverage of Boko Haram by the Nigerian newspapers is sensational, war-inclined and falls short of the solution-driven approaches encouraged in conflict-sensitive journalism. The study recommends that Nigerian journalists should increase their knowledge of the conflict-sensitive journalism so that they can make important contributions in finding solutions to the problem of Boko Haram insurgency.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background to the Study

Ever since the inception of democracy in Nigeria, people have been expressing divergent views on its benefits. To some, it is a threat to the security of their lives and property, while those that are key participants in the polity recognize it as suitable for the country. Knowing the importance of peace for the citizens, studies on insurgency have attracted experts' attention whose literature has been of help to policy makers both governmental and nongovernmental to strategize plans against Boko Haram. Notwithstanding the universality of terrorists' activities in many parts of the world, to Nigerians, Boko Haram's bomb attacks are the first of its kind, therefore becoming difficult to tackle.

In the words of Ojo (2011) commenting on the Nigeria's security challenges in this democratic setting, the greatest security challenge facing President Goodluck Jonathan's administration is the imposing impunity of terrorist activities of the Boko Haram, an Islamic fundamentalists based in Northern Nigeria. It is on record that between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011 alone Nigeria witnessed over fifty cases of bomb blasts across the country with a casualty figure of over 800 people dead and many injured. In addition, millions of Naira and properties were destroyed. It was also revealed that there are foreign militias from Somalia, Chad, Sudan and other Islamic countries in Borno state. From 2010 to 2015, the casualties of Boko Haram's attacks are too many to be counted but can be estimated in thousands.

According to President Goodluck Jonathan, while commenting on the Boko Haram challenges, "the emerging dimension of threat to national security that is rearing its horrible head in our nation must be confronted headfirst and defeated. The spate of violent crimes in parts of the country including kidnapping, armed robbery, assassinations etc. are contemporary security challenges facing our nation" (Soriwei and Fidelis, 2010:11).

The study's main focus is on the coverage of Boko Haram insurgency by selected Nigerian newspapers through content analysis. In an attempt to get more information, qualitative approach through in-depth interview was employed with four journalists from each sampled newspaper.

Commenting on the identity of Boko Haram, Schulze (2009) cited in Alao (2012:13) argues:

Boko-Haram is ideologically isolated and lacks popular support from the population of Muslim leaders. Though this is contentious, she buttressed her position with the condemnation of the movement by Islamic bodies like the Nigerian umbrella body of Muslims, Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI) that categorically dissociated Islam from the activities of Boko-Haram. Such a conclusion needs to be approached with caution, while it is difficult to believe that Christians will be sponsoring the bombing of fellow believers, this study argues that highly placed and wealthy individuals not yet identified due to security lapses might be bankrolling the sect and provide channels for easy passage of ammunitions and explosives.

Boko Haram's origin is shrouded in mystery as no one knows specifically the motive of the sect as well as the real identity of its members. Some see it as political and to others it is religious. The menace of Boko Haram has affected Nigerians, leaving them helpless. Therefore, it is pertinent to study insurgency through content analysis and in-depth interview with the newspaper reporters so that ways to solutions can be made known.

On the genesis of the Boko Haram, Alysergie and Johnson (2014) traced its first appearance to 2002 in Maiduguri where Kanuri and Hausa claim its dominance. Maiduguri is the capital of the northeastern state of Borno. Boko Haram sect was created by Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf, who led a group of radical Islamist youth in the 1990s. The group aims at establishing a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of sharia law across the country.

On studying Boko Haram, a professor in University of California studying Muslim societies in Africa, Paul Lubeck cited in Alysergie and Johnson (2014) has noted that Yusuf was a trained Salafist (a school of thought often associated with jihad), and was strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, a fourteenth-century legal scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is an important figure

for radical groups in the Middle East. The sect calls itself Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, or "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad." It's widely known as Boko Haram, which colloquially translates into "Western education is sin," for its rejection of Western concepts such as evolution and the big bang theories.

The group did not mean to violently drive out the government before 2009; Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an unlawful, non-Islamic state, and preached a doctrine of abandonment. But violent clashes between Christians and Muslims and insensitive government solution, including pervasive police brutality, encouraged the group's radicalization. Boko Haram's hundreds of followers, also called Yusuffiya, consist largely of poor northern Islamic students and clerics, as well as professionals, many of whom are unemployed (Alysergie and Johnson, 2014).

Boko Haram refused to abide by a motorbike helmet law in July 2009, leading to a police response that caused an armed uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and extended to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. The incident was suppressed by the army and left more than eight hundred dead. It also led to the execution of Yusuf and other sect members, which human rights advocates considered to be extrajudicial killings. In the aftermath of the 2009 unrest, "an Islamist rebellion under a splintered leadership" emerged, says Lubeck in Alysergie and Johnson (2014). Boko Haram carried out a number of suicide bombings and assassinations, from Maiduguri to Abuja, and staged a prison break in Bauchi, freeing more than seven hundred inmates in 2010.

Violence continued to increase, and by 2013 some Nigerians as reported by the press began to see greater influence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Boko Haram operations. Insurgents acts against civilians, like the murder of sixty-five students while they slept at the agricultural college in Yobe state in September 2013, chainsaw beheadings of truck drivers and the killing of hundreds on the roads of northern Nigeria were reported by Nigerian press. After sometimes, bloodshed

returned to Abuja in April 2014 in the bombing of a bus station that killed virtually one hundred people, followed by the kidnap of more than two hundred Chibok schoolgirls in northern Nigeria.

However, Nigeria assembled a Joint Task Force (JTF) of military and police units to combat Boko Haram and declared a state of emergency in three northeast states Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in May 2013. The move pushed the militants out of cities, but attacks in rural areas continued. The JTF, augmented by vigilantes who were folded into publicly endorsed Civilian JTF units, have factored in massive killings of militants and civilians, which may have rendered support for the insurgents (Shehu, 2014).

Boko Haram identity is vague because its members are not necessarily the followers of Salafi doctrine. To some, they are non-muslims under the pay role of Jews to indict Islam as their operations go against the Islamic teachings (Shehu, 2014). To others, it is an extension of Muhammed Marwa's people (Maitatsine). Many foot soldiers are drawn from impoverished, religiously uneducated youth. According to Jacob Zenn cited in Alysergie and Johnson (2014) an analyst on African affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, some fighters claim to have been trained in Iran and are part of a Shiite Muslim group. The intricacies surrounding the Boko Haram necessitate this research on how the media frame their identity, motives, perceived risks and recommended solutions in Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

History has shown that the media can incite people towards violence. It is on record that Adolf Hitler used the media to create hatred for Jews during the Second World War (Jimoh and Danladi, 2012). However, with the information dissemination role of the media, Boko Haram became a known sect in Nigeria after the killing of their leader during the tenure of the then president of Nigeria, late Umaru Musa Yaradua in 2009. This has made it significant to some writers in Nigeria and abroad to come up with literature explaining the events in their judgments and proffering solutions to the

problem. Notwithstanding the literature on insurgency, attempt has not been made to investigate newspapers' framing of the identity, motive, perceived risks and recommended solutions of Boko Haram from the view point of conflict-sensitive journalism which the researcher is set out to examine.

Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) has noted that the concerns follow media's antisocial record of inciting and encouraging conflicts i.e. the discontent of war journalism did not end with only suppositional prescription of a shift to peace journalism. Researchers and experienced journalists have spent time suggesting how the media might shift from war to peace in covering conflicts. Key contributors in this regard include Galtung (1998), McGoldrick and Lynch (2000), Howard (2003), Kempt (2003) and El-Nawawy and Powers (2008).

Similarly, a one time president of America (Thomas Jefferson) briefly shows the power of the newspapers on people's perception about issues "Were it left for me to decide whether we should have a government without newspaper or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter." The above classical statement by Jefferson situates the print media in the society as a leading vehicle to give light in perceiving issues. Being the oldest in the mass media category, newspapers exert some influence in the society that people look on to them not only for the news of the day, but informed opinions on topical issues (Aneato, 2009).

Also, Ibrahim (2012) has noted that Nigeria as a country has suffered a lot from numerous ethno-religious crisis since independence. Most times the coverage of such crises by the Nigerian press has been described as partisan and further promotes the polarization of the country along regional lines as well as unethical reporting. However, the framing of Boko Haram is not free from this allegation that the southern newspapers may give weight to war journalism while the northern papers may prioritize peace journalism depending on their clients' vulnerability to the current Boko Haram insurgency.

Surveillance has been one of the core responsibilities of the media. This onerous task is expecting the media to take into cognizance the reports capable of inflaming the current violence and putting the tranquility of the state at stake. This is achievable by framing with a tilt to peace related approaches. Studies have shown that the Nigerian media have not done well in this regard. Okpara (2010) unveils in his study that the Nigeria media are yet to effectively play the surveillance function in their reportage of conflicts. He contended that this has led to the emergence of unabated conflicts in Nigeria.

Okali (2011) lends support to the above finding when he unveils in his study that the Nigerian media have not done well in discharging their surveillance role which has an adverse effect on the security of the Nation. However, the forces that contribute to conflicts in Nigeria, media are one of thousands, as poverty is the first factor to be addressed by the government. This has been corroborated by Amienyi (1989) who critically evaluated the specifics of media performance in Nigeria and reported that certain socio-cultural factors were serving as obstacles to broadcasting for national integration.

While commenting on the impact of newspapers framing on the audience, Oso and Pate (2007) note that the political elites through their use of ethnic and other divisive strategies use press to whip up emotions, recruit and mobilise the lower classes as cannon fodder in their political warfare for state power and resources. This has been the case during elections and the various social conflicts the country has witnessed in recent time. However, in the case of Boko Haram, similar accusations on newspapers of being used by political elites to ignite the menace keep growing. Lawrence (2011) reveals in his study that the Nigerian media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. He further contended that their reportage of the insurgency have most often glorified the act of terrorism. However, the idea that when it bleeds it sells more has a lot to play here that is why the media has been accused of this glorification.

A study conducted in 2014 suggests further studies on newspaper reportage of terrorism and its influence on people perception about the whole issue of terrorism in Nigeria, such studies should focus on greater numbers of newspapers in the country with a nationalistic outlook (Idowu, 2014). This study draws you the suggestion above to analyze the coverage of Boko Haram by the newspapers and examine its implications on conflict-sensitive journalism. Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) has noted that the influence of mass media in national and international security policies is growing thus necessitating studies on how the media respond to conflict situations.

Many researches suggest that media is capable of inflaming or mitigating conflicts depending on the way they report it (Ozohu, 2013; Nacos, 2007; Hoffman, 2006; McQuail 1987; Wilkinson, 2000). For this reason, there is a shifting interest towards conflict-sensitive journalism, whereby the media are expected to give voice to all parties, focus on invisible effects of conflicts and be truth oriented, people oriented as well as solution oriented.

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The aim of the study is to establish how conflict-sensitive *Daily Trust*, *Leadership*, *Vanguard* and *Punch* newspapers have been in framing the identity, motive, perceived risks and recommended solutions of the Boko Haram insurgency. The specific objectives are:

1. To examine the consistency of newspapers' coverage of Boko Haram insurgency with conflict-sensitive journalism.
2. To determine the newspapers' framing of the identity and motive of Boko Haram.
3. To find out the areas of salient emphasis on perceived risks of Boko Haram insurgency in the newspapers' reportage.
4. To identify the predominant solutions offered in the newspapers' reportage of Boko Haram.

1.4 Research Questions

For the purpose of achieving the set objectives, four research questions were raised for the study as:

1. How consistent is the reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency by the Nigerian newspapers with conflict-sensitive journalism?
2. How is the identity and motive of the Boko Haram insurgents portrayed in the newspapers' reportage?
3. What are the areas of risk emphasis in the newspapers' reportage of Boko Haram insurgency?
4. What are the predominant solutions offered in the newspapers' reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study can be justified by the growing challenges and threats posed by the insurgents in the national and international scene and the interest of the vulnerable and the insurgents to read newspapers for their information. In the words of Yusha'u (2010:1) commenting on the importance of the newspapers in resolving issues of public concern, "it is imperative to note that some of the key players in the first republic like Dr Nnamdi Azikwe and Chief Obefemi Awolowo were newspaper publishers". This according to Agbaje (1993:459) "meant that the press had become inextricably linked with the emerging pattern of political rivalries often couched in geo-ethnic terms." Cognizant of the above fact, studying newspapers in the context of rivalries which Boko Haram movement is one of, will help in proffering solutions to the problem.

Similarly, Mbazie and Nnah (2012) cited in Ibrahim (2012) have noted that with the advent of bomb blast insurgency in Nigeria, the journalists must come out of their shell to show genuine concern and play defining role for the quick resolution of the matter. The media, according to them, should rise up, employing journalistic activism and advocacy to stem this ugly trend, while urging the media not to be cowed from discharging their surveillance function no matter the state of insecurity, Idiong

(2012) adds that the media must ensure that they play their surveillance functions well with a view to complementing the effort of security agents. Thus, there is need in the side of the media to strategise plans of rescuing the country by distancing them from the current uprising, and this can be achieved by adopting the conflict-sensitive journalism.

The mass media constitute a unique social institution. This is in the sense of its dual character. It is both a business, increasingly being subjected to the fundamental logic of commerce and the market, and an ideological institution providing the dominant symbolic and discourse environment through which we make sense of the world we live in, the mass media are at the heart of social and political power (Blumler, 1990 cited in Oso, 2011). In this sense those who are interested and involved in the struggle for power; hidden persuaders; other advocates and interest-claimants see the mass media as a strategic resource. The framing and agenda-setting power of the media is of concern to them because “control over the definition of a problem is a major stake in the policy process” (Cobb and Elder, 1981: 400 cited in Oso, 2011).

Government and the media organizations can use the data generated from the study to plan for the containment of the spread of the insurgency. In addition, the study will serve as a guide to future researchers in the area of insurgency and its results can supply vital information to the policy makers in Nigeria and Diaspora to strategize their mission of peace-making in African countries and the globe.

On investigating the perception of adults in relations to the integrative contribution of mass media in Nigeria on security challenges, Amienyi (1990) asks the adults to indicate how helpful they thought radio, television; newspapers and magazines were to the creation and sustenance of national integration in Nigeria. He finds a high percentage of respondents (80%) perceiving radio and television as being very helpful to national unity and integration. However, newspapers being the pioneer of information dissemination from the inception of Nigeria before the electronic media, its help to the sustenance of Nigeria cannot be underestimated. National integration can be achieved

when the media contribute to the attainment of peace through the framing of peace-driven reports on the Boko Haram insurgency and other national challenges.

1.6 Scope of the Study

As the study is about press coverage of Boko Haram insurgency and its implications on conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigeria, the quantitative content analysis is restricted to articles published in *Daily Trust, Vanguard, Leadership and Punch* newspapers from 2013 to 2014. The in-depth interview aspect is restricted to four journalists each from the sampled newspapers. The rationale behind the sampled period i.e (2013-2014) is the expansion of the activities of the Boko Haram, as they started their attacks on security personnel, down to churches and from 2013 to 2014, they expanded their attacks on all Nigerians.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

2.1 Conceptualization of Insurgency and Terrorism

The coinage of the term 'terrorism' was derived from a Latin verb '*terrere*' that means 'to frighten.' Alao (2011) cited in Campell (2001) notes that *terror cimbricus* was a panic and state of emergency in Rome in response to the approach of warriors of the Cimri tribe in 105 BC. Even though, insurgency and terrorism are different words but they share commonalities in their effort of destructing lives and properties. There is a common divergence among scholars as to the concept of terrorism and this led Sick to observe in Alao (2012) that 'one man's terrorist is another man's

freedom fighter'. However, the act can be positive or negative depending on the class of the orchestrator.

According to Abolarinwa (2011) terrorism has established itself as a world phenomenon before 1648, and providing a definite definition for it has been accorded with series of controversies. Etymologically, the term emanates from Latin, "terrere", meaning "to frighten" via the French word *terrorisme*, which is often associated with the regime de la terreur, the Reign of Terror of the revolutionary government in France from 1793 to 1794. The Committee of Public Safety agents that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were referred to as "Terrorists". The English word "terrorism" was first recorded in English dictionaries in 1798 as meaning "systematic use of terror as a policy". The Oxford English Dictionary still records a definition of terrorism as "Government by intimidation carried out by the party in power in France between the years 1789 to 1794.

It has been viewed that terrorism is value laden and subjectively defined in line with the ideological school of the individual defining it. Thus, terrorism both as practiced and justified by terrorist themselves, is a method used to achieve a specific outcome by using force or violence on one segment of society with the primary goal of causing fear in the larger society to make change in that society (Garrison, 2004). This shows that the usage of the the term is mostly negative, as it is used to depict violence or other destructive acts. Walter Laqueur in 1999 counted over 100 definitions of terrorism and concludes that the only characteristics generally agreed upon are that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence (Laqueur, 2003).

Terrorism as a form of unconventional warfare is at times used when attempting to force socio-political change by convincing a government or population to agree to demands to avoid future harm or fear of harm, destabilization of existing government, motivating a displeased people to join a mutiny, escalating a conflict in the hope of upsetting the status quo, expressing an injustice, or drawing attention to a cause. For instance, the crisis in the Niger Delta Zone of Nigeria, where the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) took up arms against the Federal

Government in pursuit of their rights- resource control, marginalization, and lack of infrastructural development in the Zone is an example of fighting for a cause (Chinwokwu, 2013). This is similar to Boko Haram movement who think that the right constitution to govern people is not upheld by the government, therefore needs to be replaced with Quran.

Even though, the African Union has not come up with a list of terrorist organizations in Africa, its Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism article 1 (3) defines terrorism as any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) Intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) Create general insurrection in a State (Oyeniya, 2010).

In a contemporary time, terrorism has been adopted to mean a wide deployment of force largely targeted at civilian population by disgruntled elements within the society to direct the attention of government to their plight or to force a change of government. The difficulty associated with surfacing a satisfactory definition of terrorism leads Hoffman (1998:3) to view that "If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism". In spite of the difficulty associated with the

definitions, some elements of terrorism are apparent in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings and hostages.

The study goes with Cunningham (2003) that a wide variety of actors from individuals (Carlos Illych Ramirez -the Jackal; the Unabomber) to groups (Tamil Tigers, Provisional IRA, Hamas, Boko Haram) to institutions (Gestapo, KGB, SAVAK) and finally to governments and states (the Taliban,) practice what we define as *terrorism*. The involvement of America in Vietnam, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Egypt among others was seen as terrorist act by Ogunsola (2011) cited in Aloa (2012). This goes further to justify that the definition of terrorism is a function of individual perception. Hence, terrorism is not limited to non-state actors. It explains why there is no unified perspective of what terrorism is.

Terrorism attracts rigorous attempt of international community to be contained and fought against. The trend becomes an important area of study especially after the 9/11 attacks, the phase that witnesses increase of academic works from different disciplines of study. When does a certain act of violence qualify as terrorist activity? In response to this provocative question, Nacos (2000) suggests that there is a need to draw clear lines of demarcation between a 'common' criminal and a terrorist. There is an obvious contrast between the two, common criminals do not in any way engage in making political statement. On the contrary, terrorists are keen to make political statement with the intent of attracting extensive and cheap media coverage.

Accordingly, Schmid and De Graaf (1982) explain that violence which is perpetrated by terrorists can be regarded as a means of communicating. The scholars go further and argue that "*for terrorist, the message matters not the victims.*" The concept of terrorism is fundamentally contested, value-laden and open to multiple interpretations based on a definer's predisposition which means, "*Terrorism is in the eyes of the beholder*" (Crelinsten, 1998). As terrorism is defined with different dispositions in mind, the researcher divides the definitions based on geography starting with America then Europe, Asia and Africa, then concludes with academic views.

2.2 American Definition of Terrorism

To define terrorism officially, the government of the United States of America defines it as:

Act of terrorism, means any activity that (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping (United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 19th Congress, Second Session, 1984; Selden, 2003).

It is of utmost importance to note that, this definition does not include the order of magnitude of violence involved in the attack, neither to be a catastrophic event of physical damage and loss of human life. In the 1983, the United States Department of State (DOS) formulated one of the most popularly used definitions of terrorism in the world (Sinai, 2008). This definition succinctly identifies terrorism with political struggle targeting civilians while the perpetrators are outside the government circle. The Defense Department of the United States succinctly defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological (Sani, 2014).

Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Hoffman, 1998; Steven and Gunaratna, 2004 cited in Sani, 2014). This informs why it is fought globally.

This definition outlines social and political goals that trigger off terrorism, although it does not make clear the differences between them. As stated earlier, definitions on terrorism varied as there is no consensus even among institutions and agencies of the same government of the US, each agency

defines according to the mandate and interest it pursues. In his words while addressing the Congress nine days after September 11 attacks, U.S President, George W. Bush stated that ‘terror, terrorism and terrorist’ become inseparable concepts and coherent entities deserve to be eliminated to ensure vibrant democratic institutions and stability of regions as well (State Department, 2001).

2.3 European Definition of Terrorism

The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism that was adopted in the 1977 with an official authority of the Council of Europe was obliged to clearly separate political offences (that are regarded as acts of terror) from other acts motivated by the political motives. However, the European Convention had not come up with single logical definition of the terrorism, instead, it brought up with a large number of terrorist acts so as the member States would implement the content approved by them in order to work together in containing the menace (Dumitriu, 2004 cited in Sani, 2014).

In the same way, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was adopted in 2005 saddled with responsibility to enhance the efforts of the parties terrorism and its negative effects on the full enjoyment of human right, in particular the right to life, both by the measures to be taken at nation and through international cooperation with due regard to the existing applicable multilateral and bilateral treaties or agreements between the parties (Sani, 2014).

Meanwhile, as the author of *Inside Terrorism* Bruce Hoffman comments that not only difficulty of defining terrorism, however, how the meaning changed over time as well as how meaning varies among the multiple viewpoints and contexts . Accordingly, after period of twenty years, the Government of United Kingdom in the (Act of Terrorism) Act 2000 introduces a series of anti-terrorism measures; section 1 of the act outlines offences it considers as acts of terror. It defines terrorism as:

- (a) involves serious violence against a person, or (b) serious damage to property, that (c) **endangers a person’s life** (other than that of the person

committing the action), (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public, or is designed (e) seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system, where the use or threat of violence or damage is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause (Jackson, LeeJarvis, Gunning, and Symth, 2011:102).

2.4 Asian and African Definitions of Terrorism

Terrorism has been a hereditary problem to human race since the time immemorial, unfortunately until now there has been no straightforward definition of the concept (Gus, 2003). Asian region with a particular reference to Southeast Asia is not free from the hitch of defining the concept as in the case of America and Europe. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which comprised Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of the Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, and Socialist Republic of Viet on 5 November 2011 (about two months following the September 11attacks) signed the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (DJACT). However, the Declaration was unable to formulate any cogent definition of terrorism, other than maintaining that terrorism is a “direct challenge to attainment of peace, progress and prosperity to ASEAN” (Banlaoi, 2009 cited in Sani, 2014). This was deliberate attempt on the part of ASEAN not to define the concept due to the involvement of the Muslim communities in the region which perhaps could perceive any definition as anti-Islamic at the height of emergence of the so-called Jihadists in the Southeast Asia (Geest, 2002 cited in Sani 2014). However, Indonesia and Malaysia reached an agreement on the Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures on 7 May, 2002. The Trilateral Agreement attempts to define terrorism as:

Any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the respective territories of the parties or in the border area of any of the parties an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resources,

or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States (Fukuda, 2004; Banlaoi, 2009).

However, the agreement stated above inspired counter-terrorism based on the UN Convention that criminalized the act of terrorism. Failure of the agreement resulted in the lack of necessary agency established to shoulder the responsibility of enforcing the agreement.

Nevertheless, in stark contrast to ASEAN, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the League of Arab States through the Councils of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Ministers of Justice in Cairo, in 1998. The Councils attained consensus definition of terrorism. The Convention defines terrorism as:

Any act or threat of violence whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to cause panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources (Martin and Phelan, 2010:8).

It is however deduced from the above definition that the act of terrorism refers to any act that instills panic into non-combatant and deploys threat and damage to the environment for whatever motive. Nonetheless, experts have criticized the definition for its breadth, vagueness and consequent vulnerable to abuse. A scholar argues that:

The unqualified reference to the 'violence' or the 'threat' of violence – irrespective of whether it achieves any actual result, or of the gravity, of the violence caused or threatened allows for a potentially very broad range of conduct to be brought under the rubric of this convention (Duffy, 2005:27).

Meanwhile, similar attempt has been achieved by the African Union (AU) Convention on Prevention and Combating Terrorism for offering its version on how the continent sees the act of terrorism. The Convention's regional consensus defines terrorism as:

Any act which is a violation of the criminal ... which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any

person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (a) intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or (b) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (c) create general insurrection in a State (African Union, 1994).

2.5 Academic Definition of Terrorism

There is no concurrence within the scholarly field of terrorism and political discourse on factual interpretation of terrorist activity, but rather, there is a general consensus as to what constitutes terrorism by exhibiting some elements of casual coherence and common proportions (Chomsky, 1991; Tilly, 2004). After analyzing 109 competing definitions, Jackson, LeeJarvis, Gunning and Symth, (2011:104) defined terrorism as:

an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

According to this definition, terrorism is a method of communication between the perpetrators and main targets through random sampling of the victims of circumstance drawn from the non-combatants. The victimization of civilians creates large audience and mobilizes the target of terror so as to produce disorientation or compliance. It is deduced from the definition that terror activity depends so much on the media publicity since victims serve as message. The media are very well suited for the purposes of terrorists (Nacos, 2006). Terrorism however becomes the theatre, and the

news media, on the one hand, are seen as unable to resist the chance of a good story since bad news is good news for them, therefore, mass media feel obliged to extensively cover such news of bombings, hijackings, kidnapping and assassinations (Schlesinger, 1983).

Noams Chomsky, a linguist and activist proposes *literal* and *propagandist* as two distinct ways to approach the study of terrorism. Literal approach refers to a way of scientific understanding of terrorism as social phenomenon, determining what constitute terrorism as social phenomenon by analyzing major examples of terrorist activities and emphasizing on causes and remedies. Pursuing propagandist approach sees the concept of terrorism as a “weapon to be exploited in the service of some system power” (Chomsky, 1991).

To dichotomize between the two approaches, the former adopts a serious study that determines causes and remedies through empirical study, whereas the latter is more concerned for labeling and diminishing a perceived political enemy by deploying hegemonic military power in the pretext of legitimate coercive diplomacy. This approach is generally adopted by governments in totalitarian states (Chomsky, 1991).

Charles Tilly, a social scientist, argues that terrorism as a social phenomenon is defined by strategy not by creed as opposed to American neo-conservatives. He further explains succinctly that terrorism exists in a wide variety of cultures, institutions and political struggles not confined to a particular group, belief, creed or nation (Tilly, 2004). This point is contrasting with American neo-conservatives that restricted terrorism to Muslims and make the world to believe. He maintains that “terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances and beliefs. Terrorism is not a single coherent phenomenon. No social scientist can speak responsibly as though it were” (Tilly, 2004).

Going by the above conceptual definitions of terrorism, some level of accuracy are achieved but the lacuna associated with them was failure to relate other forms of violence to the act of terrorism,

including 'state terrorism' which is considered by governments as legitimate and coercive diplomacy. Many scholars bridge this gap by identifying specialized military action as another form of terrorism (Sani, 2014).

Noam Chomsky describes military action on political oppositions by the dictatorial regimes in Latin America as terror activity. The term terrorism has come to be applied mainly on individuals and groups as 'retail terrorism'. Whereas the term was once applied to emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, now it is restricted to thieves who molest the powerful. Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term 'terrorism' to refer to the threats or use of violence to intimidate or coerce generally for political ends (Chomsky, 2003). However, governments through specialized armed forces, nongovernmental and antigovernment organizations exercise some form of terrorism or the other including kidnapping, murder, torture and mutilation (Tilly, 2004).

Taking cognizance of the above definitions, terrorism means a state of uncertainty. It refers to all forms of violent acts which are aimed at achieving political, religious or ideological ends.

2.6 Comparison of the Definitions

It is obvious that an attempt about accomplishing an all-embracing definition is not yet feasible. In the line of this argument, the above definitions to some extent share universal features and vary in others. Even the definitions formulated by different agencies of the same government have failed to come up with a harmonised definition of terrorism.

The United States Department of State offers clear explanation of the term 'noncombatant' that refers to civilians and unarmed military personnel who are not on the cause of duty. Moreover, the definition considers the act of terrorism as attacks capable of posing danger to human life or possible demolition of essential infrastructure, resources, military installations or armed military personnel when 'a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site'. It also included bombings on

U.S bases around the globe. Not surprisingly, the Department of State emphasizes and prioritizes the 'premeditated' and 'calculated' nature of terrorism. The uniqueness of this definition is its focus beyond the civilians that mostly suffer the attacks to include 'combatant targets'. This broad category involves not only assassination and kidnapping of military attaches but also attacks on cafes and several facilities attended by off-duty service personnel as well as military installations and armed military personnel at a period of peace. Even though the definition given by the Department of the State fails to consider the psychological dimension of terrorism, as it aims at having far reaching psychological consequences capable of instilling fear among the large watching audience (Hoffman, 1998).

In the same vein, the Defense Department of the United States succinctly defines the phenomenon which emphasizes on three essentials of violence act to be considered as terrorism. The key elements included violence, fear and intimidation, and each inculcates terror in its victims. Nevertheless, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose given task of investigating and solving crimes that encompasses political (e.g. terrorism) and others, defines terrorism and focuses on different essentials in the broadest sense of the phenomenon. It accentuates 'noncombatant' as not only government and its citizens but also involves inanimate object like private and public property, and clearly identifies 'politically-motivated' act such as vandalism and sabotage as well.

Meanwhile, the definition given by the Government of the United Kingdom regards any action that includes the usage of firearms or explosives or both as the act of terror whether it is predetermined to influence the government or to intimidate the public or section of the public aimed at achieving political, religious or any ideological motive.

In the case of Southeast Asia, no definition was provided by the Joint Declaration to counter-terrorism due to apparent differences in spiritual beliefs among the member countries. However, Indonesia and Malaysia reached an agreement on the Information Exchange and Establishment of

Communication Procedures. Both of the countries have agreed to conceptualize terrorism based on UN convention that criminalized the act of terrorism.

Notwithstanding, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the League of Arab States through the Councils of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Ministers of Justice in Cairo, in 1998 and came up with a consensus definition that improved on the previous ones. This definition adds that any act capable of 'damaging the environment' or that can inflict harm on natural 'resources' are considered as act of terror. This further substantiates that interest or ideology guides the definition of terrorism.

Meanwhile, the African Union (AU) Convention on Prevention and Combating Terrorism formulated a consensus definition of terrorism in 1994. The definition incorporates additional element that previous definitions did not regard as acts of terrorism, this included threats to cultural heritage.

In light of the above definitions, it is the general consensus that the act of violence against non-combatants and governments in the pursuit of ideological goals is regarded as terrorism. In an attempt to explore the stated definitions, it can be seen that the definitions formulated by the western capitalist world (North America and Europe) are much similar and the emphasis was mainly political. Meanwhile, the Middle Eastern and African definitions look similar as well as they unanimously incorporated additional elements that previous definitions do not regard as acts of terror, including posing threats and violence to environments and natural resources, and also cultural heritage added by the African Union definition. It therefore proves that every definition is shaped and influenced by the kind of interest or ideology that the definer wants to accomplish (Sani, 2014).

2.7 Conflict-Sensitive Journalism and its Perspectives

Conflict sensitive-journalism is a media report of issues aimed at establishing peace-making processes with the intent of having peaceful society.

Conflict sensitive-journalism reflects a modernization of the original values of the news media. It is rooted in the belief that the news media in many societies can be a powerful force to reduce the causes of conflict and to enable a conflict-stressed society to better pursue conflict resolution. The media can do this by training its journalists to better understand conflict and the media's role in it. The journalists can strengthen their reporting to avoid stereotypes and narrow perspectives on the causes and process of conflict. The media can contribute to a wider dialogue among disparate parts of the community in conflict, through improved reporting. It can explore and provide information about opportunities for resolution. And at the same time the media must maintain its essential standards of accuracy, fairness and balance, and responsible conduct (Howard, 2009).

Conflict sensitive-journalism otherwise known as peace journalism combines journalism with peace as an external aim and understands itself as "a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards war and peace" (Shinar, 2007:2). Media have to be peace-inclined in their watchdog role between the government and the governed.

Conflict-sensitive journalism arouses concern that peace journalism "could compromise the integrity of journalists and confuse their role as neutral disseminators of facts" (Loyn, 2003). This concern is all the more justified because some supporters of peace journalism seem all too inclined to underrate values like objectivity, neutrality and detachment (e.g., Mc Goldrick, 2006; Peleg, 2007). However, journalists are expected to be as accurate as possible in their report of issues which peace journalism can deny them that professionalism.

According to Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) cited in McGoldrick (2006:4) "peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them". The two together, disregarding the tools of good journalism and understanding peace journalism as a form of advocacy journalism and create a dangerous mix which is prone to abuse the noble goal of peace as

legitimizing a biased coverage. However, this is the reason why conflict-sensitive journalism is not fully adopted in the portrayal of some of the newspapers' reports.

According to Seow and Maslog (2005) commenting on the coverage of conflict, including any reportage about war, is grounded in the notion of conflict as a news value. As a result, conflict reporting is often sensational and a mere device to boost circulation and ratings. Norwegian Professor of Peace Studies, Johan Galtung first proposed peace journalism as a self-conscious, working concept for journalists covering wars and conflicts (Galtung, 1998). He viewed peace journalism and war journalism as two competing frames in the coverage of a conflict. He memorably likened war journalism to sports journalism, which characteristically sees its object in terms of a zero-sum game where winning is all. A better model, he argued, would be health journalism. Here the plight of a patient with cancer, for example, would be described, the causes as well as the range of possible remedies and future preventative measures. This model would prove more productive in the context of conflict reporting than focusing on violence, negative events and siding with a particular protagonist.

War journalism is oriented to war/violence, propaganda, elites, and victory. In addition, war journalism plays up conflict as an arena where participants are grouped starkly into two opposing sides ('them vs. us') in a zero-sum game and focuses on visible effects of war (casualties and damage to property). In contrast, peace journalism is a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation. Like public journalism and development journalism, peace journalism is grounded in communication philosophy— namely the commitment to the idea of civic participation, the understanding of social justice as a moral imperative, and the view that the value and sacredness of the individual are realised only in and through communities (Galtung, 1998).

By taking an advocacy, interpretative approach, the peace journalist concentrates on stories that highlight peace initiatives; tones down ethnic and religious differences, prevents further conflict, focuses on the structure of society; and promotes conflict resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation by giving voice to all parties (not only two opposing sides), and creates empathy and understanding. Other peace journalism approaches include taking a preventive advocacy stance—for example, editorials and columns urging reconciliation and focusing on common ground rather than on vengeance, retaliation, and differences—and emphasising the invisible effects of violence (e.g. emotional trauma and damage to social structure). Through careful, consistent, and conscientious application of peace journalism practices, the peace journalist hopes to create a setting in which the causes of and possible solutions to the conflict become transparent (Yang Lai Fong, 2009).

Galtung offers some concrete points for reframing in his vision of peace journalism and war journalism. They are outlined in the following table (Lynch, 2005).

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p>I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues - General “win, win” orientation - Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture - Making conflicts transparent - Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding - See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity - Humanisation of all sides; more so the worse 	<p>I. WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win) war - General zero-sum orientation - Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone - Making wars opaque/secret - “Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice for “us” - See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war - Dehumanisation of “them”; more so the worse the weapon

<p>the weapon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs - Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/ culture) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting - Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
<p>II. TRUTH-ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups 	<p>II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies
<p>III. PEOPLE-ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to voiceless - Give name to all evil-doers - Focus on people peace-makers 	<p>III. ELITE ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece - Give name to their evil-doers - Focus on elite peace-makers
<p>IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace = non-violence + creativity - Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war - Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society - Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation 	<p>IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace = victory + ceasefire - Conceal peace initiative, before victory is at hand - Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society - Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again

Peace Journalism (PJ): Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues. This view assumes a wider perspective on the conflict, looking not only at Boko Haram and Ruling party, but also the various persons and groups within their governments and states, political and military allies, different tribes of Nigeria, different adherents of Religion... PJ also examines each of the parties' goals and issues, and do so in a way that lends credibility and legitimacy to each.

WJ: General zero-sum orientation. This is the belief that only one party can win and that both parties aim to win.

PJ: General "win, win" orientation. This orientation considers that if the parties work together they can enhance both their positions.

WJ: Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.

PJ: Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.

WJ: Making wars opaque/secret i.e by hiding some facts.

PJ: Making conflicts transparent. While the government must certainly have some legitimate reasons for keeping some information top secret, it is also the public's right to know how their treasury is being spent. It is the job of journalists to insist the government address citizens' concerns. This policy may seem counter-intuitive to the classic international relations approach in which conflicts are viewed as a high-level poker game, with each player hiding his cards and anteing, raising the stakes and bluffing based on assumptions about the other's strategy and psychology. In contrast, the school of conflict transformation tries to foster as much communication and dialogue as possible amongst the parties. Galtung, however, is particularly careful to not bring the parties together too soon. Rather, he begins by working with each party individually so that she can fully understand what her needs and position are in the conflict. This can be understood as each party making the conflict transparent for herself

WJ: "Us-them" journalism, propaganda, voice for "us". This is perhaps most easily seen in journalists covering the military beat. It comes out clearly when we see that the number of Nigerian soldiers is meticulously counted and reported, whereas the number of Boko Haram is very much based on guesswork.

PJ: Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding. This precept of peace journalism already exists to an extent in so-called "human-interest pieces," for example 15/15

WJ: See "them" as the problem, focus on who prevails in war.

PJ: See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity.

WJ: Dehumanization of "them"; more so the worse the weapon. Consistently, Boko Haram are given the epithet "insurgent" or "terrorist." Ross (2004) believes these terms are emotional and such "words take sides, make the other side seem impossible to negotiate with. Call people what they call themselves."

PJ: Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon.

WJ: Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting

PJ: Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs. Peace proposals and anti-war protestors could have received more serious coverage

WJ: Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage).

PJ: Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/ culture).

Propaganda Orientated – Truth Orientated

WJ: Expose "their" untruths/ help "our" cover-ups/ lies

PJ: Expose untruths on all sides/ uncover all cover-ups.

Elite Orientated – People Orientated

WJ: Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece.

PJ: Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voices to the voiceless

WJ: Give name to their evil-doers i.e both Boko Haram and Nigerian insecurity.

PJ: Give name to all evil-doers.

WJ: Focus on elite peace-makers.

PJ: Focus on people peace-makers.

Victory Orientated – Solution Orientated

WJ: Peace = victory + ceasefire. This understanding of peace stems from a classic international relations view and from the lack of journalistic training in conflict analysis. It disregards the efforts necessary before and after a ceasefire agreement is signed. Indeed, it attempts to make peace an event and give it a date. This view does not take into account basic needs on either side and therefore fails to see that the ceasefire is likely to be breached with rising frustrations.

PJ: Peace = non-violence + creativity. Galtung’s equation for peace means that peace is not simply the absence of violence, it is actively engaging in non-violence, and doing so requires creativity. In his vision, journalists create the space for and propose non-violent solutions for conflicts. But, in order to do so, journalists need to be properly trained in conflict analysis and transformation. It begins by understanding that peace is something that needs to be worked at constantly, not just in order to negate war, but to actively engage in peace. Peace is a daily matter, governing our relations with others, the choices we make and our understanding of the world. Opportunities for non-violent action abound, from consciously choosing to buy clothes which were not produced in sweat shops to withholding taxes which fund unnecessary military action. Journalists should put in as much effort to seek out and report on these alternatives as they do on violence and war.

WJ: Conceal peace initiative, before victory is at hand. This relates to the WJ understanding of peace, that it only comes when there is a victory and ceasefire.

PJ: Highlight peace initiative, also to prevent more war. PJ looks into ongoing proposals for reconciliation, transformation and reconstruction. While military correspondents plot troop movements and achievements, peace correspondents should be abreast of peace initiatives and create a space for public dialogue. By doing so, the idea is that it will prevent escalation of war and future conflicts resorting to violence.

WJ: Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society. Galtung (2006) clarifies, "The classical war-based approach end[s] typically with a ceasefire agreement, possibly with a capitulation, based on the winner-loser idea. The point, then, is to control the loser's society so there is no mischief."

PJ: Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society. The task of PJ is to help bring a culture of peace. Instead of justifying control of a society, it should report on initiatives that rebuild the structures and cultures of society in a peaceful way. As John Paul Lederach states in all societies there are always individuals or groups with visions of peace. Grassroots organizations, women's associations and religious groups are but a few examples of those working on shifting from cultures and structures of violence to those of peace. Often their stories are remarkable and their work inspiring 20/20 (Galtung, 1988 cited in Lynch, 2005).

2.8 Methodological Issues in Studying Conflict-Sensitive Journalism

Drawing on existing literature, El-Nawawy and Powers (2008) cited in Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) develop 11-point typology of media that best perform conciliatory function. In a survey that represents the first empirical attempt to examine the peace building potentials of the media, the typology was tested by the authors on Al-Jazeera English viewers in Malaysia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Qatar, United States of America and the United Kingdom. The survey shows that Al-Jazeera English is rated as a conciliatory media that is more to cover contentious issues in a way that contributes to

creating an environment that is more conducive to cooperation, negotiation and reconciliation. The typology includes:

1. Providing a public place for politically underrepresented groups;
2. Providing multiple viewpoints on a diversity of controversial issues;
3. Representing the interest of the international public in general rather than a specific group of people;
4. Providing first hand observations from eyewitnesses of international events;
5. Covering stories of injustice in the world;
6. Acknowledging mistakes in journalistic coverage when appropriate;
7. Demonstrating a desire towards solving rather than escalating conflicts;
8. Avoiding the use of victimizing terms such as martyr or pathetic, unless they are attributed to a reliable source;
9. Avoiding the use of demonizing labels such as terrorist or extremist, unless they are attributed to a reliable source;
10. Abstaining from opinions that are not substantiated by credible evidence;
11. Providing background, contextualizing information that helps viewers fully understand the story.

McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) cited in Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) provide a 17-point practical guide on what a journalist should avoid in order to report conflict in the interest of peace which six of them were captured in this study.

1. Avoid portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting one goal. The logical outcome is for one to win and the other to lose. Instead, a peace journalist will disaggregate the two parties into many smaller groups, pursuing many goals, opening up more potential for a range of outcome.

2. Avoid accepting stark distinctions between “self” and “other”. These can be used to build the sense that another party is a “threat” or “beyond the pale” of civilised behaviour both key justifications for violence. Instead, seek the “other” in the “self” and vice versa.
3. Avoid treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and the time that violence is occurring. Instead, try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future. Ask yourself what will happen if...? What lesson will people draw from watching these events unfold as part of a global audience? How will they enter the calculations of parties to future conflicts near and far?
4. Avoid assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effect only. Instead try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects, e.g., the long term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in the future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other country.
5. Avoid letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders’ restatement of familiar demands and position. Instead inquire more deeply into goals: How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life? What do you want changed? Is the position stated by their leader the only way or the best way to achieve the changes they want?
6. Avoid concentrating always on what divides the parties, the differences between what they say they want. Instead, try asking questions that reveal common ground and leading your report with answers which suggest some goals may be shared or at least compatible, after all.

2.9 Media and National Security

Surveillance has been one of the core responsibilities of the media. This onerous task is expecting the media to take into cognizance the approaches capable of inflaming the current violence and

putting the tranquility of the state at stake. This is achievable by framing with a tilt to reports that encourage peace. Studies have shown that the Nigerian media have not done well in this regard. Okpara (2010) unveils in his study that the Nigerian media are yet to effectively play the surveillance function in their reportage of conflicts. He contends that the media's lack of surveillance has led to the emergence of unabated conflicts in Nigeria.

Okali (2011) lends support to the above finding when he unveils in his study that the Nigerian media have not done well in discharging their surveillance role which has an adverse effect on the security of the nation. However, the forces that contribute to conflicts in Nigeria, media are one of thousands, as poverty is the first factor to address. This has been corroborated by Amienyi (1989) who critically evaluates the specifics of media performance in Nigeria and reports that certain socio-cultural factors were serving as obstacles to broadcasting for national integration.

On investigating the perception of adults in relations to the integrative contribution of mass media in Nigeria, Amienyi (1990) asks the adults to indicate how helpful they thought radio, television; newspapers and magazines were to the creation and sustenance of national integration in Nigeria. He finds a high percentage of respondents (80%) perceiving radio and television as being very helpful to national unity and integration. However, newspapers been the pioneer of the purveyance of information from the inception of Nigeria before the electronic media, the help it renders to the sustenance of Nigeria cannot be underestimated.

Commenting on Nigerian press coverage of political conflict in Nigeria, Ekeanyanwu (2010) finds among other things that though, Nigerian media have not entirely done very badly but have left much to be desired in terms of objectivity in their coverage. This is owing to the various inhibitions that the press has allowed some forces to influence their professional performance which conflict-sensitive journalism is arguably one of it. Ademola and Okeke (2011) concurs with Ekeanyanwu in their study that Nigerian media have not been able to promote national security because of their

biases in reporting crisis in Nigeria. Oputa (2011) also unveils in his study that objectivity was not observed in media coverage of Niger Delta crisis.

Lawrence (2011) also reveals in his study that the Nigerian media have been biased in their reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency. He further contends that their reportage of the insurgency have most often glorified the act of terrorism. The idea that when it bleeds it sells more has a lot to play here and that is why the media have been accused of this glorification. As social institutions, the media are involved in conflicts in the society either as a harbinger, channel of information and a platform for the analysis of conflicts. Reporting conflicts is a responsibility that the media must carry out, recording events as they unfold (Jimoh and Danladi 2012).

On the media coverage of terrorism in Nigeria, Alao (2012) reveals that there is need to close ranks between the Northern based media and those of their southern counterparts if the 'watchdog' constitutionally assigned role of the media will be of any relevance in Nigeria. This has been corroborated by scholars calling on the need to face the sufferings the citizens are undergoing in Nigeria which is a splintered state across religious, ethnic, and political differences. Though, the country is economically buoyant, the citizenry suffer an abject poverty. The democratic dispensation which has returned in 1999 with a lot of ambitions and high expectations by the citizenry has been reversed as the dreams have been killed by the security challenges (Shehu 2014).

2.10 Boko Haram and the Maitatsine Similarities and Implications in Nigeria

There is a growing suspicion among Nigerians about the real identity and motive of Boko Haram sect, most Muslims see it as an extension of Maitatsine sect which was established in 1945 to tarnish the image of Islam as was confirmed that he (Maitatsine) was not a Muslim until his death, while a reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to islamize Nigerians while others are indifferent (Shehu, 2014; Ojobi, 2013). Maitatsine bore Islamic name to tarnish the image of Islam. Muhammed Marwa (maitatsine) who appeared to be an Islamic scholar only by name migrated from

the town of Marwa in northern Cameroun to the city of Kano in 1945. While in Kano he became an Islamic fanatic concerned with the purification of Islam in disguise with ulterior motive. He believed that Islam had been corrupted by modernization and westernization (Shehu, 2014).

According to Danjibo (2007) Marwa's common preaching became very revolting and provoking, especially against established institutions like the emirate and the political leadership to the extent that the then Emir of Kano, Khalifa Sanusi Lamido, forced him to exile from Kano. Marwa found his way back to Kano in 1966, presumably after the demise of Sanusi. Between 1972 and 1979 Marwa was detained in jail several times for his insults and acts of mayhem against the state. As Falola (1990: 143) notes:

He (Marwa) was a Qur'anic teacher and preacher. Forceful, persuasive and charismatic, he rebelled against many popular opinions among Kano Islamic circles, denouncing certain parts of the Holy Qur'an and even criticizing Prophet Muhammad. At one stage in his career, Marwa granted himself his most prestigious credential when he revealed himself to be an annabi; a prophet with divine power and a mission to save the world...He was alleged to have replaced the name of the Prophet Muhammad with his own in personal copies of the Qur'an...He was opposed to most aspects of modernization and to all Western influence. He decried such technological commonplace as radios, wrist watches, automobiles, motorcycles, and even bicycles. Those who use these things or who read books other than the Qur'an were viewed as hell-bound 'pagans.

It was observed that Marwa exploited the declining economic situation and the Almajiri system and was able to draw large followers amongst the commoners, who were unable to afford the basic necessities of life, became die-hard patriots of the sect and Marwa himself. His people prayed while counting their beads, five times a day, facing the East, but think Prophet Muhammad was not a breathing image of Allah...They read the Qur'an but don't see the need to visit Mecca...At worship, the other Moslems in supplication to the Deity, place their open arms, facing away from themselves, in upright positions, on the side of both ears. But the Maitatsines, in prayers, rest the open palms of

both hands on their chest...The Maitatsines preach a strong compulsion to kill. They believe that if they are able to kill 'Arnas' (infidels) who don't believe in Allah, they will go to heaven (Danjibo, 2007).

The leader of the Boko Haram movement, Yusuf, was a secondary school drop-out who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Qur'an, while in the two countries he developed radical views that were abhorrent to westernization and modernization. Like the late Maitatsine, Yusuf got back to Nigeria and settled in Maiduguri and established a sectarian group in 2001 known as the Yusufiyya, named after him. The sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across Northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republic (Danjibo,2007).

Almajiranci in the north, which happened to be preferred form of education compared to western education, has been breeding people who are agaisning western education. In 1964, the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, boasted of establishing over 2 million Koranic schools scattered in all parts of Northern Nigeria (Paden, 1986). This notwithstanding, colonial authorities also conspired with the Northern elite at the inception of colonial administration through the indirect rule. They shielded the Muslim north from being exposed to Western education and culture (Coleman, 1986; Dudley, 1968; Ohadike, 1992). As Sanusi (2007: 181) puts:

One consequence of the alliance between the British and the emirates was that the integrity of the political and social structures in the north could only be achieved by sealing the region off from Western influences, including from southern Nigeria. In this attempt to insulate the north from modernity, Western education was severely curtailed in order to prevent in the north what Lord Lugard termed the "utter disrespect" for British and natives ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south.

For this reason, only few Western schools were built by British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria, and the consequential impact became one of the major reasons for which Nigeria could not gain independence in 1957. In fact, the north lacked the human capacity to run its administration.

Furthermore, there is also growing concerns of external influences that are impinging and shaping religions and religious organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, (Umar 2001, Ohadike 1992).

The implications of Boko Haram are terrible as it has slowed down the national economic increase and progress since no investors would prefer to invest in a settlement where insurgents base. It further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. One of the noticeable effect has been the tendency to worsen unemployment and lead to youth restiveness, thereby making crime a profitable venture and attractive. It has also led to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector (Alao 2012).

In addition, the scourge of the Boko Haram if not checkmated might lead to food scarcity in Nigeria on the long run though a glimpse of such was experienced in July, 2012 when the prices of food items and vegetables went high in the south. This was as a result of the inability of traders from the north to transport commodities due to general insecurity in the north. The dangerous aspect that has not caught the attention of the government is the nature of migration that is currently experienced in Nigeria for the first time. In this instance, it is not the southerners alone that are migrating from the north but also the northerners on account of insecurity (Alao 2012).

A good number of the migrants from the north are in their productive age as farmers and trades men by profession. This explains why most of the Okada riders in the Western States are of northern extraction. The danger is that they have abandoned their profession (farming) as this will reduce food production and compound the problem of food importation. Currently, Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme, (2012) observe that Nigeria spends over 10 billion dollars yearly on importation of four food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice. Though President Jonathan said that the situation was unacceptable, but the long run effects of the insurgency have not been given justifiable attention. The insurgence has the tendency to lead more Nigerians into poverty (Subair, 2012). Relying on National Bureau of Statistics estimates using the relative, absolute and dollar-per-day

poverty measures, notes that poverty may have further risen slightly to about 71.5 per cent, 61.9 per cent and 62.8 per cent respectively in 2011 (Alao, 2012).

The list of people that died as a result of Boko Haram attacks according to Jimmoh (2011) was 1400 as at 2011 while Igbokwe (2012) put the figure at about 1500 in the last one year. Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme, (2012:9-12) gave a summary of terrorist acts perpetrated from July 27, 2009 to February 17, 2012 which is a manifestation of how dangerous the sect is.

The dangerous implication is the belief that government is unaided and incompetent of handling the situation as this has left the populace at the mercy of blood thirsty sect and everybody to himself. The inability of government to addressing the challenges led to the general belief that everybody needs to provide for his or her security coverage and this will further compound the problem associated with proliferation of light arms (Oche, 2008).

This position agrees with Raleigh (2011) that Severe political instability – civil wars, genocides and politicides – leads to increases in international migration and internally displaced persons, those conclusions are further interrogated to find that economic and social vulnerabilities can be equally critical factors in shaping movements from conflict zones.

This situation informed Eze (2012) to take a hard look at developments in the country where he concludes that it is a mixed bag of darkness, insecurity and glimpse of hope for the future of Nigeria provided there is honest commitment to the challenges posed by the sect. This led Iroko (2011) to observe that we cannot be sure of what will happen tomorrow. The nation ought to have learnt from the multitude of conflicts in Nigeria to be proactive and stop acting as an arm chair theorist on grave issues of national security that consistently threatens the corporate existence of Nigeria and renders the nation relatively economically impotent.

2.11 Causes of Boko Haram in Nigeria

You cannot proffer solution to a problem without tracing its causes; it is when the root of the causes is identified that is where the relief can be actualized. Among the possible causes, some are highlighted.

2.11.1 Poverty

It is axiomatic that when human beings find themselves in a state of squalor, aggression trails the scenario making it attracts myriads of interpretations, to some violence is the way out and very few can calm down. This can describe the violence in Nigeria as the aristocrats outnumbered the commoners doubly. In the words of Mass communication scholar commenting on the Nigerian population and the rate of poverty:

With an estimated population of over 120 million people, Nigeria is rated the most populous black nation in the world, the country is a federation of 36 states and over 250 ethnic nationalities, with abundant endowment of natural resources. Tragically however, Nigeria is almost leading the 25 poorest nations in the world, with an average per capita income of less than one US dollar, and over 67 percent of its people in a trap of heightening poverty. (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2009:38)

The famous Greek philosopher, Aristotle once wrote, "Poverty is the mother of all revolutions, when and where there is hunger and the poor greatly exceeds in number, trouble sets in and the state soon comes to an end" (Adamu 2014:2).

Cognizant of the above fact, Nigeria is in the relevant position to attract insurgency because of poverty. However, former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon has dispelled the postulation that poverty was responsible for the spate of bomb attacks by Boko Haram sect in the north. To him, unity is the key to addressing the hazard (Gowon 2014).

2.11.2 Corruption among Security officers

The security of Nigeria is compromised as most of the weapons smuggled in which helps the insurgents in their operations monetize their ways to the country corruptly. Mohammed (2011) adds that violent uprisings in Nigeria are ultimately due to "the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment".

2.11.3 Glorification of Insurgents' Activities by the Media

Exaggerating the report on Boko Haram Insurgency has added more grease to their elbow, believing that their activities are successful and their effort is not thwarted. Informing, enlightening, educating and entertaining the society seems to oversimplify and paint an ingenuous picture of the mass media, and veil their role as "arena where the affairs of public life are played out" (McQuail, 1987 cited in Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013:17).

According to Ozohu-Suleiman, (2013:17) "accelerating or impeding security, and shaping or refining opinions are similar ways of acknowledging that the mass media can serve as a powerful tool for inflaming disagreement and diffusing conflicts or facilitating peace". Therefore, media can be a cause of inflaming the insurgency or mitigating it. According to Hermann and Hermann (1998) argue that media in reporting insurgency, not only dispatch information but, like good drama critics, interpret it as well. They skew what they give by deciding which events to report and which to ignore, intentionally or unintentionally expressing approval or disapproval to create an atmosphere of public support, apathy, or irritation". In this manner, as long as insurgents are primarily interested in how the audience; the national and foreign publics; and decision-makers in a government reacts to their acts, insurgents' aims can never be achieved without the media.

Kubiak (2004) has noted that the real dynamic of terror lies in the telling of the story itself. And that is why the media, become an important institution with the primary duties of informing the public, to interpret events within contexts, and to raise public debate on critical issues. McCombs and Shaw (1972) corroborated that Media is an important correlate in analyzing terrorism and the public

opinion within any national society. Basically, only few have experienced terrorism at first hand as most people know terrorism only by second hand accounts framed by media reports (Kowoll, 2012).

Nacos (2006:) has argued that the media favor this sort of political bloodshed, it is nevertheless true that terrorist strikes provide what the contemporary media crave most – drama, shock, and tragedy suited to be packaged as human interest news. Being the media professionals are paid through the sales of the papers, they cannot survive without prioritizing what they regard as human interest stories.

As Wilkinson (2000) situates it that when one says ‘insurgency’ in a democratic society, one also says ‘media’, as insurgency by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to wider society. Apart from propagating terror, the media also avail terrorist group a platform to publicize their aim, inform both friends and opponents about the motives for terrorist deeds, and explain their rationale for resorting to violence (Nacos 2006) has claimed that the media cannot be exonerated from inflaming the insurgency. In other lexis, insurgents require the media for breeding panic so as to get people’s attention and this put in plain words why Nacos, (1994) argues that getting the attention of the mass media, the public and decision makers is the motive behind modern terrorism.

The issue of how the media, most especially the newspapers frame Boko Haram insurgency in the country even assume greater national importance considering the view that news framing is expected to have considerable influence on public opinion (McQuail, 2010; McComb, 2004). Though, the news media frame in any society is not the only factor affecting public opinion as it is also influenced by real world indicators, personal experience and interpersonal communications, nevertheless, the conventional news frame in any society is expected to play a central role in shaping public reaction (Hewitt, 1992 cited in Idowu, 2014).

Regarding the insincerity in tackling the root causes of the insurgency, Scholars from various disciplines have all identified root causes as key to understanding why most insurgency takes place. For example, Bloom (2007) enumerated the following as root causes of terrorism among others: Lack of rule of law, failed or weak states that provide havens for terrorists, corrupt government, depression, discrimination, social injustice. We may add to the above list among others: unemployment, absolute poverty, underemployment, rise of indigenous neo elites, executive lawlessness, marginalization, relative deprivation, oppression, neo-imperialist class, do or die politics and government insincerity and insensitivity. In the words Chinwokwu (2013:10)

Aside from the huge amount of budget Government appropriates every fiscal year, the country is yet to reap the dividends of democracy. Basic social amenities like water, electricity, education, hospital, roads etc are none existent instead 25% of government budget is allocated to the National Assembly overhead current expenditure. The public is only privileged to know how much budget is approved for each fiscal year, but how much of the budget is implemented to transform the socioeconomic status of the citizenry is another ball game entirely. Government is insincere in fulfilling her election campaign promises to the people instead they flamboyantly with great impetus exhibit executive lawlessness in corruption and abuse of office at the glaring face of hungry, poverty ridden, unemployed and absolutely deprived Nigerian youths.




Figure 1: Hotspots of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria (Forest, 2012)

The hotspots of Boko Haram attacks have also extended to Yobe, and Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Abuja, Gombe and Plateau apart from Borno where the headquarter of the insurgents bases. Analysis of Boko Haram terrorism also reveals that majority of their attacks are directed at government security apparatuses (Police, military, Prison etc) churches (or Christians), politicians, academic institutions, and Muslim figures critical of its ideology (Forest, 2012). There are serious arguments by scholars on the possible causes of Boko Haram with a tilt by the majority to the concurrence that the root causes of Terrorism lies in injustice deeply seated in societies (Norricks, 2009; Forest, 2012).

2.12 Insurgents News Framing and its Sources

The content of any newspaper is formed by getting information from those orchestrating the insurgency and the innocents or the vulnerable group. The place of news sources in the process of

news production is worth-considering. This emphasizes the strength of source credibility theory of Mass communication propounded by Hovland and Weiss cited in Anaeto (2008) with its basic assumption on the credibility of source. However, as long as reporters need to write beyond their opinions alone, as long as they see themselves as conveyers of information rather than interpreters of issues and occurrences, they will need to rely on sources though, naturally considered reliable, speak for their organizations and from ideological point in their cultural worlds (Berkowitz, 2009). These sources of information come from the victims and the insurgents.

The study of reporters and their news sources draws its roots from questions about bias, power, and influence. A key question in the early literature concerned whether reporters or sources exert greater influence in shaping the news. One extension of this question asks how journalists' use of news sources leads toward particular news agenda that either favors or excludes some issues over others (Berkowitz, 2009). This is one of the powers of the media to influence their audience.

Over the years, extensive literatures have documented the importance of news sources in shaping the news (Manning, 2001). Journalists' ability to choose who speaks (or does not speak) in news coverage enables them to frame news unintentionally. Schneider (2011) has also advanced that the use of sources and quotations enables journalists to call on the voices of their assorted sources to structure stories in particular ways. As Van Dijk (1991:152) argues: "quotations allow the insertion of subjective interpretation, explanations, or opinions about current news events, without breaking the ideological rule that require(s) the separation of facts from opinions". As such, journalists need to be careful not to tamper with objectivity in their reportage.

Berkowitz (1987) also argues that sources play large part in shaping information from which people unconsciously build their image of the world. The relationship between reporters and their sources has been portrayed as a battle for power over public opinion and public consent (Anderson, 2005)

Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981). Sigal, (1986) has noted that mapping out the dominant sources in news might shed light on whose agenda the news reflect. This can be debated on the tenability of agenda setting by the media.

Using empirical studies, researchers have found preponderance of government officials and institutional sources (such as corporate bodies, public bodies, professional associations, NGOs) in use among reporters (Zelizer and Allan, 2002). These voices enjoy extensive access to the chamber of public debating which the press provides; they often shape the news discourse and its agenda. While this may resemble calculated bias, a number of scholars don't view Journalists' reliance on government officials as willful or consciously biased actions. According to this argument, journalists are merely striving to meet deadlines and thereby rely on those news sources that are available for comment (Tuchman, 1978; Gans 1979).

Essentially, journalism's paradigm follows a science-like model, where reporters gather authoritative data and then present it without explicitly taking a side in the discourse. Within this model, experts and officials as sources become the providers of this data, so that reporters become beholden to them for the raw materials of news (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). By authoritative nature of the sources, the framing could be seen from the power of the sources like government.

The dependence on official government sources and other institutional bodies is even more pronounced in reportage and framing terrorism (Zelizer and Allan, 2002; Canter, 2009; Norris, Kern and Just, 2003; Azeez, 2010). This then fits perfectly into Bennett (1990:106) indexing hypothesis which posits that "mass media professionals ... tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic". The highly influential role of news sources in the process of news production cannot be over-emphasized.

It is, however, pertinent to note that sources, although usually deemed authoritative, speak from vested positions in their organizations and from ideological positions in their cultural worlds (Berkowitz, 2009). Sources provide the raw material for news, and thus news media maintain close relationship with established sources (the term “source” is as used here refer to human subjects who reporters turn to for their information). Williams (2003) has noted that “Sources are central to the news production” and it is important to establish contacts with sources “for a reliable flow of newsworthy information. Thus, without sources, there would be no story the better the source, the better the story (Willis, 1990). Yet, the relationship of journalists to their sources comprises one of the most critical – yet perplexing – areas of reporting. The use of apparently independent and authoritative sources enables journalists to produce a sense that they are merely conveying the opinions of others while in fact shaping the story through their choices of both sources and specific quotations (Ross, 2007).

Schudson (1978) also shares this view by asserting that news making begin with the news sources and that if journalism indeed provides the first rough draft of history, news sources are the first draft people. To Soloski (1989), news sources take the position of society’s reefers of ‘fact’ turning what is essentially a product of human creation into perception of facts. In essence, the relationship between reporters and their sources has been depicted as a battle for power over public opinion and public consent (Anderson, Peterson, and David, 2005; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981; McQuail, 2000).

2.13 Boko Haram Coverage, Media Ownership and Location

Nigeria newspapers are situated across locations and the ownership could be private or public. This has a role to play on what should be considered as news-worthy events to win the heart of the immediate community. Nigerian newspapers have come a long way. From its humble beginning in 1859 (Omu, 1978; Coker, 1968; Duyile, 1987; Akinfeleye, 1985), it has metamorphosed into one of the most vibrant subsets of Nigerian media scene. According to Kperoogi (2011), the Nigerian

Newspapers have historically functioned as a veritable arena for the robust articulation, ventilation, and circulation of transformative and politically consequential national discourse, and for the instigation of momentous social changes.

Oso (2011) cited in Ugah (2009) posits that despite its dwindling circulation figure, newspapers in the country are “still the most iconic outlet from news and other types of written communication” and that is why studies of political developments in Nigeria from the colonial to post-colonial period have always highlighted the role of the Nigerian press and of Nigerian journalists in energizing and galvanizing popular support for major, defining issues of the times.

However, since the press always takes the form and coloration of the milieu in which it operates (Siebert, 1955), the Nigerian Newspapers reflect the political and socio-economic reality of the country to its full details. In terms of the ownership pattern, majority of the national newspapers in the country are privately owned and thereby expected to be independent and objective in their reportage. However, this is not the situation especially when such reportage is about controversial national issues (Olukotun, 2004; Media Right agenda, 2000; Iredia, 2005).

An explanation for this lack of objectivity and detachment of Nigerian newspapers in covering national issues can be sought in Altchull’s (1995) cited in Campbell (2004) that the first law of journalism which states that: In all press systems, the news media are agent of those who exercise political and economic power. Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting outlet thus are not independent actors, though they have the potential to exercise independent power.

In most cases, the Nigerian newspapers often adopt the state as the primary definer of issues and events and by so doing; they reflect the ideology of the state rather than providing diverse views from which the citizen can make informed decision (Olukotun, 2004; Ahmad, 2009). For example, in covering militancy in Niger delta from 2006 to 2010, majority of the newspapers in the country

adopt government's frame of the crisis and the militants were hardly labeled as terrorists even when it was glaring that some of their attacks qualify as act of terrorism and that some of the militant groups have "not limited their violence to that which can be rationalized by a political ideology of defending ethnic communities and the environment" (Forest,2012).

In other situations, it is the ideology or the politics of the proprietor that decides media-bias, or slant (Agbaje, 1992). In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attack on America, a major meeting was held between journalists, editors and media experts on 'Media and Terrorism – Lessons of the American Attack', organized by the International Press Center (IPC), Lagos, on September 25, 2001 (Warren, 2003). The meeting, supported by the International Federation of Journalists, analyzed Nigerian media coverage of the September 11 terrorist attack in the United States, and concluded that media had been fair, balanced and objective in its post-attack report, though there were some incidents of media reports tainted with religious and race bias thus violating the principles of ethics and professionalism. Therefore, at the end of the exhaustive presentations and discussions it was agreed that:

- The media in its further reports must be sensitive to the diversity – social, religious, political, cultural, language – of different peoples in different parts of the world;
- The media should condemn terrorism but must refrain from portraying or labelling any particular religion as terrorist. It should also highlight, identified likely causes of terrorism with a view to removing them (Warren, 2003)

The meeting also agreed that in reporting the attack or any other major crisis, journalists should abide with their ethics and code of conduct by:

- Eschewing propaganda
- Not embellishing facts

- Presenting different sides to the issues to enable the reader or audience to arrive at a balanced conclusion
- Avoid being manipulated by politicians and policy-makers (Warren, 2003).

Were newspapers in the country able to input all these salient agreements in their reportage of Boko haram's terrorism? While to a researcher, this is a question that can only be answered through empirical investigation, Boko haram group seems to have reviewed the question and concluded that newspapers in the country were not objective and that they are supporting the government in the reportage of its ongoing jihad in Nigeria. Hence, the sect has not hidden its disdain and distrust of the Nigerian media (Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012).

In living up to its September 28, 2011 threat to deal with the media reporters, the sect, in a display of fury against its representation in Newspapers, bombed the offices of *Thisday*, *The Moment* and *Daily Sun* newspapers in Abuja and Kaduna on April 26, 2012. The sect cited reasons ranging from lack of objectivity to blasphemy on the side of the media for the attacks. Its spokesman, Abu Qaqa, explains this position thus:

We have repeatedly cautioned reporters and media houses to be professional and objective in their reports. This is a war between us and the government of Nigeria; unfortunately the media have not been objective and fair in their report of the ongoing war, they chose to take side. It is not only *Thisday* that has engaged in negative media campaign... but the sins of *Thisday* are more. They once insulted the Prophet Mohammed in 2001 and we have not forgotten. Nigerian media would not be a problem if they do their job professionally without taking sides (Cited in Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012).

Also in an 18-minutes Video post on Youtube on 9 May 2012, Boko haram sect also threaten similar attack on southern newspapers which include *The Punch*, *Daily Sun*, *Vanguard*, *Guardian*, *Nation*, *Tribune* and *National Accord*. In the same video, the sect spokesman also sends strong warning to *DailyTrust*, *Leadership* and *Peoples-Daily*, all which are Northern Nigeria based Newspapers, to

distance themselves from their inaccurate reportage of its attacks or face its fury (Punch, May 20, 2012).

One possible supposition from this threat is that these newspaper houses may not be able to frame the sect outside the dominant frame which sees them “as a faceless, conscienceless and bloody bunch of mass-murdering terrorists bent on ruining the country with their nihilistic demands” (Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012). The threat is likely to instill fear in the minds of the journalists.

2.14 Symbiotic Relationship between the Press and the Insurgents

While insurgents actively rely on the media for their stardom, media also get some benefits in reporting terror campaign. During the prime -time on September 11, 2001 Seventy-nine million Americans were watching news on broadcast and cable TV. Three days later, 39.4 million viewers tuned in to television news coverage (Hachten, 2004). Despite being largely shut out of the immediate information seeking on September 11, newspapers circulation figure in America also went high in subsequent days after 9/11 attack. The September 12 edition of *New York Times* sold 1.65 million (nearly more than half a million copies of its usual circulation on a normal weekday), while *New York Daily News* sold 1.1 million copies (Monahan, 2010). The import here is that terrorism or terrorist attacks are ‘audience puller’ for the media, and this explains the side of the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media (Idowu, 2014).

Media understands that their audience prefers one particular kind of news over the other. For example, the Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press survey in 1996 asked ‘what kinds of news do people want to read about?’ It found out that crime top the list (Hachten, 2004). The result of this is that media always look forward to “bleeding” stories. Terrorism, which is a mixture of crime, drama and human interest story, obviously, fits this description very well. Terrorism offers the media gripping stories with an interesting plot, it gives them new worthy and interesting information

– drama that involves human lives; a basis for political commentary, and human interest stories on the victims and their families. All these in turn lead to increase rating and high circulation figure for the media (Ganor, 2011, Schmid and De Graaf 1982).

To cap it all, terrorism has many aspects that make it a very “sexy” subject for the media: it has drama, it has danger, and it has blood. It is anecdotal and new, it has human tragedy, as well as miracle stories and heroes. It has a clear division between good and evil, it has shocking footage, and often action (TTSRL’s WP4 report, 2008 cited in Idowu, 2014). The media are rewarded [for broadcasting or publishing terrorism] in that they energize their competition for audience size and circulation – and thus for all-important advertising (Nacos, 2006).

When former Prime Minister of UK, Margaret Thatcher, said that “democracies ‘must find ways to starve the terrorists of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend, she was obviously referring to the symbiotic relationship between insurgency and the media which social scientists have attested to through many studies (Schlesinger, 1983).

The basis for this symbiotic relationship is not a subject of debate among researchers: the media are very well suited for the purposes of terrorists (Nacos, 2006). Terrorism is therefore the theatre, and the news media, for their part, are seen as unable to resist the chance of a good story (since bad news is good news for them), so they obligingly provide extensive coverage of terrorist bombings, hijacks, kidnapping and assassinations (Schlesinger, 1983).

Nacos (2000:13) explains this relationship thus: “Without massive news coverage the terrorist act would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred.” Along the same line, Hoffman (2006:12) comments “without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reaching the wider ‘target audience’ at whom the terrorists’ violence is actually aimed.

Alexander (1972) argues that terrorist groups have three purposes to interact with the media, namely attention, recognition and legitimacy. Bandura (1998) notes that the media is used for moral justification, arousal of sympathy and intimidation of the public. Archetti(2013) argues that the effects of this media strategy can be increased by trying to make the media frame the issues in a certain way. In some cases, the media can even give a positive spin to the cause, or compare the means terrorists use to means that are used by others who are considered more legitimate than terrorists, thus lending some recognition to the terrorists (Nacos, 2007).

Hachten, (2004) hence, “a cynical aphorism in the newspaper business holds, ‘if it bleeds, it leads.’ There is an obvious, if it doesn’t bleed, it certainly shouldn’t lead, and indeed, may not be fit to print at all. Mueller, (2007) posits that the result of this is that media always look forward to “bleeding” stories. However, detaching press from terrorists is not possible, but steps are recommended to pursue peace related approaches.

2.15 Insurgency and the Northern Perception of Westernization

Media reports have been portraying northerners especially Muslims who many of them at the early stage of western education rejected it because of the involvement of Christian missionaries as abhorrent to it despite the changes over time in the entire system. Muslims whose creeds are not congruent with some of the western education requirements as it contradicts their teachings of the Quran, such as the mode dressing in short skirts among girls of secondary schools and some of the scientific findings as evolution and big bang theories are still accepting western education with cautious mind (Alysergie and Johnson, 2014; Shehu, 2014).

According to a mass communications scholar Ozohu-Suleiman (2014:1) on polio campaign, asserts that “Polio eradication program in Nigeria has remained a topical issue of concern due to sustained resistance to the internationally sponsored campaign by local communities in the northern region of the country. Media reports attribute the resistance to Muslims in the region” This probably gave

media the impression about north's abhorrence to western education. Therefore, since Jamaatu Ahlussunnah Liddaawati Wal Jihad came from Maiduguri which is part of the north, people and the media labelled the insurgents with nomenclature "Boko Haram", meaning western education is prohibited.

Insurgency has become one of the most hazardous setbacks facing Nigeria. The country has joined the list of countries under blockade of terrorism when some elements within the country were able to recast local conflicts within the agenda of global jihad (Tanchum, 2012) which then gave rise to a sect known as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad' meaning 'people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and Jihad' (Ajayi, 2012), a sect which has been credited with various bomb attacks in the country over the last four years (Forest, 2012).

Boko Haram advanced a planned attacks as epitomized by their attack on UN building and Louis Edet House all in 2011. Boko Haram has carried out about 300 different attacks from 2009 to 2011 (Forest, 2012). Majority of these attacks have just come in two forms – armed assault, and bombing and they have led to more than 500 civilian casualties (Forest, 2012; Pham, 2012).

In July 2009, shortly prior to his demise, Yusuf claimed that Boko Haram did not "have any clash with the community, only the authorities, except the general public supports the authorities"(Salkida, 2009). However, this has changed between 2013 and 2014 as the victims to their attacks boosted to cover all Nigerians especially northerners.

2.16 Insurgents and the Motive of Attention Seeking

Insurgents use the media to show potential supporters that they can "deliver" thereby gaining their support (Vanhalla, 2011). When people who are perhaps mildly interested in the activities or ideas of a particular group see that that organization is actually able to have an impact on the legitimate political establishment, these people may become more respectful or sympathetic toward the terrorist cause or organization (ISSCM's WP4 report, 2008 cited in Idowu, 2014).

Attention seeking is the priority of the insurgents without which their attacks could have been worthless (Shehu, 2014). Publicity is the blood to insurgency without which the achievement of the insurgents is in vain. They employ stratagem to capture attention by threatening the audience, the target government, thus, even the intimidation of perhaps becoming victim of terrorist bloodshed is enough to instill panic, moved to affect the policy making process (Nacos, 2007).

As Hoffman (2006) writes: “Only by spreading the terror and outrage to a larger audience, the terrorists gain leverage they need to effect fundamental political change” Therefore, since the most gruesome and deadly incidents receive the greatest volume of reporting, media critics have charged that terrorists resort to progressively bloodier violence to satisfy the media’s appetite for shocking news” (Nacos,2000). Not only do terrorists want to be known to the audience, they also want to try to get their message across through the media. When terrorists strike, the audience may ask itself why people would do such things. Hence, to get people to know the cause they carry out attacks for would be a logical next step for them (Nacos, 2007; Archetti, 2013).

Insurgents are treated by the media as an accepted, legitimate by comparing their leadership with the world leaders, giving them a similar status. This is mainly achieved by getting personal airtime through interviews and recorded videos or messages. Framing is very important in this. If terrorists succeed in having the media frame their leader much like a “regular” leader would be framed, the audience may get the impression that the two are comparable (ISSCM’s WP4 report, 2008 in Idowu, 2014).

The images of attacks, especially in cases such as 9/11, can stir fear. For example, following 9/11 and other attacks, Bin Laden has become more popular among groups in the Muslim world (Economist 2001; Ellis 2007; Pipes 2001). “Simply by demonstrating that he and his kinds were able to land a catastrophic blow against the United States on its home turf, bin Laden conditioned a large number of young Muslim men – especially in the Muslim diaspora in western Europe – for recruitment into his cause without ever meeting them” (Nacos 2007).

2.17 Studies on Press Coverage of Insurgency

In her study of the CBS coverage of 1979 -1980 Iranian hostage crisis, (Palmerton, 1988 cited in Slocum, 2005; 135,) put forward a premise that “the meaning of terrorism is shaped in large part by the major vehicle we use to gain our primary information about events occurring outside our immediate circle of experience: the news media” therefore hinting that the peoples’ definition of terrorism is largely dependent on media narrations.

Some authors have conceded that the real issue is not so much the relationship between terrorism and the media which is widely acknowledged to exist, but whether such relationship actually affects public opinion and government decision making (Hoffman, 2006). Consequently, assuming that media representations of terrorism are largely the source for peoples’ information about terrorism (Kowoll, 2012), theorists have also raised mocking questions about the dramatic narration and manners in which media report terrorist acts (Azeez, 2010).

There is a general consensus among observers of Western media that on September 11, 2001, the conventional rules of newsgathering and reportage ceased to apply (McNair, 2007). According to Zellizer and Allan (2002) 9/11 terrorist attack on America shook to their foundation the familiar notions of what it means to be a journalist, how best to practice journalism, and what different publics can reasonably expect of journalists in the name of democracy. Azeez (2010) ascribes the reason for this to predicament associated with terrorism reporting unlike any other tea, bread, and butter news event.

Reporting on terrorism presents a number of dilemmas and paradoxes to journalists, whose responsibility is to inform the public objectively, fairly and accurately. Thus, there are many unsettling questions on the ways the media report terrorism, for which scholars of mass communication have not found absolute and definite answers. Such questions include whether or not the media are accomplices to the aims of the terrorists, who crave cheap publicity; whether the media are not actually magnifying the threat and fear in people in the way they report terrorism instead of allaying their fear; and whether or

not the media are really objective and accurate in the way they report terrorism and in their narrative and framing of terrorists (Azeez, 2010:3).

Scholars, using empirical researches, have identified various narratives or style used by media in reporting terrorism. Nacos (2007) observes that media often report terrorism in a tradition of 'thoughtless' and 'stereotypical' pattern, and they also adopt a 'follow-the-leader pattern' which she described as the tendency of the news media to adopt the language of the leading government officials in their social construction of terrorism.

Some scholars have also picked on the choice of words used by media in reporting terrorism. Within the framework that the language adopted in reporting terrorism can affect people's perception of terrorism and may have important consequences for public policy support concerning actions and reactions in response to violence (Dunne, Moore and Nosek, 2005). Azeez (2010) states that media tend to use evaluative language in defining or labeling terrorist for the purpose of priming and constructing a version of reality. Such choices of words are likely to imprint certain relative long-term impression about certain social grouping on the mind of the people. From this perspective:

The media ought to know that words have power....Still (partly through the use of words), the press has convinced both itself and the public that only 'Muslim' are 'terrorist'. Strangely, there are no 'Christian' or 'Jewish' terrorist! The Catholic Irish republican Army which has carried out attacks against Irish and English Protestants was never called an organization of 'Christian Terrorist' nor is the protestants Ulster defence Association so termed, though it too carried out acts of terror against Catholics (Hussain and Rosenbaum, 2004:178).

Stereotyping, sensationalism (Cohen-Almagor, 2005) and demonization of religion, ethnic groups, or geographical entity are also visible in media reporting of terrorism (Hussain and Rosenbaum, 2004; Akter, 2010; Dakroury, 2008) One grand narrative through which terrorism is reported, is what Schmid and de Graaf (1982) have called a dramaturgical paradigm consisting of good and bad.

News coverage and reports of terrorism are essentially focused on the spectacular and dramatic violence or carnage they involve. They use a narrative to underline

the misery and misfortune of the victims, without any reference to their background or why they are victims. In other words, the narrative in the news stories about terrorist acts concentrates on the human interest angle, without emphasising or discussing on the historical background of the perpetrators of the violence acts or the victims of the violence acts... the emphasis on the tragedy, violence, reactive and theatrical aspects of terrorist acts at the expense of detailed analysis of the events is so one-sided that one American political philosopher refers to broadcast coverage of terrorism, in particular, as a “phonograph of grief”. The objective of this kind of narrative is to unleash a common pattern of emotional display-thrill of anger, tension of anticipation, fear, anger and grief (Azeez, 2010: 9).

This one sided narrative of media in reporting Terrorism has therefore veiled their role as the arena where various angles of public issues are played out in order to stimulate independent thoughts and actions from the public. Using the utilitarian value of American media coverage of 9/11 attack, Norris (2003:295) asked the following questions: “did the public find information that facilitate the cognitive construction of judgment necessary to understand events? Did news frame build or disrupt bolds of national, social and political trust?

Researchers seem to be in relative consensus that news media framing of terrorism is still skewed towards propagating the dominant definition and explanation, which is often that of the government instead of opening wide arrays of information for the public. This is to say that the government has an upper hand on what should be.

2.18 Press Coverage and its Salient Angles of Events

To press, there are some angles worth-prioritizing while some are suppressed to satisfy the demands of its audience (Shehu, 2014). In Nigeria the power of the media to manipulate opinion is weighty. A prominent academic and catholic priest, attests to this when he said that “Next to God, it is perhaps the press that legitimizes what Nigerians consider to be the truth in any given situation” (Kukah cited in Uko, 2004).

In reporting terrorism in Nigeria, the news media emphasize certain aspects of the issues and make them more salient in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or solution recommendation (Entman, 1993). Thus, it is very probable that these reportages provide for the people, a pedestal on which they can form their opinion amidst nexus of other real world indicators (Obayi and Ekwueme, 2012; Norris, Just and Kern, 2003).

The power of the media to influence public opinion assumes a greater importance since researches have shown a variance of relationship between public opinion and policy making (Burstein, 2010, Shapiro and Jacobs, 2011). Scholars have also pointed how policymaking elites promote issues and influence public opinion through rhetoric about terrorism which will then translate to a situation whereby the policies ultimately enacted may consequently be related to opinions that policymakers have helped shape through their primary definition of terrorism offered to the media (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).

Irrespective of whether the media are handmaid of the ruling elites, or voices of the masses, it is widely recognized that media through agenda setting, framing, and priming function, have a varying degree of influence on public opinion direction (McComb, 2004). Consequently, the media through certain factors prioritize some news events over others.

2.19 Shaping Role of Agenda Setting and Priming Theories

Agenda Setting and Priming theories are part of the tools used by journalists to frame issues in the way it inflames or mitigates conflicts and this can be justified by its core assumptions. Theories are used to provide logical support to a particular study. Agenda and Priming theories are in the area of cognitive media effect that focus on what the media do to the people, the theories not only elucidate the power of the media to shape people attention on certain events but also explicate the traffic circle between media angle of events and peoples' understanding, perception, value

judgment and opinion formation on such event. The two theories have received significant scholarly attention since they were introduced.

Agenda setting refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphases that mass media place on certain issues (e.g., based on relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). As defined in the political communication literature. The label (Boko Haram) was given to the Jamatu Ahlussunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad and it goes like that because of the power the media has in setting the agenda for the audience.

According to Roessler (2007) 'Agenda Setting theory' describes the process of mutual influence between media and audience perception of what important issues in public life are. Agenda setting has proved to be a theory that is deep and wide, applicable for more than the 30-year lifespan, which is the mark of a useful theory (Coleman, 2009). It has been called the theory "most worth pursuing" of mass communication theories (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999).

Agenda setting owes its original insight to Lippmann (1922), who discussed how media message influence the "pictures in our heads". Although he did not specifically use the term, Bernard (1963) is generally credited with refining Lippmann's ideas into the theory of agenda-setting. "The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion," he wrote. "It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read" (Baran and Davis, 2010).

Later, Cohen's position was empirically confirmed in a research conducted by Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972). They explained their interpretation of agenda-setting: "In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping

political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position.... The mass media may well determine the important issues—that is, the media may set the ‘agenda’ of the campaign”.

Owing to the significance of agenda setting, scholars made another category that is termed ‘the second level’ or ‘attributes agenda setting’. The original concept of agenda setting, the idea that the issues emphasized by the media become the issues that the public thinks are important, is now referred to as the “first level” of agenda setting. Whereas first-level agenda setting focuses on the amount of media coverage an issue or other topic receives, the “second-level” of agenda setting looks at how the media discuss those issues or other objects of attention. Here the focus is on the attributes or characteristics that describe issues, people or other topics in the news and the tone of those attributes (Coleman, 2009). The second level therefore focuses on how people understand the things that have captured their attention. Using Lippmann’s phrase “the pictures in our heads,” first-level agenda setting is concerned with what the pictures are about. The second level is literally about the pictures.

Scholars have linked agenda setting research with studies of priming which examine the effects of media agendas on the public’s opinions as well as the public’s concerns. Derived from psychological theories, priming is the process in which news media call attention to some issues while ignoring others, and thereby influence the standard by which the public judges political figures or issues (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Krosnick and Kinder (1990) contend that the theory of Priming is an attempt to provide a wide and psychologically possible explanation on how citizens formulate and review their own points of view regarding an issue.

The psychological basis of priming is the selective attention of the public. People do not pay attention to everything. Moreover, in making judgments about public or political issues people use simple rules of thumb and intuitive shortcuts. Rather than engaging in a comprehensive analysis based on their total store of information, citizens routinely draw upon those bits of information that

are particularly salient at the time judgment must be rendered. Hence, the core idea of the theory of Priming is that when it comes to expressing an opinion, an individual does not make long disquisitions, but rather “takes a short cut”, for or against the issue in question. One of such short cuts is to resort to the information he has at hand in his memory, information he remembers spontaneously and effortlessly.

From this viewpoint, Krosnick and Kinder (1990) considered that the information provided by mass media is, by far, the most accessible one to individuals. Hence, the criteria citizens use to evaluate a politician are determined by the news the media decide to cover. The more attention paid by the media to a specific issue – or particular aspect of an issue – the more prepared the minds of the citizens will be to be influenced by that issue at the time of taking some position (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990).

2.20 Theoretical Framework

Since the study’s concern is on the framing of identity, motive, perceived risks and recommended solutions of Boko Haram insurgents and the consistency of the sampled newspapers in their framing of the identified variables with conflict-sensitive journalism, framing theory was adopted. There is a considerable debate in scholarly circles about the differences between attribute agenda setting and framing. Some say they are different; others say they are not. The idea that framing and frames are primary means through which people make sense of a complicated world got its modern impetus from two scholars, Gregory Bateson and Erving Goffman (Entman, Matthes and Pellicano, 2009). Framing has been defined as “the way events and issues are organized and made sense of, especially by media, media professionals, and their audiences” (de Vreese, 2001).

Framing is based on the assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by audiences. Framing is often traced back to roots in both psychology and sociology (Pan and Kosicki, 1993). The psychological origin of framing lies in


experimental work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984), for which Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics (Kahneman, 2003).

To frame is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or solution recommendation” (Entman, 1993). However, solution recommendation and problem definition are the core objectives of this study. According to Norris, Kern and Just (2003) the idea of ‘news frames’ refers to interpretive structures that journalists use to set particular events within their broader context, they explain further “News frames bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments. The essence of framing is selection, to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of events”.

Therefore, by virtue of emphasizing some elements of a topic above others, a frame provides a way to understand an event or issue. In this respect, the framing and presentation of events and news in the mass media can thus systematically affect how recipients of news come to understand these events (Price, Tewksbury and Power, 1995). Norris, Kern and Just (2003) point out that the conventional news frame in any society is expected to play a central role in shaping public reactions especially where there is a broad consensus creating a shared ‘one-sided’ interpretation among most leaders and who share a common national culture and identity. Framing theory has a good explanatory power as to how media narratives of issues will influence people’s understanding and opinion on those issues.

In the light of this, the topic under study looks at the press coverage of the insurgency by southern and northern newspapers to see their definition of Boko Haram insurgents in terms of their identity, motive, perceived risks and the solutions to the problem which will shape the psychographic analysis of the audience and how that can have implications on conflict-sensitive journalism. The way how

newspapers frame the identity, motive, solutions, perceived risks will trigger off the conflict or cool it down.






Figure 2 : Schematic Description of Framing Theory

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

Following the conceptualization of research design as a guide which spells out how data relating to a given problem should be collected and analyzed (Osuala, 2001), and in line with the research questions raised in chapter one, this study adopts a combination of in-depth interview and content analysis for determining the coverage of the Boko Haram in selected newspapers and examining its implications for conflict-sensitive journalism. Hence, combining methods help in providing opportunity to develop completeness, depth and breadth, or elaboration in the understanding of the phenomenon (Rossman and Wilson, 1988).

Content analysis is the analysis of what is contained in a message. Broadly, content analysis may be seen as a method where the content of the message forms the basis for drawing inferences and conclusions about the content (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976). Furthermore, content analysis falls in the interface of observation and document analysis. It is defined as a method of observation in the sense that instead of asking people to respond to questions, it “takes the communications that people have produced and asks questions of communications” (Kerlinger, 1973). Therefore, it is also considered as an unobtrusive or non-reactive method of social research.

The reason for the choice of this method is to get relevant data from the newspapers that will answer the research questions raised for the study. It is through the content analysis that the frequencies of war languages and peace indicators can be coded as well as the identity, motive, perceived risks and solutions recommended in the newspapers.

In depth interview was chosen to complement the data gotten from the content analysis, as the qualitative data is more elaborate and interactive. In defining in depth interview, scholars have viewed it as an intensive interview scheduled in advance, takes place in a private setting conducive to trust and candor, and requires careful preparation. (Fontana and Frey 1994; McCracken, 1998, Weiss,1994). In-depth interview uses small sample to get more information, it provides detailed background about the reasons respondents give specific answers. Elaborate data concerning

respondents' opinions, values, motivations, recollections, experiences, and feelings are obtained (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011).

3.2 Content Universe

The universe is made up of all conceivable elements, subjects or observation relating to particular phenomenon of interest to the researcher (Asika, 2009). For the content analysis, all the editions of the years 2013-2014 by *DailyTrust*, *Vanguard*, *Leadership* and *Punch* formed the population of the study. The choice of the Newspapers is based on the data the researcher is set out to examine which has to do with the newspapers' portrayal of the identity, motive and the rest of the variables captured in the research questions.

For the in-depth interview aspect of the study, Nigerian journalists formed the population. The rationale for this population is that the journalists are the ones handling matters regarding how the media particularly newspapers frame issues.

3.3 Sampling Technique

For the in-depth interview, purposive sampling which belongs to non –probability sampling was adopted. Four Journalists from the four newspapers (*Daily Trust*, *Leadership*, *Vanguard* and *Punch*) were sampled because of their closeness to the papers under study and their knowledge of issues relating to the framing of issues on the insurgency by the press, as their responses will add more information to the topic under study.

The four newspapers from the northern and southern part of the country were purposively sampled for the study. The editions of the newspapers were systematically sampled and the nth element is seven editions after skipping six editions, excluding weekend's editions. Systematic sampling belongs to the class of Probability sampling which according to Asika (2009) is a sample selection method in which the sample items or subjects are chosen randomly where every element or item in the population is given equal chance of being included in the sample.

3.4 Sample Size

According to Monette (2008) sample consists of one or more elements selected from a population under study. It is a fraction of the population which is the representative of the entire population. A representative sample accurately reflects the distribution of relevant variables in the target population and the result gotten from the sample can be sufficiently generalized on the population.

Three hundred and twenty eight (328) editions across the newspapers were sampled, 82 from each. For the interview, four Nigerian journalists were sampled. The indicators in table 1, 2 and 3 were covered within the period of two years without sampling because of the primacy given to it by the researcher as the central idea of the work goes to examining the implication the framing of the press has on conflict-sensitive journalism.

Four reporters from each sampled newspaper were selected for their experience and knowledge of the framing by the press on the national issues which Boko Haram is part of.

3.5 Coding Scheme

A coding sheet was designed by the researcher to collect the data for analysis. The coding sheet contained all the variables relevant to the research questions. For the in-depth interview; interview guide was used and the answers were recorded using midget radio.

3.6 Content Categories

Content categories can be defined as compartments or “pigeon holes” with explicitly stated boundaries into which the units of content are coded for analysis. They in fact flow from the research question and should be anchored in a review of relevant literature and related studies. Content categories are constructed in response to the query: What classification would most efficiently yield the data needed to answer the research questions raised? (Berelson,1952). For this

study, the categories are the peace and war indices developed by Galtung, the frames of Boko Haram's identity, motive, perceived risk and recommended solutions.

3.7 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the smallest unit of content that is coded into the content category. The units of analysis vary with the nature of data and the purpose of research. Thus, the unit of analysis might be a single word, a letter, a symbol, a theme (a single assertion about one subject), a news story, a short story, a character, an entire article, or an entire film or a piece of programme. (Wimmer and Dominick, 1994). For this study, articles constitute the units of analysis.

3.8 Inter coder Reliability Test

According to Poindexter and McCombs (2000), Inter-coder Reliability measures the consistency of coders in coding the content. There are many ways of calculating inter-coder reliability. The widely used formula computes a coefficient of reliability by stating the ratio of decisions that coders agreed on to the total number of decisions made by each coder (Holsti, 1969).

$$C.R. = \frac{2M}{N1+N2}$$

Where:

CR = Coefficient of Reliability

M = Number of Coding decisions agreed on

N = Total Number of Coding Decisions made by Each Coder.

Four research assistants were trained by the researcher. After the training session, each coder was independently given 12 daily editions of newspapers, 3 from each of the 4 sampled papers to content analyse. Each coder made a total of 978 codes making a total of 4890 out of which there was agreement on 4270 codes. Inter-coder reliability coefficient is 87.32%, which meets the required standard of acceptance. (Lombard et al, 2002).

3. 9 Method of Data Analysis/Presentation

Simple descriptive statistics was employed to show the frequencies and percentages in the tables of content analysis method.

The data collected through in-depth interview were presented by starting with the *Dailytrust* reporter, *Leadership* reporter, *Vanguard* reporter and the *Punch* reporter. The study adopted standardized open-ended interview format, where the same questions were asked by the researcher to all the reporters.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the data generated, analyses them and interprets for the purpose of answering the research questions raised in the study. The questions were derived from the objectives set for the study. The data were analysed and compiled in tables based on its frequencies and percentages.

Conflict-sensitive journalism emphasises abandoning some words which are war oriented. The terms are categorised into “demonizing languages”, “victimizing languages” and “emotive languages”. Words such as terrorist, extremist, cruel, barbaric, fundamentalist, fanatic, brutal and vicious are categorised as demonizing languages which are often found to support war journalism.

Words such as devastate, destitute, tragedy, pathetic and defenceless are categorised as victimizing languages while words such as massacre, genocide, assassinate and decimate are categorised as emotive languages in conflict reporting. Regardless of the part of speech used in applying the words in reporting conflict, what takes attention is that the words are encouraging war rather than discouraging it.

As part of the objectives of the study which is to examine the consistency of the newspapers’ coverage of Boko Haram with conflict-sensitive journalism. The peace and war indicators are important in determining how consistent the press are to conflict.

Table 1: Use of Demonizing Languages

Language Classification	Indicators	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Demonizing Languages	Terrorist	100	31.15%	1462	41.76%	693	45.99%	204	29.9%
	Extremist	26	8.1%	481	13.74%	177	11.75%	109	16.0%
	Cruel	27	8.4%	172	4.91%	52	3.45%	44	6.5%
	Barbaric	24	7.5%	138	3.94%	67	4.45%	36	5.3%
	Fundamentalist	29	9.0%	203	5.80%	172	11.41%	66	9.7%
	Fanatic	13	4.0%	66	1.89%	65	4.31%	62	9.1%
	Brutal	78	24.3%	387	11.05%	214	14.20%	102	15.0%
	Vicious	24	7.5%	592	16.91%	67	4.45%	59	8.7%
	Total/Percentage	n=321	100.00%	n=3501	100.00%	n=1507	100.00%	n=682	100.00%

The table above reveals the newspapers' portrayal of demonizing languages where Vanguard has 45.99% in using the word terrorist, Leadership followed with 41.76%, followed by Daily Trust with 31.15% and the last was Punch with 29.9%. In using the word extremist, Punch has 16.0%, followed by Leadership with 13.74%, followed by Vanguard with 11.75% and the last was Daily Trust with 8.1%. In using the word cruel, Daily Trust has 8.4%, followed by Punch with 6.5%, followed by Leadership with 4.91% and the last was Vanguard with 3.45%. In using the word barbaric, Daily Trust

has 7.5%, followed by Punch with 5.3%, followed by Vanguard with 4.45% and the last was Leadership with 3.94%.

In using the word fundamentalist, Vanguard has 11.41%, followed by Punch with 9.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 9.0% and the last was Leadership with 5.80%. In using the word fanatic, Punch has 9.1%, followed by Vanguard with 4.31%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.0% and the last was Leadership with 1.89%. In using the word brutal, Daily Trust has 24.3%, followed by Punch with 15.0%, followed by Vanguard with 14.20% and the last was Leadership with 11.05%. In using the word vicious, Leadership has 16.91%, followed by Punch with 8.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.5% and the last was Vanguard with 4.45%.

Going by the total frequency of demonizing languages in the sampled newspapers, Leadership has 3501, followed by Vanguard with 1507, followed by Punch with 682 and the last was Daily Trust with 321 and this can be attributed to their expertise in reporting conflict related issues.

However, a very serious issue raised in the analysis of the results is the fact that most professionals in the newspaper houses are not vast in knowing the concept of conflict-sensitive journalism, as such, making it difficult to adhere to the diction of peace journalism languages. The percentages that appeared in the framing of reports on Boko Haram insurgency show that the use of demonizing languages in the sampled newspapers is high, thereby encouraging the ongoing war between the insurgents and the government.

Table 2: Use of Victimizing Language

Language Classification	Indicators	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
	Devastate	26	16.7%	15	1.9%	169	43.7%	8	4.7%

Victimizing Languages	Destitute	14	9.0%	28	3.6%	10	2.6%	3	1.7%
	Tragedy	58	37.2%	400	51.2%	141	36.4%	115	66.9%
	Pathetic	51	32.7%	111	14.2%	52	13.4%	43	25.0%
	Defenceless	7	4.5%	227	29.1%	15	3.9%	3	1.7%
	Total/Percentage	n=156	100.0%	n=781	100.0%	n=387	100.0%	n=172	100.0%

By victimizing languages, in using the word ‘devastate’, Vanguard has 43.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 16.7%, followed by Punch with 4.7% and the last was Leadership with 1.9%. In using the word destitute, Daily Trust has 9.0%, followed by Leadership with 3.6%, followed by Vanguard with 2.6% and the last was Punch with 1.7%. In using the word tragedy, Punch has 66.9%, followed by Leadership with 51.2%, followed by Daily Trust with 37.2% and the last was Vanguard with 36.4%. In using the word pathetic, Daily Trust has 32.7%, followed by Punch with 25.0%, followed by Leadership with 14.2% and the last was Vanguard with 13.4%. In using the word defenceless, Leadership has 29.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.5%, followed by Vanguard with 3.9% and the last was Punch with 17%. As portrayed by the percentages, the use of victimizing languages are not too high compared to demonizing languages, though it still encourages war, but with lesser impact.

Going by the total frequency of victimizing languages, Leadership has 781, followed by Vanguard with 387, followed by Punch with 172 and the last was Daily Trust with 156 and this was determined by the individual newspapers reportage of conflict-sensitive journalism based on their expertise and the importance it attaches to peace journalism.

Table 3: Use of Emotive Language

Language Classification	Indicators	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Emotive Languages	Massacre	54	44.6%	1504	55.1%	197	22.3%	166	57.6%
	Genocide	32	26.4%	1112	40.8%	104	11.8%	95	33.0%
	Assassinate	21	17.4%	96	3.5%	546	61.9%	12	4.2%
	Decimate	14	11.6%	16	0.6%	35	4.0%	15	5.2%
	Total/percentage	n=121	100.0%	n=2728	100.0%	n=882	100.0%	n=288	100.0%

By emotive languages, in using the word massacre, Punch has 57.6%, followed by Leadership with 55.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 44.6% and the last was Vanguard with 22.3%. In using the word genocide, Leadership has 40.8%, followed by Punch with 33.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 26.4% and the last was Vanguard with 11.8%. In using the word 'assassinate', Vanguard has 61.9%, followed by Daily Trust with 17.4%, followed by Punch with 4.2% and the last was Leadership with 3.5%. In using the word 'decimate', Daily Trust has 11.6%, followed by Punch with 5.2%, followed by Vanguard with 4.0% and the last was Leadership with 0.6%. However, the fact in the analysis is showing that most newspapers are making the readers emotive and as such encouraging the war instead of discouraging it.

Going by the total frequency of emotive languages, Leadership has n=2728, followed by Vanguard with n=882, followed by Punch with n=288 and the last was Daily Trust with n=121. However, in all the languages that encourage war which include demonizing, victimizing and emotive languages, Daily Trust has the lesser usage of those languages in comparison to other newspapers, followed by Punch, followed by Vanguard and the one with more frequencies of those languages was Leadership. The analysis shows that some newspapers have expertise in controlling the rise of war taking into consideration the use of their languages more than others.

Table 4: Approaches that are inconsistent with Conflict-sensitive journalism

	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Reactive	43	14.4%	45	14.4%	50	15.5%	42	13.8%
Visible effect of war	76	25.4%	69	22.1%	79	24.5%	70	23.0%
Elite-oriented	40	13.4%	44	14.1%	49	15.2%	42	13.8%
Zero-sum oriented	25	8.4%	30	9.6%	24	7.4%	29	9.5%
Two-party oriented	23	7.7%	26	8.3%	19	5.9%	22	7.2%
Differences oriented	24	8.0%	22	7.1%	23	7.1%	26	8.5%
Partisan	68	22.7%	76	24.4%	79	24.5%	74	24.3%
Total/Percentage	299	100.0%	312	100.0%	323	100.0%	305	100.0%

In the distributions of the war indices, Vanguard has 15.5%, followed by Leadership and Daily Trust with 14.4 % and the last was Punch with 13.8% in being reactive to Boko Haram insurgency report. For visible effect of war, Daily Trust has 25.4%, followed by Vanguard with 24.5%, followed by Punch with 23.0% and the last was Leadership with 22.1%. For elite-oriented, Vanguard has 15.2%, followed by Leadership with 14.1%, followed by Punch with 13.8% and the last was Daily Trust with 13.4%. For zero-sum oriented, Leadership has 9.6%, followed by Punch with 9.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.4% and the last was Vanguard with 7.4%. For two-party oriented, Leadership has 8.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.7%, followed by Punch with 7.2% and the last was Vanguard with 5.9%. For differences-oriented, Punch has 8.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.0% and the last were Leadership and Vanguard with 7.1%. For partisan, Vanguard has 24.5%, followed by Leadership with 24.4%, followed by Punch with 24.3% and the last was Daily Trust with 22.7%.

Going by the total frequency of indicators of war journalism, Vanguard has n=323, followed by Leadership with n=312, followed by Punch with n=305 and the last was Daily Trust with n=299. By the overall frequencies, the total of war indicators is 1239.

However, the analysis shows that some newspapers are using war journalism excessively in their report without knowing its implications on Nigerians and the world. With the outrage in the percentages and the frequencies visible in the war journalism which by far outnumber the peace journalism, the frames have a lot of implications on conflict-sensitive journalism as it will further escalate the ongoing war between the insurgents and the government.

Table 5: Approaches that are Consistent with Conflict-sensitive journalism

	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Proactive	15	12.0%	17	15.0%	14	12.0%	13	11.3%
Invisible effect of war	6	4.8%	3	2.7%	4	3.4%	7	6.1%
People oriented	18	14.4%	20	17.7%	22	8.8%	19	16.5%
Agreemen	21	16.8%	15	13.3%	19	16.2%	17	14.8%

t oriented								
Win-win oriented	23	18.4%	25	22.1%	20	17.1%	19	16.5%
Multi-party oriented	31	24.8%	24	21.2%	25	21.4%	28	24.3%
Non partisan	11	8.8%	9	8.0%	13	11.1%	12	10.4%
Total/Percentage	125	100.0%	113	100.0%	117	100.0%	115	100.0%

The above table was also developed to answer research question1, which asks how the reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency by the Nigerian newspapers is consistent with conflict-sensitive journalism?

The coding for this category was based on the sampled editions per newspaper. Frames of war and peace journalism were identified using the classification of war and peace journalism by Galtung (1998). As shown by the indicators of peace, Leadership has 15.0%, followed by Daily Trust and Vanguard with 12.0% and the last was Punch with 11.3% in being proactive. For invisible effect of war, Punch has 6.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.8%, followed by Vanguard with 3.4% and the last was Leadership with 2.7%. For People oriented, Leadership has 17.7%, followed by Punch with 16.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 14.4% and the last was Vanguard with 8.8%. For agreement oriented, Daily Trust has 16.8%, followed by Vanguard with 16.2%, followed by Punch with 14.8% and the last was Leadership with 13.3%. For win-win oriented, Leadership has 22.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 18.4%, followed by Vanguard with 17.1% and the last was Punch with 16.5%. For multi-party oriented, Daily Trust has 24.8%, followed by Punch with 24.3%, followed by Vanguard with 21.4% and the last was Leadership with 21.2%. For non-partisan, Vanguard has 11.1%, followed by Punch with 10.4%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.8% and the last was Leadership with 8.0%.

Going by the total frequency of Peace journalism indicators, Daily Trust has n=125, followed by Vanguard with n=117, followed by Punch with n=115 and the last was Leadership with n=113. However, the analysis shows that some of the Nigerian newspapers were more conflict-sensitive than others either because of their expertise in conflict-sensitive journalism or negligence to the area by others. By the overall frequencies, the total of peace indicators is 470.




Figure 3: Frequencies of Peace and War Journalism

The above chart indicates the total appearance of peace and war approaches in the press coverage of Boko Haram. War indices become more prevalent in all the sampled newspapers than peace indices. While war frames got the total frequencies of 1239, peace frames got only 470 in all the four sampled newspapers. The chart shows that most Nigerian newspapers are deficient in making frames that are peace-driven.

Table 6: Portrayal of the Identity of Boko Haram

Religious Background		Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
	Muslim	46	43.8%	39	43.3%	72	71.3%	63	70.0%
	Christian	8	7.6%	10	11.1%	3	3.0%	5	5.6%
	Others	51	48.6%	41	45.6%	26	25.7%	22	24.4%
	Total	105	100.0%	90	100.0%	101	100.0%	90	100.0%

Economic Status	Rich	42	42.9%	45	41.3%	37	38.9%	47	48.5%
	Poor	56	57.1%	64	58.7%	58	61.1%	50	51.5%
	Total	98	100.0%	109	100.0%	95	100.0%	97	100.0%
	Yoruba	4	5.2%	3	4.5%	2	3.1%	3	4.1%
	Hausa	18	23.4%	14	20.9%	25	38.5%	27	36.5%
	Igbo	7	9.1%	6	9.0%	3	4.6%	4	5.4%
	Others	48	62.3%	44	65.7%	35	53.8%	40	54.1%
	Total	77	100.0%	67	100.0%	65	100.0%	74	100.0%
Tribal Origin	Ruling party	43	35.2%	59	41.5%	58	41.1%	54	35.5%
	Opposition Party	47	38.5%	48	33.8%	52	36.9%	61	40.1%
	Others	32	26.2%	35	24.6%	31	22.0%	37	24.3%
	Total	122	100.0%	142	100.0%	141	100.0%	152	100.0%
	Educated	18	24.3%	21	26.3%	15	19.7%	11	18.3%
Political status	Not Educated	56	75.7%	59	73.8%	61	80.3%	49	81.7%
	Total	74	100%	80	100.0%	76	100.0%	60	100.0%

Acquisition of Western Education									
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From the table above, in identifying Boko Haram members as Muslim, Vanguard has 71.3%, followed by Punch with 70.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 43.8% and the last was Leadership with 43.3%. In identifying Boko Haram as Christian, Leadership has 11.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.6%, followed by Punch with 5.6% and the last was Vanguard with 3.0%. In identifying Boko Haram as others, Daily Trust has 48.6%, followed by Leadership with 45.6%, followed by Vanguard with 25.7% and the last was Punch with 24.4%.

However, from the analysis, the dominating religions in Nigeria i.e Islam and Christianity are disassociating themselves with Boko Haram, though; the words of the insurgents which portray them as Muslims attracts arguments, because most Muslims deny Boko Haram members to Islam as most of their tenets go contrary to Quran, thereby putting their struggle in either political landscape or a fresh doctrine which is independent of the existing religions of Nigeria. Some have accusations on foreign religions especially Jews as they do it to tarnish the image of Islam.

In identifying Boko Haram by their economic status, Punch has 48.5% in portraying them as rich, followed by Daily Trust with 42.9%, followed by Leadership with 41.3% and the last was Vanguard with 38.9%. In portraying them as poor, Vanguard has 61.1%, followed by Leadership with 58.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 57.1% and the last was Punch with 51.5%. However, the analysis shows that the insurgents are poor but sponsored by some elites for either political gain or otherwise.

In identifying Boko Haram by tribal origin, Daily Trust has 5.2% in portraying them as Yoruba, followed by Leadership with 4.5%, followed by Punch with 4.1% and the last was Vanguard with 3.1%. In portraying them as Hausa, Vanguard has 38.5%, followed by Punch with 36.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 23.4% and the last was Leadership 20.9%. In portraying them as Igbo, Daily Trust has 9.1%, followed by Leadership with 9.0%, followed by Punch with 5.4% and the last was Vanguard with 4.6%. In portraying them as others like minor tribes in Nigeria and the foreign tribes, Leadership has 65.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 62.3%, followed by Punch with 54.1% and the last was Vanguard with 53.8%. However, the analysis shows that the insurgents are foreigners from western countries as received the highest percentage, and then Hausa followed, because the insurgency in the country is restricted to the northern part of Nigeria, to some it is hard for stranger to go there and unleash terror on the residents of those areas who are mostly Hausa.

In identifying Boko Haram by political status, Leadership has 41.5% in portraying them as ruling party, followed by Vanguard with 41.1%, followed by Punch with 35.5% and the last was Daily Trust with 35.2%. In portraying them as opposition party, Punch has 40.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 38.5%, followed by Vanguard with 36.9% and the last was Leadership with 33.8%. In portraying them as others, Daily Trust has 26.2%, followed by Leadership with 24.6%, followed by Punch with 24.3% and the last was Vanguard with 22.0%.

However, from the analysis, the ruling party is seen as not fighting the insurgents by their negligence to the conflict, it is alleged that they refused to avail the security with the required weapons to outfight the insurgents, while the ruling class accuses the opposition party of igniting the bombings in order to tarnish the image of the ruling party and to infuse hatred in the minds of the citizens.

In identifying Boko Haram by the acquisition of western education, Leadership has 26.3% in portraying them as educated, followed by Daily Trust with 24.3%, followed by Vanguard with 19.7% and the last was Punch with 18.3%. In portraying them as not educated, Punch has 81.7%, followed

by Vanguard with 80.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 75.7% and the last was Leadership with 73.8%. However, from the analysis, the insurgents are portrayed as uneducated because there is a belief that Boko Haram are paid for the killings they do by the sponsors and this is occasioned by the poor state of economy in the country. The poverty of the parents forced their inability to enroll children in school.

Table 7: Portrayal of the motive of Boko Haram

	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Impose Religious Belief	41	28.3%	39	30.0%	46	30.5%	37	26.4%
Poverty Redress	15	10.3%	16	12.3%	13	8.6%	17	12.1%
Ban Western Education	47	32.4%	41	31.5%	51	33.8%	49	35.0%
Politics	35	24.1%	27	20.8%	32	21.2%	30	21.4%
Military Coup Strategy	5	3.4%	3	2.3%	6	4.0%	2	1.4%
Others	2	1.4%	4	3.1%	3	2.0%	5	3.6%
Total	n=145	n=100.0%	n=130	100.0%	n=151	100.0%	n=140	100.0%

The table above shows the distribution of the motive of Boko Haram insurgents. On the imposition of religious belief, Vanguard has 30.5%, followed by Leadership with 30.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 28.3% and the last was Punch with 26.4%. On the poverty redress, Leadership has 12.3%, followed by Punch with 12.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 10.3% and the last was Vanguard with 8.6%. In banning western education, Punch has 35.0%, followed by Vanguard with 33.8%, followed by Daily Trust with 32.4% and the last was Leadership with 31.5%.

In political motive, Daily Trust has 24.1%, followed by Punch with 21.4%, followed by Vanguard with 21.2% and the last was leadership with 20.8%. In strategizing coup d'état, Vanguard has 4.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 3.4%, followed by Leadership with 2.3% and the last was Punch with 1.4%. In having the motive as others which include: juju and revenge against the north by Igbo over the past civil war (Biafra), Punch has 3.6%, followed by Leadership with 3.1%, followed by Vanguard with 2.0% and the last was Daily Trust with 1.4%.

However, from the analysis, the popular motive which is the banning of western education indeed tallied with the name ascribed to the movement which is Boko Haram by the media by their attacks on western education schools. The name means western education is prohibited, though it has implication on conflict-sensitive journalism as they are not called as they call themselves that is Jamaatu Ahlussnna Liddaawatu Waljihad.

Banning western education has received the highest percentage where it portrays the goal of the insurgents as having the western education replaced with Qur'anic education. Politics and military coup strategy as part of the motives of Boko Haram can make the group angry and intensify their attacks on all the newspaper houses and Nigerians for their feeling of being misrepresented.

Table 8: Areas of Risks Emphasis in Newspapers' Coverage of Boko Haram

		Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Perceived Risks	Threat to Foreign Relations	75	20.8%	66	19.2%	77	22.0%	59	18.5%
	Threat to Economic Stability	73	20.2%	70	20.4%	69	19.7%	67	21.0%
	Threat to Religious Co-existence	58	16.1%	55	16.0%	52	14.9%	54	16.9%
	Threat to Political Stability	74	20.5%	76	22.2%	72	20.6%	69	21.6%
	Threat to Cultural	69	19.1%	62	18.1%	59	16.9%	55	17.2%

	Diversity								
	Others	12	3.3%	14	4.1%	21	6.0%	15	4.7%
	Total/Percentage	361	100.0%	343	100.0%	350	100.0%	319	100.0%

The table above shows the distribution of the perceived risks of Boko Haram insurgency. In being threat to foreign relations, Vanguard has 22.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 20.8%, followed by Leadership with 19.2% and the last was Punch with 18.5%. In being threat to economic stability, Punch has 21.0%, followed by Leadership with 20.4%, followed by Daily Trust with 20.25 and the last was Vanguard with 19.7%. In being threat to religious co-existence, Punch has 16.9%, followed by Daily Trust with 16.1%, followed by Leadership with 16.0% and the last was Vanguard with 14.9%. In being threat to political stability, Leadership has 22.2%, followed by Punch with 21.6%, followed by Vanguard with 20.6% and the last was Daily Trust with 20.5%. In being threat to cultural diversity, Daily Trust has 19.1%, followed by Leadership with 18.1%, followed by Punch with 17.2% and the last was Vanguard with 16.9%. In identifying other threats like migration and emigration, Vanguard has 6.0%, followed by Punch with 4.7%, followed by Leadership with 4.1% and the last was Daily Trust with 3.3%.

However, from the analysis, the threats which attract a lot of attention are foreign relations and economic stability. The belief that the foreign nationals will find it difficult to invest in the country where their property and lives are not saved is there, and that will make the country face economic defect which can easily make the country collapses. All the threats pointed out have impact on national stability especially the economic threat which will plunge the country into chaos.

Table 9: Solutions Offered by the Newspapers

Main Category	Sub categories	Daily Trust		Leadership		Vanguard		Punch	
Predominant Solution Recommendations	Amnesty	57	12.8%	49	10.9%	55	12.4%	58	12.5%
	Fight	78	17.5%	82	18.3%	77	17.3%	84	18.1%
	Negotiation	81	18.2%	76	17.0%	74	16.6%	49	10.5%
	Resignation of President	31	7.0%	38	8.5%	29	6.5%	40	8.6%
	State of Emergency	25	5.6%	35	7.8%	37	8.3%	34	7.3%
	Poverty Eradication	40	9.0%	39	8.7%	40	9.0%	46	9.9%
	Educating the People	47	10.5%	32	7.1%	26	5.8%	30	6.5%
	Preaching Tolerance	36	8.1%	32	7.1%	27	6.1%	48	10.3%
	Military Coup	8	1.8%	6	1.3%	9	2.0%	7	1.5%
	Foreign Intervention	19	4.3%	32	7.1%	40	9.0%	41	8.8%
	Others	24	5.4%	27	6.0%	31	7.0%	28	6.0%
	Total/Percentage	n=446	100.0%	n=448	100.0%	n=445	100.0%	n=465	100.0%

The above table shows the distribution of the predominant solutions offered by the sampled newspapers. In recommending amnesty for the Boko Haram, Daily Trust has 12.8%, followed by

Punch with 12.5%, followed by Vanguard with 12.4% and the last was Leadership with 10.9%. In recommending fight, Leadership has 18.3%, followed by Punch with 18.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 17.5% and the last was Vanguard with 17.3%. In recommending negotiation, Daily Trust has 18.2%, followed by Leadership with 17.0%, followed by Vanguard with 16.6% and the last was Punch with 10.5%.

In recommending resignation of the president, Punch has 8.6%, followed by Leadership with 8.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.0% and the last was Vanguard with 6.5%. In recommending state of emergency, Vanguard has 8.3%, followed by Leadership with 7.8%, followed by Punch with 7.3% and the last was Daily Trust with 5.6%. In recommending poverty eradication, Punch has 9.9%, followed by Daily Trust and Vanguard with 9.0% and the last was Leadership with 8.7%. In recommending educating the people, Daily Trust has 10.5%, followed by Leadership with 7.1%, followed by Punch with 6.5% and the last was Vanguard with 5.8%. In recommending preaching tolerance, Punch has 10.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.1%, followed by leadership with 7.1% and the last was Vanguard with 6.1%.

In recommending military coup, Vanguard has 2.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 1.8%, followed by Punch with 1.5% and the last was Leadership with 1.3%. In recommending foreign intervention, Vanguard has 9.0%, followed by Punch with 8.8%, followed by Leadership with 7.1% and the last was Daily Trust with 4.3%. In recommending others like dividing the country into the north and south with independent leadership and voting out the incumbent president or impeaching him, Vanguard has 7.0%, followed by Leadership and Punch with 6.0% and the last was Daily Trust with 5.4%.

However, from the analysis, the popular recommendation to treating the problem of the insurgency is fight, which means the government in power is needed to supply sophisticated weapons that can help the security to outfight Boko Haram insurgents. Though, negotiation has a reasonable percentage but, the argument is that since the Boko Haram insurgents are not ready for the

negotiations by paying lip service to some that were tried and their invisibility will make it difficult to attain any negotiation.

4.2 Interview with the Reporters

In the interview with the reporters, on asking how familiar are reporters with the conflict-sensitive journalism? Daily Trust reporter says: “Well, conflict-sensitive journalism, though a new concept but am a little bit familiar with it”. His answer indicates that he adopts conflict-sensitive journalism where he has the knowledge of its application. This means there are limitations to where he uses the frames. According to Leadership reporter “Alright, I cannot claim very high familiarity with it. But, I can say that I have little to say about it”. In the words of Vanguard reporter “Ok I am in the picture of what conflict-sensitive journalism is all about”. While the Punch reporter says: Yes, it sounds familiar, but not very deep. This shows that all the reporters in the four national dailies have the knowledge of the conflict-sensitive journalism, only that the depth of their knowledge about it is shallow.

On asking whether the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why? Daily Trust reporter says: “Definitely is important because it limits the excessive use of languages that can trigger violence”. In the words of Leadership reporter “yes it is important because it will help in curtailing the ongoing crisis in Nigeria”. According to the Vanguard reporter “Of course, it is important in helping the stability of the country”. While the Punch reporter says: “Very, very important in a number of ways”. With all these answers given by the reporters show that conflict-sensitive journalism is very important in reporting conflicts with a tilt to peace initiatives.

On asking about the ways its adoption in their report of conflicts helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? Daily Trust reporter says: “Though the issue of objectivity sometimes challenges the excessive use of the conflict-sensitive journalism, as some are of the view that it gives room for subjectivity by trying to skew what you exactly have as a report.

Notwithstanding this big challenge, I think it is helpful in mitigating the insurgency by trying to be proactive about the implications of violence, allowing people to suggest ways out, reporting the happenings in a way it will not fuel the insurgency”.

However, by this we can understand the negligence in some newspapers for not applying conflict-sensitive journalism, thinking that it may tamper with the objectivity of their report. In the words of Leadership reporter “I can say in three ways: 1.in reducing the intensity of the insurgency, 2. in giving chances of the contributions from the public, 3. in helping the government to make persistent attempt to get rid of the insurgency for the benefit of the citizenry through a wide consultations”. According to the Vanguard reporter, says: “Yes by listening to the contributions of the people on the insurgency, government can use the input in their plans against the insurgency”. While the Punch reporter says: “It helps, because of the choice of words in the report which are not conflict-motivating and the styles adopt in hearing from multifaceted views on the insurgency”. With these answers we can understand that conflict-sensitive journalism is helpful in solving some of the problems attached to the insurgency.

On asking about the identity of the Boko Haram insurgents, Daily Trust reporter says: “Well, most of the views revolve around the ruling party as the opposition accuses them of allowing the insurgency wilfully to continue because of their political gain, while those in the ruling party are accusing the opposition party on the sponsorship of the ongoing insurgency with the aim of soiling the image of the government so as to create hatred in the minds of the electorates”. In the words of Leadership reporter “No, one can hardly say this is Boko Haram specifically because their identification is still vague, but going by the popular opinion they are Islamic sect”. According to the Vanguard reporter “They are poor people in the north who were entrapped in the cage of poverty, as such taking revenge in killing people to frustrate the government that cannot deliver well to them”. While the Punch reporter says: “They are Islamic sect just like ISIS and Alqaida”.

However, from the analysis, the identity of the Boko Haram insurgents takes number of dimensions, to some the ruling party is contented with the situation by not showing prompt action, to others, is the opposition party that ignites it, some are saying is Islamic sect while others are saying it is the result of the poverty in the north,

On asking based on the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do the journalists think is the motive of this cause? Daily Trust reporter says "Well, the most prominent aim is to topple the non- Muslim government and establish a sharia state that will use Quran as the constitution, the second aim is to scrape western education schools founded by non-Muslims". In the words of the Leadership reporter "Well, the aim is unequivocal, because they made it known that they have their constitution which is Quran and the style of governance and that anybody participating in it (democracy) is infidel". According to the Vanguard reporter says: "In my understanding, the aim is to make the life of the ruling class miserable". While the Punch reporter says: "As they said that they would not allow democracy to continue as it contravenes the teachings of Islam, I think going by their word is the real aim".

From the analysis, the motive of the Boko Haram is multi-dimensional, but the popular among is the establishment of the Islamic state that can be guided by the Quran, this culminates the hatred they have for the western education as its founders in Nigeria were Christian missionaries. Democracy is not an exception; to them participating in it rendered one as unbeliever.

On asking on the Fears that have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, in their own view, what do they think are the threats? According to Daily Trust reporter says: "So far what I am seeing as the threats regarding Boko Haram is numerous: one it can spoil the relationship between Nigeria and other countries, it can boost the rate at which Nigerians are suffering from abject poverty and many others". According to Leadership reporter says: "The threats can come in so many ways depending on the knowledge of the indices one can use to say that this is a threat from a specific perspective. To me as a journalist I can say it is a threat to our

objective coverage of report since the insurgents can threaten you, if your report goes contrary to their argument". In the words of Vanguard reporter "It will affect our multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationship and that will definitely affect the economy and tourism of the people". While the Punch reporter says: "So the threats are many but the most frightening one is the economy that is at risk.

However, from the analysis, the threats are many but the most disturbing is the economy, without which nothing can go well in the country. The fears reporters have for the insurgents have implication on the objective reportage. Insurgents have warned them to take caution when reporting their related issues otherwise faces attacks.

On asking on the fact that most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would they recommend as the solutions to the problem? In the words of Daily Trust Reporter "I think is the duty of the ruling class to provide Nigerian army with the sufficient weapons to defeat Boko Haram". According to Leadership reporter says: "I think the solution is to get the matter addressed, may be by calling the Insurgents and hear from them on their wishes, if they are servable then the government should compromise". The Vanguard reporter says: "I think the solution is for the government to do justice to the people by providing them all they deserve in terms of education, social amenities and other related needs". While the Punch reporter says ": I think the solution is for the populace to join hands with the government to see the end of Boko Haram".

However, from the analysis, the solutions to the Boko Haram insurgents are many, but the most recommended is the possession of weaponry to fight the insurgents if the negotiation cannot get ground and other verbal approaches to achieving peaceful nation.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

The discussion of findings in the study is presented through the research questions raised in chapter one of the study.

RQ 1: How is the reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency by the Nigerian newspapers consistent with conflict-sensitive journalism?

In answering research question 1, the researcher used the data from the table 1, 2 3, 4 and 5, in-depth interview and some works that were reviewed as well as the theory chosen to support the study logically. Drawing on existing literature, El-Nawawy and Powers (2008) cited in Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) developed 11-point typology of media that best perform conciliatory function, among the typology are: avoiding the use of victimizing terms such as martyr or pathetic, unless they are attributed to a reliable source; avoiding the use of demonizing labels such as terrorist or extremist, unless they are attributed to a reliable source as well as emotive languages.

From table 1, it was observed that Leadership has the highest reportage of demonizing languages with 3501 and this shows that their staff are not conflict sensitive when compared with the Vanguard with 1507, another factor why Vanguard became second can also be resulted from its location ie Lagos where the activities of the Boko Haram are rare, thereby making it reluctant in designing strategies to bring the insurgency to an end. Punch became the third with the frequency of demonizing languages with 682 and this can be related also to lack of knowledge of the conflict-sensitive journalism or reluctance because of less impact the insurgency has on the area it is located. Daily Trust has less frequency with 321, this can be resulted from their expertise on conflict-sensitive journalism and the location ie Abuja where they operate as most of the immediate community is vulnerable to the activities of Boko Haram.

By the percentages of the newspapers portrayal of demonizing languages, Vanguard has 45.99% in using the word terrorist, Leadership followed with 41.76%, followed by Daily Trust with 31.15% and the last with low percentage was Punch with 29.9%. Knowing that the media has a role of framing issues in their report, scholars have been cautioning them on the way issues should be reported and interpreted to the consumption of the public. As a result, in her study of the CBS coverage of 1979 - 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, Palmerton (1988) cited in Slocum,(2005; 135), put forward a premise that “the meaning of terrorism is shaped in large part by the major vehicle we used to gain our primary information about events occurring outside our immediate circle of experience: the news media” therefore hinting that the peoples’ definition of terrorism is largely dependent on media narrations. However, it is the report of the media that can make or mar the positive thinking of the people.

In using the word extremist, Punch has 16.0%, followed by Leadership with 13.74, followed by Vanguard with 11.75% and the last was Daily Trust with 8.1%. In using the word cruel, Daily Trust has 8.4%, followed by Punch with 6.5%, followed by Leadership with 4.91% and the last was Vanguard with 3.45%. In using the word barbaric, Daily Trust has 7.5%, followed by Punch with 5.3%, followed by Vanguard with 4.45% and the last was Leadership with 3.94.

The need to take into consideration the choice of peace related languages become important by the press as they are the people setting agenda for the audience which covers both the insurgents and the victims as said in the theoretical review that *Agenda setting* owes its original insight to Lippmann (1922), who discussed how media message influence the “pictures in our heads”. Although he did not specifically use the term, Bernard Cohen (1963) is generally credited with refining Lippmann’s ideas into the theory of *agenda-setting*. “The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion,” he wrote. “It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal

interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read” (Baran and Davis, 2010). However, the use of demonizing language has implication on conflict-sensitive journalism in making the insurgents feel mislabeled and blackmailed; as such, continue with the fight.

In using the word fundamentalist, Vanguard has 11.41%, followed by Punch with 9.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 9.0% and the last was Leadership with 5.80%. In using the word fanatic, Punch has 9.1%, followed by Vanguard with 4.31%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.0% and the last was Leadership with 1.89%. In using the word brutal, Daily Trust has 24.3%, followed by Punch with 15.0%, followed by Vanguard with 14.20% and the last was Leadership with 11.05%. Scholars emphasize the impact of framing on the audience which makes avoiding some languages necessary.

According to Norris, Kern and Just (2003) the idea of ‘news frames’ refers to interpretive structures that journalists use to set particular events within their broader context, they explain further “News frames bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments. The essence of *framing* is selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of events”

In using the word vicious, Leadership has 16.91%, followed by Punch with 8.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.5% and the last was Vanguard with 4.45%. In the literature reviewed, Hermann and Hermann (1998) says: media in reporting insurgency, not only dispatch information but, like good drama critics, interpret it as well. They skew what they give by deciding which events to report and which to ignore, intentionally or unintentionally expressing approval or disapproval to create an atmosphere of public support, apathy, or irritation”. In this manner, as long as insurgents are primarily interested in how the audience; the national and foreign publics; and decision-makers in a government reacts to their acts, insurgents’ aims can never be achieved without the media.

In using the word 'devastate', Vanguard has 43.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 16.7%, followed by Punch with 4.7% and the last was Leadership with 1.9%. In using the word destitute, Daily Trust has 9.0%, followed by Leadership with 3.6%, followed by Vanguard with 2.6% and the last was Punch with 1.7%. In using the word tragedy, Punch has 66.9%, followed by Leadership with 51.2%, followed by Daily Trust with 37.2% and the last was Vanguard with 36.4%. In using the word pathetic, Daily Trust has 32.7%, followed by Punch with 25.0%, followed by Leadership with 14.2% and the last was Vanguard with 13.4%. In using the word defenceless, Leadership has 29.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.5%, followed by Vanguard with 3.9% and the last was Punch with 17%.

In the literature reviewed, emphasis has been made on the power of the media in instigating or suppressing any violence. According to Ozohu-Suleiman, (2013:17) "accelerating or impeding security, and shaping or refining opinions are similar ways of acknowledging that the mass media can serve as a powerful tool for inflaming disagreement and diffusing conflicts or facilitating peace".

In using the word massacre, Punch has 57.6%, followed by Leadership with 55.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 44.6% and the last was Vanguard with 22.3%. In using the word genocide, Leadership has 40.8%, followed by Punch with 33.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 26.4% and the last was Vanguard with 11.8%. In using the word 'assassinate', Vanguard has 61.9%, followed by 17.4%, followed by Punch with 4.2% and the last was Leadership with 3.5%. In using the word 'decimate', Daily Trust has 11.6%, followed by Punch with 5.2%, followed by Vanguard with 4.0% and the last was Leadership with 0.6%. Avoiding the emotional languages used by the media, presupposes peace journalism and According to Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, quoted in McGoldrick, 2006, 4), "peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them".

However, with the prevalence of demonizing, victimizing and the emotive languages and their percentages, it can be observed that the Nigerian newspapers are poorly adopting peace journalism in their report and this will have implication on conflict-sensitive journalism as the insurgents and

the government will continue the fight. Conflict-sensitive journalism advises abandoning any form of fight which the media is now championing.

In table 4 and 5, frames of war and peace journalism were identified using the classification of war and peace journalism by Galtung (1998). As shown by the indicators of peace, Leadership has 15.0%, followed by Daily Trust and Vanguard with 12.0% and the last was Punch with 11.3% in being proactive. For invisible effect of war, Punch has 6.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 4.8%, followed by Vanguard with 3.4% and the last was Leadership with 2.7%. For People oriented, Leadership has 17.7%, followed by Punch with 16.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 14.4% and the last was Vanguard with 8.8%. Conflict-sensitive journalism otherwise known as peace journalism which combines journalism with peace as an external aim understands itself as "a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards war and peace" (Shinar, 2007, 2).

For agreement oriented, Daily Trust has 16.8%, followed by Vanguard with 16.2%, followed by Punch with 14.8% and the last was Leadership with 13.3%. For win-win oriented, Leadership has 22.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 18.4%, followed by Vanguard with 17.1% and the last was Punch with 16.5%. For multi-party oriented, Daily Trust has 24.8%, followed by Punch with 24.3%, followed by Vanguard with 21.4% and the last was Leadership with 21.2%. For non-partisan, Vanguard has 11.1%, followed by Punch with 10.4%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.8% and the last was Leadership with 8.0%.

Going by the total frequency of Peace journalism indicators, Daily Trust has n=125, followed by Vanguard with n=117, followed by Punch with n=115 and the last was Leadership with n=113. The analysis shows that some newspapers were more conflict sensitive than others. Though, the overall frequencies of peace indicators are discouraging here, because they are not well adopted by the newspapers thereby having implication on conflict-sensitive journalism.

In the distributions of the war indicators, Vanguard has 15.5%, followed by Leadership and Daily Trust with 14.4 % and the last was Punch with 13.8% in being reactive to Boko Haram insurgency report. For visible effect of war, Daily Trust has 25.4%, followed by Vanguard with 24.5%, followed by Punch with 23.0% and the last was Leadership with 22.1%. In the words of Mc Goldrick (2006) “avoid assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effect only. Instead try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects, e.g., the long term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in the future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other country”.

For elite-oriented, Vanguard has 15.2%, followed by Leadership with 14.1%, followed by Punch with 13.8% and the last was Daily Trust with 13.4%. For zero-sum oriented, Leadership has 9.6%, followed by Punch with 9.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.4% and the last was Vanguard with 7.4%. With the arguments on ground on the acceptability of peace journalism, some newspapers may not take it a responsibility to adopt the strategies suggested by conflict-sensitive journalism scholars. Conflict-sensitive journalism arouses concern that peace journalism "could compromise the integrity of journalists and confuse their role as neutral disseminators of facts" (Loyn, 2003). This concern is all the more justified because some supporters of peace journalism seem all too inclined to underrate values like objectivity, neutrality and detachment (e.g., Mc Goldrick, 2006; Peleg, 2007). However, this may be the reason why peace journalism is not widely adopted.

For two-party oriented, Leadership has 8.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.7%, followed by Punch with 7.2% and the last Vanguard with 5.9%. For differences-oriented, Punch has 8.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.0% and the last were Leadership and Vanguard with 7.1%. For partisan, Vanguard has 24.5%, followed by Leadership with 24.4%, followed by Punch with 24.3% and the last was Daily Trust 22.7%. Going by the total frequency of indicators of war journalism, Vanguard has n=323, followed by Leadership with n=312, followed by Punch with 305 and the last was Daily Trust n=299.

The analysis shows that some newspapers adopt the use of war journalism excessively in their report while some try to be conflict sensitive in their report. McGoldrick and Lynch (2000) cited in Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) provided a 17-point practical guide on what a journalist should avoid in order to report conflict in the interest of peace which six of them were captured in this study, among was to avoid portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting one goal. The logical outcome is for one to win and the other to lose. Instead, a peace journalist will disaggregate the two parties into many smaller groups, pursuing many goals, opening up more potential for a range of outcome.

From the results of the interview with the reporters of the sampled newspapers, it was observed that all the reporters have the knowledge of the conflict-sensitive journalism except that its application depends on the vast experience of the reporter, his judgment of peace journalism and his industry on the importance of the concept. As says by the Daily Trust reporter that the concept has challenges when interviewed on the importance of applying it: "Though the issue of objectivity sometimes challenges the excessive use of the conflict-sensitive journalism, as some are of the view that it gives room for subjectivity by trying to skew what you exactly have as a report. Notwithstanding this big challenge, I think it is helpful in mitigating the insurgency by trying to be proactive about the implications of violence, allowing people to suggest ways out, reporting the happenings in a way it will not fuel the insurgency".

RQ 2: How is the identity and motive of Boko Haram insurgents portrayed in the newspapers' reportage?

In answering research question 2, the researcher used the data in table 6 and 7, in-depth interview and some of the works reviewed, in identifying Boko Haram members as Muslim, Vanguard has the highest percentage of 71.3%, followed by Punch with 70.0%, this can be resulted to the location of the Vanguard and Punch i.e Lagos as most of the opinions expressed can be credited to non-residents of the north east where the terror is being unleashed. In the words of Punch reporter on the identity of Boko Haram insurgency says: "They are Islamic sect just like ISIS and Alqaida".

Being north as Muslim dominated states especially north east where the activities of the Boko Haram are prevalent, and by nature of the attacks on churches made some people think that Muslim brothers are the Boko Haram sect. Daily Trust became third with 43.8% and the last was Leadership with 43.3%, this can be resulted to the location of the newspapers i.e Abuja. The belief that some Muslims have not yet surrendered to some western ideologies made the allegations high. As commented by Sanusi (2007) One consequence of the alliance between the British and the emirates was that the integrity of the political and social structures in the north could only be achieved by sealing the region off from Western influences, including from southern Nigeria. In this attempt to insulate the north from modernity, Western education was severely curtailed in order to prevent in the north what Lord Lugard termed the “utter disrespect” for British and natives ideals alike that was beginning to emerge in the south. In the words of Daily Trust reporter: “No, one can hardly say this is Boko Haram specifically because their identification is still vague, but going by the popular opinion they are Islamic sect”.

In seeing Boko Haram as Christians, Leadership has the highest percentage of 11.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.6%, this can be resulted to some allegations that it was a plot to tarnish the image of Islam. The third was Punch with 5.6% and the last was Vanguard with 3.0% as they held most of its allegations as identifying Boko Haram sect as Muslims. In identifying Boko Haram as others like Jews and Buddhists, Daily Trust has 48.6%, followed by Leadership with 45.6%, followed by Vanguard with 25.7% and the last was Punch with 24.4%. This was resulted to the view that it was a plot from abroad to give a bad name to Islam and that has become the popular opinion.

With the ability of the insurgents to own sophisticated weapons, the belief that Boko Haram are rich become famous in all the newspapers but with the belief that the sponsors are not the real actors. Punch has 48.5% in portraying them as rich, followed by Daily Trust with 42.9%, followed by Leadership with 41.3% and the last was Vanguard with 38.9%. The belief that Boko Haram insurgents were poor in the sampled newspapers carried higher percentage compared to being rich believing

that their frustration of the abject poverty led them to participate in the terrorism. In the words of the Vanguard reporter when asked on the identity of Boko Haram insurgency in term of economy says: “They are poor people in the north who were entrapped in the cage of poverty, as such taking revenge in killing people to frustrate the government that cannot deliver well to them”.

In portraying them as poor, Vanguard has 61.1%, followed by Leadership with 58.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 57.1% and the last was Punch with 51.5%. It was observed that during Maitatsine which has commonalities with Boko Haram exploited the declining economic situation and the Almajiri system and was able to magnetize hefty followers amongst the commoners, who were unable to afford the basic necessities of life, became die-hard patriots of the sect and Marwa himself (Danjibo, 2007). Boko Haram has targeted young students of Islam called ‘almajiri’ (a Hausa word for emigrant child; also sometimes referred to as ‘street children (Onuoha, 2012). Boys aged as young as six are traditionally sent away by their parents to travel between various teachers, only to end up living in poverty and appalling conditions, begging in the streets or working as child labourers. According to the Nigerian Ministry of Education, the estimated number of *almajiris* in 2010 was 9.5 million, concentrated primarily in the northern states. Due to their socioeconomic circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable to indoctrination and radicalisation by religious fanaticism (Juliana, 2014).

Most of the articles portrayed the insurgents as Hausa by their tribe and this can be resulted from the dominance of Hausa people in the states that are prone to the attacks by the insurgents. In identifying Boko Haram by tribal origin, Daily Trust has 5.2% in portraying them as Yoruba, followed by Leadership with 4.5%, followed by Punch with 4.1% and the last was Vanguard with 3.1%. In portraying them as Hausa, Vanguard has 38.5%, followed by Punch with 36.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 23.4% and the last was Leadership 20.9%. In portraying them as Igbo, Daily Trust has 9.1%, followed by Leadership with 9.0%, followed by Punch with 5.4% and the last was Vanguard

with 4.6%. In portraying them as others like western countries, Leadership has 65.7%, followed by Daily Trust with 62.3%, followed by Punch with 54.1% and the last was Vanguard with 53.8%.

Boko Haram insurgents are attributed mostly to ruling class in their effort to deviate the attention of the people so that the 2015 election can be easily rigged. While the opposition party is accused of the terrorism in order to soil the image of the ruling party. In identifying Boko Haram by political status, Leadership has 41.5% in portraying them as ruling party, followed by Vanguard with 41.1%, followed by Punch with 35.5% and the last was Daily Trust with 35.2%. In portraying them as opposition party, Punch has 40.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 38.5%, followed by Vanguard with 36.9% and the last was Leadership with 33.8%. In portraying them as others, Daily Trust has 26.2%, followed by Leadership with 24.6%, followed by Punch with 24.3% and the last was Vanguard with 22.0%.: In the words of Daily Trust reporter about the identity of the insurgents says: “Well, most of the views revolve around the ruling party as the opposition accuses them of allowing the insurgency wilfully to continue because of their political gain, while those in the ruling party are accusing the opposition party on the sponsorship of the ongoing insurgency with the aim of soiling the image of the government so as to create hatred in the minds of the electorates”. There is the belief that most of the insurgents are not educated that is why they are ready to demolish western education schools, that is why Leadership has 26.3% in portraying them as educated, followed by Daily Trust with 24.3%, followed by Vanguard with 19.7% and the last was Punch with 18.3%. In portraying them as not educated, Punch has 81.7%, followed by Vanguard with 80.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 75.7% and the last was Leadership with 73.8.

Regarding the motive of the Boko Haram insurgents, there are arguments that they are set up to ban western education as their name implies that western education is taboo, to others is nothing but an attempt to impose the belief of Islam. In the words of Punch reporter on the motive of Boko Haram insurgency says: “As they said that they would not allow democracy to continue as it contravenes the teachings of Islam, I think going by their word is the real aim”.

Table 4 portrayed the motive of Boko Haram insurgents, on the imposition of religious belief, Vanguard has 30.5%, followed by Leadership with 30.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 28.3% and the last was Punch with 26.4%. On the poverty redress, Leadership has 12.3%, followed by Punch with 12.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 10.3% and the last was Vanguard with 8.6%. In banning western education, Punch has 35.0%, followed by Vanguard with 33.8%, followed by Daily Trust with 32.4% and the last was Leadership with 31.5%. : In the words of Leadership reporter, says “Well, the aim is unequivocal, because they made it known that they have their constitution which is Quran and the style of governance and that anybody participating in it (democracy) is infidel”.

In the words of Vanguard reporter on the motive of Boko Haram says: “To my understanding, the aim is to make the life of the ruling class miserable”. In political motive, Daily Trust has 24.1%, followed by Punch with 21.4%, followed by Vanguard with 21.2% and the last was leadership with 20.8%. In strategizing coup d’état, Vanguard has 4.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 3.4%, followed by Leadership with 2.3% and the last was Punch with 1.4%. In having the motive as others which include: juju and revenge against the north by Igbo over the past civil war (Biafra), Punch has 3.6%, followed by Leadership with 3.1%, followed by Vanguard with 2.0% and the last was Daily Trust with 1.4%. In the words of Daily Trust reporter about the motive of the Boko Haram says: “Well, the most prominent aim is to topple the non-Muslim government and establish a sharia state that will use Quran as the constitution, the second aim is to scrape western education schools founded by non-Muslims”.

However, putting words in the mouths of the insurgents has implication on conflict-sensitive journalism as most of the labels especially the popular one ‘Boko Haram’ has not come from them as they only call themselves Jamaatu Ahlussunnah Liddaawati WalJihad and peace journalism emphasizes on calling people they way they call themselves.

RQ 3: What are the areas of salient emphasis on perceived risks of the Boko Haram insurgency in the newspapers' reportage?

In answering research question 3, the researcher used table 8. Articles analysed for the study have foreseen various threats posed by the insurgents. The table shows the distributions of the perceived risks of Boko Haram insurgency. In being threat to foreign relations, Vanguard has 22.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 20.8%, followed by Leadership with 19.2% and the last was Punch with 18.5%. In the words of Vanguard reporter on the threat posed by Boko Haram says: "It will affect our multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationship and that will definitely affect the economy and tourism of the people.

As commented by a scholar that kidnappings of western nationals for ransom have also been attributed to Boko Haram. Some cases include the kidnapping of a French priest, Georges Vandebeusch, in November 2013 as well as that of a seven member French family, which is believed to have produced a ransom of USD 3 million. Both of these kidnappings took place in Cameroon (Barja, 2014). "The killing of foreign nationals will raise fear in their minds and by so doing distancing them from Nigeria.

Being Boko Haram a threat to economic stability, Punch has 21.0%, followed by Leadership with 20.4%, followed by Daily Trust with 20.25 and the last was Vanguard with 19.7%. This is because the more foreigners are afraid of investing in the country the more looses in the economic earnings of that country. In the words of Punch reporter on the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgency says: "So the threats are many, but economic instability is at the fore front". Being Boko Haram a threat to religious co-existence presupposes the bad result of accusations among adherents of the religions on the identity of the Boko Haram, where Christians accuse Muslims and vice versa, Punch has 16.9%, followed by Daily Trust with 16.1%, followed by Leadership with 16.0% and the last was Vanguard with 14.9%. In the words of the Leadership reporter: says "The threats can come in so many ways depending on the knowledge of the indices one can use to say that this is a threat from a specific

perspective, to me as a journalist I can say it is a threat to our objective coverage of report since the insurgents can threaten you, if your report goes contrary to their argument”.

In being threat to political stability, Leadership has 22.2%, followed by Punch with 21.6%, followed by Vanguard with 20.6% and the last was Daily Trust with 20.5%, the stability of the polity may be ruined by hitting it up with the challenges posed by the Boko Haram. In being threat to cultural diversity that is appreciation of living together by respecting cultural differences among colleagues, Daily Trust has 19.1%, followed by Leadership with 18.1%, followed by Punch with 17.2% and the last was Vanguard with 16.9%. In identifying other threats like migration and emigration, Vanguard has 6.0%, followed by Punch with 4.7%, followed by Leadership with 4.1% and the last was Daily Trust with 3.3%, where most of Nigerians will be lost in diaspora leaving a gap of expertise and artisanship to the neighborhoods. In the words of the Daily Trust reporter says: “So far what I am seeing as the threats regarding Boko Haram are numerous: one it can spoil the relationship between Nigeria and other countries, it can boost the rate at which Nigerians are suffering from abject poverty and many others”. Most of the perceived risks by the media will make the insurgents feel winning the conflict which is deemphasized by the media.

RQ 4: What are the predominant solutions offered in the newspapers’ reportage of the Boko Haram insurgency?

In answering research question 4, the researcher used table 9 that shows the distributions of the predominant solution recommendations offered by the sampled newspapers. In recommending amnesty for the Boko Haram, Daily Trust has 12.8%, followed by Punch with 12.5%, followed by Vanguard with 12.4% and the last was Leadership with 10.9%. To some the government in power should offer amnesty for the sect as was offered to Niger Delta militants.

In recommending fight, Leadership has 18.3%, followed by Punch with 18.1%, followed by Daily Trust with 17.5% and the last was Vanguard with 17.3%. To some, amnesty is not the solution, but to

possess weapons that will motivate army to outfight the insurgents. In the words of Daily Trust reporter: "I think the duty of the ruling class is to provide Nigerian army with the sufficient weapons to defeat Boko Haram".

In recommending negotiation, Daily Trust has 18.2%, followed by Leadership with 17.0%, followed by Vanguard with 16.6% and the last was Punch with 10.5%. Some recommended sitting down with the sect, robbing minds with them on the issue which will let the government know the purpose of their struggle and make compromises. In the words of Leadership reporter, says: "I think the solution is to get the matter addressed, may be by calling the Insurgents and hearing from them on their wishes, if they are servable then the government should compromise".

In recommending resignation of president, Punch has 8.6%, followed by Leadership with 8.5%, followed by Daily Trust with 7.0% and the last was Vanguard with 6.5% as the president is the agent of the problem because he has failed in delivering well to halt the success of the insurgency. In recommending state of emergency, Vanguard has 8.3%, followed by Leadership with 7.8%, followed by Punch with 7.3% and the last was Daily Trust with 5.6%. To some the governors in the affected states have failed the citizens in securing their lives and property, therefore the need for the total control of the states by the army is necessary.

In recommending poverty eradication, Punch has 9.9%, followed by Daily Trust and Vanguard with 9.0% and the last was Leadership with 8.7%. To some, poverty is the cause of the insurgency, because most of the members that were caught confessed on receiving pay before killing people.

In recommending educating the people, Daily Trust has 10.5%, followed by Leadership with 7.1%, followed by Punch with 6.5% and the last was Vanguard with 5.8%. To some, most of the members are not educated especially western, which made them believed that western education is prohibited. In recommending preaching tolerance, Punch has 10.3%, followed by Daily Trust with 8.1%, followed by leadership with 7.1% and the last was Vanguard with 6.1%. To some the need to

involve the work of religious preachers is necessary, in order to remind people on the prohibition of killing innocent souls. In the words of Punch reporter on the solution to Boko Haram insurgency says: “I think the solution is for the government to do justice to the people by providing them all they deserve in terms of education, social amenities and other related needs”.

In recommending military coup, Vanguard has 2.0%, followed by Daily Trust with 1.8%, followed by Punch with 1.5% and the last was Leadership with 1.3%. To some, the military takeover is what will address the problem of insurgency, since they have an edge over the democratic government in strategizing plans to curtail the insurgency. In recommending foreign intervention, Vanguard has 9.0%, followed by Punch with 8.8%, followed by Leadership with 7.1% and the last was Daily Trust with 4.3%, this rationale is behind the involvement of the countries that have military power to help in containing the insurgency.

In recommending others like dividing the country into north and south with independent leadership and voting out the incumbent president or impeaching him, Vanguard has 7.0%, followed by Leadership and Punch with 6.0% and the last was Daily Trust with 5.4%. To some the national assembly should impeach the president or the country should be divided into two under the leadership of leading tribes in each of the sections.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: Summary

From the findings it was observed that Nigerian journalists are less familiar with conflict-sensitive journalism as all the four reporters from *Daily Trust*, *Leadership*, *Vanguard* and *Punch* newspapers attested to that. Though, from the objectivity of the report, some see the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism subjective reportage. To them, to adopt some approaches that will limit the reporter from using some words in the report which may help give a clear picture of the group being

described is subjectivity. Majority of the journalists see the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism helpful in their contributions to see the end of the insurgency notwithstanding the arguments surrounding its adoption.

The identity of the Boko Haram even though vague, the most popular view is the one that the group describes themselves with, which is Islamist sect notwithstanding the arguments and the counter arguments surrounding the identity. However, the sponsorship of the sect based on the findings is mostly coming from the rich especially political elites who take advantage of the poor condition of the citizens and mobilize them on the pay role to achieve their aim which is best known to them. Though, the perpetrators of the cause have their motive which is popularly to establish an Islamic state and ban western education, the real aim was high jacked by the political elites.

The fear in the minds of well meaning Nigerians is the risks confronting the country if this Boko Haram persists, where most of the risks pointed out dwelled majorly on the collapse of the economy, as the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents may frighten foreigners thereby distancing themselves from any investment. Not only that, the stability of the country is at risk, because the insurgency can take a new coloration of Muslims versus Christians fight and that will definitely jeopardise the peace of the country . Having misconceived the insurgency by Nigerians, accusations between the two major sects of religion are always increasing. So, based on the findings, the possible solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency are for the government to do what is expected of it to the citizens, as the root of the insurgency is from the Poverty. The public also should join hands with the government to outfight the insurgents and the necessary weapons should be made available for the security.

5. 2: Conclusion

From the analysis of data generated and the various findings that have been made, some conclusions can be drawn:

Firstly, using the indicators of peace and war journalism, war journalism indicators have received higher frequencies and percentages. This shows that the level of consistency of the Nigerian press with conflict-sensitive journalism is poor. The languages which are deemphasized by the peace journalism i.e demonizing, victimizing and emotive languages are prevalent in the articles published by the sampled papers. The study concludes that Nigerian press is not well educated and informed on the concept of conflict-sensitive journalism notwithstanding the controversies over its adoption.

Similarly, the study concludes that the identity of the Boko Haram are islamist sect despite the counter arguments concerning the identity, but what takes more frequencies and percentages is islamist sect which means the orchestrators are Muslims. Also, the study has it that most of the insurgents are not educated in line with western education and the elites are using them to achieve their hidden goal. It also concludes that the motive of the insurgents is to establish an Islamic state and ban western education.

More so, the study concludes that the most disturbing threat posed by the insurgents is the collapse of the economy, through discouraging foreign nationals from investing in the country. It also established that the idea of accommodating one another culturally and tolerance to religious co-existence are at risk.

Moreover, the study concludes that the best solution is to provide sophisticated weaponry to the security so as to overcome the challenges of being ill-equipped in terms of the necessary working materials to succeed. Other solutions can come in the form of negotiation with the sect, to hear their grievances if are solvable.

5.3: Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made:

1. Nigerian journalists should increase their knowledge of the conflict-sensitive journalism so that they can make important contributions in finding solutions to the problem of Boko Haram insurgency.
2. Professionalism in the Media organizations should be adhered to strictly.
3. Special training should be planned for all the Nigerian journalists on the ways to adopt conflict-sensitive journalism.
4. Government should sponsor international workshops on conflict sensitive journalism.

Conflict sensitive reporting should be taught in all journalism schools as a core course.

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APPENDIX I

Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Daily Trust

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Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Leadership

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Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Vanguard

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Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Punch

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APPENDIX II

Transcribed Interview with Daily Trust Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict-sensitive journalism?

Informant: Well, conflict-sensitive journalism, though a new concept but am a little bit familiar with it.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Definitely is important because it limits the excessive use of languages that can trigger violence.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: Though the issue of objectivity sometimes challenges the excessive use of the conflict-sensitive journalism, as some are of the view that it gives room for subjectivity by trying to skew what you exactly have as a report. Notwithstanding this big challenge, I think it is helpful in mitigating the insurgency by trying to be proactive about the implications of violence, allowing people to suggest ways out, reporting the happenings in a way it will not fuel the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: Well, most of the views revolve around the ruling party as the opposition accuses them of allowing the insurgency wilfully to continue because of their political gain, while those in the ruling party are accusing the opposition party on the sponsorship of the ongoing insurgency with the aim of soiling the image of the government so as to create hatred in the minds of the electorates.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: Well, the most prominent aim is to topple the non- Muslim government and establish a sharia state that will use Quran as the constitution, The second aim is to scrape western education schools founded by non-Muslims.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: So far what I am seeing as the threats regarding Boko Haram are numerous: one it can spoil the relationship between Nigeria and other countries, it can boost the rate at which Nigerians are suffering from abject poverty and many others.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solutions to the problem?

Informant: I think is the duty of the ruling class to provide Nigerian army with the sufficient weapons to defeat Boko Haram.

Transcribed Interview with Leadership Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict-sensitive journalism?

Informant: Alright, I cannot claim very high familiarity with it. But, I can say that I have little to say about it.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: yes it is important because it will help in curtailing the ongoing crisis in Nigeria.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: I can say in three ways: 1. In reducing the intensity of the insurgency, 2. In giving chances of the contribution from the public, In helping the government to make persistent attempt to get rid of the insurgency for the benefit of the citizenry through a wide consultations.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: No, one can hardly say this is Boko Haram specifically because their identification is still vague, but going by the popular opinion they are Islamic sect.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: Well, the aim is unequivocal, because they made it known that they have their constitution which is Quran and the style of governance and that anybody participating in it (Democracy) is infidel.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: The threats can come in so many ways depending on the knowledge of the indices one can use to say that this is a threat from a specific perspective. To me as a journalist I can say it is a threat to our objective coverage of report since the insurgents can threaten you, if your report goes contrary to their argument.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

Informant: I think the solution is to get the matter addressed, may be by calling the Insurgents and hear from them on their wishes, if they are servable then the government should compromise.

Transcribed Interview with Vanguard Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict-sensitive journalism?

Informant: Ok. I am in the picture of what it entails to be conflict-sensitive journalism.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Of course, it is important in helping the stability of the country.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: Yes by listening to the contributions of the people on the insurgency, the government can use the input in their plans against the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: They are poor people in the north who were entrapped in the cage of poverty, as such taking revenge in killing people to frustrate the government that cannot deliver well to them.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: To my understanding, the aim is to make the life of the ruling class miserable.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: It will affect our multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationship and that will definitely affect the economy and tourism of the people.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

A: I think the solution is for the government to do justice to the people by providing them all they deserve in terms of education, social amenities and other related needs.

Transcribed Interview with Punch Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict-sensitive journalism?

Informant: Yes, it sounds familiar, but not very deep.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict-sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Very, very important in a number of ways.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: It helps, because of the choice of words in the report which are not conflict-motivating and the style adopt in hearing from multifaceted views on the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: They are Islamic sect just like ISIS and Alqaida.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: As they said that they would not allow democracy to continue as it contravenes the teachings of Islam, I think going by their word is the real aim.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: So the threats are many but the most frightening one is the economy that is at risk.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

Informant: I think the solution is for the general public to join hands with the government to see the end of Boko Haram.

Appendix III

Portrayal of the Identity of Boko Haram Insurgents Based on Religion, Economic Status and Tribe

	Religion			Economic Status		Tribal Origin			
	Muslim	Christian	Others	Rich	Poor	Yoruba	Hausa	Igbo	Others
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

Portrayal of the Identity of Boko Haram based on Political status and the Acquisition of Western education

	Political Status			Acquisition of Western Education	
	Ruling party	Opposition party	Others	Educated	Not educated
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

MOTIVE OF THE BOKO HARAM	PERCEIVED RISKS
--------------------------	-----------------

	Impos e Religio us Belief	Pove rty Redr ess	Ban Wester n educati on	Polit ics	Military Coupe Strategy	Other s	Threa t to foreig n relati ons	Threa t to econo mic stabili ty	Threat to religious coexisten ce	Threat to political stability	Threat to cultural diversity.	Other s
1												
2												
3												
4												
5												

Portrayal of the Motive and Perceived Risks of Boko Haram Insurgents

Portrayal of the Predominant Treatment Recommendations offered by the Newspapers

	Amnesty	Fight	Negotiations	Resignation of President	State of Emergency	Poverty Eradication	Educating the People	Preaching Tolerance	Military Coup	Foreign Intervention	Others
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											

Occurrences of War Journalism Languages

Demonizing Language									Victimizing Language					Emotive Language			
	Terrorist	Extremist	Cruel	Barbaric	Fundamentalist	Fanatic	Brutal	Vicious	Devastate	Destitute	Tragedy	Pathetic	Defenceless	Massacre	Genocide	Assassinate	Demigrate
1																	
2																	
3																	
4																	
5																	

Distributions of Approaches to Peace and War Journalism

Peace Journalism								War Journalism						
	Proactive	Invisible effects of war	People oriented	Agreement-oriented	Win-win oriented	Multi-party oriented	Non-partisan	Reactive	Visible effects of	Elite-oriented	Zero-sum oriented	Two-party-oriented	Differences oriented	Partisan

									war					
1														
2														
3														
4														
5														

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APPENDIX I

Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Daily Trust

83. Daily Trust Newspaper of	7 th January,2013
84. Daily Trust Newspaper of	14 th January,2013
85. Daily Trust Newspaper of	21 st January,2013
86. Daily Trust Newspaper of	28 th January, 2013
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164. Daily Trust Newspaper of 21st December,

Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Leadership

82.	Leadership Newspaper of	7 th January,2013
83.	Leadership Newspaper of	14 th January,2013
84.	Leadership Newspaper of	21 st January,2013
85.	Leadership Newspaper of	28 th January, 2013
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| 161. | Leadership Newspaper of | 7 th December, 2014 |
| 162. | Leadership Newspaper of | 14 th December,2014 |
| 82. | Leadership Newspaper of | 21 st December, 2014 |

Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Vanguard

82.	Vanguard Newspaper of	7 th January,2013
83.	Vanguard Newspaper of	14 th January,2013
84.	Vanguard Newspaper of	21 st January,2013
85.	Vanguard Newspaper of	28 th January, 2013
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82.	Vanguard Newspaper of	21 st December, 2014

Editions of the Newspapers Analysed from January, 7th 2013 _ December, 21st, 2014 in Punch

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APPENDIX II

Transcribed Interview with Daily Trust Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict sensitive journalism?

Informant: Well, conflict sensitive journalism, though a new concept but am a little bit familiar with it.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Definitely is important because it limits the excessive use of languages that can trigger violence.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: Though the issue of objectivity sometimes challenges the excessive use of the conflict sensitive journalism, as some are of the view that it gives room for subjectivity by trying to skew what you exactly have as a report. Notwithstanding this big challenge, I think it is helpful in mitigating the insurgency by trying to be proactive about the implications of violence, allowing people to suggest ways out, reporting the happenings in a way it will not fuel the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: Well, most of the views revolve around the ruling party as the opposition accuses them of allowing the insurgency wilfully to continue because of their political gain, while those in the ruling party are accusing the opposition party on the sponsorship of the ongoing insurgency with the aim of soiling the image of the government so as to create hatred in the minds of the electorates.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: Well, the most prominent aim is to topple the non- Muslim government and establish a sharia state that will use Quran as the constitution, The second aim is to scrape western education schools founded by non-Muslims.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: So far what I am seeing as the threats regarding Boko Haram are numerous: one it can spoil the relationship between Nigeria and other countries, it can boost the rate at which Nigerians are suffering from abject poverty and many others.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solutions to the problem?

Informant: I think is the duty of the ruling class to provide Nigerian army with the sufficient weapons to defeat Boko Haram.

Transcribed Interview with Leadership Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict sensitive journalism?

Informant: Alright, I cannot claim very high familiarity with it. But, I can say that I have little to say about it.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: yes it is important because it will help in curtailing the ongoing crisis in Nigeria.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: I can say in three ways: 1. In reducing the intensity of the insurgency, 2. In giving chances of the contribution from the public, In helping the government to make persistent attempt to get rid of the insurgency for the benefit of the citizenry through a wide consultations.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: No, one can hardly say this is Boko Haram specifically because their identification is still vague, but going by the popular opinion they are Islamic sect.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: Well, the aim is unequivocal, because they made it known that they have their constitution which is Quran and the style of governance and that anybody participating in it (Democracy) is infidel.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: The threats can come in so many ways depending on the knowledge of the indices one can use to say that this is a threat from a specific perspective. To me as a journalist I can say it is a threat to our objective coverage of report since the insurgents can threaten you, if your report goes contrary to their argument.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

Informant: I think the solution is to get the matter addressed, may be by calling the Insurgents and hear from them on their wishes, if they are servable then the government should compromise.

Transcribed Interview with Vanguard Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict sensitive journalism?

Informant: Ok. I am in the picture of what it entails to be conflict sensitive journalism.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Of course, it is important in helping the stability of the country.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: Yes by listening to the contributions of the people on the insurgency, the government can use the input in their plans against the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: They are poor people in the north who were entrapped in the cage of poverty, as such taking revenge in killing people to frustrate the government that cannot deliver well to them.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: To my understanding, the aim is to make the life of the ruling class miserable.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: It will affect our multi-lateral and bi-lateral relationship and that will definitely affect the economy and tourism of the people.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

A: I think the solution is for the government to do justice to the people by providing them all they deserve in terms of education, social amenities and other related needs.

Transcribed Interview with Punch Reporter

Interviewer: Hello sir. How familiar are you with the conflict sensitive journalism?

Informant: Yes, it sounds familiar, but not very deep.

Interviewer: Do you think the adoption of conflict sensitive journalism is important in the Nigerian press and why?

Informant: Very, very important in a number of ways.

Interviewer: In what ways its adoption in your report helpful in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Informant: It helps, because of the choice of words in the report which are not conflict-motivating and the style adopt in hearing from multifaceted views on the insurgency.

Interviewer: From the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and the reports you have from the public, who do you think are they?

Informant: They are Islamic sect just like ISIS and Alqaida.

Interviewer: From the reports supplied by the insurgents to the press, what do you think is the aim of this course?

Informant: As they said that they would not allow democracy to continue as it contravenes the teachings of Islam, I think going by their word is the real aim.

Interviewer: Fears have been in the minds of Most Nigerians on the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents, In your own view, what do you think are the threats?

Informant: So the threats are many but the most frightening one is the economy that is at risk.

Interviewer: Most Nigerians have been praying to see the end of Boko Haram insurgency, what would you recommend as the solution to the problem?

Informant: I think the solution is for the general public to join hands with the government to see the end of Boko Haram.

Appendix III

Portrayal of the Identity of Boko Haram Insurgents Based on Religion, Economic Status & Tribe

	Religion			Economic Status		Tribal Origin			
	Muslim	Christian	Others	Rich	Poor	Yoruba	Hausa	Igbo	Others
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

Portrayal of the Identity of Boko Haram based on Political status & the Acquisition of Western education

	Political Status			Acquisition of Western Education	
	Ruling party	Opposition party	Others	Educated	Not educated
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

Portrayal of the Motive & Perceived Risks of Boko Haram Insurgents

MOTIVE OF THE BOKO HARAM							PERCEIVED RISKS					
	Impose Religious Belief	Poverty Redress	Ban Western education	Politics	Military Coup Strategy	Others	Threat to foreign relations	Threat to economic stability	Threat to religious coexistence	Threat to political stability	Threat to cultural diversity.	Others
1												
2												
3												
4												
5												

Portrayal of the Predominant Treatment Recommendations offered by the Newspapers

	Amnesty	Fight	Negotiations	Resignation of President	State of Emergency	Poverty Eradication	Educating the People	Preaching Tolerance	Military Coup	Foreign Intervention	Others
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											

Occurrences of War Journalism Languages

Demonizing Language									Victimizing Language					Emotive Language			
	Terrorist	Extremist	Cruel	Barbaric	Fundamentalist	Fanatic	Brutal	Vicious	Devastate	Destitute	Tragedy	Pathetic	Defenseless	Massacre	Genocide	Assassinate	Decimate
1																	
2																	
3																	
4																	
5																	

Distributions of Approaches to Peace and War Journalism

Peace Journalism								War Journalism						
	Proactive	Invisible effects of war	People oriented	Agreement-oriented	Win-win oriented	Multi-party oriented	Non-partisan	Reactive	Visible effects of war	Elite-oriented	Zero-sum oriented	Two-party-oriented	Differences oriented	Partisan
1														
2														
3														
4														
5														