COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE FROM ECOWAS

BY

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
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DECLARATION

I, Flying Officer Ebieteli Calmday-Nelson, do hereby declare that the data contained in this study have been appropriately acknowledged and duly referenced.

To the best of my knowledge, this thesis have not been submitted to any other institution or organisation other than the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, for examination.



Candidate April, 1994.

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled "COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A case from ECOWAS", BY EBIETELI CALMDAY-NELSON, meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science - Political Science (International Relations) of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to the ALMIGHTY GOD, in the courteous name of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, who guaranteed my health, intelligence and wisdom - three vital requirements that were consistently needed throughout the tenure of this programme.

And for also protecting me in my daily trips to and from the often dangerous Kaduna-Zaria express-way.

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ECN

ABSTRACT

The Central thesis of this study is that Africa's Underdevelopment and Dependency on the industrialised external nations of Europe and America, which is a colonial legacy, is disruptive of the concept of collective security in the region. This is because these Metropoles attach priority to their economic and strategic interests in their relationship with African States (the satellites), especially in the area of conflict management.

The study proposes self-reliance and Pan-Africanism through the Framework of the O.A.U., as the doctrine on which African security must be founded. It sees the Liberian crisis and the ECOWAS response of ECOMOG, as a new approach towards the attainment of collective security goals at the continental level and ultimately of achieving the ideal of global peace.

The work satisfies the belief that the Underdevelopment **and** dependency Theory (UDT) in Political Science is not a prerogative of economic analyses alone, as evidence prove that, in addition to the fact that all economically oriented analysis of necessity have security implications, the UDT can indeed be more suitable for analysing the insecurity of the African region in particular, **and** the less developed world in general.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community (ECOWAS)
ACP-EEC-Pact	African, Carribean and Pacific Countries Summit at Lome with the European Economic Community.
ADB	African Development Bank.
AEF	French Equatorial Africa (formed 1910)
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council (Nigeria).
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Francais or French West Africa (formed 1904).
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats de L'Africque de L' Ouest (Dakar, Senegal).
BPE	Board For Public Enterprises.
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Carribean Community
CARIFTA	Carribean Free Trade Area
CBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
CCCE	Caisse Centrale de Co-operation Economique
CDC	Commonwealth Development Corporation
CEAO	Communaute Economique de L'Afrique de L' Quest.
CFA	Communaute Financiere Africaine
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Committee of Independent States
DOM-TOM	France's Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
ERM	Exchange Rate Mechanism
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Co-Operation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FF	French Franc
FOSIDEC	Fonds de solidarite et d'latervention Pour Le development de La Communaute
G7	Group of 7 most Industrialised Countries
GATT	General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GSA	General Services Agency (Liberia)
IEC	Interim Electoral Commission (Liberia)
IFC	International Financial Company
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity (Liberia)
ILA	Interim Legislative Assembly (Liberia)

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INN	International Negotiation Network
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JEC	Joint Electoral Commission (Liberia)
LAFTA	Latin America Free Trade Area
LAIA	Latin America Integration Area
LAMCO	Liberian and American Mining Company
LMC	Liberian Mining Company
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
LNTG	Liberian National Transitional Government
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
LPP	Liberian Peoples Party
MOJA	Movement For Justice in Africa
MRU	Mano River Union
MSF	Medicin Sans Frontiere (A Belgian-based Voluntary Medical Relief Service)
MVA	Manufacturing Value Added
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBI	National Bureau of Investigation (Liberia)
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NIIA	Nigerian Institute for International Affairs
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service (Liberia)
NIM	Nigerian Institute of Management
NNS	Nigerian Naval Ship

NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NWO	New World Order
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricience
OERS	Organisation of Senegal River States
OFN	Operation Feed the Nation
OFY	Operation Feed Yourself
OMVS	Organisation Pour La Mise en a Leur du Fueve Senegal
PAL	Progressive Alliance of Liberia
PPP	Peoples Progressive Party (Liberia)
PRC	Peoples Redemption Council (Liberia)
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RDA	Ressemblement Democratique Africaine, or the Black African Party.
RNC	River Niger Commission
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SSS	Special Security Service (Liberia)
STABEX	Export Stabilisation Scheme
TCPC	Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (Nigeria)
TWP	True Whig Party (Liberia)
UDAO	Union Douaniere Afrique de L' Ouest
UDEAQ	Union Douaniere' des etats de L' Quest
UDEAC	Union Douaniere' des Etats de L' Afrique Centrale

UDT	Underdevelopment and Dependency Theory
UK	United Kingdom.
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia.
UMA	Union Maghreb Arab
UMOA	Union Monetaire Quest Africaine
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
UNICEF	United Nations International Children Education Fund
UNITA	Union For the Total Independence of Angola
UNO	United Nations Oroganisation
UNTAC	UN Temporary Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTAMIC	UN Technical Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	UN Operations in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WAA	West African Airways
WACB	West African Currency Board
WACU	West African Customs Union
WAEC	West African Economic Community
WAMU	West African Monetary Union
WARG	West African Regional Group
WATA	West African Trade Area.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 General Background

This study will concentrate on the security implications for the Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS, in particular, of the relationships of its sixteen member States, and indeed the member States of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in general, with foreign powers, especially the Western industrialised States of France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). It is concerned with the various elements and particularly external considerations which undermine the basic issues that must agitate our minds when we ponder over the collective security of Africa, using the West African sub-region as a focus.

But what is security within the African and indeed the Third World Context? Security for whom and for what? Traditionally, security used to be defined solely in terms of the military consequences of conventional conflicts between States. But the New World Order has over the years redefined security and its threat to include "non-military sources of instability in economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields". This was disclosed in the United Nation (UN) Security Council Annual Summit Declaration of January 31,

1993[1]. Subsequently therefore, this study will concentrate on the two broad approaches to the definition of security which have developed over the years -

i. The Military/Strategic approach; and

ii. The non-strategic, socio-economic approach[2].

In the scheme of this work, both models are interdependent. The strategic conception of security focuses on the use of military power for the preservation of national independence and the territorial integrity. In the context of this work, this sums into the inviolability of the African region.

On the other hand, the non-strategic approach to security is essentially socio-economic; it sees security of the African region not only in terms of military power but also in terms of the level or otherwise of socio-economic power and the level or otherwise of socio-economic development which the governments of member States of the ECOWAS in particular, and the OAU in general, are able to provide for themselves and their people. Thus, one authoritative source defines security as "the ability of a nation (and by inference the African region) to protect its internal values from external threats"[3].

Arnold Wolfers[4], agrees when he says "security is the protection of values previously acquired or the absence of fear that these values

would be attacked". It goes without saying that in order to achieve a state of absence of fear of attack, the polity must establish a credible deterrence. Thus security in the context of this study would amount to the ability of the governments and people of West Africa, and Africans in general, either to deter attack or to defeat it. Here lies the significance of the collective or regional security approach to our thesis.

One of the problems of International Relations is finding meanings to terms that have universal usage. One such term is - "collective security". Like the subject of political science itself, there is still no consensus on what collective security fully entails. That notwithstanding, as far as this work is concerned, collective security is supposed to be one of the most promising of all the approaches to peace. It is a device of *maintaining peace and deterring aggression. The word security* here, represents a goal, while the word collective indicates the nature of the means employed. Consequently therefore, that employed means is regionalism as symbolised by the ECOWAS and OAU respectively.

Subsequently, collective (or regional) security (as we would often alternatively refer to them in this study) may be defined as "a machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an establishment order"[5]. The basic principle of collective or regional security is that an attack on any one State

or 'establishment order' is an attack on all. It is an international translation of the principle "One for all and all for One". In other words, it means that a war, by whatever means, anywhere, against any one, is a war against everyone and everywhere. The age-old debate on the need for regional security arrangements is for all its theoretical trappings therefore a singularly important practical matter. It is important because a regional arrangement is a form of voluntary agreement by States that share common interests like geographical location (space), ideological leaning, cultural and economic links to further joint action. It is a technique through which independent States collaborate to achieve regional objectives while still maintaining their individual sovereignty. Regional arrangements may therefore be established for political, security, economic, cultural or other reasons, or for a combination of two or more of these reasons.[6]

As an accepted norm in International Relations, the whole idea of collective or regional security arrangements is even much more relevant, desirable and compelling on the African Continent and in particular the West African sub-region after about a century of colonial plunder and exploitation. While the Fundamentals of African and more specifically West African security must stress the external factors, internally-generated security problems, with the advantage of hindsight, appear also critical. Internally generated security problems in the African continent consists of conflicts resulting from International Relations characterised by expansion

of nationalism and irredentism, transborder military activities and competition for economic resources.

Other categories are civil wars occasioned by as many factors as there are civil wars. We need not belabour the point that the new States of Africa are new in more sense than one. Their historical antecedents as political entities is short, they encompass a plurality of nationalities more often than not competing among themselves rather than complementing each other:
They parade a pluralism of religions, ethnic groups and world-views under political and military elites overburdened by an external model mentality. And in many aspects they are Nation States in a hurry to achieve national integration and socio-economic transformation.

Possessing a colonial legacy of very ill-defined boundaries that cut across various ethnic groups. Boundaries that are undemarcated and hardly delimited, international interactions in Africa have engendered conflicts that have added to the complexity of African security problems. Other causes of regional strife are secession due to fear of ethnic domination, institutionalised social injustice and sheer territorial aggrandisement.
Africa has witnessed;

i. civil wars, contingent on secession in Congo (Zaire), Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria.

ii. wars of insurgency against central authority - Angola, Mozambique, Chad and Uganda.

iii. wars of liberation which unlike the first two, are wars intended to restore security, in the face of unrelenting and uncompromising foreign minority regimes such as against Ian Smith of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Portuguese authorities in Guinea Bisau, Angola and Mozambique and apartheid South Africa in Namibia. Wars of liberation are wars of restoration, wars to right the wrongs of overspent colonialism and racism. Instead of constituting problems for African security they should be seen as contributing to the solution of the security question.

iv. wars of expansionist nationalism and irredentism such as the Ogadam war in Ethiopia and the war of Somali nationhood, have their roots in the methods of European colonisation and the mode of transfer of power from the Colonial authority to the African elite.

This is perhaps best exemplified by the war which the Saharawi Arab Republic is waging against Morocco.

v. A final typology of African wars in the post independence era, that warrants concerted efforts at regional or collective security are those caused by conflicting and competing claims to zones of economic resources e.g. the Morocco/Algeria crisis of the early sixties, over phosphate deposits; Also, Libya and Chad had fought a resource war over Uranium-rich Azou strip and Nigeria and Cameroon had military brushes over

Bacchus Valley with large quantities of petroleum deposits and Nigeria and Chad over portions of the Lake Chad valley.

In all classes, whether wars of foreign intervention, of secession, insurgency or resource wars they all add up to the fact that in many respects Africa and its Cardinal sub-regions, suffers from a chronic security problem. Furthermore, complicated and intractable security problems provide avenues for foreign intervention under various guises which play into the hands of the very developed and industrialised powers against which African Security should be provided in the first place. These powers especially France has special military relations with her former colonies; through diplomacy she has even expanded the scope of her influence to include some non-Francophone countries like Zaire and Equatorial Guinea. France requires a measure of military and diplomatic activity in Africa in order to maintain her medium power status within the comity of developed nations. That is why she parades a long catalogue of defence pacts and military interventions in many parts of Africa. But these interventions for whatever reasons amount to under-cutting of our sub-regional and continental security properly defined from our own perspective.

Therefore the scope of collective African security viewed from the strategic angle must include the following:-

i. The defence of the continental land mass, its adjoining

oceans, seas and its airspace against extra-continental super and great power machinations;

ii. The defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member State of the ECOWAS in particular and the OAU by extension, against extra African and intra-African violations, intimidation and subversion;

iii. The maintenance of internal security of each African member State;

iv. And the defence of sub-regional and continental treaty obligations where ever they exist.

The aims of this strategic oriented security posture would be:

(a) to deter aggression from all quarters against the continent, or its component sub-regions.

(b) to build a sufficient military force to defeat aggression that cannot be deterred.

(c) to assume a defence posture that would react promptly and decisively to contain violence and any military developments likely to undermine the subsume continental security.

In the final analysis therefore, collective security is the sum total of the security of individual member states of the ECOWAS and ultimately the organisation of African Unity (OAU).

Since the analytical framework to be adopted in this study - i.e

the underdevelopment and dependency theory, was originally designed by its proponents as a solely economic model, we must now pass on to the consideration of non strategic elements of sub-regional and continental security, because it has become glaringly clear to mankind that more military force by itself does not ensure increased security of a given polity. Indeed some observers have argued that increased armaments beget more armaments by a potential enemy, thereby creating a vicious cycle of military insecurity.

Speaking about the United States, obviously the most powerful nation in the world, McNamara[7] argued that "the security of (the US) lies not solely or even primarily in military force, but equally in developing stable patterns of economic and political growth..... the root of man's security does not lie in his weaponry, it lies in his mind." With particular reference to third world countries, Africa included, McNamara argues convincingly that "In a modernising society security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and without development there can be no security".

We should add that security is the absence of poverty and hunger. Economic malfunctioning in the face of growing population breeds insecurity because nothing is more threatening to a political

regime than hungry citizens. The wages of poverty are political unrest, internal upheavals, violence, extremism and politics of confrontation. There is a symbiotic relationship between military and economic power of a State. The non strategic socio-economic paradigm of security should inform African States to develop such critical capacities that should enhance their relative security. These should include[8]:

1. The capacity of managing domestic processes of economic development and national integration.
2. The capacity to resist outside economic penetration detrimental to the values and aims of the State.
3. The will to develop a capacity to achieve a measure of self-reliance.
4. The determination to develop a national awareness and the desire to increase the influence of the state for common good.

This socio-economic conception of security is mass oriented; it is security that permeates the generality of African population; it is security not conceived in the narrow prism of a few elected or self-appointed rulers to sustain a particular regime, instead it is what is generally called "peoples security" irrespective of who is in power.

Economic and military power, the two fundamental rudiments of continental security must be internally generated and rooted to

enable Africa to:

1. Withstand externally fueled security dangers;
2. Determine our own path of development without molestation;
3. Be free to agree or disagree and be able to settle our differences without hindrance; and
4. Reach a broad consensus on important international questions.

Finally, collective security in our region, properly defined and attained would promote stability of political culture, transform our fissiparous multinational nation - states into truly integrated states; enable Africans pursue those socio-economic goals that ensure eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance. Collective African security would propel us into those scientific and technological transformation that would determine whether we shall ever attain a stage in which the generality of Africans can boast of a meaningful and worthwhile existence like other humans in the developed parts of the world. Military power and economic power must remain the two sides of the African Security Coin.

Having given an operational definition of the central issues of collective security and established the need for collective regional security efforts in Africa, it is now pertinent to underscore the significance of ECOWAS, our model sub-regional institution in the collective security efforts of Africa: Collective Security arrangements like the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia - the ECOMOG are neither new nor are they substitutes

for global organisations like the United Nations. Infact, regional organisations are specifically recognised in chapter 6 Articles 33 and 52 of the UN Charter on pacific settlement of Disputes, which states among other things that parties to a dispute may resort to regional agencies or arrangements for the settlement of their conflict.

Attempts at regional collective security before the first World War may be cited from the 'Holy Alliance' popularly called the concert of Europe, which lasted from 1814 to 1914. It was successful in dealing with the Balkan Wars[9]. In terms of the Socio-economic, non-strategic approach to Regional or collective security, modern day efforts was first mooted in 1957, when six west European countries - France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg; came together to form the European Economic Community (EEC)[10]. This was ostensibly, to enhance their recovery from the effects of the second world war which severely battered their economies. Ever since the emergence of the EEC experiment, and its relative success, other regions have come to see collective effort as a strategy of enhancing their collective welfare and subsequently security. Some foreign examples of regional organisations created along geographical or ideological lines to further political and collective security objectives on the one hand and economic and social welfare on the other include - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Warsaw Pact countries under the defunct Soviet Union; and the Arab League.

On the other hand, a catalogue of Third World initiated regional organisations with varied scope, aims and functions include: the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC); the Colombo plan; the Latin America Free Trade Area (LAFTA) now succeeded by the Latin America Integration Area (LAIA); and the defunct East African Community (EAC). Others are the Carribean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) now succeeded by the Carribean Community (CARICOM); the Audean Pact; the Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricience (OCAM); The South African Customs Union (SACU); Union Douaniere des Etats de L' Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) etc.

In West Africa, regionalism has its roots in the colonial era and was prompted by the administrative and economic interests of the colonial overlords. It was fashionable to establish institutional economic and other wise co-operation among States under the same imperial power who share the same region: West African Airways; West African Examination Board and the West African Frontier Force, etc, were some cases in the Anglophone regions.[11]

Those of Franco-phone countries were even much more pronounced as they had virtually all part of their economy and security bound together and tied to the French polity. Independence was the signal accomplishment that brought new perspectives to reinforce the existing arrangements.

1.1 The Problem

The main thrust of this study is underlined by the belief that regionalism should represent a method of encouraging and arranging peaceful settlements of disputes without intervention from outside, and perhaps basically unfriendly parties in the affairs of the African region. It should serve significantly as an agency for advancing co-operation and ensuring collective security which is vital to development.

Despite this justification for regional grouping by countries within the West African sub-region, in particular, and Africa as a whole, who constituted themselves into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and the OAU in 1963, respectively, with the subsequent aim of establishing the need and right of member states to exercise either individually or jointly the principle of self-help with one another, either by protocol, treaty obligations or through special arrangement as manifest in the establishment of the ECOWAS monitoring group in Liberia - ECOMOG, and the various OAU peace keeping missions like in Chad, the fact that the roots of regionalism in Africa, and particularly in West Africa can be traced to the colonial era, as proposed by the underdevelopment theorists, seem to be constituting many obstacles to the stated ideals of regionalism in the region. Giving the instance that ECOMOG's headaches in Liberia begins with the intransigence of Mr. Charles Taylor, and the ubiquity of his

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), despite the fact that Liberia does not posses the technology to produce modern fighting weapons, Momoh[12], wondered whether Taylor can on his own account afford to sustain a war for that long considering the fact that he started it in Liberia since December 24, 1989.

There may be many approaches and numerous differences in the objectives of these external influences that tend to incapacitate West African and indeed African collective security efforts. But these limitations operate from the same position and from a largely common assumption which frame a clear and consistent perspective - the perspective of African dependency on their erstwhile colonial masters in particular, and the industrialised world in general. It was in this respect that Babangida declared: "As we all are aware, the consequences of our unfulfilled expectations can have serious social consequences, including popular upheavals which have threatened the stability of many of our countries. No doubt, it is the fear of this eventuality that has prompted well-meaning African statesmen to study the linkages among security, stability and development with a view to applying their relevant aspects to the African situation."[13]

This may be blamed on among other factors, the neo-colonialistic ties between many African Countries and their former colonial masters, the high poverty ratio in Africa which enslaves the survival of most African economies to foreign aid and the

technological deficiency across the region that inevitably links our defence policies to foreign domination. Hence, this study also hold that there is a correlation between the above mentioned factors and the seeming lack of success in ECOWAS and OAU initiated regional security efforts. Our contention is based on the notion that there is the likelihood that the member States will be more engrossed in their externally influenced individual options to solve regional security problems at the expense of collective strategies.

A central problem of this study therefore is that, though we all seem aware of the need for collective regional security, under the platform of the OAU, which is expected to serve as a mechanism for consultation, it does not seem clear that we have fully grasped the enormous significance, especially in the present historical conjuncture, that external influences tend to limit and even frustrate regional consciousness and efforts to pursue collective security in Africa. The study therefore specifically seeks to examine the security problems currently faced by the ECOWAS and the role its monitoring group in Liberia , the ECOMOG, and the manipulations of external interests plays in the resolution or non-resolution of these problems.

Throughout the work, our perception of an ideal regional security model may have become somewhat synchronous with the theory of development. This is based on our belief that there can be no

meaningful economic activity, as perceived by the original proponents of ECOWAS in a region characterised by instability. What this implies is that, West Africa as a reference point, may not be able to develop without recourse to collective security efforts. It was in this respect that the former Chairman of ECOWAS, President Dauda Jawara of the Gambia observed that;
"It is an omission that the founding fathers of ECOWAS conceived a purely economic Union, despite the impracticability of achieving meaningful economic goals in any region threatened by insecurity"[14]

In essence therefore, this study is interested in answering the following questions:

1 "What is the impact of external influence upon regional security efforts in Africa?
2. "What negative roles do these factors play in the resolution, or non-resolution of the security problems of the OAU?"
3. "Giving the primacy of politics and giving again that ECOWAS has chosen collective self-reliance to enhance welfare and development, can it be said that the organisation with the evolution of ECOMOG, is in the process of achieving the dream of collective security for the African region, through cooperation with the OAU?

1.2 Propositions/Hypotheses

On the basis of the above problems, the following hypotheses will guide the research:

I. The neo-colonial influence of France in Francophone Africa, constitutes a major threat to collective security ideals in the region.

II. Dependency and underdevelopment disrupts collective security efforts in Africa, as manifest in the evolution of ECOMOG.

III. Dependency and underdevelopment will ultimately subjugate African security to the interests and policies of external powers, unless sub-regional organisations within the region systematically evolves strategies aimed at improving integrative schemes of collective security management in the continent.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This study examines the impact of external influence upon regional security efforts in Africa and the negative roles they play in the resolution or non-resolution of the problems of ECOWAS and the OAU.

The significance of the study is under-scored by the fact that though the literature in the field has identified foreign

intervention in Africa as one of the general problems militating against successful collective efforts in the region, studies specifically focusing on dependency as directly influencing this seem to be lacking. Indeed this view is supported by President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, who pointed out in an address at a presentation ceremony of the centre for Advanced Social Sciences that, the North-South divide and Africa's dependency on foreign aid are arguably the most threatening individual factors to the collective security of the African continent in particular and the Third World in general[15].

Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi, former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA), in his paper - "The Imperative Constraints of Superpower Conflicts on Africa", also lamented that the quantity of the factors under the control of a State is a direct function of the power-status of the State. In other words, the more powerful a State is, the more its capability to intervene[16]. It of course logically follows that the less powerful state or, if we are going to be blunt, a collection of weak states, has very few factors under their control and are therefore subject to insecurity by virtue of foreign penetration. This however does not mean that Africa, or indeed the West African sub-region is condemned to the vicissitudes of external manipulations in their collective security aspirations. What it means is that the actions which a weak state or region has to take to maximise its security options are different contextually from

those a powerful state has to take to maximise its own options. This study is therefore in its own modest way, an attempt to fill the vacuum created by the lack of indept studies in this area.

We also choose to focus attention on the prospects and trends of collective security efforts in West Africa. Early studies on ECOWAS could not critically assess the performance of the organisation from the security perspective and on grounds of relative recency. After 18 years of existence, the time is ripe enough to make a critical assessment of the performance of the organisation with emphasis on the prospects of a military cooperation. This view is informed by three points:

i. The fact that the organisation is assumed to have learnt and benefitted from the lessons and experiences of other schemes preceding it, for which it should improve upon after 18 years in existence.

ii. The fact that the ECOWAS sub-region is today the most conflict prone zone in Africa.

iii. The signing by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, on 29 May, 1981 of a draft defence pact as the protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence and the creation of ECOMOG by leaders of the ECOWAS standing Mediation Committee on 7 August, 1990.

This study will therefore also serve as a critical assessment of the performance of the ECOWAS, particularly with respect to the

prospects of a military cooperation for the past 18 years. In doing this we also hope that it will stimulate the interest of integrators and policy makers alike, on the need to reassess and assert the performance of the organisation so far. This has become urgent in the face of two new agendas;

(a) the contemporary ideological unipolarity of the world, and
(b) the challenges of Europe '92 and beyond to Africa.

The consequences of the consolidation of these two new agendas is envisaged to be disadvantageous to the collective security of ECOWAS member States and Africans[17]. Hence a timely reassessment of ECOWAS and subsequently OAU to design strategies to respond to the challenges posed by these two new agendas becomes very pertinent.

After the Liberian war began in 1989, it quickly engaged the attention of leaders and peoples across the West African sub-region. Given both the scope of the tragedy in which Liberia was becoming engulfed, and the implications of the conflict for sub-regional security and indeed for the pride and dignity of Africa and the black race, a broad consensus emerged within the region that the situation needed to be arrested. It must be recalled that at the time this nightmare was unfolding, the rest of the world, though saddened by its gory details, was seemingly so pre-occupied

with developments else where that it was not persuaded to commit either human or material resources to the Liberian cause. It was therefore left to the leaders and peoples of West Africa in particular and Africans in general, to assist their Liberian brothers and sisters in stopping the senseless carnage and restoring peace to that unfortunate country. In response to the desperate pleas of the traumatised majority of Liberians, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS initiated a mediation process which in August 1990, culminated in the formation and deployment of a sub-regional peace monitoring group, ECOMOG.

We are aware that ECOMOG's constitution, mandate and activities have been subject of some controversy, over these four years. While the views on ECOMOG were generally well intentioned, some of the arguments were unfortunately based on inaccurate information, misconceptions of the various interests involved, and incomplete appreciation of the totality of issues - political, diplomatic, economic, military - at stake.[18] This study therefore, also seeks to provide a concise but detailed documentation of West Africa's response to the Liberian tragedy. As such, it is a timely and important analysis of an issue of continuing international concern.

Finally, this study will add to existing literature on the subject area of collective security in general and specifically to West Africa and the African region.

1.4 Critical Review of the Literature

A review of the relevant literature shows that even while the system was initially on trial, writers had started attacking the basic principles of collective security.

Lippman's[19] objection against the system is that the principle of collective security is the custodian of status quo. It ignores the problem of peaceful change. Even if status quo is just, collective security enlarges the area of conflict. "It is not only unworkable but an unwise and dangerous principle. Every war becomes a world war. It makes war universal". Hence the theory of collective security is self-contradictory. It can only produce that strange and menacing paradox of "perpetual war for perpetual peace." Collective security is dangerous also because it makes nations dependent upon it in vain. An inadequate collective security system, Lippman contends, "is worse than no security at all". It is not collective and does not bring about security. He insisted that collective security may be a pitfall for the naive and unwary rather than a bulwark for the strong and the free. If a nuclear power is directly involved in a particular dispute any collective security action will only usher in a third world war.

Lippman's last contention to us seems an exaggeration as experience has shown that nuclear arsenals have only served a 'deterrence role' in world politics.

Claude[20] points out that collective security is not unrealistic about power, it is unrealistic about policy. The ineffectiveness of the collective security system is not due to the system itself but to the lack of determination of member states to implement the charter provisions.

In the case of ECOWAS and our case study, the ECOMOG, this seems a reasonable contention, the only discrepancy being that the policy ineffectiveness derives from external intervention.

Certain individual writers also suggested collective security arrangements. For instance, Pitt[21] suggested in 1805 that all major European powers should jointly support a new status quo against "any future attempt to trouble the general tranquility." The idea of collective security is generally taken to have started in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Roosevelt[22], declared in 1902 that "it was incumbent on all civilised and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world." A league of peace was formed consequently.

Wilson[23], as the key figure behind the movement for a project for collective enforcement of peace, also contributed numerous positive articles to the literature.

Ogwu[24] viewed collective security from the perspective of

regionalism. She argued that a significant trend in international relations has been the serious efforts made by diverse regions of the world to establish lasting frameworks for trade, economic and security co-operation among them. Claiming that since world war two, the number of regional security arrangements has increased astronomically. In Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, major military as well as non-military regional groupings have proliferated. She described regionalism as the halfeay house between the nation-state and a world not ready to become one. According to her, in Africa, and particularly the West African sub-region, there is a growing perception of regionalism as the greatest hope of achieving the viability and stability that is essential for survival. "This concept of community formation seems to have a demonstration effect on other states in the international arena, but it is also significant that the majority of States prefer the concept of functionalism in their regional interactions." She explained that functionalism must be in terms of fulfilling specific technical and functional needs, cutting across national boundaries and thus creating a web of interdependence that gradually diminishes the potential of states for conflict.

This contribution is commendable for its attempt to coin out the essential linkage between economic development and regional security.

Musa[25], contended that the dynamics of modern statehood demand that nations get into one form of association or another, the idea of a State existing in isolation of other States being outdated. He argued that the sovereignty of states is enhanced if they are members of Unions for mutual advancement in the economic, political and social spheres. Attributing the marked increase in the number of international institutions for co-ordination and cooperation inspite of the variances in the national interests of States to this argument, he posited that the need for international cooperation in achieving national security goals is a major factor in the current re-union of the two erstwhile ideological blocks. Having blamed Africa's security problems largely to the incidence of colonial, industrial and superpower intervention, he noted that one of the areas third world countries in general, and African nations in particular, can practice absolute independence is defence.

He perhaps conceived this view because, these countries have common boundaries with one another. Moreover, they can avoid crisis by always being at round table conferences to resolve problems. Where trouble is imposed on any member country, other countries will rally round to bring the matter to a decisive conclusion. He concluded that they can achieve his proposed understanding by coming together under the umbrella of an international organ to which they should agree to surrender some part of their sovereignty.

Babangida[25], suggested that the quest for peace and stability in West African countries and indeed in the whole continent of Africa is of paramount interest to all of us, insisting that peace and stability is a pre-condition for regional security. He noted that, many countries in Africa are plural societies; statism, ethnicity, tribalism, localism, religion, secret societies and cults, and sometimes economic and other interest groups represent actual or potential threats to internal law and order, lives and property, stability and orderly development. Rather than condemn ourselves to the destabilising activities of these interests, he argues that we should put in place collective policies and measures, (under the platform of the ECOWAS and subsequently OAU), aimed at harnessing their energies for building a strong and virile region. Indeed, he noted, "Colonisation of Africa and the consequent pillage of its human and material bases for development clearly indicates that our ability for addressing the problem of nation-building has been severely decapitated from the beginning". According to him, this explains in part, why a combination of external and internal threats has rendered African Countries powerless to fully confront the problem of nation-building. He then suggested that the problems of how to satisfy the aspirations of our peoples, build a strong and viable social community and at the same time defend our sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are inextricably intertwined in collective security efforts.

This line of argument is not unexpected from President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, a prime mover of an ECOWAS intervention force in Liberia.

Nwachukwu[27], in defending the ECOMOG initiative as a collective security arrangement wrote that, "we did what we did to protect the dignity of the black man and to ensure the security of our region." He argued that "no responsible government would allow the wanton destruction and the fratricidal conflict in Liberia to continue without doing something about it." Having claimed that our mission in Liberia is within the context of our foreign policy, he concluded that peace being a pre-requisite for democracy, the United Nation must intensify efforts to mediate.

Arguments such as this may be reasonable especially viewed against the background of our socio-economic problems, but Nwachukwu's position could be interpreted to mean that Nigeria and the ECOWAS are growing weary of further involvement. This position could send the wrong signals both in the region and internationally, consequently inducing more foreign intervention.

Aguda[28], in his own contribution says ECOMOG, rather than providing collective security is intervention. What indeed worried Aguda was the possible adverse legal and political implications of the formation and operation of ECOMOG in Liberia. He observed that while recent events in Liberia have brought into focus the

intervention in the domestic affairs of independent states, the treaty establishing ECOWAS does not set down any rule of non-intervention by member states. He argued that the principle of international sovereignty must be the very foundation of international relations, and it is upon that principle that the other principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is founded. Afterall, he said, the United Nation through its General Assembly resolution 21311 (1965) and 2625 (1970) has clearly enunciated the principle of non-intervention.

Considering the humanitarian justification for ECOMOG, and the implications of a spill-out of a worsening Liberian crisis to the security of the sub-region and subsequently entire African region, we think Aguda's arguments can be punctured. This may be further consolidated by item C of ECOWAS protocol relating to defence, signed on 29 May 1981.[29]

Odinkalu[30], wrote that right from inception ECOMOG was a misnomer in concept and nomenclature. For one, a force composed of soldiers from only five West African countries is grossly unrepresentative of an ECOWAS of sixteen countries and did not deserve to go under a tag suggesting a mandate from the regional group. He argued that the fact that such a mandate was lacking, has led to a division in the ship of ECOWAS that was until recently, enjoying a relatively safe sail. Odinkalu while making his arguments that ECOMOG has no basis in law, precedent or expediency, claimed that in all

fathomable respects, it is a grand assault on the foundations of international relations. He pushed this view with the argument that Liberia was not the first of its kind in these parts. Before it, we had Biafra and Congo. In Africa we have Angola and Eritrea, and recently Rwanda. In other parts of the globe, we can count Cambodia and, of course, 'evergreen' Lebanon. Arguing that none of these has spawned anything resembling ECOMOG, he insisted that all illusions about the mission of ECOMOG must have been exploded by its recent assumption of a combative posture.

Though Odinkalu's point on the unrepresentativeness of ECOMOG based on the fact that only five ECOWAS countries initially sent troops may be admitted on the basis that ECOWAS actions, by charter agreement, should only apply when ratified by a consensus of all member countries, it should be noted that other West African countries have since identified with ECOMOG. On the other hand, his claim that ECOMOG is a grand assault on the foundations of international relations is questionable, giving the fact that collective security arrangements have been in vogue since the beginning of the twentieth century, while the need for regional organisations which bear them is even recognised in articles 33 and 52-54 of the United Nations charter.

Contributing to the literature, with particular reference to the case study, Fawole[31], wrote that the decision by any nation or sub-regional group to intervene in a foreign crisis or situation should

ordinarily be predicated on a number of related factors. Important among these is the decision makers 'diagnosis' of the crisis situation in the target country. This means a proper analysis and understanding of the crisis, its dynamics, its implications for sub-regional or regional politics and security, and significance for the intervening country or group itself. It is this careful diagnosis that should precede the decision whether to intervene or not. Though he noted that time, for prolonged diagnosis may be a scarce commodity for the decision-making unit before action is actually contemplated, there are other variables one may consider tangential to a successful military intervention in a foreign crisis. These include the possession by the intervening countries of military manpower, fire power, naval and airlift capability not just sufficient for its defence and security requirements alone but in abundance for deployment in foreign operations. These must be adequate not only to guarantee the success of the initial intervention but to sustain it over a long period of time in the case of a protracted war or crisis. Considering the foregoing analytical requirements and the subsequent stalemate for so long, he wondered what ECOMOG has really been doing in Liberia.

Though Fawole's proposals are quite significant with respect to their strategic and decision-making values, the insistence on the term "foreign crisis" when one is specifically writing about Liberia to ECOWAS relationship is misleading.

Proof of the enormous growth in the literature available on collective security and examples of collective security arrangements is advancing fast. However, by focusing attention on the ECOMOG, a recent instrument, with the prospects of continuing international concern, this study also aims to add a new dimension to existing literature on collective security efforts.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

This thesis is borne out of the curiosity and belief that the underdevelopment and dependency theory in political science is not a prerogative of economic analysis alone, as portrayed by most of its original proponents. Evidence abound to prove that, in addition to the fact that all economically oriented analysis, of necessity have security implications, the various models of the underdevelopment and dependency theory can indeed be more suitable for analysing the insecurity of the less developed countries in general and the African region in particular.

Inspite of the limitations of the Underdevelopment and Dependency Theory (UDT), it is still gaining currency as a theoretical framework in the study of social formations among third world scholars. It must be remarked here that, this UDT perspective of underdevelopment is largely derived from Marxism; but those who have adopted it and contributed to it include 'non-marxists, 'neo-marxists as well as Marxists of different shades of beliefs. Thus

prominent among the exponents of this theory are: A.G. Frank, Paul Baran, Samin Amin, Dos Santos, John Saul, I. Wallerstein, C. Leys and so on[32].

Given the above remarks about the UDT, the subsequent analysis will examine its emergence, followed by the major arguments about underdevelopment and dependency situation of the Third World. Afterwards, we will examine and analyse the shortcomings of the various perspectives. By the time this is done the relevance of this political economy approach in understanding the pitiful circumstance of contemporary Africa will be apparent.

This theory has emerged because of the inadequacies of the modernisation theory, otherwise called liberal or conventional theory of development. It became apparent and forceful just after the world war II in 1945. Some of the major proponents of this theory includes W.W.Rostow, Gabriel Almond, Robert Ward, Samuel P. Huntington, David Apter, Karl Deutch, T. Parson, David Mclelland and a host of others. The inadequacies of this theory is borne out of the fact that they are parochial and Eurocentric in explaining the underdevelopment and dependency predicament of the Third world countries following their independence from colonial powers. According to their varied theories in resume, they attribute the predicaments of the Third world countries to the following factors among others: dearth of capital and technological know-how; over-emphasis on primordial interests; poor political culture; weak

political institutions; tribalism; over-population; and so on. Therefore, they argue that for these poor countries to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment and dependency, they would need foreign aids, capital, technology and apart from instituting democratic institutions, democratic values and ideals would have to be imbibed. That they need Western education, also that they will have to cultivate savings habit and so on.

An intriguing thing about these modernisation theories is that they do not only embody the dominant relationships of advanced capitalist societies, but are largely sterile analytical tools for understanding what is happening in the third world countries. Similarly, the liberal theorists fails to distinguish clearly the competing interests at stake in the third world, neither did they make antagonisms between them into central focus of enquiry. These are some of the holes picked in their theories by the UDT. This reaction led to the popularity of the UDT as championed by the Latin American Scholars, some of whom we have earlier mentioned above.

Therefore, contrary to the conventional theory postulations, the UDT advanced the following argument about the causes and implications of the underdevelopment and dependency of the third world[33].

Foremost, they submit that one can only understand the predicaments of the Third world, and particularly Africa, the unit of our analysis, if only we go back to history. Historically, they said, the contemporary crisis are due to the incorporation of the Third World into world capitalist system over several centuries through slavery and colonialism. Imperialism, they said, structured and is still structuring their economies in a way that they continually reproduced poverty, inequalities, and above all political and economic subordination to the interests of western capital. Suffice to allude to A. Gunder Frank's opinion; according to him this issue in question can only be fathomed within the context of the rapport between the industrialised countries which he called 'Metropoles' and the less industrialised countries which he referred to as 'Satellites'. The former exploited and is exploiting the latter extracting surplus and capital. Thus it is the dearth of capital in the satellites that he said caused our underdevelopment. In addition, he opined that, the kind of unequal relationship that exist between the metropoles and the satellites also exists within the satellites. This he refers to as satellites - satellites relationship. Thus using the empirical case of Brazil that witnessed little development in the world war I era of 1914 - 18, when America was busy prosecuting the war, there was lesser exploitation. On this basis, he said that development will only take place in the satellites, if their relationship is severed. Frank is a frontline UDT theorist[34].

Still in the same vein, Walter Rodney, though emotional in his argument, submits by showing the mechanisms in which colonialism was orchestrated in the third world, Africa in particular. He identified instruments such as monetization, unequal exchange, establishment of indigenous institutions and structures that facilitated imperialist goals. So he said, prior to colonialism, "the Third World economic base was only undeveloped and not underdeveloped". Therefore, he distinguished an underdeveloped situation from an undeveloped one[35].

Samin Amin, according to his views which other UDT theorists shared, is that third world which he referred to as the periphery is underdeveloped because of the lack of autocentric economic base, that is self-centred. And also because of the roles of the unproductive national bourgeoisie, also called the compradorial class. It is also a weak class that is dependent on the foreign bourgeoisie for its productive capacity. Moreover, that the accumulation at the periphery is patterned to the advantage of the industrialised countries which he called the centre. This international economic order he posited is not in the interest of the periphery. So that any attempt to develop along the capitalist line is doomed because the road to autocentric capitalism is blocked[36].

Furthermore, the arguments of most UDT theorists also echoed themselves in that of Paul Baran; using the empirical experience of

the way the British capital systematically destroyed the small scale textile industries of India between 1780-1850. He observed that whenever capitalism entered any nation under the supervision of the imperialists, it transformed the country from the producer of manufactured goods to producer of agricultural produce. This happened in Africa too, where their economies are made to be externally oriented. He discussed the roles of the multinational companies in the extraction of surplus value, an action which result to the disarticulation of the economies. That is to say that there is lack of intersectoral linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Put differently that there was no forward and backward linkages. The agricultural and mining sectors in the satellites feed the industries of the metropoles with raw materials, which are onward processed into manufactured consumer goods or capital goods for export to the periphery. Implicitly, the industrial sector depends on the metropoles for technology, finance capital and the know-how. It is in this vein, that Baran opined that capitalist development in the periphery is blocked. It is because of this, that himself and some others advocate the view that the third world should delink from the western capitalism for socialism[37], which recently is being submerged by the world system.

It is at this juncture, that we will want to submit that, the foregoing presentation of the views and aspirations of scholars like A. G. Frank, W. Rodney, Samin Amin and P. Baran are simply the

summary of the views of other UDT scholars on the issue of underdevelopment and dependency. Their various theses such as the Block Thesis (P. Baran); Centre-periphery (S. Amin); Satellite-Metropoles (A. G. Frank); Internal Colonialism (F. Gonzalez Cazanova); New Dependency (Dos Santos); Sub-Imperialism(Ruy M. Marini); World System (I. Wallerstein); Neo-Colonialism (Kwame Nkrumah), etc, are all encapsulated in the analysis above.

Despite the beauty and incisive arguments postulated by the UDT theorists on the causes of third world predicaments, bourgeois social scientists and orthodox marxists have thrown spanner into their theories, just as the UDT scholars earlier did to theirs. The criticisms can be grouped both at the level of theory and practice. I start first with the theoretical criticisms[38].

The UDT argument has been punctured at the conceptualisation level. The critics argue that the conceptualisation of underdevelopment and dependency are ambiguous, because the indicators are not properly defined. Third world countries though are generally underdeveloped, their stages or level of underdevelopment differs. One cannot equate the underdevelopment of either Brazil, India or even Taiwan with that of Nigeria, Ghana or Sudan. This means that the character of their dependency varies.

Similarly, the exploited class is not apparent in the context of the relations between the centre and the periphery. The critics

ask the question, whether the classes in the periphery are equally exploited by the centre. They also query whether the petty-bourgeoisie themselves do not exploit the underprivileged classes in the periphery.

Moreso, it is criticised for using polemical-crude concepts such as centre-periphery and metropoles - satellite. The critics indict them for mere reversion of the liberal theorists concepts of modern and traditional. Hence they accuse them of lack of originality and ingenuity.

The UDT has been criticised for not properly differentiating the modes of production, i.e. Feudalism and Capitalism. They disagree with the attempts to 'blackmail' capitalism as the only exploitative mode of production; thus they assert that there was exploitation in feudalism too. Both modes exploit surplus value.

The UDT postulation is also faulted because of the disembodied and disjointed manner in which they discuss imperialism.

Similarly, the thrust of the concepts of underdevelopment and dependency are also said to be the same, in so far as it focus on the consequences of imperialism - colonisation on the Third world countries.

Theoretically, it is also being criticised for being economistic, a view which I strongly uphold. Also that it conceives the development of capitalism in the West as basically stemming from the exploitation of the resources of the periphery, and not as a result of the fundamental roles of labour in capitalist development. This is because, the UDT ignores social classes, state, ideology and politics of the underdeveloped nations.

Finally, on the theoretical criticisms, is that the UDT over emphasis the external causes of underdevelopment more than the internal factors. Put differently, the UDT magnify the contradictions between the metropoles and the satellites, while they down play the contradictions between the ruling class and the oppressed. They failed to take into account those structures that obstructs the development of productive forces - the indigenous structures like Feudalism, attitudes, values etc.

We now look at the empirical criticisms[39]. This can be seen in their inability to explain why there is capitalist development in Taiwan, South Korea, and not in other third world countries. This shortcoming is borne out of their pessimism about the possibility of capitalist development in the third world. Infact, scholars like Raufu Mustapha, in his Block Thesis of Kano; Ralp Kaplinsky, Steven Langdon, on the Kenya Debate; have identified some indigenous bourgeoisie capable of bringing about capitalist development. These empirical evidences have punctured the UDT

pessimism.

The foregoing criticisms advanced by both the bourgeois social scientists and orthodox marxists can be summarised as such: The former see the UDT as a dangerous scepter that has to be exorcised, for it admitting the necessity of revolution. The later criticised them for de-emphasising internal contradictions and class struggle, and for wanting to delink from imperialism without revolution.

Before we discuss some credits that have been adduced to the UDT, it is imperative to re-criticise some of the criticisms. Firstly, some of the methodological problems identified with the theory, particularly at the level of concepts can be explained away as resulting from the fluidity of an evolving theory.

And the argument that, the UDT focus more on the expropriation of resources, as the motor of capitalist development, as against the exploitation of labour in the periphery, is weak. The idea is implicit in the theory.

Also, the UDT do not advocate aurtarky, rather it advocates that if the periphery cannot completely break away from the centre, they should redefine their relation, at least in the security sector, where I had earlier mentioned that African countries could exercise absolute independence.

Contrary to the low opinion of Colin Leys on UDT, it is not only a theory of underdevelopment but that which is capable of gradually liquidating underdevelopment.

We now examine some of the credits of the UDT. In the first instance, the theory or perspective offered the advantage of dealing with specifics. They have been able to reduce the high level of abstraction of orthodox marxism applying it to the periphery. That is to say they explained how imperialism handicaps the development of the Third World.

Also, the relevance of this theory can be seen in that, issues highlighted are those of concern and interest to the articulate sections of the third world countries. The scholars are those who want to transform the developmental aspirations of their people to reality.

The theory is popular also because of the highly conspicuous overlordship of the United States. It must be submitted here that the criticism earlier discussed, rather than destroy the theory have helped it to acquire self-definition and prominence at the expense of the political economy approach in Latin America, and to some extent in Africa[40].

So far, it is apparent that the foregoing discussion of the theses and anti-theses of the UDT, have themselves underscored the

contributions of the theory in comprehending the crisis of contemporary Africa. While this is a fact, it is still expedient to analyse the nature and dimension in which the predicaments or crisis of Africa have assumed today, before we can make any evaluative judgement of the relevance of the theory to the security and political economy of Africa. This analysis Julius Ihonvbere has done.

According to Ihonvbere, Western Imperialism, has not only distorted, disarticulated and underdeveloped the African continent, it also ensured its structured incorporation into, and peripheralisation in the international division of labour. A process that was achieved, among other means, through monetization, unequal exchange, westernization etc., and over the years have produced the following consequences which continue to determine the content and direction of politics and society. Viz:

> "Creation of an unstable and unhegemonic state; creation of decadent, dependent and largely unproductive bourgeoisie; a dependent private sector; dependence of African States on the production and exportation of a narrow range of cash crops for foreign exchange earnings; dependence on cash crops; vulnerability of price fluctuations due to the tactics of multinational corporations and their home governments; scientific and technological backwardness; dependence on foreign aids to sponsor developmental projects and reliance on foreign experts domination of the economy vertically integrated and profit seeking transnational corporations; deepening process of rural-urban dislocation; articulation of modes of production and exchange cultural alienation and the use of coercion to reproduce

> the domination of society by the local ruling class. Other consequences includes debt crisis, food crisis, unemployment, poverty, ignorance, social and cultural inequalities, insecurity and instability etc."[41]

Given this graphic picture of Africa's predicament, one would agree that the permutations or combination of the consequences of underdevelopment cum imperialism can be explained, even in its collective security perspectives, using the UDT as an analytical tool despite the shortcomings earlier identified.

Also, having noted the criticisms to the UDT, it is our opinion that, development whether economic, political, social, structural, or otherwise require self-oriented and regional approach. Development based on dependency and capitalism linked with imperialist economy has not been healthy for Africa. What Africa therefore requires is ideal development free from any outside hegemony. Moreover, since regional development can not be divorced from regional peace and stability, all the arguments that have been adduced must of necessity consider their relevant security connotations.

1.6 Methodology

The methodology of any discipline includes the rules of interpretation and criteria for admissible explanation, together with its data gathering techniques and data processing routines[42].

Put more clearly, the methodology refers to the "how to do it" phase of a social research, for it spells out in clear and unambiguous terms the population to be studied, the kind of sampling plan to be adopted and the size of the sample drawn. It also indicates the type of instruments to be used for data gathering (e.g. questionnaires, interviews, observation, content analysis, analysis of secondary sources etc.), the statistical technique to be employed if any (e.g. gamma, Lambda, qui-que etc.) and, the type of tabular presentation - graphs, tables, charts, figures etc. In addition, methodology specifies how the investigators intend to test their propositions, study the people, or describe the social setting[43].

The focus on the subject of collective security is dictated by the fact that information on the sub-regional organisation known as ECOWAS and the evolution of our study unit, the ECOMOG are available and "accessible" in such sources as relevant textbooks; which of course, may and often times have culminated from the researches carried out by the authors. Others are journals, magazines, newspapers, official documents and other unpublished papers and documents.

Basically therefore, this study is based on the method of library research, but we moved a step further by conducting informal interviews and discussions to complement our main sources. In this regard we visited the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja and the Ministry

of Defence, Lagos, as well as the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and spoke with a few officials, from which exercise some insight was gained. We also sought, when we found necessary, the opinion of informed personalities on the subject area. In this respect, the contributions of my colleagues who were "on the ground" in Liberia, is invaluable. To this end therefore, our sources of data collection are both primary and secondary.

As the basic method employed is the historical - descriptive method of research, the logical analysis, which is concerned with the relationship between a conclusion and the evidence given to support it will be adopted. We have also sought to strengthen our analysis by making reference to foreign schemes which serve to illustrate our arguments better. Such schemes as the challenge of Europe '92 and beyond to the security of Africa; and the role of the OAU in the emergent New World Order under the United Nations Organisation (UNO).

The construct type of validity as a concept of measurement or testing is adopted throughout the work[11]. This is because, as in this case, construct validity is a concept that is useful in research in areas where knowledge is so limited that the usual kinds of interim measures such as, predictive, concurrent and content validities, are of little value.

Tabular presentations in the form of tables and figures will be applied where necessary.

Finally, no researcher in a field so replete with complexities, ethical problems and historical consequences as collective security could fail to reflect certain biases in his analysis. Even the most objective scholar is partly a prisoner of his experiences, the values predominant in his society, and the myths, traditions and stereotypes that permeate his nation and environment. As an African soldier therefore, one can not deny the influences caused by professional biases and peculiar cultural perspectives, in the adoption of a theoretical framework - UDT, and in certain inferences. However, such biases have consciously been reduced to the barest minimum.

1.7 Organisational Framework

The remaining part of this work is organised into four chapters:

Chapter two, takes an overview of ECOWAS by looking at foreign interests and the history of integration in West Africa. This is considered relevant because afterall, collective security is only an aspect of integrative schemes and moreover, the platform for this study is the ECOWAS as a regional body. Consequently, we have considered the factors that led to the formation of the ECOWAS; its aims and objectives; institutions and structures and finally an

assessment of its collective security initiatives in 18 years.

Chapter three, chronicles the case study by taking a detailed insight into the crisis in Liberia and ECOMOG.

Chapter four, which is titled -"Dependency and the ECOMOG Thesis" is the analytical chapter and thus deals with the political and economic aspects of the problem of collective security in Africa. Here a background study of the nature of the history, economics and politics of the African region is given, with focus on the exogenous factors that affected the regional peace keeping and peace enforcement efforts of the ECOMOG in Liberia, especially dependency. It also proposes Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist doctrines on the basis of OAU as a way forward.

Chapter five, which is the final chapter and titled - "Africa and International Security in the 2000s", makes a summary of the whole study and generally analyses the issues raised from a global perspective. It then concludes with the findings of the work, especially as they relate to the African region. Finally, some recommendations are made, taking note of the issues raised, on how to effectively address the challenges of African security and international peace in the emergent New World Order.

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CHAPTER TWO

ECOWAS: AN OVERVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

> "... you can not meaningfully talk about economic cooperation and integration by itself without also relating to the underpinning of political stability within the sub-region. The two are inseparable and therefore have to be discussed inter alia"[1]

This chapter takes an overview of ECOWAS. Doing this will afford us the opportunity of examining the situation in West Africa before the formation of ECOWAS; what led to its formation; its aims and objectives; the institutional structures of the organisation and an assessment of its collective security initiatives since establishment.

2.1 Background

The region referred to as West Africa itself has been very difficult to delineate. Different delimitations of the region's boundaries have at different times been given. The term West Africa has come by convention to be applied to a relatively restricted region in the north-west of the continent.

To the west and south, it is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean; to the north by the edges of the Sahara desert; while its eastern

boundaries have not been properly defined. However, it is usually taken as the frontier line drawn in 1919 between the French and British Cameroon from the Lake Chad to the Coast opposite Fanando Po.[2]

The territory extends roughly from 5^0 to 25^0 north latitude and longitude 17^0 west to 15^0 east. In all, it covers about 43,200,000 kilometres; from its western to eastern extremes is about 31,500 km while its north to south distance is over 24,300 kilometres.

Its most recent delineation was that by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). According to the ECA,the pragmatic approach to possible economic development in Africa would better be achieved through the creation of sub-regions that took into consideration geographical contiguity, ethnic and social factors. This was informed by the United Nation's (UN) usage of the term region, by which the African continent is regarded as a region. Therefore a sub-region would consist of any given group of countries that lie within the geographical area of the African region. Thus based on economic, social and political conditions in Africa as early as the 1960s, the ECA recommended the division of the African continent into five sub-regions - East, Central, South, North and West. Following this, presently 16 countries which are geographically contiguous make up the West African sub-region. These are; Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Sierra Leone,

Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.[3]

During the precolonial times, this area was inhabited by many people and erstwhile Kingdoms and empires, like the Mossi, the Hausa, the Soninke, the Malinke, the Bambara, the Songhai, the Kanuri, the Wallof etc., around the Savannah belt, while other small city states like the Opobos, the Nembe and the Ijaws prospered around the Tropical rainforest belt to the Coast.

History is replete with evidence confirming that there was a lot of interaction and boundary crossing activities between the peoples of this area because of the trade which flourished before the advent of colonialism. However, Ezenwe[4], is of the opinion that the introduction of slave trade in the 16th century due to the discovery of the Americas destroyed the earliest chances of the evolution and development of large scale economic units. This was coupled by the African opposition and resistance which started crumbling in the face of a concerted European invasion, which eventually culminated into colonialism, through the scramble for and later partition of Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. Thus as far as West Africa was concerned, it was rather a game of monopoly with France and Britain as the only serious contestants which eventually resulted in the division of West Africa into two dominant territories: British West Africa and French West Africa, with portugal retaining only a very small portion for itself - the Lusophone states of Guinea-Bissau and Cape

Verde.

Colonialism was therefore to have a lasting impact on the underdevelopment and development and subsequently dependence of what is now known as West Africa. This picture was illustrated by Crowther as follows:

> "Looking at the Colonial period, we may ponder the fact that probably the most enduring mark left by Europe on Africa has been the creation of new political units, ... which completely changed the map of Africa. In West Africa, these Units almost unaltered, have formed the basis of new independent states".[5]

During colonialism, Britain and France, the imperial powers which divided most of West Africa among themselves ran their territories in a manner which was later to have profound influence in the formation of regional integration schemes and collective security efforts before the formation of ECOWAS. The French colonial policy was based on the theory of assimilation which saw the French colonies as part and parcel of imperial France and were thus administered on the basis of Federalism; with a central administrative body, thus forming the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF), which immensely helped the course of integration among French West African colonies and between them and Metropolitan France. French West Africa was therefore not integrated only administratively but also in the economic and cultural sense. In addition to a common currency, there was tremendous uniformity of the impact of the French language and culture, which enabled this

sector of the West African sub-region to hang together as a distant cultural, if not political zone.[6]

Accordingly, in British West Africa, though administration was more decentralised, still there were some form of inter-state integration, despite the fact that the territories were not geographically contiguous. There was the West African Court of Appeal, the West African Currency Board, the West African Marketing Board and the West African Airways.

Despite the fact that colonialism ensured that no formal integration of the British and French territories came into being, there were however a series of intercolonial state relations based on diplomatic agreements and associations such as the Anglo-French Consultative commission which was later instituted; while there were also other informal yet very important exchange of visits and rendezvous on a reciprocal basis between the British and French colonial administrators on both sides of their boundaries.

Again, there were other aspects of the circumstances of West Africa, which did not permit the Anglo-French administrations to be mutually exclusive. This has to do with strong historical, ethnological and cultural links and economic co-operation activities between the people of West Africa on both sides of the inter-colonial state boundaries. As a result of these, colonial boundaries were porous and flexible enough to permit continued

intercourse across borders, since many borders were arbitrarily drawn and therefore dividing peoples of the same ethnic compositions like the Yoruba, the Ewe, the Ashanti, the Bariba, the Hausa, the Wollof and the Mossi, into so many territorial boundaries.[7] Thus movement of people across these new boundaries became inevitable and therefore rendered somewhat ineffective the boundaries as dividing lines.

2.2 Pre-ECOWAS West Africa

It was in recognition of the above, that certain opinions[8] hold that attempts at integration in West Africa predate the independence of West African States in the 1960s, as can be seen from the existence of interlocking economic arrangements among states in the sub-region, such as bilateral trade agreements, preferential arrangements, functional and institutional co-operation schemes, commodity development schemes and monetary co-operation arrangements.

The thought of initiating integration schemes has persisted with varying degrees of enthusiasm, but has not been able to garner the support of states to the magnitude the ECOWAS covers. This was because of colonialism which balkanished the sub-region, that at independence, newly independent states jealously protected their newly won sovereignty and therefore adopted policies aimed at asserting their independence, which consequently restricted

movements and transactions across borders. Hence at post independence, the integration schemes which came into existence were organised on the basis of the former inter-colonial state boundaries, with the Francophone territories being more responsive to such integration attempts; of course, with the full support and encouragement of France, whose interest and to whom most of the advantages of these schemes served useful purposes with regard to maintaining its influence and hegemony especially within Francophone Africa.

Some of the attempts at collective efforts were observed to have been made with the aim of reviving or preserving the pre-independence links whereas others were designed with a view to building new political alliances via commercial and economic cooperation agreements reached.[9] One of the earliest integration attempts was the union Douaniere Afrique de L'Ouest (UDAO), or the West African Customs Union. It was established on the 9th of June 1959. Members included Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey (now Benin), Mauritania, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger and Mali. It was described as a loose economic union, which had no secretariat and depended largely on bilateral agreements.[10] It was beset by numerous problems among which were the differing levels of development of the member states; coordinating investment policies and rivalry between member states - especially Ivory Coast and Senegal. As a result, the Union failed to make any significant impact on the member States. However, due to the inherent

weaknesses of the union, the members met in Paris in 1966, to seek ways of establishing a more viable union. The meeting culminated into the replacement of the UDAO with a new one - Union Douaniere' des etats de L'Afrique de L'Quest (UDEAO). The UDEAO, though an improvement upon the defunct UDAO, was described as a far looser economic grouping, tied together by a Council of Ministers, a Committee of experts and a Secretariat in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso".

The UDEAO, had as its central interest, the creation of a system in which special tax credits to member states were the sole incentive to intra-regional trade. The union scarcely justified the hopes of its founders and its failure was attributed to internal and external factors which weakened its objectives - Ivory Coast and its "Entente" partners, Niger and Burkina Faso discriminated against UDEAO members and hence drew a lot of criticisms from them (UDEAO members) especially Mali, which belonged to the rival organisation of the Senegal River States (OERS) and did not have comparable processing and marketing facilities. Hence with some justification, Mali complained that this discriminatory arrangement was contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of the UDEAO. The Communaute Economique de L'Afrique de L'Quest (CEAO) was then formed in 1973, at the instance and suggestion of President Moussa Traore of Mali, to replace the defunct UDEAO, after the ratification of the Bamako protocol. Its membership is drawn from six States - Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and

Burkina Faso. Benin which endorsed the preliminary Bamako Accord, refused to sign the final treaty at Abidjan, instead demanding for an observer status, while Togo never signed either the Bamako protocol nor the Abidjan Treaty. Guinea, had of course, since independence cut off all links with the A.O.F., and therefore had no business being in CEAO.

The CEAO is not a full scale customs union, but an organised exchange trade through it precipitated the evolution into a customs union by 1986; its aim being to create a free trading zone among French West African countries with its foundation on the Franc Zone and the Yaounde-type of association with the European Economic Community (EEC). At its present stage, it is best described as a preferential trade area (pta), that is in principle, free for products and partially liberalised by granting tariff preferences and by elimination of non-tariff barriers in respect of manufactured goods.[12] Compared with the unions it succeeded, it is less ambitious in orientation and more realistic in structure; it is smaller and hence looks more manageable. The CEAO is seen as a French speaking rebuff to an all embracing West African Economic Community and to stale Nigeria's moves towards that direction as well as to counter-balance Nigeria's political and economic weight in the sub-region.

In 1986, a big financial scandal rocked the organisation popularly referred to as the "Diawara Affair", during which one time Ivorian

Minister Mohammed Diawara, former CEAO Secretary-General Moussa Ngom and Moussa Diakite, ex-CEAO fund (Fonds de solidarite et d' intervention pour Le development de La Communaute) (FOSIDEC) director, were accused and found guilty of embezzling 6.5 billion CFA Francs earmarked for the fund's operation. These events have seriously affected the functioning of the organisation, which has therefore remained in hybernation for some time.[13]

An integration effort worth mentioning is the Couseil de L'Entente, spearheaded by President Felix Houphouet Boigny and formed the same time as the UDAO in 1959. It is a political and economic grouping which also envisages the eventual establishment of a customs union. It was made up of four members - Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin, Togo joined later in 1966. The Entente hardly fits into any formal definition of integration scheme but is looked upon as an informal instrument for the coordination of politico-economic policies based on self-interest and it is highly personalised by the figure of Boigny, whose consistent support both morally and financially was presumed to be the backbone of the survival of the organisation up to the date of his death on December 7, 1993.

Another scheme is the organisation of Senegal River States (OERS), formed in 1968 with Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal as members. Its objectives were the maintenance of peaceful relation and cooperation among members and the furtherance of economic development through coordinated planning and increased mobility of

goods and persons. Despite the ambitious programmes it planned to execute, the organisation was short-lived as political problems arose between Guinea and the rest of the members, especially Senegal. The main reason for its failure was the fluctuating relationship between Presidents Senghor and Toure. President Toure had frequently refused in the past to attend meetings of Heads of State, the ruling body of the organisation; this attitude hardened into a prolonged and systematic boycott as a result of the portuguese invasion of Conakry in 1970, for which Toure accused Senegal of complicity. In 1972, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal signed the agreement formally scrapping the organisation. However, a new organisation - Organisation pour la Mise en a Leur du Fueve Senegal (OMVS), was formed to succeed the defunct OERS with Senegal, Mali and Mauritania as members. Unlike the OERS, the OMVS, opted for less ambitious goals with one over-riding economic objective: the planning and development of the Senegal River Basin and the construction of two dams to be completed in 1980 - one in Senegal and the other in Mali.

So far, only integration schemes at the general level have been highlighted and they seem to be largely restricted to the Francophone countries. This, as has earlier on been mentioned, has to do with the geographical contiguity of these countries and furthermore their subscription to a common language and a common monetary zone - "the Franc", further enhanced by the formation of the West African Monetary Union (Union Monetaire Quest Africaine:

UMOA), and the Central Bank of French West Africa (Banque Centrale des Etats de L'Afrique de L' Quest - BCEAO).

For the Anglophone countries, although as earlier mentioned, there were integration schemes that brought them together, such as the West African Currency Board (WACB), the West African Airways (WAA) and the West African Marketing Board (WAMB), they all lost their importance when Ghana gained independence in 1958 and decided to set up institutions based on its national aspirations. Thus the remaining countries - Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, followed suit immediately after they gained independence.

Thus the only Anglophone integration venture before ECOWAS is the Mano River Union (MRU) which comprised of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The MRU was inaugurated in 1973, with the aim of establishing a custom union, with a common external tariff and complete trade liberalisation, for goods of local origin, programmed into two main phases; the first to commence from 1973-77 and the second yet to be fixed. Economic disparities in the members are less wide than in other groupings which may in part explain the absence of compensation for trade liberation even if accompanied by an unmarkedly unbalanced pattern of intra-trade. Furthermore, no radical policy appears to be contemplated as regards common investment code governing the incentives that may be offered foreign investors. Guinea joined the MRU in 1980 and if not for President Toure's diplomatic efforts to mediate between Liberia and

Sierra Leone, Doe's overthrow of President Tolbert seriously threatened the operation of the union, as violent change of government instantly affected the cordial relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Currently, Liberia's civil war is affecting the smooth operation of the union.

There are also other specific groupings which preceded the ECOWAS; these are the River Niger Commission (RNC) formed in 1965 and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBC) established in 1964. The RNC was formed with the sole aim of developing close cooperation of the States for the judicious exploitation of the resources of the River Niger Basin. The Lake Chad Basin was formed in the same light, to seek common means of developing the chad basin. As can be seen from their membership, it is only the RNC (Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Benin, Mali and Nigeria) and the CBC Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) that brought Francophone and Anglophone States together. Although there were efforts made to integrate both sides together, for example, the defunct Ghana-Burkina Faso, Ghana-Guinea, 1959; Ghana-Guinea-Mali, 1959; as well as the West African Trade Area (WATA) formed in 1964 between Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and more recently the Senegal-Gambia (Senegambia) unions, not much breakthrough was achieved because of cultural and linguistic barriers between them. Thus until the formation of ECOWAS, there were not much cooperation activities between the Anglophone and Francophone countries.

2.3 Factors Leading to the Formation of ECOWAS

Several factors have been adduced as leading to the 'coming together' of the Francophone and Anglophone countries. Among them was the awareness that after a decade of independence, there were limitations imposed on national development which was occasioned by restrictive markets; diminishing accessibility to external capital and aid and most importantly reconciliation of rival political leadership within the sub-region. Also among the factors was the contribution of the Lome Convention of February 1975.[14]

According to Ciroma,

> "The emergence of independent African States brought into focus the economic significance of national boundaries which introduced discontinuities in trade, in flows of factors of production and in awareness that most of the African Countries are too small to be able to create modern viable industrial structures within their national frameworks. The problem of enhancing the rate of economic progress and combating poverty, ignorance and disease...soon led to the realisation that the individual efforts of African Countries could not sufficiently induce rapid rates of development necessary to achieve this noble objective. It is now generally recognised that the appropriate strategy for rapid economic development is regional economic integration".[15]

It should be remembered that before this time, the Francophone states saw themselves as more in a world of their own. The same was almost true of the Anglophone. Within the Anglophone countries, there was also the rivalry between Ghana and Nigeria; as

well as Nkrumah's bitter quarrels with the Francophone States. All of these made an all West African integration look very distant. This was worsened by the Francophone countries heavy dependence on metropolitan France; further consolidated by President De Gaule's anti-Anglophone sentiments.

Against this backdrop therefore, perhaps what was even more important to the bringing together of the Anglophone and Francophone countries was the issue of reconciliation of the political leadership of the various unfriendly countries as mentioned earlier. To a large extent, some of the conflicts of leadership of the immediate post - independence period had been resolved. For example, the reconciliation of the Senghor-Houphouet Boigny axis which had hitherto held up economic cohesion in the former French West Africa, by belonging to rival groupings - the Entente and the OMVS respectively. While on the other hand, Ghana after the overthrow of Nkrumah, sought to improve relations with its immediate neighbours - Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin. Its improved relations with its easterly neighbours - Togo and Benin, led to the joint construction of a transmission line and sale of power from the Akosombo Dam. Ghana was also given an observer status in the land transport committee of the "Entente", through the encouragement of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

On the other hand too, there was the salient factor emanating from

the Francophone countries themselves which accelerated closer relations between them and the Anglophones, and hence put the newly formed CEAO cohesion into jeopardy. Benin and Togo refused to endorse the CEAO Treaty on grounds that they had commitments to their neighbours and principal trading partners, Nigeria and Ghana. Togo in particular, was more interested in creating a wider regional organisation with Nigeria. Niger also expressed strong reservations about the CEAO, saying "it would be unrealistic to set up any West African Economic Community without the participation of the English Speaking countries", because Nigeria was its main African trading partner. Mauritania too had misgivings because it had wanted to reserve the right to extend its Maghreb neighbours, the same preferences it enjoyed in the CEAO.[16] As it stood, it was therefore certain that for any meaningful and viable integrative effort to prevail, there was need for a sub-region - wide organisation to be set up.

One final factor that also contributed was Nigeria's emergence from its civil war (1967-70) which served as an eye opener to the country's leadership that it should take keener interest in the activities of its neighbours; which subsequently led to its improved relations with its immediate neighbours. Thus the confidence which Nigeria exuded after emerging from the war, bolstered even more by the oil boom, the country thus committed much effort and resources into seeing that a sub-region-wide organisation was set up, in conjunction with Togo.

2.4 The Genesis of ECOWAS

The ECOWAS constitute the first regional attempt ever to transcend the traditional historical and linguistic cleavages between French, English, Portuguese (and Arab) speaking West African States. The sheer size of this vast economic grouping has a total population of over 180 million and a combined Gross National Product of 97.5 billion U.S dollars, which sounds very impressive and seem to augur well for the economic potentials and future of the Community.[17] But then how did ECOWAS come into being?

Perhaps, the most credit for the eventual formation of ECOWAS should go to the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The realisation that a continent-wide Economic union was too ambitious led the ECA to divide Africa into five sub-regions - North, West, Central, East and South. These sub-regions were regarded as being large enough to be economically viable and were meant to form units of integrated economic development. Then at its first meeting held in December 1962, the ECA standing committee on industry, natural resources and transport, decided to render assistance to governments in promoting sub-regional cooperation in the development of industries on the basis of international specialisation and in their harmonisation with appropriate industrial plans through studies and field investigations.

According to Ajene[18], however, the genesis of the idea of a total integration of Anglophone and Francophone States of West Africa was first considered at the 7th session of the ECA, held in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 1965, with recommendations - Resolutions 142(VIII) and 145 (VII) which urged members of the commission to establish as soon as possible on a sub-regional basis, an inter-governmental machinery for harmonising their economic and social development in the sub-regions taking into account the experience of similar institutional arrangements inside and outside the continent at that time, such as the European Economic Community (EEC), the Maghreb and the East African Commission (EAC).

Ajene contends that the integration efforts in other regions of Africa such as the EAC and the Maghreb, served to spur the interest of West African States, who for this reason held several meetings to give meaning to this idea. The first of such meetings was the Lagos Conference on industrial co-ordination in West Africa held in November 1963. Then under the auspices of the ECA, a conference on economic co-operation in West Africa was held in Niamey in October 1966. This was followed by another at Accra in 1967, where an agreement was signed on the articles of association for a proposed economic community. In April 1968, nine Heads of States of West Africa met in Monrovia to sign the protocol establishing the West African Regional Group (WARG), where Nigeria and Guinea were mandated to prepare a list of priority studies on ways of improving cooperation between West African States; while Liberia and Senegal

were to prepare a draft treaty and protocol on a customs union; with an interim council of Ministers constituted to study the proposals made, pending another summit meeting to be held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Despite this initial enthusiasm, no further action was taken as neither the interim council of ministers nor the summit ever met again. Adebayo Adedeji, then Nigeria's Commissioner for Economic Reconstruction and Development was quoted as saying that "the initiatives were frustrated by the agents of imperialism and colonialism who concentrated on what divides us rather than what unites us".[19] Though he did not name these agents accordingly however, France and its satellites on which it exercised tremendous influence seemed to be his targets as it was obvious that the Entente States, were initially not receptive of the idea, because they felt that the whole question of integration was being rushed and more importantly because France and Ivory Coast had strong reservations about it due to their suspicion that Nigeria might dominate such a venture. It was not surprising therefore that Ivory Coast with pressure from France had to recognise Biafra as a Sovereign State during the Nigerian civil war caused by Biafra's bid to secede.

Meanwhile the civil war itself contributed immensely to the lull in the enthusiasm for integration until 1972, as Nigeria which has been the main proponent of not only a sub-region-wide but also a

continental common market, was engrossed in a very fatal civil war tending to dismember the country. Thus with Nigeria's determination to push ahead with the integration idea, came an increased passion of anti-Nigerianism by France. Nigeria's proposal did not seem well received by France, which immediately started considering alternative and rival schemes. France and its partners were content to improvise yet another variation on the theme of Francophone cooperation more restricted in membership than even the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (OCAM), yet more ambitious in scope than that offered by the Entente and the OERS. It was therefore not surprising that Georges Pompidou, successor of President De Gaulle embarked on three successive visits to West and Central Africa in 1971 and 1972 ostensibly to reconcile the arch-rivals of the two Francophone groups in West Africa - the Entente's Houphonet Boigny and the OERs Senghor, with a view of forming a bulwark against Nigeria as his remarks to President Hamani Diori reveals -

> "It is .... appropriate that French speaking countries should harmonise their views and co-ordinate their efforts vis-a-vis English speaking Africa and Nigeria in particular, so as to ensure that any subsequent decisions are taken on a basis of equality and mutual respect."[20]

This development was enough to set Houphouet Boigny and Senghor on the reconciliation path, that Senghor had to pay an unprecedented visit to Abidjan in December 1971, during which the two leaders affirmed their commitment to the formation of CEAO, whose sole

underlying purpose was a part of a "complex manoeuvre to counter balance Nigeria's political and economic weight', in particular to check Nigeria's attempts to organise a larger economic community.

The announcement of the decision to form CEAO, quickened the Nigerian resolve to press ahead, for it precipitated the then Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon's diplomatic offensive and he used the opportunity of his invitation by President Eyadema of Togo, to attend Togo's 12th independence anniversary to start a vigorous campaign for a much wider grouping, counting on Nigeria's long standing good relations with Togo to do the trick. According to Ojo[21], winning Togo to the Nigerian side was not difficult as from as early as 1962 onward, the two countries inter-relations had remained very cordial and this cordiality had stemmed from Ghana's complicity in President Sylvanus Olympio's assassination in that year (1962) which warranted Nigeria to serve notice to Ghana to stear clear of Togo's affairs; warning that for security purposes Nigeria's borders were considered to extend as far as the Ghana-Togo borders. Moreover, Togo also counted on Nigeria for the much needed protection of its territory. Thus Gowon therefore mixed serious business while the independence celebration lasted. The outcome of this was the Nigeria-Togo initiative to create between their two countries an embryonic West African Economic Community which would remain open for other West African Countries to join whenever they are ready. With this, a joint Nigeria-Togo Commission was established and scheduled to meet in Lagos in June

1972 to work out a framework and strategy for such co-operation.

While Nigeria's new found interest in conjunction with Togo was enough to guarantee the refusal of Togo to endorse the CEAO Treaty, Nigeria did not relax on its oars. It also courted other countries which it felt had a sympathetic ear to the Nigerian cause. The Nigerian leadership brought into its diplomatic campaign a Nigerian phenomenon called 'spraying' during which Gowon was reported to have literarily written out cheque on the spot for every cause as well as mouth watering aid packages and favourable bilateral agreements. Benin and Guinea benefitted immensely from such acts and in return gave their unflinching support to the West African *Economic Community* being proposed.[22] Thus with President Matthieu Kerekou's advent to power in Benin, the country also refused to endorse the final CEAO treaty, while the support of the Anglophones for the Nigerian initiative was of course a foregone conclusion as all of them were favourably disposed to the idea since the WARG days. Niger also became interested when Lieutenant Colonel Senyi Kounche came to power, rejected the anachronistic defence pact with France and sought Nigeria's oil and Asphalt on preferential terms, while Mauritania joined the CEAO with some reservations and though somewhat sympathetic to the Nigeria-Togo initiative, it saw no incompatibility between the CEAO and the proposed WAEC and hence chose to remain in CEAO.

Gowon's strategy and diplomatic offensive was adjudged as being

partially successful as at May 1973. Only Mali, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta (Benin) were firmly opposed to the WAEC. While Ivory Coast had a genuine fear about a Nigerian dominated venture (relations between the two countries during this period was at best mutually suspicious), Burkina Faso relied on Ivory Coast for access to the sea and other benefits it derived due to its membership of the Entente, so it was unable to make an independent stand. Senegal proved more of a difficult nut to crack as it assumed the role of the Francophone spokesman. This was not surprising as this change of attitude was attributed to Pompidou's visit.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian-Togo joint Commission led by Adedeji of Nigeria and M. Jean Tevi of Togo, met as scheduled from the end of June to early July 1972. Following this, some guiding principles were drawn that:

1. the new Economic Community should cut across linguistic and cultural barriers;
2. that initially, limited objectives capable of early realisation should be pursued;
3. that a pragmatic and flexible approach should be adopted;
4. that the necessary institutions should be set up to deal with specific issues calling for immediate attention; and
5. that an open door policy should be adopted to enable all the Countries in the sub-region to become members of the community

if and when they are ready.[23]

Following this, an intense diplomatic activity was initiated by a joint Nigeria-Togolese officials who toured all the countries of the sub-region to deliver copies of the draft proposals in July and August 1973. At the same time they went along with a letter from Gowon on the 11th of July which invited the West African Heads of State to become foundation members of the new community. The outcome of the joint commission's tour was a Ministerial Conference in Lome, Togo, in December 1973, where all the countries of the sub-region were represented; the purpose for which was to examine the principles for the evolution of ECOWAS. The conference was so successful that an elated professor Adedeji, when he returned from Lome commented that contrary to speculated reports, member States agreed that neither existing economic groupings nor the differences in language and level of development was a barrier to the establishment of an effective community embracing the countries of West Africa.[24]

At the end of the meeting, Nigeria and Togo were asked to prepare a draft treaty for ECOWAS, to be considered at a further meeting in Accra in January with another following almost immediately after in March 1974 in Niamey to examine and make pronouncements on the results of the preceding Accra deliberations, following which a final treaty could be ratified at a final summit in Lagos at a later date. At this point, and at the rate events were moving one

would have expected that it would henceforth be a smooth sailing journey until the final ratification of the treaty of ECOWAS, but this was not to be as some problems cropped up to mar initial successes made. While the joint Nigeria-Togo endeavour produced the draft treaty as was required, with the advice and assistance of the ECA; the Accra meeting scheduled for January 1974 came a little later, from February 11-15. It recorded the attendance of economic experts from 9 of the 15 countries, including representatives of the ECA, to examine the draft treaty. The five absent countries were all members of the CEAO, while the sixth absent member, Mali, attended only on the last day of the summit.

Before this time, the CEAO members had already asked for and had been granted a postponement of the meeting to allow them sufficient time to study the new Nigerian-Togolese proposals. At about the time of the scheduled Accra meeting, Ivory Coast asked for a further postponement as a result of other commitments and the need for the CEAO members to meet first and consider their joint approach to the proposal. To this, Ghana in consultation with Nigeria and Togo decided to convene the meeting which eventually took place in February 1974, a month behind schedule.
According to Gowon;

> "Failure to convene the meeting would have amounted to a considerable loss of face on the part of the sponsors and even worse, would have casted considerable doubt on the seriousness of our enterprise".[25]

Between the Accra meeting and the summit meeting in May 1975, things took a dramatic turn that seriously threatened the grounds already gained. The Niamey conference which was to succeed the Accra meeting never materialised as Niger, the intending host did not attend the Accra one and when it consented, it was foot dragging on hosting the Conference. Twice the meeting was postponed from March to April and finally May, but then events took another turn when Hamani Diori (then President of Niger) was overthrown and the new government though willing was unable to host the meeting as scheduled. Alternative States were then considered, meanwhile Togo had sponsored the Lome meeting; Ghana, the constitutional experts meeting in February; Guinea though willing was not very cordial with CEAO members while the Sahelian countries though sympathetic but due to domestic problems and draught stricken could not offer to host and further more, their sensitive relations with France and the CEAO partners were not about to be overlooked just then. On the other hand, Senegal was not approached nor considered because of its unrepentant stand on ECOWAS and the stability of Ivory Coast was very doubtful at the same time, while Nigeria hoped to host the final summit.

At this point, alternative sites have almost been exhausted when eventually President Tolbert of Liberia was approached and he consented to hosting the conference. By this time a lot of time and ground had been lost but Tolbert's willingness to host, definitely saved the situation. The meeting was eventually fixed

for January 27-30 1975, whose purpose was to prepare the final draft of the treaty for the consideration of the heads of State at a later date in Lagos. The decisions arrived at in Monrovia, were unanimous and without any reservations whatsoever. However, there was a proviso, ostensibly at the instance of CEAO members, which sought to recognise and accept the principle of dual membership for all those wishing to belong to both communities (that is ECOWAS and CEAO), and other regional groupings as well as the recognition of the contractual right and obligations of member states to respect their various intra and extra regional commitments.[26]

With this, Gowon then fixed tentative dates (either 19-21 or 26-28 May 1975) taking the various Presidents onerous State duties into consideration, for the final summit meeting. While most of the replies to Gowon from the leaders of members states were very positive, the one from Senegal proved to be a near fatal set-back for all the gains already made; for it was at this stage Senghor chose to propose some novel ideas, calling for a rather much wider grouping to include Central Africa, while expressing reservations about the proposed summit meeting.

> "You know what the attitude of Senegal is as far as this problem is concerned. We are always ready to participate in all the meetings convened to examine this problem .... The serious objection which we continue to raise is that this community should be parallel to that of East Africa and that it should extend from the North of Mauritania to the South of Zaire..."[27]

While the Nigeria-Togolese initiative was going on, other factors were also at work which facilitated in no small way the eventual formation of ECOWAS. One of them was the timely African, Carribean and Pacific countries negotiations with the EEC, popularly referred to as the ACP-EEC summit in Lome, during which in the preceding meeting of the ACP, Chief Wenike Briggs, Nigeria's Federal Commissioner of Trade was chosen as the African spokesperson during the impending ACP-EEC meeting. According to Ojo, Nigeria was in the fore front throughout the negotiations, gave leadership at crucial times, lent leverage to the ACP side and the eventual success recorded at the negotiations was due to Nigeria's important role. For this, mutual respect and trust developed and the spirit of Lome became the slogan. Thus a political climate and an economic structure was brought into being which allowed for ECOWAS to be concluded.[28]

While this was happening, at the instance of Chief Henry Fajemirokun, then President of the Nigeria Chamber of commerce, said to be a close friend of Adedeji (Nigeria's chief negotiator for integration); the support of other West African States chambers of commerce was co-opted to form a declaration of West African Chambers of Commerce, whose pressure on member states in no small way also contributed to the successful conclusion of the ECOWAS negotiations. Despite the many hurdles and setbacks that came in the way of ECOWAS, by 1975 West African leaders had resolved to come together under a common umbrella. Thus came May 28, 1975, the

Heads of States and Governments and Ambassador Pleni Potentiaries representing 15 States of the sub-region met in Lagos to ratify the Treaty which formally gave birth to ECOWAS. Cape verde joined at a later date, to become the 16th member state.

As has been cited elsewhere earlier on, before this time due to the uncompromising stance of the Francophone states, fears were expressed that the CEAO members would not join the wider sub-regional ECOWAS, due to the age long Anglophone-Francophone divide. But the fears subsided when eleven Heads of states including such influential leaders like Felix Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast and Mouktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania personally graced the occasion of the signing of the Treaty. Senghor, who had already expressed reservations about ECOWAS was not present as he had gone on official engagement outside Africa. He was however represented by the Prime Minister Abdou Diouf; while Lanzana Beavogui, Prime Minister of Guinea represented President Toure, who had serious official engagement back home. The Vice President of Mali represented his country while Ghana's Economic Planning Commissioner acted as his country's Ambassador Plenipotentiary.

On the whole, according to Ezenwe,[29] because of the practical difficulties involved in forming economic groupings among independent states, and particularly in the less developed countries, it took West Africa ten solid years from the time of the ECA resolution in 1965, to form ECOWAS, as the period was

characterised by hesitation, vacillation and neo-colonialistic politicking which were dependency inspired.

2.5 Aims and Objectives of ECOWAS

Generally, the aims and objectives of ECOWAS like every other regional integration scheme in the developing regions is that of breaking out of dependence and underdevelopment and to move onto the path of development. This infact is explicitly stated in the ECOWAS treaty itself. The preamble to the treaty (paragraph 3) states inter-alia that the foundation of the union is based among other factors on;

> "The conviction that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their states calls for effective economic co-operation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance."

Article 2 of the treaty however, specifically states the aim of the community: -

> "It shall be the aim of the Community to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering close relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African Continent."[30]

Thus in pursuance and realisation of these aims, the community set for itself the following specific tasks, for which it shall by stages ensure:-

(a) the elimination of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of importation and exportation of goods;

(b) the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the member states;

(c) the establishment of common customs tariffs and common commercial policy towards third world countries;

(d) the abolition of the obstacles of free movement of persons, services and capital between member states;

(e) harmonisation of the agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects in the member states; notably in the fields of marketing, research and agro-industrial enterprises;

(f) the implementation of schemes for the joint development of transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in these fields;

(g) harmonisation of economic and industrial policies of the member states and the elimination of disparities in the level of development of member states;

(h) the harmonisation required for the proper functioning in the community of the monetary policies of member states;

(i) the establishment of a fund for compensation, co-operation and development and;

(j) such other activities calculated to further the aims of the community as the member states may from time to time undertake in common.

To achieve these tasks "Article 3 of the Treaty admonished all member states as a "general undertaking" to make "every efforts to plan and direct their policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for achievement of the aims of the community" and "in particular, such member states shall take all steps to secure the enactment of such legislation as is necessary to give effect to this treaty".[31] What is so important about this 'Article 3' is that it clearly highlights the fact that setting out tasks do not in themselves mean much, but what is actually important is their accomplishment. Therefore for the ECOWAS to achieve its stated objectives, member states must be willing to effect them by making the necessary enabling national legislative acts. What is perhaps the most nagging problem of ECOWAS today is the non-implementation by member states of the policies and decisions already taken, which Article three clearly pre-empted. And yet again, this might not be unconnected with interests and influence of foreign powers. Thus this article therefore remains a challenge to the ECOWAS member states.

2.6 Structure and Institutions of ECOWAS

The second chapter of the ECOWAS Treaty embracing Articles 4 to 11, contain details of the establishment, composition and functions of these institutions. The first is the Authority of Heads of States and Governments simply referred to as the "Authority". This is the principal organ and governing institution charged with the responsibility of general direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the community. Its decisions are binding on all other institutions of the community; it meets once in the year while the chairmanship rotates on an annual basis.

The second institution is the council of Ministers, consisting of two representatives each from member states, charged with the responsibility of making recommendations on matters of policy regarding better functioning of the community, to the "Authority" as well as giving directions to other subordinate institutions. It meets twice a year. The third is the Executive Secretariat, which is headed by the executive secretary, assisted by two deputies, a financial controller and other staff. The Executive Secretary is appointed by the "Authority" to serve for a four year renewable tenure, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. He is responsible for the day to day administration of the Community and its institutions, while he and his entire staff owe their loyalty to the organisation.

The fourth is the Tribunal of the Community, charged with the settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty terms in the event of disagreements between member states in accordance with "Article 56" of the Treaty. Four other technical and specialised commissions have been established, these are:

(1) the trade, customs, immigration, monetary and payments commission;
(2) the industry, agriculture and natural resources commission;
(3) the transport, telecommunications and energy commission;
(4) the Social and Cultural affairs commission.

Each of the commissions consists of sixteen members, with each member state being represented by a member, who may be assisted by advicers. Articles 12 to 49 of the Treaty give details about the activities of the Commissions.

Provision is also made for the post of an External Auditor in the Treaty. The External Auditor is appointed by the Authority on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, which determines the terms and conditions of service and powers which the Auditor can exercise. The original treaty of the ECOWAS which was signed in Lagos on the 28th May 1975 by 15 member states, and became effective 20 June 1975, contained 65 Articles of Association.

2.7 Collective Security Initiatives of ECOWAS

We have seen from the previous sections of this chapter that Co-operation in defence and security is not mentioned any where in the Treaty but it soon became evident that the right atmosphere for social and economic cooperation in West Africa would require not only the removal of the fear of aggression by other member States but also the assurance of mutual defence against external aggression.[32] This belief may be justified by an examination of the issues that are involved in any attempt to operationalize the already stated provisions and in the functioning of the provided institutions.

The provision on the progressive elimination of customs duties and other charges is beset with a serious problem. Member States of ECOWAS have competitive economy rather than a complementary one. Nigeria and Ghana for instance produce cocoa with the implication that the abolition of custom duties may mean that cocoa products from both countries would compete within a single market. Moreover, the elimination of custom duties and other charges means the creation of a larger single market not only for agricultural products but also for industrial goods. Apart from the issue of one or more countries exploiting the benefits more than others, there is here the case of transnational corporations who may in the final analysis be the major beneficiary. The East African common market faced the same dilemma. In an attempt to deal with this

problem, the ECOWAS protocol took steps to define trade originating from member States as one under indigenous ownership and control. But ownership could be on paper only. Even if ownership is completely indigenous, control may still lie outside. The provision can only be implemented if there is agreement on broad social philosophy, leading to a harmonization of agricultural, industrial and monetary policies. This can be done if the ideological orientations of states remain similar. But Africa is a continent of violent changes; who can guarantee that one form or the other of a military coup d'etat or revolution would not take place in a member state and succeed in leading it towards a new ideological position.

The provision on the free movement of persons, services and capital also raises very serious economic and political issues. It is not surprising that some member states are yet to ratify the final document on this provision. Employment problems is common feature among ECOWAS member states. Labour unions in the individual countries would certainly frown at such a provision that would threaten the future of their members. Whether founded or not, nationals feel strongly that their job opportunities would be reduced with the influx of foreigners. Narrow nationalism is therefore a basic problem the provision faces. In Nigeria, for instance, today, thousands of citizens are already crying out about the menace of foreigners who have now arrived in the true spirit of ECOWAS. This outcry compelled the major General Mohammadu Buhari

regime in 1984 to repatriate some African ' aliens'; a decision that inspired much tension in the region at the time. There is also the political question of political refugees. In a sub-region characterized by political instability, what diplomatic channels would be used in dealing with cases of political refugees? Would a state not be accused of subversion if it shelters citizens of other countries with anti-government sentiments towards their own governments?.

The spirit of ECOWAS also demand the joint promotion of industrial ventures. Economic arguments should dictate that such industries be located where they would be most viable. However, the question of location of industry and the distribution of its attendant benefits is not as simple as that. Using a large country as Nigeria for example, experience has shown that some serious political considerations also come to bear on such decisions. It took Nigeria decades to resolve the case of iron and steel industry. In the case of an economic community encompassing sixteen member countries, such a problem is magnified.

As a measure towards a relative self-sufficiency of its members, ECOWAS has also called for an increase in the production of food crops. This means that member states should also adjust their agricultural policies to reflect the new emphasis on food sufficiency. As immediate benefit is not likely to follow this policy, it would obviously meet with opposition from the farmers

who need immediate benefit, and some member states who rely mainly on cash crops for their foreign reserves.

Coming to the issues of the provided institutions and their functioning within the ECOWAS treaty and protocols, other problems are at once noticed. The institution of the Authority of Heads of States and Governments adopted the consensus principle in decision making. Simply put, each state has veto power and decisions can never be binding unless there is consensus among all member states.[33] The rejection of majority principle in favour of consensus may make the decision making process inefficient in the event of major divergence in ideological orientation of member states and conflict of personalities among heads of states. For example, the Liberian problem was reportedly worsened by the personal quarrels between the late President Samuel Doe and leaders of some West African Countries like late Felix Houpheut Boigny of Cote D'Ivoire and captain Blaise Campoare of Burkina Faso.[34]

In the institutions of the secretariat, four or more questions are worth raising: How would the frictions deriving from the appointment of the Executive Secretary be eliminated? Are the staff of the Secretariat in reality loyal to the Community or to their respective national interests? How can competent staff be recruited when members states and other international agencies compete for their services? Is the ECOWAS Secretariat not a dumping ground for political failures in member states? Must the

Secretariat of the Community always remain in the Nigerian Capital and its fund in Lome, Togo?[35]

By highlighting these issues, one is not suggesting that the idea of ECOWAS in itself tend to compromise sub-regional security. In fact, the idea is a demonstration of the fact that certain national objectives can best and perhaps only be realised within an international framework. But it is of course true that within each regional system, there exists forces of tension and conflict, as well as factors of cohesion and cooperation. It is the degree to which adjustment of these forces can be achieved that determines the degree of viability and success of each regional system. In the case of the ECOWAS therefore, having established that most of the provisions in its operations maintains the potential to generate conflict among rival member states, and even within individual member states, which ultimately threatens sub-regional security, and is of course often exploited by foreign interests,it can never be over emphasized to state that the need existed from the onset for an institution on security matters to be established for the ECOWAS. Thus to accommodate future changes and exigencies, Article 4(1) of the treaty concluded that, additional commissions or bodies may be established by the Authority of Heads of States and Government, to further the full attainment of the objectives of the Community. In line with this article therefore, after about one year of its existence, the community realised that it cannot attain its objectives outside an atmosphere of peace and harmonious

understanding. The Heads of States and Governments then resolved in Lome on 5 November 1976, to produce an annexed protocol on non-aggression. Two years later, it was signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978 by member States of the community. But when in the 1979 Dakar, Senegal summit of the ECOWAS, Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema and President Leopold Sedar Senghor proposed an original document which envisaged the creation of a joint defence organisation and command, three member states including Mali and Benin objected. These dissenting States though not entirely opposed to the project, indicated sufficient reservation to prevent the drawing up of a precise plan. However, the joint communique issued in Lome, by Heads of States after the two day fifth summit of the ECOWAS on the 27 and 28 of May 1980, made strong proposals for the ECOWAS Defence pact to provide a collective security system as a guarantee for the community's institutions. An eight nation ministerial commission to work out details of the proposal was set up. Countries on the commission were; Togo, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Cape Verde, Sierra-Leone and Liberia. The Commission was charged with the responsibility of formulating a harmonized definite draft protocol on mutual assistance on defence Matters. Subsequently, on May 29, 1981, at Freetown, a draft Defence pact from the Special Ministerial Committee of 1980 was signed as the "protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence". This development brought to reality the overwhelming consensus of members on the need for a military assistance alongside economic integration. Comprising 24 Articles, the protocol concerned

economic progress on assured security of all member states.

The protocol on Non-Aggression provides that "member states shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member states". Member States are also enjoined to "refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member states". The protocol further provides that foreign residents in member states should be prevented from working against the territorial integrity of member states and a member state should not be used as a base for destabilising another state.[36]

In the event of any dispute arising among member states, they should resort to peaceful means of settlement and failure to do so the matter should be referred to a Committee of the Authority. If the Committee is unable to settle the dispute, it should be referred to the Authority. No penalty is however imposed by the protocol on any member state that fails to resort to peaceful means of settling disputes or for harbouring political dissidents who are trying to destabilise other States.

give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression.

The protocol mentions the following institutions for its implementation:

- the Authority
- the Defence Council
- the Defence Commission

The Authority is to examine general problems concerning peace and security of the community during the annual ordinary meeting of ECOWAS. The Heads of States may also hold extraordinary sessions on defence matters when circumstances so dictate. The Authority is to decide on the expediency of military action and entrust its execution to the force commander of the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).

The Defence Council shall consist of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States. In cases of crisis the Defence Council is to be chaired by the current chairman of the Authority and it shall be enlarged to include any other Minister from member States. In an emergency, the Defence Council should examine the situation, the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used. In case of armed intervention, the Defence Council, assisted by the Defence Commission shall supervise with the

authorities of the State or States concerned, all measures to be taken by the Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for intervention are made available to him. The actions of the Force Commander shall be subject to the competent political authority of the member state or states concerned.

The Authority is to establish a Defence Commission which shall comprise a Chief of Staff from each member state. The Defence Commission shall be responsible for examining the technical aspect of defence matters. The Defence Council is to appoint a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the Executive Secretariat who should be a senior serving military officer. He will be in charge of administration and follow-up of the decisions taken by the Authority.

The member states agreed to place at the disposal of the community earmarked units from their existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention. The units are referred to as Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). The member states may organise from time to time, as may be approved by the Authority, joint military exercises among two or more earmarked units of the AAFC. The Allied Armed Forces of the Community are to be under the command of the force commander appointed by the Authority, on the recommendation of the Defence Council. He, together with the Chief of Defence Staff of the assisted Country, will be the joint Chief of Defence staff of the Allied Armed Forces and will be responsible

for the implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority.

When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a member state of the Community, the Head of State of that Country is to send a written request for assistance to the current chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS with copies to other members. The request means that the Authority is duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under a state of emergency. The Authority is to decide on the expediency of military action and entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Armed Forces of the community (AAFC).

The Authority shall meet urgently when there is conflict between member states of the community and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority will decide only to interpose the AAFC between the troops engaged in the conflict. In case where an internal conflict in a member state of the community is actively maintained and sustained from outside, the chairman of Authority is to be informed by the aggrieved state for necessary action. Community forces will however not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal.

Despite being ratified by majority of its member states, perhaps because of its initial advocacy of a solely economic integration and its subscription not only to the OAU charter but also the

United Nation's, whose Article 2(4) enjoined all member nations to practice tolerance and desist from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the ECOWAS, inspite of the protocol on Defence, began to drag its foot on the question of institutionalising its security objectives. This situation persisted even with the conviction of the ECOWAS leadership of the urgent need to create an organ responsible for the defence of the community in the light of the continuous threats of armed attack and aggression from outside the community as well as within. For instance, in 1978 and 1982, the Libyan sponsored aggressions in Chad drifted into neighbouring Nigerian villages and nearly threatened peace in the region. Similarly, when in 1987 suspicion rose to fever pitch that apartheid South Africa was building a bridge head in Equatorial Guinea, which could have amounted to compromising military security in the entire sub-region and therefore required a concert of ECOWAS initiatives, it was Nigeria who solely took the bull by the horn and invited the Guinean leader for talks, promising aid in exchange. Moreover, prio to the Liberian civil war which was launched on December 24, 1989, it was obvious that Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader, received military training in Libya, while Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso jointly offered him sanctuary, supply route and diplomatic cover.[38]

This irregular state of affairs concerning West African Security protracted until the military coup d'etat in Liberia, which was

master-minded by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. Doe at the time he assumed power in Liberia on 12 April 1980, was considered too young at the age of 28 years and largely illiterate. Despite being the first of its kind in the first "independent" African state, there were many recalcitrant forces in the Peoples Redemption Council Government that became Liberia's supreme body. President William Tolbert, who was the then chairman of the OAU and thirteen of his former Ministers were summarily assassinated by Doe despite international appeals.

Consequently, a new dimension emerged in ECOWAS security initiative when in June 1980, an ECOWAS Commission was set up to monitor developments in Liberia. Cote d'Ivoire's President Felix Houphouet-Boigny with Presidents Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, who constituted the original team, actually made their maiden visit to Monrovia on June 27, 1980. Their on-the-ground assessment of the Liberian situation was aimed at advising ECOWAS leaders who had earlier barred Liberia's delegation from participating in the 5th ECOWAS summit (May, 1990) in Lome, Togo and the April 1980 OAU economic summit in Lagos, respectively. Subsequently, faced with the tragedy of the Liberian civil war which began in December 1989, the 13th summit of the ECOWAS, held in Banjul, Gambia from 28-30 May, 1990, decided to establish the Community Standing Mediation Committee, initially made up of the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

The immediate cause of the military take over in Liberia was blamed on the 'rice affair' of 1979 which culminated in the April demonstrations that claimed over 41 lives and left over 500 people wounded. Moreover, sentiments had been generated by the issue of the Americo-Liberians who though accounted for only about four per cent of the country's 2.5 million population had dominated the political scene since independence.[39] When Doe became Head of State and Chairman of the Council, the situation rather than improve in Liberia, worsened. Furthermore, the country instead of the gradual liberalisation that should greet the stage-managed 1985 national elections, experienced the emergence of a more brutal regime under the disguise of constitutional means. This situation in its protraction motivated the evolution of concerted dissent, which eventually culminated in the incursion at the eve of Christmas, 1989, by forces of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). These events and the consequent blood bath in the Country subsequently motivated the ECOWAS leadership to act to operationalise the protocol relating to "Mutual Assistance on Defence".[40] Thus the creation of the "Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)", by leaders of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, at the Banjul, Gambia crisis summit of 6-7th August 1990, and its primary deployment to halt the bloodbath in the war-torn West African country of Liberia.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

THE CASE OF LIBERIA AND ECOMOG

3.0 INTRODUCTION

> "Three and half years of senseless conflict have produced heavy casualties on the Civilian population with some 150,000 people killed and nearly a million people displaced".[1]

There is a broad, palpable consensus among Africans, particularly enlightened opinion within the West African sub-region and indeed throughout the entire international community, that despite the many reservations, the formation and deployment of ECOMOG in 1990, marked a most significant mile-stone in the history of independent Africa's responses to her internal conflicts. Given the novelty of this development, and particularly the consideration that it is the basis of our theoretical analysis as the case study, it needs no emphasis that a detailed insight into the Liberian crisis and ECOMOG be given in this chapter.

Government organisations and people have offered an array of perspectives, on the legality, legitimacy and operational strategies of this historic mission. It is important to document these perspectives, not only in order to aid a

background. The establishment of Liberia, resisted by indigenous Africans, concentrated wealth and power in the Americo_Liberians until the 12th April 1980 coup d'etat led by Sergeant Samuel Doe terminated over one century of their rule.[2]

Liberia occupies a unique place in the political history of Africa for several important reasons. First, it is the oldest Republic in the Continent, dating back to 1847. Second, until 1980, it boasted of the oldest de facto one party political system in Africa as the ruling True Whig Party (henceforth TWP) had been in power continuously since 1877. Third, it did not experience European style colonisation unlike its neighbours; Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sierra leone, or indeed, the rest of the Continent.[3] Instead, it was a clear example of what we can call "black-on-black" domination or imperialism having been colonised by a handful of free American slaves in 1822, under the auspices of the American colonisation society.[4] Arguably, then, it shared a similar history with Sierra leone in that they both owe their contemporary existence to the emergence of the so called "philanthropic" movements in Europe and America in the wake of the abolition of slave trade, eager to find a permanent asylum for "free men of colour" in Africa, who had become a serious social and economic burden on the white dominated societies of Europe and North America at the time. From 1822 to the early part of

this century, the settlers, commonly referred to as Americo-Liberians, waged several wars against the indigenous people of Liberia in an attempt to pacify and subjugate them to their rule and authority.[5]

Besides, most of the recaptured Africans, that is, those captured on their way to slavery in the US but were later released by the American navy, "were used and treated as menials". In 1827 for instance, "some 127 recaptured Africans who returned to Liberia were forcibly indentured and "apprenticed" to Liberian subjects, the adults for seven years and the children till the age of twenty-one".[6]

Although the Americo-Liberians at best represent only five percent of the total population of Liberia which was estimated at 1.8 million in 1980, they nevertheless controlled political and economic power in the country almost to the exclusion of the majority of the citizens. Of the country's 19 Presidents before the April 12, 1980 coup, none was an indigenous Liberian. Besides, 11 out of the 19 presidents had actually been born in the United States of America. Accordingly, they paid little or no attention to the sensibilities of the indigenous Liberians with regard to their laws, customs and religious beliefs. Indeed, before 1946, there were separate laws for the indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians who inhabited Monrovia and other coastal areas of the country,

that is Montserrado county. This state of affairs remained more or less the same until the advent of the Tubman Administration in 1944. More than any other president, it was Tubman who tried to narrow the gap between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous Africans and gave the latter some sense of belonging in the Republic. This is not to say, however, that the indigenous majority shared equal power and opportunities with the Americo-Liberians, during his administration.

Infact, the Liberian elite during the Tubman and Tolbert administrations came from the top 300 or so Americo-Liberian families, or less than 2 percent of the total population of 1.8 million in 1980. Forming the core of the country's national bourgeoisie, they dominated all top government and cabinet posts,occupied most of the strategic positions in commerce, industry, the church, fraternities (especially the masonic temple), provided most, if not all, the officer corps in the armed forces of Liberia before the coup in 1980. In short, they shared similar, if not identical; political, social and religious values and beliefs which bound them together. Besides, there were also other strong historical circumstances which the settlers had either experienced personally or by their ancestors, which helped them to develop a survival instinct and esprit de corps which only served to strengthen their determination to hold on to power and to

protect their privileges and domination over an increasingly politically conscious and inquisitive indigenous populace. More than anything else, then, three concentric circles of power and influence existed in the country: The true Whig Party (political), the Church (religious) and the Masonic Temple (fraternities); while they provided important socializing avenues, they also played a very vital role in ensuring cohesion among the Americo-Liberians. Thus, political patronage as well as advancement in politics, the church and in fact even in commerce, depended on membership of at least one or more of such associations. For instance, President William Tubman, 1944-1971, was head of state and flag bearer of the True Whig Party, held the highest lay position in the Methodist Church and belonged to several masonic fraternities such as: the United Brothers of Friendship, the Order of the Eastern Star, the Sisters of the Mysterious Seven and the House of Ruth.[7]

In short, the Americo-Liberian elites controlled effectively all the vital vehicles for political participation and expression of dissent in the country. For many years, president Tubman's son, Shad Tubman Jnr., was the President of the confederation of Trade Unions in the Country. In addition, the press was under stringent control as were the radio and television. Indeed, one way of ensuring the survival of the 'system' was through the appointment of

relatives of the incumbent president into very sensitive and important positions both inside and outside of the country. For example, the Minister of Finance in the early years of the Tolbert administration until his death in 1975 was the President's own younger brother, Steve Tolbert, while the President of Senate and Senator for Montserrado county, Frank Tolbert, was the president's senior brother. Finally the president's two daughters were both made Deputy Minsters in the Ministry of Education, one in charge of instruction while the other was responsible for supervision[8].

Elite production was done in several other ways. First, was through inter-family marriages, for example President Tolbert's daughter was married to the eldest son of President Tubman, Shad Tubman, at a time when Tolbert was Tubman's Vice President. Second, was through careful but energetic process of cooptation of bright and promising young indigenous Liberians. This was easy to do especially in the Tubman years because of the strong hold the President had over the country as father of the nation.

3.1.1 The Presidency Under Tubman and Tolbert

Throughout the twenty-seven years of Tubman's presidency, Liberia remained an Oasis of stability in a continent that was awash with political crisis and civil wars. The stability was however ensured by the country's 'colonial' political

structure and in particular, the dominant roles of the presidency and the True Whig Party as we have already illustrated; a situation which enabled the Americo-Liberians to maintain a tight grip, albeit uneasily, on the rest of the country.

Specifically, during his long years in office, Tubman consolidated the powers of the presidency so much so that by 1971, the other arms of government: namely the Senate, the House of Representatives and the Judiciary, were all rubber stamps of the president. According to Gus Liebenow, Tubam personalised government to the extent that cheques worth $25 and above had to be personally signed by him [9]. In addition, he was the major source of the elaborate patronage network in the country. This enabled him to surround himself with sycophants. Towards the end of his rule, he presided over an authoritarian, coercive and patently corrupt administration which was, for twenty-seven years, unchallenged. Tubman perfected his hold over the rest of the society through an elaborate network of security agencies: the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Special Security Service (SSS) and the most powerful and ruthless of all, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).Tubman did not hesitate to unleash these organisations against actual or perceived enemies in order to stay in power. The end result was that all opposition was stifled out of existence and the

country became a virtually police state [10]. In short, the civil liberties of the citizenry such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, all highly valued and cherished in democratic countries were seriously trampled upon. Corruption among public officers was rife. The civil service, or what passed for one, was demoralised and was in glaring need of "a total overhaul". The low salaries and pay packets encouraged corruption among public figures whose major concern was their personal survival.

The question that easily comes to mind then, is why did Tubman escape the turbulence and violence that eventually swept Tolbert from power in 1980, for over twenty-seven years?. Several reasons can be advanced to explain this state of affairs. In the first place, there were the very powerful security agencies to protect the autocratic regime. Secondly, under Tubman the country experienced relative economic prosperity especially during the first two decades of his twenty-seven years in office. Lastly, Tubman initiated several very important and epoch-making reforms designed to remove the most obnoxious of the injustices against the majority of the citizens. For instance, in 1964, for the first time in the history of the country, the hinterland was represented in the legislature. Before then, indigenous Liberians interested in "observing proceedings of the National Legislature could do so only upon depositing with Government

in Monrovia (the capital city) the sum of $100. As an observer, a tribal delegate had no voting rights. For no less than a century, the tribal people had been taxed to support a government in which they were never represented".[11]

Much of the reforms were carried out under the unification policy, deliberately designed to narrow the gap between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous people as Tubman had himself described the system he inherited as "colonial" [12]. It is possible to conclude, then, that the relative peace enjoyed by Tubman was due to the fact that the majority of the citizens were grateful to the president for ameliorating some of the worst excesses of the previous administrations. Thus, they were prepared to tolerate some infringement on their rights and freedoms. Besides, the degree of their political consciousness was also relatively low compared to what it was during the Tolbert years.

3.1.2 The True Whig Party: A cog in the Wheel of Change

In tracing the events that led eventually to what is now referred to as the Liberian crisis, mention must be made, albeit briefly, of the role played by the True Whig Party. the Liberian constitution makes provision for civilians numbering 300 and above to establish a political party and compete for political power. However, in practice, that right was never conceded by the ruling TWP until the advent of the

Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by Baccus Mathews in 1975. All previous attempts both before, and during the presidency of Tubman to set up an opposition party to compete with the TWP failed.[13] Thus, the party was able to remain in power for over a century, 1878 to 1980, thus making the country the oldest de facto one party state in Africa.

The party itself represented a 'club' of individuals who were prepared to uphold and advance the privileges enjoyed by the minority Americo-Liberians in the country. all those who were not prepared to "play the game" according to the rules of the party were fenced out of political, economic and social privileges that the elaborate patronage system could confer. Many senior officers were dismissed from government posts for not toeing the line. A prominent example was the dismissal of Dr Togba - Na Tipoteh, then budget advisor to President Tolbert as well as Professor of Economics in the University of Liberia. He lost both jobs because he refused to be co-opted and instead, identified with the plight of the masses and indigenous people.[14] In the early 1970s it was becoming apparent that a few but highly dedicated indigenous Liberians were determined to challenge the TWP, albeit, gradually. Thus, in 1973, a small group of indigenous Liberians, led by three highly qualified and dedicated men: Dr. Togba - Na Tipoteh, Dr. Amos Sawyer and Dew Mason, founded the Liberian chapter of the Pan-African organisation, Movement For Justice in Africa (MOJA), to work toward "raising the consciousness of

the masses and their mobilization in concrete political action against oppression...through show-downs, stoppages and militant action[15]". MOJA also registered a sister organisation, SUSUKU, whose major objective was to work among the rural populace in order to raise both their political consciousness and improve their living standards through communal agricultural co-operatives.

In short, then, what was becoming clear during the last years of the Tubman administration, but more so during the early years of Tolbert's presidency, was that the TWP was unable to respond fully to the political yearnings of educated indigenous Liberians who were proud enough not to sell their 'birth rights' to the Americo-Liberian political oligarchy. The reluctance of the TWP to reform and accommodate 'non-conformists' into its fold was to become much more glaring under the Tolbert administration and was to contribute in no small measure to the collapse of the First Republic in April 1980.

3.1.3 Domestic Socio-economic Inequalities as a Background to the Crisis

Although physically small, Liberia is nonetheless a relatively wealthy country by African standards. It is endowed with many valuable minerals including very rich iron ore deposits, the biggest in Africa and the third largest in the world [16],

diamonds, rich forest reserves and rubber, plus a very fertile soil for agriculture. In the early years of the Tubman regime, a lot of foreign investments were attracted into the country mainly in the iron ore, timber and rubber plantations. In 1972, a year after his death, private american investment totalled more than $500 million, easily the largest, then, in black Africa. The booming investment climates boosted the country's budget which rose progressively to reach $71 million at the time of Tubman's death in 1971. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recorded a high of $420 and Liberia was listed as a middle income country by the World Bank. However, one thing which was also glaring was that the gains from the economic boom were not evenly spread among the population. Instead, 2 percent of the Americo-Liberians controlled about 60 percent of the nation's wealth and consequently grew richer while the majority remained impoverished. The inequalities were so obvious that former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, described the country in 1976 during a state visit, as a "depressing, appalling slum". What was responsible for this contradiction?

The answer could be found in the politico-social and economic structure which we have already painted in the earlier sections. In part, the depressing economic state of the masses could be traced to the attitude as well as the relationship between the ruling Americo-Liberian elites and

the multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in the country. significantly, the Americo_liberians, especially the prominent families, also provided the top local managerial personnel as well as the consultants especially on legal matters concerning concession agreements to the multinational corporations (MNCs). As the major beneficiaries from the operations of the MNCs, they were not interested in revising the concession agreements or, their rigid implementation in the interest of the majority. As Clower et. al. pointed out Tubman went out of his way to protect the interest and "the position of the establishment and enriched it beyond precedent out of the revenues provided by foreign firms". Most employees of the MNCs were either unskilled or semi-skilled. Thus they received starvation wages which in most cases were less than $80 a month. It was not until 1977 that Tolbert ordered salary increases for the lowest paid, a 50 percent increase which brought the daily wages of unskilled workers to $1.50 for agricultural workers and 66 percent for industrial labourers increasing their hourly wages from 15 to 25 cents[17]. Although such disgraceful wages were resented especially by enlightened indigenous Liberians who regarded them as blatant exploitation, they could not openly protest because of the tight security network that Tubam weaved over the country. Besides, the True Whig Party used its elaborate network of patronage to entice indigenous students with fat scholarships abroad while returnees took up very attractive government jobs

and settled down very quickly to enjoy the trappings of privilege. The system worked very well for many years until the return of Sawyer, Tipoteh and Gabriel Baccus mathews among others, to the country.

The free hand given to the MNCs and especially the concessions such as Firestone and iron ore Companies also contributed to the worsening economic fortunes of the country, generally. For instance, although Firestone has the largest rubber plantation in the world in Liberia, and has been operating in the country since 1925, it remained an enclave within the national economy. It contributed very little to the growth of infrastructure and industrialization as it refused to process the rubber in the country or set up a factory for manufacturing tyres and had only a tyre retreading outlet in Monrovia.[18] This situation bred frustration, anger, bitterness and a determination to change the political system which has kept the majority in such poverty and bondage and fostered a neo-colonial economic system in Liberia. But Firestone was not the only culprit. The biggest iron ore mining Company then, the Liberian and American Mining Company (LAMCO), which in 1970 was exporting over 4 million tonnes annually, was no exception. For instance, the first concession agreement signed with the Liberian Government which provided for a payment of 56 cents per ton of iron ore exported from Liberia was not renewed until 1976. What was clear, in short, was

that there was a clear conflict of interest among many of the top Liberian Government officials in their relationships with the MNCs on the one hand, and their official positions in government on the other. For example, the Treasury Secretary in Tubman's government in the 1960s was also responsible for the supervision of taxes paid by all the MNCs in the country. However, the same man was also Director of the Liberian Mining Company (LMC). again, Tubman's eldest son, Shad Tubman, was for many years Public Relations Consultant to LAMCO - the biggest iron ore Company in Africa, then. Finally, until his untimely death in a plane crash in 1975, the younger brother of President Tolbert, Steve Tolbert, was on the Board of Directors of Bong Mining Company[19]. Consequently, the multinationals were allowed to literarily plunder the resources of the country with a reckless abandon that is unprecedented in Africa's neo-colonial experience. Strike action to improve conditions of work or wages was unthinkable because the Trade Unions were firmly under the control of Americo-Liberian elites. For example, Tubman's son, Shad Tubman, headed the confederation of Trade Unions in the country, while an affiliate was led by President Tubman's Social Secretary[20]. Thus, throughout the long administrations of Tubman and Tolbert, a period which spanned 36 years in all, the country experienced only two strikes, in 1961 and 1980 and both were still born.

The free rein given to foreign multinational corporations in the country was the subject of bitter criticisms from indigenous elites. They advocated an assessment of the concession agreements and in particular, an urgent review of the so-called "Open Door" policy of Tubman in order to decide "how wide the door should remain open". They argued that the MNCs were not reinvesting their profits into the economy, a situation which made them embarrassing enclaves within the national economy. The criticisms were so persisted that Tolbert was forced to address the issue. He told the nation in 1972 that "our minerals, forest and other natural resources are being steadily depleted. Our environment is being polluted and yet our people receive comparatively insufficient direct or indirect immediate or future compensation" [21]... Tolbert was later able to renegotiate the 1926 agreement with Firestone in 1976. The result was an extra one million dollars into the coffers of the nation.[22] However, attempts by the president to curb what we call the most "unacceptable face of capitalism and neo-colonialism" could not go far enough for reasons which have been stated earlier. Consequently, the MNCs were able to adjust almost immediately, to their old ways of doing business in the country and once again, the major losers were the majority indigenous people, the masses.

The oil crisis of the early and late 1970s exposed the

fragility of the dependent economy of Liberia. Much of the revenue realized from the investment boom was spent on white elephant projects centered around Monrovia and the coast where most of the Americo-Liberians lived. According to Clower et. al. "the literature of economic development provides few examples where more had been spent to provide so little for so few."[23] In other words, the Liberian economy was already in very bad shape before the oil crisis of the 1970s. Unfortunately, the oil crisis also affected the major MNCs in the country engaged in the extractive industry which accounted for over 90 percent of all the oil consumed in the country. It coincided with the time when the country's oil consumption was also on the increase, from 3.3 million barrels in 1972 to 4.2 million in 1973. Not surprisingly, the oil bill also rose steeply, totalling $35 million in two years, 1974 and 1975. At the same time the price of the country's major export commodity, iron ore was also experiencing a decline due to demand contraction in the industrialized countries of Europe and America, the major trading partners of Liberia. The price of rubber, another important export item, also suffered a similar fate due to the slump in the demand for cars in the developed countries. Coupled with all this, was a reduction in the aid package from America, Liberia's major benefactor, and from friendly countries in Europe and Scandinavia with economic interests in the country's timber, diamond and iron ore.

3.1.4 Tolbert and the Growing Opposition: PAL, PPP and the Rice Riots

The rice riots of April 1979 marked a significant turning point in the history of Liberia. The immediate cause of the riots could be traced to the proposal by Government in late 1978 to increase the price of rice from $22 to $30 a bag. "This proposed increase in the price of rice would probably not have enraged the Liberian public so much had the president of Liberia and one of his brothers not been connected with the production, importation and sale of rice"[24]. As soon as the government's intentions were made known, the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by Baccus mathews made several suggestions to government that were aimed at stemming the impending price hike. In a letter to the President, Mr. Mathews suggested that instead of passing the increase to the consumer, the price of rice could be hiked by $3 through subsidies to be paid to farmers in the country: "A price increase of $3 on locally produced rice", they argued, "would mean an additional profit of $19,500.00 for Liberian farmers. The progressive Alliance of Liberia wishes to know", therefore, "whether Government would look kindly on the idea of PAL making available the amount of $19,500 for distribution to our farmers at the rate of $3 on each bag of rice produced. The price of rice to the public would therefore remain $22.00

a bag".[25] In short, PAL would subsidize the farmers, get the political credit and still make the staple commodity available to the man in the street at the same old price. But as would be expected, the suggestion was rejected. Instead, government engaged the good offices of prominent Liberians to prevail on Mathews not to go ahead with the proposed mass demonstration, but to no avail. Therefore, events moved rather quickly. "By early saturday morning on April 14, the day of the planned demonstration, just as the leadership of PAL was about to defuse the tension, disperse the crowd gathered at its headquarters and 'call-off' the demonstration promised, government security Forces acting upon orders of the President stormed the headquarters of the PAL, destroying lives and property... about two hundred people were feared dead" [26]. The security forces also rounded up all the key officers of PAL and MOJA as well as anyone suspected of having sympathy or support for the two Associations. Many of the ring leaders were charged with treason and sedition, offenses which carried the death penalty in the country.

To the surprise of most observers however, Tolbert ordered the release of the detained men including Mathews, on the eve of the 16 OAU summit in Monrovia in July, 1979. In addition, PAL was allowed to register as a political party thus breaking the one party jinx in December 1979, under the new name of the Peoples Progressive party (PPP). However, the honeymoon was

short-lived. On March 7, 1980, Baccus mathews called a general strike to force the president out of office. Although the strike was a total failure, it nonetheless provided Tolbert with needed ammunition to deal with the PPP and its leadership, especially mathews, perhaps for the last time. On Saturday, March 8, 1980, "Government (again) rounded-up the leadership and members as well as alleged members and sympathizers of the Progressive Peoples Party".[27]

Forty-eight hours later, the President informed Liberians that there had been an attempt to over-throw the "legally constituted government of the Republic of Liberia" by force by the PPP of Baccus Mathews. The President described those involved in the attempted putsch "as this group of lawless and criminal minded citizens, joined by hooligans".[28] He then vowed to put a final end to the threat posed by what he described as "leftist associations" which were challenging the supremacy of the TWP and distabilising the Republic at "all cost", and in "such a way that they will never rise again". "The time", he emphasized, was therefore ripe for "extreme rigidity and in the extreme interest of the people no act of clemency will be exercised".[29] The Government's determination to deal decisively with the alleged plotters and their sympathizers was also reflected in the huge reward placed on the heads of all those who had escaped arrest and were at large. Perhaps it was the unusually uncompromising posture of Tolbert and the thinly veiled threat of more drastic

punishment awaiting the detained PPP leaders, that led residents of Monrovia to believe that government was about to hastily try and execute some of the ring leaders. This perception also naturally filtered to the rank and file in the Army some of whom had also been in contact with the detained men prior to the 'coup attempt'. Thus, in what appeared as a well-timed rescue operation, 17 non-commissioned and hardly literate personnel in the Liberian Army seized power on April 12, 1980, two days before the anniversary of the rice riots when, it was believed, mathews and some of his senior officials would have been executed. In the course of the coup, Tolbert was killed. Soon after, 13 very senior officers in his government and the True Whig Party, all Americo_Liberians, were hastily and publicly executed in Monrovia.[30]

3.1.5 Doe's Era and the Emergence of Armed Factions

The coup put an abrupt end to 133 years of Americo-Liberian domination of the politics of the country and the majority indigenous people. For the first time since 1847, Liberia had an indigenous son as its head of state in the person of Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. He was then only 28 years of age, and barely literate. Doe read out a litany of grievances which the majority of the people had against the deposed Americo-Liberian oligarchy headed by the late Tolbert:

> "There had been an incomparable Corruption in the form of conflict of interests.. the selling of influence, the use of official positions for private gain, and other forms of corruption.. there were illegal seizures and even convictions without trial...the unemployment situation was so bad that there were more people looking for work than employed.. the cost of food is high and most of the people can not afford $40 to buy a bag of rice... The health situation is so terrible that nearly one out of every five newly born babies dies before reaching the age of one".[1]

The crucial role played by the leaders of the PPP and MOJA in the political education of the coup makers as well as the other events leading to the coup, was reflected in their appointment into critical positions in the first cabinet announced by Doe. For instance, Dr. Togba-Na Tipoteh became minister for Economic Planning and Development, Baccus mathews, Foreign Minister, H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Minister of Education, Amos Sawyer, Special Adviser, George E. Boley, Presidential Affairs Minister, and Charles Taylor (close friend of the Army Chief, Thomas Quiwonkpa), Director of the powerful General Services Agency (GSA).

The appointments led many observers to believe that the Americo-Liberian Oligarchy and dictatorship had finally come to an end. However, the marriage between Doe's Peoples' Redemption Council (PRC) and radical political groups was short lived. Indeed, the honeymoon came to an abrupt end about a year after the coup, when Doe's second in command,

Thomas Weh-Syn, was executed in 1981 after being charged with trying to topple the PRC government. From then on, the radicals who had provided the intellectual basis and support for the regime started to withdraw. The withdrawal of the core of the opposition movement from the PRC government provided the opportunity for Doe to consolidate his grip on the country. This was achieved in part through the appointment of men and women from his ethnic group, the Khrans, into very sensitive positions especially in government and the Army. Thus, with time, the regime assumed an embarrassing ethnic colour to the dislike of the other ethnic groups who formed the majority. This was followed by massive and blatant violations of human rights as Doe began to "see" many imaginary as well as "real" enemies in almost every nook and corner in the country.

At the same time, the economy began to nose dive. There was widespread corruption and mismanagement of the economy prompting a flight of US capital from the country. This led to a 20 percent drop in economic activity especially between 1985 when Doe "won" presidential elections and 1989 when Taylor launched his attack. The Liberian official currency the US dollar, was devalued locally with the circulation of what came to be known as "Doe Dollars" which, unlike their American counterparts, were non-convertible outside the country. Although it was clear that the economy was badly in

By 1984, it seemed as if the reign of terror would be finally brought to an end with the country poised for a return to civilian administration, following the adoption of a new constitution by referendum on 3 July, that year, and a date for presidential elections set in October, 1985. But on August 20, President Doe ordered the arrest and detention of Dr. Amos Sawyer, erstwhile chairperson of the Constitutional Drafting Commission, on the spurious charge that he was "masterminding a communist plot to install a socialist government" in Liberia. After spontaneous protests from the students of the University of Liberia, a protest which was violently suppressed by soldiers on the orders of Doe, Sawyer was released in October, 1984. In the run-up to the presidential elections in 1985, Doe, as was predicted, announced his intention to contest the elections as well as the formation of a political party, the national Democratic Party of liberia (NDPL). This was followed by the harassment of opposition leaders in the country, with the aim of preventing them from either contesting or registering their political associations as political parties. For instance, in August 1985, two months to the presidential elections, Sawyer's Liberian Peoples Party (LPP) was banned under Decree 75 "which gave the authorities ample scope for banning people with un-Liberian political beliefs from forming political parties "[33], for what was described as his advocacy of 'ideologies foreign to Liberia'. Another draconian Decree,

88A, was enacted to effectively "protect government officials from criticism" by making it a criminal offence "to spread lies and rumours".[34] After the intimidation and harassment of other opposition leaders, it was hardly surprising that Doe 'won' the elections and thereby became a 'civilian' president with a six year 'mandate'. The 'victory' of Doe dashed the hopes of all those who had expected an end to the corrupt and tribally centered government of the former Master Sergeant turned Head of State.

Earlier in 1983, the Commander of the Armed Forces of Liberia and one of the group of 17 that overthrew Tolbert, Thomas Quiwonkpa, went into voluntary exile in order to escape from the inevitable 'long knives' of Doe. With the rigged elections, widespread and mounting criticisms and the manner in which Doe had 'civilianised' himself, Quiwonkpa made a dramatic bid for power in Monrovia in the morning of November 12, 1985. For eight hours, he and his supporters were able to hold on to the national radio station and made several broadcasts announcing the fall of Doe's government. Thereafter, the tide turned quickly against him and his men. he was captured and violently butchered on the orders of Doe. His badly mutilated body was displayed for all those who cared to see. [35] The aftermath of the abortive putsch saw mass killings of the Gios and the Manos, all from Nimba County which was believed to have been the base of Quiwonkpa. About

3,000 people, including women and children, were killed in reprisal raids carried out by the security forces of Doe. [36] Houses and other property were also destroyed.

The failure of the coup also led to the flight of Charles Taylor, a close associate of Quiwonkpa, into the United States but Doe sought his extradition on charges of corruption. After much pressure from Monrovia, Taylor was arrested and put in prison pending his trial. After three months behind bars, Taylor escaped first to Ghana, then to Sierra leone, and finally to Cote D'Ivoire, one of Liberia's contiguous neighbours. While in exile, Taylor recruited young Liberians mainly from Nimba County who had every reason for wanting to see the down fall of Doe. And although the Ivorian President, Houphouet-Baigny, denied support for Taylor, he had strong reasons also for wanting to see the fall of doe. He is a family friend of the Tolberts [37] having given his daughter in marriage to the eldest son of the Liberian President, A.B. Tolbert. Late A.B. Tolbert was among those arrested by Doe and his men in the wake of the April 1980 coup. He disappeared under mysterious circumstances while in custody and was later confirmed dead by Doe although his body was never found. On December 24, 1989, Taylor slipped across the ivorian-Liberian border with a handful of his men and launched an attack against security posts in Ninba County close to the Ivorian border. Thereafter, events moved rather quickly as

life and property and

iii). Appealed to all parties to accept the holding of elections as a means of returning the country to peace and harmony.

Earlier, the ECOWAS Heads of State and government had approved a suggestion by the Nigerian President and then Chairman of the organisation of African Unity (OAU), Ibrahim Babangida, to set up an ECOWAS Mediation Standing Committee. The Committee held its first meeting in Freetown, Sierra-Leone, from 5 to 20 July, 1990, to find a peaceful solution to the civil war. [38]

3.2.0 The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis

Some scholars may see the breakdown of law and order and the accompanying indiscriminate killing of people including foreigners as the foundation events for the internationalization of the Liberian crisis. However, it may be more accurate to suggest that the internationalization of the crisis began much earlier with the seeking of external support by NPFL Leader, Charles Taylor for his plans to overthrow President Doe's government. For example, Cote D'Ivoire was the initial base of Charles Taylor. It was in that country that he built his Army mainly recruited from the Gio and Mano groups of Liberia. Also, Libya trained many of the NPFL officers and men, and this is one of the reasons why

Taylor did not enjoy United States favour in the crisis. [39] Libya was seen as a major source of funds for the NPFL and its insurgency operations.

Burkina Faso gave Charles Taylor initial support morally, materially and financially. it was a strategic training ground for NPFL men, provided guards for Taylor's protection, and a major source of arms supply for Charles Taylor. Both Benin Republic and Togo to some extent also gave support to NPFL. In his period of angry accusations of West African leaders sponsoring the rebels, President Doe kept repeating charges that Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya were sponsoring and arming the rebels led by Charles Taylor. As reported by Newswatch, President Doe had asserted that the Ivorian government wanted him deposed because it was against Monrovia's multi-party democracy; while the Libyan government backed the rebels because it wants Taylor to kill the 5,000 or so Americans in Liberia.[40] Even though observers knew these countries supported the NPFL, the reasons given by Doe's government were meant to attract United States' support but this did not materialise. In may 1990, President Doe's Government accused Cote D'Ivorie of allowing Libyan planes to land in the country with arms and ammunition meant for the rebel forces of Charles Taylor. [41]

Even when the rebel forces split, and Prince Yeduo Johnson formed his Independent National Patriotic Front For the

Liberation of Liberia (INPFL), he too sought and got external support especially from the United States as alleged, though this was denied by the U.S.A. As reported by The Guardian, Charles Taylor during a press Conference, hinted that the USA had supported Prince Johnson in these words:

> "Taylor also implied that Washington had backed the dissident rebel Prince Johnson against his own movement perhaps even to the extent of airlifting Prince Johnson's men into Monrovia to fight". [42]

It was not only the 'rebels' that sought external support. President Doe also visited some nations in the sub-region for support, and got weapons from external sources. For example, it is alleged that he got weapons from Taiwan and South Korea, while getting some support from Sierra Leone and Nigeria. In short, Taylor once said that troops began kidnapping and killing Nigerians because they saw Nigerian weapons in the hands of Doe's troops.

Another major factor that internationalized the Liberian crisis was the combined effect of the kidnapping, holding hostage, and killing of foreign nationals. As the war progressed, and hardship increased, discipline broke down among the Armed Forces of Liberia and rebel troops which began kidnapping and killing foreign citizens indiscriminately. Early victims include two American Missionaries killed by rebel forces, and two Italians working for a logging firm in

the Nimba County.[43] Also, a British newspaper, Sunday Observer reported that the Nigerian refugees held in Taylor's Territory "were executed in front of reporters". The report said that two Nigerian Journalists, Kriss Imodibe of the Guardian, and Tayo Awotosin of the Daily Champion had disappeared, with rebel sources later confirming that they had been killed as spies.[44]

On June 6, 1993 about 300 defenseless citizens were also murdered in cold blood in what is commonly referred to as the Harbel Massacre, and like the November 1992 attacks on the Firestone plantations in which five American Nuns were killed, both ECOMOG and amos Sawyers Interim Government of National Unity blames the NPFL for responsibility.[45]

The kidnapping, holding hostage, and killing of foreign citizens especially from ECOWAS member states reached a climax with the sending of ECOMOG to Liberia in August 1990. At a time, over 3,000 foreign citizens were held by the NPFL alone, mainly Nigerians. As reported by the Daily Champion:

> "Resentful of the mediatory role of ECOMOG forces in war torn Liberia, a desperate Mr. Charles Taylor yesterday held hostage citizens of the five ECOWAS nations which contributed men and equipment to ECOMOG".[46]

The citizens of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra leone, and Guinea were specifically marked for elimination. In short, Mr. Taylor

vowed to kill a Nigerian or Ghanian for each Liberian killed by ECOMOG forces.

The mass movement of refugees from Liberia to the neighboring countries contributed a lot to the internationalization of the crisis. With the break down of law and order, the total collapse of discipline among the soldiers, the increasing level of social and economic hardship, and escalating insecurity of life and property, thousands of people began to move out of Liberia. First, foreign citizens left, and gradually, the movement fever caught the citizens of Liberia too to the extent that African Concord reported in July 1990 that:

> "Each day, close to 1,000 Liberians now flee into neighboring Sierra Leone as the war between government troops and rebels of National Patriotic Front of Liberia rages on" [47]

Nigeria hosted over 141,000 out of the over 600,000 Liberian refugees towards the end of 1990. [48]

According to the official report from the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), about 300,000 Liberian refugees were in Guinea, 120,000 in Cote D'Ivoire, and 80,000 in Sierra Leone. As early as February 1990, 30,000 people had crossed the borders into Cote D'Ivoire and 12,000 to Guinea, causing the UNHCR to start planning relief measures for the refugees. [49]

The attack on refugees and innocent civilians inside Liberia by soldiers also raised international public opinion. Over 1,000,000 refugees were in different locations within the conflict ridden country. Both government troops and rebel forces took pleasure in massacring refugees. For example, in August 1990, Doe's forces murdered 600 refugees who were in the St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Monrovia at night. Men, pregnant and nursing mothers, and children were all killed in cold blood. [50] Also, on August, 12, 1990, government troops gunned down 21 civilian refugees in Congo Town. Most of the refugees killed in these acts of murder by government forces were mainly Gio and Mano ethnic groups, people whom Doe saw as supporters of Taylor. Many victims were dragged out of hospitals, homes and refugee camps and killed. Newswatch reported that the killing of patients prompted the Italian Ambassador to call for United States intervention in August 1990, while five other European Ambassadors issued statement to the effect that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide". [51]

Some Liberians actually called for international assistance after considering all the problems tending to overweigh their country, especially the senseless killings going on, the socio-economic hardship facing the people especially hunger and starvation in Monrovia, and the prevention by rebel forces of members of the International Red Cross from offering assistance in Liberia. For example, Senator David Toweh from

the Nimba County who had his sons killed by government forces, speaking on the floor of Senate on May 30 1990, declared that the only way out of the crisis was mediation by international organisations like the Organisation of African Unity, United Nations Organisation, and the Economic Community of West African States, and called on the outside world to help Liberia. [52]

The attack on United Nations Mission in Monrovia by government forces not only shocked the world but also drew its condemnation. The attack was directed against hundreds of Gio and Mano ethnic members who ran into the United Nations Mission for protection in June 1990. About 2,000 of the people were there when the masked troops armed with bayonet bearing riffles and who gave no respect for the immunity of the United Nations stormed the Mission. Observers reported that the troops after entering the mission forcefully, ignored the wailing of women and children, killed one United Nations guard, bayoneted several people and took away many others to an unknown destination. This attack on the United nations infuriated the international community. An enraged Michael Heyn, the UN Representative in Liberia described the attack as "incredible and a violation of international law", while the UN Secretary-General despatched a protest letter to Doe's government. He also ordered the immediate evacuation of UN workers from the Country. [53]

Another factor that internationalized the Liberian crisis was the harassment and killing of foreign journalists. Nigeria for example had two of her journalists, Kriss Imodibe and Tayo Awotosin killed as earlier mentioned. Doe's government arrested journalists from the United States and United Kingdom. In short, on entering Liberia, ECOMOG liberated many journalists detained by both government and rebel sides. it was reported that Prince Johnson detained Mr. Isaac Bantu of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and David Brown of Liberia Television for ignoring a news conference that he gave. [54]

Attacks were also carried out against foreign embassies in Monrovia by the belligerants.

These attacks violated the diplomatic immunity of embassy buildings in international law. For example, the Nigerian Embassy was invaded at least twice, but first on July 12, 1990. The reason given by rebel forces for the invasion was mainly the perceived friendly relations between the Doe government and Nigerian authorities. [55]

Also, the Togolese Embassy was attacked by Mr. Taylor's forces. With these attacks, many saw the conflict as a phenomenon that would touch on many nations.

The attack on embassies, arrest and killing of citizens were seen by many as threats to International peace and security. Fear and tension mounted in the world especially in the West African sub-region because such actions could pull the big

powers into the conflict in the guise of protecting their citizens.

The move to Liberia by foreign governments to evacuate their citizens and missions is part of the internationalization process. With the increasing insecurity of life and property especially as both government troops and rebels were attacking refugees, embassies and foreigners, nations had to move in to evacuate their citizens. By May 1990, Japan, Italy, Britain and others closed their embassies, and asked their citizens to leave Liberia. The United States sent in six warships in June 1990 to see to the safety of American citizens and installations in Liberia, and to evacuate the citizens. Ghana evacuated her 70,000 citizens, Nigeria evacuated her embassy officials, and lecturers seconded to the Ibrahim Babangida Postgraduate School. Two Nigerian warships NNS OFFIOM and NNS AMBE made their way to Liberia around July 1990 to evacuate some 5,000 Nigerians trapped there. Nigerians began to cry earnestly for evacuation in June 1990 following the letters of threat to their lives sent to the Nigerian Embassy by rebels of the NPFL. The letter had marked out several Nigerians in Liberia for elimination including the Ambassador, and Nigerian lecturers in the University of Liberia. The letter partly read:

> "We congratulate your (Ambassador's) efforts and the efforts of your government in helping Doe to eliminate Gio and Mano people. But don't forget, Doe will not and never

> will be there forever. We will be liberated one day and on that day, we shall identify our foes... and all of you would suffer, just the same way we have suffered under Doe with your kind assistance".[56]

The departure of foreigners was interpreted as a failure of the Doe government to contain the rebellion.

The rebel forces blamed some countries for the crisis facing Liberia. Charles Taylor for example in a press conference held in August 1990, especially blamed Nigeria and the USA for the excesses of President Doe. He asserted in reaction to plans to land ECOMOG forces in Liberia:

> "I think that good sense will prevail and that the American People and the Congress and Bush administration will realize that this is and always will remain an internal conflict.. The problem is Samuel Doe. Doe murdered our people for 10 years. Washington and Nigeria must take some responsibility for this. Where did Doe get his weapons from?".[57]

Blames like these sent out signals to nations and may have encouraged the nations that gave support to Taylor.
The internationalisation of the Liberian crisis can be said to have reached its peak with the formation of a multi-national peace-keeping force to bring the crisis under control. With the war escalating daily in intensity and theatre of operation expanding, ECOWAS leaders decided to find an international (sub-regional) solution to the crisis. Thus from August 6th -

7th 1990, the ECOWAS mediation Committee leaders - President Babangida (Nigeria), Lansana Conte (Guinea), Joseph Momoh (Sierra Leone), Dawda Jawara (Gambia), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), as well as the foreign ministers of Togo and Mali agreed to establish and despatch to Liberia without further delay the ECOMOG, with Ghana's General Arnold Quainoo as the inaugural Commander. The communique issued at the end of the meeting mandated ECOMOG to keep peace in Liberia, separate the warring factions, and ensure a return to normalcy. ECOMOG forces were asked to open up the routes to enable the much needed food, drugs, clothing, and other needs to be transported into Liberia to help the starving and sick people, especially refugees. Also, they were mandated to establish a security zone around Monrovia to enhance peace and to maintain law and order.

A national conference was to be organised involving all political parties and interest groups in Liberia with the aim of establishing a broad based interim government in which President Doe, Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor, the major belligerants at the time were not to participate. The interim government (subsequently convened August 30, 1990 and headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer) was to set up the machinery for conducting a free and fair election to be supervised by ECOWAS and made open for international observation. The interim government was also to facilitate the return of nearly one million Liberian refugees to the country. The peace force was to be

about 3,500 though it was over the years continuously reviewed upwards. It is important to say here that contrary to the belief that ECOMOG was not invited to Liberia, the then Liberian Vice-President, Dr. Harry Moniba said in an interview with West Africa that President Doe wrote a letter to the ECOWAS Chairman requesting for the deployment of a peace-keeping force. In the words of Dr. Moniba who claims to have copies of the correspondences when asked about ECOMOG intervention:

> "Incidentally, let me add that the coming of ECOMOG was due to a letter written by the Doe Administration to the Chairman of ECOWAS, asking them to send a peace-keeping force". [58]

ECOMOG forces left Freetown, Sierra Leone on August 23, 1990 and landed Monrovia on the following day. The peace-keepers were welcomed by president Doe's and Prince Johnson's factions, while Taylor's NPFL declared war on ECOMOG. The NPFL saw ECOMOG as an intruding aggressor-force which had been assembled to deny him fulfilment of his presidential ambition. Thus, NPFL never gave any form of cooperation to the ECOMOG, and blocked all avenues to peace.

As a result, in September 1990, a fresh mandate was given to ECOMOG a few days after President Doe was killed on September 9, 1990, by prince Johnson's INPFL, to use force, but now with Nigeria's Major-General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro as Field Commander. Since Dogonyaro (September 20, 1990 - February

1991), all subsequent Field Commanders of the multinational force have been Nigerian generals. These includes: Major-Generals - Rufus Kupolati (Feb-Sep, 1991); Ishaya Bakut (Sep 1991-Sep 1992); Adetunji Olurin (Sep 1992 - Sep 13, 1993); John Shagaya (Sep 1993 - Nov 27, 1993); and John Inienger who assumed Command in Dec 1993.

When General Sani Abacha, the then Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of Defence, and now Head of State, was asked why ECOMOG was given the new mandate to enforce peace, he said that under the then grim situation, the use of force had become inevitable. [59]

With the new use of force mandate, on October 12, 1990, ECOMOG took control of Monrovia, [60] and scattered the NPFL men that had held parts of the capital hostage.

The arrest of President Doe by the INPFL right inside the ECOMOG Headquarters and his subsequent death in the hands of Prince Johnson and his men, raised a lot of international outcry. It reminded humanity of the arrest and subsequent murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in 1961 by one of the factions in the Congo Crisis right under the nose of United Nations Peace-keepers. An event that repeated itself shortly afterwards when a Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister was shot dead by Serbian gunmen under UN escort on January 8, 1991 in the height of the Yugoslavia crisis - a classic lesson to peace-keepers in future operations.

One other event that further entrenched the internalisation of the crisis was the invasion of neighbouring Sierra Leone by Charles Taylor's NPFL forces, in April 1991. This invasion led to the search for mutual assistance on defence from countries like Nigeria by Sierra Leone. Knowing fully well that Sierra leone was being attacked by the NPFL because of her role in ECOMOG operations, Nigeria and Guinea which had mutual defence agreements with Sierra Leone quickly sent soldiers to help maintain the security of her borders, after she had pushed back the invaders. Soon, a fourth Liberian faction named the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) established base in Sierra Leone fighting against Taylor's NPFL. Raleigh Sankoh was visibly acting as its spokesman initially but the leadership of the faction seemed to have settled on Alhaji Hassan G. V. Kromah, as manifest in his presence at the Geneva II talks. ULIMO was officially founded on May 29, 1991, in Conakry, Guinea.
Again, the NPFL attack on Sierra leone raised fears in neighbouring countries like Guinea and the Gambia not only for the security of their territorial integrity but also for the stability of their governments. This was because it was perceived internationally that Charles Taylor not only wanted to destabilise Sierra leone's support for ECOMOG through the invasion of the country, but also to over throw President Momoh's government.

The existence of two governments in Liberia, one then led by President Doe, and the other formed and led by Charles Taylor from August 4, 1990, [61] was a source of concern to the international community, and the existence of two governments after the death of Doe continued to be of concern to it. With the death of Doe, an Interim government was formed in exile, but later installed in Monrovia on November 22, 1990.

One other major factor that led to the internationalisation of the Liberian crisis was the fear that the war if not contained may spill into the neighbouring countries with very dangerous security and defence implications for the West African sub-region. Along with this fear, the stability of neighbouring states was threatened by the influx of thousands of fleeing refugees from Liberia into these states.

It was also clear to the international community that thousands of foreign nationals including ECOWAS citizens were not only facing the danger of losing their lives as mentioned earlier, but were trapped in Liberia with little or no means of escape and virtually without any form of protection.

Again in a situation where the Doe government failed to govern, and the opposing armed factions were unable to dislodge him, there was no solution in sight. Not only this, the circumstances only led to the situation where the entire population in Liberia was held hostage in a burning and frightening coldrum.

Finally, the mass media played a major role in the internationalisation process. For example, the televised scene of hundreds of people massacred in a church by Doe's men; the filming of Doe's capture, torture and murder; the stories of starving people, and of thousands of refugees fleeing the war-torn country aroused human sympathy and concern. Along with these, the Nigerian media took an anti-Taylor posture after his men's murder of journalists; and these encouraged people who had sat on defence to support intervention in Liberia. [62]

3.3.0 The Negotiation Process and Settlement Prospects of the Liberian Crisis

Faced with the tragedy in which their country was becoming deeply engulfed, Liberian religious groups had formed an Inter-Faith Mediation Committee which, in mid-June 1990, convened a meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone, inviting the parties concerned and other interested groups of Liberians to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. Sadly, however, that initiative ended in a deadlock, with the Doe government insisting that the insurgents lay down arms before any meaningful talks could be held, and the insurgents on their part demanding that Doe step down from the presidency before their guns could be stilled.

Subsequently, the first summit of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee was held at the Kairaba Conference Centre in Banjul, the Gambia on 6 and 7 August, 1990. It was attended by five national leaders (Gambia's Sir Dawda Jawara, Ghana's Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, Guinea's General Lansana Conte, Nigeria's General Ibrahim Babangida, Sierra Leone's General Joseph Momoh), representatives of the Togolese and Malian Presidents, the Secretary General of the OAU Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim and a member of the Liberian Inter-Faith mediation Committee, the last two of whom attended in an observer capacity. The session, after a thorough review of the Liberian situation, agreed on a comprehensive plan for restoring peace and security in Liberia.

That plan, as contained in the communique issued at the end of the session, provided:-

- That the warring parties observe an immediate ceasefire;
- That an ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) be constituted, with troops drawn from member states of the Mediation Committee as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone, placed under a Commander provided by the Republic of Ghana and assisted by a Deputy provided by the Republic of Guinea, for the purpose of keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the ceasefire is respected;
- That a broad-based Interim Government be set up by the Liberians themselves, through a national Conference of

political parties, warring parties and other interest groups;

- That none of the leaders of the warring factions should head the Interim Government and that whoever heads it should be ineligible to stand for presidential election;
- That the Interim Government establish an independent and acceptable Electoral Commission, for the organisation of the General and presidential elections which should be held within 12 months;
- That the elections be open to international observation, with an ECOWAS observer Group constituted at the appropriate time, to ensure that it is free and fair;
- That in view of the substantial material and financial resources necessary to make ECOMOG and the Elections Observer Group possible, a special Emergency Fund be established with an initial capital of 50 million US Dollars generated through voluntary contributions from ECOWAS Member states and third parties (donor governments and agencies);
- That the entire international community, particularly members of the United Nations Security Council, lend support to ECOWAS humanitarian and political initiatives in Liberia, in the interest of the African people as a whole, and for the overall maintenance of international peace and security.[63]

Two of the warring parties (Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia and

Johnson's recently emergent INPFL) accepted the proposals and pledged their readiness to commence the observance of a ceasefire. But, despite several contacts and appeals, Taylor stuck to his guns. He insisted that there could be no ceasefire as long as Doe and his men still occupied the Executive Mansion in Monrovia. Then he complicated matters further by announcing the formation of an Interim Government of which he became President. Denouncing the proposed ECOMOG as unwarranted foreign intervention in Liberia's "internal affairs", he said the most he could accept would be an ECOWAS civilian team sent in to "assess" the situation on the ground after Doe must have stepped down and ceasefire put in effect. President Jawara of the Gambia, who had chaired the deliberations, in response to Taylor's objections, offered to add "a civilian component" to ECOMOG. But that clearly could not satisfy the NPFL's demand.

With no agreement in sight, the savage war continued, resulting in an escalating death toll of both Liberians and foreign nationals. The Mediation Committee therefore decided, inspite of Taylor's persistent objections, and infact despite the objections of some ECOWAS member-states, that the time had come for ECOMOG to move into Liberia, disengage the warring factions, secure an end to hostilities and restore some semblance of law and order as a first step towards the eventual restoration of peace.

On 24 August, 1990, the pioneer ECOMOG force initially assembled in Freetown, Sierra Leone, sailed into Liberia. Consolidating on this first bold step towards peace, the major groups involved in the crisis after a flurry of consultations, agreed to participate in an all-party national conference at which the future of Liberia, restoration of law and order, return of democratic rule, reconciliation of the people and reconstruction of the national economy would be discussed. The conference which took place in Banjul opened on 27 August, 1990. Since this was an initiative by the Liberians themselves to iron out their country's problems, ECOWAS decided not to interfere with or even participate in the deliberations. But to the disappointment of many, Taylor whose participation was duly acknowledged as crucial to any comprehensive negotiations, did not attend. Earlier on, the NPFL had proposed that the conference be held in Buchanan (Liberia's second largest city) which was totally under their control. But given the then prevailing war situation, none of the other parties and interest groups felt safe enough to meet in NPFL-held territory. It may be that Taylor's absence from Banjul was to spite the delegates of other groups who had earlier turned down that invitation to Buchanan.

The Banjul national conference which closed on August 30, constituted an Interim Government, with Professor Amos Sawyer at its helm. The choice of Sawyer was informed by the

consensus that he had stayed above the power struggle in Liberia. The conference also gave birth to a 35-member Interim Legislative Assembly (ILA) composed of one member from each of Liberia's 13 counties, two from each of the six existing political parties, six from the NPFL (including the speaker of the Assembly - the second most powerful office under the Liberian Constitution); and four from Prince Johnson's INPFL including the Deputy Speaker. Yet, while the delegates believed that they had achieved an adequately broad-based arrangement and had sufficiently accommodated Taylor's interest, the NPFL which now controlled 90 percent of Liberia's territory, rejected that arrangement and insisted that Taylor be made President of an NPFL-dominated Interim Government.[64]

On 9 September, 1990 three days after ECOWAS Chairman Jawara embarked on a mediatory tour of some member states over the Liberian impasse, President Doe was wounded and captured at the ECOMOG Headquarters by Prince Johnson and his INPFL, in whose hands he later died. There were optimisms that with the man whose obstinate clinging to power had fueled the crisis being taken out of the way, a negotiated settlement of the Liberian crisis was now at hand. But rather, following Doe's death, Prince Johnson whose INPFL finally liquidated Doe, promptly declared himself Interim President. Almost simultaneously, the Commander of the late Doe's guard,

Brigadier-General David Nimley, assumed control of the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia still holed up in the Executive Mansion fortress, declared himself the new president. However, while Johnson and Nimley both indicated their willingness to formally hand over power to Amos Sawyer's Interim Government of National Unity, Taylor's NPFL forces which had repeatedly pointed to Doe as the major obstacle to peace continued to hold an antagonistic position to both ECOMOG and Sawyer, insisting on a continued pursuit of the military option in settling the Liberian conflict.

In response to Cote D'Ivorie's President Felix Houphouet-Boigny's abortive call for an Extra-ordinary summit on Liberia, in Yamoussoukro on 15 October, 1990, ECOWAS Chairman Jawara called for a preliminary meeting of Ministers of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee to be held in Banjul from 22 to 24 october, 1990. The objectives of this third ministerial meeting of the committee were primarily:

- To assist all warring parties to negotiate and finally sign a cease fire agreement; and
- To properly prepare the grounds for the proposed Extra Ordinary Summit.

Towards the achievement of these goals, an advance copy of a draft ceasefire Agreement was despatched to each of the

parties. In response, the INPFL delegation to the talks said they were willing and ready to accept the terms of the draft agreement. The AFL delegation similarly accepted the draft in its entirety and further indicated that their forces were only holding the Executive Mansion in Monrovia, pending the arrival and installation of the Interim Government. The NPFL delegation similarly indicated their readiness to accept the Agreement, provided it was amended, particularly with respect to those provisions relating to the Interim Government. They also agreed to accept ECOMOG as then constituted provided a provision was made for the inclusion of contingents from other states within and outside ECOWAS. The NPFL also proposed that once a ceasefire was put in place, another national conference of Liberians should be convened under the auspices of the ECOWAS mediation Committee to merge the Amos Sawyer Interim Government with their own.

Sadly, however, the NPFL delegation later reported to the Ministerial meeting that after consultation with their leader, they were unable to sign even the draft ceasefire Agreement that had fully accommodated their own amendments. Thus, the meeting was left with no choice but to accept a ceasefire between the AFL and INPFL while leaving the door open for the NPFL to join whenever it felt able to do so.

Subsequently, the Authority of heads of State and Government

of ECOWAS held its first-ever Extra-Ordinary Session on 27 and 28 November, 1990 in Bamako, Mali, under the Chairmanship of President Jawara. With the understandable exception of Guinea, Mauritania and of course, Liberia, the session was attended by the Heads of State of all the 13 other member states of ECOWAS.

After expressing appreciation to members of the Mediation Committee for the initiatives taken and gratitude to ECOMOG for its contributions towards finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Liberia, the leaders for the first time collectively endorsed the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia as embodied in the Banjul Communique and decisions of the Standing mediation Committee adopted on 7 August, 1990, and appealed for greater international support.[65]

Following the Bamako Summit, a fourth Ministerial meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee was convened in Banjul, on 20 and 21 December, 1990. Not only were all members of the Committee present, but Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea and sierra Leone, as well as all warring factions were also represented. Also in the Gambian capital for its first meeting was a Technical Sub-Committee set up during the Mediation Committee's october meeting to negotiate the details of implementing the ceasefire agreement.

On 21 December, the second day of the meeting, the warring parties prepared and signed a Joint statement. That document spelt out that:

1. The warring parties, in keeping with the final communique of the ECOWAS Authority hereby agree to form a future interim government. Towards this end the warring parties agree to organise an All-Liberia Conference in Liberia within the next 60 days.
2. Also, the warring parties agree to constitute a Technical Committee to work out security arrangements, under the supervision of ECOWAS, for the hosting of the ALL-Liberia Conference.
3. The warring parties agree to seek assistance from ECOWAS and other friendly governments and organisations to help repatriate and resettle Liberians prior to the ALL-Liberia Conference.
4. Upon formation of the future Interim Government, the said government shall take appropriate measures, with the assistance of ECOWAS, to begin disarming the warring parties.
5. The warring parties agree to continue the ceasefire as is with all parties remaining where they were as of the signing of the ceasefire agreement in Bamako on November 28, 1990, and to continue discussions in Liberia on the modalities of Monitoring the ceasefire under the

supervision of ECOWAS. All efforts will be made to conclude the modalities for monitoring the ceasefire within 30 days.

6. The warring parties agree that immediately upon signing this statement, all seaports and airports will beconsidered military free zones. Towards this end, the warring party controlling the seaport/airport to be utilised will work out the appropriate security measures whenever use of the seaport/airport is desired. For each arrival/departure, two Inspectors of ECOMOG will work along with the warring party controlling the seaport/airport each time it is used.

The Ministerial meeting expressed particular satisfaction at the understanding reached by the warring parties, urged them to conclude within 30 days the formulation of modalities for implementing the ceasefire accord and ended on the understanding that contact would be maintained to ensure that the Technical Sub-Committee (which had already swing into action) reconvened early in 1991.

As a follow up to that meeting, the sub-committee held its second meeting in Monrovia, from 18-22 January, 1991. At that meeting, the ECOWAS Secretariat tabled a draft agreement, which formed the basis for negotiations among the warring parties. But there were two issues on which agreement was not

easily achieved, namely, the confinement and disarming of troops. The strongest objection was raised by the NPFL delegation to the effect that it could not commit itself to any confinement and disarming of its troops until the outcome of the proposed second National Conference was known. With that objection, stalemate again ensured inspite of the fact that agreement had already been reached in principle during the Committee's deliberation on the modalities for implementation of the ceasefire. To keep the peace process alive, a Third Summit meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee had to be convened this time in the Togolese capital, Lome.

The Third Summit of the Standing Mediation Committee took place at the Headquarters of the Togolese People's Rally in Lome, on 12 and 13 February, 1991, under the Chairmanship of the Gambia's President Jawara. Also in attendance were Dr. Amos Sawyer (for Liberia's Interim Government of National Unity, IGNU), Mr. Prince Johnson (INPFL) and a representative of the OAU who was invited to attend in an Observer capacity.

The Summit, preceded by a Ministerial Meeting of the Committee reviewed developments relating to the Liberian crisis since the first ECOWAS Extra-Ordinary Summit at Bamako in November 1990. It recalled that at the Bamako Extra-Ordinary Summit, all the three warring factions had signed a Declaration in

which they agreed to observe an immediate ceasefire to be monitored by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). They had also agreed to work out the modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire and to resolve their differences with regard to an interim government for Liberia as envisaged in the ECOWAS peace plan. The summit noted, the efforts that had been made since then to get the warring parties to agree on the practical modalities for the statement signed by the three warring parties at Banjul in December 1990, in which the factions, among other things, undertook to conclude an agreement on the modalities for the implementation of the ceasefire within thirty days.

In view of the difficulties which the Technical Sub-Committee had encountered during its second meeting at Monrovia from 18 to 22 January, 1991 with regard to the negotiation of the modalities for implementing the ceasefire, the Heads of state and Government went into extensive Consultations with the warring factions. The result of those deliberations was the adoption and signature of a formal ceasefire Agreement by all the three warring factions. By that Agreement, the parties agreed to the confinement of their troops to positions to be determined by ECOMOG in consultation with them. With regard to the disarming of the troops, the parties also agreed that upon the formation of the future interim government, that government would take appropriate measures, with the

assistance of ECOWAS, to start the disarming of the troops. The Committee appealed to all parties to continually demonstrate the spirit of reconciliation which they had manifested in Lome and directed the Executive Secretary to take all necessary steps to ensure that ECOMOG forces effectively and speedily implement the ceasefire Agreement throughout Liberia in accordance with its provisions, in order to create appropriate conditions for the convening of National Conference of Liberians on March 15, 1991. Finally, the Committee warmly welcomed the decision of the Government of the Republic of Mali to contribute forces to ECOMOG operations and reiterated the need for other ECOWAS member-states to contribute troops and materials towards strengthening ECOMOG's capacity.[66]

The Lome Summit was hailed as a major breakthrough in the quest for peace in Liberia. But the euphoria was not to last. It soon became clear that inspite of the Ceasefire Agreement, the leaders of the warring factions, particularly Taylor's NPFL, were yet to disagree on several other issues, both of substance and of procedure, and that these differences would need to be reconciled, sometimes repeatedly, before any further progress could be achieved on the road to peace in Liberia. Thus, even after the February 1991 Lome accords (since tagged Lome1), several other meetings and summits have had to be convened, sometimes with paltry results, but all in

the quest for progress of the peace process. The following therefore is a summary of the major Summits, other consultations and declarations wholly or partly focusing on aspects of the Liberia stalemate since then.

3.3.1 Joint Declaration On the Liberian Situation, 1 March, 1991

At the invitation of the togolese President, General Guassingbe Eyadema, the Liberian Interim President, Dr. amos Sawyer, NPFL Leader Charles Taylor and INPFL Leader Prince Yeduo Johnson, met in Lome from 27 February to 1 March, 1991. That meeting provided a unique opportunity for the three leaders to engage in further dialogue amongst themselves with a view to advancing the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Liberian crisis with particular regards to the arrangements for the convening of a national conference in Monrovia, on 15 March, 1991.

A Joint Declaration issued at the end of their talks states that they "agreed to corporate fully with ECOWAS and to refrain from taking any action that might be prejudicial to the arrangements being made to ensure the successful convening of a national conference in Monrovia on 15 March, 1991 and thereafter".[67]

3.3.2 Consultative Meeting of Heads of State in Yamoussaukro - Yamoussoukro I

Following reports of renewed hostilities, the Heads of state of Nigeria, Gambia, Togo and Burkina Faso met with Sawyer and Taylor in Yamoussoukro on Sunday, 30 June, 1991, under the chairmanship of Cote D'Ivoire President Felix Houghouet-Boigny.

During the meeting, the Heads of State requested President Houphouet-Boigny, in his capacity as doyen to launch an urgent appeal to Dr. Amos Sawyer and Mr. Charles Taylor to accept a ceasefire, as preliminary to National reconciliation and the restoration of peace to Liberia.

The Heads of State also solicited the assistance of the International Negotiation Network (INN) of Jimmy Carter, former President of the United States, in monitoring the electoral process in Liberia. They requested that the INN work in collaboration with a five-member Committee set up for the purpose, and comprising the Gambia, Togo, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Cote D'Ivoire, to closely Monitor the non-violation of the ceasefire. It was agreed that the two parties of Sawyer and Taylor would undertake to maintain security in each of the zones under their control, until the conclusion of elections.

These proposals were accepted by the two Liberian Leaders, who pledged their reconciliation, in the presence of the five Heads of State, by a long and warm embrace.

3.3.3 The 14th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government

The 14th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of state and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria on 4 to 6 July, 1991 undertook an extensive review of the Liberian situation and commended the tireless, painstaking efforts of the standing mediation Committee. The Authority of Heads of state and Government noted the meeting in Yamoussoukro and endorsed the constitution of the five-member committee on the Liberian situation. In its final communique at the end of the Abuja Summit, "The Authority stressed the need for the five-member committee to ensure that a proper environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections are held; such environment include the effective supervision and control of the armed forces belonging to each of the warring parties, the facilitation of the repatriation and resettlement of Liberian refugees prior to the elections, and the effective restoration of conditions necessary to guarantee free movement of persons and unfettered campaigning by the political parties. Considering that the elections are envisaged to be held within a period of six months, the Authority requested the committee of five to do everything possible to expedite the creation of these necessary

conditions. Recalling the fact that the All-Liberian National Conference had agreed on the composition of the Interim Elections Commission the Authority requested the Interim Government ofLiberia to expedite the Constitution of the Commission to enable it commence its works".

The Abuja Summit also reaffirmed its belief in the need for other ECOWAS Member States to respond without further delay to the appeal to contribute troops to strengthen the capacity of ECOMOG so that it could more effectively discharge its peace-keeping functions and responsibilities in Liberia.[68]

3.3.4 First Yamoussoukro Summit of the Committee of Five-Yamoussoukro II

Following the endorsement it received at the Abuja Summit, the Committee of five on Liberia held its first session in Yamoussoukro, Republic of Cote D'Ivoire on 29 July, 1991 under the chairmanship of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Present at the session in their capacity as members of the committee, were the Heads of State of Cote D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and a representative of the Togolese President.

At the invitation of the Committee, the session was also attended by: Dr. Amos Sawyer, President of the Interim

Government of Liberia, Mr. Charles Taylor, Head of the NPFL, and a representative of International Negotiations Network (INN). The Committee reviewed developments on the Liberian crisis since its consultative meeting of 29 and 30 June 1991, and congratulated both the Interim Government and the NPFL for maintaining the ceasefire, in conformity with their commitments during the June meeting.

The Committee further recognised the vital importance that the necessary conditions of security on the ground be created and, to this end, decided to hold appropriate consultations with a view to restoring lasting peace to Liberia in justice and dignity. The Committee also thanked President Carter for responding to their invitation and for making his INN available to assist in organisation of the electoral process in Liberia. Finally, the Committee agreed to meet again in Yamoussoukro in one month's time.[69]

3.3.5 Second Meeting of the Committee of Five 16-17 September, 1991- Yamoussoukro III

The Committee of five held its second meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote D'Ivorie, from 16 to 17 September, 1991 under the Chairmanship of President Felix Houghouet-Boigny, President of the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire. Also present at the invitation of the Committee were: Dr. Amos Sawyer, president of the

Interim Government of Liberia; Mr. Charles Taylor, head of the NPFL, and the Representative of INN.

The Committee reviewed the developments relating to the Liberian crisis since its last meeting of July 29, 1991 and noted that since that meeting, consultations were undertaken between member states of ECOWAS and with some friendly states outside the sub-region on a number of matters aimed at restoring lasting peace and security to Liberia.

Recognising the vital importance that the necessary conditions of peace and security on the ground be created in order to reinforce the confidence of all parties, the meeting agreed on the need to remodel and reinforce ECOMOG and reiterated earlier appeals to other member states of ECOWAS willing and able to contribute troops to do so without any further delay. It welcomed the announcement by Senegal of its readiness to contribute troops to ECOMOG and noted that both the Interim government and the NPFL head adhered to their commitments to continue to observe and consolidate the cease-fire in Liberia. Furthermore, the Meeting welcomed the agreement of the parties to implement, under ECOMOG Supervision the encampment of their troops in designated locations and their disarmament, and agreed that the arms and ammunition would be deposited in appropriate armouries also under the supervision of ECOMOG. Thus, the meeting mandated ECOMOG, in liaison with the parties

concerned, to work out the practical modalities for the implementation of this agreement.

Both the Interim Government of Liberia and the NPFL, also agreed at that meeting:

- to set up a five-member Elections Commission for the organisation and supervision of the elections in Liberia.
- to establish a five-member Ad-hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes arising from the electoral process as provided by the Liberian Constitution, and
- to cooperate fully with the International Negotiations Network (INN) of the Carter Centre invited by the Committee to assist with the electoral process.

The Committee decided to meet again in Yamoussoukro on 29 October 1991.[70]

3.3.6 Third Meeting of the Committee of Five 29-30 October 1991 - Yamoussoukro IV

The Committee of five on Liberia held its third meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote D'Ivoire from 29 to 30 October 1991 under the chairmanship of President Felix Houphonet-Boigny.

At the invitation of the Committee, apart from those who are

members of the Committee of five, the other members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee participated in its deliberations together with Guinea and Sierra Leone. Also present at the invitation of the Committee were Dr. Amos Sawyer, president of the Interim Government of Liberia, Mr. Charles Taylor, head of the NPFL, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU, and Mrs. Dayle E. Spencer, representative of the INN.

Reviewing developments relating to the Liberian crisis since its last meeting in Yamoussoukro on 16 and 17 September 1991, the Committee noted with appreciation that since that meeting, the Republic of Senegal, in keeping with its promise to contribute troops to ECOMOG, had started deploying its troops to Liberia. It also noted the fact that the parties,in consonance with the agreement reached in Yamoussoukro during the last meeting of the Committee of five, had nominated a five-member Elections Commission for the organisation and supervision of elections in Liberia and a five-member ad-hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes that may arise from the electoral process, as provided for by the Liberian Constitution. The Committee urged the parties concerned to take all necessary action to ensure that the Interim Elections Commission begins its work without any further delay.

Recalling its earlier appeal to other ECOWAS Member States to

contribute contingents to ECOMOG, the Committee welcomed with appreciation the announcement by Guinea-Bissau of its readiness to contribute troops to ECOMOG.

Recalling the earlier Yamoussoukro Agreement of the parties to implement, under ECOMOG supervision, the encampment of their troops in designated locations and their disarmament, and the mandate given to ECOMOG, in liaison with the parties concerned, to work out the practical modalities for the implementation of that accord, the Meeting agreed on a *programme of Implementation of these important elements of the* cease-fire.[11]

That programme envisaged the implementation, within 60 days, of all the modalities for the establishment of the necessary conditions of peace and security on the ground in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties and create a proper atmosphere conducive to the holding of free, fair and democratic elections within a period of six months. To this end, the Committee therefore renewed its mandate to ECOMOG to ensure a smooth and speedy implementation of the programme in order to make it possible for democratic elections to be held in Liberia within the stipulated period.

3.3.7 Informal Consultative Group Meeting of the Committee of Five, Geneva 6-7 April 1992

From 6 to 7 april, 1992, the Committee of five held an Informal Consultative Group Meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, at the invitation and under the chairmanship of the Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny. Present at the meeting were Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire, Abdou Diouf, President of the Republic of Senegal, and Vice President Augustus Aikhomu, representing the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Also present were Dr. Amos Sawyer, President of the Interim Government of Liberia, and Mr. Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

The Consultative Group reviewed developments relating to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Accord signed on 30 October 1991. The group noted such positive developments as the appointment of the members of the Interim Elections Commission and the ad hoc supreme court, the completion of reconnaissance visits by ECOMOG to the areas held by the NPFL, and the opening of some of the trunk roads in Liberia. However, many other important aspects of the Yamoussaoukro Accord had remained unimplemented, particularly those relating to the establishment of a buffer zone along the Sierra Leone -

Liberia border, and the encampment and disarmament of all combatants.

The Group reaffirmed the validity of the Yamoussaukro Accord of 30 October 1991, as offering the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict, and for creating the necessary conditions that would conduce free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia. It therefore called on all the parties concerned, in particular the NPFL, to repose trust and confidence in ECOMOG and to co-operate fully with ECOMOG to ensure, without any further delay, the speedy, uninterrupted and effective implementation of the Accord. In this connection, in order to facilitate the implementation of the Accord, the meeting agreed to make the following clarifications:

- That the buffer zone on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border envisioned by the Accord should be established without further delay. ECOMOG alone shall secure the zone. NPFL may send unarmed observers to the zone.
- That all entry and exit points into and out of Liberia, in particular the seaports and airports, shall be secured by ECOMOG. NPFL may maintain an unarmed administrative presence at these points through police, customs and immigration in the areas under its control.
- That the encampment and disarmament of all combatants shall

be carried out by ECOMOG as envisioned in the Yamoussoukro Accord.

- That Mr. Charles Taylor may maintain a personal security of Company strength equipped only with small arms.

In the light of the foregoing clarifications, the meeting directed the Field Commander of ECOMOG to implement the Yamoussoukro accord without any further delay.[72]

3.3.8 Fifteenth Summit of ECOWAS, 27 to 29 July, 1992

The Liberian situation also featured prominently in the deliberation of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS at its Fifteenth Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal, from 27 to 29 July, 1992.

The Authority commended the Committee of Five, for its untiring efforts to restore peace, stability and security in Liberia in accordance with the mandate given to it at the earlier Abuja Summit. It noted that the Committee had held no fewer than four meetings in Yamoussoukro during 1991 and one meeting in Geneva in April 1992 and endorsed all the agreements reached at those meetings between the parties concerned, particularly the Accord of 30 October 1991 and the clarifications made to it at the Geneva meeting of 6-7 April 1992. The Authority affirmed its strong conviction that the

Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Liberian conflict.

The Authority further noted that the Accord of 30 October 1991 had provided, for the accomplishment of the following tasks before the holding of democratic elections that all entry and exit points into and out of Liberia were to be secured by ECOMOG; that road blocks on all highways were to be dismantled to allow for unfettered movement of persons; that a buffer zone along the Liberia - Sierra Leone border, secured by ECOMOG, was to be established; that all hostile foreign forces were to be withdrawn from the territory of Sierra Leone; that all combatants of the warring parties were to be encamped and disarmed by ECOMOG; and that an Interim Elections Commission and an Ad-Hoc Supreme Court were to be established.

The Authority believed however that more could have been achieved but for the lack of co-operation by the NPFL, which frustrated all attempts by ECOMOG to implement the terms of the Yamoussoukro Accords. Convinced that this unco-operative conduct by the NPFL, especially with regard to the encampment and disarmament of its Combatants and the insertion of buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, posed a serious threat to the peace, stability and security of the West African region, the Authority therefore decided that no effort should now be spared by all the member states of ECOWAS and

the rest of the international community to bring the situation in Liberia to an early end. Accordingly, the Summit resolved:

- that the Field Commander of ECOMOG shall complete the implementation of the programme contained in the Yamoussoukro Accord of 30 October 1991, clarified by the Geneva Meeting of the Committee of Five, not later than thirty days from July 29, 1992;
- that unless Charles Taylor and the NPFL comply fully with the implementation of the said programme, the Authority, shall impose comprehensive sanctions against Charles Taylor and the NPFL - controlled areas of Liberia, and other party that fails to comply with the implementation of the programme;
- that all the member states of ECOWAS shall take all necessary measures to give full effect to this decision;
- that the Committee of Five, in Consultation with the Standing Mediation Committee, shall seek the assistance of the security Council of the United Nations to make whatever sanctions that are imposed, effective and binding on all members of the international Community in accordance with the provisions of the United nations Charter.[73]

The ECOWAS leaders decided to invite the Secretary General of the United Nations and the International Negotiation Network (INN) to take necessary measures to facilitate the

verification and monitoring of the electoral process in Liberia by the United Nations. And finally, the Authority, once more, called on the entire international community to provide every assistance to ECOWAS to ensure the success of its peace-keeping efforts in Liberia.[74]

However, it is no longer news that due to Charles Taylor's intransigence, the sanctions threatened in article 2 of the 15th Summit of ECOWAS on the 27 to 29 July, 1992, by the Authority, were actually imposed. But despite two supportive UN resolutions (i.e. Resolutions 788 and 789 both of 1992) little success was achieved due largely to the complicity of interest groups both within and from outside the sub-region.

The leaders of West Africa have continued their quest for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian crisis. The ECOWAS countries had since the July 1992 Dakar Summit gone into many extensive consultations with the warring factions, and the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict had heightened and dampened at different points in time. At the last count, after meeting for a week in Geneva, representatives of the present three key parties in the four year-old Liberian Civil war have supposedly worked out a new peace agreement to end the country's bloody civil conflict.

3.3.9 The Geneva II Agreements and the Cotonou Accord of July 25, 1993

The Geneva II Agreement was approved July 17 by G. Baccus mathews of the Interim Government of national Unity (IGNU), Mormolu Sirleaf of the NPFL and Alhaji Hassan G.V. Kromah of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), under the auspices of the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the Economic Community of West African States. It was to be binding only after the leaders of the three parties had signed it July 25, and this was achieved during the 18th annual ECOWAS Summit in Cotonou, Benin.

The agreement calls for the formation of a transitional government to run the country for a period of six months under the constitution of Liberia and in accordance with the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. The government will have three branches - The Executive, Judiciary and Legislature - and a five-member Council of State.

The conference failed to decide on who will head the Executive branch of the transitional government, creating the first black hole in the agreement. And so several proposals, similar to those made during the 1991 All-Liberia Conference in Monrovia, were advanced. The interim government suggested that the Executive be composed of a President and two Vice

Presidents, with the interim government holding the presidency while the vice presidency went to the NPFL and ULIMO. Each of the three parties that signed the agreement would submit three names from which the president and the two Vice Presidents will be chosen.

On the other hand, the NPFL suggested the formation of a five-member council of state to take the place of the Presidency. Three members of the Council would come from the groups who signed the Geneva II agreement, while the remaining two will be chosen from a list of nine persons nominated by the parties. The NPFL also proposed that no leader of the parties to the Geneva talks (Sawyer, Kromah and Taylor) should be eligible to participate in the transitional government.

It is ironic that the NPFL would make this proposal because the same proposal was contained in the Banjul agreement of August 1990, which the NPFL refused to endorse.

The interim government further proposed that if the leaders of the three parties do not agree on any of the proposals, then they should consider holding an all-Liberian Conference as "a final means of resolving the (issues of the) presidency".

On the judiciary, the NPFL and the interim government agreed to keep the current structure of the Supreme Court. However, they invited ULIMO to fill the remaining vacancy on the Court. The parties also agreed that the Supreme Court shall adjudicate all matters arising from the elections that will

follow the transitional process. With the NPFL having its own legislative body as does the interim government, the parties agreed to consolidate the two legislative bodies into one. The reconstituted body will comprise 35 members, 13 each from the NPFL and IGNU and nine from ULIMO. The speaker will come from ULIMO. The parties further agreed to hold general elections within seven months from the day they officially signed the agreement. People who will hold leadership positions within the transitional government, from president to managing directors and heads of public corporations and autonomous agencies, shall be ineligible to contest the election that will follow the transitional period. Voter registration will begin as soon as possible, having due regard for the need to expedite repatriation. The transitional government and the Electoral Commission will work out the "Modalities" on who will observe and monitor the elections. The parties agreed to ask Liberians and the international community to finance the electoral process.

The new ceasefire agreement prohibits the importation of any weapons and "war-like materials" into Liberia, the build up of military manpower or armaments, or any other activity that would violate the ceasefire. As required by several past agreements, Geneva II calls for the disarmament, encampment and demobilisation of NPFL troops. However, it said that the supervision and monitoring of this process will be carried out

by a new peace-keeping force from ECOWAS member countries which is not part of the current ECOMOG, by troops from OAU member states and a UN observer mission. The agreement said the presence of the UN observer mission will ensure Confidence for the neutrality of the operations. And it stipulated that adequate security for Charles Taylor, determined by the NPFL itself and the UN Observer mission, will be provided.
Yamoussoukro IV had also called for disarmament and encampment and the provision of security for Mr. Taylor. But Charles Taylor never agreed to disarm. What is different now is that ECOMOG will be expanded to include other ECOWAS and OAU member countries. And a UN Observer mission will presumably be seen as a victory for Mr. Taylor, who contested repeatedly the impartiality of ECOMOG.

The parties agreed that the military embargo imposed on all warring factions by ECOWAS and UN Security Council shall remain in full force. However, they asked that the economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS be lifted upon "certification by the ECOMOG that the terms and conditions" of the ceasefire have been complied with.
The parties further agreed that ECOMOG should create a buffer zone along the Liberia-Guinea, Liberia-Sierra Leone, and Liberia-Cote D'Ivoire borders to prevent cross-border attacks or the importation of arms. They called for the deployment of UN Observers in all such zones.

In what may be seen as one of the sticky points, the agreement said that the warring parties shall remain in control of the territories that they held at the signing of the ceasefire agreement and at the commencement of encampment. Upon signing of the ceasefire agreement, all prisoners of war and detainees shall be immediately released to the available UN authority or Red Cross authority in the area where such prisoners or detainees are held. The parties also agreed to organise a *national Army and Police Force once the Transitional* government has been established. The schedule for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement will be drawn up by ECOMOG and UN observers.[75]

All in all Geneva II would appear to be comprehensive even if, in places, it does leave itself wide open to manipulation by anyone hell bent on mischief.

Interestingly however, since the July 25 signing of the Peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, there had been hopeful signs that perhaps finally the Cotonou agreement will be the mother of all peace agreements to end the four year old Liberian civil war. First, the three parties - the NPFL, ULIMO and IGNU, have named three representatives to the five-member council that will be the decision-making body of the transitional government. They also named three candidates each who, nine in all, were meeting on August 14-15 in Cotonou to choose the remaining two members of the five member council of state.

Changes had however, since been made by all factions on these appointments. Given the composition of the transitional government in the Cotonou Agreement, the interim government made some concessions since it will follow the line of the NPFL suggestion of a five-man council. However, IGNU got the Chairmanship of the in-coming transitional government with the appointment of Bismarck Kuyon, who was later replaced with Philip Banks III. Banks himself subsequently lost the Chairmanship election to fellow IGNU member - Professor David Kpormakpor.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council on August 10 welcomed the decision by Secretary General Boutros Boutro-Ghali to send a technical team to Liberia to obtain information relevant to the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The Security Council also in Resolution 856 agreed to send an advance party of 30 military observers to participate in the work of the Joint cease-fire Monitoring Committee. The Committee was set up in the Cotonou agreement to monitor, investigate and report all violations of the current cease-fire. It will be dissolved upon the arrival and deployment of an "expanded" ECOMOG Peace-Keeping Force and a 200-300 man UN Observer force.[76]

It is also interesting to note that Mr. Charles Ghankay Taylor of the NPFL who has broken several previous peace agreements, said that he would follow the latest accord to the later, even

before it was officially signed on July 25.[77] While the news is encouraging that Liberians may have finally decided to put their country first, it is important at this point to note the fact that Taylor and his NPFL may have been under great pressures in Geneva, as they had repeatedly called for UN involvement after being driven out of several strategic areas of the country, following the failed "Operation Octopus" initiated last October to over run positions of ECOMOG and the Interim Government. This is a tempting view considering the fact that it will be recalled particularly, that the only other time the NPFL has ever committed itself to serious negotiation towards peace was when it was under bombardment by one of the former ECOMOG Field Commanders, General Joshua Dogonyaro.

In the meantime, it remains to be clearly seen whether what all this signals is real progress towards peace or a repeat performance of dashed hopes, such as observers of Liberia's agony had witnessed before from Bamako through Lome to Yasmoussoukro and now Geneva.

This view becomes even more pertinent considering that there are several other issues which must be dealt with if the peace process is not to founder. For example, the recent emergence of a new armed faction fighting the NPFL in Sinoe and Rivercess counties and making bold advances into the Krahn heartland of Grand Gedeh county has thrown doubts on the

efficacy of peace keeping deployment in those vital territories. Investigations carried out by the IGNU and ECOMOG, indicated that the new faction, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) led by George Boley was engaged in high level recruitment in Monrovia.[73] Ironically though, the new agreement came on the eve of the 147th independence anniversary of Liberia, reminding nationals of the country and indeed the entire international community of the monumental task they must now undertake to restore the nearly one and a half century of nation building that has almost been destroyed in less than four years.

It is significant also, to note here, that in continuation of the negotiation process, leaders of the IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO, after months of squabbles and stalemate concerning interpretations of the Cotonou Accord, pledged after a February 15, 1994 meeting in Monrovia, to implement the military and political requirements of the Cotonou agreement.

Militarily, the parties agreed to provide within 48 hours from February 15, all information concerning the numbers of locations, numbers of weapons, the location of mines, numbers of prisoners of war, and the designation of liaison officials for the benefit of ECOMOG and UNOMIL (the UN Observer Mission to Liberia). The parties also agreed to joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG reconnaissance missions in their respective areas.

Politically, the parties agreed to hold the elections that were initially proposed by the Cotonou Accord for February, on September 7, 1994, but before then to instal on March 7, the long-awaited Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG). March 7 is the day on which the full deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL Forces would have been completed and disarmanent begun. The parties also agreed to settle, at least partially, the arguments surrounding the Transitional Council of State and the entire transitional process.[79]

The March 7 triple deadline to fully deploy ECOMOG troops across the Country, disarm the warring factions and instal the broad-based transitional government was almost foiled by the absence of Mr. Taylor's NPFL and arguments within ULIMO Factions at the proposed function.[80] However, the induction of the LNTG which is expected to govern Liberia for a transitional period of six months, finally took place late the same day, with Mr. Taylor pledging co-operation and participation in the proposed September elections. Perhaps, afterall, the long agony of the Liberian citizenry is at last nearing its end.

FOOTNOTES

1. This is how the UN Secretary-General's special representative to Liberia Mr. Livingston Gordon - Somers, jointly chairing the Geneva II talks with ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu, and the OAU Special Envoy, former Zimbabwe President Canaan Banana, described the Liberian situation to delegates to the Conference, as reported by West Africa, Jul 26-Aug 1, 1993, P.1292.

2. John Amfani Ayan (1992), Nigeria And Peace-Keeping Efforts In Chad And Liberia. Paper prepared for the SSRC-Mac Arthur Foundation Visiting Scholar Program On International Peace and Security in a Changing World Workshop, New York, N.Y., 17th April, PP.14-15.

3. We believe in this regard, that Ethiopia's Occupation by Italy from 1935 till its liberation by allied forces during the second world war also disqualified it technically, from being grouped with Liberia as a Country that did not experience European Colonisation.

4. For more on this, see Amadu Sesay (1978), International Politics in Africa: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policies of Liberia And Sierra Leone, 1957-1973 (un-Published Ph.D. thesis, University of London); Amadu Sesay (1980), "Societal inequalities, ethnic heterogeneity and political instability: The case of Liberia", in Plural Societies (The Hague), Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn, PP.15-30;
Amadu Sesay (1984), Conflict and Collaboration: Liberia and Her West African Neighbours", in Nigerian Journal of Political Science, Zaria, Vol.3, No.2, Dec., PP75-93; and M.B. Akpan (1973), "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African Peoples of Liberia", in Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, PP.217-336; Gus Liebenow (1966), Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Evanston: North-Western University Press; and finally, G.E. Saigbe Boley (1983), Liberia: The Rise And Fall of The First Republic, London, MacMillan.

5. It is rather very interesting in that regard to note that Liberia's 18th President, William Tubman, actually took part in at least two of such wars in 1910 and then 1915, the so called Bolobo expeditions.

6. G.E. Saigbe Boley (1983), Liberia: The Rise And fall of The Fist Republic, London, Macmillan, P.24.

7. See Gazette Extraordinary Vol. xxxvii, July and August, Nos. 7 and 8, 1971, Monrovia: Government Printer, P.5.

8. G.E. Saigbe Boley (1983), Liberia: The Rise And Fall of The First Republic, London, MacMillan, P.96.

9. Gus Liebenow (1966), Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Evanston: North-Western University Press, P.66.

10. See Amadu Sesary, (1980), "Societal inequalities, ethnic heterogeneity and political instability: The case of Liberia", in plural societies, The Hague, Vol. 11, No.3, Autumn, pp.15-30; and Gus Liebenow (1966), Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Evanston: North-Western University Press. p.68.

11. G.E. Saigbe Boley (1983), Liberia: The Rise And Fall of The First Republic, London, Macmillan, P.64.

12. For an interesting and incisive account of Americo-Liberian/indigenous Liberian relations, See M.B. Akpan (1973), "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule over the African Peoples of Liberia", in Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2.

13. For a detailed account of such attempts, and Failures, See Gus Liebenow (1966), Liberia: The Evolution of privilege, Evanston: North-Western University Press, PP.32-66; and Amadu Sesay, Ibid, PP.15-30.

14. Amadu Sesay (1992), Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis, In: Vogt M.A. (Ed.) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace-keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, P.35.

15. Africa Confidential, London, Vol. 21, No. 8, April 1980, P.7.

16. World Development Report 1979, Washington, D.C., World Bank, P.126.

17. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1976/77, London, Rex Collins, P.B629.

18. Amadu Sesay (1992), Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis, Ibid, P.38.

19. For details, see Greg Lanning and Marti Mueller (1979), Africa Undermined, Hammoudsworth, Pengiun, P.257.

20. Clower, R.W., et al (1966), Growth Without Development, Evanston, North-Western University Press, P.103.

21. "Independence anniversary speech", July 26, 1972, in Presidential Papers, Monrovia, Executive Mansion, No date, PP.556-7.

22. See Africa Research Bulletin, Economic and Technical Series, June 15-July 14, 1977.

23. Clower et al, Ibid, P.71.

24. G. E. Saigbe Boley, Ibid, P.101.

25. Ibid, P.102.

26. Ibid, P.104.

27. G.E. Saigbe Boley, Ibid, P.117.

28. Ibid, P.117.

29. West Africa, March 17, 1980, PP.468 and 500.

30. Among those killed were Frank Tolbert, senior brother of preseident Tolbert, Cecil Dennis, Foreign Minister, and Richard Henries, speaker of the House of Representatives.

31. The Master Sergeant of The Revolution, Monrovia, Ministry of Information and Culture, June 1981; West Africa, April 21, 1980, P.689 and Amadu Sesay (1983), "The Liberian Revolution: Foward March, Stop, About-Face Turn", in Conflict Quarterly, Fredericton, Canada, Summer, P.50.

32. West Africa, July 9-15, 1990, P.2066.

33. West Africa, April 16-22, 1990, P.612.

34. Ibid, P.612.

35. Charles Taylor however claimed that Quiwonkpa's body was eaten by Doe's men. See Patriot Special Freedom Pangs, (Gbanga, Bong County, Liberia: NPRA Press Centre, Ministry of Information) May-June, 1991, PP.26-29.

36. West Africa, April 16-22, 1990, P.612.

37. See Amadu Sesay, "Le Coup d'etat du Liberia: Facteurs Internes et effects regionaux", In Politique Africaine (Paris) No. 7 September, 1982, PP.91-106.

38. See Ahmadu Sesay, "Historical Background To The Liberian Crisis", In M.A. Vogt (Ed.) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace-keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, PP.29-49.

39. The Guardian, August 5, 1990, P.7.

40. Newswatch, May 14, P.14.

41. The Guardian, May 30, 1990, P.6.

42. The Guardian, August 5, 1990, P.A3.

43. Newswatch, May 14, 1990 P.16.

44. Reported in Newswatch, October 1, 1990. P.23.

45. West Africa, July 19-25, 1993, P.1269.

46. See Daily Champion, August 30, 1990, P.20.

47. African Concord, July 30, 1990, P.20.

48. The Guardian, January 23, 1991, P.23.

49. Newswatch, February 5, 1990, P.20.

50. Newswatch, August 13, 1990, P.9.

51. Newswatch, August 13 1990, P.23.

52. The Nigerian Economist, July 9, 1990, P.18.

53. See Newswatch, June 11, 1990 for details.

54. Daily Times, January 7, 1992, P.9.

55. See African Concord, July 30, 1990, PP.20-21, and Daily Champion, July 13, 1990, P.1.

56. Cited in Newswatch, July 30, 1990.

57. Charles Taylor, quoted in The Guardian, August 5, 1990, P.A3.

58. See interview in West Africa, February 24 - March 2 1992, PP.316-317.

59. The Guardian, September 20, 1990, P.2.

60. Daily Champion, October 13, 1990, P.1.

61. Charles Taylor announced on August 4, 1990, that he had formed a government, and called on all countries to "realise and respect our territorial integrity" (see The Guardian, August 5, 1990, P.A3).

62. See Osisioma B.C. Nwolise, "The Internationalisation of The Liberian Crisis And Its Effects On West Africa", In M.A. Vogt (Ed.) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace-keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, PP.55-71.

63. Final Communique: First Session of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, The Gambia, 6-7 August, 1990.

64. Final Communique: ALL Liberia Conference: Banjul, Gambia, 27 August, 1990.

65. Final Communique: First Extra-Ordinary Session Of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Bamako, Mali, 27-28 November, 1990.

66. Final Communique: Third Summit Meeting of The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Lome, Togo, 12-13 February, 1991.

67. Joint Declaration On the Liberian Situation, March 1, 1991, ECOWAS Secretariat, Lagos.

68. Final Communique; 14th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria, 4-6 July, 1991.

69. Final Communique: First meeting of the Committee of Five On the Liberian Crisis, Yamoussoukro, 29 July, 1991.

70. Final Communique: Second Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis, Yamoussoukro, 16-17 September, 1991.

71. Final Communique: Third Meeting of the Committee of Five on The Liberian Crisis, Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October, 1991.

72. Final Communique: Informal Consultative Group Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Liberia, 6-7 April, 1992.

73. Final Communique: 15th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Dakar, Senegal, 27-29 July, 1992.

74. See Nnamdi Obasi, "The Negotiation Process", In M.A. Vogt (Ed.) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional Peace-Keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, PP.178-200.

75. West Africa, July 26 - August 1, 1993, PP.1290-1291.

76. west Africa, August 23 - 29, 1993, P.1503

77. West Africa, July 26 - August 1, 1993, P.1290.

78. West Africa, November 8 - 14, 1993, P.2018.

79. West Africa, February 28 - March 6, 1993, P.362.

80. West Africa, March 21 - 27, 1994. P.497. Also NTA News Bulletin, March II, 1994.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEPENDENCY AND THE ECOMOG THESIS

4.0 Introduction

> "The problem is not only a Liberian problem anymore. Ammunitions and other weapons are coming in, reliably from Ghaddafi, the Libyan president, through Burkina Faso and Cote D'Ivoire, into Liberia.
> And of course, there is adequate intelligence information that some of these weapons are also dropped in Cote D'Ivoire, in the hands of the opponents of the Old man there (Felix Houphouet-Boigny).
> There are also reports that the bodyguards of Charles Taylor are dissidents from Gambia and Burkina Faso, some are dissidents from Ghana *and also from Sierra Leone*.
> This goes to show the magnitude of the problem. The problem is a Liberian problem. But there are external interests in what is happening here"[1].

This chapter focuses on the problems of dependency and underdevelopment as they affect collective security efforts in Africa. In chapter one, we argue that there is a correlation between these factors and the lack of successful operation of collective security efforts in West Africa in particular, and Africa, generally.

However, the thrust of this chapter is to examine the role of external influence in Africa's collective security, in the face of the neo-colonial legacies of dependency and underdevelopment. While we hold the notion that external influence which derives

directly from dependency undermines collective security efforts in the ECOWAS sub-region in particular, and the African region in general; at the same time, we also argue that the consequent insecurity caused by dependency reinforces the need for a pan-Africanist Option in the attempt to solve the African problems of underdevelopment and insecurity.

In analysing the problem, this chapter is divided into three hypothetical sections; The first, which is a test to our first proposition will examine external intervention in African affairs and the background for France's political and Military influence in Africa; the second, specifically aims at examining the hypothetical argument that external influence deriving more particularly from French West African States dependency on their metropole, is a major cause of delay to success by ECOMOG in Liberia. While, the third section aims to test our last proposition that - dependency will ultimately subjugate African security efforts to foreign interests, unless sub-regional models of collective security such as the ECOMOG example in West Africa is adopted to improve integrative Schemes of Security Management in the African region.

4.1.1 PROPOSITION I:

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND THE BACKGROUND FOR FRANCE'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

> "The neo-colonial influence of France in Francophone Africa Constitutes a major threat to Collective Security ideals in the region"[2].

One of the triad of this thesis is the argument that intervention by outside powers in the affairs of African States presents a most serious threat to African Security. This takes various forms ranging from economic and military aid to outright military intervention and political subversion by means of highly sophisticated and equipped intelligence systems[3]. Since the 1960s, these interventions have escalated both in scope and intensity, and have come to be directly related not only to the economic and military dependence of Africa on the industrial powers, but also to the structural pattern of African conflicts, as well as the economic, strategic, ideological, and security interests of the Metropoles. The need to recognise the vital nature of African conflicts to the industrial powers, especially the West, is evident in the initial divergence and then reconciliation of the Franco-Belgian perceptions of their interventionist postures in the second Shaba Crisis of May, 1978[4]. Both countries fought a rearguard battle to save the French plan to spread the burden of intervention among African states by creating a "Pan-African Security Force" with the support of Afro-Capitalist States like Gabon, Cote D'Ivoire, Senegal and Zaire against stiff opposition by erstwhile

Afro-Socialist States including Libya, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique[5].

Britain and the United States have intervened in Africa when there appears to have been any slightest threats to their economic and strategic interests, as in Nigeria (1967-1970)[6], and in the Shaba province of Zaire (1977-1978)[7]. Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire poses a serious cause for concern for independent observers abroad and a permanent source of embarrassment for Africans in this respect. Just like Sudan, Zaire occupies a pole position in America's strategic schedule in Africa. It provided a conduit pipe of arms for the US to the Savimbi-led UNITA rebels in their war against the communist Angolan government of E.Dos Santos. That was why Mobutu got one concession after the other in his negotiations with the IMF, America's covert tool in various strategic manipulations. Officials of successive administrations have never denied that the US influences who gets what from the IMF. A report commissioned by the Congressional Research Service found out that the US has frequently violated its announced policy of keeping politics out of the IMF and other international financial institutions. Author of the report, Caleb Rossiter, a professor in Cornell University's Washington Programme, listed numerous instances when the US has disregarded the economic guide-lines that are traditionally followed at the IMF and other institutions. The report also found out that the US on many occasions used "its influence to obtain or reject loans for Countries based on how well it likes the policies

of their governments... This influence is often decisive in the institutions because votes are weighted according to the size of the voting country's financial contributions, and the US is the biggest contributor"[8].

In the Zairean case, it is hard to imagine a country with greater natural resources at such bad shape. Zaire has suffered little or no drought. Its farming land is rich. It has immense deposits of Cobalt, Copper, diamonds and other scarce minerals. It also has immense forests, and its rivers provide a natural transport system as well as a huge source of hydro-electric power. And yet, real wages are a tenth of what they were at independence; malnutrition is chronic and 50 percent of the people live in absolute poverty. Susan George, in her book-"A fate worse than Debt",described the personal and family wealth of Mobutu; "the debt of the country is $5 billion and coincidentally, that is the estimate of how much General Mobutu and his family have stolen from Zaire"[9]. This is a paradox of American intervention in Africa to fulfil the dual mandate of promoting metropolitan interests while simultaneously undermining African Security.

Also, Sudan provides a veritable case study for testing the sincerity of purpose and honesty behind the setting of IMF's conditionalities. Why was the economically unstable country so attractive to the financial institutions? Do these bodies really

believe that a country which exports only hazel nuts and cotton will be able to repay its debts, despite its perpetual conflict situation? The answer lies in the geography of superpower politics. During the cold war, Sudan was important to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Countries, since it acted as a barrier to presumed expansionism of Soviet policies on Africa and the near East. In the West, the Country, which is Africa's largest in terms of area, shares a border with Colonel Gaddafi's Libya. In the East it has a common border with Socialist Ethiopia which since 1974-1975 has maintained close political and military links with the former USSR. It was also significant as a coastal state on the Red Sea, on which the USSR maintained a military presence in several ports, and is also closely allied with the anti-Socialist regime in Saudi Arabia. This kind of vantage placement provided Sudan with a form of blank cheque for all sorts of loans guaranteed by NATO Countries for large scale development projects, most of which are of questionable economic value. While the IMF maintained its tough stance on withdrawal of subsidies from social services in order to undermine the health and security of the Sudanese Africans, it kept a sinister silence on the huge military budgets and construction projects handled by Western Metropolitan countries. The Nimieri regime that exploited its anti-Communist stance to pile up a debt to the tune of $15 billion is no more in power, leaving a legacy of perpetual indebtedness and dependence for the Sudanese Africans.

On December 9, 1992, America went into Somalia in an "Operation Restore Hope". It was closely followed in March 1993 by a UN intervention force. The troops did not intervene in this African conflict as peace keepers, because that would have required two preconditions. Peace to keep and an invitation from a host government. At the time, President George Bush, addressing the American public hours before the dispatch of the Marines, said that the mission was 'purely humanitarian'. This, if it were sincere, would have been highly commendable, but as the international troops on whom Somalia had pinned its hopes for peace, had lately become "another faction in Mogadishu's clan warfare", that statement now simply reveals less than it obscures. Many experts who know about internal Somalia politics now argue that the underlying reason for the impulsive US intervention was not primarily humanitarian; it was to prevent Somalia from falling into the Iran-Sudan Camp. An eventuality of that nature could directly threaten Western economic interests - in this case oil, given the strategic position of Somalia, lying near Arabian oil fields[10].

Both Britain and the United States, as is obvious from contemporary international polity, are neo-colonial states Par excellence, so that intervention in African crisis is aimed as much to protect Western investments and sources of raw materials as to shore-up regimes favourable to Western manipulation.

Of all foreign interventionists in Africa however, the French

stance is the most unique. From the role of coloniser, the French have switched to that of the guardian of the independence of Franco States, and lately have combined this role with that of Africa's gendarme[11]. The Uniqueness of the French case lies not so much in France's ability to combine these roles and at the same time to retain her credibility even outside the Francophone states, as in the tenuous belief that France is not strictly speaking an external power both in and around africa. This has been the thesis of General Jean Callet, Michael Debre, and Admiral Labrousse, who see French presence in Africa as a "pledge of peace and hope".[12]

From the 1960s, when the majority of the states in Africa attained their independence, security concern in the region have revolved around the attempt, started by France's General Charles' de Gaulle to develop and consolidate a French sphere of influence in Africa. The Gaullist strategy, in addition to being aimed at undermining collective security efforts in the region, was also based on the creation of this sphere through which France sought to reinforce its power base in Europe and among the NATO powers. One justification the French perceives for projecting her influence in Africa as manifest in her continuous initiation and maintenance of various Francophonie summits, whose worldwide membership has swelled since the initial 1960s to 47 nations in 1993, and the variety of French language organisations, is that it helps keep going the image of France as a middle-ranking power, and even helps to justify her place as a permanent member of the UN Security

Council. In the contrary, Britain's morose public opinion of recent towards the Commonwealth Organisation initiated in the 1930's which now has 50 member nations with Nigeria's Chief Emeka Anyaoku as secretary general, is not unconnected to the fact that this grouping has refused to be dominated by the issue of British cultural identity. This became manifest when in 1961, Nigeria and Ghana spear-headed the movement that led to apartheid south Africa leaving the commonwealth and also, when in the early 1980's commonwealth pressures on the British Metropole over Rhodesia led to the independence of Zimbabwe.

When France granted independence to its former possessions in tropical Africa, it took steps to ensure internal stability there with two conditions in mind. In the first place, it acted on the assumption that, in addition to a police force, some semblance of a national army would be required in each new state to preserve order. Secondly, it sought to facilitate access for French forces in the event paris might want, at some future date, to deploy troops anywhere in the area. Both considerations were based on the premise to perpetuate French influence in Africa. This submission was justified by an article published in an influential French Journal - Documents de la Ravue des Deux Monde, in 1962 which stated in part'.

> "French aid to the Third World is not a gratuitous generosity, and it would be childish to deny the political or commercial motivations of what is variously called aid, technical assistance or co-operation..."[13]

'Technical assistance' programmes covering military aid were, therefore, worked out with Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Cote D;Ivoire Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). All of these countries, except Burkina Faso, at the time signed mutual defence treaties that placed complete responsibility for their external protection on France. Only Guinea and Mali subsequently remained outside the military umbrella France extended over its former territories in Africa.

Most of the accords specify that the African partner may call on France for aid against both internal and external threats. All the accords give France over flight rights and access to African airfields and ports for military purposes. Permanent French military bases were established in Senegal, Chad and Madagascar from which intervention forces can be airlifted to trouble spots anywhere in Africa. Small detachments were maintained in several other states.[14] Since then, French intervention forces have been employed in among other places, the Shaba region of Zaire, in central African Republic and more extensively in Chad where until 1989 they were engaged in active combat against Libya.

France's agreement with some of these African states contained the following:

Article 1:- The Central African Republic, Chad and Congo Brazzaville have agreed with the French Republic to form a common system for preparing and guaranteeing their own defence and the defence of the community.

Article 2:- The contracting parties pledge themselves to render mutual assistance and constantly to co-ordinate their action in respect of defence.[15]

The dependent and neo-colonial aspect of these agreements is apparent in the fact that it stipulates the right of France to maintain in these African countries' territory, armed forces which will remain under the control of France and not of the African military authorities. It is easy to see that, since France is a member of the NATO military alliance, such an accord represents a scheme by the Western Metropoles, that threatens the unity of purpose and neutrality of African states and may even involve them in a military conflict against their will.

Most of the accords initially gave France exclusive rights to supply the needs of the African states for military equipment and training. However, adjustments to the original agreements have provided more freedom to both donor and recipients. As a result of these agreements, military assistance is given by France to her African allies in the form of providing training facilities for Officers from these countries. About 8 percent of African Soldiers

were trained under this agreement in the first decade after independence. By 1972, free gift of arms stood at 8.5 million Francs annually. Recently, following the border clash between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, a French Military team arrived the region on February 27, 1994, in an attempt to complicate another African conflict.[16]

Moreover, as far as paris is concerned, the policy is that of continuity - there have been no radical changes in the policies since the death of both Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Inspite of expectations that socialist Francois Mitterand may behave differently, it is he who actually completed the consolidation of this French sphere through further involvement in the civil war in Chad amongst others, and by ensuring that the Franco African group remain cohesive. when the socialist government of Francois Mitterand came to power in 1981, there were many who expected considerable change in France's African policies. Indeed, there have been shifts of emphasis. In the essential aspects of security relations, however, the same concern and commitment that are implicit in de Gaulle's view still drive French policy today and continue to underpin its regional military role. It is the historical evolution of France's political involvement - most particularly in respect of its African presence - that holds the key to understanding not only the French perception of its military commitment to the point of obligation but also the acceptance of this French military influence by former colonies in

Africa.

Continuity marks the history of France's African policy from the Third Republic's Colonial period to independence granted under the Fifth Republic in 1960. Briefly, the milestones of this evolution are:-

(1) The Brazzaville Conference of 1944, generally broadening representation of Overseas people; (2) The 1956 Loi-Cadre, which established territorial assemblies; (3) The referendum imposed by de Gaulle in 1958 on a constitution for a "French Community", and (4) Independence in 1960, which was made viable by bilateral co-operation agreements with each newly independent country. There was a remarkable progression under three different political regimes; the provisional regime, in which all power was concentrated under General de Gaulle, a parliamentary regime, marked by the predominance of an assembly with ever -changing majorities, and finally, a regime that gave primacy to the executive. The first of these regimes clearly laid the groundwork for French African policy, the second implemented it by establishing the legal equality of all people in the French Union, and the third legitimized the equality of the states of the Union by granting full independence.

Typically, under colonial rule the vast majority of indigenes had no political rights or role. The constitution of 1946, however, extended representation in the French parliament to all native

people in Overseas lands (i.e. Africa). The government sought to create a new type of interracial democratic community, to be called Union Francaise. The preamble to the constitution stated that "France shall form with the peoples of its Overseas territories a Union based upon equality of rights and privileges, without distinction as to race or religion"[17]. Considerable emphasis was placed upon the formative role of native representation. Thus new African leaders were trained in modern government through direct participation in the political life of Metropolitan France, a practice unique in Western parliamentary institutions. This has been of in estimable value in drawing the later independent African States and their leaders close to France, as will be seen later, in the ECOMOG thesis.

Before World War II French colonies were grouped into two administrative units, French West Africa (AOF), formed in 1904, and French Equatorial Africa (AEF), formed in 1910. In neither instance were these colonial federations based on an ethnic, tribal, or political precolonial unity of the area. French conquest for the most part ignored or destroyed the pre-existing structures. This was when France in ernest began to undermine the harmony and prospects of collective security in Africa. The federations were basically an administrative convenience. They enabled France to oversee the regions in the most economical manner while satisfying the French commitment to centralised government. The constitutional forms under which AOF and AEF were administered

were virtually identical. At the head was a governor general residing in Dakar (AOF) and Brazzaville (AEF). In his office rested control of all local civilian, judicial and military services. The governor general reported to the Minister of colonies in Paris. Empowered to intervene at any level, the governor general was advised by a council appointed by him. Theoretically, this council could include well-educated Africans (evolue's). In fact, the highly centralized system worked for the careful exclusion of virtually all Africans from the government process.

The 1946 constitution was the first legal alteration of this formula. Each territory gained an assembly with limited legislative powers and the right to make recommendations to the governor general. Executive power, however, remained with the governor. The first major step toward self-government was the Loi-Cadre of 1956. Gaston Defferre, was Minister of Overseas territories in the Mollet government at the time. The Loi-Cadre empowered the French government to implement measures which would lead to decentralization in the territories so that the population would be more closely involved in managing its own affairs. It was Defferre's interest in decentralization which drove this policy change. It is worthwhile to note that when the British introduced reforms in regions under their rule, they did so for each colony individually. There was no overall plan imposed simultaneously. Most administrators at the time believed the Loi-Cadre was necessary to prevent a secessionist movement such as the one begun

in Algeria and the one that succeeded in Indochina. It had become increasingly difficult for the French to enforce their rule, and the Loi-Cadre conveniently shifted responsibility to African politicians. Mitterand, who was at that time Minister of Justice, had warned that only a federation with a "fraternal and egalitarian community" would preserve French power from "the plains of flanders to the forests of Equatorial Africa".

The special interest and influence that the current Mitterand presidency has in third World affairs and most particularly in Africa has its genesis in these earlier official and personal involvements. It is important to note that the same ties that de Gaulle later referred to in 1960 between the security of Europe and that of Africa, Mitterand and Defferre also had recognised and indeed acted upon.

The questions of the relations among the territories of AOF and AEF and the ties between these and France were the major political issues at the heart of the debate of the Loi-Cadre. With the exception of the Black African party (Ressemblement Democratique African, or RDA), there was virtually no call for independence before 1958; thanks to the influence of French politics and reforms. The 1958 constitution led to the abolition of AOF and AEF. Each territory was linked directly to the French Community; as the former union came to be called. Control over key areas of foreign affairs, defence, and fiscal policy remained in the hands

of the community. When a referendum on this constitution was held in October 1958, the option was offered of becoming independent by rejecting the constitution or of voting for it and becoming a member of the community. It was quite clear however, that voting for independence would deprive the territory of any French aid. When Guinea alone voted negatively, the French withdrew all their personnel, aid and whatever equipment that could be shipped. The East Germans quickly moved in, and all sides suffered from "the example". With the Algerian war escalating and demands for independence growing throughout Africa, the constitution of the community was rapidly overtaken and all territories except for French Somalia and (Djibouti) became independent in 1960. The constitutional links between France and its African overseas territories were replaced by contractual accords de Coopoeration which each signed at the time of independence. In essence, they provided for cooperation across the board in matters of foreign policy, defence, finance and education.

For French administrators, independence meant an end to careers in the former colonies. The Corps of Overseas Administrators was abolished in 1959. The French in Africa remained to a large extent, however, and, infact, were reinforced by former residents of Algeria and Indochina. The British Colonial service administrators, at independence, had to decide whether they wanted to retire under a lump-sum scheme or, if offered the opportunity, to become part of the new state's civil service. Given these

froces d'assistance rapide. Headquartered in Metropolitan France, these units can be air-and sea - lifted on temporary operations, as was the case in Zaire, Chad, the central African Republic, and elsewhere. In addition, these forces are available for special assignment, as with the United Nations in Lebanon and with the proposed multinational peace-keeping force in the Sinai. Although dedicated primarily to external operations, the units in this force also undertake secondary missions in support of France's own territorial defence. In total, the three principal ground force elements of the 11th Para Division, 9th Marine Infantry Division, and 31st Half Brigade, which constitute this force, number approximately 21,000 men[19].

The basic authorization for military actions external to France appears to rest currently on a political document, the preamble to the law of June 19, 1976, which implemented the military planning for the years 1977-1982. It stipulates that the forces should be able to contribute to the security of countries with which France has political, military, or economic accords. The breadth of this wording gives rather substantial leeway for application. Another source of authority for using the intervention forces can be found in the general instructions for the use of armed forces as approved by the chief of staff of French armies on January 12, 1979; "Overseas armed forces must be able to support the governments decisions in pursuing its policies, the defence of the national interest, the prevention and settlement of crisis or conflicts in

which France may be directly or indirectly involved"[20].

It is the "prevention and settlement of crisis or conflict in which France maybe be directly or indirectly involved" that has allowed the broadest possible interpretation of French mission in Africa. Whereas in the true sense there is generally a commitment to responding only to a bona fide request for intervention by an "authorized government official (head of host government or head of state), there is also the perception that certain extreme cases can be acted upon when no such clear request has been made. Those attempting to overthrow a pro-French government in a country of "strategic" importance to France might not be able to count on the French military waiting patiently for a properly formed request by the besieged government. A pragmatic application of the principle of "danger to lives and property of French citizens, political concerns or strategic interests could be expected to be put into effect. Inspite of an acute awareness of the concerns of the third World in general and Africa in particular, the presidency of Mitterand and the new right wing government of prime Minister Edouard Balladur, shows every sign of continuing the earlier formulated basic policy and theory of involvement with respect to external actions. As signals from the lessons of the Liberian crisis and the ECOMOG experience reveals, and most recently the Bakassi peninsula issue, French government today, is as concerned with the security of Africa as were previous ones, and for basically all the same reasons; i.e. to expand French sphere of

influence and to undermine all efforts at collective security in Africa in other to promote the success of the former objective.

Since June 1976 for instance, French forces d'assistance rapide, have undertaken operational missions in over six African countries, sometimes several times. These do not even include various instances in which elements of permanently stationed forces de presence have manoeuvered for Security purposes within the confines of a host nation's borders. The fact is that the French know well how to back up their African political commitment and strategic interests with military capability because they have done it, and often. This is of inestimable value for both the military and the political components of France's influence in Africa; a situation that perpetually undermines the ideals of collective security by Africans themselves. This is because, these schemes of Metropolitan France, vis-a-vis their interactions with the satellite Franco-African states, conforms with the general perception of the dual concept of "African dependence and insecurity" as a state of affairs and as a deliberate policy of fostering the continued balkanisation of Africa into a multiplicity of small, non-viable Pseudo Sovereign States which are discouraged from the path of independent development and which must rely on the industrialised powers for their collective security.

4.2.1 PROPOSITION II:

THE ECOMOG THESIS

> "Dependency and underdevelopment disrupts collective security efforts in Africa, as manifest in the evolution of ECOMOG".[21]

ECOMOG is a child of circumstance. Nigeria Foots almost the entire bill for the ECOMOG operation. Nigerian Soldiers also constitute about 60 percent of the entire troops.[22] Taylor saw it as a ploy by the then president Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria to help his then Liberian Counterpart, the late Samuel Kanyon Doe, believed to be his friend.

Francophone West African countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, largely due to extraneous influence on them, from France, also reasoned along with Taylor. They therefore treated ECOMOG as part of the expansionist ambition of Nigeria. As such, they not only refused to contribute to the operation, but also resolved to covertly and at times, even overtly sabotage the collective security initiative. In essence therefore, the real basis of the dispute over ECOMOG was not so much a disagreement over the legality of the mandate, but rather intra-community differences, influenced by external interests, particularly France which aspires to maintain the cohesiveness of her sphere of influence in Africa for the continued projection of her economic,

prestigious and strategic interests. In this ploy, the comprador-Bourgeoisie sentiments of some West African leaders became in valuable.

Before the Mediation committee's decision to deploy forces into Liberia on August 7, 1990, for "Operation Liberty" to take shape, five members of the ECOWAS community raised objections to the plan. These include Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo and Mali. They are all Francophone West African countries. The Burkinabe President, Captain Blaise Compaore was quoted as saying at the time:

> "We learnt from the international Media, the momentous decision by some member states of ECOWAS to send a supposedly reconciliatory force to Liberia, and without first fully briefing other countries on the exact assignment of the force. As far as we are concerned, the mediation committee of ECOWAS is not competent to intervene in a member states internal conflict"[23].

As if this was not damaging enough, both Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso went ahead in sending troops and arms to Charles Taylor, the leader of the National patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) warring faction.

These Francophone objections strengthened Taylor's hands as he labelled the ECOMOG scheme as aggression and pledged to fight the intervention. Thus, on a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio broadcast on August 24, 1990 - the day ECOMOG landed

Monrovia, Taylor was encouraged to state that -

> "There would be a very, very high price to pay for the death of any Liberian in the hands of a West African peace-keeping force. I now have a right to ask for help from whoever wants to assist me. I am personally directing the military operations. We will fight to the last man. We don't consider this force to be a peace force. I have given orders to open fire on any stranger setting foot on our territory"[24].

The events of that night, when heavy shelling from the NPFL left several injured, with a Nigerian Soldier - Lamidi Wasiu, becoming the first casualty of the mission, confirmed that Taylor was not only playing at words. The soldier, a guards man from the 123 Guards Battalion, was shot to death by a single snipper bullet in the port area in Monrovia, as ECOMOG tried to instal emergency defences within the dockyard[25]. Thus, any discerning observer will not be hard put to understand the interventionist role France, and their Satellitic Bourgeoises, have played and continues to play in African conflicts to this day.

The dispute as it developed had the hall mark of a colonial hangover. There was growing disquiet that Liberia would raise the demons of anglophone - Francophone misunderstanding, what Leopold Senghor characterised as "the Spirit of Fashoda", in West Africa. It was precisely such cultural antipathies transposed from the colonial period that motivated the decision to come together in ECOWAS, but the cleavages remained and, though often subdued,

appeared from time to time to complicate the process of intra community relations. Such existing polarities, despite the Francophone resistance was further discernible from the fact that four of the five states (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra leone and the Gambia) which initially sent troops for the ECOMOG operations were anglophones. It is also note worthy to recall that Guinea, the only initial Francophone participant, had been the same sole West African state that voted against the French Community and for independence in the October 1958 referendum, and therefore has long established the reputation of a non-conformist in the Francophone alliance.

What gave even more salience to this polarity in the case of ECOMOG was that Mali and Togo which were members of the mediation committee that took the decision to deploy ECOMOG refused to contribute troops. Mali took its decision at the on set and so could be excused. Togo had earlier pledged to contribute but later retracted this on grounds that a ceasefire must first be established among warring parties. Some diplomatic sources credited Togo's reversion to its aversion for Ghana with which she had a long standing border problem but this consideration ignored the warm relationship between Gnassingbe Eyadema, the Togolese leader, and Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, which would certainly have been a stronger motivating force. The indication therefore was that a much stronger loyalty was at stake i.e., La Francophonie, endeared by French inspired pressure from Felix

Cote d'Ivoire's opposition also had another focus. Boigny had always indulged in the familiar, if overplayed role, of "La Sage D'Afrique" (Africa's wise old man). This was a credential that had some measure of historical substance because as far back as the 1950's, before the era of African independence, he was a Minister in the French Assembly. Hence, it was hardly to be expected that Boigny would be tolerant of what he considered "military upstarts" taking a leadership role in the affairs of the sub-region without his express approval, especially when France is ever ready to use him to reinforce her influence in the region. In fact, he was never particularly endeared to the ECOWAS inspiration and, once it was clear that it would be a reality, had sponsored under French directives, a Francophone organisation - CEAO - with a military wing -ANAD - as a counter-weight. From this standpoint, the creation of ECOMOG was a sign of moral ascendancy that could translate into Nigerian hegemony in the West African sub-region. Boigny found it difficult to reconcile himself to such possibilities. It seems clear therefore, that the difficulty of action in the ECOMOG initiative was not so much a function of the position of internal parties to the conflict but the consequence of comprado Bourgeoisie sentiments of certain ECOWAS leaders and the influence of external intervention from Metropolitan interests.

It is no secret that since Liberia plunged into anarchy, these Metropolitan powers have either directly or indirectly through their satellites been influencing the internal policies of the

warring factions. This view is consolidated by the fact that Taylor has been able to maintain a sophisticated military campaign in Liberia for four years despite the fact that Liberia has no skills in Military technology. For instance, the sanctions threatened in article 2 of the 15th Summit of ECOWAS Leaders on 27-29 July, 1992, though imposed and supported by two UN resolutions - Resolutions 788 of November 1992 and 813 of March 1993 encouraging the ECOWAS peace plan, and, supporting sanctions inposition respectively, nevertheless failed due largely to the complicity of external powers. It was reported that at about the time this deadline of West African leaders for Taylor to disarm his fighters or face reprisals expired, the rebel leader received a plane load of artillery weapons, including the sophisticated M-15 and AK 47 guns.[28] The deadly machines arrived under secret cover by Russian made aircraft which touched down at the Roberts International Airport. The airport, closed to regular flights since the war started December 1989, had been under NPFL Control at the time.

Despite these acts of sabotage against the regional efforts to restore peace, external interests had at various instances also undertaken a campaign to discredit ECOMOG. This was demonstrated when Taylor was encouraged by Burkinabe intelligence to believe that the loss of Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties was as a result of ECOMOG's alliance with opposing rebel factions. The NPFL leader had at the time said over the rebel radio - "The Loss of ground had been due to desertion Of senior Commandos and a collusion between

ULIMO and ECOMOG"[29]

Actually, with the help of foreign arms vendors, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), had succeeded in dislodging NPFL in several territories between July and August, 1992. However, after winning over Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties, travellers from Taylor's inland Capital, Gbarnga, said they saw armoured cars and jeeps mounted with heavy machines entering Kakata through the Ivorian-Liberia border. The weapons of death belonged to the NPFL which launched a Counter-Offensive, on August 26, 1992.[30] This is a testimony of the disruptive connection of foreign dealers and their African acolytes in fueling African Conflicts.

It has been established that these foreign interests, makes fast money from the export to the metropoles of gold, iron-ore, timber and other minerals in "Taylor-land" as the area under NPFL's control is called. For example, French Companies have been identified to be involved in the lifting of minerals especially iron-ore. In March, 1991, the sinking of two Italian boats off the Coast of Buchanan by ECOMOG gun boats revealed the extent of these deals. Divers discovered a number of arms and ammunition which were being conveyed to Taylor, in exchange for his cheap resources. Newswatch[31], had particularly reported the instance when 100,000 tonnes of iron-ore from "greater-Liberia" were to be exchanged for French arms with the NPFL. Japan on its part went into rubber business, an event which is suspected to have seriously stimulated

US renewed interest in Liberia. Interim President, Amos Sawyer, while reacting to the mounting economic crisis in Monrovia which is being secured by ECOMOG attributed his government's problems to "Continued plundering of natural resources in the hinterland by Taylor and his external collaborators", whom he accused of exporting timber and mineral resources without paying proper revenues"[32] This situation brings to focus the need to examine the role of foreign "donor/relief" agencies in the Liberian Conflict and their seeming connections to the delays to ECOMOG success.

The work of the international agencies normally associated with relief assistance and humanitarian aid such as the UN and the charitable organisations sponsored by religious groups, have become prominent factors in the pantheon of conflict situations in Africa. In situations such as those prevailing in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and in no small measure in Liberia, it has become difficult to discern whether or not these agencies are active motivators of the processes of conflict, or truly agencies seeking to help in the process of halting bloodshed. this latter purpose sometimes seems to be furthest from their minds. Instead they create conditions where it becomes impossible to seperate their protestations of moral neutrality from principles which promote the ambiguous accommodation of outright insurrection. This is one issue that has come to the fore in Liberia as ECOMOG has illustrated its ability to seize large portions of territory from Charles Taylor's NPFL forces. Suddenly the relief community which has been enjoying the

protection and security afforded by the presence of the force in Monrovia had begun to declare that it cannot operate its relief services from bases in Kakata and Buchanan as it had done when Taylor's forces were in these places, now that ECOMOG is there. Instead, it had become necessary, they said, to carry staff from Monrovia into neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire to supply food and medicines to areas which are in fact quite near to ECOMOG lines.

The emergence of this crucial issue had first been exacerbated by the accusations emanating from Taylor and his collaborators of indiscriminate slaughter of civilians by ECOMOG planes. Very often representatives of relief agencies have been used as purveyors of these accusations in order to lend greater credence to them in the international media. In several cases though, close scrutiny and investigation have proven these accusations to be less than accurate. Several examples of incidents where the alarm raised by the relief agencies has been proven to be less than exact in its presentation of the reality have been unearthed. In late February 1993, ECOMOG planes were said to have bombed targets on the Ivorian side of the border at Danane, a town which has become a major refugee centre for Liberians and from which UN and other agencies have been operating their relief shuttle into Taylor held territory for a long time. The first cry came from the Ivory Coast government but it was soon taken up by the UN Office in Monrovia. However, within a few days it was discovered first of all that the planes had hit a large convoy of trucks on the Liberian side of the

border only and had not used bombs but machine guns and that two UN agency representatives were in a jeep in the convoy. It was also discovered that majority of the convoy was not made up of relief vehicles but were definitely carrying arms and supplies in violation of the embargo on trade with the NPFL put in place by the ECOWAS and ratified by the UN. Only two trucks in the convoy of more than 10 were found to be carrying relief goods. In that incident one of the UN agency representatives was even reported to have been arrested and man-handled by NPFL men who claimed that he had used his radio to guide the planes in for the attack.[33]

In another key incident ECOMOG planes on a night raid around Gbarnga in mid-February 1993, were accused of bombing and strafing the Phebe Hospital run by charitable organisations. In the first announcements of this alleged attack it was said that the hospital wards had suffered direct hits and patients and staff were seriously wounded. In a few days time the report changed dramatically with eye witness testimony saying that what had actually happened was that a "Presidential Convoy", that is, a motorcade probably escorting Taylor, had been chased in the vicinity by the planes and had driven into the Phebe Hospital compound. The planes did strafe the convoy and appeared not to have realised in the heat of the attack that were it had sought refuge was actually a hospital compound. It was reported later that Taylor had been slightly wounded in that attack, and that damage to the hospital compound, if any, was negligible, and no

patient or member of staff had been seriously wounded.[34]

It is unlikely that in most of these cases the relief agencies can be accused of direct collaboration with the dissident forces of Taylor with any real evidence being unearthed to support such accusations. Nonetheless these suspicions have been fuelled by a marked penchant on their side towards granting Taylor a lot more credence and right to continue his rebellion than common sense would recommend. This perception is reinforced by a general recognition of the fact that for four years these agencies have insisted on operating in Taylor-held areas as if they were under siege from outside forces rather than admitting the fact that was clearly exposed before their eyes that it was the neglect of governance and responsibility and the seizure of territory and administrative authority by an irregular force that was responsible for any social distress in those areas. For a long time indeed, relief agencies were the only responsible organisations willing to grant Taylor's rebel border, recognition as an administrative authority. As a result their stance was largely responsible for creating the situation which led to Liberia being regarded as a nation of two governments. This consequently imposed inestimable damage to the ECOWAS peace process.

The question of why relief assistance was being given for four years to a "government" which neglected to utilise its own large resource base for the benefit of the people even as it exploited

these resources for the profit of private individuals must be put to the relief community in Liberia. There are foreigners working with some of these agencies who were openly associated with some of the activities of commercial organisations on Taylor's side before they surfaced as "Consultants" to these agencies. In other instances it has been noticeable that some officials of relief agencies based in Monrovia were always seeking to be given the opportunity to go through the ECOMOG lines into NPFL-held territory when the peace keeping process was in a stalemate. Afterwards, these same officials were clamouring to be allowed to carry materials into NPFL-held territories from across the Cote d'Ivoire border rather than to operate from their own warehouses in Buchanan, merely because Buchanan had been secured by ECOMOG. Why?

Interestingly there is incontrovertible evidence that NPFL arms have often been stored in the very same warehouses in San Pedro and Danaue in Cote d'Ivoire, where relief materials have been deposited in transit to Liberia. This suggests that there has been direct complicity in the entire process of prolonging the Liberian conflict on the part of some relief agencies. There is no doubt that it is not easy for persons who find themselves on the receiving end of air bombardment and a military offensive which is largely one-sided to avoid being hysterical in their protests when they find themselves under fire. This syndrome has been most pronounced in the outcries against ECOMOG by relief agencies in the Liberian crisis. In spite of this, ECOMOG has continued to seek a

measure of accommodation with the agencies to the extent that they have devised a system whereby relief convoys which have been codified and approved are allowed to move across the Cote d'Ivoire border through Logatuo on the Liberian side into NPFL-held territory. In spite of this, one particular agency, Medecin Sans Froutiere (MSF), a Belgian-based Voluntary medical relief service has regularly violated the agreement, insisting on carrying convoys into Taylor territory outside of the Schedule agreed in a joint relief group meeting with ECOMOG in Monrovia. The result of this approach to relief operations by MSF was an incident a few weeks afterwards when an ECOMOG fighter plane strafed an MSF Convoy on the route from Gbarnga to Kakata. ECOMOG Field Commander at the time, Major General Adetunji Olurin was particularly forthright in his admission that his planes did hit the Convoy, but explained that he had warned the relief agencies that any movement by their convoys outside of the agreed schedule to which he was a party would be considered fair target by his forces. General Olurin explained this decision by pointing out that intelligence reports have consistently indicated that Taylor's rearmament operations have always appeared to coincide with intensive cross-border activity by the relief agencies into Taylor territory.[35] Ironically it is the relief agencies own situation reports that help to reveal this. Very often their "sitreps" indicate incidences where their vehicles have been forced to join so-called "Commercial" convoys under threat of seizure by the NPFL if they do not comply.

In spite of what, on the surface, appears to be a relatively harmonious relationship between ECOMOG and the relief agencies, there is indeed serious tention between them on the ground. This is exacerbated by the fact that relief agencies have often insisted on taking unilateral steps to decide on where and when their operations should be carried out without adequate consultation with ECOMOG, and doing it in such a way that the suspicion that their decisions are tinged with sympathy for Taylor's military ambitions is easily arrived at. For example, in a certain operation, UNICEF, with its headquarters in Monrovia sought approval to go into Taylor territory to evacuate orphans who were forcibly abducted from an orphanage in Monrovia in 1992, from where they were being kept close to Taylor's own headquarters in Gbarnga. After five days the UNICEF team returned without the orphans, explaining that Taylor's officials had refused to have them taken out, claiming that they were in no danger unless ECOMOG targeted them directly, and also expressing the opinion that their evacuation would lead to panic among the populace. This was one of the clearest evidences yet that Taylor was utilising the tactic of human-shield hostage-taking to try to prevent ECOMOG from hitting legitimate military targets in his territory.

In another occurrence, a major religious agency, the Catholoc Relief Service, also having its national headquarters in Monrovia, was vehement in its condemnation of ECOMOG bombing of its rice-laden warehouses in Buchanan. However, after ECOMOG took Buchanan

and the Central Officials of that agency were able to reach their warehouses, it was discovered that no major damage had been done to any of the warehouses by any bombing and that in fact the greatest damage had been caused by NPFL looting and attempts on their part to burn one warehouse as they escaped from Buchanan. It is true that the breakdown of the Liberian economy has led to a major dependence on humanitarian aid for the majority of the populace. Exactly why this should have continued in rural areas where there was no resistance to Taylor according to him, over the last four years, is not clearly explained by the relief agencies. The relief community therefore, has been a collaborator in this tragic circumstance at least by default. Afterall, it is a fact that several times these agencies have been known to use the same ships to ferry relief materials into ports used by the NPFL, which carried spare parts, fuel, and even arms, for the rebels. The excuse has been, in most cases, that the arms were disguised in packages labelled mis-leadingly.[36]

The irony in all this is that, the continued insistence against providing a cover for some form of supervised movement of relief traffic into Taylor's area of control provides cover for his own clandestine re-armament seems to elude the perception of these 'foreign do-gooders'. This is why ECOMOG decided in May 1993, to carve out a "Corridor of tranquility" within Liberia. The essence of the corridor of the peace mission was to ensure the delivery of relief materials across the battle-line to Liberians in Taylor-held

Supreme Committee made no provision for membership of the warring groups, other than the NPFL. ULIMO and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), had at the time concluded that the meeting had taken sides with Taylor by drawing up the peace Formula on his own terms which reliable sources,[39] claimed contained high inputs from Cote d'Ivoire's President Boigny. Of course, that peace formula was one in the series of vain attempts by regional leaders. Also, when in response to NPFL's brutality the ECOMOG offensive had scored many important successes, notably the capture of Roberts field and Buchanan, it was the same Ivorian government that quickly proposed the dubious last-minute initiative to set up peace talks. This prevented the impending assault on the NPFL capital, Gbarnga, a situation that would have terminated the war at the time.

In analysing the disruptive nature of dependency and the consequent foreign intervention on the Liberian crisis and ECOMOG, the factor of semi-metropolitan external influence is also significant. This is where Libya and its reputed aspiration to be recognised as a regional power comes into focus. Charles Taylor himself and most of his combatants were trained in Libya, and still receives arms shipment from Gaddafi. When on August 31, 1992, NPFL fighters bombed ECOMOG station in Monrovia, intelligence reports claimed that Taylor's men had reacted to an intercepted signal issued from Libya.[40] About 400 ECOMOG soldiers in several parts of the troubled country were on this occasion held hostage by the NPFL. The

hostages were subsequently disarmed and their movements restricted, while the captured ECOMOG vehicles were deployed to the battle ground for the use of the NPFL. Worried about the fate of his men, General Ishaya Bakut, the then field Commander complained that he could not get food across to his forces in the hinterland which was under NPFL Control. He blamed the situation on external support for the NPFL and the break-down in communication caused by the NPFL hostilities.[41]

Also, in May 1990, late President Doe's government accused Cote d'Ivoire of allowing Libyan planes to land in the country with arms and ammunitions meant for the rebel forces of Taylor.[42]
It is the view of this study that Taylor did not enjoy direct US favour in the crisis because Libya was seen as a major source of arms and funds for the NPFL. It equipped the NPFL on inception with assault riffles, recoil propelled granade (RPG's), Mortars, Machine guns and other sophisticated weapons.[43]
The significance of the Libyan connection can be underscored by the fact that, following the recommendation of the Ministerial meeting of ECOWAS in Banjul from 22-24 October 1990, the Chairman of the Standing Mediation Committee appointed a Ministerial Contact Group, accompanied by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, to visit Libya and ensure that there was no further exacerbation of the Conflict in Liberia. The Contact Group held discussions with Libyan authorities, though the outcome was not made public.[44]

Though this thesis has consistently pointed out that the responsibility of Taylor for prolonging the Conflict in Liberia is very high, the emphasy on the collaboration of external interests with the main rebel faction of NPFL to undermine the success of ECOMOG should not be construed to mean that other factions were not similarly used. Even when the rebel forces split and Prince Yedou Johnson formed his INPFL, he too sought and got external support especially from the United States as alleged, though this was denied by the USA. As reported by the Guardian, Charles Taylor during a press conference, hinted that the USA had supported Prince Johnson in these words:

> "Taylor also implied that Washington had backed the dissident rebel Prince Johnson against his own movement perhaps even to the extent of air-lifting Prince Johnson's men into Monrovia to fight".[45]

It is infact, difficult to believe that America would remain totally neutral in the Liberian crisis considering the fact of Liberia's long-standing historical links with the US, and also because Americans, as at 1989, had considerable public and private interests in the country, including.[46]

* A voice of America transmitter that broadcast to all Africa, the Middle East and the South-Western part of the defunct Soviet-Union;
* A telecommunications relay that transmits the diplomatic

traffic between Washington and almost all of her Embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa;

* An OMEGA Navigation Station, one of seven in the worldwide network, which enables ships and aircraft to calculate continuously their exact positions;
* Approximately 3,500 American citizens residing in Liberia; and
* The American Firestone Plantation Company has its largest rubber plantation (also the largest in the World) in Liberia.

Also, don't forget, the super power nation urgently dispatched US Marines to the war-torn country's shores when all the chips were down. With this, how can any study be convinced then that the US was not somehow involved?

Infact, on the eve of August 24, 1990, the day ECOMOG landed Monrovia, the Journalist attached to the mission had an interview with Johnson, the INPFL leader for an update on the war situation. At intervals the man would adjust the audio level of the walkie talkie he was clutching, with the remark, "Are you hearing?", "Over". It was later learnt, according to reports,[47] that the warlord was actually in contact with the American Embassy in Monrovia, which was later understood had planted the communication device in his hands to be able to monitor developments at the port.

On Septermber 9, 1990 Samuel Doe paid an unscheduled visit to the ECOMOG Headquarters at the Free Port Of Monrovia with all parapharnalia of Office. A spectrum of opinion contends that

Prince Johnson's visit immediately afterwards to the ECOMOG Headquarters, which led to the capture, torture and death of Doe, was master-minded and facilitated by some external forces.[48] Arguably, the same external forces who had earlier planted the communication gadget on him while he welcomed ECOMOG on the eve of August 24, 1990. This development not only discredited the then ECOMOG Commander, Lt-General Arnold Quainoo who was not informed and indeed was not prepared for Doe's visit, but nearly ruined the entire regional initiative. To reinforce this view, Hezekiah Bowen, the Chief Of Army Staff on the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) under Doe alleged that a particular foreign power, believed to be the US financed Johnson's efforts during the war. This revelation then dove-tails into Bowen's insinuation when he told reporters that, "if you look at the video film of how Johnson killed Doe, you will see that immediately after Doe was nabbed from the ECOMOG Headquarters, Johnson started calling American Embassy on the Walkie talkie. Though, he never got a reply".[49] This probably explains the real source of the weapons in Johnson's armoury.

Furthermore, an examination of the American-owned Firestone Plantation's claim of non-compliance with the NPFL's terrortactics has been called into question with the revelation that Taylor actually used Firestone's facilities as integral components of his military and administrative machine. When ECOMOG eventually entered the Magnificent Firestone Plantation at Harbel, just over 40 kilometres to the South-West of Monrovia, it is unlikely that

they had expected to find as much evidence of collaboration with the NPFL as they did. The very first discoveries as they commenced their advance into the plantation itself were shocking and revealing. A network of massgraves was found in sites that could hardly have remained concealed for the nearly two and a half years during which Firestone's Operations had been going on in territory controlled by Charles Taylor and the NPFL. While this discovery alone would have been enough to call into question Firestone's constant claims of non-compliance with the NPFL's terrorist tactics in its seizure of large chunks of Liberian territory since November 1990, the revelation that Mr. Taylor had actually used Firestone's facilities as integral components of his military and administrative machine was clearly illustrated by what ECOMOG found when they arrived at the heart of the Harbel Complex.

A huge stockpile of unused explosives and weapons were stored just adjacent to the Luxurious Manager's mansion from which Taylor had directed a large part of his war effort since October 15, 1992. The discovery that some of this arsenal was packed in a crate bearing the famous 'hands of friendship' symbol of the United States aid agencies further confirms the alleged complicity of the so-called donor/relief agencies, as earlier analysed. Ambassador Bill Twadell, US representative in Monrovia, had at the time discounted any suggestion that the US had supplied weapons to the NPFL on an official basis, but there had been enough reason for speculation that Taylor had been able to tap some of the covert

sources of US arms supply meant for insurgent groups such as Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, and the Nicaraguan Contras in the past.[50] Another major discovery was the fact that the NPFL had been using the Firestone technical workshop as their own military repair facility, and all the evidence indicated that they had utilised this facility for as long as the time the territory fell into their control. The main NPFL-FM radio station was discovered to have been housed in one of the Firestone Company's office buildings as well. The status of the defence of the complex and the level of counter-attacks which accompanied the flushing out of the NPFL from it was indicative of a commitment to holding onto the complex which went way beyond the simple protection of a neutral and non-involved institution which Taylor's information network tried to portray their defence of Harbel as.

However, the most important discovery made by ECOMOG revealed evidence of economic rather than military collaboration on the part of Firestone with the NPFL. Several tons of processed rubber already packed for export was found in the company's warehouses. The importance of this find lay in the fact that even before the imposition of sanctions against trade with the NPFL by ECOWAS in August 1992 was ratified by the UN shortly after, Firestone had denied that it was operating commercially any longer from its Harbel base. Up to late 1991 the company had been shipping its product through the Monrovia Freeport which was easily more convenient than sending it down to the country's second port at

Buchanan, over 76 kilometres away. It was in early 1992 when Taylor intensified his intransigence, and consolidated his hold over the rest of the country by arming his rebels more effectively, that Firestone began to send its product out through Buchanan. Since this signalled the possibility that such revenue as port fees and tax due on shipments of this vital resource were being paid to Mr. Taylor's illegal organisation instead of to the Interim Government of National Unity in Monrovia, the IGNU raised the issue with Firestone several times in 1992, but were always given the assurance that Firestone was simply maintaining its equipment and tending its plantation while awaiting a peaceful resolution of the crisis.[51]

The most disheartening and disappointing revelation to have emerged from the capture of Harbel though concerned a political rather than military or economic issue. Ironically it is Taylor himself who seems to have inadvertently left this evidence behind. A number of highly revelatory video tapes of his various activities apparently recorded by his personal crew for his own viewing were found abandoned in the manager's house at Harbel, along with several sensitive documents. Among the selection of video tapes, there is one which is devoted to the 1992 visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to Taylor. Apart from the fact that what is shown here clearly raises questions about Mr. Carter's objectivity and neutrality in dealing with the Liberian crisis, there is evidence here as well that suggests that American interests in the fortunes

of Firestone played no small part in determining the level of accommodation of Taylor's rejection of sub-regional entreaties to comply with the peace initiative. The Carter meeting with Taylor actually took place on the Harbel plantation, and one of the highlights of the visit was a private luncheon which was filmed. Both Carter and Ambassador Bill Twaddell, who had only just taken up his post at that time, can be heard clearly discussing with Taylor the issue of Firestone's ability to continue its operations with Taylor's cooperation and Taylor is seen and heard clearly assuring them of his willingness to work closely with Firestone to ensure its product's safe evacuation through Buchanan Port.[52] This particular damaging evidence of crass materialism on the part of persons charged with helping to bring some sanity to the political situation in Liberia at the time has profound implications for both our thesis and the future of collective security efforts in Africa. The relevance and dependability of external peace corps such as the Carter Centre, to the restoration of stability and democracy in Africa will hardly be strengthened by this incident.

We have earlier noted in chapter three of this study that the Firestone Liberian concession is one of the most notorious examples of overbearing free enterprise exploitation of a sovereign nation by external interests, in history. There have been enormous strides achieved in the process of the growth of this unequal relationship since it was initiated in 1926, but the purpose of the

initial concession literally mortgaged Liberia's economy to the multinational company. Although the Firestone concession in Liberia has been recently sold to the Japanese giant Bridgestone, Americans still largely manage the operations. There is of course a large Liberian workforce which is dependent on the continued operation of the Company in Liberia for their livelihood. Firestone's tax and service fees also form a substantial proportion of the State revenue of Liberia. Given the company's continued importance to the survival of the Liberian nation, its collaboration with Taylor is viewed with skepticism and anger by many Liberians today. The belief that Firestone was simply satisfied to take advantage of the lack of accountability which operations in the rebel enclave afforded it has gained ground in Monrovia recently because of certain other occurrences. Most significant of all, Liberians have been able to view copies of a British television report which was clearly stage-managed by the NPFL's sophisticated information management team, in which ECOMOG was accused of bombing workers' quarters on the Firestone Complex at Harbel. The President of Firestone Liberia, Don Weihe, appeared in this report lamenting that his company should have been the victim of such an atrocity. In the same report however, the then Chief of Staff of ECOMOG Brigadier S.V. Malu was grilled by the foreign press on this issue and he stated with minimal equivocation that if ECOMOG found good reason for believing that Firestone's location at Harbel was being used as an NPFL military base it would have no hesitation in attacking it.[53] The discoveries made there

since have given weight to this stance and further justifies the extent to which our earlier categorization of so called foreign aid with African dependency leads to the disruption of collective security efforts in the region.

Recent developments concerning America's seeming complicity with contending forces in the Liberian crisis are also quite significant. Nearly a month after he was arrested in Washington DC by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on August 3, 1993, a federal grand jury has indicted Cameroonian journalist Dominic Ntube and his alleged State Department Secretary accomplice on charges of stealing classified US government documents and passing them unto officials of the NPFL in Liberia. Ntube's alleged accomplice is Ms Geneva Jones, an African-American State Department employee, who had worked in the department's bureau of politico-military affairs on a salary of $28,000 a year for five years.[54] Her primary responsibility included sorting and distributing cables from US Embassies around the World. According to Affidavits filed with the Court, between June 28 and July 29, 1993, the FBI, through "various means of surveillance', said that Jones removed from the State Department a mix of documents classified as "Confidential" and "Secret". Some of these documents supposedly related to the national defence of the United States and the on-going civil war in Liberia.[55]

It is also claimed that Jones, following her arrest August 3, 1993, said she had been transmitting the alleged "Confidential" and

"Secret" documents to Ntube for about a year and a half. In turn, Ntube allegedly transmitted the documents to Victoria Raffell in Abidjan. Raffell is identified in the FBI affidavits as "an official in Charles Taylor's Organisation".

Since Ntube's arrest, many Africans without prejudice, have been asking the same question: "Why would Ntube involve himself in spying on the Liberian crisis, a conflict in which Cameroonians obviously lack interest?".[56]

By the assessment of this study, many Africans, while reserving judgement, seem to be of the opinion that certain American interest groups have now decided to "dump" Ntube in their usual "CIA manner"[57], because of the exposure in November 1992, by West Africa Magazine, of a suspected US Intelligence link with contending rebel factions in Liberia. This view is supported by the significance of Ms Jones terms and length of service with the State Department; her prompt confessions against Ntube (perhaps under immunity); and the fact that she has since been freed on a $25,000 bond, while Ntube whose bond was set at $50,000 without collateral, remains in jail because he has yet to post a bond.

Also, given the liberty with which the Western industrialised metropoles had often manipulated the Bretton-wood institutions (IMF, World Bank and GATT) and the UN, to achieve their economic and strategic calculations, there is reason to believe that the

nature of recent UN interest in the Liberian crisis, may be aimed at executing a hidden agenda that may ultimately contribute to proposing our thesis: For instance, on Saturday June 5, 1993, a scarying dimension resurfaced as rebel forces fighting for control of Liberia unleashed a reign of terror resulting in the mindless massacre of about 250 civilians. This genocide which was widely believed to have been undertaken by the NPFL, took their battle to the defenceless civilians in Dolo, Bodinway and Harbel plantations about 60 kilometres from Monrovia, the country's capital. These plantations are owned by the foreign Firestone rubber company. A report by ECOMOG in Liberia said: "The NPFL rebel infiltrators used gunfire and cutlasses in their campaign in which men, women and children were butchered indiscriminately.[58] More than 700 civilians were also injured, maimed and even crippled. The attack came barely three weeks after ECOMOG intercepted a radio message from Taylor to John Richardson, one of the NPFL's field officers. Taylor had reportedly instructed Richardson to kill all the men in their way and rape the women of whatever sizes and shapes.[59]

Response to the bloody episode was one of round condemnation from all and sundry. The Interim Government carried out preliminary investigations into the outrage and came up with the finding that it was the evil work of Mr. Taylor's NPFL.[60] There were grounds to believe the outcome of the initial enquiry, not least the history of similar atrocities perpetrated by the NPFL, including the killing of three American nuns, the execution of members of late

President Doe's Krahn tribe and of foreigners, especially Nigerians, when the NPFL entered Monrovia. Charles Taylor however, denied that his forces had anything to do with the abhorrent crime. Having routinely denied previous charges of war crimes, Mr. Taylor's dissociation of the NPFL from the "shocking and disgusting" Harbel massacre did not in itself cut much ice. But the denials were seen in a different light when the NPFL leader called for a full international investigation by his hidden collaborators.

On August 4, 1993, the UN in one of its typical international manoeuvres established an independent, neutral panel of inquiry" made up of three members and headed by Mr. S. Amos Wako, a Kenyan, to establish the facts, to examine allegations of responsibility and to make recommendations. The panel worked for five weeks, submitting its report on September 10, 1993. The executive summary of this UN report exonerated the NPFL and concluded that "the massacre was planned and executed by units of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)",[61] a conclusion which seems deliberately designed to mislead the international community against taking a more resolute and concerted action against the NPFL, another seeming ploy to delay ECOMOG success in Liberia! That the UN even made such a submission despite compelling evidence to the contrary is only a testimony to the fact that the West and its Security Council, is a leopard whose spots in African conflicts may be difficult to identify. This view was consolidated by Taylor's

statement shortly afterwards that, rather than handover his arms to the 15,000 strong ECOMOG forces, he will continue to call for a "neutral" UN peace group to which his followers can lay down their arms. Only this can guarantee peace, he contends.[62]

Even the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was quick to react to the panel's findings. It noted in a seven-page comment that "the UN panel categorically accuse the AFL of commiting the Harbel area massacres-a position which runs counter to the outcome of IGNU's preliminary investigations which placed responsibility for the criminal deed on the NPFL". It added that "while the IGNU does not seek to discredit the judgement of the eminent panel in its evaluation of the evidence gathered, there are reasons to maintain that the panel's evidence needs to be subjected to further and rigorous scrutiny.[63] The IGNU also observed that where evidence incriminating the NPFL was concerned, the panel dismissed such evidence as a "scheme of deception". IGNU said it did not understand how the panel's report does not explain why such evidences as the trail of death and rice grains which led into NPFL-held territories were so rapidly dismissed by the panel.[64] This study neither understands.

Moreover, after watching for years, the UN and OAU in July 1993, decided to launch a joint mediation effort in search of solutions to the unending civil conflict in Liberia. While the impression is generally given that the sticky point in the Liberian peace process

has remained the NPFL's refusal to accept the West African initiative at face value, and that the purpose of the UN and OAU intervention at Geneva II is to provide a formal guarantee of the neutrality of ECOMOG, in the real sense, coming shortly after the political impasse that accompanied the nullification of the June 12 elections in Nigeria and the reported order the US government issued for Nigeria (the Core-State in the ECOMOG Scheme) to pull out of Liberia,[65] it seems obvious that though the Sponsors of the UN (America and other Western metropolitan permannent members of the Security Council) may wish the World to believe that their involvement at Geneva which led to the Cotonou agreement was a sincere effort at finding lasting peace for Liberia, the actual motive was more to hijack the credit that should normally go to ECOMOG and West African leaders, for their apparent success in the collective security efforts in Liberia. This is why the Western Media keep referring to the Cotonou pact as a UN brokered agreement. Liberian Interim President, Amos Sawyer was subsequently compelled to state:

> "Such biased reports from the Western Media is a deliberate attempt to undermine those efforts being made in the West African Sub-region to bring peace and democracy to Liberia".[66]

Meanwhile, the optimism and euphoria which accompanied the signing of the Cotonou Peace Accord in July 1993, have been largely reduced by events occuring in Liberia since then. Although the accord spoke of a time frame of "approximately 30 days" for the

installation of a new Transitional Council to replace the Interim Government of National Unity, this has since become unrealistic given the need for effective disarmament of the warring factions which by the peace agreement should precede this phase. Though the long-awaited Liberian National Transitional Government was at last installed after months of delay on March 7, with elections fixed for September 7, 1994, still unresolved however, is the allocation of four cabinet posts - Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice and Defence - a delay which most African integrators find difficult to understand.[67]

Based on the foregoing analysis and evidences, there is the widespread impression across Africa, that these metropolitan powers in Europe and America, despite their traditional economic and strategic calculations in African conflicts, had failed to show any significant concern for the success of ECOMOG because they felt slighted by the ECOWAS initiative towards solving the Liberian problem and therefore decided to stand bye, leaving the poor sub-regional grouping to spend itself to exhaustion. Thus, it can be concluded that, on the one hand, the metropoles were anxious to see the failure of ECOMOG in order to justify the perception that collective security ideals can not be achieved in Africa, independent of Western metropolitan participation; while on the other, these metropoles perpetually competed among themselves for hegemonic influence in Africa, by manoeuving their economic and strategic interests to focus. This concluding analysis imply that

the external involvement deriving from African under-development and dependency, have caused the escalation of the conflict in Liberia as proposed by the thesis. Similarly, the counteracting interests (external influence versus regional military integration) between the Western metropoles and the aspiring ECOWAS provides the answers to the dual question of why peace remains elusive in Liberia and how collective security efforts can resolve conflicts in Africa.

This contention also abstract's the theme of our next test.

4.3.1 PROPOSITION III:

PAN-AFRICANISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EQUATION

> "Dependency and underdevelopment will ultimately subjugate African Security to the interests and policies of external powers, unless Sub-regional Organisations within the region systematically evolves strategies aimed at improving integrative schemes of collective-security management in the continent".[68]

Prior to independence, France, Portugal and Spain defined the dependent territories of Africa as an integral part of the metropolitan country.[69] France applied this argument to justify her opposition to Algerian independence; and on joining the UN in 1955, both Portugal and Spain, claimed that their colonies were not "territories", as defined in chapter XI of the UN charter, but integral parts of metropolitan Portugal and Spain, respectively. African assertion of the right of self-determination was resisted, except within the "national framework" of the imperialist powers.[70]

In an essay entitled "Does 'Africa' Exist?", presented before a highly enlightened American audience in 1960, Melville Herskovits maintains that Africa is a geographical fiction. He argues that Africa is "thought of as a seperate entity and regarded as a unit to the degree that the map is invested with the authority impossed on it by the map makers", and warns of the danger of "according continental designations a degree of rality they do not posses".[71] Even modern day Russian attitude seem to be aimed at underminimg

the security of Africa as a continent of politically independent sovereign states. For instance, before and after the failed August 1991 coup d'etat, President Boris Yeltsin was on record as saying that socialism should have been tried in a small African country and not the huge Soviet Union.[72] By this statement, in the judgement of this thesis, the Russian President implied that Africans are guinea pigs and could be experimented on. For him to come as far as Africa for his analogy, when there are as many small countries in Europe and right under his nose in the Committee of Independent States (CIS), made up of tiny groups of nationalities, points to the blind chauvinism and racial bigotry of Russia's new leaders.

To test the proposition therefore, that underdevelopment and dependency will ultimately subjugate African security to the interests and policies of external powers, unless Africans initiate their own salvation, we can identify three areas as the major pillars which provide support and shape the means through which these foreign powers tend to undermine African security:

(i) Economic base;

(ii) Military strength; and

(iii) Political will and skills development.

4.3.2 Economic Base and African Security:

The reciprocity between African economy and security is an inseperable one. The economic base not only provides the resources for food, shelter, industrial production and trade, but is also the foundation of military strength. It is not too fanciful to argue that the quantity and quality of African security can be measured by the quantity and quality of human and natural endowments of Africa and of African production capacity.

In terms of human resources, Africa compares favourably with other regional or political units of the world. Population size is at least one indicator of power potential. With a population of over 600 million in 1992,[73] Africa alone, is a larger demographic community than the 12 countries of the EEC combined. Africans represent 12 percent of the World population compared to America's 6 percent. Indeed, the experiences of both India and China, with a population of about 1,000 million each, supports the view of this thesis that a large political unity transcending the present ethnic and national differences creates a better environment for African security than the present atomization of the continent. The most disturbing feature of African population infact, is its geopolitical balkanisation.[74] Only Nigeria, "the giant of Africa", has a population that in 1991 was put at about 88.5 million.[75] The six small islands of Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles have together a population of just over 2

million by 1985 estimates. Botwana, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gaban, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, and Swaziland each has a population of less than one million. Of the rest, only Ethiopia and Zaire have populations of between 25 and 30 million.[76] The result is that Africa today probably contains a larger number of "mini-States" than any other continent or region in the world.

A product of European imperialism, the geopolitical balkanisation of Africa has considerable implications on its collective security. It has led to the atomization of Africa into independent ('politically'), outward oriented economics tied to the Western metropolitan market sytem.[77] More importantly, it has made Africa not only heavily dependent on Western economies and economic institutions, but also highly susceptible and vulnerable to external threats. The corollary is that unless Africa breaks away from this vicious dependence and moves towards closer political and economic integration, her present demographic configuaration will continue to impair her capacity to shape her development and security.[78] A remarkable feature of politically atomized Africa is the extreme poverty of individual States, whether large or mini-States. At the post-independence decades, with the exception of Libya, whose Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in 1976 was $6,310 with an average growth rate of 10.2 percent in 1960-1976,[79] the bulk of African States fall within the low income group, with average GNP per capita of not more than $280 in 1976.[80]

Also significant is the fact that average annual growth rate in per capita income ranges from a mere 0.9 percent in the case of the low income countries to 2.8 percent in the middle income group during the first sixteen years (1960 - 1976) of independence, a situation worsened by an average annual rate of inflation in 1970 - 1976 of 9.8 percent for the low income group and 12.5 percent for the middle income group. Moreover, in 1962, the outstanding debts of all sub-Saharan African countries were less than $3 billion, with a debt service ratio of less than 2 percent. Between 1978 and 1982, high interest rates and deteriorating terms of trade for Africa meant that Sub-Saharan debt soared to $72 billion with a further $8 billion in arrears. By 1990 debt exceeded $146 billion, equivalent to 110 percent of GDP. Income per head fell by an average 1.1 percent a year between 1982 and 1992 compared to an average rise of 0.8 percent a year in all developing countries and 6.4 percent in the East Asia developing countries.[81] The fact that Africa currently pays $30 billion annually to service its external debts shows to what extent the continent's security and development depends on external constraints. Debt servicing imposes sacrifices and threat to lives on millions of Africans that result in a continuous drop in the already precarious standard of living.[82]

In terms of national resource endowment, Africa compares very favourably vis-a-vis other regions of the world. Apart from its enormous forest resources, the range, quantity and quality of Africa's mineral resources are impressive. Africa is, for

instance, among the largest producers of chromium, cobalt, copper, bauxite, gold, platinum, diamonds, uranium and phosphates-all minerals of vital strategic and agro-industrial value.[83] There are however, three aspects of Africa's natural, especially mineral resources endowment which greatly undermine their value for security.

First, most african States are "mono-crop" or "mono-mineral" economies, in the sense that even though they may be endowed with two or more combination of forest or mineral resources, they depend nearly entirely on one product for their national incomes. In Senegal and Gambia, it is peanut; in Zambia, copper; and in Nigeria, crude oil, despite its richness also in liquified Natural Gas (LNG), columbite and tin. Mining industry thus assumes undue prominence in the economy, accounting in 1970, for 95 percent of total exports from Zambia, 90 percent from Mauritania, 75 percent from Sierra Leone, 69 percent from Liberia, and 67 percent from Zaire.[84] Up to date, the Nigerian economy still depends to the tune of about 80 percent on crude oil export alone. Consequently, the economies of most African States suffer the disastrous effects of adverse flunctuations in the price of commodity or mineral exports. In the 1970s, this danger had already assumed alarming dimensions throughout Africa and is today a single major threat to regional security. This is because this discrepancy makes African economies not only vulnerable to external pricing but to the floating system of international exchange as well. This system allows relative

currency values to be determined on the open market. Holding all other factors constant, currencies with strong purchasing power command dearer premiums. Predictably, the nations which produce a diverse array of highly demanded goods have strong or "hard" currencies since such goods must be purchased in their respective currencies. Consequently, the industrialised countries fare appreciably well in the floating exchange system because of their manifold productive capacity. In contrast, African countries which singularly have fewer goods to sell internationally, typically, have weak or "soft" currencies.

The second impairment of the structure of African resource base is that, rather than being evenly distributed throughout the region, the key minerals are heavily concentrated in apartheid South Africa, the erstwhile "hostage territory of Namibia, and the neo-colonial states of Zaire, Zimbabwe and Nigeria; a situation which makes them easily accessible to the metropolitan Western World. South Africa ranks first in the World as producer of two important precious metals-gold and platinum-as well as of chromium, vanadium, and antimony, and stands either second or third as a major source of manganese, asbestos and uranium. Zaire is the leading producer of cobalt and diamonds; while Nigeria is among the leading producers of petroleum.[85] For instance, estimates by the UN conference on trade and development shows that foreign investiment stock in the region stands at $11 billion in 1993, besides that of South Africa which also accounts for a further $11 billion.

Zimbabwe and Nigeria each accounts for 19 percent, with Gabon in third place with 13 percent, followed by Liberia with 12.5 percent. Between them, these five countries accounted for three quarters of the region's foreign owned Capital Stock[86] a graphic demonstration of the second impairement being discussed.

The third and perhaps most significant aspect of Africa's resource base is that exploitation of the minerals is almost entirely in the hands of foreign international mining companies, the multinational corporations (MNCs)[87] A tabular display of the leading companies depicts not only the extent to which they have penetrated the mining economy of Africa and the diversified character of their investment interests, but also the concentration of their investments in apartheid South Africa and Namibia, a demonstration of the readiness of the metropolitan West to exploit the weaknesses inherent in the most dependent and conflict prone satellite states in the African region.

	Charter Consolidated	South Africa, Mauritania, Zambia	Gold, Copper, asbestos, diamonds

Source: Researcher's compilation

In this same vein, recently, privatisation of State own-industries in Africa has become the trend. Privatisation is being touted as an imperative aspect and key feature of any recovery strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. But an examination of this new phenomenon sweeping the crisis ridden continent, show that this only amount to putting the region, more into the hands of multinationals, who are neither compelled by moral considerations nor constitutional obligations to plough back their profits into local enterprising; a situation that worsens Africa's dependency and insecurity.

The argument for privatisation revolve mainly around two issues; that it will attract overseas investors to put more money in Africa and also liberalise market operations. The proponents for privatisation also say State-controlled companies in Africa are often overmanned, too bureaucratic and riddled with corruption. Furthermore, they argue that privatisation will liberalise the economy and create job opportunities.

There are however, those who maintain that Africa, unlike the developed world, can not afford to open up all sectors of its economy to privatisation; This school of thought argues that

certain key industries such as electricity, rail and road transport and agriculture need to be State-controlled if prices are to remain affordable to majority of people. The reason simply being that most workers are lowly paid despite the high dependency ratio in Africa.

This study contends that the notion that privatisation creates employment has been shown to be a fallacy in the UK and other countries that embarked on the scheme. Almost every industry privatised in the UK, including British Telecom, British Gas, and Thames Water Authority has witnessed the retrenchment of staff and hiking of prices for the consumer.[88] The same goes for the over 80 Nigerian enterprises privatised by the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) between 1989 and 1993.[89] The cost benefits of privatisation have yet to be demonstrated to be in favour of the consumer rather than share holders in the privatised industries. Yet, unlike in UK, privatisation in Africa does not go hand in hand with the creation of "watch dog bodies" like Oftel and Ofgas which regulate prices charged by Post Telecommunications and British Gas to their consumers. In Africa, privatisation seems only to lead to the scrapping of crucial subsidies, such as has been experienced in the many African countires implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). African Countries also lack the trade Union muscle which workers in Europe have relied upon for decades to defend themselves against exploitation of their labour.

All this explains why this thesis considers it curious that much of the debate about privatisation in Africa being the ultimate answer to the continent's problems has come from Western metropolitan agencies like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Financial Company (IFC), and the UK based Common-Wealth Development Corporation (CDC). Knowing that African industries, as yet, simply cannot compete with Western counter parts, because indigenous entrepreneurs do not have the capital base to compete with their Western counterparts in buying shares in viable privatised industries, it appears to this study that privatisation and liberalisation of Africa's economies, is opening the floodgates for multinationals, in collaboration with their indigenous Bourgeoisies (Fronts) to take their pick, with the prospects of the ultimate consequences of this being a continent whose collective security is mortgaged beyond its capacity to pull its own boot strappings.

Combined, these facts indicate that African resources are not in effective control of Africans and supports the rejection of this thesis of dependence and neo-colinialism and their security implications not just for individual states, but for the continent of Africa as a whole. More importantly, this situation, in line with our third proposition, calls not only for African recovery of effective ownership and control of its natural resources, but also for strengthening power and collective security initiatives to guard against the forcible seizure of these vital strategic and

agro-industrial endowments once they have been recovered from the hands of metropolitan agents.

In terms of productive capacity, these structures of the resource base, in conjunction with the colonial legacy of geopolitical balkanisation, account in large measure for what has been aptly referred to as the "development of underdevelopment" in Africa and for the conseqent magnitude of the security problem. The problem is exacerbated by wrong public policies and strategies for the provision of economic security. This can be illustrated by growth in production as well as changes in the agricultural sector, which in Africa employs about 70 percent of the population. The importance of the agricultural sector in the overall economic security and independence of Africa cannot be denied. The comparative table below is instructive because it indicates the degree of divergence in the economic policies of four representative countries - Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Libya. Except for Libya,[90] only a lip service is paid to agriculture in the four cases.

Table 4.3.2 b.

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE, 1970 - 1976 (in percent)

Country	GDP	Agriculture	Industry	Services
Chad	0.8	-1.3	8.1	-0.6
Cameroon	2.7	3.4	3.3	0.7
Nigeria	7.4	-0.2	12.6	9.5
Libya	3.8	23.5	-7.4	20.3

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1978, pp.78.79.

In the particular case of Nigeria,[91] where considerable expansion in petroleum production and export[92], diverted government attention from agriculture, what has come to be known as "the food problem"[93] has become one of the most dangerous threats to security and stability. Projections into the year 2000 indicate deficits of several thousand tons, especially in such essential items as rice, cassava, plantain, livestock, poultry and fish.[94] The situation in Nigeria may well be a reflection of the general trend in African food crisis.[95] Food situation in African countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan Angola and Zaire, where civil unrest and violence has displaced populations and caused abnormally high levels of mass migration throughout the region, is worsening.

African strategies for achieving self-sufficiency in food production have been the unfortunate victims of high ideals with

poor planning and implementation.[96] Such was the case with the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programmes introduced in Ghana and Nigeria respectively in the 1970s.[97] Lacking military and technological power, Africa can easily acquire food power by investment in agriculture, both for domestic consumption and for intra-African trade. Domestically, this strategy will not only settle once and for all the problems associated with the saying that "a hungry man is an angry man", but also be a necessary first step in resolving the dilemma of the "vicious cycle" theory. Internationally, it will reduce, if not completely eliminate, African dependence on food importation from the industrial countries, and as a corollary, African vulnerability to the familiar instruments of economic warfare in the event of conflict with the more militarily and technologically advanced countries.

Another disturbing feature of the economic base for African Security from the point of view of structure of production capacity is that manufacturing is concentrated in the processing of primary commodities, so that over three quarters of industrial value added is in such import substitutes as food and beverages, textiles and cement.[98] Despite its enormous mineral endowments, Africa has very little capacity of manufacturing for export outside each national economy. The share of manufacturing in GDP is still very low, and in the majority of states less than 10 per cent.[99] Worsestill, Africa's manufacturing sector has apparently followed the downslide

experienced by other sectors of the economy. While in 1980 Sub-Saharan Africa's manufacturing value added (MVA) totalled $12 billion (0.4 percent of the global total, to which when South Africa's $30.5 billion is included becomes 11 percent), in 1990 the region's share had slipped to 0.9 percent; though if South Africa is left out it stood at 0.4 percent.[100] Trade as an important factor in promoting relations among States and in solving mutual problems of security is considerably hampered. Trade amongst memberstates of the ECOWAS for instance, is only 4 percent of the total value of their combined national trade and is yet to show any signs of improvement despite the fact that the much expected trade liberalisation scheme which was to have taken off since 1981 has eventually taken off from January 1, 1990.[101] Today, the overwelming direction of African trade remains positioned as it was more than a century ago, outward, and in the direction of the metropoles.

Although government intervention in the oil producing countries, such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, has led to relative progress in control of the petroleum industry,[102] the entire resource base of Africa still exists at the mercy of foreign exploitation; so that the struggle for access to Africa's minerals and other raw materials has become inextricably entangled with the collective security of Africa and the national interests and policies of the metropolitan West. Thus, the question of peace and security in Africa, the theoretic satellite region, has become, in part a

function of the struggle for control of Africa's natural resources, such as oil, copper, iron-ore, diamond, uranium and cocoa by the metropolitan West. For instance, the dependence of Western nations, especially the US, on oil imports from Africa (and the Middle East) had in the 1970s and 1980s posed a serious dilemma, namely the struggle with the erstwhile Soviet Union and the difficult choice between keeping oil supply lines open and toying with African interests on vital issues of Namibian independence and apartheid rule in South Africa.[103] In this circumstance, the Americans have tended to react not to the demand and supply force in world oil market, but to the uncertainties and insecurities about their future and national interests.

Consequently, this thesis believes that, the search for economic security inevitably entails autonomous development of Africa as an integrated Unit. Despite recent movements towards this goal, as reflected in the ECOWAS,[104] other sub-regional integrative schemes and the Lagos programme of action[105] on Africa, most African States have continued to reinforce colonial economic relations not only by their refusal to break away from the exploitative model of capitalist industrialisation, overtly and covertly sold through such instrumentalities as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,[106] but also by shielding themselves under the Lome Convention both for Trade, Monetary, Investment and Technology transfer issues, and for Western aid largesse; a situation which by 1993 has complicated the African security dilemma with an external

debt of over $275 billion. Infact, by the end of 1991, the West African Sub-region alone was facing a debt overhang of a staggering $78.3 billion, representing 45 percent of the region's total debt stock.[107] It goes without saying that, despite the burden-some value of bilateral debts, most of Africa is beholden to the World Bank and IMF. And it is now common knowledge that the kind of conditionalities imposed by the two Brtton Woods institutions have always wound up harming African economies and security which are already well mortgaged to the metropolitan donor states and institutions for the unforeseeable future. This summation becomes even more appaling when the fact that most African countries have allowed their economies to depend solely on Western aid is highlighted. For instance, in countries like Mozambique, aid equals 98 percent of GNP; Tanzania, 40 percent of GNP and Somalia, 34 percent of GNP.[108]

Against this general backdrop of economic base and security, the words of Lius Ignacio Silva, can not but be regarded as utterly incontrovertible. The Brazilian Labour leader said!

> "Without being radical or overly bold, I will tell you that the Third World War has already started. The war is tearing down developing countries. Instead of soldiers dying, there are children; instead of millions of wounded, there are millions of unemployed; instead of destruction of bridges, there are tearing down of factories, schools, hospitals and entire economies. It is a war by the United States (a metropole) against the (Latin American Continent)

> and Africa (a Satellite region). A war over foreign debt, one which has as its main weapon, interest - a weapon more deadly than the atom bomb, more shattering than a laser beam".[109]

4.3.3 Military power and African Security:

There is a symbiotic relationship between military security and economic security. Economic strength is the foundation of two important determinants of military security namely military power and mobilized forces. At the same time, military power is necessary not only to protect the economic base, but also to defend the territorial integrity of the society as a whole. Thus, the role of military and economic power in African security is mutually reinforcing. As Knorr[110] has observed, both can be seen as capacities for deterrance and defence, for exerting coercion, and for influencing the behaviour of a potential adversary.

The military potential of Africa for security purposes is not determined by the present size and equipment of the armed forces. If any thing, the military balance of African States masks the fragility of Africa's military potential in the event of sustained war. For African States as for any other State or group of States, military power is more a function of the magnitude and structure of productive capacity, of a policy for peace and war, and of the general preparedness of the Armed Forces and the civilian population than the more quantitative calculation of weapons

purchased from a foreign producer, and the mere statistics of troop numbers as reflected in the following table.

Table 4.3.3 a. Size of African Armed Forces, 1983

Under 5,000	5,000 - 10,000	10,000 - 25,000	25,000 - 50,000	50,000 - 100,000	over 100,000
Benin	Burundi	Ghana	Angola	Libya	Algeria
Botswana	Cameroon	Kenya	Tanzania	Somalia	Egypt
Cape Verde	Congo-Brazzaville	Tunisia	South Africa		Ethiopia
CAR	Guinea	Madagascar	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Morocco
Chad	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique			Nigeria
Comoros	Cote d'Ivoire	Uganda			
Djibouti	Liberia	Zaire			
Eg.Guinea	Mauritania	Zambia			
Gabon	Rwanda	*Togo			
Lesotho	Senegal				
Malawi	Gambia				
Mali					
Mauritius					
Niger					
Sao Tome					
Seychelles					
Sierra Leone					
Swaziland					
Burkina Faso					

Note: Does not include reserves, paramilitary, or police gendarmeries.

Source: International Institute for strategic studies, The Military Balance, 1983 - 84 (London: IISS, 1983), pp.66-81. Those countries not listed are placed in the 'under 1,000' column.

* Revised figures for Togo is 12,000; from West Africa August 23-29, 1993, p.1479

Subsequently, while it is important to open up and maintain sources of supply of weapons, it is far more important to develop and accelerate local production not just of weapons but of all categories of goods and services required by the armed forces. Experience has shown that the armed forces require goods and services of three main levels of sophistication. These are":

1. Softwares-Food, clothing, shelter;
2. Intermediate-wares- Drugs, fuel, vehicles, radio etc;
3. Hardwares- Arms and ammunitions, modern communication systems, complex ships, aircrafts, missiles and nuclear arsenals, etc.

African security is meaningless if African States cannot develop the infrastructure for the production of these wares and services, and are seen to be actually producing them at an incremental speed. The dilemma is, however, that the higher the level of sophistication of these goods and services, the far removed from the reach of African production they become. Precisely for this reason, that is, for its economic and technological backwardness,

Africa has been forced to depend on the industrial metropolitan powers for arms supply. This fact is demonstrated by the table on Arms transfer to African States, 1974 - 78, a trend that has been consistent over the years.

Table 4.3.3 b. Arms Transfer to African States, 1974 - 78

$10-50 Millions	$50-100 Millions	$100-300 Millions	$300-1,000 Millions	Over 1,000 Millions
Benin	Ghana	Mali	Angola	Algeria
Botswana	Cote d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Morocco	Egypt
Burundi	Kenya	Nigeria	Somalia	Ethiopia
Cameroon	Mauritania	Sudan	South Afr.	Libya
Chad	Tunisia	Tanzania		
Congo-Brazzaville		Uganda		
Equatorial Guinea		Zaire		
Gabon		Zambia		
Gambia				
Guinea				
Guine-Bissau				
Madagascar				
Malawi				
Niger				
Senegal				
Togo				
Zimbabwe				

Arms Suppliers	
Soviet Union (defunct)	56%
France	11%
West Europeans	9%
East Europeans	8%
USA	4%
Peoples Republic of China	1%
All Others	15%

Total Arms Transfers, 1974 - 78: $14,300 Million (current year dollars)

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1969 - 1978 (Washington,D.C.: Dec.1980), pp.160 - 161.

Table 4.4.3 c. on the comparative statistics of ECOWAS States, on another hand, depicts that, relative to their national populations, territorial sizes and Wealth, most African countries have rather over-committed scarce national resources to short term policies of military imports and maintenance of sizeable troops strength, instead of collectively developing a viable military-industrial complex that can structurally correct over time, their undue dependence on external military sources and the attendant susceptibility to amassing debts.

Table 4.3.3 c. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF ECOWAS STATES

Serial	Country	Population	Area in Sq.km	Military Exp.	Percentage of GNP	Arms Import in US $	Strength of Armed Force
1.	Benin	3,666,000	112,622	27,000,000	2.2	10 million	3,000
2.	Burkina Faso	7,200,000	274,200	37,000,000	2.9	0	4,000
3.	Cape Verde	300,000	4,033	X	X	X	X
4.	Cote d'Ivoire	8,924,000	322,500	100,000,000	1.2	20 million	5,000
5.	Gambia	619,052	11,295	X	X	0	XX
6.	Ghana	12,943,000	238,538	25,000,000	0.6	10 million	15,000
7.	Guinea	5,543,000	246,048	70,000,000	4.1	10 million	10,000
8.	Guinea-Bissau	823,000	26,400	X	X	X	6,300
9.	Liberia	2,024,000	111,370	41,000,000	4.1		5,000
10.	Mali	7,228,000	1,240,000	35,000,000	2.9	10 million	5,000
11.	Mauritania	1,561,000	1,085,760	80,000,000	9.9	10 million	8,000
12.	Niger	5,890,000	1,267,000	16,000,000	0.9	5 million	2,000
13.	Nigeria	*88,500,000	923,768	1,807,000,000	2.3	230 million	138,000
14.	Senegal	6,130,000	196,840	61,000,000	2.1	5 million	10,000
15.	Sierra Leone	3,594,000	72,325	12,000,000	1.0	0	3,000
16.	Togo	2,752,000	56,600	22,000,000	2.3	5 million	*12,000

Legend: X Not available

XX None or negligible

Note: * Nigeria - 1991 census figures review

Togo - Revised figures from West Africa, August 23-29, 1993, P. 1479.

Source: Lt. Col. RSB Bello - Fadille (1988). Allied Armed Forces of ECOWAS: A case for its Actualization. NDA, Kaduna, Nigeria.

When the foregoing tables are compared with table 4.4.3 d. below, the relationship between economic capacity and the ability to procure military hardwares for defence and security becomes obvious, since the preponderance of African States fall within the $100 - $499 GNP per capita bracket. More importantly, it shows that African States transfer their scarce incomes to the weapon producers of the industrial world without in reality, getting a commensurate security trade-off in return.

Table 4.3.3 d. RELATIVE BURDEN OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF AFRICAN STATES, 1975

Milex as % of GNP	Per Capital GNP				
	- $100	$100-499	$500-999	$1000-2,999	$3,000+
above		Egypt			
5-10%	Chad Somalia				
2-4.9%	Burundi Ethiopia Mali Rwanda Burkina-Faso	CAR Congo Eg-Guinea Guinea Mauritania Morocco Nigeria Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zaire	Algeria Angola Zambia	South- Africa	
1-1.9%		Benin Cameroon Ghana Kenya Madagasca Senegal Togo	Cote d'Ivoire Tunisia	Gabon	Libya
Less than 1%		Botswana Gambia Liberia Malawi Mozambique Niger Sierra-Leone Swaziland	Mauritius		

Source: World Military Expenditures (Milex) and Arms Transfers, 1966 - 1975, P.6.

When this is placed against the background of the fragility of the agro-industrial base Africa's dependence on foreign sources of military supply poses one of the most serious threats to African Security. This conclusion is supported by two principal considerations. In the first place, as a result of their thorough knowledge of the national defence establishments of their client States, each metropolitan power bloc exerts direct or indirect control over African military forces in situations of conflict. The United States the defunct Soviet Union, France, Britain and China, not only send military advicers to African States, but also station troops in Africa. In 1979, France had over 10,700 military advicers scattered over the Francophone States of West and East Africa while those from the defunct Soviet Union and East European States, concentrated in Algeria, Angola, the former Ethiopia, Libya and Mozambique numbered about 6,800.[111]

In the second place, the training, equipping and preparation of supply lines against any perceived or actual threat to security - conceived as vital elements of military mobilization[112] - cease to be effectively determined by Africans. For example, in the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) the lack of spare parts for the primary trainer aircraft - the "Bulldog", which are usually imported from Britain has since grounded the vital air force responsibility of flying training, leading to a situation where the student pilot course 30 remains unable to be introduced to their primary assignment of flying training, four years after graduating from the prestigious Nigerian Defence Academy in 1989.[113]

More specifically, during the period 1960 - 1979, France had trained 19,900 Officers and men,[114] as compared with 12,925 by the erstwhile communist States put together, and 2,100 by the United States in 1955 - 1980.[115] Since in any case, the mobilization base[116] needed quickly to move into large scale military production to meet any threat is lacking, such mechanisms of military initiatives as anticipation, threat and war, turn the bonds of dependency into fetters. African defence planners think of these initiatives in terms of options within which to maneouvre, but they hardly seem to consider how their ability to do so can be quickly undermined by dependency. This distorted polity of African security options is no more apparent in the military sphere than in the economic sphere, where the use of various weapons of economic warfare[117] enables the metropoles to gain economic and military/security domination over Africa. The most dangerous weapon now being used is manipulation of the bottle neck effect,[118] especially in regard to "strategic goods" such as African commodity and mineral exports, as well as staple food stuff, imported machines, and armaments for which there are no domestic substitutes and where the terms of trade between Africa and the metropolitan industrial powers are vulnerable. It is in this light that the American government's huge annual subsidy to its farmers in order to control production of grains, in an otherwise free market economy, and the selective campaigns for arms control by the West must be viewed by African proponents of collective regional security.

4.3.4 Political Will, Skills Development and African Security

A major force in shaping African Security is political will. Politics provides the important link between economic strength and military power. It also determines not just the general character of national power but also the degree of mobilization at any point in time. Political will is a complex of force, including principally socio-cultural consciousness, ideological commitment, organisation and skills which are necessary, though not sufficient conditions under which groups or States can co-ordinate their policies and actions to achieve common goals. Despite the crystallization of the Pan-African movement in the OAU, member States are still to a large extent divided on many issues of security like strategy of development,[119] defence, deterrence, war and intervention in the internal affairs of other States.[120] For example, contrary to expectations, the 30th Session of the OAU Summit ended in Cairo, Egypt on July 7, 1993 with very little to show for it. The one concrete resolution that came out of the summit was the vote to give the organisation new peace keeping powers based on a new mechanism for conflict prevention, resolution and management. As necessary as that resolution appears in view of the political upheavals in the continent, it did not receive the blessing of all the African leaders. Leading the opposition was Daniel Arap Moi,[121] President of Kenya, who said his government would oppose a permanent peace-keeping force. Though an OAU secretariat will nevertheless be created to deal with the matter,

the mechanism is already facing obstacles. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the OAU identified the first problem as lack of resources. Other problems include getting the OAU to accept full responsibility for the force and getting the political commitment of African leaders to the idea.

A demonstration of political will implies not only a capacity to generate a national concensus on an issue of vital interest and to sustain it, but also to resist all forms of foreign influence, personal or State-national interests that conflict with the overall goal of African independence and collective security. It is against this background that certain African observers began to propose a rethink of the UN's role in Somalia following the debacle in Mogadishu.[122] The humanitarian mission had been derailed, it would seem, by the jaundiced views of the Europeans and North Americans who formed a large part of the UN forces. It seemed Canada sent racist troops, some of whom later faced charges of torturing and murdering certain Somalis; the complicity of Italian troops (by striking a deal with gunmen not to search for weapons) had led to the deaths of seven Nigerian UN soldiers on September 5, 1993; the high handedness of American troops were manifest in amongst other incidents, the killing of four journalists after one US-led attack left more than 50 civilians dead; even the Germans, whose troops have not left their shores since the end of the second World War in 1945, arrived Somalia with a sense of experimentation.

Obviously therefore, the problem from the onset seems to have been that the European and North American UN soldiers lacked the cultural background to tackle the issues at stake. They failed to correctly read the situation. In a society where great store is placed on clan loyalties and respect for elders of the clan, it would have made sense if these sensibilities had been taken into consideration before hand. Not after so much unnecessary damage as the American-led UNOSOM later realised. Such reasoning would have informed the mission to avoid the undue premium placed on the elimination of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, by the Clinton administration before and after the unfortunate June 5, 1993 ambush which resulted in the killing of 23 Pakistani UN soldiers.

The foregoing Somalia scenario introduces the need for skill in government and administration, as well as in the African armed forces and in diplomacy to be considered. Skill has two major aspects which are directly relevant to political will: The first is skill acquisition, which is associated with the stock of available knowledge enriched through scientific and technological progress and diffused through the labour force by means of education, training and experience. Ideology is perhaps the most important component of the stock of knowledge, which can be acquired through a long process of political education and socialization. The second aspect of skill relates to its application. Skill application performs the important function of linking skill acquisition to political will. Ideology not only provides the

focus for actors in these role situations on African security issues, but also helps to generate policy coherency necessary for collective action. In general, skill application determines the ability to mobilize economic strentth and military potential for achieving security and it compels all actors to perceive and interpret choices in terms of how they affect this outcome. Thus, for collective security preparedness, it is not so much the size of the regional population, or the armed forces for that matter that is crucial, but the cohesiveness and the solidarity of the population - that is to say, the quality, skill and national consciousness of the mobilized manpower. At the national level, Libya examplifies this argument, where despite the economic warfare declared by a Western Metropolitan coalition since 1991, in terms of an air, fuel and arms embargo, over allegations and claims concerning the 1988 Lockerbie (Scotland) Pan Am flight air crash terrorism, the small African country manages to strive due largely to the national consciousness of the mobilized human resource under Gaddafi.

Political mobilization is so important to collective security that it must necessarily be linked to political ideology. In this sense, Pan-Africanism as a doctrine of African independence, Unity and Security can provide the ideological basis, for political mobilization. Unfortunately, deficient political will by many African leaders have remained a major obstacle undermining the collective security goals of the region. According to Hamza Alavi

"the essential problem of the State in post colonial societies stems from the fact that it is not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie, but rather, by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie".[123] These bourgoisie elements, essentially clientellist in their relations with foreign governments and international business conglomerates (i.e. the MNC's),[124] constitute serious security risks for their own countries in particular and for the African region as a whole. This is significant in that at independence, the metropolitan bourgeoisie do not entirely withdraw, but in collaboration with indigenous bourgeoisie, use the instruments of the State and control over economic means of production to continue the process of exploitation. In chapter three of this study, we were able to trace the evolution of the Liberian crisis to this argument, where Americo-Liberian imperialism was the tool.

In a speech at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, on Septermber 23, 1960, Kwame Nkrumah rejected the Franco-Belgian-Portuguese claims on Africa and insisted that "Africa is not, and can never be, an extension of Europe.[125] This shows that as postulated, African leaders do recognise that dependency can subjugate the security of the continent to external interests unless Africans evolve strategies aimed at improving integrative schemes for collective security management. This is where Pan-Africanism becomes central. At the time the OAU charter came into force on Septermber 13, 1963, there were forty-one member States.

The number of independent member states is today fifty-two with Eritrea at the last count.[126] Each State is faced with internal and external security problems, which reflects in microcosm the larger security problems of Africa as a whole. The need to assure security at the State, rather than the continental level, which invariably compels the poor African States to depend on the metropoles can be said to be one of the major dilemmas of African security. The recourse to foreign dependence in matters of State security by individual African countries was largely reinforced by the class character of the post-colonial State.

Pan-Africanism provides a common ideological basis for the advancement both of African independence and of collective security. Its primary goal is the unity of African peoples in one independent, political community embracing all ethnic and national groups and free from political, economic and racial dependence. The charter of the OAU States that the founders of the organisation are :

> "Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences".[127]

Despite differences in political, economic and cultural outlooks, this emphasis on collective security action and unity should remain

the core of African strategy in world politics. In the words of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, "the essential fact remains that we are all Africans, and have a common interest in the independence of Africa".[128] From the Pan-African point of view therefore, security is seen not so much in terms of the preservation of the integrity of individual sovereign States as in defence of African independence and development as well as promotion of the unity and solidarity of all Africans.

Pan-Africanism shapes African security in other important practical respects. The existence of the OAU provides the organisational forum and mechanism for defining the nature of threats to African security and for harmonising African policies on the type of response posture to threat situations. As the membership of independent African States increases, the possibility of distortions and incogruities in individual State perception and interpretation of the nature of threats to security also increases. This inescapable feature of political development in Africa requires that Sub-regional organisations and their collective security mechanisms, as in the case of ECOWAS and the ECOMOG, Forthwith, becomes the basis of continental security integration in Africa. The tide of regionalism sweeping across the globe, should add urgency to Africa's response to the challenges facing it in the 1990s and beyond. Other major regions of the world are in the verge of integration or have concluded agreements in this direction: Europe 1992; North America Free Trade Area; and the

Asian Free Trade Area, amongst others, all have underlying economic and politico-military objectives.

The option of regionalism has three inter-related components from the point of view of security, namely, military, political and economic. The common denominator among them in terms of orientation is the establishment of a regional security arrangement for defence in the event of conflict. Economically, in some respects, the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) which was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on June 3, 1991, when ratified by two-third majority of the OAU member States would become operational and should thus start the liberalisation process among African States. Liberalisation will create among other things, the necessary conditions that should enable African governemts to adopt common policies, which is essential in an integration process. Politically, regional security arrangements as hereby envisaged should not be such as to involve African countries in bilateral or multilateral pacts with foreign powers, but should consist of an institutionalised common defence framework. Militarily, African leaders have already agreed on the creation of an OAU Defence Force.[129] But the precise character of the Defence Force has not been delineated; nor has a strategic doctrine been formulated on the basis of which the force will be trained, organised and operated. It is not too fanciful therefore, to speculate that what is envisaged is a marriage of Nkrumah's idea of an African High Command,[130] and the contemporary idea of an

African Security Council, which will serve the dual functions of defence against external aggression and of peace-keeping within Africa.

In order to fully exploit the capabilities of an African High Command, or an African Security Council as the case may be, in its dual roles, it is necessary to have the forces located at five strategic regional points around the continent and co-ordinated from a command headquarters, to be sited in Nigeria for obvious reasons of size, resource base and level of military professionalism and skills development of the labour force. The five regional forces could be coined out of the pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC), which are the sub-regional economic groupings:

1. The Economic Community Of West African States-ECOWAS;
2. Economic Community Of Cental African States - ECCAS;
3. Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference - SADCC;
4. Union Maghreb Arab - UMA; and
5. The Preferential Trade Area - PTA.[131]

Any African Country that does not fall into any of these Unions should be integrated into the Community in its immediate geographical neighbourhood. A point in case is Cameroon which should join the 16 member ECOWAS formed in 1975. Similarly, a democratic South Africa should join the 10 member SADCC, which was

formed in 1980 to lessen dependence of the frontline States on the Powerful South African economy and to coordinate development with each country responsible for a particular sector. At the moment, only the PTA which was established in 1982 to co-ordinate and improve trade between its 19 member countries and work towards a common currency and a common market by the year 2000, seems to have the full membership of all the States in the East African neighbourhood.

There are several advantages of this type of regional security arrangement. One of the most obvious advantages is the prospect of "Flexibility of response" to threat situations wherever they may occur around the continent. In such eventualities, the sub-regional force will immediately be mobilized, and the point of full mobilization will come when the other four sub-regional forces are progressively involved to deal with the threat. In this respect, the model of ECOMOG has placed ECOWAS much more firmly on the international map as a serious and credible orgnisation. This is an era in which regional security issues has acquired a new post-cold war dimension, and ECOWAS has shown the other sub-regional groupings that African Countries can engage in both peace-keeping and " peace enforcing",[132] as strategies aimed at improving integrative schemes of security management in the African Continent. The realisation of this ideal, and action, by the other component units of the African region will serve to justify the later half of the final proposition of this thesis.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the interview of the second Field Commander of ECOMOG - Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro (now a retired Lieutenant General), in Quality, April 4, 1991, P. 31.

2. Cited in hypothesis 1 in Chapter one of this study, P. 18.

3. See especially John Stockwell (1978), In Search of Enemies, (New York: Norton); Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (1974), The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, (New York: Knopf); Soviet intelligence presence in Africa totalled 918 in 1976, with highest concentration in Nigeria (125), Senegal (79), Tanzania (64), Mali (57), Zambia (50), Kenya (46), and Ethiopia (46). See Patrick Wall (ed), The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World: New Studies in Global Strategy (London: Stacy International, 1977) P. 235.

4. International Herald Tribune, May 23, 1978, P. 8

5. See Essays by a group of Nigerian Scholars, Mostly Nsukka intellectuals led by Okwudiba Nnoli (ed), Path to Nigerian Development, (Dakar: Codesria, 1981), P. 253.

6. See Suzanne Cronje (1972), The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War, 1967-1970, London, Sidgwick and Jackson; and Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.

7. See British and United States Year in Africa, in Colin Legum (ed), African Contemporary Record, 1977-1978 and 1978-1979.

8. West Africa, August 2-8, 1973, P. 1339.

9. Ibid, P. 1339

10. West Africa, October 11-17, 1993, P. 1818.

11. See Oscar Oyone B. Ede, "French Activities in Africa" and M> Bassey Ate, "France in Africa: The NATO Dimension and the Implications for Nigeria" - papers presented at the Seminar on French Policy in Africa, Organised by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, May 27, 1981.

12. General Jean Callet (1976), "The French Presence", in Wall (ed), The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World, Pp. 159-168; and National Defence Review (February and October, 1976).

13. Sylvester Momoh Onoja, (1976), Independence and Dependence In Francophone Africa: A Study in French Neo-Colonialism. M. Sc.

Thesis, A.B.U., Zaria, December, P. 164.

14. See Jeune Afrique Magazine, February 9, 1972, P. 45

15. Sylvester Momoh Onoja, Ibid, P. 163

16. Jeune Afrique, Ibid, P.48. West Africa, March 7-13, 1994, P.405.

17. See the Constitution of the Republic of France, 1946, P. 1

18. George H. Wittman (1982), "Political and Military Background for France's Intervention Capability", in AEI Foreign Policy, Vol.4, 1982-4, P.14

19. In late 1981 the French Ministry of Defence changed the name of this command from the earlier forces d'actions exte'rieures, presumably to satisfy foreign political sensitivities.

20. George H. wittman, Ibid, P. 15.

21. Cited in hypothesis II in Chapter one of this study, P. 18

22. Newswatch, September 14, 1992, P. 43

23. Newswatch, August 27, 1990. P. 16

24. Newswatch, July 1-7. 1991. P. 1076.

25. Newswatch, September 10, 1990. P. 25

26. See table 4.1.5a on page 239 of this study on French aid flow to Cote d'Ivoire vis-a-vis other Francophone West African States, for proof of the French Commitment to this satellite.

27. African Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 10, May 17, 1991, P. 3

28. Newswatch, September 14, 1992, P. 43

29. Newswatch, September 7, 1992, P. 22

30. Ibid, P. 22

31. Newswatch, April 10, 1991, P. 24

32. Newswatch, September 7, 1992, P. 22

33. West Africa, May 17-23, 1993, P. 816.

34. Ibid, P. 816

35. P. 817.

36 Ibid, P. 818

37. Tell, May 31, 1993, P. 40

38. Newswatch, April 22, 1991, P. 35

39. Newswatch, October 7, 1991, P. 20

40. Newswatch, September 14, 1992, P. 43

41. Ibid, P. 43

42. The Guardian, May 30, 1990, P. 14

43. Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Co., Ltd., 1991, P. 122

44. See Nnamdi Obasi, "The Negotiation Process", in M. A. Vogt (ed), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace-keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co., Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, P. 185.

45. The Guardian, August 5, 1990, P. 3

46. See Nnamdi Obasi, "Perceptions of the ECOMOG Peace Initiative", in M. A. Vogt (ed), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A bold attempt at regional peace-keeping, Gabumo Publishing Co., Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, Pp. 351-352.

47. See Segun Aderiye, "ECOMOG Landing", in M. A. Vogt (ed), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG, Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, P. 107. Johnson himself was said to have confirmed these reports during his first meeting with General Quainoo inside NNS Ambe.

48. See Professor Ibrahim James, "ECOMOG under Attack", in M. A. Vogt (ed), The Liberian crisis and ECOMOG, Gubumo Publishing Co. Ltd., Lagos, Nigeria, P. 140.

49. The Sunday Magazine, August 16, 1992, P. 22.

50. West Africa, April 5-11, 1993, P. 550.

51. Ibid, P. 550

52. Ibid

53. Ibid, P. 551

54. West Africa, October 18-24, 1993, P. 1871.

55. Ibid, P. 1871.

56. Ibid, P. 1872.

57. The "CIA Manner" means the attitude by which America's Central Intelligence Agency in particular, and the American elite, in general is reputed for using unsuspecting foreign nationals for dubious clandestine operations, only to abandon them to their unfortunate fate in the event that there is the likelihood of the unveiling of their covert activities.

58. Tell, June 21, 1993, P. 49.

59. Ibid,

60. West Africa, October 4-10, 1993, P. 1752

61. Ibid.

62. Tell, June 21, 1993, P. 49.

63. West Africa, October 4-10, 1993, P. 1752.

64. Ibid, P. 1753.

65. Though the American government was later reported to have denied issuing such an order, many media houses quoted the Cable Network News (CNN) as having reported this state department order. Some of such sources in Nigeria include - Sunday Punch, July 4, 1994; The Punch, June 28, 1993, P. 2; and National Concord, June 28, 1993, P. 30.

66. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993, P. 1611.

67. West Africa, October 18-24, 1993, P. 1868. West Africa, February 28 - March 6, 1994, p.362. West Africa, March 14 - 20, 1994, p.463.

68. Cited in hypothesis III in Chapter one of this study, P. 18.

69. On the grounds of this theory, France justified its ceasing from 1947 onward to transmit information on the Overseas Departments of Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion, since it "would be no more plausible in their case to speak of dependence than it would be in the case of a province in relation to the state of which it formed a part". See UN document A/915 of June 14, 1949, P. 3; also see Belgium, The Secret Mission of Civilisation: The Belgian Thesis (New York, 1957).

70. See UN document A/5448 of October 31, 1963, Pp. 4-5; See also Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and Portugal: A study of Anti-Colonialism, London, 1963.

71. Melville J. Herskovits, "Does 'Africa' Exist", in Symposium on Africa, Wellesley, Mass, Wellesley College, 1960, P. 15.

72. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993 P. 1628.

73. See UN demographic year book, 1992

74. Kwame Nkrumah (1965), Neo-Colonialism: The last stage of Imperialism, London: Nelson.

75. West Africa, September 6-12, 1993, P. 1578.

76. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-1980; New York, African Publishing Co., 1981, Pp. B747-B762.

77. R. H. Green and Seidman (1968), Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan Africanism, Harmondswork, England, Pengium Books; Maintain that colonial "balkanization" of Africa and the consequent atomization of national markets constitute the main obstacles to economic development. See also D. Nadada Nabudere (1979), Essays on the Theory and Practice of Imperialism, London: Ony Press.

78. This is the Core of Nkrumah's conception of African Security: Kwame Nkrumah: Africa Must Unite, London, Heineman, 1963.

79. World Development Report 1978, Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1978, Pp.88-89.

80. Projections up to the year 2000 indicate that per Capital GDP for most African Countries will not exceed $410. See Wassily Leontieff et al., (1977), The Future of the World Economy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1977.

81. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993, P. 1630.

82. West Africa, April 5-11, 1993, P.540.

83. See Greg Lanning and Marti Mueller (1979), Africa Undermined (Harmondsworth, Pengium, 1979), Pp. 110-111.

84. UN Economic Commission for Africa, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa 1971, New York: United Nations, 1972.

85. Lanning and Mueller, Ibid, P. 110-111.

86. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993, P. 1630.

87. See Greg Lanning and Marti Meuller (1979), Africa Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of Africa, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin: and Review of African Political Economy No. 2 (January - April 1975 which is devoted to the impact of the MNCS on Africa, with case studies of Kenya, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Mauritania.

88. West Africa, October 25-31, 1993, P. 1929.

89. Newswatch, November 1, 1993, P.36

90. See J. A. Allan, K. S. Mclachlan, and Edith Pearose (eds), Libya: Agriculture and Economic Development, London: Frank Cass, 1973, especially Chapter 1 section 2: The Economic Impact of Oil on Libyan Agriculture.

91. See Gerald K. Helleiner, (1966), Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Homewood, III: Richard D. Irwin, 1966. Also see Scott R. Pearson, (1971), Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy(stanford, Calif. Stanford University Press; and World Bank, Nigeria: Options for Long - term Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

92. S. A. Madujibeya, "Oil and Nigeria's Economic Development", African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 300 (July 1976): 284 - 316.

93. S. O. Olayide (1975), The Food Problem: Tractable or the Mere Chase of the Mirage? (Ibadan: University of Ibadan, 1975).

94. Ibid, Pp. 9-10; See also M. J. Ojo, "Food Supply in Nigeria, 1960-1975", Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 15, No.2 (Lagos: Central Bank of Nigeria, December 1977).

95. In May 1973, the Director-General of the FAO called attention to the danger of World-Wide food crisis and recommended, among others, a strategy of perpetual food availability based on "the Concept of Minimum Safe level of basic food stocks for the World as a whole". FAO, Commodity Review and Outlook, 1974-76 (Rome: FAO, 1976), Ch.II P.7: See also World Food Conference, The World Food Problem: proposals for National and International Action, E/Conf. 65/4; and Helge Ole Bergesen, Towards a Global Food Regime? A Study of the politics of the World Food Negotiations (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1976) especially part 1: "Food Security Negotiations".

96. Economic Commission for Africa, Food Situation in Africa (Addis Ababa, E/CN. 14/618).

97. Moses Danguah (ed), Ghana Economic Review, 1973-75 (Accra:

Editorial and Publishing Services, n.d.); 41-43; Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970: a Political and Economic Outline (London: Hoddor and Stoughton, 1981) Pp. 77.80; and Nigeria, Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-5 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1979), Pp. 26-29

98. See, for instance, F.A.Olaloku et.al., (1979), Structure of the Nigerian Economy (London: Macmillan, 1979).

99. Andrew M. Kamarck (1971), The Economics of African Development, Rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1971.

100. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993, P.1630.

101. Briggs, Inye Nathan (1992). Sovereignty and the Problem of Regional Integration: The Case of ECOWAS 1975-1991. M.Sc. Thesis, A.B.U., Zaria.

102. See Peter Nore and Terish Turner (1980). Oil and Class Struggle. London, Zed Press; and Adeoye A. Akinsanya (1980). The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World. New York, Praeger.

103. Gregory Treverton (ed), Energy and Security London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, 1980; also Strategic Survey, 1979. London: IISS, 1980. Pp. 24-28.

104. J. P. Renninger (1979). Multinational Co-operation for Development in West Africa. New York: Pergamon, 1979; V. P. Diejamoah and M. A. Iyoha (ed), Industrialization in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Lagos: Heinemann, 1980.

105. See West Africa, May 5-11, 1980, Pp. 771, 773-774.

106. See especially Chinweizu (1975). The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers... and the African Elite, New York: Vintage, 1975; See also Cheryl Payer (1969). The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York: Monthly Review. 1969.

107. West Africa, August 2-8, 1993, P. 1334.

108. West Africa, September 20-26, 1993, P. 1675.

109. Ibid, August 2-8, 1993, P. 1335.

110. Klaus Knorr (1970). Military Power and Potential. Lexington, Mass, Health, 1970, P.3

111. US, Department of Defence, Foreign Military Sales and

Assistance Facts, 1980 (Washington DC., 1981).

112. For this problem, See U.S., Sixth Quarterly Report to the President by the Director of Defence Mobilization (July 1, 1952), and L.V. Chander and D.H. Wallace (1951). Economic Mobilization and Stabilization. New York: Henry Holt.

113. The researcher is a member of the 37th Regular Course, whose NAF Cadets graduated from the NDA in 1989 and has since been a member of the 'grounded' 'SP30' course.

114. U.S. Department of Defence, Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Facts, 1980. Washington DC., 1981.

115. Ibid

116. George A. Lincoln et.al., (1954). Economics of National Security: Managing America's Resources for Defence 2nd ed. (Englewood, Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall - defines "mobilization base" not only as the productive capacity for national defence, but also the ability of a state to develop and exploit "additional" capacity beyond immediate national requirement.

117. See P. J. D. Wiles (1968). Communist International Economics. Oxford: Basil BlackWell, especially Ch. xvi; Albert O. Hireschman (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, Calif., and W. B. Medlicott (1952). The Economic Blockade.

118. This can be defined as a short-term or long-term closure of a whole branch or several branches of production because of complete disruption of the source of raw materials or a severe balance of payments crisis. See Wiles, Communist International Economics, dis. V and XVI Pp. 456-464.

119. See especially Daoudu Thiam, (1965). The Foreign Policy of African states: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects. London; and William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg (ed.), African Socialism. Stanford, 1964.

120. African positions on these issues can be gleaned from the " great debate" on "dialogue" with South Africa. See in particular Nweke, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955 - 1975, Ch. 4; A. Tolbert, "Dialogue with South Africa - The Great African Debate", The Ethiopian Herald, May 9, 1971; Peter Enahoro, "Dialogue", Africa, No. 2 (1971); and Colon Legum, "Dialogue: The Great Debate", African Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, Pp. A66-A82.

121. Newswatch, July 12, 1993, P. 27.

122. West Africa, September 13-19, 1993, P. 1611.

123. Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, No. 74, July - August, 1972.

124. Nore and Turner (ed), Oil and class struggle; Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa; and Harry Goulboume (ed). Politics and State in the Third World, London: Macmillan, 1972.

125. Quoted in Mazrui A. Ali (1967). Towards a Pax Africana: A study in Ideology and Ambition. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, P. 43.

126. Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Records, 1979-1980. New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981; provides detailed information on annual developments in Africa on a Country-by-country basis in addition to surveys by experts covering Africa as a whole. Official documents on African affairs are also included.

127. See Brown (ed.), Documents on African Affairs, P. 2.

128. Kwame Nkrumah (1961). I Speak of Freedom: A statement of African Ideology. New York, Praeger, P. XI

129. AHC/DOC. 119 (XVI).

130. Kwame Nkrumah (1967). Challenge of the Congo. New York, International Publishers, Ch. 21.

131. West Africa, July 19-25, 1993, P. 1244.

132. West Africa, Ibid, P. 1238.

CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 2000s

5.0 Summary

> "ECOMOG is without doubt a successful move on the part of ECOWAS. Is there any likelihood that it will develop into a permanent security body for the sub-region?"[1]

The foregoing scenarios of this study indicates the prospects and limitations of African States to preserve and foster their Collective Security and by so doing to contribute to international peace and security. The study blames Africa's insecurity and underdevelopment on internal division and external dependency and proposes that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's dictum on the indivisibility of Africa has become more relevant with the passage of time.

It identified the major categories of threat to African Security to include; economic and military dependence, conflicts, and wars within states (often encouraged by external parties), inter-state antagonisms (as demonstrated in the contradictions between ECOWAS member-states), and foreign power intervention in African affairs. There is however, also South Africa's policy of apartheid and belligerancy which was not emphasised for two reasons: One, it is a threat that cannot be seen as an isolated problem but as inextricably entwined with the others. And two, the optimism being

inspired by the efforts at democratisation in that enclave, which at the time of this study has led Nelson Mandella, the President of the African National Congress (ANC) to call on the international Community to lift sanctions against the regime. Moreover, South Africa's multi-racial Transitional Executive Council had began sitting December 6, with the new multi-racial constitution being approved by the South African parliament December 22, 1993.

The curiosity and belief that the UDT, in political science is not a prerogative of economic analysis alone, as portrayed by most of its early proponents was justified as it was shown that indeed, all economically oriented analysis of necessity have security implications, especially for the African region.

From the overview of ECOWAS, which looked at foreign interests and the history of integration in West Africa, right to the testing of the hypotheses, it was shown by the study, that by the time the colonizers left, having underdeveloped Africa (as Walter Rodney argued persuasively) while simultaneously industrializing their own countries, the Metropolitan West in particular, though the industrialized World in general, had put in place a global economic and security order which tied Africa to the former's apron strings, with the Brettonwoods institutions policing the insecurity of an underdeveloped Africa.

We were also able to trace the imperialist origins of the Liberian

civil war (our case study) to its establishment under United States tutelage in 1847 as a settlement for ex-slaves. This was supplemented by the widespread belief that if Liberia had conducted a free and fair election in 1985, if Liberia had respected human rights as every one is now expected to do, it is possible that the Liberian crisis could have been avoided in 1989.[2]

The study has also been able to demonstrate the fact that it is futile to talk about economic integration unless the environment in which you pursue such integration is peaceful and secure; this is what this study believe was the underlying factor that motivated the standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS to take the decision it did to establish ECOMOG in August of 1990. It should be noted here that despite the expediency of the ECOMOG model in this thesis, the ECOWAS sub-region has been chosen as the case study area because many examples of conflict make the sub-region the uneasiest and, perhaps the unsafest, region in Africa today - since independence Chad has only had breathers from real war in staggered moments. In Senegal, the Dakar government is at Loggerheads with the separatist Casamance Movement. In Mali, even though the Touareg's have ceased fighting, all is not yet fine. In Mauritania, there has been the FLAM Movement which has been fighting a covert armed political cause for the blacks. The emergence of RENAM, an armed group whose members are drawn from Negro Mauritanians who feel they are being badly treated by the political authorities, adds another dimension to that conflict. While the prolonged rebel activities in Sierra Leone and Fratricidal war in Liberia has been in the central focus

of this study.

Subsequently, the study positively tested that, despite France's complex relations with both Francophone and Anglophone Africa, her undue influence on the continent, like that of any other industrialized Metropolitan state, is detrimental to efforts at Collective Security in Africa. This was manifest in the analysis of external intervention in African affairs, such as the Overt and Covert activities of foreign powers in prolonging the Liberian crisis, as well as in the analysis of the background for France's political and military influence in Africa. While testing the third proposition, it was shown that African states must be involved in the development of Pan-Africanist military and industrial complexes. This is because of the inescapable fact that African development and security includes the ability to produce means of self-defence. In this sense, the development of indigenous military industry and technology, as in operating a viable food security and overall economic 'policy', is not the same thing as the development of external sources of arms procurement. The former connotes "self-reliance" and the later "dependency". It may be significant to note that this Pan-Africanist outlook, contrary to widespread opinion which tend to trace its evolution to the independence era of the 1960s, had actually already taken roots in the 1940s with the Manchester Conference. Infact, according to Kenneth Kaunda, one of the foremost Pan-Africanists alive today, and former President of Zambia, "the term Pan-African owes its

origin to Henry Sylvester Williams, a London-based Trinidadian Lawyer who in 1897 formed an association of that name. This association of Africans and peoples of African decent from the Carribean and America held a conference in 1900 in London aiming at lobbying for the improvement of the circumstances of their people."

5.1.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

It will be inappropriate to conclude this study without revising the lessons of the Liberian case and the ECOMOG experience.
The West African intervention force, ECOMOG, is now often touted as the most unique, and in some ways the most successful, such body operating in the various areas of conflict on the African continent at this time. Paradoxically, ECOMOG's handling of some of the most debilitating and unexpected violations of the process which legitimized its mandate, by the warring factions which it is supposed to police, has created the standard by which its success is measured.[3]

The uniqueness of ECOMOG is predicated on the terms and nature of its genesis. It was established as the instrument of a policy which arose from the first genuinely collective political initiative of a sub-regional economic organisation in Africa. In contrast, the Tanzanian effort in conjunction with local resistance forces which was instrumental in ousting the Amin regime in Uganda in 1979, appeared to be a much more risky venture. In retrospect,

however, the ECOMOG initiative might have gained greater success and less casualties if it had treated its mandate with similar decisiveness.

ECOMOG, right from the start, had treated its mandate as one in which it was of paramount importance that the warring factions within the subject nation be given every opportunity to decide to halt hostilities voluntarily. In other words, right from the outset it was vitualised that the parties to the conflict would regard the intervention force as a partner in the process of restoring peace to Liberia. This perception persisted despite evidence that the humanitarian justification for ECOMOG's deployment and protocols of the Geneva Conventions were being violated. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were crafted for those times of conflicts when normal human rights conventions may not apply, and were designed to take care of people in any conceivable situation under those conditions. Article 3 is specific on the obligations of the civilian populations, and cover the protection of civilians in times of war.[4] In the end this turned out to be a scenario that was too optimistic in the context of the political bitterness and communal distrust which had become extant in Liberia.

The lessons which can be gleaned by students of the nuances of conflict management and collective security who put some effort into reviewing the ECOMOG experience are multi-faceted. One of the

key assumptions, that of the will of the warring groups to desist from conflict once a neutral force was present to guarantee protective security within the country, has proven to be both doubtful and costly. This assumption on the part of the political controllers of ECOMOG led directly to a building up of strength on the part of the main faction, the NPFL, whose main motivation and objective proved to be the seizure of power rather than the halting of the rape of democratic principles which it accused the Doe regime of, and which it constantly mooted as its reason for invading the nation in the first place. The decisiveness with which the peace keeping force entered on its first advent into peace enforcement under the command of Maj-Gen Joshua Dogonyaro in 1990, after the policy of accommodation and persuasion had led to the humiliating capture and murder of Doe while on a visit to the ECOMOG Headquarters provided, in itself, an abject lesson for the force and supporters of Collective Security efforts in Africa. This becomes even more significant when considered parallel to the fate of Patrice Lumumba who was abducted and murdered during the Congo (now Zaire) UN peace-keeping operations.

Subsequently, events have shown that for the process of peace to move forward with the cooperation of the most intransigent element in an imbroglio it is necessary to exorcise external influence and have the wherewithal to apply superior force as well as the will and commitment to use it. Whenever this principle has been applied by ECOMOG during the last four years, there has been noticeable

momentum gained in the move toward a negotiated reduction of hostilities among the Liberian factions. This has always come about when Charles Taylor, the NPFL leader, has shown signs that the dangers of collapse on the part of his military machinery has threatened his hold on the political process in the areas held hostage by his fighters. The lesson that this strategic reality appears to have consolidated, is that it is important for peace keepers to identify the most intransigent and hostile group within any conflict situation in which they are mediating and give no quarter in their defence of the principles being rejected and violated by that group.

Unfortunately, the above lesson seems to have been ignored by ECOMOG itself at crucial points in the execution of its mandate. The escalation of attempts to appease Taylor's rejection of the ECOMOG mandate during 1991-92 led to an escalation of the build-up of his groups's arsenal, as well as unprovoked attacks on the peace keeping force in increasing levels of seriousness. Some observers also attribute the export of the Liberian insurgency into Sierra Leone in 1991 to the breathing space given to Taylor during that period. However the most disastrous consequence of this period of appeasement has been the brutalisation of the majority of Liberia's rural populace not only by the NPFL tactic of arbitrary military oppression but also through the development of an unstructured resistance movement (ULIMO) which resorted to some tactics and strategies which were similar to those used by the NPFL in holding

on to territory seized from Taylor's men. Precisely because ECOMOG had not established a rationale for moving swiftly to hold on to such territory by agreeing to cooperate with the resistance movement in the initial stages of its success, this movement also developed an autonomous rationale that existed outside of the ambit of the peace keeping mandate. Subsequent developments have shown the wisdom of neutrality. ECOMOG's experience tends to suggest that such a course would have drastically shortened the length of the terms of its mandate and brought about a negotiated settlement without the escalation of outright conflict which developed in October 1992.

However, one of the consequences of the NPFL attack on Monrovia and environs in October 1992, has been to test the ECOMOG model to its limits. The result of this challenge has unveiled a plethora of military as well as political consequences which have pushed ECOMOG's role as a model for future peace keeping formulae in Africa to the forefront. It is clear that Nigeria's dominant position both economically and in terms of simple logistical self-sufficiency (relatively speaking) in the sub-region had been a key-factor in enabling the ECOMOG model to succeed. However, of even more importance to the survival and relevance of the model as a sub-regional endeavour has been the support available within the sub-region from countries such as Ghana and Guinea whose sacrifice of men and material has, in relative terms, been even more difficult to sustain than has been Nigeria's enormous

contributions. The expansion of the ECOMOG participatory profile with the inclusion of Senegal in late 1991 enhanced the sub-regional unity which was needed to sustain the relevance of the plan. However, when Senegal, for reasons of domestic priority, found it necessary to withdraw, the fact that this did not set off a chain reaction among the "lesser" partners (Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana, Guinea and Gambia) increased the relevance of the peace keeping force, instead of reducing it. It is now clear that integrated sub-regional planning and command in the pursuit of the peace keeping mandate has been as important in validating its relevance and success as the existence of a main partner willing to expend its wealth in pursuit of a principle.

Similarly, the intervention of Metropolitan state interests such as from France and the United States, and the activities of certain 'donor' agencies and the collaboration of multinational corporations like the Firestone Company has proved that Africa's present and projected Collective Security problems are beyond any foreseeable solution unless measures are employed to promote 'home grown' policies within Africa itself, that could alter the crisis of regional conflict management in as dramatic a fashion as the situation warrants. After all, the West has a lot to answer for what has gone wrong in Africa in the last 30 years in particular. They have promoted wars in many parts of the continent, subverted popular governments and undermined genuine Liberation Movements anytime they showed any inclination to think independently of

Washington, Paris and London. For instance, the United States, France and Belgium have supported President Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, a vast potentially rich country, to devastate the state by his corrupt and authoritarian rule. Britain tolerates despotism in Malawi, and hash treatment of the opposition in Kenya - both leading recipients of UK aid. Nowhere was this process as pronounced as in Southern Africa where a policy of "Constructive engagement" which could only help the apartheid regime in South Africa was actively pursued throughout the 1980s. The result of this policy in Southern Africa, especially in the Frontline states and South Africa itself, is a history of destruction, destabilisation and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.[5]

The October 1992 attack showed up a key deficiency in forward planning in ECOMOG which arose from the development of the tactic of appeasement during the period of 1991-92. Taylor's determined thrust rolled back the light defence and uncertain form of deployment which remained on the ground even after it had become clear in mid - 1992 that the NPFL was engaged in serious preparation for war. The fact that the command was being changed just as this attack was mounted could have been a disaster for the morale and structure of the defence strategy mounted by ECOMOG, but this proved not to be the case. Instead, Major General Olurin's takeover of the command from Major General Bakut proved to be a blessing in disguise. Through no fault of his own General Bakut's person had become the target and focus of the worst expressions of

rejection of the peace initiative by Taylor. General Olurin came to the post without any political baggage emanating from previous connections with the initiative. In addition as a member of Nigeria's Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), he had an expedient assess to the leadership in Nigeria, so that he was able to impress upon the Babangida administration the urgency of the peace keeping force's need with remarkable dispatch. This facilitated the speedy build-up of reinforcements over the most crucial fortnight between October 15 and the end of the month, enabling ECOMOG to hold off the NPFL onslaught and eventually to repel the invasion decisively.

ECOMOG's ability to replenish its resources against great odds has proven to be its greatest achievement. There are many lessons both of positive as well as a negative nature which will emerge from this endeavour, and there is no doubt that the entire operation is being closely observed and studied by military and political experts all over the world. Moreover, now that ECOWAS has done it for a sub-region, it is up to the OAU to repeat it on a continent-wide scale. This is why this thesis in its concluding analysis wishes to contend that the African conception of security should now differ from the ways in which national security are being defined by governments of each of the 55 sovereign states in the continent. Due largely to the legacies of colonialism and neo-colonialism and the consequent African underdevelopment and dependency, the concept that national security must incorporate

manifest in certain developments and perceptions: We all know why Germany is now going through an economic trough: having to bankroll the modernisation of eastern Germany, a former Soviet Satellite. But, oh no, the Germans blame African immigrants. We all know why the Soviet Union collapsed: the utterly wretched failure of Communism to deliver the goods. But, oh no, Africa was to blame, Russian Leaders of thought now say. They contend that the Soviet Union spent too much time and money on a continent still in a "primitive" state. The French right wing parties gained power at the last elections which brought in Prime Minister Balladur, by making vituperative statements about black people living in France. Africa has become the Western World's whipping boy: blame it for the ills of mankind. Even Canada and the USA have contemplated stricter immigration and residency regulations targeted at Africa. After all, the dominant view of Africa during the last decade has been that of a continent beset by drought, famine and political upheaval.

This negative view of Africa notwithstanding, it is the contention of this thesis that the proposed African approach to Collective Security must be encouraged by the international community for global peace to prevail because, though United Nation's intervention is normally undertaken under its charter chapter 6, the first case of UN intervention was the Korean war in 1950, five years after the World body was established with the signing of its charter at the San Francisco conference of October 24, 1945. And

despite the fact that the Gulf war of January 1991 was a rare case, UN Security Council resolution 678 of 1990 authorising Collective Security was the second in the history of the UN, coming 40 years apart. The significance of this discrepancy is underpinned by the frequency of crisis situations threatening world security in different parts of the globe. Somalia whose UN operation (UNOSOM) began in March 1993, after the Americans had initiated "operation restore hope" December 9, 1992, is another case in point. (In this analysis, distinction must be made of the divergence between collective security efforts as a means of ensuring regional and global stability on the one hand, and the classical concept of peace keeping with the precondition of a ceasefire and at the invitation of warring parties).

This submission that the international community should encourage Africa to stabilize world peace from the regional perspective, in the light of the UN's inadequacy to manage every crisis situation around the globe, becomes even more significant when considered against the background that the changes in global politics, the demise of superpower competition and the events in Eastern Europe have already produced discernable shifts in international focus away from African problems and conflict situations. While for instance, the World Powers struggled to remove the Iraqi aggression from Kuwait and while a European and United Nations Mediation force were hurriedly being emplaced to deal with the conflict situation in the former Yugoslavia, African conflicts such as those in

Liberia, Somalia and Sudan were for long neglected, despite their disastrous consequences. Yet the African population which according to the African Development Bank (ADB) tripled between 1950 and 1990 to attain 648 million (over 12 per cent of world population), is expected to reach 1.58 billion people by 2025.[6] Moveover, half of this population is under the highly productive age of 30, while despite its huge reserves of natural resources, the continents landmass alone is larger than that of the United States, Western Europe and China put together.[7]

Despite the preceding submission, it must not be forgotten that a major debate on this thesis, principally set out to answer the query of whether Africans can collectively manage to resolve their conflicts by themselves or whether, foreign intervention was a more appropriate route. Having seen the nature of underdevelopment and dependency in the African region and the significance of external interests in undermining the sovereign status of African states and subsequently their collective security efforts, this thesis contends that, although external assistance mainly from the UN and other multilateral organisations such as the EEC; the Commonwealth; Francophone summit; and the Arab League are required, especially in the areas of Logistics and Finance, the notion that the resolution of African conflicts should first and foremost be the preserve of Africa's collective action must be unchallenged. It should be noted too, that this thesis is not trying to establish a conditional linkage between the two points raised above. They are

fundamentally different and each is a distinct imperative. But they can be mutually inclusive. So Africa can not wait for Metropolitan aid largesse before they begin to aggressively address the issues of their development and security. It only means that though the most viable option for African Security in today's dispensation is self-reliance, this however, should not be confused with self-sufficiency as no nation could achieve this in an interdependent world.

Naturally, there is a historical explanation to Africa's security and development problems. Some of these have been extensively demonstrated during the study, to the extent that today, we all, too often, are quick to point at legacies of colonialism and at the inbuilt mechanism in the international economic system, which imposes on us, dependence on the traditional patterns of trade and ensure perpetuation of the vicious cycle of our poverty. True as this may be, but is it not also true that we have not been resolute in pursuing the very kind of policies of unity through integration which would have enabled us to emerge out of this cycle of dependence and insecurity? Is it also not true that we have willingly allowed ourselves to be trial grounds of experimental models of development formulated by people, some perhaps well meaning, but without the least knowledge of the real conditions in our countries and by some deliberately misleading us? Is it not true that we have been more enthusiastic about charity than we have been about the challenges of genuine self-reliance? We must put

into place policies which ensures the complimentarity of our economic and defence structures in order to achieve both the economic and politico-military aspirations of our collective security.

No matter what Africans may today think about the various emergent schemes of her marginalisation such as the international politics of a post cold war new world order, or about the scheme of the imperialist group of seven most industrialized countries, otherwise known as the G7, consisting of Canada, Britain, the USA, Germany, France, Japan and Italy, or about the 12 nation European economic and monetary union and its impact on Africa, the primary objective of such schemes as the single Europe Act of 1992, consolidated at Maastricht in the Netherlands in 1991, is to develop Europe through integration. Its impact on the World is certainly secondary. It is therefore the firm conviction of this thesis that Africa's concern for her security and development ought to transcend mathematical calculations of gains and losses from European integration which is perhaps irreversible, and the eventuality of other disadvantageous schemes of the new world order which at the moment are outside our control. It seems we often fail to appreciate the fact that it was Europeans who developed Europe, and it is the Asians who are now developing Asia. These depended on deliberately planned and created factor inputs of domestic origin to do so. It is unlikely that Africa would be an exception to this rule. This is why Africa's concern should be on Africa, on its

any of the Five permanent members - USA, USSR(now Russia), UK, China and France - can veto the resolution if it cast's a negative vote. Thus agreements on international security are usually reached over the heads of African leaders. Therefore, African countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa are being mentioned as likely candidates for one of the permanent seats in the envisaged expanded security council. But will this happen? Already the United States, the dominant power in the United Nations, has suggested that Japan and Germany should become permanent members of the Council, but without Veto power, and including certain regional powers on a rotational basis.

The US decision came after a sixteen month study on the future role of the UN that included extensive public hearings throughout the US. The recommendations have been forwarded to the UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian who was reported to have "Welcomed the thought-provoking analysis and looks forward to reviewing it."[8] Has Africa considered undertaking such an exercise? If the answer is in the negative and nothing is done to present Africa's position, the continent's leaders would not be justified in complaining that Africa has been marginalised once again.

The emergent new world order also, seems paradoxically to be bringing in its wake new dimensions of insecurity, revealing new patterns of conflicts on the one hand. On the other hand, the gap

between rich and poor is getting wider. In Africa, economic and social conditions have become increasingly intolerable, despite the various economic prescriptions by the World Bank and the IMF. In fact, if this new world order is supposed to mean the triumph of liberalisation and free markets, the rule of international law and an era of peace and security, then the performance has been found wanting against the ideal because, such gross inequalities in the political and economic world system, as manifest between the metropolitan 'North' and satellite 'South' are obviously incompatible with genuine peace, security and political stability within nations, especially in Africa.

Subsequently, this study wishes to recommend that Africa's belief in collective action as a way of promoting international peace and security in the new world order, should be rooted in the following vision of the future:

5.1.1 Recommendations

One of the most remarkable phenomena on the international scene in recent years has been, without a doubt, the speed with which nations are uniting to form supranational blocs. Countries around the world are now eagerly attempting to overcome vast geographic distances, entrenched cultural barriers and blunders of the past in order to harness the political and economic advantages of common organisations. Europe officially formed a "federation" in 1992.

Barring any last minute objections, the US, Mexico and Canada were expected to forge a similar union in 1993.

In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created to help facilitate similar international cooperation. Its charter, ratified by over 30 countries in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 25, 1963, sought to "promote unity and solidarity of African states" through "political, economic and scientific cooperation". But despite this background, so far, African states have not made any significant attempt at restructuring their relations with the external world. Neither the OAU nor any of its sub-regional groupings have any provisions yet in their treaties which aim at this objective. Indeed, if collective efforts are to succeed in Africa, there must be concerted efforts both at the national and the regional levels towards de-emphasising the rather disadvantageous relations with the former colonial masters and the rest of the Metropolitan World. Ways must be found on how to look more inward in the development of indigenous technology. The five sub-regional groupings on the continent must also be willing to take a joint stance on how to enhance intra-regional trade. In doing this, the OAU should see it as a matter of urgency in trying to provide facilities and infrastructures such as communications network; telephone, telegraphs, roads, rails, air transport, etc. Although some of these programmes have already been embarked upon, the pace at which they are pursued do not portray the urgency created by their absence.

foundation for security and development, by implementing agreed decisions and committing a minimum critical amount of resources to implement them.

With the collapse of many African economies and the apparent marginalisation of the region, it has also become necessary to redefine the essence of security. The traditional definition of security in largely militaristic and state-centric terms need to give way to a definition that is people-centric and is predicated on the welfare and survival of the people and the social system.

The prospects for internal economic and security development have dramatically improved now that South Africa is well on its way to forming the country's first, and the continent's last, majority rule government. South Africa's eventual participation in the OAU, if properly organised, could empower the organisation's economic agenda. South Africa has financial, technical and capital assets that could greatly accelerate the pace of endogenous development and security. There is also tremendous potential for technical and capital transfer to other African States. South Africa's highly developed manufacturing sector produces such exportable goods as food products, transportation equipment, machinery and textiles. But economic and security benefits will not occur unless the OAU takes deliberate steps to exploit the opportunities that will inevitably arise from South Africa's membership. This means establishing institutions and formulating policies that will

harmonize South Africa's interests with the rest of the continent. Creating an export-import bank is one way to achieve this goal. The second imperative is for the OAU to adopt a fixed system of exchange whereby a uniform currency, backed by gold, silver, platinum and other precious metals found abundantly in Southern Africa, is used to facilitate inter-African trade.

Other than the advantages that should derive from economies of scale, in productive capacity and division of labour, the over 600 million people in the region is a huge potential market if it was not fragmented as is the case at present. There is therefore the need for Africa to have a common investment code, rules and regulations that would make it a viable region for investments. A fixed exchange system would impose monetary discipline and institutional coordination on, and among, African Central Banks by the mere fact that proper maintenance of such system mandates monetary prudence and systematic cooperation. The export-import bank's major function would be to finance inter-African trade, which includes not only the exchange of goods but technical services as well. Such a continental lending system would help spread Southern Africa's technology and capital resources throughout the continent while protecting African economies against currency debasement and inflation.

Through the bank's activities, the OAU would become involved in the promotion and supervision of development project. The export-

import bank would not only promote inter-African trade, it would also encourage Africa's 51-plus central banks to eventually adopt a uniform currency, since great economic advantages would be realised by holding hard currency. A continental currency, fixed to rare minerals, would create equitable exchange rates against other prominent international currencies and alleviate Africa's subordinate position with regards to extra continental trade and security. As trade among African states advances, the bank's operation would come to resemble the routine activities of a continental central bank.

However, for the benefits of such adjustments and 'regional' policies to show, the threat to African Security and development, imposed by corrupt African politicians, civil servants, and businessmen, working in concert with the multinational companies to defraud the people of Africa and stash the loot in Western banks, must be eradicated through the conclusion of regional agreements, anti-corruption leagues and codes of conducts governing the activities of these multinationals. Africa must strive to advance a system that could halt the transfer of vital material and capital resources from the poor to rich nations.

The Anglophone - Francophone divide is one problem that needs to be given serious attention. As far as this problem prevails, it remains a permanent threat to any collective security efforts in the African region. While it seems that this problem is beginning

to subside, at least as demonstrated by the West African example of managing to constitute and launch ECOMOG, the potential for being evoked at short notice is still very imminent. This thesis suggest that it is high-time all African states saw themselves more as brothers in the common struggle to better their collective security; than as belonging to alien language camps that were forcefully imposed on them.

Management of collective security problems is easier with sub-regional organisations like the ECOWAS, under a regional umbrella like the OAU. This is because of their narrower agenda, smaller size and geographic proximity or coherence which lend them a sharp operational focus. Despite the constraints of political relationship among group members and the fragile nature of political institutions, economic and social structures due to foreign dependence and underdevelopment, experience has shown that external intervention and immediate and direct resort to the UN are somewhat at a disadvantage for lasting international peace and security operations, partly because of the ambitious nature of their charters and partly because their size and diversity creates an environment that is hostile to collective decision-making in sensitive areas. This explains the intransigence of General Aideed's faction (which led to the death of many UN soldiers including 23 Pakistani on June 5 and 7 Nigerians on September 5, 1993) and the insubordination of the Italian contingent to the UN command in the UN operations in Somalia. Therefore, there is a

responsibility for the international community to encourage with all sincerity, concrete inter linkage between sub-regional efforts at collective security and their regional commands on the one hand, and the regional commands with the UN on the other.

The Liberian situation created a receptive audience for consideration of regional initiative to mediate and moderate the crisis for two main reasons: First the allegation that the different factions engaged in the violent tussle for power in Liberia were sustained by certain external interests through their West African comprado - Bourgeoisies, threatened the posture of political solidarity which the "ECOWAS Family" was seeking to contrive as the agent of economic integration. Moreover, if the ECOWAS concept is to be taken seriously, a show of concern was necessary. Secondly, there was a serious danger that if the conflict was allowed to assume greater momentum, it might be assimilated into the ECOWAS States and subsequently, the entire region. ECOWAS has thus led the way in the development of the use of humanitarian action. There is a growing acceptance that international multilateral enforcement action, designed to protect the civilian population and facilitate the implementation of the humanitarian assistance is becoming a new tool of conflict management. The ECOMOG operation has opened a new chapter in the nature of peace keeping such that in Yugoslavia and Somalia, there are indications of greater readiness to adopt this approach.

This is why on the pan-Africanist front, the immediate problem of the OAU right now should be how to come to terms with the issue of fundamentalism, with regards to article 3(II) of the OAU charter, which calls on member states to "adhere to sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; and respect for the sovereign and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence".[9] Observers say the OAU has remained impotent as much for the policy of non-interference as for lack of a standing force. They cite the case of how the United States deployed troops to Somalia in December 1992, while the OAU stood helplessly by. Fortunately however, the 30th summit of the organisation's leaders which took place in Cairo, Egypt between 28-30th June, 1993 made plans to institute a mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution. This is a welcome beginning that needs to be aggressively pursued.

Such an additional mandate will inevitably however, require greater sacrifice by OAU member states in terms of financial commitment, despite their difficult economic terrain. Therefore, regular payment of subscription by member states of the OAU must be afforded the desired attention in this context. With arrears of at least $62 million blighting the OAU, collective security and peace will not succeed in Africa if on one hand, African countries give well over $10 billion a year in debt service and give nothing to the OAU for their subscription.[10] For instance, out of the assessed

contribution of $24.76 million for the 1993-94 fiscal year, only $3.93 million, representing 16 percent of the budget, had been received at the end of 1993. Moreover, virtually all member states owe the OAU huge amounts of money; Of the 52, the only countries up to date with their contributions are Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.[11]

The core-state issue also raises a problem for collective security. Through ECOWAS, Nigeria sought to show that a mutuality exists in the interests of the sub-regional states and that their security lay in strengthening the ability of the states to be self-reliant. The decision of ECOWAS states to draft and sign the protocol on Mutual Assistance on issues of Defence in 1981 was a consequence of this search for ways to reduce foreign influence in Africa. In the case of OAU therefore, Nigeria which still aspires to assume the undisputed stature of the core-state, should by virtue of this aspiration give effective leadership. Actions and developments which are contrary to the spirit of ideals such as democracy, regional integration and pan-Africanism should be discouraged. It is in this vein that the errors leading to the political impasse resulting from the 'unjust' annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria, and the Buhari regime's 1984 massive expulsion of African brothers and subsequent closure of land borders to neighbouring states, should be considered.

Nigeria also needs to do a thorough homework by convincing its citizens that the ECOWAS and OAU has a lot of gains for the country. Failure to do this would mean that the citizens will continue to question the rationale for the country's involvement in projects like the ECOMOG. This is particularly pertinent when we consider the enormous resources the government puts into ventures like the ECOMOG.

The argument for self-reliance as an option for the development of African skills/technology and ultimately for the improvement of collective security schemes in the region may also be re-enforced by an examination of the tale of mass exodus of African professionals to Europe and North America. At the last count by the UN[12], an estimated 100,000 trained African professionals are working in the West; this is nearly one-third of Africa's skilled work-force. To compound the issue, the UN Development programme (UNDP)[13] points out, more than removing skilled people, this emigration also reduces Africa's capability to train a new generation of professionals". Ironically, this task has been handed over to about 100,000 foreign experts working in sub-saharan Africa and costing about $4 billion annually - nearly 35 per cent of the region's official development aid.

The reasons for the move to the West are quite obvious. Frustrated by low pay and limited opportunities at home, Africa's engineer's , pilots, medical doctors, scientists, technicians, university

lecturers and other professionals are heading for richer countries where their talents can be better applied, and better rewarded. To crown it all, education systems in African countries are modelled on the requirements of the West, making it easier for the metropoles to profit from immigrant African skills. The challenge is therefore now on African leaders to evolve strategies to operationalise their self-reliant security objectives by retaining indigenous professional manpower. It is suggested that investment in people by African governments should be accelerated: in their nutrition and health, and in their welfare and education, particularly in science and technology. The major responsibility for reducing the loss of Africa's professionals, lies with the countries on the continent tailoring their education systems more closely to their security and development needs and improve the management of their economies. Since other than the economic, people generally also migrate for political reasons, if the tide is to be stemmed, African leaders will also have to provide their people with basic human rights and to provide a conducive climate for the professionals to practice their skills. If these changes do not take place, the lure of the West will be too tempting for even the most patriotic African.

Finally, Africa is today admittedly in the process of political transition. There is growing demand by the people for more participation in the process of governance and for the accountability of government. This new awareness now presents a

challenge to government - a challenge on how a response should be formulated, articulated and the peoples' wishes accommodated. And whether in the process, the debate is about multi-partism, political pluralism or political reforms, the essence of it all is to bring about democracy in Africa. This thesis need not over-emphasize the need to democratise our own society and to ensure that the people participate in the process of national governance, as well as the need to establish a society in which the observance of human rights and the provision of fundamental freedoms are seen as necessary preconditions for national and regional security. What we should not accept, however, is the notion that there can be a universal standard formula defining democracy and democratic practices. Democracy is a function of social value and as such it is heavily influenced by social, cultural and historical factors. Each society defines these values differently. Failure in this vital implementation can only perpetuate the proven evils of underdevelopment and dependency, and consequently induce parallel failure to our aspirations for an African Collective Security framework.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Paxton Idowu interview in ECOWAS special, West Africa, July 1-7, 1991, P.1087.

2. West Africa, July 19-25, 1993, P. 1247

3. West Africa, August 23-29, 1993, P. 1247
For Kaunda's blue print on pan-Africanism also see, West Africa, December 20-26, 1993, p.2290;

4. West Africa, April 5-11, 1993, P.543

5. West Africa, May 31 - June 6, 1993, P. 899

6. West Africa, October 18-24, 1993, P.1860

7. West Africa, August 2-8, 1993, P. 1342

8. West Africa, October 11-17, 1993, P.1802

9. Sunday Champion, August 16, 1992, P.10

10. West Africa, October 18-24, 1993, P.1873

11. West Africa, February 14 - 20, 1994, P.270

12. West Africa, October 18-24, 1993, P. 1863

13. West Africa, Ibid, P. 1863.

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