AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF DARFUR

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this project entitled "African Union and Conflict Resolution: A Case study of Darfur" written by Sanusi Dangi Abbas, meets the requirements for the award of Master's Degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy (MIAD) of the Department and is hereby approved for its contribution to knowledge and literature presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my loving parents, Late Alhaji Dangi Abbas of blessed memory and Hajia Binta Dangi Abbas, I love you all.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Praise be to Allah, by whose grace and mercy this study has successfully been completed. I praise Him and seek His help and forgiveness. I seek refuge with him from the evils of my soul and deeds, I thank Allah immensely for everything in life.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The increasing number of intra-state and inter-state wars in the post Cold War international environment has marked out a zone of conflict embracing former communist states of Asia, Central and Latin America and the Continent of Africa (Evans, 1994). In Africa in particular, the premium of social and political instability has risen exorbitantly. The weight of political mismanagement, economic decline, corruption and shaky political structure have combined to produce a phenomenon of "failed states and "wounded societies" which are bridled with ethnically inspired conflicts. The cases of Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire (DR Congo), Sierra Leone and Sudan are critical examples. Elsewhere, in South Africa, Namibia, Uganda and Angola the political system are young and fragile.

The Darfur is a large region in Western Sudan near the border with Chad, in the North-West Africa (Just Comment, 2004). The conflict in Darfur began in February 2003 when two rebel groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur. The

Sudan liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claimed that the Sudanese government discriminated against Muslim Africa ethnic groups in Darfur. In response, the government of Sudan dismissed the SLA and JEM as terrorist groups. However, the conflict puts the three Africa groups, that is , fur Zaghawa and Masisacheit, against nomadic Arab ethnic groups periodic tensions between the largely Africa-Muslim ethnic groups and Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced to the 1930s and recently resurfaced in the 1980s. Successive governments in Khartoum have long neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and have done very little to prevent or contain attacks by the Arab Militia against Non-Arabs in Darfur (ICE, 2004) Non-Arab groups took up arms against successive central government in Khartoum, albeit unsuccessfully.

Recent conflicts in Darfur region of Sudan have exacerbated an on going political struggle over power and resources that have seen more than two million people die since 1983. Over a million people have been displaced by violence since 2003 fleeing to refugee camps (Just Comment 2004). For the more than 21 years, the Sudanese government

and rebel groups from the South have been engaged in Africa's longest running civil war. Given the horrendous statistics, about the number of casualties, the need to face the challenges posed by the Darfur conflict becomes more urgent. In response to these challenges, THE African Union (AU) has been acclaimed for its leadership role and engagement in addressing the Darfur conflict. International consensus is emerging in favour of substantial increase of the presence of the Au Mission in Darfur including expansion of the size of its monitoring force with a clear mandate for its troops to protect civilian. Rapid expansion of the AU mission requires a corresponding increase in its peacekeeping capacity through provision of equipment: logistical, financial, materials and other resources (Centre for International Political Studies, 2004).

Darfur has become crucial for the Africa union's future role in peacekeeping. The task of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building have assumed prominent positions on the continental agenda.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study is an assessment of the Role of African Union in Conflict resolution using Darfur as a case study.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main research questions in this work are:

i. What are the causes of the Darfur Conflict?

ii. Does AU have the capability or capacity to manage the conflict in Darfur?

iii. If AU does not have the capacity, what measures could be taken to resolve the conflict?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study is set to achieve the following objectives:

i. To find out the causes of the Darfur Conflict.

ii. To examine the capacity of the African Union in managing the Darfur Conflict.

iii. To find out other possible measures that could be taken to solve the conflict.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION

The significance of this research work is to create an understanding to the nature of the role of AU in Darfur crisis which has claimed 300,000 lives and made over 2.2 million people homeless.

The survival and effectiveness of the AU to a lager extent depends on its financial resources and logistics which would inject new ideas and initiatives for effective peacekeeping performance. In this way it is hoped that the study will add to the present body of knowledge of policy options to the African Union initiatives.

In addition, the recommendation in this study will contribute in the debate on how the African Union should reposition its peacekeeping mission for positive improvement in conflict management in Africa.

1.5. PROPOSITION

The main propositions in this work are:

i. The main causes of the Darfur Conflict are resources and ethno-religious issues.

ii. The African Union is ineffective in resolving the Darfur Conflict.

iii. Dialogue is the main solution to the Darfur Conflict.

1.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The study covers a period of five years (2003-2008). In the course of undertaking this research, the researcher encountered problems which

include financial difficulties, limited time and the availability of current literature on the subject.

1.7. LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.3.1 Concept of Conflict

Mall, Ramsbothan and Woodhouse (1999) observe that conflicts are intrinsic and meritable aspect of social change. Its is an expression of the heterogeneity of interest, values and beliefs that arise as new information generated by social change comes up against inherited constraint. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choice.

In illuminating the concept future, (Stagner 1967) opines that conflict is a situation in which two or more human beings desires goals which they perceived as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both... each party is mobilizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation and each party perceives the other, as a barrier or threat to that goal.

Ethnic groups according to (Sanda, 1976) may be described as groups consisting of interested members who define themselves as

belonging to a named or labelled social group with whose interest they identity and which manifest certain aspect of a unique, constituting a part of a wider society (Sanda, 1976).

Culture gives meaning and direction to individuals who belong to it, and it is the core of ethnic identity when an ethnic group adopts a political program that calls for the creation of separate state to coincide with these cultural boundaries, it becomes a national goal. According to Gellner the key to nationalism is the idea of one nation, one state. The proliferation of ethnic conflict has occurred in at least three types of situation. In the democratic west an ethnic revival has led to increased assertiveness among minority ethnic group (Basques, Bretons, Scots and French-Canadians) in the Third World, decolonization has left many states with Congo, Nigeria Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Lebanon and a host of other countries. In Eastern Europe and the USSR political liberation has raised fears that serious ethnic conflicts will increase in this part of the world (Gellner, 1983).

Kupolati observed that in the post colonial period, African states were confronted by a myriad of conflict which invariably has constituted

security concerns and problems (Kupolati 1995:224). Such conflicts are civil wars provoked by a number of factors including ethnicism and national irredentism that derived from social injustice, abusive inequalities, political repression and intolerance.

Mazrui (1996:9) has observed that Africa's problems are not only political, but are also economic, cultural and increasingly demographic. He deduced that Africa's population structure has come economic and political implications. He asserted that the youthfulness of the African population is not being absorbed by its economy. The productive sector of the African population is softening not producing anything of value and there is high unemployment and/or underemployment even in this sector. On the political level Mazrui argued that in such condition, this age group present a potent amenable to nationalist, anti-imperialist rhetoric as a panacea for their problems.

Mazrui concluded that much of the political unrest on the African continent can be attributed and alienated young people. They are easily drawn to parties and groups that promise total and revolutionary change. In the recent past they have been in the forefront of

prodemocracy movement in many of the African countries (Mazrui 1996:9).

Kupolati argues that during the nationalist struggle and in the post colonial African, many leaders promoted and enforced the one party state as a vehicle for national unity and mobilization for development. The imposition of a monolithic political structure on a heterogeneous society had negative consequence. For instance, it has been noted that the apologists of the one party hold that it enhances national unity while democratic pluralism depends tribal or ethnic rivalries. However, in many instances, one party state have relied on supremacy of one ethnic group which in turn has worsened ethnic conflict (Kuploat, 1995:225).

In the view of Asiwaji, in the process of carrying out the various areas of influence, the colonial power partitioned several single ethnic groups between different political regimes. The consequence of this was to draw a boundary across an ethnic group with common ancestry, strong knship ties, shred socio-political language (Asiwaji, 1984).

It is difficult to disagree with writers like Galtung, who have pointed out that in many ethnic conflicts the state is not a neutral

arbitrator (a third-party), but is part of the conflict (a second party). We have only to look at the activities of the security forces of some states in responding to ethnic unrest to witness this type of partial involvement (Galtung, 1981). Amnesty International (1984,1987) for example, condemned both Srilanka and Turkey for the way in which they have treated their Tamil and Kurdish minorities.

Furthermore, other states are often unable or unwilling to pay a constructive role, according to Rayan, they may be disinterested in a particular ethnic conflict; they intervene to exploit it for their own end (e.g. the exploitation by the USA and Iran of Iraq's problem with its Kurdish minority, or the exploitation by the USSR and Afghanistan of ethnic problems in Pakistan); or intervention by one state will trigger a competitive intervention by another (Greece and Turkey in Cyprus, Israel and Syria in Lebanon, Cuba and South Africa in Angolaq etc.) (Ryan, 1988).

During the struggle for independence, most of nationalist movements that emerged had ethnic support basis and ideologies. After

independence they resorted to ethnicism meditated on fierce completion for political officers for instance Nnoli observed that:

> **The struggle for power became equally interpreted in Ethnic terms. It became a struggle for the hegemony of various communal factions of the petty-Bourgeoisies, first in the regional enclave, and then in the country as a whole and the masses were fully mobilized in this ethno-political struggle. As political parties inevitably became ethnic in character, they champions of the interest of the various ethnic groups, and that the struggle among them for political power in the country represented the struggles of the various ethnic groups for political ascendancy in the society. They emotive and sometimes overtly and openly preyed on illegal ethnic conflict of interest as a means of mobilizing of their leaders (Nnoli, 1983).**

Nevertheless, ethnic conflicts are not only based on political motive but include economic interest and the struggle for resources. Therefore, the big powers can also play either a positive or a negative role in such conflict. The Liberian case provides an example evidence of negative role of the involvement of foreign interest in the conflict. For instance Twaddell noted that the steady supply of arms depends on the steady of money. The primary source of funds appears to be from the sales commodities from Liberian's trove of natural resources, principally diamonds, timbers, gold, and rubber. Trade records indicate that most

Liberian diamond probably find their way to Belgium. Buyers in France and Malayisa are primary customers of Liberian timber (Twaddell 1996). Goose and smth of their own observed that the Rwanda experience has shown a good example of what can happen when small arms and light weapons are sold to a country plaqued by ethnic, religious and nationalist strife. They believe that such weapons are responsible for most of the killing of civilians and combatants. Light convectional arms sustain and expand conflict in a world increasingly characterized by nationalist tension and border wares in trying to enquire as to who is responsible they reported that;

> **The biggest regular suppliers of weapons to the covert arms trade are not freelancing private dealers, but government themselves. The main in cash (Goose and Smyth, 1994).**

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis of the African Union Role in the Darfur conflict would be based on mediation theory because it explain explicitly the concept of third-party intervention in the management of conflict. Mediation theory as propounded by various scholars such as Hoffman M, john Burton, W. Hills, were able to employ mediation as the active participation in the

negotiation process of the third-party intervention in the resolution of both inter and intra state conflict.

The theory of mediation evolved largely within the context of the Cold War. Predominantly, Western and rationalistic in its discourse and focused on the interplay of state and state actors in relation to the superpower competition, it places emphasis also on the mediation of internal conflicts although much of the theorizing and many of the methods and techniques explored have applicability to internal conflicts which have assumed such saliency with end of Cold War.

The theoretical assumption generally presupposes a domain of "rationality" where all parties, more or less, share certain central values based on rational argument. It is assumed that the problem is to get the parties to the table and that through negotiation it will be possible to find a 'win-win' solution develops institutions and mechanism to mange conflict; hence international forces have been developed by both global and regional organization to create better zones in the theatre of war. The theory assumes that once a conflict broke out, the third party intervention becomes imperative of negotiation emerged and a complex

network of arbitration and dispute resolution become increasing professionalized.

Hoffman has posted that in recent years, third-party mediation of conflict have taken on the increased prominence, for a variety of reasons both positive and negative. Third-party approaches can be divided into two major streams based on the outcome sought partial settlement of specific issues or integrative and transformation of a conflict. Possible actors in both instances include private individuals, non-governmental organisations, scholar-practitioners, diplomats, regional organisations and inter-national organisations.

Possible actions can include arbitration, bargaining and negotiation, leveraged mediation and/or facilitative problem solving workshops. For all the actions involved in conflict management to be effective in the mediation of conflict, there must be a cease-fire between the warring parties and this can only be realized when there is peacekeeping force on ground to separate the conflicts. It is clear now that peacekeeping forces are created by states in order to get to the negotiation table and settle their differences through the possible

actions as indicated above. The mediation theory will enable us to measure the effectiveness of the AU peacekeeping mission to get the parties to end aggression against each other and settle down to dialogue.

In addition, Hoffman (1992) has pointed out ... the modalities of third parties (Peacekeeping) initiatives need to be open to change at any given point in the process, which leads to modification both in the approaches and techniques accepted as well as in the nature and contents of the cease-fire agreement which are reached.

The third-party intervention within the tenet of this theory and its applicability to the study implies that for the peacekeeper to be able to separate conflict parties for dialogue or negotiation or perform its role especially, effective training, harmonized operating procedure, commonality of weapon system and an effective doctrine and command systems. This is to ensure critical observation of the ceasefire agreement and as Hoffman rightly said: what can be seen from the collapse of ceasefire, peace accords and other arrangements where the underlying

causes of conflict have not been addressed is fragility and transient nature of legalistic formular, even when imposed through coercion.

The mediation theory has been criticized by radical scholars as being unnecessary genetic and nationalistic. Realist theorists of international politics, for instance do not agree with the major postulates of the mediation theory. In effect, realist thinkers argue that the possibility of "finding a common ground" by way bargaining and negotiation as posited by the mediation theorist is at best utopian. They contend that situations of conflict are largely befit of rationality, which may make for diplomatic or peaceful resolution of conflict (Okeke, 2003).

Despite the above criticisms notwithstanding, mediation theory provides one valuable insights into the character and dynamics of contemporary practices of conflict management, which emphasize diplomacy mediation, arbitration and peaceful settlement. It equally underscores the and vitality of third-party involvement (mediation) in conflict situations among or within states of the world.

It is in the light of this the theory of mediation is considered most appropriate as the basis of analysis in this study.

Because the AU and mediators of Darfur Sudan peace talks, peacekeeping, and cease-fire between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels, the conflict mediation theory also explains how negotiation are conducted by the AU mediation terms as 3rd party participation which will present a fair comprehensive and workable solution to the conflict in Darfur Sudan.

1.9 METHODOLOGY

Secondary sources of data form the basis of this study. The relevant information is sourced from the Textbooks, Journals, Archives, Periodicals, magazines, Newspapers and News on TV, radio and the Internet.

10. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

The works is organised in five Chapters, Chapter one deals with the followings: Introduction, Statement of the Problem, Research Questions, Objectives of the Study, Significance and Justification, Scope and Limitations, Literature Review and Theoretical Framework, Theoretical Framework, Methodology and finally, Organisation of the work.

While chapter two is the Literature Review and Theoretical Framework Work, while chapter three deals with the role of the African Union in the Sudan Darfur crisis, and chapter four deals with An Assessment of the AU in Darfur Conflict and finally chapter five deals with the summary, conclusion, and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter traces the historical development of the Darfur Sudan Conflict. It looks at the impact as well as the intentional involvement in the Darfur Sudan conflict.

2.1 THE ROLE AND GEOGRAPHY OF DARFUR

The Darfur Sudan region consists of three states, lying the extreme west of Sudan. It's bordered from the East by Northern States, and north Kordofan State and West Kordofan States. From the south, it is bordered by North and West Bahr Al Ghaza States. From the Northern its is bordered by the Libyan Arab Republic, from the west by Chad Republic and from the southwest by Central African Republic (Kamal, 2005).

The boundaries of Darfur Sudan region lies between longitudes 220E-270E and latitudes 100N-100N. The area of Darfur covers an area of some 493,180km^2 (196-555 miles 2) ... about three quarters the size of Texas, and slightly smaller than France.

Darfur Sudan has an estimated population of 8Million people. The people of the region are divided into two main ethnic groups: those who

are of Arab origin and the local non-Arab population. The division is consistent with and further emphasised and sharpened by the occupational and territorial structure of the region. The occupational composition in Darfur follows perfectly the ethnic lines of the sub-division, Arabs who are mainly nomadic, are either cattle or herdsmen, whereas the non-Arab indigenous people with the exception of the Zaghawa are settled traditional small-scale farmers.

The people of Darfur Sudan region can broadly by be divided into those of Arab decent and the local, non-Arab indigenous inhabitants. The name Arab means Arabic-speaking people who, through a long historical process, have mixed up or mingled with the indigenous non-Arab Sudanese. There are many tribes in Darfur Sudan and these include the Fur, Bani, Halba, Tangor, Borty, Habaiya, Zayadia, Rezeigat, Masahelt, Maalia, Malduob Bargo, Dajs, Bani Hussein, Tama, Mahvia, Mohammed, Salamat, Messeivia , Eraighat, Eratab, fallata, Ghimir, Bani Monsour, AB-Darag, Selaihab Minna, Turgom, Makareet and Africa and Arabian tribes (Kamal 2005).

The indigenous Darfurian tribes of smell-scale traditional cultivators, otherwise referred to as the Fur are the largest ethnic group in the Darfur Sudan region; they are as well the founding fathers of the Fur sultanate and the traditional rulers of the region. Among the other non-Arab ethnic groups are the Zaghawa nomads, Mesaheit, Berti, Tama, Marateet and Tunjur. These groups jointly established to protect and lobby for the interests of the indigenous Darfurians in the political scramble for power and wealth at the centre. SMC

The Arab ethnic group in Darfur region on the other hand can be grouped into the following: the Habania Beni Hussein. Zayadia, Beni Helba, djawama, Razeigat, the Maharia in addition to the Arab urban merchants and government officials mainly called of Jellaba origin. These groups also come together to from an alliance called the 'Arab congregation in the mid-1980s. The alliance was designed was basically to lobby for official and financial backing from the central government (Suleiman 2003).

Ethnic distinction in Darfur as is the case for Sudan in General, are not that clear cut. There are also some tribes intermixing with Chadians,

Central Africa republic and Librans. The Darfur region has never been known to refuse people from outside Darfur. A larger number of northern and central Sudanese, like Gaoliyeen, Shagees and people from Dangolo came to the Darfur region for the purpose to trading and they inhabited it. Therefore Darfur became am intermixture of different tribal and ethnic groups (Kamal 2005). The inhabitants of Darfur, with their different Arab and Africa roots are 100% black Sunni Muslim. They are interested in the spiritual and culture activities like learning and memorizing the Qur'an by heart and learning the Arabic language. Arabic in addition to many local dialects. Darfur is famous for different kinds of folklore, like singing, collective dancing and handicrafts. SMC.

The relation between Arab and non-Arab inhabitants have been tense during much of Darfur Sudan's history. It was a centre of slave trade when fur kingdom exported African from other parts of Sudan as slaves to the Arab world. Local Arab and non-Arab inhabitants have differing economic needs, the non-Arab peoples are primarily sedentary farmers, while the local Arabs are primarily nomadic herdsmen. This brought them into conflict over access to land and water.

2.2 CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR SUDAN

The conflict in Darfur Sudan started in February 2003 and has rapidly developed into one of the most violent military confrontation in the African continent. At the core of the current conflict is a struggle for control over resources. This conflict has brought Darfur to the forefront as one of the worst humanitarian conflict in the world today.

Causes of the conflict in Darfur Sudan are therefore examined in the light of the geographical location, historical factor and population structure, behaviour and mode of living of the people. At the core of the current conflict however is a struggle over the control of resources. Hence, those who control power control resources (Ted, 2004).

In 2000 with the ouster of the founder of the Hassan Al-turabi, and a split within the Islamic movement the government imposed a state of emergency and used its new authority to crack down on dissidents in Darfur Sudan (Ted 2004). By 2002 a little known self-defence force of a largely Fur dominated group emerged as the Sudan liberation Army (SLA) challenging government forces in Darfur Sudan. The movement started its activities in 2002 under the name of Darfur Sudan Liberation

front (DLF). It later chose the broader appeal of a national name to increase its potential reach, hence, SLA. It based mostly on the Fur and Massaheit tribes and is politically moderate. The SLA has tried to ally itself with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The Asmara based umbrella organisation which unites all Sudanese opposition groups whether north or south.

The other rebel movement struggling against the Khartoum government is the justice and equality movement (JEM). This movement, based mostly on the Zaghawa tribe, is linked with the radical popular patriotic congress party led by the veteran Islamic Hassan al-Turabi who has taken out with his former NIF disciples. However, the relationship between the SLA and J.E.M. is by far the richer of the two and the one with grater international media exposure even it its radical Islamist connections makes it an unlikely candidate for fighting a radical Islamist government (Crimes of War, 2004).

The rebel groups S.L.A/J.E.M. due to alleged neglect and marginalization in the management of not just their own affairs, but also in the affairs of the country, decided to take up arms against the central

Khartoum government in Sudan. The insurrection started slowly in February and March 2003 and went into higher gear on April 25 when the S.L.A. rebel attacked the provincial capital at Al-Fashir, killing 72 troops of the garrison destroying four aircraft on the ground and capturing the garrison commander, General Ibrahim Bushra.

The deep cultural elitism of the "Arab! And of resentment and perceived oppression and neglect on the part of the "Africans". The African rebels pointed out that in spite of being a loyal part of the Muslim North, Darfur Sudan is in fact as badly off in terms of lack of infrastructure, neglect of education and economic underdevelopment as the Christian South (Crimes of War, 2004). The SLA and JEM picked up arms against the Sudan government claiming that the national resources have been unjust distributed and that especially the Darfurians have been for too long neglected and marginalized in both the sharing of national revenue and the steering of the affairs of Darfur in particular and Sudan in general. In the opinion of some Darfurians, the Khartoum governments is biased towards certain tribes and so it should be held responsible for far lack of fairness, inequality and injustice that the

Darfurians have suffered and are still suffering. Though the multifaceted conflict in Darfur poses a complex threat to National Security the massive flow of arms into the region and their illegal possession contributed to the escalation of the conflict.

To sum it up therefore, the root-causes of the conflict, are fanned by geographical and historical factors. In addition, there is also multi-ethnic structure of the population and the conflict over resources, especially between farmers and nomads. Bitterness resulting from these conflicts bred semi permanent hostilities to culminate in a rebellion led by the two groups that transgressed the authority and legitimacy of the Sudanese state. The flow of arms into Darfur Sudan however, was cultural roots, since human communities have their cultures peculiar to them, the people of Darfur have been known for carrying of light arms (knives, swords, bows and arrows) whenever the left their homes. This reality produced what has been known as "war culture", it is a way of the people relying on their tribe for protection since the government authority would not be available in all the region border areas. Today this picture changed drastically. Illegal possession of modern firearms

and weaponry has spread and the mentality of resolving dispute through the use of force has taken on the increase (Kamal K.O. 2005).

2.3. THE IMPACT OF THE DARFUR SUDAN CONFLICT

The main impact of Darfur Sudan conflict on the Darfurians is of a humanitarian nature while the conflict wider impact is political. The conflict has realized serious concern about a major humanitarian disaster. The people of ethnically-diverse Darfur region of Sudan faced destitution, hunger and infectious diseases. In addition to 1.2 million or more displaced people living and dying in camps on both sides of Darfur's border with Chad, Hundreds of Thousands more are struggling to survive in their homes and in the vast area held by the rebel movements fighting the Khartoum government (Forced Migration, 2004).

As in the summer of 2003, the UNHCR began helping a small but growing number of Sudanese fleeing from the west of Sudan into neighbouring Chad. By the end of that year as the refugee population rose to 75,000, it warned the world for the first time of ethnic cleansing and of an invisible emergency in Sudan's Darfur region and eventually termed it the 'agency's worse humanitarian conflict (Refugees, 2004). On

the other hand, UNICEF reports that approximately 2,021,00 were affected by the conflict in Darfur by late 2004 and presently over 300,000 were displaced.

However, a huge aid effort is grinding in to gear but the distances involved mean that food relief is expensive and unlikely to be sufficient. For instance Chad and Darfur, though sitting a rich melting pot of tribes and ancient caravan routes crisscrossing Africa, are remote from today's major communication networks, difficult to reach and covering one of the world's most hostile environments of desert, Scrub Mountain and scoring heat.

The wave of attack last spring has left many more people destitute and solely dependant on international aid (www.msf.org) MSF (Medicines Sans frontiers) has declared that a famine resulting entirely from political causes was imminent (Darfur Sudan Briefing paper, 2004), poor security is prohibiting Aid teams from accessing the region and government forces have contributed to obstruct humanitarian assistance. Refugee groups Aid agencies have documented extensive violence and discriminating against women and children, Government security forces

and militia groups have been reportedly involved in discriminating against African of women and children, torture, slavery and the forced conscription of under-aged young men. Throughout Darfur hundreds of town and villages have been decimated by Sudanese government aerial bombings,. Militia offensive and sustained Janjaweed raids. SLA and JEM retaliatory attacks have added to the violence, destruction and massive displacement (www.Refugees.org).

According to MSF England, the aid workers in Darfur were "in retreat" from attacks by armed groups. He said that 500,000 people of the 3 million who needed "out of reach". The US said genocide is being committed against Darfur's black Africa population. But the Sudanese government has consistently said the scale if the problems is being exaggerated for political reasons. It also denies backing the Arab Janjawee militias accused of mass rape, killing and looting (Trust international, 2006).

On the wider impact, the country affected by the Darfur Sudan conflict is Chad. The main impact is political. President Deby is an ethnic Bidayat. The Bidayat are tribe closely related to the Zaghawa and other

Tebbu groups who live astride the Sudan-c=Chadian border. Several of these tribes are closely linked with the insurrection, while president Deby is closely allied to the Khartoum government that supported his armed takeover in December 1990. But at the same time President Deby is heavily dependant on his Zaghawa/Bidayat support group, particularly to keep control of the field din Southern Chad. This situation has considerably weakened the Chadian regime and there are fears, particularly in Paris and Kartoum, that President Deby might fall a victim of these contradictions (Crime of War, 2004).

2.4. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE

The international community's response to the armed conflict in Darfur Sudan from 1999 to 2002 has been consistently too little, too late. It has been slow and ineffective. It was not until late 2003, almost one year after the conflict erupted, that some members of the international community began to speak about gross human right abuses and a widespread humanitarian conflict in Darfur.

The UN Security Council has however, passed several resolutions raising concern about war crimes and crimes humanity committed in

Darfur by the Sudanese government, its security forces and government backed Janjaweed militia against civilians from the same ethnic group as the rebels in the (SLAM) (UN Security Council Resolution 1593,2005). Some UN officials have been forceful in their statement and have publicly expressed concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian condition in Darfur Sudan. The UN president Humanitarian Co-ordinator Mukesh kapila consistently reported to the headquarters about gross human rights abuses and violation in Darfur. He wrote that "the war in Darfur started off in small way last year but has progressively got worse, that the situation in Darfur is akin to ethnic cleansing". (S M C).

American position in Darfur conflict according to some analysts is that, the bush Administration did not consider the Darfur Sudan conflict as a priority instead; the administration was largely focused on the talks between the governments of Sudan the government of Sudan GOS and SPLA. The administrative officials were reportedly concerned that forceful statement or measure against the G.O.S. could undermine the peace process between the G.O.S. and SPLA.

In April 2004, the UN Human Right Commission expressed its view on the Darfur situation by adopting a Chairman's statement supported by the overwhelming majority of the commission members. The statement was adopted with 50 in favour, one against US and two abstentions (Australia and Ukraine). The US delegation brought unsuccessfully, a stronger resolution on Darfur Sudan. Two amendments offered by the US. Were detached Human right group and US officials criticized the Chairman's statement as being too weak on the government of Sudan. The US delegation declared at the end of the session in April 2004 that Washington would demand a special session of the commission on the situation in Darfur Sudan. The contention of the US is that any "resolution should call upon the Sudanese government to stop events". Also, following long deliberation by the Security Council, the resolution presented by US at the UN was amend to drop the threat of imposing embargo on Sudan. France, the African group, China and Pakistan stood behind that amendment. The amended resolution 1565 obliged the rebels to adhere to the requirements embodied therein (Kamal, 2005).

Nevertheless, since February2003 USAID has provided an estimated 100 million dollars humanitarian assistance to Darfur and the Bush administration pledge and additional 188 million dollars in early June 2004. USAID has also established a Deserter response Team (DART) for Darfur Sudan. The G.O.S. has however, accused USAID of being too sympathetic to the rebels (Ted D. 2004). Meanwhile the delegate from Ireland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated that the EU was concerned over the human rights situation in Darfur.

The representative of the Republic of Congo speaking for the African Group argued that the African group remained extremely concerned by the human rights situation in Sudan Darfur and the draft txt would reflect all the efforts that had been made. Amazingly the Darfur rebels the conflict. They rather preferred the involvement of EU, USA, and UN, parties they believed would be more sympathetic to their course. Indeed, AU had played a pivotal role, taking upon itself monitoring of ceasefire and sponsoring of talks (Kamal 2005).

China and Pakistan position on Darfur Sudan were objective and firm, thus pressurizing the Security Council into adopting a balanced

resolution. France's was the most moderate compared to other European States. Its relations with Sudan and Chad led her to look at the situation in its right context and avert severing relations between the two neighbouring countries. Britain attempted to outsmart others by expressing its readiness to dispatch five thousand troops to Darfur Sudan. Likewise, Australian government released statements to that effect. C.R.S.

The position of Germany was not only supportive of the rebels, but also incriminating and threatening to the Sudanese government. Indeed the Germany position was the most hostile among the European countries. The Eritrea position is hostile. It has continued with escalating hostilities by harbouring the rebels and providing them with military and logistic support.

Eritrea-Israeli targeting of Sudan particularly their involvement in the Darfur conflict is quite evident. But in his report dated 08-07-2004 under the heading "Sudan Earns Jewish Concern" writer, Peter Ignos said Jewish lobbies intensified their effort to put and end to the killing of tens of thousands of black Muslims in Sudan. He further revealed that though

most of the Jewish funds go to Israel related issues, the Jewish council in Washington countries the writer, mobilized a campaign opposed to killings in Sudan (Kamal, 2005). On the Arab from Egypt categorically rejected imposition of any sanction against Sudan, While Saudi's position also explicitly rejected imposition sanctions on Sudan, expressing its conviction of measures taken by the Sudanese government to address the situation. The Libyan role on the other hand was somewhat ambiguous at the beginning. The Zaghawa tribe, a rebel group, has some of its clan in Libya. Although the Libyan role was late, it has rejected foreign intervention in Sudan and it has recently been involved in seeking a solution to the problem, with the Libyan leader now playing a major mediatory role. Chadian president wants the Darfur Sudan conflict to be resolved peacefully.

Finally, despite all efforts by the international community at resolving the Darfur Sudan conflict, the conflict continues.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN THE DARFUR CRISIS

3.1 THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS PEACEKEEPING MANDATE

The birth of the African Union (AU) in 2000 came in responsible to the changes that were taking place in Africa and, indeed, the world. The heads of States and Head of Government of OAU issued the State Declaration on September 9, 1999, calling for the establishment of an African Union. The State Declaration was followed by summits at Lome in 2000, when the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted, and at Lusaka in 2001, when the plan for the implementation of the AU was adopted (Just Comment, 2004). The African Union was launched in Burban on July 9, 2002 by its first President Thabo Mbeki at the first session of the Assembly of the African Union.

It is significant to note that members of the OAU were conscious of the need to resolve conflict and prevent it in order that the development. African economies are in dire straits, social and economic indicator of the populace show low-level of material well-being. To accentuate the situation, the continent was riddled with conflict and civil wars.

In the global environment, nations were steadily moving towards regional unity and integration as essential features of globalization (Femi, 2005). One of the strong reasons serving as the driving force leading to the signing of the Constitutive Act was well in the preamble and it has to do with the problem connected with conflict and its management. The resolution acknowledgment the damaging and devastating nature of conflict, proclaim that the AU is:

> **Conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflict in African constitutes a major impediment to socio-economic development of the continent and the need to promote peace, security and stability as a development and integration agenda (AU Constitutive Act).**

This indicates that a new corps of African leaders emerged with a new orientation when they came to realization that the defunct OAU lacked the vision, the political will and tools to deal with these changes even though the organization had served African fairly well as a continental platform for the anti-colonial struggle. This was why as a new organization, anchored on a new vision, ethos and method of work became an imperative necessity this was found in the African Union and in the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Addressing the myriad of socio-economic problems and political challenges facing the continent, particularly the problem of governance and the management of the debilitating conflict in Africa as well as measures to prevent them, were the main goals and objectives of the new African Union and NEPAD.

A core group of like-minded countries worked collectively for the actualizations of this new vision, ethos and method of work which found support in the unanimous adoption in Lome, Togo of the constitutive Act on 11, July 2000 to replace the OAU Charter, following the Kampala forum of 1992, and the subsequent merger of MAP and OMEGA to produce the new Africa initiative. It is pertinent to reiterate the relevance of the concept of the inseparability of peace, security, stability and development" for the new Au which has adopted the new Africa initiative as its working programme, in the programme, the Union is focusing attention on peace, security, good governance, eradication of poverty, education, communication, technology, infrastructure, health, rural development, agriculture, co-operation with international organizations, and formation of partnership with industrialized countries of the worlds.

In view of the major obstacles that faced the OAU during its time, especially in the aspect of conflict management and peacekeeping, the new organization, the AU was specially charged to ensure sufficient capacity-building, with a view to strengthening the modalities for peace building, peacekeeping and conflict management/resolution in Africa. The AU is therefore a framework that is consistent with the new world order with emphasis on collective approach to development and management of conflict. To this end, the previous pleas of OAU was broadened to accommodate new realities in the area of:

a. Prevention, management and resolution of conflict

b. Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement

c. Post conflict Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

d. Combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

Interestingly, it is only this young African organization that you will find a collective and voluntary acceptance of the right f intervention in a member state, pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave

circumstances of mass human rights violation. The principle of non-interference therefore is still maintained in Article 3 (g), however, intervention by the union is a new dimension. This second pillar of the Au framework for preventive action in conflict situation is the protocol establishment the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU adopted by the inaugural meeting of the AU. In July 2002, the protocol which became effective in December 204 upon reification by members in the lynchpin of peacekeeping by the AU Designed to deal with the 'threat or breach of peace', the protocol is conceived to operate within 'partnership for peace with the UN' (Just Comment, 2004). The main responsibility of the (PSC) of the African Union is the maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa the protocol establishing this structure therefore, calls for an African Standby Force (ASF) to give teeth to the council's peacekeeping efforts, according to the protocol the standby force' shall be composed of standby multi-disciplinary units with civilian and military component in their countries of origin and ready for rapid development of appropriate notice. The ASF is convinced along the line of the UN "standby arrangement" where a state identifies, trains and equips specific

contingents for peacekeeping operations until the time comes for their development.

Although the new partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an economic blue-print it has played a crucial part in developing an African peace and security agenda. In view of the good will NEPAD enjoys from African's external partners. Its main contribution to peacekeeping lies in mobilizing financial resources for the African Union's Peace fund aimed at enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities and financing its operation. This legal framework provided the Au with the mandate to lunch peacekeeping mission in Africa where crimes against humanity, genocide or rebel groups. The threats to civilians pose by continue evidence in Darfur Sudan rightly demands the intervention by the African Union.

It is perhaps often overlooked that in accordance with article 4(J) of the AU Act COA, on its own violation, requested intervention from the AU in order to assist her in the restoration of peace and security in D. It was this singular act of political will the GOS that opened the world the

initial intervention from the AU, even when the international community was still debating its reaction to the conflict (Femi 2005).

3.2 THE NATURE OF AU ROLE IN THE CONFLICT

After preliminary contact fact-finding mission and consultations all stakeholders the first round of inter-Sudanese political talk convened in Abuja on 23 August 2004, under the auspices of the African Union. This meeting had earlier been preceded by several other talks most fruitful being negotiating that led to the cease-fire agreement conclude in N'djamena, Chad on 8 April 2004 and the agreement on modalities for the establishment of the ceasefire commission and development of observers in the Darfur Sudan signed on 28 May 2008 in Arab, Ababa, Ethiopia (Femi, 2005).

The Au established the ceasefire commission with the total of members, among them two representatives from the Sudan government, two from the SLM/A and from the JEM to monitor violence troops to protect the monitors. The mandate of the ceasefire allows fro AU to ensure "the implementation of the rules and previous of the ceasefire" and to develop adequate measures to guard against violation of the

ceasefire in the future. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the Au gave a sweeping mandate that authorized "all steps deemed necessary to ensure effective monitoring" (just comment, 2004). Nevertheless, it is the section 6 of the Addis Accord that provides for the deployment of an Africa Union Team of observers and a lightly armed Au monitoring mission "... To ensure the protection and safety of the observers ..." In addition the deployment of " a protection element", as earlier envisaged by the Au Peace and Security Council, was held as a distinct possibility. The "protection element", to be drawn from Au members states, shall number between 100 and 300. These important peace accords served as the forerunner to the Abuja talks.

At the third round of the Talks, which was held from 21 October to 9 November 2004, two important protocols were signed, one on the enhancement of the security situation. Among other things the protocol on security prohibits hostile military flights over the Darfur Sudan region, including the rebel – held territory and call for the disarming of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government. Under the humanitarian protocol, aid workers were to be granted freedom of movement and

access in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict (Femi 2005).

The parties have also commenced preliminary discussion on a draft Declaration of Principle (DOP), which is intended to serve as a roadmap for lasting peace in the Darfur Sudan. The Fourth Round of talks commenced in Abuja on 11 December 2004 and ended on 21 December 2004, with the warring parties committing themselves to uphole the cease-fire agreement and the two Abuja protocols, while seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict preparation a re underway for the Talks to resume as soon as practicable.

As many people have observed, the ceasefire agreement is increasingly becoming a dead-letter and salvaging it demands concerted international action, the Sudanese government had failed to comply with the requirement sustain to disarm and 'neutralize' the Janjaweed militias. The AU ceasefire monitors and protectors are too few to ensure compliance with the agreement and to offer meaningful protection to civilians in Darfur Sudan-an area the size of France (Just Comment, 2004). A commitment in the late 2004 to increase the monitoring force

to approximately 3,500 went unfulfilled for over half a year, and during this time the AU was unable to secure from Khartoum a mandate for civilian protection. Only a mandate to monitor the largely non-existent ceasefire in a positive move, African countries such as Tanzania, South, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Mali have indicated that they are willing to contribute troops to serve in the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur Sudan.

The Au has said it will increase it forces to 7,700 by September 2005, and possibly to deploy to this force-level with own resources and NATO as consequence has very recently agreed to provide logistics and transport capacity. The bigger problem is that e vend with N.A.T.O. helping in this way, the nascent AU Peace and Security Commission is simply not up to this mission if the goal for Darfur Sudan is adequate protection for civilians and humanitarian operations (http://www.tnt.com/etcmhtml).

Regarding the expansion of the AU mandate to protect civilians, Sudan has maintained that the AU peacekeeping force be confined to the protection of the ceasefire monitoring team in Darfur and military action against any of the conflict parties in the case of ceasefire

violations, clear assertion of the sanctity of the Sudanese state casts doubts on Khartoum's willingness to adhere to the term of the N'djamena ceasefire agreement while it crimes that it has no problem with the ceasefire observers or African troops to protect the observers, it has serious misgivings about the peacekeeping role, which it states is its own responsibility. Hence Khartoum was only prepared to allow the AU peacekeepers to solely deal with the rebels especially ushering them off them off the battlefield and into their barracks.

African countries are already over-burdened by enormous domestic challenges of their own that many of them can contribute neither troops no equipment. Those who have the personnel lack the means to deliver and maintained them. The personnel on ground must also be maintained, all of which cost huge sums of money. Even through only a paltry sum of US 1.6 million dollars has so far paid into the US 200 million AU peace fund for the period 2004-2007, its is heart warming that there is no shortage of political will on behalf of Africa to track head-on, the daunting problem of peace and security such as that being faced in Darfur Sudan. The willingness of African countries to ensure

their limited resources with one another was borne out by the early development of Rwanda troops Darfur, under the auspices of African Union (Femi 2005).

3.3 THE AU-UN JOINT PARTNERSHIP IN THE DARFUR SUDAN CONFLIC

The Security Council resolution authorizing UN peacekeepers to replace the beleaguered AU Mission which was championed by the US, UK. and France, while China, Russia and Qater abstained, giving cover to Sudan's subsequent rejection. A year and laborious negotiation latter, the UN/Au hybrid was from in July 2007, to enter Darfur Sudan with its hybrid operation "Light Support package" (LSP) and "Heavy Support Package" (HSP) became the first phases f the three agreements to turn AMIS into UNAMID in order to strengthen the peacekeeping regarding its size, funding, mandate and capacity in particular (Darfur's New Security Reality).

The action of the Au and the UN have been purely described as Humanitarian and peacekeeping which fall under the Article 11 establishing the international peace and security of the UN. Furthermore the actions are guarded by the general foreign policy interest of every

sovereign nation in the world largely, just as US, UK, France, China and Russia display in the UN Security Council. While on the other hand the government of Khartoum has consistently maintained the exclusion of the UN peacekeepers to the region due to the conviction that the UN is powered by the Western interest. The complication is that the hybrid force Commander General Murtian Lurther Agwai is a Nigerian and Nigeria is a Western ally and the west has a vested interest in Nigerian economy which may have promoted the targeting and killing of the UNAMID by the rebels and this create problems of co-operation between UNAMID and Khartoum government (New Nigeria.).

Disputes over mandate interpretation emerge because of the different institutional character and personalities within the AU and UN. Whether "technical! Or "political" the differences between AU and UN have had to work through together; its effectiveness in protecting civilians will depend greatly upon the willingness of UN headquarters in New York and AU Headquarter in Addis Ababa to give UNAMID headquarter in El Fansher sufficient political support upon the political and military judgement (Darfur Sudan's New Security reality).

However, the absence of a viable peace agreement is another problem which have created new dimension of the conflict to emerge as UNAMID challenge first, rebel divisions and in-fighting have increased. Secondly, internal fighting over land and power has resulted in fragmentation within Arab tribes with some groups distancing themselves from the NCP. Thirdly there has been a convergence of interest between some Arabs and rebels group. Fourthly, there has been increased violence and insecurity in IDP camp accompanied by an NCP strategy to empty the camps. Fifthly, the NCP, has accelerated expropriation of land from its traditional owners to the benefit of both prop NCP Arabs and Non-Arabs named Zaghawa associated with SLA/MM.

Despite all this challenges UNAMID Deployment has also been hampered by logistical problems, the light and heavy support package implementation is not complete with many of the troops and police personnel still to be deployed. Some of the logistical problems for UNAMID deployment are inherent to the difficult environment: adequate weather supplies are an ongoing concern, as well as arrangement for

getting supplies to Darfur Sudan. But Khartoum has also created difficulties about land use and by refusing to allow UNAMID to fly at night or refurbish airstrips (Darfur Sudan's New Security Reality).

The resolution contains provisions under VII of the UN charter, mandating the new force "to take necessary action" to protect civilians but it comes with restrictions Khartoum could easily exploit. First, the force will only be able to monitor, not sizes weapons represent in Darfur Sudan in violation of the Security Council arms embargo on the region a significant weakling resolution 1706 unfortunate given proliferation of weapons and armed groups in Darfur Sudan. Secondly, its prescribes no consequences for non-compliance. There is no mention punishable action is Khartoum or any other actor-fails to co-operate. Also, other resolution is still based on the unfortunate DPA though there are frequent tolerance to any subsequent agreement perhaps UNDAMID's biggest problem is that it is more than one year latter the NCP has been able to continue its divide fighting and highly militarized IDP camps.

Finally, much energy was spent commendably, to ensure that hybrid operation would be able to takeover from the ailing AMIS but

there is now risk that the stronger UNAMID force which arrive in Darfur Sudan early 2008 has not lent itself to quick solution to the Darfur Sudan conflict which evolved from a rebellion with relatively defined political aims to a conflict increasingly overshadow by shifting alliances, defections, regional and international meddling and a growing, complex tribal dimension (Darfur Sudan's New Security Reality).

3.4 PROBLEM AND PROSPECTS FOR AU PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN DARFUR, SUDAN

The civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan Chad and conflict in Sahara Africa were all owed to go without "African solution". The AU must learn a lesson from the attitude of the O.A.U. in relying solely on help from "friendly countries" for conflict resolution in war torm areas of Africa. AU will need to find African resolution to its internl conflict. Hence the task it is currently facing in the Darfur Sudan conflict (Jonah 2006).

The AU will need to relate and work closely with sub-regional organizations for effective conflict prevention, management and resolution in accordance with Article 52 of the UN Charter, which seeks a

regionalization of peace and security initiatives; there would be need for the AU to pay attention to the approach adopted by ECOWAS in setting up of ECOMOG. Here, ECOMOG has proved to be a very good example of sub-regional effort in dealing with intra-state conflict. It is indeed the support of people that makes regional arrangement work and it is important to continue effort in this direction. In the words of Julius Nyerere when he has referring to past. The O.A.U. "existing only for the protection of the African leaders. Therefore, it will be important for the organization to pay more attention to national issues and he known to be seriously working for Africa. Of course, one must admit that the O.A.U. was not know by the ordinary man in Africa. It was a place where African cohesion was reflected not in deeds and programmes but in words and conference diplomacy of the African group at the UN and its agenda in large unwieldy ministerial and summit conferences of the O.A.U. Thus, sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS have grown in power and operationally without substantive co-ordination with the O.A.U. (Garuba, 1998).

Lack of funds is the most serious impediment of the A.U.'s efforts in trying to curb the armed conflict. In a book, "Regional Integration for Peace Security and Development in Africa's Danfulani has suggested four ways by which peace-building, peacekeeping and peace enforcement could be financed, viz population per-head, taxation, company and allied agencies taxation, subvention through the UN and ECOWAS security Fund (Danfulani, 1998). The AU may wish to adopt this proposal. In addition to its ensure funds for peacekeeping considering however the fact that member states have demonstrated the political will and the conviction that the essential for development are in abundance within Africa there is hope. that the necessary fund will be provided logistics (transportation system, equipment and motivation of troops etc.) are other factor hampered the AU presence in Darfur Sudan. To ensure available of transport equipments, general store, food, drugs and clothing on demand, the AU should study the possession and capabilities of African nations and enter into standing arrangements with them as the areas nations, which have transport planes, spare etc. should be known and contracted so that once need, the agreement will be

activated. This will ensure that troops can be easily and quickly and quickly mobilized, transported and deployed in the theatre of conflict.

Also effort should be made in getting member states to undertake not only to work to safeguard and to consolidate relation conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability within the region but also to co-operate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanism for the timely prevention and resolution of inter-state and inter-state conflict. It should be specified of course that AU must be in place complete structures that will need to be alert to its responsibility of sharing with the UN the burden of peacekeeping and should undertake to tackle effectively all issues of peace and security.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE AU IN DARFUF CONFLICT

4.1 STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF AU PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN DARFUR, SUDAN

Mission majority of Darfur Sudan's population continue to suffer from ongoing attacks by government and rebel-force and bandits, on indirectly from insecurity and the collapse of local economy. A resurgence of fighting since late 2005, continuing attacks on civilians and spillover of fighting into neighbouring Chad highlight the gap between AMIS's capacity to protect civilians and the massive protection needs on the ground. The AU peace and Security Council authorized an increase of personnel to 7,731 in April 2005 (AU PSC, 2005) this number has not yet been reached as at the end of 2006.

As of March 2006, the 6;898 – strong Amis includes 760 protection forces (Military), 1,385 unarmed civilian police, 715 unarmed military observers and additional personnel. The force has succeeded in bringing limited stability to some areas where it is deployed but it lacks sufficient numbers, equipment and funding to put a stop to the increasing

violence against civilian in Darfur Sudan (UN-security Council 2005). The African Union is faced with the most difficult decision in its short history. Created three years ago with the idea of "Africa solution to African problem" at its heart it must decide whether to handover its first major peacekeeping operation to the United Nations. The approximately 7,000 AU troops deployed in Darfur Sudan have failed to end a conflict that has so far killed more than 100,000 people and left millions in overcrowded camps (john, 2006). The year 2005 saw a steady determination on the ground with militia attacking civilians, rebel movements splintering and the arrival of armed groups from neighbouring Chad.

Given the mass they were sent to resolve conflict but many feel that AU never stood a chance. Originally deployed to observe ceasefire that existed in name alone, the AU peacekeeping mission was strengthening on a piece meld basis until it reached its current size. In a few areas the peacekeepers have made difference keeping the parties part and encouraging some people to return. But until recently, the force had to rely on pick-ups fro transport leaving them vulnerable to attack

and reluctant to step in when trouble flared. In October 2005 for instance, four Nigerian soldiers and two contractors were killed in an ambush. The very next day, 33 Au soldiers were taken hostage without a gun shot being fired it was clear they were losing the respect of the warring parties. The African Union has lost credibility as a deterrent to attacks on civilian and humanitarian convoys, and a result hundreds of thousand of internally displayed persons have been cut off from the humanitarian assistance then need (UN Security Council, 2005). There are both internal and external constraints. Internal constraints include a lack of institution expertise and technical capacity in deploying multi-sectoral field mission external constraints include a lack of the continuation, obstruction of the G.O.S. inadequate funding from international donor government and insufficient military equipment and logistics. As a result, AMIS a deterrent effect has diminished as its own force have succumbed to deadly attacks on humanitarian aid convoys by the rebel groups, Janjaweed forces and bandits and continuing Janjaweed and government attacks of civilians. The primary responsibility for the deterioration in the security situation belong to the warring parties, who continue to attack civilian and civilian project in violation of the

international humanitarian law and the government, which has created a climate of lawlessness by permitting Janjaweed force to commits with impurity. But it is also clear that the AMIS is ineffective therefore its ability to counter such attacks in limited by its low number and other constraints.

According to Maj. Gen. Ihekire, the Nigerian force commander of the AU in Darfur Sudan, "if some one has not got wings and you say he has failed to fly – I don't you can call that failure" he said when asked how he assessed the achievement of the AU mission. Ihekire would like to see AU assault plane and more troops but that now seems unlikely (Jonah 2006). The Africa Union P.S.S. on March 10, 2005 extended the mandate of AMIS in Darfur Sudan through September 30, 2006. UN plans call for AMIS troops to be mainstay of the future UN force in Darfur Sudan by retraining the AMIS soldiers and the're-hating' them and incorporating them into a large UN force with improved logistical support and arms. This would expedite the introduction of the UN force and the future UN mission. The introduction of a UN force will also

provide an opportunity to strengthen the AMIS regarding size, finding, mandate and capacity and in particular, mobility (UN security, 2005).

4.2 PROPOSAL TO DEPLOY A UN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE

A proposal to deploy a UN force gathered momentum in January 2006 as Amis funding problems increased. The Un Security Council has expressed its approval of the AU's decision to extend its peacekeeping force mandate in Darfur Sudan by six months. The AU Peace and Security Council announced it will keep AU peace keepers in Darfur Sudan until September 30, 2006 when it plan to hand control of the peacekeeping force over to the UN. The Un Security Council praised the decision as practical, allowing the UN time to ready capable of assuming peacekeeping operation in Darfur Sudan without threatening the already peace in Area (Jurist Paper chase, 2006).

The proposal to deploy UN force has stiff resistance from the Sudanese government. It consistently tried to prevent any initiative that could protect civilians in Darfur Sudan. UN Security-General Kofi Annan failed to convince Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to allow UN peacekeepers to be deployed. Sudan maintains it dose not need an

international intervention by the UN, Sudan opposes such moves, saying an extra funding should instead be given to the 7,000 hard-pressed AU peacekeepers already in Darfur Sudan (Daily Trust, 2006). Annan said the talks with Sudan will continue and he is optimistic UN peacekeepers will be deployed in Darfur Sudan. "I, of course, will continue to press for the eventual deployment of UN force in Darfur. On this point we agreed that the dialogue had to continue", Annan says. "In the meantime President Al- Bashir said he would prepare a plan for the next six months, which he would submit to me by end of the month" (Franz 2006).

Khartoum submitted a plan to the Security Council that it would send 10,500 more government troops to Darfur to stop the violence instead of Un force. "Displaced people in Darfur Sudan are absolutely terrified that the same soldier that expelled them from their homes and villages may now be sent supposedly to protect them." The Security Council on August 29th 2006 discussed a draft resolution proposing deployment of around 20,000 Un troops and police, despite Khartoum's rejection of any Darfur Sudan mission (daily Trust 2006). The United State and the European Union, who have found the AU, until now, are

reluctant to give any more and want the UN to take over. A UN mission they say should be bigger, better equipped and more capable of aggressively responding to Darfur's myriad – armed groups. Its estimated budget of a billion dollars would also be funded directly by all UN members. An editorial in the state-owned Sudan vision said Sudan would never give in to pressure to accept UN forces. "Britain and the American administration ... were required to lead the international community in boosting Sudan's peace instead of destabilizing it. It said, "both of them have chosen to drag Sudan into confrontation with the United Nations of which Sudan is a member".

President Omar Al-Bashir has promised to make Sudan a graveyard for foreign intervention and government-backed militia say they are preparing for a Holy war. The message they are trying to send is clear-Sudan", Jamal Ibrahim the Foreign Minister Spokesmen said (Jonah 2006).

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Politicians say Khartoum fear that the Un troops be used to arrest any official likely to be indicated by the international criminal court investigation at alleged war crime in the region. But Human Rights

groups say there are also indications that Sudan may not want international force finally, African leaders at an African Union Summit in Gambia on 3 July 2006, agreed to extend was supposed to terminate on 30 September 2006, until at least December 2006. Meanwhile, it is the request of the UN Security Council to extend the Au Peacekeeping operation in Darfur Sudan until the end of the year (Franz 2006).

4.3 AU PEACEKEEPING STRATEGY AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Peacekeeping is an adaptation of the provision of charter 1 Article 1 paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, which gives the organization the jurisdiction to work toward a conflict free World (UN Charter, 1989). The Charter recognizes the importance of collective effort in the achievement of international security. It states the purposes of the UN as "the maintenance of international peace and Security, an to that end; to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situation which lead to a breach of peace.

The concept of contemporary "peacekeeping". The repleted with doctrinal ambiguities and defies a straightforward definition. The word has become synonymous with any number of international activities designed to resolve or attenuate conflict. Since the end of Cold War the tenets of the traditional peacekeeping have been eroded and the scope of its activities has expanded significantly. In practice, the boundaries between peacemaking and the related nation of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building are not always apparent. The once clear distinction between peacekeeping operations and enforcement action has become blurred. Moreover; the UN is no longer the only actor performing peacekeeping duties; regional organization such as AU and other ad-hoc coalition have in fact become the primary peacekeepers.

A peacekeeping force therefore, is war or fighting, in order to try to prevent more violence. Simply put, it is the interposition of natural international force to conflicting parties. Peacekeeping is often now associated with the task of though peacekeeping has its origin in the UN, it is note however specifically provided for in the charter of the UN or in the charter of the O.A.U., it evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety

of international conflicts, which have been placed on the UN agenda over the years.

Its limitation not withstanding, peacekeeping has proved to be a strategy or technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. It has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world. Such operations are mounted to help control conflict that threatened international peace and security while lasting political, diplomacy solutions are being sought the operations are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary General and must have the consent of the government and usually also other parties involved. Peacekeeping operation can involve military observer mission made up of unarmed officers, while others who are allowed to possess arms carry light weapons used only for self-defence. Self-defence also includes the defence of other members of the force as well as the protection of their property.

Peacekeepers have the right to insist on their mandate and this makes them very important and it is imperative that such mandate is not

ambiguous as to be opened to many interpretations. Thus they are entitled to maintenance by the authorizing body and they must be protected and defended. This is to show that such authority is capable of further enforcement action if needs be (Onje, nd).

4.4 THE IMPLICATION OF THE DARFUR SUDAN CRISIS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Darfur Sudan's deadly ethnic dynamics have spread become intertwined with those across the border and became a regional conflict, adding another dimension to the volatile situation, as Khartoum and N'djamena fuel war in each other's backyard. The conflict has also spilled into Central Africa Republic (CAR) and there is growing risk it will merge with the crises in Southern and Northern Kordofian.

Since the beginning of 2007, over 240,000 people have been newly displaced or re-displaced. Kidnapping and sexual assault of women by government forces and associated militias as well as rebel groups have continued. Humanitarian agencies which have helped ensure the survival of over four million war affected Darfurians, find themselves the direct target of violence. They have been forced to pull out of many areas and reduced to providing assistance via "in and out" operations in some

areas, often by helicopter. Violence against them comes from all sides: government militias, non-signatory rebels, SLA/MM forces and IDPs themselves, with the proliferation of rebel movements, it is difficult for humanitarian agencies to co-ordinate aid delivery, because of the insecurity, nearly half a million people are inaccessible to them (Darfur Sudan's New Security Reality).

The Darfur Sudan rebels, for tactical reasons are starting to link up with resistance movements in the Kordotans, where tensions are rising. JEM has tried to expand its operations there, connecting with the Misseriya Shahama and capitalizing on the growing frustration of some communities and tribes of ex-west Kordotan.

There has been growing resistance to the NCP in Northern Kordofan, led by the Kordantan Association for Development (KAD) and other groups which accuse the NCP of marginalization polices, particularly over development money and projects and instigation of tribal fighting. Relations between Darfur and Kordafan-based rebel groups are likely to expand barring an NCP policy change.

Though it has not been impacted by the Darfur conflict in the same way as Chad, North Eastern CAR hosts some 2,660 refuges and has been a staging ground for Chadian rebels; it was used in a similar manner by the SPLA as a safehaven and resupply point during the 1980s and 19990s and as late as 2004 the Sudanese army also used the region to launch counter-attacks against the SPLA throughout the 1990s and as a passages way into Chad to fight Deby's forces (Darfur's New Security, Reality).

In April 2006 a Darfur Sudan-based Chadian rebel group, led by Mahamat Nour, attacked the Chadian Capital, N'Djamena along the Sudanese border.

In addition to the Darfur Sudan spillover, Northern CAR has suffered from its own insurgencies, as government troops and rebels have clashed for more than a decade. In the Northeast, an umbrella insurgent group, the union des forces democratiques pour le rassemblement. It regularly raids town and army outposts to capture goods and munitions from poorly guarded government supply depots. It

has committed serious abuses against civilians. Bozize frequently accuses Khartoum of supporting the UFDR but has not taken relation.

As a consequence of this volatile situation, at 291,000 northerners have been displaced since 2005 (212,000) as IDPs 79,000 as refugees in Chad, Sudan and Cameroon) on 25 September 2007, in response to deteriorating security in both Chad and CAR, the Security Council authorized a UN force (MINURCAT) and an EU Mission in effort to cartel the regional conflict.

The situation in neighbouring Chad has also deteriorated over the past year over 230,000 Darfur refugees are now in twelve refugee camps lining the border. These were first established in 2004 and include the mix of non-Arab tribes violence. The refugees have increasingly found themselves in the midst of another complex conflict (Darfur's New Security Reality).

While the instability in Chad is related to event in Darfur Sudan has led to over 170,000 Chadian IDPs) it is compounded by Daby's autocratic rule, Khartoum-backed rebels challenging his regime, as well as its support for and co-opting of Darfur Sudan rebel movements, militias,

the Janjaweed, regional powers and international peacekeepers to their advantage.

Eritrea has a long history of involvement in Sudan's conflict, supporting both the SPLA and various Darfur rebel factions. Nevertheless, given its tense relationship with Ethiopia, it has tried to regain favour with the NCP, as shown in the way it brought the Eastern from to closed talks with the ruling party in 2006, resulting in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. Like other regional leaders, President Isaiah Afrwerke is keen for his country to be regarded as an important player.

Egypt has always been concerned about the Darfur Sudan crisis because it quickly perceived the potential for it to lead to fragmentation in Sudan with serious impacts on its own national security. It is eager to prevent any development, which might lead to the disintegration of its southern neighbour or the emergency of a hostile regime in Khartoum, including the possibility of a return of one with an Islamic extremist agenda. It is particularly concerned about consistently supportive of the NCP in exchange for accommodation of its interest while the Rebel factions react strongly to major Egyptian participation in that force

claiming it is too close to Khartoum; Egyptian influence on the rebels is also limited because it has never given them active support (Darfur's New Security Reality).

Libya has played significant role in Darfur Sudan since the conflict began, culminating in its function as host of the peace talks. The meeting it organized in late 2004 and 2005 for tribal and civil society leaders remain unique in offering an independent forum for key Darfurians to meet and discuss the conflict. Simultaneously it has given the NCP diplomatic cover to resist international pressure and effort to strengthen the peacekeeping operation. Libyan actions have been motivated in part by Gaddafi's desire to be a powerful regional player and mediator but proximity of conflict in Chad and Darfur and their domestic impact have triggered a more sustained effort.

Finally, Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Egypt all have strong interests in Darfur, crisis as it affects the whole region.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. SUMMARY

The aim of this study has been to ascertain the role of African Union in Darfur conflict and to examine whether such role by the AU's mission in Darfur, Sudan conflict is effective or not, the research however showed that the AU's mission in Darfur Sudan is both insufficient and ineffective in managing conflict in that region.

Nevertheless, it is justified that the sources of conflict in Darfur have a correlation with Ethno-Racial and cultural differences. The study confirmed this by clearly showing that one of the deep-causes of conflict in Darfur Sudan lies in the feelings of superiority (racial) and cultural elitism of the "Arab" and perceived oppression and neglect on the part of "Africans".

However, it is stipulated that the AU peacekeeping mission in Sudan is more of a humanitarian activity than of conflict management. The finding of course this position, the research showed that AU mission in Darfur Sudan is more of a humanitarian observation and monitoring group and therefore not the actual peacekeeping operation.

In addition, the activities of the African Union Mission in Sudan (A.I.M.S.) have been significantly impaired by lack of finance and logistics. The finding also justified by further revealing that the AU's funding and logistic problems are enormous for instance, the AU mission in Darfur is grossly under-subscribed, it is poorly funded and ill-equipped to effectively cover the area of Darfur and also in managing the conflict.

In a nutshell, we believe that when supported financially by the international community as well as African countries the AU will fair better in the area of conflict management and resolution in Africa generally.

The AU has been engaged in the management of the Darfur Sudan conflict. The A.M.I.S. has played a significant have been made by the AU in the mediation of talks between G.O.S. and the rebel factions, S.L.A. and J.E.M. all efforts made by the AU to expand its presence in Darfur have lost yielded the anticipated outcome. The warring parties in Darfur Sudan have lost hope in AU conflict management mechanism; their belief is that, since the AU forces are vulnerable to attacks themselves,

then its roles in managing conflict is ineffectual. Nevertheless, the research concluded that the ineffectiveness of the AMIS is due to its finances, logistics and other constraints.

5.2. CONCLUSION

The courses of the Darfur Sudan conflict has been traced, also with good examples, the research despite much intricacies in the Darfur conflict, was able to bring out vividly the way and manner in which conflict is conducted in Darfur Sudan and its subsequent escalation in different parts of the region.

5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following measures are hereby recommended:

One, Government forces and Janjaweed militias must immediately cease their attacks on civilians and civilian property in Darfur.

Two, Take genuine step at bringing the conflict to an end by talking with opposition.

Three, Conduct prompt, impartial and independent investigation of abuses by all parties to the conflict in Darfur.

Four, Prosecute alleged perpetrators in accordance with international fair trial standards.

Second, to the African leading countries such as Nigeria, S/Africa and Egypt etc:

Five, Should mediate on such talks between the rebels and the Sudanese government in order to bring an end the conflict in Darfur.

Six, There is need to rapidly deploy ceasefire observers to Darfur and ensure that ceasefire observers periodically publicly report on all violation of the ceasefire agreement.

Seven, Set up a special trust fund aimed at keeping the peace and rehabilitation the displaced in Sudan.

Eight, Debt owned by number states should be paid to the organization for it to function well.

Nine, A well-funded AU standby force should be set up to arrest the situations that degenerate into conflict.

Ten, Draft resolutions that seek to end reverse situation in Darfur.

Eleven, Provide logistic and medical support for the AU to be to handle the conflict in Darfur Sudan.

Twelve, Contribute personnel, equipment, funding and other resources to the social reconstruction and socio-economic development in Darfur Sudan

Thirteen, To U.N. Humanitarian Agencies and Humanitarian Non-Governmental organizations.

Fourteen, Makes efforts to decentralize aid distribution to reach the majority of the victims rather than concentrating on displaced comps and settlements.

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