LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF ECOWAS

BY

DANLADI ABRAHAM ANGULU KWASU

A Thesis submitted to the Post-Graduate School, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Science (M.Sc.) in International Relations, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria.

DEDICATION

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MY LATE MOTHER WHO DEPARTED TO GLORY ON 30TH MAY 2000. MAY HER SOUL REST IN PERFECT PEACE – AMEN.

DECLARATION

I, Danladi Abraham Angulu Kwasu, do hereby declare that, this thesis is my personal work and that all data and the works of other people have been appropriately acknowledged and fully referenced.

To the best of my knowledge, this thesis has not been submitted to any other institution or organisation other than Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, for examination.



Danladi Abraham Angulu Kwasu
(Candidate)

20 March 2000
Date

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled "LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF ECOWAS" by Danladi Abraham Angulu Kwasu, meets the regulation governing the award of Master of Science Degree in International Relations, of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Post Graduate Co-ordinator/Member	Date
Chairman, Supervisory Committee	1-9-2000 Date
Member, Supervisory Committee	01-09-2000 Date
Head of Department	04-2-2002 Date
Dean, Post Graduate School	18/11/02 Date
External Examiner	Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I will express my gratitude first to God who has granted me the opportunity to undertake this course. I want to appreciate the patience and the understanding of my Head of Department and Supervisor, Dr. P.P. Izah throughout the period of this research. My gratitude also to late Squadron Leader GA Yusuf, whose understanding went a long way to enable me complete the course work for this programme.

My gratitude to my former Commander, Group Captain OF Iyanalu for allowing me the use of the computers for the initial printing. I wish to thank Sergeant Kukah M. and others who help in the initial typing out this work.

My appreciation to my wife Jummai and my son Elshaddai Zishindung for their patience and understanding of my unpredictable and volatile nature whenever I am by the reading table.

Finally, I will also express my appreciation to my late mother, Matche Bakun Angulu Kwasu and my sisters Jummai Simon and Lami Roseline, whose efforts have gone a long way in laying the foundation for my education. For those who in one way or the other have contributed to the success of this study, I say 'Thank you'. May God bless you all – Amen.

ABSTRACT

The Foreign policy of a state is as a result of the interaction of different factors in the internal and external environments of such a state. As to what is the fundamental factor that exerts more impact on States' foreign policy, there have been divergent views. These views have diverged between the leadership idiosyncrasies, the external and systemic variables and the internal attributes of the states concern.

In this study, which is an analysis of foreign policy decision-making with emphasis on how the leadership perception of issues influences foreign policy decisions; taking Nigeria's decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS as a case study; we have tried to analyse the impact of leadership perception of issues in relation to foreign policy decisions. The central thesis of this study is that the leadership perception of issues is the most significant factor that exerts influence over and above other factors in foreign policy formulation. This is because the leadership perception of an issue is the major factor that co-ordinate and sharpens the relationship that exists between other variables and foreign policy decisions.

The general outline for states' foreign policy might be influenced by external factors, the global systemic variables prevalent in the international scene and the internal attributes of such a state, but they cannot on their own be the sole determinants of the nature and conduct of slates' foreign policy. For a proper explanation of the nature and conduct of stales' foreign policy, there is need for an in-depth understanding of the leadership perception of issues.

CONTENTS

Title Page i

Dedication ii

Declaration iii

Certification iv

Acknowledgement v

Abstract vi

Contents vii

List of Tables x

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction 1

Research Problem 5

Literature Review 6

Hypotheses 15

Significance of the Study 15

Theoretical Framework 16

Definition of Concepts 18

Methodology 19

Analytical Framework 20

CHAPTER TWO

POST INDEPENDENCE ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATING WEST AFRICA

Conditions for Regional Integration 25

West African Countries' Approach to Regional Co-operation 30

The West African Custom Union (UDAO) 33

Entente Council (Counseil De L'entente Africaine) 34

The Union Dounaire Des Estats l'Afrique De l'ouest (UDEAO) 35

The West African Monetary Union 36

The Communate Economique De l'Afrique De l'ouest (CEAO).....37

The River Niger Commission 39

The Senegal Basin Development 39

The Mano River Union 40

Other Bilateral Organisations 41

The Evolution of ECOWAS 43

Nigeria-Togo Initiative 46

CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA'S DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

Introduction 50

The West African Environment 50

The Nigerian Domestic Situation 60

The Nigerian Economy 63

The Pattern of Nigeria's External Trade 67

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKERS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS

Introduction 74

The Decision Makers 74

General Yakubu Gowon 75

Professor Adebayo Adedeji 79

Dr. Okoi Arikpo 83

General Perceptions Among the Leadership 85

Economic 85

Political 87

Security 89

External Factors 91

The CEAO 91

The European Economic Community (EEC) 92

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 95

The Integrationists 96

The Anti-Integrationists 97

The Role of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 100

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary 107

Conclusion 102

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Land area, population and per capita GNP distribution in West Africa 52

Table 2. Direction of West Africa Imports in 1971 54

Table 3. Direction of West African Exports in 1971 55

Table 4. Direction of Nigeria's External Trade 1960-1970: Exports and Re-exports...68

Table 5. Direction of Nigeria's Imports 1960 – 1975 69

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy analysis has always been an attempt to posit relationships that exist between variables that could be explained and possibly predicted. In the analysis of foreign policies of African states, variables that have been considered to influence foreign policy decisions have tend to diverge between the leadership's idiosyncrasies (the leaders' individual personality factors) and the global systemic variables. In-between these variables are the individual and universal characteristics of these African countries.

Could the external factors and the global systemic variables [1] prevalent in the international environment account for the nature and conduct of a country's foreign policy? If it were so, then nearly all-African countries and most third world nations would pursue foreign policies that are similar in nature and content. This is as a result of their being subjected to the same prevalent conditions at the international scene - their common links with the international capitalist system and their common dependency status, which has exposed them to the vagaries of continuos exploitation by the imperialists powers.

The argument that the international environment determines the foreign policy of a state imply that all states with similar roles at the international scene will react in like manner to changes at the international scene, and that domestic factors and idiosyncratic variables of the leadership have no influence on foreign policy decisions. To an extent, this means that changes in the external environment will automatically influence the foreign policy posture of states not minding whether other factors remain constant or not. [2] By implication, the foreign policy actors are nothing but robots that are controlled by existing

situations in the international scene. Thus, foreign policy decisions taken by these actors are bound to be what they are notwithstanding the dynamics of the internal factors and the perceptions of the foreign policy decision-makers.

In the same vein, if the internal attributes of a state are to be the determinants of that state's foreign policy behaviour, then states with the same internal attributes will under the same situation approach international issues in like manner. Likewise, states with different internal attributes will have different approaches to international issues. Ajene in a Study, [3] illustrated how this is not always the case, he brought out instances where states with similar internal attributes adopts different approaches to international issues whereas some states' reactions to such issues were similar in-spite of the differences in their internal attributes. [4]

The general outline of states' foreign policies might be influenced by the internal and external environment in which these states operate, but this may not affect their specific responses to issues that developed. For instance, the prevailing situation in the West African sub-region (Liberia) might have warranted the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, to explain the timing for its formation and a particular country's decision to participate or not to participate in such a force, there is the need for an analysis of the decision-making process with particular attention on the leadership perception of the issue.

In foreign policy analysis, there is the need to demarcate between the operational environment and the psychological environment. The operational environment stands for the reality of the existing situation under which foreign policy decisions are to be formulated and executed. On the other hand, the psychological environment represents the image milieu or setting of the situation as it appears to the decision-makers. [5] The crisis in

Liberia provides the operational environment in the case of the formation of ECOMOG, while the decision to intervene and a country's decision as whether or not to participate in the force emanates from how the situation appears to the decision-makers. The operational environment might influence a state's foreign policy but it is the psychological environment that will determine the final course of action that is to be adopted.

In other words, the behaviour of a state in the international scene is guided by the domestic attributes of that state and existing factors in the international system. However, the significance of these factors and the manner in which they are co-ordinated to formulate foreign policy depends on how the decision-makers perceived them.[6]

The number of available feasible choices that could be adopted may be limited, it still remains that the leadership perception of the situation will be important to their conceptualisation of the available alternatives and the final course of action to be adopted. It is the perception of the leadership that could rightly account for their definition of issues, the context in which such issues are placed, the nature and cluster of objective variables that become relevant in the decision-making and the final action. In essence, it is the perception of issues by the foreign policy decision-makers that influence their decisions. As pointed out by Ajene, 'Foreign policies are the results of policy makers perceptions of issues, interacting with their perceptions of the opportunities and constraints engendered by those issues. The behavioural correlates of these perceptions are the actions and in-actions of decision-makers'.[7]

According to J.W. Burton, the starting point of foreign policy is from perception.[8] One of the immediate causes of foreign policy decision-makers behaviour is their perception of the issue at stake and whenever there is a misperception of the issue, this will engender a faulty foreign policy decision. Thus the understanding of the believes and images of foreign

policy decision-makers will be a clue to the direction that they are likely going to follow in the foreign policy making process.

This study is an attempt to analyse the leadership perception of issues vis-à-vis other factors in the formulation and execution of Nigeria's foreign policy with particular reference to the country's decision to sponsor the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

It is generally difficult to delimit the group that is involved in the formulation of the country's foreign policy, as the personalities involved tend to change depending on the issue under consideration. As for the case of ECOWAS, the most important actors were the Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, the commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji and the commissioner for External Affairs Dr. Okoi Arikpo.

It is expedient to point out at this juncture that, though this study's focus is on the leadership perception of issues and how it influences Nigeria's foreign policy posture, in no wise does it imply that it is only the leadership perception of issues that has influence on the country's foreign policy. The foreign policy decision-makers do not take decisions in a vacuum, they always try to consider the opportunities and constraints that are open to them. In the final analysis, it is their perception of these opportunities and constraints engendered by the issue that will determine their approach to that issue. When two decision-makers (actors) have the same perception of an issue, there is the tendency that their response to the issue will be the same. As pointed out earlier, although this study focused on the decision-makers' perception, it does not mean that the study is exclusive of other factors such as the environmental, institutional, structural and others that have been advanced in extant literature as factors influencing Nigeria's foreign policy. It is only an

attempt to look at the factor that co-ordinate other determinants in order to make their effect relevant in the determination of foreign policy decisions. It is the role of the decision-makers (which is influenced by their perception of the issue) that sharpens the relationship that exist between various variables and foreign policy decisions.

It is our contention that the leadership perception of issues is the most important factor that sharpened and gives direction to foreign policy decisions. Although the interplay of both domestic and external factors set the opportunities and constraints on foreign policy issues, it is the foreign policy decision-makers' perception of the issue, these opportunities and constraints that will influence the final foreign policy decision. It is only a proper understanding of the decision-makers' perception of issues and how they place them that could properly account for their actions and reactions in the international scene. This analysis of the leadership perception of an issue will sharpen the relationship that exists between variables and foreign policy decisions, which will otherwise remain subtle.

RESEARCH PROBLEM.

There has not been any consensus of opinion among scholars as regards the most salient factors that have exerted much influence in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation. Some have tend to emphasise the overriding effects of the internal attributes of the country, while others emphasise the international systemic variables and the external factors and still others are of the firm believe that the most salient factor is the perception of issues among the country's foreign policy leadership.

The crux of the matter is which of these factors can we advance as the most dominant in the country's foreign policy formulation. In establishing a research problem, there is the need to raise some research questions. The research questions for this study are:

1. What was the most important factor that influenced Nigeria's decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS?

2. What was the role of the key foreign policy decision-makers' consensus of perception on the decision?

This study is an attempt to examine the influence of leadership perception of issues vis-à-vis other factors on Nigeria's foreign policy decision-making, with reference to the country's decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. In this study, an analysis of the foreign policy leadership perception of the costs and benefits that were to accrue to the country as a result of the formation of a sub-regional economic body will be carried out.

LITERATURE REVIEW.

A lot of works have been carried out on the foreign policies of nation states, including Nigeria. Different scholars have come out with different and divergent views as regards the factors that have had profound influence on the foreign policies of nation states. This literature review is an attempt to survey the views that have been advanced to account for the foreign policies of nation states by some of these scholars.

Graham Allison in an analysis of decision-making based on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, outlined three models (or paradigms as he called them) that could be used in analysing the foreign policies of nation states. These according to him are the rational actor model, the organisational model and the bureaucratic politics. [9]

Government or decision-makers are not monoliths as assumed by this model. They comprise of men that share divergent values and act differently. In the Nigerian situation, the issue of rationality cannot be applied; that decision-makers rationally maximised national interest is ignis fatus. Since independence, there has been emphasis on the promotion of the country's national interest in the conduct of her foreign policy. This, however is rather ambiguous as the term national interest itself is vague and has remained undefined in the Nigerian context, thus it has continued to be subjective to the underlying assumption of the foreign policy decision-makers. This has led to the promotion of the country's national interest in a variety of ways, with the manner been determined by the ideas and perception of the decision-makers.

In Nigeria, foreign policy decision-making has little or no bearing to bureaucratic bargaining as it is restricted to a few individuals who in actual fact are not always a true representation of the various bureaucracies. Even in the developed states with long foreign policy practice where most bureaucracies are represented in foreign policy decision-making, it has been observed that in some cases, the views espoused by the officials involved are not much related to their positions within the government. Even in the celebrated Cuban missile crisis of 1962, upon which Allison based his analysis, Robert Jervis observed that none of the leading officials espoused any view that was related to his position within the government. [10] (This is in reference to the views of the secretaries of the Treasury, Defence, State and the Attorney General). [11]

The application of Allison's models to the Nigerian context further proved to be irrelevant because they were based on a crisis situation which needed what Wolfe and Columbis referred to as a "crisis solution". [12] Even under the crisis situation, the issue of leadership perception cannot be ruled out. An instance which an individual may consider as

a crisis situation may not be perceived as such by another, this will in turn affect their perception of the type of decision or action to be taken.

Unlike America (where the models were applied) and other long established states of the world, African states, as observed by Thiam Doudu, a one time Senegalese foreign minister, lack any established process or organisation for foreign policy decision-making. [13] Hence in most of these African states, foreign policy decision-making lies within the whims and caprices of the leadership.

Gambari has attempted to apply Allison's bureaucratic politics model to a study that set out to examine how domestic political processes are relevant to certain foreign policy decisions and roles. [14] He succeeded in giving a detail empirical analysis of processes and factors that are involved in Nigeria's foreign policy decision-making as regards certain issues. At the end, he could not link up his conclusion to the theoretical framework, likewise he could not link up his findings to an hypothesis that was derived from the model.[15]

Gambari in this study argued that it is the domestic political factors that established their primacy more than anything else in the formulation, execution and the opposition group's criticism of foreign policy under the First Republic. He further argued that it is the domestic political consideration of the groups' power and influence that was much central to the foreign policy process within the period. [16]

Gambari's claim is doubtful as foreign policy was formulated almost entirely by the Prime Minister with very little control from the cabinet members. Even with the appointment of Jaja Wachukwu as foreign Affairs Minister, Tafawa Balewa still remained as a 'super foreign minister'. [17] Foreign policy decisions were left almost entirely to the

whims and caprices of Tafawa Balewa whose perception of issues exert much influence on the country's foreign policy.

Rosenau in an analysis of the sources of motivation in foreign policy decision-making, emphasises the importance of the domestic and external factors. He contended that the processes that are located in the internal and external environment, towards which the foreign policy elite direct their decisions are as relevant as those that take place in the minds of the foreign policy elite. [18]

Rosenau in his analysis has accorded undue emphasis to the domestic and external factors relative to the influence of the leadership perception. The domestic and external environment may affect foreign policy decision-making but on the final analysis, the choice of a specific foreign policy decision is a function of the leadership perception of the issue. It is the decision-maker's perception of a foreign policy issue in the light of his past experience that determines his reaction to such an issue. What then matters in the making and explanation of foreign policies of nations is not the reality of what the environment is but the decision-makers' perception of the environment. The fact is that the decision-makers are human beings., and every human being has a different perception of things, depending on his cultural settings, genetic traits, religion or ideological orientation. [19]

Akinyemi asserted that it is the Nigerian federal structure that has conditioned the nature and style of the country's foreign policy decisions. According to him, the political groups' attitude to foreign policy had their roots in the different regions of the federation.[20]

This stereotype account of associating groups' attributes and reactions to the regions in which they are based is wrong. What is clear is that under this period, both Balewa and Wachukwu were in complete agreement on what Nigeria's position on foreign policy

should be, although they were from different regions of the federation. As pointed out by G. J. Idang:

> The appointment of Jaja Wachukwu as external affairs minister did not drastically change the whole situation as both Abubakar and Mr Wachukwu, despite the great difference in their background and experience, were always in agreement as to what the fundamental assumptions of Nigeria's foreign policy should be. [21]

Moreover there were both radical and conservative groups in all the regions of the federation. This confirms the fact that federalism based on regional attributes cannot sufficiently account for Nigeria's foreign policy.

Denis Austin expressed the view that the colonial heritage (these include the orientation, political machinery and institutions for foreign policy execution, which were inherited from the colonialists) and the historical experience of the African countries predominate in the making of their foreign policies. [22] These factors advanced by Austin are relevant to foreign policy decisions only through their influence on the perception of the leadership. The leadership's orientation, the political machinery and institutions that were left behind by the colonialists for foreign policy execution where fashioned to influence the foreign policy elite perception in favour of the metropoles, this accounts for their pursuance of foreign policies that are status quo in orientation.

For Izah, he argued that it is the objective social, political and economic conditions that exert influence on Nigeria's foreign policy. According to him, it is the enormous domestic problems more than any personal view or idiosyncrasies of the top Nigerian leaders that have shaped the country's foreign policy. [23] He pointed out in passing that the perception of the various leaders have effect on the country's foreign policy style.

However, he contended that the problem of Nigeria's foreign policy study is the identification and measurement of the complex domestic and external factors in the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy rather than any unpredictable behaviour of the leadership. [24]

The identification and measurement of the complex domestic and external factors in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy can only give us an idea of the environmental opportunities and constraints that are engendered in the issue. The influence this will have on a foreign policy decision will depend on the foreign policy decision-makers' perception of the issue itself and these opportunities and constraints that are opened to them.

All the works reviewed above are based in varied forms on the general conventional wisdom that the foreign policy of a nation is determined by its domestic structure. [25] This is why some of them have unanimously abided by the view that there is no incompatibility between domestic principles and success in foreign affairs. Thus, they have tried to show that the various components of the political system (such as political parties, pressure groups, press, public opinion and others) operating within the constitutional democratic process, directly or indirectly shapens the country's foreign policy. [26]

Although these works have contributed in showing the links that exist between a country's domestic structures and its foreign policy but they have given too much weight to institutional forces. [27] Furthermore, most of these scholars have concentrated mainly on the political aspects of foreign policy while unquestionably accepting the claim that politics, economics and the leaders perceptions are distinct aspects of foreign policy, which is a hang over of the liberal and neo-classical mentality. [28]

Neither the internal dynamics and the political institutional framework nor the systematic variables could be used to satisfactorily account for a country's foreign policy

posture. The assumption that the domestic and external factors shapens the foreign policy of a state is tantamount to neglecting the important factor of the leadership perception which co-ordinate other factors to make them relevant in foreign policy decision-making. Different people have different perceptions, to sufficiently account for a state's foreign policy behaviour, one need to consider how the decision-makers reconstruct their 'reality' of the environment, [29] this will require an approach that take into account the aspect of the leadership perception of issues.

In the formulation and execution of African foreign policies, the leadership has always played a very important role. According to William Zartman, 'the incomplete awareness of national interest as a *policy criteria*' among African countries has given room for the leadership perception to dominate in the foreign policy process. [30] He further argued that there is a 'personal nature to the presidential foreign policy leadership...' [31] This is an indication that the leadership perception has much effect on foreign policy decision-making.

Likewise in the post colonial Nigerian State, foreign policy decision-making has been personalised. Although both external and domestic interests that need to be protected and promoted do exert influence on foreign policy decisions, in the final analysis, the head of government or at best in collaboration makes the decisions with few ministers of the relevant ministries. According to Olatunde J. B. Ojo, 'when the head of government indicates his preferences or agrees with the relevant ministries, policy is made. The rest is a matter of selling the policy to the relevant interested parties.' [32]

Ajene in an analysis of the leadership perception of issues and the resultant foreign policy difference among three (3) West African countries (Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone), clearly demonstrated how different states' approach to the same foreign policy issue could differ or tally depending on the leadership perception of such an issue. [33] He

pointed out that the objective characteristics of a state cannot account for a state's behaviour in the area of foreign policy decisions. He also maintained that the behaviours of states in the international sphere are mediated by the perceptions of the leadership. He concluded that it is the perceptual differences between the leaders rather than significant differences in the characteristics of the countries that were responsible for the disparity in their foreign policy decision-making and orientations. [34]

Emphasising the importance of the decision-makers' perceptions vis-à-vis other factors in foreign policy decision-making, Robert Jervis pointed out that:

> It will be fruitless and pointless to ask what states intentions are if its behaviour is determined by the situation in which it find itself. Instead, observers will try to predict how the context will change because this will tell them what the state's response will be. Decision-makers could then employ their powers of vicarious identification and simply ask themselves how they will act if they were in the other's shoe. They will not have to worry that the other might have values and believes that differed from theirs. [35]

Othman pointed out that it is the few persons who are privileged to control the machinery of government that have also been given the freedom to do whatever they desired with the country's external relations. He pointed out that the country's foreign policy has been left to the interpretation, control and caprices of the leadership and that the people are never consulted on foreign policy issues. [36] This freedom without consultation has definitely given room for the leadership perception to exert much weight on the country's foreign policy.

Mahmud Tukur in an analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy under the first Republic, concord with Douglas Anglin's view that the foreign policy elite personal and political convictions had more impact on foreign policy decisions than national economic considerations. [37] He drew up a conclusion (similar to Othman's), [38] that the perceptions, psychology and idiosyncrasies of the foreign policy elite were the main determinants of the country's foreign policy decisions. [39]

In an analysis of the signing and abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact, Olatunde J. B. Ojo pointed out that it was the leadership perception of certain internal and external factors that led them into signing the pact, and changes in these variables combined with the leadership perception of their salience 'provided a backdrop for the decision to abrogate the pact'. [40] He concluded that the decisions to ratify and abrogate the pact are in conformity with an hypothesis that the leadership's values and political style 'operating within the context of political elite interaction are the most potent variables in decision-making in the post colonial state'. [41]

Gordon J. Idang pointed out that the behaviour of any nation in the international scene is influenced by the perceptions, attitudes and value preferences of those in charge of the foreign policy decision-making process. [42] According to him the nature of foreign policy in any nation is a direct manifestation of the attitudes and perceptions of those that dominated the foreign policy decision-making process. He further concord with Margaret Sprout that even the so much emphasised environmental factors manifestation depends on the extent and manner that they are been perceived and taken into account in the foreign policy decision-making process. [43]

These works either directly or indirectly have pointed out the relationship that exist between the leadership perception of issues and the foreign policies of nation states. They

have also shown the dominance of the leadership perception over and above other factors in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. The emphasis on the primacy of the leadership perception in foreign policy formulation is a step in the right direction towards adequately accounting for the foreign policies of nation states.

The fact is, notwithstanding the importance of any factor in foreign policy formulation, its influence is limited by how it is been perceived by the decision-maker who co-ordinates the different relevant factors based on how he perceived them in the light of his past experiences. To rightly account for the foreign policy of any nation, each policy or policy direction must be judge relative to the leadership perception [41] vis-à-vis other relevant factors.

HYPOTHESES

In carrying out this study, the following research hypotheses will be tested.

1. Leadership perception exerts significant influence over and above other factors in the country's decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS.
2. A consensus of perceptual opinion among the leading actors led to the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is an attempt to analyse the influence of leadership perception of issues on Nigeria's foreign policy, focusing mainly on the country's decision to sponsor the formation of a sub-regional economic body - ECOWAS.

Most works on Nigeria's foreign policy have tend to focus on the domestic political processes within the country, [45] the political and administrative structures of the country, [46] the international environment [47] and the domestic factors, [48] thereby undermining the aspect of the leadership perception as an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy decisions.

Focusing on the leadership perception of issues and its influence on foreign policy decisions, it is our hope that this study will contribute to this aspect of the country's foreign policy which has remained relatively blank, except for few studies such as Ajene's [49] whose focus was not on Nigeria alone but on three countries within the West African sub-region (Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework for this study is the Decision-Making Theory. This theory was pioneered in 1954 by Richard C. Synder assisted by two of his junior colleagues H. W. Brucks and Burton Sapin, all of them were then affiliated to the Foreign Policy Analysis Project of Princeton University of the United States. This was the first extended and systematic attempt to conceptualise the role of decision-making in the formulation of foreign policy and in the process of international politics. [50] The trios' main concern was how to find a way of dealing with the complex factors that influences states behaviour. They argued that this could be achieved by developing a comprehensive checklist of the factors that could influence the behaviour of all states and of course of any one state. According to them:

> An understanding of all states is to be founded in an understanding of any one state through the scheme, which will permit the analytical construction of properties of action, which will be shared, in common by all specific states. [51]

They argued that for an understanding of international politics which is the 'actions, reactions and interactions among political entities called nation states' there is need for process analysis,[52] which includes above all the explanation of the decision-making process.[53] For a proper explanation of the sequence of international political actions and reactions, the makers of decision that led to these actions and reactions must be identified and an evaluation of the intellectual and interactive processes through which decisions were reached is necessary. [54]

The nation state as an actor in international politics was of central focus in the theory, though its proponents pointed out that the development and existence of supranational forces and organisations and non-governmental factors influences, and should be taken into consideration in any system of action. The theory questions the tendency on the part of traditional scholars to reify the state. In this theory the state was seen as:

> Its official decision-makers - those whose authoritative acts are to all intents and purposes, the act of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence the state is its decision-makers. State X as an actor is translated into its decision-makers as actors. [55]

This is as a result of the fact that the decisions of nation states are not taken by abstract entities but by concrete human beings.

Synder referred to the decision-making analysis as a form of social analysis, which uses a phenomenological approach in the sense that it does not try to impose the observer's criteria on the actors. He argued that for a proper understanding of the dynamics of these

nation states political actions, it is paramount that the analyst recreates the 'world' of the decision-makers as they view it. They saw the state as an actor in a 'situation', they define 'situation' as a combination of some selected relevant factors in the external and internal setting as they are being interpreted by the decision-makers. [56] 'The way they define situation becomes another way of saying this is the way the state is oriented to action and why'. [57] As the most important factors and conditions that shapens the foreign policy of any state are to be found in the foreign policy decision-making process, the model therefore compels the analyst to pay attention to the perceptions that conditions the decision-maker's choice.

The importance of this theory as a theoretical framework lies in the fact that it is an in-depth exploration of the psychological environment of the decision-makers with much emphasis on the decision-makers rather than on the state as an actor in itself. More to this, the need for a phenomenological approach and the theory's attempt to recreate the decision-makers perception in the analysis of issues, makes it relevant as a theoretical framework to this study which focuses on the leadership perception of issues and the resultant foreign policy decisions.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

FOREIGN POLICY: This is the aspect of state policy that is related to the international system. It is the range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined national objectives or goals.

FOREIGN POLICY ELITE: In a broad sense, as used by most scholars, this comprises of a wide group of persons, especially powerful men within the society who are in a position

to determine or influence a nation's political destiny and also set foreign policy goals. [58] The term is used in this study in reference to the few individuals in government who participate in foreign policy decision-making, or make foreign policy decisions in the name of the state. This comprises mostly of the members of cabinet and few top bureaucrats that participate in foreign policy decision-making. This term will be used interchangeably with foreign policy actors, leadership and decision-makers.

DECISION-MAKING: This is an act that involves the choice of an alternative from among a series of competing alternatives. [59]

LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION: It is the reality construct of decision-makers based on well structured internal cognitive processes interacting with the stimulus objects in their internal environment. [60]

METHODOLOGY:

The data that will be used for this study will be secondary data that will be derived from the works and accounts of scholars who have carried out studies on Nigeria's foreign policy. Newspapers and Magazines reports will also be used, official documents and releases will also form part of the data for this study.

The study will focus on how the leaders' perception of an issue influences their perception of the best alternative choice among all other available competing choices opened to them.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:

The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, it is divided into the following sub-topics: Introduction, research problem, literature review, hypotheses, significance of the study, theoretical framework, definitions of concepts, methodology and the analytical framework.

Chapter two is an analysis of some of the conditions that are necessary for regional integration. It will also take a look at some of the attempts at co-operation and integration in the West African sub-region from the early post independence period up to the formation of ECOWAS. Chapter three is a survey of Nigeria's domestic situation before the creation of ECOWAS. A survey of the existing situations in the West African sub-region within this period will also be done in this chapter.

Chapter four is an analysis of the foreign policy decision-makers' perception of prevailing domestic situation and existing situations both within and outside the West African sub-region as a backdrop for the decision to sponsor the formation of a sub-regional economic body - ECOWAS. Chapter five is the summary and conclusion.

FOOT NOTES

1. The global systemic variables are those external factors that are common to other nations, the cold war era could be classified as a global systemic variable. External factors are those that are peculiar to individual nations, which may be by virtue of their geographical location, immediate neighbouring countries or membership of some bilateral or regional organisations. However, in this study, we will lay less emphasis on this demarcation.
2. See Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).
3. Ajene O.G., Leadership perception of Issues and Foreign Policy Difference: A Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Orientations in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1984).
4. Ibid. pasim.
5. See Ibid. p. 16.
6. See Wolfe and Columbis, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice (Prentice - Hall of India, 1986).
7. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit. P. 16.
8. `Burton J.W., Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules. (Cambridge University Press) p.66.
9. See Gambari I.A., Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria Under the First Republic (ABU Press 1980) P.3; Also T.A. Columbis and J.H. Wolfe, Op. Cit. p. 141.
10. Robert Jervis, Op. Cit. p. 21.
11. See Ibid, for the views espoused by these leading officials.

12. J.H. Wolfe and T.A. Columbis, Op. Cit.
13. Cited from P.P. Izah, Continuity and Change in Nigerian Foreign Policy (ABU Press, 1991) p. 3-4.
14. I.A. Gambari, Op. Cit. p5.
15. See Henry Assisie Asobie, Decision-Making Revisited. An Analysis of the Application of Theories and Models of Foreign Policy Decision-Making to the Study of Nigeria's Foreign policy. in Gabriel O. Olusanya and Richard A. Akindele (eds.), The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria 1960-1990 (NIIA and Vintage Publishers, (1990) p.25.
16. I.A. Gambari, Op. Cit. p. 4.
17. Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960 - 1966 (Ibadan University Press, 1973) p. 113.
18. Rosenau J.N., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York 1967).
19. U. Joy Ugwu, Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures (NIIA, 1986) P.52.
20. Akinyemi A.B, Foreign Policy and Federalism (Ibadan University Press, 1974) pp. 2-3.
21. G.J. Idang, Op. Cit. p6.
22. Cited from Aluko O. (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States (Hodder and Stroughton, 1971) p.1.
23. P.P. Izah, Op. Cit. p. 135.
24. Ibid. p. 140.
25. See Aforka Nweke, The Domestic Structures and processes for Nigeria's Foreign Policy in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Nigeria's External Relations: The first Twenty - five Years (University Press Ltd, Ibadan, 1986) p. 34.
26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. p. 35.

28. Ibid.

29. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit. p. 35.

30. Cited in Ibid.

31. Cited in Ibid.

32. Olatunde J.B. Ojo, Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS, in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, Op. Cit. (1990) p. 346.

33. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit. p. 35.

34. Ibid.

35. See Robert Jervis, Op. Cit. p. 16.

36. See Othman Mahmud, The Agent of Change - Foreign Policy. In Asikpo Essien - Ibok (ed.), political Repression and Assassination (Gaskiya Zaria, 1983).

37. Mahmud Tukur, Nigeria's External Relations: The United Nations as a Forum and Policy Medium in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. October 1960-December 1965 (Northern Nigeria Publishing Corporation, (n. d.) p. 81.

38. Othman Mahmud, The Agent of Change.... In Asikpo Essien - Ibok (ed.), Op. Cit.

39. Mahmud Tukur, Op. Cit. p. 81.

40. Olatunde J.B. Ojo, The Making and Termination of Anglo - Nigerian Defence Pact, in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, Op. Cit.

41. Ibid. p. 270.

42 G.J. Idang, Op. Cit.

43. Ibid.

44. U. Joy Ugwu, Op. Cit. p. 11.

45. Gambari I.A, Op. Cit.; G.J. Idang Op. Cit.

46. Akinyemi A.B., Op. Cit.

47. Mahmud Tukur, Op. Cit.

48. P.P. Izah, Op. Cit.

49. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit.

50. Henry Assisie Asobie, Decision-making Revisited.... In G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1990) p. 25.

51. Rosenau J.N., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1969) p. 200.

52. Ibid.

53. See Henry Assisie Asobie, Decision-Making Revisited .... in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, Op. Cit. (1990) p. 25.

54. Ibid.

55. Rosenau J.N., Op. Cit. p. 202.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Mahmud Tukur, Op. Cit. p. 3.

59. Augustus Adebayo, Power in Politics (Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan 1986) p.31.

60. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit. p. 46.

CHAPTER TWO

POST INDEPENDENCE ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATING WEST AFRICA.

CONDITIONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Regional co-operation has been described as a 'vague term covering any inter state activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced need.' [1] It is a joint action involving either two or more states, either in the area of programmes or a common project.

As for economic integration, it involves several stages of close economic relations between defined states within a geographical region. [2] It is a long time gradual process through which the existing political systems 'continuously forgo the desire and ability to conduct key foreign and domestic policies independently of each other' [3] instead they try to make joint decisions or delegate the decision-making process to newly created supranational central organs. [4] The existence of these supranational institutions do lead to an infringement on the total sovereignty of the members states.

Economic integration, to the political scientist, appears to be a continuous process that is a classic example of a continuous exercise of conflict resolution. [5] These conflicts in the experiment of integration are as a result of competing interests and priorities of the components political systems, and the resultant competition in the distribution of the costs and benefits of integration. [6]

Scholars and policy makers are in a consensus that integration should aim at raising the living standards of the masses through a deliberate and concerted policy of collective self-reliance aiming at eliminating underdevelopment and progressively reducing the

dependency of these countries on the developed capitalists countries. [7] Conventional neo-classical theorists are of the view that integration do bring about expanded economic opportunities through specialisation based on comparative advantage and economies of scale. [8]

To the economist, the benefits of integration derived by the sponsoring powers are profits that are measured exclusively in monetary terms. To the political scientist, other criteria such as prestige and influence on the future political decisions of other member states and to an extent, security benefits are to be included.

The criteria for regional co-operation could either be geographical or functional involving ideological, economic, cultural and security needs. Generally, the motivating force in regional integration has always been provided by a fusion of elements of geographic proximity, complementary economic interests, shared historical experiences and common political aspiration: whether for self determination or for international status and prestige.' [9] These have provided the backdrop for the formation of most regional groupings world-wide.

Integration is a gradual process that involves five stages, these are:

a. The formation of a free trade area, which is the beginning and it has to do with the abolition of all forms of trade barriers among the member states.

b. Establishment of a custom union, which is the establishment of a common tariff policy towards non-members countries.

c. The establishment of a common market which will create an environment for the free movement of factors of production and commodities in the area .

d. A complete economic union which involves the harmonisation of national economic policies among member countries.

c. Total economic integration, which is the unification of economic and social policies and the setting up of a supranational authority. [10]

Ontin is of the opinion that the distinction between an economic union and a common market is not to be taken serious. He argued that a common market spans beyond the issue of freedom of trade and free movement of factors of production but that 'it involves as well the adoption of measures such as the co-ordination of the social and economic policies of the participating countries which will ensure that a single market only prevails for goods as well as factors of production.' [11] He further stressed that total economic integration could be said to be the same with full economic community. [12]

Singer suggested some preconditions that are fundamental to economic integration. These conditions deal mainly with the prevalent situation within the proposed union, among these are:

a. Economic integration is likely going to be more successful when member countries are of equal economic importance, as the existence of a more developed member may give birth to the fear of domination among members.

b. It will be more beneficial when member countries are at an 'exceeding small industrial base' that focuses mostly on the processing of natural resource products and small-scale industries. This will make the union will be devoid of vested interest and the overriding problems will centre mainly on the distribution of new industries rather than compensating those countries with contracting inefficient industries.

c. There is much likelihood of success when the size of each member is not so large as to warrant any of them to 'contemplate an essentially national policy of industrialisation' in place of regional co-ordination.

d. There is need of regional or foreign sources of aid which will be channelled through institutions whose objective is the support of the integration idea. [13]

A fifth condition could be added to Singer's four conditions, this is the need for the economies of member countries to be free from control and manipulation by foreign companies, as this will divert the benefits of integration to foreign countries in form of profits dividends and payments of specialised manpower. There is also the tendency that the foreign companies will collaborate to stifled increased competition.

In the case of ECOWAS, Nigeria has the capability of dominating other countries. Relatively advanced levels of industrialisation in Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast (Cote D'ivoire) are pointers to the existence of 'vested interests', thus there is the tendency for new regional industries to gravitate towards these countries. Nigeria is equally large enough to contemplate an independent national policy of industrialisation as an alternative to regional development. Likewise, most economies in the West African sub-region as a whole are controlled by foreign capital, thus for the benefits of integration to accrue to the participating countries, there is the need for them to implement an indigenisation or a nationalisation programme first before integration

It is worthy of note that the preconditions enumerated above do not in any way cover the complete range of conditions that are necessary for a successful attempt at integration. Karl Deutsch and his colleagues contributed much to the properties and requirements for a successful integration. They outlined nine conditions that they considered to be essential for any unification process. [14] However, they did not claim to have discovered any combination or set of conditions that are necessary for a unification process. [15]

Haas and Schimiter in their work on Latin America also suggested a pattern of nine variables, which may intervene in the link between economic and political unification. They considered some four factors as background conditions that are of particular interest, these are the relative sizes of the units; their rate of transaction; their extent of pluralism; and the elite complementarity. [16]

In any form of integration, a certain level of goodwill and trust among the government of member states, and the nature and stage of economic development within the region are very important in determining the rate of progress that will be made towards integration. Also important is the extent to which the economies within the region are complementary or competitive and the rate of trade within the region both at inter and intra-country level.

As for ECOWAS, the move by the West African states towards a closer economic relationship was born out of the desire to find a way of accelerating economic development in the sub-region. [17] This move became possible with the severing of political and partly economic ties with the former colonial powers which prior to independence were the custodians of these countries' political, social and economic welfare. Although the objective of integrating the region was economic, the motivating factor was mainly political, as it was a 'reaction against the economic consequences of the long period of political dependence on European countries'. [18] This nationalistic factor that motivated these countries into experimenting on integration made them to ignore some of the conditions that are assumed to be of relevance to economic integration. It also contributed to their ignoring the relevance of the nature of the structure of their economies to the desired stage of co-operation, as the community aim was to develop co-operation between member states in all fields. [19]

WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES' APPROACH TO REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Since their attainment of independence in the 1960s, Some West African countries have with much zeal pursued policies of regional co-operation, this is as a result of their desire for socio-economic development and also for their ambition to reduce their dependency on the former metropoles. [20] This has led to the proliferation of attempts at regional co-operation and integration in the Sub-region. However the political structures, combined with the linguistic and the colonial structures that were obtainable in the West African sub-region acted as a retarding factor to an early post independence 'movement towards a comprehensive integrative system'. [21] As a result of colonial legacy, the pattern of groupings in the sub-region, tend to follow linguistic lines along the Anglophone and Francophone barriers, comprising of the former British West African countries and former French West African countries (Afrique Occidentale Francaise).

In the former French West African countries, there was a debate immediately after world war II, among locally elected French West African nationalists leaders as to whether independence should be sought and obtained under a framework of a federation of French West Africa (Federation de L'Aof). With leaders such as Felix Houphouet Boigny who were in favour of the autonomy of the various units; the French with the aim of preventing the realisation of a united French West Africa, favoured the autonomists group. This is due to the fact that a united French West Africa will be a hindrance to France's interest in the sub-region. To perpetuate France control of the sub-region, a policy of balkanisation was adopted base on the principle of 'divide and rule' whereby the area was broken up into small 'non-viable states that are incapable of independent development'. [22]

The French also embark on a policy of initiation, support and the control of purely Francophone political and functional regional organisations. This was an effort that was

aimed at ensuring the preservation of distinctive French administration and cultural heritage. It was equally an attempt to prevent the formation of broader trans-linguistic and trans-cultural pan-African organisations thereby promoting France's political, economic and strategic interests in the sub-region. This two-fold policy can adequately account for the emergence of a number of regional organisations among the French speaking West African countries from 1958 to the early 1970s.

In terms of co-operation among West African countries there was a striking contrast between the Francophone countries and their Anglophone counterparts in the sub-region. The former, with France's intervention, strove to maintain and retain the colonial institutions and also to create new ones, but to all intent and purpose, the later went out to disband even the existing ones with little or no effort at creating new ones. That notwithstanding there were few functional institutions that were in existence among the Anglophone West African countries, an example is the Mano River Union (MRU) whose membership comprises of Sierra Leone and Liberia.

To an extent, the Francophone countries were successful in initiating functional co-operation programmes but similar attempts towards cross-cultural co-operations or integration between the Francophone and Anglophone countries in the sub-region in the 1960s were nothing but largely failures. There was the attempt to establish an economic association between Ghana and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and between Ghana and Guinea in 1961. There was also a discussion on economic co-operation between Gambia and Senegal in 1963. In 1966, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone made an attempt to establish a free trade area; all these attempts ended up as failures.

Failures of attempts at cross-cultural co-operations could be traced to the impact of the different colonial development philosophies on the two groups of countries in the sub-

region. The level of control exercised by the former metropolitan powers, especially France, on the political and economic life of their former colonies in the West African sub-region cannot also be ignored in trying to account for these failures. This control from the former metropolitan powers has much influence on the political elite attitudes towards cross-cultural economic co-operation in the sub-region.

The instances of success at co-operation and bilateral agreements stem from the absence of sub-regional wide customs arrangement and economic institutions combine with most countries balance of payment problems and the need to clear off structural obstacles to trade expansion efforts. This gave rise to bilateral agreements; as bilateral agreements that incorporate payment agreements help to foster trade and also conserve scarce foreign exchange.

Most of the countries had one form of bilateral trade agreement or the other with other countries in the sub-region. There was the Ghana-Upper Volta agreement, the Mano River Union comprising of Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Ghana-Togo agreement. Nigeria also had agreements with six other countries in the sub-region, these are, Benin (Dahomey), Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. [23]

It is worthy of note that even bilateral trade agreements among West African countries had limited success. This could be attributed to their similar pattern of production and the non complimentarity of their goods, thereby leading to blocked balances resulting from a persistent debtor or creditor position of one or the other of the parties. [24] As a result of these problems, although bilateral agreements cut across cultural and the old colonial boundaries, nevertheless they proved inadequate for fostering intra-regional trade or for the promotion of economic co-operation within the sub-region.

There were Series of attempts towards integration during the first decade of most West African countries' independence. Some of these attempts were designed to 'bolster new political alliances through commercial and economic agreements' while others were designed with the aim of reawakening existing pre-independence links. The remaining part of this chapter will focus on some of these attempts at fostering co-operation and integration in the sub-region. The analysis will be restricted to the post independence period up to mid 1970s (1957-1975).

THE WEST AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION (UDAO)

The earliest of these organisations was the West African Customs Union or Union Dounniere entre les Etats de L'Afrique Occidentale (UDAO). The UDAO was established on 9 June 1959 when seven French speaking West African countries (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta) signed in Paris a convention creating the organisation. It was a lose economic union that depended much on bilateral agreements among member nations. The main aim of establishing the union was to maintain the customs union regime in effect before independence, and also to harmonise import duties among the member states. [25]

Rivalry between Senegal and Ivory Coast led to the collapse of the union immediately after the former French West African countries became autonomous states. While Senegal was determined to preserve her place among the ex-Afrique Occidentale Francaise. Ivory Coast was eager to develop her trade and industry; thus the union became in-operative shortly after its formation. The union's over ambitious goals, inflexible provisions and complicated machinery also hinders its smooth and effective operation. [26]

The organisation was also faced with other problems such as the existing differential levels of development among the various member countries and difficulties in co-ordinating investment policies. There was also the issue of sovereignty as most countries were out to protect their newly gained political independence, there was the tendency for development activities to concentrate in the relatively more developed countries and the problem of distributing financial gains from the union through inter - countries payments.

In June 1966, the UDAO was replace by the UDEAO, but the new organisation could be said to be only a change of name as the membership of the union remained unchanged with little insignificant adjustments.

ENTENTE COUNCIL (COUNSEIL DE L'ENTENTE AFRICAINE)

In 1959, under the inspiration of Felix Houphouet Boigny, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta (also members of the UDAO) came together to form the Counseil de L'entente Africaine (Entente Council). This was a political and economic union that made provision for the eventual establishment of a custom union. Its aim was the management of joint services within two transport projects, these are the Cotonou and Abidjan harbours and the Abidjan - Niger railway lines. Solidarity fund was established for the financial operation of these projects and member countries contribution and receipts was based on their relative level of development. Every state contributed 10% of her budgetary receipts to the fund but the proceeds were distributed in favour of the relatively less developed member countries.[27]

The union's success attracted Togo to join it as the fifth member country in June 1966. The union was more successful than the UDAO, its relative success stem from the level of

commitment of the member states. The 'progressive modification of the initial idea of the solidarity fund' further contributed to the union's success, the fund was modified from its former role into a lending institution that assists member countries and also guarantees them borrowing rights.[28] The relatively less developed member countries Dahomey, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta) were granted greater drawing rights than Ivory Coast that was relatively more developed.

THE UNION DOUANIERE DES ESTATS DE L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST (UDEAO)

The UDEAO was the organisation that replaced the UDAO in June 1966. As earlier pointed out, it was nothing more than a mere change of name as its membership was not affected and there were only little insignificant adjustments.

The UDEAO was a much more loose economic grouping that made provision for a committee of experts and a council of ministers, it has its secretariat in Ouagadougou. It cannot be said to be a full scale custom union, rather it was an organisation with the concern of creating a special tax credit as a sole incentive to intra-regional trade.[29]

The UDEAO's convention made provision for the free movement of goods that are produced within the community and for the equitable distribution of custom revenue imposed on non member countries' imports. It made provision for a common external tariff with 3 types of rates: there were to be preferential treatment to member states, minimum tariff for favoured nations and a general tariff which was to be 3 times higher for other countries.

Both internal and external factors weakened the objectives of the system. Among these factors are the Ivorian trading relationship with some of her entente partners, and in so far as net imports were concerned, upper Volta and Niger were discriminating against some of the UDEAO members such as Mali. The narrow internal tax base of member countries and their heavy dependence on revenue from custom duties also led to difficulties over the administration of common custom duties and the distribution of the resulting revenue. [30] Towards the end, when things started disintegrating, member countries decided to impose internal taxes and import restrictions at their discretion.

These problems confronting the organisation made some of the member states to loose confidence in the organisation. The organisation also came under strong criticism, which was spearheaded mainly by Mali. [31] With all these the organisation finally collapsed in June 1972.

THE WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION

The West African monetary union or Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) was established on may 2 1962. Its membership comprises of seven French speaking West African countries (Dohomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta). Mali withdrew from the union that same year and issued her own currency, the Mali franc. Following the devaluation of the Mali franc in 1967, she joined the union again. These seven French speaking West Africa countries used the same currency, the Communate Franciere Africaine (CFA) franc and also share a single central bank, the Banque Centrale des Estats de l'Africque de l'Ouest (BCEAO). The notes issued by the BCEAO were legal

tender in all member countries. There was a fixed parity between the CFA franc and the French franc; with its convertibility guaranteed by the French government.[32]

Under this arrangement, member countries were to enjoy overdraft facilities, but the bulk of their exchange transactions were to be handled by France. Their foreign exchange reserves were held exclusively in French franc and were to be deposited in an operational account in the French treasury. The arrangement also provided for individual firms to be allowed the freedom to transfer money into and out of these countries. To an extent this arrangement provided a solution to those countries that were faced with balance of payments problems and it also serves as a stabiliser to the value of the CFA franc. In all, it gave France an unrestricted control of the economies of member states, as they have to follow France monetary and financial policies.[33]

THE COMMUNUATE ECONOMIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE DE'OUEST (CEAO)

Following the demise of the UDEAO in June 1972, a new organisation known as the Communnuate Economiques de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), or the West African Economic Community (WAEC) was established in 1973. In 1970 Heads of state of some member countries of the ex-AOF met in Bamako, Mali (Guinea was not represented) to propose the formation of a new organisation to succeed the UDEAO. On June 3 1972 the main treaty was signed and the annexed protocols were also signed in Abidjan on April 12 1973. The treaty that brought the CEAO into force was finally ratified in Bamako in 1973.

The composition of the CEAO points to the fact that it was a French inspired strategy using her former colonies, to check the sub-region's giant- Nigeria, as it was feared that she will dominate any economic community that might be formed in the sub-region. The

CEAO's membership comprises of all member countries of the former Custom Union of West African states (UDAO) with the exception of Benin Republic.

It was envisaged that the organisation was to evolve into a custom union having a common external tariff on imports from third countries by the year 1986. The organisation also aimed at abolishing custom duties on trade on raw materials among members, but regional 'co-operation tax' was to be imposed on industrial goods. [34] Other objectives of the union include the development of transport and communication system; and the harmonisation of industrial development within the community and the expansion of trade among African nations. [35]

Benin and Togo, two countries that have close historic, economic and ethnic ties with Nigeria and Ghana respectively decided to assume observer status right from the CEAO's preparatory meetings; thus the two countries did not ratify the treaty establishing the organisation. Although Upper Volta signed and ratified the treaty establishing the CEAO and its protocols, the country's leadership saw her membership in the organisation as a hindrance to fully accomplishing her economic development plans and orientation. [36]

It was Niger's firm belief that as long as Nigeria was not a member, the custom union was not complete and that Nigeria's absence will make the custom union unviable. On the other hand, the landlocked states in the organisation (Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger) based on their past experiences in similar organisations insisted on assurances of sacrifices from Senegal and Ivory Coast, this resulted in the establishment of a solidarity fund.

Lack of commitment among members to the principles on which the organisation was formed crippled the organisation. Although in June 1972, the CEAO members signed an agreement in principle and by 1973 the annexed protocols were also signed; 'the conflicting

reservations and amendments had made it difficult for the CEAO to take off from the well prepared "Tableau synoptic."[37]

THE RIVER NIGER COMMISSION

Discussion between Nigeria and Mali started in February 1960, later Dahomey and Niger joined up in 1961 to seek expert advice on the consequences of an intergovernmental plan on the development of the Niger basin. [38] The commission came into existence in February 1963 after the Niamey conference. The commission is an inter-governmental organisation of six West African countries through which the river Niger passes through; these countries are Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria and Mali.

The functions of this commission include the evaluation and dissemination of data on the Niger basin; examination of member states projects that are related to the basin; maintenance of liaison between member states so as to ensure the most effective use of the waters and resources of the basin. It also makes recommendations to 'governments plans for common studies for the judicious utilisation and development of the resources of the basin and draw up general regulations to ensure implementation of its principles.' This commission is a functional co-operation without the attributes of a free trade area or a customs union.

THE SENEGAL BASIN DEVELOPMENT,

The Senegal basin development or the Organisation des Estats Riveraine du Senegal (OERS) was established after members states of the former Mali Federation comprising of Senegal, Mali and Mauritania met with Guinea in 1962 to arrange common development

plans for the Senegal basin. A convention creating an inter-state committee for promoting and co-ordinating studies and on the development was signed a year after in Bamako. A statute establishing the organisation was signed in Labe, Guinea on 24th March 1968.

The organisation has the main objectives of furthering economic development through co-ordinated planning and increased mobility of goods, services and people. The dispute between Senegal and Guinea resulted to the break up of the organisation in 1971. In March 1972, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal came together to form the organisation Pour La Mise en Valour de Fleuve Senegal (OMVS) in place of the OERS. Rather than laying emphasis on political objectives, the new organisation's main thrust was economic, which was the planning and development of the Senegal River Basin.

THE MANO RIVER UNION

The Mano River Union (MRU) was inaugurated in October 1973; as of then, the union's membership was made up of two English speaking West African countries: Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea later joined the union in October 1980 to bring the membership to three. The organisation was a loose custom union having a common external tariff and complete trade liberalisation for goods that originate from member states. [39]

The union has established a commission on trade and industry, they have also 'agreed on common principles and policy for the promotion of 1989 Union industries' [40] The union also aims at embarking on bilateral ventures in the following fields.

a. Establishment of joint industries
b. Development of hydro-electricity in the Mano River Basin
c. Land resources survey of the Mano basin

d. Joint training schemes in the fields of forestry, post and telecommunications and marine activities.

e. Establishment of good routes between Freetown and Monrovia

f. A scholarship programme for the union.

g Faculty exchange programme and joint curricular planning.

h. Institutional material and book development for both countries. [41]

OTHER BILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

Certain factors have tend to bar the Anglophone and Francophone West African countries from co-operation, that notwithstanding, there exists instances of co-operation among them especially after the demise of colonialism from these countries. The Lake Chad Basin Commission which, was established in the early 1960s with Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as member countries is an example of such cross linguistics co-operation in post colonial West Africa.

One of the early attempts towards cross-cultural integration in the sub-region was initiated by William Tubman of Liberia in 1964; it was an attempt to establish a free exchange zone between Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This attempt was mainly oriented towards achieving economic objectives. After a summit of representatives of the four countries in Monrovia on 24 August 1964, a secretary general was appointed and a secretariat was also established in Liberia. It was hoped that the free exchange zone set up among these countries would facilitate economic and commercial activities, which would have led to the establishment of a West African Economic Community. Political

conflict between Guinea and Ivory Coast led to the non-participation of the two countries, which in turn resulted to the subsequent collapse of the attempt. [42]

In 1968, a transit rights agreement allowing the transit of people and merchandise was signed between Nigeria and Togo. This agreement abolished visa requirement for a visit of less than ninety days, but the requirement of a passport to cross the frontiers remained unabolished. [43]

Also in 1968, a Senegal - Gambian committee was set up for the development of communications among the two countries. Ghana and Upper Volta also signed an agreement for the supply of meat between them. They also signed a protocol agreement for the recommencement of commercial air service between the two countries.

Again in 1968, Ghana, Dahomey and Togo signed an agreement; as a result, Dahomey and Togo formed a joint company, the Communuate Eletrique du Benin, to buy electricity from the Volta Power Authority (Ghana). The Niger River commission was also established by countries that are bordering the river Niger. Its aim was to ensure the utilisation of the Niger River to generate electricity, irrigation, industrial fishing and navigation. The treaty for the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) was ratified in 1970 under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The association's aim was the improvement of planned production of rice and also to promote research that will improve yield. Other agricultural institutions in the West African sub-region include the Cocoa Producers Alliance (CPA), African Groundnut Council (AGC) and Inter African Coffee Organisation (IACO). All these association had the sole aim of developing the various sectors of agriculture thereby improving the output which was of importance to the development of

the sub-region as agriculture was and is still very important to the economies of most countries in the sub-region.

There were series of bilateral trade agreements to effect trade payments among countries in the sub-region, this was born out of the desire to eliminate the use of foreign exchange in trade transactions within the sub-region. The Nigeria-Niger agreement, which apart from trade also included the supply of electricity from Nigeria's Kainji dam to Niger, is an example of such trade agreements that were concluded.

From this analysis, one can rightly conclude that there were numerous attempts toward co-operation with the aim of subsequently integrating the sub-region. The chequered history and the failure of attempts at integrating the sub-region provided the needed background for a comprehensive integration of the sub-region.

THE EVOLUTION OF ECOWAS

The idea of integrating Anglophone and Francophone West Africa was discussed during the December 1962 ECA's meeting. The ECA's 7th session which was held in February 1965 in Nairobi, Kenya; recommended in resolution 142 (viii) and resolution 145 (vii) that member states of the commission should establish on regional basis, as soon as possible, an intergovernmental machinery for harmonising their economic and social development.

Attempts towards evolving a comprehensive sub-regional economic organisation that cut across the colonial language groups in the sub-region started with meetings organised by countries in the sub-region. Some of these meetings were organised under the auspices of the ECA, beginning with the Lagos conference on industrial co-ordination in West

Africa on 10 - 14 October 1966. It was during the Accra, Ghana conference of 27th April - 5th May 1967 that the articles of association for the establishment of an economic community for West Africa was adopted and signed.

Article one of the articles of association stipulates the aim of the community to be established as:

a. Promotion of co-ordinated and equitable development of member states' economies through economic co-operation.

b. Enhance as much as possible the interchange of goods and services among member states.

c. Contribute to the orderly expansion of trade between member states and the rest of the world.

d. Through these efforts, to contribute to the economic development of the African continent as a whole.[44]

Article two deals with the general undertakings of the contracting states. It focuses on the co-ordination and the harmonisation of economic policies; constant consultation between member states negotiating with the world market as well as formulating and adopting common policies; providing the community with information required; engaging in joint research and training of manpower and the implementation of other projects that are meant to promote the objectives of the community.[45]

Article three granted the individual member states the right to take both within and outside the community measures of economic co-operation without the agreement of the other member states, in as much as such measures are not prejudicial to the aims of the community.[46] This article protected the rights of the French speaking West African

countries who were already into some form of economic agreement with France, it also encourage and preserved some existing functional organisations and bilateral economic agreements among member countries. [47]

After signing and adopting the articles of association, an interim council of ministers was established to prepare a draft treaty for the proposed community. The council's first meeting was in Dakar, in November 1967 and it was agreed that the inaugural meeting of the proposed community should take place at the Heads of State or Head of Government level. This summit took place on 24 April 1968 when the Heads of States of nine countries met in Monrovia (Liberia) to sign the protocol establishing the West African regional group.

Countries represented at this Monrovia meeting were Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and Upper Volta. It is worthy of note that, with the exception of Upper Volta, all the entente member states (Dahomey, Niger, Ivory Coast and Togo) were conspicuously absent. Although Togo was absent from this meeting, in principle, she was in support of the idea of regional economic co-operation. The Liberian leader, President William Tubman was mandated to contact Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey (the absentee states) on the idea of the union. [48]

During the Monrovia meeting Nigeria and Guinea were mandated to carry out priority studies of areas of co-operation. Liberia and Senegal were also mandated to prepare a draft treaty and protocol on customs union. Officials of both Nigeria and Guinea met to prepare the priority studies, which were, submitted to the 14 West African states pending its consideration by the interim council of ministers. Unfortunately, this council did not meet again, thus neither were the studies considered nor the draft treaty and protocols considered or adopted

NIGERIA - TOGO INITIATIVE

The 1968 effort at establishing a community was followed by a period of inaction and no any other effort at integration was made until General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo met in April 1972 to discuss how to improve economic co-operation in the region. After this meeting, the two governments signed an agreement of co-operation between them. Subsequently, a joint delegation of top officials from the two countries visited 14 West African countries between July and August 1973 to present the proposal for the sub-regional organisation. Consequently on 10 - 15 December 1973, ministers of fifteen independent West African countries attended a summit in Lome, Togo The draft treaty that was prepared during this council of ministers summit was adopted in another ministerial meeting that took place in Liberia in late January 1975.[49] A third ministerial meeting was held in Lagos to finalise the treaty before the Heads of State summit.

The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was finally signed by Heads of State and Plenipotentiaries representing fifteen West African countries on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. The treaty came into effect on 23 June 1975 when seven states (as provided by article 62 of the treaty) ratified the agreement. The countries that ratified the agreement were Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo and Upper Volta. By early July of the same year, the number of countries that ratified the agreement rose to ten following the ratification by Dahomey, Gambia and Niger. With this, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) came into existence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Haas Ernst B. The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of pre-theorising, cited in Guy martins, African Regional Integration. Lessons from the West and Central African Experiences (NIIA Lecture series No. 50, 1989) p.5.
2. E.J. Usoro, past and present Attempts at Economic Integration in West Africa, in E.C Edozien and E. Osagie (eds.), Economic Integration of West Africa (Ibadan University press, 1982) p.40.
3. See E.J.O. Nwabuzor, Theory of Economic Integration. A political Approach in Ibid. p.19.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p.20.
6. Ibid.
7. Guy Martins, Op. Cit. p.7
8. Ibid. p.6
9. Okon Udokang, Nigeria and ECOWAS: Economic and political Implications of Regional Integration in A.B Akinyemi (ed.) Nigerian and the World. Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy. (oxford University press Ibadan 1978) p.57.
10. Dr Guy martins, Op. Cit. p.6.
11. See R.A Tokuta (Miss) ECOWAS Treaty and the East African Common Market Compared in Akinyemi A.B. et al (eds.), Readings and Documents on ECOWAS (NIIA/Macmillan Nigeria Ltd, 1983) p.92.
12. Ibid.

13. E.C. Edozien and E. Osagie, Economic Integration in Less Developed Countries: Theoretical Considerations, in E.C Edozien and E Osagie (eds.) Op. Cit. pp 12-13

14. See E.J.O. Nwabuzor in Ibid. pp. 27 - 29 for a detail analysis of the conditions.

15. See Ibid. p. 27

16 Ibid. p. 30

17. See Ralph I. Onwuka, Development and Integration in West Africa: The case of the Economic Community of West African states p.18.

18. E. J. Usoro in E.C. Edozien and E. Osagie (eds.), Op. Cit. p. 41.

19 . Ibid.

20. Guy martins. Op. Cit. p.1

21. See Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p.8

22. Guy Martins. Op. Cit., p.8.

23 E A. Ajayi, Towards Economic co-operation in West Africa, in A.B. Akinyemi et. al (eds.) Op. Cit. p.136

24. Ibid. p.136.

25. Kori-siakpere Emoghene (Miss), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Its Successes and failures 1975 - 1985 (Unpublished B.A. project, Delta State University, Abraka 1992) p.10

26. Ibid.

27. E.J. Usoro in E.C. Edozien and E. Osagie 1982 Op. Cit. p. 51

28. Ibid.

29. Ambassador peter A. Afolabi, ECOWAS: Building a West African Economic Community, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.), Op. Cit. p. 50

30 E.A. Ajayi, Op. Cit. in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Ibid. p. 141

31. Ambassador peter A. Afolabi, in Ibid. p. 51

32. See S.B. Falegan, West African Organisations for Co-operation in E.C. Edozien and E. Osagie Op. Cit., p.60

33. Ibid.

34 E.A. Ajayi in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 140

35. Ibid.

36. See Ambassador peter Afolabi, ECOWAS, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.), Ibid. p. 51

37. S.B. Falegan in E.C. Edozien and E. Osagie (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 69

38 Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p. 29

39. Guy martins, Op. Cit. p. 14

40 See Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p. 32

41. Guy martins, Op. Cit. p. 14

42. Ambassador Peter Afolabi in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.), Op. Cit. p.53

43. S.B. Falegan in E.C Edozien and E. Osagie (eds.), Op. Cit. p.66

44 See Ralph I. Onwuka Op. Cit. p.61

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. p. 62

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid. p.65

49. Ibid. p.7

CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA'S DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an attempt to examine the domestic situation that was prevalent in Nigeria as of the time of the formation of ECOWAS. Before doing this, a general overview of the situation in the West African sub-region will be made. It is our contention that it was the leadership perception of the existing domestic situation and the external environment vis-à-vis the benefits the country was to derive from the organisation that influenced their decision to provide the initiative for the formation of ECOWAS.

THE WEST AFRICAN ENVIRONMENT.

West Africa is that area bounded in the south and west by the Atlantic Ocean, in the east by the Federal Republic of Cameroon and in the north by the northern boundaries of Mali, Mauritania and Niger. [1]

This area was colonised by some of the colonial powers (notably Britain, France, Portugal and Spain), who established a sort of colonial economic linkage between the metropoles and these peripheral states that were located in the West African sub-region.

A solid foundation that was based on force, violence, political and legal mechanisms was laid down under the colonial era for the transformation of the West African colonies. This action was based on the desire to integrate these areas into the world capitalist system as peripheral production enclaves rather than as equal actors in the system. It was under this period that the background for the creation of capitalist infrastructures and the

entrenchment of the pattern and direction of the commercial and political relation for the sub-region in the post independence period was provided.

As the colonial economy was developing there was the gradual transformation of the social and class structure which also set in motion the process of integrating these countries into the world capitalist system. Thereby engendering the concomitant development of external economic relations based on the export of primary products.

During the colonial era, exports from these countries were of great importance to the economic base of the metropoles. Under this period, the economies of these countries were monetised in order to guarantee a smooth and regular export of minerals and agricultural products from the area. All forms of political and economic associations with these colonies became the prerogative of the metropolitan colonial powers. This succeeded in instituting a form of colonial dependency status on the part of the colonies and this continued into the post independence era.

As of 1975, the 15 countries that constitute the ECOWAS, according to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), had a population of about 122.717m, which is spread over an area of 6,141,153 sq. Km.[2]. There is a wide variation in the sizes of these countries both geographically and in terms of population. For instance, Gambia, the smallest country has a population of less than 0.5m spread over an area of only 11,295 sq. km, Niger Republic has a corresponding figure of 4.304m and 1,267,000 sq. km, whereas Nigeria has 71.262m occupying an area of 923, 768 sq. km.[3] (see table 1).

TABLE 1: LAND AREA, POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP

DISTRIBUTION IN WEST AFRICA

COUNTRY	AREA (sq. km)	POPULATION MID 1970 1970 (IN THOUSANDS)	PER CAPITA GNP AT MARKET PRICES (ESTIMATED MID 1973)
DAHOMEY	112622	2947	110 (Preliminary Estimate)
GAMBIA	11295	493	120
GHANA	238537	9313	300
GUINEA	246000	5243	100 (preliminary Estimate)
GUINEA BISSAU	36125	800	230 (For 1972)
IVORY COAST	322,463	5600	360
LIBERIA	111369	1452	330
MALI	1240000	5370	70
MAURITANIA	1032 455	1257	190
NIGER	1267000	4304	90
NIGERIA	923 768	71262	170
SENEGAL	197 161	4070	270
SIERRA LEONE	72 236	2787	190
TOGO	56000	2105	170
UPPER VOLTA	274 122	5714	70
TOTAL	6141 153	122 717	184.7

SOURCE: E.A Ajayi, Towards Economic Co-operation in West Africa, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Readings and Documents on ECOWAS p. 131.

Most countries in West Africa were in the first decade or at best second decade of their independence. Some of the leaders, such as Felix Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast and Leopold Senghor of Senegal, to mention a few, were anxious to guard and preserve their political independence. They were therefore, not politically committed to the idea of integration as they continuously opposed any move that will make them loose part of their sovereignty on certain economic decisions.

Ironically, in-spite of the desire by the leaders of these West African countries to guard their sovereignty in its totality, their political and economic allegiance was to the West especially to their former colonisers. This was further compounded by the former French West African countries' undue allegiance to France; they were so tied to the apron strings of France to the extend that they developed a feeling of strong affinity to France than to their neighbouring English speaking West African countries. There was also an existing solidarity among French speaking West African countries that had the concomitant effect of widening the barrier between the French and the English speaking countries in the sub-region. For attempts towards a comprehensive integration as an avenue for regional development to succeed there was the need for these barriers to be narrowed. [4]

Intra-regional trade among these countries had been very low relative to the level of trade that goes on between them and other developed countries of the north (see table 2 and 3). In the early 1960's the trade figure among these West African countries was 3.3% and since then the situation has not dramatically change

TABLE 2: DIRECTION OF WEST AFRICAN IMPORTS IN 1971

(IN THOUSANDS OF US DOLLARS)

Country	World	EEC	W. Africa	Africa	% EEC/World	% W. Afr./World
Dahomey *	54747	34869	6288	7963	63.69	11.48
Gambia *	20459	9531	5880	781	46.59	28.74
Ghana	434283	216122	15901	24407	49.76	3.66
Guinea *	55023	40900	1066	1066	74.33	1.94
Guinea Bissau	30577	8951	2	1834	29.27	0.00
Ivory Coast	399129	278491	14285	30068	69.77	3.58
Liberia *	149697	59936	2430	3039	40.04	1.62
Mali	64368	35631	12080	12566	55.35	18.77
Mauritania	63811	35269	3290	5933	55.27	5.16
Niger	53932	34659	5880	6984	64.26	10.90
Nigeria	1510467	878187	3971	50146	58.15	0.26
Senegal	218080	135722	2370	14308	62.23	1.09
Sierra Leone	114437	55650	7543	12721	48.63	6.59
Togo	70055	45832	4301	5377	65.42	6.14
Upper Volta *	46659	30714	8555	10166	65.83	18.33
Total	3285724	1900564	938342	187359	57.84	2.86

* Figures are for 1970

SOURCE: Computed from E.A Ajayi, Towards Economic Co-operation in AB Akinyemi et al (eds.)

Readings and Document on ECOWAS pp. 132 - 135.

TABLE 3: DIRECTION OF WEST AFRICAN EXPORTS IN 1971

(IN THOUSANDS OF US DOLLARS)

Country	World	EEC	W. Africa	Africa	% EEC/World	% W. Afr./World
DAHOMEY *	26877	16543	5405	6029	61.55	20.11
GAMBIA *	14715	13763	13219	253	93.53	-
GHANA	341965	173864	2433	3648	50.84	0.71
GUINEA *	42377	12810	273	353	30.23	0.64
GUINEA BISSAU	1990	231	-	181	11.61	-
IVORY COAST	455735	293715	21643	26998	64.45	4.75
LIBERIA *	213733	136493	2613	2774	63.86	1.22
MALI	39115	10214	19554	20025	26.11	49.99
MAURITANIA	90444	67252	2592	4147	74.36	2.87
NIGER	38420	22620	13219	13255	58.88	34.41
NIGERIA	1793170	1122287	25722	27196	62.59	1.43
SENEGAL	124977	78045	2034	5660	62.45	1.63
SIERRA LEONE	98481	77924	373	624	79.13	0.38
TOGO	55240	43233	1324	1769	78.26	2.40
UPPER VOLTA *	18202	5583	8791	8950	30.67	48.30
TOTAL	335544	2074577	119195	121880	61.83	3.55

* Figures are for 1970

SOURCE: Computed from E.A. Ajayi, Towards Economic Co-operation in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Readings and Document on ECOWAS PP 132 - 135

From the two tables above, it is clear that West Africa has one of the most foreign trade dependent economies in the world; they are also the most dependent on the advanced industrialised countries' markets, the least integrated region and the slowest growing in terms of mutual interdependence. [5]

All countries in the region depend on foreign trade. In 1971 Gambia's export as a percentage of her gross domestic product (GDP) was 51.7% while her imports as a percentage of her GDP was 53.7%; in Upper Volta it was 6.3% and 19.6% respectively. For the sub-region, the average was 24.4% and 23.2% respectively. [6] Most countries in the sub-region also rely on import duties as their main source of revenue, for example 55% of Benin Republic's revenue was from import duties and Nigeria's stood at 18%. [7]

These countries are mainly primary producers and their products, unfortunately were competing rather than complementing each other both in the world market and within the ECOWAS sub-region. The bulk of the exports from these countries are either to one or two major markets of the industrialised nations of North America and Europe. These primary products form a large percentage of the total exports, making a significant contribution to the GDP, yet the impact of primary export expansion on general economic growth has been small and indirect.

The paucity of intra-regional trade among these countries is a reflection of the non-complementarity of their products and the weak economic ties that existed among them during the pre and immediate post independence era. This is an aspect of the colonial legacy which has lingered into the post colonial period. During the colonial era, ties were created between the colonies and the metropoles, and the construction of communication links took a pattern that tend to enforce these ties with the metropoles while no efforts were made to develop any close ties among the colonies within the sub- region.

As an enduring part of the colonial legacy, intra-West African trade is partly limited by the difficulty of direct remittance of funds among these countries, as exchange transactions are largely carried out using the pound sterling and the French franc through London and Paris. Even for the countries that have entered into bilateral agreement in order to find a solution to the problem, the procedure still involves a cumbersome and an inefficient system of moving money physically from one place to the other for the purpose of settlement.

The sub-region is not only the most foreign trade dependant but also one of the poorest and the most heterogeneous with the highest level of ethnic pluralism on the globe; these are common features among nearly all countries in the region. As a result of the 26 February 1885 Berlin Conference, some of the ethnic groups were split between two or more countries, for instance, the Ewes were split between Ghana and Togo, the Yorubas between Nigeria and Benin Republic and the Fulas are found in not less than six countries in the Sub-region. This has created the tendency for irredentism among these tribal groups as was the case in Ghana in the early 1960s.

Out of the 15 states that make up the sub-region 13 of them rely on not more than two raw materials for over 60% of their export revenue. This has exposed the sub-region to the negative effects of fluctuations of commodity prices in the world market and also to the vagaries of manipulations from the world developed countries who are the major importers of these raw materials. [8]

Eight of the countries in the sub-region are among the world's 37 low income countries, while only five are in the middle income.[9] Most of the economic activities are found in the agricultural related sectors of the economy while activities in the manufacturing and industrial sectors are limited.

The agricultural sector is the backbone of the economies in the sub-region; it provides the bulk of the government revenues and foreign exchange earnings. About 70% of the labour force in the sub-region are employed in the agricultural sector. The sector accounted for 39.4% of the sub-region's GDP in 1971, [10] though its contribution varies widely from one country to the other, it ranges from 18% in Senegal to 53% in Niger Republic. This sector has remained underdeveloped with a very discouraging growth rate. In the year 1971/1972, about 10 out of 14 countries in the sub-region recorded either a zero or negative growth rate in food and agriculture. [11] It is not only the agricultural sector that has remained underdeveloped, but nearly all sectors of the economies of these countries. Industries are still in their infant stages and the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the GDP of these countries is very low. In 1971 it was as low as 9% for the sub-region; for that same year, it was 2.3% for the Gambia while that of the Mauritania was 2.9%.[12] All the countries in the sub-region are dependent as per excellent and the sub-region is the least industrialised in the world's periphery.

Modern machinery and equipment for the production of high and qualitative goods for all aspects of industries are lacking. No country in West Africa could be said to have reached a state where economic growth is self-sustaining, that is, the take off stage of development. By the year 1975, no country has established the foundational pillar of an industrial economy, which among others are the iron and steel complex, machine tools complex and the petro-chemical industry. [13]

In general terms, going by the world's standard, the area is very poor. The per capita Gross National Product for the sub-region stand at an average of about $184.7, ranging between $70 for Mali and Upper Volta and above $360 for Ivory Coast [14] (see table 1

above). This average per capita GNP is very low when compared to those of other regions of the world.

With unfavourable terms of trade and with deficit balance of payments, most of these countries find it difficult to balance their annual budgets. During the 1973/74 oil crisis, when oil prices quadrupled in the world market, nearly all the countries in the sub-region were the worst hit as their foreign exchange earnings were inadequate to cope with the high increase in oil prices.

In terms of the colonial history, there existed a lot of differences. Liberia, which was a settler colony of American freed slaves, achieved her independence as early as 1847 whereas Guinea Bissau obtained hers from the Portuguese only in 1975. Four of these countries- Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were colonised by the Britain, while eight - Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta were colonised by France. Togo was a German colony that was later administered by France and Britain.

These countries also differ considerably in the extend of their natural resource endowment, economic development, recorded Gross National Product (GDP) per capita, average rate of inflation, annual growth rate and literacy rate. [15] Not only in these, do these countries differ, but they also differ in their institutional and social characteristics. For instance, at one extreme end is Nigeria with abundant human resources (an estimated population of 71.26m), occupying an area of 923,768 Sq. Km, [16] also rich in mineral resources most importantly oil which has increased her convertible foreign exchange holdings, thus she was able to embark on an over N30 bn investment programme for the 1970-80 plan period. [17] Whereas on the other hand, Togo's budget for the 1974-75 fiscal year was only N40 m. [18]

Countries in this sub-region pursue different monetary and fiscal policies, they also have different orientations in implementing structural change and divergent approach to rapid economic development. [19] The sub-region as a result of colonial legacy belong mainly in either of two monetary systems; their are those that operate the franc zone and some under the sterling. 'The Anglophones were protected under the Common Wealth preference system, while the Francophone nation where associated with the EEC under the Yaounde convention'. [20] Liberia is tied to the US dollar while Guinea introduced her own Franc in 1960. [21] As for Guinea Bissau, she is linked to the currency of Portugal. [22] The sub-region has not less than four monetary systems, which is an obstacle to the free flow of goods and services, capital investments and unilateral transfers.

THE NIGERIAN DOMESTIC SITUATION

Nigeria attained her independence from Britain on October 1 1960. she operated a federal constitution and experimented on the West minister model of parliamentary democracy. The country's federal structure as Akinyemi pointed out, was a weakness rather than a strength in the formulation and smooth conduct of the country's external relations. [23]

At *independence, the state of the Nigerian economy, her huge land-mass, combine* with her large population and the existing economic potentials in the area of agriculture and mineral resources was a pointer to the fact that the country was suppose to assume a leadership role in Africa. Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo rightly presented this fact when he said 'Africa looks up to Nigeria for leadership....'[24] Between 1970 and 1975, as a result of these potentials combined with the then existing economic stability, the country became the fastest growing market in the African continent.

The ideological orientation of the leadership since independence has been pro-West. In the formulation and conduct of the country's foreign policy, they have portrayed more of a "particular ideology" than of "total ideology". Particular ideology is the 'conscious or unconscious arguments advanced by those in power or their opponents to justify their positions', [25] in other words, these are the convictions and believes of individuals. As for total ideology, it is the 'systematised beliefs or idea which form the basis of a state organisation and actions of its leaders'; [26] this provides the objective basis for the interpretation of reality. The concept of ideology in Nigeria's external relations is vague. Her foreign policy depicts much of a particular ideology while been bankrupt of total ideology. The country has never had foreign policy decision-makers that are ideologically committed. [27]

The county's foreign policy towards other countries in the sub-region has been based largely on four principles, these are: the sovereign equality of all independent African states; respect of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; non interference in the internal affairs of these states and finally the belief in functional co-operation as a means of promoting unity among African nations. [28]

Nigeria has strove to abide by these principles in the conduct of her external relations with other countries in the sub-region. Even when the country decided to "make noise" and to get the conference of independent African states in Lagos to condemn the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo; the general believe among the leadership was that the act was not tantamount to an interference in the internal affairs of Togo. [29]

Prior to the civil war, Nigeria remained indifferent to the internal politics going on within the West African sub-region. She was also indifferent to the conqueting acts going on between the French speaking West African countries and France. However activities

perpetuated by some of these countries, especially during the civil war, forced Nigeria into paying more attention to political developments within these countries.

In essence, the civil war had much influence in the conduct of the country's foreign policy. From the experiences of the civil war external relations, there was the need to establish friendly relationships with the governments of other countries in the sub-region. There was also the need to reduce the level of dependence of West African countries on extra-African powers, which was in the interest of the country's security.

In the sphere of politics, the military came into power in January 1966; in July 1966, General Gowon (then a Lt. Col.) came to power in a counter coup. By 1967 new states were created thereby temporarily reducing the tensions on decision-making which was engendered by the large sizes of the components units of the federal structure. The following three years saw the country drifting towards political chaos, this culminated into the civil war that lasted for about 3 years. After the civil war, a generous reconciliation was embarked on. It was after resolving this crisis that Gowon then had time to concentrate on foreign affairs.

Under the Gowon's administration, the two bodies in-charge of decision-making for the country, the Supreme Military council (SMC) and Federal Executive Council (FEC) were both headed by Gowon who was the head of the federal military government. In theory, foreign policy decision-making was vested on the SMC but it was the FEC that was exercising it. Bureaucrats assumed enormous powers both in the formulation and execution of policies. One of the two policy organs, the FEC, which was also the most powerful has senior civil servants (permanent secretaries) who together with the federal commissioners formulated policies and make recommendations for the SMC.

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

In the 1960s agriculture was the most important sector of the Nigerian economy, there existed abundant mineral resources in the sector, and the percentage of the active population engage in it and the sector's contribution to the country's GNP as well as the country's foreign exchange earnings were very high.

The Nigerian economy was characterised by the export of primary products, which were exchanged for manufactured goods. With unfavourable terms of trade, added to her lack of influence on the prices of both primary products and manufactured goods, she became more dependent on the whims of the so called market forces, which further exposed her to the economic vagaries of the industrialised countries of the world. Her exports mainly agricultural products, were earning less than what they should, meanwhile she was paying excessively for her manufactured imports. Her manufacturing sector was still at its infancy, with the advent of the oil boom the situation started changing but there was no any remarkable improvement.

Nigeria is blessed with enormous forest resources with an impressive range of quantity and quality of mineral endowments; these include those of strategic and agro-industrial value, among which are coal, columbite, gold, iron, limestone, natural gas and uranium.

In-spite of her enormous mineral endowments the country is still faced with the problem of exploration. Most of these minerals have remained largely unexplored and remained unknown. Whereas the petroleum industry was expanded and greatly exploited, other sectors of the economy, especially agriculture, were allowed to dwindle. As a result, before the mid 1970's, the Nigerian economy has become a mono-product economy relying heavily on oil. To compound the country's problem, even the petroleum and its associated

natural gas was not fully under the country's control as its exploration and exploitation was carried out by foreign international mining companies.

Oil became an important revenue earner for the country in the late 1960's. Soon after the civil war in 1970, the oil industry experienced a boom; both output, revenue earned per barrel and total revenue from oil spiralled. Before the war, oil production was only 600,000 barrels per day; by 1971, the country was ranking the tenth largest producer in the world with an average of about 1.5m barrels per day. This provided for about 50% of the country's foreign exchange earnings for that year.[30] By June 1972, the country became the ninth largest oil producer in the world.[31] In 1973, oil production increased to about 2.0m barrels per day with the sector also providing for over 75% of the country's total export earnings.[32] By 1974, she was the sixth largest oil producer in the world with a daily output of about 2.3m barrels per day.[33] Foreign exchange earning from this sector of the economy formed about 86% of the country's total foreign exchange earning for the year.[34]

Nigeria was the most dominant power in the West African sub-region; manpower wise the country has about 58.1% of the sub-region's total population and she is generously endowed with a wide range of mineral resources. By the mid 1970's, her industries have expanded to include car and truck assembly plants, oil refineries, chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises and there was the proposed iron and steel industry which was to be established not long from then.

Within the same period, the manufacturing industry's share of the GDP improved remarkably, the country was also self sufficient in the manufacturing of soap and detergents, cotton, textile, footwear, beer, soft drinks and matches.[35] This coincided with the period when the economy was undergoing transformation from a largely immobile subsistence type into one which industries are been established. That notwithstanding, the

country could not be said to be an industrialised country as most of the industries were still in their infancy.

Apart from the fact that the industries were still in their infancy, multinational corporations (MNCs) dominated the distribution and manufacturing sectors of the economy. As at 1972, out of 126 selected MNCs involved in the distributive sector of the economy, 81.75% were jointly owned by Nigerian and Capitalist from Western Europe and the United States. [36]

Relative to other developed countries of the world, Nigeria was very poor, she has not made any technological breakthrough. In 1975 her per capital income was estimated at N205, which was lower than those of some countries in the sub-region such as Ghana and Ivory Coast. [37] This was a period when the country was in a hurry to meet up with the developed countries of the world, she embarked on a lot of social and economic projects that require a lot of finance from the government. The country was therefore in need of every dollar that can be realised for its internal development. [38]

Starting from 1970 with the advent of the oil boom after the civil war, the country's economy made some remarkable improvements in terms of its growth rate. The growth rate of the economy in 1970-71 was 9.6%, it increase to 12% by 1971-72 [39] and 12.5% by 1972-73. The country's short term liabilities was estimated at N215m as at march 1971, but due to vast oil revenue, she was able to liquidate them by February 1972.[40] There was also a tremendous increase in the country's foreign reserve, it increase from £64.9m in 1970 to £126.5m in 1972.[41]

The 1973 oil crises brought a price hike of about 180%, this send oil revenue for the country soaring, between 1971/75, oil revenues increased from $860m to $6.9bn. The

country's recorded trade deficit of $38m in 1973 was covered up in 1974 with a surplus of $136m.[42] The soaring oil revenues provided substantial revenue for capital investments.

As revenue from petroleum resources was strengthening the country's economic base, there was an appreciable decline in the country's level of dependence on foreign capital. In the 1962-68 development plan, of the £669m earmarked for capital investment, £339m (over 50%) was expected from outside the country. By the 1970-74 plan period, only 19.4% of the total expenditure was expected from outside; [43] the 1975-80 development plan did not make any provision for foreign capital.

As a result of oil revenue, the country's problem was no longer that of money but how to spend the money. It was in this light that the federal government increased salaries in 1974 in a magnitude of 74.6-130.7% and went ahead (contrary to the advice of some members of the public service review commission) to pay nine months salaries and wages arrears at ago after implementing new salary scales. [44] It was also partly due to oil revenue that the Nigerian civil war was financed at a cost of over N375m without any form of external borrowing. [45]

By 1973, it was obvious that Nigeria no longer need any form of foreign financial assistance. It then means that she was no longer constraint to conduct herself in a manner that was acceptable to the Western Nations so as to draw financial assistance from them. Then Nigeria could afford to pay the salaries of civil servants in Grenada, pay N25,000 to the earthquake relief fund set up by the Pakistani Government and committed N19.5m to the expansion of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. [46]

The oil accruing to the country was not all through a blessing to the Nigerian economy as there were some attendant evils associated with it. Relative to the situations in other West African countries, Nigeria was self sufficient in food production but the advent of the

boom in the oil industry resulted to a downward production trend in the agricultural sector, which hitherto was the backbone of the country's economy. During the first decade of independence, there were cases of ports congestion; with the oil boom there was the concomitant massive importation of both food, manufactured goods and machinery for up springing industries, thus the situation of port congestion became alarming from 1970. On 9 April 1975, 72 ships were reported to be awaiting berth in Lagos, by the next day the number has dramatically increased to 103 ships awaiting berth.[47]

THE PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL TRADE

The structure of international economic relations that was left behind for Nigeria at independence by the departing colonialist was oriented preponderantly to the West with the United Kingdom dominating. A substantial percentage of the country's external trade was mainly with Britain and other countries in Western Europe. Since independence, the country's external trade with other countries in the sub-region as a percentage of her external trade has been very low (see Tables 4 and 5).

TABLE 4: DIRECTION OF NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL TRADE 1960-75 EXPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS (as percentage of total value of exports).

YEAR	UNITED KINGDOM	OTHER COMMON WEALTH COUNTRIES *	WESTERN EUROPE	UNITED STATES	WEST AFRICA
1960	47.6	1.4	33.9	9.4	0.7
1961	43.9	1.2	33.6	11.1	0.9
1962	42.0	1.8	38.0	10.1	3.3
1963	39.4	2.1	42.7	9.2	3.4
1964	37.9	1.6	40.6	6.7	5.2
1965	38.2	1.3	41.0	10.0	2.0
1966	37.3	4.3	39.8	8.0	1.9
1967	29.9	4.3	48.0	7.9	1.5
1968	28.9	3.8	45.5	8.3	3.0
1969	27.3	3.0	44.0	12.6	0.8
1970	28.3	3.1	45.0	11.5	2.1
1971	21.5	2.3	45.8	17.3	2.1
1972	21.0	2.0	42.8	20.9	2.1
1973	16.9	3.3	36.3	24.1	1.1
1974	18.5	2.2	34.7	27.4	1.4
1975	14.1	1.3	33.5	29.0	1.4

* Excluding West African Common wealth Countries.

SOURCE: Computed from G.O Olusanya and R.A Akindele, The Fundamentals of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and External Relations in G.O Olusanya and R.A Akindele (eds.), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty five Years. (University Press Limited Ibadan, 1986) p. 13.

TABLE 5: DIRECTION OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT 1960 - 1970 (As percentage of total value of imports)

YEAR	UNITED KINGDOM	OTHER COMMON WEALTH COUNTRIES *	WESTERN EUROPE	UNITED STATES	WEST AFRICA
1960	43.6	26.0	26.0	5.4	0.3
1961	38.8	26.2	26.2	5.4	0.3
1962	36.8	27.5	27.5	7.5	0.2
1963	36.3	30.1	30.1	4.0	0.3
1964	31.3	30.0	30.0	11.5	0.4
1965	31.5	32.1	32.1	12.2	0.4
1966	30.0	33.9	33.9	16.3	0.5
1967	29.0	32.6	32.6	12.6	0.6
1968	31.4	32.8	32.8	11.7	1.0
1969	35.0	30.5	30.5	11.9	0.6
1970	28.3	45.0	45.0	11.5	0.8
1971	32.0	31.0	31.0	14.1	0.3
1972	29.5	36.4	36.4	10.4	0.3
1973	27.1	37.2	37.2	10.3	0.2
1974	23.1	40.5	40.5	12.3	0.4
1975	23.0	43.7	43.7	11.0	0.5

* Excluding West African Commonwealth Countries.

SOURCE: Computed from G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele The Fundamentals of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Nigeria's External Relations: The first Twenty-five Years. p. 14.

The low level of trade between Nigeria and other countries in West Africa has been attributed to the structural pattern of trade that colonialism created and left behind in the country nay the sub-region. This pattern is vertical in outlook, it encourages trade between the metropolitan powers on the one hand and the West African countries on the other, while discouraging the development of intra-regional trade in the sub-region. Pre-colonial facilities were developed in such a way as to achieve this set objective of promoting trade between the sub-region and Europe, and at the same time ensuring that no form of serious trading takes place within the sub-region. Communication facilities were constructed to link the various countries in the sub-region with Europe, but to date, to make a telephone call at times, one has to go through Europe to reach other countries of West Africa. Another factor that could account for the low level of trade between the country and other countries in the sub-region is the non-complimentarity of their economies and their articles of trade.

As stated earlier, it is our firm belief that the existing conditions were the fundamental factors that form the basis on which the leadership perception of the issue under consideration was built upon. In other words, it is the leadership perception of the existing domestic and external factors that will engender the final course of action that will be adopted in any foreign policy decision.

FOOTNOTES

1. J.O.C Oyemelukwe and M.O. Filani, Economic Geography of West Africa (Longman Group Ltd, 1983) p. xi.
2. E.A. Ajayi, Towards Economic Co-operation in West Africa, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 130
3. I bid.
4. Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p.8.
5. Guy Martins, Op. Cit. p.3.
6. A.B. Akinyemi and I.A Aluko, Introduction, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p.4.
7. O.G. Ajene, Op. Cit. P 65.
8. Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p.2.
9. Ibid.
10. A.B. Akinyemi and I.A. Aluko in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p.4.
11. See Ralph I. Onwuka Op. Cit. p.25
12. A.B. Akinyemi and I.A. Aluko in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p.4
13. Ibid. p.3
14. Ibid. p.4
15. Ralph I. Onwuka, Op. Cit. p.4
16. E.A. Ajayi in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 130
17. Ashok Kumar and Eghosa Osagie, Problems of Economic Community of West States in A.B. Akinyemi (ed.), Op. Cit. p. 47
18. See Ibid.

19. R. Omotayo, Nigeria and the Economic Community of West Africa: A Role and Problem Analysis in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Op. Cit. p. 127.

20. A.B. Akinyemi and I.A. Aluko, Introduction, in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p.5

21. Ashok Kumar and Eghosa Osagie in A.B. Akinyemi (eds.) Op. Cit. . p. 51

22. A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 5

23. A.B. Akinyemi, Op. Cit.

24. Awolowo O in Daily Times of September 9, 1959, cited in I.A. Gambari, Op. Cit. p.77

25. G.A. Nweke, The Transformation of Nigeria's Foreign policy Since Independence, in J.A. Atanda and Y.A. Aliyu (eds.), Political Development: Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria, Since Independence held in Zaria March 1983 vol.I (Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, Zaria, 1985) p. 214.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. O. Aluko, Nigerian Foreign Policy, in O. Aluko (ed.), 1977, Op. Cit. . .

29. Ibid.

30. Olajide Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria 1957 - 1970: A study in inter-African Discord (Rex Collings Ltd, 1976) p. 29

31. See Olajide Aluko Nigerian Foreign Policy in O. Aluko (ed.), 1977 Op. Cit. p. 183

32. Ibid.

33. Olajide Aluko, Oil at concessionary price for Africa in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.). Op. Cit. (1990) p. 324

34. G. Aforka Nweke in J.A. Atanda and Y.A. Aliyu (eds.), Op. Cit. P. 228

35. Olajide Aluko, Op. Cit. p. 29

36. Aforka Nweke in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Op. Cit. (1986) p. 39

37. Olajide Aluko in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Op. Cit. (1990) p. 324

38. Ibid.

39. Olajide Aluko Nigeria Foreign Policy, in Olajide Aluko (ed.) 1977, Op. Cit. p. 183

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ajene O.G., Op. Cit. p. 137

43. G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, The Fundamentals of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations, in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Op. Cit. (1986) p. 17

44. See Oyeleye Oyediran and W.A. Bolaji, Nigerian Public Service in 1975, in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975 (University Press Ltd in Association with Oxford University press, 19 78) p. 123

45. See Olajide Aluko, Op. Cit. p. 29

46. A.B Akinyemi, Nigerian Foreign policy in 1975: National Interest Redefined, in O. Oyediran (ed.), Op. Cit. p. 109

47. See Babafemi Ogundana, Infrastructural Problems of Development in Nigeria: Port Congestion, in O. Oyediran (ed.), Op. Cit. table 2 p. 73.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKERS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

In taking the initiative to sponsor an economic community for West Africa, the foreign policy decision-makers had a perception of the benefits that will accrue to the nation. This perception was borne out of their interpretation of certain internal and external factors. This chapter deals with the key participants in this foreign policy decision and their perceptions of these factors.

THE DECISION-MAKERS

The main actors in this foreign policy issue were the head of state, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, who pointed out that he does not need any persuasion from bureaucrats about the necessity of the West African community; [1] the commissioner of economic development, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji. Although Dr Okoi Arikpo's involvement was not too conspicuous, as the minister of External Affairs, his perceptions on the issue are very important.

The decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS was made by Gowon but the idea was essentially that of Prof. Adedeji. This confirms Olatunde J.B. Ojo's assertion that *foreign policy decision-making has been personalised in the post-colonial Nigerian state.* According to him, in the final analysis, foreign policy decisions are made by the head of the government alone or at best in collaboration with the ministers of the relevant ministries. He further asserted that 'when the head of government agrees with the relevant minister, policy is made'. [2]

Although when the head of state or president and the relevant minister agrees, a policy is made, in order to make such a policy legitimate and authoritative, there is need for the decision to be processed through the institutional processes and the interaction of various forces. It has to be informed by specific domestic and external factors and the final direction of such policy is determined by the decision-makers, perception of these factors.

GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON.

Yakubu Gowon was born on 19 October 1934 in Tuwan, in the Angas speaking area of present day Plateau State. His family migrated to Wusasa, a 'Christian island' situated outside the Amina Walls (Ganuwar Amina) of the Muslim dominated Zaria City. This was the place where Yakubu Gowon grew up.

Yakubu Gowon's father, Pa Gowon was a disciplinarian that believed more in moralist lecture rather than wielding the cane. Brought up under a humble and a strict Christian background with a father, who was a moralist, Yakubu Gowon grew up as a very religious man.[3] He has a very intense human feeling of empathy, he often found it very difficult to deliberately hurt people's feeling.

Gowon's brought up in Wusasa had much influence on the way he tend to accommodate all people from different shades of life not minding their tribe or religion. As he pointed out.

> Honestly, all of us in that village really grew to love one another ... That place created a true love atmosphere...The other interesting thing was that even the Muslim boys were part of us. We respected their religion and we did not interfere with it. And we play with one another as friends. That was how close we were. As a

result of this, certainly one grew up without been too bigoted about religion... that is why Wusasa had a lot of effect on me.[5]

Gowon is a gentleman to the core, a soft spoken but dynamic leader',[6] a circumstantial hero that came up form grass to grace. He was tossed to the helm of affairs by the country's political turbulence, moving from a very humble background to occupy the country's highest office at the tender age of 31. He became a 'compromise candidate in a new political drama, a creature of crisis who had leadership trust on him at the darkest moments of Nigeria's history'.[7]

The Nigerian political system is a reconciliatory one that emphasises pluralism and the desire to reconcile diverse interests.[8] It is a heterogeneous society which has being continuously pulled apart by centrifugal social forces, thus threatening the stability and continuos existence of the country as a single entity. Kirk Greene describe the situation as:

In the final analysis, the Nigerian tragedy has been bedevilled by a set of oppositions-generalized, stereotype, not necessarily of the same order and may be imaginary, yet each widening the wound and reducing the hope of healing it: North v. South, Islam v. Christianity, alleged feudalism v. assumed socialism, federalism v. unitary preferences, traditional authority v. achieve elitism, haves v. have-nots, each with sinister undertones of tension, irreconcilability and threatened withdrawal.[9]

With a reconciliatory political system which emphasises pluralism and the need to reconcile diverse interest, a reconciliatory leader like Gowon who has the qualities of 'tactical accommodation and a capacity to discover areas of compromise between

otherwise antagonistic viewpoints';[10] and relies on the politics of compromise and synthesis in reconciling political interest groups was what was needed.

Gowon was a dedicated Pan-Africanist that believed mainly in functional co-operation, a defender of black people's right. [11] He was passionately committed to Africa. After the civil war, between 1970 and 1974 he had paid state visits to nearly all African countries. Under the banner of human dignity, he was a strong advocate for morality in the treatment of black people. [12]

As a result of his Christian upbringing, Gowon was full of generosity and a strong adherent to personal largesse. His decision to assist in the development of Papua and New Guinea and not only to pay salaries of all civil servants in Grenada in 1975, but also to send a contingent of Nigerian police to train the Grenedian police at Nigeria's expense, [13] were clear illustration of Gowon's strong adherence to dramatic personal largesse.

This personal largesse was also clearly manifested in the sacrifices, concessions and altruism he demonstrated during the course of initiating the ECOWAS. Also his decision to offer concessions to Cameroon on the Calabar channel (Bakassi peninsular) with the extension of the maritime boundary between the two countries form point 12 to 'G' on the British admiralty chart No 3433'. [14] This concession involve a large stretch of high economic area which ordinarily should have been unacceptable even to a reverend negotiator.[15]

Gowon's benign Christian nature contributed much to his ability to maintain internal unity, but on the other hand this was a strong weakness in term of the coercive requirement that is needed to embark on an assertive foreign policy. [16]

His empathy contributed to his decision not to expel Ghanaians residing in Nigeria when the Ghanaian government decided to expel Nigerians residing in that country in 1970.

Although the Ghanaian action was seen in Nigeria as an anti-Nigerian move that was aim at frustrating the federal government's efforts of keeping the country united, Gowon saw retaliation as been antagonistic to the sprit of unity in the sub-region. Instead of retaliation, he went ahead to approve the supply of oil to Ghana at concessionary prices.

In 1972, Gowon was about to sent troops to Niger Republic to forestall an impending coup against his friend president Hamaini Diori, [17] without consideration to either the long term or the short-term consequences of such direct intervention in the internal political affairs of a neighbouring African country. In the same vain during the Nigerian civil war, General Gnasingbe Eyadema intercepted a Biafran plane loaded with Nigerian money to the tune of £7.0m. [18] He insisted and collected a huge sum of money from Nigeria for the return of the money intercepted. [19] In-spite of this, Gowon on the grounds of concession and personal understanding decided to concede the ECOWAS headquarters to Togo, though Nigeria was the principal financier of the organisation, providing about one third of it's annual budget. [20]

A combination of patience, caution, humility and all other moral attributes had much influence on his perception of foreign policy issues. In most cases, his perception of international politics was on the basis of morality and fairness that is not in consonance with the firmness and pragmatism that is required in power politics.

Gowon saw the country's oil resources as been of limited quantity. He believed that earnings from this resource have to be maximised and also be used to transform the economy technologically. He saw diversification and transformation of the economy as been bond to the 'economic fortunes of the sub-region as a whole.' [21] His perception was that the 'gigantic task of economic and political regeneration' which the country was engaged in will be of little benefit as long as this diversification and economic

transformation is not attuned to the economic 'requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa' especially the west African sub-region.[22]

He believed that African countries' independence would continue to be deceptive 'as long as their economies remain underdeveloped and are dominated by extra-African powers'. [23]

It was his believe that the country's ability to exercise influence in global affairs is directly proportional to her weight and influence in the African continent. Consequently, in-spite of the country's need of every dollar, that can be realised, for her internal development, he saw it as been worthwhile to embark on 'petro-dollar' diplomacy as a means of exerting influence in the African continent.

Based on the country's enhanced potentials due to increase in revenue from oil, Gowon saw the 1970's as the era of Nigeria's industrial take-off. He believed that to achieve this industrial take-off, there was the need to create a favourable market for both raw materials and the finished products; he saw the economic community if formed as been able to provide this needed market.

PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI

Professor Adebayo Adedeji was born on 21 December 1930 in Western Nigeria. He holds a Masters degree in public administration from the Harvard University and a Doctorate degree in economics from the University of London. He taught at the post graduate level at the University of Ife. He has written and edited quite a good number of books and monographs on economic development and development administration. By the time he became a federal commissioner he has acquired varied experience in research,

administration and in economic planning. A brilliant student of economic development and public administration. He was a a former Director of the Institute of Administration at the university of Ife, where high level public servants and technocrats were trained. As a result, Adedeji had much influence among the senior public servants and technocrats [24] some of whom had important roles in the ECOWAS formation projects.

Prof. Adedeji was a 'convinced and unrepentant believer in the inevitability of economic co-operation at the sub-regional level in Africa.' [25] As an avowed integrationist, he became the architect of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) which was aimed at uniting and integrating the Nigerian youths. He was totally committed to the Economic Commission for Africa's (ECA's) sub-regional integration strategy of development and was much more inclined to the technical economic arguments for such type of integration.[26]

He chaired the foreign policy think-tank that endorsed the idea of Africa serving as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. 'The linkage of Nigeria's economic and political regeneration with the economic health of West Africa' [27] was his handwork. The 1969 conference which consider inter alia, the possibility of an integrated West African Economic Community to stimulate the country's growth and development was organised by his ministry. Based on the proceedings of this conference, the ministry while preparing the country's second National Development plan gave cognisance to the need for a West African Economic Community which could make the country's hitherto sluggish manufacturing industry response to government incentives. [28] Though not unaware of the associated difficulties for such an attempt to become a reality, the ministry was of the conviction that an integrated West African Economic Community was a necessity.

The Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction was entrusted with regional economic matters. Adedeji's appointment as a Federal Commissioner to this

Ministry in late 1971 created an opportunity for him to translate his believe in the need for economic co-operation of the West African sub-region. Before his appointment he had in 1970 in an article illustrated the prospects for a West African economic co-operation, which was a demonstration of his total belief in the importance of economic co-operation for the sub-region. [29]

With his ministry entrusted with regional economic matters, Adedeji with Gowon's confidence on his side pioneered the diplomatic, economic and technical work that later brought about the formation of ECOWAS. Adedeji was the key figure among the 40 members of the Gowon's entourage that travel to Togo in 1972 where it was announced that ECOWAS was going to be established. [30]

Apart from being at the forefront of the planning and intensive diplomatic activities, he equally initiated and directed a number of activities. According to Asante, in terms of 'Shuttle diplomacy' Adedeji became the sub-region's Henry Kissinger. [31]

Adedeji saw economic and material growth by themselves as important but not being sufficient conditions of development. Growth to him must result from ways that actively promote the self-reliant capabilities of the country so that it can be of lasting value. For him, development cannot be reduced merely to 'capital accumulation, economic growth and economic restructuring'; as that will be tantamount to confusing development and what constitute the basis of development. What is needed is not just development but the restructuring and transformation of the economy from dependence to self-reliance. [32] He believed that except Africa is economically decolonised completely, any talk of laying a foundation for an effective self reliant, sustaining and internally generated process of development will be tantamount to a farce.

Adedeji has been a vigorous and a dedicated advocate of intra-African economic co-operation and integration. To him, it is a 'fundamental requirement for the successful achievement of declared national socio-economic goals,' [33] He has consistently argued that progressive intra-African economic penetration is fundamental to the achievement of national and collective self-reliance.

He believes that integrating the sub-region will provide the dynamic potential for Nigeria and other countries in the sub-region to break out of their narrow national markets, which will bring about economic decolonization. [34] He saw economic co-operation among African states as 'sine qua non for the achievement of national Socio-economic goals' rather than the erroneous assumption that consideration should be given to it only when the development process is well advanced. [35]

To him, 'co-operation in the production and distribution of strategic goods and services on a multinational basis' is a necessary condition for a self-sustained growth among the West African countries. He was of the believe that it is through active and virile economic co-operation that the various countries will hope for the future; as 'this was the only way in which we can hope to complete our liberation by adding economic independence to our political freedom.' [36] In ECOWAS, he saw a search for collective self-reliance among countries in the West African sub-region within a larger global context where there is a continuos struggle by the developing countries to establish a new world order. [37]

Prof. Adedeji, based on the country's enhanced economic potentials, saw the 1970's as a decade for Nigeria's industrial take-off. With this, he was of the believed that the West African sub-region was an indispensable source for both raw materials as well as a viable market for the finished products. [38] He argued that the formation of ECOWAS will give

the country access to some raw material that are either not available or are available in limited quantity within the country. [39]

DR OKOI ARIKPO

Dr Okoi Arikpo was born in Ugep among the Okoi people of lower Cross Rivers. He was a man of impressive academic credentials in the fields of law and Anthropology; a 'scholar and public servant of distinction' and a teacher 'who broke free from the constraints of life under colonial administration.' [40] He was the first Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC), an appointment he held for 4 years until he was appointed a Federal Commissioner in 1967 by the Gowon administration.

He was a politician of long standing. He went into politics in the early 1950s and became a parliamentarian first in the East and later in the Federal House, he became a minister from 1952 - 1954; and later went into private practice.

Okoi Arikpo was among the early generation of Nigerians, whose training and exposure embued them with genuine patriotism and prepared them to fully appreciate the challenges of political independence, the value of the unity of their country and the importance of the qualities of dedication and personal integrity in the leadership of the country. [41] He moved from the trade ministry to the external affairs ministry in 1968, where he played a vital role in external propaganda and information during the civil war. He had a cordial working relationship with most staff of his ministry. [42]

Arikpo seems to lack decisive leadership ability, a weakness which Joe Iyalla, on his appointment as the ministry's permanent secretary in 1972, exploited to bring his stern administrative qualities to bear heavily in the ministry. With Joe Iyalla's arrival to the

ministry, Dr Okoi Arikpo was by passed in most issues; correspondences with the Head of state were usually signed by him instead of Arikpo. [43] This notwithstanding, by virtue of his position as the commissioner of the ministry, Dr Arikpo was still in-charge of co-ordinating all Nigeria's external policies and relations. His (Arikpo's) perception of the issue was more important than that of any other person from the ministry; moreover he was in a position to modify or change any proposals that emanate from his ministry.

Dr Arikpo's perception of ECOWAS was much similar to that of Gowon. He was of the believe that Nigeria should make desperate efforts to stop or reduce the level of her neighbouring countries' dependence on extra-African powers through bilateral and multilateral trade and other economic arrangements [44] such as regional economic organisations and also through the provision of financial aid to these countries.

He saw the formation of a sub-regional economic community as a means of fostering economic development within the area, which apart from reducing the sub-region's financial dependence on extra-African powers will also guarantee internal peace and security in Nigeria. He was equally of the believe that ECOWAS will be an avenue for promoting solidarity among member countries. He believed that mutual economic co-operation among developing countries at bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels could bring about economic salvation of the areas. [45]

He interpreted America's move during the 1973/74 oil crisis, to camp non oil producers against the OPEC member states as an attempt by some developed countries to pillory the OPEC member states as the culprits of the hyper inflation in the world. [46] He saw ECOWAS as a deterrent to the move to camp countries in West Africa against Nigeria, the only OPEC member nation from the sub-region. To this end, he believed that entering into

joint ventures with the country's neighbours, even though it will call for sacrifice on the part of Nigeria, was worthwhile.

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP.

The foreign policy decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS was informed by the decision-makers perception of specific domestic and external factors and the perceived benefits that will accrue to the country with the formation of ECOWAS. Certain economic, political and security considerations were common among the key foreign policy decision-makers, these provided the backdrop for the final outcome of this foreign policy decision.

ECONOMIC

As a result of the economic boom that Nigeria was experiencing due to the quadrupling of oil prices in the world market, the country's leadership perceived of ECOWAS in terms of the economic benefits that will accrue to the country. They believed that in the long run, ECOWAS would create an avenue for national economic expansion through the creation of a regional market, which will be beneficial to the Nigerian economy.

The oil boom provided a substantial amount of money for capital investment. This combined with the existing high growth rate of the economy, provided a basis for the leadership to perceive of the 1970's as the decade for the country's industrial take-off. With vast oil revenue and the high rate of industrialisation that was taking place in the country; there was a commitment by the leadership to transform the country into the industrial nerve centre for Africa. They therefore envisaged a development plan that will lay

the foundation for the country's industrial take-off. Consequently, in the plan drawn up for the period 1975 - 1980, the sum of N6.0 b was allocated for the industrial sector. [47]

With the new wave of industrialisation taking place in the country, the leadership believed that the profitability of the country's industrialisation would depend largely on a West African market that will serve as a source of raw material and also provide the market for the products from the industries. [48] Adedeji believed that ECOWAS will provide 'access to some raw materials which are either not available in the country or are available in poor quantity.' [49]

It was generally believed that ECOWAS would bring about regional free trade, which will stimulate economic development. The foreign policy decision-makers perceived of an economic union as a pre-requisite for the expansion of the country's market within the sub-region. This perception was given impetus by the expansion of the country's industries to include vehicle assembly plant and oil refineries among others. The economic union was seen as an avenue to provide a vast market for the rising infant industries, which will encourage entrepreneurship and increase both investment and profits thereby leading to trade creation.

The leadership perceived of the country's concentration of both human and natural resources, as a basis for her to achieve economic independence and also defeat all forms of neo-colonialist forces in the sub-region and Africa at large. [50] There was also the general perception that with this level of resource endowment that the foundation for the socio-economic development of Africa can be laid [51].

They saw the establishment of an economic community in the sub-region as providing the foundation for this socio-economic revolution and also as part of the politico-economic restructuring that was needed to enhance co-operation and collective self-reliance, which

was necessary for redressing the problems of regional underdevelopment. [52] To achieve a balance growth and development, it was also generally believed that there was the need for free trade within the sub-region; therefore much emphasis was laid on the need of an economic union for the expansion of mutual trade in the sub-region.

There was equally the need to expand and indigenized the postcolonial inchoate bourgeoisie. After the civil war, with the production of national and 'transnational' emergency contractors and entrepreneurs, joined together with increase in the size of the business sector, [53] the task for the expansion and indigenization of the inchoate bourgeoisie became an emergency issue. The leadership saw ECOWAS as an instrument for achieving this goal.

As to the argument that the financial cost of ECOWAS made it undesirable in view of the fact that the country needed every dollar that can be realised for its internal development; the leaders believed that though Nigeria was a poor country, her economy was much more better than those of other countries in black Africa. They were also of the opinion that it is not possible for any country to provide assistance to other countries if that is to be done only after satisfying internal demands for economic and social developments. They argued that considering the long term benefits that the country stand to gain from the community, the immediate financial cost should not deter her from sponsoring the formation of the community.

POLITICAL

Politically, the leadership perceived of the country's huge size, her human and natural resources and her new prosperity as providing a rationale for the country to assume a

leadership role in West African and African affairs. This has been a general assumption among the Nigerian leadership right from independence. Chief Obafemi Awolowo expressed this view when he declared that 'all Africa looks up to Nigeria for leadership and we must not fail them'. In the same vein, Gen. Aguyi Ironsi declared that:

> We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the majority of the civilised world looks up to us to provide responsible leadership in Africa: and we realise that we shall be judged, to a very great extent, by the degree of success or failure with which we face up to the challenge with which this expectation throws on us. [55]

There was also a political factor that was borne out of the Nigerian civil war. During the war, Ivory Cost, a country in the West African sub-region gave recognition to the Biafran Republic. This was a clear manifestation of the paucity of Nigeria's diplomacy and political influence in the sub-region. This brought out the reality that there was need for a favourable rapprochement with other West African countries. The country's leadership saw economic integration through ECOWAS as been fundamental to the achievement of the needed political influence.

The leadership was of the believed that the amount of influence that Nigeria can assert in world politics was directly proportional to the amount of influence she can effectively assert in the West African sub-region The formation of ECOWAS was therefore seen as an avenue for the country to assert her posture as a sub-regional power in West Africa.

The country's championing of the formation of ECOWAS was a conscious effort by the leadership to reduce the political and economic dependence of West African countries on extra-African powers, thereby diverting their attention to Nigeria. The country's post civil war affluence from oil revenues was believed to be an avenue for achieving these

political architectural designs. This was to in turn provide the institutional framework for the country's leadership in the African continent and also serve as a political vehicle to subvert France's political and economic influence in the West African sub-region.

SECURITY

As a result of the civil war experience, Nigeria came to realise the desideratum of much emphasis of her foreign Policy on the West African sub-region. The leadership was forced back to the foreign policy school where they had to learn the realities of international politics; they came out with the realisation of the fact that good neighbourliness was essential if Nigeria was to survive as a nation. After the war, a new era of reconciliation and conciliatory moves was enacted in the country's foreign policy. This was manifested in the country's new approach to OAU issues; the effort she made towards making the Lake Chad Basin Commission more effective; the new dynamism that was introduced in the country's bilateral relations with other countries in the sub-region and her active role in the formation of a West African economic grouping of Anglophone and Francophone States.

As a result of the realisation of the need for closer co-operations with her immediate neighbours, within the first few years after the war, Nigeria signed trade agreements with 7 of her neighbouring countries in the sub-region, air service agreements with 5 and economic co-operation with another 5. She was also able to establish telecommunications links with 5 others within the sub-region and joint custom posts with 3 others. [57]

Much emphasis was laid on the development of the Lake Chad Basin, this was in collaboration with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The country further completed an

arrangement with Benin Republic to construct an international high way linking the two countries, a joint cement project and a printing press were also to be established in Benin. The emphasis of the country's relationship with Benin Republic and the effort the Nigerian leadership made to increase goodwill for Nigeria in that country was as a result of her bitter experience during the civil war. Then, the leadership in Benin was pressurised by France to allow the use of that country as a base for transporting supplies to the rebel Biafran forces.

Weak neighbours are assumed to serve as fertile grounds for the activities of 'more powerful countries' that may posed a direct threat to a country's security. The leadership saw the existence of weak neighbouring states that are looking unto extra-African powers for their political, military and economic survival as a very serious threat to the security of the country. General Gowon's call on Cameroon and Chad, both of them central African states, to join ECOWAS was not unconnected to this consideration and the desire to 'create an economic and security buffer for Nigeria within the context of ECOWAS'. [58] . It was the same consideration that made him to announce that Nigeria was ready to assist her neighbours to establish joint development projects for security reasons. [59]

Although Nigeria's economic relations with West African countries was aimed at promoting self-reliance, thereby ensuring regional co-operation to reduce the vulnerability of the sub-region to foreign economic influence; the perceptual backdrop for this was purely in the context of the country's security and the competition with France for supremacy in the sub-region's affairs. The security aspect was necessitated by France's stationing and control of troops as part of her diplomacy in the sub-region. It was further compounded by France's economic presence in her former colonies.

France was considered as 'the natural rival of Nigeria' in the West African sub-region, the fact that the country's four immediate neighbours (Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger)

were former French colonies was perceived to be a potential threat to Nigeria's security. A sub-regional translinguistic economic organisation was perceived by the leadership as been capable of neutralising this security threat.

The invasion of Guinea by 'Unknown' external forces in 1970 was viewed as a possibility that could also happen to Nigeria. [60] Considering the level of security risk across the country's frontiers especially in a situation where foreign forces will want to use her neighbouring countries as operational bases for aggressive activities against her; the leadership saw an institutional arrangement that will promote good neighbourliness and reduce the level of dependence of countries in the sub-region on foreign powers as a sure way of reducing this risk. It was the firm believe of the leadership that this could best be achieved through regional integration.

EXTERNAL FACTORS.

The interpretation and perception of certain external factors that had their origin outside Nigeria by the leadership also exerted influence on the county's leadership decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS.

THE CEAO

With the CEAO, a regeneration of the moribund UDEAO, a French inspired complex manoeuvre to counter balance Nigeria's political and economic weight and her moves toward a larger sub-regional economic community- which was to jeopardise France's neo-colonial activities in the sub-region; there was the likelihood that a wide gap will be created

between Nigeria and her Francophone counterparts in the sub-region. There was thus, the urgent need for Nigeria to check the CEAO and narrow the widening gap. The formation of an economic community which was to bring together both Francophone and Anglophone countries within the sub-region into closer co-operation was seen by the leadership as the Panacea to this problem of widening gap between her and other Francophone countries in the sub-region.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

There was the issue of the formation and expansion of the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC as illustrated in the last chapter was a major market for Nigeria's exports; but with the integration of these countries into an economic community, it became apparent that the tariffs wall will pose a serious danger to the country. The gravity of the issue of tariff wall against Nigeria's exports became more glaring when Britain, Nigeria's major trading partner in that region, along with Ireland and Denmark started negotiating an agreement to join the EEC in 1972. It was eminent that such an agreement will lead to both a loss of the existing 'common wealth preference for Nigerian goods in Britain and also the imposition of tariffs on about 80% of her exports. [61] Meanwhile her Francophone competitors as a result of the Yaounde accord will have unrestricted flow of exports into the enlarged market. The leadership saw political and economic co-operation within the sub-region and the organisation of countries in the sub-region (all of whose exports are competing in the world market) 'as one bargaining unit vis-à-vis the EEC' as a solution. This made the leadership to believe that it was logical for Nigeria to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. [62]

The discouraging way and manner the EEC went about negotiating for associate status with the African nations further compounded the issue. Firstly, different terms were negotiated for different countries, which was tantamount to political and economic 'balkanisation' of Africa. Secondly, the community stuck generally to the principle of reprocity which made the associates to grant the 'most favoured nations' status to the EEC countries in return for granting favourable trade terms that are applicable to the non associates. The Nigerian leadership believed that the economic implications of these arrangements represented a neo-colonial relationship; this was one of the factors that hindered them from associating the country with the EEC. [63]

When Britain's main focus became that of joining the EEC, her attention shifted more to the EEC than to the Common Wealth Nations. Within this period, there was a gradual decline of the Common Wealth and there was a gradual de-emphasis (by member nations) on the Common Wealth in policy making. [64] At this point, there were calls for Nigeria to withdraw her membership from the Common Wealth because of Britain's indifference to the interest of the Common Wealth countries which was as a result of her bid to join the EEC. [65]

In an address to the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the president of the Nigerian Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mines, Henry Fajemirokun, pointed out that the lesson to be learnt from Britain's bid to join the EEC was that 'African countries should also come together to pool their resources for regional development.' He further pointed out that economic and social advancement of Africa is not through Europe. [66]

Alhaji Shehu Shagari, then Nigeria's commissioner of finance also shared the same view with Fajemirokun. At a Common Wealth ministers meeting in London in 1972, he declared that:

> If Britain with her unique history, geography and past achievements could brush everything aside to embark on an experiment of economic integration with the neighbours, then African countries and other members of the third world should come together to form similar regional common markets. African countries should come together and unite in-spite of the well-known obstacles. We do not have to do this under the umbrella of the enlarged EEC, but on our own system. [67]

The vital question the Nigerian decision-makers were faced with was whether the Common Wealth that has been the pivot of her foreign policy in the sixties could survive the seventies and eighties. [68] The alternative that was opened to the decision-makers was regional economic integration which was to be the pivot or centrepiece of the country's foreign policy. Moreover there were regional organisations already springing up in other parts of the world.

The success of the EEC as a regional economic community was also inspirational for Nigeria to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. The EEC became an enviable organisation that was been emulated in Latin America and other third World countries. It was believed that a West African economic community could also achieve a similar level of success. The general believe, as it were, was that what is good for Europe is also good for the West African sub-region.

To the leadership, the EEC signified a set of reinforcing factors that necessitated the formation of a sub-regional economic grouping. With the EEC, the need to safeguard the country's primary exports and anticipated industrial products made it necessary that she

negotiate with the EEC in concert with other countries in the sub-region under a frame work of a sub-regional economic community. By negotiating with the EEC in the absence of a West African common market, the terms of reprocity laid down for associates by the EEC will deny Nigeria's primary exports market in Europe and will also deny her industrial products access to the West African market because of more competitive products from the EEC. The leadership envisaged that better terms could be secured from the EEC if West African countries negotiate with the EEC as a block. Gen. Yakubu Gowon rightly pointed this when he said that: 'only through joint co-operative efforts can African States hope to benefit economically from any arrangement with either the EEC or any powerful economic grouping in the World.' [69] ECOWAS was seen as been able to provide a collective frame work for better terms which will safeguard inter-trade between member countries.

THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA.

ECOWAS was given impetus by the activities of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). One of the key elements of the development strategy of the ECA is that of regional integration, thus the greatest and most consistent advocate of the economic co-operation and integration strategy of development has been the commission. The commission saw this strategy as not only been desirable but necessary if the African continent is to industrialise, develop intra-African trade, reduce her level of dependence on vulnerable and fluctuating foreign markets, maximise scarce skills and capital resources and forge the way to an enduring political and economic unity.

The Economic Commission for Africa has carried out considerable researches on the possibility of integrating the economies of countries in various sub-regions in Africa. The

commission was of the view that sub-regional co-operation was a necessity for African countries. She was of the strong believed that economic co-operation and harmonisation of industrial development in each sub-region would be the panacea to Africa's development problem.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has argued consistently, that under the present political and economic fragmentation of the African continent, that it will be impossible or at best very difficult for Africa to realise her vision without collective self-reliance, economic co-operations and integration. As a result there were several resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly and initiatives by the commission calling on African states to co-operate on geographical sub-regional bases.

THE INTEGRATIONISTS

The civil war experience has brought to light the fact that non-indigenous economic interests are different from and antagonistic to Nigeria's economic and political interest. [70] Agitation for indigenization of foreign enterprises within the country became high. The second and third National Development Plans were formulated under the melieu of this economic nationalism. There was then the question as to whether it was not expedient to link the country's economic development policies to the issue of integrating the sub-region.

Prof. Adedeji and his Ministry of Economic Development did this linkage of economic development policies to the issue of integrating the sub-region. They believed that this will provide the basis for the availability of indigenous capital and advanced technology which was to provide the lacking realistic basis for indigenization of foreign enterprises that were

operating in the country. Their perception was base on the believe that economic integration was catalystic to the development and expansion of indigenous capital. [71]

The issue of integration was seen by the pro-integrationists as been 'sine qua non to collective self-reliance, itself a main instrument of national self-reliance' for which the bourgeoisie are considered to be the main agents. [72]

The general perception among these pro-integrationists was that economic integration would not only spur development in Nigeria but in the West African sub-region as a whole. More to that, they also believed that it would provide an institutional means through which Nigeria can influenced and possibly shaped the foreign policies of her neighbours. As a result, the issue of indigenization and economic integration of the sub-region were prominent features in the second National Development Plan.

In the overall, the pro-integrationists saw the issue of integration as an instrument for economic co-operation and development and also 'as a necessary concomitant and logical underpinning of indigenization and economic integration and self-reliance'. [73] They view indigenization and economic integration as been necessary conditions for the transformation of the economy. They argued that the short run sacrifices that will have to be made for integration should not be the primary focus, rather that the political and economic gains that will accrue in the long run should be the country's primary consideration.

THE ANTI-INTEGRATIONISTS

There were also the anti-integrationists who were all out against the idea of integrating the sub-region. They had their own perception of the issue of integration. One of the leading anti-integration proponents was Philip Asiodu, then permanent secretary of the

Ministry of Industry. He strongly supported the interest of the 'transnationals' a group he joined few years later on his retirement from the civil service. Although a leading anti-integrationists, his perceptions and views did not seem to have much influence on that foreign policy decision, as his views and proposals bureaucratically could be modified or change by the commissioner of his ministry. The commissioner for his ministry then was Alhaji Shetima Ali Mongunu. There is no any indication that Mongunu's perception of the issue was divergent from those of other key participants in that foreign policy decision.

The anti-integrationists saw the country as having a population that is large enough as not to require any form of regional integration as a pre-requisite for large-scale industrialisation. They perceived of the Nigerian economy, as it were, as been 'self sufficient in internally generated capital for economic development purposes'. [74] As money was no longer the country's problem but how to spend it, they believed that with the surplus money, substantial official and private capital could be absorbed without encountering debt servicing problems.

Their perception of the country's benefit from an integration and membership of ECOWAS was that the whole gains vis-à-vis the losses will be economically counter-productive. They readily pointed to the competitive nature of the sub-regions products which, according to them, will make trade liberalisation of little or no benefit.

They also perceived of integration as an avenue of sharing the country's oil wealth with other countries in the sub-region, whose economies are still been controlled by foreign enterprises. By implication, they argued, the benefit of the oil wealth that will be shared with other countries in the sub-region will be reaped by these foreign enterprises. To the anti-integrationists, this antagonises the idea of liberating African economies from foreign powers.

They were also of the believe that Nigeria cannot through integration significantly improve her share of trade with the outside world, which was already standing at 25% of the total African trade with the world. In the same vein, they were also sceptical as to the possibility of regional integration been able to increase the country's bargaining power in international trade negotiations. [75]

Philip Asiodu admitted the fact that integration of the sub-region with a ''harmonised industrial development planning' could help stimulate Nigeria's economic growth and development'. He however argued seriously against it, he was rather of the view that a purely domestic solution is the way out. [76] He believed that the multinationals' traditional near-monopoly of some sectors of production and the resultant unnecessary high cost of local production was a major constraint on the country's economic growth and development. [77]

According to him, better planning along with policies that will stimulate internal demand and provision of incentives to indigenous entrepreneurs who are in partnership with foreign investors will help in achieving the desired development. He recommended that a focus on indigenisation and the improvement of the various indigenous sectors will lead to economic growth and development. [78]

The anti-integrationists also advance arguments based on foreign exchange and security to support their stand. They argued that, if the sub-region is integrated, it will be easy for Frenchmen that have acquired the nationality of Francophone states to spy for France; and that the free movement of labour and capital would give room for Nigeria's foreign exchange to be drained out of the country by 'foreign' nationals that are moving out. [79]

THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES

The Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture was the best organised extra bureaucratic group that had much interest in the ECOWAS. The president of the group, Henry Fajemirokun was a personal friend of Prof. Adedeji. The chamber saw integration in the light of the benefit that they will derive from it and the subsequent indigenization.

It was the issue of indigenization that elicited the chamber's support of the idea of integration. Some business groups would have in theory opposed integration, but the potential gains that they expected from the subsequent indigenization silenced them. The indigenization policy served to allay their fears that integration will give room for foreign entrepreneurs to push out of operation the indigenous entrepreneurs; they saw themselves as potential beneficiaries that will take over control of the business sector.

The indigenous groups anticipated that by supporting and getting involved early in the working out of the details of integration, that they will succeed to include a clause in the agreement which will allow only largely indigenously owned enterprises to trade freely in the common market. The prospects of supplanting foreign enterprises both at the national and sub-regional levels arouse the interest of the local entrepreneurs to support the idea of integrating the sub-region.

For the foreign multinationals, they were of the believe that it will be tantamount to antagonising the nation if they oppose the idea of integration when their local counterparts were supporting it. They also saw in integration some benefits that their enterprises will gain; for instance, they perceived that integration could provide more opportunities for

backward linkages with their parent companies at home and also more opportunities for expansion. It was therefore in the interest of both the indigenous and foreign members of the chambers to support integration.

The friendship between Fajemirokun, the president of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture and Professor Adebayo Adedeji was of importance in the negotiations for the formation of ECOWAS. Prof. Adedeji used this friendship to elicit the support of the chamber's leadership. He did not only succeed in getting the support of the chamber but he was able to induce it to function across national frontiers within the West African sub-region. This sub-regional organisation, the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture had tremendous influence in dragging other governments in the sub-region to committing themselves into the Economic Community of West African States.

FOOT NOTES

1. Olatunde J.B. OJo. Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in G.O Olusayan and R.A Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1990) P. 348.
2. Ibid. P 346.
3 Isawa J. Elaigwu. 'Gowon' (West African Publishers Ltd, Ibadan, 1986) P. 70
4. Ibid. P. 1
5. Interview with General Gowon. Cited in Ibid. pp. 27-28.
6. Ibid. P. 1
7. Ibid. P.71.
8. Ibid. P. 7.
9. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria Vol. I (Ibadan University Press, 1971) p.5
10 Ali Manzrui, cited in Isawa J. Elaigwu Op. Cit., p.6.
11 Olajide Aluko. Oil at Concessionary Prices in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1990) p. 333
12. U. Joy Ugwu. Op. Cit., 1986 p.9
13. Joe Garba. Diplomatic Soldiering (spectrum Books, 1987) p. 10
14. U. Joy Ugwu. Op. Cit., p. 54
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Joe Garba. Op. Cit., p. 4
18. The Biafrans intention was to dump the money in the currency market so as to undermine Nigeria's financial stability.
19. Joe Garba. Op. Cit., p.5

20. Ibid. P. 4

21. Olatunde J. B. Ojo. Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in G. O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1990) p. 347

22. See Ibid.

23. See Olajide Aluko. Oil at Concessionary Prices... in Ibid. p. 333.

24. Olatunde J.B. Ojo. Sponsorship of ECOWAS in Ibid. p. 347

25. Adebayo Adedeji. Collective Self-Reliance in Developing Africa: Scope, Prospects and Problems. Keynote Address in A.B. Akinyemi et al (eds.) Op. Cit. p. xxii

26. Olatunde J.B. Ojo. Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit., (1990) p. 347

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. p. 348

29. S.K.B. Asante. African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative strategies (Spectrum Books Ltd, 1991) p. 89

30. Ibid. PP. 92-93

31. Ibid. P. 89

32. Ibid. p. 4

33. Ibid. P. 88

34. Ibid. P. 85

35. Ibid.

36. Olajide Aluko. Nigeria Foreign Policy, in O Aluko (ed.) Op. Cit., p. 170

37. See Ralph I. Onwuka Op. Cit., p. 137.

38. O.G. Ajene Op. Cit., p. 137

39. Ibid. p. 138

40. See 'West Africa' 18-24 March 1996 p. 414

41. Chief Emeka Anyaku cited in Ibid.

42. Joe Garba. Op. Cit., p. 4

43. Ibid.

44. Olajide Aluko, Oil at Concessionary Prices..., in G.O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit., (1990) p.33

45. Ibid. p. 323

46. Ibid. p. 326

47. Ajene O.G. Op. Cit., p.138

48. Ibid.

49. Cited in Ibid.

50. R.A. Akindele. Prescriptive Signals for Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the 1970's. The View from the second National Development Plan, 1970-74; in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1986) P.62.

51. Ibid.

52. R. Omotayo Olaniyan. Nigeria and ECOWAS in Ibid. P.127.

53. Olatunde J.B. Ojo, Sponsorship and Membership... in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele Op. Cit., (1990) p.348

54. Chief Obafemi Awolowo in Daily Times 9 Nov. 1960, cited in I.A.Gambari Op. Cit., p.77.

55. Cited in U. Joy Ugwu Op. Cit. P.9

56. Ambassador Peter A. Afolabi. ECOWAS: Building a West African Economic Community in A.B. Akinyemi et. al (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 48

57. Okoi Arikpo cited in P.P. Izah Op. Cit. p. 105

58 O.G. Ajene Op. Cit. p. 60

59. Ibid. p. 148

60. Olatunde J.B. Ojo Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit., (1990) p.353

61. Ibid. p.358

62. Ibid.

63. See Ajene O.G. Op. Cit. pp. 141 - 142.

64. Ray Ofoegbu. The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation: A Study of the Ministry of External Affairs in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele Op. Cit. (1990) P.81.

65. See Olajide Aluko Public Opinion and Foreign Policy under the Military in Ibid. P.205

66. Ray Ofoegbu. The Structure . . . in Ibid. P.79

67. Olajide Aluko. Public opinion . . . in Ibid. pp.205-206

68. Ray Ofoegbu. The structure . . . in Ibid. P.79

69. See Ajene O.G. Op. Cit., p.143

70. Olatunde J.B. Ojo. Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in Ibid. p.348

71. Ibid. P.349

72. Ibid. P.351

73. Ibid. P.353

74. Ibid. P.351

75. Ibid.

76. Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko. The political Economy of African Foreign Policies: A Comparative Analysis (Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984) p.204.

77. Olatunde J. B. Ojo Sponsorship and Membership of ECOWAS in G.O Olusanya and R.A. Akindele Op. Cit. (1990) p. 35.

78. Ibid.

79. Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko Op. Cit. p. 205.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

It has been pointed out in this study that neither the external factors and the global systemic variables that are prevalent in the international environment nor the internal attributes of a state could be said to be the sole determinant of the nature and conduct of a state's foreign policy. The internal attributes and the external environment may likely influence the general outline of a state's foreign policy but to understand a particular state's response to foreign policy issues, there has to be an in-depth understanding of the leadership perception of such issues. It is the setting of the situation as it appears to the foreign policy decision-makers that determines the final course of action that will be adopted. In other words, the foreign policy of a state is influenced by the domestic attributes and external factors, but the way and manner these factors are co-ordinated to formulate foreign policies is determine by the decision-makers' perception of such factors and the issue under consideration.

This however does not imply that the leadership perception of issues is the sole determinant of a country's foreign policy. Our contention is that the interplay of both domestic and external factors set out the opportunities and constraints in foreign policy formulation, but the most important factor that gives direction to foreign policy decisions and also sharpen the relationship that exist between the various variables and such foreign policy decisions is the leadership perception. It is therefore, a proper understanding of the decision-makers perception of issues that could properly account for their actions and reactions to foreign policy issues.

As this study's consideration is the leadership perception of issues as it affects the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS; the perception of the factors involved and the issue by the key participants in that foreign policy are very important.

Due to Gowon's moral attributes and his perception of international politics and human relations on the basis of morality and fairness, he saw the country's diversification and economic transformation as being of benefit only if it is attune to the requirement of the region's economy. He believed that the political independence of African countries would continued to be a farce as long as their economies continue to remain underdeveloped and controlled by extra-African powers. He saw ECOWAS as an institutional framework through which all forms of assistance to other countries in the sub-region could be channelled thereby helping them to develop their economies and to be self-reliant.

Gowon saw the country's ability to exercise control in global issues as being directly proportional to her ability to exert weight and influence in the sub-region. Based on his perception of the 1970's as Nigeria's decade for economic take-off; he saw it as been achievable only if a favourable sub-regional market for raw materials and the industrial products was created. He believed that ECOWAS, if formed, was capable of serving that function.

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, an avowed integrationist and a convinced and unrepentant believer in sub-regional economic co-operation initiated a number of activities and pioneered the economic, diplomatic and technical work which later brought the economic community into existence.

Adedeji believed that except the continent is economically decolonised, any hope of laying a foundation for an effective self-reliant, sustaining and internally generated process of development will be useless. To him economic decolonisation will provide the dynamic

influence while subverting that of France, her natural rival, in the sub-region. The security aspect is from the country's bitter experience during the civil war, the contest for supremacy in the sub-region between her and France and the existence of weak neighbours that could serve as operational bases for more powerful countries that may be a threat to her. It was also envisaged that ECOWAS would narrow the gap that the CEAO was to create between Nigeria and other Francophone countries in the sub-region.

General Gowon and Dr. Okoi Arikpo were after security and higher political and economic roles for Nigeria in the African continent. Professor Adedeji was committed to the idea of a West African economic community based on his perceived gains of economic growth and development that will accrue to the country. With this, it was not surprising for the country to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS.

The EEC was equally an important factor in the formation of ECOWAS. The leadership saw the EEC as signifying a set of reinforcing factors that makes the formation of ECOWAS necessary. They associated Britain's entry and the enlargement of the EEC with the concern for economic integration of the West African sub-region. There was the fear of the loss of export earnings as a result of the tariff walls from the enlarged European Community.

As Britain was the major importer of the country's products, her subsequent joining of the EEC was perceived as going to make the country's exports experience stiff competition from other third world countries. There was also the need to safeguard the West African market for the country's anticipated industrial products. The leadership was of the believe that the country will have an advantage if she could negotiate with the EEC in concert with other countries in the sub-region rather than the different countries negotiating and associating with the EEC individually. It was envisaged that this was the only way for

countries in the sub-region to obtain better terms from the EEC. The consistent call by the ECA for African countries to form sub-regional organisations as developmental strategies provided an impetus to the leadership.

These perceptions were commonly shared by the key participants in that foreign policy decision and by pro-integrationists outside the corridors of power. However, there were also the anti-integrationist that were strongly against the idea of integrating the sub-region. This emanated from their perception of the issue. The anti-integrationist saw Nigeria's large population as been capable of providing enough market to support large-scale industrialisation. To them, the country's economy was self sufficient in internally generated capital for her economic development. They perceived of the competitive nature of products from the sub-region as making trade liberalisation to be of little or no benefit.

The anti-integrationist believed that integration while the economies of countries in the sub-region were been controlled by foreign enterprise would lead to the reaping of Nigeria's oil wealth by the foreign enterprises. They also argued that integration would neither increase the country's share of world trade nor will it increase the country's bargaining power in international trade negotiations. They saw integration as not in the interest of the country's security but in their opinion, indigenization was the only panacea to Nigeria's development problem.

The only well organised extra-bureaucratic group with much interest in ECOWAS, the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, was in strong support of the move towards the formation of ECOWAS. The potential gains from the subsequent indegenisation were what elicited the support of the local entrepreneurs. As for the foreign entrepreneurs, they saw their opposition to the idea of integrating the sub-region as been tantamount to antagonising the nation. Moreover, they believed that they would also

benefit from the integration. More to that, the chamber's leadership saw the formation of ECOWAS as a means of promoting intra-regional trade in the sub-region.

Although the anti-integrationists were strongly against the idea of integrating the sub-region; it is obvious that their dissenting voices were too low relative to those that were in support of the idea of the formation of the ECOWAS. The bourgeoisie class was perceived to be an important element in the industrialisation and the development of the country. The formation of ECOWAS was seen as a means of promoting the economic interest of this class. Moreover the West African sub-region had became an area that was considered by the leadership as "the special area of concentration' of Nigerian diplomacy.' [1] With all this the voices of the anti-integrationist were nothing but the noise of a waning group.

CONCLUSION

The first hypothesis states that leadership perception exerted significance influence over and above other factors in the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. From the overall analysis, it is clear that this foreign policy decision was given impetus by several domestic and external factors, but the major factor that co-ordinated other factors and sharpens the direction of this foreign policy decision was the leadership perception of these factors in relation to the issue under consideration. It was the image of the situation and their perception of the benefits that the country will derive with the formation of ECOWAS that led to the decision.

The backdrop of support or opposition of the idea of integrating the sub-region by the personalities that constituted the various groups that were active in the decision, was their perception of the whole issue. This is a clear confirmation of the hypothesis that the

leadership perception exerted significance influence over and above other factors in the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS.

The second hypothesis is that a consensus of perceptual opinion among the leading actors led to the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. A point that emerged is that the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS, although taken under a military regime, was not taken autocratically and arbitrarily. The key participants took the decision in a collective manner after careful consideration.

From the study, it is clear that General Gowon's perception and those of Professor Adebayo Adedeji and Dr. Okoi Arikpo were vital in the decision to sponsor the formation of ECOWAS. The perception of the issue and the benefits that will accrue to the country with the formation of ECOWAS were broadly similar among these key participants. There was no any divergent view among them as all their views and perceptions of the issue tend to reinforce or support the idea of integration.

The findings in this study seem to have agreed with G.J Idang's findings, [2] that the perceptions of the foreign policy leadership are the most important determinants in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation. And that the nature of foreign policy in any nation is a direct manifestation of the attitudes and perceptions of the foreign policy decision-makers.

FOOT NOTES

1. Olajide Aluko. Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa ... in G.O. Olusanya and R.A Akindele (eds.) Op. Cit. (1990) p. 323

2. G.J. Idang Op. Cit. 1979, passim.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adebayo Augustus, Power in Politics (Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, 1986).

2. Ajene O.G., Leadership Perception of Issues and Foreign Policy Difference: A Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Orientations in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone (*Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1984*).

3. Akinyemi A.B., Foreign Policy and Federalism (Ibadan University Press, 1974).

4. Akinyemi A.B. (ed.), Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1978).

5. Akinyemi A.B. et al (eds.), Readings and Documents on ECOWAS (Macmillan Nigeria Ltd, 1983).

6. Aluko O., Ghana and Nigeria 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-African Discord (Rex Colling Ltd, 1976).

7. Aluko O., The Foreign Policies of African States (Hodder and Stroughton, 1971).

8. Asante S.K.B., African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies (Spectrum Books Ltd, 1991).

9. Atanda J.A. and Aliyu Y.A. (*eds.*), *Political Development: Proceedings of the National* Conference on Nigeria Since Independence, Held in Zaria, March 1983 Vol. I (Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, Zaria, 1985).

10. Burton J.W., Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge University Press).

11 Claude S. Philips Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Northwest University press, 1964).

12. Edozien E.C. and Osagie E. (eds.), Economic Integration of West Africa (Ibadan University Press, 1982).

13. Elaigwu Isawa J., 'Gowon' (West African Publishers Ltd, Ibadan, 1986).

14. Gambari I.A., Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria Under the First Republic (ABU Press, 1980).

15. Garba Joe, Diplomatic Soldiering (Spectrum Books, 1987).

16. Guy Martins, African Regional Integration: Lessons from the West and Central African Experiences (NIIA Lecture Series No 50, 1989).

17. Idang G.J., Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960 - 1966 (Ibadan university Press, 1973)

18. Izah P.P., Continuity and change in Nigerian Foreign Policy (ABU Press, 1991).

19. Kirk-Greene A.H.M., Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria Vol. I (Ibadan University Press, 1971).

20. Kori-Siakpere Emoghene (Miss), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): It successes and failure 1975 - 1985 (unpublished B. A project, Delta State University, Abraka, 1992).

21. Mahmud Tukur, Nigeria's External Relations: The United Nations as a Forum and Policy Medium in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. October 1960 - December 1965 (Northern Nigerian Publishing Corporation, N. D.).

22. Olusanya G. O. and Akinyele R. A. (eds.), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-five Years (Ibadan University Press, 1974).

23. Olusanya G. O. and Akindele R. A. (eds.), The Structure and Process of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria (NIIA and Vintage Publishers, 1990).

24. Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975 (University Press Ltd in Association with Oxford University Press, 1978).

25. Ralph I. Onwuka, Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States (W. Girardet Co., Ibadan, N.D.).

26. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976)

27. Rosenau J. N., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton University Press, New Jessey 1969).

28. Ugwu Joy U., Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Features (NIIA, 1986).

29. Uka Ezenwe, ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa (West Books Publishers Limited, Ibadan, 1984).

30. Wolfe and Columbis, Introduction to International Relations; Power and Justice (Prentice –Hall of India, 1986).