CIVIL -MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA 1990-1999

BY

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DECLARATION

I OLUSEGUN ADENUGA, hereby declare that this Thesis has been written by me and to the best of my knowledge it has never been submitted to Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria or to any other institution of higher learning for award of any degree.

All materials used have been duly acknowledged.

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CERTIFICATION

This Thesis entitled: *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Nigeria 1990 – 1999* written by Olusegun Adenuga, has been submitted to and accepted by the Post Graduate School of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria as part of the requirement for the award of degree of Master of Public Administration (MPA).

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Nigerians home and abroad who took active part in restoring democracy to our fatherland. For those who paid the supreme prize in the cause of the struggle against military rule may their gentle soul forever rest in peace. Amen.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT

All thanks goes to the Almighty for the completion of this project work. The success of this study is also attributed to so many people. It would be difficult to appreciate them all using this forum. However I owe them all uncountable gratitude for their efforts. At this point, I would like to mention my indebtedness to my supervisor **DR. A. A. ANYEBE** for his tireless and constructive criticism through the period of this work.

I would also like to appreciate the contributions of my lovely wife and daughters; **ADAH, ANU and OLAMIDE** I thank them for their support and understanding throughout the period of this research work. My profound gratitude also goes to **MR. KINGSLEY OYEMA** of the National Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island Lagos, **MRS. RITA IFERE** of the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies Kuru near Jos.

"Finally, I would like to plead with all those whose names were not mentioned, and to let them know that their support was equally appreciated.

ABSTRACT

The Nigerian Military has not been able to interna1ize the western concept of civil-military relations, which is based *on* subordination to civil authority. This explains the frequent intervention and disruption of the democratic process. This incursion by the military, especially in the third world countries has not achieved the desires economic, social and political goals. The Nigeria Military has ruled for nearly 30 years since independence.

The research project examined the crucial issue of civil-military relations in a democratic setting and how the Nigerian Military can subordinate itself to civil rule. Drawing examples from relevant comparative cases such as Brazil, USA Cuba, Israel and India, the research attempts to provide clear suggestion regarding the role of the military in Nigeria and how it can play its role without questioning the legitimacy of civil and democratic authority. The study also examined the causes of military incursion into Nigerian politics, the nature and form of military rule and the impact on the polity.

Finally suggestions were made on how the military can be subordinated to civil authority. The research established that for democracy to endure there should be mutual confidence and to civil authority. The research established that for gerontocracy to endure there should be mutual confidence and collaboration between civilian rulers on one hand, and the military on the other. Such that the military will internalize complete loyalty and subordination to civil

authority. The military needs to re-professionalize through re-orientation and education, while the politicians govern according to the constitution. The research also establishes that the most fundamental antidote to direct military incursion in Nigerian politics is good leadership and governance.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The military is one of the essential institutions of the state, without which the notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are meaningless. For this reason, it has become imperative for the modem state to maintain an Armed forces for its defence of the nation. The critical position of the military or the Armed Forces brings to the fore, the problem of what should be the appropriate relationship between them and the political class. This needs to be addressed since governance and execution of public policies for the purpose of material well-being of the people rests with the political class.

Different countries have different models of civil military relations, and in no country can one talk about the complete shielding of military influence in the process of governance. In the developed parts of the world for example, the influence of the military industrial complex is well articulated. However, the relationship between the military and the day-to-day governance is based on the doctrine of "civilian supremacy." This is different from the situation in many Third World countries where the military extends its role beyond influencing policies to direct involvement in the process of governance.

Military intervention is prevalent in many third world countries and can

be explained by a number of factors. These include the problem of greed among the politicians, the violence associated with elections and electoral process and inadequacy of politicians in dealing with social and economic problems leading to violence and insecurity. Other reasons include ethnic and social pressure from within the society, which propel the military to overthrow civil/democratic regimes. The prevalence of these conditions in some third world countries, such as India, Kenya and Zambia have not however, resulted in the same situation of direct military take-over of the political process. This is as a result of their model of civil military relations, which subordinates the military to civil authority. All over the world, including the advanced democracies such as USA, Britain, and France, military influence in politics cannot be ruled out. The tremendous influence exerted by the military industrial complex in the USA is a good example. But such influence has not resulted in take over of political power.

However, the consequence of military intervention in Nigeria is that the military institution which is meant to strengthen civil authority to enable a democratic culture grow, has itself: become immersed in politics. The implications are many. To begin with, democratic and representative institutions of government are not allowed to grow. Secondly, the society has become militarized and, thirdly, it has led to decline of professionalism within the military. Further more, military rule has created a legacy of corruption,

lawlessness, ethnic animosities and mass poverty.

The search for a stable democratic system in Nigeria since 1960 has been characterized and conditioned by a number of important paradoxes. Firstly, there is the seeming commitment by all sections of the Nigerian society to the doctrine of civilian political supremacy. Even the military when they intervene in politics, justify it as a temporary rupture of the "normal" political process aimed at "cleaning up" an abused system.

Yet, in it 45 years as an independent nation, Nigeria has been ruled by the military for 28 years, while democratically elected civilian regime lasted for just about 17 years. Thus we have a paradox; an apparent military commitment to the doctrine of civilian supremacy is equally matched by the longevity of military regimes in office. Military rule, which should be the "aberration", became the "norm" while elected civilian regimes, which should be the "norm", became relegated to the status of an aberration"

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

From the very inception of the civilian administration in May 1999, it became apparent that the re-establishment of a stable civil-military relation was one of its priority. Thus, barely only a few hours after he was sworn in as President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo appointed new military service chiefs and announced the retirement of 93 senior military officers who had held

political posts. These actions underscore the belief that political stability in Nigeria was possible only through a fundamental reform of the country's armed forces. As Atiku Abubakar note, the military constitute a "big problem that the present government plans to sanitize. In the same vain, Lt Gen T. Y. Danjuma (rtd) said at the graduation ceremony of senior course 24 Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, "it is time for us to move forward and lay the foundation for good governance and democracy which is built on trust between the civilian and military segments of the society. He called for the development of real professionalism in the armed forces and indicated that a joint effort involving the three arms of government is required to establish the proper conduct of government under a democratic dispensation, with particular attention paid to their relationship with the military. These efforts portray the administration's belief that the success of democracy in Nigeria depends on devising strategies that would ensure the military's permanent subordination to civil authority.

Going by previous experience, to a large extent the survival of this democracy depends on the development of appropriate civil-military relations, which entails that the Nigeria military understands and abides by its role in a democracy. Ideally both exist for fulfilling the goals and needs of labour in a democratic dispensation, governance is expected to be provided by elected representatives while the military provides defence. In democracies, the formal

leader of public organizations are the politicians. Along the line, the military usurped and took over from the politicians in addition to their own roles. This pitched the civilian politicians against the military.

The 1999 constitution of Nigeria, section 130, sub-section 2 provides that the president shall be the commander in chief of the Armed Forces. By virtue of his dual role of chief executive and commander in chief: the president heads both the Civil Government and the Armed Forces. As the civilian chief executive who also has the power to appoint officers for the Armed Forces, he is at the apex of the military chain of command, thus well placed to enforce control over the military. A cordial, progressive and productive relationship is necessary between the civilian and the military in accomplishing their constitutional roles. Such a relationship will positively benefit the civil populace and the military This requires high-level of professionalism from members of the Armed Forces. In the light of the above, this study set out to find answers to the following questions:

a. Do armed forces have roles to perform in a democratic dispensation?
b. Why had elected governments in the past failed to subordinate the military to civil control?
c. How has the Nigerian Armed forces faired under military rule?
d. How can the armed forces contribute to the development of a viable civil-military relation?

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The general aim of the study is to identify ways of discouraging military incursion in governance, while the specific objectives include:

a. Determine the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria.

b. Determine the place of the military in democracy.

c. Determine how civil-military relations in Nigeria can be enhanced.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study contributes to existing knowledge and current discussion on civil-military relations. It could assist the armed forces in the re-professionalizing and subordinating the military to civil authority after a long period of military rule.

SCOPE

The scope of the study concentrates on the subordination of the military to civil authority in Nigeria. References is however, made to other countries where necessary. The study covers the period from 15 Jan 1996 when the military first intervened in Nigeria's politics to May 29, 1999.

The study covers the period from October 1990 to May 29, 1999 when the military handed over power to a democratically elected government.

METHODOLOGY

The research work is analytical in content, thus the personal interview of both serving and retired military officers, civil servants and the general public were sourced. Secondary data were also collected and used. This is mainly from books, magazines and journals from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island library. Other sources of secondary data include United Nations documents, official government documents, conference papers, news-magazines and newspapers. The literature and data obtained from the above sources were analyzed qualitatively using logical arguments and sequential presentation of points.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

DEMOCRACY

Few subjects have generated as much interest among scholars and policy makers alike, as civil-military relations in cotemporary times. This arises from the fact that the possibility of evolving a free and democratic society depends on the balance between military institutions on one hand, and democratic governance on the other. Consequently, a number of academic works have been done on the subject matter.

Democracy is often defined as a government of the people, by the people and for the people. The people determine in a competitive environment, those who govern them. They get involved in the processes and decision that affect their lives through their representatives. Philippe Schimitter and Terry Lyn see democracy as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their action in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and co-operation of their elected representatives.

The general consensus amongst scholars is that the people determine those who govern them, they have a say in the processes and decision that affect their lives through their representatives and those entrusted with power, serve the people who gave them the initial mandate. Democracy is led by the majorities, who have a duty to respect and uphold the right of minorities.

Normally democracy is enhanced by a virile and professional ,military. The military is expected to be adequately catered for by those in power, and members of the armed forces do not need to be in government for their needs to be met. It is in this light, that democracy will be treated in the project.

THE ARMED FORCES

The term 'armed forces' is used interchangeably with terms such as army and the military'. According to Windham, armed Forces can be defined as "a class of men set apart from the general mass of the community trained to particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, governed by peculiar laws, marked by peculiar distinctions..." In a clearer manner, Fredrick Engel's described the sunned-forces as "the organized association of armed men maintained by a state for the purposes of offensive and defensive warfare. The armed forces therefore, exist for the purpose of war and for the defence and protection of the state.

In the literature the armed forces is discussed in relation to civil-military relations. According to Obed Malifia and Gideon Gonda, civil-military relations cover the entire sphere of the relationships between the armed forces on one hand and the civil society on the other. In the views of Samuel Huntington, the real issue in civil military relations is how to maximize military security at the

least sacrifice of other social values, and this include a complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilian and military groups; SG Best refers to civil-military relations has also been describe as the complex of behaviour in which civilian and military interaction takes place. It may, therefore include political, economic, social and cultural interaction. It is basically about relationship, but tends to be dominated by the question of civilian political control of the military.

MODELS OR PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

For our purposes, we may identity at least nine models of civil- military relations. These include:

a. The Liberal Western Model.

b. The Socialist Model.

c. The Developmental Militia.

d. Conscious civilianization.

e. Peripheral Participation

f. Civilian-Military Diarchy

g. Anarchist.

h. Militocratic

i. The Authoritarian One-party State Model.

The Liberal Western Model: This model emphasizes the separation of

politics and the military as in most European countries. This model of civil-military relations is predicated on assumption that the military has no power of its own. Its legitimacy is based on the consent of the society. The supreme authority in the state is reposed in the elected government which then defines clearly the goals of the military. African states pretend that the military can withdraw to the barracks and stay there. Even the French experience does not attest to such a clean break immediately after withdrawal. African military establishments have always staged a come back as civilians prostituted political power, bastardized rules of the game of politics and adulterated the socio-political and economic systems. This is not necessarily an evidence that the military is a more efficient achiever; but the military often symbolizes the nation amidst societal disunity.

We believe that African states in which there have been military interventions in politics, must move away from this model, in the absence of adequate political education. If they want peace and stability, their dogged adherence to the liberal Western model, in the absence of the properties of such a model, is to entrench the seeds of instability. Ironically even African socialist intellectuals, in spite of all their rhetoric about the need for a socialist system, either ignore the pattern of civil-military relations or adhere paradoxically to the Western liberal model. The military has never ruled the United States of America since its independence. General Eisenhower did not

contest the presidency as a military man or for the military constituency, even though his credibility acquired in military service gave him the necessary popularity at that point in time. Apart form the brief intervention by Cromwell and the roundheads, Britain never had a military regime. Therefore, the experience of these countries may be useful but not necessarily models for emulation. If African states must seek a democratic model to learn (not transplant) form, it is probably more rational to take a good look at India and see what makes that democracy survive in spite of its complexity and political turmoil.

The Socialist Model: The Socialist polity exhorts the supremacy of the State and the state power in trust for the people. Underlying presumption is the ability of this system to maximize its distributive capability in order to reduce drastically inequalities among individuals and groups. If the liberal Western model exhorts the freedom of the individual, this model emphasizes the collective interest of members of the community. The mass socialist party is dominant and all embracing. Even the military is part of this socialist party and has a stake in the government. The experiences of the Soviet, the Chinese and the Tanzanians (under one party system) illustrate this. Thus if Lin Piao, the late Chinese and Chief of Staff was ambitious, he had to work within the party to maneuver his way to leadership, given his military support. He was said to have been quietly eased out in a helicopter crash.

This model is grafted on strong ideological commitment of the people. Where the ideological basic is fragile, there may be coups and attempted coups. Thus, frightened to death by the 1964 mutiny, Julius Nyerere embarked on a new military establishment that would be part of the party" be subject to political education and have a stake in the government. Yet Nyerere found out later that there was an abortive attempt by some members of the military to unseat him. This was not surprising given the relatively weak ideological base in Tazannia then, and Nyerere's adventure into Uganda which had given his own soldiers a taste of what it was to oust a head of state.

The Development Militia: It is also possible to have a polity in which, while the military is either part of politics or out of it, its role is clearly defined in peace time. Here the military like all institutions in the state, is seen as an agent of development. Thus it participates in agriculture, builds direct roads, barley bridges, offers paramedical health services in rural areas, engages in political socialization of youths, distributes food during natural disasters and contributes to the general development process. The Egyptian military fits into this category.

If the military is part of a mass party, it does not pose as much problem as when it is outside the party. For as the military provides services to the populace in the face of the sagging legitimacy of the political leaders, it may be persuaded to implode into the political arena as managers of the polity. While

the role of the military in developmental process could be defined, it is not clear how these roles in social services would detract from military professionalism and ethics. Even more important is the issue of the nature of relationship between the military and political elites.

Conscious Civilianization: Where the military have already intervened in politics, a number of options are open to the military leader. He can go Kemalist like Turkey's Ataturk did. Here the military hero pulls of this military uniform and become a full-fledged civilian. He is no longer in control of the armed forces. He then can subject himself to elections for the state's premier office. The dangers are that he may be overthrown or have his ambitions upset by his colleagues in the army unless he has support in the force and societal pressures for civilian rule are great. Nasser and Franco provide good variants of this. Nasser's successors, Sadat, and Mubarak emerged from within the armed forces and their hold on the armed forces are reputedly strong. On the west coast of Africa, there is an epidemic of civilianized soldiers - Idris Derby of the Chad; Compaore of Burkina Faso, Rawlings of Ghana; Mainasare of Niger and Yahya Jameh of the Gambia.

Another variant of this model is where there is a conscious attempt by leaders to civilianize their political personality and at the same time create a verisimilitude of political parties as a means of mobilization of the masses. They retain their military constituencies. Mobutu Sees Seko of . Zaire (or DRC) and

Eyadema of Togo have tried these techniques. In Nigeria, General Sani Abacha tried to do same when his government manipulated the existing political parties to nominate him as their consensus candidate. Since he died before the plot was dramatized it is still speculation on how he was going to manage this extra-ordinary demonstration of confidence in him by essentially political contractors and touts - a process in which five political parties had nominated him as their consensus candidate.

Yet a more humorous variant of this was the Central African Empire under former Emperor Jean Bdel- Bokassa. All frenzied up under the ghost of Napoleonic splendor, Bokassa civilianized himself into an imperial political glory. Thus if Africa had lost an emperor at the Horn (Ethiopia), the core of Africa, witnessed the emergence of a new emperor. The way he was overthrown is a lesson to African leaders, if they ever care to learn.

Finally, an interesting variant of this model was the Union Government suggested under Col. Acheampong government in Ghana. The Union government was to be formed without political parties and their electoral problems. As Ghana's former Transport Minister argued:

> *The NRC rejected the academic view that democracy is only secure assured when the people are led like swine, once every five years, to vote in their rulers who proceed*

to ignore all their fears and aspirations.

Unfortunately General Akuffo' s coup prevented us from seeing what lessons this variant has Binaisa's Uganda no-party democracy is an interesting variant of this.

Peripheral Participation Model: This model was successfully adopted in Cuba and Brazil. It requires the Chiefs of Staff of each service of the Armed Forces or the Chief of Defence Staff to be ex-officio members of the central cabinet, without any veto powers in the decision making process. The military's interest would be represented in the government while the Chiefs of Staff would have the responsibility of educating the military personnel on the necessity for maintaining civilian supremacy. The military chief could also advise the politicians when they transcend their constitutional limits. It assumes that the military elite would be politically conscious and articulate.

The flaw with this sort of political arrangement is that it assumes that the military chiefs always have the support of their younger colleagues. The chiefs could be classed with politician by their colleagues especially as the legitimacy of the regime sags. Secondly, it presupposes that these chiefs have no political ambitions of their own, especially after the military had just withdrawn from politics

Civilian-Military Dynasty: This is a model popularized by the doyen of

Nigerian politics, Nnamid Azikiwe. Azikiwe's suggestion is that the military and civilian should share government for, at least, five years the military has withdrawn to the barracks. The military would have the veto powers. The fear of many coups frightened Azikiwe to give veto power to the military constituency. After the first five years, the military should withdraw, leaving the civilians to run the government. Veto powers or none, the gun is enough veto power, and who can tell the military to go after five years?

A variant of this is to have an elected functional head of government while during the interim period there is a military council acting as the political umpire and performing the ceremonial roles of the Head of State.

As Ghana's government under Busia found out, even this did not protect it against Acheampong's coup of 1972.

The Anarchist Model: This model presumes that the greatest danger to the individual's power of expression is the state and organized government. It claims that the former "enslave man's spirit, dictating every phase of his conduct. The latter is in essence Tyranny, irrespective of whether it is government by divine right or majority rule. Thus the military's legitimacy is also rejected. It rejects the thesis that the complex social and political system of contemporary society necessitates the creation of a legitimate order in which the military as an institution or formal organization has a positive role to playas part of that system. If all, formal political structures and the armed forces are

abolished, the danger to the individual would be eliminated.

Obviously, for developing countries groping for some semblance of order and political stability, the anarchist model seems too radical and irrelevant. But it should be noted for its lessons for the nation -state.

Militocratic Model: In this model the whole polity becomes militarized. The military rulers entrench themselves in power, refuse to demilitarize and act as primary power contestants. Very often the military leader relies very heavily on coercive instruments of the police and the military to remain in power. He tries to balance his two constituencies civilian and military. The extent to which the whole society is militarized would depend on the personality of the military leader or group of leaders.

As prime power contestants, these military leaders eliminate potential contestants. Even when in search of legitimacy they create institutions for civilianization, their thumb on the gun secure their ascendancy in both civilian and military constituencies as Zia ill-Haque of Pakistan and Commander-General Samuel Doe of Liberia had demonstrated.

General Nimeiry, the former President of The Sudan and again, Eyadema of Togo illustrate decidedly military regimes whose pretence to demilitarization disappeared over time. As power contestants, they relied on coercion. As Nimeiry found out, there is some truth to the Rousseau statement, that where might is right, any might that is greater than the first succeeds to its rights. It

was not surprising that he was overthrown in a mass uprising in Khartoum.

Thus the dangers of bloody countercoups are there in decidedly militarized models of the polity. In addition, as the military stays longer in politics, they lose their sense of direction and prove unable to feel the political temperature of the system A similar case was the military regime in Uganda, under Idi Amin. The regime may become insensitive and pose grave dangers to the citizens. If Idi Amin did anything to Uganda, it was that he united Ugandans against himself as he dispensed similar quantum of misery to each group. The danger of this model is that as the civilian populace forgets their misery under politicians, they switch their searchlights on the military successors to effect a political change. Thus, even if the military government exhorts the primacy of economics, it must live with the necessity to cope with the saliency of politics.

Authoritarian One Party State Model: Does the history of Africa show that an all embracing authoritarian one party which subjects the army to civilian control is more successful in solidifying the boundaries between the barracks and the party? It is difficult to say. There are, however, indications that in some authoritarian one party state, there had been less cases of military coups. Thus, Ivory Coast, Kenya (despite attempted coups), Sekou Toure's Guinea, the military had over the years been subjected to civilian control. So far, after the introduction of multi party democracy in these countries, these one-party dominate states which had used their old firm grassroots network for

effective control of the military have experienced political instability. Cote d' Ivoire is currently embroiled in a civil war.

All these models and variants have deliberately been made to differ from traditional typologies of civil-military relations, in order to highlight our need to think of African model politics which carve out roles for the military in politics.

CIVIL-MIUTARY RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Civil-military relations in Nigeria, as in many third world countries, are marked by military occupation of the center stage of power. In modern states, legitimacy cannot be secured through the barrel of a gun or from administrative apparatus. It can only be derived through an organized party system, interest group networks, the media, group and collective support. Searching for example of nations where the military have stayed out of power in the third world countries is an uphill task. Latin American militaries have been characterized by frequent military intervention in politics. All countries of the region have, at one time or the other experience an active participation of their armed forces in domestic political affairs. Military regimes have alternated with civilian , government, with a swing in favour of democracy in the 1970s. The armed forces in countries such as Brazil, have returned to their barracks and evolving novel means to occupy themselves. On the other hand the military in India have stayed out of power. They maintain a very significant role

in domestic events and foreign policy. There are sufficient reasons in India for military take-over, but military intervention is never considered an attraction. We shall consider civil-military relations in Brazil, India, USA, Cuba and Israel.

Brazil

The Brazilian military ousted the civilian president in 1964 and ruled for 21 years. The military regime was guided by a national security doctrine with two major elements. The first was a broad definition of security, which included not only the defence against external aggression, but the internal defence against insurgencies and communism Utilizing repressive measures, the military successfully countered domestic insurgencies from 1967 through 1973. The second component of the national security doctrine was economic development. Under the military, the economy grew considerably with the deepening of Brazil industrial base. Growth rates exceeded 11 percent a years between 1968 and 1973, helping to legitimize military rule.

Despite such an active political and economic role, the political influence of the armed forces in Brazil has diminished since leaving office in March 1985. Their relationship with the state has been gradually restructured. In Brazil it is now a common practice to see congress and civilian ministers become involved in broadly defined security issues. The military has been forced sort of, to compete with civilian for extremely limited resources. This has been able to halt

a continual decline in their share of government expenditures. The Brazilian constitution, which was revised in 1988, changed the manner by which the military could exercise its moderating power by placing them under presidential authority, while still preserving the military's external and internal roles.

According to Alfred Stephen, although the Brazilian military ceded power to civilian president in 1985, it retained significant prerogatives. Based on Stephen's items (Prerogatives) in civil military relations in Brazil:

a. Control of peak intelligence agencies by a military chain of command, with weak civilian review boards.
b. Participation of active military officers in the executive cabinet.
c. Elimination of the ministry of defence. This was however recreated in 1998.
d. No routine detailed hearing on defence matters.
e. The placement of the police under direct military commands; making local police chiefs sort of "active military officers".
f. The military determine the standard for their promotion.
g. Military personnel not to face judgment in civilian courts.
h. Some forms of military autonomy during internal unrest and
i. The military were assigned direct control over specific areas of economies activities (aviation aeronautics, industry and navigation).

What stands out clearly from the Brazilian model is that 'over time,

democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of influence.

India: India is the world's largest and most populous democracy and largest developing country with a democratic system. Surrounded by military dominated and non-democratic states, it represents one of the most interesting cases of firm, stable and authoritative civilian control of the military. Form the very- first day of independence the new ruler of India were determined to put the military under firm civilian control by according its role as a servant of the state in conformity with the democratic setup. This objective was achieved by introducing several changes, which enhanced the power, prestige, and authority of the civilians while reducing that of the military.

To begin with, the formation of an interim government in September 1946 to ensure the orderly transition of power, led to the appointment of an Indian defence member, Sardar Balder Singh, to the government general's executive council. Simultaneously, the C-.in-C ceased to be an extraordinary member of that council although he continued as the head of the three services. Moreover, to strengthen the civilian dominance steps were taken to make the three services legally equal and to exaggerate the relative influence and power of the chiefs of the two weaker services – Air Force and Navy at the expense of the numerically dominant army.

Within the defence ministry two important committees existed – the

defence committee and the defence minister's (production and supply) Committee. The ministers within the ministry, service chiefs, defence secretary, and the adviser were members of these committees. Within the service headquarters the most important inter-services committee was the chief of staff committee where the three service chiefs conferred. The advantage of these committee lay in the fact that the best military profession, administrative and financial advice was available to the Defence Minister. It also enable close interaction and necessary rapport of the military, civilian, political wing of government and facilitate coordination through discussions. "While the operational directive is laid by the political leadership", as PR Chaqri writes, "the actual planning of operation is left to the Chiefs of Staff: and over the years, a convention had been established that in purely operational matters such advice of the chief is mostly automatically accepted. The Indian military organization is such that the military is not directly involved in political decision-making process.

The mechanism of defence control is predominantly civilian. For example, fiscal control and responsibility is strictly within civilian hands vis-a-vis the finance and defence ministries. The military is routinely called upon to account to the civilian administrators for disbursement and for the smallest deviation from budgetary allocation. Moreover, all request for new weapons, force expansion and structure adjustments are routinely evaluated by civilians

from the earliest stages of the decision making process. The finance minister exerts its influence on fiscal management in two ways: first, in discussion about the overall shape of the budget, and presumably in negotiation concerning the limits to be placed upon defence spending; second, through the functioning of finance adviser (defence). This remarkable position, held by senior civil service officer with finance experience, is a branch of the finance ministry. The finance ministry is responsible for preparing the defence estimates in close consultation with the defence ministry in all stages; and he can report to both the ministers of defence and finance.

The whole functioning of the defence control mechanism in India is in conformity with the highest traditional of liberal democracy and rooted in the constitution and built on the principle of civilian supremacy over the military. The working relationship has been generally cordial and the committee system of functioning ensure that controversies do not sharpen beyond manageable limits. Here it is important to note that the credit for the political non involvement of the Indian army also goes to the military elite. The military approach has been quit sophisticated from this perspective civilian control is the result of a long process of indoctrination, training, socialization and direct and indirect manipulation of officers corps. As far as the training is concerned, the military leadership puts great emphasis on military professionalism and

during the training period of new cadets the principle of civilian control of the administration are emphasized. Junior officer in the military are taught to be politically neutral and are content to remain so, concentrating mainly on military matters.

There are political, economic and social problems in India. Further to this, there is a caste and class differentiation with high population. In spite of all these problems and indeed more, the India military has not seen cause to intervene in the nation's polity. It has remained pre-occupied with its professional task of defending the country from perceived and real external aggression. The Nigeria armed forces have lessons to learn from this.

The United States of America: Civil-military relations in the United States of America are heavily influenced by her liberal political tradition. According to Huntington, the country has sought to solve the problem in two ways, through extirpation or transmutation. The former refers to almost complete elimination of all institution of violence, while the latter has to do with their transformation along liberal values such that they lose their military characteristics.

Although past military generals are well respected as shown in many who have been voted as president, there is a deep respect for civilian supremacy and abiding subordination to civilian authority in the USA. No military general, no matter how powerful, can be seen to challenge civilian authority or removing

the military from civilian control. However, underlying this civil-military relation is the broad consensus attained by business, economic and political elites that soldiers can threaten the democratic process if they are not checkmated.

At the various stages in the evolution of the US civil-military relations, according to Mailafia and Gonda, the military played a supportive role in the overall economic development and technological transformation as in the period between 1815 and 1940, and during the cold war period. But the development has been supported with the creation of specific legislation to facilitate the control of military establishment. Since the end of second World War, there has been increase movement of military personnel into civilian position in government, business, research and (academic). The lesson here is that there is a fusion between the military and civilian establishment without the formal threatening the latter. Mailafia and Gonda summarized the situation as follows:

As a result of these change, there was reversal of public opinion regarding the military. The liberal anti-military outlook was replaced by that of respect for the Armed forces. Statesmen, Scholars and Publicists saw the military in new light as the defenders of democracy and western civilization.

Cuba: Before the Cuban revolution of 1959, the Cuban military was generally perceived as an instrument of coercion and repression directed against the people. The dictatorial regime of General Batistan used the military

to defend the interest of the United States, the neocolonial master. The revolutionary experience between 1956 - 1959 in the sierra maestro, and the taking over of the army by guerilla force transformed the character of the Cuban military. The major characteristics of civil military relation as identify by Mailafia and Gonda are as follows: One, it has emerged as the strongest institutional force as well as repository of training manpower in the society. Yet, the idea of full-time military service is discouraged in favour of elaborate system of reservist and paramilitary groups, which are mobilized when needed. Secondly, there is hardly any difference between civilian and military sector as they engage in similar social-economic activities. Thirdly, it is not apolitical military as the party and the military are fused. In this way, Cubans have evolved a unique pattern of civil military relations in the third world.

Israel: Israel has been appropriately described as a nation in arms or a garrison state. This is explained by the fact that she is surrounded by hostile neighbours who are challenging the legality of the state. This situation has determined the pattern of civil-military relations, which has evolved. There is hardly a distinction between soldiers and civilian because of the institutionalization of compulsory military service. This makes subservience to civilian authority much easier. The office of the prime minister through the minister of defence, exercise control over the military. The Israeli defence forces (IDF) has remained highly professionalized and aloof from politics, although some ex-general like Moshe Daya have played active role in the political and democratic process. Today, Israeli army is a part and parcel of the

society with the idea of universal and obligatory military service accepted broadly.

Another lesson to be learnt from the cases examined in this study is for the military to be servants of the people. The real dilemma to resolve is between the need for the military security on one hand and the freedom of civil society to consolidate the democratic process. As Mailafia and Gonda put it, at the institutional level the objective should be 'a system of civil military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

IN NIGERIATHE POLITCAL SYSTEM

The political system includes groups, interest, values and institutions that participate in national development. For Michael Howard, it is "an abstract notion of many forces which impinge upon the state and the government" These include the private sector, political parties and individual voters. While David Easton Defines a political system "as one, which contains all the institutions and processes involved in the authoritative allocation of values for society.

The military is very central to all political system. Plato' recognized early enough that the military and its role of defence arose out of the responsibility of the state to provide security. The first task of the modern state was the provision of law, order and security. To this extent, the military is a key institution of the state whose primary task is to secure its citizens against possible internal and external threat to security, law and order. While in the western societies a distinction was made between political office holders and the military institution, in many pre-colonial African societies, this distinction was not so clear, as the two were fused together. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it can be argued that the ilitary is the guarantor of state power and the custodian of national interest in so far as it takes seriously its primary

assignment of securing the state.

Although the military was originally conceived as a "neutral political force", its role changes as the society changes. Thus according to Huntington, the military does reflect the tensions and contradictions of civil society. It is for this reason that many scholars have come to the conclusion that military intervention is a reality in all society the only difference being the degree of involvement and intervention. In the United States and western societies, the "military industrial complex" remains a factor in influencing public policies including the maintenance of high defence spending and budget allocation to the military.

However, the situation has been different in many third world countries. In these societies, the military has become directly involved in the process of governance through the overthrow of civilian governments. In so doing, they have often invoked the traditional argument that being the custodians of national security; the military tends not to allow a continued drift towards chaos. And this is the context in which civil-military relations in many third world countries including Nigeria has remained problematic. The return to civil politics since May 1999 is expected to alter the nature of civil-military relations in ways that ensure the consolidation of civil and democratic forms of government based on the acceptance of "civilian supremacy" in governance.

THE NATURE AND FORM OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA

Military seizure of political power and subsequent rule is often described as an aberration. This is so as far as such seizure of power does not fit into the constitutional prescribed means of attaining power. Nigeria is one of the best illustration of the form and nature of military rule given the numerous cases of coups and counter coups, which had been brought on the stage, military rules have exhibited different forms of authority. In Nigeria's post independent experience in which the military coups, counter coups and attempted plots can be counted, while seven military heads of state have ruled at different time.

The first point to note about the nature and form of military rule in Nigeria is the autocratic and dictatorial style of governance. Against the background of what is perceived as mismanagement by the political class, military rulers start by suspending the parliament and political parties. In some instances, politicians and key actors of civilian administration are thrown into jail. Thus, they rule with decrees and without respect for the rule of law. Although the provisions of the constitution regarding fundamental rights of citizens are preserved, but this is more in name than in practice.

Another important feature is that organization of state power often favour unitary centralism. This is largely a reflection of the military command structure, which is hierarchical in nature, with chain of command following -from the top to the bottom Thus, the commander in chief is the most powerful,

concentrating power and authority in his hands.

However, the various military regimes have attempted to create organs and institutions to enhance collective decision-making such as the supreme military council (SMC) under General Gowon, the Armed forces Ruling Council (AFRC) under General Ibrahim Babangida, and the Provisional ruling Council (PRC) under General Abacha, to mention a few examples. What obtains in practice is that both executive and legislative functions are combined by one person who is the head of state and the most powerful person.

Military rule in Nigeria has never entailed complete control of all organs of power by the military officers. Co-operation and collaboration of (1 civilians facilitate military rule. Thus, Mailafia and Gonda served that the "arbitrary distinction between civilian and military rule have little analytical utility at least in Africa today. Jackman buttresses this point by suggesting that the armed forces in developing countries such as ours never rule alone. However, the motive here is the need to benefit from the technical and expert advise -from the civilians in the public bureaucracy and the displaced political class as well as the need to have some element of legitimacy.

The most important issue is the legacy, which the military left behind as a result of prolonged stay in governance. And this has to do with the militarization of consciousness, which derives from the exercise of power without recourse to the law or obeying the ruling of the courts of the land.

Thus, following long period of military rule, arbitrariness and use of brute force has come to dominate civil life.

EFFECTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN NIGERIA ON MILITARY PROFESSION

Military intervention in politics amounts to a deviation form the line of duty, as it is not a conditional role. Indeed, going back to section 197 of the 1979 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria, which has been upheld by the 1989, and the 1999 constitution, the primary role of the military is defense. The following are the obvious consequences of military involvement with the process of governance:

Ethnicisation of The Command Structure: One of the most debilitating consequences of prolonged military rule is the permeation of ethnic and regional, feelings and loyalty into the Nigeria military. Prior to the intervention, the military remained the symbol of national unity and loyalty. However, all this changed as a result of involvement in the business of government. It has been shown by scholars such as Elaigwu, that the ethnic feelings generated by the patterns of killing following the January 1968 abortive coup created ethnic and regional suspicions. As a matter of fact, the July 1966 coup, which toppled the Government of General Ironsi, was perceived as a revenge action by those officers involved against the January 15 group.

Omoniyi argues that the Nigeria military as it is today, is far from being a representative institution. There can be no greater confirmation of this than sectionally motivated coup as in the abortive attempt led by Major Gideon Orka in April 1990, claiming to be championing the course of the Middle Belt and other ethnic minorities.

Erosion of Discipline: One obvious effect of prolonged military rule is the erosion of discipline and obedience to superiors, which is the basis for the integrity of the military profession. Appointment into political offices and the immense opportunity to acquire wealth, often bestowed on young officers as reward for personal loyalty and other disrespectful act to superiors who were not in the circle of the clique ruling. A one time Chief of Army Staff said it all in his retirement speech when he said: ... .the end of our involvement in politics was the visible decline in professionalism, moral and discipline in the Nigerian Army. For example, we suddenly found ourselves operating the Nigerian Army with total disregard to existing rules and regulations. We become an army of anything is possible.

Erosion or Solidarity Involvement in politics led to the emergency of camps between officers who had political post and those who have not. The purist of parallel ambition destroyed the espirit-de-corps in the Armed Forces. The military as a result, become fractionalized, and the level of professionalism as well as internal cohesion drastically dropped.

Loss Of Personnel: Often described as high rate of attrition of officers, occupation of the center stage of politics led to loss of officers as a result of politics, coups and counter-coups. This was largely as a result of killings, executions, and premature retirements, dismissals and phasing out. A large number of officers were retired in 1990 following the April 21 coup.

Professional Underdevelopment: It may be appropriate to use the concept of "underdeveloped" to describe the situation of Nigerian military after three decades in the politics realm. Largely because of the pursuit of power, issues of manpower development and professional competence took the back stage. Along with the decline in internal cohesion, unity, and discipline, is the near decay of military infrastructure and equipment. The Nigerian Air Force for example, is reported to have been totally crippled with it fighter jets depleted. Military exercise which used to complement training in foreign military institutions virtually, ceased in the course of prolonged military rule. Scheduled courses in training institution had to be cancelled due to lack of equipment and funds. At unit level, commanders could not conduct training for fear of being suspected of having ulterior motive against the government.

Isolation of the Military: Several years of involvement in governance has resulted in the negative image and social isolation associated with the military institute. Precisely, because of the activities of a few officers who held

political posts, public disrespect and scorn tend to follow military personnel. They are accordingly subjected to a myriad of social and political abuses and presented as treasury looters, violet and misfits.

This question of isolation appeared to have a peculiar international dimension under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida and even more seriously under General Sani Abacha. Nigeria, following the annulment of the June, 12 1993 election, was considered a 'pariah' while the military was subjected to international sanctions and isolation

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY RULE

After occupying the political stage for much of our independence, existence, it may not be out of place to attempt to examine the political economy of military rule in Nigeria. What is important to be considered, here is the specific political and economic gain or cost associated with prolonged military rule in Nigeria.

To begin with, military rule has resulted in fundamental changes in the Nigeria political economy. It has led to change in the nature and oganization of state power in Nigeria and some measure of restructuring in the polity. One way in wl1ich this has been done is the preservation of the country's unity through the civil war, which was successfully prosecuted and the structural changes in the polity, especially the creation of new states in place of the

imbalance in the regional arrangement. In this way, the military help to promote unity and integration which was supplemented by other laudable schemes like the NYSC, unity schools and national sport festivals.

Military rule can also be credited with innovative policies such as the indigenization programme made possible by increased earning from exported petroleum product from the 1970s. Others include the establishment of iron and steel projects, vehicle assembly plants and a remarkable imprint in the foreign policy arena. The country actively pursued non-alignment policies and took a leading position in the struggle against apartheid and struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

However, involvement in politics brought immense wealth and material advantage on individuals who occupied political positions. As Adekanye has put it, Ex-Generals who participated in the process of governance made economic fortune and dominated the leading sections of the economy. They control vast chain of businesses, serve as directors in hortative companies and government owned paraslatals and are simply power brokers.

In terms of economic development of the country, the military made appreciable impact as shown above even though they could have even done more with the resources at their disposal. The abundant petro-dollar in the 197Os were enough for the government to develop the economy to a large extent. The military did not deliver on programmes like SAP, World Bank Loans

and indigenization decree as promised due to mismanagement. These Led to hyperinflation, mass unemployment, drastic reduction in the value of the Naira and increased in foreign debts. The impact of the mismanaged economy of the state can be seen on the standard of living in the country which most analyst categories as below poverty level. Nigerians and international communities welcome the return of democracy.

THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE POLITICAL ORDER

It is well recognized that Nigeria's plural and diverse nature makes the country most suitable for democratic governance. This has accounted for what is generally recognized as a strong tradition of civil society. Unfortunately, democratic order had failed to endure since the country gained independence in October 1960.

Nigeria's first democratic experiment, which was hailed as the largest black democracy, collapsed five years later. The parliamentary system of rule foisted on the country was new, the few rulers did not learn any democratic value from colonial rule, which was autocratic, and the period the new leadership had to learn was too short. All this prepared the ground for the series of crises and tensions that saw the collapsed of the first democratic experiment.

Again, in October 1979, following 13 years of military rule, Nigeria once more returned to democracy. Despite the optimism, it turned out to be more

brief than the first one as it was brought to an end on December 31 1983, by another military putsch. The handover to a democratically elected government in 1979 was preceded by a carefully drawn out transition programme, which began with a local government reforms in 1976, the setting up of a constitution drafting committee in 1976 and constituent assembly in 1977.

In every respect, the political parties formed were almost a replica of the first republic except for the National party of Nigeria, which enjoyed a measure of national spread. This, however, did not prevent the party from being seen as a party of the Hausa-Fulani controlled by the Kaduna Mafia. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) were reincarnation of the AG and NCNC respectively, in the first republic. The evidence of the first republic also abounds as shown in election rigging, political intolerance, violence and lack of respect for the rule of political competition, inflation soared, while unemployment grew out of proportion. The consequence was to be overthrow of the regime in December 1983.

The prevailing consensus that military rule is an aberration ensure that military rulers on their own, initiate transition to democracy. The failure of the Buhari regime to announce a transition programme and what was generally perceived as it draconian nature, led to its overthrow in August 1985 in a palace coup organized by General Ibrahim Babangida. The regime started on a warm

note because of the pledge to respect Hunan right which it accused the previous regime of violating. It soon commenced a transition programme with the setting up in 1987 of the political bureau. Secondly, it demonstrated lack of sincerity in implementing the transition programme because of too many cases of dissolution of political parties and their leadership. Thirdly, it kept on changing the handover date; first from 1990 to 1992; and finally to1993. Worst of all, it annulled the results of the June 12, 1993 presidential election that would have terminated military rule.

The Babangida regime could not however continue because of the public outrage generated by the annulment. While president Babangida was forced to "step aside", an interim National Government headed by Chief Earnest Shonekan was set up. But the ING suffered a legitimacy crises and was sacked by General Sani Abacha, the number 2 man in the ING on November 17, J 983. This development once more marked the restoration of military rule.

On June 8, 1998, General Sani Abacha died, bringing to an end his transition programme, which was designed to ensure that he succeeded himself. The five political parties set up and funded by the regime were pressurized into adopting him as the sole presidential candidate. The draconian character of the rule created a siege mentally for the military, political class and civil society. Those who championed the cause of June 12 elections were easily

branded as member of the opposition, and those who formed the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) were forced into exile or underground.

Following his death, General Abdusalami Abubakar emerged as the new military president. His renewed commitment to return the country to democratic rule led to a one-year transition programme, which ushered in a new civilian regime in May 1999. Nigeria has thus commenced another experiment, which is expected to lead to enduring democracy. Under the new dispensation, it is expected that the military will play a supportive role to promote the consolidation of democracy: As Gen Victor Malu remarked, "politics and governance are not legitimate business of the military, a point supported by Marshal Isaac Alfa who assured that henceforth, promotion will be based on "leadership quality, to the nation and service" the major concern now is whether the military will allow this democracy to endure. This is also the major challenge to the armed force today.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CIVIL RULE1 DEMOCRACY AND THE NIGERIA MILITARY

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY

Civilian control has always been part of militaries from their origins. The earliest militaries were controlled by the rich and propertied class, and the soldiers were to implement decisions of this class. They naturally promote and defended the interest of the rich class who controlled them. Such control of military by one class even though it is also civilian control, of a sort, is what Huntington refers tp as "subjective control". This is because the subjective is narrowed to the interest of the class in power. The professionalisation of the military is supposed to bring about "objective control", This makes the military a tool of the state and not a given class in the society. This recognizes the independence of the military as against its dependence on a small class.

Indeed. objective civilian control according to Huntington, is supposed to minimize military power and make it political1y neutral.

Discussion of the role of the military in a democratic setting at the came time implies the search for a viable civi1 military relation. Most militaries in third world countries have been involved in direct control of political power. In Latin America, military intervention became a fashion in the last century, until it burnt itself out naturally. In Africa, there was a prototype of the Latin America model of political growth starting from the sixties through seventies even to the

present day.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRATIC NIGERIA

Bearing in mind the experience of the United State, Cuba and Israel, it is possible to explain what should be the role of the Nigeria military in a democratic setting that will ensure civil-military relations capable of guaranteeing the survival of democracy. There seems to be a consensus that the role of the military in a democratic setting should be restricted to the traditional role of preserving law and order and defending the sovereignty of the nation. But this should not include direct takeover of the political process, as has been the case for much of Nigeria's post independence history. In other words, the military must be subordinated to the control of civilian authority.

What is not generally agreed upon is the methodology of achieving this. For example, scholars like Elaigwu rejected the liberal model of civil military relation on the ground that it is not suitable to the peculiar circumstances of Africa given the praetorian character of the military and its prolong stay in power. However, instead some form of accommodation in which he agrees that the military should have some visible role to play in democratic process as has been in Colombia, Mexico and Brazil to mention a few examples. It has also been suggested that to keep the military relevant and busy in peacetime, there is need to integrate it into the development process. It is expected that given

the size or professionals in the Nigerian military, personnel in engineers, signals, finance, medical, electrical and mechanical engineering corps can put their enormous technical and professional expertise at the service of the society to promote development. In this way, it can contribute to the industrial development and generate additional resources outside the budget. This will also keep them up to date in their specialized fields and also enhance their effectiveness during military operations.

There is also the need to carry out a thorough political education conscientisation of the military so that the rank and file can appreciate the values of democracy as well as re-orientate the personnel with regard to the traditional obligation of the military, This is necessary because the present generation of officers and soldiers have witnessed long years of military governance, and probably admired certain attractions, perhaps even benefited, Military personnel should be made to realize through seminars, training sessions and durbars that military intervention erodes professionalism, discipline and destroys the fabric of the military. They must be schooled to accept the fact that, a professional military is one that does not even contemplate direct involvement in governance, whatever the challenges. Also, the point should be made that the time has come to pay attention to the reform of the armed forces, The mass retirement of officers who have held political posts by the present democratically elected regime in May 1999 is once of the

steps aimed at rebuilding discipline, a necessity for professionalism. What remains to be done is a programme of truly reprofessionalizing the Nigerian military.

Other areas of neglect as a result of direct involvement of the military in governance to the detriment of the profession are, training, equipment procurement, and maintenance. It seems that a deliberate effort was made to keep the military ineffective because of regime security. The table of equipment produced in 1990 and equipping units to scale has not been done. The reasons could be economic all lack of the will to do so.

As a result, officers and soldiers were not fully engaged Maximum attention should be given to equipping military formations and training institutions at all levels. Proper training must be embarked upon and regular training exercise within services and joint exercises with sister services. Also, training exercises should be organized with armed forces of ECOWAS countries considering our involvement in sub-regional security arrangement. The Nigeria military should get more involved with global peacekeeping operations as a way of cross fertilizing its skill and experience. A professional military rather than think of direct involvement in governance will concern itself with matters of security and defence for the state.

Cases of reported attempts of military incursion should be promptly investigated and disposed off according to the law of the land. A Nigerian

minister during the second republic commented that he advised the then president to retire a general to avert a military intervention but this was ignored. He was vindicated when the government was toppled in 1993. Major Koromah of Sierra Leone was simply kept in Jail by president Tejah Kabbah following a report accusing him of trying to topple the government. He later look over power from the prison where he was detained. Also for example, according to Elaigwu, Gen. Gowon was aware that there was a plot to overthrow his regime but failed to do anything about it before traveling to Uganda for the OAU meeting in 1975. The government must take necessary steps to nib in the bud attempts of military incursion before they occur.

The primary objective of military professionalism according Huntington is to reduce the excessive power of the military and lessen its danger to society. He also posits that officership is a profession. The process, which led to the professionalisation of the military, was informed by the need to take the assignment away from military amateurs into the hands of professionals. The professional soldiers should have corporateness, expertise and responsibility.

Huntington further states that professionalism forced the armed forces to get immersed in their technical tasks, with less time for any diversion. The professional stays within the policy laid down by his political leaders,

irrespective of its political and moral basis. While advising the legislature and the executive about defence matters, the professional is also obedient and loyal to the state and to legitimate authority, and dedicated to providing defence and security. These should be the role of members of the Nigerian armed forces in a democratic set-up like ours.

THE ROLE OF NIGERIAN POLITICIANS IN A DEMOCRACY

The politicians or political class are the most critical actors in a democracy. To this extent, they arc the major players whose behaviour will determine the future and survival of democracy. Therefore, there is the need to examine the role expected from them and other democratic organization to ensure democracy is sustained in Nigeria.

Performance: The task of governance rests primarily on the political class. They have the duty of portraying democracy in a good light through performance or what is generally being describe as the "dividends" of democracy. Democracy must be seen to address problems of poverty, unemployment, security and general welfare.

Constitutionalism: It is the duty of the politicians to ensure that the spirit and letter of the constitution are upheld. The tragedy of past democratic experience is that constitutions were honoured more in their breach. This

requires that they must encourage the emergence of a strong and independent judiciary, a culture of the rule of law and observation of human rights.

Institution Building: Democracy is about building institutions that can guarantee democratic stability such as the legislature, political parties, the electoral system and agencies to promote accountability and transparent governance. Aggrieved members of the political class who have lost out in elections are known to have incited the military. Other members of the civil populaces who have hitherto enjoyed patronage in the form of contract have also been known to encourage military intervention. These categories of people should be made to realize the beauty, decency and benefits of a strong and sustainable democratic institution.

Professionalism: Professionalism in this context refers to the professional attitude of both civil and military leaders in the ministry of defence. They are responsible for their subordinates and organizations, committed to the defence framework rooted in democracy. Professionalism entails the understanding of the responsibility of civil and military leaders in the defence ministry but subordinated to civil authority both are expected to perform their duties with, honesty, morale courage, competence, selflessness and commitment.

CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

This set of actors are seen as any group that are out to empower citizens to challenge any outlets for excessive exercise of power, which erode potentially and actually, the dignity of citizens in a state. Since military intervention is one of the major recipes for undermining professionalism, the development and proliferation of civil society group, particularly those that have to do with the defence and promotion of democracy, good governance, accountability and human rights, will help to retain the military in the barracks. these groups and association should be encouraged to continue to do so.

The Media: Closely related to non-governmental organization (NGO) is the role played by the media, especially independent media in Nigeria. Sadly, most of the electronic media are owned by government. This puts a limitation on how far the media can be used to oppose military intervention and governance, and promote a high sense of military responsibility. The independent media has played a very vital role in the promotion of democracy in Nigeria. This helps remove the principal distraction from military professionalism.

The Working People: An active but rational workers' union, such as the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), which helps articulate the position of the working people and gets them to defend democracy and not any political party, will help the military to stay in the barracks. Military intervention can be

responded to by civil disobedience, strikes, and sit-to-rule actions. These actions will discourage the military to intervening into governance.

As pointed out, the political elite need to rule well according to the rule of law. This will stop the usual excuse of the electoral fraud, general corruption and ethnicism among others, which the military usually give for intervening into the political scene. However, it must be stated that failure by civilians does not permit military intervention. Democracy provides a means of replacing a bad government with another through the ballot box. The military must restrict itself to matters of defence and security as may be directed by the civil authority.

ENDNOTES

1. Huntington SP The Soldiers and the State (Mas sacha Setts. Harvard University Press 1957) ., p. 295
2. Manprect Sethi. "Changing Role of Military in Latin America: Some Approaches and Interpretations" (Unpublished)., p. 2
3. J.Iawa Elaigwu, "The Management of Defence in a Democratic Set up in Nigeria Case" at the National War College, 19n January 1998., p. 17
4. Rafiu Adesina, Military in Politics (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books 1999)., p. 7.
5. J 19awa Elaigwu, op. Cit. 13 – 14
6. Huntington SP., Op. Cit., p. 1

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

The study has attempted to examine the crucial issue of civil-military. relations in a democratic setting. The Nigerian example, which has been examined in greater details show that civil-military relations has not followed the Anglo- American pattern as it was envisaged at independence. The Nigerian military has not been able to internalize western concept of civil-military relations which is based on subordination to civil authority which explains the :frequent intervention in politics and disruption of the democratic process.

Causes of military intervention in Nigeria range from economic and social problems from the society leading to violence and insecurity. Others include, the problem of greed among politicians, the violence associated with elections, electoral competition and the inadequacy in dealing with social, ethnic and economic problems. The consequence of these interventions by the military is that the military institution which is meant to strengthen the civil authority to enable a democratic culture grow, has itself become immersed in politics. Some of the implications are, democratic and representative institutions of government like the legislature, political parties and electoral system, are not allowed to grow. It has also led to decline in professionalism within the military, which was caused by neglect in areas of training and equipment for training

institutions and units.

Several years of military involvement in governance has resulted in the negative image and social isolation associated with the military institution. This took an international dimension following the annulment of June 12, 1993 election, when Nigeria was considered a "pariah" while the military was subjected to international sanction and isolation.

Military rule has however resulted in fundamental changes in the Nigerian polity. One way is the preservation of the country's unity through the civil war, which was successfully prosecuted, and the structural changes in the polity, especially the creation of more states. In this way, the military helped to promote unity and integration, which was complimented by the other schemes like NYSC, unity schools and national sport festival.

The lesson to learn from a review of civil-military relations in United State Brazil and Cuba is that Nigeria should establish mutual confidence and collaboration between civilian rulers on one hand, and the military on the other, such that the latter will internalize complete loyalty and subordination to civilian authority.

The challenge for Nigeria is not to adopt a particular form of civil military relations, but to re-orientate and educate the military to respect and subordinate itself to civil and democratic authority. They may serve as the custodian of national sovereignty, but not to take direct control of political

power.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the effort to evolve appropriate model of civil-military relations that can sustain and guarantee a democratic order, the following recommendations are being put forward:

a. The first task is the need for the re-orientation role in a democracy. This can be done through mass political education and military personnel on the need to appreciate democracy as the promoter and guarantor of peace, stability and progress.

b. Closely related to the above is the need to ensure professionalism in the armed forces through training within and outside the country. Training facilities in training institutions and units should be resuscitated and funds made available for realistic joint and combined training.

c. The politicians should elevate their performance to enhance the legitimacy of the democratic process. They should ensure the security and welfare of the people.

d. Apart from training exercise, there should be more involvement in peacekeeping operations for members of the armed forces. This will engage their minds and at the same time enhance professionalism.

e. The media should be used to enlighten the public about military

activities, the role of the military in the society and the reorientation programme of the military.

f. There should be a constitutional provision that empowers the citizens to respond to military incursion by way of strike, protests, civil disobedience and work-to-rule.

The military should be integrated into the development process. Some specialists in corps like signals, engineers, medical, finance, electrical and mechanical engineering could put their technical expertise and facilities at the service of the public.

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