ENFORCEMENT OF PUNISHMENTS FOR CORRUPTION OFFENCES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES IN THE FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE; 1999 2010

IDRIS, MUSA
08034772717
idi musa 2009@yahoo.com

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

ABSTRACT

One of the major concerns of the federal government's anti-corruption crusade is the enforcement of punishments for corruption offences in her public service. This is because of the increasing level of corruption with impunity in spite of the provisions of different anti-corruption acts. The objectives of this paper are to ascertain the levels of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service. Others are to examine whether the level enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has affected their level of effectiveness, identify the problems associated with the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies and make suggestions for improvement. Survey research using questionnaire and interview were mainly used. The population for the study consist of staff of the federal ministries, departments, and agencies. Representatives of civil society organisations were interviewed. These were presented in tables, frequencies and percentages using chi-square distribution to test the hypothesis. The study revealed that both the levels of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies were low. It has also been discovered that the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has affected the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies. The study recommends for the reform of the Nigerian legal system by re-orientating the judges to demonstrate courage to ensure speedy discharge of their responsibilities and the employment of more competent prosecutors. Others are capacity building, facility update and the establishment of special anti-corruption courts to relief the overburdened judges of cases of corruption in the interim.

Key Word: *Enforcement, Punishment, Corruption, Effectiveness, Anti-Corruption Agencies, Public Service.*

1.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the major challenges to governance especially in the first decade of the twenty first century is corruption. Its dimension has over the years attracted the attention of global, continental and national governments. This has placed the fight against corruption on the priority agenda of governments. Pursuant to this, the federal government of Nigeria established institutions through enabling laws aimed at fighting corruption in the society in general and the public service in particular. These inter-alia include the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) established vide ICPC and EFCC Acts of 2000 and 2004 respectively as well as the Code of Conduct Bureau and its Tribunal. Others were the Fiscal Responsibility and the National Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Acts of (FRN, 2007).

However, of greater concern has been the enforcement of the laws establishing the agencies especially the enforcement of punishments on public officials for corruption offences. This is because of increasing rate of corruption with impunity while others public servants seems to be immune from prosecution. For instance Thirty one out of thirty six former state chief executive between 1999 2007 were alleged to be corrupt but only the former Bayelsa State Governor (DSP Alamieyesiegha) was convicted on 26th July, 2006 (Buhari 2007). The trial of the other governors remain stalled. The chairmen of the EFCC and the ICPC have become disgusted with the way the judiciary handles corruption cases that they have called for special anti-corruption courts to be set up (Akinyemi, 2010). Nigerians do not believe that enough sanctions exist to deter people from corruption (FRN, 2003). Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Nigeria staggers between 1.0 in 2001 to the highest of 2.7 in 2008. This could not be sustained as the CPI slipped down to 2.5 in 2009 and further to 2.4 in 2010. Why is the rate of corruption still high in the Nigerian Public Service in spite of the impressive array of institutions established to enforce anti-corruption laws? What is the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and how has it affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies? What are the problem associated with the enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and how can these problems be addressed?

The objectives of this paper are to determine the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service. Others are to examine how the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service, identify the problems of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and make suggestions for improvement. The hypothesis of the study is stated in the Null (H_0) and the Alternate (H_1) in order to avoid bias thus; H_0 the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption has not affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service, H_1; the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service.

The significance of this study to research, policy and practice of governance as well as civil society organisations and international assistance agencies cannot be over emphasised. The literature reviewed is rich and current. The data collected and analysed is also current and reliable. These will provide vital information to both researchers and policy makers. The identification of gap between the theory and practice will enable practitioners fine tune their strategies for more effective anti-corruption agencies. The civil society and international assistance agencies will also find the findings of the study useful in assessing specific country assessment for possible intervention.

This study covers the period 1999 2010. The choice of this period can be justified on the bases of being a period of return to democratic governance in Nigeria. Principles of transparency and accountability are enshrined in democratic governance than is expected of military regimes. Although, corruption is pervasive in both private and public sectors, this paper is limited to corruption in the public sector since it is of greater concern to governmental studies. It is also limited to the effectiveness of the EFCC, ICPC and CCB in the federal public service in order to give it more focus.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The research design for the study is mainly survey research consisting of the use questionnaire and interview. The population for the study is 7,173 consisting of the staff of the EFCC, ICPC and CCB. Others are staff of the Federal Ministry of Justice, Office of the Auditor General of the Federation, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, Kaduna, and the Academic Staff of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Those interviewed were representatives of Civil Society Organisation, Centre for Democracy and Development, Human Rights Monitor, Zero Corruption Coalition, Civil Society and Advocacy Centre and the African Centre for Leadership and Strategy. The sample size for the study is 379 using Yamane's (1967) formula as expressed by Israel (1992) thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n = sample size
N = total population
e = Level of significance (95%)

$$\therefore n = \frac{7173}{1 + 7173(0.05)^2} = \frac{7173}{1 + 7173(0.0025)} = \frac{7173}{1 + 17.9325}$$

$$= \frac{7173}{18.9325} = 378.872 = 379 \text{ (approxiamately)}$$

The source of data were both primary and secondary. These were presented in tables, frequencies and percentages. The statistical tool used in testing the hypothesis was Chi-square distribution () given by the formula

$$\chi^2 = \Sigma\left(\frac{O-E}{E}\right)^2$$

Where O = the observed frequency of any value and
E = the expected frequency of any value
(Clucey, 1996;97, Spieged and Stephens, 1999:261)
This was calculated with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Corruption is a very common term. However, it defies a precise definition. Scholars, practitioners and concerned organisations therefore advanced different definitions of the concept based on their orientation and milieu. Aduda (2007) Ladipo (2000) Transparency International (1999 and 2000) and the World Bank (1999) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. Public office is abused when officials accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe and when private agents offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profits. Others include patronage and nepotism, theft of state assets or diversion of state revenues among others.

Ekumankama (2002) sees corruption as the abuse of power, violation of official or judicial duty, and intentional design for personal gain against the interest of the public or individuals. The definitions advanced above limits corruption to the public sector as if it does not exist in the private sector. This however, serves the purpose of the paper. Corruption may not necessarily be for self gain but it could be for the benefit of a third party.

Corruption is antithetical to good governance as it adversely affects the socio-economic and political well being of the state (African Development Bank, 2006 and Bello Imam, 2005). For this reasons the anti-corruption acts provides for punishments for corruption offences. Hoffman and Graham (2009:146) define punishment as the infliction of "hard treatment by an authorised authority (that is, the state) where the suffering is in some way connected to the actual or potential violation of a law." Thus punishment is both preventive and deterrent measure to prevent potential corrupt public officials from engaging in the act and impose sanctions on those who commit it. For punishments for corruption offences to be effective, they have to be enforced. The Black's Law Dictionary (1990; 528) defines enforcement as "the act of putting something such as law into effect, the execution of a law; the carrying out of a mandate or command." The indicator of enforcement of punishment in this paper are; trial of suspects, speedy trial of suspects and completion of trials. Others are number of suspects convicted, severity and actual enforcement of punishments.

Huther and Shah (2000) defines effectiveness as the extend to which a projects or institution's objectives are achieved, or expected to be. This requires measurement of the effect of a given set of anti-corruption activities on levels of corruption or corruption activities. Of interest is the measurement of changes in levels of corruption as well as the degree to which observed changes to be credibly attributed to the anti-corruption interventions by the agencies through prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution for corrupt offences in the federal public service.

The public service encompasses the civil service, the police and other security agencies, the armed forces, the national and state assembly services, the judicial service, parastatal and agencies of government in which government owns controlling shares (Bureau for Public Service Reform (BPSR) (2007). As Ademolekun (2002) puts it, the public service is the totality of the administrative institutions and structures within which the work of government is carried out.

Corruption practices become the exception rather than the norm if the likelihood of being caught is high, if the consequences once caught is predictable and severe (African Development Bank (ADB), 2006 Ali, 2007 and Gregory, 2007). Hurther and Shah (2002) advocate that successful anti-corruption programmes should lower the expected gains and raise the expected penalties of corrupt behaviour. That is, the CCB, EFCC and ICPC must change the cost benefit calculations of federal public servants who belief that the expected net benefits of corruption are positive. ADB (2006), Ali (2007) and Huther and Shah (2000) observes that a self interested public servant will seek out corruption if the expected gains outweigh the cost as presented in the equitation below;

$E(B) = n \times E(G)\ pro(P) \times (P) > 0$

Where E = The expectations operator

n = No. of corruption transactions

G = Gain from the corruption transactions

Prob (P) = The probability of paying a penalty; and

P = the penalty for the corrupt activity.

Based on the cost-benefit consideration, anti-corruption agencies can reduce corruption in the federal public service by increasing the probability of paying a penalty, and enforcing the penalty for corruption behaviour.

1.4 MMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

dent variable in the hypothesis stated in section one is enforcement of
ıption offences while the dependent variable is the effectiveness of the
's. Out of the 379 questionnaires administered on the respondents, 322
ions on the levels of enforcement of punishments for corruption
ness of the anti-corruption agencies as well as the determination of
s affects each other will be based on the responses from the
's is complemented by the views of Civil Society Organisations

(CSOs).

1.5 ENFORCEMENT OF PUNISHMENTS FOR CORRUPTION OFFENCES

The indicators of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences are; trial of suspects, speed of trial of suspects, completion of trial of suspects, and conviction of offenders. Others are severity of punishments, and actual enforcement of punishments. The responses are graded in the five-point Lickert scale of very high, high, undecided, low and very low.

Table 1: The Level of Enforcement of Punishments for Corruption Offences

Criteria for Enforcement of Punishments	Very High		High		Undecided		Low		Very Low	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Trial of suspects	103	31.99	86	26.71	12	3.73	79	24.53	42	13.04
Speed of trial of suspects	22	6.83	64	19.88	6	1.86	142	44.10	88	27.33
Completion of trial of suspects	42	13.04	68	21.12	4	1.24	92	28.57	116	36.02
Conviction of offenders	22	6.83	120	37.27	32	9.94	100	31.06	48	14.91
Severity of punishments	27	8.39	57	17.70	28	8.70	142	44.10	68	21.12
Enforcement of punishments	14	4.35	58	18.01	14	4.35	84	26.09	152	47

Source: Researchers Survey, July, 2010

The data in table one above indicates that majority (31.99%) of the respondents rated trial of suspects for corruption offences was very high. However, the speed of trail of suspects for corruption offences was low while the level of completion of the trials was rated very low. However, despite the fact that only few cases were completed, a high percentage of those tried were actually convicted. But the punishments for corruption offences were not severe contrary to the provisions of the conceptual framework. The overall level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences was rated very low by the majority (47.20%) of the respondents.

1.6 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES

The indicators of the effectiveness of the agencies are; prevention of corrupt practices in Federal Public Service, detection of corrupt practices, and investigation of alleged corruption cases. Others are prosecution of corruption offenders, reduction in the rate corruption in the public service, and the overall effectiveness of the agencies. The effectiveness rating of each of these indicators by the respondents is presentation in tables 2 below.

Table 2: Rate of Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies

Effectiveness Criteria	Very Effectiv		Effective		Undecided		Ineffective		Very ineffective	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Prevention of corrupt practices in Federal Public Service	2	9.01	124	38.51	27	8.39	115	35.71	27	8.39
Detection of corrupt practices	46	14.29	110	34.16	22	6.83	130	40.37	14	4.35
Investigation of alleged corruption	62	19.25	130	40.37	12	3.73	115	35.71	3	0.93
Prosecution of offenders	57	17.70	96	29.81	20	6.21	141	43.7	8	2.48
Reduction of the rate of corruption	19	5.90	116	36.02	13	4.04	157	48.76	17	5.28
Overall effectiveness of anti-corruption	20	6.21	135	41.93	7	2.17	146	45.34	14	4.35

Source: Researcher's Survey, July, 2010

From the data in table 2 above, we can infer that the agencies have been effective in the discharge of their preventive duties. A greater percentage of the agencies staff agreed with this position when compared with the non-agency staff. But the anti-corruption corruption agencies have been ineffective in detecting the occurrence of corrupt practices in the Federal Public Service. A greater percentage (40.17%) of the respondents opined that the anti-corruption agencies have been effective in investigating cases of corruption. The greater percentage of the agency staff shared this view in comparison to the non-agency staff. However, tables 3 and 4 presenting the activities of the investigation departments of the ICPC and CCB had fully investigated only 23.44% and 6.97% of the cases respectively. This actually shows ineffectiveness of the agencies in investigating corruption cases.

Table 3; Analysis of Investigation of Cases by the Investigation Department of ICPC (2001- 2007)

Year	Cases Referred	Cases Fully Investigated	Percentage	Cases under Investigation	Percentage	Cases Rejected for Lack of Jurisdiction	Percentage
2001	20	11	55.0	9	45.0	0	0.00
2002	155	11	7.1	117	75.48	27	17.41
2003	308	10	3.25	211	68.51	87	28.24
2004	226	0	0.00	207	91.59	19	8.41
2005	79	0	0.00	74	93.67	5	6.33
2006	234	160	68.38	74	31.32	0	0.00
2007	147	82	55.78	51	34.69	14	9.52
Total	**1,169**	**274**	**23.44**	**743**	**63.56**	**152**	**13.00**

Source; Adapted from ICPC Annual Reports, 2006 and 2007 p. 14 and 16 respectively

Table 4: Status of Cases Received by Investigation and Monitoring Department of CCB (2000 - 2007 (March)

S/N	Status	Number	Percentage
1	Total No. of Cases Discontinued Due to Lack of Merit	234	50.98
2	Total No. of Cases Under Investigation	123	26.79
3	Total No. of Cases referred to other Organisations/Agencie	18	3.92
4	Total No. of Cases Pending Further Development	52	11.33
5	Total No. of Cases sent to the Tribunal for Prosecution	32	6.97
6	Total No. of Petitions Received	459	99.99 = 100.00

Source: CCB 2007 Ministerial Briefing

The data in table 2 also shows that the anti-corruption agencies have been ineffective in the prosecution of suspects for corruption offences. This view is also shared by the civil society organisations. A greater percentage of the respondents rated the agencies ineffective in combating corruption in the Federal Public Service. The CSOs are of the view that even though, the anti-corruption agencies achieved only a marginal reduction in the rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service, more public servants are now afraid of engaging in corruption than before since it has more than ever before became a matter of public concern.

Table 5: The most Effective Anti -Corruption Agency in the Nigerian Public Service

Response	Number of Respondents	Percentage
CCB	22	11.17
EFCC	102	51.78
ICPC	73	37.06
Total	**197**	**100.00 (Approximate)**

Source; Researchers Survey, July, 2010

As presented in table 5 above, the data indicates that, the EFCC has been the most effective anti-corruption agency out the three with 51.78% followed by the ICPC and CCB with 37.06% and 11.17% respectively. The agency staff were deliberately excluded form these question to avoid bias. The CSOs also opined that the EFCC has been performing better than the other agencies.

1.7 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis postulated in section one states that;

H_0: The level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has not affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service.

H_1: The level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service. The hypothesis was tested using SPSS and the products are in tables 6,7 and 8 below.

Table 6: Frequency Table

Responses on Enforcement of Punishments (Independent variable)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very High	14	4.3	4.3	4.3
	High	58	17.7	18.0	22.4
	Undecided	14	4.3	4.3	26.7
	Low	84	25.7	26.1	52.8
	Very Low	152	46.5	47.2	100.0
	Total	322	98.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	1.5		
Total		327	100.0		

Table 7

Responses on Overall effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (Dependend variable)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Effective	20	6.1	6.2	6.2
	Effective	135	41.3	41.9	48.1
	Undecided	7	2.1	2.2	50.3
	Ineffective	145	44.3	45.0	95.3
	Very ineffective	15	4.6	4.7	100.0
	Total	322	98.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	1.5		
Total		327	100.0		

Table 8

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided)	95% Confidence Interval		Monte Carlo Sig. (1-sided)	95% Confidence Interval	
				Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pearson Chi-Square	527.687[a]	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.000			
Likelihood Ratio	466.740	16	.000	.000[b]	.000	.000			
Fisher's Exact Test	447.020			.000[b]	.000	.000			
Linear-by-Linear Association	225.809[c]	1	.000	.000[b]	.000	.000	.000[b]	.000	.000
N of Valid Cases	322								

a. 12 cells (48.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

b. Based on 10000 sampled tables with starting seed 1502173582.

c. The standardized statistic is 15.027.

The critical value on the X^2 table at 16 df and 95% () is 7.962 while the calculated X^2 value produced from the SPSS in table 8 is 527.687. The decision rule in using X^2 for test of hypothesis is; reject H_0 if calculated X^2 value is greater than critical value and accept the H_1 and vice-versa. In this case, the X^2 calculated value of 527.687 is greater than the critical value of 7.962 Therefore, the H_0 which states that the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has not affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service is rejected and the H_1 accepted.

1.8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the data analysed and hypothesis tested in section three, the study concludes that both the levels of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service were low. Furthermore, the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences has also affected the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in the federal public service. Hence, an increase in the level of enforcement of punishments for corruption offences among others will increase the level of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in combating corruption in the federal public

service. In relation to the conceptual framework, the expected gain from corrupt practices by federal public servants in Nigeria exceeds the probability of paying a penalty for corrupt practices.

In view of these, the study recommends for the reform of the legal system to enable it effectively cope with the challenges of corruption. The reform should among others, include employing more competent prosecutors, severer punishments for corruption offences and equipping the courts for fast dispensation of justice.

The judges should also be re-oriented to demonstrate courage to ensure speedy discharge of their judicial responsibilities. Concurrently, special anti-corruption courts should be established to relief the overburdened judges of cases of corruption pending the reform of the legal system.

As corruption has become more dynamic and more complex, advanced technology is required by the anti-corruption agencies in detecting and investigating corruption offences. International collaboration with relevant agencies is required through capacity building and facility update. Robust demonstration of political will is required to implement these reforms.

REFERENCES

Adamolekun, L. (2002) *Central Government Organisation* in Adamolekun, L. (ed) *Public Administration in Africa; Main Issues and Selected Country Studies,* 17 27, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Limited.

Aduda, G.T. (2007) *Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (Due Process); A Mechanism for Combating Corruption in Infrastructural Delivery in Nigeria,* Partnering to Combating Corruption Series Leicestershire Water Loughborough University, United Kingdom.

African Development Bank Group (2006) *Combating Corruption in Africa; Issues and Challenges,* Concept Note paper for the 2006 Annual Meetings, Ouagadougou, Burkinafaso.

Akinyemi, A.B. (2010) *Fighting Corruption and Social Conflict to Achieve Development,* Text of the Lead Lecture Delivered at the 10th Anniversary Celebration of Arewa Consultative Forum on Thursday April 29th 2010, Kaudna.

Ali, Y.O. (2007) *The Anti-Graft War* in Saliu, H., Amali. E., and Olawepo, R. (eds), *Nigeria's Reform Programme, Issues and Challenges* (511 540), Ilorin, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin.

* *Department of Public Administration, University of Abuja, Nigeria*

Bello-Imam, I.B. (2005) *The War Against Corruption in Nigeria; problems and Prospects,* Ibadan, College Press and Publishers Limited.

Black, H.C., Nolan, J.R., Norlan Haley, J.M. Comdy, M.J., Hicks, S.C. and Alibrandi, M.N. (1990), *Black's Law Dictionary,* Sixth Edition, St. Paul, Minn. USA, West Publishing Company.

BPSR (2007), Nigerian Public Service Reform; Answers to Sixty Six Frequently Asked Questions on Public Service Reform, Abuja.

Buhari, M. (2007) *"Quote Me."* In Zero Tolerance, the Magazine of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crises Commission Vol. 2 No. 1 (14).

CCB (2004) *Annual Report,* Abuja, the Presidency.

CCB (2007) *Ministerial Press Briefing,* Abuja, the Presidency.

EFCC (2004) *Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004,* Abuja, Heritage press Limited.

Ekumankama, D.U. (2002) *Law, Corruption and Other Economic Crimes in Nigeria Today; Problems and Solutions,* Jos, New World Publications.

FRN (2003) *Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey; Analysis of Survey Results, Final Report.*

FRN (2007) *Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007,* Abuja, the Federal Government Printer.

FRN (2007) *National Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Act, 2007,* Abuja, the Government Printer.

Gregory, R. (2007) *Accountability in Modern Government,* in Peters, B.G. and Piere, J. (eds), *the Handbook of Public Administration,* (339 350), London, Sage publications.

Hoffman, J. and Graham, P. (2009) *Introduction to Political Theory,* Second Edition, London, Pearson Longman.

Hurther, J. and Shah, A. (2000) *Anti-corruption Policies and Programmes; A Framework for Evaluation,* Operations and Evaluation Department (OED), the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS 2501.

ICPC (2000) *The ICPC Act, 2000,* Ibadan, University Press Ltd.

ICPC (2007) *Annual Reports 2001 2007,* Abuja, Finlay Communications Ltd.

Israel, G.D. (1992) *Sampling the Evidence of Extension Programme Impact, Programme* Evaluation and Organisational Development, IFAS, University of Florida.

Ladipo, Y.O. (2002) *Bribery and Corruption in Nigeria, the Public Accountant;* the Journal of the Institute of Certified Public Accountant of Nigeria, Vol. 1, July October, 11 16.

Lucey, T. (1996) Quantitative Techniques. 5th Edition, Ashford Colour Press Ltd, London.

Spiegel, M.R. and Stephens, L.J. (1999). Statistics. McGraw Hill, New York.

The World Bank (1999) *Can Corruption be Measured?* www.exe/worldbank. org/BW/Vol.3No.6

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999 2010 Editions, htt://www.transaprency.org