

**DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON NIGERIA'S ROLE IN ECOWAS
MANAGEMENT OF THE 2012 CONFLICT IN MALI**

BY

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STUDIES
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AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA**

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AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA**

JANUARY, 2017

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation entitled “Domestic Constraints on Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS Management of the 2012 Conflict in Mali” has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. Information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other institution.

Lawrence Peter ABIN

Date

Certification

This dissertation entitled “Domestic Constraints on Nigeria’s Role in ECOWAS Management of 2012 Conflict in Mali” by Lawrence Peter ABIN meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (M.SC.) in Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Mrs. Mary Peter, also to the memories of my father, Peter John Abin and my Uncle Daniel John Abin.

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First, I am tremendously grateful to God: Father, Son and Holy Spirit for the strength and courage bestowed on me to write this dissertation.

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Abstract

This study examines the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS' bid to resolve the conflict in Mali. In line with her leading role, Nigeria had played a major role in preventing further loss of lives and property, and restored democracy in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, with the current security situation in Nigeria, a sub-regional leader, it raised concern on what the country has done in the security and constitutional conflict in Mali. In this study, the specific objectives were to assess: Nigeria's role, explanation for the intervention, and factors that affected her performance in Mali. It is the assumption of this study that; Nigeria's involvement in managing the conflict in Mali was to enhance its national interest and policy of promoting sub-regional peace and security, Nigeria did not play a leadership role in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali and that Nigeria's domestic challenges, especially internal insecurity militated against her performance. The Hegemonic Stability Theory was employed to explain Nigeria's role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali. This theory argued that Institutions designed to help states in cooperating with one another are more likely to be created and maintained when there is a powerful state that is capable of providing collective goods (stability) and willing to do so. As it affects ECOWAS, Nigeria has been a leading force in view of her population, military strength and resource (oil). The research employed both primary (through interview) and secondary data. Also using documentary method of analysis, the study demonstrates that the rationale behind Nigeria's role in ECOWAS' effort in Mali was linked to her national interest (expressed in terms of the fear of spill over of the conflict, her hegemonic ambition) and her West African policy of promoting peace and security within ECOWAS. The study equally revealed that Nigeria's role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali was more contributory and supportive than transformative. The study also demonstrated that Nigeria scaled down her contribution to Mali and later with the degeneration of internal security situation, she pulled out her contingent to bolster the internal security concerns. Other factors that limit Nigeria's role include; problems of logistics, intelligence, doctrine and training. From this experience, it is imperative for Nigeria to promote cordial relations with other non-ECOWAS countries in order to share intelligence on practical modalities of an intervention.

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Acronyms

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AU	African Union
AQUIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development
CNRDRE	National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and Restoration of the State
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
FROLINAT	National Liberation Front of Tchad
JEM	Justice and Equity Movement
GUNT	Government of National Unity and Transition
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAD	Mutual Assistance and Defence
MDSF	Mali Defense and Security Forces
MIA	Islamic Movement for Azawad
MICEMA	ECOWAS Mission in Mali

MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPCI	Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement
MUJAO	Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIBATT	Nigerian Battalion
NIFAG	Nigerian Armed Forces Assistant Group
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
MINURSO	United Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hanra and Rio de Oro Arabic
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADR	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TAC	Technical Aid Corps Scheme
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNIVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNIFIL	Interim Force in Lebanon
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNMIS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNIMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNIPOM	United Nations India- Pakistan Observer Mission
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
UN	United Nations Organizations

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Conflict constitutes one of the major features confronting the West African-sub-region and the world at large. The sub-region has always been in potential or actual antagonism between the political elite and militant groups. Accordingly, the fundamental incompatibility in most Post-Cold War conflicts did not revolve around disputes over territory between two or more states; rather they were disputes between two or more groups within a state. This incompatibility found expression in the ethnicisation of politics, the use of religion as a means of mobilization, the violent assertion of rights to self-determination, the collapse or near collapse of the state, resource conflicts and criminal activities through trading in precious minerals like diamond, oil, arms and drugs (Bolaji, 2010).

This fact has been reinforced by the end of the Cold War which has not resulted in a reduction in number and intensity of conflicts in West Africa. Unlike in the 1970s when foreign military interventions were rampant in Africa, the dawn of the 1990s witnessed little or a half-hearted efforts at complementary regional conflict resolution efforts. This is probably as a result of the end of the Cold War politics and the shift in attention of the super powers to the geo-strategically explosive situations in the Persian Gulf. In this case, the end of Cold War was obviously a monumental disaster for the security of many post-colonial African states, exposing them to the full wrath of the majority poor citizens who had been impoverished by perverse economic performance of rulers since independence (Ate, 2011). Ate added that, these failings aggravated by social and economic dislocations, set the stage for explosion of

intra-state conflicts across the continent. At the level of West Africa, the end of Cold War signified the explosion of civil war which exposed the challenges faced by the sub-region. Furthermore, Afisi (2009) observed that though conflicts in general are not always violent, nevertheless those that have plagued West Africa at community, state and regional levels have been characterized by violence. In countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone violent conflicts have led to population dislocation and wrecking of the socio-economic infrastructure. In August 1990, there were 225,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 150,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 69,000 in Sierra Leone and a large population of Liberians in Nigeria. In the same vein, 5,000 people had been killed and about 3,000 Nigerians, Ghanaians and Sierra Leonean population were being held hostage by the insurgents from National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor (Oche, 2000). The destructive effects of such conflicts and their economic and security consequences have touched the conscience of many leaders, particularly Nigeria in the sub-region and left ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) with no other choice but respond in order to stop the carnage.

Against this backdrop, peace and conflict resolution have emerged as issues of great concern in West Africa. In this respect, ECOWAS, which was initially established as an economic integration grouping has become entrusted with security and peacemaking functions in order to achieve these goals effectively, the ECOWAS Authority created the ECOWAS Monitory Observer Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990 to serve as an intervention Force in the sub-region. ECOMOG has since participated in restoring peace and security in most countries especially Sierra Leone and Liberia. Meanwhile, ECOWAS like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) where the command has been under the United States of America, needed leadership support by a sub-regional major power with influential status. It was thus

expected and inevitable for Nigeria to play that role in view of the country's status as Africa's first oil producer, with an army of about 70,000, the second most important military power in sub-Saharan Africa, with a relatively developed manufacturing capacity and a pervasive influence on the economies of its immediate neighbours (Bach, 2007). A demonstration of Nigeria's leadership role went beyond the provision of material and logistic support for ECOWAS to contributing bulk of its personnel in area of conflict resolution. For instance, Nigeria through ECOMOG was instrumental in resolving the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. ECOWAS thus provided enabling environment for the conduct of election in these countries (Nweke, 2007) Yet, ECOMOG was among other things viewed as a "child of circumstance" with no clear mandate in order to correct the limitations of ECOMOG, ECOWAS Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and security was adopted in 1999. In spite of this development, the recent resurgence of security and constitutional crisis in the Sahel affecting the West African countries of Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal sends alarming signal for Nigeria to assume a leading position in ECOWAS conflict situations, especially the case in Mali.

In January 2012, a rebellion was launched by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which culminated in the occupation of northern regions of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao and the declaration of independence by the MNLA in March 2012. Against the background of armed attacks in these northern parts of Mali and the way in which the Malian government was managing the conflict, President Amadou Tourmani Toure was overthrown in a military coup, led by Captain Sanogo on March 22, 2012 therefore plunging the country into a constitutional conflict. The security and constitutional crisis in Mali has thus aggravated a regional security emergency. By December 2012 approximately 155,000 Malian refugees moved to the neighboring countries of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania

and Niger, while nearly 200,000 more people were displaced internally following the military intervention in March 2012 and the control of the key cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu of northern Mali by rebel movements like the Tuareg's National Movements for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Ansar Dine group (UNHR: 2012).

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

Nigeria has played a stabilizing role in West African Affairs. She has evidently enhanced sub-regional peace and security through diplomatic initiative, military involvement, democratization and financial commitment. In line with her leading role, Nigeria recommended the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and intervened to quell the conflicts that followed the overthrow of the then President Samuel Doe of Liberia as well as the reinstatement of President Ahmed Kabbah in Sierra Leone.

Consequently, the coup of March 2012 and the rebellion in northern Mali raised the question of role expectation for Nigeria and created a regional security emergency to ECOWAS member states; more particularly what is expected of Nigeria considering her past intervention, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This security and constitutional situation (in Mali) and the current security challenges in Nigeria, a sub-regional leader obviously raised concern about what Nigeria has done, under the auspices of ECOWAS in resolving the conflict in Mali.

The study examines the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS' bid to resolve the conflict in Mali.

1.2.1 Research Questions

The research questions associated with this study include the following:

- i. What informed Nigeria's role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?

- ii. What role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?
- iii. What were the factors that militated against Nigeria's performance in playing this role?

1.3 Objectives of The Study

The objectives of this research are as follows:

- i. To examine what informed Nigeria's role in the ECOWAS conflict resolution initiative in Mali
- ii. To examine the role Nigeria played in the overall ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali
- iii. To assess the factors that militated Nigeria's performance

1.4 Assumptions

The research assumptions for the study are as follows:

- i. Nigeria's involvement in managing the conflict in Mali was to enhance its national interest and policy of promoting sub-regional peace and security.
- ii. Nigeria did not play a leadership role in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali
- iii. Nigeria's domestic challenges, especially internal insecurity militated against her performance in Mali.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Over the years, there have been quite a number of works on ECOWAS intervention especially Nigeria's role in the conflicts of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Such attempts are no doubt helpful

but on the basis of this research it is observed that they may remain limited as they unavoidably focused more on ECOWAS Revised Treaty, and thus did not capture ECOWAS intervention under the 1999 Conflict Resolution Mechanism and 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These works also ignored the possibility of Nigeria's internal insecurity affecting the effectiveness of ECOWAS in Mali, looking back at its past intervention experiences in conflict situations like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Apparently, since 2011, Nigeria has witnessed recurrent insurgent activities, which have attracted government attention, including frequent deployment of soldiers to aid civilian population. The escalation of this insurgency is manifested in the insurgents' attack on worship centres, police stations, military barracks, prisons, banks, beer parlours, media houses, motor park, schools and market places. Viewed against this background, this study becomes necessary, as it focuses on what Nigeria, under the auspices of ECOWAS did in Mali in the face of its domestic security concerns. This study then provides the opportunity for a possible up-to-date account. It is also significant because it examines the efficacy and effectiveness of ECOWAS conflict intervention approaches; as they are applied to bring peace, restore security, manage conflicts and provide the enabling environment for the sub-region(particularly Mali), to develop her socio-economic and political agenda, hence, the study hopes to enhance the policy process in this area. Also, as ECOWAS has taken up the challenge of resolving the conflict in Mali, it is important that proper awareness be created on the approaches employed in this regard. Consequently, this study intends to provide information for other interested academics, international community and diplomats.

1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The study covers Nigeria's involvement in ECOWAS intervention in Mali from 2012-2013 periods of two years. It specifically examines how Nigeria intervened and the impediments encountered under the 1999 Conflict Resolution Mechanism and 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It then focused on whether Nigeria played a leadership role in Mali, looking at previous interventions and its (Nigeria) current internal security concerns. Moreover, the period of this conflict is a time in which ECOWAS was expected to further implement its instruments of conflict resolution in the face of resurgence of sub-regional conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Senegal. Meanwhile the choice of Mali is necessitated by the need for, a more in-depth discussion of ECOWAS intervention therein and the fact that both Nigeria and Mali were embroiled in internal security challenges.

A limited number of respondents were interviewed because of the difficulty of acquiring information from other respondents. The main challenge encountered during data collection was the inaccessibility of information from Defence Headquarters and Defence College. No officer was ready to grant audience, they rather referred the researcher to the ECOWAS Commission and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also challenge encountered by interviewees, in recalling dates of vital events. However, this limitation was supplemented by ECOWAS document and Internet Sources. Again, the researcher was limited to designated interviewees with no opportunity to independently draw respondents.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Sources of Data

The research employed both primary and secondary data. Primary was obtained using interviews while secondary data was gotten from documents, books, journals and the internet. The primary data was obtained through interview conducted with Stakeholders representing

three institutions; ECOWAS Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Component (i.e. Director of West African Affairs Division (WAAD) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peace and Security Consultants in ECOWAS Commission and the Force Commander of AFISMA (An ECOWAS Intervention Force in Mali). These major Institutional Stakeholders are examined in terms of their relevance to the subject matter:

ECOWAS COMMISSION: The ECOWAS Commission is an executive organ of ECOWAS charged with the responsibility of implementing the vision, mission and objectives of ECOWAS as well as the decisions emanating from community protocols and instrument. It serves as the administrative hub of all ECOWAS programmes, projects and activities. It is important to stress that ECOWAS Commission was previously regarded as ECOWAS Secretariat. It came about as a product of restructuring that commenced in 2006 and the need to assign increasing powers and responsibilities to the commission with greater emphasis on human dimensions of development. The Commission executes programmes and policies of the community under the general direction of the Authority of Heads of State and Government as well as Council of Ministers.

For the purpose of this research, two respondents were identified from the Department of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping and Security in ECOWAS Commission: The Principal Programme Officer Documentation and Peace and Security Consultant respectively. An examination of the Principal Programme Officer Documentation of the Commission indicated his possession of eye-witness documents and great insight on conflict in Mali. His expertise is equally complemented by a Peace and Security Consultants who has been in the situation room of ECOWAS Early Warning System and was in constant touch with ECOWAS Contingent in Mali, when the conflict erupted. Above all, the position of these

respondents on Nigeria's involvement in Mali is generally regarded as a microcosm of direction of the 15- ECOWAS Member State including Nigeria and Mali.

Also, other primary sources of data obtained in ECOWAS Commission were the Organization's instruments and official reports such as the founding ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993, ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security 1999, Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework of 2008, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light, their Ammunition and other related materials of 2006, ECOWAS Annual Reports, ECOWAS Bulletins, Reports of ECOWAS Authority (of Head of State and Government) as well as Council of Minister, Mediation and Security Council

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Another important institution to this study is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry handles external relations of Nigeria's vision and ideal by maintaining relations with other States and International Organizations like ECOWAS. It presents and protects the interest of Nigeria on external issues as well as organizes and supplies the activities of Nigeria's mission abroad. However, the target respondent from this Ministry is Department of West African Affairs Division (WAAD) which addresses issues having link with West Africa to which the Conflict in Mali is no exception. The Department serves as Liaison office between Federal Republic of Nigeria and Nigeria's Mission in Mali as well as the Republic of Mali. The Department especially the Director has been in possession of eye-witness mails since when the conflict in Mali started.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: A very important Stakeholder to the research is the Military Institution. The main duty of the Defence Forces is to defend the state from

external and internal aggressors. The Defence Forces may equally be called upon to join in Peace-keeping Operations in other Countries as seen in ECOWAS, United Nations and African Union. For many years Nigeria has been in the fore front of ECOWAS Conflict Management Approaches. It has influenced and improved the conflict situation within the sub-region. Nigerian Military has some Major Institutions which comprises; the Defence Headquarters, Defence College Abuja, and Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC). However, the final choice of one respondent was in part dictated by access. The Respondent, Former Force Commander to AFISMA, an ECOWAS intervention force in Mali. His selection is due to his personal involvement (eye-witness account) and his experience on the subject matter. He participated in ECOWAS Peace-keeping operation in Liberia, Sierra Leone and more recently Mali. He was equally a one-time Military Secretary. Thus was a custodian of documents of all army officers in Nigeria including the Peace Operation in Mali.

Therefore the rationale for selecting the interviewees is based on their position, expertise and personal involvement on the subject matter.

1.7.2 Data Collection Procedures

As indicated above both primary and secondary data is acquired for this research. The primary data was gathered through the use of Interview Technique. Three of the Respondents were visited in their different official capacity while one was interviewed on private level

(after retirement). Before interview, the researcher requested the consent of the respondents through letter of introduction (From Department of Political Science, A.B.U. Zaria). Regrettably, only one respondent accepted the use of recorder for the interview process. Thus, the researcher combined both recording and note-taking for information gathering. The interview involves personal (face-to-face) discussion which was semi structured with an interview question guide. Thus the interview has seven (7) list of questions that were covered, but interrogated further when new issue arise in the course of interview. This interview method involves questioning and discussion on the issue. Similar set of question was used for the respondents to provide information that may be regarded as official secret to some but not a secret to others. Timeline of the interview was determined by the peculiarities of each interviewee, though a minimum of forty-five (45) minutes was envisaged by the researcher. Consequently, interviews and discussions were recorded and transcribed word-to-word. This interview transcript is presented at appendix in order not to interrupt the flow of the text if it were presented in the body of the work.

In addition, the field experience exposed the researcher to limited access to other important Stakeholders. As request to conduct interview was not honoured in Defence Headquarters, Defence College Abuja, Peace-keeping Unit of Staff College and Command Training School Jaji as well as the Embassy of the Republic of Mali in Abuja which is expected to give authoritative position of the Government of Mali. After longtime of silence, the researcher further did a follow-up of these institutions whose response is still being awaited. However, this challenge was improved and complemented by some documents and internet source. The problems and obstacles faced in this regard is in a way understandable in that the area under study is an aspect of Defence and Security which most institutions regard as official secrets and access.

On the otherhand, unpublished works and articles from academic journals were sourced from the Post Graduate Library, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences Library and Kashim Ibrahim Library of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Inaddition, Books on Conflict and Conflict management as well as Magazines and Newspaper were accessed from the Northern History Research Scheme Library History Department A.B.U. and Cente for Democracy, Development Resaerch and Training (CEDDRT). Books on Conflict were equally gotten from Staff College and Command Training School LibraryJaji.

1.7.3 Method of Data Analysis

The data collected was analyzed using Documentary Analysis. This method involves a careful consideration of range of related questions and selection of only important and relevant or important element or setting from documents. Such documents normally include Statutory Instruments, Annual Reports, Statistical Reports, Bulletins, and Newsletters, from Government Department, Ministries, Parastatals and other Government Agencies. The data collected either from the Library or from Government Agencies are presented, analysed and conclusions drawn there from (Ngu, 2009). Clearly, it combines both the elements of Interpretive and Comparative Analysis. Interpretive Method relates an event to another and described it within a broader content, while Comparative Analysis examines similarities and differences in events. In this wise, information relevant to the research questions and objectives was identified and analyzed thematically, making deductions and inferences from the available data. Also, quotation and insight from the interview were simultaneously collaborated with secondary data.

1.8 Outline of Chapters

This research consists of five chapters. Chapter one deals with the general overview of the study and introduces these segments; background to the study, statement of problem, research

objectives, assumptions, and research methodology. There is also the scope and limitation of the study as well as the general outline of chapters.

Chapter two gives a review of relevant literature on Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Resolution Debate, The role of Nigeria in United Nations intervention, Nigeria's Conflict Management Efforts in Africa , ECOWAS Conflict Resolution Efforts in previous conflict situations and the role of Nigeria in sub-regional conflicts.

Chapter three explains ECOWAS Conflict Management Framework, especially 1999 Mechanism, 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Nigeria's West African policy. In addition, chapter four explains the role of Nigeria within ECOWAS' intervention in Mali in the light of research questions, objectives and assumptions.

Finally, chapter five concentrates on the summary, conclusion and recommendations from the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 The Concept of Conflict

Conflict is part of our human experience and thus there are varying inclinations, meanings and interpretations of what conflict is. However, the term conflict very frequently brings to mind picture of anarchy, antagonism, war, destruction, misunderstanding, aggression and so on.

Anibueze (2009) Confirms the above interpretation when he asserted that conflict represents a situation in which a group or at least two parties, because of hatred or contempt of the other, rejects dialogue and takes to violence. Anibueze's position emanated from the injustices of successive Nigerian Governments against the People of Niger Delta on the one hand and the Youths or Youth Vigilante Groups' violent protest over government's neglect on the other. This is because the gains accruing from the sale of oil were not spent on the welfare of the people of the region. He suggested a platform which will enable free exchange of opinions between Nigerian government and the Militant elements in the Niger Delta that is, an objective analysis of the situation in Nigeria rather than a personal and perhaps biased point of view. This definition is interesting because it draws attention to violent actions expressed between the Government of Mali in one hand and Rebel Groups on the other especially the destruction of cultural antiquities in Timbuktu by the rebels. In the same vein, conflict is a frustration based attitude or protest against lack of opportunities for development, lack of recognition and identity (Aja, 2009). To Aja, this frustration based attitude moves in four phases:

- i. Early conflict indicators.
- ii. Conflict resistance.
- iii. Explosive or exhaustive conflict.
- iv. Terrorism- a most deadly spiral and the highest level of violence.

The early conflict indicators is a stage in which conflict is hidden from general view, though one or more of the parties may be aware of potential confrontation. The conflict resistance here presupposes an enduring situation of dispute (i.e. protracted), a period when conflict built up support from political elite. Explosive conflict portrays failure of normal communication between two sides. And Terrorism is the peak of the dispute, when violence is most intense, usually to make the weaker party give in to some demands. Also, Aja (2009) observed that conflict is a strain in a relationship that goes with emotion. Thus the higher the emotion, the high the tendency of an evolving conflict intensity. He argued that any attempt to trade off blame by the parties only creates resents and anger that often heighten any existing conflict tendency; conflict resistance, exhaustive conflict and terrorism. In a similar postulation, Zartman and Ramussen(1997) viewed conflict as an escalated competition between groups whose aim is to gain advantages in the area of power, resources, interests, values or needs. Zartman and Ramussen maintained that this escalated competition increases physical injury, destruction and forceful elimination of one another. In this respect, it provided for the existence of two or more parties, condition of resource or position scarcity, the presence of reaction (attitude) designed to hurt or injure the other and mutually opposed goals. Thus, for Anibueze, Aja, Zartman and Ramussen, conflict is a state of extreme discord caused by actual or perceived opposition of values, needs and interests. But for this conception of conflict to be more useful, there is need for a broader interpretation which goes beyond extreme ones.

In turn, scholars have used the term conflict in a broader and a less-aggressive connotation. For example, Fisher et. al. (2003) and David (1968) considered conflict as the relationship between two or more parties who have or think have incompatible goals. According to Fisher et al. (2000), from the micro, interpersonal level through to groups, organizations,

communities and nation, all human relations, including social relations, economic relations and relation of power, experience disagreements arising from unequal social status, unequal social status, unequal wealth and access to resources and unequal power leading to problems such as discrimination, unemployments, poverty and crime. They further argued that conflict at interpersonal level and family as well as regional and global levels are all crucial for example, in the household, child abuse and domestic violence are far-reaching in their impact and at the global level decisions made by a multinational economic bodies such as IMF, World Trade Organisation and World Bank have grass root impact. Likewise, conflict refers to situation in which a person is motivated to engage in two or more mutually exclusive activities (David, 1968). He aptly captured that conflict like incompatible responses cannot occur simultaneously for example, in a monogamous society a man cannot marry two women at the same time, no matter how attractive they are to him while the soldier in combat is torned between the desire to runaway and the fear of losing face with his comrades. In agreement to this conception, conflict according to Nicholson (2012) exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent. Nicholson further added that conflict can be extended from interpersonal clash involving two parties to intergroup conflict between organizations, communities, ethnic groups and nations. Accordingly, Nnoli (1998) maintained these disagreements arise from imbalances in human relations such as unequal social status, unequal wealth (or access to resources) and unequal power. Nnoli further considered colonialism with the emergence of new concept of state (divisive ethnicity) and new system of government to have played up ethnic awareness, sentiment and consciousness which subsequently leads to rivalry and competition in all sort of manner. This new concept is expressed to the extent by which ethnicity has become a pliable instrument in the hands of power contenders or war Lords in a polity to galvanize support fight a cause and achieve set

goals. As exemplified in Africa, where ethnicity has remain a potent for struggle of power and for generating violent conflict. While above conception of conflict tend to present a broader interpretation (especially viewing it beyond violent manifestation), there is need for an integrative dimension.

Umoh thus suggested that “The use of conflict can be justified not only because it works, but also because it provides the most fertile ground for creative thinking. It is not only producing compromises, it also yields new ideas which might not have been conceived without the stimulus of conflict” (Umoh, 1996:36). Conflict in this context is seen as a strategy for organizing a community and for accelerating the pace of change in the society. Umoh further argued that contrary to the general position that every political system only has final authority whose decision is supreme, there are several groups with divergent interests and beliefs which even the government depend on their consent and cooperation to survive. Umoh’s view here seems to emphasize the principle of self-determination like the longing for Azawad autonomy agitated by the MNLA.

According to Dewey (1930) conflict is the gadfly of thought that stirs us to observation, memory and leads us to invention. He believed that conflict creates behavior conscious and self-conscious which are conditions for rational conduct. Thus for Dewey, conflict generates new norms and institutions as seen in the ECOWAS principle of West African solution to African problem and modification of its Conflict Resolution Frameworks occasioned by intra-state conflicts of Post-Cold War like the Malian experience.

Simmel (1955) like Dewey believed that conflict is the resolution of tension between contraries (parties). Simmel argued that a society that does not experience (functional) conflict is in a stage of temporary balance and that conflict is not purely negative rather contains greater positive dimensions like reconciliation and unity, which often lead to an

improved society. He maintained that conflict is usually a form of socialisation and certain amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversies, which originally tied up with the very elements that ultimately hold the group together. Coser (1956) agreed with Simmel that conflict solidifies a loosely structured group, since conflict with one group often leads to a serious alliance with other group. It is here maintained that if the initial relationship between two or more individuals or group is primarily conflictual, there will nevertheless emerge atleast a few minimal strands of understanding and reciprocity, especially rules of combat, or perhaps only an agreement to disagree. As applied to the conflict in Mali, the security and constitutional emergency led to collective actions by ECOWAS member states. Therefore Umoh, Dewey, Simmel and Coser believed that conflict contributes to the integration of social systems. However, their conceptions raised question on whether it leads to total societal transformation, which the Marxists seek to answer.

Consequently, in Karl Marx's view, conflict is the contradiction inherent in exploitative relations between owners of means of production and those who sell their labour. To Marx, this contradiction eventually leads to a breakdown (social revolution) which will result in change in the economic foundation of the society (mode of production). When this happen the entire superstructure especially political, legal and religious will be transformed (Bottomore, 1979). More importantly, Marx postulated tha contradiction in capitalist mode of production would lead to conflictual situation that would usher in communism through the proletariat, who are the revolutionary agents. To him, the more the subordinate group in a system becomes aware of their collective goals (interests) and develop group consciousness, the more likely they are in conflict against the dominant group. In the same vein, Wallerstern basing history on the importance of production process, viewed conflict as a situation in which two or more parties strive to acquire resources at the same time (Mingst, 1999).But,

the Marxist view above has raised some controversy because of its emphasis on economic factors leaving out sociological and psychological issues of perception, norms, values and belief system. Therefore, according to Dunmoye (2012) in a developing polity (including Mali), where politics and economics have vague boundaries and where social and economic interests are interwoven, it is difficult to discern primordial interests from materialistic or economic interest. This complexity of ethno-religious conflict is clearly expressed in terms of the quest for land, religion, boundary disputes over farmland or grazing lands, religion, chieftancy disputes, native vs settlers syndrome and marginalization of ethnic minorities which are which are interrelated factors that cannot be clearly categorized.

The contending conceptions of conflict above suggest that conflict occurs because every society is a collection of competing interest(forces), it does not necessarily leads to violence, it leads to positive changes in societies and transform the entire social system(Marxist view). In Mali, the rebellion by MNLA and overthrow of a democratically elected government have generated a situation of extreme tension within the ECOWAS Sub-region. Therefore, whether or not conflict plays functional or dysfunctional role in human relation depends on the manner such conflict is managed or resolved. Thus, a greater concern should focus on management and resolution.

2.1.2 Concept of Conflict Management

Conflict management has to do with the direction, control or resolution of conflict (Imobighe, 2002). He later argued that if conflict is well managed and resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, it could lead to some qualitative development in the relationship between them. However, if conflict is badly managed leads to escalation, it could become harmful and lead to unnecessary dissipation of scarce resources. Imobighe (2002) also developed the concept of integrated conflict management system. It sees conflict management as a process

involving three levels of activities. These include conflict prevention and peace promotion, conflict control and abatement, and conflict resolution. The integrated conflict management emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to the management of the conflict. This means developing early warning system that will indicate where conflict is brewing or imminent in any particular region in order to prevent violence or communal carnage.

If efforts to ease tension and promote peace should fail and conflict should erupt for whatever reason, then conflict management moves to the second level of activity, which is to control and abate conflict through a variety of measures. The intention at this stage is to prevent the escalation of hostilities and create a propitious atmosphere for the third stage which is the actual resolution of the conflict. It is at this stage that intensive negotiations are put in place to settle all the fundamental issues involved in the conflict. Once the issues involved in the conflict are successfully resolved, management is said to have gone full circle.

Imobighe observed that the crisis in Warri (between Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo and local council) has been managed essentially through judicial process and the use of security forces to suppress the crisis. There has been outright neglect of conflict prevention and resolution as parts of the conflict management. On account of this, not much was achieved at the level of actually resolving the fundamental issues involved in the conflict. Significantly, ECOWAS intervention notably Nigeria needs an integrated conflict management system to address sub-regional conflicts like Mali in a proper comprehensive management process.

According to Eliagwu (2005) conflict management refers to interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones, or on-going conflicts. Eliagwu observed that the response of Nigeria's Government to conflict situation has been ad hoc rather than organized. He maintained further that from 1980-2005, Nigeria has witnessed over 140 violent conflicts which were poorly managed by the government. It is

here clear that the political elite (government) in Nigeria are in most occasions incapable of predicting conflicts, rushes to deal with symptoms of violent conflict than to address the causes, provide relief material and create commissions of inquiry whose recommendations never implemented. This suggests that conflict management in state is a continuous process including Nigerians role in Mali conflict.

In the same light, conflict management describes the way we respond to and deal with conflicts because many conflict cannot be really resolved (Aiyede, 2006). It is here argued that good conflict management enables parties to co-exist amicably and deal with their disputes without necessarily resolving the underlying conflict. This explains why every society applies different strategies or mechanisms for the managements for the management of conflict to ensure its survival, peace, continuity, security and development. Aiyede further elaborated that globally, it took the sad experience of the Second World War to establish the United Nations (UN) in 1945 which is charged with the principal responsibility of promoting world peace. While West African States, notably Nigeria, emerging from Post-Cold War Era of intrastate Conflicts formed ECOMOG with the goal of persueing sub-regional peace and security. To Adossi (2009) conflict management is a comprehensive effort utilized to contain a conflict, reduce the manifestations of violence, and engage all parties involved in order to solve the conflict and put an end to the violence. Adossi gave five ways of handling or managing conflict. They include the following;

- i. Ignore, hoping it will blow over
- ii. Accept the conflict but minimize its consequences
- iii. Separate the contending parties- where possible.
- iv. Clarify the issues over which the conflict is taking place in the hope clarity will lead to an understanding of the parties' different perspectives; or

v. Try to reach a workable compromise between the parties through negotiation (Adossi, 2009:30)

Conflict management according to Akpan (2006) refers to attempt to control or regulate conflict through a number of measures. The interesting theme of this conception is that it considered the peculiarity of conflict intervention which may sometimes either be electoral support or mediatory role. Likewise, Akpan observed that under conflict management, conflict situation may require coercive use of state apparatus, for instance, to intervene to quell the tension involving a total breakdown of law and order, requires coercive management approach. To Fisher et al. (2003) it is a step taken to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioural changes in the parties' involved. They went on to distinguish three kinds of intervention designed by UN to bring about peace which will provide the immediate means for survival for the population at risk. The first, is Peace-making which is an intervention designed to end hostilities and bring about an agreement using diplomatic, political and military means as when necessary. Second is the Peace keeping which involves monitoring and enforcing an agreement, using force as necessary. This includes verifying whether agreements are being kept and supervising agreed confidence-building activities. Peace-building is the third which encompasses undertaking programmes designed to address the causes of the conflict and the grievances of the past and to promote long-term stability and justice. However, these kind of interventions do overlap and intermingle, as seen in Liberia, where ECOMOG's mandate include both Peace-keeping, Enforcement and Peace-building

On the other hand, conflict management is seen as long-term intervention. Thus conflict management according to Mohammed (2006) is a long term mechanism of resolving intractable conflict in which the people involved in conflict are parties to this process. It is

used to describe the ability to control actual or impending conflicts while the forces of powerful settlement are strengthened. In this light, conflict management is aimed at controlling disagreement that could lead to war and prevent crisis situations that could explode into war. Therefore, international organisation and regional organizations (hegemonic involvement of Nigeria) are the leading promoters of peace and in most cases directly intervene and mediate in major conflicts with a view to effectively managing situations that could lead to wars. To Ryan (2014) conflict management is a long-term management of a conflict to avert escalation, to minimize harm. Ryan further gave five broad component of conflict management expressed in terms of transitional justice. These include prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, memorials and institutional reform. First, Prosecutions are the application of legal action against the perpetrators of crimes such as genocide, war crime and crime against humanity. Two, Reparations are various types of compensation given to victims of human rights violations. These include financial payments, social services (health care or education), and symbolic recompense such as a public apology. Third, Thruth-seeking is the investigation of abuses. Fouth, Memorials are the conservation of the public memory of people, places or events. These include physical monuments, mass grave sites, or institutions such as hospitals and educational establishments . Fifth, Institutional reform entails a wide process of restructuring such as a new constitution, electoral reforms, and power sharing arrangements. Devolution of power and changes in local administration. In support to this, it is seen as interventionist initiative aims at preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones of ongoing conflicts (Ezirim, 2009). According to Ezirim, five techniques are employed in conflict management efforts. In the first, conflicting parties are brought together to establish a mutual agreement. Second, government or third parties to the conflict may directly intervene to introduce or impose a

decision. Third, new initiatives, programmes, or institutional structures (like elections) are implemented to address the conflict question. Fourth, contending parties are compelled or coerced to utilize previously established means of resolution or containment. Fifth, government or another third party may use coercion to eliminate or instill fear among one or all those engaged in a given conflict, leading to subsidence. It is important to note that the conception of conflict management presented by Mohammed, Ryan, and Ezirim, failed to consider the peculiarity of conflict situation that may take short conflict timeline. They failed to also stress the relevance of early warning system which is a very important aspect of conflict management process in ECOWAS.

Therefore, conflict management according to Ken (2009) is the operationalisation and responses to the enforcement of the strategic provisions, goals and ideas of conflict resolution agenda. To him, conflict management necessarily proceeds and is predicated on early warning system with an updated database on the possibility and motive of conflict. Early warning systems here standardize, organize information and close knowledge groups in conflict management. He also maintained that the theoretical initiative and design of the peace process of conflict resolution is concretely expressed in conflict management. As a result, early warning mechanism is essentially aimed at providing practitioners in the field of conflict management, the possibility of anticipating and responding to crisis situation before they become violent or afford them the coverage to take remedial action. In the case of WestAfrica, the ECOWAS Early Warning System produced reports on the consequences of the fall on Niger and Mali, even before the 2012 conflict in Mali.

Though Otite and Albert (2004) perceived conflict management as long-term arrangement involving institutionalized provisions and regulative procedures for dealing with conflict wherever the occur. According to them, to adequately deal with conflict emotions or

sentiments and irrationality must be controlled as well as simple common language and metaphor make positive contributions can be used in this regard. Additionally, it involves mobilization of cultural expectations and imperatives such as African hospitality, commensality, reciprocity and belief systems for example, Kola hospitality and commensality are cultural instruments in Nigeria and Africa that can be itself use to settle atleast intra-family and intra-ethnic conflicts in the open glare of an attentive audience in town or village squares or at the shrines of common deities, ancestors and predecessors. Significantly, Otite and Albert argued that in some respects the concepts of conflict resolution, conflict transformation and conflict management overlap both in content and in practice. The next section thus considers conflict resolutions as a concept.

2.1.3 Conceptualising Conflict Resolution

The term conflict resolution has been variously defined. Some of these conceptions are worth considering; into two areas, a broader and a narrow conception of conflict resolution. A broader perspective looked at conflict resolution as a set of many elements, incorporating confrontational and post-conflict stages, social and economic conditions aimed at improving conflict situation. It is reflected in the works of Ryan, Swanstrom and Weissman, Adossi, Akpan, Fisher et al., Bretherton, Bamidele and Stone. while the narrow school of thought viewed conflict resolution as a short-term activity with a sense of finality, where conflict is terminated in a true sense as revealed in the works of Iji, Imobighe, Deutsch, Mohammed, Faal, Wallensteen, Otite and Albert, Salami, and Miall Thus according to Iji (2007:48) “conflict resolution is synonymous with the term peace, amicable solution arrived at after troubled-shooting exercise in which two or more parties in discord agree to mend their co-existential forces, a temporary or permanent truce or cessation of exchange of aggression” Iji observed that such cessation of mutual hostilities can be arrived through negotiation,

mediation and arbitration. Negotiation here is a direct process of dialogue and discussion taking place between two conflicting parties. Mediation portrays a method of settlement in which a third party, an individual or an institution assists in bringing about an amicable solution to a conflict. Further Arbitration is attained when parties in conflict voluntarily table their disputes to an agreed neutral party for a decision that is binding on the parties and may only be set aside by courts on statutory grounds. In arbitration the intermediary chooses a settlement for the disputants, while during mediation, the intermediary only helps the parties in conflict to analyze the situation, negotiation then involves bargaining in terms of give and take and adjudication focuses on a formal judgment (court) on a disputed matter.

This view is corroborated by Imobighe (2003) who stated that conflict resolution is the final stage of conflict management which involves the eventual termination of conflict through intensive negotiations of fundamental issues associated with the conflict. Imobighe argued that this stage is created by efforts of conflict managers whom are directed toward controlling violent conflict and creating a suitable climate for peace. Also, conflict resolution according to Mohammed (2006) is the term used to refer to the process of finding satisfactory outcome to a dispute by providing each side in conflict with appropriate terms of bargaining. For Mohammed, conflict resolution begins by identifying the problems and demands of each party involved and by adequately addressing the interest of each. Best (2012) equally believed that conflict resolution connotes a sense of finality, where conflicting parties are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement and the conflict is terminated in a true sense. Best later made a distinction between methods of conflict resolution in Africa and the western alternative. It is here observed that both methods strive to promote non-violent methods of resolving dispute, yet they differ in their roots and cultural specificities. The African methods like pronouncement of the diviner, headmen and village councils are rooted

in history, tradition and culture, while the western alternative is more diversified and easier to differentiate between different methods. He argued that at the governmental level, good governance is the most appropriate method of resolving conflict, followed by communication, collaboration, dialogue, mediation, litigation and crisis management. According to Deutsch (1973) conflict resolution is a stage in which duelists or conflicting parties are seen to have a common code of honour, a code to which each party to a conflict must be willing to recognize the legitimacy of the other party and be committed to accepting the outcome of the regulated conflict, even if it is considered to be unfavourable to his interest. Deutsch later pointed out that in most instances, a conflict in which the outcomes are satisfying to all the participants will be more constructive than one that is satisfying to some and dissatisfying to others. In the same vein, according to Faal (2011) the term conflict resolution is often used interchangeably with conflict management yet they refer to different approaches to conflict. To him, conflict resolution refers to the final phase of a conflict in which attention is focused on bringing about a comprehensive settlement, whereas conflict management is a continuum between the beginning of a conflict and its ending period during which different methods are used to control it.

Against this background, Wallensteen (2007) explained that it is the development and implementation of peaceful initiatives for ending conflicts, especially alternatives to violent forms of leverage. To Wallensteen it involves the ability of third parties to mediate and to change conflict situation. In line with this view, Otite and Albert (1999) argued that conflict resolution is short-term arrangement which provides opportunity for conflicting parties to interact with the hope of at least reducing the scope, intensity and effects of conflicts. To him failure to resolve conflicts over scarce resources and divergent perceptions of socio-political situations will degenerate in to genocide or fratricide as experienced among the Ife-

Modakeke Yoruba, the Jukun and the Tiv-Jukun of Nigeria and the Hutu-Tutsi of Burundi and Rwanda. Conflict resolution according to Salami (2009) refers to the relational process of getting opposing parties reach an amicable and satisfactory point of agreement. Salami then suggested two broad areas of conflict resolution; the violence and non-violence approach. The violent means is directed toward coercing another's will through a threat or application of coercive power. The non-violent methods in the other hand, change conflict situation by making it too costly (literally or psychologically) for an undesirable situation or relationship to be sustained. According to him any of the of the approaches may be adopted by conflicting parties depending on whether a party has win or lose level of orientation. In view of Salami's win and lose orientation in conflict resolution, Miall (2004) considered conflict resolution as the movement from zero-sum destructive situation to positive-sum constructive outcomes. Conflict resolution here emphasized intervention of powerful and skillful third parties like international, regional and international nongovernmental organization in fostering new thinking and new relationship among conflicting parties. However, all the above conception of conflict resolution has been criticized on account of its inadequacy. In Call and Cook (2003)'s view this narrow point of view is restricted to elite-focused processes, with little or no attention on non-elite processes like social and economic conditions to peace. This criticism leads us to a broader definition of conflict resolution.

Alternatively, proponents of the broader conception of conflict resolution, debunk monolithic understanding which defined it as essentially as stage devoid of conflict. The broader interpretation claimed that resolution of conflict must always include changing attitudes of conflicting parties and eventual modification of aggressive behavior. In this light, conflict resolution according to Akpan (2006) refers to a situation where different approaches are employed to address disagreements, sources of conflict and change the structure of

conflict to that of peace. Akpan argued that originally when a conflict arrives at an open stage, there were usually two alternatives of resolution. One is an agreement based on compromise and the other is subordination to the will of the stronger party. Akpan then argued that with the increasing complex society, conflict can be decided by methods as wide ranging as arbitration, elections, courts (tribunals), administrative decisions, negotiation, mediation, constitution making and even international third party intervention. In addition, conflict resolution refers to strategies that address open conflict in the hope of finding not only an agreement to end the violence (conflict settlement), but also a balance to some of the incompatible goals underlying it (Fisher et al. 2003). According to Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005) conflict resolution is simply the various ways by which cooperation can be maintained in a society. They further observed that it can either aim at resolving or terminating conflicts in an open and predictable process in accordance with legal principals or focus on efforts to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive attitudes and allaying distrust through reconciliation initiatives and strengthening the institutions through which the parties interact. (As cited in Onu, 2009:87). Adossi (2009) added more specifically that the cooperation among parties should understand conditions that led to the conflict. To him, to address conflict effectively, it is not enough to only consider the confrontation part but it is also necessary to look at it as a set of many elements, especially colonial legacy triggered by immediate pre-condition. Also, conflict resolution is set of strategies used to foster the security, identity, self-determination and quality of life for all people involved in a conflict (Sanson and Bretherton, 2007) To them, an important feature of conflict resolution within the area of peace psychology is not to avoid conflict rather to deal with it in a way which minimizes the negative impact (violence) and maximizes the

positive potential (quality of life) inherent in conflict. According to them, there are three basic strategies for dealing with or reducing conflict. The first is to change the situation so that it conforms to your values. For example, if a group to which you belong is not doing things the way you want them done, you can try to get elected as president and to change the group. The second basic strategy is withdrawing from a conflict rather than attempting to change things. This strategy often is often were, the opposing party to a conflict has superior tactics. And the third basic strategy, changing your values, is used when the first two won't work, when we can't make the situation conform to our values (strategy 1), and when we can't leave the situation (strategy 2) the only way to resolve conflict is to change our values to fit the realities of the situation.

Moreover, conflict resolution like medical practice involves diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. "Diagnosis" involves finding out what the problem is, "Prognosis requires a critical investigation of where the problem is now and where it is likely to degenerate later, and "treatment" is the application of the right kind of medication (Bamidele, 2012) He further identified four main approaches associated with them; psychosocial approach, problem-solving approach, social provision and structural approach, and the systems approach. First, the psychosocial approach posited that human conditions are shaped by unique past histories of specific group and their international dynamics. Second, problem-solving approach is aimed at providing inter personal resources to deal with present problem-ridden situations. Third, the social and structured approach emphasizes the role of structural inequality as a source of social conflict. Fourth, the system approach sees social problems in systemic terms; one part affects the other. The strength of conflict resolution practice here lies in working with interconnectedness between person, environment, and social action.

To further ensure this broader interpretation, Ryan (2014) argued that the concept of conflict resolution requires elaboration in the light of tripartite stages of conflict (pre-conflict, confrontation and post-conflict). Ryan referred to these three stages as phases of conflict resolution: conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict reconciliation. Conflict prevention here includes both direct and indirect action that reduces the dysfunctional impact of antagonism. Conflict management comprised action which limits violence mostly after conflict already broken out while conflict reconciliation attempts to heal the broken relationship and rebuilding new a just-society. Stone (1968) is of the opinion that conflict resolution is concerned with processes of removing tensions between states or maintaining them at the levels consistent with continued peaceful pursuit by states in their individual or collective goals.

2.1.4. Conflict Resolution Debate

A number of scholars have explained conflict management or transformation as an extension or a part of conflict resolution, while others expressed an unfavourable opinion of the desirability of achieving an absence of conflict and clearly distinguish between the three terms. This debate is however, reduced into: resolution versus management, and resolution versus transformation.

2.1.4.1. Resolution versus Management

It is highly unlikely to achieve complete absence of conflict, since it is something we will always have with us. So Miall (2004) wrote that conflict resolution is unrealistic rather the practical option is to manage, contain and to occasionally reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside. Similarly, Bercovitch et al. (2005) argued that the notion that conflict can be eliminated is idealistic and unreal, in general, what can be eliminated is the violent expression of conflict. They also argued that violence which is seen as threat or

coercion, tend to act as a necessary adjunct to de-escalation in most cases. In support of this argument Dana (2001:23) conceded that “There is no guarantee to avoid conflict, but you can do a lot to minimize the negative consequences” Dana maintained that given the inexorability of competition for scarce resources and asymmetrical structure of power in society, conflicts can only be mitigated (managed) Therefore, according to Heywood (2000), though conflict resolution is usually portrayed as a process in which rival views or competing interests are reconciled with one another. He expresses his support for conflict management in that it is later thought of as a search for conflict resolution than as its achievement, as not all conflicts are or can be resolved. To Zartman (1991), both conflict management and resolution mean finding a multilateral solution to the problem that replaces the attempt of each party in a conflict to impose his will. Zartman further noted that a better understanding of mechanism and possibilities of regional conflict reduction can be gained by linking management and resolution to theories of conflict itself.

Jinadu (2007) was also more concerned with the pragmatic management than with the notion of resolution or removal of deep-seated ethnic related conflicts which emphasized positive as opposed to negative aspect of conflict. His view rests on the raging controversy over citizenship question, which persists in spite of power sharing arrangement (federalism and federal character) in most developing polities.

Conflict management is also seen as a wider phenomenon. According to Burton (1986), it ranges from deterrence to propaganda usually carried out by conflicting parties, while conflict resolution seeks to resolve or eradicate the problem. However, Burton’s submission on conflict management tends to ignore the role of third parties’ in using their prestige and power to encourage the resolution of a conflict. Hence, Tidwell (2002) argued that the notion of conflict resolution demands a mature understanding of context during conflict, human nature

and the role of volition or opportunities in the process of conflict. In turn, Steele (1976) like Tidwell, obsessed with this amorphous dichotomy, viewed management as part of conflict resolution. To him, the goals and timeframe of conflict resolution are amorphous with no clear win/lose or beginning/end benchmark. Hence it involves the development of means which prevent broad aggressive action.

Having seen the debate on resolution and management, the question then becomes is conflict resolution also transformation? It is in response to this that resolution versus transformation emerged.

2.1.4. 2. Resolution versus Transformation

Lederach (2007) argued that an emphasis should be placed on conflict transformation (platforms) rather than in the elusive quest for sustainability (resolution). According to Lederach, conflict transformation does not suggest elimination or total control of conflict situation, rather it proposes that people recognize and work with its dialectic nature. Thus, conflict transformation is like a healing process in social relationships and gives new and positive orientations. In furtherance of this view, Fetherston (2000) argued that conflict resolution needs to undergo reappraisal in the light of critical social school (theory) and in the context of peace building practices which have emerged out of conflict zones. Fetherston advocated a needs-based problem-solving process that brings about reorientation and reconstruction in conflict situation. Notter and Diamond (1996) have also sought to make a distinction between resolution and transformation. Conflict resolution is thus seen as activities that seek to discover, identify and find a solution to the root cause of conflict, while conflict transformation seeks to change the conditions that give rise to the understanding cause of the conflict. To them, conflict resolution activities are problem-solving, research,

training, and intergroup dialogue which do not provide end-state to create of peaceful societies. Consequently, conflict transformation processes of national reconciliation, healing and social transformation are appropriate approach. However, not every scholar is readily convinced that the term conflict transformation has greater application and value than resolution.

Mitchell (2002:1) argued that “the concept of conflict transformation has emerged because of the corruption of the conception of resolution” He explained that the employment of this relatively new term (transformation) is a reaction to the growing misuse of the term resolution to stand for anything short of outright defeat and revenge as an outcome as well as for many processes involving overt violence as resolution methods. In further defense of resolution, Mitchell argued that changes in relationships have not been afforded a central place in resolutionary approaches, because it is normally assumed that these will naturally follow once the conflict has been resolved. Mayer in Botes (2003:15) posed a question that again connects resolution and transformation: is conflict resolution about ending disputes, peace building, achieving social justice or transforming relationships? He maintained that transformation often does not occur as a result of experiences people have with conflict but from a long-term resolution strategy. In over viewing this debate, Botes (2003) observed that, while there is a definite movement to make clear distinction between the terms conflict resolution and conflict transformation, they are still often used interchangeably both in common language usage and in the academic literature.

This disagreement notwithstanding, conflict resolution still finds a place in West Africa. Accordingly it is worthy of note to consider Nigeria’s involvement in UN, AU and past ECOWAS intervention

2.1.5 The Role of Nigeria in United Nations Interventions

Nigeria's unique role in the promotion of world peace under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) goes back to the conflict of the 1960s in the Congo.

Nigeria notably puts its military force to effective deployment under the UN Joint Operation with Congolese Central Government Forces against the Gizengists (Pro Lumumba Forces) in January, 1962 which resulted in the formation of the United Nations Organisation Command in the Congo (ONUC, UN Operation in the Congo). This was the first explicit deployment of UN military power within a reputedly sovereign independent state (not as Korea where power was not deployed vicariously through US and other Pro-Western Forces). This intervention was triggered by the military of Congolese Security Forces, Katanga's attempted secession and general breakdown of effective control by the then government at the centre; then President and Prime Minister, Kasavubu and Lumumba regarded the conflict as international one and in the same wise accused the Belgians for clandestinely sponsoring secession plan of Katanga for colonialist purposes. Significantly, Belgium was alleged to have committed an act of aggression that prompted enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under this chapter the use of peace-effortment is employed when measures taken in pursuit of Chapter VI fails. Such enforcement measures include among other things the use of force.

Nigeria became thus an important member among the nine African delegation which held briefing with Hammarkjold, then UN Secretary-General on the need for UN assistance in the Congo. In the aftermath of Moise Tshombe's, the Provincial President's announcement of Katanga's secession move from the Republic of the Congo on 11th July, 1960, troops were drawn from Nigeria and other African countries such as; Ethiopia (460), Ghana (770), Morocco (1,250), Tunisia (1,025) to Leopoldville (Burns, 1963).

Also, at the General Assembly level, Nigeria alongside other Non-Aligned States championed the Hammarskjold's concept of resolution concerning conflict in the Congo. With this support support and vote, the General Assembly declared that necessary and effective measures be taken by the Secretary- General to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies from non-state actors into the Congo, except in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations(Holcombe,1963). In effect, after becoming the 99th member of the United Nations Organisation, Nigeria teamed up with other third world countries at the Standing Disarmament Conference of the UNO to stress the need to save entire human race from the consequences of a possible holocaust (Ogbu, 1992).

Another dimension to Nigeria's involvement in the Congo is the quality of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) despatched to the country. At the request of the United Nations, a contingent of 400 officers and men of the NPF were delivered under the command of Mr. L.O. Edet. The NPF contingent was divided into riot units and had the primary assignment of riot control in order to maintain law and order. The contingent occasionally worked with the Congolese Police as well as performed patrol duties, regulated traffic, investigated crime and carried out guard duties at the UN headquarters in Leopoldville (Kinshasa). The then President of Congo, Monsieur Joseph Kasavubu was greatly impressed with the performance of the NPF who were unarmed, relied basically on the use of the whistle, teargas and the manner the NPF conducted themselves. As a result over 682 NPF personnel were decorated with UN medals for their performance in the Congo. Likewise, even after the expiration of UN Peace Mission in the Congo, the NPF personnel continued to operate until December (Gbor, 1997). Admittedly, even the Nigerian military contingent, especially those under the command of Late General Aguiyi Ironsi operated in consonance with the mandate of the UN. The mandate of this mission involved supervision of disarmament, withdrawal of former

rebel elements, monitoring cease-fire, supervising prisoner exchanges and implementation of arms control regime. It is observed equally that the UN mandate for Nigeria and indeed other members tends to be clearer than what is obtainable in ECOWAS and AU (Sule, 2013). In Angola, Nigeria appeared as a decisive stakeholder to the UN resolution relating to conflict in this country. This civil war which began between the government and the rebel UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) since 1976, defied a lot of interventions, before Nigeria's involvement. Significantly, the support of Nigeria here led to the signing of Lusaka Protocol on November, 1994 and establishment of a new Peace-keeping operation, named the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) created to facilitate the implementation of the peace pact. Accordingly, Nigeria's major General Chris Garuba, acted as the Chief Military Observer in Angola, the first Force Commander of UNAVEM III and successfully chaired the military aspect of the peace negotiations. Besides the military observers and police component in UNAVEM III, Nigeria's involvement is highly instrumental to the establishment of National Unity Government involving UNITA (Zabadi, 1997).

Just as with Angola, Nigeria made exponential contributions to the UN Conflict Management Efforts. The Nigerian Permanent Representative led crucial Security Council Mission to Mozambique to provide the needed push to the elections at the delicate stage to the elections. As a result UN put in place structure to aid the implementation of the General Peace Agreement which culminated in a three-day election from 27-29 October, 1994. The conflict was waged against by rebel RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) Focres against FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) government in Mozambique which previously defied several attempts at peaceful resolution (Zabadi, 1997).

Apart from ECOMOG intervention, Nigerian contingent equally guided unarmed United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to document reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians. Nigeria provided a quota of the expanded 11,100 UNAMSIL military personnel and retook the capital and installed the the civilian government. As a matter of fact, Nigeria worked closely with the UN agencies launched quick-impact and income- generating projects to provide Jobs to thousands of unemployed youth and ex-fighters as well as basic services to local communities. Moreso, Nigeria has assisted UNAMSIL troops in reconstructing schools and clinics as well as launched and funded agricultural projects. Okelo, Nigeria's Special Representative initiated diplomatic effort that led to the peace agreement in Lome in 1999 which convinced the conflicting parties of the need for the expanded role of UNOMSIL (Adeleye, 2013)

Again, some diplomactic steps were mounted by Nigeria to address the conflict in Liberia. Former Nigerian President, General Abubakar (Rtd) recommended the internationalcommunity to create a safe-passage for Taylor to leave Liberia to any country (especially Nigeria) of his choice, as his departure would facilitate the peace process (Azikwe, 2009). In like manner, Former President, Obasanjo of Nigeria was staged under UN to persuade Taylor to leave and go on exile in order to give the peace process opportunity for success. Consequently, with Taylor's exit, an interim government was set up by Gyu de Bryant, which was able to reach an agreement with rebels in Accra, Ghana leading to the creation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on September 19, 2003 to support ceasefire agreement. Similarly, Nigeria is believed to have kept the Liberian conflict alive in the UN at a time the permanent members were more concerned with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Nigerian delegation aptly worked hard to bring the problem to the notice of the Security Council and the UN at large. It then follows that if not for Nigeria's

diplomatic efforts at the UN, United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL) would not have been mounted to Liberia to complement the role of ECOMOG in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. In effect, states which had hitherto been lukewarm in its attitude to the Liberian Peace Process ultimately became more cooperative and supportive, for instance, the United States provided Nigerian contingent with uniforms, communication equipment, trucks among other things (Zabadi, 1997).

Further, Nigeria participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between 1978 and 1982. Over 700 Nigerian Army Officers were deployed through Nine Nigeria Battalion (NIBATT). During the mission Nigerian troops suffered a number of casualties as a result of gunfire from the belligerents. The mission in Lebanon was mandated to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (Mohammed, 2014). As regards, the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia, Nigeria was among the countries that responded to the UN call to contribute contingents to address the situation in the former Yugoslavia in 1990. As a result, an advanced contingent was mounted which include personnel from arms and services, particularly the Nigerian Army Engineers, Supply and Transport, electrical and mechanical Engineers, Band, Chaplain, Imam and Education personnel. However, Nigeria had to contend with general mission problems such as lack of clear mandate, command and control, rules of engagement, poor logistic, inadequate finance and intelligence (Mohammed, 2014)

Above all, a considerable number of eminent Nigerians held influential position relating to UN Conflict Management Efforts. Three notably Nigerians served as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. These include Prof. Ibrahim Gambari (Joint- AU- UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in Darfur, UNAMID), Olu Adiniji (Central African Republic, CAR and Sierra Leone) and Margaret Vogt (CAR). Like wise,

six Nigerian have served as UN Force Commanders such as Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi (ONUC Congo), Major General Chris Garuba (Angola), Lt. Gen. Obiakor (UNMIL, UN Mission in Liberia, Liberia), Major General Owonibi (Liberia), General Martins Luther Agwai (UNAMID, United Nations Mission in Darfur, Darfur) and Major General Moses Obi (UNMIS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan, South Sudan), (Adeniyi, 2016). In like manner, Nigeria has notably played a prominent role in a number of conflict that attracted UN interventions. These interventions include; Military Observers to the India-Pakistan conflict (UNIPCM) 1965-1966, Battalion and Staff Officers to Lebanon (UNIFIL, UN Interim Force in Lebanon), Military Observers during Iran-Iraq Conflict (UNIMOG) 1988-1991, Military Observers to Namibia (UNTAG, United Nations Transition Assistance Group) 1989-1990 to Cambodia (UNTAC, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) 1992-1994, Military Observers to Mozambique (ONUCMOZ) (Haman et al., 2014).

2.1.6 Nigeria's Conflict Management Effort in Africa

While other members of African Union can be exonerated from their responsibilities to the Union, Nigeria's Conflict Management Involvement remained central in the quest for African solution to African problem.

In consonance with its leading role in OAU (now AU), Nigeria has been supportive of the continental body in the area of conflict management. Initially, Nigeria was a decisive figure in the Union's plan to establish the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. It has served as a member on the Ad-hoc Committee which mediated in the Algeria- Morocco border dispute in 1963-64, as well as OAU Good Offices Committee which mediated in the border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Kenya and Somalia. Nigeria also played mediatory role in the 1970s, by prevailing on African states to refer disputes only to the OAU and not the UN in order to discourage the involvement of the Extra-African Powers

in these conflicts for instance, Nigeria persuaded Equatorial Guinea to withdraw its dispute with Gabon from the UN, for settlement within the OAU Framework. As a result, an understanding was arrived at with the UN, not to attend to disputes which had not been first submitted to the OAU, for settlement. All African problems are then subjected first to OAU mediation either by Summit Diplomacy or by the use of Ad hoc Committee on good offices (Zabadi, 1997).

In the conflict in Chad, Nigeria played a leading role in both diplomatic and military levels. Nigeria alongside France, Sudan and the Chadian leaders recorded dramatic success to the then Adhoc Committee of OAU which comprises Algeria, Cameroun, Gabon and Mozambique. The conflict was triggered when Libya intervened in support of one faction, FROLINAT (National Liberation Front of Chad), while the France also had a military presence in Chad. Nigerian peace efforts in Chad revolved around several conferences in Lagos and Kano between Chadian factions to resolve their differences. Further, Nigeria employed some form coercion to bring recalcitrant neighbours who were sponsoring these rebels to their knees without the objection of other African states, by cutting off oil supply. These efforts resulted in the formation of Government of National Unity and Transition (GUNT) which created conducive atmosphere for free and fair elections. Also, General Geoffrey Ejiga, a Nigerian was said to have led a command of Peace-keeping Force despatched to Chad.

In Sudan, on account of the collapse of Abache agreement which was under Chadian President Idris Derby, Nigeria led African Union to support Chad in organizing a new round of negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Rebels. Nigeria's involvement in this regard invited Foreign Observers to monitor the humanitarian situation. Clearly, Nigeria under the AU hosted significant peacetalks in Lagos, Abuja and Kano (Ebegbulem, 2012).

Thus on April 8, 2004, the Sudanese Government, the Sudan Liberation Movement/ Arm (SLMA) and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) signed the Nd'jamena Ceasefire Agreement. Nigeria has equally spent over 82 million Dollar on Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur and lost over 150 soldiers, not counting those declared missing. On a negative note, the killing of several Nigerian soldiers in the flash points of Sudan has prompted many Nigerians to question the need for its continued participation in Peacekeeping Efforts. Moreso, former Nigerian Head of state, Abdulsalami Abubakar was appointed Special Envoy to Darfur, for assesment and survey of the humanitarian crisis and the report of his visit, spurred the AU to intensify efforts for peaceful negotiation. The conflict in Sudan is traced from the interaction between various sources that originated from tradition of Arab domination of the South dated back to the first contact between the Turkish ruled North and the Southern Black African people. While other contributory factors to the conflict include; control of natural resources, religion, politics, culture and history (Amedu, 2013). Again, Nigeria agreed to deploy 300 for the AU Observers in Darfur (O' Brien, 2012).

Like Sudan, conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia cannot overrule, the significant role played by Nigeria to achieve its resolution. With the political hostility in these countries, Nigeria pursued an African settlement set up in 1977, the then Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Garba was made the Statutory Chairman of the OAU Good Offices Commission charged with the responsibility of finding a lasting solution to the dispute. It is revealed equally that Nigeria expended a lot of time and energy in the process of trying to find a solution to the Ethiopian-Somalia conflict. Joe Garba, has on several occasions make contacts with the heads of states of the two conflicting parties in Ethiopia and Somalia respectively. Garba, had through his untiring efforts won for himself and his country (Nigeria), an admiration and confidence as an Unbiased and Business-like Mediator. He was

in all occasions the man both the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia and Somalia wanted to see at one time or the other to intercede between the two countries for an honourable solution to the problem. The conflict began when Somali lay great claims to all its former areas of influence, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, North-east territory of Kenya and Djibouti. From this experience, successive governments of Somalia have insisted on taking over these areas on ethnic, historical and religious grounds, especially the one Somali's launched massive attack against Ethiopia on 23 July, 1977 (Ogbu, 1992).

Similarly, Nigeria has played a significant role in the attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Morocco and Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Nigeria was a member of the Six-Nation Ad-hoc Good Offices Committee set up on the Western Sahara at the Annual OAU Summit. It played a profound role in articulating what eventually became the OAU position on the issue. The origin of this conflict is traced to the year 1956 when Morocco began to lay claims on territories of her neighbouring countries. These included; the Algeria, whole of Mauritania and Western Sahara. Notwithstanding this internal tension, Spain, the former Colonial Master of the Western Sahara on November 10, 1975 went ahead to partition the disputed territory between Morocco Popular Front for the Liberation of Seguray el Hamra de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), which on February 27, 1976 declared the territory independent and formed a government in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. SADR thus took up arms against Morocco and Mauritania but, later bowed out leaving Morocco which has remained firm in its determination to deny the POLISARIO of Independence and homeland. As a result of violent consequences of this conflict, OAU intervened to put the tension to rest. As members of the Adhoc Committee both General Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Traore of Mali in 1978 toured the Maghreb and their report provided the basis for OAU recommendation at the 1979 Monrovia Summit.

In the same manner, the Shagari Administration used the Mini-Summits under the Ad hoc Committee to strengthen OAU's position while searching for a lasting solution to the conflict and trying to contain the divisive attitude of the OAU members on the issue. It is imperative to stress here that the recommendations of the Ad hoc Good offices Committee that were adopted by OAU was a brain-child of Nigeria. The recommendation among other things include election, deployment of international peace-keeping force and a ceasefire (Ogbu, 1992)

2.1.7 ECOWAS Intervention in Sub-Regional Conflicts

Over a decade now especially the end of cold war, the West African sub region has been ravaged by intra-state conflict which required ECOWAS intervention. This era was characterized by great instability that threatened the peace and security in this region. In the mean time Africa and West Africa has been described as a "shattered zone" (Okoro, 2002:119) , this means a region afflicted by political and social conflicts for which nobody has had or even claimed to have permanent solutions. ECOWAS thus have taken many forms of intervention in the face of this security emergency as recorded in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Niger.

2.1.7.1 Liberia

The conflict in Liberia began in December 1989, when Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched a violent campaign against the then government of President Samuel Doe with the aim of overthrowing a regime they regarded as tyrannical. Since Doe led a bloody military coup in 1980 to become Liberia's president, the country had become politically unstable with repeated cases of attempted coups, counter-coups and reprisal. Unlike previous tension, the case of 1989 quickly developed into a full-fledged

conflict which resulted to enormous losses in human lives, destruction of property and the nation's economy. As Taylor's NPFL swelled in size controlling over 90 percent of the country within months, for example, Doe's forces allegedly massacred over 5,000 people including men, women and children(excluding figures of people killed and buried in mass graves).In early 1990 a battle line was drawn, when Prince Yeduo Yormie Johnson backed out of the NPFL of Charles Taylor to raise his own army to wage a two-dimensional war on one hand against Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and on the other against the NPFL (Aderiye, 1992). The role of ECOWAS-ECOMOG should not be ignored in preventing further wanton destruction of life and property. It is important to note that at the time of intervention none of the ECOWAS instruments especially the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, 1978 protocol on non-aggression and 1981 protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence empowered it to intervene in purely intra-state conflicts. It then follows that ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was a purely post-cold war expediency rooted in customary international law. According to Nweke (2007) ECOWAS- ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was an African solution to African problem, invariably conceived and implemented by Africans without waiting for the dictates of the west. This determination to bring the conflict to an end is further seen in several forms. Liberian experience provided a path breaking approach through Nigeria's hegemonic leadership, whereby attempts towards conflict resolution might not necessarily be based on legal institutional frameworks but the exigencies of the moment. After several attempt in August 1996 ECOWAS was able to secure a peace accord in Abuja, Nigeria, which prepared grounds for disarmament, removal of land mines and roadblock. It most importantly paved way for the return of refugees and re-opening of foreign missions, international organizations and humanitarian organization in Liberia. According to Adisa (1992) ECOMOG had basically achieved two things in Liberia. It had reduced the level of carnage and moderated

the scale of violence. In this light, the decision by the heads of state of ECOWAS to support the deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia stirred the level of responsibility owed by each for the security of other states in the sub-region. In adding his voice, Arthur (2010:17) posited that, when one compares what ECOWAS has been able to do in Liberia in relation to other regional economic commissions, where leading or hegemonic nations have not had the political will to lead, then one very much appreciates the important role of Nigeria in ECOMOG.

In spite of ECOWAS relative achievement, there are arguments to the effect that had ECOWAS committed more resources to peace-making through diplomatic efforts, ECOMOG intervention would have paved way for the end of the conflict much earlier than it happened (Akabogu, 1992). In effect, ECOWAS ought to have ensured its peace-making efforts through diplomatic means before troops-deployment. It is therefore, not unexpected as argued by Oluwadare(2014) that some of the belligerents, specifically the Charles Taylor-led NPFL were hostile towards ECOMOG, while AFL and the Breakaway Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia(INPFL) led by Prince Yormie Johnson expressed their willingness to allow ECOWAS Troops. Also Lewitt (2001) opined that ECOWAS lacked the capability to institute comprehensive conflict maintenance systems with insufficient sub-regional legal protection. Since ECOWAS pre-1999 protocols did not explicitly make references to refugees and internally displaced persons. Sam and Katie (2000) observed that though ECOMOG is largely credited for creating an environment which saw the July 1997 legislative and presidential elections, ECOWAS faced the challenges of Anglophone-Francophone divide, fears of Nigerian domination, language barrier, unclear legal status and logistic problems. Several francophone states, particularly Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, strongly objected to the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia. This thorny issue of

intervention and the rights of intervention inevitably meant that consensus among member states has been hard-earned or illusive. Thus the ECOWAS intervention force dispatched in August 1990 comprised only forces from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and the Gambia and Sierra Leone (ECOWAS, 2010). Logistically, the special Emergency Fund on Liberia had little or no contribution from members, each troop contributing country thus bore the financial burden for its contingent. This insufficient funding had adversely affected the morale and discipline of Troop many of which relied heavily upon Nigeria. The lack of funds engendered jealousy, hostility and tales of corruption where soldiers and officers pawned equipment and supplies for personal enrichment prompting the invention of the acronym –Every Car or Movable Object Gone (ECOMOG). In-fighting among the Generals and senior civilian administrators was another factor that weakened the cohesion and effectiveness of ECOMOG at initial stages of its deployment. According to Jaye (2008) the inadequate behavior of some West Africa states in fueling the conflict need to be considered. For instance, the leaders of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso allegedly provided financial and military assistance to Taylor’s NPFL.

After 1997 general election in Liberia, the new leader, President Taylor faced daunting hostilities from rebel groups. These hostilities intensified in 2003 to what is known as second Liberian conflict. In view of ECOWAS determination to restore peace and security in the region, former Nigerian head of state General Abdulsalami Abubakar was nominated to mediate and facilitate the Liberian peace talks. The discussions toward a ceasefire led to the signing of an agreement on June,2003 by the three belligerent parties namely, the government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia(MODEL). ECOWAS also through Abdulsami and former president Obasanjo convinced Taylor to relocate to Nigeria on exile and guaranteed a safe

haven, so long as he reframed from interfering in Liberian conflict. As a result of Taylor's exit, peace returned as his deputy, Moses Blah took over, later an interim government headed by Gyude Bryant was set up and ECOWAS participated in the transition programme that led the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as President of the Republic of Liberia and Africa's first woman president on November 23, 2005(Azikwe, 2009).

2.1.7.2 Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone was the second since the end of cold war that attracted the intervention of a sub-regional force, ECOMOG. In March 1996, Sierra Leone held its first presidential and parliamentary elections in thirty years. The Sierra Leone People's party of president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected into power. His election heightened contestation between the government and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), rebel group which launched its rebellion and invasion in the diamond-rich southeast of the country. In November of the same year, ECOWAS facilitated peace talks that culminated into the Abidjan Accord.

Yet, a military coup d'état on May 27, 1997 led by Major Johny Paul Koroma of the Sierra Leone Army overthrew the government of president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with Major Koroma at its head, assumed control of Freetown. They extended invitation to the RUF of Foday Sankoh to join them, giving the RUF free access to the capital. The period of AFRC/RUF control of Freetown resulted in chaos and anarchy. The threat to regional peace and security posed by Sierra Leonean conflict led to more ECOWAS intervention. ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone was mainly to reverse the military coup and restore government to power (Golwa, 2009). The success of this military intervention in politics was attributed to support received from Nigerian troops. Before the military coup of May 25, 1997 in Sierra Leone, a contingent of Nigerian troops was stationed

at the presidential lodge. Nigerian Armed Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) contingents allegedly leaked information to the coup plotters revealing when there would be a change of NIFAG guard units with others on the outskirts of Monrovia (Lewitt, 2001). Contrary to the claims that ECOMOG leaked information, the core of the problem was that they were not deployed wisely. Instead of deploying troops in the city and close to Freetown, the Taskforce commander, General Ahmadu ordered deployment in Hastings and the police Training School far away from Freetown and the outskirts of the city. This unwise decision originated from division (schism) between professional officers operating in outside operations and their political counterpart at home (Olonisakin, 2004). ECOMOG's problem in Sierra Leone is equally attributed to change of government. General Abdulsami Abubakar, unlike his predecessor who saw ECOMOG mission in Liberia as a personal project, was more inclined to pay more attention to Nigeria's problems. The new regime was concerned with building Nigeria's image in the eyes of the international community through improvement of human rights situation at home and preparation for elections (Olonisakin, 2004) It is further exacerbated by corruption, and indiscipline existing among ECOMOG Forces. As large number of its officer corps was reportedly in Sierra Leone for personal gain especially in trade (Kabia, 2011). Like in Liberia, ECOWAS had to contend with loyalty offered to rebel groups for example Taylor allegedly used Liberian territory to offer financial and military assistance to the RUF (Jaye, 2008).

Conversely, Azikwe (2009) observed that ECOMOG Forces stationed in Liberia were expanded to include Sierra Leone and in fact ECOMOG headquarters was relocated from Monrovia to Freetown mainly with troops from Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. ECOWAS also involved in negotiations between political parties and factions, which led the conduct of a free and fair election in 2003. However, Lewitt (2001) later observed that it was the British

intervention on the rebel stronghold following abduction of British troops by the west side Boys, rebel group that brought the Sierra Leonean conflict to an end.

2.1.7.3 Guinea Bissau

Another conflict-spot that posed great challenge to ECOWAS quest for a peaceful sub region was Guinea Bissau, with its record of political instability. The political turmoil began with the assassination of Bissau's revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral by dissidents of African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde in 1973. The same year, Luis Cabral, Amilcar's brother succeeded him but was later overthrown by Vieira's faction in 1980. To the great dissatisfaction of Bissauans, Vieira ultimately pursued a capitalist path and buried Amilcar's popular socialist programme. Joao Bernardo Vieira ruled Guinea-Bissau for 19 years under an autocratic regime characterized by serious economic mismanagement. Also, Vieira's popularity in the army fell drastically after ordering the execution of several soldiers for alleged coup attempt (Azikwe, 2009).

Consequently, in May 1999, President Vieira was toppled in a military coup led by a dismissed army chief, General Ansumane Mane. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the bilateral defence and security agreement, which his government had signed with Guinea and Senegal, President Vieira requested their intervention which yielded partial results. They efforts of these two countries were marred by the determined rebels and so were not in position to enforce peace, but rather to provide military assistance to Vieira. Vieira then requested that ECOWAS deploy ECOMOG in the country. ECOWAS followed this call through its committee on Guinea-Bissau brokered a series of peace talks in Praia, Cape Verde on 26 August 1998, Abuja, Nigeria on 1 November 1998, and Lome, Togo, on 15 December 1998 which received the agreement of president Vieira and chief mutineer Mane. While

between December 1998 and March 1999, Benin, the Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Togo deployed approximately 300 ECOMOG troops in Guinea-Bissau to guarantee security, keep the warring parties apart and guarantee free access to humanitarian organizations (Lewitt, 2001). According to Sam and Katie (2000) ECOWAS intervention in Guinea-Bissau was a significant departure from previous initiatives the general belief that ECOMOG simply a Nigerian tool was no longer persuasive. Since the force was primarily composed of one Anglophone and three francophone countries. Furthermore, ECOWAS intervention in Guinea-Bissau like the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone presented some daunting challenges. There was enduring tension between Junta military troops and the pro-government alliance. The parties in conflict harboured divergent interpretation of ECOWAS Mandate. For Vieira, the Abuja accords provided a hiatus during which he could attempt to regroup his forces while Mane' perceived the suspension of fighting as a necessary diplomatic step that would eventually harm his position. On this wise, Mane' considered a force of 750 troops to be sufficient for ECOWAS to carry out the mandate and Vieira demanded a force of not less than 4,000 troops. The inability of Nigeria to supply logistics (resources) paved way for France to arrange a package of logistic and financial aid with the troop-contributing states (Massey, 2001).

In spite of ECOWAS resolution efforts, Guinea-Bissau still experience resurgence of political instability with the overthrow of Kumba Yala in September 2003 and assassination of President Vieira in March 2009. In the midst of this constitutional crisis, ECOWAS deployed troops to restore peace and assist the new interim government of Raimundo Pereira (former speaker of the parliament) to return to democratic rule (Yabi, 2010).

2.1.7.4 The Republic of Guinea

Between 2006 and 2007, Guinea experienced serious economic and political setback following violent strikes and demonstrations against the government of Lansana Conte'. Several protesters reportedly lost their lives in workers and students demonstration over wages and cost of basic goods, later exacerbated by emergency situation. On February 13, 2007 Conte declared a state of emergency calling in the army to restore law and order. It took the swift intervention of ECOWAS to normalize the situation. ECOWAS through Nigeria's former President Babangida mediated in the crisis and was able to achieve a compromise between the government and the striking workers. ECOWAS then established an office in Guinea with a team of technocrats to closely monitor developments in Guinea after mediating an end to the crisis of January/February 2007. ECOWAS was further supportive of processes towards holding credible and transparent legislative election in the country (Azikwe, 2009).

The Death of President Conte' on December 22, 2008 triggered another constitutional turmoil. Within hours of his death the military led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power in a bloodless coup. Guineans accepted Dadis Camara's promise of elections and a return to civilian rule. Yet, this popular support oiled with promises to restore democracy was later contradicted with another Junta. As the assassination attempt by an aide-de-camp, made Dadis Camara flee the country and an interim junta, led by General Sekouba Konate took charge. Konate allowed the opposition political parties to appoint a civilian minister and scheduled elections for June 27, 2009 (Campbell and Harwood, 2011). ECOWAS thus through president Blaise Campaore of Burkina faso, brokered peace Agreement between the rival groups in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 15 January 2010 ECOWAS heads of state then agreed on benchmarks among the Guinean political actors: to establish a new transitional authority through credible, free and fair elections, and to ensure that the chairman

and members of the CNDD(National Council for Democracy and Development), the prime minister and those who hold high offices in the new transitional authority will not be candidates in the forth coming presidential elections.

Also, the ECOWAS Heads of State imposed an arms embargo on Guinea in response to the killings at Conakry stadium. In October 2010, 157 opposition protesters were said to be murdered by members of the Guinean military which triggered the CNDD authorities to acquire new weapons. ECOWAS commission went on to obtain the support of African Union and the European Union in the implementation of the embargo (ECOWAS, 2009).

Although, ECOWAS played significant role in the conflict as highlighted above, the junta already had the support of many Guineans who for long , nursed a feeling of frustration in 24 years of president Conte' administration. Therefore ECOWAS initially had to contend with the opinions of Guinean population.

2.1.7.5 The Case of Cote D'ivoire

The conflict in Cote d'Ivoire engaged attention of ECOWAS, as a result of outbreak of hostilities of September 19, 2002. The conflict was triggered by controversial question of national identity and eligibility conditions which exclude some section of the political class from contesting the presidential election. This controversial electoral code stipulated that presidential candidates must be Ivorian born of Ivorian parents. As a result Alhassane Ouatarra, the most credible opposition candidate, was disqualified from contesting the election that witnessed the emergence of Laurent Gbagbo as President (Azikwe, 2009). Conflict situation was equally exacerbated by a mutiny staged by a group of 150 soldiers who took control of the North, seized armory and attempted the capture and overthrow of Abidjan and president Gbagbo Ten days after the crisis began, ECOWAS decided to deploy

a sub-regional peace keeping force otherwise known as ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire) to Cote d'Ivoire.

On October 17 2002, ECOWAS signed a cease fire agreement with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI), rebel group in Bouake, Cote d'Ivoire and another one with Ivorian popular movement of the Great west (MPIGO) in Lome, Togo December 2003(ECOMICI-NEWS, 2004). Besides sustaining ceasefire agreement, recorded at the early stages of the conflict, ECOMICI provided security to ministers and other VIP's in the Government of National Reconciliation, later provided security cover at schools, markets, factories, banks, public transportation and other high-risk areas. ECOWAS was thus able to sustain peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire for 15 months before the arrival of the UN Peacekeepers in April 2004(ECOWAS Annual Report, 2005) Nevertheless, the 2002 conflict later sparked off in 2011, following the post-election violence that occurred as a result of former president, Laurent Gbagbo's desire to remain in power in spite of the verdict. ECOWAS as a promoter of sub-regional Democracy reacted swiftly to the post-electoral turmoil and came out firmly in support of Ouattara as the legitimate winner of the election and on 7 December, decided to suspend Cote d'Ivoire from all ECOWAS decision bodies, and appealed to Gbagbo to yield power without delay. Like previous intervention, the case in Cote d'Ivoire had its challenges. ECOWAS effort of resolving this conflict faced the problem of funding (logistics) caused by internal commitment (like election) of key member states (Guardian Development Network Report, 2014).

2.1.7.6 Togo

A conflict that attracted ECOWAS intervention in Togo was one that followed the Death of Togolese president on February 15th 2005. After the Demise of Gnassingbe Eyadema, the military loyal to late the President went contrary to the Togolese constitution and imposed his son, Faure Gnassingbe as the new President of Togo. Following this imposition, the country's population particularly Togolese radical opposition reacted violently against the unconstitutional act and thus there was tension. To prevent Togo from degenerating into serious crisis, which could have dangerous consequences in West Africa, ECOWAS decided to intervene. This intervention was largely diplomatic and political.

Five days after the outbreak of the conflict, ECOWAS convened its first summit on Togo in Niamey. Unfortunately, ECOWAS members were divided on the way the conflict could be resolved. A faction proposed discussion with Faure Gnassingbe and Togolese army leaders who could be afraid about their safety if they stepped down. The president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore and his Ghana-counterpart John Kufuor defended the same position by suggesting amnesty for the Instigators of the crisis. On the other hand, the second faction supported legality: since Togolese constitution in Article 65 provided that after the demise of a president the speaker of the parliament becomes the interim president and organizes presidential election within the next sixty days. According to this faction, Faure Gnassingbe must step down or face sanctions in case of refusal. Eventually the entire ECOWAS member states accepted one solution: convince Faure Gnassingbe and the Leaders of Army to give up power for Fambare Ouattara Natchaba, the speaker of the parliament.

After failing to convince Faure Gnassingbe to give up power, on February 19th 2005, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Togo; ban on Togolese leaders trips, embargo on weapons in Togo, all the ECOWAS Member states recalled their ambassadors from Togo and banning of Togo as ECOWAS member state. In support of ECOWAS' action, African Union (AU)

and French speaking nation's international organization decided to suspend Togo. The pressure partly forced Faure Gnassingbe to step down on February 25th 2005. Therefore ECOWAS in its press release on February 26th 2005, lifted with immediate effects its sanctions on Togo, calling on all Togolese parties to strictly respect the provisions of the constitution (Mahounon, 2009).

Besides diplomatic approach, ECOWAS had employed political initiative. on February 28th 2005, ECOWAS through Mamadou Tanja and Amadou Toumani Toure negotiated an agreement with two Togolese parties in Lome: the one in power and coalition of the opposition (Rally for the Togolese People, RPT and Union Forces for Change, UFC).ECOWAS went on to supervise the controversial election, in which Faure Gnassingbe had 60.15 percent vote while Emmanuel Akitani-Bob of Coalition opposition followed with 38.15 percent. The declaration of the results sparked off new tension in Togo, leading to many deaths and refugee crisis in Benin and Ghana. In the same vein, the supporters of the radical opposition denounced the result and claimed victory of the election. In spite of reaction from opposition, ECOWAS went on to declare the Togolese presidential election as fair and to be in accordance with universal electoral law. It is also observed that notwithstanding existing differences of opinion among ECOWAS members, ECOWAS peace process succeeded because of unity of purpose within its leadership (ECOWAS International Conference Report, 2010). As above, ECOWAS Initiatives did not bring final solution to Togolese Political crisis, supporters of opposition coalition rejected their participation in government of national unity proposed by Faure Gnassingbe, yet ECOWAS decided to intervene to restore constitutional order in Togo.

2.1.7.7 Republic Of Niger

All through 1990 to 2007 Niger suffered serious economic and political setback as a result of violence by the Tuareg rebels against the civilian population and the Niger security forces. The Tuaregs were demanding greater autonomy for their traditional homeland of Tenere, Niger. Their activities in this town and beyond culminated in losses of human lives, injuries, hostage takings and destruction of property. This situation attracted the intervention of ECOWAS which sent a mission to Niamey on 16th July 2007, to liaise with government of Niger to obtain official information on the situation (ECOWAS Annual Report, 2007)

In the contrary, Azikwe (2007) observed that dealing with the situation in Niger requires comprehensive approach than information sharing, ECOWAS working closely with the UN need to address the legitimate grievances of the Tuaregs. To him until this is done, the Tuareg question would be a major source of insecurity in the sub-region.

ECOWAS equally intervened in 2009 in wake of a contested referendum that would indefinitely extend president Tanja Mamadou's mandate beyond his allotted step-down date of 22December 2009. In May 2009 and he later appointed a new constitutional court which enabled him to push forward with a constitutional referendum that extended his mandate for three additional years. This development was greeted with furious reaction from Nigerien population, the opposition, regional and international community. After unsuccessful mediation efforts of former Senegal president Abdoulaye Wade, Niger was suspended from ECOWAS in line with its protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. ECOWAS leaders requested President Mamadou Tanja and the Niger authorities to suspend to suspend indefinitely the legislative elections scheduled for 20th October 2009 in favour of dialogue with the other leading political parties in resolving the country's conflict. The widespread condemnation of Tanja's action led to military intervention by Salou Djibo. Again, ECOWAS appointed Nigerian former Head of state, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, as its

mediator to Niger. Abubakar's mediation effort was equally supported by a delegation composed of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia (ECOWAS, 2009). Further, ECOWAS along with the military junta supported democratic transition in Niger and facilitated the restoration of constitutional order most especially its financial contribution of \$3,000,000.00 which enhanced the capacity and functioning of Electoral Commission in Niger (ECOWAS Annual Report, 2011).

2.1.8 The Role of Nigeria in ECOWAS' Interventions

Nigeria as a sub regional hegemon has found herself in the critical position of having to bear the burden of insecurity, especially intra-state conflict of ECOWAS countries. Accordingly, Nigeria through ECOWAS had taken a number of steps towards shaping the processes and outcome of these conflicts in a decisive fashion. Some of these measures may be described into three different categories; Diplomatic, Financial and Military involvement

Military Intervention

Military intervention by Nigeria has undoubtedly received the greatest attention out of other conflict resolution measures. This attention partly began with Liberian conflict of 1990 to 1997 which provided opportunity for Nigeria to display her leadership status in the wake of early neglect by the international community to prevail therein. In face of this emergency situation, the then Nigeria's president Ibrahim Babangida recommended the formation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which was endorsed and formalized by the ECOWAS standing committee on mediation, in August 1990 (Shagaya, 2003). Nigeria also commanded ECOMOG and provided the bulk of the troops. Besides the first commander of ECOMOG, Gen. Arnold Quainoo, all subsequent commanders were from the Nigerian military. According to Nweke (2007), Nigeria had provided eight of the nine supreme

commanders of ECOMOG from August 1990 to July 1999. Nweke went on to argue that Nigeria's dominant position in the ECOMOG command structure could be justified using the African adage that "He who pays the piper dictates the tune" In the same vein, the idea that Nigerian army is the most equipped compared to other countries in the sub-region was affirmed in the testimony that only Nigerian army supplied Jet for the Liberian operation. This fact is further seen in the initial failure of ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau which was attested to non involvement of Nigerian military. The early absence of Nigeria caused operational setbacks in personal, material mobilizations and operations (Akinbi and Akinola, n.d)

As had been the case in Liberia, Nigerian involvement was decisive in Sierra Leone. It began with a comprehensive arrangement which was reached between Nigeria and Sierra Leone under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in which the Nigerian Army dispatched Infantry and Artillery troop. Thereupon, when the need to expand from single service to include the Navy and the Air force, Nigeria and Sierra Leone formed the Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG), stationed in Freetown. It is worthy to note that though NIFAG was administratively under ECOMOG; its operations were independent of the Multinational Monitory Group. As its administrative and operational matters were handled directly from Lagos and Abuja. (Olonisakin,2004). Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone was further manifested through Nigeria's decision to take advantage of situation therein to expel militarily RUF forces from Freetown, thus enabled the reinstatement of President Ahmad Kabbah on March. However, the military involvement was also meant that Abacha and his generals could continue to divert millions of dollars while billing them as ECOMOG expenses (Bach, 2007). Similarly, Yoroms argued that Nigeria's involvement in West African conflicts was mainly for her regime stability rather than for the resolution of regional

security. Yoroms maintained that the regimes of Babangida and Abacha have decided the pattern of security operation through sponsoring dictatorial regime and military coups in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria's military leadership has been further criticized and misinterpreted in a number of ways. ECOMOG under Nigeria's command was not seen as impartial by parties involved in the conflict. According to Ladan (2009) Nigeria's role should not be misinterpreted to mean the country did not partly fuel the Liberian Imbroglio. As Sgt. Samuel Doe, then president was secretly supported by Nigeria alongside Israel and the United States. This misconception led to the invasion of Nigeria's Embassy in Liberia and brutal murder of Nigerian nationals by Charles Taylor's NPFL Rebel. Ladan further observed that though Nigeria was the engineer of the ECOWAS military expedition, the country failed to provide a model of democracy at home that other countries (including Liberia and Sierra Leone) would follow. Its leader, General Ibrahim Babangida was seen to have come to power through the barrel of the gun. In the same vein, Nigeria's leadership was also undermined by the corruption resulting from underpaid and ill-fed force. ECOMOG and indeed Nigeria were detested for looting and plundering in areas of operation. This to a large extent earned ECOMOG the nick name "Every Car or Moving Object gone" (Fleitz, 2002). This bad reputation is further manifested when Taylor ordered out the mostly Nigerian force (ECOMOG) as soon as he ascended power.

Furthermore, there was noticeable division between the professional officers operating in outside operations and their political counterpart at home (Nigeria). The Nigerian military government was seen to have given greater attention to political interests over military matters, recruitment of incompetent officers in to command structure. ECOMOG'S failure in preventing or repulsing the advance of AFRC and RUF in Freetown was partly attributed to this domestic reality (Olonisakin, 2004).

Financial and Logistical Support

To further promote peace and security, Nigerian government has reportedly met the bulk of financial and logistical cost of ECOWAS operations in sub-regional conflicts.

The ECOMOG operation in Liberia (1990-1997) also known as *Operation Liberty* has cost Nigeria a huge sum of US\$8billion (funded around 90% of the operation). Nigeria also provided the bulk of the troops, specifically 75% of the 11,000 ECOMOG troops by 1993 (Yoroms, 2005). It is also observed that bulk of ECOMOG contingents came from Nigeria. Other members of the 11,000-strong West African Peace Force include Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Senegal. As a result, ECOMOG is seen as brain child of Nigeria that would never have been born and sustained without its personal, financial and logistical contributions. Nigeria also undertook active diplomacy that contributed to the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with the mandate to cooperate in supervising the cease-fire and the transitional process from hostility to peace (Fung, 1996).

In Sierra Leone, Nigeria, single handedly provided petroleum products, allowance and ration for Malian and Benin troops. It was equally responsible for the movement of troops from Liberia to Sierra Leone (Olonisakin, 2004). Nigeria government has equally met the administrative cost of the ECOWAS mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). This big-brother support allowed the ECOMICI provide security to ministers, and other VIPS in the Government of National Reconciliation. The sub-regional interposition forces also provided security cover at schools, markets, factories, banks, public transportation and other high-risk areas (ECOMICI News, 2004). In effect, Nigeria spent the sums of 4.7 billion naira, 2.1 billion and 2.2 billion naira in 2001, 2002 and 2003 representing a yearly average of 3 billion naira.

Malu (2009) attributed the earlier failure of ECOMOG mission in Guinea Bissau to Nigeria's absence therein. This hegemonic neglect was necessitated by a national outcry over the way and manner the country has waded into trouble-spot without tangible benefit. Yet, He also observed that Nigeria had spent over 13 billion US dollars to peacekeeping operations in West Africa, excluding the large number of men and women of the Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice for the course of peace in the region. Thus "without Nigeria's involvement and leadership, it was doubtful that peace could have been achieved" (Malu, 2009:174). Notwithstanding the initial neglect, Nigerian government through ECOWAS decided to disburse 3.5 million dollars to pay three months salary arrears to the soldiers and to provide them vehicles and communication gadgets. These gestures by Nigeria played a determining role in the timely holding, under satisfactory security conditions of the two rounds of the presidential elections on June 28 and July 26 2009. Thus the elections were adjudged violence free, fair and transparent by observation mission of AU, EU and civil society organizations (Yabi, 2010).

Diplomatic Intervention

Apart from military and financial involvement, Nigerian government had taken the lead in mediatory efforts of ECOWAS conflict situation. According to Alli (2012), Nigerian leaders, from General Babangida to President Jonathan have played very direct role in the diplomatic intervention resolving sub-regional conflicts.

The conflict in Liberia originally brought out the triumph of Nigerian diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution. The relative success of this effort came when Taylor and his supporting countries of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso agreed to fully embrace the Abuja peace plan of 1995. Since before this milestone, there had been several unsuccessful agreements, notably

Liberia, Contonou, Akosombo and Accra peace agreements on Liberia. It is here observed that the success of Nigeria's mediation on the conflict motivated other recalcitrant countries to support ECOWAS intervention. Consequently, Ghana provided 1 battalion of 500 troops, 319 troops from Burkina Faso, 251 troops from Benin and a paramedical team of 35 men from Cote d'Ivoire (Zabadi, 2000). Again, General Sani Abacha's accession to power in Nigeria led to Nigeria's spectacular reconciliation with Taylor and his NPFL Forces. They no longer had to face the hostility of ECOMOG Forces rather staged program towards disarmament, resettlement and elections which saw the election of former Liberian warlord as President (Bach, 2009). Zabadi (2000) agreed that each agreement had to be supported by intense diplomacy from Nigeria for success to be achieved. The Revised Abuja Agreement had 14 items based on Nigeria's recommendation. These items ranged from ceasefire, disengagement of factions from their checkpoints and combat positions, disarmament, demobilization and repatriation, to constituting an independent Electoral commission, and elections. In Zabadi's view, Nigeria had to diplomatically intervene to all the problems encountered during the implementation stage of the revised treaty. A case in point was the constitution of an independent Electoral Commission. Nigeria mandated the Liberian council of state to produce seven members of the electoral commission, three to represent former factions and four to represent the civil society and then the chairman of the commission who was appointed in consultation with ECOWAS. According to Nwosu (1999), the emergence of Dogonyaro as ECOMOG (August 1990-September 1990) Commander in Liberia was a great stride. ECOMOG under his watch reportedly adopted persuasion as veritable method of conflict resolution. It distributed leaflets calling on Liberians to stop the blood bath. Nwosu further observed that Nigeria within the context of the ECOWAS Mediation Committee arranged other conferences besides the Banjul Initiative to resolve the Liberian conflict.

These include the peace conferences in Bamako, Mali (November, 1990), Lome, Togo (February 1991) and the Liberian peace conference in Monrovia (March 1991) which succeeded in narrowing the areas of differences among the factions involved in the conflict. Furthermore, Nigeria's determination in ending the violence in Liberia could also be explained in Malu's statement. According to Major General Victor Malu, a Nigerian Commander of the West African Peacekeeping Force, "I will use all means available to search for and seize any remaining weapons" (Laffin, 1997:149). Evidently, more than 23,000 combatants from all factions reportedly handed in their fire arms. Malu's contribution at a time was viewed by Charles Taylor as attempt towards running a parallel government and thus requested for his replacement as commander. Nigeria equally played diplomatic role that made Charles Taylor stood down as president on 11 August handed over power to the National Transitional Government of Liberia(NTGL) and went into exile in Nigeria(Agyapong, 2005)

Although France played important role in Cote d'Ivoire, the bulk of the peace initiatives were taken by ECOWAS. Nigeria largely contributed troops for the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring assignment in 2002. Just as Ambassador Ralph Uwuechwe of Nigeria, the special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in Cote d'Ivoire monitored and coordinated ECOWAS efforts in the country. Uwuechwe held talks with Ivorian political forces and Mr. Lansana Kouyate special Representative of the Francophonie in the northern stronghold of New Forces in Bouake (ECOMICI News, 2004). Again, from 2002 to 2003, Obasanjo undertook several missions across West Africa to ensure a unified approach to the Ivorian crisis. Likewise, in its 2011 conflict, President Jonathan adopted and led a principled approach in conflict and insisted on constitutionalism and democracy in resolving any

conflict. Nigeria's government thus approved the election results and the victory of Ouattara in the presidential elections (Alli, 2012).

Nigeria equally provided a key mediatory role in the Senegalese conflict. This conflict was set off by the decision of President Abdullahi Wade to contest for a third term in 2012 presidential election. Accordingly, former President Obasanjo's mediation was useful in easing the tension that built up towards the presidential elections (Alli, 2012). Nigeria also provided much needed support and contributed to the ECOWAS efforts to resolve the political crisis in Togo. Obasanjo was able to deploy his diplomatic muscle effectively by inviting Faure Gyassingbe and the main opposition leader, Emmanuel Akitani to Abuja where a peace accord was agreed upon in 2006 (Alli, 2012). The constitutional conflict in Niger had equally attracted the mediatory attention of Nigeria. ECOWAS appointed General Abdulsalami Abubakar as the ECOWAS mediator for Niger's constitutional crisis. Abdulsalami had convened series of consultative meetings in Abuja during which he met separately with representatives of the government of Niger and the opposition of coalition. He met for two days from 11th November 2009 with a 41-member delegation representing the coalition of members of the opposition under the aegis of the Coordination Forces for Democracy and the Republic. The Coalition resisted the 4th August referendum that allowed the president of Niger to extend his tenure by three years in violation of the country's 1999 constitution and of the ECOWAS protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (ECOWAS, 2009).

It is clear, therefore, that Nigeria's leadership has been very crucial in the conflict resolution of ECOWAS. This is why any ECOWAS intervention has to be sensitive to a sub-regional hegemon.

2.1.9 An Appraisal of the Review

The literature review began with the concept of conflict and then provided four points of view on conflict: the violent, integrative, broader and the Marxist. From the concept of conflict, the study introduced a narrow and a broader meaning of conflict resolution and the debate that underlies the concept of conflict resolution, especially the resolution, transformation and management points of view. The concept of conflict management is equally reviewed within long term and peculiarity (short) conception

As observed from the literature review, there is need for more research on Nigeria's role in ECOWAS Intervention, especially under ECOWAS Conflict Management Mechanism and also the influence of Nigeria's domestic situation. The available literature on the conflict in Mali basically focused on conflict and its implications on West Africa as well as legality of France intervention than Nigeria's Role in Mali. Such works include Abubakar 2014; Adeshola 2014; Oluwasegun 2013 and Bello 2014. Therefore, it is hoped that this research will enrich literature on Nigeria's Role in ECOWAS Conflict Resolution.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on Hegemonic Stability Theory. Charles Kindleberger (1975) who is presented as the Major Proponent (other key advocates include Robert Keohane, 1984; Robert Gilpin ,1975; and Stephen Krasner ,1976) of the theory argued that the international system is more likely to be stable when there is a single dominant state which is capable of articulating and enforcing the rules of interaction in international political and economic relations. Consequently, the decline or absence of a hegemon is assumed to diminish the stability of the international system. In Kindleberger's view, for the world system, especially economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer. An open market economy is seen as a

collective or public good that could not be sustained without the actions of a dominant economy. Collective goods encompasses interdependent activities and choices, ranging from peace, financial stability to free trade. In this perspective, collective goods suggest all members of a system enjoy it, but mainly provided and facilitated by the dominant state.

Kindleberger went on to elaborate the hegemonic leadership of two great countries to a liberal international economic order and security system; the influence of Britain beyond its borders in the nineteenth century and how power of the United States took hegemonic dimension since 1945. The Great Britain is said to have used its dominant position to create an era of free trade among its formal empire, while the establishment of the Bretton Wood, international trade and monetary system's reduction of trade barriers, the use of the dollar as a global reserve currency and expansion of overseas investment was employed by the United States after the Second World War. Invariably, the lack of an effective hegemon is assumed to be the major contributing factor to the depression of the 1930s.

In addition, Kindleberger identified five defining characteristics of a Hegemon to consist of; vibrant economy, political clout, strong defence establishment and ideological concession. First, the Hegemon is associated with a Vibrant Economy. According to Kindleberger, a Hegemon is expected to have a large and growing economy with unrivalled supremacy in at least one leading economic or technological sector in the international political and economic relations. It is expected for the dominant state to possess high level trade liberalization, have access to crucial raw material and to maintain an open market. A hegemon is equally expected to stabilize the international system during crisis by providing five public goods: market for distress (unsalable) goods, liquidity into the global financial system, a stable system of exchange rate, macroeconomic coordination and counter cyclical lending. This is

exemplified with America's effort in the post-1945 era recovery of both Europe and Japan, by donating billions of dollars in aid and opening its markets to their products.

Second, Hegemon is viewed to have a Strong Currency. The currency here seeks dominance in highly hierarchical and dynamic system which is akin to competition, conflict and confrontation, both currency and conflict gain and lose power and prestige at the expense of one another in the zero-sum game for example, the US dollar has been a leading contributor to the world economy. It has the unique role as the world reserve currency which made the US to depend on cheap financing from abroad and every nation has to purchase huge amounts of this currency for its national reserve.

Third, the state with hegemonic power must have the Strongest Military in International Political Relations. Significantly, stronger than other states in the system. Since a state with quality military establishment is usually superior to other that are in disadvantaged position. Thus, Great Britain has acquired sophisticated firearms artilleries overtime than Africa and other less developed nations which relied on low-yield calvary and castle which were obviously inferior to the ones in Great Britain. United States is also known to have been spending billions of dollars annually on its defence and its large military establishment.

Again, the state which assumes hegemonic status is expected to exercise great power and influence (Political Clout) on the rules that govern global political and economic relations. In this context, the Hegemon should have the will to lead, to establish a hegemonic regime and the capacity to enforce the rules of the system. In the aftermath of World War I, Great Britain possessed the will to lead, but lacked the requisite abilities to do so. Consequently, without the ability to enforce stability on the international system, Great Britain was unable to prevent the onset of the Great Depression or World War II. The dominant state must

employed its symbolic, economic and military capabilities to entice or compel others to accept an open trading system as well.

Associated with this, is Ideological Concession. The Hegemon must commit to the system which he perceives as mutually beneficial for other important state-actors. According to Kindleberger for the architecture of the system to hold, the dominant state had to acquire not only preponderant power but also liberal ideology and willing followers. This he believes constitutes non-material factor that distinguished US hegemony from dominance.

2.2.1 Relevance of Hegemonic Stability Theory

From the foregoing, it is evident that Nigeria has over time relatively possessed attributes that made her a leading player or Hegemon in Sub-regional Affairs.

Economically, besides being the most populous in the region, Nigeria is the second biggest economy and the only sub-regional supplier of crude oil (10th in the world). Indeed, West African economic activity is concentrated in Nigeria. As seen in cross-border activities which closely linked Southern Niger to the Northern Nigerian economy; Benin and Togo benefit from the major economic activity between Lagos and Ibadan. There is also great economic influence on the sub-region, especially the Franc Zone where it has increasingly been making investment in the banking sector. Over the years, there has been strong exchange rate between the CFA Franc-currency of Francophone countries and the Naira. Owing to the fact that Naira was stronger than CFA Franc, most Francophone countries staggering search for Nigeria's Naira and equally work in Nigeria in order to remit exponential amount of money back to their countries i.e. Benin, Togo, Niger. Nigeria is seen as the dominant player in the economic bloc, accounting for over 70% of the sub-region's GDP over the years for instance, it accounted for 71.1 % of the region's GDP for years 2005-7, with Cote d'Ivoire being the next biggest with 8% (ECOWAS, 2010). This economic

position explains why Nigeria has always been in forefront its neighbours' financial and logistical aid such as Mali. In effect, Nigeria was said to be the highest contributor to Mali conflict management in West Africa.

Nigeria is known to have the largest and strongest military establishment within the sub-region. Auspiciously, Nigeria is ranked as the fourth country with the most powerful military in Africa, after Egypt, Algeria and Ethiopia. In this context, Successive Nigeria administration has been committing enormous resources to its Defence Forces, for example, the Naval Force of Equitorial Guinea and the strength of the Gambian military put together are less than two Battalions of Nigeria Armed Forces. This explains why Nigeria continued to lead ECOWAS Troop Countributing Countries Unit, including AFISMA in Mali.

Apart from these, there are intangible attributes of Nigeria which are relatively expressed interms of its political clout and ideological concession. Nigeria has been the rallying point for other ECOWAS member states, especially in areas of conflict management. In Liberian, Sierra Leone and Even Mali Conflict. In effect, members of ECOWAS at the Commission level, usually wanted Nigeria to take a lead role and command in ECOWAS effort to resolve the conflict in Mali. In spite of Nigeria's internal security concerns, it went on to despatched a lot of financial and technical assistance to the election in Mali.

Since the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria has been in the forefront of common ideology and supranational vision. This is expressed in terms of the need to create a borderless, peacefully, prosperous and cohesive ECOWAS (from ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of People). Conversely, the fact that leaders of ECOWAS including Nigeria continue to remind one another of the need of ECOWAS vision underscores the fact that the sub-region is still far from achieving this noble ideal. The challenge then is why the achievement of sub-regional vision remains elusive over forty-one (41) years of ECOWAS?

2.2.2 Criticism of the Theory

One problem of Hegemonic Stability Theory is that its applicability is limited. According to Snidal (1985) the applicability of the theory can be challenged due to its limitation and the fact that the theory only holds true empirically under special conditions. For him, the range of the theory is limited to very special conditions and ultimately that the decline of a hegemonic power may demonstrate the possibility of a collective power. As evidence, Nigeria's leadership challenge in AFISMA was limited by the French –Speaking WestAfrica Alliance. They are seen to have played central role in their natural habitat conflict theatre of Northern Mali. Also at the Commission level, the leadership of ECOWAS was headed by French speaking countries as well as ECOWAS Chief Mediator to Mali.

In addition, the theory has been criticized for exaggerating intangible attribute of state over the international system. In essence, Political Clout and ideological concession cannot be accurately be measured in precise terms. It is thus based on rough comparism. This position aptly captured by Nel and Stephen (2010) in Nolte, who argued that the Hegemonic Stability Theory is only useful tool of identifying, analyzing and comparing states that aspire to the status of a regional power. In this context, he suggested that the theory should focus on regional aspiration rather than leadership achievements.

Finally, the theory equally opens question on whether or not the hegemonic position of Nigeria is acceptable to other ECOWAS member countries, especially Francophone countries. For example, it took a lot of hardwork on Nigeria to convinced the French speaking members like Togo and Niger to agree to have one grouping as ECOWAS today. In Mali, other French speaking contingents refused to take orders from Nigerian Commandant. Thus French Speaking members are on paper in alliance with Nigeria while in Reality, they have higher attachment to France.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 ECOWAS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND NIGERIA'S WEST AFRICAN POLICY

3.1 Introduction

The ECOWAS conflict management framework is explored under four broad themes. These themes are: 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Management, 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and 2008 ECOWAS Framework for Conflict Prevention. While the second section examines Nigerian West African Policy.

3.2 Background to ECOWAS Conflict Management Framework

The Economic Community of West African States officially came into existence with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos on 28th May 1975 by fifteen member states. The community consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (ECOWAS, n. d). It is originally intended under the treaty to accelerate economic and social development in West African sub-region. In chapter 1 Article 2, the treaty provides that the community shall promote cooperation and development in economic, social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, increasing economic stability and fostering closer relations among its members (ECOWAS, 1975). However, 15 years after its formation ECOWAS began to grapple with a plethora of conflicts which have sapped enormous energy and resources meant for economic development. Since Economic integration can only be realized in an atmosphere of peace, stability and security, ECOWAS then took the leadership of West African sub-region in the promotion of peace and security. To resolve these violent conflicts, ECOWAS initiated some moves that culminated in the enactment of protocols and related instruments to address issues of collective security in the sub-region. In 1978 ECOWAS agreed on Non-Aggression protocol and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (MAD) in 1981. The protocol on Non-Aggression

provided essentially for the peaceful resolution of disputes between member states, while the protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence spelt out situations that would call for joint sub-regional action on an external aggression as well as interventions in interstate and intra-state conflicts. Conversely, with time, above protocols were found to be quite limited in scope. They were basically suited to emergency situation and inter-state conflicts at a time in which intra-state conflicts became rampant. Notwithstanding these inadequacies, in 1990, a standing mediation committee was created which saw the birth of ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force that originally intervened in the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts. In 1991, also a committee was set up to examine crucial areas of 1975 treaty and to make recommendations in the form of revised treaty was later adopted at the summit of Heads of state in Cotonou in July 1993. Unlike the 1975 Treaty which bound ECOWAS decision strictly on institutions, the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty extended the direct applicability of ECOWAS decisions to the member states (Ajulo, 2001). Accordingly, article 9(4) of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, provides that the decisions of the Authority should henceforth bind member states directly as well the institutions of the community (ECOWAS, 1993).

3.3 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Management

In December 1999, ECOWAS Summit consequently agreed on a protocol establishing the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace and security. The protocol provides a set of institutional and command structure which ensures proper implementation of the mechanism in conflict situation (Agbu, 2006). The institutions are: the authority, the mediation and Security Council, and the executive secretariat. Their supporting organs include: the defence and security commission, the council of elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

3. 3.1 The Authority

The Authority is the highest decision-making body. It is composed of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS. It is obliged to mandate the mediation and Security Council to take, on its behalf appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of this mechanism and acts on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, security, and humanitarian support.

3.3.2 The Mediation and Security Council

The Mediation and Security Council is one of the three main institutions of the mechanism which operates at three levels: Heads of state and Government, Ministerial and Ambassadorial .It serves as the equivalent to the UN Security Council at sub-regional level :authorizes all forms of interventions, especially the decision to deploy political and military missions. The Mediation and Security is officially supported by the Defence and Security commission, Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitory Group which are explained shortly.

3.3.3 The Defence and Security Commission

The Defence and Security Commission is composed of chiefs of Defence, Internal Affairs Officers, Experts from ministry of foreign Affairs and other related agencies. It is basically charged with the responsibility of examining all technical and administrative issues and of assessing logistic requirements for peace-keeping operation.

3.3.4 The Council of Elders

The Council of Elders consist of eminent personalities from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and religious leaders whose composition is approved by the mediation and security council at the level of the Heads of State and Government.

These eminent personalities use their experience and skills as mediators, conciliators and facilitators in conflict situation.

3.3.5. The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) composed of several standby multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) charged with series of functions: ranging from observation, peace-keeping, enforcement of sanctions to humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster.

3.3.6 The Executive Secretary

The Executive Secretary has the power to initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiations and reconciliation actions for effective resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. It consists of Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Defence and Security, and the observation and monitoring centre.

Also, under Article 25, the mechanism may be applied in cases of:

- i. Aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof;
- ii. Conflict between two or several member states;
- iii. Internal conflict that threatens to trigger humanitarian disaster or which poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;
- iv. Serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law;
- v. The overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government;
- vi. Any other situation as decided by the mediation and Security Council.

In the same manner, under conflict management Article 28(ECOWAS,1999) stipulated that member states shall make available to ECOMOG units adequate resources for the army, air force, navy, gendarmerie,police and all other military, paramilitary or civil formations necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. However, Article 29, stipulates that

whenever the Force is deployed, the strength, mandates and Missions of the units shall vary according to the evolving situation on the ground.

Further, the 1999 mechanism was supplemented with protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to facilitate peace and security in conflict which are often caused by problem of lack (unpopular) of democracy and good governance.

3.4 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)

Accordingly, the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance sets out principle and modalities aimed at strengthening peace, Democracy and Stability in the sub-region. More particularly, it lays down the benchmarks for good administration in terms of Election monitoring, assistance, the role of the armed forces, the police and the security forces in democracy, Rule of law, Human rights, and good governance as well as the role that ECOWAS play in this regard (ECOWAS, 2001).

Similarly, ECOWAS is obliged to dispatch a monitory team to country undergoing elections for the purpose of monitoring the elections. The observer or supervisory mission shall arrive in the member state concerned at least forty-eight hours prior to the conduct of the elections. The mission shall remain in the affected country during the election results are announced. Members of the mission shall then sign and submit the report to the Executive secretary by the mission shall then sign and submit the report to the Executive Secretary by the mission's leader within Fifteen (15) days with effect from the date of accomplishment of the mission (ECOWAS, 2001:13).

3.5 Convention for The Control of Influx Of Small Arms in West African Sub-Region

The convention is built upon the reality that the custodian of small fire arms and other ammunition are limited to sovereign governments. Consequently, to prevent the outbreak of

intra state conflict or other form of violent activities, efforts must be made to control the influx of small arms within the sub-region.

As a result, member states shall ban, without exception, transfers of small arms and light weapons to Non-State Actors that are not explicitly authorized by the importing member. Other measures include control on the manufacture of small arms and light weapons within their national territories, establishment of national computerized registers and data base of small arms and light weapons, prohibition on the possession, use and sale of light weapons by civilians, necessary measures for storage and security of their national stocks of small arms and light weapons (ECOWAS, 2006)

3.6 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) consists of fourteen chain of activities designed to strengthen human security and incorporate conflict prevention activities (operational and structural as well as aspects of peace-building; operational prevention include early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament, ECOWAS Standby Force). While structural prevention is often under peace-building initiatives, comprising political, institutional (governance), developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace. The framework was designed to achieve the goal of transforming ECOWAS, from ECOWAS of the state (heads of state) to the ECOWAS of the people by redefining the role of the civil society and dissuading the promise prone politicians from hijacking the development discourse (CDD, 2011; ECOWAS, 2008). The components of ECPF are: Early warning, preventive Diplomacy, Democracy and Political Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Media, Natural Resource Governance, Cross-Border Initiatives; Security Governance, Practical Disarmament,

Women, Peace and Security; Youth Empowerment, ECOWAS Standby Force; Humanitarian Assistance; and Peace Education.

The ECOWAS Warning and Response Network set out to furnish incident and trend reports on peace and security, as well as real-time preventive response options. It comprises a database build on conflict indicators and accessible via the internal and supported by a network of state, civil society, Zonal bureaus and situation room in the commission which is tasked with the management and analysis of information and the provision of various reports to support early warning and response attitudes(preventive diplomacy). Human Rights and Rule of law sets out to ensure equal protection and access to Justice and Social Services for all before the law and strengthen institutions of human rights in the region. The media component of the ECPF is obliged to forge an enabling West African Information landscape for accountability, where the electronic and print media become veritable watch dogs of human security. While Natural Resource Governance ensures transparency and environment friendly development in area of natural resource management, especially exploration, contract and exploitation.

Women, Peace and security as component of ECPF is set out to propel and consolidate women's role and contribution to centre stage in the design, elaboration, implementation and evaluation of conflict prevention, resolution, peace building and humanitarian initiatives while strengthening regional and national mechanisms for the protection and advancement of women. Humanitarian Assistance Unit of the ECPF was set out to mitigate the impact of humanitarian disasters and emergencies that could result in social and political upheaval.

In spite of the functions stipulated in the ECOWAS Framework for conflict management, its implementation requires the cooperation of AU and UN. The three bodies cooperate on the issue of peace and security on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in

accordance with the UN Charter. Thus ECOWAS Framework radiates from the constitutive Act of AU and the UN Charter (ECOWAS, 2008)

It then follows that ECOWAS decisions are not arbitrary; they are inspired and rooted notably in its treaties, protocols and mechanisms.

3.7 ECOWAS Objectives in Mali

At the onset of the conflict in Mali, ECOWAS set out three broad objectives, namely:

- I. To assist Mali restores the country's unity and territorial integrity.
- II. To assist Mali to restore constitutional legality and order in the country; and

By extension, preserve regional peace and security (Interview, 2015).

3.8 Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Nigeria has been involved in world politics for decades under different administrations (military and civilian). In view of this, the leadership posture of Nigeria's heads of government explains the extent of Nigeria's relations with other nations and gives a general orientation towards the external environment.

The foundation of Nigeria's foreign policy was laid in the late fifties, when the country's foreign policy was guided by the following principles:

- i. Safeguarding the interests of the federation and its citizens.
- ii. Membership of the commonwealth and the United Nations.
- iii. Not identifying with any of the power blocs as a matter of routine.
- iv. Devotion to African-oriented policies in the interest of continental unity; and
- v. Total decolonization of Africa from colonial and minority rule (Okoro, 2002)

Though Nigeria's foreign policy during Alhaji Tafawa Balewa was characterized by a low-keyed conservatism, the country played a key role in its support for world peace and security. It contributed troops to the United Nations force in the Congo, formation of the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the establishment of Chad Basin Commission. While the regime of Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi was preoccupied with internal or domestic problems and so could not make significant impact on Nigeria's foreign relations (Ugwukah and Eteete, 2010).

Again, the foreign policy of Gowon in spite of Nigeria's civil war gave priority attention to Nigeria's immediate neighbor. This is demonstrated in the pursuit of the policy of good neighbourliness. Whereas, the Murtala/ Obasanjo foreign policy was more aggressive than his predecessor Yakubu Gowon. General Murtala Muhamed believed that Africa has come of age. Thus should no longer take orders from any country however powerful (Ugwukah and Eteete,2010).

During Shagari's tenure, the federal government took an initiative to expel other African nationals resident in Nigeria because of the attendant population explosion and limited economic resources. This action generated a negative image for Nigeria's leading role in ECOWAS. It is argued that foreign policy of this era lacked initiative, direction and innovation (Okoro, 2002). In the extreme, Buhari administration's foreign policy was characterized by hostility to Nigeria's neighbours, undefined objectives, confrontational diplomacy, a demoralized foreign policy service and contracted instrument of diplomacy.

The foreign policy of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida emphasized economic diplomacy which concentrated on wooing investors and enhancing Nigeria's economic development. It is said that Nigeria in this era was respected and consulted by several African and non-African governments on international issues. However, Nigeria's image was badly affected because of the annulment of the June 12, 1993. While, Nigeria's foreign policy under Abacha suffered serious diplomatic setbacks because of his violation of international norms of behavior. His execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders regardless of appeals from the

world leaders gave rise to sanction on the country. Thus Abacha's method of handling Nigeria's foreign policies was attributed to his limited experience and insensitivity which moved Nigeria's status from African Leader to pariah state (Okoro, 2002).

Conversely, General Abubakar's went on to normalize relations with Nigeria's traditional friends, especially the United States, Britain, Canada and the European Union. In West African sub-region, he pursued a peace making agenda of ECOWAS through the ECOMOG.

With the new era in Nigeria, Obasanjo's foreign policy started with shuttle diplomacy, in which he travelled to almost every part of the world, France, Britain, US, to redeem Nigeria's battered image. He basically placed his foreign policy on; reintegrating, Nigeria's external debts, renaissance Africa and the recovery of looted monies (Ugwukah and Eteete, 2010).

Nigeria's foreign policy during Yar'adua was anchored on the Citizen diplomacy. This concept was geared towards protecting the image and integrity of the country and possibly retaliating against countries who were hostile and who branded Nigeria as corrupt. Between 2011 and 2014, the intensity of attacks and bombings had increased with target such as religious gatherings, mosques, churches and Schools (Adewumi, 2014). Notwithstanding the internal security challenges, Nigeria's foreign policy under President Goodluck Jonathan is guided by the principle of reciprocity and economic diplomacy aimed at diversifying the economy through foreign investors (Yakubu, 2014)

3.9 Nigeria's West African Policy

Nigeria, the giant of Africa has been actively involved in West African Politics for over fifty years. This ubiquitous role is expressed in Nigeria's interaction (reaction) with her immediate neighbor and other West African states. Nigeria is surrounded by mainly Francophone countries. She has on the west Benin Republic, on the North Niger, on the North-east Chad and on the east the Cameroun. On the south is the Atlantic Ocean (the Gulf of Guinea), in

which is located the island of Fernando Po (Okochi, 1990). While the entire West African sub-region comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Prior to 1960, Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours were characterized by antagonism and mistrust. While Between 1960 and 1966, Nigeria's security and economic policy in West Africa focused heavily on Nigeria's neighbours than on the entire sub-region(Omojuwa,2012).The geo-strategic location, demography and rich economic resources have often time generated envy and hostility from these countries (with poor economic development). Nigeria's neighbours were seen to accord grudging recognition to Nigeria's leadership position in the sub-region (Okoro, 2002).It is thus observed that Nigeria's neighbours are not always very friendly and that the threats and challenges to Nigeria's role in Africa are actually closer home (Alkali,2003). It is further revealed that Nigeria's geog-political position within the West African sub-region, its relation with its neighbouring countries and the pervasive presence of France in the Francophone countries also underlines not only the precariousness of Nigeria's continental role, but also poses immediate threats to its very security and sovereignty as a nation.

France's influence on neighbouring West African countries was clearly manifested during the Nigerian civil war, when France and her allies in West Africa, including Cote d'Ivoire and Benin helped the Biafran Secessionist. The aftermath of the crash aircraft carrying arms to Biafran secessionist in Cameroun is another case in point. Resulting from this experience, Nigeria discouraged its neighbours from supporting Biafran secession and the advice was heeded which to large extent explained the failure of Biafra secessionist agitation (Campbell,1978). Consequently, Nigeria began to see its neighbour as its special area of concentration of diplomacy with the belief that Nigeria's security is tied to that of its

neighbours. In the same vein, Nigeria developed an interest in the internal affairs of these states to ensure that only co-ordial regime prevail; friendly governments are not supplanted by hostile government (Ifedayo, 2013;Campbell,1978).

In line with this experience, Nigeria assumed the Big Brother status in which she gives aid to poorer African States. This gesture was heightened with the oil boom, as Nigeria became wealthy enough to grant aid for the developmental purposes of these poorer African states (Ifedayo, 2013).The practical aspect of this new policy thrust was manifested in Nigeria offering economic and technical assistance to a number of these neighbouring countries. Nigeria constructed road and bridges for Benin Republic. It also provided interest-free loans and other economic assistance to needy states. Nigeria is seen to have established joint ventures, partnership and investments with Benin, Togo and Guinea. It also supplied aid to drought-stricken Niger Republic, \$1 million to Dahomey in 1972 for the rehabilitation of the road between Port Novo and Idiroko, electricity supply to Niger Republic from Kainji and even sold petroleum at concessional prices to a few other countries in Africa. In spite of this gesture, Nigeria made it clear that she had no territorial ambitions towards her neighbours and demonstrated this in her support for the principles of sovereign equality of states, and non- interference in the internal affairs of others. Yet the good neighbourliness has greatly helped to prevent the escalation of the or the occasional border skirmishes between Chad, Cameroun and Benin (Ukeje, 1999;Zabadi, 2000).

Nigeria has on several occasions resisted the temptation to use her cloud against her weaker neighbours even after they have deliberately carried out acts of aggression against her. Evidently, gendarmes from neighbouring Benin Republic, Cameroon and Chad have frequently raided and occupied Nigerian territory. Yet Nigeria did not retaliate, preferring instead to settle such disputes peacefully. For example, when Cameroonian gendarmes

attacked and killed Nigerian soldiers within Nigerian territory in 1981, President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria resisted the pressure of even the National Assembly to take military action against Cameroun. This inaction thus attracted comments from Nigerians who referred Nigeria as a “sleeping giant” (Zabadi, 2000:518) who could easily be taken advantage of by her smaller and weaker neighbours (Alkali, 2003).

In the 1970’s more economic agreements were signed between Nigeria and Benin. 1972 witnessed an agreement for Nigeria to supply about 30, 000 kilowatts of electricity annually from Kainji Dam. In 1976, more concrete agreements were signed for joint venture projects, like the construction of 43.5 kilometres Lagos-Cotonous Expressway; Cement and Sugar Projects. Nigeria is seen to have single-handedly financed these projects. In terms of defence, Nigeria provided training to the Beninois military, air force and naval personnel in its military schools (Okoro, 2002).

Among Nigeria’s neighbors in West African sub-region, Cameroun has given Nigeria the most difficult moment, especially dispute over the exact location of the northern borders between Nigeria and Cameroun. Yet Nigeria has continued to maintain a good neighbor policy. The two countries initiated a joint commission on economic and scientific cooperation. Nigeria and Cameroun have exchanged programmes of students and lectures in the educational institutions of both countries, particularly in the fields of medicine and language. Again there are many Nigerian citizens living and doing business in Cameroun while the Cameroonians do same in Nigeria (Nwoke, 2005; Okoro, 2002).

Nigeria and Niger are two important neighbouring countries which have entered into several economic and cultural agreements. In January 1963, a common customs station was established along the Nigerian-Niger border. Nigeria entered into an agreement for the purchase of crude oil from Nigeria, in exchange for cattle trade with Niger. In pursuance of

goodwill and solidarity to the government in 1965 banned the Savable Party of Niger Republic (The outlawed opposition party in Niger) from operating in Nigeria since the party was not in the interest of good government in Niger (Okoro, 2002).

Prior to the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria and Togo had formed an Economic Grouping under which agreements were signed. Air Traffic, Trade and Communications were signed in 1968. Also, in 1977, Nigeria and Togo signed an agreement for the supply of 8,000 barrels of oil per day or 100,000 million tons per year. Togo equally supplies Nigeria Phosphate and helps in refining some of Nigeria's oil for internal consumption. Togo was one of the moderate French speaking nation that supported Nigeria, especially at the peak of Nigerian civil war, it intercepted nine tons of old Nigerian notes at Lome' Airport. It also closed down a Lebanese Bank trafficking in Naira. Togo thus remains one of the few Franco-phone Friends Nigerian can trust for the moment (Okoro, 2002; Nwoke, 2002).

In terms of organization, Nigeria's role is equally manifested. Nigeria took the initiative that led to the establishment of Lake Chad Basin Development Fund. The Chad Basin Commission was organized among Chad, Cameroun, Niger, and Nigeria for the purpose of cooperation in areas of fisheries, agriculture, animal husbandry and hydrology. As regards the River Niger Commission, when the African states of the Niger Basin became disenchanted with colonial arrangements governing navigation on the river, it was Nigeria, along with Mali, Niger and Dahomey that spearheaded the move that brought the representatives of the Basin states together in Niamey in February 1963. It was initiated to promote and co-ordinate studies and programmes concerning the exploitation of the resources of the river Niger Basin. Nigeria also provided a lot of money to the growth of the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA). With the assistance of Nigeria, the Association was able to build three Seed health cubicles in Ibadan and constructed


greenhouses to take care of seeds introduced into WARDA member countries from outside West Africa. WARDA was established to make West Africa self-sufficient in rice. Significantly, Nigeria alongside Togo constituted the final moving force that brought ECOWAS into fruition (Okoch, 1990).

Therefore, it took Nigeria's leadership role in national coalition formation, and difficult regional negotiations to get ECOWAS inaugurated. Nigeria thus placed enormous importance to ECOWAS because by expanding Nigeria's influence throughout West African and strengthening local economies, the community could reduce great power influence (especially France) in the area. Lagos could equally be seen as a base for leadership within Africa, which simultaneously disguising the fact to reduce or even dispel African fears of Nigerian hegemony (Campbell, 1978). However, since economic development cannot be achieved in absence of peace, peace keeping as become a key consideration in ECOWAS economic bid. Nigeria's initiative in instituting the ECOWAS Monitory Group as well as ECOMOG's impact in the resolution of the Liberian and sierra Leone crises are clearly demonstrated (Nwoke, 2005).Nigeria put a lot of diplomatic, military, political and economic resources to resolve the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In line with her West African policy, Nigeria encouraged the establishment of Ministry of cooperation and integration in many West African countries. In Nigeria, the responsibility for the coordination of integration activities is lodged within ministries of Finance and Planning. This initiative by Obasanjo was a signal of the renewed interest and commitment to regional integration. Nigeria equally initiated the West African Gas Project and West African Power Pool (Nwoke, 2005). Nigeria's leadership initiative in ECOWAS also demonstrated in the Fast-Track initiative. Nigeria with Ghana resolved to take urgent steps towards the establishment of free trade zone.

3.10 Conclusion

This section has discussed ECOWAS Conflict Management Framework and Nigeria's WestAfrican Policy. It has equally traced Nigeria's foreign policy over the years. More specifically, background of ECOWAS Management Framework, 1999 Conflict Management Mechanism, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, Convention for the Control of Small Arms and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework were highlighted. In all these, Nigeria role is seen to be geared toward regional cooperation and integration in WestAfrica. Though the cardinal normative framework underpiining ECOWAS peace and security is the 1999 conflict management mechanism, other ECOWAS instruments and Nigeria's policy towards WestAfrica discussed above complement each other. Hence, Nigeria is vigorously pursuing an integration agenda through various Conflict Management approaches including the case in Mali.

POLITICAL MAP OF MALI



Source: ECOWAS, 2015:3

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 NIGERIA IN ECOWAS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT EFFORTS IN MALI

4.1 Introduction

The year 2012 in Mali was marked by the outbreak of a security and political situation, sparked by January 2012 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebellion, March coup 2012 and the subsequent Islamist takeover of northern part of the country which provided another opportunity for Nigeria to demonstrate its leadership role in ECOWAS conflict management efforts. Nigeria's role in this respect can be better understood if we take seriously the following questions: What informed Nigeria's role within ECOWAS intervention in Mali? Did Nigeria play a leadership role in Mali? What were the factors that affected its role in this ECOWAS intervention? However to understand Nigeria's role in this ECOWAS intervention, it is necessary to examine the 2012 conflict in Mali and its political history.

4.2 Mali and Its Conflicts

4.2.1 Mali: Political History

Mali is one of the 15 ECOWAS member states and has an area of 1.25 million square kilometer. The population in 2013 was estimated at 14.5 million, and it bordered Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (WorldBank, September 20, 2015).

Mali is equally regarded as a political creation of French Imperialism and Colonialism. Before its independence, Mali and Senegal were referred to as the Sudanese Republic. So with the withdrawal of Senegal, what formerly made up the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. It thus gained independence from France on September 22, 1960, with Modibo Keita of the Socialist Sudanese Union-African Democratic Party becoming the first President of

the Republic of Mali. During his eight-year rule, Keita nationalized Malian economy and instituted socialist orientation with tie to the Eastern bloc. However, the tenure of Keita was short-lived with a military coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore in 1968. This regime change, particularly Keita's incarceration and eventual death triggered wide spread protests all over the country. In spite, the internal instability, the junta stayed in power for 11 years and later crafted a new constitution which saw his re-election as a civilian President. In 1991, Traore like the previous regime was ousted by Amadou Toure following the killing of 100 pro-democracy agitators by Security Forces loyal to Traore. On assumption to Office, General Amadou Toumani Toure, set up a transitional committee to conduct the 1992 general election that witnessed the emergence of Alpha Oumar Konare as Mali's first democratically elected President in a multi- party system. This was followed by the 2002 presidential elections in favour of Amadou Toumani (Azikwe, 2009; Infoplease November 27, 2014; Worldcountries September 20, 2014).

Amadou Toumani, the former Head of state, was re-elected to a second 5-year term in 2007. Administratively, Mali is divided into 8 regions, 1 District, District de Bamako (the Nation's Capital), Gao, Kayes, Kidal, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, Sikasso, Timbouctou (Timbuktu). Its elections are conducted based on popular vote of five-year term (eligible for a second term) and operated a parliamentary style of government with the President as head of state and Prime Minister as head of government. Regrettably, the election scheduled for April 2012 was delayed on account of the MNLA rebellion and coup d'etat in Mali. This election was eventually held on August, and its second rounds on 24 November and 15 December 2013 which produced President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Moussa Mara respectively.

4.2.2 The Economy of Mali

Mali is a landlocked ECOWAS state that depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. Over 65 % of its land area is desert or semi desert, while the economic activity is predominantly confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River. Consequently, Mali depends on foreign aid which explains why it is among the 25 poorest countries in the world. Out of its population, 10% is nomadic, while over 80 % of the labour force is engaged in farming and fishing. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity and the harvest of cotton and gold exports which make up 80% of the export earnings (www.cia.gov., January 20, 2017). Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities (including livestock). It was at the verge of developing Iron-Ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold and has considerably invested in tourism, when the recent security situation in the northern Mali (Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal) as seen in the Political of Mali above has impeded government effort in this regard.

It is clear from above that modern Mali emerged along with internal political antagonism (conflicts) especially the period of 2012-13 which are further explained.

4.2.3 A Brief History of Mali Conflict

Mali which gained independence from France in 1960, has passed through several rebellions led by Tuareg group (constituting 10%), other ethnic composition consist of Mande 50%, Fula 17%, Voltaic 12%, Songhai 6% Others 5% (Info please/World countries November 27, 2014; World Bank, September, 20 2015). Tuaregs are evidently light-skinned and considered to be related to Berbers of North Africa and primarily reside in the northern region of the country, located in the Sahara Desert.

The years following independence and preceding 2012, witnessed recurrent episodes of conflict in Mali with the Tuareg rebellion in 1960-64, a period of revolt and unrest from 1990 to 1996 and 2006-2009. The disagreement leading to this conflict centred on the allegation of underdevelopment of the north and little state presence in the region. The northern population, especially the Tuaregs felt marginalized by different Government and thus staged agitation for self-determination of the northern region of the country known as Azawad. In the 1962 conflict, government's response to their agitation was followed by a brutal counter insurgency and its use of the military was disproportionately high compared to the act committed by the rebel. The 1990 conflict witnessed the signing of peace agreement-Flamme dela paix. This agreement allowed destruction of rebels' arms in the "Flames of Peace" Ceremony (Devon, 2013; Lohmann, 2011; Kouca and Ecawell, 2012). During the 2006 conflict, the government with the help from Algeria reached a peace agreement-the Accord d'Algiers. The agreement called for an economic, social and cultural development of the northern region as well as integration of the Tuareg rebels into the Malian armed forces.


4.2.4 Mali Conflict of 2012

Despite past resolution steps taken by the government of Mali as explained above, the landlocked country became uncertain stage, marked by security, political (constitutional) and humanitarian crises from 2012 through 2013. In January 2012, the MNLA, along with Ansar al Din organized armed invasion against the Malian garrisons in the north of the country. In view of this and discouraged by the approach of political class to the conflict, members of the armed forces instigated a coup d'état and toppled President Amadou Toumani Touré on march 21. The National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and Restoration of the state (*Comite National pour le Redressement de la Democratie et la Restauration del'Etat*,

CNRDRE) announced the suspension of the constitution and dissolution of government. Expectedly, ECOWAS came formally in to the conflict in March, 2012. After series of negotiations, the sub-regional union secured the withdrawal of the junta in support of constitutional order and *CNRDRE* was promised a slot in the formation of the new government and amnesty for atrocities committed during the coup. This intervention necessitated President Toure to formally tender his resignation while Dioncounda Traore, the President of the National Assembly was sworn-in as acting president (Thurston and Lebovich, 2013). By April, the Tuareg rebels along with Ansar Dine (Defenders of the faith) seized opportunity of this political instability to take control of Northern Mali and to declare independence for “Azawad” comprising of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu provinces. Each group established a base in the main cities of the North; AQIM in Timbuktu, MUJAO in Gao, and Ansar Dine in Kidal (Lye and Roszkowska, 2014). Unfortunately, Ansar Dine’s proclamation of northern Mali as an Islamic state to be ruled according to Sharia law further revealed the complexity of the conflict, as the MNLA break away, issuing a statement that imposition of Sharia was against its values. At a point, the MNLA began to lose its territory to Islamist coalition comprising Ansar al Din, AQIM (Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb) and MUJWA (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, a broke away faction from AQIM); Ansar Dine seeks to impose Islamic law across the country. AQIM vowed to spread Islamic law liberate Mali from French colonial legacy. MUJAO is an AQIM splinter group aimed at spreading Jihad within the whole of West Africa (www.ieee.es). This situation also created deep humanitarian crisis in Mali and neighbouring countries. The crisis had forced over 204,000 people to leave their homes and to accept status of internally displaced persons, while about 208,000 had sought refuge in neighboring Algeria, Niger, Togo, and Guinea (Mireille and Perry, 2013). It is in this context that the recent conflict attracted response of

external actors. Following the approval of United Nations Security Council on 20th December 2012, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) came into force. It originally envisioned 3,300 personnel deployment but later increased to 7,700 African soldiers. Yet, serious concern had been raised over regional troops' military capacity to engage in the terrain of northern Mali and their commitment. On 11th January 2013, France launched a military air and ground operations sequel to southward advance of AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJWA. Prior to the military intervention, France provided support through its Delegation of Home Security Service and the Mission for Military and Defence Cooperation. They provided training and logistical support to national security services (police, gendarmerie and civil security). In the aftermath of French *Operation Serval*, a UN peacekeeping mission was established on April 25, 2013. This UN mission called United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed to stabilize Mali in July, 2013 Table 3.1 further depicts conflicting events in chronological order

Figure 4.1 Timeline of the Mali Conflict, January 2012-January 2014



Source: Kimenyi M. *et al.*, 2014:5

To this extent, the Tuareg question (of exclusion) cannot be completely denied from history of conflicts in Mali. However, to have better understanding of the dynamics of this conflict and go beyond the narrow and static explanation of the recent conflict, it is necessary to effectively identify parties in the conflict and its causes respectively.

4.2.5 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT IN MALI

The conflict in Mali like most conflicts in Africa has its structural and triggering sources. The structural factors are systemic deficiencies that were not addressed over long periods of time while the triggers refer to the sudden event that spark the conflict.

4.2.6 Triggers of the Conflict:

The conflict is linked to government's failure to reinforce the army in the face of a major rebellion. Mali's armed force was reportedly short of weapons, equipment and even salaries (Reeve, 2014). As the conflict intensified, the Malians became increasingly frustrated with the perceived lack of support from Amadou Toumani Toure's government. The resentment was further championed by a group within the Malian officer corps to overthrow the civilian government. It was further captured as follows:

To the shock of the soldiers, several garrisons in the North were lost to MNLA attacks, and some were given up without a fight. To their horror, in Anguelhoc defeated soldiers were massacred, their throats slit after being taken prisoner. Army believe it and the soldiers' wives and widows who marched in protest surely played a major role in pushing their husbands' comrades to take the fight to the government (Mann, 2012)

Apparently, the coup was led by captain Amadou Sanogo whom within the aegis of the *National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE)* justified his action on the President's poor handling of the decades Tuareg rebellion and most importantly the recent victory of the rebels over the military at the Aguelhoc of Kidal region. (Bakrania, 2013).

4.2.7 Structural Causes of the Conflict:

Besides this immediate source, the conflict was boosted by the return of heavily armed battle hardened fighters from Libya who served Late Libyan president Muamar Ghaddafi. These fighters were mainly Tuareg who fled to Libya for economic opportunity and then received training as soldiers in the 1990's. With the demise of Gaddafi, they could no longer be maintained and thus Mali experienced a return flow of a lot of combat experience and a

stockpiles of weaponry.(Heinrigs and Tremoliere, 2012). An estimated 10,000-20,000 weapon were reportedly taken out of Libya during the military campaign that overthrew Qaddafi. These weapons apparently armed the Tuareg nationalists and then the jihadist militias in northern Mali (Smith and Musilli, 2013). Their arrival is thus seen to have given the rebellion new momentum.

Before the outbreak of the 2012 conflict, northern Mali had already become a sanctuary for criminal networks and terrorist groups. These groups organized sophisticated criminal enterprises involving drugs, human trafficking, arms smuggling and kidnapping of western nationals for ransom. These Sahelian criminal enterprises and profit accruing from these made Jihadi Insurgency a lucrative economic activity. As such the growing number of Jihadist groups became motivated due to the economic opportunism of the region (Francis, 2013).

Also, there is the issue of marginalization and exclusion of some sections (especially the Tuaregs) of the Malian population from the political and economic processes. During colonial era, the French pursued a policy of land registration which made many Tuareg communities lost their right to the land they had previously inhabited. The Tuaregs lay claim to the fact that their ancestral homeland was divided by the wave colonial rule which balkanized them into sparse desert in northern Mali as well as in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya and Niger. This step was further consolidated by President Modibo Keita's policies of land nationalization and agricultural modernization. In the same vein, socioeconomic data(measuring school attendance, malnutrition and vulnerability to food security) for the period of 1995-1997 suggests that there is lack of investment and low access to health and education provision in the north compared to other regions of the country(Bakrania, 2013).

Again, there has been a gross under-representation of Tuareg and Arabs in post-independence cabinets, the army and even in senior civil service positions. There is also the failure on the part of government to implement previous agreement and terrorist networks operating in the region (Lye and Roszkowska, 2014).

From the above survey on Mali, it is crucial to re-emphasize that like most ECOWAS member states, Mali is among other things characterized by a north-south divides of inequality which instigated ethnic group or rebel elements' rebellion battle for control for their region or even struggle for the control of the entire country.

4.3 The Rationale behind Nigeria's Role through ECOWAS Intervention in Mali

The beginning of every venture is anchored on its rationale. Within ECOWAS, Nigeria has been at the centre of conflict management in West African Sub-region (though other ECOWAS member states still contributes), it is thus imperative to examine the rationale behind her involvement in Mali.

The 2012 Mali conflict placed upon ECOWAS member states, especially Nigeria which has been the stabilizing force in sub-regional international relations, a huge responsibility to ensure that the conflict is put rest. Several conventions have been adopted by ECOWAS member states in their bid to regulate or manage sub-regional conflict. These conventions are the 1999 ECOWAS mechanism for conflict management, 2001 protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and 2008 ECOWAS Framework of conflict prevention. These normative frameworks embody specific regulation and conditions for sub-regional intervention including Nigeria's role.

As regards the conflict in Mali, the provisions of ECOWAS normative framework; the 1999 mechanism for conflict management allows for the prevention of escalation of conflict by ECOWAS members including Nigeria, a stabilizing power. Thus ECOWAS 1999 mechanism for conflict management underscores the importance of sub-regional cooperation, especially Nigeria in the management and regulation of conflict. Chapter 1, Article g, stipulates that member states should promote close cooperation among themselves in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping (ECOWAS, 1999:8). Chapter VI, Article 28 further summarizes this obligation as follows:

- i. Member state shall make available to ECOMOG units adequate resources for the Army, Airforce, Navy, Gendarmerie, Police and all other military, paramilitary or civil formations necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.
- ii. Each member state shall provide ECOMOG with a unit the size of which shall be determined after consultation with each member states.
- iii. The strengths of these units shall be reviewed according to the situation on the ground (ECOWAS, 1999:18)

Article 26 (V) of the 2008 ECOWAS Framework of Conflict Prevention stipulates that as the region repositions itself to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict, ECOWAS member states (particularly Nigeria) have responsibility to ensure sustainable peace and security by implementing measures and initiatives that go beyond violence management (ECPF, 2008:15).

In addition, under ECOWAS protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, ECOWAS member states are obligated to intervene when democratic election principles are under

threat; when there is coup d' etat, constitutional convergence is emphasized and promoted (Interview, 2015). According to ECOWAS conflict prevention framework(2008) constitutional convergence is based on the principles of good governance, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the promotion of non-partisan and responsible press and the democratic control of the armed forces.

By virtue of Article 1 (Chapter 1) of the protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the following shall be declared as constitutional principles shared by all member states;

- i. Every accession to power must be made through free, fair, and transparent elections.
- ii. Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.
- iii. Popular participation in decision- making, state adherence to democratic principles and decentralization of power at all levels of governance.
- iv. The armed forces must be apolitical and must be under the command of a legally constituted political authority, no serving member of the armed forces may seek to run for elective political (ECOWAS, 2001).

Indeed, from the standpoint of this conflict management framework, the two countries (Mali and Nigeria) belong to ECOWAS and thus obligated Nigeria to support Mali in the resolution of her security and constitutional crisis within the framework of ECOWAS' principles and standards. In effect, Nigeria intervened in Mali because ECOWAS Mechanism (Article 25(iii-v) ECOWAS, 1999) was applicable, since the conflict in Mali triggered humanitarian disaster to her neighbouring countries, there was overthrow of a democratically elected government of Ahmadu Toure and serious violation of human rights by the rebels

and Malian Defence and Security Force. This situation is reminiscent of the carnage and refugee crisis from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts which triggered Nigeria's ECOMOG intervention. Besides, Nigeria as member of wider international community has the responsibility to promote international peace and security, especially when the conflict meet the criteria for intervention set out by regional and world body.

Again, the activities of Boko Haram and the spread of terrorist networks, created the need for more attention on security situation. Thus Nigeria's involvement in Mali was borne out of the policy of curtailment or containment; if the conflict is not curtailed, it could spread to another place. There was the need to prevent spillover, since Niger is the only country between Nigeria and Mali. It was really a wakeup call for Nigeria (Interview, 2015).

President Good luck thus held that "we believe that if we stabilize northern Mali, not just Nigeria but other countries that are facing threats will be stabilized. The terrorists have no boundaries. They don't respect international boundaries" The President stressed further that Nigeria's contribution was to avoid the crisis spilling into other West African countries and if left unchecked it has the potentials of increasing investment risks in African continent (Madike, 2013).

In the same vein, the chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika said, "we are aware that most of the terrorists in this country today are trained in Mali" He maintained that Nigeria will not only be supporting the resolution of the international community, but also enhancing its own security and that of its immediate neighbours by undertaking this operation (Wordpress, February 26, 2016). Nigeria's role in Mali was equally hinged upon the need to prevent spillover from Mali to Nigeria. In addition, Amb. Olugbenga Ashiru, the then minister of Foreign Affairs said, "The events in Mali, if we don't quickly stop it, it

will have effect on the whole of West Africa and Nigeria is their prime target” (www.nigeria.gov).

In consonance with the position of Nigerian government, the then foreign Affairs minister, Olugbenga Ashiru, stated that “the deployment of Nigerian troops to Mali was in the best interest of Nigeria. “the events in Mali, if we don’t quickly stop it, will have effect on the whole of West Africa and Nigeria is the prime target. So we need to act quickly, forcefully in Mali to stop them, to contain them, to destroy their capability to be able to launch any counter offensive within the sub-region” The minister also held that “when you compare our intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia to our intervention in Mali today, the intervention in Mali is to ensure the survival of Nigeria while that in Sierra Leone and Liberia was to enthrone democracy, rule of law and order. For Mali, our intervention is borne out of our own national interest, the survival of our country because terrorists know no boundaries (Madike, 2013).

Additionally, Al-Qaeda and other Jihadists are believed to have chosen northern Mali as their base for spreading across West Africa and their most prized target is Nigeria. Also the fear of Nigeria’s predicted disintegration in 2015 will become very real if they are allowed to succeed (Sola, 2013). It is equally held that Nigeria was involved in Malian conflict to achieve the following objectives:

- i. To crush Boko Haram Insurgents based in Mali
- ii. To stop the spread of fundamentalism in West Africa including Niger and Nigeria
- iii. To bring peace and Stability in Mali (Interview, 2015).

Further, Nigeria has been a great power in sub-regional affairs. In line with her policy of good- neighbourliness, Big-brother role and aid (material and financial contribution) to countries in the sub-region, the major power remains profoundly interested in ECOWAS conflict management efforts. With reference to Mali, Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS and had been in the forefront of the conflict resolution in the region and formation of ECOWAS Monitory Group (ECOMOG), it is expected she demonstrates herself as a giant. Again, there is the global picture Nigeria already painted to the world, especially from its leading role in the past conflict; Sierra Leone and Liberia (Interview, 2015). Significantly, Nigeria pays 33 percent of the regular budget of the ECOWAS which goes to show-case her power status in the sub-regional organization (Akindele, 2013). Indeed, a further manifestation of her West African policy is seen in her material and financial contribution to the conflict in Mali which is shortly discussed in the next section.

4.4 Nigeria's Role in Mali: A Leadership Commitment?

At the early stage of the conflict in Mali, specifically the aftermath of the March 2012 military intervention led by Captain Sanogo against a democratically elected President, Amadou Toumani Toure, Nigeria, the supposed Hegemon was among the first countries to revolt the illegitimate seizure of power, with strong words of condemnation (Omeje, 2012). The Nigerian ministry of Foreign Affairs in statement posited that, "The government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria condemns unequivocally this unfortunate development in Mali as it constitutes a gross violation of ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to which all the states of the sub region, including Mali, are parties(Okpi, 2012)" Again, Former President Good luck Jonathan further described the coup as an apparent set back to the consolidation of democracy in Mali in particular and the African continent in general(Ojeme, 2012)" In this sense, Nigeria had taken a lead in terms of diplomatic protest

note, which is in consonance with the 2001 ECOWAS protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Article 1b which stipulates that every accession to power must be through free, fair and transparent elections.(ECOWAS,2001). In spite of this swift condemnation against the Junta, Nigeria's influence and power to pressure military regime to restore democratic government remain unnoticed.

Apparently, the earliest ECOWAS delegation to Mali after the March coup had no Nigeria's membership. The Team rather comprised Presidents of Ivory Coast, Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso, though these ECOWAS leaders were forced out of Mali by the supporters of coup.(Daily Trust ,March 30,2012,). Yet Nigeria's capacity towards effective mediatory role and elections in Mali is greatly recognized as a key player in ECOWAS intervention. Nigeria played prominent role through regular meetings of heads of the different security agencies of ECOWAS member states, including Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Chief of Defence Staff. Thus Osborne and Obada(2013:8) disclosed that "President Goodluck Jonathan had adopted a principal approach in Mali and insist on constitutionalism and democracy in resolving other lingering and emerging political crisis in Mali. He is also a co-mediator in the Mali crisis" In this connection too, Nigeria's role in the signing of the peace agreement between the government of Mali and the Movement of the Liberation of AZAWAD in Burkina Faso under ECOWAS mediator, then President Blaise Compaore, significantly paved the way for Mali's elections in 28th July and 11th August 2013.The results presented Mr. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita as president of Mali, having scored 77.7 % of the total votes cast (Reeve,2014, ECHOES OF ECOWAS, June 2013). In the same light, Nuruddeen Muhammad stressed the important role played by Nigeria in the 18 June 2013 Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement to Election and Inclusive Dialogue in reducing tension in Mali. He posited that "Not only did the Agreement reemphasize the principles of the Unity, territorial

integrity and secular status of Mali and paving the way for the holding of elections, it also provided a framework for consolidating internal dialogue towards lasting peace (ECOWAS,25 March 2014:4).” Kadre’Desire’ Ouedraogo, the president of ECOWAS commission equally noted the successful mediation of Nigeria which led to the signing of an agreement between MNLA and the Malian Government on 18th June 2013 and paved way towards its elections (ECOWAS, July 2013). Besides, Nigeria stood out in the deployment of ECOWAS Electoral Technical Assistance Mission to Mali and coordinated the ECOWAS Fact- Finding and Observation Missions to the Elections in Mali (ECOWAS, 2013). The Federal Republic of Nigeria assisted the government of Mali with vehicles, computers, printers and one million US Dollars (US\$1,000,000) towards the conduct of election (Interview, 2015). Further, Nigeria’s commitment including financial and logistic supports towards the conduct of this election was generally acknowledged and demonstrated by the conferment of the highest national honour of the republic of Mali “Grand Croix de l’ Ordre National du Mali” meaning the Highest Cross of the National Order of Mali on President Good luck Jonathan of Nigeria, by the former Interim President of Mali, Dioncounda Traore (Reeve, 2014).

In the military front, Nigeria was equally involved in ECOWAS intervention in Mali. In the first place, Nigeria participated actively in several reviews that culminated the transformation of ECOWAS Mission in Mali, from MICEMA (envisaged 3000 troops) to AFISMA estimated at 5,500. Nigeria tried its military commitment by deploying the highest number of troops among ECOWAS participating countries of AFISMA (African-Led International Support Mission in Mali). It contributed 1200 personnel, comprising Nigerian Army battalion strength of 900 troops and Nigerian Air force strength of 300 troops, including two Dassault Breguet Dornier Alpha Fighter Jets and two MI-35 Helicopters(Interview,2015).

While other ECOWAS members of AFISMA committed less: Benin 300 troops, Burkina Faso 500 troops, Ghana 120 troops, Ivory Coast 500 troops, Niger 500 troops, Senegal 500, Sierra Leone 500, and Togo 500 troops(Alcalde,February 28,2016). Chad also supported ECOWAS with 1800 troops to restore peace and order in Mali (ECHOES OF ECOWAS, 22-July-4th August, 2013). Nigeria's contribution in AFISMA was later confirmed by President Good luck Jonathan who put it straight that "Nigeria has commenced the deployment of 900 combat soldiers and 300 Air force personnel to Mali as part of AFISMA. Nigeria has so far provided about \$32 million for the immediate deployment and logistic support for the troops" (www.nationalmirroronline.net). Again, it is attested that Nigeria was the highest donor of AFISMA Donor Conference with the sum of 5 million US Dollar in Addis Abba (Interview, 2015)

Notwithstanding Nigeria had the highest troops within West African troop contributing states and opened the ECOWAS military role in Mali, its leadership skill in terms of operational significance at improving the conflict situation in Mali was not clearly demonstrated .Compared to Liberia Nigeria did not lead a quick military Force in Mali. The case of Liberia was faster, as it took General Babangida a couple of hours to scramble a Nigerian military contingent that stormed Monrovia and effectively secured it, after Sgt. Doe's request (Akuson, 2012).

According to Campbell (2013) "France already has around 750 troops on the ground, and is planning more than triple that to at least 2,500, The United States, UK, Belgium, Denmark and Canada have pledged transport planes, and in some cases, logistical and training support, it is not expected for Nigeria to play outsize role in the midst of these countries." Moreover, in the aftermath of French intervention, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Togo and Ghana were the first contingents that arrived immediately to quell the Jihadist offensive (Spacewar,

March 30, 2016). Again, in contrast to previous Nigeria's military engagement, the ECOWAS-AFISMA participating countries bore the financial burden. The contributing countries of AFISMA had to individually cope with basic logistics such as provision of the right uniforms, food and proper transportation for troops (ECHOES OF ECOWAS, 2013). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is believed that it took the sweat, blood and finances of Nigerians through ECOMOG to create a basis of orderly governance before the United Nations at least relieved Nigeria of the financial burden. Nigeria solely took responsibility of providing, petroleum products, rations and allowance for some West African troops in Sierra Leone (Danjuma, 2015).

Moreover, The swift intervention of France in January 2013 which at least in the short-while succeeded in driving the Islamists out of northern Mali further serves to indicate that Nigeria and indeed ECOWAS was not ready to take on its responsibility of implementing ECOWAS decision aimed at African solutions to African problems. According to Maru (2013) the Nigeria and ECOWAS' failure to deal with its own problem invited the involvement of external actors and France. Maru further observed that the French intervention exposed the weakness of ECOWAS member states especially Nigeria in bridging the gaps between early warning and early response, with a mismatch of sluggish political decision and deployment capacity. Since ECOWAS has through its early warning system desperately informed the Malian authority about the imminent threat. The ECOWAS Early Warning system had produced at least three report of the possible repercussions of the fall of Gaddafi on ECOWAS frontline state of Niger and Mali (Interview, 2015) In faulting the role of Nigeria and other ECOWAS member states, Pryce (2014) observed that the southward advance of Tuareg and Islamist rebels in January 2013 was mainly halted by the timely intervention of French military forces. Pryce went on to explained that though the deployment of AFISMA

had been authorized as early as October 2012, it only arrived on 31 January 2013 and drew largely on the military forces of Chad, a Central African country that obviously did not hold ECOWAS membership. Notwithstanding, President Idriss Deby's poor human rights record and heavy-handedness to opposition at home, Chad was reportedly the first country from the Sahel and only non-ECOWAS member to give a rapid respond to the crisis in Mali. The Chadian troops were in the forefront in Gao, then Kidal and Ifoghas mountains and took the most casualties of all. At least 36 soldiers were reported killed, of which 26 died in a single battle on February 22 2013 including the Chief of Chadian Special Forces and others were injured including president Deby's General Mahamad Deby (Boutellis, 2013). This bold step clearly suggests Chad's new military power in the region as it fought alongside French forces to flush out Islamist groups.

Nigeria's military involvement did not go on throughout the conflict timeline. It withdrew military commitment at verge of transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA. It is being reported that President Jonathan ordered the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Mali (Theguardian, May 6, 2015). To lend support to this position, Ibrahim (2014) posited that "This is the first time in the history of United Nations Peacekeeping operations that Nigeria withdrew unilaterally it own troops. Ibrahim stated that Nigeria felt sideline in the appointment of Major General Jean Bosco Kazura of Rwanda as the Force Commander of MINUSMA instead of Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, a Nigerian, who had been AFISMA Force Commander from January to June 2013. This resentment was further indicated by a statement from Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Ola Sa'ad Ibrahim who said "What I want to say is this, I don't know...in our opinion the problem is solved, the place is being stabilized because the AU and ECOWAS did all that. We were able to broker ceasefire and conduct the elections" (ThisDay, April 16, 2015)

Another indication of failure of Nigeria's military in Mali was the surprising support for French efforts coming from Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Olugbenga Ashiru who noted that, "If the French had not intervened at the time they did, the situation in Mali would have been different today. Nigeria and indeed all members of the AU are grateful for the intervention" (Oluwadare, 2014:116). In the same vein, though Nigeria sent troops to AFISMA, it is believed that no West African country was part of AFISMA involved in fighting in northern Mali and none was prepared to send troops to fight insurgents (Hainzi, 2014). Yet there is a contrary view that in areas where Nigerian troops were deployed little or no incident was recorded (Interview, 2015)

A content analysis of the Transcripts of ECOWAS meeting on Mali also revealed a growing recognition of military performance of Chad in Mali, and political solution option of Algeria and Mauritania. Special tribute vested on Chad for accelerated deployment of its contingents as well as the sacrifices of their troops in Mali, ECOWAS (November 9, 2012) Final Report, ECOWAS (February 25, 2013) Final Report, and ECOWAS (December 12, 2014) Report. Thus the dominance of Chad and France, and Nigeria's withdrawal from MINUSMA cannot be the signpost of a sub-regional power.

In terms of ECOWAS humanitarian assistance, Nigeria's role in Mali is not clearly demonstrated as seen in Liberia. In Liberia the Nigerian peace keepers provided protection and support for the delivery of humanitarian aid (Liberia, 1993-1997). ECOWAS, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) and the UN had to rely on Nigeria's continued support (Agbu, 2006). Conversely, in Mali Nigeria's role is not apparently shown. According to Dr. Fatimata Dia Sow, the ECOWAS Commissioner for Social Affairs and Gender, ECOWAS had offered great humanitarian assistance to Mali. In effect, ECOWAS deployed ECOWAS Emergency Response Team (EERT) to support the

rehabilitation of the country's essential services and provision of assistance to the people affected by the security and political crisis. This support was rendered by medical doctors, Policemen, Lawyers, Firemen/Engineers as well as experts in refugee matters. The EERT members hailed from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo who served in Bamako, Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu (ECHOES of ECOWAS, 2014).

4.5 Factors that Militated Nigeria's Role in Mali

It is evident from the foregoing that Nigeria did not exhibit a strong sense of leadership in ECOWAS intervention in Mali. This is partly due to Nigeria's domestic insecurity situation. In affirming the linkage between Nigeria's insecurity and its leadership failure or its downsize role in Mali, Ering *et al.*(2013) indicated that the insecurity created by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria negatively affected Nigerian troops' contribution to Mali. They noted further that the withdrawal of Nigeria's troops from Mali is against the backdrop of the fight against Boko Haram and other armed groups taking heavy toll on the country's finances. In essence, from 2011 to 2013, Nigeria's budgetary allocation for defence witnessed a substantial increase; 2011:N348 billion, 2012:N921 billion, and 2013:N1.055 trillion (Onyemaizu, 2014; Umeagbalasi and Justice, 2014). Likewise, Oyedele (2013) quoting a ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that "We cannot dissipate our energy, we have to secure our country first. So we cannot do more than 450, other countries would have to step in (their contributions) and the good thing is that the mission involves ECOWAS and the AU, so they would prevail on other countries to set up". It is further stated that the scale down will minimize the operational cost and rest of the soldiers will be used to fight Nigeria's crisis of Boko Haram (Oyedele, 2013). The Defence Headquarters also expressed that, "Nigeria

requested that some of its troops will be withdrawn from Malian operations because of the ongoing internal security challenges back home (ThisDaylive, June 24, 2015). It is equally pointed out that Nigeria's political problems and security situation in northern Nigeria weakens her regional role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali (International Crisis Group, April 21, 2015). This implies that "Nigeria withdrew most of its large contingent to bolster its domestic campaign against Boko Haram" (Reeve, 2014:4). According to Bergamaschi (2013) the need for Nigeria to mobilize all its national forces to fight Boko Haram at home and subordinate role given her in the mission caused the withdrawal of some Nigerian troops from MINUSMA. Invariably, the operation in north eastern Nigeria was subsequently bolstered with the addition of over 1,000 Nigerian troops withdrawn from the theater of operations in Mali (Adewumi, 2014). It is strongly believed that the main reason for withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Mali was to address the internal insecurity (Interview, 2015). As a result the military engagement in Nigeria was subsequently scaled up with the establishment of a new military formation, the 7 Division in Maiduguri with the strategic role to directly curb and rout the insurgents (Adewumi, 2014:7)

Furthermore, the overstretched circumstance of Nigerian military has been highlighted as one of the factors that hindered its leadership role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali. Out of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Nigeria, 32 states and the FCT were officially under military deployment for internal security operations. The scope of this deployment was obviously without stationed troops that could contribute to Nigeria's regional and international engagements (Adewumi, 2014). Moreover, the year 2013 in Nigeria witnessed a major increase in terror attacks by Boko Haram, which killed and injured thousands of innocent civilians, police, military officers, public officials and group members (Karmon, 2014). According UN Humanitarian Agency (OCHA, 2013), over 1200 people

(excluding insurgent killed during targeted military operations) have been killed from attacks by the rebel group between May and Mid-December 2013. Again, at the time of the conflict in Mali, Nigeria's security image was in shamble (Interview, 2015) Also there were embarrassing circumstances in which insurgents drive or walk into territories supposedly under the watch of Nigeria's military without let or hindrance, even in states placed under emergency rule. This position was further confirmed by the US Air Force Chief of Staff who said, "Nigerian security forces have so diminished in capability that they are currently afraid to even engage Boko Haram" (Oluba, 2014:10). It is equally posited that:

The evident decline in the combat quality of the Nigerian military became very apparent when the contingent sent for peace keeping efforts in Mali were declared not fit for combat but rather best suited to man checkpoints and load trucks. Yet in some counter-insurgency the Malian soldiers were considered better trained for combat and had to fight side-by-side with French troops (Oluda 2014:6)

Obviously, Nigerian Army deployed to Mali lacked the capacity to fight on the frontline and so could not carry out even basic military maneuvers. They have poor discipline and support which are compounded by the nature of recruitment (Madike, 2013). Thus there was the problem of sharing highly sensitive intelligence information with Nigeria in Mali because it is widely understood that the Nigerian military includes "a fifth column of local Boko Haram" Military personnel were alleged to have revealed sensitive strategic and operation information to the terrorist elements.(Aribisala,2014). In the same vein, it is reported that troops from other AFISMA contributing countries like Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso and Chad operated independently of Nigerian troops. In spite these countries desert warfare comparative advantage, there was little or no intelligence sharing to Nigerian troops

(Interview, 2015). This suggests that the Nigerian army cannot even be trusted to safeguard sensitive information from falling into the hands of the insurgents.

Apart from Nigeria's domestic security predicament, there were other outside or external factors which were directly or tangentially responsible for Nigeria's dismal performance under ECOWAS intervention in Mali.

One factor that externally hindered Nigeria's leadership role in Mali was France influence in the Sahel states. These French speaking countries were not only colonized by France, but their politics still remain highly influenced by French government. Some of these states are rich in natural resources and minerals such as Uranium and Gold. Niger is the second largest producer of Uranium in the world and Mali is believed to be the largest Gold producer in Africa. Significantly, France's giant company *AREVA* has quasi monopoly in terms of Uranium production in Niger and *Total*, French oil giant is planning to drill two wells in Mauritania, west of Mali (Abderrahmane, 2012). It also necessary to note that an Italian company had discovered petroleum, uranium and phosphate in northern Mali in 2010 (Kanti, 2013). Plus, France plays a unique role in Mali and Niger. As with other French West African states, Mali has deep connections in the region, economically and culturally. Uranium has emerged as one of the strongest of these links. France is indeed the world leader in nuclear power, annually generating more than 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear sources (Norwood and Null, 2013) Again, France wanted to strengthen its presence gently through AU and UN while still strong enough to scare the Chinese in order to avoid accusation of hegemony and neo-colonialism (Bresler I., 2013). Strong and wide-ranging strategic interests in Mali by entities outside the ECOWAS space, especially Algeria, Mauritania and France) contributed to duplicity of efforts and competing interventions (Interview, 2015). But again, France needed to promote its image in international community.

Prior to Mali, humanitarian interventions were either led by US or have seen the US as the largest contributor; Iraq in 1992, Somalia in 1992, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq war in 2003, and the NATO Libyan Mission in 2011(since NATO allies still depended on American precision munitions, refueling aircraft and reconnaissance). According to Adebayo (2015) Nigeria's influence in ECOWAS intervention has been challenged with ubiquitous and negative presence of French neo-colonialism in West Africa. To him, Paris sought to break up Nigeria during the its Civil War in order to reduce the country's influence on the sub region's eight Francophone countries and presently maintains a 3,000 strong military presence in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Niger. France equally needed to reduce the negative image it acquired from her alliance with the genocidal regime in Rwanda. Reportedly, French government delivered millions of dollars worth weapons to Hutu regime and sent troops during the infamous Operation Turquoise to create a safe zone in western parts of Rwanda still under Hutu control (Pitt, 2013).

In addition, Nigeria and France have had hostile relation over the years. In 1961, Nigeria broke diplomatic ties with France over the testing of French Atomic Bomb in Sahara Desert. As a result, France has seen Nigeria's position in West African sub-region and Africa in general, as a challenge to it hegemonic influence in this region. While Nigeria has seen French presence in its neighbouring Franco-phone West Africa state as a threat to its economic, military and cultural interests. It is equally revealed that France offered military and material support to the secessionist regime of Biafra (1967-70). During the civil war France equally instigated some of its former colonies to recognize the secessionist government and to provide its territory for the training of rebel contingents (Akinyeye, 2007; Okoro, 2002).France also used the Republic of Cameroun to suppress Nigeria's interest, demonstrated with Cameroun's claim over the Bakassi Peninsula and the repeated violence

on Nigerian military and civilian population along the Nigerian –Cameroun border. Again, Francophone African states have been committed to several Franco-African Defense and Socio-cultural agreements. These states thus do not look at France as a hegemonist but as a partner. It is held that, “this is why France has been able to justify her intervention on the basis of ‘invited Intervention’” (Akinterinwa, 2005:88).

Apparently, French policy as it affects Nigeria is predicated on a three tactical objectives: to ensure that political grievances with Nigeria are not allowed to disturb economic understanding and cooperation; to prevent Nigeria from being able to adversely influence the Francophone states to the detriment of French interests in Africa; and more importantly, to secure the Nigerian market for French products (Akinterinwa, 2005:87). Strangely, the two countries have long trade relations in spite of this antagonism, France has been generally acknowledged as the fourth client of Nigeria, after the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. In 1998, French import of crude oil was to the tune of \$732 Million (63 million naira). As at August 2000, French private sector investments in Nigeria reached a peak of \$3.2 billion, making France the third largest investor after US and the UK (Akinterinwa, 2005:99). Also, Trade between Nigeria and France grew from 550 billion naira in 2008 to well over 1 trillion in 2012, one of the fastest growth rates compared to other French trading partners(www.venturesafrica.com, February 29,2016). France exports to Nigeria worth 330 billion while Nigeria’s export to France was 770 billion naira but this mainly because of Nigeria’s oil (www.leadership.ng,February 28, 2016). This suggests that France did not lead the intervention in Mali out of sheer altruism. It had underlying interests in Mali to which Nigeria, a sub-regional hegemon is cautious about. This also raised the question of the place or what Nigeria can offer in the presence of a great power house like France?

Another major challenge was the contempt and hostility that Mali and Algeria held against Nigeria and ECOWAS. A regional delegation was reportedly barred from landing at Bamako Airport due to a political demonstration against Nigeria and ECOWAS interference. This sentiment was even extended to civil society organizations, media outlets and political observers, questioning the regional body's support for peace. Also, it took several weeks for ECOWAS especially Nigeria to hold open conversations about morale within the Malian Armed forces and their capacity for operations in the north (Sandor, 2013). Nigeria's attempt at leadership role was complicated by erratic request from the government. After the council meeting, the transitional authorities in Mali addressed request to ECOWAS on September 2012, acceding to the demand by the council for a revision of their original demand to ensure a more effective deployment of MICEMA. Yet addressed parallel requests to the African Union, the United Nations and other international military force for the same purpose of assisting the country to recover its territorial integrity (ECOWAS, November 9, 2012).

Failure of Algeria to cooperate with Nigeria especially in area of intelligence gathering was another significant drawback. Algeria relatively has an extensive intelligence presence in Sahel region and it is being recognized as its powerful military force. Its border also provides access to cheaper food and petrol for the people of Mali (Belik A. *et al.,n.d*). In addition, the significance attached to Algeria in the resolution of the conflict in Mali is expressed in this manner, "the country (Algeria) is capable of mounting the most pressure on armed groups base in northern Mali , given the longstanding relations between Ansar Dine's current leader, Iyad Ag Ghal and the Algerian intelligence services are well-known" (www.crisisgroup.org, April 21, 2015). Algeria was equally not keen on having troops from ECOWAS on its borders and the Malian army itself was lukewarm about being on the danger of support from its African neighbours, given the involvement of Nigeria driven –ECOWAS

troops in human rights abuses in previous missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Rudolph, 2013). Also the reports of human rights violation perpetrated by the Nigerian security forces in pursuit of Boko Haram threaten the perceived legitimacy and prestige of the government to play any leadership role in conflict situations including Mali (Siegle, 2013). In addition, there was no coordinated strategy among the core countries. Mauritania and Algeria opposed external intervention with the fear that any intervention would target them. Algeria was opposed to a military intervention in what it considered its backyard, while Mauritania resented any intervention outside the joint operational committee of chiefs of Defence Staff grouping, essentially the core countries of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (Interview, 2015). Conversely, Algeria and Mauritania insisted on diplomatic solution Niger and Burkina Faso preferred Military option. Niger and Burkina Faso maintained that Algeria's insistence is a ploy to avoid accepting the consequences of restoring order in Mali (Boukhars, 2015)

Another problem that hindered Nigeria's quick intervention was the factionalization of the Malian Defence and Security Forces. Some of them were members of the rebel groups, especially MNLA (Interview, 2015). ECOWAS particularly Nigeria could not get an interlocutor to speak on behalf of the army and to which it could define the terms of deployment of military mission. This is indicated by lack of understanding between the regional organization and Malian Defence and Security. Evidently, the 17th September 2012, meeting of ECOWAS Foreign and Defence Ministers at its mediation and Security Council in Abidjan reached a deadlock.

Besides, there was tension over the concepts of operations (CONOPS) for MICEMA. There was conflicting opinion between ECOWAS and the Malian authorities regarding the first phase of MICEMA Intervention. ECOWAS chose Scenario 1 concept of operation while

Mali preferred scenario 2 concept of operation. Scenario 1 stipulates that troop contributing countries should be responsible for the initial 90 day of self sustenance whilst ECOWAS should be responsible for fuel throughout the duration. Scenario 2 obligates TCC to obtain armoured vehicles and mobility to make the units more efficient (ECOWAS August 15, 2012).

Another drawback to Nigeria's leadership role in 2012 Mali conflict was inadequate logistics and intelligence. This include incompatibility of French Equipment with English equipment, lack of equipment, language problem; and communication equipment could not communicate each other (Interview, 2015). It is equally linked to the huge territory to be covered, communication (ECOWAS, 2013). It is indicated by the fact that the AFISMA battalions contingent, excluding the Chadian Soldiers which arrived in the theatre of conflict were ill-equipped and ill-prepared for combat. They lacked funding (in fact, some of the staff officers from Nigeria were not even paid), the transportation capability to project power and reconnaissance and combat aircraft to survey targets in a huge area of operation (Interview 2015; Boukhars, 2011). On the other hand, success recorded by French military intervention, code named "Operation Serval" was attributed to these elements: prepositional French troops in Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Good knowledge of the terrain, efficient logistical capacity, reliable intelligence, Air power, large support of local population and leading role of Chadian Troops. Added to this, was the presence of over 4,000 French troops, 32 combat troops, helicopters and Drones (www.ieee.es, February 28, 2016). In the same vein, France is seen reinforcing its asset in Gao with Chadian and Nigerien troops that it brought in by air. The 800 Chadian troops alongside the French elements played key role, particularly in the assault in the Amattedai valley (Shurkin, 2014).

There was also constraints imposed by doctrine and training. Nigerian Peace keepers in Mali in 2013 lacked the training and equipment needed to be of much help against Al-Quaida-linked Forces despite their role in curbing the bloodshed in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the same manner, Different contingents obtained different training doctrines on conflict situation. Apparently, the whole Chad and Niger are desert, it determines the kind of training they give their troops; their training is geared toward desert warfare. While Nigeria is endured with all terrains; Desert Warfare, Jungle Warfare, Mountain warfare and Amphibians (Interview, 2015). In view of the fact that some of the Francophone countries concentrated on desert warfare, northern Mali is seen as their natural habitat which to some extent explained Chad leading role in Mali.

Again, the international nature of the conflict and the internal dilemma within ECOWAS could not be totally ignored as another impediment to Nigeria's leadership role in Mali. At the outset, Nigeria laboriously prepared ECOWAS plan to deploy an African force but was reluctantly endorsed by UN security Council Resolution 2085 on 20th December (www.Crisisgroup.org). Again, though the United Nations Security Council (under resolution 2056) endorsed mediation efforts of ECOWAS on 5th July 2012, the consideration for an ECOWAS intervention force was postponed (Kodjo, 2015). Thus Nigeria and indeed other African Actors expressed their resentment at the way they were treated. The UN did not treat them as true partners and was reluctant to recognize their rightful place in Mali (Theroux-Benoni and Dakono, 2013). According to Oluwadare (2014) as with previous Nigeria-led ECOWAS mission, Nigeria felt that the UN's effort served to steal the glory after its tortuous regional peacemaking and peace keeping efforts which the world body failed to recognize. Moreover, there several conflict resolution stakeholders; the UN, France, Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso among others who are involved in Mali. Each wanted to play a role.

(Interview, 2015) Further, at the time the conflict erupted ECOWAS' leadership was Francophone-dominated, which allowed France to wield great influence among ECOWAS member states and other conflict players. Blaise Compaore, then Burkinabe leader, served as a key mediator to the resolution of the conflict in Mali, he allegedly hosted French Gazelle Helicopters in Burkina Faso before their deployment for military combat in Mali January 2013. The Chairman of ECOWAS in 2012-2013 was President Alassane Ouattara, of Cote d' Ivoire whose electoral mandate was largely restored by the French army. The ECOWAS Commission President was former Burkinabe Prime Minister and a member of Campaore's Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), Kadre Ouedraogo. All these individuals are closely aligned with France and might have promoted French interest within ECOWAS. Thus most ECOWAS members, especially the Francophone's were slow at deploying troops and expectedly Nigeria failed to take over the campaign once France had paved the way with air strikes (Sangiovanni, 2013). It is equally believed that there was decision by several ECOWAS members to block military equipment intended for Mali in their ports (Marchal, 2012) The foregoing suggest that Nigeria was placed in tight corner of the internationalization of the conflict in Mali and the sub-regional hegemon could not deliver, as Mancur Olson in Saniovanni (2013) argued any arrangement for the joint provision of defence and security is subject to collective action problems and with the presence of ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanism, Nigeria may no longer legitimately claim a humanitarian intervention on her own.

4.6 Summary of the findings

The research was to determine what prompted Nigeria's role within ECOWAS Intervention in Mali. As a result, the study revealed that Nigeria's involvement was to prevent the spread of fundamentalism and terrorism in West Africa. However, the efficacy

of Nigeria's role was dependent upon its internal security concerns. Specifically, at that time 32 out of the 36 states of the federation were under military deployment for internal security operations. In addition the research indicated that Nigeria's influence in ECOWAS Intervention in Mali was challenged with ubiquitous of France presence and its policy of preventing Nigeria from adversely influencing Francophone West African Countries. The finding also revealed that Nigeria Contingent despatched to Mali was limited in terms of requisite training (Desert Warfare) needed for the theatre of conflict in Mali.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the study, the conclusion drawn from the analysis and some recommendations on how the situation can be improved.

5.2 Summary of the Study

This study examines the role of Nigeria within ECOWAS in resolving the conflict in Mali and the factors that impaired its leadership role in this intervention. Under normal circumstances, given the mineral resource (especially oil), population and military power, Nigeria is expected to play leadership role in every ECOWAS intervention. In this regard, the study set out to explain whether Nigeria played a leadership role in ECOWAS intervention in Mali, the factors that affected Nigeria's performance and the lessons drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS intervention. A general introduction was thus given which highlighted the background, statement of the problem, assumptions, significance of the study, limitation of the study as well as research methodology which relies both on primary and secondary sources of data.

Chapter two, centered on the literature review and theoretical framework of the study. The review of the literature includes the concept of conflict, conflict resolution, previous ECOWAS intervention in sub-regional conflicts and the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS' interventions. The concept of conflict provided four points of view on conflict; the violent, integrative, broader and Marxist. Further, a narrow and a broader meaning of conflict resolution, and the debates that underlies concept of conflict management, the concept of conflict resolution, especially the resolution, transformation and management dichotomy was equally captured. The role of Nigeria in United Nations Intervention, Nigeria's Conflict Management Efforts in Africa and ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, the Republic of Guinea, Togo and Niger were reviewed. Out of these conflict situations, Nigeria's role within ECOWAS was examined in terms military intervention, logistics, finances, and diplomatic involvement. Consequently, the review illuminates the need for more study on Nigeria's role in ECOWAS' role in Conflict Resolution Efforts. It is then hoped this study will enrich literature on Nigeria's role in ECOWAS conflict resolution. While the theoretical framework of the study is based on Hegemonic Stability Theory because it emphasized the role of hegemon in stabilizing Regional Organisation especially in conflict resolution.

ECOWAS conflict management framework and Nigeria's West African Policy featured in Chapter Three. ECOWAS framework for conflict management examines ECOWAS in light of its instrument of conflict management including the 1999 mechanism and the 2001 protocol on Democracy and good governance, ECOWAS Convention on small arms and light Weapons, and ECOWAS conflict Prevention Framework as well as Nigeria's foreign policy. While the second section deals with Nigerian West African Policy.

While the highlights of chapter four revealed that Nigeria's intervention in Mali is out of her national interest, her West African policy and her leadership ambition. It equally showed that Nigeria was among the first countries to condemn the military intervention in Mali, participated actively in ECOWAS meetings towards settling the disputes in Mali, President GoodLuck Jonathan of Nigeria co-mediated the conflict especially the signing of Ouagadougou preliminary agreement between the government of Mali and the MNLA which paved the way for Mali's election in 2013, Nigeria was in the forefront of the ECOWAS electoral support in Mali which culminated to conferment of the highest national honour of the republic of Mali on President GoodLuck and equally headed and contributed the highest number of troops. Yet a quick response to the conflict was not demonstrated by Nigeria, compared to the case of Liberia. Nigeria also failed to take the lion share of the financial burden in AFISMA reminiscent of its contribution in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Every contributing country bore its burden individually in Mali. The swift intervention of France and Chad with its 1800 troops further indicates the unreadiness of Nigeria to demonstrate a leadership role in ECOWAS military involvement. Nigeria's military was relegated to checkpoints as no member of ECOWAS' AFISMA sends its troops to the war front against the insurgents in the area of humanitarian support. In the area of humanitarian support Nigeria's role was not clearly demonstrated. The domestic security concerns indeed impaired Nigeria's hegemonic status in ECOWAS intervention in Mali, specifically fight against insurgency and in Nigeria negatively affected her performance in Mali as Nigerian troops were withdrawn to address immediate security challenge and low support from government of Mali and Algeria. Externally, Nigeria was cautious of France influence in the Sahel which was compounded by the power play expressed in the regionalization and internationalization of the conflict of the Franco phones including France.

5.3 Conclusion

The major role of a hegemon is to lead and stabilise the system to which it is part of. Indeed, Nigeria has the tendency of being the regional power and hegemon in ECOWAS intervention given her military dominance, size and economic resource. However, this study demonstrated that the involvement of Nigeria in Mali has been at best contributory and supportive, and to a large extent has not demonstrated leadership at improving the conflict situation in Mali. Yet its assertive role in supporting the electoral process in Mali cannot be under estimated.

It is also revealed that the domestic concerns, especially in terms of the fight against insurgency, negatively affected Nigeria's role in Mali, and other contributory factors that impaired its role like the influence of France in the Sahel region, inadequate logistics, inadequate training and doctrine to engage the rebel element. It is evident that Nigeria in line with her national interest and West African policy needed to prevent the further escalation of sub-regional conflict but due to aforesaid factors, her resolve to act as hegemon was lessened in ECOWAS intervention in Mali.

5.4 Recommendations

Despite the obstacles faced by Nigeria in her bid to resolve the conflict in Mali under the aegis of ECOWAS, there are messages and recommendations for her future involvement.

Given the aforesaid, the following recommendations are provided:

1. Nigeria must be more committed to its internal security challenges as addressing these would make her receive credibility in its interaction with other ECOWAS members and even the conflicting parties.
2. Nigerian military needs a larger force with a standby contingent for ECOWAS mission.
3. It is desirable that Nigeria prioritize its mission in every ECOWAS intervention.

4. Nigeria ought to promote cordial relations with other non ECOWAS countries Like Chad and Algeria in order to share intelligence on practical modalities of an intervention.
5. Nigeria should institute aggressive propaganda in order to weaken the influence of big powers in ECOWAS member states. This will to some extent cripple the ties between colonial masters and West African countries.
6. Nigeria must define its interest in every conflict and work towards its actualization. Apparently, France did not lead the military intervention in Mali out of sheer altruism but among other things, to promote its economic interests in the Sahel region.

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APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE

- i. What necessitated Nigeria’s role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?
- ii. Was it prompted by national interest and Nigeria policy of promoting sub-regional peace?

- iii. What role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?
- iv. How hegemonic or transformative is the role of Nigeria in Mali, particularly in Military involvement, humanitarian front and democratization?
- v. What are the reasons or factors that affected Nigeria's role in Mali?
- vi. To what extent did the fight against insurgency in Nigeria affects her performance in Mali?
- vii. What kind of lessons can be drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS intervention?

APPENDIX B

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

MAJ.GEN. ABDULKADIR S.U. (RTD), AFISMA Force Commander was interviewed on 25/10/2015, Duration: 55 Minutes (11:30-12:25).

MR. F.O.ADESHIDA, DIRECTOR West African Affairs Division (WAAD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interviewed on 5/11/2015, Duration: 50 Minutes (03:55-04:45).

MR. BOLAJI K.A, Peace and Security Consultant, Department of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping and Security, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, was interviewed on 4/11/2015, Duration: 28 Minutes (03:22-03:50).

MR. WARKANI H.A, Principal Programme Officer Documentation, ECOWAS Commission Abuja was interviewed on 2/11/2015, Duration: 1hr 8 Minutes (2:45-3:48)

APPENDIX C

Interview Transcripts

Military Establishment:

Question: what necessitated Nigeria's role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?

Response: As at the time, we intervened in Mali, Nigeria was facing similar situation. There was the need to prevent spillover. As you may be aware, the only country between Nigeria and Mali is Niger. So if it started in Niger before you know is already in Nigeria. Again, there is the global picture Nigeria already painted to the world, especially from its role in the past conflicts; in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Remember in Liberia there was no United Nations resolution before Nigeria's involvement.

If we excelled far away, the case in the neighborhood (Mali) is a necessity. So putting these together there is national interest and fear of spill over.

Question: General, what role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?

Response: Nigeria has been involved in peacekeeping efforts as far back as during the Congo in the 60's. With regard to Mali, when the Malian crisis started, two West African Leaders that is, the immediate past president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compoare was appointed as the Chief Mediator by ECOWAS heads of state and government. Immediate past president, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was appointed as Co-Mediator and they swung into action with the support of ECOWAS countries in order to see how much intervention they can bring about peace... That effort with the approval of ECOWAS culminated into putting together a Force in West African Sub-region to intervene in the conflict in Mali.

Also, the Donor Conference sometimes in November 2012, Mr, President, then President Good Luck... Nigeria was the highest donor. Nigeria contributed 5 million dollar. Added to this, Nigeria contributed a battalion troops also large number of air force officers and four Alpha Jets stationed in Niamey, in Niger in order to support the peace

effort that brought together countries including Chad which is not An ECOWAS Country. Also to see that the crisis in Mali was put to rest.

So, with the appointment of Nigeria's President as co-mediator, meetings were held in order to intervene between the Tuaregs and Malian government. Tuaregs were fighting for the autonomous state of AZAWAD which is basically northern Mali. Initially, it was ECOWAS that spearheaded the effort until 1st July, I handed over to the selected Force Commander by United Nations; Jean Bosco of Rwanda...Until 1st July that Nigeria handed over.

Question: How hegemonic or transformative is the role of Nigeria in Mali, particularly in Military involvement, humanitarian front and democratization? Looking at Nigeria's leading role in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Response: When we talk about lead role a lot of things are involved; one, equipment and then manpower which at a time we lacked because members of the Malian Deference and Security Forces were fractionalized. Some of them were Commanders of the MNLA, MUJAO, Ansaru and some other elements spread around northern Mali. Yes, Nigeria played a key role; it was as if solution to conflict in Mali was depended on Nigeria's presence. Even before the arrival of Nigerian troops, the whole of Mali was looking up to Nigeria, the whole of Mali greeted the arrival of Nigeria. In areas where Nigerian Troops were deployed there were little or no incidence through out their stay until we pull out in 2013.

With regard to Election, Nigeria played a very key role; diplomatic shuttle using the Nigerian Embassy and Defence Attache' in Mali.Nigeria attended every meeting that has to do with peace efforts, despite the fact that we have pulled out because of obvious reason of the Northeast, Nigeria.

Question: To what extent did the fight against insurgency in Nigeria affects her performance in Mali?

Response: Well, it did! If you look at the landmass of North East is big, we have only one division, Nigeria definitely needed to scale down in his contribution to global peace efforts in order to tackle internal crisis that we are facing; also that was the reason for the withdrawal of troops from Mali. Because the presence of French and Chad, I would not say was sufficient. Atleast, with the level of equipment they brought to the theatre...The presence of Nigeria was still needed around.

Again, you cannot put another man's house when your house is on fire. We were in Mali, the North East was burning, we needed troops in order to deal with that situation; that was the reason for the withdrawal of our troops from Mali. Even though if we look at the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS, one would have expected she shouldn't have withdrawn.

i. Are we say to that France and Chad are the hegemon here?

Even though the level of equipment differ, it was a collective effort; there was cohesion, each team played it role

ii. General, it then means there is the issue of capability of Nigerian military capacity?

It was because of capability, because of competence that the ECOWAS head of state and government gave command of troops to Nigeria. We excelled in Congo; we excelled in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It was rather a case that we did not anticipate that the situation in the North East will degenerate the way it did.

iii. It means Chad and other neighbouring countries are more experienced in desert warfare?

Well, the whole of Chad and Niger are desert. It determines the kind of training. Therefore, most of their training would be geared toward desert warfare, while we (Nigeria) are endured with all terrains: Desert warfare, Jungle warfare, Mountain Warfare, Amphibians.

The Malians did not want Nigeria to pull out. In fact, ECOWAS, every time there is crisis, countries look up to Nigeria to take a lead role and we cannot go back on that... Committee of chiefs of Defence Staff wanted Nigeria to take a lead.

Question: What kind of lessons can be drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS intervention?

Response: We would have intervened earlier than we did but for the issue of sovereignty and denial of government that they could handle. Mechanism should be created to save lives and property. We see that the conflict started 2012. Until after a year we did not intervene until January 2013.

Even January was not the approved date of intervention, the approval was September 2013. The rebels were few kilometers. If we had waited Mali (Bamako) would have been under MNLA and other rebel elements.

It brings to the fore the need to actualize ECOWAS Standby Force and African Standby Force as quick intervention force should any crisis happen to move immediately. The Absence of ECOWAS Standby force affected immediate deployment.

There should be common type of training on intervention: the incompatibility of equipment, communication equipment was not compatible. French and English speaking could not communicate with each other..Staff officers sent to Mali were not even paid.

Is interest of France seen in this intervention?

Well, even if it is so will you blame them you go to where you feel more comfortable? That also brings the fore for us to identify what we want before going...France is country that

never let go its colony. There were financial and material resources by Nigeria. The need to identify what we want in terms of influence, we made that mistake in Liberia and Sierra Leone and we repeated the same in Mali. With no serious physical presence. This God Father of a thing, we are not using our position, resource (endured) to dictate the pace.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Question: what role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?

Response: Well, Nigeria was involved in the Malian conflict to achieve the following objectives:

- i. To crush Boko Haram insurgents based in Mali
- ii. To stop the spread of fundamentalism in West Africa including Niger and Nigeria
- iii. To bring peace and stability in Mali.

Nigeria had to support the electoral process in Mali. The Federal Republic of Nigeria assisted the Government of Mali with Hillux vehicles, computers, Printers and one million US Dollars towards the conduct of election.

Question: How hegemonic or transformative is the role of Nigeria, particularly in military involvement, humanitarian front and democratization?

Response: By virtue of paying over 60 % Nigeria has become a natural leader in the sub-region. Though Nigeria may appear withdrawn in assertive involvement, Nigeria had to take the lead we engage the Tuaregs. Nigeria is so far the highest contributor to the Malian conflict. There is also fiscal commitment: 5 million and 2 million Dollars respectively; materials to resuscitate facilities for the military in Mali. Nigeria played a dominant role in resolving the conflict in Mali; the process of installing constitutional power in Mali which were well appreciated by government of Mali.

Question: To what extent did the fight against insurgency in Nigeria affects her performance in Mali?

Response: To some extent, troops are needed both for internal and peace keeping operations like the recent Mali. Therefore, there was the need to strike a balance.

Insurgency/Terrorism is a global phenomenon and there is always a transborder security implication or link.

Question: what kind of lessons can be drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS intervention?

Response: Terrorism is becoming continental

It is not limited to Mali; needs global, continental, sub regional and hegemonic approach; if we allow some of these national crises to grow the end up developing links that internationalize the conflicts.

ECOWAS Commission:

Question: What necessitated Nigeria's role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?

Response: Three factors informed Nigeria's intervention in Mali:

First, was the provision of ECOWAS normative framework. The 1999 mechanism of conflict resolution allows for prevention of further escalation of conflict in the sub-region. It gave ECOWAS humanitarian mandate in conflict situation. Under the supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, there is need for intervention when democratic election principles are under threat. When there is coup d'état, democratic convergence is promoted.

Second, because of the request or the fact the government of Mali invites international community; UN, AU and ECOWAS to which Nigeria is a very important member. It obligates Nigeria's intervention

Third, was a Nigerian factor: Boko Haram was an eye-opener. If allowed militants groups could make home from one country to another. It was a wakeup call for Nigeria

Question: what role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?

Response: The 2012 conflict in Mali was an opportunity for Nigeria and other ECOWAS member states to demonstrate their support. Nigeria contributed about 1200 personnel, including two Dassault Breguet Dornier Alpha Fighter Jets and two MI-35 Helicopters to the peace process in Mali. Nigeria also contributed a lot to the election in Mali, attended several ECOWAS meeting of foreign ministers, mediation...Then president Blaise Compaore did very well in bringing peace agreement between Bamako and MNLA.

Question: How hegemonic or transformative is the role of Nigeria in Mali, particularly in military involvement, humanitarian front and democratization?

Nigeria was missing in action.

Question: What are the reasons or factors that affected Nigeria's role in Mali?

Response: Though ECOWAS Early warning system had produced at least three report of the possible repercussions of the fall of Gaddafi on ECOWAS frontline state of Niger and Mali, there was denial on the part of the government of Mali on its inability to quell the rebellion.

At the time of the conflict in Mali Nigeria's security image was in shamble, and lack of direction of her leadership.

Again, the regional hegemon struggle with internal challenges; Nigerian military was overstretched with internal deployment in 32 states, few left in the barracks with no quick power to deploy. There is less spirit of voluntarism, since a lot of dollars is often expended for peacekeeping.

There was lack of logistic: no transport plane to the theatre of operation, no office.

Nigeria did not have the intelligence; rather she was a sitting giant. While French and Francophone countries were doing the bombing. Chad and Togolese troops did not take order from Nigerian Commander.

Algeria was a major obstacle to military intervention in Mali while Mauritania resented any intervention outside the Joint Operational Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff Group of Core countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). France is also a very important force in the 2012 conflict in Mali. France always have political hold with it colony. Also, funding is also key. The over 1000 troops sent to Mali were not paid.

Question: what kind of lessons can be drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS Intervention?

Response:

Funding is key to ECOWAS intervention.

Countries should address their internal challenges in order to demonstrate better external operations.

ECOWAS Commission:

Question: What necessitated Nigeria's role within ECOWAS to resolve the Mali conflict?

Response: Well, Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS and had been in the forefront of the conflict resolution in the region and in the formation of ECOMOG. It is thus expected it shows itself as a giant.

It is also out of the policy of curtailment or containment. If the conflict is not curtailed it could spread to one place to another. This will lead to excessive accumulation of weapons. Again, peacekeeping involves a lot of resources and Nigeria being the hegemon is in better position to assist.

Question: what role did Nigeria play in ECOWAS' effort to resolve the conflict in Mali?

Response: Looking at the role of Nigeria in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone one will expect same in Mali.

Nigeria did openly intervened and was a stakeholder in ECOWAS Mediatory effort, then president Goodluck attended several meetings towards resolving the conflict between the MNLA and the government of Mali. Nigeria's role is also seen in terms of troops contribution to the ECOWAS intervention Force, codenamed AFISMA.

Question: How hegemonic or transformative is the role Nigeria in Mali, particularly in military involvement, humanitarian front and democratization?

Response: Nigeria tried to rally member state to intervene. Eventually ECOWAS mobilized, intervened but in keeping with above, it became apparent that much more was required.

Question: what are the factors that affected Nigeria's role in Mali?

Response: Nigeria found herself in a more complex situation than it imagined, coupled with the menace of Boko Haram. Boko Haram exposes the lapses of Nigerian military.

The conflict in Mali was more internationalized than domestic or regional.

There was wide strategic interest (outside ECOWAS) in Mali. Another twist, the desire for the declaration of AZAWAD has always being seen by francophone countries as issue that has tacitly endorsed by France. Surprisingly, the MNLA has its headquarters in France.

Question: Sorry Sir, the word internationalization is not clear here

Response: Just like the case of Boko Haram that started as a Nigeria issue, it is now a multinational effort. We have Chad and Chad. The UN, France, Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso were involved in the conflict in Mali. Each wanted to play a role
Again, there is the issue of shifting of dates for ECOWAS intervention.

Nigeria traditionally has always been very careful of French interest in the region, while France as classified Nigeria as neighbor it cannot avoid. France has always been nervous of Nigeria's role in West Africa and Nigeria has been conversely conscious of this relationship with France.

In the diplomatic circle, Nigeria was very careful not to intervene to invoke the wrath of France and francophone countries that surround her; when France discovered that conflict was internationalized, France quickly intervened.

There was spirited effort to intervene but funds was a challenge; there was need to address internal challenges.

There was the language issue in Mali. Since in battle communication is key. The language of Nigerian troops was English...

Strategically, Europe in this case France interest in the Sahel is also a factor. In this region of Sahel, oil, Uranium, gold are in large reservoir.

Question: what kind of lessons can be drawn for Nigeria's future ECOWAS intervention?

Response: Nigeria ought to improve relations with French speaking African countries to gain quick support in ECOWAS intervention.

Nigeria should give priority to her domestic challenges in order to achieve success in ECOWAS intervention.