THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN ZANGO KATAF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF KADUNA STATE, 1999-2011

BY

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M.Sc./SOC-SCI/6310/2011-2012/P16SSPS8190

A DESSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,

ZARIA

2017

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this research conducted by DODO, Cornelius Nya'akunat on **"The Impact of Violent Conflicts on Inter-group Relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 1999-2011"** haven been scrutinized and approved as contributing to knowledge, meets the regulations that govern the award of Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

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DEDICATION

This work is deservedly dedicated to God Almighty for his faithfulness, graces and mercies and to my parents, Mr. Stephen Dodo (late) and Mrs. Rita S. Dodo with deep sense of appreciation and utmost gratitude.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation was written by me and to the best of my knowledge the topic has not been presented or accepted in another institution for any degree. All ideas and information from other authors have been acknowledged.

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DODO, Cornelius Nya'akunat **Date**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not reach its successful completion without the combine effort of so many people. I must start by thanking God Almighty for counting me worthy to pursue this intellectual activity to its logical end. His faithfulness, mercies and graces have kept me healthy both in mind and body in this challenging task. There were a lot of challenges that would have swept me off my feet but God saw me through. I humbly say unto him at this time "NGWAI" (thank you).

I wish to formally register my sincere appreciation and indebtedness to my humble, calm, illustrious, studios and hardworking supervisors, Mallam Garba Aminu and Dr Aliyu Yahaya (Head of Department, Political Science and International Studies) as well as my external examiner, Professor Alabi of Nigerian Defence Academy, my internal examiners, Drs. J. E. Gyong (Reader) and M. M. Nuruddeen for not only accepting to supervise and examine my work but who also through their constructive criticisms and useful corrections, made this work a reality. I say thank you very much.

To the many scholars who in one way or the other had a hand in molding my thought, I remain ever grateful. Special mention must be made of Professor Ntim Gyakari Esew (formerly of the department and now in Kaduna State University, Kaduna) who played an important role in my gaining admission into the university to study Political Science at both undergraduate and post-graduate levels. I will not forget to mention Professor Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi, the Head of Department as at the time I gained admission and present Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Professor Yusufu Yakubu (the immediate past Head of Department), Professor Paul Pinda Izah, Professor Dunmoye Ayo 'Rauf, Professor Ejembi Unobe, Professor Kayode Omojuwa, Dr Abubakar Siddique, Professor Umar Ka'oje, Mallam Saidu Adamu (late), Dr. Mohammed Faal,

Dr. Edgar Agubamah, Dr Sunday Suleiman (late) and Dr. George Atelhe (now in BSU). Also worth mentioning are Dr. David Moveh and Dr. Tafida (Departmental PG Coordinators) among others, all of the department of political science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I thank you all.

I wish to appreciate specially the effort of the following people who assisted me during my course and field works: Sir K. T (Squares), Joshua Magaji (Josh), Enoch Joseph, Mr Donald Dodo, Mr David John, Patience Kadani, Lavender, Mr Abel Adejor, Blessing La'ah and Nurudeen Falallu. Also worth mentioning are Bala Adamu and Wamban Jama'a both of Network for Justice, Kaduna and Dr Zwahu Bonat of Center for Population and Development, Kaduna.

With blissful heart, I express my deepest and utmost gratitude to my family, both immediate and extended as well as friends for the kind and generous assistance. I pray God Almighty to richly reward and bless you all.

ABSTRACT

Despite strong optimism that the enthronement of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 would avert or contain conflicts, there has been frequent recurrence of violent conflicts in the country manifesting in either ethnic or religious and mostly a combination of both forms. The country has witnessed high level ethnic and religious conflicts with devastating consequences on human life and property. In other words, the country has produced a catalogue of conflicts with ethnicity and religion being manipulated, resulting in loss of lives in an unprecedented manner and unquantifiable psychological and material damages. The study explored the secondary data generated from vast literature on the subject matter in addition to a personal survey and interview. Applying a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods, the study attempted to find out the impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 1999-2011. The arguments were presented within the context of theory of cultural-pluralism, using stratified sampling as a method or framework for data generation and analysis. The research submits that the local government has played host to different conflicts. It has been deeply enmeshed and suffused in violent conflicts characterized by killings and displacement of persons, loss of business investments and loss of properties worth millions of naira leading to deterioration of harmonious co-existence or relations (disharmony, hostility, suspicion and distrust) with religion, ethnicity, poverty and unemployment manipulated to achieve political objectives.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The subject of conflict has remained a challenging one for social scientists in contemporary time. Humanity is living in an era that is full of hope for peaceful co-existence among peoples but also dangerous with the possibility of series of explosive conflicts based on the mobilization and utilization of various identities and deterioration of relations at the different levels of the identity divides. The spread of a mighty wave in the escalation of violent conflicts threatens the survival of human existence. Several complex crises have manifested and/or are currently manifesting in ethnic and religious – and mostly a combination of both forms. There are also diverse conflicts of various dimensions in Nigeria ranging from political, economic to socio-cultural depending on the context and specificity.

Since the emergence of the nascent democracy in Nigeria in 1999 with the optimism that it would avert or contain conflicts of any kind, some parts of Kaduna State have become flashpoints of violent clashes, Zango Kataf local government inclusive. The country as a whole and Kaduna State in particular has witnessed high level violent clashes with devastating consequences. In Kaduna State for instance, Zango Kataf Local government because of its plural – complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nature, has played host to different types of conflicts, whose centrifugal tendencies portent dangerous vortex for corporate existence and inter-group relations in the local government.

The fact remains that major armed conflicts have often had their genesis in misunderstanding between two or more individuals or groups. In shaping the reciprocal attitudes of members of the groups in the local government toward one another, the limiting determinant is the nature of functional relations between the groups. The groups in question or the conflicting parties (Hausa and Fulani with the natives as well as the natives themselves) have been competing to attain some goals so that the success of one group necessarily means the failure of the other. One group has claims on another group in the way of managing, controlling or exploiting them, in the way of taking over their actual or assumed rights or possessions.

Groups are a fundamental part of social life. They can be highly rewarding to their members and to society as a whole, but there are also significant problems and dangers with them. They have caused conflicts. Over the years, the phenomena of ethnicity and religious intolerance as well as control of scarce economic and political resources have led to incessant recurrence of conflicts between or among groups in the local government under study.

The impact of these conflicts are multi-dimensional and because of their violent nature, which often takes the form of riots, sabotage, assassination, and armed struggles among others, they no doubt have serious implications particularly on inter-group relations of the local government and thus making it an important issue or essential focus for research, exploration, discussion and action. Salawu, (2010: 345) backed the above argument up when he made clear that:

> *The discussion of conflicts in whatever context even becomes more necessary given the fact that there is a phenomenal recurrence of conflicts across Nigeria thereby increasing the level of general insecurity particularly in the areas where such conflicts had occurred.*

The entrenched and recurring conflicts in the local government, is therefore the main focus of this study.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

The study examines the impact of recurrent violent conflicts on inter-group relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State from 1999 to 2011. In other words, the problematic under investigation is whether or not violent conflicts between 1999 and 2011 have in any way altered extant (i.e. pre-conflict) inter-group relations in the study area.

The conflicts in the local government studied deal with a situation in which the relationship between the Hausa and Fulani with the natives as well as that which exist among the natives themselves is characterised by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontations.

The complex processes of change and development are at the core of the problematic connected with conflicts in the study area. The question of groups, either ethnic or religious perceiving themselves as neglected or excluded from the terrain of political power and in sharing of the benefits of resources in the study area is central. The problematic of contestations or conflicts in the study area permeates central issues as ethnicity, religion, justice and citizenship rights. In other words, the antagonistic relationship between or among groups in the local government studied has been as a result of claims over resources or values and competition to attain goals by the conflicting parties.

1.3 Research Questions

The study attempted to address the following questions:

1. What was the nature of inter-group relations prior to the conflicts in Zango Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 1999 and 2011?
2. What were the causes of the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011?
3. How did the conflicts between 1999 and 2011 affect inter-group relations in Zango Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This study is basically aimed at examining the impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 1999 and 2011. Therefore, the objectives of the study are:

1. To examine the nature of inter-group relations prior to the conflicts
2. To examine the causes of the conflicts
3. To investigate the impact of the conflicts on inter-group relations

1.5 Significance of the Study

Although there is a large and growing body of literature on conflicts and inter-group relations in Nigeria, there are still some gaps as shown in the next chapter especially on micro studies which this study represents. Most of the studies are viewpoints based on generalisations and not empirical micro studies in terms of causes and impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations. Causes and impact of conflicts are multi-dimensional and vary from time and space with diverse degrees of consequences. There is also a general believe that conflicts have devastating consequences but details of the impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations, especially at the micro level need special attention. The significance of the study therefore, is in

its attempt to contribute to the existing literature on the subject of violent conflicts and inter-group relations. In this case, future conflicts at the micro level could be properly managed or prevented.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The study was restricted to Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State in the period 1999-2011.The period coincided with civilian/democratic political dispensation which unlike military rule, for which the country had been subjected to for a long period, allows freedom of expressions on a wide range of societal issues. Bottled up or suppressed grievances across and within communities of the local government during the military rule therefore exploded on wider scale within the period under study.

The research was limited by unwillingness of some people or respondents to open up minds on issues studied or provide vital information or release some materials that would further enrich the work due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Related to the above, some people, organisations and local government officials would not accept to grant interview. There were also challenges faced in terms of time and resources (human and capital). The researcher had limited resources for extensive field work using many research assistants and therefore, did not permit the inclusion of all the population of the people living within the study area. I therefore made use of the available resources at my disposal.

1.7 Research Methodology

a. Research Design

The researcher adopted a survey research procedure where the subjects or respondents are studied in their natural setting through eliciting information from them by sample survey study. This, to the researcher provided useful information within the shortest possible time. This also allowed a large number of respondents who constituted the sample to be studied and it helped discover meaning in the data collected to such an extent that facts and events were better understood, interpreted and explained.

b. Sources of Data

The major sources of data collection in this research work are both primary and secondary. The primary source of data collection includes questionnaire. Interviews (Conventional and Focused Group Discussion) were also conducted to collect data from traditional rulers, religious leaders and victims of the conflicts living elsewhere outside the local government under study as well as some officers of the Internally Displaced Persons.

The secondary data was sourced from the stock of available relevant materials on the topic under study which include books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and internet as well as unpublished papers (seminar and paper presentations). Data were collected from civil society organizations (CSOs) or Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The Non-governmental Organisations were chosen because they are not part of government but operate in civil society. This suggests that an NGO operates within the private spheres of social life and works not for profit. They are not organisations which are serving the self-interest of members but are concern in one way or

the other with the disadvantaged. Central to NGOs are issues that are detrimental to the well-being or prospects of people or society as a whole.

Again, the researcher as an indigene of the local government studied, had his personal experience on the topic in question fully employed in this research work. The researcher observed and recorded the information on paper. As an onlooker or a spectator observer, the researcher was not involved in the activities of the conflicts. He was only restricted to observing those activities of the conflicts he had the opportunity to. That is the monitoring of the behavioural and non-behavioural activities or conditions of the sampled subjects. The non-behavioural observation included recording physical processes such as physical destruction or damage of lives and properties while the behavioural observation concentrated on non-verbal analysis, linguistic analysis and spatial analysis (i.e how the various groups physically related with one another).

c. Population and Sample Size

A total number of 200 questionnaires were administered to respondents drawn from five major ethnic groups of the local government such as Atyap, Bajju, Hausa/Fulani, Ikulu and Kamantan. These groups were the major players in the conflicts. The sample size was determined by a combination of technical as well as human and financial considerations. Technically, there are issues of population size, level of precision (accuracy) desired, the level of variability of the variables to be estimated, the homogeneity of the population and the extent and prior knowledge about the characteristics of the population. The human and financial considerations have to do with the cost of the research and the funds available, the human resources available to execute the research, the time consideration and the issue of logistics. The table below shows how questionnaires were distributed.

Table 1.7.1: Population and Sample Size

S/N	ETHNIC GROUP	POPULATION	SAMPLE SIZE
1	Atyap	97,859	60
2	Bajju	142, 180	87
3	Huasa and Fulani	12, 388	08
4	Ikulu	50,354	31
5	Kamantan	22,818	14
	Total	**325,599**	**200**

Source: (2006 Population & Housing Census)

The formula used in drawing the respondents is:

Ethnic Group Population x Total Sample Size

Total Population One

d. Sampling Procedure

The 200 questionnaires in the table above were distributed or administered to respondents among the five major ethnic groups in the local government, selected through probability sampling techniques. A probability sample technique is one in which every member of a population has a known assurance or likelihood of being included in a sample to be studied (Obasi, 1999: 137).

Given the nature of the problem (area and subject under study) the researcher used stratified and purposive sampling techniques in drawing respondents for interview (Conventional and Focused Group Discussion). A stratified sampling technique is one that recognises different groups (or the composite characteristics) of a target population and takes appropriate measures to include them in the sample (Obasi, 1999: 139). Of the two types (proportionate and disproportionate) of stratified sampling, the proportionate which has to do with representation of each stratum or group of the population into the sample based on their numerical strength in relation to the population was employed. Purposive sampling involves hand-picking desired sample elements to ensure or guarantee that all relevant typical cases which provide the researcher with requisite data or information are included (Nnamdi, 1991: 46 and Obasi, 1999: 141). The interviewees

included some traditional leaders from five ethnic groups of the local government. They are the District Head of Abobo (Bajju), the District Head of Zango (Hausa), the District Head of Madakiya (Bajju), the District Head of Kamuru (Ikulu), the District Head of Marsa (Bajju) and the district Head of Zuturung (Bajju). Others interviewed are the pastor of Living Faith Church, Zonkwa, a religious leader, Secretary of Anghan Chiefdom and Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan. Some victims of the conflicts in the local government being studied living elsewhere were also interviewed. The interviews with the traditional and religious leaders were conventional while the one conducted with the victims of the conflicts and some members of the public drawn from the different ethnic groups were Focused Group Discussions.

Also, being an indigene and having knowledge of the area studied, the researcher at his own discretion, selected places that were most affected by the conflicts and interviewed some of the victims of the incidents.

e. Sampling Technique

As stated in (d) above, a stratified sampling technique was adopted. It is one that recognises different groups (or the composite characteristics) of a target population and takes appropriate measures to include them in the sample (Obasi, 1999: 139). Before the selection of the respondents, the researcher divided the study area into eleven wards and grouped the various wards into five as clusters for convenience. A cluster sampling involves selecting members of a sample in groups rather than individually (Obasi, 1999: 140). The groupings were based on the ethnic composition of the wards.

Table 1.7.2: Ethnic Composition and Wards

CLUSTER	ETHNIC COMPOSITION	WARDS
1	Bajju	Gidan Jatau, Madakiya, Ungwan

		Rimi and Zonkwa
2	Atyap	Gora, Ungwan Gaya, Zaman Dabo and Zonzon
3	Ikulu	Ikulu
4	Kamantan	Kamantan
5	Hausa and Fulani	Zango Urban

Sources: Zango Kataf Local Government Pamphlet & 2006 Population Census

Blocks of buildings in the clusters were sampled and the researcher then listed the households in each of the selected blocks of buildings, sampled them (households) and finally sampled the persons (respondents) within each of the selected households. According to Ngu (2005), this type of complex design is known as multistage cluster sampling which though may not require the initial listing of all individuals comprising the population of the local government, but would normally lead to the ultimate selection of a sample of individuals in the local government. The respondents cut across social categories such as traditional leaders, religious leaders, civil servants, farmers, traders, students and victims of the conflicts in the local government among others.

f. Target Population

The targeted population cut across groups, age, sex, occupations, class, et cetera. As such, a careful measure was taken thereby ensuring a fair representation of the entire population.

g. Research Assistants

The researcher hired two research assistants with qualifications of National Diploma (ND) to help record the proceedings of the interview on paper and tape and they also gathered the personal particulars of the group members. The research assistants eased access to respondents in terms of distributing questionnaires and their collection.

h. Focused Group Discussion

Focus Group Discussion is one interviewing technique that focuses on group values, beliefs, preferences, characteristics, problems, dynamics and successes. This method is targeted at groups with the aim of understanding their needs, characteristics, dynamics, challenges, etc. within the context of an issue under study. The researcher therefore focused on three groups. The Focused group discussion covered the Hausa and Fulani victims of the conflicts living elsewhere with six (6) members and two groups of the natives with six (6) and eight (8) members each. The victims of the conflicts interviewed were displaced from Zonkwa and environs to the Kaduna Hajj Camp.

i. Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

Descriptive statistical method of data analysis was adopted in this study and the presentation of data was based on socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The data was presented in a tabular form showing the frequency distribution of respondents based on sex, age, marital status, educational attainment, occupation, income level, religious affiliation, ethnic affiliation, and etcetera. Each of the distribution of respondents was presented in a bar chart. Data collected through interviews (conventional and Focused Group Discussion) and personal observations are not analyzed separately. Rather, they are analyzed with the ones collected through the questionnaires so as to complement the overall analysis.

1.9 Outline of Chapters

This dissertation is organized into five closely interrelated chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which outlines mainly the background of the study, research problem, research questions, research objectives, significance of the study, research assumptions, scope and limitations, methodology and outline of chapters, while the second chapter deals with literature

review and theoretical framework. The third chapter lays emphasis on the background of Zango Kataf Local Government Area – a brief history of the study area and discussed historical pre-conflicts situation and revolts between the Hausa and Fulani with the natives and among the natives themselves in the local government. While chapter four deals with presentation and analysis of data collected from the field work, chapter five contains summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORERICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

There is a growing body of literature on the subject of conflict and inter-group relations in contemporary Africa. This chapter reviews only a few of the literature that focuses on conflicts and inter-group relations in Nigeria generally and Kaduna State in particular. The review is undertaken thematically. The chapter further discusses the theoretical framework (cultural-pluralism) adopted in this research exercise.

2.2 Conceptual Perspectives:

Conflict

Conflict is an instance of endemic antagonism in political life between various interests and principles (Nnoli, 1995: 72). That is contradictions arising from differences in interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions and tendencies (Nnoli, 1998: 6).

Social conflict is a struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aim of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals (David, 1968: 232).

The term conflict as noted by Wolff (2006: 2) is used to describe a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives, entirely just goals. He further argues that sometimes, conflict is as a result of the struggle for power and material gain by leaders and followers alike.

In order to have a thorough understanding of violent conflict which is the focus of our discussion, it is important to note that conflicts can also be non-violent, and violent conflicts cannot be fully understood without discussing the non-violent aspect. Notably, what constitutes violence or non-violence varies depending on the context or perception of the legitimate use of force or challenge of authority.

A non-violent conflict has been termed by Sandole (1998) as “Manifest Conflict Process (MCP)” and defined as a situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, each other's goal-seeking capability.

Non-violent conflicts enter a violent phase when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate, to damage or destroy the opposing parties’ ability to pursue their own interests. For Davies (1973: 251), the existence of frustration of substantive (physical, social-affection, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or implemental needs (security, knowledge,

and power) is the essential condition for one non-violent conflict to escalate into violent. To him: *"Violence as a response is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated."*

In political conflict analysis, the use of force, physical damages and human casualties are the characteristics of a violent conflict. An "Aggressive Manifest Conflict Process (AMCP)" is the term that Sandole (1998) used to describe violent conflict, which, according to him represents:

> *... a situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, attempt to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another (e.g., religious shrines, national monuments); and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another.*

Smith (2005: 3) employs the term "Armed Conflicts" when speaking about violent disputes and defines it as: *"...open armed clashes between two or more centrally organised parties, with continuity between the clashes, in disputes about power over government and territory."*

The conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State can therefore be conceived as a precarious situation (physical damages and human casualties) arising from the struggle between or among various ethnic or religious groups over values, claims to status, political power, and scarce socio-economic resources, leading to deterioration of social relationship.

Group

Groups are a fundamental part of social life. They can be highly rewarding to their members and to society as a whole, but there are also significant problems and dangers with them. All these make them an essential focus for research, exploration and action. How we define 'group' and the characteristics or ideas we use has been a matter of debate for many years.

The significance of collectivities like families, friendship circles, and tribes and clans has long been recognized, but it is really only in the last century or so that groups were studied scientifically and theory developed (Mills 1967: 3). As researchers turned to the systematic exploration of group life, different foci for attention emerged. Some social psychologists looked at the ways in which, for example, working in the presence of others tend to raise performance (Allport, 1924). Others looked at different aspects of group process.

Kurt Lewin, (1948: 165), for example, found that nearly all groups were based on *interdependence* among their members and this applied to whether the group was large or small, formally structured or loose, focused on this activity or that. In a famous piece, Lewin wrote, 'it is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but interdependence of fate.' In other words, groups come about in a psychological sense because people realize they are 'in the same boat' (Brown 1988: 28). Interdependence has, thus, come to play a significant role in the way that many writers define group.

To Rupert Brown (1988: 2-3), a group exists when two or more people define themselves as members of it and when its existence is recognized by at least one other.

We mean by a group, a number of persons who communicate with one another often over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all the others, not at second-hand through other people but face-to-face (George Homans, 1950: 1). To put it simply, they are units composed of two or more persons who come into contact for a purpose and who consider the contact meaningful (Theodore M. Mills, 1967: 2). Thus, a group is defined as two or more individuals who are connected to one another by social

relationships.

Conceiving of a group as a dynamic whole should include a definition of group that is based on interdependence of the members or better, the subparts of the group (Kurt Lewin, 1951: 146). Thus, a group is a collection of individuals who have relations to one another that make them interdependent to some significant degree. As so defined, the term 'group' refers to a class of social entities having in common the property of interdependence among their constituent members (Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, 1968: 46)

A group is a social unit which consists of a number of individuals who, at a given time, stand in more or less definite (Muzafer, et.al., 1954/61: 198) interdependent status and role relationships with one another, and which explicitly or implicitly possesses a set of norms or values regulating the behaviour of the individual members, at least in matters of consequence to the group (Ibid, Pp197).

Descriptively speaking, a psychological group is defined as one that is psychologically significant for the members to whom they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and value, that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behaviour (John C. Turner, 1987: 1-2).

In part, differences in definition occur because writers often select those things that are of special importance in their work and then posit these as the criteria for group existence (Benson 2001: 5). To this, Jarlath F. Benson identified a list of attributes for a group as thus:

- A set of people engage in frequent interactions

- They identify with one another
- They are defined by others as a group
- They share beliefs, values, and norms about areas of common interest
- They define themselves as a group
- They come together to work on common tasks and for agreed purposes

From this, she suggested that groups are either intended or organic. They are not some random experience and as a result, they have three crucial characteristics:

- There are parts
- There is a relationship between the parts
- There is an organizing principle (Ibid).

To this might also be added, as both John C. Turner (1987) and Rupert Brown (1989) have pointed out, groups are not just systems or entities in their own right but exist in relation to other groups.

Group in this study is a collection of individuals who are connected to one another by social relations defined in terms of ethno-religious composition.

Inter-Group Relations

The concept of inter-group relations complies that there is usually the existence of more than one group and usually what happens or follows is that there is exchange of relationship which may be political, social or economic. Inter-group relations imply a mutual world of inter-dependency in which no groups or single individual is all sufficient and all knowing. The concept implies that no groups or individual is an Island and because of individual specific limitation and

shortcoming, there is always an exchange of relationship in order to complement the shortfalls in our relationship. In economic towns where there is economic specialization in the production of goods and services, there is also need for exchange of goods and services thereby creating a world of inter-dependency and mutual relationship. Either as an individual group or society, it is impossible to produce everything a society or an individual needs and thus the need for inter-relationship (Uji, 2015: 89).

Inter-group relations refer to relations between groups thus defined. Inter-group attitudes such as prejudice and inter-group behaviour such as discriminatory practice refer to the attitudes and the behaviour manifested by members of groups collectively or individually. The characteristic of an inter-group attitude or an inter-group behaviour is that, it is related to the individual's membership in a group (Sherif Muzafer, et.al., 1954/61: 198).

In shaping the reciprocal attitudes of members of two groups toward one another, the limiting determinant is the nature of functional relations between the groups. The groups in question may be competing to attain some goal or some vital prize so that the success of one group necessarily means the failure of the other. One group may have claims on another group in the way of managing, controlling or exploiting them, in the way of taking over their actual or assumed rights or possessions. On the other hand, groups may have complementary goals, such that each may attain its goal without hindrance to the achievement of the other and even aiding this achievement (Ibid).

Even though the nature of relations between groups is the limiting condition, various other factors have to be brought into the picture for an adequate accounting of the resulting inter-group trends and inter-group products (such as norms for positive or negative treatment of the other

group, stereotypes of one's own group and the other group, etc.). Among these factors are, the kind of leadership, the degree of solidarity, the kind of norms prevailing within each group. Reciprocal inter-group appraisals of their relative strengths and resources, and the intellectual level attained in assessing their worth and rights in relation to others need special mention among these factors. The frustrations, deprivations and the gratifications in the life histories of the individual members also have to be considered (Sherif Muzafer, et.al., 1954/61: 199). But none of these singly determines the trend of inter-group behaviour at a given time. They all contribute to the structuring of inter-group behaviour, but with different relative weights at different times.

The classical definition of inter-group relations was originally provided by Sherif (1966: 12), who suggested: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of inter-group behaviour." Within organizational theory, the term inter-group relations refers to both individual interactions involving members from different groups and the collective behaviour of groups in interaction with other groups, at either the intra- or inter-organizational levels. The study of inter-group relations has recently enjoyed a considerable resurgence from social scientists (For example, Brett and Rognes, 1986; Brewer, 2003; Brown and Gaertner, 2001; Mackie and Smith, 2001; Sedikides, Schopler, and Insko, 1998). This resurgence has been driven in part by contemporary conflicts that have highlighted the importance of understanding the origins of inter-group tensions and how those tensions can be reduced or eliminated. It reflects also increasing recognition of the importance of inter-group co-operation. Several important traditions distinguish how inter-group relations have been conceptualized in organizational theory (Alderfer and Smith, 1982 in Sherif, 1966).

Inter-group relations as used in this study therefore, depict the harmonious/cordial and antagonistic/hostile relationship that existed or exists between or among ethno-religious groups in Zango Kataf Local Government.

2.3 Forms and Causes of Conflicts

The multi-dimensionality of conflict cannot be overemphasised. In other words, there are different forms and causes of conflicts to include ethnic, religious, political, economic and social among others (Aluforo, 2011: 116, Tijani et.al, 2012: 2114 & Salawu, 2010: 346).

Some violent conflicts are therefore, ascribed to grievances arising from limited economic opportunities, poverty and inequalities. Here, violent conflict is hinged on a number of grievances such as systematic discrimination and gross human rights violation, inequality in economic and political power, or dearth of resources especially in multi-ethnic society. In this regard, conflict is perceived as being instrumentalised as a means of seeking redress. It is also believed that the dominant propellant of conflict is economic benefits and commercial interest. This presupposes that the preoccupation of the belligerents and insurgents is the economic spoils and booty that they appropriate from the protracted violent clashes (Alufero, 2011: 117). In an attempt to explain what transforms a non-violent conflict into a violent one, Davies (1973: 251) stated that the existence of frustration of substantive (physical, social-affection, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or implemental needs (security, knowledge, and power) is the essential condition for one non-violent conflict to escalate into violent. He then said: *"Violence as a response is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated."*

Social conflicts become possible when some groups are discriminated against or deprived of satisfaction of their basic (material) needs on the basis of their identity (Best, 2006: 50-51).Under the anxiety of actual denial of basic needs, the probability that people will react violently is

increased (Maclean, 1975). In this area, they see the recognition and protection of identity as the most important in explaining conflict situations. According to Crighton, (1991: 127):

> *Social conflicts that take long to resolve are identity-driven and grow out of the feelings of powerlessness and memories of past persecution. Conflicts that are caused by a crisis of identity are usually the most dangerous and most violent (Best, 2006: 50).*

Religious intolerance is a major factor in conflict situations and it means the inability of some people, be they individuals or groups to tolerate the weakness or deviant behaviour of other members (National Teachers' Institute, 1990:34). Such intolerance often leads to tension, discord, hostility and possibly result to violent confrontation (Ibrahim, 2000: 117). Ashaka (2001) opines:

> *The increasing incidences of violent religious conflicts in this country can be linked to the growing number of both fanatical Christians and Islamic groups in some parts of the country. These religious fanatics carry their dogma, beliefs and sectarian religious view to the extreme. They are often prepared to wage war against those who have contrary beliefs and maintain different mode of worship or religious principles and practice that are not acceptable to them. The fanatics therefore have no regard for the fundamental human rights which guarantee freedom of worship for the citizens. More so, religious fanaticism engenders religious bigotry, hostility and possibly violent reaction against opposing or differing religious groups. Most of the widespread religious disturbances in some parts of the country are widely believed to be the hand work of some religious extremist (Ashaka, 2001:1).*

In a similar vein, some militant religious leaders tend to inculcate that attitude of militancy on their followers. Such leaders are often very dogmatic, narrow-minded, and intolerant and advocate social exclusion for their followers. Any religious leaders who have these personality traits are more often than not, pre-disposed to use their followers to achieve narrow religious objectives or inordinate personal ambition. This, according to Omotunde (1991), may lead to out-break of religious riot.

Religion and ethnicity have been manipulated causing violent conflicts and the elite have been central to these manipulations. The state and conservative elite have manipulated, exploited and

utilised identity diversities at both regional and ethno-religious levels causing most sectarian conflicts, posing a potential source of disunity among the peoples (Toure, 2003: 86).

According to Kukah, (2003), religion was used as a platform for the crises in Kaduna State between 1984 and 1987. To him, the military strengthened new elite among the minorities after the collapse of the Second Republic who manipulated religion causing conflicts because the military regulated freedom. He opines:

> *However, because military rule regulates freedom, religion increasingly became the platform for socio-political articulation across the country. It also becomes a tool for the emergence of a cross cutting cleavage. The religious riots which occurred in parts of Kaduna State demonstrate a turning point in inter-communal relations (Kukah, 2003: 184).*

According to Toure (2003), Kaduna State is made up of about forty (40) ethnic groups, predominantly Christians and Muslims that would further enhance development of the society but has become a source of conflict. He opines: "*Ironically, with all its varieties, on which its strength is supposed to be drawn for advancement of society, the area has been a flashpoint characterised by sectarian conflictuality (Toure, 2003: 27)"*.

Ethnicity according to Nnoli (1978:5) refers to a social phenomenon associated with interactions among members of different ethnic groups. It emerges when the members of an ethnic group become characterized by a common consciousness of their identity in relations to other groups with in-group and out-group differences becoming marked with time. Such exclusivist identity-based discrimination undoubtedly results in conflicts over scarce economic resources and socio-political goods.

Eruption of violent conflicts is linked with group pluralism and interactions to achieve their diverse objectives (Deeka, 2002). In seeking relevance or retention of political power, the elites manipulate and massage religious and ethnic sentiments. Many of the ethnic clashes and

sectarian conflagrations are rooted in the context of the group conflict theoretical assumption (Jega, 2002).

The above shows that the heterogeneous nature of the country is one of the major causes of frequent inter-ethnic conflicts. Although this is noticeable in situations that give rise to competition for scarce political and economic resources, Nnoli (1978) observed:

> *Conflicts are important aspect of ethnicity. This is inevitable under conditions of inter-ethnic competition for scarce valuable resources particularly in societies where inequalities are accepted as natural and wealth is greatly much esteemed (Nnoli, 1978: 8).*

Otite (1999:20-22), also argues that most conflicts in Nigeria are premised on land space and resource competition; disputed jurisdiction of traditional rulers; creation and location of local government council headquarters; scarce political and economic resources; micro and macro social structures of Nigeria; population growth; and disregard for cultural symbols.

There has also been the continuous question of governance with key issues of social equality, citizenship, community rights, participation of people in decision-making and democracy in the fore (Toure, 2003: 27). Chris (2009) opines:

> *While the roots of ethnic and religious conflicts have been linked to colonialism and the cold war (Machava, 2008:2), other scholars argue that ethnic and religious conflicts are rooted in bad governance, politicization of ethnic and religious identities, the competition and conflict for political power by the ethnic and religious communities respectively (Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1999 in Chris, 2009: 106).*

To Salawu (2010), the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments to forge national integration and promote real economic progress through deliberate and articulated policies has led to mass poverty and unemployment which has in turn resulted into communal, ethnic, religious and class conflicts that have characterized the Nigerian nation. He opines:

> *Poverty and unemployment have therefore served as nursery bed for many ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria because the country now has a reservoir of poor people who warmongers as mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people*

> *who are prepared to kill or be killed for a given course at token benefit (Salawu, 2010: 348).*

The challenges of managing Nigeria's political and ethnic plurality have not been an easy task. The ethnic problem has posed a number of threats to the legitimacy of the national government and its ability to offer leadership appropriate to the demand of nation-building. The mobilization of ethnic sentiments and solidarity seeking to gain or retain relevance has fuelled anxiety, suspicion, fear of domination and outright conflicts (Osumah and Okor, 2009).

The recurring incidences of conflicts in religious and Inter-ethnic as well as political and economic forms in some parts of the country have become a major national problem in contemporary Nigerian society. Both religious conflicts and Inter-ethnic among other forms of crises are frequent and devastating in the country that they are threatening the existence of individuals and the nation at large. Ukpabi (1989:106) observed that in Nigeria, the political circumstances out of which conflicts might arise have never been lacking since the end of British colonial rule in 1960. He noted that problems have been encountered by the various groups in the country in their efforts to fashion a workable interaction between power and concert, freedom and obligation as well as between the nationalities themselves and the nation state to which they belong. In such situations, Ukpabi observed there would always be interest to defend, project or violate during which violent conflicts may not be avoided.

Summarily, conflicts in Nigeria have been linked with the accusations and allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry. In every nation (Nigeria inclusive), there is no complete agreement on how wealth, power and status are to be shared among individuals and groups. There is also no agreement on how to effect necessary changes and reforms. This is because, different groups and individuals have diverse interests in which case, some groups will have their aims met, while others will not.

What this means is that conflict usually occur when deprived groups and individuals attempt to increase their share of power and wealth or to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs or ideology. The overall consequence of this is the escalation of conflicts that are witnessed all over the country today which are meant to correct any perceived form of marginalization, oppression or domination (Salawu, 2010: 348).

2.4 Conflicts and its Impact in Nigeria

Based on past experiences, conflicts in Nigeria which begin as politically or economically based frequently assume ethnic and/or religious dimensions. Also, experience shows that violent conflicts in Nigeria are always physical and take the form of ethnic or religious or a combination of both (ethno-religious). In other words, ethno-religious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of inter-group crisis in Nigeria. Ethno-religious conflict, therefore, according to Salawu (2010) means:

> *a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation (Salawu, 2010: 347).*

Partly because of their tendency to spill over from their initial theatres into other localities, states, or even regions of the country, ethno-religious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of inter-group crisis in Nigeria. They have occurred mainly in the Middle-Belt and cultural borderline states of the Muslim North, where Muslim Hausa-Fulani groups have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups in a "dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities, in which it is often difficult to differentiate between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin (International IDEA 2000: 296)".

The major examples of violent conflicts in Nigeria have included Tafawa Balewa clashes in 1991, 1995 and 2000, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, and the Jos riots of 2001. Although no

exact figures of casualties are available, the Kaduna riots of 2000 and the Jos riots of 2001, each claimed several hundreds of lives and generated violent ripple effects beyond Kaduna and Jos respectively (Eghosa and Suberu, 2005: 19).

Two events in Kano in the early eighties signalled the beginning of the end of the post-civil war peace in Nigeria. The first involved the Maitatsine (or "Yan Tatsine") riots of December 1980, which claimed thousands of lives and set the tone for subsequent riots involving the Maitatsine heretical, anti-materialist, Islamic sect in other northern cities like Bulunkutu, Yola, Jimeta and Gombe (Chistelow 1985 ;Lubeck 1985, 1986, in Eghosa and Suberu, 2005: 18). The second event was the destruction of churches and other properties belonging to Christians by Muslim mobs protesting the construction of a church in Kano's Muslim heartland in October 1982 (Eghosa and Suberu, 2005: 18).

In 1994 at Jos-North, Jos plateau state of Nigeria, inter-ethnic conflict broke between the Hausa-Fulani settler community and the Berom tribe, Afizere tribe and Anaguta tribe over the appointment a Chairman of Jos-North Local Government Area. Also in 1997 another Inter-ethnic conflict between a tribe called Igbirra and the tribe called Bassa, and between Gade tribe and Gbagyi tribe over the control of a town called Toto and Umaisha districts of Toto Local Government Area of Nasarawa State of Nigeria and a host of others (Ibrahim James, 2000:117).

In October, 2000, another violent conflict in the form of ethno-religious occurred. This was the Lagos-(Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba) Kano mayhems. The cause of this was the misunderstanding between the Hausa residents and the Yoruba in Idi-Araba in Lagos over the use of a convenience by a Hausa resident, as a result of this misunderstanding many Yoruba residents of the area were killed with bows, arrows and machetes. Responding, the O' dua People Congress (a Yoruba militia) came into the picture and things worsened. Later, Oko-Oba, another Lagos suburb with a

high population of Hausa/Fulani stock joined the fray of madness. The violence later spread to Kano and as expected the southerners were mostly the victims (Ibid, Pp.347).

One ethno-religious conflict that left a remarkable mark in Nigeria was the Kaduna/Enugu riots. The root cause of this set of riots was the introduction of the Islamic Legal Code (Sharia) by some governors of the northern states of Nigeria. Governor Ahmed Yerima of Zamfara State first introduced the Islamic Legal Code in October 1999, which was greeted with pockets of unserious protest. Initially, not much harm was committed as a result of the protests over the introduction of the Sharia code. However, the hitherto subdue fire was ignited when Governor Mohammed Makarfi of Kaduna State tried it in February 2000. Because of the deep seated animosities between the Muslims and Christians in Kaduna State in general and the state capital in particular, coupled with the fact that both are almost at par in population, the two went for their swords and many were slain or slayed in cold blood (Salawu, 2010: 346).

2.5 Conflicts and Inter-Group Relations Southern in Kaduna and Zango Kataf Local Government Area

Kaduna State has, from the 20th Century occupied a volatile position in the history of ethno-religious tensions and conflicts in Nigeria. It has experienced varied complex conflicts – sometimes subtle and at other, violent – most expressed in ethno-religious forms (Toure, 2003: 27). In the Southern part, there had been unequal political relationship between the Hausa/Fulani group and the pagan community (now Christians) of the area which has been compounded by religious differences and the political, cultural and religious cleavages between these communities in the Zaria Emirate have been reinforced by economic imbalance (Suberu, 1996: 50). He asserted:

> *The differences between the majority and minority communities in Zaria Emirate over traditional political control, culture, religion and resource*

> *distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitations and confrontations (Ibid).*

Between 1987 and 1999, the Southern part of Kaduna State recorded three violent conflicts that resulted in wanton destruction of properties and loss of lives in an unprecedented manner. Sa'idu (1999) asserted:

> *For the third time in twelve years, an organised army of head hunters, brandishing the banners of 'indigeneity' and 'struggle for self-determination', had set upon a peaceful Fulani, Hausa and associated community in Southern Kaduna State and have slaughtered dozens of innocent lives and looted and burnt down hundreds of houses, stores, business premises, offices and vehicles in Jema'a local government. The first time, it was at Kafanchan in March 1987, and then followed the massacre of hundreds of Hausa, Fulani and others presumed to be Hausa or Fulani at Zango Kataf in February and May, 1992 (Sa'idu, 1999: 1).*

This is an indication that a turning point in Nigeria's relapse into inter-group strife was the 1987 Kafanchan-Kaduna ethno-religious riots which revived the age-old tensions between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani and non-Muslim communities throughout the North and beyond. The deluge of inter-group conflicts that has afflicted Nigeria since the Kafanchan-Kaduna crisis may be classified into the following four main, often overlapping, types: ethno-religious clashes, inter-ethnic violence, intra-ethnic and/or intra-religious conflicts, and inter-group economic clashes (Toure, 2003: 27). The Kafanchan College of Education Muslim/Christian riots which according to Kukah, (1993: 185) started on the 6th of March, 1987 as a minor internal misunderstanding among the Muslim and Christian students of the College of Education in Kafanchan, Kaduna State, finally sent sparks of fire whose destruction went beyond Kafanchan to other parts of the state, and threatened the stability of the entire country.

Similarly, Suberu (1996) asserted:

> *The Kafanchan disturbances of March, 1987 started as theological disagreements between Christian and Muslim students of Kafanchan Teacher's College, Kafanchan in Jema'a Emirate of Southern Zaria. The disagreement rapidly degenerated into fracas which spilled into Kafanchan town and ignited*

> *age-old tensions between the politically dominant Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers located in the town centre on the one hand, and the numerically larger and predominantly Christian and/or animist non-Hausa/Fulani natives inhabiting the town's suburbs on the other (Suberu, 1996: 52).*

According to Bala Ade Dauke, another major centre of trouble has been the sleepy railway town of Kafanchan in the southern part of Kaduna State. There dozens of small ethnic groups have been struggling for years to obtain recognition of their chiefs as independent of the Hausa Emir who rules in the Jema'a part of Kafanchan town (Bala, in Karl Maier, 1999: 23).

In November 1998, when the 90-year-old Emir of Jema'a, Alhaji Isa Muhammadu Mohammed died, his death set off an immediate controversy, with local ethnic groups demanding that they have their own chief (Ibid). According to Dauke (1999),

> *On 26 November 1998, the indigenous ethnic groups of the area wrote to the state governor, Colonel Farouk Ahmed, warning that there would be trouble if the Government attempted to install the new Emir, who is the son of the late Emir, without addressing their concerns. The letter reportedly said that "we cannot be held responsible for any breakdown in law and order in the area (Dauke, 1999: 24).*

The controversy appeared to be smoothed over after the Hausa community agreed that the indigenous groups could have their own chief while the assorted ethnic groups acceded in allowing the new Emir to be installed as representatives of the two sides met on 7th May, 1999 to confirm the agreement. Two weeks later, against the expectations of the Hausa community and the local non-Muslim groups, preparations were begun for the ceremony to install the new Emir. By the time the governor, Colonel Ahmed, arrived on the outskirts of town from the state capital, Kaduna, Kafanchan was engulfed in a riot. Dozens of people were injured, several reportedly killed, and hundreds of shops and homes, including the Emir's palace, were damaged by a series of raging fires (Bala Ade Dauke, 1999: 23).

The religious disturbance that engulfed Kaduna metropolis in the year, 2000 affected many parts of the state, Kachia inclusive. The immediate cause of the disturbance in Kachia and its environs was the attack on Kachia by Christians of Gumel (See Government White paper, 2001: 10) and also the assertion that there was serious disharmony between the chairman, the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and the District Heads of Kachia Local Government (Ibid).

The movement of corpses from Kaduna in the February 2000 disturbances to Kagoma in Jema'a Local Government also resulted in burning of some houses and Mosques (See Government White Paper, 2001: 11). Similarly, the burning of some houses and a Mosques in Kwoi, Chori and Nok was as a result of the confirmation of the death of four (4) prominent Jaba (Ham) sons in the February 2000 Kaduna conflict (White Paper, 2011: 12).

In Zango Kataf, there have been agitations and revolts since the pagan period. Selective recruitment in terms of employment and education or even discrimination in the amount paid to workers created disharmony and led to opened resentment among the people of the Zaria province and the district head of Zango in the 1950s (Laraba Nyam, 1990: 349). She cited for instance:

> *Throughout the pagan area, the clerical work was done by the staff of the district head who was Hausa/Muslim but the social organisation in the Northern district was not tribal. The Village heads in nearly all cases in the Northern District had his own scribes who kept the village registers, issued receipts, corresponded with District Heads and performed all the clerical work which in the pagan districts was purely conducted by Moslem scribes of the District Heads. This situation of using Moslem scribes continued up to the 1950s and it was bound to create discord among the people in the province (Nyam, 1990: 349).*

By the 1950s, tension had developed to a head and evidence of a breakup was eminent. All these agitations continued until 1992 when a violent clash engulfed the area. In 1992, a village of

Zango-Kataf exploded into several days of violence over the decision of the local Kataf authorities to move their central market from the Hausa section of the community where it had traditionally been located (Bala Ade Dauke in Kalr Maier, 1999: 24).

> *On February 6, 1992, a violent inter-ethnic clash started between the Atyap and the Hausa, even as the authorities had information in relation to the tension surrounding the movement of a market in Zango to a new site and the counter action to block it. The first casualties were some people at the new market. There was a swift counter-attack as Zango town was encircled and attacked by the Atyap militants. Many lives were lost (Extract in Citizen, 1992: 15).*

The conflict was worsened by the partisan pronouncements in some high government quarters, both at the national and state levels, in support of either the Hausa/Fulani Muslims or the atyap Christian communities. According to Mustapha (1997), *"the southern Nigeria based press with its history of "anti-Hausa/Fulani hegemony," sided with the Atyap (Mustapha, 1997: 219)."*And to Bungwon and Gimba (1992), *"Muslim organizations were in support of the Hausa, while the Christian groups were promoting the Atyap cause. Dominant Atyap elite became desperate because of the strong family connection in Zango of both the then secretary to the federal government and the governor of Kaduna State (Bungwon and Gimba, 1992:3)"*

Sentiments took-over and hardly were there serious attempts to checkmate the conflict. A remote cause of the Atyap uprising was linked with an incident at Zango market in March 1946 where Atyap women were molested and beaten up by some Hausa youth, after the former had resisted compulsory sweeping of the market place (Toure, 2003: 136).

In March, 2001, a violent conflict blew out between the Bajju and Ikulu over claims of "territorial" ownership of land and a town (Toure, 2003: 163). This shows that Hausa dominance is no longer the only issue but that new historical and ahistorical claims are springing up, with a

new dimension of inter-and-intra-ethnic rivalries, some of it drawn on clannish levels hitherto thought extinct.

2.6 Summary and Gap in the Literature

There are different perspectives of conflict ranging from psychological to social, political, economic, ethnic, religious, and anthropological among others, with their different definitions. Apart from the psychological which takes an individualistic view, all other perspectives take the social (interpersonal or inter-group) view. Social conflict is viewed as:

> *a struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals (David, 1968: 232).*

In spite of the vast and growing literature on the causes and impact of conflicts in Nigeria generally, there is still a yawning gap in these studies. Most of the studies are viewpoints based on generalisations and not empirical micro studies in terms of causes and impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations. The causes and impact of conflicts are multi-dimensional and vary over time and space with diverse degrees of consequences, which have not received adequate attention and analysis. There is a general believe that conflicts have devastating effect but the details of the impact of violent conflict on inter-group relations, especially at the micro level and Zango Kataf Local Government in particular has not been well focused. This study has attempted to address some of these issues.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are many theories that can be applied to explain the topic under study such as conflict theory, Group theory, Marxist political economic theory, relative deprivation theory, frustration aggression theory, micro and macro approach, greed and grievance analytical framework, and

systemic pathologies among others but we adopted cultural-pluralism in this research exercise because we feel it appears most suitable.

According to Crawford Young (1979: 17), John Sydenman Furnivall was a British-born colonial public servant and writer who worked in pre-war Indonesia and Burma and he analysed cultural pluralism to explain a situation where European residents, intermediate immigrant groups such as Chinese or Indians and indigenous populations shared habitation of the same land, were part of the same economy, interacted with one another, yet in the most important domains of social life, they remained wholly separate, "each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways."

Michael Garfield Smith, a Jamaican social anthropologist and poet of international repute enlarged and transformed J. S. Furnivall's analysis of cultural pluralism into a theory. In Smith's conception, a plural society is composed of socially or culturally defined collectivities demarcated by wholly separate and autonomous institutional structures. The collectivities are closed corporations; they are bound within a state framework through the domination of one group, for whom the state becomes the agency of subjugation. Thus, pluralism has as its natural corollary, inequality and stratification (Ibid).

The cultural pluralism as a theory focuses on the social structure and identifies the socio-cultural forces that influence the political process that determine the structure of political relations in society. The model is of the view that African societies are made up of many ethnic groups of varying sizes and influence. These groups are seen as culturally distinct from each other on the basis of language, social organisation, values, beliefs and other cultural characteristics. These various groups also have different interest and aspirations and tend to assert their differences and

power relation to other groups. This theory is analytically geared to the existence of groups vying for influence, control and domination (Barongo, 1983: 141). Here, the theory lays more emphasis on the endemic antagonism in political life between various interests and principles. That is the contradiction arising from differences in interests, ideas, orientations, perceptions and tendencies among others. In this situation, there is competition or struggle over state or political power, struggle over values, claims to status and scarce resources, which ultimately lead to violent confrontations, suppression and oppression, domination and marginalisation syndrome, etc.

The theory emphasises the role of culturally induced conflict. Ethnicity, language, region and religion interactively form Nigeria's matrix of cultural pluralism (Young, 1979: 276). Political competition in the Nigerian arena placed ethnicity in the centre of public cognition of political struggle (Ibid, Pp.5). It contains that even though there are different forms of identities, the one that is based on people's ethnic origin and the culture that is learned on the basis of that ethnic origin is one of the most important ways of explaining violent conflicts. Identity is thus seen to be the reason for social conflicts. The theory argues that social conflicts become possible when some groups are discriminated against or deprived of satisfaction of their basic (material) needs on the basis of their identity (Best, 2006: 50-51). According to Maclean, (1975), under the anxiety of actual denial of basic needs, the probability that people will react violently is increased.

The theorists in this area see the recognition and protection of identity as the most important in explaining conflict situations. According to Crighton, (1991: 127):

> *Social conflicts that take long to resolve are identity-driven and grow out of the feelings of powerlessness and memories of past persecution. Conflicts that are caused by a crisis of identity are usually the most dangerous and most violent (Best, 2006: 50).*

The theory therefore emphasizes the ever continuing aggressiveness, rivalry and competition, among the various cultural groups in a multi-cultural society (Barongo, 1983: 141).

2.7 Relevance of the Theory

The choice of cultural-pluralism in this research is largely influenced by the plural nature of the local government under study which is made up of ethnic groups such as Atyap, Bajju, Ikulu, Hausa/Fulani and Anghan among others as well as religious groups such as Islam and Christianity. This means that the study area is made up of different ethnic groups of varying sizes and influence. These groups are to a larger extent culturally distinct from each other on the basis of language, social organization, values, beliefs and other cultural features. They also have various or different interests and aspirations and tend to use the resources available to them to assert their differences and power in relation to other groups. The struggle, competition and antagonism/hostility among these groups have become very intense where larger ones attempt to ensure their dominance over the others by controlling key resources and power while the minority groups struggle for recognition and fair deal in the distribution of these resources.

In terms of this theory, the political life of the study area is organized around the desire by the various ethnic groups to further and protect their own interests. And these interests are culturally defined and have to do with what groups possess as distinct communities and what they can get from others in a competitive situation. Accordingly, the political behaviour of the people in power has been influenced by particularistic considerations. The leaders have used their power to ensure the dominance of the groups to which they belong and those groups which are excluded from political power for the time being engaged in the struggle for power and the resources. This has created a tug-of-war and I therefore examine cultural-pluralism as a possible explanation for

what motivates groups, whether ethnic, religious or otherwise to engage in conflicts or commit violent attacks in Zango Kataf Local Government Area.

2.8 Critique of the Theory

The model assumes that the various ethnic groups which constitute the polity exist as separate communities, each with its own distinct cultural values, institutional patterns and political orientations. Nowhere in black Africa does one find such well-defined and self-contained cultural units. In its original formulation and application, the theory attempted with remarkable success to grapple with the realities of a colonial society in which race or colour played an important part in structuring social relations and distributing wealth, power and prestige among the different cultural groups in society. In contemporary Africa, the theory might conceivably be applied profitably to the racially and culturally heterogeneous white-dominated societies of Southern Africa. But in black African countries where patterns of action and political alignments on the basis of ethnic identity are fluid, depending on the situation and the issues involved, an attempt to make the ethnic factor a major variable in the analysis and explanation of African politics is problematic and misleading. This theoretical perspective is western-derived and therefore does not provide useful framework for the understanding of the dynamics of African politics (Barongo, 1983: 141-142). It is primarily the material environment that determines the formation of cleavages between social groups with competing interests, thereby defining the character and structure of political interaction in a competitive-bargaining situation. Moreover, it is the material resources actually or potentially available to individuals and groups in the polity that determines their relative importance, influence and power (Ibid, Pp144).

Again, violent political competition and the existence of unstable political relationships among groups and individuals cannot be said to be inherent in the nature of African societies. Nor is cultural heterogeneity a peculiar feature of these societies making African politics different from that of the United States of America, Canada or even the United Kingdom, all of which are equally heterogeneous societies (Barongo, 1983: 143). The reasons why African politics differ from those of developed countries are related to differences in the historical and contemporary experiences of African countries (Ibid).

The theory suffers from being static and ahistorical. It is non-explanatory because, being static and ahistorical, the perspective is not able to help the analyst in identifying the essential variables that must be taken into account to understand and explain the nature, the content and the dynamics of African politics. Since the theory limits explanations to why a particular phenomenon occurs in a particular society, scholars using it do not seek possible explanations beyond the confines of the immediate environment in which it occurs. They look for explanations only within the boundaries of the social structure of the society concerned, usually overlooking even the incremental changes in society and the problems they create. It is ahistorical because it does not take into account the historical experience of a society as a major variable in explaining contemporary patterns of behaviour. The model is primarily concerned with the present and to it, the present has no past. The matter here is to look at the existing society and identify the forces that account for what is happening in it (Barongo, 1983: 142).

To really understand the nature and dynamics of contemporary African politics, one has to go back into history to see how African societies have developed over time since the advent of colonialism and imperialism and understand their present condition. The historical experience of a society is important in influencing political behaviour if it provides a perspective within which

a problem can be perceived and defined. It is the experience of the past that helps an individual particularly one faced with a problem, to understand and interpret the present and to be able to predict with a reasonable high degree of certainty the possible outcomes of his/her actions. History gives meaning to present problems, it generates new ideas, creates norms and lays down traditions which sanction and constrain behaviour. The historical experience presents the decision-maker with a set of experimented courses of action from which he can choose when approaching a particular problem (Barongo, 1983: 144).

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND OF ZANGO KATAF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter essentially deals with the background of the study area (Zango Kataf Local Government Area). It is basically concerned with a brief history of the local government under study and the pre-conflict inter-group relations in the local government.

3.2 Brief History

Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State was one of the additional local governments created in the federation out of the present Kachia Local Government on the 27th of May, 1989, by the then military regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. It has a vast

area with scenic landscape. A land of abundant natural resources, Zango Kataf Local Government is home to one of the largest grazing and forest reserves in Kaduna State (Zango Kataf Local Government Pamphlet, 2008). There is a waterfall at Matsirga which serves as a beautiful holiday resort. There is also the Ancient Care in Kabam Kamantan which serves as a hide out for warriors during wars (Ibid).

According to the 2006 projection, Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State has an estimated population of 350, 000 with the male population amounting to 165,658 and the female 160,909 (2006 Population & Housing Census).

The four major ethnic groups of Zango Kataf Local Government include the Bajju (Kaje) with an estimated population of 142,180, Atyap (Kataf) – 97,859, Bekulu (Ikulu) – 50,354 and Anghan (Kamantan) – 22,818. Others include Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, and Tiv among others with an estimated population of 13,356 with the Hausa/Fulani having a larger share of the population of the so-called minority as 12,388 and the others put together, 968 (Ibid).

There are three religions in the local government as Islam, Christianity and traditional with Islam and Christianity the major ones (Zango Kataf Local Government Pamphlet, 2008). Until the 1960s, the population of the local majorities was largely "animist" but later converted and presently predominantly Christians (Toure, 2003: 118). For the Hausa and Fulbe (Fulani), who are local minorities, they have been predominantly Muslims for hundreds of years. The missionaries came with an aversion for all forms of extant religions but had an unparallel dislike for Islam and by implication the places, peoples and areas it had taken root became unsuccessful in their mission to convert souls (Yahaya, 2012: 71). Perhaps, due to historical, religious and political reasons, the other ethnic groups or communities (local majorities) have principally

perceived the Fulbe (Fulani) as allies of the Hausa. But in reality, until recently, the Fulbe (Fulani), physically and socially, have been living together in settlements with the other ethnic groups (local majorities) than they have with the Hausa (Ibid).

There have also been inter-marriages, mostly of the women from the other ethnic groups to the Fulbe (Fulani) and partly to the Hausa. Perhaps, mostly due to religion, by which Muslim men are allowed to marry non-Muslim women (but not so Muslim women to non-Muslim men), Fulbe (Fulani) women have not been marrying in other communities but rather among them and to the Hausa (Toure, 2003: 118-119).

The local government is made up of four (4) chiefdoms as Bajju, Atyap, Anghan and Ikulu with fifty-three (53) districts, presented below:

Table 3.6.1 Anghan Chiefdom

Kamantan Ward (Ten Districts)
Bale
Fadan Kamantan
Fadiya Gida
Fadiya Tudun Wada
Gidan Maga
Kabam
Kangun
Kanzir
Yangal
Zaku

Source: Information Unit, Zango Kataf Local Government

Table 3.6.2 Atyap Chiefdom

Gora Ward (Three Districts)	**U/Gaya Ward (Two Districts)**	**Zaman Dabo Ward (Seven Districts)**	**Zango Urban Ward (One District)**	**Zonzon Ward (Three Districts)**
Bafei Gora	Mabushi	Gidan Zaki	Zango Urban	Magamiya
Gan Gora	Ungwan Gaya	Jankasa		Ungwan Ruhugo

Manyigwui		Kanai Mdi		Zonzon
		Kibori		
		Kwaku		
		Manchong		
		Zaman Dabo		

Source: Information Unit, Zango Kataf Local Government

Table 3.6.3 Bajju Chiefdom

Gidan Jatau Ward (Four Districts)	**Madakiya Ward (Five Districts)**	**U/Rimi Ward (Four Districts)**	**Zonkwa Ward (Four Districts)**
Abet	Aduwan	Anfana	Abobo
Farman	Ataat	Kpunyai-Chenchuck	FadanKaje
Kamrum	Ayagan	Marsa	Kurmin BI
Zuturung	Madakiya	UngwanRimi	Zonkwa
	Tsoriyang		

Source: Information Unit, Zango Kataf Local Government

Table 3.6.4 Ikulu Chiefdom

Ikulu Ward (Ten Districts)
Anchuna
Anpaga
Ashafa
DutsenBako
Fansil
Getei
Kamuru
Laduga
Yade
Zagom

Source: Information Unit, Zango Kataf Local Government

The Bajju chiefdom is headed by Agwam Bajju, Anghan chiefdom by Ngbair Anghan, Ikulu chiefdom headed by Agwom Ikulu and the Atyap chiefdom headed by Agwa-tyap. Each of the

fifty-three (53) districts above has a district head in charge (Zango Kataf Local Government Pamphlet, 2008).

3.3 Pre-Conflict Inter-group Relations between the Natives and Hausa/Fulani in Zango Kataf Local Government Area

Conflicts in the local government are derived from its background and historical economic and political relationship. In other words, the question as to who controls what and who gains what, which generate conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government Area can be traced to the background and historical economic and political relationship of the local government. According to Toure, (2003):

> *Conflicts in Zango Kataf are largely shaped by historical, political, economic and social processes. Ethnic and religious identity based contestations and conflicts were dominant features of the historical process for most part of the 20th Century (Toure, 2003: 118).*

Conflicts and revolts in the local government have been long and persistent. For decades, in the 20th century, there were complaints, protests and revolts by the communities that perceived themselves as being dominated. The area has witnessed higher rise in conflicting interaction between the Hausa and Fulani and the locals. The native population of the local government have had a long historical, political and economic antagonistic relationship with the so-called Hausa and Fulani Muslim settlers in the area. Central issues included aristocratic oppression, political exclusion and economic marginalisation. Political and other complex conflicts, some of which got violent, kept on exploding. Perceived political dominance and the control of economic power by the Hausa and Fulani gave rise to the expression of struggles largely in ethno-religious terms. Occupying central stage in the dynamics of conflict in Zango Kataf Local Government had been the issue of power relations (Ibid). He summarised the above statement as follows:

> *For the entire colonial epoch, Zangon Kataf was the most restive of all the districts in Zaria Province. It was a sort of melting pot and it produced all sorts of contradictions. The dominant form the revolts took was ethnic. In its specifics was the question of a Hausa minority having dominance in local administration and the economy over the majority ethnic groups (Toure, 2003: 131).*

There had been all sorts of relationships between the Zazzau Emirate dominated by the Hausa and Fulani Muslims and the natives of Zango. This has been the general trend in the Southern part of Kaduna state which always degenerated to conflicts. Suberu, (1996: 48) asserted: "*Ethnic minority tensions and conflicts in Southern Kaduna have probably engendered far more serious violence than any other forms of communal instability in recent Nigerian history"*.

Historically, the area now known as Kaduna State encompasses the old Zaria (Zazzau) emirate and province, and found in this area are two broad cultural segments. Smith (1960: 2) called or referred to these groups as the Mahammadan Hausa and Fulani and the "Pagan Population," with the former constituting 60% of the emirate and occupying mainly the Northern part of the state, while the later occupies the Southern area.

In the pagan-dominated half of the territory within which Zango Kataf Local Government Area is situated or located are to be found the Hausa "in enclaves, walled towns or open villages which are the foci of economic, political and administrative life in their respective areas (Smith, 1960: 2)." The Hausa settlement of Zango was established in the middle of the 18th Century in the homeland of the Atyap people as a mid-way base for long distance traders (Toure, 2003: 120). The Zango town was said to have started off around 1650 AD (Cudjo Report, 1992) as a resting place camp of traders from various parts of Hausa land like Kano, Katsina and Zaria among others (Yahaya, 2012: 68). Gradually, the town evolved into an oasis of some sort as it became the loci of or central to development in the area but was also surrounded by Kataf

(Atyab) settlements (Ibid). This pattern of settlement has contributed enormously to the crystallization of the contours of socio-economic conflict between the Hausa and Fulani group and the pagan communities (Suberu, 1996: 48). Inter-group relations between the Hausa and Fulani and the natives would raise violent and irreconcilable claims by the said groups. While other low scale conflicts between or among 'indigenous' ethnic groups had been common occurrences in most recent past, it was the 1984 Zango Kataf 'disagreements' between the Zango Kataf Hausa and surrounding Kataf communities that served as a turning point in such inter-group relations (Yahaya, 2012: 69). An important issue that had coloured the pattern of interaction between the Hausa and Fulani 'settler' groups and the surrounding 'indigenous' groups is the question of independence and non-subjugation of their land prior to colonial conquest and the ensuing colonial pattern of administration that saw them placed under Hausa district head but felt excluded from the decision-making processes (Ibid).

Practically, colonialism, particularly its appearance in the form of Native Authority or Indirect Rule, to the bulk of the ethnic groups from the southern part of Kaduna State including Zango Kataf Local Government, translates into what they perceived to be their forceful and total subjugation to 'alien rule' (Emirate Rule). The natives considered this as a disregard and humiliation to their culture, customs, traditional institutions and political organisations (Cudjoe, 1992 and SOKAPU, 1994 and 1996). The imposition of this kind of rule and introduction of alien value and culture, with unpleasant laws through the Alkali courts, amounted to ridicule, inhumane treatment and collectively served as a drawback to their progress as a people (Kukah, 1993 in Yahaya, 2012: 69).

In the complex forms of client-age and vassalage which developed between the Hausa and Fulani and the pagan population, the pagans were the traditionally legitimate target for slave raiding, the

exaction of tribute and other forms of domination. Prominent features of ethnic relations in the pre-colonial era were series of incessant slave raids by emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate to the North on the communal polities. Until the British colonization, however, the emirates were unable to establish effective political control over the inhabitants (Spurway 1932 in Toure, 2003: 120 and Yahaya, 2012: 69). Aristocratic rule in Zango Kataf Local Government was imposed in the course of British colonization by the Zaria emirate (Toure, 2003: 120). The incorporated pagan populations were more vulnerable to cultural, economic and political domination by the Hausa and Fulani. They were administered by emirate-appointed district heads (Suberu, 1996: 49).

Some of the slave raids against ethnic groups of Zango Kataf Local Government by the Feudal rulers of the Zazzau are attributed to failure of payment of tribute (Toure, 2003: 121). The evidence of slave raiding can be noticeable in the differences pertaining to the levels of socio-economic development in the Zazzau emirate and the local government. Important is the reality of the time that class differentiation and contradictory socio-economic interests had begun to emerge in the so-called stateless communities, Zango Kataf Local Government Area inclusive (Ibid, Pp124).

This unequal historical political relationship between the Hausa and Fulani group and the pagan community has been compounded by religious differences. As earlier mentioned, Islam is the major religion of the Hausa and Fulani which provides the doctrinal or ideological foundation for the emirate system. The pagan population was formerly animistic but now predominantly Christians.

The political, cultural and religious cleavages between the Hausa-Fulani and the pagan population have been reinforced by economic imbalance between the two groups. Within the Southern Zaria (now Southern Kaduna), socio-economic opportunities and infrastructure improvements have tended to be concentrated in areas or enclaves inhabited by Hausa/Fulani settlers (Smith, 1960; 2, Yahaya, 1980: 74 & Suberu, 1996: 50).

Again, in terms of class formation, the kind of socio-economic system, in addition to the policies of native authority resulted in the local rich class being created only among the Hausa (Toure, 2003: 128). The native were subjected to serious exploitation and extortion in the collection of tax. The non-Hausa traders were also denied stalls at the Zango Market (Toure, 1995) but the Hausa community did not experience these extortions, illegal exploitative practices and ethnic discrimination (Toure, 2003: 129).

It is also important to note that economic relations between the Zazzau and the local government were not only limited to slave raiding as explained above but also had an important dimension of beneficial interactions. In commerce for instance, Hausa Merchants recruited agents in the communities to facilitate trading activities where local trading representatives searched from villages, items of trade such as livestock, grains, honey, rain coats, etc in exchange for the sale of leather works, potash, kola-nuts and clothing by the Hausa (Brandt 1939 in Toure, 2003: 124).

The locals considered the administrative structure to be exclusive, oppressive, wicked and full of misrule on them. The differences between the Hausa and Fulani and the native population over traditional political control, culture and religion as well as resource distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitations and confrontations.

Table 3.4.1 Revolts/Conflicts and Causes

YEAR	ROVOLTS/CONFLICTS (CAUSES)
1910	Peasant revolt against forced labour and taxation
1913	Revolt against forced labour and taxation (non-compliance with forced labour, non-payment of taxes and violent physical attack on Hausa District Officers)
1940	Bajju activists waged agitation and mobilised the community against tyranny, brutalisation and oppression by the Hausa rulers against the Bajju people
1946	Demand for Bajju chiefdom (a complete break away from Hausa dominance)
1946	The continuous payment of taxes without schools, dispensaries, jobs and amenities to show for. Also, resistance to serving forced labour, land expropriation, complaints and protests against ethnic oppression, and discriminatory practices by district rulers. The revolt centred on civil disobedience including refusal to pay taxes, boycott of the Zango market and non-compliance with orders of the authority. The immediate cause was linked with an incident at Zango market in March, 1946, where some Atyap women were molested and beaten by some Hausa youths, after the former had resisted a compulsory sweeping of the market place. The revolt was against "Hausa/Muslim dominance" in Atyap affairs and complain of decades of "oppression at the hands of the Hausawa"
1954	Some Bajju demonstrators confronted principal British officers and instantly demanded for creation of a district for the Bajju community. Emphasis was placed that they did not want a Hausa/Muslim ruler
1972	Atyap forces exploited the long-term anti-Hausa sentiments and mobilised some section of the Atyap community to surround Zango town, with threats of attack on the Hausawa.
1992	Violent inter-ethnic clash took place between the Atyap and Hausawa. The remote cause of the Atyap/Hausa uprising was linked with an incident at Zango market in March, 1946, where some Atyap women were molested and beaten by some Hausa youths, after the former had resisted a compulsory sweeping of the market place while the immediate was the announcement in January by the then chairman of the impending relocation of the Zango weekly market
2001	A violent conflict blew out between the Bajju and Ikulu peoples over claims of "territorial" ownership of land and town

Source: Toure, 2003: 131-162 & Suberu, 1996: 53-56

The historical political, cultural and economic relationship between the Hausa/Fulani Muslim and native Christian groups has played a vital role in the various ethno-religious revolts and conflicts of the local government. The emirate or indirect rule introduced in the local government created a process of a hierarchical social order in which the status of Hausa and Fulani Muslim group had been upgraded above the natives or non-Muslim groups (Turaki in Yahaya, 2012: 70). In the colonial period, the Hausa Muslims were officially portrayed as superior to the so-called

pagans. Rulers from the former were imposed on ethnic communities that were different in terms of language, religion and culture. In the administrative arrangement, the Anghan, Atyap, Bajju and Ikulu villages' and hamlets' heads were subordinated to the Hausa ruling circles (Toure, 2003: 127). The system of colonialism ensured that only a Hausa village head was taking charge of the affairs in the local government (Administrative Policy, 1921: 35). It is this obnoxious imposition of emirate system on a people who resent it for obvious reasons that has historically created endless crises (SOKAPU, 1994: 2 and Yahaya, 2012: 7).

The native authority officials, district staff and hangers-on of the aristocracy were Hausa Muslims in an estimated population of 50,000-60,000 (Toure, 2003: 128). He further stated that as at 1946, there was no single "pagan" or non-Hausa among the district salaried staff.

Economically, in terms of class formation, the kind of socio-economic system in addition to the policies of native authority resulted in the local rich class being created only among the Hausa (Toure, 2003: 128). Colonial policies introduced a complex situation of taxation and its collection, enforced on the district head. The native were subjected to serious exploitation and extortion in the collection of tax. The non-Hausa traders were also denied stalls at the Zango Market (Toure, 1995) but the Hausa community did not experience these extortions, illegal exploitative practices and ethnic discrimination (Toure, 2003: 129 and Yahaya, 2012: 70). In the process, the brutality with which the colonial state was said to have proceeded in the collection of tax through the district head, saw a series of revolts from most of the 'indigenous' ethnic groups in the area (Yohana, 1991 in Yahaya, 2012: 70). There has been a contention that it was in this process that the district heads had gone beyond their limits and dealt with the people in unpalatable ways (Ibid).

The colonialists through deliberate policies introduced, segregated and physically separated the Hausa Muslims from the other ethnic groups in the local government. They (Hausa) were moved to a new settlement (in the centre or heartland of the Atyap community), confiscated land belonging to the Atyap clans and families, and entrusted same to the District Head who was a Hausa Muslim. This process of land expropriation from the Atyap peasants and given to the Hausa community remained a major factor in igniting ethno-religious conflict because the natives were neither allowed to build houses nor live in Zango town (Toure, 2003: 128 and Yahaya, 2012: 71).

Native peasants were compelled to supply forced labour on private farmlands of leading district officials (Ibid). Illegal exaction by Hausa rulers was directed at the natives in discriminatory terms. For instance, they were drafted in the construction and clearing of markets and making repairs on houses of district officials (Toure, 2003: 129, also in Zango Katab, 1946). The women of the native were also forced to sweep markets, provide firewood and carry loads on their heads for Hausa officials for long distances while either travelling or on tour. The natives were also forced to supply grains and livestock for the consumption of district rulers, even in times of drought or famine (Ibid). This kind of relationship between the Hausa and Fulani Muslims and the native population has accounted for or played a key role in the revolts and conflicts in the local government in the preceding years.

Colonialism further strengthened the antagonism between the Hausa and Fulani group and the natives as well as the relationship among the ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups. Political reforms at the micro level received a major boost in the area around 1956 when Village Council Groups were created through the unification of the activities of the various Village Councils heads that were dealing directly with the district head. The chair of the Village Group Council played an

intermediary role between the district head and the numerous village heads (Usman 2002: 182 in Yahaya, 2012: 71). This was expected to reduce the agitations against the emirate rule but it seemed to have deepened and amplified the agitations within the fold of the rising educated elite who felt sidelined in the scheme of things as the qualification for contesting for the headship of the Village Group Council was restricted to only to the village heads. This implies that it served to exclude them from aspiring for the position (James, 2007 and 2009 in Yahaya, 2012: 71). The elite also saw it as another attempt by the emirate to install pliable elements that would do their bidding in the area rather than them (educated elite) who might pose problems to it.

The genuine interest of the various ethnic groups converged with the interest of elite from the emirate and those of the isolated and aggrieved native groups in the area. The relationship provided a fertile ground for the effective mobilisation of the people around issues of 'common' interest while obfuscating the personal interests of such elites from both the emirate and the locals. As it relates to the agitations against the emirate rule, elite of the natives was able to mobilise peasant revolts by the Bajju (Kaje), Kataf (Atyab), Bekulu (Ikulu) and Anghan (Kamantan) in Zango District (Yahaya, 2012: 72). As the agitations persisted and intensified, an indigenous District Head was appointed. This emboldened the non-Hausa groups as it seemed to signify a ground breaking victory and it laid the ground for the acquisition of victor's mentality of some sort while on the part of the Hausa and Fulani 'settler' community, it indicated a threat, loss of power and lack of fair hearing (Toure, 2011).

3.4 Pre-Conflict Inter-group Relations among the Natives of Zango Kataf Local Government Area

As societies change, some patterns of relationships emerge. It is more likely that boundaries become more or less permeable. Equality among ethnic groups either increases or decreases and orientation to outer societies may either grow stronger or weaker. These patterns of intermittent shifts in configuration and accompanying transformation in the forms of interaction and relationships between or among the different ethnic groups will be a crucial component in examining the roots and rising incidents of conflicts involving different ethnic groups in a society. Until recently, the natives of Zango Kataf Local Government Area have lived in cordial terms (Danjuma, 2013: 3). Yahaya, (2012: 69) noted that there were occurrences of conflicts among the natives or indigenous groups but these conflicts occurred among them on a low scale. Recent political developments in the local government studied have ushered in the series of conflicting inter-group relations between or among the natives co-habiting the same space (Ibid). The pre-conflict antagonistic relationship among the natives centred more on issues of power, tax, and land or boundary disputes.

The appointment of an indigenous district head served to spark up the individual agitations of elite from the various ethnic groups in the local government. For example, the appointment of Bala Ade Dauke, an Atyab (Kataf) and Christian as district head, ended up igniting agitations from the elites of Bajju (Kaje), Anghan (Kamantan) and Bekulu (Ikulu) ethnic groups demanding that their individual districts be created for them as they could not live under a an Atyab district head (Yahaya, 2012: 73).

There were also controversies arising from demarcation of boundaries between chiefdoms newly created in the local government. In a white paper report of the committee on demarcation of boundaries between the newly-created chiefdoms in Kaduna state, the Agwatyap, Agwam Bajju and Agwom Ikulu claimed that there is no boundary dispute between or among them (White

Paper, August, 2001: 51). However, the Agwam Bajju insisted that Bajju chiefdom would not like its land or people to be taken to other chiefdoms. This shows clearly that there is conflict already created because some of the settlements of the Bajju fall under other chiefdoms. In a memorandum submitted to the committee on demarcation of boundaries between the newly-created in 2001, the Bajju Development Association (BADA) made a request that made the memorandum in its entirety look more than an ordinary boundary dispute matter. It essentially requested government to excise all Bajju communities from different chiefdoms to form one big Bajju Chiefdom. Some of those communities are Kamuru, Zagom and Fadia Tudun districts in Ikulu chiefdom (White Paper, August 2001: 52).

The above development encouraged or buoyed up cross-boundary payment of taxes and levies which is a negation of the original conception and principles of taxation. District heads, village heads and tax collectors are empowered to collect poll tax from persons who are permanently resident in a geographically demarcated area within the district or Local Government Area (Ibid). But evidences abound on the perpetuation of the practice of cross-boundary taxes and levies by some traditional rulers. District Heads, Village Heads and Ward Heads (Gorori) from Zonkwa, Fadan Kaje and Fadiya districts of Bajju chiefdom collected taxes and levies in the village settlements in Kamuru and environs in Ikulu chiefdom such as Zagom Gajere, Fadiya Aliyu, Zagom Afifan, Rafin Juma'a, Ungwan Jatau, Ungwan Dori, Chirani, Kanshuwa, Tsohon Gida, Rumfa, Ungwan Kassa, etc. (White Paper, August 2001: 15-16). Cross-boundary taxes and levies fraught with its many problems and several negative consequences became the order of the day. It undermined the unity and cohesion of the natives.

In a related development, the Agwom Ikulu in a report submitted to the committee on demarcation of boundaries between newly-created chiefdoms in Kaduna State reiterated the fact

that some villages such as Zuturung Pama 1, the Headquarters of Zuturung district is in Kamantan land (White Paper, August 2001: 51). But contrary to this, Danjuma (2013: 3) in explaining some of the folk traditions in respect of the names called the Anghan (Kamantan) and Bekulu (Ikulu) peoples claimed they occupy territories belonging to the Bajju chiefdom. He stated:

> *"The Anghan came to Kajju as a small band of immigrants apparently escaping from danger and the Bajju received them and settled closed by. The Bajju call them "Babzriak" and "Bzriak" in Jju means keeping something or someone in a place, though precarious, but the best alternative for them. The Bajju calls the Bekulu "Banyet-kurum" and "Kurum" in Jju means to embrace. The Bajju embraced the Bekulu who came to Kajju in distress (Danjuma, 2013: 3)."*

He (Danjuma) further stated that these two groups (Ikulu and Kamantan) are occupying areas which are historically Kajju (Ibid).

In another development, the District Head of Kamuru pointed to the already existed unhealthy relationship between the Bajju and Ikulu. The history of Bajju (Kaje) behaviour culminating in the breach of public peace and order is really an old one (Memo, August 1994: 1). These incidents have repeatedly occurred within and outside Kajju. In Ikulu land, for instance, such unfortunate developments featured prominently, at least twice in recent years. In February 13, 1994, for instance, the incident was over a nomenclature amendment from Kamuru Station to Kamuru Ikulu. After a prolonged controversy in ECWA church over the incident, the General Church Headquarters resolved to visit the church on Sunday 13th, February, 1994 under the leadership of the Church's president and his executives at all levels concerned with the issue and the intention of the president was to worship with the divided congregation and thereafter possibly rule on the controversy. The Bajju, knowing that the ruling might not be in their favour, disrupted and sabotaged the effort of the president by mounting road blocks on access routes,

harassing innocent passer-by, uprooting all signboards bearing “IKULU”, erecting “war flags” at strategic locations, displaying placards and chanting war songs (Memo, November 1994: 1).

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

In the course of the field survey, a total number of two hundred (200) questionnaires were administered to respondents drawn from five major ethnic groups of the local government, who were the key players in the conflicts. One hundred and ninety-three (193 representing 96.5%) of those questionnaires were retrieved. More so, interviews (both conventional and Focused Group Discussion) were conducted with some traditional rulers, religious leaders, officers of Internally Displaced Persons and victims of the conflict. The researcher also employed his experience as a participant observer pertaining to the study area. Data collected through interviews (conventional and Focused Group Discussion) and personal observations are not analyzed separately. Rather, they are analyzed with the ones collected through the questionnaires so as to complement the overall analysis.


4.2 Questionnaire and Interview Data on the Conflicts

As earlier stated in chapter one, in the course of the field survey, a total number of two hundred (200) questionnaires were produced and administered to respondents among the major ethnic groups of the local government. One hundred and ninety-three (193 representing 96.5%) of those questionnaires were retrieved. The table below shows the number of questionnaires retrieved from the respondents.

Table 4.2.1: Questionnaires Retrieved per Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Atyap	**57**	**29.5**	**29.5**
Bajju	**84**	**43.5**	**73.0**
Hausa/Fulani	**08**	**4.2**	**77.2**
Ikulu	**30**	**15.5**	**92.7**
Kamantan	**14**	**7.3**	**100.0**
Total	**193**	**100.0**	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The above distribution shows that 57(29.5%) questionnaires were retrieved from the Atyap ethnic community, 84(43.5%) from the Bajju, 08(4.2%) from the Hausa/Fulani, 30(15.5%) from the Ikulu and 14(7.3%) from the Kamantan people. This implies that a total number of 193(96.5%) questionnaires were retrieved from the 200 administered. The formula adopted in

drawing respondents from each of the five ethnic groups in the local government is stated in the methodology in chapter one. The formula to a greater extent, gave the sampling process reliability and validity.

Table 4.2.2: Sex of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Male	101	52.3	52.3
Female	86	44.6	96.9
No Response	6	3.1	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The table and chart above show that 101(52.3%) of the respondents were males while 86(44.6%) were females and 6(3.1%) did not respond. This implies that the male gender was more represented perhaps, they are larger in population. Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State has an estimated population of 350, 000 with the male gender constituting 165,658 and the female 160,909 (2006 Population & Housing Census).

Table 4.2.3: Age of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
18-29years	88	45.6	45.6
30-49yrs	84	43.5	89.1
50 and above	21	10.9	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




From the above distribution, 88(45.6%) of the respondents are between the ages 18-29 years and 84(43.5%) of the respondents are between the ages of 30-49 years while 21(10.9%) of the respondents are between the ages 50 years and above. This implies that those between the ages of 18 and 29 responded more but there is a fair representation of all age grades in the study. Young and politically active people are likely prone to violent actions especially given other factors like unemployment which is a problem at the present.

Table 4.2.4: Marital Status of the respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Single	75	38.9	38.9
Married	100	51.8	90.7
Divorced/Widow/Widower	17	8.8	99.5

No Response	1	0.5	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The table and chart above show that 75(38.9%) are singles, 100(51.8%) married and 17(8.8%) either divorced or widows/widowers. One respondent representing 0.5% did not respond. Since the majority of the respondents are married and they fall between the age brackets of 18-29 years, there is evidence of early marriage in the local government.

Table 4.2.5: Educational Level of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
No formal education	35	18.1	18.1

Primary	46	23.8	41.9
O/Level	60	31.1	73.0
Tertiary	42	21.8	94.8
Others, specify	06	3.1	97.9
No Response	04	2.1	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




In the table and chart above, 35(18.1%) of those who responded do not have formal education, 46(23.8%) have primary education, 60(31.1%) O/level and 42(21.8%) either had tertiary education or are in tertiary institutions while 6(3.1%) have other educational qualifications other than the above but 4(2.1%) of the respondents did not respond. The data reveals that the area

under study has low level of Western education since majority of the respondents is secondary school leavers or hold O/Level certificates. Perhaps there are no educational institutions other than primary and secondary schools and opportunities in the local government. Even though the situation affects all ethnic groups in the local government, taking into consideration their population, the educationally backward are the Hausa/Fulani and the Kamantan people (Interview with District Heads of Marsa, Kamuru and Zuturung).

Table 4.2.6: Occupation of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Farming	70	36.3	36.3
Civil servant	47	24.4	60.7
Trading/Business	57	29.5	90.2
Others, specify	12	6.2	96.4
No Response	07	3.6	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The table and the chart above show that 70(36.3%) of those that responded are farmers, 47(24.4%) are civil servants and 57(29.5%) are into trading/business. While 12(6.2%) are engaged in activities other than the above, 7(3.6%) of the respondents failed to respond. This implies that the major occupation of the people in the area studied is subsistence farming because there is relatively low level of Western education. In an interview with the district head of Madakiya, he asserted that a larger part of the population is engaged in farming, including even those who went through universities, polytechnics and other tertiary institutions because of the high rate of unemployment in the local government in particular and the country at large.

Table 4.2.7: Approximate income earned per annum:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Below ₦50,000	90	46.6	46.6
₦50,000-₦500,000	76	39.4	86.0
Above ₦500,000	23	11.9	97.9
No Response	04	2.1	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The distribution above reveals that 90(46.6%) earn below ₦50,000, 76(39.4%) earn between ₦50,000-₦500,000 and 23(11.9%) earn above ₦500,000 while 4(2.1%) of the respondents did

not respond to the question. This implies that majority earn below ₦50,000 per annum. In an interview with the District Heads of Madakiya and Zuturung, they asserted that majority of the population in the local government are farmers who do not engage much in cash crop farming and therefore, their income is apparently below ₦50,000 per annum. There is therefore, a clear indication that the income and resources of majority are very inadequate as it preludes the people from having a standard of living accepted in the society. There is abject poverty in the area because a larger part of the population lives below the poverty line which is specified in terms of the income level needed to purchase a nutritional level minimally required for caloric replacement at an average level of activity.


> *"Worldwide, the poverty line most often utilized was set forth by the World Bank and refers to an income equivalent to USD l$/day in purchasing power parity: Whomever is deemed to fall below this arbitrary poverty line is extremely 'poor'(Sachs, 2005; The World Bank, 2005)."*

If ₦50,000 is divided by the number of days in a year (365 days), it gives an estimated amount of ₦137 per day which is below the USD $1/day that is traded for about ₦230. This means that a good number of the populace is living in abject poverty.

Table 4.2.8: Levels of unemployment and poverty in the local government:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Very high	61	31.6	31.6
High	91	47.2	78.8
Very low	17	8.8	87.6
Low	02	1.0	88.6
No Response	22	11.4	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



In the table and chart above, 61(31.6%) asserted that the level of unemployment and poverty is very high and 91(47.2%) opined that it is high. While 17(8.8%) are of the opinion that it is very low and 2(1.0%) low, 22(11.4%) of the respondents did not respond. This is an indication that there is high level of unemployment and poverty in the local government since majority asserted and this is evident in tables 4.6 and 4.7 where majority of the population are farmers and the income earned by most per annum falls below ₦50, 000. The unemployed constitute the highest percentage of the population in the local government that is why some are engaged in farming and other businesses out of will just to earn a living (Consensus among district heads interviewed). One of the members in a Focused Group Discussion accepted the fact that there is unemployment and poverty but asserted, "Most of the Christian youths are unemployed because they are lazy and are mostly utilised because they need an opportunity to cart away properties"

(Also in an interview with the Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamanan). He further stated that a Hausa man by nature does not depend or rely on his parents. As such, he is hard-working to earn a living. Notwithstanding what the reason is; poverty, unemployment and deprivations breed frustration, aggregation and violent behaviours. The level of unemployment and poverty in the local government is a contributory factor to the conflicts as the unemployed are mostly utilized (Interview with Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamantan). According to Aluforo (2011):

> *A large proportion of the youth who are able-bodied but idle, unemployed, frustrated and aggrieved with the social system are willing and ready to be recruited and mobilized to engage in violent political and religious conflicts because such offer them the opportunity to break into public and private property and cart away whatever they can find (Aluforo, 2011: 119).*


Religious and political leaders always capitalized on this to achieve their selfish desires. This is supported by the assertion that, "Competitive partisan political activities are used as avenues through which groups are mobilized, identities rigidly re-enforced and often infused with excessive religiosity (Ibid)." Unemployment has prompted most youths into becoming drug addicts, drinking alcohol and eventually being used as perpetrators of the act of violence in political situations or activities (Interview with District Head of Zango).

The issue in the local government is not actually unemployment but "underemployment" as a larger part of the population is self-employed, others doing menial jobs and some engaged in farming. Most people in the local government cannot afford not to work, but a larger share of the population is engaged in low level productivity and low paying tasks (Focused Group Discussion with the Natives).

Table 4.2.9: Religious Affiliation of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Islam	26	14.8	14.8
Christianity	145	74.0	88.8
Traditional	15	7.7	96.5
Others, specify	01	0.5	97.0
No Response	06	3.0	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




From the table and chart above, 29(14.8%) are Muslims, 145(74.0%), Christians and 15(7.7%) are traditionalists. While 1(0.5%) respondent belongs to a religion other than the above, 6(3.1%) respondents did not respond to the question. This indicates that Christianity is the dominant religion, followed by Islam. This is typical of the general trend. Southern Kaduna is predominantly characterized by Christianity since the colonial period, particularly at independence. Until the 1960s, the population of the local majorities was largely "animist" but later converted and presently predominantly Christians (Toure, 2003: 118). For the Hausa and Fulbe (Fulani), who are local minorities, they have been predominantly Muslims for hundreds of years (Ibid).

Table 4.2.10: Ethnic Affiliation of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage

Kamantan	14	7.3	7.3
Atyap	56	29.0	36.3
Bajju	82	42.5	78.8
Ikulu	29	15.0	93.8
Hausa/Fulani	12	6.2	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The table and chart above show that 14(7.3%) are of the Kamantan ethnic group, 56(29.0%) Atyap, 82(42.5%) Bajju, 29(15.0%) Ikulu, and 12(6.2%) are Hausa/Fulani. Majority of the respondents were Bajju perhaps they constitute the larger part of the population in the local government. The estimated population of ethnic groups in Zango Kataf Local Government include: Bajju (Kaje) – 142,180, Atyap (Kataf) – 97,859, Bekulu (Ikulu) – 50,354, Anghan (Kamantan) – 22,818, Hausa/Fulani – 12,388 and other so-called settlers put together, 968 (2006 Population & Housing

Census). This implies that the three largest ethnic groups in the local government in order of sizes are Bajju, Atyap and Ikulu respectively. District Heads of Zango, Madakiya, Marsa, Zuturung and Abobo confirmed the assertion. From the two tables above, the local government is multi-religious and multi-ethnic in composition and therefore prone to violence along these dimensions which is common in Nigeria.

Table 4.2.11: There was harmonious co-existence among the various groups prior to the conflicts:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	18	9.3	9.3
Agreed	73	37.8	47.1
Disagreed	81	42.0	89.1
No idea	13	6.7	95.8
No Response	08	4.1	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The above distribution shows there was peaceful or harmonious co-existence among the various ethno-religious groups prior to the conflicts as 91(47.1%) of the respondents agreed to the assertion. While 81 (42.0%) of the respondents disagreed, 13(6.7%) claimed to have no idea of the relationship that existed before the conflicts and 08(4.1%) did not respond. There was a consensus among all interviewed that relationship among various groups was relatively peaceful prior to the conflicts but the difference in their responses lies in the degree or level of the cordiality of that relationship. While some asserted that it was very cordial, others opined that it was average. Particularly, while the Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan who was born and bred in the local government and is over 78 years of age asserted that the relationship between the Hausa and Fulani Muslims was very cordial with the natives that he was even named after a village (Yangal), a pastor of Living Faith Church in Zonkwa stated that it was averagely or relatively peaceful. To the Pastor, the Hausa and Fulani Muslims in the past controlled those

matters believed to be most essential to the survival and integrity of the local government. The issue of land confiscation was a major factor in the antagonistic relationship between the Hausa and Fulani group and the natives. Land belonging to the natives were confiscated, and entrusted same to the District Head who was a Hausa Muslim. This process of land expropriation from the indigenes and given to the Hausa community remained a major factor in igniting ethno-religious conflict because the natives were neither allowed to build houses nor live in Zango town. The pre-occupation of the dominant group (Hausa and Fulani) in the past was on the economic elements of the local government and here, the interests of the two groups (the Hausa and Fulani, and the natives) were perceived to clash. This was also coupled with the fact that the two groups – Hausa and Fulani and the natives belong to different religions (Also in Focused Group Discussion with the Natives). Another member of the Focused Group Discussion conducted with the indigenous was very blunt when he mentioned that even among the natives there was conflict, though on a small scale. He asserted that the conflict got violent between the Bajju and Ikulu in 2001 as a result of territorial claims. The Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan asserted that the cordiality of relationship between the groups (the natives and the Hausa and Fulani) was most expressed during festivities and funerals. With the various cultural festivals such as Bajju day, Atyap day, Ikulu day and Batadon day which the natives celebrate to show the uniqueness of their culture, we (the Hausa and Fulani) celebrated with them. He further stated that during Christmas and Easter celebrations, the Hausa and Fulani Muslims joined as the Christians do same during Sallah (Eid-El-Fitri, Eid-El-Kabir and Eid-El-Molud) celebrations. Same kind of relationship was expressed during either Muslim or Christian weddings. A member among the natives in a Focused Group Discussion also confirmed this relationship. The Sarkin Hausawa also cited an example of how he was involved in the settlement of dispute between the Bajju

people of Zuturung Mago and some Fulani cattle herdsmen that lasted three weeks. The former claimed that the Fulani destroyed their crops as they attacked the cattle leaving one severely injured. This incidence occurred when he went to condole the people of Zuturung Mago over the loss of one of her sons.

The indigenous groups lived in a relatively peaceful atmosphere compared to how they related with the Hausa and Fulani group. This was so because they have a common religion and have undergone similar exploitative process by the colonialists through the imposition of indirect rule system and the exploitation was perpetrated by the Hausa and Fulani that is why the locals revolted against them (Interview with District Head of Kamuru and Focused Group Discussion with the Natives). To the district head of Kamuru, the Bajju and Ikulu have never had any crisis until 2001 and the conflict was elitist creation. He asserted that though conflicts among indigenous groups became manifest when an indigenous district head was appointed, the Bajju and Ikulu have not been engaged in any violent confrontation.

Again, in an interview with the secretary to Anghan Chiefdom, he attributed the relative peace and cordial relationship enjoyed by the ethnic and religious groups (the natives and Hausa and Fulani) to the administrations of Colonel Lawal Ja'afaru Isa and Alhaji Amed Makarfi. He stated that the administrations did well by implementing some of the recommendations of the Reconciliation Committee Reports of the Zango, 1992 crises which to a larger extent reconciled the people of Zango Kataf Local Government. To him, the Colonel Ja'afaru Isa and Alhaji Amed Makarfi's administrations in the state had the political will and courage to break the vestiges of colonialism of indirect rule system of administration imposed on the people of Zango Kataf in particular and the Northern part of Nigeria as a whole. The various tribal communities inhabiting the present Southern part of Kaduna State were unilaterally brought under the oppressive

dominion of the Emirate System of administration which was anchored predominantly on Islamic religion. He further stated that the skewed system of administration subjugated the non-Muslims of the local government, while at the same time creating superiority and "born to rule syndrome" which made the Hausa overlords to look down contemptuously on their counterparts who were overwhelmingly Christians as inferior second class citizens.

The vestiges of colonialism were broken by these administrations by creating chiefdoms for the various indigenous tribal communities of Southern Kaduna. These communities, now ruled by their cultures and traditions unlike what was obtainable before, have enjoyed relative peace and cordial relationship prior to the conflicts (Secretary, Anghan Chiefdom). This is evident in the fact that the local government had not experienced any major conflict between the natives and the Hausa and Fulani for 21 years (1992-2011). To this end, we can conclude or make a summation that prior to the 2011 post-Presidential election conflict there was relative peace or harmonious co-existence between or among the various ethno-religious groups in the local government.


It was gathered in a Focused Group Discussion that there had been revolts and conflicts in the past between the natives and the Hausa and Fulani over a relatively small number (Hausa and Fulani) of the population in the native majority area of the local government having control of the economy and to a larger extent, the political sector. But prior to the conflicts, the relationship between these groups was to a larger extent peaceful, harmonious, tolerant and beneficial. One of the members of the Focused Group Discussion was being specific about the political relationship. He asserted that the Hausa and Fulani have accepted the fact that they are a minority in the local government and have therefore always supported the natives as they (Hausa and Fulani) do not even contest for anything (Interview also with District Head of Zango).

Another member of the Focused Group Discussion stated that he and most of the Hausas belonged to PDP which shows how cordial the political relationship was, prior to the conflict.

Table 4.2.12: Number of conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011, where and when:

No. of Conflicts	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
One time	96	49.7	49.7
Two times	82	42.5	92.2
No Response	15	7.8	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The above shows that as 96(49.7%) of the respondents opined there has been one conflict between 1999 and 2011 which took place in 2011 in Zonkwa and environs. To 82(42.5%) of the respondents, it happened twice – Kamuru in 2001 and Zonkwa and environs in 2011, while 15(7.8%) respondents did not respond as to the number of conflicts, where and when they occurred. This means that majority is of the view that conflict occurred once in Zango Kataf Local Government within the period under study and it was in Zonkwa and environs in 2011. There was only one conflict in the local government between 1999 and 2011. That is the 2011 post-election conflicts in Zonkwa and some parts of the local government such as Madakiya, Matsirga, Samaru, Kamuru, Gidan Maga and Ungwan Rimi (Interview with district heads of Zango, Madakiya, Abobo and Marsa). There was a consensus among members of the Focused Group Discussion that between 1999 and 2011, there was only one major conflict which is the 2011 post-election crisis that lasted between 18th and 20th of April, 2011. Probably because they

did not see the conflict in Kamuru in 2001 as a major conflict but two conflicts actually occurred within the study period. There was conflict in Kamuru between the Bajju and Ikulu nations in 2001 over territorial claim of land and another in 2011 in the aftermath of the elections (Interview with District Heads of Zuturung and Kamuru). In respect of the conflict in Kamuru, Toure (2003) puts it clearly as thus: *"In March 2001, a violent conflict blew out between the Bajju and Ikulu over claims of "territorial" ownership of land and a town (Toure, 2003: 163).*


Two conflicts occurred within the study period but the post-election crisis had more serious and devastating consequences on the social relationships of the people or inter-group relations between or among the various ethnic groups and religious bodies in the study area. The views by the Districts Heads of Zuturung and Kamuru tally with early official data presented on the number of conflicts in the local government.

Table 4.2.13: Cause(s) of conflict(s) in Zango Kataf local Government between 1999 and 2011:

Causes of Conflicts	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Struggle for political power	61	31.6	31.6
Struggle over scarce resources	32	16.6	48.2
Ethnic domination	25	13.0	61.2

Religious intolerance	51	26.4	87.6
All of the above	09	4.7	92.3
None of the above	1	0.5	92.8
No Response	14	7.3	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The above shows that 61(31.6%) viewed the cause of the conflicts in the light of struggle for political power, 32(16.6%) struggle over scarce resource, 25(13.0%) ethnic domination and 51(26.4%) religious intolerance. While 9(4.7%) perceived all of the above as contributory factors to the conflicts in study area, 1(0.5%) is of the opinion that none of the above contributed and

14(7.3%) respondents did not respond to the question. The Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan strongly supported that the major cause of the 2011 post-presidential election crisis in the local government was religious intolerance. In a Focused Group Discussion with the displaced persons, it was gathered that the conflict was religious in nature because the natives who belong to other political parties were not attacked. They disclosed that even the chairman of the then CPC at the state level (a Bajju man and Christian) was spared or unharmed.

Several reasons have been dished out as catalytic to the orgy of conflicts in the local government. Even though conflicts in the local government studied within the study period could be multi-dimensional, the responses reveal majority concurred that they were caused by struggle for political power and therefore political. While the Bajju/Ikulu conflict of 2001 was ethnic, the 2011 post-election conflicts were political and ethno-religious since it had its roots from the presidential election (in the struggle for political power) but gained prominence in the killings and destruction of lives and properties respectively among ethnic and between religious groups (Interview with district head of Kamuru and Fucused Group Discussion). In this case, the explanation of the conflicts cannot divorce politics from ethnicity and religion because the Hausa and Fulani Muslim elements, who were engaged in the violent confrontation with the natives, belong to a different ethnic and religious group. The local government is multi-ethnic and multi-religious in composition and ethnicity and religion seem to be coterminous in the sense that the Hausa and Fulani are predominantly Muslims while the natives (Bajju, Atyap, Ikulu and Kamantan) are Christians. The conflicts could therefore easily be regarded as ethno-religious. In the struggle for political power, the bloody massacre of innocent souls unfolded "ethno-religiously". In an interview with the district heads of Abobo, Kamuru and Madakiya as well as the secretary of the Internally Displaced Persons, they opined that the conflict in Zango Kataf

Local Government was a reaction against the killings and destructions that started in the Northern part of the state (Kaduna and Zaria precisely) on hearing the outcome of the 2011 presidential election. To them, it was a reprisal attack on the Hausa and Fulani Muslims who were mainly supporters of the then Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which had General Muhammadu Buhari (Rtd) as its flag bearer while the natives (majorly Christians) who unleashed the mayhem supported Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) that emerged winner of the election.

The 2001 Bajju/Ikulu crisis and the 2011 post-Presidential election crisis had immediate and remote causes. The remote causes of the 2001 Bajju/Ikulu crisis are attributed to lack of acceptably defined and recognized boundary between the Bajju and Ikulu, cross-boundary payment of taxes and levies (Harajin-Biye), the amendment of nomenclature from Kamuru Station to Kamuru Ikulu in 1989, non-action by government on the reports of previous committees, failure of the Bajju to participate in the traditional cultural activities of the communities, anomalies identified in the Kaduna State creation of districts Edict №19 of 1991, non-participation of Bajju community in community development programmes, ethnic chauvinism expressed in an expansionist policy, forceful removal of the turban of the district head of Ikulu in 1997 and youth unemployment but the immediate causes are Bajju's reaction to the appointment and planned turbaning of an Ikulu man, Mr. Michael Adamu Yero as the District Head of Kamuru, mounting of road blocks at "Sharp Corner" and Zagom along Fadan Kamantan-Kamuru highway, reprisal attacks by the Ikulu youths and a letter of threat of eviction addressed to the then Executive Governor of Kaduna State, Alh. Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi (See Appendix).

In the 2011 post-Presidential election crisis, the remote causes are the non-adherence of the

People's Democratic Party (PDP) zoning system as enshrined in its constitution, the formation of PDP/Northern Political forum which was alleged to counter the ambition of President Goodluck Jonathan to run the presidency under the PDP platform, divisive preaching by both Muslim and Christian preachers, unemployment of youths, lack of discipline in the society and particularly among the youths, the economic challenges experienced by the country and the lack of social amenities, the political arrangement makes no provision for the winner of an election to carry along other contestants, deep-rooted animosity and suspicion as well as religious intolerance and disregard for each other's customs and traditions by both Muslims and Christians in Kaduna State, particularly in the southern part (including Zango Kataf Local Government), the issue of indigene and settler syndrome and there were also allegations and counter allegations by both Christians and Muslims of Southern Kaduna before the crisis that each group was keeping dangerous weapons to be used in fighting each other (See Appendix). The immediate cause was the announcement of the 2011 presidential election result by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Headquarters, Abuja and its outcome. Reprisal Attacks was also another immediate cause of the crisis, particularly in Southern Kaduna where rumour mongering and the urge to avenge the killing and destruction that took place in the Northern part of the state played an important role in igniting the conflicts (Ibid).

The 2011 post-election conflicts in Kaduna were political in nature at its onset because attacks were made on PDP chieftains and properties belonging to them were destroyed by CPC supporters and miscreants. Along the way, the riots turned religious as Mosques and Churches were destroyed, vandalized and/or burnt down. This has always been the trend in Kaduna State as any civil unrest has always turned into an ethno-religious one (White Paper Report, August 2011: 12-13 in Appendix). Since 1980 when crises started erupting in Kaduna Sate, they could

be segmented into political, religious and ethnic or a combination of the three. In the 2011 post-election disturbances, it has not been easy to say how or at what point or stage a purely political crisis degenerated into ethnic/religious one (Ibid, Pp142). The 2011 post-election conflicts can therefore be termed as "Political cum ethno-religious."

Table 4.2.14: Land related competition, ownership and conflicts:

Responses	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	30	15.5	15.5
Agreed	51	26.4	41.9
Disagreed	87	45.1	87.0
No idea	14	7.3	94.3
No Response	11	5.7	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The above table and chart reveal that 81(41.9%) agreed that there has been competition over ownership of land leading to conflicts, 87(45.1%) disagreed. While 14(7.3%) had no idea as to whether there has been unregulated competition over land in the local government, 11(5.7%) did not respond to the assertion. This implies that majority of the respondents disagreed there is any competition over land in the study area but there is just a slight difference in responses with the agreed. The 2001 Bajju/Ikulu conflict as stated earlier was over territory and land. Again, except the district head of Zango, the interviewees supported the fact that there have been little or no land disputes. He (the district head of Zango) made clear that there is the issue of fadama land still lingering between the Hausas of Zango and the Atyap, where they both claim ownership. He made clear that the Kaduna State government accepted that the land belongs to the Hausas of Zango but because it was causing conflict between the two ethnic groups, she promised to

acquire the land and compensate the Hausas but nothing has been done. He pointed out that the whole issue has been politicized in that the Atyap still cultivate the land with claims that the government has handed it over to them, meanwhile the Hausas have not been compensated – "the issue of that land potent a serious threat to the peace of the area."

Table 4.2.15: The ethnic group that owns most of the farm lands and other key assets like houses, etc in the local government:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Bajju	85	44.0	44.0
Ikulu	28	14.5	58.5
Atyap	44	22.8	81.3
Kamantan	13	6.7	88.0
Hausa/Fulani	09	4.7	92.7
No Response	14	7.3	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



In the table and chart above, 85(44.0%) asserted that most of the farmlands and other key assets are owned by the Bajju people, 28(14.5%) the Ikulu and 44(22.8%) the Atyap. While 13(6.7%) opined it is the kamantan and 09(4.7%) the Hausa/Fulani, 14(7.3%) of the respondents fail to respond. This implies that the Bajju owns most of the farmland and other key assets in the local government. Zonkwa is the headquarters and the most developed part of the local government with the Bajju having a larger share of the assets there and in most part of the local government as a whole (Interview with district head of Abobo and Madakiya). In terms of land and other assets in the local government, the Bajju and Kataf own more respectively but in Zango urban, the Hausa/Fulani own virtually everything (Interview with district head of Zango). A pastor of Living Faith Church in an interview asserted that lands were confiscated and giving to the Hausawa in Zango by the colonial masters.

Table 4.2.16: The conflicts caused losses in terms of lives and properties:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	87	45.1	45.1
Agreed	66	34.2	79.3
Disagreed	16	8.3	87.6
No idea	11	5.7	93.3
No Response	13	6.7	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The above distribution shows 87(45.1%) strongly agreed there were loss of lives and properties,


66(34.2%) agreed and 16(8.3%) disagreed with the assertion. While 11(5.7%) claimed they had no idea as to whether lives and properties were lost, 13(6.7%) respondents shied away from responding to the assertion. This implies that majority concur with the assertion that the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011 caused irreplaceable loss of lives and properties in an unprecedented manner. For every violent conflict, there is loss of lives and/or properties and that was the situation in the local government within the study period. This was confirmed in an interview conducted with the Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan, district heads of Abobo, Madakiya, Zango, Zuturung and Kamuru as well as in the Focused Group Discussion with the natives where they asserted, the conflicts have impacted negatively on the relationship of the various ethnic and religious groups in the local government because lives were lost and properties destroyed. "We termed that conflict a massacre because many lives were lost" (A displaced person in a Focused Group Discussion). The views of those that agreed there was loss of lives and properties corroborate official data in the appendix. Even though the 2001 Bajju/Ikulu conflict in Kamuru was quickly arrested by security agents, four (4) lives were reportedly lost (See Police report, 2001: 5). The post-Presidential election disturbances of April, 2011 were quite devastating resulting in varying degrees of injuries and loss of lives. It is difficult to ascertain accurately the exact number of those who lost their lives. However, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) reports as well as memoranda submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances give a summary of the lives lost where the violent destruction unfolded. In Zango Kataf Local Government Area for instance, the police report shows that 274 lives were lost. Report from the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) shows 311 people lost their lives while the memoranda submitted reads 352 loss of lives (White Paper Report, August 2011: 29). Not only

that some of the memoranda submitted by communities affected by the conflicts contained figures, they carried even names of those that were killed. Of the 815 people reportedly killed in Kaduna State as a whole in the 2011 post-Presidential election conflict, Zango Kataf Local Government Area recorded 463 deaths (Ibid, Pp. 30-58). Seeing through the videos of that conflict, innocent citizens were massacred. They were butchered and burnt to death by some unscrupulous elements (See Video clip in Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Kaduna State Command and Network for Justice, Kaduna). The few ones that disagreed there was loss of lives and properties were either biased or hid the truth to avoid further aggravation or exacerbation of the conflict as the District Head of Marsa in an interview would say in his native language, Jju "Báryat ba zi má ni báryat ba gbát, in ban kki ámi ba, zi ni nbrang bzyan nkyang á".

Table 4.2.17: Many people in the local government were displaced from their homes, adding in the street new armies of the unemployed, the destitute and the highly aggrieved:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	52	26.9	26.9
Agreed	102	52.8	79.7
Disagreed	11	5.7	85.4
No idea	18	9.3	94.7
No Response	10	5.2	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




The table and chart show that 52(26.9%) strongly agreed people were displaced from their homes in the conflicts, 102(52.8%) agreed and 11(5.7%) disagreed with the assertion. While 18(9.3%) claimed to have no idea that people were displaced, 10(5.2%) respondents did not respond. This implies that majority were in agreement to some people in the local government being displaced from their homes. A sizeable number of the population resident in the local government was also reportedly displaced from their homes. In other words, people were displaced from various parts of the local government such as Zonkwa, Madakiya, Matsirga, Ungwan Rimi, Samaru, Gidan Maga and Kamuru where the conflicts occurred to various places as the Hajj Camp in Mando, Kachia, Kagarko, Laduga, Kafanchan, Ungwan Bawa, Pambegwa/Kauru, Dankande Mobile Barracks etc, all within the state where they sought refuge (Government White paper in Network for Justice, Kaduna and Interview with district head of Madakiya and Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamantan). A member of the Focused Group Discussion

asserted, *"The question as to whether people were displaced or not is unnecessary. We are in the Hajj Camp and we are here responding to you today not because we want to be here but we are displaced persons."*

Table 4.2.18: Ethnic group (s) worst or least affected by the conflicts:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Hausa/Fulani	71	36.8	36.8
Bajju	20	10.4	47.2
Atyap	18	9.3	56.5
Ikulu	60	31.1	87.6
Kamantan	12	6.2	93.8
No Response	12	6.2	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The above distribution shows that 71(36.8%) respondents maintained that the Hausa/Fulani were the worst affected, 20(10.4%) the Bajjus, 18(9.3%) the Atyap, 60(31.1%) the Ikulu, 12(6.2%) Kamantan and 12(6.2%) fail to respond. This shows that the conflicts within the period under study worst affected the Hausa/Fulani. The conflict in Kamuru between the Bajju and the Ikulu did not record much negative implications as the situation was quickly arrested by security agents (Interview with District Heads of Kamuru, Zuturung and Focused Discussion with the natives) but the 2011 post-election violence in Zonkwa and its environs, recorded serious and devastating consequences and the Hausa/Fulani Muslim elements were the worst affected (See Kaduna State White Paper, Aug. 2011: 41-57 and interview with Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamantan, District Heads of Abobo, Kamuru, Zango and Madakiya). It was confirmed in a Focused Group Discussion with the victims of the conflict that the Hausa/Fulani Muslims were the worst affected in 2011 post-election conflicts in the local government.

Table 4.2.19: The conflicts created disharmony, hostilities, a situation of distrust and suspicion among the various groups in the local government:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	69	35.8	35.8
Agreed	95	49.2	85.0
Disagreed	06	3.1	88.1
No idea	13	6.7	94.8
No Response	10	5.2	100.0
Total	193	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015




Table 4.3.17 and chart show that 69(35.8%) strongly agreed on the assertion that the conflicts created disharmony, hostilities and a situation distrust and suspicion in the local government, as 95(49.2%) agreed and 6(3.1%) disagreed. While 13(6.7%) had no idea, 10(5.2%) of the respondents did not respond. This implies that the conflicts in the local government have created some sort of disharmony, hostility, distrust and suspicion between the various ethno-religious groups both within and outside the local government especially with some people killed and others displaced to various parts of the state as shown in tables 4.3.16 and 4.3.17.

A reconciliation committee according to the District Head of Madakiya was set up but all to not avail because some ethnic and religious groups did not respond to their call. There have been series of attacks on some communities by unknown persons in the study area in the aftermath of the conflicts, leaving the people of the local government in great distrust and suspicion. He

stressed, there is mutual misunderstanding, misrepresentation, mistrust and suspicion which breed conflicts in the local government (Also in Focused Group Discussion with the Natives). Also, in an interaction with the Director, Centre for Population and Development, Kaduna, he asserted that the conflicts have not been completely resolved and that government has not implemented the resolutions of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the causes and impact as well as the perpetrators of the conflicts brought to book, as a result of which there have been attacks on communities like Madauchi, Fadan Kaje Gida and the family of Andrew Kazzah in Fadia Gida leading to the killing of innocent persons and many others left injured. Pastor Issues Ango in an interview on the 5th of May, 2015 stated that in the last five months, Lenak-Kamantan was attacked and last month (April, 2015), another Bajju village called Vwo-Nkpang equally suffered same. The secretary of Anghan Chiefdom affirmed that the relative cordial relationship that existed before the conflict has been tampered, with the series of attacks on various communities which have created so much suspicion and distrust. To him, some diehards Hausa/Fulani have not been able to come to terms with the present reality of the break in the colonial vestiges, preferring instead to cling nostalgically to the vestiges of the past colonial statusquo of indirect rule and its concomitant effect of attempting to sustain second-class citizenship, which he considered the main reason behind the massive attacks recorded in the aftermath of the 2011 post-presidential election conflicts.

It was gathered in the Focused Group Discussion with the victims of the 2011 Post-presidential conflict that the greatest dismay is that the conflict has not been completely resolved, as such; there is suspicion and lack of trust. It still lingers because the Kaduna State government set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the actual causes, impact, perpetrators, etc of the 2011 post-election conflict, unfortunately, that commission never interfaced with the victims. It did not

even visit the flashpoint of the area. Another committee was set up – Peace and Reconciliation Committee. Unfortunately, that committee was worse off than the so-called Judicial Commission of Inquiry (Interview with Secretary General of Internally Displaced Persons, Kaduna State). Aluforo (2011) asserted:

> *"In Nigeria, several efforts such as deployment of huge security operatives, peaceful dialogue amongst religious groups and setting up probe panels have been made to manage conflicts but with little or no positive transformation (Aluforo, 2011: 111)."*

In another interview with the immediate past chairman of Zango Kataf Local Government, he opined that the ethno-religious conflicts have tend to destabilised the local government in that, lives and properties were lost as well as people displaced from their homes to other places within the state leading to all sort of relationships – disharmony, hostilities, distrust and suspicion among various ethnic and religious groups. The conflicts in the local government have fundamentally threatened the cohesion of the area. Because the conflicts have created distrust, suspicion and hostilities, they have provided the opportunity for the various groups to mobilise and draw attention on their predicaments.

Similarly, a Pastor of Living Faith Church in Zonkwa asserted that with the seemingly religious intolerance in the local government, the conflicts have led to tension, discord, hostility, etc in the study area. He further stated that there is serious anxiety, suspicion and that the conflicts in the local government still linger as some communities have suffered from attacks even after the 2011 post-presidential election crisis.

In another interview with a legal practitioner whose name he preferred not to be mentioned, asserted that the ethno-religious conflicts in the local government within the study period have encouraged the proliferation of arms and ammunitions and their acquisition by un-authorised

persons and groups. All these engender or result in social tension and general insecurity as it is manifesting in the spate of attacks on various communities of the local government. He went further to assert that with the displacement of people from their homes and lives lost in the conflicts, there is a devastating consequence among/between various ethno-religious groups both within and outside the local government as unnecessary tension is being created. To him, the conflicts have created or tend to create a situation of permanent distrust and suspicion leading to antagonism and hostilities among the various ethno-religious groups.

To the Sarkin Hausawa of Fadan Kamantan, the conflicts have redefined perceptions of ethno-religious identities and interests, leading to frantic reformulation of that identity and repositioning of various groups in the political terrain, economic and social relations to take advantage of particular shifts or shield themselves from potentially negative consequences. In the aftermath of the 2011 post-presidential election conflict, the Christian-Muslim relations have become more salient in the local government than in the preceding years. The relationship between the two major religions has been redefined. He expressed further that ethnic and religious identities have become stronger after the conflicts in that the relationship among the natives is more cordial as against the so-called settlers (Hausa/Fulani) because of their religious inclination. The conflicts have brought about issues as they relate to majority-minority relations. There is now an unequal treatment of the so-called minority by the dominant native population or group. There is unequal politico-economic relationship between the natives and the Hausa and Fulani group. He also did not deny the fact that there have been series of attacks on some indigenous communities in the local government but he attributed that to the Fulani. In his words, “there has never been the spate of attacks on the indigenous (native) community in the past like what we have experienced after the 2011 post-presidential election conflicts and reasons


have been that the Fulani find it difficult to forgive unlike the Hausa." This has left the natives and the Hausa living in the area in great and somewhat permanent suspicion and distrust that to him, reconciliation will be very difficult because of the damages caused during the conflicts and in the aftermath. He further stated that some natives do not allow the Fulani people settle in the community. But the greatest fear is that a large number of the natives see the Fulani as allies of the Hausa and vise vasa.

As stated earlier, it was gathered in a Focused Group Discussion with victims of the conflicts and the natives that there have been revolts and conflicts in the past between the natives and the Hausa and Fulani over a relatively small number (Hausa and Fulani) of the population in the native majority area of the local government having control of the economy and to a larger extent, the political sector. But prior to the conflicts, the relationship between the groups was to a larger extent peaceful, harmonious, tolerant and beneficial. The conflicts have now affected that cordial relationship because many Hausa and Fulani Muslims have been displaced, killed, injured and their properties destroyed (Interview also with District Head of Zango and Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamantan). The district head of Zango further asserted that the Hausa/Fulani Muslims that had such an experience and are still living in the local government might not be willing to exercise their voting rights in subsequent elections. This, to an extent, has affected their relationship with the natives as they cannot freely inter-relate and therefore denied the right to association and that of franchise. In his words, "Our religious freedom has been greatly limited in many parts of the local government."

Table 4.2.20: The conflicts portray the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security agents that security of lives and property could be guaranteed:

	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Strongly agreed	75	38.9	38.9
Agreed	59	30.6	69.5
Disagreed	33	17.1	86.6
No idea	19	9.8	96.4
No Response	07	3.6	100.0
Total	196	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2015



The distribution above reveals that 75(38.9%) strongly agreed to the assertion, 60(30.6%) agreed and 33(17.1%) disagreed while 19(9.8%) had no idea, as 7(3.6%) of the respondents did not respond. Majority of the respondents accepted the fact that the conflicts portrayed the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security agents that security of lives and property could be guaranteed. This is evident in the Focused Group Discussion as it was gathered that when the conflict erupted, government did not send any security agents until after three days. While the security forces were quickly deployed to quell the riot in the Northern part of Kaduna State, they were not posted to the Southern part of the state until 19th April, 2011 (White Paper Report, April, 2011: 138).There is an Army foundation in Kachia which is closer to Zonkwa but nobody ordered such deployment. The security agents later deployed were from Kaduna metropolis and Jos. And they were inadequate and ineffective that is why the killings and

destruction were massive (Interview with Secretary, Internally Displaced Persons, Kaduna State and Focused Group Discussion). According to Agwam Bajju, his domain faces serious inadequacy of policemen and officers, hence the reason for the massive destruction of properties and loss of lives (Interview with District Head of Abobo). In an interview with the Secretary General of Internally Displaced persons in Kaduna, he stated again that the Zango Kataf Local Government post-election conflict was extra-ordinary in the sense that the perpetrators recorded the killings, maiming, assault, etc. as they were unfolding (See also Videos in Network for Justice and The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Kaduna State Command). In the videos, faces can be identified. One can pin-point this is Mr. A, B or C because the conflict took place not in the dark and people did not disguise but nobody is interested in doing anything. The culprits are known but nobody is arrested (Focused Group Discussion). Aluforo (2011) asserted:

> *"Political and religious conflicts in Nigeria have been blamed on significant gap in the ability of security agencies to guarantee security of lives and properties as well as bring those responsible for the conflict to book (Aluforo, 2011: 119)*

4.3 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This study set out to investigate the impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 1999 and 2011 with a view to finding out the relationship of various ethno-religious groups prior to the conflicts, the causes of the conflicts and how these conflicts have impacted or are impacting on those relationships. The responses gathered in this survey research have so many facts underpinning the impact of violent

conflicts on inter-group relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State between 1999 and 2011.

In an attempt to examine the nature of inter-group relations prior to the conflicts, the findings shows that prior to the conflicts within the study period, there had not been any violent conflict on a large scale in the local government apart from the 1992 Zango crises. Yahaya, (2012: 69) noted that there were occurrences of conflicts among the natives or indigenous groups but these conflicts occurred among them on a low scale. Until recently, the natives of Zango Kataf Local Government Area have lived in cordial terms (Danjuma, 2013: 3). What that means is the local government had been relatively peaceful. In essence, prior to the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 1999-2011, there had been relative harmonious, tolerant and beneficial relationship among the various groups. This was expressed during cultural and religious festivities and burial ceremonies among others.

The two major conflicts that occurred in the local government within the period under study had complex multi-dimensional causal factors which included political, ethnic and religious among others. Several reasons have been dished out as catalytic to the orgy of conflicts in the local government. Even though conflicts in the local government studied within the study period had multi-dimensional causal factors, the findings reveal that they were caused by struggle for political power and therefore political. Recent political developments in the local government studied have ushered in the series of conflicting inter-group relations between or among the natives co-habiting the same space (Yahaya, 2012: 69). The pre-conflict antagonistic relationship among the natives centred more on issues of power, tax, and land or boundary disputes (Ibid). According to Aluforo (2011: 117), some violent conflicts are ascribed to grievances arising from limited economic opportunities and inequalities. Here, violent conflict is hinged on inequality in

economic and political power. In Zango Kataf local government, there had been unequal political relationship between the Hausa/Fulani group and the pagan community (now Christians) of the area which has been compounded by religious differences (Suberu, 1996: 50) leading to crises.

The impact of these conflicts on inter-group relations in the local government studied cannot be overemphasised. The violent occurrence of conflicts within the study period in the local government had wide ranging and devastating political, economic and social impact on inter-group relationship of the local government. Although no exact figures of casualties are available, the Kaduna riots of 2000 which also affected the local government studied, claimed several hundreds of lives and generated violent ripple effects beyond Kaduna (Eghosa and Suberu, 2005: 19). With the conflicts in Zango Kataf local government which manifested in the struggle for political power and eventually led to not only loss of lives but people displaced from their homes and properties destroyed, a situation of distrust and suspicion, disharmony or hostilities and antagonism has been created.

Eruption of violent conflicts is linked with group pluralism and interactions to achieve their diverse objectives (Deeka, 2002). In seeking relevance or retention of political power, the elites manipulate and massage religious and ethnic sentiments. Many ethnic clashes and sectarian conflagrations are rooted in the context of the group conflict theoretical assumption (Jega, 2002). Zango Kataf Local Government Area like most other local governments in the Southern part of Kaduna State is multi-ethnic and multi-religious in composition. The local government is plural in nature with various ethnic groups as the Bajju, Atyap, Ikulu, Anghan and Hausa/Fulani, and religious groups as Christianity and Islam. The main problem arising from the plural nature of the local government is that ethnicity and religion seem to be coterminous. For instance, while the Hausa/Fulani are predominantly Muslims, the other ethnic groups like the Bajju, Atyap, Ikulu

and Kamantan are Christians. Any conflict between these groups therefore, can easily be regarded as ethno-religious in nature. The 2001 conflict between the Bajju and Ikulu could be regarded as ethnic while that which was between the Hausa/Fulani and other ethnic groups of the local government in 2011 could be termed ethno-religious. These groups, as shown in the theory (cultural pluralism) employed in this research work, have varying sizes and influence. They are to an extent distinct from each other in terms of language, values and beliefs, among others. They equally have different interests and aspirations. They tend to use the resources at their disposal to assert these differences, and protect various interests and aspirations. The struggle, competition and antagonism have caused conflicts among the various groups leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties as well as people displaced, thereby affecting the relative harmonious relationship that existed among them.

The study reveals that with the March 2001 violent conflict between the Bajju and Ikulu over claims of territorial ownership of land and town, Hausa and Fulani dominance is no longer the major issue but there is eventual springing up of new historical and ahistorical claims with a new dimension of inter and intra ethnic rivalries, some of which drawn on clannish levels hitherto thought extinct.

In addition to the above, the Hausa and Fulani have always being considered allies probably because of religion but the study reveals that the Fulani finds it difficult to forgive unlike the Hausa and that has resulted to the spate of attacks on the indigenous communities in the aftermath of the 2011 post-Presidential election conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter essentially deals with the summary of major findings of this work, conclusion and recommendations. In other words, the chapter is concern with the summary of major findings and conclusion on the impact of violent conflicts on inter-group relations between 1999 and 2011 in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna as well as recommendations.

5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Zango Kataf Local Government Area like most other local governments in the Southern part of Kaduna State is multi-ethnic and multi-religious in composition. The local government is plural in nature. These groups have varying sizes and influence. They are to an extent distinct from each other in terms of language, values and beliefs, among others. They equally have different interests and aspirations. They tend to use the resources at their disposal to assert these differences, and protect various interests and aspirations. The struggle, competition and antagonism have caused conflicts among the various groups leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties as well as people displaced, thereby affecting the relative harmonious relationship that existed among them. The conflicts between and among these groups can easily be regarded as ethno-religious in nature. The 2001 conflict between the Bajju and Ikulu could be regarded as ethnic while that which was between the Hausa/Fulani and other ethnic groups of the local government in 2011 could be termed ethno-religious.

Prior to the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 1999-2011, there had been relative harmonious, tolerant and beneficial relationship among the various groups. The conflicts had wide ranging and devastating political, economic and social impact on inter-group relationship of the local government. They led not only to loss of lives but people displaced from

their homes and properties destroyed, a situation of distrust and suspicion, disharmony or hostilities and antagonism being created.

The study reveals that with the March 2001 violent conflict between the Bajju and Ikulu over claims of territorial ownership of land and town, Hausa and Fulani dominance is no longer the major issue but there is eventual springing up of new historical and ahistorical claims with a new dimension of inter and intra ethnic rivalries, some of which drawn on clannish levels hitherto thought extinct.

Also, the Hausa and Fulani have always been considered as allies probably because of religion but the study reveals that the Fulani finds it difficult to forgive unlike the Hausa and that has resulted to the spate of attacks on the indigenous communities in the aftermath of the 2011 post-Presidential election conflict.

5.3 CONCLUSION

In the light of the set objectives to this study, there were three assumptions to give validity and objective credibility to the work. The assumptions state how the local government is characterized by ethnic and religious diversities posing a potential source for conflicts, how the various groups inter-related before the conflicts and also how those conflicts have impacted or are impacting on the inter-group relations of the people in the local government.

Data collected from official documents, questionnaires administered and retrieved as well as interviews conducted prove that the study area is multi-ethnic and multi-religious. As stated in the summary of findings above, these groups have varying sizes and influence. They are distinct from each other in terms of language, values and beliefs, among others. They have different interests and aspirations which they tend to use the resources at their disposal to assert their

differences, and protect the various interests and aspirations. The struggle, competition and antagonism have caused conflicts among the various groups. The two major conflicts that occurred in the local government within the period under study had complex multi-dimensional causal factors which included political, ethnic and religious among others. In other words, the conflicts were multi-dimensional as the different ethnic and religious groups engaged in the violent confrontations as a result of struggle for political power and competition over scarce resources leading to massive destruction of properties, loss of lives and displacement of people from their homes causing social disharmony and distrust amongst the locals. The 2001 conflict between the Bajju and Ikulu could be regarded as ethnic while that which was between the Hausa/Fulani and other ethnic groups of the local government in 2011 could be termed ethno-religious.

The theoretical framework (cultural pluralism) employed or adopted in this research and the assumptions have therefore received objective credibility and scientific validity.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no one eternally-divined way of resolving or managing conflict. Each conflict is unique in its own sense and calls for a peculiar solution after careful review of its cause(s), actors involved and their willingness to work for an amicable solution of the contentious issues.

In ZangoKataf Local Government, there are claims and counter claims of “settler/indigene” dichotomy. The Nigeria constitution does not recognize this dichotomy. As such, this sentiment among the people is absurd. Government should ensure that such sentiment is removed from people’s minds through rigorous campaigns or integration through traditional institutions, schools, religious organizations, media, etc. Ethnic communities located outside their core ethnic

geographical concentration should feel sufficiently secured and enjoy the same feeling of equity as the core group to invest or mortgage their destiny and those of the generation yet unborn to their communal leadership in their places of destination. Communities outside their core geographic compact ethnic centres should also aspire and endeavour to integrate into their host communities' geographic compact concentration centres for the sake of unity.

Allegations abound that places of worship (Mosques and Churches) were misused by religious leaders to campaign for political parties or individual contestants in the 2011 elections in such a way that passion and tempers were inflamed and eventually gave rise to religious intolerance leading to the carnage afterwards. Activities of these places of worship should be monitored by government such that inflammatory sermons are avoided or contained.

The degree of inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages in the local government has the potential of blending the cultures leading to cultural synthesis and cultural hybridization, i.e. acculturation. This acculturation process should be cultivated and encouraged by all.

There is need for continued dialogue among the various ethnic groups and religious bodies for the purpose of ensuring peace in the area. Dialogue is a meeting of hearts and minds across ethnic and religious frontiers. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious group dialogue can promote mutual enrichment from the ethnic and religious point of view and also enhance peaceful co-existence among the people of different ethnic and religious groups.

Related to the above, government should encourage effective and functional platforms for ethno-religious leaders so that through them it would be possible to establish network for conflict prevention. The various ethnic and religious leaders should be able to sit together and discuss the causes of the conflicts and how to prevent occurrence of future ones.

There is the need for various ethnic and religious groups to know and respect the rights of one another and this can only be achieved when the populace is properly enlightened by government and civil society organizations. This will reduce unnecessary and frequent occurrence of conflicts.

Government should endeavour to nip conflicts in the bud, and this would be done through obtaining or getting security information that would enable it take the necessary steps to avert out-break of violence in the area. Ethnic and religious conflicts are not avoidable but can be prevented. This requires however, that potential sources of conflicts which threatens cohesion of the area, need to be identified and analysed with a view to early resolution and concrete preventive steps be taken to forestall armed or violent confrontation.

There is also the need for continued and sustained analysis and mapping out of conflict flashpoints (conflict prone areas) as well as early warning signs, as these demands the highest priority of government. This will no doubt help in containing or managing conflicts with the aim of averting or reducing them to the barest minimum. Data collected revealed that the local government is vulnerable and a flash-point that poses serious threat to or dangers in the state that can eventually engulf the whole country. In this vulnerable or flash-point area, innocent people are brutally murdered and properties worth millions of Naira destroyed whenever there is crisis as witnessed in recent years. The local government in particular and other vulnerable or flash-points within the state as a whole should be identified and given serious security attention. These areas should be manned with security agencies, especially ZangoKataf Local Government, which has experienced many socio-political and ethno-religious conflicts due largely to inadequate security presence. Pre-cautions should be taken in places that are more prone to conflicts especially with diverse ethnic and religious groups.

Put differently, government should be more committed to the provision of adequate and effective security that should be able to respond promptly to any insurgence of any crisis anytime in order to prevent violent conflicts rather than try to resolve them when they have occurred. There is the need to revamp the security apparatus and ensure that very rapid response is provided during any crisis or violence-prone situation. And where conflicts cannot be prevented or when there is outbreak of crises, adequate security agents should be quickly deployed to put off the fire.

Most of those who participated in the crises were young unemployed and idle people. It is the view of the general populace in the local government that unemployment is very high, particularly among the youths. "Unemployment does not only mean failure of the government to employ people but broadly means the inability of the economy generally to create conducive environment and incentives to establish employment generating bodies like industries, factories, businesses, etc" (White Paper Report, 2011: 144). Government should therefore, as a matter of urgency consider the establishment of a cottage industry – Agro-Allied or Agro-Based industry in the local government to absorb the excess but redundant labour force that has become a potential recruitment ground for some greedy, selfish and unscrupulous elements. In other words, government should employ or provide employment opportunities and incentives for the employable. This will go a long way in reducing frustration and disillusionment which tend to breed tension and social instability. It will take them off the streets, keeping them busy to themselves and society, so they will be less prone to be misused and pushed into acts of violence or criminality.

Related to the above, public-spirited individuals or groups from within and outside the local government (area) should be encouraged by way of government incentives to establish industries and open commercial ventures to complement government efforts in creating and providing

gainful employment to the teeming unemployed youths. This means that there is the urgent need for the government to alleviate poverty of the populace.This is very necessary to reduce tension and ensure violence free behaviour among the citizenry.

Again, if a committee or commission of enquiry is set up to look into issues that concern any conflict, it should be closely monitored by government to ensure that those shouldered with the responsibility, carry out their task. There should also be proper implementation of the findings of the committee or commission thereafter. In other words, government should not be seen to exude the posture of feebleness, incapacity and indecisiveness sufficient enough to warrant a verdict or judgment by communities or groups. It should redeem its image by the prompt implementation of past recommendations.

Necessary actions should be taken against perpetrators of conflicts. Data gathered reveal that those who engaged in the killings and destruction in the post-election conflict are known and can be identified but nothing has been done. They should therefore, be brought to book. Until and unless that is done, conflicts would not be prevented or properly managed.

Traditional institutions are the closest authority to the grassroots and their roles or functions need to be re-examined to make them more pro-active in ensuring peace or tranquillity in their areas. They should be the eyes and ears in all situations such that anticipated violence or any crisis is promptly reported to the appropriate authority for early action. Government should therefore review and strengthen the existing traditional structure and community surveillance system as a means of crime prevention and conflict mitigation.

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"Zango Kataf Local Government Pamphlet, 2008"

"Information Unit, Zango Kataf Local Government"

"Primary Health Care Unit, Health Department, Zango Kataf Local Government"

APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEWS:

Interview on 22/05/2014 with Balarabe Dalhatu, District Head, Zango Urban, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 23/05/2014 with David Kantiok, District Head, Madakiya, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 24/05/2014 with Ishaku Ilyasu, District Head, Abobo, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 24/05/2014 with Bayei Kato, District Head, Marsa, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 27/05/2014 with Noel Bako, District Head, Zuturung, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 27/05/2014 with Madaki A. Dada, District Head, Kamuru Ikulu, Zango Kataf Local Government, Kaduna State

Interview on 01/06/2014 with Bala Adamu, Secretary General, Internally Displaced Persons, Kaduna

Interview on 01/06/2014 with Abdullahi Hassan Mohammed of Network For Justice, Kaduna

Interview on 05/05/2015 with Issues Ango, A. Pastor of Living Faith Church, Zonkwa

Interview on 06/05/2015 with Adamu Garba Yangal, Sarkin Hausawa, Fadan Kamantan

Interview on 07/05/2015 with Ballason M. G., Secretary General, Anghan Chiefdom

FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION ON 04/06/2014 WITH SOME VICTIMS:

1. MUSA, Dan'Azumi – Displaced Person
2. DAN'AZUMI, Yusuf – Displaced Person
3. USMAN, Ibrahim – Displaced Person
4. LAWAN, Muhammad – Displaced Person
5. AUWAL, Hussaini – Displaced Person
6. NURUDEEN, Sani – Displaced Person

FIRST FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION ON 26/03/2016 WITH THE NATIVES:

1. Jacob Duga
2. David Dodo
3. Waje Baidu
4. Yakubu Yohanna
5. Solomon Nathaniel
6. Yabvo Narke
7. Theresa Wushi
8. Paulinus Nayan

SECOND FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION ON 02/04/2016 WITH THE NATIVES:

1. Garba Haruna
2. Magani Dada
3. Alheri Madaki
4. Nathaniel Madaki
5. Barnabas Daniel
6. John Dangana

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

PART I: INTRODUCTION

DODO, Cornelius Nya'akunat M.Sc/Soc-Sci/6310/2011-2012

Dear Respondent,

This is to certify that the above named person is a bona-fide post-graduate student of the department undertaken a research. The questionnaire is designed to collect data on the topic, **"The Impact of Violent Conflicts on Inter-group Relations in Zango Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 1999-2011".** This research is being conducted as part of the requirements for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc.) in Political Science. Therefore, your responses will be instrumental in this course and will be treated with all confidentiality for the purpose of a genuine academic work.

Thank you for your cooperation

PART II: SUBSTANSIVE ISSUES

Causes of Conflicts

1. How many conflicts have taken place in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011, name of place(s) and period (year)? ----------

2. What was/were the causes of the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011? ----------

3. Has there been unregulated competition over land? ----------

4. Which ethnic group owns most of the farm lands and other key assets like houses, etc in the local government? ----------

5. What is the level of unemployment and poverty in the local government? ----------

6. How have the factors in 5 above contributed to the conflicts? ----------

Group Composition and Impact of Conflicts on Inter-group Relations

7. Religious Affiliation----------

8. Ethnic Affiliation----------

9. How was the relationship among the various ethno-religious groups prior to the conflicts? Was it harmonious or antagonistic among these groups in the local government? ---------

10. What were the reasons behind either the harmonious or antagonistic relationship?

11. How did the conflicts impact on the local government in terms of lives and property lost as well as persons displaced? ----------

12. Which ethnic group(s) are/were worst or least affected by the conflicts? ----------

13. How did the conflict affect the relationship of groups? Did it strengthen the relationship or create disharmony, hostilities, antagonism and a situation of distrust and suspicion among the various groups in the local government? ----------

14. What is/was the level of security during and after the conflicts? Can we conclude that the conflicts portray the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security agents that security of lives and property could be guaranteed? ----------

APPENDIX III

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

PART I: INTRODUCTION

DODO, Cornelius Nya'akunat M.Sc/Soc-Sci/6310/2011-2012

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PART II: Respondent's Profile/Bio-data and Socio-economic Features

Instruction: Tick one of the options (√) or fill in the blank space provided

1. Sex: a. Male ( ) b. Female ( )
2. Age: a. 18-29yrs ( ) b. 30-49yrs ( ) c. 50 and above ( )
3. Marital Status: a. Single ( ) b. Married ( ) c. Divorced ( ) d. Widow/Widower ( )

4. Educational Level: a. No formal education ( ) b. Primary ( ) c. O/Level ( ) d. Tertiary ( )

e. Others, Specify----------

5. Occupation: a. Farming ( ) b. Civil Servant ( ) c. Trading/Business ( ) d. Others, Specify----------

6. Approximate income per annum: a. below ₦50 ( ) b. ₦50-₦500 ( ) c. above ₦500 ( )

7. There is high level of unemployment and poverty in the local government: a. strongly agreed b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

PART III: SUBSTANSIVE ISSUES

Causes of Conflicts

8. How many conflicts have taken place in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011, name of place(s) and period (year)? ----------

9. What was/were the causes of conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011? a. struggle for political power ( )b. Struggle over scarce resources ( )c. Ethnic domination ( )d. Religious intolerance ( ) e. all of the above ( ) f. None of the above ( )

10. There has been unregulated competition over land: a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

11. Which ethnic group owns most of the farm lands and other key assets like houses, etc in the local government? ----------

Group Composition and Impact of Conflicts on Inter-group Relations

12. Religious Affiliation: a. Islam ( ) b. Christianity ( ) c. Traditional ( ) d. Others, Specify----------

13. Ethnic Affiliation: a. Atyap ( ) b. Bajju ( ) c. Anghan ( ) d. Ikulu ( ) e. Hausa/Fulani ( ) f. Others, Specify----------

14. Prior to the conflicts, there was harmonious co-existence among the various ethno-religious groups in the local government: a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

15. The conflicts caused losses in terms of lives and property a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

16. Many people in the local government were displaced from their homes adding to the streets new armies of the unemployed, destitute and the highly aggrieved with its attendant consequences: a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

17. Which ethnic group(s) are/were worst or least affected by the conflicts? ----------

18. The conflicts have created disharmony, hostilities, antagonism and a situation of distrust and suspicion among the various groups in the local government: a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

19. The conflicts portray the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security agents that security of lives and property could be guaranteed: a. strongly agreed ( ) b. Agreed ( ) c. Disagreed ( ) d. No idea ( )

APPENDIX IV

FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

PART I: INTRODUCTION

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PART II: SUBSTANSIVE ISSUES

Causes of Conflicts

1. How many conflicts have taken place in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011, name of place(s) and period (year)? ----------

2. What was/were the causes of the conflicts in Zango Kataf Local Government between 1999 and 2011? ----------

3. Has there been unregulated competition over land? ----------

4. Which ethnic group owns most of the farm lands and other key assets like houses, etc in the local government? ----------

5. What is the level of unemployment and poverty in the local government? ----------

6. How have the factors in 5 above contributed to the conflicts?

Group Composition and Impact of Conflicts on Inter-group Relations

7. Religious Affiliation----------

8. Ethnic Affiliation----------

9. How was the relationship among the various ethno-religious groups prior to the conflicts? Was it harmonious or antagonistic among these groups in the local government? ---------

10. What were the reasons behind either the harmonious or antagonistic relationship?

11. How did the conflicts impact on the local government in terms of lives and property? ---------

12. Where persons displaced? If yes, where were they displaced from and to where? ----------

13. Which ethnic group(s) are/were worst or least affected by the conflicts? ----------

14. How did the conflict affect the relationship of groups? Did it strengthen the relationship or create disharmony, hostilities, antagonism and a situation of distrust and suspicion among the various groups in the local government? ----------

15. What is/was the level of security during and after the conflicts? Can we conclude that the conflicts portray the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security agents that security of lives and property could be guaranteed? ----------