AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ZARIA, NIGERIA.

DISSERTATION IN FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

FRENCH POLICY IN AFRICA

1960-1980: A CASE

STUDY IN NEO-COLONIALISM
BY

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july 1989

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank everyone who assisted me directly or otherwise in the pursuit of this study. Specifically, I wish to mention my research supervisor, Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, my second reader and Department Head, Dr. O.G. Ajene, the Dean pf Postgraduate Studies, Dr. W. Hinjari, and my External Examiner, Dr. Soni Tyoden. I also wish to mention with deep appreciation the assistance given to me by Prof. A.D. Yahaya, Prof. Kweku G. Falson, Prof. Idris Mohammed, Prof. Isa Mohammed, Prof. Dr. Leibrecht, Prof. Christian Joubert, Prof. C.A. Kogbe, Ambassador B.A.T. Balewa, Ambassador M.B.G. Dogon-Yaro, Dr. Bola Akinterinwa, Mallam Abba C. Kyari, and the entire academic staff of the Department of Political Science of the Ahmadu Bello University. My thanks also go to Mr. F.U. Ubosi, Miss R. Gichuru, Miss Nancy Okello, Mrs. F.O. Ademosu, Miss Zulekha Dramera, Mr. Louis Onuoha, Mr. V. O. Ozemoya, Miss C.V. Okprima and Mr. P. Opara for handling my script at different stages.

My thanks and gratitude also go to the authorities of Ahmadu Bello University Library, the Library of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, the Library of the Institute of International Relations, Paris, the Schiller University Library, Paris, the Foyles Bookshops, London, and the French Foreign Ministry.

I cannot conclude without thanking my dear wife, Zainab, herself an educationalist of high standing, for her assistance and tremendous patience and understanding.

Mahmoud Yahya
July, 1986

EXTRACT

AS a direct consequence of the Second World War, France and other colonial powers began the process of releasing their colonies to independence. In doing so, however, the French leaders, notably under President Charles De Gaulle, took steps to ensure that the metropolitan power did not lose out completely. They did so by introducing the so-called *Loi Cadre,* which is a regime of measures calculated to maintain France's hold on the former colonies. It consisted, among other things, of a referendum in the colonies to decide on their continued association with France after independence. This led to the formation of the French Community of States, a kind of Commonwealth, through which France hoped to exercise control over the economic, political and defence policies of the newly independent countries, facilitated by treaties and accords. Most importantly, the newly independent countries were to remain within the franc zone, even though the African franc was devalued about 100% against the French franc. Defence treaties ensured France's control over the manning, training and utilisation of the African armed forces in accordance with the overall interest of the French Community. The economic and trade agreements saw to it that France had the first priority to import African raw materials and to sell finished goods within the Community. Politically, periodic meetings of the Community's Heads. of State helped to check any excesses and brought everyone into line in the formulation of general policies. In her bid to ensure the defence of her perceived interests in Africa, France went outside her sphere of influence into the English-speaking African countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Rhodesia and South Africa, to either cause confusion or promote close relations in the field of commerce, industry and culture. France's role in the Nigerian Civil War was calculated to destablise the country which was seen by the French as a threat to their own influence in the Sub-region. Relations with Rhodesia under Ian Smith, and with apartheid South Africa, revealed the opportunistic, albeit self-centred, nature of French foreign policy. Paris broke United Nations sanctions and employed all sorts of under-handed methods in order to protect her trading, scientific and investment

interests in the two countries. Whilst ignoring Black African opinion on this score, the French also pursued a pseudo-racist policy at home, where deliberate efforts were made to encourage the repatriation of Africans from France. The policy of assimilation which was vigorously pursued during the colonial days was now doomed to failure. The various methods used by French leaders to control and influence the economic, political, security and cultural policies of their former colonies as fully discussed and analysed in this study constitute the phenomenon we call neo-colonialism.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	—	Agence France Presse
AGC	—	Air Gabon Cargo
AGF	—	Assurance Generale de France
ATA	—	Air Trans Africa
B & C	—	Bourdin & Chauses
ASECNA	—	Agence pour la securite de la Navigation Aerienne en Afrique et Malegache.
BIC	—	Banque International Pour la Commerce et Industrie (de la Cote d'Ivoire).
BNP	—	Banque Nationale de Paris
CFAO	—	Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique de l'ouest
CFP	—	Compagnie Francais de Petrol
CAT	—	Cargo Air Transport
CGE	—	Compagnie General d'Electricite
CAD	—	Committee for Development Aid
CICA	—	Conference Internationale de Controle d' Assurance des Etats Africain
COFACE	—	Export Credit Guarantee Department
COGEMA	—	The Atomic Energy Commission
COMICON	—	Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance
COFRAMINES	—	The State Mining Company
CNRA	—	National Council for Algerian Liberation
DFCE	—	French Bank for Foreign Trade
ECOWAS	—	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	—	European Economic Community
GPRA	—	Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
IDC	—	Industrial Development Corporation
INTELCI	—	Telecommunication Internationale de Cote d'Ivoire
IPAM	—	Institute Pedagogique Africaine et Malegache
ISTRA	—	Impremerie Stras-Bourgoise
MTLD	—	Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
MOCI	—	La Monitor de Commerce Exterior
SNEA	—	La Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine (ELF)
NIC	—	Newly Industrialising Countries
OAS	—	Organisation of American States
OCAM	—	Central African and Malagasy Organisation
OAU	—	Organisation of African Unity
OECO	—	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC	—	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PC	—	Partie Communiste
PS	—	Partie Socialiste
RPR	—	Resemblement Populaire de la Republique
RDF	—	Rapid Deployment Force
SCCC	—	*Societe de Coulee Continue de Cuivre*
SGE	—	Societe Generale d'Entreprise
S & B	—	Spie Batignoles
SDECE	—	Service de Documentation et Contre Espionage
SOFACO	—	Societe Africaine des Fabrication des Formulation et des Conditionment
SFOM	—	Societe Financiere Pour les Pays d'Outre Mer
TESA	—	Thompson Electric of South Africa
UAG	—	Union des Assurance de Gabon
UAP	—	Union des Assurance des Paris
UNICEF	—	United Nations Children's Fund
UPC	—	Union Populaire Camerounaise
UTA	—	Union des Transports Aerienne
UTH	—	Union Touriste et Hotelier

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As a direct consequence of the ending of the Second World War, European powers released most of their colonial possessions to independence or some form of self-government. Among the countries so released were the French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa. The decision to release these colonies was not an easy one either for France or the other imperial powers such as Britain, Spain, Belgium and Portugal. It was the beginning of a new phenomenon in the development of world political economy. Indeed, it was the third stage in the evolution of the world capitalist system which had dominated the fate of nations, big and small since the latter part of the 19th century. As far as France was concerned, the move to release her African colonies was nothing but a change of tactics in the strategy of domination and exploitation of these countries which had been going on unabated. The same is true of the other powers. The purpose of this study is to examine very carefully how France thought out, planned and executed her policy of domination over her former African colonies, a phenomenon we have chosen to characterise as "neo-colonialism."

Before we go into the details of France's strategy in achieving her objectives, it is necessary to explain what is meant by Neo-colonialism. According to Kwame Nkrumah:

> **"The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international soveriegnty. In reality, its economic system, and thus its political policy, is directed from outside."[1]**

Thus conceived, neo-colonialism is an aspect of imperialism which may be explained by the Marxist theory of capitalist development. Although Karl Marx did not leave a theory of imperialism, *per see,* he provided the basis for

further eleboration of this phenomenon.

In his book, Das Kapital,[2] Marx explored the capitalist mode of production which showed no concern for human needs but concentrated on the creation of surplus value from a class of working labourers. Such surplus value is then sold and the profit is ploughed back to buy further means of production. His theory in this respect was part of an unfinished model by which he intended to reveal the "laws of motion" in the overall development of this mode of production. It is the logical application of the Marxist theory of capitalist development that the successors of Marx sought to locate and explain the phenomenon of capitalism.

Lenin, in his work, "Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism"[3] argued that "Imperialism was the monopoly stage of capitalism." Written in Austria in 1916, the book sought to explain the goals of the First World War which was viewed as imperialistic. Its aim, according to Lenin, was to *redistribute colonies and spheres of influence for finance* capital. He was concerned with the growth of monopoly capital in the latter part of the 19th Century (and early this century) which was replacing competitive capitalism. This, according to Lenin, required expansion of capital which thus *led to the division of the world and the creation of spheres of* influence.

Lenin's focus on imperialism dwelt more on the structural changes of capitalism than upon relations between imperial powers and their colonies.

There are other interpretations of Imperialism, notably by J. A. Hobson, J. A. Schumpeter, Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Bucharin and Hilferding. They dealt with different manifestations of imperialism such as sociological, socio-biological, security, economic and power.

The early stages of imperialism manifested themselves at the time when European powers competed for the acquisition of colonies in the latter part of the 19th century. Britain's power and hegemony over international trade and finance was challenged by the newly industrialising countries. This consequently led to the First World War of 1914—18.

The second phase of imperialism was the post war era, with

its own depressions of the 1930s. But with the growth of nationalism and Nazism in Germany, imperialism changed its tune by reversing the traditionalist trend of conquering backward territories to the conquest of fellow metropolitan countries and the imposition of the doctrine of Aryan race superiority. This inevitably led to another war (1939—45) and the defeat of Germany (which started it) and Japan.

At the end of the Second Ward War, the battered European powers had to turn to the United States for assistance to reconstruct their own cities.

The United States, as the leading capitalist nation, seized the opportunity to assert its power and authority and to organise and dominate the imperialist network. This was the beginning of the third phase of imperialism and the dawning of the cold war era that saw the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union as the two dominant world powers.

NEO-COLONIALISM:

It was quite clear from the late 1940s that the system of colonial style of control for the colonies could not be maintained. The European powers had to devise new means of honourable dis-engagement from the colonies but ensuring at the same time they did not loose out completely. The process of retaining these privileges so as to maintain the capitalist control is what led to the new policies of domination called Neo-colonialism. The advantage to the former colonial power of having neo-colonialist relationship is that it had no responsibility at all if anything went wrong.

In a colonial relationship, however, the metropolitan power had to explain to its parliament the reason for any action, good or bad.

Through the policy of neo-colonialism, imperialism merely changed tactics. It did away with its flags without bother, and devised new ways of achieving the same objectives which she hitherto enjoyed as a colonial power.

Some of the instruments used are the control of prices of commodities, the manipulation of interest rates, bilateral and multilateral aid, conclusion of trading, navigation, economic and military treaties to facilitate continued control and

In Egypt, too, President Nasser took the most dramatic step of nationalising the Suez Canal in 1956. That inevitably led to war between his country and the erstwhile colonial power, Britain. The story was the same in the Congo when Patrice Lumumba sought to nationalise the Belgian-owned Union Miniere mines. This led to the assassination of the Congolese leader by the American Secret Service (the CIA) and the bloody secessionist bid of mineral rich Katanga Province under the Western-backed, Moise Tsombe.[7]

The secessionist war in Nigeria, better known as the "Biafran" war, was the direct result of neo-colonialist manipulations of the nation's huge mineral resources, especially petroleum and gas deposits. Certainly, other sociological factors had played a part in the drama that led to the civil war (1967—70), but the control of resources soon manifested itself as the *raison d'etre*.[8]

Another variant of neo-colonialist exploitation in the developing world is the policy of the western capitalist powers to supply loans and trade credits under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other multilateral agencies of the United Nations, and regional bodies.[9]

Their conditions for such loans which feature the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) included currency devaluation, withdrawal of subsidies on consumer goods and services, lowering of tariff for the importation of merchandise from the creditor countries, and the lowering of prices for the produce and raw materials exported by the debtor nations to the creditor countries. Consequently, the poor third world countries have become poorer due to debt servicing and the high cost of consumer goods. The rich countries have become richer as a result of SAP arrangements.

Countries that attempted to foil the plot were subjected to harsh punishments. In the case of Nigeria, for example, all Western banks were instructed by their governments not to handle any credit transactions without specific approval by the IMF and the host government.[10] By this simple instrument, it became impossible for Nigeria to trade with those countries. Its own earnings from the export of crude were put

in danger of being confiscated through court injunctions and long legal processes as was witnessed in the celebrated cement Armada Scandals of the late 1970s. Nigeria resorted to trade by barter with southern countries in order to avoid the punitive measures imposed by Clubs of Paris and London. But that too failed through the machinations of the imperialist powers, with good measure connivance from within.

Neo-colonialism has manifested itself in the wars in Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Cyprus, Vietnam, Korea, the Philippines, Sri-Lanka, Pakistan and other places. It has been an endless struggle to control resources and space through the exploitation of tribal, religious and sectional differences by bellowing their nascent ambers.

Neo-colonialist leaders and their apologists are not willing to accept that they are doing anything wrong. They believe in their own propaganda so much that they see a great favour done to the poorer nations in their pursuits for economic investment and the provision of loans. They are so highly sensitive to criticism and do not take kindly to the nationalisation of assets such as Nigeria did against Shell-BP in 1979. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, reacting to Nigeria's take over of BP in 1979, declared in front of television cameras by pointing a finger at his Nigeria counter-part standing nearby that "Britain (would) teach Nigeria a lesson."[11] And Nigeria did learn her lesson less than ten years later when her leaders went to the London Club to negotiate a rescheduling of Nigeria's trade credits. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, warned publicly that the British Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) should ignore Nigeria's request until she is able to produce a clean bill of financial health from the IMF.[12]

The sensitivities of Western leaders to nationalisation and outspoken condemnation of neo-colonialism were effectively conveyed by former British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home:

"... If the cry of neo-colonialism was just a parrot-cry of adolescence, the countries possessing the capital at present could shrug their shoulders and invest. But it is not; it is coming

to be prelude to the seizure of assets. A few more cases like Indonesia and the supply of capital will dry up and not only there, but further afield as well... I therefore, hope that countries of Asia and Africa in particular will heed this warning in time, and that we shall hear less about neo-colonialism."[13]

Neo-colonialism, as the latest stage of imperialism, thrives in an atmosphere of dependence. A country's degree of dependence can be gauged for example, against its needs for foreign exchange to import raw materials and spare parts for its industry. To get the foreign exchange, the country may have to sell its own raw materialss and other exportable goods. For this reason, such a country would need the goodwill of foreign countries to buy the exports, to provide the exchange needed, etc. Woe betide that country if the goods it exports are also obtainable elsewhere. The situation is even worse where the country has no exportable raw materials or goods and, therefore, depends on "charities" from foreign sources. This is the locus of neo-colonialism.

THE FRENCH APPROACH:

Before their humiliating defeat in the South East Asian wars in 1959, the French had already perfected a plan for their neo-colonialist policies in West and Central Africa. The first step was the introduction of the so-called *Loi Cadre* which was a series of balkanisation measures.[14] The boundaries of the territories were to be defined to facilitate dealing with the smaller units individually. This, infact, was the prelude to the 1958 referendum for the Fifth Republic.

Having suffered immensely from German occupation during the war, France was determined to pursue policies that would guarantee genuine independence for her. The French sought to maintain two traditions both of which have combined in their Foreign policy, namely the identification of state and nation and the concern to maintain national independence, as well as the protection of international status and the promotion of French culture. They do so, being conscious of their economic vulnerability, with the consequent commitment to promote economic strength through state efforts both at home and abroad. Both of these have

their roots in the French history and experience stretching back well before the Fourth Republic, and even before 1789.

The neo-colonialist policy of France towards Africa would not appear to have seriously taken into account, her own national motto of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" which has its roots in the French Revolution of 1789. In those days, most French men saw the revolution as the final fulfilment of the 17th Century Descartian theory which concluded that the rational faculty of man was his guide towards the attainment of truth. Furthermore, the faculty itself is somewhat fairly distributed amongst all men by God himself.[15] This theory led the French revolutionaries of that time to treat all forms of authority with contempt and, consequently, condemned all forms of injustice and inequality. Descartes led his desciples to accept that for the human being to be respected, he must first and foremost prove that he is rational and that his actions could be defended at the bar of reason. Any action to the contrary must be regarded irrational, and therefore, worthy of contempt and condemnation. The assumption here, therefore, is that the Africans were neither rational nor could they defend their actions.

In their struggle to preach the Descartian gospel of liberty, equality and friendship, the French assumed a certain degree of arrogance and insensitivity. Their mission which was to educate the "barbarians" of this world about beauty and culture, was to be implemented by a military might which trampled upon the liberties of other peoples and made them less equal and less fraternal to the French. At least one of the men responsible for French colonial expansion in the Third Republic was honest about it: "The declaration of the rights of man was not written for the blacks of Tropical Africa..."[16]

The German defeat of France during the Second World War, and her experience under the Nazi occupation had shocked France so much that her leaders vowed never to take military preparedness for granted again. In this resolve, they took certain decisive foreign policy actions calculated to ensure a long term stability, prosperity and self-respect. Among these actions was to review her African posture in the hope that she would continue to exploit the colonies which occupied a rear

guard position. The visions of General De Gaulle as crystalized in Brazzaville in January, 1944, i.e. four months before mainland France was liberated from Nazi occupation by the Allied Powers, was the first sign of a change of attitude on the part of France over the policy of colonialism.[17] Although De Gaulle did not have a chance to realise his vision until many years later, his role in the evolution of French policy in the post war years was the most crucial. As leader of the French Resistance Movement, Charles De Gaulle had come to appreciate the value of freedom not only for France but also for those dependent territories which hardly had any say in the scheme of things. But like all classic imperialists, De Gaulle saw the survival of France in the continued domination of the colonies as they became independent. Accordingly, he decalred:

"If (the) overseas territories cut themselves off from metropolitan France, for how much would we count between the North Sea and the Meditterranean?"[19]

In view of the foregoing, it is further asserted that France has never meant to respect the letter of her national motto as far as these words relate to her former colonies in Africa and other nations which shared common experiences with those former colonies in Africa and elsewhere. The sum total of France's foreign policy posture towards these countries is necessarily neo-colonialist.

The groundwork for France's future relations with Africa was laid much earlier than the Bandoeng Conference or the Indo-China wars that preceded it. The defeat of the French armies at the Battle of Dien-Bien-Phu only confirmed France's fears of a diplomatic defeat at the same time. The reaction to Dien-Bien-Phu at home was more than the proud nation could handle. When the war of Algerian independence broke out, the French National Assembly, with the Indo-China humiliation still fresh in their minds, called for strong action against the North African country. French soldiers in Algeria and those at home, fearing another defeat, joined hands to overthrow the Fourth Republic to enable them have a free hand in Algeria, "so as to save the honour of the Frenchman in Algeria." They succeeded in their machinations by over-

throwing the Fourth Republic and by bringing out of retirement, General Charles De Gaulle.[20] Of course, General De Gaulle has denied, in his published memoirs in 1970, that he had a hand in the revolt that overthrew the Fourth Republic.[21]

THE COMMUNITY — A FRAMEWORK FOR NEO-COLONIALISM:

When De Gaulle came to power, one of his pre-occupations was to give France a new constitution. One of the major aspects of the constitution for the purpose of this desertation is Section 86 which dealt with the creation of the French Community. This, in effect, meant the granting of independence to French colonies but, at the same time, retaining them within the French sphere of influence by keeping them in the so-called French Community. In 1958, General De Gaulle undertook an extensive tour of French colonies in Africa not only to sound out their feelings about his plans for the community, but whether France could also rely on any of these countries as future allies. Among the carrots that General De Gaulle dangled at the newly emerging nations for his neo-colonialist designs were:-

(i) Their remaining within the Franc Monetary zone with all the backing of the powerful French economy:
(ii) Support by the French armed forces, which means the establishment of French Military bases in the former colonies as an insurance to their independence.
(iii) The provision of development aid which, under the new system, was to be called "Co-operation."

As Dmitri Lavroff put it bluntly:

> **"The co-operation between France and (Black) Africa should not be considered as totally without motive. Those with "angelic" attitudes may condemn political and economic co-operation between nations as having been motivated by the pursuit of power and economic advantages. It is true; not such co-operation can be said to be without motive. But the objectives of any policy is not based on its purity but in the satisfaction of the mutual objectives of the co-operating nations."[22]**

Although attempts have been made by Gaullist students (and General De Gaulle himself) to give the impression that

General De Gaulle's motives to grant independence to African countries had nothing to do with direct advantages to France, there are many reasons to doubt this assertion. De Gaulle himself, of course, had referred to his so-called "Brazzaville Speech" of 1944, when he tried to sell the idea that he was in favour of independence for African countries. But then he said: "We intend to bring the countries under our control to the point where they will be able to freely decide their future." However, the Brazzaville conference had drawn the conclusion that:

"The goals of the French civilising (six) mission in the colonies cannot be reconciled with any idea of autonomy or with the prospect of an evolution outside the French empire. The self-government of the colonies, even as a remote possibility, is to be rejected."[23]

In his own Memoirs, General De Gaulle had also said:

"After what had happened in our African and Asian possessions, it is unlikely that we can maintain our empire there in the same manner as before. If we want the peoples for whom we are responsible still to remain with France tomorrow, we must transform their present status as subjects into one of autonomy. But with the proviso that we hold firmly to our values and demand that such countries keep their word to us."[24]

Even though De Gaulle would appear to be open and direct at the time, the events that happened in Guinea in 1958, have shown that he was really not sincere. In any case, it was clear that General De Gaulle's constitution for the Fifth Republic went quite beyond the establishment of local assemblies granted by the Defferre measures. The French Union was then the new constitution of the French Community and the former colonial territories were referred to as states and given internal autonomy. Foreign Affairs, Defence and a few other important Ministries remained under the control of the French Community, i.e. the Government in Paris. The French mainland and all the overseas colonies were called to accept the new constitution in a referendum in September, 1958. It was made quite clear that any country that refused to accept the new constitution would be deemed to have accepted "inde-

"One is inclined to think that the solidarity of relations after independence will depend very much in methods adopted by the colonising powers in order to guide the new nations into the difficult path to independence.[26]

Thus from the standpoint of French Foreign Policy since 1945 the one outstanding achievement by France's own yardstick was the *Loi-Cadre* and the 1958 constitution which created the French Community. Indeed, it is the central pillar in the context of this study because it formed the final link between the policies of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

It must be noted that the period of 1960—1980 covered by this study, focuses essentially on De Gualle's Foreign Policy. The whole strategy of France was based on the tactics of De Gaulle and his advisers, which was to keep the ex-French colonies tightly under the control of Paris and to refuse to allow the encroachment of other cultures around them.[27]

In addition to the French Community, there was a deliberate attempt around 1962, to promote the grouping of the French speaking countries within some sort of Union. Notably, the President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, proposed that states of the so-called "Union Africain et Malegache" should create "a vertical organisation solidly, yet flexibly structured with a view to promoting especially close co-operation in Africa."[28]

This idea became popular with some of the more conservative members of the French Community. For example, President Hammani Diori was delegated to convey the attitudes of the supposedly independent speaking countries to General De Gaulle for approval.[29]

Prior to this initiative, some legislative measures had been taken by the French Government in Paris, by enacting the French Language Decree of 31 March, 1966. The purpose of that Decree was to lay the groundwork and explore ways and means of promoting and expanding the French language in the world. Nevertheless, the French were somewhat cautious in their approach as they were conscious of the fact that they might be criticised for trying to impose French culture for "Neo-colonialist" reasons. They were particularly concerned about the reactions of the more radical states such as Algeria. Some of the less affected countries, such as Quebec and Haiti, were aware of the moves but

independence was quite del erate and carefully planned. The inherent inequalities in th relationship which inevitably translates into French domi nce reflects the essential feature of latter day French im eralism which we term neo-colonialism. In the followin chapters, an attempt is made to explore in greater depth, t e varying dimensions of French *neo-colonialism in Africa.*

Chapter Two examines F ance's role in African civil wars where she employed the w apons of diplomacy, intelligence and bare-faced coercion in c der to achieve her objectives. The Nigerian Civil War and the Algerian liberation struggle were made the main focus of t is study. In Chapter Three, we examine the role of develo nent aid in the pursuit of France's *objectives in Africa, espec lly in her own former colonies.* Chapter Four of the study l oks at the way and manner France has used the lever of trad to dominate the economies of African countries. In Chap er Five, we see how France has used military aid to influ nce the development of African armed forces and by so do ng exercise great control over the internal security of these countries. We also examine in Chapter Six, how France extended her influence to racist *South Africa through trade arrangements, military and scien-*tific pacts and investme t. That chapter also examined France's role in the strug e by White Rhodesians to thwart sanctions imposed on the illegally independent territory by the international commun y. In the concluding chapters, we studied the policy of Franc in the field of cultural propaganda and how it was manip ated to win more friends and *influence people for her.*

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    Senegal — 97.6% — Yes
    Upper Volta — 99.1% — Yes
    Guinea — 95% — No
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31. Speech in Parliament in Paris, during debate on France's policy of Co-operation with developing countries, Hanzard No. 48 page 1782 of 11 June, 1964.

CHAPTER TWO

FRANCE AND AFRICAN WARS

As noted in our introductory chapter, the French foreign policy between 1960 and 1980, the period covered by this study, was essentially the policy of De Gaulle. It was part of the so-called policy of *grandeur,* by which De Gaulle sought to create some kind of myth around the French personality, i.e., the greatness of the country, its potentialities and as a source of inspiration for its citizens.[1] In its application to Africa, this policy had its own distinct character and motivation. Its pre-occupation was three-fold: (a) To preserve and safeguard the French Community; (b) To suppress internal revolts by leftist parties and other movements, and (c) to fight off communist plots or other developments in neighbouring African countries that might have a direct influence on the French Community member states. In the last case, the roles of Presidents Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure were seen as good examples of communist surrogate regimes with plans to cause revolution in neighbouring French Community states.[2] In pursuit of this policy, France evolved policies and signed bilateral and multilateral treaties with Community members in Africa to justify direct military intervention to fight off internal revolts or to intervene covertly or overtly in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. For example, the Ordnance of 7 January, 1959, explained the nature of the defence agreement with the Community members as follows:-

> "At all times, in all circumstances, all forms of aggression against a Community member-state shall apply equally as aggression on the Republic of France."[3]

Apart from France's own interests, there were also allied interests in maintaining a military presence in Africa. According to the French Prime Minister, Mr. Couve de Murville:

> "The attitude of the (French) army during the later stages of the Algerian conflict, was that some of its leaders believed that they were fighting a universal war for Western civilisation against communist barbarism..."[4]

This view of Couve de Murville was further reinforced by John Newhouse when he observed:

> **"France's battle-hardened Algerian army would admirably fit in (the United States) strategic design (of Western defence) whereby the U.S.A. will be the nuclear sword, and Europe the conventional shield."[5]**

It is in both contexts of neo-colonialist, cum imperialist designs that we wish to consider France's involvement with African wars.

THE ALGERIAN LIBERATION WAR:

Algeria was the first African country to be colonised by France (1832) and it was one of the last to be released to independence after a protracted liberation struggle which lasted for eight years from 1954 to 1962. The Algerian war was different from other liberation struggles in Africa that started almost simultaneously, such as the Bameleke (UPC) uprisings in the Camerouns, in the sense that it was a truely national struggle, involving all the people of Algeria in one unified front against the French occupation forces most of whom had been redeployed recently from the Indo-China wars. Many of the French people saw Algeria as an extension of France. Some of them referred to it as "Southern France."[6]

It is observed that had the so-called "fly-whisk" incident of 1827 not occurred, Algeria would probably not have become a French colony. It was alleged that in the course of a discussion in 1827, the Dey of Algiers insulted the French Consul, M. Duval, by calling him a "wicked, faithless, idol-worshipping rascal." The Algerian leader went ahead and hit the Consul with a fly whisk.[7] This unpleasant and most undiplomatic incident did not go unchallenged by the French diplomat. He immediately sent a report to Paris. The French government reacted by sending an invasion force which attacked Algeria, and the capital, Algiers, fell in 1832. This was the beginning of French colonial rule in Algeria which lasted for 130 years.[8]

Nevertheless, the events that took place in Europe later on, especially as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884, would still have brought about the colonisation of Algeria, even if the

1827 incident had not occurred.

The 1832 invasion, conceived by Consul Duval, spawned the first of Algeria's resistance heroes such as Abdel-kader, an Emir who was not only a religious leader but also a military tactician. He launched a Jihad (Holy War) and fended off French attacks for 15 years. His most famous stand was during the siege of Constantine from 1836 to 1837.[9]

After a long lull, the spur to independence started in 1945, at Setif, a market town west of Constantine, a scene of particularly brutal massacres by French security forces in which the Algerians claimed that at least 45,000 of their people were killed. It was this incident which persuaded Muslim Algerians that if French settlers would not go willingly, they must be forced to go.[10] After the Second World War, Messali Hadj, who was already very outspoken since 1924, against the French occupation, created what came to be known as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) which called for the creation of a National Sovereign Assembly and the withdrawal of French forces from Algerian soil. The MTLD was not successful in its bid and a splinter group, led by a group of nine revolutionaries, was created. It was named the National Liberation Front (FLN) and Ahmed Ben Bella was chosen as its leader. The nine Algerians, so-called "Neuf Historiques," laid their plans through 1954, for a guerrilla war against the French.[11] And by 1956, the war had spread to at least six military zones (Wilayas) which the FLN had set up to conduct the operations.

In 1956, a secret council of the FLN, called the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA), planned a new offensive which was to take the war into Algiers, the capital. The council met in the absence of Ben Bella, who was holed up in Italy, waiting for the "all clear" sign to cross the Mediterranean, back into Algeria. The CNRA also drew up a Socialist Programme which was to shape the future of the Algerian state.[12]

The battle for Algiers became decisive in 1957.

The FLN waged very ruthless and effective campaigns of bomb attacks in the capital, directed at the colonial settlers. This new guerilla strategy and tactic was said to be the brain

child of Yaadi Sacef, a senior eminent figure who organised a network of underground tunnels and bomb arsenals in the Casbah, the old quarter of the city.[13] His ring was, however, broken and brought to world attention. Nevertheless, by 1958, the FLN had established a government in exile, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) and this received its official recognition from more than 50 countries before the war was over in 1962.[14]

It should be noted that by 1954, there were at least 1,042,000 European settlers, or 11% of the total population of Algeria. These settlers had acquired over a quarter of the cultivated land area mainly in the moister, more fertile areas situated along the Mediterranean Coast, which was developed to produce cash crops such as vines, soft wheat, citrus fruits, olives, tobacco, and market garden products for exports to markets in Metropolitan France. About 80% of the European residents lived in towns where they were mostly administrators, bankers, technicians, traders, professional men and skilled workers. Though some had lesser jobs, their influence was far in excess of their numbers. The French settlers exercised power and enjoyed privileges and high incomes. The Algerian majority suffered loss of status, subservience and poverty. Few Algerians received any education or technical training, and fe w Algerian workers participated in industry or other non-agricultural activities. The country claimed only two Algerian Engineers on the eve of Independence.[15]

De Gaulle Elected:

In 1958, when the war for independence was raging very fiercely, General De Gaulle came to power in France. One of the first measures he took in Algeria was to announce a Five-year Economic Development Plan known as Plan Constantine (1959—1964).[16] This plan was the foundation of France's neo-colonialist designs for Algeria after independence. The Plan provided for a massive increase in state investment in Algeria, at a time when insecurity resulting from the war had triggered off a flight of private capital from the territory. The French had anticipated the end of the war and their own economic plan for Algeria was seen only as an

annex to the French economy. A number of key industrial developments undertaken after independence, e.g., the Gas Liquefication Plant at Arzew and the Iron and Steel Company of El-Hadjar, were merely a continuation of French projects under the Constantine Plan.[17]

Algeria finally achieved independence in 1962, but by that time, the economic problems facing the country were extremely enormous. The war had claimed lives of several hundred thousand Algerians and forced half a million to seek refuge in Morocco and Tunisia. At least two million people in rural areas had been uprooted from their homes by the French army as part of its pacification programme, and resettled in Regroupement Villages.[18] They did this under very harsh conditions. The way and manner the rural populations were uprooted by the colonial power before Algerian independence was so brutal that the writers, Bourdieu and Sayad, described them as "parmi les plus brutaux qua'it connus l'histoire."[19]

Strategy Against Neo-Colonialism:

The main problem of Algerian leaders after independence was how to defeat the effects of colonialism and the prospects of neo-colonialism by formulating an economic philosophy for development, the basic guideline of which is "the total severing of the umbilical cord with France.""20. Different attempts were made under the leadership of the first President, Ahmed Ben Bella. But it was not until 1964 that the ruling party, the FLN, adopted what is called the Algiers Charter,[21] a series of texts adopted by the first Congress of the party in April, 1964. The Algiers Charter was supposed to be a continuation of the pre-independence Tripoli Programme drawn up at the end of May, 1961, by the FLN at a special meeting convened in Tripoli by the party. The Algiers Charter went much further in detail and elaboration than the Tripoli Programme. It rejected very firmly, the capitalist path to development in favour of a socialist approach which it defined not only in terms of the nationalisation of the means of production, but as a system of "worker self-management."

It was quite clear that the first years of independence were concerned about the survival of the State, and President Ben

Bella found himself in a very weak position because he had to make concessions to various contending powers and power groups. In the summer and autumn of 1962, thousands of workers took over the management of firms and factories abandoned by the Europeans in order to keep these units in production and to protect their own jobs. Ben Bella then issued the famous "March Decree" in 1963, legalising the position of these workers communities, for political expediency only.[22] The nationalisation of French-owned land at the end of 1963, had thus begun with the taking over of those farms. By the beginning of 1964, the *Secteur Autogere Agricole,* controlled 2.3 million hectares, representing about a third of the total cultivated area from which the bulk of the country's agricultural exports were produced and on which some 135,000 permanent workers and 50,000 seasonal workers were employed.[23]

It is noted that by 196, about 413 industrial units had passed under the control of self-management committees, although this sector never included more than 10,000 to 15,000 workers, that is, 10% of the total industrial work force.

Under the independent Algerian government, the first steps towards the creation of an economic system, dominated by State Capitalism, were taken. French State participation in certain industrial enterprises were acquired by Algeria, e.g., in the Oil Company, SN Repal, the Algiers Oil Refinery, (CAMEL) — Compagnie Algerienne De Methane Liquide d'Arzew, CARAL — Renault, Saba-Berliet and Union Industrielle Africaine, and a series of new State enterprises were created between 1962 and 1965. Inspite of all this, Algeria remained heavily dependent on French aid. Internal sources of finance were strictly limited. Behind the rhetoric, no real attempt was made under Ben Bella to make the self-management sector an organised political and economic force.[24]

Enter Boumediene:

The coup [illegible] President Boumediene against Ben Bella in 1965, saw a [illegible] reinforcement of the policy of state control over the major means of production. From the beginning, the new regime gave the impression that it was

going to encourage private investment and, in fact, invited the local private sector to participate in the construction of a modern and integrated national economy. The country's economy was still weak and all sources of investment were needed to strengthen it. A number of incentives were given. But, at the same time, the government set out to reduce the dominant position occupied by French and other foreign enterprises in the country's economy and to re-gain control of the country's natural resources. In 1966—67, for example, the Algerian government nationalised French banks and insurance companies and created three state banks in their place. Nine foreign mining companies were nationalised in 1966, and in May and June, 1968, 45 subsidiaries of French and other foreign manufacturing companies were taken over. By 1970, of the 700 to 800 French-owned industrial enterprises which had existed in 1963, less than 100 survived. This wave of nationalisation culminated in the decision by the Algerian government in February, 1971, to declare unilaterally 51% participation in major oil companies, particularly Elf, Erap and Compagnie Francaise de Petroles, the three major French companies responsible for the bulk of Algerian Oil production.[25]

Conservative French leaders were of the view that the Algerians were very harsh in their actions against the French. But this is because the French were the main foreign investors in that country, being the former colonial power. The policy of nationalisation would appear to have been the trend not only in Algeria but in most former colonies, and this was more evident in places like Nigeria and Libya where the control of Oil Companies, Banking and Insurance was carried out to an even harsher degree. "Etatisation" and re-gaining control over national resources were only a part of the economic programme adopted by the Boumedienne regime. Formulated between 1966 and 1967, the Algerian Development Strategy was strongly influenced by the theoretical work of economists such as F. Perroux, A. O. Hirshchmann, E. Gannage and, notably, G. Destanne de Bernis. In outline, their theory seeks to ensure that "national resources are utilised within the country in order to reduce, progressively, the

extroversion of the economy." The long-term objective is "to construct a complete productive sector, capable of satisfying the needs of consumption and, at the same time, the full utilisation of local resources, in particular manpower." The strategy is built around two basic priorities: "that of capital accumulation over consumption, and industrialisation over the development of agriculture."[26]

Although the Algerians have tried their level best to cut off the umbilical cord with France, neo-colonialist manifestations have persisted in many areas, particularly in the cultural sphere and the dominant colonial mentality among the ordinary Algerian people. Thousands of Algerians still look to France as the land of opportunity and they go there every year in search of employment. Most of them do not return. Like the French settlers in Algeria before them, many Algerian settlers in France prefer to refer to their own country as "Southern France." Both the new Arab nationalism and radical Islam have not changed the general attitude of the Algerian people towards French culture and other liens of neo-colonial influence.

THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR:

France's involvement with the Nigerian Civil War was quite different from that in Algeria. In the first place, Nigeria was not a French colony, in which case she was not a member of the French Community. Secondly, there were no French or other European settler-communities in Nigeria. Thirdly, French investments in Nigeria at the material time were relatively quite negligible.

The main reason for France's involvement in the Nigerian Civil War was to destabilise the country in such a way that it would cease to influence events in the surrounding French Community countries to the detriment of France's economic and other strategic interests. This was made quite clear in various statements made by French leaders and government. For example, in an officially sponsored article published in March, 1969, it was stated:

"The crisis in Nigeria, a country which is historically and geographically surrounded by former French colonies, cannot be

taken with indifference: Four Francophone African States, surround Nigeria, most of which contain minorities from the major Nigerian tribes of Yoruba (in Dahomey), Hausa (in Niger) and Ibo (in Eastern Cameroun)."[27]

The French had always felt, rightly or wrongly, that their interests were being threatened by Nigeria through the influence she (Nigeria) supposedly exercised over the Hausa, Fulani and Yoruba tribes whose traditional allegiances before colonisation were rooted in the ancient kingdoms which coincided with modern-day Nigeria.

At the height of the Nigerian Civil War, the French government issued a policy statement on 31st July, 1969, in which more reasons were given for France's support for the scessionist side — Biafra. The French government alleged that the Nigerian Government was being hostile to the policies of General De Gaulle and was, consequently, planning to nationalise France's interests in the country. This statement was hinged on reported plans by Nigeria to take punitive measures against foreign companies which supported the secessionists. The oil exploration firm, SAFRAP, was said to be targeted by Nigeria. This made France to intensify her suppport for Biafra in the hope that she would eventually, after Biafra's victory, get not only SAFRAP's oil wells back, but also acquire the interests belonging to other oil companies.[28]

When Nigeria went into civil war in 1967, hardly did her leaders know that she was falling into the pre-laid traps of France. The French Government, under De Gaulle, had considered Nigeria as a serious stumbling block in the way of her neo-colonialist strategies in West and Central Africa. Nigeria's successful opposition to France's nuclear tests in the Sahara in 1960 and 1961 was seen by France as an unnecessary nuisance. Nigeria and Ghana moved for a U.N. resolution to condemn France and followed their action with the breaking of diplomatic relations with Paris. This decision by Nigeria, in particular, a newly independent African country, was seen as a serious affront to the French Republic which saw itself not only as a European power but also as an African power, too.[29]

When General De Gaulle made a decision to destabilise

Nigeria, he was probably encouraged to do so by, among others, Mr. Felix Houphouet Boigny, the President of Ivory Coast, who also wrongly considered Nigeria as a threat to the cohesion of Francophone African countries in the West African Sub-region.[30] Nigeria's size and other potentials had portrayed her as a power that was bound to dominate the political and economic activities of that Sub-region in direct competition with France. France, on the other hand, having just launched her former colonies to independence with all the neo-colonialist strings of the French Community, was very eager to see that her interests in that part of Africa were not endangered in any way. But then, De Gaulle found himself in this action, willingly or not, in alliance with two arch-colonialists and former friends of Hitler, namely, Francisco Franco of Spain and Salazer of Portugal. The three former colonial powers were determined to see that no African country was allowed to entertain any notion that it could run a modern government. Of course, African leaders, determined to prove the contrary, employed gigantic and disproportionate efforts.[31]

The third incongruant was the government of Israel which took advantage of the presence of a senior Jewish officer in De Gaulle's security services, Mr. Jacque Foccart, to settle scores with Northern Nigerian leaders who openly attacked Israel for her anti-Arab policies and whose legitimacy as an independent state they had questioned. Mr. Foccart facilitated a security liaison between the Israeli intelligence service, MOSAD, and the French Secret Service (SDECE), later re-named DGSE.[32]

Although France had been infuriated by Nigeria's attitude over the atomic tests, a firm decision to destabilise the country was not taken until 1963 — ironically four years before the civil war. Mr. Jacques Foccart, then said to be Secretary General for African and Malagasy Affairs (but, in fact, responsible for French Secret Service Operations in Africa) joined hands with Mr. Felix Houphouet Boigny to carry out France's designs against the West African giant. Mr. Foccart posted a Senior Intelligence Officer of the French Secret Service, Lt.-Col. Bischelot, to Ivory Coast under the

cover title of "Special Technical Adviser to the President." He was deployed in the President's office with the specific assignment "to find ways and means of destabilising Nigeria."[33]

So, by the time Lt.-Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu declared the secession of Eastern Nigeria in May, 1967, France was ready:

> **"By the spring of 1967, the services of Jacques Foccart were ready. Contacts with Ojukwu were initiated immediately. Houphouet Boigny, the great protege of De Gaulle saw to it that he was personally involved in the project. Jacques Foccart was himself in Abidjan working together with one other of his special agents, Mr. Jean Maricheau Beaupre, who was given a special assignment in that country.[34]**

Mr. Beaupre, who came to be known as the Special Representative of "Mr. Jean" (Foccart's popular patronymic) became the Chief Co-ordinator of France's activities in the Biafran secessionist bid. A former journalist of the Paris Magazine, "Paris Match," he had a great admiration for De Gaulle, having worked under him during the Second World War in the special Secret Services of the Resistance Movement. He was a very ruthless fellow with a penchant for secrecy and was noted for his involvement in the overthrow of Mr. Foulbert Youlou, as a result of which he was imprisoned in Brazzaville in August 1963. It was Mr. Beaupre who recruited the notorious mercenary, Bob Dennard, and other mercenaries for Biafra.[35]

On 17th July, 1967, Le Monde reported a press release issued by the American Embassy in Lagos in which it was stated that "a B26 bomber, supplied by the French Army and piloted by a French crew, has landed in Enugu, capital of Biafra."[36] The Americans were careful also to reveal the previous stop-overs of the aircraft, before landing in Enugu, namely, Lisbon, Dakar and Abidjan. This release by the American Embassy was the first firm indication of France's involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. Hitherto, the official position had been that the French Government had no hand in the events in Biafra.[37]

Again, the Parisian newspaper, "Canard en Chaine" of 23rd August, 1967, reported more details about France's involve-

ment in Biafra as follows:-

"The civil war in which the Nigerian tribes have found themselves at war with one another as a result of the Biafran secession, will not surprise anyone in Paris. The commandos who have put these Anglophones at war with one another, were actually trained and advised by French mercenaries supplied by Jacques Foccart, Secretary-General of the community (sic) at the Elysee Palace."[38]

One of the interesting developments was how a former Air France pilot, Mr. Languillaume, who had just been grounded for an air crash and for which his licence had been suspended, managed somehow mysteriously to obtain another licence within a few hours of grounding in order to fly to Gabon and take part in Biafran missions.[39]

While Foccart's men were busy trying to effect the secession of Biafra, another plan was at hand to get rid of the Gabonese President, Leon Mba, who was lying ill in a Parisian Hospital. He was removed without difficulty and Mr. Albert Bongo was appointed to replace him as President. At 32, Bongo at that time was probably one of the youngest heads of state in Africa. As soon as he came to power, he got into clandestine contacts with Ojukwu. The French had foreseen the crucial role Gabon would play in effecting the secession of Biafra and had chosen Bongo as a surrogate.[40]

There was an interesting development in Ivory Coast on 14th May, 1968, when the old Houphouet Boigny called a meeting of his National Council consisting of nearly 1,030 cadres to the Presidential Palace and asked them to discuss and define the position of Ivory Coast, regarding Biafra. The only dissenting voice at the meeting was that of the Director of Foreign Relations and Economic Co-operation who cautioned against the recognition of Biafra. The President was said to have shouted him down, saying that the Director was too young to give advice on such serious matters.[41] As a result of this meeting, Ivory Coast announced its recognition of Biafra, after which Houphouet Boigny advised De Gaulle to do the same. Paris, however, could not come to announce its own recognition. Instead, it co-ordinated the hostilities.

Earlier on, Mr. Albert Bongo, who was asked by Foccart to announce his own recognition of Biafra, was said to have

hesitated first. On 25th April, 1968, the President issued a statement in which he declared: "one has to be prudent; it is now too early to say anything."[42]

Soon after he had made that statement, Messrs. Houphoet Boigny and Foccart drew the attention of Mr. Bongo to "all the favours" done to him and asked him to be "loyal and obedient to the orders of Foccart."[43]

Early in May, Mr. Bongo issued a statement in which he declared:

"We cannot continue to assist passively in genocide which is going on now in Nigeria. It is utopian to think that Nigeria, with 50 million inhabitants, can exist as a nation as it now is. The best thing is for the Federal Government to confer independence on the 14 states which it has just created in the country."[44]

On 13th July, 1968, the mercenary, Rolf Steiger, piloted the first French aeroplane carrying ammunitions, via Gabon, to land at Uli air strip in Biafra.[45] These flights later continued from time to time, with Libreville as the main take-off point. In fact, because of the frequency of the flights, Colonel Ojukwu was once quoted as having said, "there are more aeroplanes landing in Biafra than in any other airport in Africa, with the exception of Johannesburg."[46]

Estimates from different sources indicate that Biafra received at least 350 tons of arms and ammunitions per week from September, 1968 to March, 1969. The value of arms and ammunitions received by Biafra throughout the period of the conflict was put at US $384 million.[47] The Associated Press had reported that all the aeroplanes were piloted by French men and it appeared that their own security was also assured by the French. The aeroplanes did not carry any distinctive marks but they could be seen at the Libreville airport."[48] The usual explanation was that these flights were mercy flights of the International Red Cross.

The city of Libreville was full of mercenaries and other people who exploited the situation in Nigeria. The night clubs, such as "Paillott" and "Frigidaire" were full of mercenaries where they all recapitulated their experiences during their flights in and out of Nigeria. The French Ambassador, Mr. Moris Delauny, the Director of Trans-Gabon Air and Station

Chief of SDECE, Mr. Jean Claude Brouillet, and his agents, were there.

One interesting aspect of these events was Foccart's inventiveness, such as the creation of nebulous companies for clandestine operations. One of such companies was "Beaujolin." The one called "Barracuda" was involved, perhaps more than any other, with the Biafran Civil War. This company was headed by Madame Ponchardier, wife of the chief of the mercenaries and the chief of "the defenders of Gabon," namely, Moris Robert, Jacques Foccart and Pierre Debizet. It was this company, named after a fish, that was utilised by Paris for the freighting of arms to Biafra. Inspite of the fact that the Red Cross and the *Chevaliers De Malte* were witnesses, they had never officially acknowledged that these aircraft and the companies that hired them, were delivering military supplies. But to make it easier for the Red Cross to avoid taking responsibility, the military attache in the French Embassy in Gabon was assigned the responsibility of supervising all "Red Cross" activities. When Frederick Forsyth made his allegations about the shooting down of Red Cross planes by Nigerian Air Force's MIG-17s, it was clear that he had not gone to Libreville to inspect the cargoes of such "mercy" flights.[49]

Contradiction:

The French Government kept on contradicting itself over Biafra. On several occasions, it claimed that it had no hand in what was happening in Biafra. We recall, for example, when a meeting was held in Niamey, Niger Republic, to discuss the Biafran situation. The French Government issued a statement quoted by AFP of 17th July, 1968, as follows:

> **"The Government of France which has been following the developments in the peace initiatives concerning Biafra, would like to join any effort that may bring about peace to that country as soon as possible."[50]**

Having made this statement, Paris issued the so-called *"31st July Declaration"* (which coincided with the meeting of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa) in which it declared:

"Blood has been shed in Biafra for almost one year. The population of Biafra have demonstrated their ability to survive as a people. The conflict must be resolved on the basis of fundamental human rights and in accordance with international procedures."[51]

There is no doubt that the inspiration for that statement came from General De Gaulle himself. That statement was supposed to pre-empt the negotiations which were going to take place in Addis Ababa from 5th August, 1968. It was tantamount to the conferment of recognition on Biafra by the French Government, even though they did not say so.[52] As noted earlier, the attitude of President Houphouet Boigny in the whole affair should not be under-estimated. During the crucial negotiations of 1968, Houphouet Boigny sent a letter to General De Gaulle enclosing a personal letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu in which the colonel asked for assistance from the French President.[53]

In October, 1968, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Mitchelle Debre, made an appeal before the United Nations General Assembly for what amounted to a recognition of Biafra. He declared:

"The time has come when we should ask our friends in Africa what they are doing about fundamental human rights; and their reply is, it is only among brothers that intolerance survives. Well, keep quiet for a long time, be inactive and allow blood to flow, and famine to increase, and by so doing, weaken the prestige of new Africa. It is only a good and faithful friend of Africa standing in this rostrum who can say with confidence what their reactions will be."[54]

A few days later, Presidents Modibo Keita of Mali, Sangoule Lamizana of Upper Volta and Hamani Diori of Niger condemned the French position as follows:

"Certain countries have taken partisan position in favour of the secessionist Biafran province, and they try to justify such a position. Such justifications contradict the actual comportment of these countries."[55]

A few months later, at an AUCAM conference in Kinshasa, the subject of Biafra was brought up, and it caused a division which nearly wrecked the conference, and the topic had to be

abandoned in the interest of the unity of the French Community.

In examining the outline of French Foreign Policy during the Nigerian Civil War, it is possible to see the roles played by African leaders to determine the outcome of events. For example, President Senghor and President Houphouet Boigny were in favour of Biafra; but on the other hand, President Hamani Diori of Niger and President Foulbert Tsiranana of Madagascar, among others, were in favour of a united federal Nigeria.

There was pressure everywhere for President De Gaulle to come out openly and declare his recognition of Biafra. It was believed especially by Houphouet Boigny that by so doing, the whole of the French-speaking world would declare its support for Biafra. This would have forced Nigeria to accept the status quo. General De Gaulle was said to be an admirer of any effort by any group of people to express their wish voluntarily and to fight for their independence.[56] For General De Gaulle, what was happening in Nigeria was an expression of such a desire by a people who wanted to fight for the creation of their own nation.[57] What he ignored, however, was that the geographical territory did not consist altogether of Ibo-speaking people, or of Catholics, as he implied.

The reactions of these Chiefs of State who were traditionally very faithful to France and to General De Gaulle, helped in no small measure, in fixing the limits of France's intervention in the conflict. Their own views were very important to France because, if they had been neglected, they might have had some negative repercussions on the unity of the French Community itself.

The late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, was said to be in the process of normalising relations with France when he was assassinated in the coup of January 1966. At that time, negotiations for Nigeria's associate membership of the European Community, which De Gaulle consistently opposed, had been ratified. But, because of the absence of Nigerian and French diplomatic missions in Lagos and Paris, General De Gaulle blocked the signing of the treaty. President Houphouet Boigny was said to have intervened in

favour of Nigeria and persuaded General De Gaulle to accept reconciliation between Nigeria and France.[58] As a result of the intervention, the Prime Minister sent a letter to General De Gaulle (which has not been made public), in which he expressed his desire to re-establish normal relations with France. Unfortunately, this came too late because of the coup that toppled Tafawa Balewa from office. It is also one of the bitter lessons of politics that, inspite of the positive moves made by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, General De Gaulle went ahead with his destabilisation plans.

The Fall of De Gualle:

In the height of these activities, General De Gaulle lost his referendum of 27th April, 1969. This loss caused a lot of panic in Gabon among the mercenaries and among the Secret Service officers, including their own boss, Mr. Foccart, for they were not sure if the new President at the Elysee Palace, George Pompidou, would support the Biafran policy and the clandestine operations against Nigeria. Mr. Foccart and his collaborators who were already in close association with Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, decided to take a quick action and to supply more arms in double speed before the new President would place an embargo on their activities.[59]

When President Pompidou came to power, he became reluctant about the continuation of arms shipments to Biafra. He was mindful of the Western press opinion which, at one time, seemed to favour what Gaullist France was doing. In July, 1969, for example, the Washington Post Newspaper commented that:

"the people of Biafra had suffered enough, and their suffering had incited international opinion which has called for further restrictions to be imposed on Nigeria. Starvation was now being used as a weapon of war. This cannot be accepted."[60]

Two days after this publication, that is, on 13th July, 1979, President Bongo of Gabon spoke to the AFP, the French News Agency, which reported him as follows:

"The President of Gabon has declared that the resistance organised by Biafra continues. Biafra still exists, and Biafran soldiers are evidently not going to surrender."[61]

As he was talking to AFP, there was a telephone call which interrupted the interview. When he returned to the interview, he declared:

"Nigeria should find a way to reunite itself, I hope. So also do the four other countries that recognise Biafra hope."[62]

It was later learned that Bongo was forced to withdraw his intransigent remarks on Biafra by Mr. Jacques Foccart who had telephoned him. The French were now trying to persuade Colonel Ojukwu to accept a settlement with Nigeria, leading to the creation of a confederal set-up in which Biafra and France stood to benefit.[63] Later, Foccart met with Bongo. Two hours after their meeting, the AFP sent out the following correction on its subscriber telex machines:

"President Bongo said: 'if the Nigerian people are ready to reunite, then we are ready to help them to'."[64]

Although many observers had praised Bongo for seemingly working hard in the interest of the orphans who were flown in from Biafra, and for his willingness to share the Gabonese "cake" with the orphaned children, the reality of the matter is far from the truth. Even though the children were being maintained by the International Red Cross and other international relief organisations, Presdient Bongo was hoping that one day he would hold them for a ransom. According to the French newspaper, "Canard en Chaine," Bongo was reported as having said that he would not part with the children without a payment of ransom from the Nigerian Government "for the enormous expenses that were incurred in maintaining the children." He said that the Government of Gabon was "not going to lose a penny" out of the huge expenses incurred in maintaining the children. In an article entitled, "Price on 3,000 children," the newspaper described Bongo's attitude as follows:-

"Today, Bongo is not only seeking to recoup his money, but also to collect from the Lagos Government, a debt of gratitude. The Gabonese President, whose interest in the Biafran affair wa very well-known, is going to compromise his prestige, war or coup... Well, the Biafran children in exchange for money?"[65]

The sudden change of attitude by France under President George Pompidou represented a dramatic shift in policy. The new government in Paris was ready to re-assess the situation and to reconcile with Nigeria.[66] It is remarkable that soon after the civil war, France was able to expand her investments and business interests in Nigeria to an extent that surprised even the French themselves. Nigeria soon became the biggest trading partner of France in the whole of the African continent. France lost the war, but won the peace, even though General Gowon had declared a policy of "no victor, no vanquished" at the end of the civil war.[67]

Conclusion:

The choice of two examples, namely the Algerian liberation struggle and the Nigerian Civil War, has shown how France tried to pursue her neo-colonialist, cum imperialist, interests in two distinct environments, namely a Francophone country (Algeria) and a non-Francophone country (Nigeria). In the Algerian setting, an attempt was made to resettle veterans of the Indo-Chinese wars where France suffered a defeat, with the hope of assimilating them in the territory. When that plan was thwarted by the fierce liberation wars mounted by the Algerian people, a new government under General De Gaulle (1958) introduced an economic development plan, namely the Plan Constantine, 1959—64, to lay the groundwork for neo-colonial control of the country after independence already foreseen by the government. The settlers saw themselves not only as French men at war to maintain their assumed rights but also as agents of the Western powers to sustain Western civilisation against "communist barbarism." They opposed the carefully thought-out independence plans of General De Gaulle, albeit unsuccessfully. But De Gaulle's own plans too misfired after independence, as the Algerian authorities, under both Ben Bella and Boumedienne, pursued tough economic policies leading to massive nationalisation of French companies. The neo-colonialist strategy was defeated, but not completely, as France had continued to influence Algeria through cultural links and job opportunities.

With her involvement in the Nigerian Civil War, France

sought to weaken the West African giant as she saw the country as a threat to her own domination of the Francophone countries surrounding the Federal Republic. France saw an opportunity in the civil war to balkanise Nigeria and by her direct assistance to Biafra hopefully win concessions in the field of oil exploration. Although France failed to achieve this objective, she later became one of Nigeria's biggest trading partners, with substantial investments.

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CHAPTER THREE

FRANCE'S DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY

The Foreign Aid Policy of France occupies a very important part in it's foreign policy. The Fifth Republic has considered this subject with great seriousness since 1961 by commissioning at least four major commissions of inquiry from time to time in order to look at and appraise the situation of aid to developing countries over the years. The first commission of inquiry which was appointed to investigate the status of development aid, was the Pignon Commission of Inquiry in 1961. This was followed in 1963 by the Jeanneney Commission, and finally in 1975, the Abelin Commission. In between these, there had been several other reports and enquiries ordered from time to time by the National Council for Economic and Social Development.

The Pignon Report:

By a decree dated 10th June, 1961, the erstwhile Prime Minister of France, Mr. Debre' constituted the Pignon Commission of Inquiry charged with "the study of all measures that would allow the re-organisation of the totality of services dealing with aid and co-operation with developing countries."[1] The decision to unify these services, was announced in a white paper dated 10th June, 1961. On the orders of the Prime Minister, the recommendations in the Commission's report were brought into effect in February, 1962. For the first time, the Pignon Commission of Inquiry brought together the various aid agencies and also sought to harmonise all policies of French Technical Co-operation abroad.

The Jeanneney Report:

A former Ambassador to Algeria, Mr. Jeanneney was appointed by decree of 2nd March, 1963 to study the policy of co-operation with developing countries. The Commission was charged with the responsibility to "study the diverse elements of the policy of co-operation with developing countries pertaining to the Franc zone as well as the organisation of

administrative and financial structure necessary in that policy."[2] The Commission completed it's work within a short time and submitted it's report to General De Gaulles on 18th July, 1963. The Jeanneney Report was considered to be too partial to the Francophone countries of Black Africa, and it was largely criticised in France for recommending huge financial assistance to them. Some critics cynically referred to the beneficiaries of aid under the Jeanneney report as "Rois-Noirs" — Black Kings. In fact, one of the most outspoken critics of the aid plan as proposed under the Jeanneney Report, was Mr. Bonnefous who published a book titled "The Stolen Billions: French Aid to Under-Developed Countries."[3] Nevertheless, the Jeanneney Report, can be described as clearly revolutionary in the sense that it recognized the need to give more aid to the needy instead of all the neo-colonialist propaganda tht accompanied previous aid policies. But of course, the gratitudes that went with it meant France's increased influence in the region, and with it, a victory for neo-colonialism.

The Gorse Report:

Another former Ambassador to Algeria and a Minister, Mr. Gorse was appointed in May, 1970, by Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas to head the third commission of inquiry in order to "examine in its different aspects, the policy of co-operation of France with under-developed countries and to propose the orientations governed by that policy and to define the modes of all types of co-operation during the period covered by the sixth plan."[4] The report of the commission was submitted to the Government on 17th June, 1971. It was rather surprising, however, that the Council of Ministers issued a statement dated 20th October, 1971, in which it announced that the contents of the Commission's report would not be published. The Gorse report came out just over a year after General De Gaulle had left office, and one year into Pompidou's tenure as President. Mr. Chanban-Delmas, under the new policy theme of "The New Society," decided to pursue a new method of co-operation with developing countries by integrating the report in the sixth

development plan and placing emphasis on the integration of aid and co-operation in the organisation of the economy. A new idea proposed by Gorse is the involving of commercial institutions and international organisations in the programme of development aid. It also tried to evaluate the activities of the developing countries themselves, putting them all in one perspective in order to make aid more effective. The Gorse Report was quite voluminous and it detailed France's action as regards countries in the process of development. It took some new directions and further recommended some of the neglected aspects of the Jeanneney Report.

The Abelin Report:

The Abelin Report's objective was to make an analysis of the situation in France's co-operation with developing countries and, above all, to propose a new philosophy in orientations directly appliable by the Ministry of Co-operation. In view of the fact that France's history of development aid had hitherto dealt with African countries South of the Sahara, Mr. Abelin was directed also to "clarify the latest position of our co-operation, adjust them according to new circumstances and affirm them on a new international platform."[5] Published in September, 1975, the Abelin Report was quite mindful of the new world economic situation especially with the oil crisis that began in 1974, and also the changing economic situation of the Petroleum producing countries themselves. For example, some of the countries that had hitherto benefited from French aid, had now become oil producers. With the oil boom of the seventies, they have now become relatively rich, notably Algeria and Gabon in the Francophone zone. The untimely death of President Pompidou did not stop the implementation of the Abelin Commission's report. As a matter of fact, no sooner than the President Giscard d'Estaing took over, he reconstituted the Ministry of Co-operation and appointed Mr. Abelin as the Minister in charge. Unfortunately, although Mr. Abelin had a lot of interest in developing countries, he could not achieve his objective because he had to work with bureaucrats who were determined to pursue their own out-dated methods of managing the policy of

co-operation.

The four commissions of inquiry and their reports have their own different characteristics depending on the President or the Prime Minister in power at the material time. General De Gaulle, Mr. Chaban-Delmas, Mr. Abelin in the Ministry of Co-operation — each one of them, wanted to demonstrate and fashion out his own personal image and to build his own prestige around the type of policy of co-operation that was being pursued in his time. General De Gaulle, for example, had put a lot of emphasis on foreign policy, but especially on his relations with European and African countries. In fact, De Gaulle's sympathy with the Francophone African countries was made so clear and linked to his so-called "Brazzaville Myths" that it was hard to dissuade him from pursuing those policies. The retirement of De Gaulle in 1969, and the election of Mr. Pompidou to replace him, as well as the choice by Mr. Pompidou of Mr. Chaban-Delmas as his Prime Minister changed the whole image of politics of the Fifth Republic. Under Pompidou, the Prime Minister assumed a greater importance. Mr. Pompidou, in his Press Conference of 10th July, 1969, had made the following comments which threw some light on his policy of co-operation. "Aid must continue, but we must not forget the exigencies of Commerce and Politics. We consider the position of the third world in commerce and international trade, but so do we also consider such matters as the sale of arms."

What is development aid?

It seems that of the four commissions of inquiry, only Mr. Pignon's report failed to give any definition of what is meant by development aid. The other three, Jeanneney and Gorse in particular, had seen and given some meaning to this aid, probably, Mr. Abelin's report, had given the most original of such definitions when he described under-developed countries sas "under-equipped nations." He made it clear that under-development was based on technical achievement or the lack of it, than otherwise. In Gorse's report which, it should be noted was at least ten years after independence, he tried to distinguish the levels of development of developing countries. He explained that "the recent international mutations

due to the hiking of oil prices and certain raw materials have introduced certain differences between developing countries as follows:-

(a) Countries which are in the process of industrialisation;
(b) Those which are partially industrialised;
(c) Those that lack the capacity to finance their own development;
(d) Producers of raw materials and earners of various revenues, as well as;
(e) Those with renewable resources."[6]

Of course, causes of under-development are diverse and complex. The Gorse report gave two of those reasons, namely the negligence of agriculture, and population explosion. He declared that the period following the second world war coincided with powerful reduction in the mortality rate. The sudden increase of population also brought about unemployment. Consequently, it also reduces savings that might have assured increased financing of investment. In the circumstance, the effort being made by developing countries to catch up with the developed countries was becoming gradually less effective as it was not enough to bridge the gap between the industrialised world and the third world. The Abelin report, on the other hand, ascribed the reasons for under-development to the international economic system which has concentrated scientific, research and technical development in the developed countries.

TABLE I: COMPARISON BETWEEN FRENCH AID FOR DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY AID (MILLIONS OF FRANCS)

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
1. Development Aid	985.8	820	887.5	995.1	982.9	990.5	946.5
%	95.6	85.5	87.9	89.1	88	87.9	87.4
II. Military Aid	45	128	122	120.3	133.1	135.5	136.2
Personnel	(1)	79	76	80.3	89.4	92.6	93.5
— Training	8	9	7	6	6	6	6
— Equipment	37	40	39	34	37.7	36.7	36.7
%	4.4	14.5	12.1	10.9	12	12.1	12.6
Total	**1030,8**	**848**	**1009,5**	**113,4**	**1116**	**1125,8**	**1082,7**

1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
1112	1258	1460,8	1657	1839	2112	2169	2472
87.1	86.5	87.9	87.9	88.8	89.4	89.2	86.6
163.5	190	204.1	226	230	250	262	380
127.5	**131**	**134**	**137**	**137**	**151**	**163**	**304**
/	**10**	12.1	**16**	23	**21**	21	42
38	49	58	**73**	**73**	78	79.8	133
12.9	13.5	12.3	12.1	11.2	10.6	10.8	13.4
1275,6	**1453,2**	**1664,9**	**1883**	**2069**	**2362**	**2431**	**2852**

Note:

(1) 92.8 million was shown in the Army Budget.

Source: French Statistical Year Book, 1979.

The Jeanneney report made an attempt to differenciate between aid and co-operation. According to him, "aid is that totality of intellectual and material contributions which involve the sacrifice made by the countries that make them. Co-operation on the other hand is viewed principally as a contribution through coming together."[7]

The Gorse report, instead of giving a definition of development aid, asked whether military aid should be considered as development aid and whether it should be accounted for as such in the totality of aid given to third world countries. Of course, the answer to this was given by the Committee for Development Aid (CDA) which says that military aid is not to be considered as part of development aid given to third world countries. Gorse, on the other hand, was of the opinion that although military aid cannot be considered as development aid, it does indirectly aid development by consolidating peace and stability in the receiving country.

If the definition of aid by these commissions is not sufficient, probably that of co-operation is even less coherent.

In his own report, Abelin had said that the world in 1975 did not understand that economic assistance has given France one dimension of a new concept of co-operation. "It, in fact, brings together all our relations in the field of finance, industry, commerce, culture, technical assistance, investment, and training. In short, co-operation has presented a new element in the world economic order."[8] In other words, the term co-operation which we refer to here, is that element that links France with developing countries, and it essentially

concerns the structures and modalities of French policy as regards particularly the African countries.

It is apparent that under-development remains an economic notion which cries for a corresponding economic solution. In both the Jeanneney and Gorse reports, the impression is gained that economic aid should be as disinterested as possible. But at the same time, the absence of definition of co-operation also gives the impression of incertitude and ambiguity in the veritable objectives of the policy of co-operation.

The Legal Framework of Co-operation:

As explained in chapter IV France concludes various technical, economic and cultural co-operation agreements with various countries and these are outlined in accords and protocols to give legality to the action proposed. In the case of economic co-operation, the legal basis is virtually the same, and form of the document is equally identical. In fact, most such agreements, cover a gamut of subjects in the realm of economic, cultural, scientitic and technical co-operation. Before France introduced this system to African countries, it already had experience of this in it's former colonies of Indo-China.

It is tradition of most colonial powers to link independence given to their former colonies with some sort of under-taking of continued co-operation. Some of these links are tied to military co-operation; others to economic, financial, cultural and other forms of co-operation. In the case of the Defence Agreement with Nigeria, for example, Britain was to station her troops in Northern Nigeria after independence. Although this was accepted as a condition during the negotiations for self-government and independence, the House of Representatives raised hell over the issue immediately after the country had attained independent nationhood and, consequently, the agreement was unilaterally abrogated by Nigeria in 1961. Nevertheless, we have to accept that such accords of co-operation, have a lot of legal and diplomatic significance and they cannot be under-estimated. The French author, Merle, had alleged that none of the former British, Belgian and

Dutch colonies was accorded independence without prior agreement to some form of guarantee for the protection of the interests of the metropolitan power.[9] Of course, this is true to a certain extent, but it cannot be generalised. This practice was more pronounced on the French side than it was with the other colonial powers of Europe because, as we have seen earlier, the 1958 constitution made it a condition for former French colonies to join the community "in their own interest" on the attainment of independence. By so doing, they were guaranteed the support of France in various economic fields, including the backing up of their weak currencies by the French Franc. The accord between France and Tunisia dated 16th June, 1956, was the model document used later in preparing such agreements with African countries.[10] These accords are the essential instruments of international law between the receiving and the donor country. It pre-supposes or establishes the rights and obligations of the co-operating nations. A quick examination of the number of agreements on technical co-operation signed between 1960 and 1980 would reveal that France discriminates in favour of Francophone countries.

One factor of interest in these accords of economic co-operation is the tendency for them to multiply. In fact, one action leads to another, and yet to another, to such an extent that the agreements build themselves up in form of a pyramid. See Table II.

These problems have led to a review of some of the agreements between France and a few other countries particularly Senegal, Ivory Coast and Madagascar. Some of the countries tried to adapt to the provisions of the agreement while others preferred an evolutionary approach instead of total revision of the agreements. Some of the new accords with various countries have shown the tendency to either adapt or to take some form of evolution, especially those agreements with Cameroun and Senegal in 1974; Benin Republic in 1975, etc. Those that affect Madagascar, for example, are quite interesting in the sense that they affected diplomatic relations, military matters, cultural, judicial, technical assistance, telecommunications and high seas fishing.

Some agreements have dealt with customs problems and marine traffic. There were other co-operation agreements also between the French Treasury and Malagasy Republic which are maintained in a provisional form to be reviewed from time to time.

To carry out the functions of co-operation in the African countries, economic groupings such as the OCAM were established to co-ordinate aid in its various forms. Somehow, OCAM was a problem child from the time of it's inception. It became so controversial that some cynics called it, "the valet of colonialism." The first problem was the objection of Mauritania to the admission of the Congo Republic in respect of which the former withdrew from the organisation. Some kind of ambiguity was observed in the nature of OCAM in it's organisation of political and economic association and other defined objectives. The most outspoken critics are the Pan-Africanist politicians and certain other member states of the OAU, especially around 1971—1973 when other countries also withdrew. The Congo and Zaire withdrew in 1972, whilst Cameroun, Madagascar and Chad withdrew in 1973. Therefore, OCAM has represented a kind of crisis of co-operation and there were demands for the revision of the accords linking these countries with OCAM. When OCAM became so highly politicised, the former President Hamani Diori of Niger and Houphoet Boigny of Ivory Coast tried to find an alternate solution and, at their own initiative, a summit of Francophone African Heads of State was convened in Paris on 12th November, 1973. Since then, these summits of Francophone Heads of State have become regularised and have been taking place almost annually either in Paris or in one of the African capitals. Their main objective is to consider all aspects of co-operation between France and African countries, and especially monetary questions.

Another important element in Franco-African relations is the existence of the Franc zone. This kind of co-operation is more evident in West Africa where the so-called West African Monetary Union exists. This union was confirmed by a treaty signed on 12th May, 1962 and followed by an accord of co-operation between the French Republic and the member

states of Africa on the same date. A similar situation also existed in Central Africa by virtue of the Brazzaville accord of 1960. France also came into some arrangement with the Central Banks of Equitorial and Central Africa. For the setting up of a monetary union like the UMOA, the accords between France and the West African Monetary Union, as well as the Central African Union, were revised in 1973. In spite of the reforms in the structure of the Bank of Central Africa and the Central Bank of West Africa, "France has maintained a considerable influence of the orientation of the Franc Zone."[11]

TABLE II: REVISION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON CO-OPERATION

COUNTRY	REQUEST FOR REVISION	DATE OF OPENING NEGOTIATIONS	SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENTS	PUBLICATION IN GAZETTE
BENIN	30 Nov., 1972		27 Feb., 1975	10 Jan., 1978
C/ROUN	March 1972 (1) 9 Feb., 1973	Sept., 1973	21 Feb., 1974	18 Sept., 1974 17 Dec., 1975
C.A.R.				
CONGO	March 1972	28 Nov., 1973	1 Jan., 1974	(2)
I/COAST	10 July, 1973			
GABON	13 Dec., 1972	10 Dec., 1973	12 Feb., 1974	7 Aug., 1974 (3)
U/VOLTA	November 1972			
MADA-GASCAR	June 1972 (1) 2 Jan., 1973	25 Jan., 1973	4 June, 1973	30 July, 1975
MALI	15 July, 1973			
MAURI-TANIA	3 July, 1972	December 1972	15 Feb., 1973	18 May, 1974
NIGER	August 1972	5 Oct., 1972 Dec. 1975 (4)	19 Feb., 1977	(2)
SENEGAL	Oct. 1973 (1) 8 Jan., 1984	25 March, 1974	29 March, 1974	30 Nov., 1976
TOGO	November 1972	9 Nov., 1973 Jan., 1976 (4)	6 March, 18 June 6—19 Oct., 1976	30 April, 1978
TCHAD	September 1975	6 Jan., 1976	23 March 1976	(2)

NOTE:
The two dates in respect of Cameroun, Madagascar and Senegal correspond with a simple announcement at first, and the official request on the second turn.

In case of Congo, Niger and Togo, the agreements were not published in the official gazette.

In case of Gabon, only the Convention was published.

The two dates of Tchad and Niger were brought about by postponment and were taken on alternate dates.

Source — Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

Some of the earlier agreements signed by France with her former colonies in Africa as a foundation for co-operation within the new French community were written in such a way that they did not provide for time limits, e.g. expirations or revocation by one party or the other. In fact, on the contrary, the agreements signed by France with five members of the Entente Council were the only ones that were limited to five years, renewable on expiration. Nevertheless, this limitation of five years did not prevent some of the countries from rejecting or withdrawing unilaterally from such accords. For example, Mali withdrew from the accord by a decree of 22nd September, 1960. France also denounced it's own part in January, 1961. In spite of this, diplomatic relations between the two countries were not broken. Later, other agreements were proposed between France and Mali and these were signed on 9th March, 1962, at Bamako and ratified by Mali in May, 1962 and France, in July, 1963. In 1967, when Mali returned to the Franc Zone, some new accords of co-operation were again signed between her and France. The case of Guinea is very well-known: after independence, Guinea signed a number of agreements with France, but then some of these agreements were sometimes automatically cancelled. For example, in April, 1960, after the discovery of a plot to overthrow President Sekou Toure, Guinean leaders accused France and the Entente countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as being responsible for organising it.

But then, Guinea was not the only country that denounced some of the post independence agreements. President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, a protege of France and a stounch supporter of the French system of Government, had declared in 1972, that he would not follow other people in this system of accord revision simply for doing sake, and that he was not going to act as an echo of other countries against France. He pointed out that a number of such accords had, in fact, been quietly revised between France and his country and he saw no reason why people should publicly make an issue out of it. This is what differenciates those who want an evolutionary review of the accords and the rejectionists. The French writer Flory, declares, "It should be admitted that the

accords signed immediately after independence were negotiated in an atmosphere of total evolution and they were therefore, particularly fragile and their evolution was, of course, inevitable."[12]

The agreements on economic and financial co-operation establish the nature of relationship between France and the African countries in monetary, commercial and economic activities. For example, the preamble to the agreement and co-operation on monetary matters, economic and finance, signed between France and Malagasy Republic on 27th June, 1960 stipulates partially as follows, "the Republic of Malagasy has expressed it's willingness to pursue it's development in collaboration with other countries of the Franc Zone." France, on the other hand, undertakes to "express it's willingness to continue to support the Republic of Malagasy in every way possible in it's financial, technical and cultural matters which are necessary for it to achieve it's objectives and progress in economic and social fields as fixed by it."

It should be pointed out that over the years, the volume of economic and commercial co-operation between France and the former colonies had greatly diminished, partly because France has found new markets in other parts of the world and particularly within the EEC; and on the other hand, the Francophone countries other than France. Apart from that, they have also established direct links with the EEC as a group and they also enjoy certain other benefits through the ACP arrangement. The various economic agreements on monetary and financial matters are reinforced by a number of conventions and protocols organised between the French Treasury and the treasuries of the different African states e.g. the protocols on customs co-operation, convention on mutual administrative assistance on fiscal matters, protocols for the elimination of double taxation, etc. As we have already seen elsewhere, technical co-operation forms a very important component of France's foreign aid. France sends many experts to Africa to assist in various pursuits of life such as teaching, agriculture, etc. All the personnel sent abroad are placed at the total disposal of the receiving country. In fact, in many cases, such experts are supplied on the basis of specific

requests made by African Governments. In the early 60s there were doubts as to the future of this policy of co-operation but then, after the second African tour of President Pompidou in 1972, when a number of agreements were reviewed, the former President of Niger, Mr. Hamani Diori, requested for the creation of a Franco-Nigeriane Commission to be charged exclusively with looking into mutual problems of the two countries in the field of co-operation.

Notes:

1. The Pignon Report, Paris, February 1962, page 120.
2. The Policy of Co-operation with Developing Countries, Paris, 1963, p.131.
3. Bonnefous, E. "The Stolen Billions: French Aid to Developing Countries, Paris (Fayard), p.293.
4. The Gorse Commission Report, Paris, p.424.
5. The Abelin Report, Paris 1975, p.17.
6. Ibid p.15.
7. Ibid p.13.
8. Ibid
9. Merle, M. — "L'independence et le mention ou la rupture des liens institutionels avec l'*ancienne metropole*," *Paris* 1960, *p.* 23.
10. Ibid *p.8.*
11. Bourgi, A — "Aspects Actuelles de la Co-operation Franco-Africaine," Paris, 1975, p.200.
12. Flory M. — "Essai *de typologie de la co-operation bilateral pour la development.*" Annuaire Francais de droit internationale, 1973, p. 715.

was concretised with the Yaounde I Accord in 1963, which was ratified and reaffirmed in 1969. That association represented a continuous development in Franco-African trade. The association with the EEC afforded member countries in the francophone to exercise a certain measure of initiative in trade relations, and to take advantage of these preferential tariffs in their own interest, even though new opportunities were opening for them in trading with countries other than those in the EEC. France did her best to get countries like Senegal to sell their groundnuts to other European member countries through this association with the EEC. Where she failed to get enough for the EEC, she tried dubious methods to get it from other sources, such as Nigeria. France took advantage of the Nigerian Civil War and it's immediate aftermath characterised by low producer prices for groundnuts and shortage of foreign exchange, to lure Nigerian farmers into Niger to sell their produce. A German firm was given licence to establish an oil processing mill right on the Nigerian border at Magaria, from where the oil was taken to Europe. The Nigerian government had to take steps in 1972/3 to increase producer prices almost two-fold in order to discourage this surreptitious trading practice.

As far as the exports of the African countries are concerned, the figures had continued to grow progressively, although the growth was affected through the enlargement of the EEC, and also through the establishment of special relationship with the African, Carribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in 1975. But, like the proverbial old grey rabbit, France found another way of re-exporting her own imports to Communist East European countries. See Annex, "Trade Agreement between France and Certain African Countries and the Popular Republic of Romania."

General Trade:

Recent trade figures have shown that Nigeria is France's leading export market in Africa. In 1982, Nigeria exported to France goods, mainly crude petroleum worth US$1,642 million, of which US$1,621 consisted of oil. This left a deficit in its own trade with France of US$529 million for the year. Ivory

Coast is France's leading francophone market in Sub-Saharan Africa with imports totalling US$480.5 million and exports worth US$542 million in 1982. Exports were only marginally up on the 1981 total, while there was some growth of French exports to Congo and the Cameroun. French exports to the Cameroun rose from US$488.5 million to US$583.4 million, giving a surplus of US$298.5 million. The surplus with Congo was even higher, with US$339.2 million of imports and US$420.6 million in exports.

Deficits were run with Gabon (US$106 million), Niger (US£100 million), Zambia (US$89.7 million), Mauritius (US$37 million), Uganda (US$21 million) and Ghana (US$11.4 million).

In 1982, which was considered a dismal year for French trade, ending with a deficit of US$7,190 million, Sub-Saharan Africa was, somewhat, one major region of the world with which France achieved a balance of trade surplus. The African results themselves would appear to have high-lighted the weakness of France's performance in that year. It was only with it's traditional franc zone partners that France managed to achieve a trading surplus. Her exports to the franc zone increased to US$4.274 million dollars in 1982, from US$3.636 million in 1981, thereby increasing the share of the global total from 4.37% to 5.19%. Imports from the franc zone from US$2.537 million to US$2.741 million showed that a share of the total fell from 2.85 to 2.66%. Oil was a major factor in the sudden turn around in France's trading fortunes. Imports of Nigerian oil bounced back in 1982, close to their 1980 level, after they had suffered a slump of about 50% in value in 1981. Imports of Algerian oil also jumped. Nigeria and Algeria were france's second and third largest oil suppliers after Saudi Arabia.

See the various trade statistics contained in the following Tables.

French Investments:

Franco-African economic relations have entered into a new phase recently. French companies' success in Africa in the future will depend less on their participation in big construc-

tion projects, and more on the enthusiasm with whcih they respond to African demands for industrial investments. This change in emphasis will offer important possibilities for small and medium size French companies. The creation of this industrial and artisanal network requires the know-how and financial support of small and medium size companies in France.[4]

Mr. Benoit's views also coincide with the views of an official report (submitted to the Government of France) concerned with studies in relations between France and the third world. That report found that from 1973 to 1980, the growth in French exports to the third world created 220,000 to 360,000 jobs in France, compared with 70,000 to 100,000 jobs lost because of higher imports from developing countries.

It has also been accepted that direct investments by French companies in developing countries tended to contribute more to French export growth than increased imports from these countries. Similarly, France tended to lag a long way behind some of its industrialised partners in investing abroad:

"The report came out against a certain number of received ideas. French public opinion, and even some heads of companies, tend to have the idea that investing in Africa is a way of creating competition against yourself and increasing unemployment. In fact there is no example of a French industrial development in Africa which did not contribute to the development of the company concerned."[5]

Apart from helping dialogue between French and African political and industrial leaders, *Rencontres Africaine* plays a more concrete role in promoting Franco-African contacts. Closely linked with Rencontres Africaine, are *Conference Permamente de Compagnie Consulaires Africaine et Francaise,* (which links France's Chambers of Commerce to those of 13 African countries) as well as *Club du Dakar.* Set up in 1973, the Conference Permanente has as one of its aims, the promotion of industrial and commercial developments in Africa. In 1976, the *Conference Permanente* was instrumental in creating the *Maison de l'Afrique,* which is also *Rencontres Africaine's* headquarters. The organisation is financed by nine

general cargo that Black Africa comes into its own, taking a good share of this sector at all main ports. Tonnages are less important here than the number of regular lines. Tropical food products and timber, form the bulk of incoming traffic while cereals, sugar, dairy products and other foods, chemicals, and a huge variety of manufactured goods are also exported.

Of the six major autonomous French ports, Le Havre, is one that handles most cargo destined or coming from Africa. Imports from Africa rose 18% to 11.7 million tonnes in 1981, mainly due to an increase in oil imports particularly from North African producers, but then also from Nigeria and Gabon. Exports increased by a more modest 5.5%, but there was particularly strong growth in trade with Nigeria which more than doubled to more than 430,000 tonnes. Trade with West Africa alone increased by 11% to 4.2 million tonnes, of which 2.9 million tonnes was oil imports. General imports total 3.2 million tonnes, compared with a little over one million tonnes of outgoing traffic. With more than 300 million tonnes of traffic, Nigeria was Le Havre's leading West African trading partner, followed by Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroun and Senegal.

The port of Dunkerque also handles a lot of African goods. But in this sector, South Africa would seem to have been the worst hit on the African continent through the fall of iron ore and coal traffic which was the main cause of the 42.6% reduction in the port's imports from Africa, to 4.4 million tonnes. Ore imports from Liberia and Mauritania held fairly steady at 1.2 million and 1.1 million tonnes respectively. The port's African export traffic offered a more encouraging outlook, with an increase of 14.3% in 1981 to 1.5 million tonnes. West Africa alone recorded a 50% increase in traffic, to 824,494 tonnes.[7]

The port of Rouen which handles mainly cereals exports, is also a factor in the handling of general cargo for West Africa. Traffic at Rouen fell to 11.3% in 1981. Of course, trade with Africa was also down at 4.5 million tonnes, although West Africa faired better than the rest of the continent. With a total of 1.7 million tonnes, Rouen's West African trade was only 2.5% down. Traffic with North Africa which totalled 2.2 million

tonnes, dropped nearly 10%, while that for the rest of the continent fell 10.4% to 307,423 tonnes. Most of the phosphates from Togo and Senegal, tropical timber from Ivory Coast, Cameroun and Gabon are exported to France by the port of Rouen. Very little of France's cereal exports find their way to West Africa. But the port of Rouen is a major supplier of cars to the region, particularly since it is port of departure for kits for the Peugeot Group's giant Assembly Plant in Kaduna, Nigeria.

Another important export product to Wet Africa is sugar, and this particularly goes to Nigeria which received 84,000 tonnes from Rouen in 1981. The port of Nantes-Saint Nazaire has been undergoing tremendous improvements in the hope that there would be a bigger traffic in LNG business between France and Algeria in particular, and subsequently with Nigeria which is developing this particular industry quite rapidly. Traffic increased at the port by 10.6% to 15.8 million tonnes in 1981. It was to increase to a capacity of 26 million tonnes by the end of 1985.

Total African traffic for 1981 was 4.5 million tonnes. Algeria was Nantes-Saint Nazaire's main port trading patner, although the more than 3 million of traffic Nantes had with Algeria included 2.2 million tonnes of natural gas, and 362,232 tonnes of oil. Nigeria came second. That port also imports timber from Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Gabon and Congo; Mollasses from Djibouti, Mozambique and Mauritius, Phosphates from Senegal.

The port of Bordeaux has Senegal as its faithful African trading partner, with 198,523 tonnes of traffic in 1981, including 118,551 tonnes of phosphates. Nigeria accounted for another 180,836 tonnes of traffic, virtually all of it oil, while Mauritania came third, with 127,471 tonnes, including 98,611 tonnes of iron ore.

Construction Industry:

The French construction industry is doing quite well in Africa, particularly in South Africa and Nigeria. Details of their involvement in South Africa are contained in the chapter dealing with Franco-South African co-operation.

The headquarters of Societe General d'Entreprise (SGE), at Rungis, near Paris, suffered a disappointment not long ago with the cancellation of the US$949.8 million Lagos Metro Line Contract. That company was to take US$597 million worth of the civil engineering part of the contract, sharing work on a fifty-fifty basis with another French group, Spies-Batignolles (S & B), which was a big operator in Apartheid South Africa. Both groups are members of the all-French Inter-Infra consortium to which the contract was awarded by Nigeria. Had the contract been approved, it would have been the largest SGE has ever engaged in, in Africa. This company is among France's biggest construction companies, with a turnover of US$1,995 million in 1982. SGE is itself a part of an even larger group, the recently nationalised Compagnie Generale d'Electricite (CGE), and it's position is comparable to that of it's partner in the Lagos Metro project, Spie-Batignolles, which is part of the privately-owned Scheider group. The two groups are active in all sectors of construction industry in Africa. In Nigeria, the SGE has carried out a variety of important road construction contracts, mainly through SGE-TPI, while S & B has handled the US$62.4 million contract for the building of 2,000 homes for the workers of the Steel Works at Warri, Bendel State of Nigeria. Niger Republic is another country where the group is very active. In 1981, SGE-TPI signed a US$19 million contract for a road from Mirryah-Goure and Satom, and a US$14.9 million contract for the Baleyra-Selingue road.

In it's building sector, SGE-C handled the US$14.1 million first phase of the islamic university at Say, a contract awarded in November, 1981. In Cameroun, the group won a series of new orders in 1981. Satom won a US$13.6 million contract for a section of the Douala-Yaounde road, and another valued at US$19 million for a motorway access route at Yaounde. Satom won several building contracts, including one for the Douala Headquarters of Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale, while Bourdin and Chausse was carrying out runway reinforcements at Maroua Airport.

In the Congo, SGE-C was awarded orders in 1981 for an office block for the Caisse Nationale d'Epargne, and a new

Novotel Hotel, both at Pointe Noire.

In Mali, both Satom and Bourdin & Chausse, are building the US$41.8 million Boni-Gao road. In Senegal, SGE-TPI has been directing Senegal's Diama project. The same company is also a member of Eurotrag Consortium which was building the Trans-Gabon railway. In Ivory Coast Thinet handled the Abidjan Administrative Centre and in 1981, it won a US$24.4 million contract for a tower block, and another for a new Ibis Hotel, both in Abidjan.

Satom plays a special role in the group's African activities as it is active exclusively in Africa and the Caribbean. It works in SGE's three main sectors, and is present in most of the Francophone West African countries. It had a work force of 7,683 at the end of 1981, when it's net turnover was US$111.4 million.

SGE-C began it's work in Africa in 1971, when it was awarded a contract for an international hotel in Lubumbashi, Zaire. The Kinshasa World Trade Centre followed in 1974 and, since then, the company has constructed public buildings in several Francophone countries, established subsidiaries in Congo, Cameroun and Gabon and agencies in Niger and Togo.

This company had always concentrated in looking for projects which are not easily handled by local competitors due either to the technical requirement or financial size. Since they are a large international company, they are able to organise their own financing and to acquire all the necessary technical expertise that such huge projects require. And once they are established in a country, SGE-C try to use their site as a base to look for more work with the eventual aim of establishing a permanent presence in the country concerned.

SGE-TPI and S&B have established their own subsidiaries in Nigeria. In other places, they have tended to concentrate on major infra-structural schemes, often lasting four to five years, rather than on setting up a local presence.

In road building, Bourdin & Chausse has been active mainly in Gabon, Cameroun and Mali. Coshery is presently in Cameroun.

SGE group employs about 17,400 people abroad, out of a

total work force of 33,500. Their export earnings have been increasingly rising in recent years from US$359.6 million in 1980, to more than US$678.4 million in 1982. Two-thirds of the US$1805 million worth of new orders taken to the end of August 1982, were for foreign contracts. The trend looked certain to continue, particularly as the group's domestic market is generating a low level of demand at the moment. As the group's re-organisation is also seen as improving its ability to compete at an international level, there is no doubt that Africa will continue to play a major role in SGE's development strategies.[8]

Oil:

When it comes to oil, four Sub-Saharan African countries account for more than 80% of the world wide production of the French state oil groups, Elf-Aquitaine. In 1981, Elf produced around a quarter of all outputs from Sub-Saharan Africa and is also the leading prospector in the region. Fields on which Elf operates are in Gabon, Cameroun, Nigeria and Congo. All together, these produced 19.9 million tonnes of oil, out of the group's world-wide production of 24.3 million tonnes in 1981.

Elf's biggest production centre is Gabon. The company produced 6.27 million tonnes of Crude Oil for itself and it's partners in the country, in 1981 alone. It's own share of Gabonese production was 6.07 million tonnes. New oil finds in Gabon in 1982, revealed reserves equal to, at least, one year's production for the first time for some years. The group made four discoveries, three of them off Port Gentil, and one in the south.

In the Camerouns, the development of off shore reserves increased production from fields operated by Elf from 2,300 barrels a day. Five wells drilled in the Douala basin indicated the presence of oil there for the first time, albeit in limited quantities. Oil fields operated by Elf in Cameroun produced 5.3 million tonnes of oil in 1981, while Elf's new share of the country's production was 1.08 million tonnes. Production in Congo increased from 2.9 million tonnes in 1981, to 3.5 million tonnes in 1982. Mainly due to the start of production

from the Yanga off-shore field which, with the Sendji, came into full production in 1982, a record increase was noted.

Elf also made two small discoveries in 1981, and its associates — one on-shore at Bindi, and the other off-shore — still believe that Elf's Congo's exploration permits have great potential. In Nigeria, Elf produced 4.8 million tonnes of oil from the fields it operates and it's own share of the country's production was 1.9 million tonnes. The group made no new finds, but said it had revised upwards its estimates of oil reserves in the Opobo field in the Warri region, and of gas reserves at Ibewa in Rivers State.

In Angola, Elf has been particularly active in its exploration work. Elf struck oil in four wells there in 1982. Two off-shore fields, Palanca and Pacassa were being evaluated, and the development of the Palanca field in particular was under study. Elf's prospecting campaigns in Senegal and Mali have not yet been successful, but they had struck oil in Niger in a second well at Sokor on the Agades block. Evaluation of this field was being undertaken, but the results have not yet come out. Gabon was the only African country in which Elf produced gas, and it's 82 million cubic metres production in 1981 was entirely for its own use. World wide Elf Aquitaine has produced 24,800 million cubic metres of gas for itself and its partners and it's own share of production from fields in which it had a stake was nearly 18,000 million cubic metres. The profits of this company in 1982, were estimated to be US$271.4 million from US$502 million in 1981. Its turn-over rose from US$14,790 million in 1981, to US$+6,961 million in 1982.[9]

Electronics:

One of the world's leading manufacturers of professional electronic equipment is THOMPSON CSF, a French company which has expanded throughout the African Continent between 1974 and 1982. This group has a long history of involvement in Francophone Africa and is one of those recently nationalised companies by the French Government with it's consumer electrical and electronics counterpart, Thompson-Brandt, it represents some 60% of the total

activities of France's Thompson group.

The major part of their production are rader and other navigational aids, weapons and detection systems, broadcasting and telecommunications equipments, computer, x-ray machines, and medical scanners. Thompson has a total work force of 82,500. It earned almost US$3,406 million in 1981 from its activities outside France alone.

This company has been busy in a number of African countries with the establishment of medium wave radio transmitters and other types of operation. They got involved in the setting up of television services, particularly in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zaire, Niger, as well as colour systems based on the French SECAM technique. It's first contract was in the Ivory Coast where at least 11 Thompson Television transmitters are serving 80% of the country. The Thompson group has also supplied the television centres in Abidjan and Bouake. In the Radio sector, apart from short and medium wave transmitters, Thompson CSF has supplied a network of 14 UHF radio transmitters covering practically all the country.

Another importer of Thompson's equipment is Gabon. There, the group has supplied s4 — 500KW transmitters for the powerful Moyabi Radio Station near Franceville where the recently launched Africa No. 1 radio station is based. In fact, Thompson supplied most of the television equipment used in Gabon, and in the late 70's it received major orders for sound and video equipment for Libreville's Cite de l'Information. Construction was delayed for a long time and we're not certain if this work has been resumed.

In Zaire, the Thompson subsidiary, Sodeteg, led a French consortium which won the contract to build the La Voix du Zaire headquarters which was opened in 1978. A lot of renovation work on Cameroun's radio broadcasting network was also carried out on contract by this group. Colour television was brought to Niger in 1979 by Thompson, and the group has also been heavily involved in the country's television and telecommunication development programmes, installing television transmitters in Agades, Arlit, Bilma, Diffa and Inga 11. Thompson's Telecommunications is another area in which the group is active throughout the region.

Transmission equipment is its speciality, but Thompson accounts for virtually 100% of exchanges installed in Benin, Niger, Tchad and Gabon. Through the Telspace Organisation in which it is associated with Compagnie Generale d'Electricite, the group has installed satelite ground stations in Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroun, Congo, Togo, Mali and Niamey.

Thompson CSF is also not left behind in the aviation field. Their radar and landing gear can be found in service at airports throughout West Africa, and the group recently won a share of the annual equipment spending programme of the *Agence pour la Securite de la Navigation Aerienne en Afrique et Madagascar* (Asecna). The Thompson group has also got subsidiary companies in Ivory Coast, Senegal, Zaire and Gabon and was planning to create another in the Congo. In English speaking Africa, Thompson CSF's main breakthrough came at the beginning of 1970's. It now has major subsidiaries in Nigeria and Kenya, even though there is no country in Africa where Thompson is not doing one kind of business or the other. In Kenya, Thompson CSF carried out a US$13.6 million contract to set up a broadcasting network for the Voice of Kenya. Other work carried out in Kenya was in the Aviation and Telecommunications sector.

The group has also been doing some business in Zimbabwe. It has signed a contract for new navigation equipments at Zimbabwe's eight airports for which credits worth 10.9 million dollars had been made available in the Franco-Zimbabwean. Financial Protocol signed in 1981. In Tanzania, Thompson CSF provided radar equipment for the new international airport in Dar-es-salaam. The group also handled the US$14.9 million contract for the installation of a radio-communication network in South-East Madagascar.

Thompson CSF and Telspace also won a contract of US$11.4 million in the Sudan to rehabilitate the Port Sudan-Khartoum Micro-Wave Link.

In common with most of the major French industrial groups, Thompson CSF sees the vast Nigerian market offering the greatest commercial possibilities. The group's first success there came in broadcasting at the start of the 1970's.

Since then, it has moved into the Aviation and Telecommunications sectors, and earlier in 1982, won a US$13.4 million contract for turn-key installation of 10 telephone exchanges in eight States. Thompson was also competing for the contract to supply telecommunications equipment for the new Federal Capital of Abuja, and was hoping for a big slice of an equipment programme covering 17 airports for which tenders were being discussed. They also strongly hope for contracts for TU equipments from the States, despite the apparent cancellation of 2.7 million federal television development programme as part of the current economic cutbacks.

Another major French electronic firm is Cit-Alcatel which announced in December, 1981 a contract of US$13.6 million for the reconstruction and modernisation of Kampala's Telephone Network. This company developed at the start of 1970's and has made the French group a world leader for all electronic telephone exchanges with 30% of all lines of this type in service or on order. The Ugandan system which came into service in 1983, with an initial capacity of 30,000 lines, was the first to be installed by Cit-Alcatel in East Africa. Other systems were already in service in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mauritius and Zaire. In Zaire a 1,200 line private version of the system has been completed, as was Mauritius's 24,700 line public system. In Gabon, Libreville's 2,700 line systems was inaugurated in March, 1981. A further 7,500 lines are being installed, including a 5,000 line system for Port Gentil. In Ivory Coast, the greater part of the 40,000 line programme has ben completed.[10]

The E-10 owes it's development to the massive expansion of the French telephone network in the early 1970's. This resulted from the government's decision to go for electronic system instead of the existing electro-mechanical exchanges, in an attempt to get rid of it's massive backlog of requests for private telephone installations. Since then, E-10 has become the group's star export product. The group had more than 8 million lines in service or on order in the world in 1982. Of the 3.5 million lines on order, 1.1 million are for export. The Cit-Alcatel group is only one of the many faces of the state-owned company, Compagnie Generale d'Electricity

(CGE), a massive industrial ensemble with a consolidated net turnover of FF 66,000 million or US$8,955,000 million in 1982. and a work force of around 180,000 people. Cit-Alcatel, with net consolidated turnover of US$1,682 million in 1981, and a work force of about 40,000, represents about 20% of the group's activity. It is estimated that about 30% of the company's turnover came from abroad in 1981, and it's US$427.4 million of foreign earnings, marked an increase of more than 50% on the 1980 figure. It's foreign earnings were divided about equally between direct exports from France, and sales by the group's foreign subsidiaries. Cit-Alcatel acts as a pole for the group's public telecommunications activities which recorded a turnover of US$692 million in 1981. The Sub-marine telecommunications cable linking Ivory Coast and Nigeria which was completed in 1981, was laid by Cit-Alcatel and France's Cables de Lyon. There was also an order for satellite telecommunications station in Benin, for Telspace in which Cit-Alcatel is associated with Thompson CSF, while another station was inaugurated in Niger in 1981.

Electronic Exchange Equipment is bound to come into general use in public telecommunications in Africa. This is partly because, major manufacturers are running down production of Electro-Mechanical Exchanges, and partly because systems like the E-10 are actually cheaper. Africa's needs are enormous, but the means of acquiring telecommunications equipment are limited at the moment because of the world economic crises and internal problems. The result is that, with certain exceptions, Africa is under equipped. The African market is one which will become very important in the future for French telecommunications companies.

Computers:

The field of the computer industry has not been left out by French companies. After more than 25 years in Francophone Africa, Cit-Honeywell Bull is lucky to make a breakthrough in the Nigerian computer market, which is the largest in Africa. The company was being considered for the identity card project in Nigeria which costs millions of dollars. It has also received enquiries from other potential clients, especially

French firms already operating in Nigeria. But because of the high cost of setting up in Nigeria, the group feels it would need a fairly high level of business before it could establish a presence in the country. And Nigeria's potential for the group has yet to be assessed.

The question of presence is an important one for Ciit-Honeywell Bull. Selling computers is never a question of making a quick killing but of establishing a long term dailogue with potential customers from initial planning, right through to after sales service, technical assistance and training. The cost of the computer hardware is reckoned to represent only a third of the value of the average contract. Ciit-Honeywell Bull has been on the continent since the early 1950's when it established itself first in the Maghareb, and then in West Africa and Indian Ocean regions. It now claims to be the only computer manufacturer represented in every French speaking African country and claims it controls an average of 35% of the computer market in those countries. The bulk of its business comes from governments, banks and insurance companies and multi-national Corporations.

Micro-computerss are considered to be a potential growth area in Francophone Africa. Honeywell Bull has signed a contract worth more than US$1.4 million in Ivory Coast for the supply of two high power data processing systems to Societe de Telecommunication Internationale de Cote d'Ivoire (Intelci), contracts were signed with Congo, Benin, Senegal and with Niger's two Uranium companies, Societe des Mines de l'Air (Somair) and Compagnie Miniere d'Akouta (Comina) for the supply of medium powered systems. The Niger Government has ordered a second system.

The arrival of the Socialist Government in France in 1981, was bad news for Honeywell Bull for the Government bought out its biggest shareholder, Compagnie de Saint-Gobian which held 51% of its capital. It has also taken a large part of the share holding of the US Honeywell group, previously second biggest shareholder, with 74% of the group's capital, but now down to a little less than 20%, although the commercial and technical co-operation between the two groups continues. The group also reported financial losses

during this period. Its consolidated loses were considerably aggravated in 1982, when they reached US$183.3 million, despite a 10.7% increase in revenue to US$1,103.7 million.[11]

Chemical Market:

The leading French company in this area is Rhone Poulenc. This company has been making huge profits. In 1982, it made a turnover in Africa of US$5,060 million. It's centre of activities is in North Africa, but is making efforts to make breakthroughs in other areas as well. It's leading activity is still based in chemicals which accounted for more than one-quarter of its 1981 turnover. Fertilizers represent a further 12.5%, but the group is withdrawing from this heavy loss making activity.

This company is also making business in the agricultural chemical sectors (9% of turnover), textiles (15%), pharmaceutical products (18.9%) and films and other communications products (4.4%). Although this company makes a lot of business in Brazil, it also makes a substantial business in Africa, especially through pharmaceutical sales. Their stakes in these are held either by Rhone Poulenc itself or by their UK subsidiary, May & Baker, which tends to represent it in Commonwealth countries.

Among the most important of these subsidiaries is Embechem, a May & Baker Nigerian subsidiary, which employs about 400 people and earned US$14.9 million in 1980. But there are other smaller production laboratories in Madagascar, Zaire and Kenya. In the general chemicals field, the Rhone Poulenc group has small subsidiaries producing Polyurethane foam in Ivory Coast and Cameroun; and in Senegal it partners the government in Societe Senegalese de Phosphate de Thies which mines and processes Phosphate in the only mining activity of its kind carried out by the group in Black Africa.

Recently, this group has faced increasing competition from Canadian, Japanese and American companies. The group has also been undergoing more general financial trouble. It was reported that in 1982, it lost US$52.1 million, following losses of US$45.5 million in 1981, and US$257.8 million in 1980. In view of this problem, the group is trying to change it's tactics

by opening sales offices in all African countries. At the same time, it is trying to rationalise measures in order to improve it's financial position which, in fact, may not be as bad as the company tries to make it out. In the longer term, the prospects of major agricultural developments in several African countries are seen as offering the group important openings in Agro-chemicals. A lot of countries are talking about the "green revolution," Nigeria and Francophone states included.

Another French company which has made a name for itself in Africa in the chemical field is the Roussel-Uclaf, a group principally known in France as a pharmaceutical manufacturer. In fact, it earns more from selling products for agricultural use in many parts of Africa than it does from pharmaceuticals. This group earned more than 65% of its US$1,058 million turnover abroad in 1981. Africa's share slipped from 8.5% to 6.7%, compared with 26.4% from European countries; 14.3% from Asia and Australia, 10.7% from Latin America and 8.7% from North America.[12]

Pharmaceutical and other human health products account for over 60% of world-wide turnover in 1981, as against 22% from the Agro-veterinary sector. The rest was mainly from the group's Rochas and Range, of perfumes and beauty products, and the manufacture of spectacles, including the American Foster Grant Range. These last two activities do not provide any significant income in Africa. A rough breakdown of earnings by sector on the continent shows the Agro-veterinary sector as having sales of US$46.1 million in 1981, compared with US$35.3 million from pharmaceuticals. This company makes its money mainly in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. It makes about US$15.5 million in the Agro-veterinary activities, and US$13.6 million from pharmaceuticals in that area. In the rest of the African continent, with the exception of South Africa, Agro-veterinary earnings totalled US$20.8 million in 1981, and pharmaceuticals US$17.6 million; but then only three countries had turnover figures comparable to those of the Maghareb countries. Ivory Coast is the group's major market and also the home of it's only production facility in sub-saharan Africa. It's subsidiary, *Societe Africaine des Fabrication des formulation et des conditionment* (Sofaco)

produces plant based insecticides, herbicides and fungicides for the local market and employs 180 at its Abidjan site. Agro-veterinary turnover in Ivory Coast was about US$13.6 million in 1981, compared to US$1.8 million in pharmaceuticals. This company has also made a significant breakthrough in Nigeria where pharmaceutical sales predominate totalling US$4.7 million in 1981 alone, as against US$140,000 to US$280,000 worth of Agro-veterinary products. The country is served entirely by direct exports. Some 45% of these, comes from the group's British subsidiary, Rousell Laboratories, which has several subsidiaries of its own in English-speaking countries outside Africa.

This company, Roussel-Uclaf, also has a sizeable market in Cameroun, with US$2.2 million worth of Agro-veterinary sales and US$1.8 million of pharmaceutical sales in 1981. The group is represented in virtually all of African countries, inspite of its low sales figures. Apart from direct commercial subsidiaries, in Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya it has representative offices in a number of other countries. In places where it is not directly represented, it is generally represented by an independent distributor or the German group, Hoechst, which has had a majority holding in Roussel-Uclaf since 1974. This company's style of export is to send it's products directly to individual customers in Africa, rather than to hospitals and institutions, and they mostly take the form of common antibiotics, pain killers and anti-inflammation products. This group has recently depended on the export of a particular product called *Decis,* which is an insecticide, developed and produced, and said to be one of the most powerful and least toxic in the world, with a high rate of Bio-degradability. It was put on the market around 1978, and it now sells very fast in most African countries, especially among cotton growing communities. The company is now trying to modify it in order to make it suitable for other types of crops as well. Nigeria is one of the target countries this company has in mind. The group is also trying to develop a kind of anti-biotic for the African market, which is now sold cheaply in Europe, but supplied to Africa only via the hospitals because of the high cost of the product. They are trying to

make it relatively inexpensive in order to make it easily available on the counters in the African Chemists' shops.

Insurance Market:

This is another area in which French companies have made a breakthrough. In fact, as far as the Francophone Africa is concerned, the whole business is entirely monopolised by French companies. The big area which could have been of tremendous benefit to France as far as insurance is concerned, is Nigeria where the government has banned the participation of foreign companies in that industry. Since independence, African countries have represented a steadily declining share of French insurance companies' overseas business. The companies still have a powerful presence in Francophone Africa, but other markets particularly, North America, have grown much more rapidly. According to a 1980 report of the Ministry of Finance in Paris, Africa accounted for US$159 million, or 10.5% of French firms' total overseas turnover, compared with Europe's 70% and North America's 14%. Soon after independence of it's colonies in Africa, the French government laid the foundation of the *Conference Internationale de Controle d'Assurance des Etats Africain* (CICA) to help create an African Insurance Sector by drafting legislation and training African staff.[13] This company is still the common insurance organisation for most Francophone countries. CICA members still provide the French insurance industry with some 80% of it's African turnover, even though France ceased to be represented in the organisation in 1977.

Ivory Coast was the leading African market in 1980 for French companies, and their ninth largest world-wide, providing a turnover of US$66.7 million. The Insurance Directorate's 1980 report revealed that Cameroun came next with US$12.2 million. The combined earnings from these countries are made up of 90% of the earnings from CICA members, with the remainder shared between Niger, Togo, Bourkina Faso, Central African Republic, Mali and Tchad. Outside this organisation, Morocco is the most important market, yielding US$17.6 million in 1980, followed by Tunisia with US$6.6 million, and South Africa, with US$2.3 million. French com-

panies also have a smaller amount of business in Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Egypt, Tanzania, Zaire and Algeria.

Most French companies over the past ten years, have replaced branches directly controlled, or shareholdings in private or mixed companies. In the four main markets, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Gabon and Senegal, this process is almost complete, although in smaller markets, the French presence is confined to branches, agencies or minority holdings in local companies.

The largest French group in both Africa and world-wide, is the State owned *Union des Assurances des Paris* (UAP). It has subsidiaries in the four leading CICA markets and branches in Bourkina Fasso, Togo, Niger and Central African Republic. It has some 70% of the capital of *Union des Assurances des Gabon,* a similar sized stake in *Compagnie Camerounaise des Assurances et des Reassurances* and 35% *of Compagnie Senegalese des Assurance et des Reassurances,* a mixed capital company. In the larger two countries, UAP has maintained branches to deal with life policies, which have to be dealt with separately for legal reasons. The second ranking French insurance group as *Assurance Generale des France* (AGF) which also has a strong presence, with 80% of *Assurance Generale des Cote d'Ivoire* and more than 50% of *Assurance Generale Senegalese.* It also controls 11% holding in *Societe Camerounaise des Assurance et des Reassurance,* and 16 of *Societe Nationale Gabonaise de Assurances et des Reassurances (Sonagar),* both mixed capital companies. Like the UAP, AGF also has branches dealing with life policies in Ivory Coast and Senegal, and is present through branches, agents, or share holdings in Mali, Bourkino Fasso, Tchad, Niger, Togo, Central African Republic, Djibouti and South Africa. Other companies represented in CICA member countries, although not generally with full subsidiaries, are *Groupment Francais d'Assurance, Groups Mutuel de Mons, Preservatrice Fonciere* and *Groupe Drouot,* all of them among 20 leading French insurance groups.

The brokers themselves have African network, although their national federation estimates that only some 15 of

France's total 1,300 brokers are established there. The leading French broker, Faugere and Jutheau, which is associated with America's Marsh & Mclennan, controls one third, and operates in Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Central African Republic. It has as it's main rival, *Gras Savoye et Compagnie,* which is associated with the US Johnson and Higgins company and has set up branches in Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Togo and Gabon since 1978. But then brokering is a relatively recent arrival in African markets, given the limited number of insurance companies operating there. Brokers generally act as agents for particular companies.

The presence of French insurance companies in Africa is typified by its concentration in Francophone countries. And like the French banks, the insurance companies have rarely tried to tap the potential of countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and above all Nigeria, even though insurance legislation in Nigeria would make it impossible for them to penetrate that country. UAP subsidiary, the Union Insurance Company of Kenya, the former branch office of one of the three insurance companies which merged to form UAP in 1966, is the only exception.

A sectoral breakdown of insurance activities in Africa reveals several major differences between that market and the European market. For example, individual life policies are still a very marginal source of revenue in most African countries due to lower levels of social and economic development. Life policies in Africa represent an average of 16% of insurance revenue compared with 40%, world-wide, according to the French Federation of Insurance Companies. Group Life Policies taken out by employers are more common than individual policies, although UAP believes that a market for individual life policy is now developing in Ivory Coast.

Motor Insurance is probably the leading sector, representing an average 32% of the African Market, compared to 22% world-wide. Governments' reluctance to allow popular increases in premium as often as the companies consider necessary has caused problems. Another sector is Marine Cargo Insurance, which is the second most important sector representing 17% of the African market, compared to only 2%

world-wide, and the percentage is considerably higher in coastal countries such as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroun and Gabon.[14]

The Hotel Industry:

The French are making a booming business in this field through Novotel group of hotels. Only six years after opening its first African Hotel at Pointe Noire in the Congo, the Novotel Group can claim to be the continent's leading hotel group, with 39 hotels in fourteen countries. At the latest count, it has 55 new hotel projects at different stages of planning and discussion in 28 African countries. Novotel considers Africa as a key area of development in its own international strategy. It's calculations show that it's 1982 turnover stood at US$81.4 million or about 15% of total group turnover world-wide. Novotel which has been amongst the world's top ten hotel groups for some years, does not generally own the hotels which carry its trade name. It is a service company and runs hotels for state and private sector clients. It sometimes takes a financial stake in a particular project if it feels so interested.

The Novotel Group was founded in 1967, by Mr. Paul Dubrule and Gerard Pelisson. It runs hotels under the names of Novotel, Sofitel, Mercure and Ibis. It also owns a chain of restaurants. At the end of March, 1982, it had 415 hotels in France and abroad, a total of more than 50,150 rooms and 79 Court-Paille Restaurants. Its turnover in 1981, was US$548.3 million.[15]

The Novotel group runs two, three, or four star hotels. The Novotels are its main product. They offer a three-star service for a business and tourist clientele and are designed to be developed as part of national hotel networks, rather than just an individual hotel.

On the other hand, the Sofitel system, by contrast, is for individual development. They are in the 4-Star and 4-Star deluxe class, and are aimed at a prestige clientele, in important political and economic sectors. Novotel bought the Sofitel chain from Jacques Borel Internationale in 1980.

The Mercure network is a smaller chain of 3-Star hotels acquired by Novotel in 1975.

The 2-Star Ibis Chain, was created by the group in 1973.

There are 15 Novotel Hotels in nine African countries. Five are in Cameroun, two in Gabon, two in Tunisia, one each in Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Guinea, Senegal and the Comoros. There are also 14 Sofitels, several of them belonging to the joint *Union des Transport Ariene* (UTA) and Novotel subsidiary, *Union Touriste et Hotellier* (UTH). These are in Yaounde, Yamousukro, Libreville, Niamey, Dakar, Freetown, Lome and Lubumbashi, with three each in Mali and Morocco. In Mali, Novotel runs the Sofitel l'Amitie in Bamako, and two small luxury tourist hotels in Mopti and Timbouctou. The 57-room Relais Kanaga in Mopti opened in July, 1982. Timbouctou's Relais Azali, also opened in 1982. Other hotels in the Novotel Group in Africa were recently opened. There was the Ibis Hotel in Abidjan which was opened in 1983, and the 110-room extension to the Pointe Novotel, which was opened in 1983. Others opened in 1982/83, were the 100-room Novotel Sali Portu Dal in Senegal, a 100-room at Bamenda in Cameroun, a 60-room Novotel at Moroni in Comoros, a 160-room Ibis in Douala, and a 250-room hotel in Banjul Gambia. Others were in the negotiating stage, such as the Novotels in Ouagadougou, Mombasa, and Nairobi Airport as well as Sofitels at Douala, Bujumbura and Harare. There was a plan to build three to five hotels in Madagascar, which was being delayed by internal economic problems. Discussions were going on with prospective partners in Nigeria, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola and Ghana. Novotel's glaring absence from Nigeria is explained by their officials that Nigerian investors were not willing to put their money into hotel business because, they tended to want quick returns on their capital, and they are not willing to accept the initial wait before a new hotel starts to show a profit. This problem is seen as peculiar to Nigeria, where, according to a senior Novotel Executive, the authorities have other development priorities. Elsewhere on the continent, the group's rate of development is often held up by the lack of public investment resources.[16]

Book Publishing:

The oldest known French company in this business operating in Africa is called Imprimerie Stras-Bourgeoise (ISTRA). This company, which began its publishing activities in the 1920's, today, has a work force of 600 and an annual turnover of US$ 20.4 million. ISTRA is joint owner with the top French publishing group, Hachette, of Edicef, the leading French publisher of school books for use in Africa. The two companies began their association in the 1960's when both were members of the *Institute Pedagogique Africaine et Malagache* (IPAM) which grouped French publishers interested in the African market. Edicef was formed in 1971, at the time both ISTRA and Hachette, had their own catalogues of books aimed at the African market — ISTRA specialising in primary school books, Hachette, in secondary schools. The main reason for ISTRA's interest in the alliance was Hachette's extensive African distribution network which allowed it to set up local stocks of books in most French Speaking countries. Edicef's catalogue contains about 150 titles and turnover in 1982, totaled about US$4.7 million. This is slightly below the previous year's figure. Edicef's books are generally distributed through bookshops at which parents buy their children's school books.

There is a good deal of African partipation in preparation of the books for publication. Edicef does a significant amount of co-edition work, principally with *Nouvelles Editions Africaine* (NEA), a company based in Dakar. It is an international publishing company in which Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo, each has 20% shares. Edicef and another French publisher, Nethan, each have 10% and the remaining shares are held by several French publishers. With the importance of the Senegalese and the Ivorian markets in which NEA is present, it is estimated that Co-editions could represent as much as 30% of Edicef's turnover.

Banks and Financial Institutions:

Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), Credit Lyonais and Societe Generale are among the leading foreign banks

operating in Africa. In the colonial times, the French banking presence in Africa, south of the Sahara, was confined mainly to the Francophone countries of West and Central Africa, and took the form of branches directly controlled from Paris. This situation, however, changed in the early 60's with the attainment of independence by these African countries. The French banks had to make provisions for local participation in the capital and running of their banks and adapt to the former colonies' desire to open their trade to countries other than France. The result was to be the French banks' transformation of their existing branch networks into new independent local banks. The French banks kept substantial shareholdings along side government, and often private interests in the country concerned. In order to meet the international commitments of the new countries the French banks often had to seek out partners in Europe and America in order to facilitate trade and transfers of funds. Today, most of these banks are generally among the market leaders in the countries where they were set up often occupying 20% to 30% of the banking market.[17] The controlling share is usually in local hands and the chairman and other directors are, in the majority, Africans, with French presence maintained by a Deputy Managing Director, or something of the sort. The three big banks, have now gone beyond the Francophone territories into non-traditional areas, such as the Anglophone countries. The BNP, which is the largest of the lot, is now present in 19 African countries and is, most certainly, the biggest international bank on the African continent. Most of its interests are in *Societe Financiere Pour les Pays d'Outre Mer* (SFOM), set up in 1963 with a group of banks from other industrialised countries. The bank's partners are West Germany's Dresdner Bank and Belgium's Banque Bruxelles Lambert. On 1st September, 1982, a fourth partner, Bank of America, announced that it was giving up its stake in SFOM. So, SFOM is present in 12 African countries — Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Rwanda, Tchad, Bourkina Fasso, Zaire and Zimbabwe. *Banque Internationale Pour la Commerce et Industrie de la Cote d'Ivoire* (BIC) in which it has a 60% stake, has 50 branches in Ivory Coast, and *BICI du Cameroun* in

which BNP and SFOM have a stake of more than 36%, has 29 branches. Outside the network of the SFOM, BNP Inter-Continental has 100% owned subsidiaries in Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion. The BNP itself has 31% stake in the United Bank for Africa (UBA) in Nigeria and a 100% owned subsidiary in Niger. BNP has been in Nigeria since 1945. UBA is one of the three main banks in the country with more than 70 branches and 4,500 employees. It represents about the same volume of business as that of all the banks in Francophone West Africa in which BNP is involved, put together.

In the case of Credit Lyonais, it is present in 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo, Tchad, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. All the banks in which Credit Lyonais has a share holding, are independent local banks and it was the first to make the transformation from local branches to independent banks in West Africa. It's partners in this development were Italy's Banko di Roma, Spain's Banko Hispano Americano and West Germany's Commerz Bank.[18] Societe Generale set up it's first branch in Africa in Tunis in 1913, and then extended into Morocco. Only in the early 1940's was there real development in Sub-Saharan African with the opening of branches in Senegal, Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea, Cameroun and Ivory Coast. After independence, Societe Generale, too, joined the movement towards the establishment of local banks. The Italian Banko Nazionale Del Lavoro, the West German Bayerische Vereins-bank, and Credit Swiss, are it's current partners in Africa. It is associated with banks in Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal. The biggest of them is in Ivory Coast, but Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited, set up in 1977, with Nigerian private interests, has shown rapid growth. It had 10 branches at the end of 1982.

A fourth French bank has a particularly important historical role in African banking. *Banque Internationale Pour l'Afrique Occidentale* (BIAO) traces its origins in West Africa back to the establishment of Banque de Senegal in 1853. Originally set up at Saint Louise, it transferred to Dakar in 1884, and had the

right to issue bank notes by virtue of an imperial decree.

BIAO from Senegal, spread through other regions, playing an important part in the development of the countries, where it established itself. It helped create the Coffee and Cocoa plantations of Ivory Coast, Banana plantations in Guinea, the Forestry Industry in Gabon, the cultivation of groundnuts in Senegal and Sudan, and Cotton in Equitorial Africa. It lost it's power to issue currency in 1955, and then set about turning itself into a commercial bank on an international scale. Ten years later, it drastically changed it's capital structure with this end in view, by taking on First National City Bank of New York as a partner with a 49% shareholding. The remaining 51% was held by *Compagnie Financiere France-Afrique,* a holding company in which stakes are held by BNP (37.5%), Credit Commerciale de France (10.3%) and the Insurance Company, Groupe Drouot (4.3%). The bank is still having an extensive network of branches in West Africa, particularly in Ivory Coast, but also in Tchad, Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Togo. It also has several subsidiaries in other associated banks in Cameroun where BIAO Cameroun, has 35 branches, and in Gabon, Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta and Zaire. Like it's sister, the BNP, it has also had a strong presence in Nigeria for some years. International Bank for West Africa (Nigeria) Limited, was incorporated in 1969, using BIAO's three existing branches there. The bank now has a 40% holding against Nigerian Government's 60%. As with all the French bank's in Nigeria in recent years, growth for this bank has also been rapid. Three branches were opened in 1982 and a further six were to come into operation in 1983. It is now the country's fourth largest commercial bank, with 33 branches and more than 1,500 employees.

Several other French banks have interest in Africa in the form of subsidiaries or shareholding in local banks, but their geographical spread cannot be compared with that of the big three and BIAO. Among the notable ones are Bank de l'Indochine and de Suez, Banque Francais des Commerce Extereur, and Compagnie Financiere de Paris et des Pays Bas.

In spite of the economic difficulties facing many African countries today, these French banks are still trying to do

business, particularly in places like Cameroun, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria, which have oil reserves. The banks are looking for an increasing volume of business through both investments in the oil industry and the general economic upturn which the oil fields have brought. They are also trying to expand steadily, their branch networks in line with the needs of their respective countries.

The French big three also seem to agree that the possibility of great expansion in Africa is rather limited. In Zimbabwe, since independence, the BNP is already doing substantial business by opening up branches. Credit Lyonaise is negotiating with a view to setting up some form of representation, and Societe Generale has opened a Liaison office in Harare. Kenya is also seen as a country with potential and the BNP is again present in that country. Credit Lyonais has been negotiating to open a Liaison office at the beginning of 1981. In Nigeria, all the three banks are now fully established.

Because of the risks involved with a lot of businesses, the French banks operating in Africa, have always insisted that all business transactions are backed up by COFACE.

New Energy And Mineral Strategy:

As far back in 1979, one year before the Iranian crisis began, and two years before the Iran-Iraq War, France was away from dependance on Middle East Oil to African sources. It was learnt that the two French companies, la Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine (SNEA) and la Compagnie Francais de Petrol (CEF), were summoned to Quais d'orsy sometime in 1979, and told to put a new thinking to the future of oil supplies to France.[19] Political upheavals in Iran which had already started, were perhaps, the main reason why the French decided to take this decision. Soon after the Quais d'Orsy warning, Mr. Albin Chalandon, was appointed to head SNEA in place of Pierre Guillaumat. The latter was said to be hard line Gaullist, who was reportedly the driving force behind the French companies' position to the detriment of American and British Oil Companies. Those days were now over, and Chalandon had travelled extensively in Africa winning friends and influencing people outside the Francophone orbit. The stakes for SNEA

were high because, Africa represented approximately 75% of its production. SNEA's output remained concentrated in Gabon, where it extracted an avèrage of 10 million tonnes a year, or almost 90% of the local production. The fast rate of extraction has rapidly depleted Gabon's reserves which should be exhausted before 1990. Chalandon assured President Omar Bongo, that SNEA, would vigorously pursue its offshore prospecting. Regrettably, the company failed as it's officials were not very optimistic. There was a flurry of diplomatic activities involving not only Chalandon, but also other French officials. Chalandon was also in Brazzaville in 1978, to patch up the quarrel with the new Yhomby-Opango government. With Agip, Elf Congo had been involved in a bitter dispute with the late President Marriane Nguabi, over governmental decisions to demand a large increase in taxes and royalties from the two firms. In 1977, Oil was said to have been discovered by an American company in the Ivory Coast's offshore waters. But determined not to be out-manouvred on what was considered to be "home ground", SNEA's new boss also stopped over in Abidjan, where he managed to obtain research permits for large offshore zones. In Senegal, he was able to pull off a grand coup by signing agreements to launch research in 38% of the country's area. Nevertheless, a long standing border dispute with Guinea Bissau might have held up the exploration. In Niger, Chalandon signed other three research accords with President Seyne Kountche who had opened some 345,620 sq.km. for exploration. The American Oil giant, ESSO, had previously struck oil in the Tin-Touma region near Lake Chad. There were similar indications in Tchad itself, where several American firms had been persevering for a decade. Now that signs of oil were increasing, SNEA was attempting to elbow its way in. Mr. Chalandon also went to Mali, where he met President Mousa Traore, for several concessions in the north-east of Mali. Mr. Chalandon, also paid special attention to fence mending with Algeria. The nationalisation of SNEA's Algerian holdings in 1972, deprived it of significant resource and considerably soured relations with the Algerian government. The SNEA was now cautiously moving again into Algeria through

special purchase arrangements. The company also belonged to an international Consortium prospecting for oil in Tunisia.

The other French company, CFP, was able to maintain its position in North Africa. Chilly Franco-Algerian relations never affected its special arrangements with the Algerian National Company, Sonatrach. ACP's director of prospecting, Jean Dupuy-Camet announced that the company would increase the pace of its research in both Algeria and Tunisia. In fact, it was learnt that 40% of the CFP's 1979 prospection budget, around US$ 230 million would be devoted to its African operations.

Another aspect of SNEA's activity remained cloaked in mystery; little mention was made in the annual report about its Southern African operations. It was learned that in 1974 and 1975, SNEA was prospecting in both South African and Namibian waters, and was now sinking exploratory holes offshore near Port Saint Johns.[20] While the French company was still concentrating most of its activities in Francophone countries, it is much radier to look elsewhere. Nigeria was, by no means, ignored. In 1982, SNEA had some 35 wells in production in the Federal Republic and extracts around 4.5 million tonnes a year.

France's interests in Africa represent 15% of the French total, while imports from Africa amounted to about 8% of France's needs. With its notion of grandeur, France also looks upon its African ventures as a means of procuring the strategic minerals which it sorely lacks. Any analysis of France's forward policy in Mauritania, Zaire and Tchad in the year 1977 to 1978, must take this into account. The statement made by the earstwhile Foreign Minister, Louise de Guiringaud, at the end of 1977, concerning the supply of Uranium from Niger, was a point in question. Mr. Guiringaud underlined that a stoppage of Uranium supplies from Niger, would be a costly financial blow because, Paris would be obliged to make up the shortfall of purchases in hard currency outside the Franc zone. What was more, it would considerably reduce the country's nuclear independence, vis-a-vis the United States. A quick glance at the chart of France's imports of strategic minerals would reveal that 42.2% came from

the meeting of the Council of Ministers at the beginning of January, 1979, to extend the formulae to the field of Uranium. This involved Niger, Central African Republic and Gabon. The formulae also acted as a form of insurance in case the regime changes because the involved countries would have large investments in France. To facilitate the operation, a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Cogema, along with two nationalised banks, bought into the equity of the State Mining Company, BRGM's subsidiary COFRAMINES.[21] Similar operations were being planned for both phosphate and antimony by France.

New Signs of Disagreements Between France and Members of the Community:

It has been observed in recent years that France is loosing grip, to a considerable extent, on some of African community members. Even in a country like Ivory Coast, where a French-owned Super market stocks 15 brands of camembert Cheese, France's grip is slipping, 25 years after independence. In the Ivory Coast, the glimmering showcase of France's post colonial success in Africa, 15,000 Frenchmen have gone home in the past few years, from top government advisers to sales clerks. But even then, there are still at least, 35,000 Frenchmen in the Ivory Coast, and 3,000 of these are on the Ivorian government's payroll. There are at least, 8,000 French men in the Military bases in Ivory Coast, and another 1,000 French Advisers train local cadres.

A new phenomenon which has come to light, that a new generation of Francophone Africans is looking away from Paris towards the rest of Europe and America. French officials reveal some nervousness over what they call *la parcee Americain* — the American penetration, despite assurances that US policy supports France's role in it's former colonies.[22]

President Omar Bongo of Gabon, has on several occasions, made it public that he would want to see American investment in his country. The Americans themselves disagree with the French argument of *la parcee Americain* as nothing but Gabon's wishful thinking and French Paronoia. Nonetheless, commercial competition is building up, particularly in larger

African States which are finding American, Japanese and European companies often providing better service or other advantages. Japan controls upto 70% of the automobile market, although most sales are through French companies Lebanese traders are now moving steadily into retail trade, import and export business as well as the small industry sector.

Some Africans are seeking to temper entrenched private French interests which, supported by Paris, work together to form a barrier against newcomers. "We are prepared to offer Americans, or others, exactly what we offer the French. We feel it is important to diversify our interests."[23]

Two American companies, Amoco and Tenneco, struck oil in waters, the French-controlled company, Elf Gabon, had abandoned. "It is either that Elf's technology is behind or they were hiding something. Either way, we were upset, and our eyes are now open."[24]

In Togo, officials were likewise, miffed when a French Consulting firm recommended they scrap an idle US$ 44 million steel plant. Instead, the American investor, John Muir of New York, went in and began producing steel at a profit.

Even in politics, Togo like the other states, is seeking to broaden it's horizon. On the recent 100th Anniversary of German Colonisation, a decree noted, "Germany was the first European country with which the Togolese decided to establish friendship: a permanent Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, composed of the West German Ambassador and the French Ambassador alternating. But the German was to come first.

In the Ivory Coast, Diplomatic relations with a number of States, including Albania, were opened. The most significant inroads are in higher education. In the late 1970's, the Ivory Coast decided to ignore private French warnings that American Universities turned out people, too specialised in their fields, for developing countries. But since then, two-thirds of all Ivorian doctors earned abroad in technical fields and science have been in the United States and Canada.

"We always push our best people to go to the US. French education is too theoretical. We have to retrain people when they come back."[25]

Two Senegalese cabinet ministers had American Masters of Business Administration Degrees. Mr. Edem Kodjo of Togo, the former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and now a Professor in Paris, said in an interview: "Young Africans feel almost no emotional ties to France anymore. We are the last generation where that makes an impact. But still, these young leaders, they need France. No one else makes the effort in Africa, and they know it."

Paris is still striving to maintain its "Captive markets" in Francophone Africa, while winning new outlets in the more dynamic economies of Anglophone and Portuguese speaking Africa. The semi official weekly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, *La Monitor des Commerce Exterior* (MOCI), described France's African commerce as of "a colonial type," and went on to add that "It would be extremely dangerous if half of France's exports of industrial goods continued to be concentrated on a continent which is economically behind the rest of the Third World." Nevertheless, MOCI warns that "the numerous and faithful clientele, which France seems to have assured for itself for a long time to come in Africa, is an advantage which must be preserved."

France must face up to a strong commercial offensive into Francophone Africa by the United States. The Americans have already made a substantial headway in the Ivory Coast, and efforts are being intensified by American business interests in Cameroun and Gabon. Paradoxically, the Franc zone is playing a less dominant part in the Franco-African commercial relations. Only four Franc zone states are among the top ten French partners on the continent. Of the six countries which account for over 60% of France's sales to Africa, namely Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, South Africa and Tunisia, none are in the French Monetory Zone. Only Congo Brazzaville and Cameroun, thanks to oil production growth, have rapidly expanded their purchases of goods made in France, while the Ivory Coast, bedeviled by a severe economic crisis, has cut back. Countries, such as Togo, Senegal, Bourkina Fasso, Tchad and Central African Republic, hardly offer dynamic business opportunities. It is towards Nigeria and South Africa that commercial efforts have been amplified. It

is, perhaps, in the Maghareb states of North Africa, that French resolve has been put to the severest test by the Reagan Administration's drive to encompass Morocco, and to a lesser extent, Tunisia, in its so-called policy of "Strategic Consensus". Paris has engineered a spectacular, although gaseously expensive raproachment with Algeria. Mitterrand made a "technical", stopover in Algeria at the start of his African tour in 1982, and on the return leg, he called briefly on the Mauritanian President, Khouna Ould Hydallah. France was now to lend support to guarantee Mauritanian sovereignty in the event of an eventual attack by Moroccan forces. In West Africa, Mitterrand has been re-enforcing traditional alliances. Senegal has received substantial economic aid to bolster its sagging economy. President Abdul Diouf, is viewed as a key natural relay for French policy on the continent. The Ivory Coast is receiving special attention, with French economic interests intensifying efforts to maintain their supremacy in a country which might soon emerge as a major oil producer. Moreover, French diplomats are playing a discrete role in a discrete power broking for the succession of President Houphoet Boigny. The favourite candidate in Africanist circles remains Henri Konan Bedie, President of the National Assembly.

Niger is also being well treated, with Paris paying a price higher than the going one, in the world market for the country's uranium exports.

Ties with President Matheu Kerekou of Benin, have improved, while relations with the autocratic Eyadema of Togo, have somewhat, deteriorated. Central Africa has been the most direct problem for France's African policy making. France's status in Tchad is now in doubt following Hissene Habre's taking over of Ndjamena in a victory over Goukouni Ouadei, whom Paris attempted to support. Following Ange Paasse's abortive coup attempt, Franco-CAR links remain clouded, as President Andre Kolingba still suspects that members of the Partie Socialist (PS) of France, encouraged the umpredictable Patasse. Gabonese President, Omar Bongo, also remains on his guard against the intentions of the Mitterrand Administration, resisting attempts to diminish the

influence in Libreville, of the so-called "Clan des Gabonais". Bongo maintains ready lines of contacts with Washington and Israel as possible alternatives to his French connections. President Mobutu, the *"Bete Noire"* of PS Africanists has been re-assured that the French would give him every necessary support if he remained loyal to the French Community.

French efforts to make dramatic breakthroughs in Southern Africa, have not yielded significant results. Many frontline states imagine that France could convince the five nations of the Western contact group to exert more pressure on Pretoria for a negotiated settlement of the Namibian conflict, but they have been disappointed.

Notes:

1. European Economic Commission: "Trade Between the Euroepan Economic Commission and African countries between 1958 — 1967." Brussels, 1969.
2. "Orientation of Exchanges between France and Developing countries:" a study set up by the Directorate of External Economic Relations of the Ministry of Finance, Paris; and also: "The Policy of Co-operation with Developing Countries" (Jeanneney) 18th July, 1963, page 141.
3. Reville D: "Problems Posed by the Evolution of Exchanges between France and other Countries in the Franc zone," 1968, p.269.
4. Mr. Benoit, President of Rencontres Africaine in an interview published in 1982.
5. Ibid.
6. Marche Tropicaux, Paris (Special edition), 1982.
7. Ibid.
8. AED Magazine, 18 September, 1981.
9. Spurrier, Andrew, Article in AED Magazine, 29 April, 1983.
10. Ibid.

Notes:

11. Genet Francois in an interview published by ADB Feature Magazine, 1983.

12. "Rousset-Uclaf Fights the Fungia," an articles in AED, September, 1983.

13. Annual Report, 1980, of the Directorate of Insurance, Ministry of Finance, Paris.

14. Ibid.

15. Pierre Allain, Novotel's International Secretary, in a statement to the Press, reported by AFP, April 20, 1981.

16. Ibid.

17. Spurrier, AED, September 18, 1981.

18. Laffineur, H., Credit Manager of Credit Lyonnais, quoted by AED, May 1981.

19. Africa confidential, 31/1/79.

20. See Chapter on France's Relations with South Africa.

21. Africa Confidential, September, 1979.

22. The Kenya Nation, Nairobi, 7 March, 1985.

23. Ping, Jean — Chief Aide to President Bongo in an interview with AFP, published by International Herald Tribune, Paris, 9—10 March, 1985.

24. Ibid.

25. A statement made to the Press by Mr. Achi Atsain, Director of Ivory Coast Centre for Social and Economic Research and quoted in New York Times, 2/9/79.

CHAPTER FIVE

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Introduction:

Military aid to former French colonies was always considered as part of development aid. Before the colonies became independent, France had deliberately introduced a policy of "Military Co-operation" with new states, the main purpose being to arm the countries in such a way that they could deter foreign aggression. At the same time, through such co-operation with France, their defence would form part of the global strategy of the "metropolitant" power.

General De Gaulle, in an address at a higher military institute in France on 13th November, 1959, declared: "Naturally the defence of France is inseperable with that of other countries."

Since the second World War, French policy makers have always deliberately regarded their African colonies as, "the ultimate refuge of the sovereignty of France." French troops deployed in Africa were considered as "the rear guard army to safe guard the sovereignty of the empire and the defence of France."[1] By an order of 7th January, 1959, General De Gaulle, confirmed the role of the French African Army in the cader of the notion, "of the global defence of France." In the final analysis, according to De Gaulle, "the responsibility for the defence of France rests with the French authorities." The French overseas army, even if it may include some native Africans, is still regarded as a French Army and is commanded by French Officers. The first military bases established under this arrangement, were those of Dakar, Point-Noire, Fort Lamy (Ndjamena), Diego-Suarez and Djibouti.[2] On the attainment of independence, France tried to maintain her bases and to keep them in close collaboration with the new African armies through military assistance to them. In signing agreements for such military assistance and co-operation, the French authorities have always tried to include the clause, "to

establish in each state, new structures which could permit the prolongation of the French military presence." These include concessions — as regards military facilities, such as the right to carry out territorial surveillence, to undertake flying missions, and to inspect military installations. The military committee signed bilateral agreements covering such facilities with Senegal, Mauritania, Togo and Madagascar, as well as regional agreements covering Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Niger and the former Equatorial Africa. By so doing, they established all the necessary structures of concertation. At the end, France engaged herself with the provision of assistance to ensure the defence of each country.

France maintained about 58,500 troops in Africa up to 1963. But from 1964, these troops were progressively reduced, bringing the figure down to 21,300 (in 1964) and finally, to 6,000 by 1968. These 6,000 were spread in the bases at Djibouti (4,400), Senegal (1,309), Ivory Coast (500) and Gabon (500). See Tables 2 & 3. But even the bases themselves continued to be reduced, especially with the request made by Mali, Madagascar, Niger and Chad for the removal of French forces from their territories. Such reduction of forces was not as a result of reduced interest on the part of France but simply because of the establishment of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) bases in Bretagne, in the north of France, and also in the south of the country which made it possible for French troops to be flown to any area of conflict within a relatively short time. Therefore, the existence of the forces in Africa was considered to be of purely logistic nature. Furthermore, because of the dependence of African troops for their weapons and training on France, the French authorities consider them as part and parcel of their own defence posture in the African region. The French, of course, are quick to point out that their remaining troops in Africa are there principally to cover the commercial routes around the African continent; with Dakar, Port Bouet and Point-Noire covering the western coast of Africa; Diago Suarez and Reunion covering the south-eastern coast and Djibouti, which assumed the important role of overlooking the Red Sea petroleum route before the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. The base at Fort Lamy,

(now Njamena) played the role of covering the centre of the continent. That position was considered to be very important in the early 60's. See Table 1.

At the end of the colonial era, some of the departing powers left Africa without leaving any military bases behind. This left these countries as "preys" to the Soviet Union which helped towards the attainment of their independence indirectly through propaganda. France considered herself as the only country that stayed behind to stop the envisaged Soviet expansion in Africa. She has accused the Americans and other Western countries of incoherent African policies:

> **"With the development of the Cold War, and the Western strategy of containment, the European countries were capable not only to obtain the tacit consent of the United States and to maintain their presence in Africa, but equally too, for their active participation in the continent."[3]**

Nevertheless, that position of infuence over strategy was virtually lost by the end of the 20 years of our review. Before the end of the Cold War, and the schism of communism has transformed whatever is available into a strictly bipolar affair, the American pre-occupation with Vietnam made it possible for the Soviet Union to cast it's eyes on the mineral resources of Africa and to keep busy away from the prying eyes of the western powers. The French intervention in Kolwezi, Zaire, in 1978, is seen by the French as proof of the importance of their presence in Africa and the failure of other western countries to realise the real dangers that faced their interests on the continent. It is also seen as a confirmation of what General De Gaulle said in 1959 that France's defence did not exclude that of other friendly countries in the West.

THE DE GUIRINGAUD DOCTRINE

On 9th May, 1978, the Paris daily paper, Le Monde, reported a speech made by Mr. De Guiringaud, the earstwhile Foreign Minister of France in which he tried to justify France's intervention in African affairs with these words, "we cannot play a role and we cannot make our mark in the world without

taking risks." According to Guiringaud,

"military power, the capacity to defend one's own territory and to intervene in matters across frontiers is one of the indications of the power of a nation."[4]

But one has to caution, too, that this is a very dangerous policy that Guiringaud was advocating especially in a world dominated by super power rivalries between America and the Soviet Union, and in a world where atomic weapons are stored by the big powers.

France is known to have frequently used her troops in African states to suppress internal disorder, even before independence. But it is also a fact that it is only in black Africa that she dared do this sort of thing without trying to go via an international organisation, such as the UNO. France's continued intervention in Africa raises many questions not only on their motives and objectives, but also their own effect on her infuence and power in the continent. It is very dangerous in the long run, more so in the policy of Co-operation which France regards so very highly. It's impact on the international scene cannot be under-estimated.

One of the problems that face various French governments, it seems, is the pressure exerted on them by private economic interests which are in Africa to exploit the continent's resources. They push governments of France to take decisions which are bound to be regretted in due course. One can offer any arguments, but one cannot justify such unnecessary interventions, even though some protagonists of this tactic could say that the objective is to ensure the stability of the African continent. It is unfortunate, of course, that France is not the only guilty country in Africa where foreign troops are deployed with abandon. For example, Angola and Ethiopia have seen the deployment of Cuban troops operating under the command and guidance of East European Officers.

The stability of the continent can also be seen from the point of view of irridentism of certain countries which keep competing and going to war over disputed territorial boundaries. This problem is prevalent between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Nigeria and Cameroun, etc. Even though

the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has proclaimed in it's Charter that African boundaries as left by colonial powers, should be left as they are, conflicts have continued unabated, sometimes leading to war. French authorities are quick to point out that their interventions in Africa were on the invitation of the African governments concerned. Intervention *a la Afghanistan,* you might say! But even this policy of "invited intervention" has got it's own contradictions. For example, on 26th February, 1964, Mr. Peyrefitte, a spokesman of the French government, tried to justify France's intervention in Gabon:

"The intervention of French troops is at the request of the legitimate authorities of those countries, to establish law and order, and this is in accordance with agreements between the countries concerned."[5]

But by the same token, it could be recalled that in 1963, President Albert Youlou of Gabon faced military rebellion and the French government did not intervene for reasons which are very hard to find. But Mr. Peyrefitte again has a way of explaining it:

"it is not possible always for us to intervene whenever there is an upset (palace coup) in any Presidential palace."[6]

Now, it is necessary for the French authorities to explain the difference between a "palace coup" and a situation which causes "a breakdown of law and order." There was also the case of Mr. Tombalbaye in Chad who was overthrown by General Malloum. Without being machiavelian about it, one would think that an African Head of State needs to be in the good books of France before an interventionist force is sent to save him from a *coup d'tat.* The overthrow of Emperor Bokassa of Central African Republic is another good example of where the French government failed to do anything to stop it. In the case of Tchad, Zaire and Mauritania, the French authorities gave the reason of "protecting their own nationals," but the same was not true in the two other cases. For the French, it does not matter if the Head of State is a dictator, or anything, as long as it can be explained that the country has a

defence agreement with France. That Head of State can call for France's intervention any time he feels threatened by developments in internal politics. Even where there is no proper mutual defence agreement to allow for that intervention, a military technical cooperation agreement could be used to justify intervention. In other words, it could also be said that the personal relationship between the President of France and the President of a threatened African country often supercedes the real interests of the local populations. But, of course, the spaciousness of France's argument for intervention can be seen in the military agreement signed with Tchad on 6th March, 1976, article 4, where it was clearly stated that "French troops cannot intervene in internal affairs towards the maintenance of law and order."[7] But as we also know, sometimes these agreements have got a secret Annex to them and, in this case, this particular provision for intervention might have been contained therein. France could always advance the argument that she could intervene in the case of external aggression. In the cases of Tchad and Mauritania, France's relations with the intervening powers, namely Libya and Algeria, were examined against the background of "diplomatic expediency and the Mediterranean Basin Security."

But French authorities are sensitive when they are accused of being "the Gendarme of Africa."

In effect, if the real intention of France's military intervention in African countries is to normalize her presence in those countries, it is also important to note that her own credibility in the long run will be progressively eroded.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

If the maintenance of legal status and the protection of territorial integrity of a country is part of the definition of power, then it goes without saying that the protection of territory is a priority objective of all sovereign states. At time of independence, the new African countries did not seek only to form their own national armies to replace colonial armies, but also sought to reassure their country by arranging

various military agreements to sustain them. Only three countries — Cameroun, Upper Volta and Mali did not sign a military co-operation agreement on military technical assistance with France, even though she has received same.

Under these military technical co-operation agreements, African countries were at liberty to call on the French government to supply armed forces to help in the provision of security and the protection of territorial borders against external aggression. Such military co-operation agreements were very careful to establish all the necessry parameters for easy deployment of forces. Local military committees were established in each country and they worked in co-operation with the top military authorities of France who derived their powers directly from the Prime Minister. See Table 4. Such co-operation agreements always referred to the aid in their annexes as "aid and mutual facilities" on defence matters. Although these agreements talk about protection against external aggression, it would appear that no such external aggression ever occured.

But there were cases of internal law and order problems, e.g. in Cameroun (1961), Gabon (1964), and also Chad. These actions were carried out by troops flown specially from France which, after executing their duties, returned to their home bases. This partly explains the effectiveness of France's RDF and the reason why the French troops in Africa were progressively reduced.

It is very interesting to note that French military co-operation agreements also cover the protection of primary products and strategic produce and minerals such as, hydrocarbons, uranium, lythium, etc. Agreement on protection of primary products make sit incumbent on the African country to give France the first option to buy any such products that she may wish to export. But France also reciprocated in similar respects. This policy also helps to explain why Nigeria and other members of ECOWAS have been finding it very difficult to get that organization off the ground. Because certain sections of such agreements are always secret and not published in the gazette with the main document, it is difficult to know exactly the kind of control exercised by France on her

former colonies. This is bound to lead to a lot of frustrations, especially to the Anglo-phone African countries in the West Africa zone which look forward to closer co-operation with their sister countries in ECOWAS. France and Gabon, for example, concluded in 1974, a specific agreement concerning the supply of uranium, thorium, beryllium, phylium and other minerals with the exception of petroleum. The agreement concluded with the words, "The Government of the Republic of Gabon, considers the Government of the Republic of France as the primary client with the first priority." On the face of it, the purpose of military co-operation assistance to African countries by France is to give such assistance to the national Armed Forces of the African countries. This is the principal objective of the agreement signed with all the countries with the exception of Guinea and Mali. Since 1965, such aid is given through the channel of the Ministry of Co-operation. This aid also includes training for cadres of the national armies of the African countries either at home or in institutions in France.

The military co-operation agreements signed between France, the African countries and Malagasy Republic in 1960, have always emphasised the sovereignty of the countries concerned. These agreements have provided for a very careful planning and interpretation of the type of assistance that is given, in which case, they anticipate internal troubles and, for that reason, the officers are trianed in the model of French forces. It is rather curious, however, that inspite of all this careful planning, the coups that affected some of the Francophone countries were led by officers trained in France, e.g. General Malloum of Tchad, General Ramanantsoa or Captain Raziraka of Madagascar, Major Kountche of Niger, and "General" Badel Bokassa of Central African Republic.

Military aid which was included in the budget of the Ministry of Co-operation from 1964 — 1978 had remained almost constant at between 10 and 13 per cent of the total budget. While 45 million francs was spent in 1964 on military technical co-operation, the figure rose to 124 million francs in 1965. This is because of the transfer of the subject of military co-operation to the Ministry of Co-operation. In 1978, it was stated that there was

an increased request for aid from African countries brought about by the internal security situations in those countries. The amounts required were to cover the expenses and maintenance of 1,000 co-operation workers in 1977, a figure which rose to 1,250 in 1978. This also included the training of 1,500 people for the various African countries. The political importance of military technical assistance to African countries cannot be under-estimated.

MILITARY BASES

In spite of various denials and explanations by French officials, regarding the deployment of French troops in Africa, it is quite obvious that they are going to be maintained for the foreseeable future. We recall a statement made by the French Foreign Miniser, Mr. Yves Doutriaux to the effect that French troops based in Africa would not be withdrawn.[9] This Minister also told a correspondent of the News Agency of Nigeria in Paris, that the withdrawal of such troops would depend on the countries where they were located. "If such countries demand the withdrawal of such troops, France will not hesitate to do so."[10] The countries involved at the moment are, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Central African Republic, Tchad and Djibouti. Although it was mentioned elsewhere, that the purpose of these troops is to protect the sea routes, it is also obvious that they are there to protect French investments inside or near the countries where they are located. For example, the military base at Franceville in the heart of Gabon's mining district, near the Congolese frontier is to overlook the uranium and manganese mines which are in operation in this zone.[11] In fact, before the Franceville base was estalished, the earstwhile French President, Giscard d'Estaing paid a visit to Central African Republic in 1978 where he held a meeting with President Bongo, President Malloum (Tchad), President Mobutu (Zaire) and the Prime Minister of Gabon to conclude agreement on the establishment of new French bases in the region.

The base at Franceville is said to be large enough to carry the biggest jets available. It was also alleged that the same airport was designed to be used by South African Airlines for

refueling stop-overs in their long distance flights to and from Europe and America. Similarly France has constructed a large air base and missile testing site in the north-east corner of the Central African Republic near the town of Bouar. The country's Bakouma uranium mines should have come into operation in 1982, and the French Atomic Energy Commission was expecting to get a large share of the estimated yearly production of 1,200 tons.[12]

The French army, having learnt from it's failures in the operation in Shaba, has tried to reorganize it's operations in Africa to make them more efficient. According to General Loizillion, the French army has established integrated units which would be more efficient in African combat role.[13] These units represent a potent strike force for rapid transport to African battle fields. The French parachute drops on Kolwezi in 1978 not only revealed the lack of France's air capacity (they used American planes to transport troops), but also underlined the weakness in their communication facilities. The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Mery said in 1979, that a new system of battle field communications with the *Centre Operationnel des Armes* buried beneath the Defence Ministry in Paris had been expanded. In fact, the French have installed an air borne liaison centre in a Transall military transport air craft to chart troop movements in Africa. This system became operational in 1980. France has also been trying to upgrade the training of armies in Francophone African states. In 1978, alone, 2,200 African officers and non-commissioned men received advanced training in France. This figure rose to 2,500 in 1979. The French government spent 80 million francs for this training activity. There has also been an increase of French training officers despatched to Francophone African countries for training purposes.

THE SALE OF ARMS

As noted earlier, it is quite obvious that France has no real policy towards non-Francophone African countries. Whilst France is very careful in her relations with the Francophone

States which, for all practical purposes she regards as an extension of her own territory, her attitude towards the rest is dictated basically by economic interests which are coldly pursued with hardly any scrupple or morality. This is explained by the facts and figures revealed elsewhere in this thesis. She has supplied arms simultaneously to countries which are likely to be at war with one another (or are even in the state of billigerence), e.g. Libya and Egypt; Nigeria and Cameroun; Ethiopia and Somalia; and South Africa and the rest of black Africa etc.

France's close relationship with her former colonies in military matters also raises a question as to these countries' claim to non-alignment and membership of the organized third-world bloc.

Table 1:

STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES ASSISTED BY FRANCE (INCLUDING GENDERMERIE)

COUNTRY	1964	1968	1977	1980
BENIN (DAHOMEY)	1,000	2,900	2,400	2,290
CAMEROUN	2,700	7,750	12,000	11,300
C. A. R.	500	1,700	3,000	3,360
CONGO	700	4,300	7,000	9,425
IVORY COAST	4,000	5,100	8,000	9,450
GABON	600	1,200	4,750	4,350
UPPER VOLTA (BOURKINA-FASSO)	1,000	2,700	8,000	4,675
MADAGASCAR	2,600	7,600	12,000	21,000
MALI	3,000	4,700	7,500	9,950
MAURITANIA	500	1,700	8,000	10,720
NIGER	1,200	2,400	3,000	4,280
SENEGAL	2,500	6,700	10,000	11,720
TCHAD	400	2,800	11,000	9,200
TOGO	250	1,400	2,500	5,010
BURUNDI	800	1,200	5,000	7,500
RWANDA	900	2,000	5,000	4,850
ZAIRE	30,000	33,000	43,400	55,500

SOURCES: Martin, M — "L'armee et le pouvoir politique en Afrique noire," Bordeaux, unpublished thesis, 1970, page 489; and
"Les forces armees mondiales 1976 — 77," Paris, a french publication, 1977. And also The Military Balance, Inst. of Strategic Studies, London, 1984.

Table 2:

FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN BLACK AFRICA

YEAR	COUNTRY	TYPE OF INTERVENTION
1960	CAMEROUN	Suppression of revolt by members of U. P. C.
	CONGO	Restoration of Law and Order.
	GABON)	Conflicts between citizens of
	CONGO)	both countries.
1961	CAMEROUN	Suppression of U.P.C. revolt.
	MAURITANIA	Restoration of Law and Order.
1963	TCHAD	Restoration of Law and Order.
	NIGER	Stabilisation of Hamani Diori's government.
1964	GABON	Stabilisation of President M'ba.
1968	TCHAD	Internal Security.
April, 1969 January, 1971[1] September, 1975 [2]	TCHAD	Internal Security and Suppression of FROLINAT.
1977	ZAIRE	Logistic aid to Zairian army.
1978	MAURITANIA	Aerial raids to protect technical aid workers.
	ZAIRE	Protection of French citizens in Shaba.
	TCHAD	Internal Security duties.

SOURCE: Statement by Mr. M. A. Peyrefitte, quoted by AFP's weekly bulletin for Black Africa No. 316 of 4 March, 1964.
Also: Nielsen, W. A. — "The Great Powers and Africa," London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, page 431.

Note: 1. Date of the official termination of intervention in Tchad.
2. Date of the repatriation of members of French expeditionary corps.

Table 3:

ARMS SALES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FRANCE AND SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES 1975 — 1980

YEAR	COUNTRY	EQUIPMENT TYPE	QNTY.	PRICE
1975	To South Africa:	Agosta-class subs	2	US$ 4.2 million
	To Egypt:	Gazelle helicopters	42	NA
	To Libya:	Mirage F.1 fighters	38	NA
	To Morocco:	Mirage F.1 fighters	25	NA
	To Togo:	Magister ac	5	NA
1976	To South Africa:	Type A.69 freighters	2	NA
	To Egypt:	Crotale SAM	?	NA
	To Libya:	LIST	1	NA
		PR 72 FBBG	10	US$ 186 million
		Otomat SSM	80	US$ 201.3 "
	To Ivory Coast:	Landing ship	1	NA
	To Mauritania:	AML Armoured cars	?	NA
	To South Africa:	Exocet SSM	?	NA
1977	To Egypt:	Mirage fighters	14	NA
	To Libya:	FPBG 'F' Class subs	6	NA
	To Sudan:	Mirage 50 fighters	24	NA
	To Ivory Coast:	Alpha Jet trg ac	12	NA
		Mirage III fighters	14	NA
		FPB	2	NA
	To Egypt:	Agosta-class subs	2	NA
	To Nigeria:	La combattante class FPBG	2	NA
	To Morocco:	Mirage fighters	25	NA
	To Sudan:	Mirage V fighters	15	NA
		Puma helicopters	10	NA
		AMX-10 APC	?	NA
	To Togo:	Alpha Jet trg ac	3	NA
1978	To Morocco:	Alpha Jet trg ac	24	US$ 144 million
		Crotale SAM	?	NA
1979	To Cameroun:	Magister trg ac	2	NA
	To Gabon:	Puma helicopter	1	NA
	To Ivory Coast:	VADAR 20mm SPAA gun	6	NA
		VAB APC	13	NA
	To Senegal:	PR 72 FAC(P)	1	NA
1980	To Djibouti:	Reims Cessna U-206G	1	NA

SOURCE: The Military Balance, various issues from 1977—80, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

***NA — Not Available.**

Notes:

1. AMMI-OZ, M — "Reveu Francaise d'etudes politiques africaines," No. 134 of February, 1977 pages 65—89.

2. DABEZIES, P — "La politique Africaine du Gen. De Gaulle, 1958 — 69," Bordeaux, France, 1979.

3. MAYAL, J — "Africa: The Cold War and After," Elak Books, London, International Relations Series, Volume 4, 1971, page 87.

4. Le Monde, 11 May, 1978.

5. AFP Bulletin quotidien de L'Afrique noire, No. 316 of 3 April, 1964.
6. Ibid.

7. Official Gazette, Paris, 30 April, 1978.

8. Except in the case of Mauritania vs Algeria and Libya, and lately, in 1981, in Tchad, by Libya.

9. New Nigerian, Kaduna, page 12, 16 June, 1981.

10. Ibid.
11. Africa Confidential, 20 October, 1978.

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CHAPTER SIX

RELATIONS WITH RACIST REGIMES

France's relations with the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), may not easily fit in with a narrow definition of neo-colonialism. This is because, South Africa, even though once a colony, has been independent for nearly a century and is indeed one of the most advanced nations in the southern hemisphere. Rhodesia, though a colony during the period covered by our study, was a British responsibility and located very far from any French colony. The two countries are, however, rather unique in the sense that they were ruled by minority white settlers who have institutionalised white racial superiority over the black majority as a way of life and a form of government. Although the countries were notionally independent, it was really a ruse as the black majority lived in special enclaves where alone their civic rights were guaranteed. Such enclaves were ruled like colonies by the few whites who held the monopoly of power.

In choosing to discuss France's policy towards these racist regimes, therefore, we do so in consideration of the fact that the country is exploiting the weakness, *al beit* inability of the black African people to determine their political rights and assert their economic power. Even though the countries belonged to them, they had no rights over the abundant mineral resources or the means to control the major means of production.

Taking advantage of this weakeness, France has joined other nations in bolstering the economic power of the white races through trade and investment as well as military, technical and scientific co-operation

(A) SOUTH AFRICA:

The history of France's relations with South Africa, date many years back. But for the purpose of this study, we shall consider the development of these relations from the 50's i.e. before the government of the Fifth Republic waded in

officially.

The first open indication of France's official involvement with South Africa was on July 11th, 1963, when several African countries called on the United Nations Security Council to discuss the supplies of arms to South Africa. The French delegate, Mr. Seydoux, told the council that France would supply to South Africa only those arms she needed for external defence. She would not supply arms that could be used by South Africa for the suppression of internal insurrection by blacks.

The Security Council resolution of July, 1963, calling for a total ban on the supply of arms to South Africa was approved with two absentions namely, France and Britain. When the Security Council held another meeting in December, 1963, France voted for the resolution and called on all states "to cease forthwith, the sale and shipment of equipment and arms for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunitions in South Africa." But in spite of these resolutions, it is known that France had continued to collaborate with South Africa.

Earlier on, before the government came in, economic relations between France and South Africa could be summarised in one word: *Wool.* From the early 50's, France bought from 40 to 60 per cent of South African production annually. When the rest of the country — except for rugby players — largely ignored the existence of South Africa, that racist country was almost a household word in Mazamet, where the skins were treated, and in Roubaix, where the wool was spun. The importance of this commodity was so great that one of the biggest French banks created a South African subsidiary to cater primarily to the needs of the wool buyers.

"This is how the *French Bank of South Africa* was born in 1949. South Africa was only remotely mentioned in connection with exotic names of gold mines, the shares of which were traditionally found in most investment companies."[1]

The French Government seemed to take notice of the existence of South Africa for the first time only after the 1959 takeover by General de Gaulle, when France sought allies for

her position on the Algerian question, which had come up for debate at the United Nations. The previous regimes, left to centre oriented, were satisfied with the dormant relations between the two countries, exclusively in the hands of the private sector: Banque de l'Indochine, Compagnie Maritime des Chargeurs Reunis, Compagnie des Messageries Maritime, U.T.A. and the big "lainiers" (wool buyers) of Roubaix.

General de Gaulle was to change this. To express his gratitude to one of the very small number of countries which whole heartedly supported his position of strict non-interference in a country's internal affairs which he held concerning the Algerian war, he never publicly mentioned apartheid. Added to this mild satisfaction, South Africa drew great comfort from De Gualle's conservative adviser, Jacques Rueff, one of the first economists to call for a revaluation for the official gold price.

In 1960, South Africa was equally in desperate need of friends, when after the Sharpeville massacre, traditional links with Britain and the Commonwealth were at a breaking point. Strong France-South African ties were, therefore, a natural response to urgent political circumstances; and the two countries lost no time in giving concrete form to their new friendship. South African army officers were sent to Algeria to train in anti-guerilla tactics, and soon after, French arms were sold to South Africa. The early military support South Africa drew from France was undoubtedly at the roots of the present "success" of French firms in South Africa.

Given that the South African economy is widely controlled by British-oriented capital, France could not have found a better way to penetrate the South African market than through the Afrikaner-controlled Government and armed forces. Well over half of all loans and orders placed in South Africa in France emanate from the State Corporations, strongholds of the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist drive for rapid development of an autonomous industry received its greatest encouragement from France. The role of France in South Africa should be judged on it's strategic importance, rather than on it's purely commercial aspects. French exports to South Africa are predominantly of a military nature, and

strict censorship of details concerning these transactions is applied by both sides. Therefore, when official statistics list France as South Africa's sixth trading partner, she is in fact, second only to Great Britain.

The period covering the tenure of office of General De Gaulle, i.e. 1958 to 1969, saw the closet cooperation between France and South Africa. This cooperation was not restricted to the sale of arms only. The assistance given to South Africa was acknowledged by officials and the media of information. For example, the government newspaper, "Dagbreek", of 2nd June, 1968, declared:

"France (has) always defended us and Rhodesia in the United Nations with it's firm policy of non-interference."[2]

MILITARY CO-OPERATION:

In spite of Security Council Resolution No. 181 of December 1963, France continued to provide South Africa with helicopters, missiles, aircrafts, armoured vehicles, as well as the licences to manufacture them. In October, 1970, the late President Pompidou, gave the official OAU mission, headed by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, formal assurances that no anti-guerilla equipment would in future, be supplied to South Africa. A year later, however, on 27 June, 1971, the South African Armourment Development and Production Corporation (ARMACOR), signed contracts with the French Aviation Company, Marcel Dassault, for the manufacture under licence in South Africa, of two of the company's Mach 2 supersonic aircraft — the Mirage III, some 45 of which were already in service with the South African Air Force; and the Mirage F.1, which made it's first public flight in France in June, 1970. No disclosure was made as to the number of aircraft of both types which were to be manufactured by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of ARMACOR, or the total cost involved. It was important that an initial run of 50 planes was scheduled at a total cost of well over US$ 50 million.

On 30 June, 1971, a London newspaper published an article entitled "Aircraft Deal: Part of the Fact", in which it was stated, *inter alia:*

"South Africa and France will work increasingly closer together in the military field in future. This includes the exchange of top secret military information and making available, trained artisans and technicians. The agreement over the mirage will also contribute to strengthening the bonds between South Africa and France."[3]

The paper expressed the opinion that the agreement was significant in that it demonstrated that the South African government still regarded France as it's most reliable partner in the field of arms procurement. Secondly, the deal implied that the Gaullist tradition of indifference to the criticisms of independent Africa was being continued under the Pompidou administration. The pragmatic approach of the French to issues of this kind has an obvious appeal to the South African government, particularly in view of the fact that the issue apparently raises little consistent interest, or concern, in the French news media or among public opinion as a whole, apart from sporadic trade union protests at French policy towards the republic.

"The relative absence in France, of any wide-spread public debate about the morality of such relations is conveniently in harmony with the South African insistence on the principle of non-intereference in domestic affairs as a basic requirement for the orderly and successful conduct of foreign policy."[4]

On a more practical level, military cooperation with France is welcomed as evidence of, at least, one important Western power's conviction of South Africa's importance in global strategic terms. Whether, in fact, French policy is motivated by such considerations, is besides the point. And indeed, there has been little enthusiasm for the hints struck by the republic's leaders from time to time that France might replace Britain as the chief beneficiary under the Simonstown Agreement. What ultimately matters, from Pretoria's stand point, is the comforting knowledge that the isolation so often reflected in massive majorities against it's policies by the General Assembly of the United Nations, is more apparent than real. Much more important is the creation of concrete ties with specific countries and, in the French case, it is the links in the meritime and defence fields that really count as Mr. P. Botha,

the Minister of Defence, stressed in March, 1969. Furthermore, the Dassault Agreement should be seen in the context of the British Government's decision to go no further, for the time being, than meet it's alleged obligations under Simonstown Agreement. The authorisation of the sale of 7 Wasp helicopters, had not been followed by any new commitments on the British side. This may not be for want of trying, as far as the latter is concerned, but rather, because of a calculation by South Africa that "arms dealing with Britain is an uncertain or unreliable enterprise, given the domestic and Commonwealth hostility the issue inevitably evokes".

Mr. Botha had told Mr. Pierre Messmer, the then Minister of the French Armed Forces under President De Gualle and, subsequently, the French Prime Minister under President Pompidou, when attending the launching at Nantes, of South Africa's first French built Daphne Class Sub-Marine (Maria Van Riebeck) on 18th March, 1969:

> **"Today, we are making history. We are witnessing the creation of important links in the maritime and defence fields between France and South Africa". Mr. Botha had gone on to offer France "free use" of the new sub-marine base, then being built in Simonstown for "the maintenance of her sub-marines in peace and war".[5]**

At the end of 1973, France seemed to have lifted the ban on the re-export of military equipment imposed on most of her customers around the world, to allow South Africa-assemble Panhard armoured cars mounted with DTAT guns to be sold to Ian Smith's Rhodesian forces. An article in the Paris daily, *Le Monde,* revealed that negotiations were under way between Paris and Pretoria for the purchase of new military equipment, including hand grenades.[6] All this indicated that France was willing to supply South Africa with virtually any type or quantity of weapons, without even the usual officially imposed restrictions.

Table 1:

FRENCH MILITARY SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1962—76

DATE	NUMBER	ITEM	COMMENT
1962	30	Sud Alouette 2	
1963	16	Aircraft: Dassault Mirage III—CZ	
1964	3	Dassault: Mirage 3—BZ	
1965—66	50	Sud Alouette 3	
1965—66	16	Dassault Mirage 3—RZ	
1966	4	Dassault Mirage 3—RZ	
1966—67	16	Sud SA — 3210 Super Frelon	
1968	120	Torpedos	FF 33 million
1968	?	Missiles	FF 54 million
1968	3	Dassault Mirage 3—DZ	
1968	20	AML Armoured Vehicles	FF 8 million
1968	5	Sud Alouette 3	
1968	250	4HD Engines	FF 4.2 million
1969	9	Nord Transall C—160	
1969	16	Sud SA- 330 Puma hel	
1969	16	Sud Alouette 3	
1963	48	Nord AS 30	
1963	96	Matra R-530	
1965—66	48	Nord AS—30	
1965—66	96	Matra R—530	
1970	3	Sub-Marine Daphne Class[2]	US$ 37.8 million
1961—70	600	Panhard Model 245	
1975	?	Agosta Class Subs	US$ 4.2 million
1976	2	Freighters, type A.69	
1976	??	Exocet SSM	

SOURCE: The Military Balance Various issues.

Table 2 — Cont.

1967	Helicopter	Alouette 3	50	SNIAS
1967	Hel. engine	Artouste	50 + spares	Turbomeca
1967	Helicopter	Super Frelon	16	SNIAS
1967	Hel. engine	Turmo	16 + spares	Turbomeca
1968	Tank	AMX 30	20	Panhard DTAT Creusot
1968	Radar/Missile	Crotale	3 batteries	& Engines Matra & Thomson
1968	Submarine	Daphne	3	Dubigeon-Normandie
1969	Helicopter	Puma	20	SNIAS & Westland
1970	Transport	Transall	9	SNIAS & W. Germany
1970	Gunboats	Missile-firing	3	de Normandie
1971	Anti Submarine	Atlantic	8	Breguet Aviation
1971	Interceptor	Mirage F1	48	Marcel-Dassault
1971	Jet engine	Atar	48 + spares	SNECMA
1971	Bomber	Mirage Milan	Licences	Marcel-Dassault
1971	Air-Air Missle	Magic	.....	Engines Matra
1973	Antitank Missile	Milan	.....	SNIAS & W. Germany
1973	Sea-Sea Missile	Exocet	.....	SNIAS

SOURCE: The Military Balance and Janes.

Since the firt Panhard vehicles were sold in 1961, total military sales must have reached a figure close to 4,000 million francs. Between 1970 and 1974 alone, the estimation was that France would sell 2,000 million francs worth of arms. South Africa, the United States and Israel, until 1968, vied with each other to be France's best customer for military equipment. After the 1968 embargo against Israel, South Africa became the unchallenged leader on the long list of France's clients.

In its own cooperation with France, South Africa has manufactured Panhard armoured vehicles under licence since 1963 in the factories of Austral Engineering Works of Germiston. Atlas has assembled aircraft in it's Kempton Park with the assistance of Sud-Aviation. The Engines were imported sometimes directly and, on some occasions, via Djibouti. At least, 250 4HD engines were exported to South Africa in 1968. They were valued at 4.2 million francs. And in May, 1968, 20 AML armoured vehicles were again sold to South Africa at a cost of 8 million francs. It is also known that France delivered ammunition which is considered of a higher technical level than those of local manufacture. In August, 1969, gun parts costing 9.8 million francs were sent to South Africa through

some Swiss intermediaries. And in 1968, it was reported that about 120 torpedos costing 33 million francs, were sent to South Africa. Earlier in May, 1968, 54 million francs worth of ground to air missiles systems were also supplied.[8]

The Mpacha Air Base near Katima Malilo in the Nambian Kaprivi Strip, was built by Nord Aviation.

France and South Africa also cooperate in the field of radar cover. It is known that France maintains a satellite tracking station in South Africa. As for the radar, the following figures have been noted:-

a. In 1967, radar equipment worth 5 million francs were supplied.
b In 1969, supplies worth 1.8 million francs were made.
c. In 1968, a guarantee of credit was given to Thompson-Houston-Hotchkiss-Brandt Company for the study, the application and the production of radar missile air defence system for environmental tests and complimentary research and maintenance in South Africa.[9]

A contract for 352.5 million francs, of which 50 million francs had been subscribed by the French Government as a contribution for participation in the research, was signed in June 1968. The research in question concerned the cactus and crotale ground to air missile which were delivered in 1971.

Mr. P.W. Botha, the earst-while South African Minister of Defence, in an address to the French Parliament on 2nd May, 1969, mentioned that the crotale was South Africa's first guided missile and that it was made possible by the help of MATRA and THOMSOM CSE, two South African firms, with financial assistance from the French Government. "A happy example of fruitful cooperation", according to Mr. Botha.

Thompson-CSF built a radar network along the northern borders of South Africa. The Paardefontcine Satellite Tracking Station, built by France's CNES in 1965, was taken over by the South Africa CSIR in 1973.[10] Six 1 500-ton missile frigates with French weapons (Sea-Sea Exocet Missile) were built in Portugal for the South African Navy.

NUCLEAR CO-OPERATION:

It has been alleged that it was at the suggestion of the United States government that the former South African Prime Minister, Mr. Smuts, started a secret investigation into the potentials of South Africa as a producer of uranium.

After a massive discovery of uranium between 1948 and 1949, pilot projects for it's exploitation were set up and constuction work of facilities to treat uranium was started. The South African Atomic Energy Act was brought into force in 1948, and the South African Energy Board held it's first meeting on 15 March, 1959. With the establishment of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 1955, the South Africans began to show interest in nuclear research. The Universities of Witwatersrand and Potchefstroom opened their own nuclear research units which later harmonised their activities into the new National Research Centre at Pelindaba in 1959. At the centre of the research was a 20 MW thermic reactor of the "Oak Ridge" type, named "SAFARI 1," bought from the USA. A year later, in 1960, a second project, called "Pelindaba Zero", was inaugurated. It's purpose was to conduct intensive research on the physical performance of the reactors and also to look into the possibility of setting up a reactor using heavy water.

The first official confirmation of South Africa's contacts with France in the field of nuclear cooperation was in April, 1968 when Dr. A.J.A. Roux, the Chairman of the S.A. Board, enjoyed the cooperation of several countries, including France, in the nuclear field. Again in 1986, Mr. Maurice Belpomme, the Managing Director of the French Sodeteg, a corporation which is known to play a big part in France's production of atomic weapons, paid a visit to South Africa and held discussions with the South African Atomic Energy Board and the Munitions Production Board.[11]

The French came effectively into the South African nuclear scene in 1976, when a consortium of Framatome, Spie-Batignolles and Alsthom signed contracts to build two light water nuclear reactors of 922 MW size at Koerberg, a few kilometres north of Cape Town. The first of these came into

operation in 1983, and the second, in 1984. The projects cost FF 15 Billion.[12]

Enriched uranium has been supplied to the plants by French, Swiss and Belgian firms.[13]

According to a United Nations Report published in 1980, the two reactors in Koerberg, would be able to produce 400 kg of plutonium per year, or one bomb a week, equivalent in size to the one dropped on Nagasaki by the USA in 1945.

Research on enriched uranium started in South Africa in 1961, but publicly acknowledged only in 1970 when John Vorster sough to emphasise that "a new process of enriching uranium has been discovered."[14] The South African research team in this venture was led by Professor Earnest Becker, formerly Head of the Institute of Nuclear Research at Karlsruhe, West Germany. Professor Becker was assisted by some Jewish scientists sponsored by Israel. The Israeli collaboration with South Africa was revealed in the publication, "Two Minutes Over Baghdad", released in London in September, 1982.[15] The authors were Professor Amos Perlmutter of Washington D.C., Professor Mikhael Hendel of the University of Jerusalem and Mr. Yuri Bar Yossef, a retired Air Force Officer. That publication also revealed that South Africa, in collaboration with Israel and Taiwan, had developed a nuclear missile which could hit a target 2,400 km away. The South African Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR) is also known to be collaborating with the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA.

GENERAL TRADE RELATIONS:

Figures relative to trade in official South African and French statistics do not coincide. South Africans considers the country of origin to be that from which the merchandise is shipped (e.g. French merchandise shipped via Antwerp, is listed as Belgian). In addition to military equipment, certain other products are considered 'strategic' by South Africa and are, therefore, not listed (e.g. non-military equipment, aircraft equipment). Uranium, gold and military equipment are not listed by either country. For these reasons, the statistics

published in Table III are incomplete.[16]

From the origin of the Commercial relations between the two countries until the year 1965, South Africa sold more to France than she bought. 1965 marked a turning point, with French exports increasing drastically, almost doubling every four years. South African exports remained more or less stagnant until 1968, when they began to increase. They rose by 45 per cent after 1971, and by 51 per cent, after 1972. Since 1970, the trend is towards a narrowing of the gap, which has been in France's favour since 1965, as South Africa's exports increased more rapidly than France's.

French Motives:

As noted earlier, France increased her co-operation with South Africa from the early sixties as it completed decolonising her former colonies in Africa. It has also been noted that in spite of United Nations resolutions, calling for trade and arms embargo against South Africa, France has maintained it's selfish interest in this country. Many motives, some of them obvious, are ascribed in this defined policy of the French Republic. Some of these motives could be listed as follows:

a. **MILITARY MOTIVES:** Through the sale of armaments and the transfer of high technology, especially in the nuclear field, France has succeeded to make the South African military service partly dependent on her for the supply of spare parts. Statistics from 1960—1980 have confirmed that France was the main supplier of military equipment to South Africa. See Tables.

b. **GOLD MOTIVES:** All arms and many goods supplied to South Africa were sold in exchange for hard foreign currency or against solid gold. The gold received by France between 1958 and 1969, was certainly responsible for the maintenance of it's monetary policy over the same period.

TABLE 3: BALANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA
(Gold and military stores excluded):

IN MILLION FRANCS

YEAR	SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS	FRENCH EXPORTS	BALANCE
1955	181	64	-117
1960	249,8	163,7	-86,0
1961	271,8	144,5	-127,2
1962	322,6	179,3	-143,3
1963	344,8	272,3	-72,5
1964	349,8	326,9	-22,9
1965	331,5	434,4	102,9
1966	376,0	422,5	46,4
1967	342,0	472,0	129,8
1968	331,5	506,2	174,6
1969	446,9	719,8	272,9
1970	416,5	1049,6	633,0
1971	440,0	1002,3	562,3
1972	646	928	282
1973	980	10071,0	91

SOURCE: Direction Generale des Douanes, Paris.

c. **TRADE MOTIVES:** France is South Africa's second biggest customer in the importation of wool. France also sells on her part, machines, electrical equipment, synthetic textiles, optical instruments, beverages, spirits and chemical products.

FRENCH EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA:

By the year 1968, the total of sales, from France to South Africa, had reached 506 million francs. Among the 99 sections of the so-called Brussels nomenclature, France sells goods in the following sections:-

a. Boilers, machines, mechanical engines and aparatus — FF 105.8 million.
b. Automobile tractors, cycles and other land vehicles — FF 84.7 million.
c. Air transport — FF 83 million.

d. Electrical goods and appliances, electronic appliances — FF 41.1 million
e. Total — FF 314.6 million.

These figures represent approximately three-fifth of all exports. And if we add this to the sale of iron ore, cast iron and steel, optical, measuring and medical instruments and appliances, we would have two-thirds of all the sales. The rest of the items are as follows:-

a. **TEXTILES:** The French sell three types of this: continuous (15.3 million), discontinuous (9.8 million), synthetic and artificial textiles and cotton (6.5 million). The French are, however, not strong in other sectors which have been developed by other countries, e.g. hoisiery, carpets, tapestries, velveting, lace, paddings, felts, ropings and clothing accessories.
b. **FOOD:** The sales of food are quite low. These cover beverages and alcoholic liquids (3.4 million); prepared vegetables and fruits (1.3 million); prepared meats and shell fish (0.42 million); fats and animal and vegetable oils (319,090); sugar and sweets (230,000); live animals (1,574,000) francs.
c. **CHEMICALS:** In the field of chemicals again, the sales are low. The main competitors of France are Italy and Switzerland. Items covered include rubber and rubber goods, fertilizers, various produce of chemical industries, organic chemical products, inoraganic chemicals, plastics, raisins and their derivatives, pins, varnishes, inks and tanning products.
d. **MISCELLANEOUS:** It must be noted that the period covered in this report was looking at goods in their first stages of market development. In later years, we saw a systematic development through government encouragement of French market in South Africa. Items that followed later included such things as clocks and watches, fine pearls and precious stones, leath-

ers and hides, paper and cardboard, bookshop, goods and graphic arts, glass and glass objects. France has also sold aluminium to South Africa worth millions of francs.

Despite the rapid increase noted in recent years, South Africa's share in total amount of France's imports and exports remains small if military stores are left out. In 1973, South Africa was France's 24th supplier and her 24th customer.

If military equipment imported by South Africa were listed, it would be shown that France is the second foreign supplier, instead of the sixth as Table V leads one to believe. In spite of this important omission, published figures alone show France to be a strategic supplier of South Africa. 70% of the 1972 French exports were investment goods. This proportion was even larger in previous years.

If South Africa, though a hopeful market and source of raw materials, is not yet a very important partner from the French point of view, France, on the other hand, is one of the six countries which supply South Africa with two-thirds of her non-military requirements and buy from her slightly less than two-thirds of her total exports.

The sale of French equipment goods are linked, to a large extent, to the presence in South Africa of a number of French companies involved in the most important projects. In the Saldanha Bay ISCOR project, SPIE-Batignolles and Desquenne-Giral won important contracts for the construction of the Sishen Salhanha railway and the terminal harbour. The first company had already built the Orange-Fish tunnel with the Societe Francaise d'Enterprises, de Dragages et de Travaux Publics, Compenon-Bernards and Compagnie de Constructions Internationales. P.K. Le Roux and Hendrik Verwoerd dams were built by a consortium comprising Creusot-Loire and Bouchayer-Vialler (which form (BVS) Enterprise de Travaux Publics, Andre Borie S.A., and Dumex S.A. BVS also supplied heavy mechanical material for the Kunene Dam in 1973. Enterprise Jean Lefebvre built the Johannesburg freeway. The two major ESCOM thermic power stations of Kriel and Arnot have been equipped with material supplied by Compagnie Electromecanique.

South African Railways are among France's best foreign customers. Eclairages de Vehicules sur Rail (a CGE subsidiary) manufactures passenger wagons for South Africa. Saxby S.A. (an Otis subsidiary) regularly receives South African orders for handling and signalling equipment. CT-Alcatel and Cables de Lyon, CGE, TESA (Thomson Electronics of South Africa), manufacturers of transmission equipment for the armed forces and for SABC, and was licensed under trademark of Fuchs Electronics Holding (Pty) Limited to manufacture television sets.

The major French automobile firms, Peugeot, Renault, Berliet, Citron and Unic, sell engines and parts to local assembly plants at Rosslyn, Isando, Natalspruit, Alrode and Port Elizabeth. As South African industry moves towards the local production of finished products, increasingly higher proportions of South African imports from France tend to be highly sophisticated machinery. In 1969, a SNECMA (State-owned firm) subsidiary, Berthiez, sold lathe equipped with a COTEC electronic command to the South African Railways workshops at Germinston, and Ateliers GSP Guillemin-Sergot-Pegard sold to Broderic Engineering, a drill equipped with similar electronic apparatus. In recent years, a number of equally sophisticated machine-tools were sold to South Africa by CIT-Alcatel. ISCOR sought a 100 million francs loan from French banks in order to conclude a deal with Creusot-Loire Enterprises and Delattre-Devivier, involving the purchase of a new iron ore enrichment technique. In 1973 and in 1974, Fivescial Babcok sold to South African harbours heavy-duty handling equipment.

Near Johannesburg, France, with another CGE subsidiary (COGELEX), took part in the multinational construction of the world's third most powerful transformer, called Appolo. This six year project began in 1973 and is linked to the import of power from the Cabora Bassa Dam, where French capital, equipment and technicians are heavily involved.

If the bulk of French sales to South Africa is composed of equipment goods for advanced industrial sectors like electronics, electromechanics, aeronautics and engineering, more typical French consumer goods are still in great demand in South Africa. French perfumes, fashion clothing, cognacs,

cheeses, works of art, etc., are sectors in which France hopes to multiply her sales as a larger proportion of South Africans increased their purchasing power. All the reports filled by the numerous French commercial missions returning from visits to South Africa and Rhodesia contain detailed information on how to conquer the new markets opening up in Southern Africa.[17]

Without diminishing the commercial and strategic value of all these dynamic sectors which will undoubtedly play an increasing role in the relations between France and South Africa the most important part of French exports to that country is made up of equipment not listed anywhere. Since the Labour Party imposed an embergo against South Africa in 1964, France became the Republic's foremost supplier of armourments.

SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO FRANCE:

During the Gaullist era, South Africa's export to France saw a gradual increase. But these figures began to fall in 1969. For example, goods exported in 1968 were worth 310 million rands, but this figure came down to 294 million rands by February 1969. Five products make up 8—10 of these i.e. wool, fruit, ore, manganese, asbestos, crome, granite, leather and hides. Other important sections include fish, shell-fish and molases, cereals, oil, mineral fuel, asphalt, felts and furs, fine pearls, precious stones and metals. As earlier noted, the balance of trade in favour of France was constantly growing, and this encouraged France to sign an agreement to facilitate the entry of different South African products into France. An analysis of South Africa's export to France shows a decline in the export of the following products:- dried fruits, citrus fruits, maize, live animals, leathers and hides, wool, cotton and diamonds. Those that are increasing in size are fish, which benefit from a specific quota, and those which are supported by advertising campaigns or happen to be fashionable such as feathers, chewing gum and, lastly, a certain amount of manufactured products which appeared for the first time on the markets, such as radio and drilling equipment.

Given the nature and volume of South African imports from France, vital sectors in South Africa — defence, industry and services — rely heavily on this single source. On the other hand, except for the obvious items of gold and other rare minerals, France could easily replace South African products.

TABLE 4: FRANCE'S MAIN IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

	IN MILLION FRANCS					
	1969	%	1970	%	1971	%
Wool, skins	180,3	40,3	124,3	29,7	101,8	23,1
Fruits	83,6	18,7	53,4	12,8	71,5	16,2
Metal ores	87,6	10,6	60,3	14,4	58,1	13,2
Minerals (sulphur, etc)	38,9	8,7	44,7	10,7	46,6	10,5

SOURCE: Direction des Douanes, Paris.

France is South Africa's sixth customer, but given the deficit in favour of France which exists in the balance of trade between the two countries, officials in the South African Embassy in France feel that South African sales to France are very disappointing. The recent increase noticed in France's imports from South Africa (see Table III) is due mainly to an increase in the import of the same products listed above. Gold and wool alone account for more than 45 per cent of French imports. Imports of cut-flowers, fish, lobster, etc. may improve in the future. But the most important trend is exploring the posibility of manufacturing in South Africa at lesser cost French materials to be reimported afterwards. In 1973, Yunbo, a manufacturer of material handling machines, started to export to France a perfectly original French machine which used to be imported directly from France before Dowson & Dobson bought the licence from International Harvester.[18]

FRENCH INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Recent estimates indicate that 80% of South Africa's industrial production is directly or indirectly controlled by foreign companies. Although the national origin of foreign investments is not disclosed since 1966, it is widely thoght that France owns approximately 6% of the foreign controlled investments, behind Great Britain and the United States, but

heading West Germany, Switzerland and Belgium.

Half of France's investment put at 442 million rand in 1970, was invested in South Africa's gold mines through the companies listed in the Paris Stock Exchange. The other half was shared by various industrial complexes in South Africa.

In the automobile industry, Peugeot controls more than 8% of the South African market through the production of four different plants. Behind Peugeot, which produced more than 14,000 units in 1973, comes Renault, which owns 27% of Rosslyn Motor Assemblers Plant. In related industries, we find: FERODO, which produced clutches, air-filter and brakes, through Automotive Products of Johannesburg, and Paulstra, which produced different metallic parts for cars, railways and aircraft at Rosslyn, the border industry area near Pretoria.

In the electronics industry, the CGE group has made extensive investments in South Africa. So has Nickel Cadmium storage Batteries, Alsthom South Africa and Fuchs Electronics, Merlin Geriu, Telemanique Electrique, Souriau and Compagnie Generale de Radiologie.

Two French oil companies have invested in South Africa and Namibia. Societe Nationale des Petroles d'Aquitaine (now ELF), controlled by the French Government, holds the rights to large offshore concessions, but has not yet discovered oil. Compagnie Francaise de Patroles-Total (state-owned) holds interests in oil exploration, through Total Exploration South Africa, in oil refining through 30% of Natref shares and 19% of SAFOR shares, and in oil distribution. Other exploration rights have been awarded to the Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minieres by SOEKOR for oil Penarroya (Societe De Nickel) prospects for copper in Namibia.

In the chemical industries, L'Air Liquide controls an important subsidiary in South Africa. Union Liquid Air produces industrial gases, Rhone-Poulene owns May and Baker, and Roussel-Uclaf controls Roussel Laboratories. SOFRANIE built a fertiliser plant near Cape Town and Penchiney-Progil, in association with Triomf Feetiliser, manufactures crop spray.

In the civil engineering field, besides the firms already listed, Batignolles Africa, SOCEA-BONNA, Coyne-Billier, Triplejay Equipment, Lambert, S.A., Potain, Culligan and Degre-

needed spare parts, cosmetics, television tubes, etc. These flights, sometimes detoured via Johannesburg and Malawi, before reaching Salisbury. By 1975, the year of the UDI, Affretair had bought it's second DC.8. By so doing, it had also improved it's credentials for recognition by international aviation authorities. In fact, because of Affretair's 'reputation', even Air France utilised it's services when it had extra cargo to be carried. In 1976, for example, Affretair was used to carry cargo to a number of Sahelian countries. Some of these were cargos of food aid and medicines coming from the United Nations and other international donors. On the whole, Affretair did very well as they obtained cargo from different parts of the world, including Israel, and some of these were flown rapidly via Cape Town. On one occasion, 29 tons of cargo meant for Dharan, Saudi Arabia, was taken there by Affretair, via the South African route, after it had dropped 17½ tons of spare parts meant for Rhodesia.

Airline Exposed:

France's collaboration with Rhodesia was brought to light by the weekly Sunday Times of London in 1973 when the paper tried to bring to international attention, the following facts:-[21]

a. Affretair is owned by Rhodesian citizens and was working in the interest of the illegal regime in Rhodesia;
b. The only aircraft owned by the company at the time, a DC.8F, transported beef from Salisbury to Athens;
c. During its flights across Africa, Affretair took other merchandise to Europe, via the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam to Libreville in Gabon, and then to Salisbury. On most occasions, the merchandise was not necessarily destined to Rhodesia, but the benefits in terms of Foreign Exchange went to the Rhodesian regime.

After that article had appeared, many questions were asked. But soon enough, the Sunday Times followed it with yet another article on 2nd September, 1973, giving more information concerning the activities of this airline. The Sanctions

Committee of the United Nations Security Council reacted to the reports by publishing the facts as they knew them. Part of the UN statement is quoted hereunder:-

"A Rhodesian citizen, holder of a British passport, arrived in Amsterdam, aboard a DC.8F cargo plane, with the registration number TR-LOR (which means that it belonged to Affretair). The passenger who decided to report freely on this matter said the DC.8 aircraft left Salisbury for Libreville with a cargo of beef. During a stopover at Libreville, the aircraft refuelled, but nothing was removed or loaded into aircraft. The passenger who remained on board, saw some Gabonese officials board the aircraft and discuss amicably with the crew. After Libreville, the aircrft flew over the air spaces of Cameroun, Chad and Libya. The informant was surprised when he heard that the aircraft was flying over Libya, knowing the attitude of the Libyan Government towards Mr. Ian Smith. But the crew members told him that this did not raise danger. The aircraft finally stopped in Athens and disccharged all the meat. After a stopover af about two hours in Athens, the flight continued to it's destination in Amsterdam. This was a scheduled flight which flew to Amsterdam twice a week, according to the informant. The informant showd to our offcials, a piece of paper in which the names, Claude Milan and Denis Hogben were written. Claude Milan was in Paris while Denis Hogben was a guest at the Hilton Hotel at Schiphol. He was to inform Hogben about the arrival of the next flight to Amsterdam so that he (Hogben) could plan the return flight of the aircraft to Salisbury".[22]

After the publication of this statement by the Sunday Times, one of it's reporters went to Libreville in order to carry out further investigations. But no-one in Gabon would make it easy for him to interview possible collaborators. The British journalist was surprised to dicover that Affretair was legally registered in Gabon and that it's offices were located in a most prestigious area of Libreville. The offices were, however, not much utilised and telephone calls to it were never answered! The Libreville Chamber of Commerce which was approached could not help the British journalist either. So was the American Embassy unable to give much assistance. All they could tell him was about a so-called Import-Export Bank and the financial standing and credit worthiness of Affretair, which then had applied for loans to buy a DC.8 aircraft. The American Embassy could not obtain the required information

and it was learnt later that the sale did not go through. The British journalist then tried to get another lead by contacting a suspected under cover company of SDECE, and that one did the trick. Many Gabonese knew of such secret service outfits — "Le Rseauex Foccart," in Libreville.

The London 'Daily Mirror' also carried out some investigations into a Dutch company, called Zephir which, according to reports, had also transported merchandise to Salisbury. A company with the French initials S.C.A.C. (Societ Commercial d'Affrettment des Combustables) a forwarding and clearing agency had, in the past, handled some cargo for Affretair. After the publication of the Mirror article, a certain Mr. Claude Fouchard of the SCAC was contacted by reporters and his reply was: "We are not subject to the regulation of the UNO or it's committee of sanctions nor are we to be held responsible for freighting merchandise to Rhodesia". It was learnt later, however, that Mr. Fouchard was reprimanded by his superiors for this frankness. On 23rd August, 1973, the Sunday Times interviewed Mr. Fouchard in Paris about his relationship with Affretair. Mr. Fouchard said that his company, S.C.A.C., did not handle any merchandise which was destined to Rhodesia. Unfortunately for Fouchard, however, the British newspaper produced two documents which implicated both S.C.A.C. and Affretair and, of course, with this publication, he had nothing more to say. The British journalist said that S.C.A.C. did not only transport merchandise all over the world, especially in Africa, but in fact, they controlled a number of companies on the continent, particularly in Ivory Coast and Gabon, e.g. SOCAPAO.

The triangle of defiance in the name of the protection of Western interest, was astride Paris, Libreville and Salisbury.

In 1975, at least 7 aircrafts — 2 DC.8s and 5 DC.7s, all of them with TR MARKINGS (TR in aviation language, stands for Gabon) transported cargos to different parts of Africa. Some of the cargo included products of British Leyland, those of Ford of the United States, General Electric, Record Ridgeway Tools and the Dutch company, Philips. All of these companies broke United Nations sanctions and the Governments of countries in which these companies were located had de-

finitely turned a blind eye to their illegal activities in contravention of Resolution 253 of the United Nations.

In May, 1975, another diversionary tactic was adopted through the formation of a company in Brussels, called Cargo Air Transport (CAT). Mr. Claude Milan of Exocet in Paris, was very much involved with the company. The creation of CAT had many objectivesl the first of which was to base another DC.8 in Europe to assist Affretair whose resources were becoming quite inadequate to satisfy the growing requirements of Rhodesia, which was now poised for the inevitable UDI only six months away. The battle lines had already been drawn and CAT was going to be in the fore-front of the economic war. A certain Mr. Bernard Barberon was appointed to take charge of the affairs of this company and to find business for it. Mr. Barberon was said to be very well-known in the air freight industry. Unfortunately for Mr. Barberon, however, Sabena and KLM were not amused about the prospects of having CAT as competitors. They vehemently opposed the formation of CAT and succeeded in the end.

In 1976, the President of Gabon, notified the United Nations that Affretair did not break sanctions and that the company was actually a branch of Air Gabon. He then went ahead and got Affretair integrated formally with Air Gabon. On 5th May 1976, all the employees of that company, Gabonese, Rhodesians and the French, found themselves willy nilly as employees of Air Gabon Cargo (AGC) under the direct control of Mr. Bongo. Mr. Bongo announced that all importations of beef from Rhodesia were to be stopped immediately and that he had started negotiations with Burundi, Botswana, Swaziland and Chad for the supply of 120, 1,000, 60 and 120 tons respectively, of beef per month, from these countries. It is quite clear, of course, that this declaration could not have been true because, these figures were by far, beyond the needs of Gabon which probably consumed not more than 700 tons per month. Nontheless, on 20th January, 1977, the Gabonese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, informed the Secretary General that his Government had succeessfully resoved "the problem of Affretair" and that the company had ceased to exist in Gabon. He claimed that

Gabon now received it's meat supply from the countries listed above.

It is obvious that the President of Gabon and his Ambassador did not tell the whole truth because, it was discovered that the newly integrated Air Gabon Cargo was carrying out the same activities with Rhodesia as Affretair did before it. Air Gabon Cargo was managed by Malloch and Dunlop, with the assistance of Philippe Le Terron. Their letter box in Libreville was not changed and remained, P.O. Box 484. Their Telex Number and Call Sign "AFFAIR", remained the same. And Air Gabon Cargo continued to deliver the meat to Soduco in Gabon whose brand name was known as 'La Parisienne'. Air Gabon Cargo also continued to carry spare parts and other machinery to Rhodesia. In fact, Air Gabon Cargo tried all sorts of gimmicks to cover it's activities, but without success. People cracked jokes about the company and nicknamed it "Air Bidoche" (the Meat Airline).

Here are extracts of two secret agreements published by the United States Government, to show the culpability of the Airline:[3]

> **(a) "It is agreed on one part, Air Gabon Cargo, whose headquarters are found in Libreville, Gabon, in the same locality and installations of those occupied by the former company, Affretair;**
>
> **And, on the other part, the Cargoman Limited of Geneva and Muscat, Cargo Lux of Luxembourg, continued to maintain their cargo operations with aircraft owned by ATA and, therefore, that ATA has concluded an agreement with Trans-Mediterranean Cargo of Beirut for the delevery of spare parts for aeroplanes.**
>
> **The commercial flights put into operation by ATA have got the right to operate in 16 West-European countries the Middle East, Asia and Africa and are permitted to receive payment in foreign exchange *for the Rhodesian Government* (our underlining), which will put this money at the disposal of the same ATA Company for the payment of freight charges, etc".**

That Note also listed the names of all persons employed by ATA/Affretair Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Limited. As a result of this information, the United States Government placed new restrictions on the airline. The US Permanent Representative to the United Nations gave further evidence of

the involvement of these companies and the government of Gabon, acting as a surrogate for France, by circulating the following second text of an agreement signed by them.

> **(b) "Mr. Jack Malloch, quoted in the United States Note of 24th October, 1977, as the director of an air freight firm, which originates from ATA, continues, to carry out bi-weekly flights with a DC.8 aircraft under the name of Air Gabon Cargo.**
>
> **Air Gabon Cargo, which carries three times a week, about 400 tons of meat from Rhodesia to Congo, Gabon and Sao Tome and which receives foreign exchange in French Francs and US Dollars, and vice versa;**
>
> **Air Gabon Cargo which possesses at the moment, three DC.8 aircrafts, envisages to increase their number;**
>
> **Air Gabon Cargo operates in concert with Soduco, a meat processing company registered in Gabon".[24]**

President Bongo turned a blind eye to the activities of this company in obedience to French wishes. These clandestine activities were carried out under the direction of his Special Adviser in the cabinet, Mr. Philippe Le Terron, or the so-called "Technical Assistance Officer" based in Libreville. An investigation carried out by Mr. Pierre Pean, revealed that a senior officer of the French Secret Service was once "seen delivering packets containing diamonds from Ian Smith and his close associates to some big shots in Gabon".[25]

Even after the departure of Ian Smith in 1980, Air Gabon Cargo continued with it's illegal flights throughout the world. It is still alleged that it is involved in the illegal transportation of arms into different African countries. Air Gabon Cargo is also alleged to be involved in the transportation of smuggled cobalt from Zaire to Europe and other parts of the world on behalf of important Zairean personalities.

CONCLUSION

The details of France's collaboration with the racist regimes in Africa, has confirmed at least, one scientific fact that monopoly capitalism knows no frantiers and has no room for the feeble appeals of morality. In spite of many UN resolutions for sanctions against the two pariah states, France continued to trade and to supply highly sophisticated military equipment with which the black majority were oppressed.

Although France was closely associated with black African people in the French community, her leaders continued to ignore the yearnings of black African opinion on sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia.

NOTE:

1. — ANC Essay on South African Links, published in Lusaka, 1974.
2. — Dagbreak of 2 June, 1968.
3. — The Guardian, London, 30/6/71.
4. — Ibid.
5. — J.E. Spence, in the Financial Times of 28th July, 1971.
6. — Le Monde, 18th May, 1974.
7. — All these equipments were backed up with agreements to supply parts. They include airframes, jet engines and appliances.

   Under this agreement, each of the subs was armoured with 12 torpedoes and manned by a French trained crew of 37 men and 6 officers.

SOURCE: AFP Bulletine No. 8837 of 4th May, 1974.

8 — See Table 1.
9 — JANE Survey, 1974.
10. — See Annex for text of agreement.
11. — Liberation newspaper, Paris, 12/11/82
12. — Africa Confidential, London, November, 1982.
13 — Washington Post, 13 April, 1982.
14 — Vorster, J: Address in South African Parliament, 20th July, 1970.
15. — Viaud, Pierre: He quoted this in his book, "L'Afrique et la Guerre Nucleaire", Edigeon, Paris, 1983, p.47.
16. — Fiche Epress No. 21, Paris, July, 1972.

17. — Ibid
18. — Johannesburg Star, 22nd December, 1973.
19. — Le Monde Moderne, No. 2 Paris, 1972.
20. — Pean Op Cit
21. — Article in the London Sunday Times of 26 August, 1973.

    This was, of course, two years before UDI.

22. — UN statement issued in September, 1973.
23. — Documents released by the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, 24 October, 1977.
24. — Ibid.
25. — Pean Op. Cit.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CULTURE AS AN AGENT OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Historical Background:

Culture occupies a very important position in France's international relations and Foreign Policy. Action in this field, can be classified into three major sectors namely: Governmental, Private and Religious. Government action in this field did not start until very much after the Franco-Prussian war. Religious bodies were the first to carry on with the battle of cultural export for a number of centuries before the Government actually came in. However, both the Religious and the Private cultural groups got tremendous encouragement from the government.

During the reign of France's Emperor Louis XIII, going on to the period of Louis XIV, the earliest governmental interest shown in the activities of French Missionaries abroad was, probably, the treaty between France and the Ottomon Empire in 1535 which gave the Government of France the right to protect all christians residing within that Empire. France, under Louis the XIII experienced a lot of expansion abroad, especially in Canada. Four French men were among the people who accompanied Champlain in 1615 when the struggle for the possession of Canada started. Those four French men preceded a lot of other christian missionaries who later went to live in that country. It was also during the time of Louis XIII that the French Academy was established which later set the pace for further developments. During the time of Louis the XIV, the effort to propagate French language and culture was pursued with vigour. The Lazarists, founded in 1625 at the initiative of Vincent-De-Paul who became well-known later in the 19th century, sent missionaries to places as far as Madagascar (1648), Tunisia (1645), and Algeria, (1646). Under Louis the XIV, China allowed Jesuit priests to occupy a place not far from the Imperial Palace. They were allowed to display art and to carry out various

artistic activities, including scientific research in Mathematics and Astronomy. This earlier recognition given to French Missionaries by China led to the Edicts and Treaties of the 19th Century, especially the Treaty of Whampoa in 1814 which, to date, represents a milestone in France's history of International Relations.

The important cultural activities that took place in the 70 years before 1789, the year of the French revolution, can only be considered as an intermediate period between the reign of the great French Emperors and the great period of cultural action which followed from 1789 to 1914. In fact, one can say that 1789 marked the beginning of an epoch of 125 years of cultural action in the world.

"That period has found its unity in the projection of French culture at home and abroad, and also marked the hand over of cultural activities by the churches to the state. It also marked the difference between the Policy of Universalism and that of Nationalism between the French Nation and its European rivals."[1]

With the overthrow of the Imperial system in 1789, France's cultural activities concentrated more on discrediting the previous Governments. With the assumption of power by Napoleon I, there was no doubt about a return to the policy and spirit of assimilation adopted by France in all the areas it occupied. The so-called nationalisation of culture in France, meant the total involvement of all branches of Government and private activities in the development and promotion of the French language and culture among it's citizens. Definite measures were taken against the churches to bring their activities abroad under the control of Government. One of these measures was the order given by the constituent assembly on 13th February, 1790 which made the work of the Missionaries abroad more difficult for the Missionaries to recruit people from France, which is one important part of their activities. The Missionaries thus also lost the rapport that had earlier existed under Louis XIV between it and the Government. In fact, it would appear that the image that France wanted to portray of itself abroad was being contra-

dicted by it's own actions. The decision of Napoleon in 1801 to reconfirm the treaty with the Ottomon Empire concerning the protection of French christians abroad came rather as a surprise, especially with its new policies of isolating the christian churches from the Government. On the other hand, one saw the state pursuing its policy of assimilation on its linguistic policy tied very firmly to the propagation of revolutionary ideas in the whole period between 1789 and 1815. The so-called nationalisation of French cultural and linguistic action during the period of the revolution, and even before, were not only an indication of a quasi-explosive French messianism but also had given some kind of impetus for what followed in the next sixty years, or so, since the coming to power of Napoleon I. At least, that shows the direction France was going in the context of it's policy in Europe and abroad. France did everything possible to propagate it's language and culture wherever it could, and some French Historians still see it as a victory when Lord Palmerston, in writing a diplomatic correspondence for the British crown, put it in French, instead of in English.

Private institutions did manage to figure prominently during the period of the revolution as they did before. Some of the more active were the Protestant groups and the Jews who called for some kind of integration of their activities within the national policy. The Society of Evangelical Missions of Paris, created in 1822, opened a seminary in 1823 and sent it's first Missionaries to Lesotho. The Israeli Universal Alliance came into existence in 1860 and established it's first college in 1865. Soon later, a number of such religious sects intensified their activities, and the Jesuits, the Lazarists, the Dominicans, the Daughters of Charity, the Assumptionists, Members of the Society of Missions Abroad, Brothers of Christian Colleges, Sisters of Saint Joseph De Cluny, of Saint Paul of Charters, Fathers of Saint Esprit, White Brothers, and Missionaries of the Sacred Heart, began to send people all over the world. Anne Marie Javouhey who was the founder of the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny was, perhaps, the most noted among the active private missionaries and volunteers who carried out missionary work abroad. She led a group of missionaries to

Senegal in 1819, and was later invited by the British Government to go and start another missionary activity in Gambia and Sierra Leone in 1822. Her own congregation also sent more missionaries to Africa, notably Madagascar in 1844. There was further expansion in Madagascar before 1870, and also in Seychelles, the English Antiles, Sierra Leone in 1866, and these activities continued up to the first world war in 1914.[2] Also during the period, France had entered into some kind of agreements with the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia for some technical co-operation in military as well as civil fields. In recognition of the activities of these Missionaries and private organisations, the Government of France began to think of ways and means of giving them financial assistance to pursue their activities abroad. For example, on 7th April, 1823, the Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed a budget for the Missionaries.[3] This was eventually accepted and by the end of the second empire, an annual provision of about 300,000 francs was made in this regard. The French Government also took another revolutionary step during the time of Minister Victor Duruy to vote some money to support various establishments abroad, which encouraged the teaching of French language. The best example of such institutions is the Turkish College of Galata Sarai in Turkey which benefitted from a special subvention from the French Government.

French language enjoyed a certain pre-eminence in Europe between 1871 and 1914. But this pre-eminence was soon eroded in the face of France's defeat in it's war with Prussia, and also for the low economic activity and declining military power. The great expansion enjoyed by Britain in the fields of industry and Commerce, as well as in the exploitation of its colonies, and also the growing military power of Germany, dealt a great blow on French development. The rivalry between the great powers of Europe namely, Britain and West Germany, which were later joined by the United States, played a great role in diminishing France's cultural and linguistic expansion. All the same the French satisfied themselves in the feeling that their language remained, for the most part the language of the aristocrats of Europe, including Russia.

In response to these setbacks, private organisations continued to do their best to export French language and culture. For example, in 1883, the Alliance Francaise was founded mainly by people interested in the propagation of French culture abroad. They sought through that organisation, to identify the friends of France in the world, the friends of her language and culture, so that an area of communication would be found and, through that, to bring their efforts together to counter the influence of the spreading German culture at the material time.

The French Government, on its part, continued with its policy of the protection of all christians abroad. In 1902, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it's position clear with regard to the protection of French missionaries abroad and of French institutions especially within the Ottomon Empire. And in 1906, the Government of France, insisted that the Italian Government agree to discuss all matters concerning cultural relations with France and to ratify all outstanding treaties. Also in 1904, the French Government was able to obtain assurances from the Governments of Egypt and Great Britain over the protection of christian workers and their congregation in Egypt. And in Ethiopia, in 1884 and 1885, there was the treaty of friendship signed between France and King John of Abyssinia, and France obtained from Negus some assurances concerning the protection of Catholic Missions in Abyssinia.

The policy of giving subventions to missionary workers and colleges abroad continued unabated. For example, in 1881, FF 791,625 was provided and this figure had risen to over FF 2.3 million by 1912[4] From 1901, the French Government started to send university teachers abroad and also received foreign teachers in exchange. In recognition of these activities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established in 1910, a national universities' office. The first exchanges under this new office took place between French and English and German colleges, which sent teachers to France, and vice versa.

The turn of the century also saw the beginning of debates in the French Parliament between those favouring the policy of association on the one hand, and those pursuing the policy of assimilation, on the other. During the period also, France

achieved one of it's biggest ambitions, that is, the declaration of French language as a diplomatic language. The diversification of cultural activities abroad before 1914 had brought about a new awareness of the importance of this subject and in 1909, a decree for the creation of French language colleges abroad was initiated and confirmed in 1910, thereby, formalizing a certain aspect of French Cultural Policy abroad.

The period of the First World War, effetively from 1914 to 1918, represented a very quiet period as far as French Cultural Propaganda was concerned. The exercise was considered to be too expensive and, probably, an unncessary luxury and was, therefore, virtually abandoned. The new efforts which followed after the war were soon enough stopped by the German military defeat of France in 1940.

The period from 1939 — 1945, represented a wide gap in the development of France's cultural policy. But soon after the war, in 1946, the French Foreign Ministry started off very vigorously by first creating the Directorate General for Cultural Affairs and, to this, were attached the Service for Cultural Exchanges Department in 1946, and the office for liaison with UNESCO in 1947. Then in 1948, an office in charge of General Information and Technical Co-operation was also created. In 1958, the quinquennial plan which was titled, "The Programme of Expansion and Reconversion in Cultural and Technical Activities of France Abroad," was brought into existence. This, therefore, formally brought into being the essential instrument for carrying out cultural policy abroad.

The Myths of French Cultural Policy

As mentioned in our introductory section, the French had once believed that they had a mission in the world to civilize the rest of mankind. The so-called messianism of the French, is supposed to have imbued in them all the characteristics and the intentions as embodied in Christ himself in terms of their own responsibility to the world. It was deemed to be up to the French to establish the kingdom of God here on earth, to establish a society which is humane, just, fraternal and happy. Just as the Jews saw themselves as the chosen people to

welcome the Messiah in their midst, so did the French people think they were the chosen people to civilize the rest of the world. In considering the fundamentals of French "messianism," we should classify this into four major phases. The first phase ends with the termination of the war between France and Prussia, 1870 — 1871. This is what they called the spontaneous messianism, powerful and natural, and a successful universalist mystique. The second phase covers the period 1871 — 1919. This period is again a period of messianic power but more conscientious, more reflective, more open, and above all, susceptible to question and doubt, inquietude, but exacerbated by defeat in war. The third phase covers the period 1919 — 1945. This period, like the others, is perhaps a weaker period of action characterised by profound hesitation and romantic nostalgia of the third phase. The fourth phase from 1945 to date, is a phase of hope, a phase of reflection over the past, mixed with some doubt. But it goes on.

The New Attitude to Culture:

The idea that to be French in the fullest sense of the word involves participating in a national culture, is no longer generally accepted because that has been revealed as an unattainable goal. The report of the State Committee investigating this subject for the 7th Development Plan, 1976, admitted that

"French cultural life has not increased in homogeneity at all: on the contrary, each milieu functions in a close circuit, secreting and consuming its own culture. It is like a series of whirlwinds being created, juxtaposed without communication."[5]

The number of visitors to Museums is rising but neither art nor literature have become central concerns. Only 2½% of household expenditure goes to cultural activitity, whereas 20% is used in other distractions. Traditional culture is still cherished by those who value respectability, but it is condemned by others as being a superficial veneer, "the art of producing formulae and making polite conversation."[6]

In a way that was basically the same as it had been in the 17th century.

Culture, according to other schools, was the art of keeping up with good society; going to the right galleries and concerts from time to time so as to be able to say the right things..

The essence of French people's culture is that they cannot agree what exactly it is!

Those scholars who challenge the old view have tried to give it a new meaning. It used to be a way of escaping barberism, paganism and boorish provincialism. It used to be pre-occupied with books, plays and poetry. But the criteria of good taste are now regarded by some as outdated, and the very notion of a criterion is being jettisoned. Instead, it is proposed that culture should become something quite different:

(a) It's function is to be the difference of the individual and of small groups against the increasing homogenisation of the media against pasivity before the television screen or the football match. It is to be the stimulation of individuality, the expression of the infinitely varied creativity that is potentially lurking in all people. There should no longer be any attempt to shape this creativity into improved moulds. The State has in deed, accepted that it is not functioneries or teachers that are needed but animators. These are a new powerless species who are not the leaders but the servants of the happenings they witness.

(b) Culture is seen as an instrument for creating new forms of sensibility, bringing individuals from different racial groups together in new forms of common enthusiasm, being, in effect, a modern version of the medieval festival and carnival, except that instead of performing traditional rites, the modern festival invites people to invent their entertainment and express their own ideas.

According to Jacques Lange, when he was the oganiser of the festival of Nancy:

"Culture is a battle for the right to live freely. It sought to stress innovation to exalt the creative capacity of all, to be a form of revolution, but to avoid lapsing into mere counter culture in

which sectarian rival chapels close themselves to all but their initiates."[7]

This was a very different approach to that of the Ministry of Culture which once said:

"Culturally, France is a pagan country in need of missionery conversion using the same terminology that christians use about the unbelief that confronts them."[8]

Culture now divides France, instead of uniting it. At least, it was supposed to unite it, because many of its manifestations provoke horror and delight at the same time. That disagreement is itself a source of pleasure to some.

The Journal, "Esprit," expressed this in it's Manifesto of 1977:

"We do not believe in a society without contradictions but in a society of diversity and conflict in which the ability to analyse, to manage and to criticise, which organisers and intellectuals have appropriated, should be restored to people in ordinary life."

The essence is that, instead of having people producing culture for the masses and telling them what to think, "the limits of reason, the importance and value of conflict should be recognised."

The Ministry of Culture was created by General de Gaulle in the hope of reviving France's reputation as "Mother of the Arts," but the grandios ambitions of the novelist, Andre-Malraux, who was put in charge of it, ended in a failure that was symbolic. Malraux maintained that

"art was the new religion of men who have ceased to believe in God. The age of art was about to follow the age of education which had been instituted with compulsory schooling and had now achieved its objectives."[10]

Mr. Malraux wanted to bring culture to the masses as Jules Ferry had brought them education. He imagined himself to be the Apostle of a modern art which could unite the world once people had learned to appreciate the master pieces of all nations. And that would happen because the character of modern art was that it did not tell a story, it was visual. "Our

epoch admires what it does not understand." Art went beyond understanding, and art was what France really stood for. "I am France," he used to say, in the same way Picasso used to proclaim, "I am God."[11]

He implemented an idea of the popular front by establishing cultural centres, *Maisons de la Culture,* in the province which he liked to call "the Cathedrals of the 20th Century" where all sections of the community could meet to discuss and express their creativity and to worship art. The success of these in experimental theatres has, however, only shown up the position between the view of art as tradition and art as innovation, though Malraux called himself a "specialist in rebellion." In fact, he would appear to have a rather conservative attitude towards art. Being obsessed by the idea culture was ultimately a concern for the past.

President Pompidou redecorated the Elysee Palace in modern style, and with contemporary paintings, but Giscard d'Estaing, when he became President, ripped them off and replaced them with French 18th century styles which he considered perfect. Such is the contradiction about culture in France. Pompidou was not frightened of foreigners. He handed over the Opera to a Swiss to manage, the museum of modern Art to a Swede, and the Beaubourg Centre has become so international that it has been accused of being "the instrument of a formidable Franco-American Artistic Lobby."

But successive Ministers of culture have given priority to saving ancient monuments rather than to encouraging new French styles. Ironically, however, in trying to resist "shapeless Americanisation," they restored Versailles largely with grants from an American Philanthropist, organised by the American wife of the Curator of that palace. "It is no longer Versailles," mourns one of those who think the restoration had been overdone. "It is technicolor made in U.S.A."[12]

This is more than the old quarrel of ancients and moderns that goes through all the history of French literature. When Jacques Lange, Mitterand's Socialist Minister of Culture was in opposition, he wrote that "all cultural action must be against power."[13]

The present crisis regarding culture revolves around the difficulty of evolving a new form of pedagogy, for culture is now experience, not instruction. The snag with old culture was that it taught people what was right. The new culture requires each individual to choose for himself what experience he will attempt. Culture can no longer be presented as a single whole which people either accept as a connoisseur or reject as philistines. It is an expansion of horizons just like getting to know another person. No one can predict how two persons will react to each other, nor insist that they should like each other.

Certain Features of French Culture

In examining French cultural impacts abroad, we must not ignore developments of demographic, political, economic spiritual and socio-cultural activities that take place inside France itself, for these form the basis of whatever happens abroad. First, it should be noted that the France of today, has about 4 million foreigners living in it. This represents nearly 7% of the total population. This figure has remained relatively the same since the beginning of the sixties to this date, and most of the immigrants, come from Europe, North Africa, Francophone African States, (North and South of the Sahara), some countries of Indo-China, Asian-Turkey, Pakistan, Latin America, etc. The presence of these foreigners in France has a lot of effect on the culture of the people especially in the urban centres. Similarly, there are about 1.5 million French men living abroad.

The French people are mainly Catholic by religion and all their actions are influenced by the Catholic philosophy and spirituality. As explained earlier, the role played by the church in France is a very important one both at home and abroad. It had been impossible over the years, before and after the revolution, for any Government in France to carry out serious foreign policy initiatives without involving the church.

But then, the French have developed other aspects of their culture in a tremendous way and are world leaders in many of them, for example, music. France is very well-known in this

field and their musical instruments, musical education, the conservatoires and the schools have achieved or accomplished a lot in the field of music and they are world reknowned. If we take ballet for example, France enjoys an honourable place in the world. If we examine French songs, we may find that they may be lagging behind especially when it comes to contemporary songs due to the predominance of anglophone music coming from the United States of America. But all the same, the French are doing very well in this field. In the art of painting, the French are in the first degree, very close to the United States of America, and France has produced many famous painters. The French cinema is quite well developed but, of course, in this age when Hollywood dominates everything, France is not counted among the top. Nevertheless, a lot of progress has been made in this field, especially in the field of animation and television. It is considered, however, that a country of great culture like France should have been able to do more than they have achieved so far in the field of film production. In the field of tapestry, France is again not left behind. In fact, French artists have received the acclaim of people from all over the world for the beauty and quality of French tapestry. In the decorative arts, again we see France occupying an enviable place because of its high quality, elegance an refinement. France remains in the top class when it comes to the consideration of such things as crystals, porcelain and other decorative arts which are very popular in the home. France is also responsible for minting not only its own coins but also those of many client states in the Francophone Zone and other places. French are a world leader when it comes to fashions, (male and female), perfumes, beauty products, jewellery, postage stamps, etc. The French are also famous in mosaics and restoration art. There are other forms of art which many people don't take note of such as the Circus or even, eroticism, pornography, high class prostitution. French food is of very high quality. The French boast of having 365 cheese types, representing one type of cheese a day for one year.

Other forms of socio-cultural arts that France is famous for, are quite many. This land of liberty which welcomes many

political refugees, is famous for its hospitality. Even though the attitude of immigrants and refugees causes some kind of degradation on the security and quality of life in the cities, especially in Paris, France is still doing quite well in this field. France has not been very well rewarded in all respects as is confirmed by the attitude of Ayatollah Komeini who staged his final putsch against the Shah of Iran when he was living in France as a political refugee. The French are very proud of their freedom and this is expressed in the media of communication which is numerous. The French radio and television, the newspapers, the many high quality magazines and periodicals show how strongly the French people feel about their freedom in the various spheres of life. The quality of debate in political discussion, is very high. The practice of politics is highly civilised and very fair.

In the scientific and technological fields, France is also not left behind. France does not now occupy the pre-eminent position in this field as it did in the 19th century, but they have regained a lot of lost ground since 1950. Recent figures show that there are now over 300,000 researchers, engineers and technicians in nearly 75 universities and colleges all over the country. France now accounts for 7 — 9 per cent of all new discoveries and innovations which have been patented around the world.

The Propagation of Language

The French have always considered the spread of their languages as quite inseparable from the spread of their culture because to them, language is culture. The strategy for the propagation of French language throughout the world was defined and codified in 1969 by the High Committee of French language. The salient points of the strategy are as follows:-[14]

(a) **To consolidate French language wherever it is spoken as a mother tongue. For example, in Quebec, in parts of the United States, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Seychelles, New Caledonia, Polinisia and other overseas provinces.**
(b) **The provision of special assistance to countries in Francophone Africa, Madagascar, Comoro, Haiti, Indo-**

China, in the promotion of Primary, Secondary and University education in the French language as well as in the teaching of the language itself.

(c) To maintain the presence of French language in all the five continents of the world through their international institutions, regional groupings etc.

(d) To promote the idea of accepting French language as a major language of communication in financial institutions and also to encourage the teaching of that language in secondary schools and universities all over Europe as a major foreign language.

In all these efforts, the French are particularly conscious of the need to consolidate their language and culture in Africa and they accord it priority in their various considerations. In so doing, a great emphasis is placed in sending teachers and other experts to Francophone African States in an effort to, "transform the Potential Francophones into real Francophones."[15] They send books, Audio-Visual materials and other teaching aids in French language for use in secondary schools and higher institutions of learning, to facilitate the demand for such materials by the largely poor African countries. There is also a deliberate dissemination of newspapers and magazines, many of which are sent free of charge for distribution in Africa. In fact, it has been confirmed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Agency for Co-operation have got a special fund voted for this type of subtle propaganda.

The French have been quite successful in promoting their language in Francophone Africa in so many other ways. For example, conferences have been deliberately organised in Africa where the language used is French. Such conferences have included not only the former French colonies, but also those of Belgium, such as Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. The French community has now been enlarged to include Zaire. In fact, several organisations have been formed since 1964 to serve as vehicles for the promotion of French as their medium of communication. Such organisations include, the Federation of Universal French who organise important biennial French language conferences, and the International Law Institute for French Speaking States both of which were

established in 1964. And in 1966, the High Committee of French Language and the Association of Francophone Solidarity, were formed. In 1967, the Organisation of French Speaking Deputies was established. And in 1969—70, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation was created. All these organisations were tele-guided to co-operate in a number of areas that would benefit the promotion and growth of French language and culture. Some of these areas include:-

(a) Establishing contacts and public relations;
(b) The protection and diffusion of the French language;
(c) The development of economic, educational and cultural co-operation among Francophone states and organisation of cultural dialogues of all forms. At the time of writing, there are about 36½ million Africans who speak and write French as a second language. This contrasts with the figure of 198 million for the entire world.

France's Cultural Activities in Africa 1960 — 1980

France's activities abroad, in the field of culture, can be divided into bilateral and multilateral. In the multilateral field, we consider France's investment in international organisations such as UNESCO and similar other bodies. Bilateral activities refer to France's direct relations with individual African countries. In the 1977 budget of France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, FF441,944,208 was devoted to cultural activities abroad.[16] This is 12.5% of the total budget of the Quais d'Orsy. This amount does not include other expenses by way of direct contributions made to International Organisations by various French Ministries and Government departments. If we consider this, the total contributions related to cultural activities paid to these international bodies amount to FF 1,042,356,326. This amount is equivalent to 23% of the total budget allocation for cultural, scientific and technical research. The chief beneficiaries of these, of course, are African countries both North and South of the Sahara, as well as those in the Indian Ocean. In 1965, it was established that these countries consisted of 88% of the total bilateral

co-operation between France and foreign countries. This figure was 73.9% in 1969. But in 1977, it was down to 70%. In the 1977 budget, amounting to about FF 13.75 billion, about FF 5 billion may be said to consist of expenses exclusively reserved for cultural activities namely:-

(a) Education, training and teaching services, FF 1.42 billion.
(b) Research and scientific co-operation FF 1,44 billion.
(c) Assistance to development and cultural and technical co-operation excluding education and training, FF .1 billion.

It is worthy of note that of the FF 5,000,000,000 stated above, nearly 2.04% consisted mainly of salaries of personnel. Of course, this is one of the fallacies of development aid, be it France, United States, or the Soviet Union.

Types of Co-operation

France's cultural relations with foreign countries are usually based on various agreements. At least 350 treaties, accords, protocols and other forms of agreement had been signed between France and foreign countries by the end of the year 1977. More than half of these, were in Africa.[18] All these agreements, take one form or another and they are varied in content and form. Somehow, in France, cultural agreements are often combined with scientific and technical agreements. A typical cultural agreement with a foreign country, may take the following form:-[19]

(a) The preamble will indicate the willingness of the two parties to enter into cultural relations and their desire to further strengthen any such existing ties.
(b) The treaty may consider the duration of its effectiveness; when it will be renewed; how the accord will be applied; when it will be ratified; composition; meetings and how often they will be held; and other modalities.
(c) It may also talk about how the measures taken will be financed by the two Governments and how experts that may be involved in carrying out the agreement

may be paid.

(d) The document may state conditions for recruitment of experts and their discharge, their payment, whether it will be made in local currency or partly in local currency, partly in foreign currency, etc.

(e) The document may also touch on such matters of administrative nature, customs formalities, other fiscal measures, the movement of persons, their vehicles, their property, the import of materials such as books, film, audio-visual aids, etc.

(f) The fixing of the statutes for establishing French institutions in France or abroad.

(g) It may touch on such things as the modalities for admission of foreign students and trainees, bursaries etc., in France or abroad. Then the treaty may also touch on such things as the equivalence of degrees and diplomas. Another point, is the encouragement of developing direct relations between institutions, public and private, in the two countries in administrative, scientific and cultural fields, youths and sports.

Under various agreements, signed with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Co-operation and Culture, there were estimated to be, on the average, about 130,000 students and trainees enrolled in France each year, thereby, making France probably the second country with the largest number of foreign students after the United States. Apart from these trainees, and students, there are probably 900,000 students, (children of guest workers in France) who have been looked after by the Ministry of Education. The management of aid through education has always presented some problems to the French Government. A number of laws and decrees were passed. For example in 1968, the decree (or the law) of orientation number 68 — 978 of 12th November, 1968, was passed. Then there was decree number 72 — 172 of 20th February, 1972, concerning co-operation between French universities and their counterparts abroad. The 1972 decree, made it possible for French universities to enter into bilateral arrangements with nearly 800 foreign universities many of which were in Africa. The Government established a number

of consultative bodies concerned with education of foreigners in France. One of such bodies is the Conference of Presidents of Universities. There is also the General Assembly of Institutions responsible for the award of engineering diplomas and the so-called delegation responsible for relations with overseas universities which is actually an organ of co-operation created by the Ministry of Higher Education, in 1975. Because of these various arrangements made, the admission of foreign students and trainees into French Universities was formalised. Most of the obstacles brought about by legislation were removed. It was also made possible for foreign lecturers to work on exchange basis in French universities. For example in 1977, nearly 700 foreign educators were working in French universities. Out of these, 380 were from African universities. It has been established, that there were 130,000 foreign students in France in the year 1978 — 1979. Out of this figure, over 108,000 were full-time students in universities and colleges, as against, 25,000 in 1963 — 1964 and 52,386 in 1972 — 73. Out of the figure of 108,471 foreign students, 51.5% came from Africa (32,112 from Maghreb and 21,363 from Africa South of the Sahara and the Indian Ocean countries).[19]

Agents of Culture Abroad

People of different backgrounds serve France abroad in the cultural field, and they come from different Ministries including those of external affairs, education, finance, and trade unions. The following figures have been given of cultural agents as of 1st January, 1976.[20]

(a) *Religious agents:* about 14,000 out of a total of 16,500 religious expatriates, namely Missioneries abroad.
(b) Out of 17,500 Military Personnel Working outside France in that year, about 1,350 were cultural agents.
(c) There were 7,300 national voluntary service members. Then there were the so-called civilians or agents of the state or other agents. All these, put together numbered 18,910, Nine thousand of whom were without any specific vocation but 1,100 of these persons can trace

their roots to the Ministries that sent them from Paris. And 7,810 may be connected one way or the other to the Ministry of Foreign Relations; and for the remaining ones, these can be traced to other international cultural organisations. The Ministry of Education and the Universities, have about 16,500 agents abroad, from among them, 5,600 institutions; 2,500 college teachers and 7,800 certificated teachers for secondary and technical levels and 700 university teachers.

It should be noted that there are probably 9,000 state agents, including non-graduate agents, and 400 voluntary workers most of them in Francophone African States. There are also about 3,400 assistants who are generally posted abroad for one year to assist Foreign students in the teaching of French language. The estimate as of 1st January, 1976 of the total categories of cultural agents is 104,000. Going by the same rule, it is estimated that as of 1st January, 1980, the figure should be approximately 85,000. The percentage of these cultural agents for the Maghreb and the Middle East on the one hand, and in the rest of Africa and Madagascar on the other, the following figures would apply: 40,000 educators and experts, making up 60% and 25% to 28%, and 30% if the whole figure is taken with effect from 1st January, 1980. And it should be mentioned that all these cultural agents are selected through a rigorous procedure and trained before they are posted abroad. It is estimated that of the 100,000 odd cultural agents abroad, 40,000 may have come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Co-operation. At 1977 figures, about FF 120,000 is spent on each agent per annum. If this is calculated or multiplied by 40,000 we should arrive at a figure of FF 4,000,000,000 per annum to maintain these agents. It is alleged that the auditors have recommended to Quais d'Orsy to close down some of the institutions and "to sell whatever is sellable," in order to make savings on the whole campaign on which France spends billions and billions of francs every year for services the result of which are never seen in practice.

Radio France International which broadcasts in major African languages namely; Hausa, Swahili, Arabic, Amharic, Lingala and European languages including English (and French itself), is one of the biggest instruments of cultural propaganda in the possession of French authorities. Supported by A.F.P. and other news gathering organisations, and a network of correspondents all over Africa, Radio-France broadcasts to the continent 24 hours a day.

Newspapers based in Paris are distributed in Francophone Africa the same day that they are published, and magazines such as Jean-Afrique are being used as "wind mills" to control and guide public opinion in Francophone Africa. Other magazines such as Africa-Asie, have become increasingly popular and are widely distributed. The cinema is increasingly becoming an effective medium of cultural propaganda. Films made in Paris are screened in Africa the same day that they are premiered in the French capital. Television programmes are distributed to African television stations free of charge by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation. News programmes of Francophone African television stations depend for their news film supplies on the three French television channels.

Table 1: TOTAL OF SPEAKERS IN THE WORLD AS AT 1979

REGIONS OF THE WORLD	NO. OF COUNTRIES IN THE REGION	POPULATION	TOTAL FRANCOPHONES		TOTAL OF LINGUISTS	TOTAL OF SPEAKERS AND LINGUISTS
			BY BIRTH	BY EDUCATION		
EUROPE (INC. USSR)	32	735	53,000,000	7,650,000	41,415,000	102,065,000
NORTH AMERICA EXCEPT MEXICO	2	248	7,400,000	720,000	9,000,000	17,120,000
AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN	25	375	6,850,000	1,050,000	14,500,000	22,400,000
FRENCH AFRICA	21	140		4,400,000	32,070,000	36,470,000

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST	14	110		800,000	3,250,000	4,050,000
INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS	4	11.2	900,000	200,000	2,080,000	3,180,000
TOTALS	98	1,618	68,150,000	14,820,000	102,315,000	185,285,000
ENTIRE WORLD TOTALS			69,520,000	15,920,000	112,475,000	197,915,000

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture, Paris.

Notes:

1. Barres, M — "Faut-il autoriser les congregations?," Paris, (Plon), 1924, p.292.
2. Salon, Albert — "L'action Culturelle de la France dans la Mond," Paris (F. Nathan), 1983, p.16.
3. Ibid, p.17.
4. Ibid, p.24.
5. Balons, S — Op. cit.
6. Zeldin, Theodore: "The French," Fontana, London, 1983, p.362.
7. Ibid, p.363.
8. Ibid.
9. "Esprit," Paris, 1977.
10. Quoted in Esprit — Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Zeldin, Op. cit.
13. Ibid.
14. Report by the High Committee of French Language, Paris, 1969.
15. Simon, Pierre-Henri — 'Une language est un destin," published in "Esprit" of November, 1962.

Notes:

16. Annual Budget of the French government, 1977.
17. Ibid.

18. Journal Official, 1978.
19. See Index.

19. Statistics published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Paris, 1982.
20. S. Balons — Op. cit.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECISM AS A BY-PRODUCT OF NEO-COLONIALISM

Charles Reynolds[1] dwelt in detail on the theory of racial supremacy as an adjunct of imperialism. It is part of what came to be known as biological imperialism which was practiced in Hitler's Germany as part of the Nazi doctrine. The three main strands of this doctrine are blood (biological), the nation and space. Through this policy, the Nazis sought to eliminate the "inimical and alien" elements from the German race, create autarky and acquire larger living space — the European Empire of Germany.[2]

The French, on the other hand, have sought to eliminate the alien elements in their own society by a positivist approach via the policy of assimilation. Assimilation, in this sense, goes beyond the general meaning of the word, as it relates to citizens of former colonies. It actually stands for the total education of the French person about the ideals and virtues of being French, and the greatness of his country. In other words, assimilation is a new kind of nationalism which is anchored to symbols and certain basic truths which must be communicated as a means of evoking love and patriotism. Some of these symbols have been articulated under the principles of "prowess," "demandeur," "civism," "mesure," "grandeur" and "Gaullism." In recent times, this type of nationalism has been characterised as *Gaullism,* "the modern form of patriotism and democracy, the affirmation that a certain idea of France has always shaped our destiny."[3]

Thus, the French consciously taught Children at home and the colonies how to understand the basic truths by merging presuppositions which are essentially aesthetic with a process of thought which is essentially rational:

> **"French children are taught that France is a geometrical form. Although they know that it is not a hexagon, they learn to think of their country in this way. They are told that history is the rational unfolding of the personality of France as a nation. It is expected that the child will grow in this rational manner step by step, developing a distinct personality, but at the same time fitting**

neatly into the rational scheme of society."[4]

Such is the basis of the ideological tradition of France, with its dialectic of revolution and reaction. National symbols as they relate to national membership and identity may potentially act as levers for social change by strengthening bonds of national sentiment and loyalty to the political association itself and giving legitimacy to a new authority structure.[5]

This line of thinking is a major source of personal motivation for the French man which Jesse Pitts describes as the search for "prowess," the discovery of the pre-determined harmony rather than the imposition of personal will.[6] In this context, the word is not the same as its cruder synonym, *machismo.* Prowess is not the tormented surmounting of oneself, but rather the discovery of the harmony of the individual with the environment. It is within the cultural context of prowess that De Gaulle's pursuit of greatness of France — the psychological externalisation of the values internalised through his family — takes on political form and social meaning.[7]

The principle of prowess in the context of French nationalism is often used side by side with *mesure,* a French classical thought "derived from the Greek idea that the unforgivable sin was defying the natural order according to which each man must keep to his proper place and function in society."[8]

Curtius is of the view that France's attempts at portraying itself as a superior culture is actually borne out of her fear of being written off as an inferior nation.[9] Kulski concurs by citing the example of France's socio-cultural insecurity in the aversion to the role of the *demandeur.*[10] Under this principle, French diplomatic traditions have often emphasised the need for correctness and the refusal to accept a subordinate role. This very inferiority complex is what led Kulski to observe the so-called "cultural superiority complex" of the French. Alfred Grosser referred to "Francocentrism," "cultural nationalism" and "cultural imperialism."[11]

Another ingredient in the teaching of French nationalism at home and in the former colonies is the notion of *civisme* due

to their fear of its ever-present enemy, *anti-civisme*. Although the idea is to promote a collective personality in the Rouseauean sense, based on general will and involving public education, brotherhood and equality, the result was the contrary when examined in the context of racial harmony in France in the 1960s, '70s and 80s.

True, French nationalism has never been allowed to go haywire such as the German (Nazi) nationalism. But through the policy of assimilation, it succeeded a great deal in alienating native African culture by imposing French traditions on the former colonies.[12] French colonial officers in Africa did not practice the GRA segregationist system of the British in their residential policies. But that did not mean that the French people loved the Africans more. They mingled and lived side by side with the Africans in the major cities, but principally as a form of security precaution. In other words, their proximity made it difficult for any subterranean plot for an uprising to escape their immediate detection. Again, unlike the British, the French really regarded their colonies as an extension of "French territory," with no intention of granting them independence. The French settlers in Algeria fought a bitter war against the nationalists who wanted independence. And when De Gaulle later gave independence to Algeria, the settlers organised a series of assassination plots against him.[13] The idea is that if native Africans would fight for independence from France, it meant that they have failed to grasp the essential elements of *assimilation* and *prowess*.

The resentment against Africans borne out of "disappointment" was shared by many French people at home, some of whom formed political associations to propagate the retaliatory expulsion of all Africans normally resident in France, and others who lived there temporarily as students or casual workers. The most vociferous of these associations is the National Front, headed by an acknowledged pro-Nazi, Mr. Jean Marie Le Pean.

The other main political parties in France have avoided the open advocacy of hostilities against African immigrants, but the administration of their policies has on different occasions given the impression that the Africans were not really wanted

in France. For example, the Gaullist President, Giscard d'Estaing, took a decision in 1974 to close all borders to new immigrants, and offered monetary incentives to those already settled to leave the country.[14]

This kind of racial bigotry is another manifestation of neo-colonialism of the worst kind. The hypocrisy of it is that as they pursued these racialist policies, French leaders have retained their exploitative interests in the French Community and attended its meetings at Head of State level, every year. France's nationalist ideology in the strict interpretation of *prowess* and *mesure*, has sought to instal a refined form of apartheid through job distribution and the consequent social stratification, as well as constant disincentives through harrassment and police brutality. The African, on whom the policy of assimilation was imposed, was seen as a good guy for as long as he tolerated his own subjugation and accepted French superiority. But the moment he realised this unequal relationship and demanded respect and dignity through independence, he became an enemy. Inspite of the fact that the Community had been created purposely to allow for the continued exploitation of the former colonies, the citizens of those colonies did not enjoy peace inside France itself. By prefering independence to total assimilation, the Africans had unconsciously chosen slavery for themselves. The immigrants were now to be treated with harshness and to be humiliated through general deprivation and the harangues of a racialistic press. The most influential conservative daily newspaper, "Le Monde," was quoted as saying: "Our thesis is that the immigrant workers are a new sort of slaves."

How true?

The newspaper made this comment against the background of the fact that Africans did most of the dirty and worst paid jobs in France. Their children born in France did not have good education and had no chance of better employment. So they formed a kind of hereditary under-privileged caste. The colonial metaphor in all this is more real as the Africans lived in ghettoes which accentuates their isolation and poverty. One may call this the backlash of colonialism, which in other words, means neo-colonialism.

In the light of the foregoing, none of the numerous incidents and attitudes to be enumerated in this chapter should be taken as a surprise.

The French, unlike other Europeans, are generally slow in granting citizenship status to African immigrants even after many years of a peaceful and productive sojourn. In Sweden, for example, foreigners are allowed to vote in elections after only three years of living there. West Germany and the Benelux countries have instituted elected councils for the immigrants with consultative status. But in France, there is no such national policy. There were a few cases where some towns with large immigrant populations, have invited foreign communities to send delegates to present their case to the Municipal Authorities.[15] Laval has an ombudsman for foreigners, and in 1977, Mons-En-Baroeul, invited foreigners to participate in a referendum on its local budget. Tourcoing has held an official public debate about immigrants, but four million residents in France have no real political rights and French public opinion is hostile to giving them any rights. A poll in 1973 showed 55% against them being allowed to vote in local elections with 34% in favour. Things may change, because 52% of people under 25 believe that immigrants should have this right. But as many as 72% of French people are against giving immigrants *full* political rights,s including the right to vote on the presidency of the republic. Just 54% are in favour of establishing consultative councils.[16]

Such attitudes are difficult to maintain given that there are towns which are wholly dominated by foreigners, like Belleville and the Goutte d'Or in Paris, the Grandé Cote in Lyon, the Tres Cloitres in Grenoble and the Porte d'Aix in Marseilles. The Paris suburb of Gennevilliers is s28% foreign and the situation is necessarily more explosive than in Britain which has only one in twenty of residents who are immigrants. That is half the French proportion, and most of those have full political rights as British citizens.

The 1.5 million Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians, though superficially distinguished by their Islamic religion, have different attitudes. Two-thirds of the Tunisians are in France without their wives. They and the Moroccans are considered

fairly docile employees, but the Algerians have created a separate world for themselves. One half of them is in the building trade or public works. Black Africans are relatively few: 20,000 Senegalese; 20,000 Malians, 10,000 from the Ivory Coast. By contrast, there are 1,133,000 French citizens in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Reunion who do not count as foreigners and who are not included in calculations on immigration, but they have an official minimum wage of 20% lower than on mainland France.[17]

This is because their industrial productivity is about one third of that on the mainland, and they have an unemployment rate four times as high. They have many grievances about the way they are treated both in the colonies and when they try to get a job on returning to France.

The anger of African immigrants arises first of all from the appalling housing into which they have been squeezed. In the 1960's, the cities of France spawned suburbs known as Bidonvilles, tinned hovels without indoor sanitation or running water, and vastly over crowded. The destruction of the Bidonvilles was often carried out with little consideration, with bulldozers tearing them apart, and inhabitants forced out. Transit camps were built with cheap materials, but these too quickly degenerated into slums. Gutenberg, one of the camps outside Paris, went up in flames three times before it was admitted that it had been built of inflammable materials and that there was no fire hose and no usable telephone. Hostels provided by the State were often as disgusting and over crowded as those of the sleep merchants who packed ten men in the small rooms in tawdry hotels. Repeatedly, the immigrant tenants have gone on strike. From time to time, police invaded and brutally expelled residents.

The under paid immigrants resent their low wages. Occasionally, the public is made aware of the extent to which the dirty jobs are done by the immigrants when the street cleaners of Paris, most of whom are black, go on strike.

The Africans have to accept whatever work they can get because they are so insecure in their right to work. There is always a threat of a cancellation of their work permit. Employers know how to take advantage of the fact that even

greater poverty faces them in their home country impoverised by colonialism and it's *poste facto*. Immigrants seldom succeed in getting better qualifications and cannot even console themselves with the hope that their own children might do so. The children have a lot of difficulty in French schools and are generally one year behind their French Coevals. One third of them leave school virtually illiterate. Only one fifth complete their education and no more than 3,000 get into Universities. In 1980, there were about 1,200,000 foreigners under 19 in France.[18]

Most African women in France end up being servants. There were about a million domestic servants in France, half of whom are foreigners in 1980. It is in contact with these women in their own homes where there are no witnesses that the rich and educated French men who alone can afford servants, reveal the nature of their attachment to "liberty, equality and fraternity." The only escape for a servant is marriage, but in most cases she will mary a poor worker, or clerk, and will go on working to make ends meet. The anger of the immigrants is ultimately the anger of loneliness.

Mr. Tahar bin Jelloun, a Moroccan poet and a novelist living in France wrote a doctoral thesis in social psychiatry to try to understand what his fellow North Africans felt.[19] His clinic's case books revealed the anguish of those who are overwhelmed by their sense of failure; by their inability to master an alien way of life; the sexual frustrations of men who have left their wives at home, often turn their professional disappointments into disasters. Virility to some of them is the essence of man- when they cannot express it, their self respect goes. The prostitute is no consolation. They go to her from a superstitious belief that unless they emptied their testicles once a week, they would become ill. In the worst cases, they loose their sense of identity. They consider themselves like orphans. They turn their aggressive insticts against themselves, and they despise themselves.[20]

IMMIGRITUDE — THE NEW WORD FOR ASSIMILATION

The policy of assimilation which successive French Governments pursued over the years in respect of their relations with

people in their former colonies is now taking a new meaning. The presence of Africans and other foreign immigrants in France in large numbers is causing great anxiety in the country, and the attitude of the average French man has now changed considerably in relation to the Francophonies and other non-French speaking immigrants who now sojourn in France. We must, however, distinguish between the various types of immigrants that the French authorities have to deal with at the moment:-

(a) There are those immigrants who came to France from existing and former colonies and who feel quite at home being in the "mother country,"
(b) There are immigrants who came from other European countries,
(c) There are political refugees who came in from different parts of the world.

Our main concern here, of course, is the attitude of France towards Africans classied in the "A" category. For these people, there is no reason why the French should feel so unaccommodating because they, (the French) brought this upon themselves in the first place. Had they not colonised, there would have been no relationship whatsoever between these immigrants and metropolitan France.

A close examination of the figures both from the Ministry of the Interior and the police, would show that the majority of the immigrants from Africa were from the Francophone world. Although these people were once the "blue-eyed" foreigners during the hay days of "Assimilation," they are now victims of "Immigritude," or anti black hysteria. It should be noted that those from the non-Francophone areas of Africa number less than 1% of the total.[21] Among the African immigrants in France, the most numerous are the North Africans from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. In 1970, the Algerians were found to be the most numerous among the foreign communities living in France, and they, in fact, constituted 32% of the total. The Algerian Government itself was concerned about the large concentration of its citizens in France, and in 1973, a decision was taken by the Algerian government to suspend the issue of exit visas to Algerians

going to France except in very special cicumstances.[22] This brought the figure down to about 19%.[23]

The decision taken in July, 1974, by President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing to close the borders of France to all new immigrants did a lot in discouraging the growth of foreign immigrant population in France.[24] Between 1974 and 1981, the population of foreign immigrants appeared to have stabilised at approximately 4 million. Illegal immigration, however, continued in one way or the other, and it may continue for a long time. France, which is surrounded by many countries, is actually vulnerable to immigration, legal or illegal, from all corners, especially from the EC countries which take advantage of the community's Pass regulations to enter France and work. The problems that Europeans and other immigrants in categories "B" and "C" cause in France, tend to besmear the image of immigrants from Africa, especially those amongst them (the Europeans) who get involved in terrorist activities. The fact is that most of the immigrants who cause problems happen to be dark skinned.[25] There is hardly any pigmentational difference between the North Africans and their neighbours around the Mediterranean such as, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Israel or Greece where most of the European immigrants come from. So also is there no difference between the outlook of North Africans and Middle Eastern Arabs who are involved in various terrorist activities either against Israel or between themselves, as for example, between Iran and Iraq.

French official statistics give the impression that the influx of foreigners into France is, perhaps, more pronounced than in any other European country. For example, it is stated that in 1982, about 300 million persons passed through the 71 seaports, 110 airports and 970 other points of entry into France, either on visit or in transit. In the process of such visits, of course, many of the immigrants try to find one way or the other to regularise their stay in the country.[26]

On one occasion, the Jewish millionaire, Mr. Marcel Dassault, had suggested that to discourage the "invasion" of France by foreign immigrant workers, a policy should be adopted whereby industries should be constructed in their

own home countries so that they would not have to travel to France to look for work.[27]

In the effort to find a solution to the problem of immigrants in France, a suggestion was made in 1977 during the tenure of President Giscard d'Estaing that any immigrant who wished to return to his country voluntarily would be given 10,000 francs to help him install himself back in his own country. About 100,000 persons withdrew their residence permits under these conditions and returned home. [28] It is noteworthy that of all the Algerians in France, only 3% agreed to do so. Those who refused to return might have realised, nevertheless, that their dignity definitely rested in their going back to their own country in the long run.[29]

RACIALISTIC OUTBURSTS

The controversial status of the immigrants has given the excuse to racist and pro-fascist elements in France to vent their feelings against them. One of the most out-spoken anti-black French leaders as noted above is Mr. Jean-Marie Le Pean. In fact, his party, which contested the 1983 Municipal elections, ended up with an unprecedentedly large majority in many constituencies and, on the whole, scored about 12% of the votes cast in the December, 1983 elections. It was common in Paris to see grafitti on fly-overs and public buildings denouncing the presence of black people in France. Black, of course, does not mean black Africans alone. It includes all the non-white races such as North Africans, Middle Eastern and Asian communities. Typical grafitti slogans: "stop the influx of immigrants," or "expel all immigrants," or "purge the country of all coloured people," and "France for the French alone."

While the rightist elements were very vocal in their condemnation of black immigrantion, the leftist and moderate parties hardly said anything strong enough to counter what the racists said. Even French trade unionists are not quite on record as having attacked the rightists openly.

In the elections of 4th September, 1983, the National Front won 17% of the votes on it's platform of non-rejection of racist

xenophobia. In the second round of the same vote, on the 11th September, 1983, other pro-right elements in the other political parties apparently joined hands with Mr. Le Pean's party which assured the election of ten of it's members into the Local Councils. And in the third round in the Municipal elections of Aulnay-sous-Bois, the National Front again obtained about 10% of the total sufferage.[30]

The amount of hostility that Africans faced in France has intrigued many observers. It would appear that quite a number of people in parties like the R.P.R., and even in the Gaullist party, are quite sympathetic with Mr. Le Pean's National Front policies. For example, one Mr. Yvan Blot, member of the R.P.R. and a senior advisor in the party, and also the president of the Club de l'Horloge once declared:

"the opposition does not admit that a fraction of the voters are going to put their finger to vote a particular party because they fear to be judged fascists; there are no pages in history in which it is stated that a party of the right has turned fascist without the voters themselves having decided it to be so."[31]

Jean Marie Le Pean was himself quoted on another occasion as follows: "We are faced with an immigration menace similar to the one that faced Germany in 1939."[32]

It was at the end of the 19th century that racism was raised to the level of a scientific theory in the condemnation of zionism in Europe, particularly in France and Germany. Racism, as a political factor, belongs to the right. In the Dreyfus affair, racism as a political conception, had its common denominators in the mass movement against liberal democracy and the bourgois society.[33]

The Jews in France were nicknamed the "Meteque" by Mr. Charles Mourras in 1884 when he described them as "the absolute enemies of France and the basest of the French race which needed to be preserved as a Nation."[34] The term "Meteque" was used in ancient Greece to describe immigrants who were thought to be not quite loyal to the country and may return to their home at any time.

In reaction against positivism, an intellectual current was developed supposedly drawing it's inspiration from the

Bergsonian and Darwinian theories. This theory exalted differences between people, created the Aryan myth in the name of inequality of men and the classification of human beings, and denounced the democratic system.[35] This theory formulated particular thoughts and themes to which the right attached its own political thinking. It was during that period that France had it's first experience of anti-racism and anti-immigration.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, a large per centage of foreigners was already living in France. They were Italians and Belgians, many of whom came to assist in the agricultural and industrial development of that country. In 1886, the population of immigrants in France was said to be between 7 and 8% of the total population. And this average was maintained up to the early part of this century. It is possibly the economic recession which hit Europe between 1882 and 1886 that provoked the movement of people from all parts of the continent to richer areas, particularly Germany and France. This situation continued until 1914, when the First World War began. The suffering during the war and its aftermath, and the depression of the 30's did not help things either. And by 1939, when the Second World War began, the situation had still not improved. The period between the two wars, in fact, made the position of immigrants, especially Jews, who were considered by many as permanent immigrants, even more difficult.

In the France of today, so many ideas have been advanced towards the solution of the problem of racism as a bi-product of neo-colonialism. The publisher of one of the most widely read journals, "Le Figaro" Magazine, with a readership of more than 300,000, Mr. Louis Pauwels, in an article in 1980, proposed a separation of races in France. He did not call it "apartheid," and he did not give it any particular name. But he was of the opinion that what was happening in France regarding the mixture of races had been unprecedented in French history since the conquest of France by the Franques many centuries ago. Mr. Pauwels declared:

"The paradoxes, the affabulation and the menace of fantasmatism, all (of which) need to warn the French to be thoroughly on guard against the pernicious dangers of the mixing of races."[36]

The Magazine, "Nouvelle Droite," expressed the same opinion in a signed article written by Robert D. Herte.[37]

The editorial writer of the review known as "Elements," published an article in March, 1983, in which he declared:

"The root of the problem is the idea that we are to forge one nation and one people; if to say there was no problem of delinquence committed by immigrants, and no unemployment in the country, the question will still be asked, and immigration will be condemned, because it taints the identity and cultural personality of the people of France. The battle cry is not *"against immigrants,"* but *"with the immigrants"* — against the ideological forces which are bound to destroy their own personality and ours at the same time."[38]

We have more examples of bigotry such as Alain de Benoist who declared:

"our Western world is short of men of action, the veritable chiefs. They have forgotten such strong Celts and the Germanic people who were the real people."[37]

He called on the so-called "chiefs" to "denounce the external perversion in order to exalt the Germans who fought for the purity of races and acts which people referred to as Nazism,"

On the other hand, we have other people like Alice Saunier-Seite, a former Minister under President d'Estaing; Alain Madelin; Hubert Bassot and Gerard Loguet, a deputy of the UDF, and others who did not make a secret of their relationship with the Club de L'Horloge, which consists of senior government functionaries and who furnish various ideas to oppose sensible ideas during discussions. It is in consideration of the views of such people that Jacques Medecine, the Mayor of Nice, decided to house immigrants in groups according to their nationalities and languages — a kind of ghetto set-up in that city. It was not surprising that this idea was praised by the rightist politician, Monsieur Jacques Chirac, a former Prime Minister and Mayor of Paris.[38]

It is people like these who welcome the racialist system of "apartheid," in South Africa. Somehow, they themselves do not see it as racism, but rather as "the maintenance of the

purity of the respective races." To them, the xenophobia is necessary. Their attitude is that the immigrants are different genetically, only that they are very important and indispensable in the carrying out of certain functions to keep the system going, such as the collection of garbage and other menial jobs which should be left to them alone. As far as living is concerned, they should be isolated, and something akin to the American Indian reserves should be created for these immigrants."[39]

Towards the end of Pompidou's term of office, the Immigration Department introduced the Work Permit and Residence Visa system. In July, 1974, immigration, in theory, was actually stopped under the leadership of Paul Dijoud who succeeded Andre Postl-Vinay in the function of the Secretary for Labour and Immigration. Mr. Dijoud was replaced by Lionel Stoleru in 1977, and that marked the brutal turning point in the position of immigrants in France. He introduced very repressive measures which, in some cases, had to be annulled by the Council of State. Somehow, neither the expulsions, nor the monetary compensations given to workers who voluntarily chose to return home stopped immigrants from coming to France between 1977 and 1981.

But then in April, 1981, the Presidential candidate, Mr. Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, in front of cameras, wrote on a blackboard two figures which represent the position of people on the extreme right: "1.8 million employable immigrants as against 1.8 million unemployed Frenchmen." As far as Mr. Giscard d'Estaing was concerned, since 1.8 million Frenchmen were employed and there were 1.8 million active immigrants in the country, the unemployment was, *ipso facto,* caused by the immigrants. He, therefore, saw the immediate solution of unemployment through the expulsion of these immigrants.

But again, even the leftist parties were not left out, because in August, 1981, Mr. Claude Cheysson, who was known to be a very staunch anti-apartheid Minister under President Mitterrand made what appeared to be a slip of the tongue when he declared that "the French Government should not accept any more workers from Algeria and other North African

countries."[40] But then he advanced an additional argument in favour of immigrants who had stayed long enough in the country by suggesting that they should be given the right to vote. This declaration was welcomed with screaming headlines in the rightwing newspapers.[41] The RPR party, in particular, regarded the statement as a scandal. They thought it was something that was aimed at compromising the sovereignty of the French nation. In some cases, they described it as a manouvre which was to be used in future elections. Mr. Chirac, who made a promise before African leaders in 1979, about the future of immigrants in France, was one of the first people to cry out.

It is necessary to repeat here that immigrants who have acquired permanent residence status in Germany, in the Netherlands and also in Britain, are entitled to vote at elections. France has still not accepted this fact of life, even though nearly 2 million of these immigrants are taking part in active development of the country.

Even though the socialist part of Mr. Mitterrand had promised during the electioneering campaigns of 1981, that it would abolish the decree of 1939 which withdrew voting rights from immigrants, it has actually failed to do anything about it. In the early months of Mitterand's coming to power in 1981, he tried by all means through parliament to justify his electoral promises, but he did not go further.[42]

Unemployment Problems:

One of the major problems facing the immigrant Africans in France is increased unemployment in the country which was brought about by what is called, "Robotisation" or computerisation of industries. Big companies such as Renault, Peugeot and Talbot, have computerised to an extent that many of their manual employees consisting of immigrants have had to be phased out.

This situation of unemployment has also created avenues of cheap labour for certain manufacturers, restaurant owners and small businesses. They take advantage of the helplessness of these workers and employ them illegally without

declaring their wages in their books, thereby paying them less and, at the same time, avoiding to pay tax. The interesting thing however, is that the figure of unemployed people continues to be the same as the figure for immigrants in France, i.e. active immigrants, excluding members of their families, wives and children. There have been many calls on the government to expel these immigrants by all means. When in 1984, the Nigerian government ordered the expulsion of nearly 2 million aliens from the country, the French press came out openly in condemnation of what happened.[43] But at the same time, it was realised that some of them were, in fact, quietly, jubilating at what happened in Nigeria. One of the newspapers 'La Nouvelle Droite,' openly called on President Mitterrand "to summon up courage and do like the Nigerians by expelling all unwanted immigrants in France."[44] Some of the companies controlled by the right wing elements took advantage of computerisation to get rid of their unwanted employees. Some of the workers realised the racial undertone and refused to quit peacefully. In 1978, there was a strike at the Renault Flins factory, whose workers were mainly Mauritanians and Senegalese, who blocked production and insisted that they must be allowed to retain their jobs. It turned out that 77% of the workers in that factory at Aulnay were Africans; so were 56% at Billancourt, and 56% at Flins. The strikes brought about a certain shortage of spare parts all over France and abroad, for French vehicles.[45]

Conflicting Statistics:

There is a certain conflict between the Ministry of the Interior and the police regarding the actual population of immigrants in France. In it's own statistics published on 31st December, 1982, the Ministry of the Interior gave the figure as 4,059,068. This figure represents the total of the breakdown of the various categories of entry, residence and work permits given to immigrants over a period. But, apparently, they do not take into account deaths and departures of some of these immigrants. The figures are, therefore, suspect. In order to get acurate figures, it is necessary to have constant census of

these people. In 1975, for example,s the police gave a figure of immigrants at 3.5 million while the Ministry of the Interior quoted a figure of approximately 4.2 million, which is nearly 700,000 more than the police figure. Then, in 1983, the police announced again that the figure of foreigners in France had remained constant as of 1975, which means that their owns figure remains between 3.5 and 3.7 million, 300,000 of whom had either left or been repatriated. The publication, "Minut," in it's own published statistics, gave the figure of 6 million foreigners in France in 1983. This figure was definitely exaggerated.[46]

The Government of Jacques Chirac instituted a Commission of Inquiry in 1975, consisting of experts, with the mission of finding out the impact of immigrants on development and social life of the country. The instruction of the Prime Minister was emphatic on two particular points:-

(a) To measure the impact that the reduction of immigrants in France would have on the economy;
(b) To establish the exact figures for the purpose of planning.[47]

The motive of the investigations was actually to find out to what extent the adverse balance of trade that France suffered from was caused by the existence of too many immigrants in the country.

The group of experts, which was alsos inter-ministerial, submitted it's report and made the following major points:

"The possibility of substituting foreign workers with French workers would appear to be limited for the immediate future. Similarly, the immediate withdrawal of foreigners from the economy is going to create another form of unemployment and some technical problems."[48]

The work on macro-economic simulation will confirm earlier observations made at the sectorial level. Allowing for a hypothetical evolution of the studies, i.e. the one on the economic situation connected with the policy of restricting immigration, is going to provide a result which is most characteristic in the cadre of hypothesis and logic of the model. A reduction of the population of immigrants will only

create more unemployment for the nationals of France and it is also going to weaken the economy through the transfer of money and to provoke the aggravation of external differences.[49]

Taking into consideration the scenario of the econometrics of the case, a reduction of 150,000 foreign workers with all the favourable high percentages in mind, will result in the creation of only 53,000 new jobs for the French people. And if this is looked at more reasonably, it may even amount to no more than 13,000 jobs.

The authors of the report[50] in fact observed that these immigrants occupied very menial jobs which required very low qualifications and attracted very low wages. In other words, the amount of money involved in paying the immigrants would not pay an equal number of Frenchmen if they were to do the same jobs after the foreigners might have been expelled from the country. This is because the French workers would not be prepared to accept such low wages. The only situation where the Frenchmen would find themselves ready and willing to do the job is, perhaps, at times of crisis. But in normal times, such withdrawal of foreign workers, resulting in higher salaries for their French replacements, will also increase the cost of production and, thereby increase the price of goods, leading to an intollerable degree of inflation.

The most logical thing for the French authorities to do, therefore, was to be satisfied with the status quo, at least for the time being.

It is essential to observe that not only the Frenchmen, but also the foreign immigrant workers themselves are suffering from the effect of recession. Nevertheless, protagonists of expulsion of immigrant workers also point to the heavy burden on the social security system that these people represent, as so many of them remained unemployed and thereby have had to depend on welfare dole for their survival.

It is really a vicious circle: If they got employed, they were accused of having stolen away jobs from the French people; if they were not employed, they were accused of exploiting the social security system. In every case, the immigrants have constituted themselves, in the eyes of the French, into a

menace for the alleged fragile equillibrium of the social service budget of the nation. While they were being accused of being social parasites as such, their critics also seem to forget that the immigrant workers themselves have contributed to the building of their social security fund through their own labour in the factories and everywhere else. So, it is not the Frenchman who is actually paying for their social security; it is they themselves who have built up these reserves of welfare funds that are paid out to them.

An Inquiry which was ordered by the Treasury into the alleged abuse of welfare money and other social security facilities in and around Paris (an area which contains about 1½ million foreign immigrants), revealed that the amount of money spent on them for accidents, illnesses, maternity and other services was about 3,208 francs per annum, per foreign immigrant. But under the same scheme, the French person receives, on the average, 3,820 francs. This is much more than what the foreign immigrants enjoyed.[51]

The Delinquents of Society:

The average French stereotype of the immigrant African workers is that they constitute the largest number of delinquents and other criminals in the country. But this largely racist view point is far from the truth, as confirmed by Official Statistics published by the Ministry of Justice. These have shown that 85% of all crimes committed in France are by French people; all the criminals and delinquents are not necessarily all strangers, and that for the big crimes, the strangers are proportionately less in number than the French. The foreigners are mainly involved in petty crimes. For example, between 1971 and 1973, published statistics showed that 7.4% of foreigners were sentenced at the assizes, and these represented only 12.3% of the active population of the immigrants.[52]

Annina Lahalle, an author of a special thesis on the subject of criminality by foreigners in France, was very sceptical about the way and manner statistics were compiled by the authorities. According to her, it is necesary to consider the

social structure of the different communities in which foreigners were found because the environment is likely to affect the nature of the crimes committed. She said that:

> **"it was also necessary to compare the various foreigners, nationality by nationality, and their composition, age by age group, according to sex, professional categorisation, and conditions of living, in order to come to a proper assessment of the nature and type of crimes committed, and to what extent they affect the general security of the French people themselves."[53]**

Annina Lahalle was particularly concerned about the grouping of North Africans with other types of foreigners found in France. She pointed out the family situation of people from the Maghareb area was such that it was bound to be affected when such people find themselves in an alien setting like that of France. She said the type of delinquency or other crimes committed by children of foreigners take different forms as, for example, what children of diplomats do and what those of lower cadre workers would do in different parts of Paris. "In considering the crimes committed by children of diplomats, it is necessary to look at French children of the same status and see the type of crimes they comit."[45]

Other causes of social delinquencies are also very well-known as the Peyreffite Report already explained elsewhere.[55] The report of the Bonnemaison Commission on this subject revealed that:

> **"conditions of living, and notably over population and segregation in certain buildings, over occupation of lodgements, difficulties in finding professional employment, evolution of family moulds, deprivation in social lives, absence of parental control on children, poverty and merginality of certain categories of population, aggravated by certain phenomena like drugs, alcoholism, multiplication of temptations, together with the augmentation of those who are well disposed, etc. Economic crisis is a very definitive collection of causes of delinquence which can lead to crime, suicide, drug and alcoholism,"[56]**

Somehow, the French feel that they live in an atmosphere of great insecurity because of the presence of foreigners amongst them. They seem to forget that some of the problems of insecurity are necessarily not caused by stran-

gers. They also tend to forget that the strangers themselves are victims of violence and insecurity. Their children always suffer taunts from the French children either because they are immigrants or because of the colour of their skins. They are provoked many times and they don't get fair hearings from the police. The immigrants are insulted through the writing of grafittis on walls, such as, "Boughoule," "Le Melon," "Le Raton," "Le Portos," etc. A lot of racist slogans can be seen all over the place in Paris and other major cities, and they are not wiped out by the city authorities. You could see things like "Mort Aux Bougnoules," "Les estrangers a la Mer," and then something like "Ratonnades." There have been cases of murder, assault, rape and all sorts of physical and social degradations suffered by Africans living in France, and the perpetrators of these heinous acts are the French people themselves.[57]

A certain organisation of young North Africans calling itself 'Jeunnes Maghrebins' has been keeping a careful list of macabre activities carried out against Africans in France by French people. For example, they recorded 9 assassinations in 1982, one of the victims being Abdenbi Chemiah, who was only nineteen years of age, killed in Nanterre. More than 35 assassinations and attempted assassinations were also recorded between 1st January and 1st September, 1983.[58]

It is noted that the African immigrants in France who do not involve themselves in the well publicised criminal activities of the times, such as terrorism, are the worst victims of injustice in the hands of their hosts.

26. Ibid, p.40.
27. National Assembly Notice No. 471 submitted by the Commission for Cultural, Social and Family Affairs headed by Jean-Michel Belorgey, 1982.

28. Jeunne Afrique, Op. cit.
29. Belorgey Commission Report.

30. Le Figaro, 12 September, 1983.
31. Jean Marie Le Pean, Le Quotidien de Paris," 7th September, 1983.
32. Andre Figueras, Le Monde, article published in October, 1983.
33. Christian Delacampagne, "L' Invention du racism," Fayard, Paris, 1983.
34. Ibid.
35. Reynolds, Op. cit.

36. Louis Pauwels: "Les Paradoxes d'un Pseudo-Racisme" Le Figaro Magazine, 4th October, 1980.
37. Robert Herte, Nouvel Draite, March, 1983.
38. Rebert Herte, "Elements", No. 45, Spring ed. 1983, p.3.

37. Alain De Benoist, "Vue De Droite," Copernic, Paris, 1977.

38. Le Mondo, 15th July, 1983.
39. Gaspard, Op. cit.

40. Jeunne Afrique, Op. cit.
41. Ibid (Press Review).

42. These measures were adopted, somewhat, in parliament in the autumn of 1981, under the subject: Autain-Questiaux. But the measures did not go far enough to disenfranchise the immigrants in France.

43. Nigerian Embassy, Paris, Press Release.
44. La Nouvelle Droite, Paris, April 1983.

45. Paris Match Magazine, Paris, 1978.
46. Minut, Paris, 1983.
47. Le Monde, 4 -- 5 September, 1983.
48. Report of the Commission on the Impact of Immigrant Labour on the French Economy — Official Publication, 1975.

49. "Immigrant et la Development Economic et Sociale," a French Official Document published in May, 1976.

50. Ibid.

51. Study Published in 1978.
52. Jean-Claude Chesnais, "Histoire de la Violence," Robert Laffont, Paris, 1982.

53. Annina Lahalle, "La Justice, la Deviorce des Jeunne Imigres" — Unpublished M.A. Thesis, School of Higher and Social Studies, Paris, 1982.

54. Bonnemaison Report, "Face a la Delinquence: Prevention Repression, Solidarite," Official French Document published in January, 1983.
55. Perefitte Report, Op. cit.
56. Bonnemaison Report, Op. cit.

57. Ibid.
58. A list addressed to many organisations in Paris by the information service of Radio Beurs, and quoted by Gaspard and Servan-Schreiber, Op. cit.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study is to find out not only how post-colonial governments of France deliberately initiated policies by which they hoped to continue the domination of their former colonies, but also to understand the nuances of European thinking in their relations with African countries. The techniques of domination which include defence treaties, development aid, cultural and scientific co-operation, and trading arrangements have been described as neo-colonialism. In our introductory chapter, we traced the roots of neo-colonialism to the late 19th century Marxist theory of imperialism which Lenin defined as "the monopoly stage of capitalism." The early stages of imperialism manifested themselves in the latter part of the 19th century when European countries scrambled for colonies and the trend continued up to the 1st World War of 1914—18. After that war, imperialism entered its second phase, whereby the tradition of conquering backward states changed to the new German approach of conquering the European nations themselves via the racial doctrine of Aryan superiority. This led to the consequent 2nd World War. Imperialism again changed tactics after that war in answer to the pressure for independence by the colonial territories. This third phase saw the introduction of neo-colonialism. According to Nasser, "neo-colonialism emerged attempting to attain the same aims of exploitation as the old colonialism..."

In preparation for the domination of her colonies after the attainment of indepdence, France introduced the so-called *Loi Cadre,* a series of balkanisation measures to precede the referendum for the French Community in 1958. In the referendum, the colonies were asked to choose between total independence or remaining in some sort of Commonwealth with France. The latter promised many privileges, including common defence, development aid and monetary union. All, except Guinea (Conakry) accepted the proposal for the Community. The French authorities established a special department in the government to look after Community affairs, including the regular summits of their heads of state. Although France had established military bases in all

member-states, these were gradually pruned down as they developed Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in Northern France. RDF Missions were carried out to deal with crisis situations such as the raid on Kolwezi in Zaire in 1978.

Another extension of this kind of neo-colonialist policy was manifested in other directions, namely in the Algerian liberation struggle and the Nigerian Civil War. French soldiers who were defeated in the South-East Asian wars, were encouraged to settle in Algeria, with the hope of keeping the territory "in perpetuity" as an extension of French territory. They preferred to call it "Southern France." Algerian nationalists, led by Ahmed Ben Bella, formed the Front for National Liberation (FLN) to fight the settlers and other soldiers, brought from mainland France to suppress the nationalists. When they sensed the imminent defeat of France, the French leaders, under General De Gaulle, introduced the so-called *Plan Constantine* in 1959, the legal document to ensure France's presence after independence. In the case of Nigeria, France had seen the former English colony, surrounded by Francophone countries as a threat to French interests in those countries. Nigeria had the largest population in Africa and was the richest in the Sub-region. Apart from that Nigeria, which had ethnic connections with people in the smaller neighbouring Francophone countries was believed by France to be capable of engineering conflicts and ill-feelings against her. Indeed, Nigeria had shown her capacity to rock the boat in the Saharan Nuclear Test episode. France also considered another Anglophone country, Ghana, a threat to the Francophone stability, in the light of the clandestine assistance being given by the Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, to leftist and revolutionary elements in the sub-region. In the case of Nigeria which was used as an example, France brought into play, a series of destabilistation measures which fueled the civil war in that country. Intelligence officers were posted to Ivory Coast and Gabon to initiate and co-ordinate hostile activities, including the recruitment and supply of mercenaries to assist the rebel Biafran army, and the supply of arms and equipment to them. Although Nigeria had finally won the war, the role played by France in her effort

to protect her interests in French Equatorial Africa may not be forgotten by Nigeria.

In the field of trade with Africa in the sixties and early seventies, French imports consisted mainly of raw materials (50%) and food items (40%). In the mid-seventies, she had imported crude oil from Nigeria, Libya, Cameroun, Gabon and Algeria. France also iported gemstones and wool from South Africa. In return, she exported finished goods of all descriptions, including machinery, textiles, canned foods, automobiles, large and small industries and technologies of different kinds. France was able to maintain favourable trade balances with non-oil producing countries and was, therefore, able to exercise a lot of leverage in her relations with such countries.

Through her great influence in the EEC, France was able to assist the weaker African countries in their negotiations with the Community for preferential trade arrangements under the so-called Lome Conventions. At least 66 countries, the so-called ACP countries, nearly half of them African, enjoyed some trading privileges under the Lome Conventions. Through her association with African countries where she enjoyed a monopoly of imports, France also provided indirect access to other EEC countries to the African markets.

Inspite of her dominant position in the Francophone world, France enjoyed the biggest trading relations with Nigeria, in some cases employing dubious and underhand methods.

As regards French investments in Francophone Africa, the attitude was devloped that any industrialisation was likely to lead to increased unemployment in France. For that reason, a lukewarm attitude towards investment was adopted and importation of raw materials encouraged. Investments that were likely to earn France foreign exchange, especially in the field of construction industry, were encouraged in Nigeria and South Africa. In the prospecting field, leading French companies, such as Elf Equitaine, had struck oil in different parts of Africa and doing a booming business in Nigeria. France had invested in many lucrative areas in South Africa and Nigeria. Her trade with Nigeria alone was more than her total trade with the whole of Francophone Africa combined.

In her determination to trade wherever possible, France went all out to assist rebellious Rhodesia to burst British and UN-imposed sanctions. She did the same in South Africa. The nature of France's relations with the racist regimes was discussed in Chapter 5. Inspite of the fact that the two countries cited were neither French-speaking nor contiguous to any major French-speaking coutry, the relationship between the minority White regimes and the Black majority was akin to a colonial relationship. France's close association with (Black) Community States in Africa should have served as a strong deterrent. However, France ignored would opinion to help Rhodesia survive, as well as assisted South Africa to procure the most sophisticated military weapons, including nuclear secrets. Her trading figures with South Africa were the envy of other European countries. The conclusion here is that France has shown in so many ways that her own national interests were supreme and uncompromisable.s

French cultural policy has also been used as an instrument to influence people in former colonies. The ways and means of using this as an instrument of foreign policy and domination was examined in Chapter 7 of the dissertation. Although the French have used culture for centuries as a means of influencing people, its application as a deliberate government policy was relatively recent. The period covered by our study was greatly influenced by the Gaullist philosophy of *grandeur*. This is a concept of a France as a great nation, the chief inspirer of her subjects and the reason for their loyalty. Around the philosophy of *grandeur,* De Gaulle had built a certain myth about his own leadership of France and through it evoked a certain commitment by the people towards the country. In 1969, President De Gaulle established the Ministry of Culture and gave it a Charter consisting of four main objectives. These are, the consolidation of French language wherever it was spoken as a mother tongue, such as Quebec, Belgium and Switzerland; to provide special attention to the development of the language in Francophone Africa, e.g., Congo; to maintain the presence of French language in all five continents of the world through the international organisations and regional groupings; and finally to promote the idea

of accepting French language as a major language of communication in financial institutions, as well as teaching it in universities all over Europe. The French established a target of 150,000,000 French speakers by the year 1990, in Africa and around the world. France also set up various institutions such as the *Alliance Francaise* for the propagation and teaching of the language all over Africa and elsewhere. Special agreements for the supply of French language teachers were also signed with many countreis. Furthermore, foreign students were given scholarships to study in France every year. President Pompidou, in an address to the French parliament in June, 1964, stressed the importance of French cultural export as an instrument of foreign policy: "Our aim is quite specific; our effort is undisputably oriented towards that fundamental task of propagating our language and culture. France does not have to hide the fact that she wants to maintain everywhere, a certain influence, a certain political, moral and cultural presence." By 1980, about 85,000 French experts in various cultural fields, mainly language teachers, were serving in Africa and other parts of the world. The maintenance allowance of each agent as at 1980 value was about FFr. 120,000 per annum, or FFr. 11.1 billion. Nearly half of them were from Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation. These figures indicate not only the importance which France places on cultural export as a foreign policy tool, but also reveals the extent of information available to French authorities from reports such officers might despatch about target countries. The ability of France to put this enormous information to good use makes it the formidable modern European power that it is today.

Another aspect of French culture is the way it has manifested itself as a by product of post-colonial domination — neo-colonialism.

The French, like Hitler's Germany, are highly nationalistic, even though they have not formulated policies of extreme racial bigotry as was practised by the Nazis. But through the policy of assimilation, the French have consciously sought to super-impose their own culture on Africans, believing that it is superior. The policy of assimilation is dictated by a certain

basic philosophy they refer to as *prowess*. This word refers to the determination of the French man to discover his so-called pre-determined inner harmony with himself. *Prowess*, coupled with *demandeur*, the latter referring to the French man's superiority complex, make the French man feel superior to other nationalities. These words, and others such as *civism* and *mesure*, are symbols reminding the French man that he must find his inner harmony with the State and love it the way he loves himself. In the pursuit of this nationalist philosophy, French governments had consciously indoctrinated people in their former colonies to love, respect and defend France. The chief proponents of this assimilation in this way could not understand why an African, brought up under these nationalistic principles, should ever come forward and demand political independence. That is why the 'NO' vote by Sekou Toure's Guinea in 1958 could not be understood or tolerated. The fight for liberation in Algeria was similarly seen as an unpardonable crime. It is for this reason that some extremists among the French nationalists attempted to kill De Gaulle after he had granted independence to Algeria. It is the same kind of people who formed the pro-Nazi National Front Party in France whose policy is basically the expulsion of Africans from France. This Chapter examined various evidence to show how Africans living in France were threatened, humiliated, ridiculed or even killed by racist elements. Yet, even the moderate and centrist parties have pursued anti-Black hysteria in France to show that the Africans were not wanted in the country, inspite of the fact that they did the menial jobs for them, such as toilet cleaning and garbage collection.

It is concluded, therefore, that even after two decades of independence, France has succeeded in manipulating events and other developments in Africa, in order to maintain a certain degree of privileges she had enjoyed during the colonial days. Apart from legislative and legal approaches, such as the *Loi Cadre*, the French Community and various defence and economic co-operation agreements, France has also used open aggression, as in Nigeria's case, coercion and cunning in order to achieve her neo-colonialist objectives in Africa.

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ANNEX 1

2nd November 1968.

His Excellency M.M. Delauney,
Ambassador,
French Embassy,
Gabon, Libreville.

Your Excellency,

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter No.7C/SP of 29th October, 1968, and have pleasure to report the arrival of Colonel Fournier and his team. Their visit, which is another manifestation of the interest of your great country in our young Republic, is very much appreciated here. I would like to assure Your Excellency that every facility will be placed at their disposal to make their mission a success.

Once more, please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.


LT. COL. C. ODULEGWU OJUKWU.

Note

The above letter from Lt.-Col. Ojukwu to the French Ambassador, in which he expressed appreciation for the team of merceneries sent to Biafra by the French government is further conclusive evidence of France's involvement in the Nigerian Civil War.

* This letter was published in "Affaires Africaines" by Pean.

ANNEX 2



Note

Identity card of the Gabonese Presidential Guard given to one of the leading merceneries who operated in Biafra under the command of Bob Dennard.

SOURCE: L'Affaire Africaine by P. Pean.

ANNEX 3



EXCUSEZ - PASSER

N° 318/71

NOM : BOURGEAUD

PRENOMS : Gilbert

NE(E) LE : 30 Janvier 1929

A : CLEY (Calvados)

PROFESSION : Conseiller Ingénieur

ADRESSE : LIBREVILLE B.P. 13062

EST IMMATRICULE(E) : 318/71

A : LIBREVILLE

NOTICE

POUR ETRE VALABLE

Cette carte doit porter le timbre de l'autorité qui la délivre et les signatures requises

Elle ne doit être ni raturée, ni surchargée

LE TITULAIRE DOIT

Remettre sa carte dès qu'il cesse d'être en fonctions.

EN CAS DE PERTE

Il avertir sans délai l'autorité qui le lui a délivrée sous peine d'être responsable des conséquences de cette perte

PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE

21 AVR. 1971

Le Président

G. Bongo

Paris le 30

Note

A Laissez Passer given to mercenery Gilbert Bourgeaud for unrestricted movement within the Presidential Palace of Bongo.

SOURCE: L'Affaire Africaine by P. Pean

ANNEX 4

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF COMMUNITY

Palace of the President of the
French Republic,
Paris.

16th May, 1960

In accordance with the constitution, the President of the Republic, President of the Community, presides over and directs the Community for the exercise of its functions and assigns work to the Secretariat General as follows:

The Secretary General ensures that the Secretariat receives all the necessary advice for the discharge of co-operation matters between the states, and he can give directives on the preparation of their activities, handles all proces-verbal for its meetings, and executes all measures and decisions taken at such meetings.

The Secretary General of the Community is represented at all meetings organized by the Government of the Republic in respect of all matters that are of interest to the Community.

And in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the President and by the law, the Secretary General is responsible for the preparation of all work approved by the Senate of the Community and the transmission of such work to the authorities interested in such work, as well as recommendations, deliberations and questions written by the senators of the Community.

The Secretary General brings to the knowledge of the President any misunderstanding of interpretation between member states for the purpose of arbitration and prepares background documents to enable the President give a ruling.

The Secretary General of the Community ensures that the reports of the Community reach the President and the Chief of the states concerned.

It is assumed that the President will be kept fully informed of political developments in the African and Malagasy states in their reciprocal exchanges concerning relations with the French Republic, as well as general political problems of the Community, notably on matters of defence, external relations and economic and financial policy. The Secretary General transmits to the interested authorities all directives and correspondence of the President, as well as the conclusions and activities of the central organ of the Community.

The Secretary General presents to the Council, the budget of all the institutions of the Community in consultation with the Secretary of State charged with relations with Community member states and authorities of the Common Services of the Secretariat General.

These services of the Secretariat General of the Community will be carried out in the addresses of the Community located at Noirmoutier, 138 rue de Grenelle, where alone its business will be discharged.

ANNEX 5

DECREE NO. 74—577 OF 6TH JUNE 1964 RELATING TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF CO-OPERATION

MINISTRY OF CO-OPERATION

The President of the Republic,

On the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation.

In consideration of Decree of 28th May, 1974 concerning the nomination of members of government.

In consideration of Decree No. 59/178 of 22nd January, 1959, relating to the functions of the Ministries.

In consideration of Decree No. 68—161 of 20th February, 1968, relating to the organisation of the secretariat of Foreign Affairs charged with co-operation.

In consideration of Decree No. 69—233 of 14 March, 1969 relating to the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

The Council of State, Finance Section notes,
The Council of Ministers notes,
Decree:-

Article 1:

The Minister of Co-operation is charged with the responsibility for co-operation of the French Republic with Francophone African States South of the Sahara; Malagasy Republic and Mauritius.

In liaison with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he is to ensure the execution and negotiation treaties and agreements on co-operation concluded between the states listed above and the Reublic of France with the exception of those that concerned foreign policy and defence.

He is equally to be consulted on all decisions concerning development matters in the same states.

Article 2:

The Minister of Co-operation is to deal directly with the Ambassadors accredited to the countries mentioned above, and to give them instructions in the areas of his competence. The correspondence is copied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Permanent Missions for Aid and Co-operation will, on authority of the Minister, be placed in each country under the relevant Ambassador.

The Minister of Co-operation is to be consulted on the nomination of Ambassadors to alls the states listed in Article One.

Article 3:

The services of Defence in Article 2 and 3 of the Decree of 14th March, 1969, of Article 5 of the Decree of 20th February, 1968 and of Article 2 of the Decree of 27th May, 1969 relating to the organization of services of co-operation with African and Malagasy states are placed under the authority of the Minister of Co-operation.

This makes it incumbent upon the relevant sections of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, notably the directorate for legal affairs, the directorate of personnel and general administration, the directorate of archives and the offices of the affected personnel to note.

Article 4:

The Minister of Co-operation would preside over the meeting of the committee of the directorate of aid funds and co-operation. He is the accounting officer.

Article 5:

The Ministry of Co-operation is consulted on all occasions relating to cultural, sicentific and technical co-operation with African countries south of the Sahara other than those listed in Paris 7th June, 1974, Article One above.

Note:

Unofficial Translation by researcher.

MINISTRIES CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

MINISTRY OF CO-OPERATION

(1) Directorate for Economic Co-operation.
(2) Directorate for Cultural and Technical Co-operation.
(3) Services for Studies and International Questions.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(1) Directorate for African and Malagasy Affairs.
(2) Directorate General for Cultural, Scientific and Technical Co-operation.

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL TRADE

(1) Directorate for External Relations.
(2) Commercial Counsellors and Attaches.a

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

(1) Directorate of the Treasury.
(2) Directorate of Public Accounts.
(3) General Directorate of Customs and Indirect Taxes.
(4) Directorate of Insurance.
(5) National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
(6) Monetary Committee of the Franc Zone.

MINISTRY OF CO-OPERATION

(1) International Technical Co-operation.
(2) Technical Assistance.
(3) Technical Studies and Aid Programmes.

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION

(1) Service for International Affairs.

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH

(1) Service for the Development of Computers and Industrial Statistics.
(2) Study of Co-operation for Industrial Strategies.
(3) International Centre of the Exploitation of Oceans.

(4) Atomic Energy Commission.
(5) Directorate of Technology, Industrial Environment and Mines.
(6) Service for Industrial Standards.
(7) Technical Committee of the Centers of Documentation of the Chamber of Commerce and Industrya.
(8) Committee of Industruial Representatives for Energy Matters.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH
(1) Directorate for International Relations.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
(1) Mission for the General Inspection of Co-operation.
(2) Deputy Directorate for International Relations and Technical Co-operations.

MINISTRY OF WORKS
(1) International Relations Division.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
(1) Service for International Co-operation on Police Matters.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(1) International Relations Division.
(2) Center for Military, Intelligence and Documentation for Overseas Countries.
(3) Secretariat of State for War Veterans.
(4) Service for Relations with War Veterans in French-speaking Countries.

SECRETARIAT OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT
(1) Secretariat general for Civil Aviation.
(2) Directorate for Air Transport.
(3) Directorate for Aerial Navigation.
(4) Directorate for Air Bases.
(5) Directorate for Meteorology.
(6) Services for training in Aeronautics.
(7) Secretariat General for the Merchant Navy.
(8) Services for External Relations and Technical Co-operation.
(9) Directorate for Commercial fleet and naval equipment.
(10) Directorate for High Seas Fishing.

Source: "Marche Tropicaux et Mediterranees," Special edition, No. 1625 of 31st December, 1976.

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 7

LIST OF ORGANISATIONS OF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION OPERATING IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

TITLE	LEGAL STATUS	RESPONSIBILITY		
		Min. of Co-operation	Point of Responsibility	Responsibility of Ministries
IEMVT Institute of Livestock and Tropical Veterinarya Medicine		X		
ORSTOM Office of Scientific and Technical Research Overseas				
CTFT Technical Centre for Tropical Forestry	State Compan	X		
BDPA Bureau for the Development of Agriculture Production	State Company	X		
CFEDTT French Company for the Development of Textile Fires	Mixed Economy Companay	X		

TITLE	LEGAL STATUS	RESPONSIBILITY		
GERDAT Centre for Studies and Research for Development	Economic Interest groups	X		
IRFA Institute for Research in Fruits and Vegetables	Company	X		
IRCT Institute for Research in Exotic Textiles	Company	X		
IFCC French Institute for a Coffee and Cocoa	Companya	X		
BKAT Liaison Office for Agents of Technical a Co-operation	Company	X		
ADEAL Association for the Developmental of Cultural a and Artistic Exchanges	Company	X		

TITLE	LEGAL STATUS		RESPONSIBILITY		
FIAP International Visitors Centre in Paris	Companya		X		
BEPTOM Office for the Study of a Overseas Posts and Telecommunications	Governmental Body	X	Ministry of Poste and Tele-communications		
BRGM Office for Geological and Mineral Research	Governmental Body	X	Ministry of Industries		
OFERMAT French Bureau of Co-operation in Railways and other forms of transport	Governmental Body	X	Secretary of State for Transport		
IRAT Of Research in Institute of Tropical Agriculture	Company	X			
SMUH Secretarial for Urban Settlements	Company	X			

TITLE	LEGAL STATUS	RESPONSIBILITY		
AFVP				
French Association for Voluntary Progress	Company	X		
CIES				
International Centre for Students and Trainees	Company	X		
AUDECAM				
University Association for the development of Education and Culture in Africa	Company	X		
SEDES				
Association for the Study of Economic and Social Development	Mixed Economy Company			Ministry of Economie and Finance
SCET - INTERNATIONAL				
Central Association for Territorial Equipment (International)	Mixed Economy Company			Ministry of Economie and Finance

TITLE		LEGAL STATUS	RESPONSIBILITY		
SOFRE dont:					
Achievement	SOFREtu SOFREcom SOFREavia				
French Association for studies and	SOFREmines SOFRErail SOFRElec SOFREgaz SOFREsid	Company			
OCAU					
Bureau for University Co-operation and Reception		State Companya		Ministry of Education	
BCEOM					
Central Bureau for the study of Foreign Equipment		Mixed Equipment		Ministry of	
CCCE					
Central Cashier for Technical Co-operation		Governmental Body			Ministry of Economie and Finance
SATEC					
Association of Technical Aid and Co-operation		State Company			Ministry of Economie and (DOM-TOM)

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 8

EVOLUTION OF THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF CO-OPERATION (IN MILLIONS OF FRENCH FRANCS)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Amount	1.004.7	1.110.7	1.097	1.117.6	1.061.9	980	1.051	1.146	1.180
Annual Variation %		+10.5	-1.20	+1.8	-4.9	-7	+7	+1	+1

1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979
1.180	1,167	1.340	1,503	1,726	1,973	2,163	2,439	2,571	3,014
+1.9	-1.1	+14.8	+12.1	+14.8	+14.8	+10	+12.8	+5.36	+17.2

Source: Annual Financial Review

Note

It should be noted that loans by the Ministry of Co-operation had increased in value between 1965 and 1978 in terms of the present value of the French Franc. In other words, from a minimum of FF980 million in 1965, the volume somewhat stabilised up to 1971, and then began to increase up to 1979 in such a way that it doubled the value of 1960, reaching FF.3 Billion.

ANNEX 9

THE PROGRESS OF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION SINCE 1960

1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
8,684	8,553	8,749	9,183	9,450	9,889	10,369	10,669	10,154

1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	
10,563	11,281	11,221	10,764	10,277	10,352	10,227	10,235	

ANNEX 10

PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT AID VOTED FOR AFRICAN AND MALAGASY STATES (AMS) AND OVERSEAS TERRITORIES (DOM-TOM)

YEAR	A.M.S.	DOM-TOM
1959	31.9	5.5
1960	31.5	4.2
1961	31.7	11.2
1962	33.5	15
1963	35.9	20.8
1964	34.1	25
1965	36	26.2
1966	33.2	36.6
1967	34.6	35.6
1968	42.9	49
1969	30.7	37.3
1970	27.8	36.4
1971	27.3	41.5
1972	29.2	42
1973	28.6	43.5
1974	27.7	43.6
1975	30	45.2
1976	28	50.4

Source: Memorandum of the Committee for Aid and Development (CAD).

ANNEX 11

PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (MILLIONS OF FRANCS)

YEAR	BLACK AFRICA	NON-FRANC ZONE STATES	TOTAL PRIVATE CONTRIBUTION
1961	312	796	2,260.0
1962	388	713	2,010
1963	259.6	695.6	1,927.1
1964	281.7	1,398.4	2,640.9
1965	264.3	1,490.9	2,703
1966	300.7	1,750.3	2,836.9
1967	495.7	1,541.9	2,546.4
1968	440.9	2,918.6	4,179.5
1969	459.1	2,599.4	3,893.9
1970	340.6	3,006.3	4,641.7
1971	368.8	1,561.7	2,767.3
1972	498.6	2,457.1	3,786.5
1973	1,060.9	4,173	5,513.4
1974	586.4	6,444.4	7,497.6
1975	864.5	4,071.8	6,403.4
1976	1,727.6	8,132.2	13,921.1
1977	2,698	7,880	13,693.8

Source: French Memorandum to CAD and OECD.

ANNEX 12

TABLE OF CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS

COUNTRY	POLITICAL AREA			TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	
	Foreign Policy	Defence	Primary Strategic materials	Competitions	Military Technical Assistance
BENIN (DAHOMEY)	24-4-1961	24-4-1961 (1) 9-1-1962 (2)	24-4-1961 (1)	24-4-1961 27-2-1975	24-4-1961 27-2-1975
CAMEROUN	13-11-1960			13-11-1690 21-2-9174	13-11-1960 21-2-1974
C.A.R.	13-8-1690	15-8-1960 (1) 25-8-1061 (2)	8-10-1960	17-7-1959	13-8-1960 8-9-1968
CONGO	15-8-1960	15-8-1960 (1) 25-8-9161 (2)	15-8-1960 (1)	23-7-1959 7-11-1959 1-1-1974	15-8-1960 1-1-9174
IVORY COAST	24-4-1961	24-4-1961 (1) 9-2-1962 (2)	24-4-1961 (1)	24-4-1961	24-4-1961 14-12-1973
GABON	17-8-1960	17-8-1960	17-8-1960 17-8-1974	17-11-1959 12-2-1974	17-8-1960 25-8-1965
UPPER VOLTA	24-4-1961			24-4-1961	24-4-1961
MADAGASCAR	27-6-1960	27-6-1960	27-6-1960	7-9-1959 4-6-1973	27-6-1960 4-6-1973

TABLE OF CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS (CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	POLITICAL AREA			TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	
	Foreign Policy	Defence	Primary Strategic materials	Competitions	Military Technical Assistance
MALI				2-2-1962	1-10-1973
MAURITANIA	19-6-1961 15-2-1973 Diplomatic Convention	19-6-1961	19-6-1961	19-6-1961 15-2-1973	19-6-1961 2-9-1978
NIGER	24-4-1961 (1)	24-4-1961 (1) 9-1-1961 (2)	24-4-1961 (1)	24-4-1961 19-2-1977	24-4-1961 19-2-1977
SENEGAL	22-6-1960 22-3-1974	22-6-1960 29-3-1974	22-6-1960	14-9-1959 29-3-1974	22-6-1960 29-3-1974
TCHAD	11-8-1960	15-8-1960 (1) 25-8-1961 (2)	15-8-1960	29-11-1959 19-5-1964 6-3-1976	11-8-1960 19-5-1964 6-3-1976
TOGO	10-7-1963 Diplomatic Convention	10-7-1963		10-7-1963 23-3-1976	29-10-1961 23-3-1976

(1) Multilateral Agreements.
(2) Agreements organising Defence Councils by zone.

ECONOMIC, FINANCE AND TECHNICAL

COUNTRY	Monetary, economic and financial	Fiscal Conventions	Conventions between Treasuries	Dominial Conventions	Post and Telecommu-nications	Aviation, Civil & Air Transport	Merchant Marine and Fishing
BENIN (DAHOMEY)	24-4-1961	21-9-1965 27-2-1975	6-9-1959 27-2-1975		24-4-1961 27-2-1975	24-4-1961 9-12-1963 27-2-1975	24-4-1961 12-3-1974 27-2-1975
CAMEROUN	13-11-1960 21-2-1974	13-3-1963 10-7-1965 21-10-1976	13-11-1960 21-2-1974	22-4-1965		13-11-1960 16-5-1961 3-9-1963 21-2-1974	
C.A.R.	15-8-1960 (1)	12-13-1969	4-4-1960	13-8-1960 26-8-1961		18-5-1963	
CONGO	15-8-1960 (1)	13-11-1967		15-8-1960		2-5-1962	1-1-1974
IVORY COAST	24-4-1961	6-4-1966 15-1-1961	7-12-1963		24-4-1961 30-7-1976	24-4-1961 19-10-1962	24-4-1961 19-10-1962
GABON	17-8-1960	21-4-1966 23-1-1973	22-3-1962	6-6-1961		17-8-1960 2-12-1963	17-8-1960
BOURKINA FASSO	24-4-1961	11-8-1965 3-6-1971	15-9-1959		24-4-1961	24-4-1961 28-5-1962	24-4-1961

ECONOMIC, FINANCE AND TECHNICAL

COUNTRY	Monetary, economic and financial	Fiscal Conventions	Conventions between Treasuries	Dominial Conventions	Post and Telecommu-nications	Aviation, Civil & air transport	Merchant Marine and Fishing
MADAGASCAR	27-6-1960 10-3-1962	29-2-1962	2-6-1960	18-9-1961 4-6-1973	27-6-1960 4-6-1973	27-6-1960 1-12-1962	17-6-1960 27-11-1970
MALI	2-2-1962 15-2-1967 19-12-1967	21-5-1964 22-9-1972				5-8-1961	
MAURITANIA	19-6-1961 15-2-1973	15-11-1967	25-3-1960	10-5-1963	19-6-1961	19-6-1961	19-6-1961
NIGER	24-4-1961 19-2-1973	1-6-1965 16-2-1973	7-9-1959		24-4-1961	24-4-1961 28-5-1962 29-3-1974	24-4-1961 29-3-1974
SENEGAL	22-6-1960 29-3-1974	3-5-1965	1-3-1968 29-3-1974	18-9-1962		22-6-1960 15-6-1962	22-6-1960 16-9-1974
TCHAD	15-8-1960 (1) 6-3-1976		19-3-1960 25-9-1961 24-11-1962			8-1-1963	
TOGO	10-7-1963	24-11-1971	10-7-1963				23-3-1976

(1) Multilateral Agreements.

COUNTRY	LEGAL SECTOR			CULTURAL SECTOR			
	Justice	Convention on movement of persons	Consular conventions	Cultural Co-operation	Radio T.V.	Higher Education	Social Conventions
BENIN (DAHOMEY)	24-4-1961 27-2-1975	12-2-1971 27-2-1975		24-4-1961 27-2-1975	22-2-1960 14-6-1963 14-6-1966	24-4-1961 28-6-1967 7-9-1970 27-2-1975	
CAMEROUN	13-11-1960 21-2-1974	26-6-1976	21-2-1974	13-11-1960 31-7-1961	30-6-1963	8-8-1962	
C.A.R.	19-12-1959 12-7-1960 18-1-1965	13-8-1960*		13-8-1960	15-12-1959 15-12-1965 13-11-1967	15-8-1960 (1) 12-12-1961 (1) 15-5-1971	
CONGO	28-7-1959 18-5-1962	13-8-1960*		15-8-1960	4-8-1959 30-6-1963	15-8-1960 (1) 12-12-1961 (1)	
IVORY COAST	24-4-1961	21-2-1970 8-10-1976		24-4-1961 12-3-1969	2-2-1960 16-12-1963	24-4-1961	
GABON	31-12-1959 15-7-1960 23-7-1963	17-8-1960* 12-2-1974* 12-2-1974	14-2-1974	18-11-1959	6-5-1959 9-5-1963 3-5-1967	17-8-1960 12-12-1961 (1) 30-4-1971 1-5-1971	
UPPER VOLTA	24-4-1961	30-5-1970		24-4-1961 8-5-1965	11-7-1959 5-3-1965	24-4-1961 26-3-1971 (1)	

(1) Multilateral Agreements.

COUNTRY	LEGAL SECTOR			CULTURAL SECTOR			
	Justice	Convention on movement of persons	Consular Conventions	Cultural Co-operation	Radio T.V.	Higher Education	Social Conventions
MADAGASCAR	27-6-1960 4-6-1973	27-6-1960*	25-4-1963	4-6-1973	16-10-1961 22-5-1968	27-6-1960	8-5-1967 8-9-1969
MALI	9-3-1962	8-3-1963 15-5-1964	9-3-1962	2-2-1962	29-4-1967	10-4-1970	11-3-1965
MAURITANIA	19-6-1961	15-7-1963	7-2-1964	19-6-1961 15-2-1973	11-6-1959 1-10-1962		22-7-1965
NIGER	24-4-1961 9-2-1977	16-2-1970		24-4-1961	1-7-1959 8-6-1964 25-2-1967	24-4-1961 26-3-1971 (1) 19-2-1977	28-3-1973
SENEGALS	4-4-1960 14-6-1962 29-3-1974	22-6-1960* 21-1-1964 29-3-1974 29-3-1974*	16-2-1963 29-3-1974	4-2-1960 29-3-1974	17-7-1959 1-3-1962 29-3-1974	22-6-1960 5-8-1960 15-5-1964 16-2-1970 29-3-1974	5-3-1963 29-3-1974
TCHAD	5-1-1960 12-7-1960 7-12-1970 6-3-1976	11-8-1960*		11-8-1960 19-5-1964 6-3-1976	2-2-1960 7-3-1963	15-8-1960 (1) 12-12-1961 (1) 19-5-1964 6-3-1976	6-3-1976
TOGO	10-7-1963	10-7-1963* 25-2-1970		10-7-1963	23-11-1964 23-3-1976	28-6-1967	7-12-1973 7-12-1973

(1) Multilateral Agreements.

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 13

LIST OF CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN FORMER FRENCH COLONIES

COUNTRY	TYPE OF AGREEMENT	DATES
Burundi	— Agreement on Co-operation on equipment for cultural, technical assistance.	11/2/63
	— Convention on co-operation in radio-phonics.	5/8/64
	— Agreement on matrials of equipment for higher education.	26/5/70
	— Exchange of letters concerning competition by military personnel.	31/5/74
Cape Verde Island	— Agreement on cultural, scientific, technical and economic co-operation.	12/2/76
Ethiopia	— Cultural convention.	
	— Agreement on cultural, scientific and technical co-operation and exchange of letters.	27/8/66
	— Agreement relating to air transport.	2/9/70
Guinea Bissau	— Agreement on cultural, scientific, technical and economic co-operation.	12/3/76
Kenya	— Agreement on cultural, scientific, technical and economic co-operation.	14/9/71
Malawi	— Agreement on cultural and technical co-operation.	20/9/75
MAuritius	— Agreement on cultural and technical co-operation.	22/6/70
	— Convention on the protectionof investments.	22/3/73
Rwanda	— Agreement on friendship and co-operation.	
	— Agreement on co-operation and supply of economic materials.	20/10/62
	— Agreement on co-operation in the supply of radiophonic equipment.	
	— Agreement on co-operation and cultural matters.	

COUNTRY	TYPE OF AGREEMENT	DATES
Rwanda	— Agreement on co-operation in radio transmission.	7/12/62
	— Convention on co-operation in health matters.	13/5/64
	— Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment.	26/5/70
Uganda	— Technical and cultural co-operation Agreement.	14/7/70
Sao Tome and Principe	— Agreement on cultural, scientific and economic co-operation.	14/1/76
Seychelles	— Agreement on cultural, scientific and economic co-operation.	29/6/76
Sudan	— Agreement on cultural and technical co-operation.	22/12/69
	— Protocol relating to co-operation in archeological materials.	22/12/69
Tanzania	— Agreement on cultural and technical co-operation.	9/3/73
Zaire	— Agreement on co-operation in the supply of cultural and technical equipment.	17/12/63
	— Air co-operation agreement.	10/1/64
	— Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment.	25/5/70
	— Convention on the protection of investments.	5/10/72
	— General agreement on co-operation in military technology.	22/5/74
Zambia	— Agreement on the supply of materials for air transport.	19/12/66

SOURCES: DIVERSE

ANNEX 14
A GENERAL TABLE OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FRANCE AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BOTH PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED

	1564—1914	1915—1940	1945—1975	TOTAL
1. Algeria	—	—	118	118
2. Senegal	—	—	116	116
3. Tunisia	—	—	85	85
4. Morocco	—	—	78	78
5. Congo-Brazzaville	—	—	65	65
6. Gabon	—	—	57	57
7. Benin	—	—	56	56
8. Ivory Coast	—	—	56	56
9. Central African Republic	—	—	54	54
10. Bourkina-Fasso	—	—	48	48
11. Madagascar	—	—	44	44
12. Mauritania	—	—	40	40
13. Egypt	—	—	37	37
14. Niger	—	—	37	37
15. Chad	—	—	33	33
16. Mali	—	—	32	32
16. Mali	—	—	32	32
17. Cameroun	—	—	31	31
18. Togo	—	—	31	31
19. Ethiopia	2	—	26	28
20. South Africa	—	2	11	13
21. Zaire	—	—	9	9
22. Rwanda	—	—	8	8
23. Libya	—	—	7	7
24. Burundi	—	—	6	6
25. Mauritius	—	—	5	5
26. Guinea	—	—	4	4
27. Tanzania	—	—	4	4
28. Liberia	2	—	1	3
29. Kenya a	—	—	3	3
30. Malawi	—	—	3	3
31. Ghana	—	—	2	2
32. Uganda	—	—	2	2
33. Sierra Leone	—	—	2	2
34. Sudan	—	—	1	1
35. Zambia	—	—	1	1
TOTAL	4	2	1,113	1,119

ANNEX 15

FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN BLACK AFRICA

YEAR	COUNTRY	TYPE OF INTERVENTION
1960	CAMEROUN CONGO GABON) CONGO)	Suppression of revolt by members of U. P. C. Restoration of Law and Order. Conflicts between citizens of both countries.
1961	CAMEROUN MAURITANIA	Suppression of U. P. C. revolt. Restoration of Law and Order.
1963	TCHAD NIGER	Restoration of Law and Order. Stabilisation of Hamani Diori's government.
1964	GABON	Stabilisation of President M'ba.
1968	TCHAD	Internal Security.
April, 1969 January, 1971 (1) September, 1975 (2)	TCHAD	International Security and Suppression of FROLINAT.
1977	ZAIRE	Logistic aid to Zairian army.
1978	MAURITANIA ZAIRE TCHAD	Aerial raids to protect technical aid workers. Protection of French citizens in Shaba. Internal Security duties.

Note

1. Date of the official termination of intervention in Tchad.
2. Date of the repatriation of members of French expeditionary corps.

SOURCE: Statement by Mr. M. A. Peyrefitte, quoted by AFP's weekly, bulletin for Black Africa No. 316 of 4 March, 1964.

Also: Nielsen, W.A. "The Great Powers and Africa," London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, page 431.

ANNEX 16

OFFICERS AND MEN TRAINED IN FRANCE FROM 1961 — 1975

COUNTRY	TOTAL	COMMENTS
Senegal	1,904	
Mauritania	618	
Ivory Coast	1,296	
Niger	516	
Bourkina Fasso	846	
Benin Republic	636	
Togo	429	
Cameroun	1,222	
Congo Brazzaville	920	
Gabon	742	
Central African Republic	550	
Tchad	574	
Madagascar	11,520	
Mali	88	Since 1970 only
Zaire	202	Since 1971 only
Burundi	21	Since 1971 only
Rwanda	15	Since 1972 only
TOTAL	12,110	COST: FF 91,829,000

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence, Paris.

ANNEX 17 DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS, 1973

1. OFFICERS

Services	Schedule Officers			Technial Advisers			Misc.	Total
	Command Staff	General Staff	Instructors	General Staff	Staff Corps	Colleges		
Army	73	3	19	15	28	10	12 16	176
Navy	5	—	1	2	—	—	— —	8
Air Force	5	—	3	3	2	—	— 28	41
Gendamerie	9	3	9	7	12	3	1 8	47
Medical	36	—	—	—	—	—	— 17	53
Total	128	6	32	27	42	13	13 64	325

2. JUNIOR OFFICERS

Services	Schedule Officers	Instructors	Technical Advisers	Executives	Total
Army	91	54	32	193	370
Navy	9	3	2	4	18
Air Force	3	8	1	191	203
Gendamerie	49	89	52	45	235
Medical Corps	8	2	—	9	19
Total	160	156	87	442	845

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence, Paris.

ANNEX 18

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE AND GABON ON LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR THE GABONESE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE

GABON, AUGUST 25TH, 1965

Convention fixing the rules and conditions of assistance from the Republic of France in support of the logistics for the Armed Forces and the Police Force of the Republic of Gabon, signed in Libreville.

The Government of the Republic of France represented by: His Excellency, Mr. Maurice Delauney, Ambassador of France, on the one hand, The Government of the Republic of Gabon represented by His Excellency, Mr. Leon M'ba, President of the Republic, and Head of Government, on the other hand, within the general framework envisaged by the Defence Accord of 17th August, 1960 (14) are agreed the following:

Article 1

Object of the convention

On the request of the Government of the Republic of Gabon, The assistance from the French Republic support of the logistics for the Armed Forces, the air force and the National Police Force of the Republic of Gabon will be given in the conditions mentioned hereunder.

Article 2

Principle of support.

The Republic of Gabon is responsible for the logistic support her units and also takes financial responsibility of her units. The French Republic provides its assistance on the basis of valuable

consideration for this support by the transfer of materials and equipments and by carrying out any request for visits and inspections to the exclusion of all other monetary prescriptions for work and services.

Article 3

Modalities for the support.

The transfers concern, in principle, only materials and necessary supplies to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Gabon. The French combat Forces stationed overseas will not intervene in this support. Every request is to be addressed to the French Representation.

Article 4

Estimate for requirements.

The overall estimate for requirements of all nature, for the National Army for a given fiscal year, are presented on 15th May of the year preceding the current fiscal period in force in the French Army, for a general request for supplies based on the category of materials and following the usual nomenclature.

All the same, requests for ammunitions must be made a year before the date envisaged for the delivery.

Exceptional requests arising from unforeseen needs or departing the normal and current requests could be presented outside the annual General Supply Order but are, as much as possible, to be regrouped quarterly.

Article 5

Modalities of delivery

The lifting of materials, substances or transferred objects, the eventual package, the forwarding, up to a point of delivery fixed by the Government of Gabon are assured by the forwarding agent

accepted by the said Government and empowered by the Ministry of Co-operation close to the French delivery.

The French Military services neither intervene in the execution of tese operations nor in their financial handling. The materials ordered are delivered either in their entirety or according to the periodic requirements.

Article 6

Financial regulation of the transfers

All transfers are carried out for a valuable consideration. The costs of transportation are entirely the responsibility of the Gabonese Republic.

Transfers made through the annual General Supply Order (G.S.O.). The first provisional invoice is sent by the Ministerial Delegation for Armament of the Government of the Republic of Gabon under cover of the Ministry of Co-operation. The time limits for the delivery of the materials are stipulated in an annex. On the face of this invoice, the Government of the Gabonese Republic is to deposit into the treasury of the French Day-Master in the Embassy, a sum equal to 11/12 of the total sum of the inovices. Two cases are therefore clearly discernible:

(a) The materials are to be delivered from the stock of the French Army supplies. In this case, the forwarding agent is immediately notified that the materials are kept at his disposal.

(b) The materials are to be manufactured.

In this case, the order is passed immediately to the directorate concerned and the forwarding agent is notified in good time about the availability of the materials. After aa definitive receipt of money for the transfer and the completion of the delivery, the sale becomes the subject of a second invoice to be transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Gabon through the same channels as the preceding ones. This invoice is governed by the same conditions as the first.

Exceptional Transfers

The transfers corresponding to exceptional requests are submitted through the same regulation as above. All the same, the prices of transfers sare the object of an evaluation which is proposed in the agreement with the Government of the Republic of Gabon, as a preliminary orders made to the delivery service.

Article 7

Field of application

The application of the present convention is limited to the logistic support of units and formations enumerated hereunder:

(Army) Combatant Force: staff of the Armed Forces and organs of the garrisons. First Gabonese battalion comprising in this the training organs.

Air Force; Gabonese squadron comprising '2C' 47 '4' 'Broussards'.

Gendarmerie (Police): Element of the teahcing command, 11 mobile platoons, 36 brigades, merged into three groups and nine sections.

Any modifications to this list will be subject to an additional clause submitted to the agreement of the two parties.

Article 8

The duration of the convention

The present convention is established within the French calendar year for a period of one year and is renewable by tacit consent.

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 19

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND TOGO ON THE SAFETY OF FLIGHTS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFTS

TOGO, 25 OCTOBER, 1965

Protocol of Agreement between the Republic of France and the Republic of Toto in connection with the safety of flights by military aircrafts, signed in Lome:-

The Government of the Republic of France, represented by Mr. Claude-Francois Rostain, Ambassador Extra-ordinary and Plenipotentiary, on the one hand; The Government of the Republic of Togo, represented by Mr. Nicolas Grunitzky, President of the Republic and Minister of National Defence, on the other hand.

Within the general framework envisaged by the agreements for military technicla assistance are agreed as follows:-

Article 1 — Object of the Protocol

The French Air Force and the Togolese Army co-operate in the field of flights safety of military aircrafts by exchanging information and by lending to each other mutual aassistance in the conduct of inquiries into air accidents (disasters).

Article 2 — Principle of reciprocala assistance

The Republic of Togo is responsible for the safety of flights of its military aircrafts.

1. — The French Air Force provides its assistance free by:

— The circulation of periodical documentation and specific information.

— Its participation in inquiries into air accidents sus-

tained by Togolese military crafts and by involving the French military technical assistance personnel.

The French Air Force will, among others things, take part in, on the basis of valuable consideration, enquiries into air accidents involving Togolese military aircrafts and not involving French military technical assistance personnel.

2. — The Republic of Togo transmits to the French Air Force, all information concerning the safety of flights, the activity, the condition of its military aircrafts, and of the safety equipment.

3. — The French Air Force can carry out, on the territory of the Republic of Togo, inquiries into accidents foreseen by the traffic control in force, in the eventuality of an accident happening to a French military aircraft on this territory.

Article 3 — Modalities of Application

To facilitate studies to be carried out and the procedure to follow, the Togolese Army will adopt the definitions of the French Air Force instructions relating to air accidents sand incidents of other nature (instruction 2500/EMGFA/3/SAE of 4th June, 1946, 1965 edition).

1. — Functions of the French Air Force.

1.1 — Concerning the exchanges of information on matters of flights safety:

The French Air Force assures the Togolese Army the free circulation of documentation relating to the flights safety.

1.1 (1) — Texts for general interest:

— Instruction (iv) 22: Consigned to the usage oif navigational personnel.

— Instruction (iv) 25: Code of conduct to maintain in the event of accident and incidents (IM 2500/EMGFA/3 of 4th June, 1946, 1965 Edition):

— Instruction (iv) 18: Flights Safety Officer Manual.

— (IM 2300/EM GFA/3 of 20th April, 1953);

— Instruction card No. 1 from the flights safety bulletin.

— Bulletin of flights safety: "Flash."

— Modifications to the Preceding texts.

1.1 (2) — Texts of particular interests concerning air traffic material common to the Togoleses Army and the French Air Force.

— Instruction card No. 3, 4, or 5 of the flights safety bulletin.

— Manuals and notebooks for the air-crew.

— Supplements for flights safety to the aircrew manuals and notebooks.

— Monthly extracts from the technical bulletin.

1.1 (3) — The French Air Force will study, among other things, requests for information relating to the flights safety which may have been transmitted by the Togolese Army.

1.2 — Concerning the code of conduct in the event of air accident:

1.2 (1) — Any accident involving Togolese aircrafts and involving French military technical assistance personnel:

The French Air Force delegates, if it so deems fit, an officer to participate, by right, in the commission of enquiry into the accident, in collaboration with the Togolese Army. It makes it a point to communicate its decision to the Togolese Army.

1.2 (2) Any accident involving a Togolese military aircraft but not involving a French military technical assistance personnel. On the request from the Togolese army, the French Air Force designates an officer to participate ain the commission of inquiry.

1.2 (3) Any accident involving a French military aircraft on the Togolese territory.

The Togolese Army is to become the addressee for the notification of the air accident.

1.3 All correspondence are forwarded through the intermediary of the French Embassy (Defence Adviser to the Ambassador)

2. Functions of the Togolese Army.

2. (1) Concerning the exchanges of information on matters of flights safety:

2.(1)(1) The Togolese Army transmits to the French Air Force:

The reports of flights safety and card index records of accidents.

— The briefs of the activity and condition (19).

— The briefs of inquiries and the closure of reports of inquiries relating to accidents involving personnel of military technical assistance or happening to the aircraft whose make is still in use (operation) in the French Air Force.

— The inventories of anomalies noted in the course of maintenance operations on Togolese aircrafts whose model or make is still in use in the French Air Force (Special technical reports, hierarchical notices).

2.1 (2) The Togolese Army is empowered to request from the French Air Force the study of all common problems in matters of flights safety; it can, in particular, request the opinion of the French Air Force on measures already taken or to be taken following air accidents or minor accidents.

2.2 Concerning the code of conduct in the event of an accident.

2.2 (1) Any accident involving personnel of the military technical assistance.

The Togolese Army issues the notification of accident and directs it according to the prescriptions or instruction.

2500 — Annex II

2.2 (2) — Other accidents.

The Togolese army is empowered, if it so deems fit, to request assistance of an officer of the French Air Force, in the Commission of Inquiry. For this reason, it must include the notification of accident in its request as stipulated in paragraph 2.2 (1) above.

The accompanyaing expenses involved in the movement of the officer of the French Air Force, are, in this case, the responsibility of the Togolese Army.

(19) Two samples of the short accounts briefs will be forwarded through the Embassy of France (Defence Adviser to the Ambassador).

2.4 Any accident involving a French military aircraft on the Togolese territory. On the request of the French Ambassador, the Republic of Togo will provide its assistance to the Commission of Inquiry sent to the Togolese territory by the French Air Force.

Done in two originals.

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence, Paris.

ANNEX 20

STRENGTH OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES IN BLACK AFRICA BETWEEN 1960 AND 1973

	1960	1964	1970	1973
Old French West-Africa	35,000 (45 garrisons)	9,200 (17 garrisons)	2,640 (1)	2,639 (1)
Old French Equitorial Africa and Cameroun	12,000 (25 garrisons)	6,600 (14 garrisons)	1,130 (3)	3,190 (4)
Madagascar	11,500 (25 garrisons)	5,500 (5 garrisons)	2,650 (5)	450 (6)
T.F.A.I.	1,800		3,900	4,558(7)
Indian Ocean			400	2,572(8)
Total (Minus T.F.A.I. and Indian Ocean	58,500	21,300	6,420(9)	5,279

Note:

1. Dakar: 2,080; Port-Bouet: 330; Niamey: 230
2. Dakar: 2,010; Port-Bouet: 353; Niamey: 276
3. Fort Lamy: 730; Libreville: 200; Bangui: 120; Doula: 80
4. Fort Lamy: 1,881; Libreville: 245; Doula : 64
5. Diego-Suarez: 1,950;
6. -ditto- only.
7. Plus 600 National Army
8. 359 in Comoro and 2,213 at La Reunion
9. Plus Rou Sfer, Algeria, 200.

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence, Paris.

ANNEX 21

DIRECT MILITARY AID (BY COUNTRY) BETWEEN 1960 AND 1973

COUNTRY	AMOUNT (MILLIONS OF FRANCS)
Senegal	17,279
Mauritania	10,166
Ivory Coast	16,585
Niger	14,664
Bourkina Fasso	13,011
Benin Republic	13,011
Togo	6,248
Cameroun	9,695
Congo Brazaville	10,637
Central African Republic	7,744
Gabon	19,693
Tchad	135,836
Madagascar	23,617
Mali	8,948
Burundi	2,044
TOTAL	298,587

SOURCE: Ministry of Defence, Paris.

ANNEX 22

EVOLUTION OF MONETARY RESOURCES FOR MILITARY AID TO AFRICA FROM 1960 — 1974

YEAR	TOTAL RESOURCES	EXPENDITURES		
		DIRECT AID (INC. TCHAD OPS.)	AID STAFF	TRAINEES IN FRANCE
1961—1963	100,396	2,502	—	—
1964	45,092	3,194	—	—
1965	125,341	6,422	—	—
1966	127,651	6,428	—	—
1967	131,303	9,146	—	—
1968	135,171	8,072	—	—
1969	143,129	20,394	—	—
1970	169,200	47,310	—	—
1971	181,000	45,700	—	—
1972	210,000	69,000	—	—
1973	204,100	58,000	134,000	12,000
1974 (projected)	230,500	73,000	141,000	16,500

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 23 EXPORTS TO AFRICA: ANNUAL COMPARISONS FOR THE YEAR, 1977

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE 1975 VALUE	1975 SHARE	1976 VALUE	1976 SHARE	1977 VALUE	1977 SHARE	1977	EVOLUTION 1976	1976 %	1975 %
MOROCCO	3.412	1,5	3,978	1,5	4.719	1,5	+741	+18,6	+566	+16,6
ALGERIA A	8.071	3,6	7.03	2,6	8.76	2,8	+1,752	+24,9	+1,037	+12,9
TUNISIA	2.178	1,0	2.384	0,9	2.622	0,8	+238	+10,0	+206	+9,5
LIBYA	1.731	0,8	1.660	0,6	1.966	0,6	+286	+17,2	+71	+4,1
EGYPT	1,908	0,9	1,573	0,6	1.959	0,6	+389	+24,5	+335	+17,6
SENEGAL	987	0,4	1,258	0,5	1.659	0,5	+201	+16,0	+271	+27,5
IVORY COAST	1,750	0,8	2,356	0,9	3.237	1,0	+881	+37,4	+606	+34,6
TOGO	278	0,1	363	0,1	664	0,1	+01	+27,8	+85	+30,6
NIGERIA	1.982	0,9	2,556	1,0	3.675	1,2	+1,119	+63,8	+574	+29,0
CAMEROUN	1,029	0,5	1,255	0,5	1.576	0,5	+926	+25,6	+226	+22,0
GABON	1.436	0,6	1.875	0,7	2.023	0.6	+148	+7,9	+439	+30,6
CONGO	560	0,3	900	0,3	631	0,2	+269	+29,9	+340	+60,7
ZAIRE	568	0,3	607	0,2	673	0,2	+134	+22,1	+39	+6,9
MADAGASCAR	531	0,2	506	0,2	589	0,2	+83	+16,4	+25	+4,7
REUNION	905	0,4	1,109	0,4	1.294	0,6	+185	+16,7	+204	+22,5
ZAMBIA	76	0,0	132	0,0	66	0,0	+66	+50,0	+56	+73,7
SOUTH AFRICA	1,815	0,8	2,320	0,9	2.438	0,8	+118	+5,1	+505	+27,8

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris.

ANNEX 24

IMPORTS FROM AFRICA: COMPARATIVE FIGURES, 1977

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE							EVOLUTION		
	1975		1976		1977		1977	1976	1976	1975
1975	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	%	%	%	%
MOROCCO	1,781	0,8	1,912	0,6	2,144	0,6	+232	+12,1	+131	+7,4
ALGERIA	3,183	1,4	3,315	1,1	3,894	1,1	+579	+17,5	+132	+4,1
TUNISIA	648	0,3	688	0,2	940	0,3	+252	−36.6	+40	+6,2
LIBYA	804	0,3	1,553	0,5	1,513	0,4	+40	+2.6	+749	+93,2
EGYPT	181	0,1	450	0,1	315	0,1	+135	+30,0	+269	+168.6
SENEGAL	1,027	0,4	1,227	0,4	1,349	0,4	+122	+9.9	+200	+19,5
IVORY COAST	1,637	0,7	2,322	0,8	3,790	1,1	+1,468	+63.2	+685	+41.8
TOGO	284	0,1	278	0,1	266	0,1	+12	+4.3	+6	+2.1
NIGERIA	3,631	1.6	3.642	1,2	4.614	1,3	+972	+26.7	+11	+0.3
CAMEROUN	638	0.3	796	0.9	1.061	0,3	+265	+33.3	+158	+24.8
GABON	1,055	0.5	1.402	0.5	1,830	0,5	+628	+30.5	+347	+32.9
CONGO	254	0,1	242	0,1	167	0,0	+75	+31.0	+12	+4.7
ZAIRE	321	0,1	516	0,2	812	0,2	+298	+58.0	+193	+60.1
MADAGASCAR	380	0,2	442	0,1	627	0,2	+185	+41.9	+62	+16,3
REUNION	310	0,1	366	0,1	381	0,1	+15	+4.1	+56	+18.1
ZAMBIA	337	0,1	325	0,1	445	0,1	+120	+36.9	+12	+3.6
SOUTH AFRICA	1,234	0.5	1.538	0,5	2.470	0,7	+932	+60,6	+304	+24.6

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris.

ANNEX 25

EXPORTS TO AFRICA: COMPARATIVE FIGURES, 1980

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE						EVOLUTION			
	1978		1979		1980		1980	1979	1979	1978
	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	%	%	%	
MOROCCO	4,301	1.2	5,085	1,2	5,011	1,1	-74	-1.5	+784	+18.2
ALGERIA	6,913	2,0	8,215	0,8	3,928	0,8	+679	+20.9	-128	-3.8
TUNISIA	3,377	1.0	3,249	0,8	3,928	0,8	+679	+20.9	-128	-3.8
LIBYA	2,413	0,7	2,904	0,7	2,841	0,6	-63	-2.2	+491	+20.3
EGYPT	2,486	0,7	3,688	0,9	5,450	1,2	+1.762	+47.8	+1.202	+48.4
SENEGAL	1,392	0.4	1,653	0,4	1,746	0,4	+93	+5.6	+261	+18.8
IVORY COAST	3,809	1,1	3,865	0,9	4,801	1,0	+936	+24.2	+56	+1.5
TOGO	729	0.2	728	0.2	711	0,2	-17	-2.3	-1	-0.1
NIGERIA	3,797	1,1	3,245	0,8	5,716	1,2	+2.471	+76.1	-552	-14.5
CAMEROUN	1,879	0.5	2,350	0,6	3,0009	0,6	+659	-28.0	+471	+25.1
GABON	1,234	0,4	1,325	0,3	1,844	0,4	+519	-39.2	+91	+7.4
CONGO	631	0.2	700	0.2	1,097	0,2	+397	+56.7	+69	+10.9
ZAIRE	517	0,2	626	0,2	528	0,1	-98	-15.7	+109	+21.1
MADAGASCAR	614	0,2	867	0,2	1,124	0,2	+257	+29.6	+253	+41.2
REUNION	1,455	0,4	1,784	0,4	1,955	0,4	+171	+9.6	+329	+22.6
ZAMBIA	47	0,0	46	0,0	109	0,0	+63	+137.0	-1	-2.1
SOUTH AFRICA	2,742	0,8	2,247	0,5	4,071	0,9	+1,824	+81.2	-495	-18.1

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris.

ANNEX 26

IMPORTS: COMPARATIVE FIGURES, 1980

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE						EVOLUTION			
	1978		1979		1980		1980	1979	1979	1978
	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	%	%	%	%
MOROCCO	2,351	0,6	2,827	0,6	3,252	0,6	+425	+15.0	+476	+20.2
ALGERIA	3,204	0,9	4,858	1,1	7,431	1,3	+2,573	+53.0	1,654	+51.6
TUNISIA	863	0,2	1,338	0,3	1,677	0,3	+339	+25.3	+475	+55.0
LIBYA	1,717	0,5	2,655	0,6	2,876	0,5	+221	+8.3	+938	+54.6
EGYPT	394	0,1	276	0,1	545	0,1	+269	+97,5	-118	-30.0
SENEGAL	900	0,2	1,032	0,2	792	0,1	-240	-23.3	+132	+14.7
IVORY COAST	3,264	0,9	3,336	0,7	3,317	0,6	-19	-0.6	+72	+2.2
TOGO	188	0,1	221	0,0	264	0,0	+43	+19.5	+33	+17.6
NIGERIA	4,191	1,1	6,382	,14	12,729	2,2	-6,347	+99.5	+2,191	-52.3
CAMEROUN	1,303	0,4	1,331	0,3	1,706	0,3	-375	+28.2	+28	+2.1
GABON	1,598	0,4	2,063	0,5	2,723	0,5	-660	+32.0	-465	+29.1
CONGO	144	0,0	152	0,0	121	0,0	-31	-20.4	+8	+5.6
ZAIRE	670	0,2	703	0,2	735	0,1	+32	+4.6	+33	+4.9
MADAGASCAR	423	0,1	373	0,1	416	0,1	+43	+11.5	-50	-11.8
REUNION	457	0,1	475	0,1	525	0,1	50	+10.5	+18	+3.9
ZAMBIA	359	0,1	916	0,2	955	0,2	+39	+4.3	+557	+155.2
SOUTH AFRICA	3,401	0,9	4,044	0,9	5,087	0.9	+1,043	+25.8	+643	+18.9

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris

ANNEX 27

COMPARATIVE EXPORT FIGURES, 1981

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE						EVOLUTION			
	1979		1980		1981		1981	1980	1980	1979
	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	%	%	%	%
MOROCCO	5,085	1,2	5.011	1,1	6,465	1,2	+1.454	+29.0	-74	-1.5
ALGERIA	8,215	2,0	11,078	2,4	12,815	2,3	+1,737	+15,7	+2,863	+34.9
TUNISIA	3,249	0,8	3.928	0,8	5,241	1,0	+1.313	+33.4	+679	+20.9
LIBYA	2,904	0,7	2.841	0,6	4.930	0,9	+2.089	+73.5	-63	-2.2
EGYPT	3,688	0,9	5.450	1,2	6,166	1.1	+716	+13.1	+1.762	+47.8
SENEGAL	1,653	0,4	1.746	0,6	1.866	0.3	+120	+6.9	÷93	÷5.6
IVORY COAST	3,865	0,9	4.801	1.0	3.861	0.7	/940	/19.6	-939	+24.2
TOGO	728	0,2	711	0.2	798	0.1	÷87	+12.2	-17	-2.3
NIGERIA	3,245	0.8	5.716	1.2	9.232	1.7	÷3,516	+61.5	÷2.471	÷76.1
CAMEROUN	2,350	0.6	3.009	0.6	3.644	0,7	+635	+21.1	+659	÷28.0
GABON	1,325	0,3	1.844	0.4	2.155	0.4	+311	÷16.5	-519	+39.2
CONGO	700	0,2	1.097	0,2	2.179	0,4	÷1.082	+98.6	÷397	÷56.7
ZAIRE	626	0,2	528	0,1	573	0,1	+45	+8.5	-98	-15.7
MADAGASCAR	867	0,2	1.124	0.2	654	0,1	-470	-41.8	÷257	+29.6
REUNION	1,784	0,4	1,955	0,4	2,363	0,4	+408	+20.5	÷171	+9.6
ZAMBIA	46	0,0	109	0,0	93	0,0	-16	-14.7	+63-	÷137.0
SOUTH AFRICA	2,247	0,5	4,071	0,9	5,846	1,1	+1.775	+43.6	+1.824	+81.2

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris.

ANNEX 28

IMPORT COMPARATIVE FIGURES, 1981

MAJOR COUNTRIES	RESULTS OF FOREIGN TRADE						EVOLUTION			
	1979		1980		1981		1981	1980	1980	1979
	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	VALUE	SHARE	%	%	%	%
MOROCCO	2,827	0,6	3,252	0,6	3,453	0,5	+201	+6,2	+425	+15.0
ALGERIA	4,858	1,1	7,431	1,3	12,994	2,0	+5,563	+74.9	+2.573	+53.0
TUNISIA	1,338	0,3	1,877	0,3	2,349	0,4	+672	+40.1	+339	+25.3
LIBYA	2,655	0,6	2,876	0,5	2,736	0,4	-140	-4.9	+221	+8.3
EGYPT	276	0,1	545	0,1	918	0,1	+373	+68.4	+269	+97.5
SENEGAL	1,032	0,2	792	0,1	658	0,1	-134	-16.9	-240	-23.3
IVORY COAST	3,336	0,7	3,317	0,6	2,977	0,5	-340	-10.3	-19	-0.6
TOGO	221	0,0	264	0,0	314	0,0	+50	+18.9	+43	+15.5
NIGERIA	6,382	1,4	12,729	2,2	8,311	1,3	-4,418	-34.7	+6.347	+99.5
CAMEROUN	1,331	0,3	1,706	0,3	2,238	0,3	+532	+31.2	+375	+28.2
GABON	2,063	0,5	2,723	0,5	2,284	0,3	-439	-16.1	+660	+32.0
CONGO	152	0,0	121	0,0	713	0,1	+592	+489.3	-31	-20.4
ZAIRE	703	0,2	735	0,1	841	0,1	-94	-12.8	+32	×4.6
MADAGASCAR	373	0,1	416	0,1	375	0,1	-41	-9.9	+43	+11.5
REUNION	475	0,1	525	0,1	526	0,1	+1	+0,2	+50	+10.5
ZAMBIA	916	0,2	955	0,2	802	0,1	-153	-16.0	+39	+4.3
SOUTH AFRICA	4,044	0,9	5,087	0,9	5,436	0,8	+349	+6,9	+1,043	+25.6

SOURCE: Department of Customs, Paris.

ANNEX 29

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

"ROUMANIA,
8 February, 1965

TRADE AGREEMENT, Signed in Bucharest With Effect From 1st January, 1965 to 10th January, 1969

The Government of the Republic of France and the Governments of Central Africa, the Congo, Gabon and the Islamic Republic of Tunisia, members of the Franc zone, on the one hand, and the Government of the Popular Republic of Roumania on the other, desirous of developing trade relations between them, on the basis of equality and reciprocity, have come together to conclude a Trade Agreement on a long term basis for the reciprocal deliveries of goods for the period, 1st January, 1965 to 31st December, 1969.

Article I:

Within the period 1st January, 1965 and 31st December, 1969, the French and African Governments on the one part, and the Roumanians Government on the other, have agreed to supply to one another, the goods listed in Annex A and B to this agreement. These lists will be complied with each year by the two parties.

Article II:

The signatory governments will accord terms as favourable as possible to themselves and to facilitate the administrative machinery for the import and export of the goods respectively.

Article III:

The authorization for import and export will be conveyed by the responsible authorities in accordance with the value and quantities of the goods involved.

Article IV:

A Joint Commission is hereby created to see to the implementa-

tion of the Agreement. The Commission will determine the equitable value and quantity of the goods involved in the trade to rationalise the trade relations. It can also order a review of the list or decide on the wisdom or otherwise of executing certain sections of the Agreement. The Commission will meet annually alternating between Paris and Bucharest. It can also hold extra-ordinary sessions at the request of either Party.

Article V:

The payment for the goods will be made in French Francs or any other convertible currency.

Article VI:

Either Party coulds propose fresh negotiations to reconsider any possible revision of the Agreement, provided that the negotiation will be carried out only to ensure equal benefits to the Parties, but if nothing positive shappens in twelve months of the discussions, the Agreement will self-destruct (become null and void).

Article VII:

The provisions of the Agreement concluded on 22 February, 1963, are hereby annulled by the coming into effect of the current agreement on 1st January, 1965.

LIST A

EXPORTS FROM FRANCE AND CERTAIN AFRICAN STATES TO THE POPULAR REPUBLIC ROUMANIA

A total of 73 items, including:-
Animal Products
Butter
Tropical Fruits
Vanilla and Spices
Vegetable Oils
Cocoa
Olives
Wines and Spirits

Kaoline
Chemical Products
Medicines
Papers
Books
Powdered Milk
Tissues
Perfumeries s
Rubber
Tanned Leather
Electric Cables
Automobiles
Motorcycles
Sports Goods
Musical Instruments
Different Merchandise

Done in two copies in French and Roumanian, with the two texts having equal validity in Law.

LIST B

EXPORTS FROM ROUMANIA TO FRANCE AND CERTAIN AGRICAN STATES

A total of 104 items, including the following:-
Cheese
Honey
Animal Products
Dry Mushrooms
Paprika
Mustarde
Food Products
Wines and Spirits
Lubricating Oils
Chemical Gods, etc., etc.a

SOURCE: Recuil general des Traites de la France, JOF, 1965 — 1970, Paris, France.

ANNEX 30

BALANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA (Gold and military stores excluded):

IN MILLION FRANCS			
YEAR	SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS	FRENCH EXPORTS	BALANCE
1955	181	64	−117
1960	249,8	163,7	−86,0
1961	271,8	144,5	−127,2
1962	322,6	179,3	−143,3
1963	344,8	272,3	−72,5
1964	349,8	326,9	−22,9
1965	331,5	434,4	102,9
1966	376,0	422,5	46,4
1967	342,0	472,0	129,8
1968	331,5	506,2	174,6
1969	446,9	719,8	272,9
1970	416,5	1 049,6	633,0
1971	440,0	1 002,3	562,3
1972	646	928	282
173	980	10071,0	91

SOURCE: Direction Generale des Douanes, Paris.

ANNEX 31

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA ON CO-OPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH

TEXT - MARCHAS 27, 1968, SOUTH AFRICA

Exchange of Notes constituting an Accord relating to the launching of a Programme known as "EOLE". Entered into force on 27 March, 1968 through the exchange of the said notes.

Done in Cape Town on 27 March, 1968.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Through a Note No. 102/31—1 of 26th April, 1967, you have been kind enough to grant me your consent, in principle,s for the launching of experiments, by the National Centre for Space Studies (NCAA) in the general framework of the French space progrmame "EOLE" from the scientific satellite control station, near Pretoria.

These experiments being outside the assigned mission to this station by the Protocol of 16th January, 1961[1] concluded between the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, and notably, its Article 2, but, having been carred out under the direction of NCSS, an organ which had installed and exploited this station I have the honour to propose to you that the conditions which will apply to them are the following:-

1. The Government of the Republic of South Africa authorises the Government of the Republic of France to proceed to the launching, in the framework of its programmes of scientific and meteorological studies, from the base of the satellite station in Pretoria.

Note: 1. Taken from UNO Agreements, July 1967, p.8.

2. The organ charged with bringing into the Present Accord is, for the Government of France, the National Centre for Space Studies.

The organ charged with bringing into force the present accord is for the Republic of South Africa, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (C.S.I.R.)

3. The Government of France will furnish the Government of South Africa with all the results of scientific studies and all information that the former may judge necessary, provided it is in a position to know the nature of activities which are carried out at the station in Pretoria and these activities conforming to laws and regulations.

4. Necessary security measures are to be taken in conformity with the exigencies drawn up by the South African Ministry of Tranport which reserves the right, from time to time, to take whatever measures to safeguard the security of air traffic.

5. The personnel, materials and equipments sent to South Africa, for the enforcement of this Accord will enjoy the facilities provided for by the Protocol on the installation of the station concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of South Africa and signed in Pretoria on 6 January, 1964.

6. The provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of this Protocol are extended to include the utilisation and the protection of radioelectric frequencies necessary for carrying out projected experiments.

7. The French Government will indemnify the South African Government against all claims which would be presented to it as a result of damages arising from the experiments. I have the honour to request you to confirm the consent of the South African Government of the above mentioned proposals.

In the affirmative, this letter and your reply will constitute the Accord concerning the carrying out of experiments by the NCSS which it proposes to do in the Republic of South Africa.

B. Balay,
Ambassador of France

A.M.G.B. Fourie,
Secretary General of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Cape Town.

II

Cape Town, March 27, 1968

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of today whose purport is the following: (to see the first two paragraphs of Note I).

I hereby confirm to you that the point of view of the South African Government is correctly interpreted in the above mentioned letter and that your letter and this reply will constitute an accord between our two governments.

B. G. Fourie,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs

To H.E. Mr. G. Balay,
Ambassador Extraordinary
And Plenipotentiary of
France, Cape Town.

ANNEX 32

AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC FRANCE

The Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of France (hereinafter referred to as "the Contracting Parties").

Desiring to strengthen the mutuals ties of friendship and understanding existing between their two countries and of further promoting and developing the relations in the fields of culture and education, and guided by the principles of mutual respect for each other's National Sovereignty and Independence.

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Parties shall encourage and develop co-operation in the firles of culture, education, arts and sports between their two countries through:

(i) exchange of university professors, teachers, experts, technicians, scientific research workers, and

(ii) providing scholarships and grants to students and graduates to study at each other's universities, institutions of higher learning, technical training institutions, laboratories, factories and other educational institutions.

ARTICLE II

Each Contracting Party shall, within its capability, undertake to promote studies of the languages, culture and literature of the other Contracting Party at the appropriate educational institutions and utilization of mass communication techniques.

ARTICLE III

The Contracting Parties shall encourage their peoples to learn about the culture of each other by organising exchange programmes for their musical and theatrical groups, artists, actors, musicians, writers and journalists, and by organizing concerts, art exhibitions and lectures in the territories of each other.

ARCTICLE IV

1. For the purose of understanding and learning about the culture and civilization of each other, the Contracting Parties shall, within the limits of the laws of each country, organise programmes for the exchange of books, periodicals, photographs, newspapers, scientific and technological publications, magazines, sound and visual tape recordings, as well as information as to the statistics indicating the general development of their countries.

2. For the purpose of co-operation in the field of mass communications, the Contracting Parties shall undertake to organise programmes for the exchange of films, press, radio and television materials.

3. For the same purpose as stated in the preceding paragraphs the Contracting Parties shall facilitate the exchange of views and information about their museums, libraries and other cultural institutions and also organise the exchange of information about materials illustrating antiquities, natural history and art.

ARTICLE V

Each Contracting Party shall, as possible, grant the citizens of the other the same educational facilities and standard as are granted its own nationals.

ARTICLE VI

Each Contracting Party shall undertake, as far as possible, and within the framework of reciprocal exchanges, to allow citizens of the other Contracting Party to attend schools and institutions of

scientific and techinal research, provided entry requirements are met.

ARTICLE VII

1. The Contracting Parties will endeavour to plan the granting of study scholarships within the framework of the programme of co-operation.

2. In order to have a better understanding and appreciation of training programmes, the subject matter of diplomas, titles and other qualifications accorded in each of the two countries, the Contracting Parties could establish, for information purposes, the comparative level of studies in the two university systems.

ARTICLE VIII

1. For the purpose of mutual technical assistance, each Contracting Paty may request the other to place it a the disposal of such experts as it mays require. This may include exchange of university professors, experts, technicians and scientific workers.

2. In order to promote a mutual co-operation, each Contracting Party will authorise the other to open cultural and teaching establishments on their respective territories, and permit the assignment of the necessary personnel for the running of these establishments.

ARTICLE IX

The teachers and experts referred to in Article VIII and assigned to the territories of the Contracting Parties shall benefit from the privileges and immunities defined by a protocol which is to be established within a maximum period of six months after the signing of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE X

Each Contracting Party shall endeavour, within the limits of the laws of its country, to make available to the other Contracting Party

educational statistics and information that could make useful contributions to the educational development of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE XI

The Contracting Parties shall promote co-operation between the sports organisations of both countries in the interests of the developments of sports and also with the aim of arranging friendly sports competitions between their two countries.

ARTICLE XII

Each Contracting Party will encourage:

(1) The exchange of specialist personnel in the field of social and community development.

(2) Reciprocal exchange of programmes in the fields of youth development and leadership training.

ARTICLE XIII

The Contracting Parties shall, for the implementation of this Agreement, jointly elaborate and co-ordinate through diplomatic channels, biennial plans of concrete undertakings on culturla, educational, scientific and technical exchanges. Negotiations for this purpose shall take place alternately in the countries of the two Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XIV

Both countries shall endeavour to prevent illegal trafficking in cultural property.

ARTICLE XVI

Any amendment to, or revision of, this Agreement shall be made in writing and shall come into force after approval has been given by both Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XVII

At the expiration or termination of this Agreement, its provisions and the provisions of any separate protocols, contracts or agreements or accords made in that respect shall continue to govern any unexpired and existing obligations or projects, assumed or commenced thereunder. Any such obligations, or projects shall be carried on to completion.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each one of the two Contracting Parties will notify the other of the completion of the constitutional formalities required for the coming into effet of the present Agreement. This Agreement shall come into force on the day these notifications have been exchanged.

Done at PARIS this 16th day of May 1984 in two originals in English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

(Signed)
A. NUCCI
(France)

(Signed)
IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI
(Nigeria)

SOURCE: Nigerian Embassy, Paris.

ANNEX 33

LIST OF AGREEMENTS ON THE SUPPLY OF HIGHER EDUCATION EQUIPMENT, ETC.

COUNTRY	TYPE OF AGREEMENT	DATE
Cameroun	— Cultural Convention (article 13)	13/11/60
	— Agreement on cooperation in the supply of equipment for higher education.	8/8/62
	— Cultural Convention (Article (7)	21/2/74
Central African Republic	— Quadripartite agreement relating to higher education.	15/8/60
	— Multilateral agreement on FESAC (1)	12/12/61
	— Agreement on the supply of materials for higher education.	15/5/71
	— Convention as shown in Annex	11/6/71
	— Convention as contained in Annexes 2, 3 and 4.	6/1/72
Popular Democratic Rep. of the Congo	— Quadripartite agreement relating to higher education.	15/8/60
	— Multilateral agreement on FESAC 1.	12/12/61
Ivory Coast	— Agreement on the supply of equipment for higher education.	24/4/61
Benin Republic	— Agreement on the supply of equipment for higher education.	24/4/61
	— Agreement for assistance to the Institute of higher education Benin.	28/6/67
	— Additional protocol to the agreement on the supply of equipment for higher education dated 24th April 1961.	7/9/70
	— Agreement on the supply of equipment for higher education.	27/2/75
Gabon	— Agreement for supply of equipment for higher education.	17/8/60
	— Multilateral agreement on FESAC 1.	12/12/61
	— Additional agreement on the supply of educational equipment.	7/9/70
	— Convention related to the agreement on the supply of educational equipment.	1/5/71
	— dated 30th April, 1971.	1/5/71

Upper Volta	— Agreement on co-operation in the supplye of higher education equipment. — Protocol to the agreement on higher education equipment between France, Upper Volta and Niger.	24/4/61 26/5/71
Madagascar	— Agreement on co-operation for supply of equipment on higher education.	27/6/60
Mali	— Agreement on co-operation of the supply of higher education equipment. — Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment.	22/6/60 10/4/70
Mauritania	— Agreement on cultural co-operation, Section 2 — of the agreement on the supply of higher education equipment.	19/6/61
Niger Republic	— Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment. — Protocol to the agreement on the supply of higher education equipment between France, Upper Volta and Niger. — Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment.	24/4/61 26/3/71 19/2/71
Senegal	— Agreement on co-operation for the supply of higher education equipment. — Agreements on co-operation for the supply of higher education equipment and other conventions as annexed. — Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment, convention and exchange of letters. — Agreement on co-operation in the supply of higher education equipment. — Ditto	22/6/60 15/5/64 13/8/68 16/2/70 29/5/74
Chad	— Quadripartite agreement relating to higher education. — Multilateral agreement on FESAC. — Convention on technical aid personnel at the disposal of the Tchadian Government. — Agreement on the supply of higher education equipment and a convention.	15/8/60 12/12/61 19/15/64 6/3/76
Togo	— Protocol annexed to the agreement on cultural co-operation of 10th July, 1963 concerning special conditions for co-operation in higher education.	28/6/67
Cameroun	— Agreement on Military technical assistance to the Camerounian Armed Forces. — Convention on the role and status of the French Military Mission in Cameroun. — Agreement on military co-operation.	13/1160 13/11/60 21/2/74

Central African Republic	— Quadripartite agreement on Defence, grouping Congol, Chad, Central African Republic and France. — *Convention concerning the organisation and the* internal reform aof the Defence Council for Equatorial African zone. — Military agreement on military technical military assistance.a — Agreement on technical military assistance.	15/8/60 25/8/61 13/8/60 8/9/68
Popular Republic of the Congo	— *Quadripartite agreement on Defence group Congo, Chad, Central Africa and France.* — Agreement concerning military technical assistance. — Convention for the organisation and internal reform of the Council of Defence for the Equatorial zone. — Agreement on Military technical assistance.	15/8/60 15/8/60 25/8/61 1/1/74
Ivory Coast	— Quadripartite Defence agreement grouping Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin) and Niger. — Protocol to the agreement defining the functions of the Council of Defence.a — Agreement on Military technical assistance.	24/4/61 5/1/62 24/4/61
Dahomey (Benin)	— Quadripartite defence agreement grouping Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Niger. — Protocol to the agreement defining the function of the Council of Defence. — Agreement on Military technical assistance. — Agreement on Military technical co-operation and exchange of letters.	24/4/61 9/1/62 24/4/61 27/2/75
Gabon Item: Item:	**Defence agreement + three annexes:-** (a) Aid and Mutual facilities for defence materials in commone use. (b) Technical Military assistance. (c) Status of members of French Armed Forces. — Agreement on co-operation for primary and strategic products — Gabon joining the quadripartite. — Agreement on defence grouping Congo, Central Africa and Chad of 15th August, 1960. — Agreement on military technical assistance.	17/8/60 17/8/60 20/6/61 25/8/65
Upper Volta	— Agreement on military technical assistance + Annex on the status of members of French Armed Forces and another annexes on aid and facilities as well as exchange of letters.	24/4/61

Madagascar	**Military agreement + three annexes:-** (a) Concerning launching of Madagascar Armed Forces and military technical assistance. (b) Status of members of the French Armed Forces. (c) Concerning aid for mutual facility and equipment for external defence.	27/6/60
Item 1	— Agreement on co-operation for primary produce and strategic materials.	27/6/60
Item 2	— Convention on logistic materials.	4/5/66
Item 3	— Convention pertaining to Military Forces + annexes on the commodities earlier mentioned and two exchanges of letters.	4/6/73
Item 4	— Exchange of letters concerning the assumption of responsibilities by Malagasy for industrial installation, supervision of construction, Naval defence at the Diego Suarez.	6/12/74
Mauritania	**Defence agreement + two annexes:-** (a) Concerning the committee of Defence. (b) Co-operation on the production of primary and strategic products. — Military assistance agreement with three annexes: (a) Concerning the establishment of the Mauritanian Armed Forces. (b) Concerning the status of members of French Armed Forces. (c) Concerning assistance and use of mutual facility in defence matters.	19/6/61 19/6/61
Niger	— Quadripartite defence agreement — Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger and France. — Protocol to the agreement defining the functions of the Defence Council. — Agreement on military technical assistance + annexes. (a) Concerning status of French Armed Forces. (b) Concerning assistance and the use of mutual facility for defence matters.	24/4/61 9/1/62 24/4/61
Senegal	— Defence agreement + annexes. — Agreement on primary and strategic products. — Convention on the employment of civilians by French Armed Forces. — Convention on the employment of the French military in the civilian services of the Republic of Senegal. — Agreement on military aid (not ratified).	24/4/61 22/6/60 21/11/61 11/1/62 26/1/66

Senegal	— Convention on the regulation of training facility for the French Army and Senegalese Air Force and the Gendarmerie. — Military agreement + annexes concerning military technical competition organised. — by the Republic of France.a — Convention of the evolution of construction of Naval Bases + annexes relating to the status of personnel involved in the construction of the Naval Base. — Convention defining regulation and condition pertaining to competition in logistics of Ground Forces, Navy and Gendamerie.	26/1/66 29/3/74 29/3/74 29/3/74
Chad	— Quadripartite defence agreement. — Central Africa, Congo, Chad and France.a — Convention concerning internal re-organisation of the Council of defence of the Equitorial African zone. — Agreement on Military Technical Assistance. — Convention fixing the regulation of competitions in logistics for the Tchadian Armed Forces. — Agreement on military co-operation relating to the working of the military hospital of N'Djamena.	15/8/60 25/8/61 11/6/80 19/5/64 & 6/3/76 6/3/76 19/6/76
Sao Tome and Principe	— Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technical Co-operation.	24/1/76
Seychelles	— Agreement on Cultural and Technical Co-operation.	29/6/76
Sudan	— Agreement on Cultural and Technical Co-operation. — Agreement on co-operation in Archeological Materials.	22/12/69 24/12/69
	— Agreement on Cultural and Technical Co-operation.	9/3/73
Zaire	— Agreement on cultural and economic relations. — Air Co-operation Agreement. — Agreement on Higher Education Materials. — Convention on the Protection of Investments. — General Agreement on Military Co-operation.	17/12/63 10/1/64 25/5/70 5/10/72 22/5/74

SOURCE: Journal Officiel du France.

ANNEX 34

TABLE V DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNICAL AID WORKERS BY STATE

COUNTRY	1-1-1962	1-1-9165	1-1-1970	1-1-972	1-1-1974	1-1-9176	1-1-978
BENIN	212	233	196	195	159	157	160
CAMEROUN	560	790	861	857	795	748	730
C.A.R.	360	535	540	460	433	444	424
CONGO	526	541	500	526	489	503	493
IVORY COAST	1272	1535	2258	2961	3318	3174	3291
GABON	317	427	506	529	560	365	577
UPPER-VOLTA (BOURKINO-FASSO)	341	416	477	496	475	439	434
MADAGASCAR	1732	1780	1396	1369	776	726	712
MALI	249	350	386	410	362	350	344
MAURITIUS				47(2)	69	72	71

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation, Paris.

ANNEX 35 TABLE OF DEPLOYED AID WORKERS IN BLACK AFRICA FROM 1960 — 1978

YEAR	EDUCATION			OTHER SECTOR			TOTAL
	Civil	Military	Total	Civil	Military	Total	
1st January 1960	2,416	—	2,416	7,666	—	7,666	10,082
1st January 1961	2,794	—	2,794	5,890	—	5,890	8,684
1st January 1962	3,233	—	3,233	5,320	—	5,320	8,553
1st January 1963	4,040	—	4,040	4,709	—	4,709	8,749
1st January 1964	4,420	255	4,675	4,391	117	4,508	9,183
1st January 1965	4,484	698	5,182	4,005	263	4,268	9,450
1st January 1966	4,630	887	5,517	3,843	529	4,372	9,889
1st January 1967	5,160	961	6,121	3,616	632	4,248	10,369
1st January 1968	5,420	1,082	6,502	3,419	748	4,167	10,669
1st January 1969	5,368	906	6,274	3,122	758	3,880	10,154
1st January 1970	5,552	1,119	6,671	2,871	788	3,659	10,330
1st January 1971	5,808	1,189	6,997	2,810	756	3,566	10,563
1st January 1972	6,350	1,223	7,573	2,793	915	3,708	11,281
1st January 1973	6,442	898	7,340	2,860	1.021	3,881	11,221
1st January 1974	6,245	845	7,090	2,674	1.000	3,674	10,764
1st January 1975	6,418	769	7,187	2,494	593	3,087	10,274
1st January 1976	6,746	662	7,408	2,378	611	2,989	10,397
1st January 1977	6,927	500	7,427	2,340	545	2,885	10,312
1st January 1978	6,936	382	7,318	2,427	395	2,822	10,440

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation.

MAURITANIA	207	226	276	290	298	299	298
NIGER	343	377	542	510	468	447	
SENEGAL	1402	1443	1202	1213	1157	1150	1201
TCHAD	426	528	635	702	645	488	459
TOGO	85	137	105	128	172	199	192
OCAM	293	117	97	81	61		
BURUNDI			70(1)	100	100	110	119
RWANDA			38(1)	76	73	90	90
ZAIRE			245(1)	299	312	268	249
TOTAL	8553	9437	10330	11281	10764	10250	10312 (3)

SOURCE: Ministry of Co-operation.

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