AN IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF OPERATION YAKI AS A SECURITY OUTFIT ON CRIME CONTROL IN SABON TASHA, CHIKUN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF KADUNA STATE 2008-2015.

BY

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA. IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.

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Declaration

I hereby declare thatthe work in this Dissertationentitled **"An Impact Assessment of Operation Yaki as a Security Outfit on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha, Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State 2008-2015"** has been performed by me in the Department of Political Science. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree at this or any other institution.

Name of Student	Signature	Date

Certification

This Dissertation entitled "**An Impact Assessment of Operation Yaki as a Security Outfit on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 2008-2015",** by Dogara Waziri Fadason, meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Masters of Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

With gratitude to God Almighty, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mr and Mrs FadasonWaziri, as well as to the entire victims of crimes in Sabon Tasha.

Acknowledgement

To God be the glory for the gift of life, strength, resources and opportunity to undertake this study. It is an understatement to say 'thank God'. I wish to specially thank the Supervisory Committee of this study; DrAudu Jacob (the Chairman Supervisory Committee), and Dr David Moveh(Member Supervisory Committee) for their untiring efforts, strict scrutiny, criticism and contribution both as my lecturers and supervisors. Their strict supervision of this work has tremendously assisted to produce this document, thank you sirs. A big appreciation also goes to my internal examiner, Dr M.M. Nuruddeen who's thorough, meticulous, and objective criticism and examination of this work contributed tremendously towards improving the standard of the work. Thank you sir.

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Abstract

The challenges of crimes and the need to control the same as a way of living up to its primary responsibility led the government of Kaduna state into creating Operation Yaki in 2008 with the mandate to curb crime and criminality in the whole state. Despite this innovative security measure, Sabon Tasha seems not to be recording meaningful drop in crime rate, hence the need for empirical verification. This study therefore, assessed the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State from 2008 to 2015. Relevant body of literature on crime and crime control were reviewed. Social Control Theory of Criminology was adopted as a theoretical framework. A sample of 100 respondents was derived from the population of Sabon Tasha using multi stage cluster sampling method and questionnaires. In addition, In-depth interviews were conducted with both the personnel of Operation Yaki and residents of Sabon Tasha.The data was quantitatively and qualitatively presented and analyzed. Findings reveal generally that Operation Yaki has impacted positively on crime rate in Sabon Tasha and residents of the area feel more secure now than before the coming into being of the security outfit. Hence it is recommended that government should channel more attention and resources towards the improved functioning of the security outfit in the following direction: The culture of regular maintenance and adequate fuelling of patrol vehicles by government be improved, an upward review of the monthly allowance of members of Operation Yaki be undertaken to boost their moral, government should look into the possibility of having more offices of Operation Yaki across the state for easy access,the security outfit should be less brutal in their dealings with residents of the area, and government of Kaduna State should partner neighboring state governors and convince them to develop similar security measure in their respective states.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Crime and violence are major concerns for mankind. In its 2011 World Development Report, the World Bank (2011) states that insecurity has become the primary challenge of our time. It further says "efforts to maintain security are at the heart of human history" (World Bank, 2011:1). The negative impacts of crime on the political, social, and economic life of every country largely explains why the security and welfare of the people is considered the primary responsibility of government. Consequently, in every society, the search for more effective crime control mechanism and measures have remained a continuous exercise. In line with this, the performance of security and law enforcement agencies is under constant scrutiny and evaluation. The basis for such assessment is usually anchored on crime rates, the lack of general sense of security and public confidence.

In Nigeria, crimesranging from religious and inter-ethnic crises, civil war, post-election violence, agitation for resource control, kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, vehicle theft, homicide, assault, etc. Though the National Bureau of Statistics (2009:252) paints the picture of a drop in general crime rate in the country from 164,798 cases in 2001 to 126,587 cases in 2006, the opposite appears to be the case in later years as revealed by Official Police Statistics (cited in

Okey, 2009: 12) which shows an increase in the rate of murder from 1,629 in 1994 to 2,550 in 2008, Manslaughter from 20 in 1994 to 23 in 2008, grievous harm and wounding from 17,167 in 1994 to 18,733 in 2008, while armed robbery increased from 2,044 in 1994 to 3,142 in 2008. These statistics tend to agree with public perceptions on the rate of crime as well as Newspaper reports on the same in Kaduna State.

Kaduna State is not an exception to cases of violence and crimes. Starting from the kafanchan riot of 1987, Zangon Kataf crises of 1992, sharia crises of 2000, Miss World crises of 2002, post-election crises of 2011 and Boko Haram menace in the state. These security challenges couple with other consequences of crimes constitutes serious challenge to the peace and development of the state. On assumption of office in November 2007, Haz Iwendi the then commissioner of police for the Kaduna State Command observed that there was more fear of violence and crime generally among citizens in the state than incidences of crime itself. A breakdown of the violent crime statistics confirmed by the State Police Command in Newswatch of Sunday April 13, 2008 for the four months before the inauguration of Operation Yaki (i.e. between December 2007 and March 2008) shows that thirty persons had been brutally murdered within that period, averaging at least seven murders a month, 18 armed robbery cases which resulted in the stealing of 16.9 million naira, six cases of rape. The sheer brutality of some of these crimes left witnesses or victims with permanent psychological scars (Adzegehs, 2008). Faced with the aforestated rampant cases of violence and in pursuit of its primary responsibility of protection of lives and property through crime control in the state, the State government came up with an innovative response through the inauguration of a unique security outfit on the 26th of March, 2008 known as Operation Yaki. In a broadcast by the then Executive Governor of the State, Architect Namadi Sambo he declared thus:

> in line with our Eleven Point Agenda and to ensure the security of lives and property of the citizenry and from the reports of the security agencies we received on loss of lives by armed bandit and loss of property such as car-

> snatching, we were propelled to conceptualize and come up with a foolproof security outfit which we codenamed Operation Yaki. . .Operation Yaki is an initiative aimed at eradicating crime and to create a fertile ground for enduring peace, tranquility and development of the state (speeches by Sambo,2008).

With this innovative step taken, crime control in the whole of Kaduna state should be very effective. However, the reality seems to present an abysmal drop in cases of crime with places like Sabon Tasha in Chikun Local Government Area of the state seeming not to be recording meaningful drop in cases of crime. Being an area where cases of crime seemed to be rampant even before the introduction of Operation Yaki; 'good' residents of Sabon Tasha saw the inauguration of Operation Yaki as the beginning of the end of their bad experiences in the hands of criminals considering its mandate, its composition, training and equipment provided to the same among other things. However, the reality in Sabon Tasha seems to present a different outcome contrary to the high positive expectations of the people in the area as cases of crime do not seem to be recording meaningful drop despite the introduction of Operation Yaki hence the need for the impact assessment of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha based on its mandate.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

Cases of crime in Sabon Tasha seems to persistently remain high despite the introduction of Operation Yaki hence the need to understand the effectiveness of Operation Yaki on crime control. It is against this backdrop that this study assesses the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit in controlling cases of crimes in Sabon Tasha from 2008 to 2015 based on its mandate.

Ndagi (1999) has noted that statement of research problem in question form makes a research more clearly focused because the researcher will then be looking for answers to specific questions. Thus, in order to solve the problem stated above, this study attempts to provide answers to the following research questions.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What is the role of Operation Yaki in crime control?

2. What is the rate of crime in Sabon Tasha?

3. Do residents of Sabon Tasha Feel more secure from criminals now than before the creation of Operation Yaki?

4. To what extent has Operation Yaki controlled crimes in Sabon Tasha?

5. What are the challenges facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in sabon Tasha?

1.4 **Research Objectives**

The broad objective of this study is to assess the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha, Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State based on its mandate. The specific objectives of the study include:

1. To ascertain the role of Operation Yaki in Crime Control.
2. To know the rate of crime in Sabon Tasha.
3. To understand the view of residents on the current state of their security from criminals.
4. To know the extent to which Operation Yaki has controlled crimes in Sabon Tasha.
5. To uncover the major challenges facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.
6. To proffer suggestions on ways to make Operation Yaki more effective.

1.5 Research Proposition

1. The role of Operation Yaki has servedto deter criminals.

2. Poor numerical strength and other logistical challenges seem to be the major challenges hindering the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.

1.6 Research Methodology

Two major sources were used to generate data for this study. These include primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected using questionnaire and verbal interview. Secondary data was derived through the use of library, internet and official document such as Police Crime Record.

1.6.1 Instrumentation/Tools used

The instrument used in the collection and gathering of data for this study include questionnaire, verbal interview, official document, internet, and library while the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in the analysis of the primary data collected through questionnaire.

1.6.1.1 Questionnaire

The structured questionnaire employed in this study was carefully crafted having in mind the research questions, objectives, propositions, in order to elicit the best responses from respondents interms of objectivity, frankness on key issues and promptness of response. The rationale behind the use of structured questionnaire is because it measures respondents' perceptions well and it is reliable.

The questionnaire was designed to capture the profile of respondents. It also contained six sections with nineteen questions based on the six objectives, propositions, and questions which the research aims to answer on:

(a) The role of Operation Yaki in crime control.

(b) Crime Rate in Sabon Tasha.

(c) Perceived sense of security in Sabon Tasha.

(d) The extent to which Operation Yaki has controlled crime in Sabon Tasha.

(e) Challenges facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.

1.6.1.2 Interview and Official Document

In order to complement the responses from respondents, In-depth Interview (IDI) was conducted with the State Coordinator of Operation Yaki, his Second in Command (2IC),three personnel of Operation Yaki, seven residents of Sabon Tasha and three traditional leaders in the area on the questions which the research seeks to answer. Basically, respondents provided information on the background, role, relationship between Operation Yaki and residents of Sabon Tasha, the mandate of Operation Yaki on crime control, the impact of Operation Yaki on crime control in sabon Tasha, crime rate in Sabon Tasha, the current state of security in Sabon Tasha and the challenges facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha. The researcher was given a letter by the O/C Operation Yaki to the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) Sabon Tasha Divisional Police Station instructing him to assist with available data on cases of crime in Sabon Tasha for the period 2004-2012 which was granted on the 5th of March, 2013.

1.6.1.3 Library and Internet Research

Secondary data was derived from text books, academic journals, official reports, and the internet. The researcher made use of Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Faculty of Social Sciences Library ABU Zaria, Sociology Departmental Library ABU Zaria, Operation Yaki Joint Head Quarter Abakpa Kaduna, CEDDART Samaru Zaria, the Internet. Many books, academic journals, official reports, academic papers and internet materials were read, and utilized in the course of this research. The review was used to identify relevant body of literature on types and causes of crime, the nature and effectiveness of public and private security outfits, the impact of some anti-crime outfits, inter-agency collaboration in crime control, and challenges to effective crime control. These sources helped in revealing the existing gap which this study aimed to fill. The same aided the researcher in constructing the questionnaire for this research.

1.6.1.4 Statistical Tool Used

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in the analysis of the quantitative data collected through the use of questionnaire in this research as it is deemed reliable and appropriate given its versatility and considering its incredible capabilities and flexibilities in analyzing huge data within seconds and generating unlimited gamut of simple and sophisticated statistical result including simple frequency distribution tables, mean, cumulative mean, percentages, and other distributions.

1.6.2 Research Population and Sample Size

A research population is generally a large collection of well-defined individuals or objects that is the main focus of a research (Erinosho et'al, 2002). Sample size according to Evans, Hasting, and peacock (2000) is the number of observation in a sample that is representative of a larger population.

The population of Sabon Tasha constitutes the population of this research. The area has a total population of 49,073 going by 2006 population census (NPC, 2008). The research focused on the adult from both gender and all the ethnic and religious groups of the population.

The sample size of this research is 100. The sample size of 100 is considered representative enough to the total population of Sabon Tasha Ward in agreement with the Morgan and krejche's (1970, in Hills 1998) standard which holds that a sample size of 384 and above can represent a population size of 1,000,000. A tabular presentation of the distribution of the total population of the Sample size according to the polling units of the ward under study follows below.

TABLE 1.1: Distribution of Total Population and Sample Size According to Polling Units of Sabon Tasha

S/N	Polling Units	Population	Sample Size Per Polling Unit
1	Matari Old Court	1,160	2
2	Matari No. 8	1,107	2
3	L.E.A. Primary School	1,041	2
4	Matari Moro	2,132	4
5	Kafari Close	1,325	3
6	Gobir	1,384	3
7	Ungwan Kadara	2,527	5
8	NITEL Quarters	1,183	2
9	Rakiya Hospital	1,280	3
10	Ungwan Jaba	2,033	4
11	Ungwan Kadara East	1,192	2
12	Kasuwan Dare	1,672	3
13	Ungwan Bido	1,285	3
14	Fadaman Jaki	1,951	4
15	NNPC Quarters	1,335	3
16	Ungwan Gimbiya	1,407	3
17	Juji	748	2
18	Ungwan Sunday	1,312	3
19	Ungwan Sunday II	1,385	3
20	Ugwan Sunday III	2,386	5
21	Ungwan Sunday IV	949	2
22	Ungwan Pama I	1,537	3
23	Ungwan Pama II	2,210	5
24	Narayi New Extension I	949	2
25	Narayi New Extension II	949	2
26	Post Office	2,668	5
27	Narayi New Extension/ Zaria Road	999	2
28	Narayi New Extension/Abuja Road	1,152	2
29	Narayi New Extension/Kune Road	949	2
30	KASUPDA	949	2
31	Ungwan Baro L.E.A. Primary School	3,160	6
32	Ungwan Baro II	2,757	6
	TOTAL	**49,073**	**100**

SOURCE: INEC, 2010

The following formula was used to arrive at the sample size for each polling unit:

$$\textbf{Polling Unit Sample Size} = \frac{\textit{No. of Polling Unit Population} \times \frac{100}{1}}{\textit{No. total population of the Ward}}$$


Using the formula above, the sample size for each polling unit was obtained by dividing the number of population of each polling unit with the total population of Sabon Tasha ward multiplied by the desired sample size of the study. This produced the sample size for each polling unit in proportion to its population.

1.6.3 Sampling Procedure

The study location is Sabon Tasha in Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State, which is populated with a total population of 49,073 (NPC, 2008).Multistage Cluster Sampling was used to get the 100 respondents for this study.

Considering the large size of Sabon Tasha, the non-existent of a sample frame, and for the sake of accuracy and convenience and in order to give every resident of Sabon Tasha equal chance of being selected; **Multistage Cluster samplingTechnique** was used to divide the population of Sabon Tasha into Polling Unit Clusters of convenience. Multistage cluster sampling involves successive stages of sampling which requires the use of any of the well-known probability sampling method at each stage (Palys, 1992).

Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic illustration of sampling Procedure



Having used multistage cluster sampling technique to divide the entire population of Sabon Tasha into polling units as clusters of convenience, **Systematic sampling method**was used to serially arrange the streets in each polling units for determining the selection interval of the street(s) to be sampled. The number of streets in each polling unit was divided by the sample size of the same to get the selection interval. The first street to be sampled in each polling unit was

randomly selected and followed by selection interval. On getting to the selected street(s), a house was randomly selected (per selected street) and questionnaire administered on any randomly selected adult in the house since a house/individual must be sample in any selected street. However, in some polling units like Matari Old court, Matari No.8, L.E.A. Primary School, Matari moro2, Gobir, Rakiya Hospital, Ungwan Jaba, Ungwan Kadara East, Ungwan Bido, Juji, Ungwan Baro II, where the houses are not clearly arranged in streets, respondents were randomly selected using the selection interval as well.

1.6.4 Justification for Sample Selection Procedure/ Sample Size and for Using the Sample Selected.

The multi-stage cluster sampling method used in the selection of the sample for the study was considered appropriate considering the large size of Sabon Tasha, the absence of sampling frame, financial and other costs, and for the sake of accuracy, convenience and reliability. Secondly, it was aimed at giving everybody in Sabon Tasha equal chance of being selected. The essence was primarily to ensure adequate spread and representation of all parts of Sabon Tasha.

The researcher was also motivated to use this sample because of the fact that *Operation Yaki* was created to protect the lives and properties of the people adequately represented in the sample. Thus, they are in the best footing to tell how they think the introduction of Operation Yaki has so far impacted on crime control in the area, and what the government and the community must do to improve such impact. The researcher believes that the responses, comments, and remarks of the people represented in the sample can enjoy a wider applicability.

The sample size of 100 respondents was also considered adequate for the study given its spread, and representativeness of the population.

In order to ensure the realization of the objective of this research, we had to broaden the respondents in both number, depth of experience and strategic position in the workings of

Operation Yaki. In this wise, we interviewed some personnel and leaders of *Operation Yaki*, some residents of Sabon Tasha as well as some Traditional leaders in Sabon Tasha who were not captured in the sample

1.6.5 Target Population of the study

The first category of the target population of this research cut across all members of the existing cultural and religious groups living in Sabon Tasha including male and femaleas well as traditional and community leaders. Here questionnaire and indebt interview were used to generate data. The other category of respondents includes three personnel of Operation Yaki, and information gotten here was through verbal interview. Constituting our third category of respondents were the State Coordinator of Operation Yaki, his Second in Command (2IC) whom we interviewed in order to get some of the needed data for this research.

1.6.6 Hiring of Research Assistant

Three research assistants assisted the researcher in the administration and retrieval of questionnaires. One of the three research assistants is a friend while the remaining two are school mates of the researcher.

Table 1.2: Research Assistants' Polling Unit Covered

S/N	Name	Polling Units Covered by each RA
1	Benjamin Jacob	U/Pama I
		U/PamaII
2	Joseph Yakubu	Ungwan Baro L.E.A. Pri. Sch
		Ungwan Baro II
		NNPC Quarters
3	Nicolas Andrew	Narayi New Extension I
		Narayi New Extension II
		Narayi New Extension III
		Narayi New Extension/Zaria road
		Narayi New Extension/Kune Road
Total	3	10

Source: Field work, 2015

As can be seen, the table above is a breakdown of polling units covered by each RA. The RA assisted in administering questionnaires in 10 polling units which include Narayi New Extension I, Narayi New Extension II, Narayi New Extension III, Narayi New Extension/Zaria Road, Narayi New Extension/Kune Road, NNPC Staff Quarters, Ungwan Baro LEA Primary School, Ungwan Baro II, Ungwan Pama I, Ungwan Pama II. The remaining 22 polling units were covered by the researcher. The 3 RA are capable and reliable; and were adequately educated by the researcher on the methodology of the research.

1.6.7 Informants for In-depth Interview (IDI)

Fifteen informants were interviewed both on the side of Operation Yaki and that of Sabon Tasha community. They consisted respondents from the leadership strata of Operation Yaki (ie the state Coordinator and his Second in Command), and in order to generate firsthand information from personnel of the security outfit in the field, the researcher interviewed three personnel of the outfit which is considered enough to provide the needed relevant data on the activities and challenges of Operation Yaki in addition to the views of the two (the State Coordinator and his 2IC). Within the Sabon Tasha Community, key informants include the District Head of Sabon Tasha, the Village Head, and the Dakacin Ungwan Gimbiya. In addition to the views of the village/community leaders of the area and in order to get the views of other residents of Sabon Tasha, seven residents were interviewed and considered sufficient to provide enough the needed relevant data on the subject under study.

Table 1.3 Informants per stratum

S/N	Strata of Informants	Number
1	Leadership of Operation Yaki	2
2	Personnel of Operation Yaki	3
3	Traditional Leaders of S/Tasha	3
4	Residents of Sabon Tasha	7
TOTAL		**15**

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above breaks down the informants for interview and their strata. As clearly displayed, two (2) interviewees were selected in the leadership stratum of Operation Yaki, three (3) traditional leaders were also selected on the part of Sabon Tasha. Three (3) personnel of Operation Yaki were interviewed; seven (7) residents of Sabon Tasha were also interviewed making the total of fifteen (15) persons interviewed by the researcher.

1.7 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

In analyzing the quantitative data for this research, the researcher made use of descriptive statistical techniques such as transferring data from its source of collection to statistical tables. Frequency distributions, percentages, bar charts, pie charts and histograms were used for the sake of clarity. The analysis was done by summarizing and bringing out the implication of each data as displayed on the table. Qualitative data gathered through interview were recorded, transcribed and analyzed through qualitative method of data analysis.

The justification for using these statistical techniques rests on the need for clarity and easy comprehension of what the data are saying.

1.8 Significance of the Research

Despite the large body of literature on crime and crime control, a study on the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State has not been undertaken. In other words, this research is not aware of any study that focuses on the impact of Operation Yaki as a Security Outfit on Cases of Crime in Sabon Tasha. Even though Musing and Lamb (2011) looked at inter-agency partnership on crime control in southern America and around, their focus was restricted to drug crime control and the nature of the interagency partnership is by far different from that of Operation Yaki. Hence this research has contributed to the existing body of literature in the field of study.

Findings from this research provide a fertile ground for further research on how government can control crime more effectively.

1.9 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research is concerned with the impact Assessment of *Operation Yaki* as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha in Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State from 2008 to 2015

Research of this nature was bound to raise a number of difficult issues and one such key dilemma was the provision of ethical protection for the respondent and other sources of data like Operation Yaki, Nigerian Police Force Kaduna Command. In Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular, the theme of security is a sensitive one. In the course of the study, there was the ethical dilemma of how to preserve individual confidentiality while at the same time needing sufficient information from respondents, Operation Yaki and the Police. The general approach adopted for addressing such problems involved ensuring confidentiality by anonymising all quotes from the interviewees and assuring the respondents that information given by them will be used strictly for academic purpose.

1.10 Conceptual Clarification

For the sake of clarity and easy comprehension of the content of this study, a simple definition of some concepts used in this work is important.

The major concepts in this study include Operation Yaki, Crime, and Crime Control.

OPERATION YAKI

An innovative security outfit created by Kaduna State Government in collaboration with the Federal Government of Nigeria in Kaduna State which rests on the partnership between the personnel of the Nigeria Police Force Kaduna Command, the Military, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps, Federal Road Safety Corps, SSS, Neighborhood Watch Group inaugurated in 2008 with the mandate to curb crime and criminality in the whole of Kaduna State.

CRIME

Crime here refers to an act or omission that thwarts the right of a dignified human existence and has a punishment for its occurrence. It involves certain kind of behavior or conduct such as theft, murder, assault, rape, which cannot be allowed free reign without a disruption of order. Basically, it is seen within the context of this work as a decline of public security and a steady descend into social chaos.

CRIME CONTROL

Crime control refers to the methods taken to reduce crime in a society through swift response and strict punishment for criminals and strengthening of the criminal justice system. It involves the use of both government and private security outfits and criminal penalties as a means of deterring people from committing crimes and temporarily or permanently incapacitating those who have already committed crimes from re-offending.

1.11 Chapter Outline

This research is divided into five chapters.

Chapter one contains the introduction. Chapter two contains a review of relevant literature and a theoretical framework. Chapter three contains the background of the study area, the nature and dimension of crime in Sabon Tasha, types and specific root causes of crimes in the area, and the effectiveness of Operation Yaki in the area. Chapter four takes care of the presentation and analysis of primary data. Chapter five summarizes and concludes.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the main themes of the research literature that informed this study. The key objectives are to place the current study in the context of a wider body of research, and to set out the theoretical framework that guided the research design. In doing this, the researcher reviewed relevant body of literature on crime and crime control. Only the most important and relevant research writings on crime and crime control were considered. The section also supplies logic to this research through a theoretical framework.

2.2 Conceptualizing Crime

Crime has been defined in numerous ways. For instance, Onoge (1993) defined crime as an act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable to punishment under any Order in Council, Ordinance, Law or Statute. Clinard (1974) sees crime as those activities that break the law of the land and are subject to official punishment. To Adler, Muellier, and Lauifer (2001), crime is any human conduct that violates criminal laws and is subject to punishment. Schmallenger (2004) view crime as a conduct violating the criminal laws of a state, the federal or local jurisdiction, for which there is no legally acceptable justification or excuse, while Mills (1989) defined crime as acts that violate laws (formal, official, written statements of norms). According to them, no matter how reprehensible an act or the omission of an act may be, a crime has not been committed unless a specific law has been violated. Moreover, the violation must be either intentional or due to neglect. Tappan (1947) defined crime as an act in violation of criminal law (statutory or case law), committed without defense or excuse, and penalized by the state as a felony or misdemeanor. To Hollin (1983) crime is not only the act that causes social injury (such as imperialism, sexism, racism, poverty) but also

anything that thwarts the right to a dignified human existence (right to life, movement, happiness, liberty, and so on). However, in spite of the differences in the definitions given by the authors above, they seem to agree that a crime is (1) an act or omission (2) that thwarts the right of a dignified human existence (3) prescribed by the state; and (4) has a punishment for its occurrence. Therefore, in the context of this work, a crime is seen as any action or omission, violent or not, that violates human right or the smooth running of public activities as provided by the laws of the land and constitutes a threat to public security and is punishable.

2.2.1Types of Crime

Morenin and Reisig (1995) and Odekunle (1986) categorized the various crimes committed in Nigeria as Normal Crimes, Political and Economic Crimes, Riotous Crimes. Normal Crimes according to them include criminal acts such as theft, assault, homicide, molestation, rape, armed robbery. On the other hand, political and economic crimes have been separated by Odekunle (1986) into Elite Crimes and Working Class Crimes. He divides Elites Crimes into White-Collar (e.g., embezzlement, tax fraud) Political and Economic Crimes (e.g., illegal patronage, vote buying, and /or kickbacks) and Organized Crimes (eg, hoarding, smuggling, burglary, syndicates). Working Class Crimes are mostly carried out by the others for the elite in order to get paid. Corporate crime, or white-collar crime, is crime committed by persons of respectable and high social status committed in the course of their occupation. “These types of crime are rampant and increasing; they are the underlying causes of the recent economic crises” (Crime and Social Control: 14). In white-collar crime, crimes are committed in the elite’s suites of corporate offices. These could include insider trading, safety violations where employees are injured or killed, deception and fraud, and inappropriate use of corporate funds etc. Riotous Crimes are carried out during riots and they are largely violent acts that include assault, killing, and destruction of property. During this period, “practically every order-maintaining regulation is destroyed” (Morening and Reisig, 1995:507). In a similar vein, the Chicago Police Department

in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Incident-Based System (NIBRS) identifies crime types categories based on seriousness of the offence. More serious offences include Homicide, Sexual assault, Robbery, Assault, Battery, Burglary, Larceny, Motor vehicle Theft, Arson.

Crime can simply be classified into violent and property crimes. Violent crimes, or crimes against a person, are when force or threat of force is used in the act. These include robbery, assault, murder, rape, etc. Non-violent crimes or property crimes, are unlawful acts committed with the intent of gaining property, but does not involve the use or threat of force against individual. These include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, arson, shoplifting, vandalism etc (Odekunle, 1986).

Looking at the above body of literature, it is deducible that the various types of crimes can be classified into Crimes against Authority, Crimes against Property, and Crime against Persons. These can further be classified into Nonviolent Crimes (e.g., gambling, embezzlement, vote buying, and fraud) and Violent Crimes (e.g., Robbery, Assault, Battery, and Molestation).

2.2.2 Causes of Crime

While majority of the literature identify social factors such as poor parenting, influence of delinquent peers, and substance abuse as the major causes of crime, others see economic and biological factors like unemployment, income inequality, poverty, and inherited genes as the causes of crimes in every society. However, the causes of crime can be categorized under the following headings:

(i)Biological Factors

The physical body, through inherited genes, evolutionary factors, brain structures, or the role of hormones, influences individual's involvement in crime (Sacket, 1988). Men with the extra Y

chromosome are most likely to commit crime (Stevensen and Forsythe, 1998). However, available evidence fail to support this view as a later study provided some evidence the vast majority of men involved in crime do not have an extra Y chromosome (Brennan, Mednick, and Volavka, 1995). This factor therefore, is only of limited relevance to our understanding of causes of crime. While Sacket (1988) provided a broader look at the biological causes of crime, their view seems to be lacking in terms of detail explanation. On the other hand, the concentration of Brennan, Mednick, and Volavka (1995) only on the influence of chromosomes is too limited to provide a proper understanding of the subject under consideration. However, their views cannot be completely rejected as it can be useful in understanding the causes of crime in Nigeria and Sabon Tasha in particular.

(ii)Social Factors

The rate of poor parenting and alcohol consumption appear to influence levels of violent crimes. Other potential influences include the availability of fire arms, rate of family breakdown, the percentage of sole parent families living in poverty, and the levels of rural-urban migration (Weatherburn, 2001).

Certain kinds of parenting behavior or family environment increase the risk of juvenile involvement in crime (Weatherburn, 2001). Parenting factors known to be related to crime include parental neglect (e.g. large family size, poor parental supervision, inadequate parent-child interaction), parental conflict and discipline (e.g. abuse or nagging, harsh, erratic or inconsistent discipline), deviant parental behaviors and attitudes (e.g. parental criminality, parental violence or tolerance of violence), and family disruption (e.g. chronic spousal conflict or marriage breakup). As might be expected, the children of families with several risk factors, whether from the same or different categories, are more likely to become involve in crime than the children of families with just one or two risk factors (Loeber and Stoutharner-Loeber, 1986).

A study by Furstenburg and Teitler (1994) looks at the effect of marital disruption before and after the actual act of separation through divorce that may influence a child's development. They found that in marriages that are disrupted, parents may have high levels of conflict, be more prone to economic stress, and meager parenting practices. Such abnormalities according to Weatherburn (2001) could give birth to truancy which he believes can affect the child's academic performance. "There is evidence that truancy remains associated with juvenile involvement in crime because juveniles who truant are exposed to a range of criminal opportunities they would not encounter while under the supervision and surveillance of school authorities" (Weatherburn, 2001:4).

In a study on unraveling juvenile delinquency, Glueck and Glueck (1950) opine that young people who associate with delinquent peers are much more likely to get involved in crime. This is a function of weak parental controls or attachments (Warr, 1993). It becomes easier to such young individuals to get involved in crime because delinquent communicate deviant attitudes and values (Bruinsma, 1992).

The agreement between the views of Glueck and Glueck (1950), Warr (1993), and Bruinsma (1992) is that the interactions between individual and delinquent peers play a major role in causing individual's involvement in crime. However, while this seems to agree with the reality in the world, Nigeria and Sabon Tasha in particular, it is a matter of degree as Hirschi (1969) maintains that some criminologist have argued that delinquent peer influence exert little or influence on participation in crime. The problem with Hirschi's position is its failure to provide the names of the criminologists and more detail of their argument.

Alcohol has been shown in behavioral experiments to increase aggression hence it is difficult to study the causes and persistence of high crime rate without considering the role of alcohol (Peak and Spencer, 1987). Heavy drinkers are more likely to commit alcohol-related

violent offences than light drinkers. Alcohol has been identified as a prime contributor to rising violent crime in Baffin Region (Griffiths, Curt, Zellerer, Wood, and Seville, 1995). Of the offenders that come to contact with the criminal justice system, many do so for offences committed following the use of alcohol beverages (Wood, 1991).Auger, Doob, Auger, and Driben (1991) showed that from 31 percent to 48 percent of all violent offences committed in three Nishnaube-Aski Nation communities (a political territorial organization representing 49 communities within northern Ontario in Canada) were alcohol related. Similarly, Laprairie (1991) in her analysis of police occurrence reports recorded in James Bay Cree communities (an Indian settlement in sub-arctic Canada); found a high degree of alcohol involvement for many types of violent offences. For example, she found that alcohol was involved in 76 percent of assaults and 100 percent of sexual assaults. In all, of the 500 occurrence reports which recorded alcohol as being involved in an offence, "69 percent of interpersonal and 16 percent of property offences involved alcohol" (1991:50). Alcohol was implicated in anywhere from 56 percent to 83 percent of violent offences against the persons in five Alaska Native Villages studied by Marenin (1992). On various Indian reservations in the US, according to Steward (1964), the violent offender was under the influence of alcohol in anywhere from 59 percent of all types of offences committed. In Australia as well, "alcohol is a factor in as much as 80 to 95 percent of all Aboriginal entanglement in the legal process" (Sacket, 1988:66).

Mills (1989) finds that in Wind River Shoshone (the seventh-largest Indian reservation in Wyoming United States), out of those convicted for violent felonies, 82 percent were intoxicated at the time they committed their offence. Of those offenders, 77 percent had three or more previous alcohol-related arrests. In a survey of 30 native homicide offenders done by Bachman (1992), all were under the influence of alcohol during the commission of their offence except one.

A host of studies from across the globe show that many of the individuals held in correctional institutions were incarcerated for violent offences committed under the influence of alcohol. In the United States, for instance, depending on year, anywhere from one-third (36 percent in 1986) to one-half (49 percent in 1979) of state prisoners, two-fifths (41 percent in 1989) to one-half (48 percent) of municipal and county jail inmates, and nearly one-third (32 percent in 1987) of juveniles held in state institutions were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offence that landed them in the institution (Baunach, 1985; Beck, 1991; Beck, Kline, and Greenfeld, 1988). In England, 38 percent of young violent offenders in a borstal admitted drinking prior to their present offence (Hollin, 1983) while 67 percent of juvenile trainees being held for violent crime were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offence for which they were being held (Cookson, 1992). Studies in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Iceland have shown that roughly 60 to 80 percent of violent offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offence (Hague, 1990).

Many people who commit crime also consume illicit drugs (Stevenson, 1996). Many criminals commit more serious crimes when they become addicted to drugs. On the other hand, Stevenson and Forsythe (1998) hold that drug consumption almost certainly does cause crime but not by driving large numbers of people into crime. The seemingly rise in the level of substance abuse in Sabon Tasha tend to justify the position of the scholars above to some extent.

Drug production and drug possession are both significantly associated with high violent crime rates. For instance, Fajnzylber,Lederman, and Loayza (1998) believe that the incidence of intentional homicide is statistically larger in countries that produce drugs. This goes with the popular view that violent crimes increase with drug trafficking and consumption. Drug possession rate is also positively associated with robbery rate. In Columbia, an empirical study of the determinants of rising violent crimes measured by the homicide rate, found that in the seven major cities, the main explanation for increase of violence in the 1980s was drug trafficking

(Garfield and Arboleda, 2003; cited in Heinemann and Verner, 2006). In the same line of belief, Boyd (1999) argued that it is not difficult to conclude that Washington suffers a culture of violence that does not exist in Brussels. This according to him is because in Washington, a largely black underclass is engaged in an illegal drug trade; fire arms are occasionally used to control market transactions. There is no parallel reality in Brussels.

In Nigeria, Alcohol has contributed immensely to various violent crimes (Odedeji, 1989). Apart from alcohol, the increase in the consumption of hard drugs such as hallucinogen intoxicants, Codeine, heroin, morphine, paregoric methadone, and marijuana contributes in determining the rate of crime in the country (Obot, 1992).

Buvinic and Morrison (2000) argue that violent crime rate in Latin America are strongly correlated with city size. They suggest that crowding intensifies anti-social behavior and that transient population cannot foster the level of social cohesion that tends to keep violence at bay. Others point out that rapid and poorly managed urbanization can trigger a dynamic of mutual reinforcement between increase violent crime rate and crumbling law enforcement institutions (Gavira and Pages, 1999). However, Fajnzylber,Lederman, and Loayza (1998) finds a weaker correlation between urbanization and homicide rate, and more significant one with robbery rate. Thus robbery is likely related to population density and the social interactions that arise from it. A study on Colombian Cities by Gavira and Pages (1999) supports this conclusion, finding a strong correlation between violent crime and city's growth rate. Thus, the authors suggest that a high incidence of violent crime is to an important extent a reflection of many cities inability to keep with an increasing demand for public safety brought by hasty and disorderly urbanization process.

In explaining the rising rate of violent crime by the Aboriginal population in the urban centers of Calgary, Regina, and Saskatoon, Trevethan (1993) argue that the difference in violent crime

pattern between Aboriginal and non-aboriginal persons may be attributed to several differences in the quality and quantity of population. Boyd (1999) looked at the causes of a rising violent crime rate in Canada in the period before 1980. He concluded that a better explanation flows from a demographic increase in the relative size of the country's male population between the ages of 15 and 24. In England the significant population increase from 4 million to 8.5 million between 1600 and 1800 gave rise to elite concern on a rising crime incidence (Johnson, 1981). The rise in violent crime rate in Africa has been attributed to the lower police-population ratio in countries like Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Kenya; and on the high level of poorly managed urbanization in South Africa (Vander Spruy and Rontsch, 2008).The authors above are united on the view that a rising population and poorly managed urbanization give birth to increase in crime rate. The population of Nigeria keeps rising from 18.7 million in 1921 to 140 million in 2006 and to 163 million in 2010(NBS,2012:3). Kaduna State being the third most populated state in the country courtesy of the sudden rise in its population to 6,113,503; and Chikun Local Government where Sabon Tasha is located is populated by 372,272 (NBS,2009). Coupled with the not-too-good management of urbanization in the Country and Sabon Tasha in particular which is largely a slum; the situation in our study location can be said to agree to a large extent with the opinion of the scholars above.

The level of ease of access to fire arms is a major determinant of trend in violent crime, especially murder and robbery (Yablansky, 2000). In addition to the sheer number of guns leading to violent crime, "firearms could increase assault and murder if the presence of guns somehow causes individuals who are otherwise unlikely to engage in violence to do so" (Conklin, 2002:124). In Africa it has been revealed thus,

> Out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa, about 30 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa alone. The majority of these Small and Light Weapons about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8% by police and

> 0.2% by armed groups. Eight million new guns are manufactured every year by at least 1,249 companies in 92 countries. 10 to 14 billion units of ammunition are manufactured every year enough to kill every person in the world twice over (Okeke and Ojo, 2014:418).

In the East of Congo, over 300,000 weapons are held by civilians (Alpers, Wilson, and Rossetti, 2012). In Somaliland in Somalia's north, a survey by the UNDP has revealed the availability of over 550,000 small arms in civilian possession, accounting for one of the factors responsible for the high concentration of violence in the area. However, this estimate may not be representative of Somalia as a whole (Karina, 2009). Nigeria is a source/origin, transit and destination of small and light weapons. The exact origins and transit countries of illicit small arms and ammunition flows into Nigeria are from Cote d'voire, Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Kosovo Serbia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroun, and within Nigeria itself (Nte, 2011). For example, in June 2007, it was reported that the police confiscated 40 pistols from a local blacksmith in Niger State. Also a blacksmith in Plateau State who in 2004 with the help of some Nigeria politicians traveled to Ghana to receive training on gun manufacturing for pistols and short guns is one of these local sources of small arms (Vines, 2005). The widespread proliferation of small arms in Nigeria is contributing to alarming levels of crime and militancy (Nte, 2011). The proliferation and use of Small and Light Weapons in ethno-religious violence and armed robbery have killed more than 10,000 Nigerians, and average of 1000 people per year since 1999. Injuries due to Small and Light Weapons have increased as much as ten-fold in urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using Small and Light Weapons (John, Mohammed, Pinto and Nkata, 2007; Nte, 2011). Between November 2006 and February 2007, 212 cases of violent crimes were reported in Nigeria, 189 of these were carried out with firearms, 34 with other tools and two involved bombs (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). With the widespread violent crime in Sabon Tasha, the area cannot be said to be an exception to the view of Emeh.

In spite of the variation in scope, context, and methodology; the preceding body of literature stresses the fundamental position of poor parenting, high rate of alcohol and drug consumption,

the accessibility to firearms, demographic composition, size and quality; and the negative impact of high incarceration rate as the major social determinants of the persistence of high violent crime rate.

Though most of their views tend to agree with the reality in Nigeria and Kaduna State in particular, it is a matter of degree. In most parts of Kaduna State, Sabon Tasha in particular, the rate of population expansion as well as drugs and alcohol consumption seem to be on the rise and could be responsible for the rising rate of violent crime in the area. However, contrary to the view of some scholars above who blame it on drugs and alcohol, NOPRIN Research Findings (2010) tends to locate the causes elsewhere when it reveals that several factors contribute to the growth of violent crime in Nigeria, including a rising youth population, poverty, and unemployment. Political violence has increased since the return to electoral politics in 1999, as some politicians cultivate, arm, and use political gangs to eliminate or intimidate their opponents or rig elections. Additionally, "militants in the oil rich parts of Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, have access to illicit arms easily. The combination of these factors has increased the prevalence of and access to small arms in Nigeria, and "automatic and semi-automatic rifles, shot-guns, machine guns and shoulder-fired rockets are readily available for purchase in parts of the country" (Okey, 2007:13). Together, these factors produce a high incidence of gun-related crimes, including armed robbery in Nigeria.
Ebbe (1989) examined the geographic distribution of violent crimes and delinquencies in Lagos. He found that violent crime is on the rise in high and medium rent residential districts. He concludes that patterns of juvenile delinquency in Lagos are "products of heterogeneity of the population due to the influx of native and foreign migrants and resulting conflicts of value . . . under conditions of a lack of social integration created by the heterogeneity of the population and the resultant weak social control coupled with the bad economic conditions, some of the migrants and juveniles become enmeshed in crime and delinquency" (Ebbe, 1989:764). Because

the children of the well-to-do in Nigeria are protected from arrest and adjudication by their parents' status, while the less advantaged delinquent are caught and processed through delinquency system, it makes it difficult to control the rising rate of violent crime in the country (Odekunle, 1986).The unchecked persistent strikes in the Nigerian educational sector have institutionalized a legacy of increasing intellectual poverty and criminal activities among the youth (Egwakhe and Osabuohien, 2009).

(iii)Economic Factors

In a study that aim to understand the root causes of crime and violence in Sauth Africa, Louw (2000) concurs with the view that although no automatic causal link can be said to exist between poverty, as absolute deprivation; a stronger relationship seems to suggest itself between inequality and crime. Similarly, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002:37) investigate the relationship between Gini index and homicide and robbery rates within and between countries. They (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002:37) conclude that:

> Crime rates and inequality are positively correlated within countries, and this correlation reflects causation from inequality to crime rates, even after controlling for other crime determinants

Individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic status scale are more likely to participate in crime. There are some notable exceptions to this rule but, generally speaking, they involve crime which is relatively minor in nature (Braithwaite, 1988). The 1999 United Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice concludes that the socio economic strain measured by unemployment, inequality, and dissatisfaction with income is a major factor in explaining the variation in crime among countries in the world (UN Global Report on Crime and Justice, 1999 cited in Buvinic and Marrison, 2000). Similarly, in an extensive research, Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2000) looked at the economic determinants of a rising violent crime in Latin America. They found that economic inequality is associated with high intentional homicide and

robbery rates. Countries with more unequal income distribution tend to have higher violent crime rate than those with more egalitarian patterns of income distribution. Minnis (1963) pointed to poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to farmland among the Shashone-Bannok of Fort Hall, Idaho as a reason why that American Indian reservation had violent crime rate many times that of surrounding non-Indian communities or the national average.

However, the relationship between income inequality and violent crime is not completely straight forward. Some countries have seen decreasing income inequality accompanied by an increase in violent crime (measured in homicide rate) such as Brazil and Venezuela, or a decrease in homicide rate accompanied by an increase in income inequality (Costa Rica, and Mexico) (Morrison, Buvinic, and Shifter; 2003).

A considerable body of evidence supports the notion that young men in particular respond to economic returns of crime, and these returns will be perceived as larger if legitimate employment is scarce or non-existence. Thus there is an argument that unemployment is a factor motivating increase in violent crime rate in urban areas of Latin America (Ayres, 1998). In the words of Curling (2008:30) "poverty does not directly cause violent crime. But poverty without hope, poverty with racism and poverty with numerous daily reminders of exclusion, can lead to the immediate risk factors for violent crime".

Of all the economic factors identified by the literature above as determinants of trends in crime rate; unemployment, income inequality and poverty appear to be the strongest. To a large extent, the same could be the case in Nigeria, Kaduna State, and Sabon Tasha in particular where there seem to be a widening national income inequality from 0.4% in 2004 to 4.1% in 2010. In Kaduna State, the inequality gap has widened from 0.37 in 2004 to 9.2 in 2010 (NBS, 2010). The rate of unemployment in Kaduna State has increased from 8.40 in 2002 to 11.6 in 2008 (NBS, 2009). Poverty in Nigeria has recorded a tremendous rise from 17.1 million in 1980 to 112.47 million in

2010. In Kaduna State, 61.5% of the population is poor (NBS, 2010). In Sabon Tasha in particular, the number of the unemployed and the poor tend to be on the rise.

For instance, in a research on youths, electoral violence and democratic consolidation in Nigeria, Inokoba and Maliki (2011) revealed that youths in Nigeria have been repeatedly used as instruments of violent electoral crimes such as violent demonstrations, intra and inter-political party fighting and other politically motivated violence, ritual killing, kidnapping and hostage taking, arson and cult related violence because bulk of the youths are unskilled, uneducated or poorly educated, unemployed and children of parents of poor socio-economic status. This view is in agreement with Nweke's (2005) postulations. He posited that factors that are responsible for youth-led electoral violence include the following: "a good number of youths who engage in such violent crimes come from embattled and economically poor homesteads; they are either uneducated or school drop-outs. High rate of unemployment and underemployment especially among graduates of tertiary institutions is yet another factor, moral decadence in youths as well as political manipulation of the psycho-cultural dispositions of youth towards elections by political elites" (Nweke, 2005:392). Using information collected from personal interviews with convicted armed robbers, Ekpenyong (1989) attempted to assess the influence of personal factors on the commission of armed robbery in Nigeria. In the end, he argues that general economic conditions are the root cause. Armed robbery is "the logical outcome of differentials in access to valued goods" (1989:33). Armed robbers aspire to the same material possession that the rich have achieved by criminal means. They emulate on the streets, by robbing with a gun, what bureaucrats and capitalists steal with a pen. Odekunle (2005) singled out relative poverty and unemployment as factors responsible for the rise in violent crime rate in Nigeria. Adelekun (1990) and Egwu (1990) traced the problem of rising violent crime in Nigeria to the crises of global capitalism with its cycles of boom and recession. According to these scholars, the response of the Nigerian state to this crisis was in the form of retrenchment, mass unemployment

and food crises, all of which have led the worsening of the violent crime situation in Nigeria. Akinride (2007) located the increasing violent crime incidents to the problem of declining income and low savings. With no income coming in, and no saving to fall back on, many retrench people during the global economic crises found themselves struggling for survival. Many that cannot find alternative jobs but must keep body and soul together decide to plunge to violent crime. Similarly, Arinze (2010) in his own submission emphasized unemployment, and high inflation rate which eroded real income as factors responsible for high violent crime incidence in Nigeria. Individuals who are prone to involvement in crime offend more frequently during periods of unemployment. Odekunle (1978) views the dynamics of underdevelopment as the major cause of crime and relates all crimes happening in Nigeria to the nature of its political economy. "Crime in Nigeria occur within the context that are characterized by conflicts, political instability, extreme differences in economic wellbeing, uncertainty about the courses of future events, and a shifting balance of formal and informal social control mechanism" (Morenin and Reisig, 1995:503).

Out of the entire economic factor mentioned above as the causes of crime; poverty, unemployment, and inequality appear to be the strongest. However, the notion that income inequality and crime rates are positively related is considered as conventional wisdom in the literature of economics and criminology (Lee, 2002) this is so because in countries such as South Africa, inequality between groups does not appear to be too important in respect to crime…furthermore, there is no correlation between crime and inequality between racial groups (Demombynes and Ozler, 2004).

(iv)Political Causes

Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999) opined that a country's level of impunity and political corruption, perceived lack of justice and its link to political exclusion are among the political

factors which contribute to the legitimization of violent crime. Many see the high levels of political corruption and impunity as one of the key reasons for the high violent crime in Latin America (Buvinic, Morrison, and Orlando, 2002). Denoux and Carter (1975) argue that political environment with the following features are more prone to generate high rate of violent crime: denial of basic political rights and civil liberties or political exclusion; highly repressive regimes that engage in gross violation of human rights; endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites; the presence of safe havens that are poorly governed, or ungoverned spaces; pre-existing, protracted and violent local conflicts that can be exploited by organizations seeking to advance their agendas; state sponsorship of violent extremist groups, and discredited regimes with weak or non-existent opposition.

While the scholars above seem to agree despite the difference in scope and context; that bad leadership, political corruption and impunity determine trends in violent crime, it is the position of Denoux and Carter that seem to apply better considering its wide scope. The issue of bad leadership, corruption and impunity in Nigeria and Kaduna state in particular is arguably a known reality. For instance Adeyemi (1990) believes that violent crime increase in Nigeria because the bad leadership and corruption produce uneven development, urban migration, inadequate and misguided education, cultural anomie, and an inefficient criminal justice system. Violent crime also increases in Nigeria as a result of the failures of policy makers to implement well-constructed plans that address the needs of development and the population. The failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments, forge national integration and promote what can be called real economic progress, through deliberate and articulated policies, has led to mass poverty, and unemployment. Poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed for given course at token benefit. This has resulted into violent communal, ethnic, religious and class conflicts that have now characterized the Nigerian nation (Salawu, 2010).

(v)Accessibility to a Place

Spelman (1992) examined the association between abandoned unsecured residential homes and crime on the blocks on which these homes were located. He found a positive association. He does provide evidence that the only significant difference between the blocks with abandoned homes and those without such homes was that the former had more owner-occupied buildings.

Rengert and Wasilchick (1990) provide evidence from interviews with burglars that drug dealing locations might draw predatory offenders to an area to purchase drug. These offenders then may commit predatory crimes in the area surrounding the drug places.

Several studies suggest that the more access people have to an area or place, the more crime in the area or place. Friedman et'al (1989) examined the effects of Casino gambling in Atlantic City on crime in the small towns along the main route to the resort. They found that crime counts increase in these towns relative to towns not located on routes to Atlantic City. The increase in the rate of crime therefore is attributable to the increase in outsiders passing through the towns. Unfortunately, the authors provide no evidence that the social composition and structure were not changed by the growth of Atlantic City. Nasar (1981) examined stores with varying crime counts and found that those with the most violent crime are located on major thorough fares. Comparisons of high-and-low crime neighborhoods and street segments show that area accessibility is associated with higher crime rates. The more people pass a place, the greater the chances that the place will be the scene of a crime. This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis that places that attract large numbers of people will suffer more victimization. This suggests that facilities attract people into the block, some of whom are motivated to commit crimes (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981).
In spite of the difference in scope and focus, the scholars above agree that places located on

routes to public or populated centers are prone to violent crimes. As the colonial capital of the then Northern region, Kaduna state attracts people from different parts of Nigeria. This could account for the cases of violent crimes in the State.The major Railway Station that is located in Sabon Tasha attracts people to the area especially when a train arrives or is being awaited. These could partly explain the persistent concentration of a high violent crime rate in the area largely in line with the view of the scholars above.

The general consensus in theory seems to suggest that crime rate is positively linked to the benefits of crime, while it is negatively correlated with the costs of crime. Thus, factors such as legitimate earnings opportunities, expected benefits from criminal activity, probability that the crime will be successful, and punishment that a criminal will pay if caught are considered the major determinants of criminal activity.

(vi) Communication and Technology in Organized Crime

The internet has proved to be a useful tool for connecting people and facilitating commerce, and criminals have also taken advantage of the new opportunities offered by it for carrying out their illegal activities (Williams, 2001). The label of organize crime has evolved to include cyber criminality, street gangs and institutional groups.

With the emergence of the new of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and in particular computer in the last century, criminals found themselves within a new environment in which to operate. Beginning in the mid-1990s when the internet was commercialized and the number of internet users started growing impressively, crimes related particularly to computer networks have increased with fewer personal risks and costs and offering a profitable environment to existing crime syndicates (Baquai, 2001).

The internet can be abused as an instrument for criminal purposes by both individual and organized groups to perpetuate new forms of offences against computer data and systems.

Moreover it has served as a medium or a facilitator for illegal activities for committing "traditional" crimes (Adamski, 1999).

The role of computer networks in facilitating sexual exploitation of women and children both locally and internationally has been underlined by some studies. For instance, enabling sexual predators to reach their victims in different ways. Furthermore, the phenomena of "sexting" and child pornography have been investigated (Jaishankar, 2009), and certain websites have been defined as "criminogenic" because of the number of tools-such as chat rooms-that are present and that can ease interactions between potential offender and expose them to the rationalization of their offences(D'ovidio et'al, 2009). Similarly, some scholars have emphasized the role of the internet in trafficking in human beings (Council of Europe, 2003).

2.3 Crime Control Conceptualized

In a study on school crime control and prevention, Cook, Gottfredson and Na (2010) view crime control as the strict management of law enforcement with the aim of bringing down the rate of crime. To Schubert (2009), it is the protection of society from criminals by regulating criminal conduct and justice. Bell and Manchin (2011) see crime control as the strict and swift punishment for criminals which in return benefits society by striking in criminals because they will be harshly be punished. From the foregoing, it is safe to see crime control as the methods taken to reduce crime in a society through strict and swift punishment for criminals and strengthening of the criminal justice system.

2.3.1 The Nature and Effectiveness of some Public and Private Security Outfits on crime Control

While some of the literature (Oluwafemi, Adegboyega, and Bamidele, 2014; IFRA Nigeria, 1996; Abrahamsen, 2005; and Adegoke) tend to suggest that public security outfits have not been as effective as expected due to lack of adequate funding, modern equipment, training, remuneration;

others (such as Ebbs, 2013; Shearing et'al, 1985; and Storms et'al, 2010) insist that the ineffectiveness of public security outfits numbers among the major reasons that explains the re-emergence and wide acceptance of private security outfits which are effective to some extent in complimenting the roles of public security outfits. However, some (such as Nigeria content online of November 17th, 2010) hold that the private security outfits in Nigeria are performing below expectation due to poor condition of service of personnel and exploitation by management of some of the outfits.

As a dominant public security outfit in the country recognized by section 114 (1) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, the Nigerian Police Force is as old as Nigeria itself and has seven departments ("A"-"G") with specified duties ie Finance and Administration, Operations, Logistics and Supply, Investigation, Training, Research and Planning as well as Information and Communication. Police Force are vested by several statutes (ie Police Act, Criminal Procedure Act, and the Public Order Act) with broad powers to investigate crimes, to apprehend offenders, interrogate and prosecute suspects, grant bail to suspect pending completion of investigation, search and seize properties suspected to be stolen or associated with crime, serve summon and host of others (Alemika, 2013). With the statutory provision/function of the police, the public security outfit has not been effective in the fight against crime efficiently in the country. The organization has been bedeviled with inadequate funding, lack of modern technological equipment, inadequate training and poor remuneration (Oluwafemi et'al, 2014). The ineffectiveness of the Nigeria Police was further confirmed by findings from a study by *Institut Francaise de recherché en Afrique* (IFRA Nigeria, 1996) which reveals a not encouraging public perception on the effectiveness of the Nigeria Police Force in crime control as only 29% of all households felt that the activities of the police were satisfactory. Almost all found fault with the activities of the police, except for about 10% that could not assess the impact of the police.

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) is also a public security outfit established by Act of 2013. NSCDC had also been assigned to play crucial roles in grassroots security system and

nation building. It has power to arrest with warrant or without warrant, detain, investigate and institute legal proceedings against any person who is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence, investigate and take necessary step to forestall any planned act of terrorism and report same to appropriate security agency among others (Abolurin, 2011). It is rather disheartening to state that most Nigerians do not know the constitutional responsibility of the organization despite the availability of the offices across states of Nigeria federation. Amendment of the NSCDC Act 2007 empowered the organization to have arms squad. However, a cursory look at the armed men of this organization, one can infer that NSCDC is grappling with lack of sufficient and modern firearms. Trailing behind the foregoing, it is difficult for NSCDC to be effective in crime control in the country (Oluwafemi et'al, 2014).

In the Nigeria context, there are other public security outfits/paramilitary organizations organized to assist military or perform specified security functions. These include: Nigeria Prison Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Road Safety Corps, Nigeria Fire Service, and Custom Service (Abolurin, 2011). The effectiveness and efficiency of these public security outfits ought to have complimented the inefficiency of the Nigeria Police, However, the inefficiency of the aforementioned organizations had not been addressed, hence, the infiltration of small light weapons, contraband goods and influx of aliens into the country without necessary documents (Alemika, 2013). The ineffectiveness and inefficiency of public security outfits in Nigeria is vividly captured in the words of Oluwafemi et'al (2014:214) in a study that look at the Irony of Multiplicity of Security Outfits and Security Challenges, thus:

> The pre-eminent security outfits-the Nigeria Police have been incapacitated to subdue the menace of criminality in Nigeria while the Security and Civil Defense Corps with the new armed squad men seem unfit to make an impact apart from their humanitarian service. . . . the porosity of Nigeria borders and infiltration of weapons and ammunition from neighboring states accounts for the inefficiency of Nigeria Customs Service and Immigration Service.

Based on the position of the scholars above, it is deducible that public security outfits in Nigeria have not been as effective as expected. The failure of these security outfits to live up to their individually given mandate of crime control could explain the decision of the Kaduna State Government to bring together some of these public security outfits to form a unique crime control outfit named Operation Yaki as a way of searching for a more effective crime control strategy in the state.

The ineffectiveness of public security outfits has been attributed as one of the reasons for the re-emergence, acceptance and growth of private security companies around the world. For instance, a United Nations Report (2014) holds that the growth of private security outfits in recent times is a result of growth in fear of crime, the inability of the public security outfits to provide adequate security that people and organizations demand, privatization programs that expands private sector involvement, the growth of mass property such as shopping malls, football stadiums etc. the growing risk of terrorism, which means that greater protection is required at places at risks of such attacks. This is further confirming by Badong (2009) who believes that the activities of private security outfits help to reduce security deficit, particularly in urban centers of Ghana. In his words;

> in the face of police inefficiencies and incapacities, they perform roles that would either not have been performed by the police, such as guarding residential areas or providing CCTV operation or, if the police were to perform such tasks, like guarding Airports and other critical national infrastructure, that would have further overstretched their limited capacity. Thus, PSCs compliment the police, and . . . can serve to make the police more effective by enabling them concentrate on other more essential duties such as criminal investigation (Badong, 2009:48).

Private security companies around the world provide variety of services focusing on crime control such as enhancement of community safety and, in some instances, measures to increase the likelihood of offender apprehension, the security of public places of entertainment and shopping and the protection of residential areas, work places and critical infrastructure (Golsby, 1998). The growth of private security outfits in recent times can be seen in that in many countries, such as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Israel; the budget of private security companies and the number of personnel they employ exceeds those of public

Police, (Richards and Smiths, 2007). In India, the ratio of private security to police is estimated to be 4.98 to 1, with the number of private security personnel estimated at over 7 million (Florquin, 2011). Latin America is a region where private security is also frequently used. Research shows that there are 1.6 million security guards and private "watchmen" registered in this region, with an estimated 2 million unlicensed guards (UN Report, 2014).

> The growth in size of private security companies has been matched by an expansion of its role. Indeed, many of the functions traditionally assumed by the public police are now undertaken by private security companies, such as patrolling of public areas, investigation of crimes, the exercise of powers such as search and arrest and the provision of armed guard services, to name a few. The presence of uniform security guards in mass private spaces, such as shopping mall, universities, hospitals, gated communities and entertainment zones, or at the doors of hotels and banks, is now ubiquitous in some states, as is their role in protecting government facilities such as office complexes and critical infrastructure, including transport hub and energy facilities (UN Report, 2014:2).

However, the specific date on the emergence of private security outfits in Nigeria is controversial; however, the industry has a long history in the country and has become a major part of the nation's economy. Adegoke (2008) noted that Private Guard Companies began in 1965, when Alhaji Mumuni Founded the Nigerian Security and Investigations Company (NSICO). This was followed by the establishment of the Nigerian Investigation and Safety Company in 1967; Omo Security Services, which started operations in 1971; Metropolitan Guards, and Arkego Nigeria Limited, Founded in 1980. Contrary to this view, CLEEN Foundation (2001) in its analysis links the history of private security companies in Nigeria to the work of a man named Victor Vanni in the early 1970s. Whereas Adegoke (2008) noted that the ineffectiveness of public security outfits, the expansion of private property in Nigeria and Africa generally tend to be key factors responsible for the growth of private security. He further observed that,

> property owners have realized the commercial benefits of utilizing their own security company, since public security agents are unable to meet the security needs of various segments of the public, hence, the growing acceptance of private security guards in the country and the continuous demand for their services by individuals and corporate organizations to safeguard the safety of their lives and properties (Adegoke, 2008:14).

This observation tends to contradict the opinion that the activities of private security guards prior to Nigeria's independence laid the foundation of the re-emergence of private guards companies in the country (Inyang and Abraham, 2014). However, the fact is that private security outfits do exist in Nigeria and it is growing at a rapid rate. This is affirmed by Nexus Strategic Partnership Limited (2004) in its observation that Nigeria Private Security Industry has expanded rapidly, and has offered its services to international organizations, NGOs, embassies, local and international businesses particularly the multinational oil companies. Also, Abrahamsen and Williams (2005) in their independent study on the Globalization of Private Security, observed that there are between 1,500 and 2000 private security companies in Nigeria, and they employ more than 100,000 persons. On the mandate of private security outfits in Nigeria, section 1 (1) of the private Guard Companies Act Cap 367 of laws of the federal republic of Nigeria (cited in Inyang and Abraham, 2014:788) holds thus;

> As from the commencement of the PGCs Act, no organization shall perform the service of watching, guarding, patrolling, or carrying of money for the purpose of providing protection against crime unless the organization is registered as a company under or pursuant to the company and allied matters; has applied for and has been granted a license by the minister in accordance with the provision of this act; and is wholly owned by Nigerians in accordance with the schedule to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act.

This implies that the mandate of private security outfits in Nigeria is that of watching, guarding, patrolling or carrying of money for the purpose of supplying protection against crime. Therefore organizations which intend to perform the services of watching, guarding, patrolling, carrying of money in Nigeria must meet the aforementioned section of the PGCs Acts to operation freely and such organization must not employ the use of firearms in its operation (Inyang and Abraham, 2014).

However, the effectiveness of private security outfits elsewhere shows that a considerable number of states such as Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Cyprus, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Norway, Philippines, Spain, and Thailand reported that assisting the police, and especially informing the police of criminal activities was the major contribution of private security outfits in crime control (Shearing et'al, 1985). The private security industry has become a significant source of security and

employment in the Caribbean and is likely to remain for some time an influential player in the development of the region (Epps, 2013). The private security industry is a crucial component of security and safety in the United States and abroad. Today, private security is responsible not only for protecting many of the nation's institutions and critical infrastructure systems, but also for protecting intellectual property and sensitive corporate information. U.S. companies also rely heavily on private security for wide range of functions, including protecting employees and property, conducting investigations, performing pre-employment screening, providing information technology security, and many other functions (Storms et'al, 2010). In Nigeria, the effectiveness of private security outfits has been limited by poor working condition, high level confidentiality between private security outfits and their clients in concealing vital information from guards in order to deny them due benefits. A relevant case cited in an article in Nigeria content online (an online magazine) of November 17th, 2010, presents the challenge being faced by some guards working with Real Assets, Halogen Security Limited, and Prudential Guard who complain of absence of benefits and poor salary as a result of their company taking too much percentage from what the clients are paying. A Personnel of one of the security outfits in the country was quoted in Nigeria content online of 17th November, 2010 as saying

> I worked with two security outfits for 16 years. I started with Amnesty Security and I was with them for five years; I later left to join Prudential Guard, for which I worked within the capacity of security operative to supervisor until the time I left, one of the reasons I left was poor condition of service. No matter the time you put in, there is no pension; there is no gratuity. . . .Where ever a guard is posted, the client has no interest in him. If he sustains injury in the line of duty, he is on his own.

Another former staff of a private security outfit interviewed by the same magazine laments that

> we are still here because there are no other jobs for us to do. I have worked for over 20 years. My salary was 300 naira when I started. Everything was good then. They even negotiated with clients to increase guards' salary. Now, all of that had stopped, especially now that they have more clients. No medical and retirement benefits. You are not allowed to go on leave; and nothing is given to you when your appointment is terminated. It took me over twenty years to be able to earn 20,000 naira as monthly pay. For over five years now, some guards have not

received increase in pay. This is modern slavery hence the poor performance of private security companies in Nigeria.

Suffice it to say from the foregoing body of literature that, the ineffectiveness of public security outfits is one of the reasons that encourages the re-emergence and wide acceptance of private security outfits, however, private security outfits in Nigeria cannot be said to be living up to expectation consequent upon the above challenges being experienced by personnel in the industry. This could explain the decision by Kaduna State Government to bring together some security outfits into forming an innovative security outfit known as Operation Yaki in its search for a better and more effective solution to crime control in the state.

2.3.2 Interagency Collaboration in Crime Control

In the endless search for more efficient and effective methods of crime control, Criminal Justice Scholars have noted the tendency for greater government investment in "partnerships" and "coalitions" (Rosenbaun et'al, 1998). While crime prevention was once regarded as a matter solely for the police, it is now difficult to find reference to crime prevention, either in official policy statements or criminological literature, which do not also refer to the need for multi-agency involvement and cooperation. The last decade has also seen the creation of a variety of specific multi-agency crime prevention initiatives, and an increase in research attention being paid to such things as 'multi-agency partnership' and 'inter-agency co-operation'. (Sampson, Stubbs, Pearson, and Blogg, 1988).

In its identification of those agencies that are deemed to be competent in addressing crime control, the state has reinforced its decentralizing approach by moving away from the idea of them being solely responsible for addressing this issues. In doing so, the state is developing a new role, in which it is now responsible for both expanding and enhancing the role of local level agencies in the management of crime control (Garland, 2001). " the primary objective is to spread responsibility for crime control onto agencies, organizations and individuals that operate

outside the criminal justice system and to persuade them to act appropriately" (Garland, 2001:125). While Garlands stand on inter-agency involvement in crime control, his focus is on those agencies outside the criminal justice system. Based on this, his position can be said to be away from the composition and working of Operation Yaki as a security outfit to some extent.

Musing and Lamb (2011) focus on the effectiveness of Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), an interagency drugs control Task Force that consist of fourteen countries, five military services, law enforcement agencies and five intelligence agencies. They (Musing and Lamb, 2011) point out the successes recorded in the fight against drug cartels in Southern America and around which they hold that it's a function of the coming together of these countries and agencies.

In a study that looks at interagency partnership in crime prevention, Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) posit that if effective crime prevention requires the involvement of a range of agencies or groups having separate and sometimes quite different policies and procedures, there will need to be some means of harmonizing these. Similarly, Hope and Murphy (1983) suggest that crime prevention effort in the absent of coordination can be both wasteful and ineffective. "We have encountered cases where a lack of clear coordination has had a serious impact on the functioning of particular multi-agency groups, and in one or two cases, a lack of adequate coordination appears to have led to the demise of such group" (Liddle and Gelthorpe, 1994:17). In Nigeria, Interagency collaboration on crime control has received some level of recognition. The most prevalent is the collaboration among the military, police, Department of State Security (DSS), Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), the Nigeria Custom Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) and the collaboration is often in the shape of a Joint Task Force (JTF) e.g. JTF Operation Pulo Shield, JTF Operation Safe Haven, JTF Operation Restore Order, Operation Hakuri etc.

The scholars above tend to be saying, that interagency collaboration in the fight against crime is fast becoming the desire of most countries today. However, the success of such partnership depends on co-ordination since they are different agencies with different training and mode of operation. However, they tend to be concerned strictly with crime prevention rather than crime control generally. Though Musing and Lamb (2011) seem to present a more relevant case, their focus is limited to drug crime control and involves international organizations, agencies and countries, far from the picture of Operation Yaki.

2.3.3 The Impact of some Anti-Crime Outfits on Crime Control

The approach towards security provision in Nigeria mostly comprises the efforts of the Police, Army, Navy, Air Force and other paramilitary agencies in the form of Joint Task Force (JTF). This is so because certain cases of insecurity such as insurgency appear to overwhelm the Nigeria Police Force, the primary institution responsible for internal security in the country,

The first JTF established in post-military Nigeria was code named Operation Hakuri. Operation Hakuri had as its mandate the protection of lives and property-particularly oil platforms, flow stations, operating rig terminals and pipelines, refineries and power installations in the Niger Delta (Tom, 2000). The Task Force was deployed to the Niger Delta region to counter the operations of Niger Delta Militants in Odi Community following the killing of some military personnel in the area in 1999. Rather than live up to its mandate, it was the activities of this Operation that led to the massive destruction of lives and property after two days of continues bombardment of Odi community in the Niger Delta (Human Right Watch, 1999). Following Operation Hakuri was the OPERATION PULO SHIELD established in 2004 and mandated to counter Insurgency, Piracy, Illegal Oil Bunkering, Kidnaping and Hostage Taking in the Creeks and Coastal areas of the Niger Delta and other adjoining states and to make the region peaceful and conducive for Multinational Companies to operate (Azuatalam, 2012). This Operation

covers nine states of the Niger Delta region-Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers States and it comprised mainly of military personnel, some elements from police, Department of State Security (DSS) and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). Some of the achievements of Operation Pulo Shield include reduced militancy in the region, the provision of enabling environment for the Amnesty Program introduced by the federal government.

> OPERATION PULOSHIELD made some modest achievement. A total of 315 patrols were carried out; this led to the arrest of 16 vessels, 2 barges and 199 Cotonou boats. Also 498 illegal refineries were destroyed. Additionally, 372 suspects were arrested and over 190 assorted arms and 237 ammunition were recovered. All the items and suspects are in the custody of the Task Force and are undergoing various stages of interrogation (Operation Pulo Shield: 14).

However, despite the involvement of Operation Pulo Shield in the Niger Delta Region, criminal activities such as oil theft, illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism, operation of illegal refinery persist, with resultant huge loss of revenue to the government (Aaron, 2010). In a study that looks at Nigeria Security Force and the Management of Internal Conflict in the Niger Delta, Dode (2012) opined thus,

> Despite the application of sea, land and aerial bombardment in Gbaramatu Kingdom by the JTF with the aim of flushing out Niger Delta Militants from the Creeks; such actions have made the militants go harder and tougher on government oil facilities and officials whenever they had the opportunity. If the military option were the best solution to the lingering oil-related crises in Nigeria, it would have sufficed to state that after the Gbaramatu military operations, the militants would down their weapons and vow never to engage in such activity any more. However, weeks after, they resurfaced in the Lagos water/creek areas. This tends to support strongly, the thesis that there are better options to the Niger Delta Crises than constant military bombardment and occupation (Dode, 2012:8).

Similarly, oil installations were attacked and oil workers particularly expatriate staffs, at any rate, initially were taken hostage for ransom. All these were happening, in spite of the heavy presence of Operation Pulo Shield who was some times over run by the superior fire power of the militants (Aaron, 2010).

Away from the Niger Delta to Northern Nigeria where insurgent activities, ethnic and sectarian violence have been witnessed at different times, the Nigeria State established similar JTFs as in the Niger Delta to restore order and counter the activities of the insurgents. In plateau state which has been a theatre for ethnic and sectarian violence of different degrees since the end of military rule in 1999, a security Task Force code named Operation Safe Haven was established in 2010. Comprise of the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) and Department of State Security (DSS), the Police component consists of the Mobile Police and the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB); the Operation Safe Haven was charged with the responsibility to curtail the spate of killings by ethnic militiamen and restore order on the Jos Plateau and its environs (Itiri, 2015). Findings from a study that critically investigates the role of Operation Safe Haven in the Jos Conflict suggest thus, people's views and experiences of the roles of and impacts of Special Task Force Operation Safe Haven vary widely according to leadership of the Task Force and residential area. In some instance, religion was found to be a factor in people's evaluation of the performance of the security agents as respondents displayed high degree of sensitivity to the religious affiliation of the Task Force commander and the religious composition of the Task Force Platoons. In all the five Local Government Areas studied, there were several allegations of ethno-religious one-sidedness in the conduct of some security personnel through collusion with vested interest groups to perpetuate violence and insecurity. It was also discovered that the not-good-enough impact of the JTF is evident in that; but for some locations mostly in the urban areas, in the rural areas farmers still live in fear of attack at night and when they go to farm. Several people have been displaced and many farmlands have been destroyed. Furthermore, recourse to alternative militaristic and 'spiritual' measure for guaranteeing personal safety by some citizens reveal the weak impact of Operation Safe Haven in the state (Para-Mallam and Hoomlong, 2013).

> In almost all the attacks in the villages of Ryom and Barkin Ladi; ethnic cleansing in Heipang, simultaneous attacks in Kuru, Babale

> and Foron there have been allegations of the involvement of the soldiers, a situation which has done much damage to image and credibility, of soldiers. This level of distrust from the citizenry leveled at the security agencies has led many of the citizens to take the law into their hands on the assumption that no institution of government can guarantee them security (Para-Mallam and Hoomlong, 2013:13).

The apparent insecurity in Borno State and some states of the North Eastern part of Nigeria occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram insurgents led to the establishment of a Joint Task Force code named 'JTF Operation Restore Order' in June 2011 (Sagir,2012). The mandate of Operation Restore order was to restore law and order to the north eastern part of Nigeria and Borno in particular by serving as a counter weight to Boko Haram whose activities has dealt a blow to the socio-economic life of residents of the area. Operation Restore Order comprised members of the Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Armed Forces, Department of State Security, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service and Defense Intelligence Agency (Itiri, 2015). The Operation Restore Order was later renamed Operation BOYONA drawing from the North-Eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Subsequently, the Operation's name was changed to *Operation Zaman Lafiya* which translates to English to mean Operation Live in Peace. Another dimension to the fight against the insecurity in the north-eastern region of Nigeria is the growth and spread of Civilian JTF groups. Born and nurtured in Maiduguri by local authorities in 2013, they played an important role in pushing the insurgency out of the city, and they eventually formed in Borno's rural areas and in neighboring states; the Cameroun and Chad equivalent are known as *comite´s de vigilance.* However, Civilian JTFs are alleged to have been involved in serious abuses, including extrajudicial execution and rapes, sometimes in association with security forces. But in rural areas, they have provided essential local knowledge and intelligence to security forces and more importantly, given people a chance to reconnect with the state who otherwise may have looked to Boko Haram for protection (Crises Group Africa Briefing, 2006:7). . . . "and when it seemed the Boko Haram insurgent were not embracing the peace as expected in the Operation, the Operation was further recode named

Operation Lafiya Dole which means Operation Peace by Force" (Itiri, 2015:53). The Multinational Joint Task Force, a combination of regional and wider international military that had seemed death at mid-2015 was revived. Most significantly, forces from Chad, Cameroun, and Niger were allowed to intervene on Nigeria Territory around Lake Chad. As a result, Boko Haram was pushed out of areas like Dikwa, Gambaru, Abadam etc (Crises Group Africa Briefing, 2006). However, the activities of the various JTF Operations in the North East have been found to be loaded with cases of human right abuses. For instance, the National Human Rights Commission (2013) has received several credible allegations of gross violations by officials of the JTF, including allegation of summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention amounting to instrument and outrages against the dignity of civilians, as well as rape. In particular, "we have received persistent and credible allegations of indiscriminate disposal of dead human remains by personnel of JTF. . . the case against the JTF include allegations of extra-judicial executions, torture, indeterminate incommunicado detention, indicating a pattern of internment without clear rules; practice that could violate the absolute prohibition in international law" (National Human Rights Commission, 2013: 7).

A concise assessment of the various JTF Operations in Nigeria is contained in the words of Teslim (2013, in Itiri, 2015:53) when he submits thus,

> The above scenario has played out in several JTFs operations in Nigeria and, has brought untold hardships and wanton loss of lives to the civilian population whom they claim to offer security to and at sometimes, the insurgents escape the operations. Hence, the civilians have always been in danger of both insurgency and counter insurgency operations in Nigeria. In the Niger Delta, the JTFs operations are not different from the picture above.

It is revealing from the above body of literature that JTFs have served as quick response to violent security challenges in Nigeria and in this role though the various Joint Task Forces in the country have served as managers of such security challenges with some level of positive impacts, Joint Task Forces Operations are yet to prove to be the final solution providers to such cases of

insecurity as they are deployed mainly to limit their operations on the treatment of violent symptoms (in some cases wrongly, leading to violation of human rights) and not the causes of the problem. The case of Operation Yaki may not be any different. Though the various Joint Task Force Operations in the country as presented by the scholars above tend to wear the same composition as Operation Yaki, none of the scholars has examined the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha. Secondly, the terrain of Operation and the nature of the insecurity which Operation Yaki is mandated to curb cannot be exactly the same as those of Operation Pulo Shield, Operation Restore Order, Operation Safe Haven etc. hence the chances of Operation Yaki having a different impact on insecurity from theirs.

Worried by the dramatic increase of crimes and criminal behavior such as cattle rustlers, witchcraft, banditry (and other crimes associated with rural life) in the rural areas of Tabora, Shinyanga, Mwanza, Mara, and Singida regions of Tanzania between mid-70s and 80s and the inadequacy of law enforcement agencies (ie police and courts) to effectively and sufficiently meet the challenge, Voluntary anti-crime groups known as *Sungusungu/Wasalama* emerged opting to defend themselves and their properties against criminals poised for the acts and behavior. The impact of *Sungusungu/Wasalama* is evident with remarkable success in terms of crime prevention, reduction, and control through arresting, exposing culprits and seizure of property involved in crimes committed or about to be committed (Mgeja, 2000). Similarly, Badong (2009) has identified the relevance of the activities of vigilante groups in providing effective security solution to large constituencies of Ghanaians dissatisfied with the formal security and justice system. "They are able to deliver relevant security solutions whilst simultaneously helping to foster a culture of security among residents by empowering them to make their own security decisions" (Badong, 2009:23). However, in view of the continues use of Ghana as a transit point for drug trafficking to Europe and North America (Akyeampong, 2005), as well as the manufacture and large presence of small arms in the country, the phenomenon of Macho-men has the explosive potential of negatively impacting on security in the

country, particularly if such groups are recruited as drug traffickers for their networks and expertise. Such prospect is particularly high in economically deprived areas, and threatens the security and stability of the community through the formation of gangs and the attendant turf wars that would ensue (Aning, 2005). On the other hand, Ad-hoc groups that form in reaction to specific threats, such as villagers mobilizing against cattle rustling by nomadic Fulani herdsmen, can generally be said to impact positively to security as they enable a rapid response to an immediate security threat, and can serve to provide temporary solutions whilst longer-term solutions are sought (Badong,2009).

> Largely unable to access adequate security from the state, a large section of Ghana has resorted to non-state and self-help mechanisms to address the gap in security provisioning. These mechanisms include private security companies, communal arrangements and vigilante groups. They thus make up for the lapses of the state agencies, and are largely seen by the public to have positive impact on security in the country (Badong, 2009:20)

In a study that looked at the impact of Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), an interagency drugs control Task Force consisting of fourteen countries, five military services, law enforcement agencies and five intelligence agencies, Musing and Lamb (2011) have made known the impact of the anti-crime outfit in terms of contributing over 50% of the total cocaine seized by law enforcement agencies.

However, the views of the scholars above tend to paint the picture of some functional anti-crime outfits with largely, positive impacts on crime control. However, this could be the case with Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.

2.3.4 Challenges to Effective Crime Control

Several reasons have been identified as obstacles to effective Crime control. On their part, Alemika and Chukwuma (2008) locate the root of the problem on the colonial era when the excesses of the police against the community were not controlled. This, according to them, made the public to view the Police as their enemy, and as instruments of violence and subjugation; as extortionist and harbingers of bad news and trouble. Consequently, they (Alemika and

Chukwuma, 2008) identify the lack of public trust in the Police, Police brutality, Police Corruption, inadequacy in resource and management as major hindrance to effective crime policing in Nigeria. This view is supported by other scholars who generally argued that police Corruption and the way the Nigerian Police is being used as instrument of coercion is posing serious challenge to effective crime control (Adebayo and Ojo,2009; Odinkalu, 2005). Similarly, NOPRIN Research Report (2007) sees Police Brutality like torture, killing extortion, and rape as serious obstacles to effective Crime Policing in Nigeria. Looking at Police Brutality from the context of the killing of six young persons labeled "armed robbers" in Apo, Abuja; the research, covering 400 Police Stations reveals a Police institution whose task of crime policing has been criminalized. Consequently, "far from being a scourge to crime and its perpetrators, the NPF is now a danger to public safety. . ." (NOPRIN Research Report, 2007:2)

Despite the variation in scope and methodology, it is deducible from the stated body of literature above that, of the four factors identified above as obstacles to effective crime control, the two strongest in the literature appear to be Police Corruption and Police brutality. The similarity in view notwithstanding, Alemika and Chukwuma (2008) provide a more detail analysis of how the police acquired the attitude of corruption and brutality and how the same is hindering their effectiveness. The reasons for the difference and similarity being that, while Alemika and Chukwuma (2008) trace the problem from the Colonial era, Adebayo and Ojo limit their scope to discussing the negative impact of Police Corruption on crime control in Nigeria.

In Kaduna State and Sabon Tasha in particular, Crime control by *Operation Yaki* cannot be said to be absolutely free from all the challenges identified above.

In a study on law enforcement in Post-Colonial Africa, Okafo (2007) argues that because the Nigerian Police is alien to the Nigerian Culture and belief; it has been found to be contributing to the spread of crime, instead of fighting it. According to him, the culture and

belief, based on which the Nigerian Police was founded makes it easier for the Police to aid the spread of Crime in the country. This is evident in the way the police is staffed by some corrupt elements that makes it ineffective in crime control, contrary to local policing organizations like the Bakassi Boys, Oodua People Congress (OPC), the Hisba in the Northern part of the country and Neighborhood Watch (also known as vigilante Group) that command more support and confidence of Nigerians. This according to Okafo (2007) is because of the fact that they reflect the norms and belief of the local people. Similarly, Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) evaluate the perception of the poor in rural areas on Informal Policing Structures (like Bakassi Boys, Vigilante Group etc) in Benue, Enugu, Ekiti, and Jigawa. They identify the lack of funding, harassment and extortion by the police when carrying out their policing duties, lack of basic operational equipment such as Flash lights, insufficient Guns and ammunitions etc., and lack of recognition by some Local Government Authorities as their major challenges to effective crime control.

Looking at the above stated position of Okafo (2007) and Alemika and Chukwuma (2003), the agreement between them is on their focus on Informal Policing Structures. However, while the concern of Okafo (2007) is for the Nigerian Government to reform the Nigerian Police to look more like a home grown policing agency, Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) bring out the challenges being faced by such groups.

The existence of Informal Policing Structures in Nigeria, Kaduna State and Sabon Tasha in particular is a fact. However, besides the Vigilante Group that has been incorporated into *Operation Yaki* in Kaduna State, minor Informal Policing Structures (like the Ungwan Barde Patrol Group, Afaka Street Patrol Union) exist in Sabon Tasha but have not been accorded the needed recognition and empowerment to make them contribute in assisting the police in controlling the rate of crime in Sabon Tasha.

Conversely, despite the fact that much crime is committed by repeat offenders, many of whom associate with other people in the society, the poor relationship between the police and communities make it difficult for communities to pass useful information about such criminals to the police (Kennedy, 1997). The lack of collaborative partnership between the police and other stakeholders within the Criminal Justice System, health care, and social services to provide a broader understanding and response to issues arising from crime is the major challenge to effective crime control in most societies today (Anan, 2008)

One strong consensus between Kennedy, 1997; and Anan, 2008; is the view that the lack of understanding, and strong collaborative partnership between the police and communities produces poor relationship between the same; thereby giving birth to community fear and lack of trust and confidence on the police. Consequently, it makes it difficult for communities to provide useful information on crime and criminals to the police as well as assist in other aspects of community policing.

This captures the reality in Nigeria where the Police is made to belief it can control crime solely even without much cooperation and assistance from communities. As a result, communities are hardly communicated to by the police in a comprehensive manner on the need for both parties to cooperate and control crime. This largely explains the difficulty in crime policing in Nigeria. In Kaduna State and Sabon Tasha in particular, there is to some extent, weak relationship and communication between the personnel of *Operation Yaki* and residents of Sabon Tasha.

2.3.5 How to Produce Effective Crime Control

To make the security agencies effective in their task of crime control, government should deal with the cause of crime, appeal for the cooperation of Nigerian citizens in terms of information provision, train, retrain, equip, and increase the salary of officers and men of the security agencies especially the Police Force (David, 2011). The view of David (2011) is supported by

Knuttson and Clarke (2006) who belief that crime control can never record any positive impact with the main cause of crime in existence. These major causes of crime which are high unemployment rate, low income, low (or zero) savings etc are still prevalent in Nigeria (Akindire, 2007).

The unity between David (2011) and Knuttson and Clarke (2006) and Akinride (2007) is on the need to control crime by tackling the major causes of crime in the society. Despite the agreement between them, David provides a broader view on how to control crime.

To a large extent, the above views could contribute in enhancing the performance of *Operation Yaki* in Kaduna State in general and Sabon Tasha in Particular.

Conversely, in his search for ways to make the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) more effective in controlling drug abuse, Ige (2005) posits that for crime control measures to impact positively on crime rate, agencies must build trust and cooperation among themselves and share intelligence. Similarly, both the police and the citizenry must continually strive to build mutual trust through civilian oversight (Philip and Trone, 2002). This "involves calling the police to account for their actions, policies and organizations" (Igbuzor, 2008). On how to realize this, Igbuzor (2008) suggests the empowerment of the National Assembly, the Nigerian Police Council, and the ministry of interior (being the institutions capable of checking the police).

The agreement between Philip and Trone (2002) and Igbuzor (2008) is evident in their view that by making policing agencies build trust and cooperation among themselves and accountable for their actions, crime control measures could record positive impact on crime rate. The difference is in scope and methodology. While the views of Philip and Trone (2002) and Ige (2005) is inadequate in terms of details, clarity and implementation strategy, same cannot be said of the views of Igbuzor (2008). However, their (Ige, 2005; Philip and Trone, 2002; and Igbuzor, 2008)

views could improve the impact of *Operation Yaki* in Sabon Tasha. This is because *Operation Yaki* seems to be enjoying limited cooperation from Sabon Tasha community in terms of adequate information provision. This could be due to lack of trust, confidence and cooperation between the residents of Sabon Tasha and *Operation Yaki*. Thus, by making *Operation Yaki* cooperate with other agencies in sharing intelligence, and accountable to Sabon Tasha community, trust and cooperation could develop between Sabon Tasha Community and the security outfit. This could aid the smooth flow of information.

Put briefly, the above views suggest that by dealing with the major causes of crime, empowering and motivating police personnel, appealing for public trust, support and cooperation to the police, trust and cooperation between the police and other agencies in terms of intelligence sharing, crime control could impact positively on crime rate.

From the foregoing literature review, it is obvious that a lot have been written on Crime and crime control.

However, the focus and emphases seems to be on the Police as the sole Agency capable of controlling crime. No study attempts to assess the impact of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Even though Alemika and Chukwuma (2003), and Ige (2005) look at Informal Policing Structures, and the NDLEA respectively; neither of them captures the reality in Sabon Tasha perfectly. This provides a gap to be filled by this research. It is against this backdrop that this research sets out to assess the impact of Operation Yaki as security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State from 2008 to 2012.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

This study is situated within the premises of Social Control Theory as propounded by Travis Hirschi in his classic work, Causes of Delinquency (1969). Social Control theory differs from

other theories of criminology that seek to ask the question, "what causes deviant behavior?" instead the theory asks, "What causes conformity?"

Social control theory assumes that delinquency and crime are destined to occur for all persons unless they are prevented by strong social and personal controls. The theory focuses more on social factors that curb delinquency and crime than on those that promote delinquency. Social control theory states that social control is easier to achieve and maintain if social bonds are stronger. What causes deviance is the absence of what causes conformity.

Intrigued by society's expectation of conformity, Hirchi (1969) began theorizing about deviance by assuming people would violate norms and break the law unless they were actively prevented from doing so. The key to such prevention is effective socialization, which was a long process starting in childhood and lasting into adulthood. Thus, social control theory is considered one about process.

Who and what was responsible for this socialization? Hirschi pin-pointed three institutions or entities (i.e. families, peers and schools) having the most profound impact on each of our lives, especially as children and adolescents. He argued that close association with parents and siblings, law-abiding peers, and teachers or other school officials, for example, were required to control individuals' behavior. The establishment of a strong bond between the juvenile and society, consisting of attachment to others, commitment to conventional behavior, involvement and belief in the moral order and law, promotes conformity and prevents delinquency. Thus, attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief become four elements of a critical moral bond between the individual and society which would guard against deviance. For Hirschi, deviant behaviors would be a likely outcome of ineffective ties to those things, I.e. improper socialization. Specifically, it is likely to occur if there is inadequate attachment (to parent and

school), inadequate commitment (to education and occupational process), and inadequate involvement.

2.4.1 Relevance of the Theory to the Study

With its mandate of crime reduction in the whole state through quick response to distress calls and serving as deterrent to criminals as well as aggressive patrolling of black spots and high ways, social control theory tends to view the seeming rise in cases of crime in Sabon Tasha as a reflection of a faulty/deficient process of socialization and the absence of a strong social bond in the area, hence the need for government to address the situation and ensures Operation Yaki is effective in curbing the menace of criminality in the area.

2.4.2 Weaknesses of the Theory

The theory has been criticized by Adler, Mueller, and Laufer (1991) for focusing more on explaining delinquency instead of adult crimes. Contrary to the submission of social control theory, psychology of Mind (POM) holds that every physical healthy youngster begins life with a natural, inborn capacity for healthy psychological functioning. That is, at birth, youth do not have mind-sets which point them towards delinquency or other form of deviant behavior. On the contrary, each youth is born with an innate set of healthy attributes which include common sense, unconditional positive self-worth, a desire to learn for the satisfaction of learning, and a natural joy in the understanding and pro-social mastery of the environment (Suarez, 1985).

However, the social control theory has made a great impact in the understanding of criminology. Above all, the theory is of relevance to this research as it sheds more light and provides logical clarity and direction to this research.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AREA, THE NATURE AND DIMENSION OF CRIME AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATION YAKI IN SABON TASHA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the background of the area under study, the nature and dimension of crime and the composition, manpower, preparedness and the effectiveness of Operation Yaki in the study area.

3.2 History

This research was conducted in Sabon Tasha in Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State. One of the 12 wards in Chikun Local Government is Sabon Tasha which is the study location.

Sabon Tasha is a suburb of Kaduna whose origin dates back to around 1958. History has it that the originators of the settlement were the Hausas who first settled somewhere on the land where the campus of Kaduna Polytechnic (that is along Nnamdi Azikiwe Express Way) is located. With the passage of time and basically due to cases ofmysterious dead; residents of the area moved to somewhere behind the Railway Station in where is today known as Sabon Tasha. Because they were located behind a Railway Station, the settlement was popularly called **'Tasha'** (i.e. Station in Hausa). The same settlement was later moved to where the palace of the oldest Village Head is located today. This new settlement from 'Tasha' gradually acquired a new name as **'Sabon Tasha'** (i.e. New Station in Hausa) signifying a movement from 'Tasha' (Station) to **'Sabon Tasha'** (New Station) (Interview with the Village Head, 16th June, 2015).

3.3 Geography

Sabon Tasha is a suburb of Kaduna metropolis located in Kaduna central and is bounded by Barnawa, Romi, Television Village, Kakau Daji. It lies within latitude 10.27396 (10.44 04®) North and longitude 7.89343 (7.4704®) East. It covers an area of about 2, 659 km² with an average elevation of 621 meters (2,037 feet) (datpoint.com).

The dominant topography feature is the alluvial plain of the small tributaries of River Kaduna which dot the area and stretches across and up to River Romi in the southern flank. The dominant River Kaduna controls the course of most streams and River Romi in the area.

Like other parts of Kaduna State, Sabon Tasha enjoys raining and dry seasons. The raining season lasts from April to October (a period of 7 months) with the peak rain in July/August. The dry season lasts from November to March (5 months). Temperatures are high with the highest in March/April. The vegetation of the area is of the typical Savannah type with tall grass and scattered trees. The closeness of the area to the forested areas in the southern part of the State explains this (Udu, 1982).

3.4 Population

Sabon Tasha is densely populated with around 49,073 people (NPC, 2008). The population of Sabon Tasha is considered one of the fastest growing in Kaduna State owing to the location of the NNPC in the area which is attracting people from different places (see Table 3.1). Another explanation for the population growth of Sabon Tasha is migration from other parts of the state and around due to ethno-religion crises among other reasons (Ishaya, Sabo and Baji, 2008). The table below displays the growth of the population of Sabon Tasha from 1991 to 2006.

Table 3.1 Population Figure and Percentage Change of Sabon Tasha from 1991 to 2006

Year	Male	Female	Population	Change (%)
1991	14,242	13,009	27,251	-
1996	17,118	15,632	32,750	16.8
2006	25,655	23,418	49,073	33.3

Source: NPC, Kaduna, 2008.

From the above table, it is clear that the population of Sabon Tasha has been on the increase from 27,251 in 1991 to 32,750 in 1996 and to 49,073 in 2006, giving a 33 % increase from 1996 to 2006.

The area is multi-ethnic.. There are about 54 indigenous ethnic groups in Kaduna State (Usman and Abba, 2005: 56-61) and the heterogeneous nature of the population of Sabon Tasha seems to capture them all. In addition, the inhabitants of sabon Tasha are of mix grill with Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Ibibio, Ijaw, Angas, Jukun, Tiv, Berom, Igala, etc. all settled as a result of industrial, extensive economic and other activities. Virtually all the ethnic groups in Nigeria can be found in the area.

Islam and Christianity are the two main religion groups in the area. The third important group is the indigenous Traditional Religion Groups.

Hausa Language is the dominant medium of communication in the area.

3.5 Economy

The major economic activities in Sabon Tasha include agriculture with other minor modern economic activities such as manufacturing, trading, service delivery, and transport in certain places. In terms of agricultural production, food and cash crops are produced by farmers in the area. The major markets in the area include the major Sabon Tasha Market, Kantin Aga market, Kasuwan Gulma in Ungwan Gimbiya, Ungwan Sunday Market, and Timber Shade. The

location of the NNPC, Northern Noodles, Banks, Construction Firms, in and around Sabon Tasha play a major role in boosting economic activities in the area. Also of economic relevance is the fact that Sabon Tasha boasts of many Hotels, relaxation points and Guest Inn such as Happy Jimmy, Liverpool Hotel, Top Galaxy Hotel, Paradise Garden, Tatti Motel, Climax Hotel, Network Garden, Tourist Hotel, Manai Garden, Inn Palace, Green Aple, Carribean Hotel, Rehoboth Hotel, Kings, Bruchino, Abyelo, to mention but few. The Railway Station in the area is also of economic importance as it makes it easier for farmers and traders from neighboring villages and towns to convey their agricultural and other goods down to Sabon Tasha to sell.

3.6 The Nature and Dimension of Crime in Sabon Tasha

The nature of crime in Sabon Tasha assumes the shape of crime against persons and crime against property. Available record as revealed on table 3.2 below shows crime against persons to be the most rampant crime in the area and it is violent in nature.

Table 3.2: The Nature and Dimension of Crime in Sabon Tasha by Year.

Crime	2004	2005	2006	2007
Armed Robbery	10	13	11	16
Robbery	73	81	94	103
Moto Vehicle Theft	5	3	-	4
Rape	-	-	-	5
Assault	-	32	-	51
Petty Theft	201	288	350	388
Culpable Homicide	2	-	4	8
Intimidation	33	50	49	60
Molestation	28	25	36	41
Drug Dealings	21	24	38	30
Total/Crime Rate	**373**	**551**	**582**	**706**

Source: Divisional Police Station Sabon Tasha. Obtained on March 5, 2013.

From Table 3.2 above, it is clear that the dimension of crime in Sabon Tasha was on the rise (from 373 cases in 2004 to 706 cases in 2007) before 2008 when Operation Yaki was created and

was tilted towards crimes against persons. Deducible from the table is the fact that before the coming into being of Operation Yaki in 2008, the rate of crime in the area was maintaining a rising shape. This calls for urgent and effective solution hence the innovative response by Kaduna Sate Government in 2008 through the creation of Operation Yaki.

3.6.1 Types and consequences of crimes in Sabon Tasha

The major types of crimes being experienced in Sabon Tasha are crimes against property and crime against persons and can further be classified into violent and non-violent crimes. Crime against person which appears to be the most rampant in the area is largely violent crimes such as Robbery, Armed Robbery, Rape, Assault, Culpable Homicide, Intimidation, Molestation. On the other hand, property crime such as Motor Vehicle Theft, Petty Theft, and Drug Dealing are among the non-violent crimes that are prevalent in Sabon Tasha. Consequently, the security of life and property of residents of the area as well as socio-economic life in the area appeared to have remained a thing of concern and a challenge which they strongly hoped the coming into existence of Operation Yaki will improve.

3.6.2 Specific Root Causes of Crimes in Sabon Tasha

While the issue of poor parenting cannot be done away with in any attempt to understand the root cause of crime, it is important to note that in a state where 61.5% of the population is poor and the number of the unemployed and tend to be on the rise (NBS, 2010), Sabon Tasha being a ward in the state cannot escape from one of the major results of rising unemployment and poverty which crime.

Secondly, the seeming rise in the consumption rate of intoxicants such as drugs, marijuana, alcohol in locations like Kantin Aga, Black Street, Ungwan Pama Cemetery, NITEL Quarters amongst many other can largely explain the prevalence of crimes in Sabon Tasha as such substances possess the propensity to place the consumers in a psychological state of mind where

they believed that committing almost anything is possible even if it requires being violent. in addition, because of the addictive nature of such intoxicants, they must always look for money to buy even if it involves committing robbery.

3.7 The Mission of Operation Yaki

Operation Yaki is out to curb crime and criminality in all the 23 Local Government Areas of Kaduna State such as ethno religious violence, robbery, armed robbery, assassination, assault, homicide, kidnapping, petty theft, car theft, rape, arson to mention but few, through the aggressive patrolling of various sectors, high ways and other black spots in order to serve as deterrent and punisher of criminals (Kaduna state government, 2008).

Being a scene of those crimes that fall within the mandate and mission of Operation Yaki, the mission of Operation Yaki can best be described as the right one for the people hence the expectation of Sabon Tasha Community was high, believing that the end has come for their suffering in the hands of criminals.

However, more than four years of the existence of Operation Yaki, it seems the high expectation of the Community is yet to be fully realized thereby raising the need for empirical verification and assessment of the impact of the Security Outfit on Crime Control in the area.

3.7.1 Composition, Manpower, Preparedness, and Equipment of Operation Yaki.

The Composition and Manpower of Operation Yaki.

Operation Yaki partners other security agencies such as the Federal Road Safety Corps, the SSS, Nigeria Prison Service, Nigeria Immigration Service. However, the four major security agencies responsible for the Operational working of the outfit (in terms of 24 hours patrol/surveillance) include the Police, the Military, Air force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), and the Nigerian Neighborhood Watch Group. Operation Yaki has a

manpower strength of around 2000 Officers consisting of 350 black uniform police, 292 Mopol, 258 soldiers, 105 personnel of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), 75 Neighborhood Watch Group (kaduna state government).


Preparedness and Equipment

In addition to the training received, officers and men of Operation Yaki are organized into forty four teams and strategically positioned across the state in such a way that they are within easy reach of one another. 50 single Cabin Toyota Hilux, 20 Double Cabin Toyota Hilux, 6 Ambulance, Seven 406 Saloon Car (for in diligence surveillance), which are fully equipped with communication gadgets; 250 motor cycles, Bullet Proof Vest were provided to the security outfit. The Federal Government complemented the effort of the state government with a helicopter to assist its surveillance efforts. The federal government also provided 600 rifles as well as thousands of rounds of ammunition to boost the level of preparedness and operation of security outfit (Mamman, 2012). In the same spirit of ensuring adequate preparation and equipping of Operation Yaki, the state government from time to time does purchase patrol vehicles and other equipment. For instance, in addition to purchasing new patrol vehicles for the task force, the then Governor of the state, Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa approved funds for the repair of Operation Yaki's vehicles which were destroyed during the 2011 post-election crises in the state as a way of reinvigorating the outfit. Similarly, Governor Mukhtar Ramalan Yero purchased and distributed 40 brand new Hilux with communication gadgets for the security outfit and ordered that the old ones be refurbished and given to the Divisional Police Stations in the state. In 2015, Governor Nasir Ahmed El-Rufai procured and distributed 107 vehicles to the security outfit (the punch online Newspaper of October 19, 2015).

3.7.2 Chain of Command of Operation Yaki

With its Joint Head Quarter in Abakpa, Kaduna State; Operation Yaki is headed by the State Coordinator who doubles as the Security Adviser to the governor of the state (Mamman, 2012). The chain of command of Operation Yaki is presented diagrammatically below.

Figure 3.1: Power Chain of Operation Yaki.



Source: Operation Yaki

From Figure 3.1 above, it is clear that immediately below the state coordinator is the Second in Command (2IC) who is a police officer, followed by the Officer in charge (OC) of Operation Yaki in the various security agencies that are part of the security outfit. Under the various OCs are the Heads (the most senior officers) of the various Patrol Teams of the outfit, then the remaining men/personnel of the outfit.

3.8 Community Relation

Operation Yaki's relation with the community is largely an indirect one through the traditional/community leaders. When the need for useful information arises, Operation Yaki depends on community/traditional leaders to provide such information. It seems to have less regard for direct community partnership. In line with this, Operation Yaki hardly holds or participates in community meetings concerning security matters. However, having publicized its phone numbers to the public, Operation Yaki does have direct communication with members of the community through distress calls when individuals or groups call to report crime or provide information related to the same.

CHAPTER FOUR

Impact Analysis of Operation Yaki on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyzes the data generated through questionnaire, In-Depth Interview, and official Police Record on the topic under investigation based on which findings or deductions are drawn and verified against the propositions made in chapter one. The analysis begins with the Bio data of respondents, followed by the remaining sections. The chapter has done a combined presentation and analysis of data generated through questionnaire, In-depth interview, and Official police Record.

Table 4.1: Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaire

S/N	Polling Units In Sabon Tasha	Questionnaire Administered	Questionnaire Retrieved	Valid Questionnaire
1	Matari Old Court	2	2	2
2	Matari No. 8	2	2	1
3	L.E.A. Primary School	2	2	2
4	Matari Moro	4	4	4
5	Kafari Close	3	3	3
6	Gobir	3	3	3
7	Ungwan Kadara	5	5	4
8	NITEL quarters	2	2	2
9	Rakiya Hospital	3	3	3
10	Ungwan Jaba	4	4	3
11	Ungwan Kadara East	2	2	2
12	Kasuwan Dare	3	3	3
13	Ungwan Bido	3	3	2
14	Fadama Jaki	4	3	3
15	NNPC Quarters	3	3	3
16	Ungwan Gimbiya	3	3	3
17	Juji	2	2	2
18	Ungwan Sunday	3	3	3
19	Ungwan Sunday II	3	3	3
20	Ungwan Sunday III	5	5	3
21	Ungwan Sunday IV	2	2	2
22	Ungwan Pama I	3	3	3
23	Ungwan Pama II	5	5	5
24	Narayi New Extension I	2	2	2
25	Narayi New Extension II	2	2	2
26	Post Office	5	5	5
27	Narayi New Extension/Zaria Road	2	2	2
28	Narayi New Extension/Abuja Road	2	2	2
29	Nrayi New Extension/ Kune Road	2	2	2
30	KASUPDA	2	2	2
31	Ungwan Baro LEA Primary School	6	6	5
32	Ungwan Baro II	6	6	6
	TOTAL	**100**	**99**	**92**

Source: Field Work, 2015

As indicated on the table above, a total of 100 questionnaires were administered in the 32 polling units of the ward in proportion to their respective population as presented on table 1.1 in chapter one. From the 100 questionnaires administered, 99 (99%) were retrieved, while only 92 (92%) were well filled and good for data analysis.

4.2 Analysis of Biodata Variables

Table 4.2 Sex of respondents

Sex	frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Male	52	56.5	56.5	56.5
Female	40	43.5	43.5	100
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Field Work, October 2015

The table above shows the distribution of respondents according to sex. It shows that 52 representing 56.5% are males and 40 representing 43.5% are female. Therefore, we can conclude that majority of the respondents are males.

However, it implies that both the male and female genders were adequately represented in the sample considering the importance of generating data from both genders in Sabon Tasha as both genders are at the receiving end of the crimes in the area and can tell whether or not Operation Yaki is impacting on crime control in their areas.

Table 4.3: Ages of respondents

Age	Frequency	Percentages (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
18-25	26	28.3	28.3	28.3
26-35	38	41.3	41.3	69.6
36-50	22	23.9	23.9	93.5
51-above	6	6.5	6.5	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

The above table shows the distribution of respondents according to their ages. It shows that 26(28.3%) of them were between (18-25yrs), 38(41.3%) of them were between (26-35yrs), 22(23.9%) of them were between (36-50yrs) and 6(6.5%) of them are between (51 and above) years thus showing that most of the respondents were between 26 – 35 years of age. This implies that respondents of this study were drawn from all categories of adult population of Sabon Tasha.

Table 4.4: Marital Status

marital Status	frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Single	49	52.2	52.2	52.2
Married	32	34.8	34.8	87
Widow/Widower	10	10.9	10.9	97.9
Separated	2	2.2	2.2	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

The table above shows the distribution of respondents according to their marital status. According to the table, 49(52.2%) of them are single, 32(34.8%) of them are married, 10(10.9%) of them are widow/widower, 2(2.2%0) of them are separated. We can therefore conclude that most of the respondents are single. It means the researcher was able to generate data from singles, married, widows, widower, and even separated all of whom lives and properties are the reasons for the creation of Operation Yaki hence the importance of their views on the impact of Operation Yaki on Crime Control in their area.

Table 4.5: Occupation/Profession

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Student	20	21.7	21.7	21.7
Civil Servant	21	22.8	22.8	44.6
Self Employed (farmers included).	19	20.7	20.7	65.2
Applicant	30	32.6	32.6	97.8
Security personnel	2	2.2	2.2	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

The above table shows the distribution of respondents according to their occupation/profession. It reveals that 20(21.7%) of the respondents are students, 21(22.8%) of the respondents are civil servants, 19(20.7%) of the respondents are self-employed, 30(32.6%) of them are applicants, 2(2.2%) of the respondents are security personnel. We can therefore conclude from the table that most of the respondents are applicants.

This seems to suggest the existence of high unemployment rate in the area which could explain the persistence of crime in the area hence the importance of the view of these respondents on the impact of Operation Yaki on crime control in their area and what can be done to make the security outfit more effective.

Table 4.6: Educational Qualification

Educational Qual.	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Primary	2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Secondary	23	25	25	27.2
Tertiary	63	68.5	68.5	95.7
Non Formal	4	4.3	4.3	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

The above table shows the distribution of respondents according to their educational qualification. The table shows that 2(2.2%) of them have primary school qualification, 23(25%) of them have secondary school qualification, 63(68.5%) of them have tertiary qualification and 4(4.3%) of them have non formal education. hence majority of the respondents have tertiary qualification.

This implies that the researcher was able to get the views of people who have acquired tertiary education such as Ordinary National Diploma (OND), National Certificate of Education (NCE), High National Diploma (HND), University Degree among others as well as those who have obtained less or non-formal education because they all were considered enlightened enough

to understand and tell the impact of Operation Yaki on Crime control in their area and the way forward towards making Operation Yaki more effective in the area.

4.3 The role of Operation Yaki in Crime Control.

This section presents and analyzes the views of respondents on the role of Operation Yaki as a security out fit on crime control in Sabon Tasha. Different views were expressed and the analysis is contained from tables 7 to 8 below.

Table 4.7: Respondents View on whether or not they are aware of the existence of Operation Yaki

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage
Yes	83	90.2	90.2	90.2
No	5	5.4	5.4	95.4
No idea	4	4.3	4.3	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

According to the table above a total of 83 or 90.2% are aware of the existence of Operation yaki, while 5 or 5.4% are not aware and the rest 4 or 4.3% had no idea. It implies that ALMOST all the residents of Sabon Tasha are aware of the existence of Operation Yaki thereby making them the right people to know the role of the outfit in crime control in Sabon Tasha.

Table 4.8: The Role of Operation Yaki in Crime Control

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	valid Percentage (%)	Cumml. Percentages (%)
patrolling highways and black spots only	31	33.7	33.7	33.7
serving as deterrent to offenders	39	42.4	42.4	76.1
arresting, and handing over criminals to police for further investigations	20	21.7	21.7	97.9
no idea	2	2.2		**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

On respondents perceived roles of operation yaki on crime control, a total of 31 or 33.7% said its patrolling high ways and black spots only, while 39 or 42.4% said by serving as deterrent to offenders, while 20 or 21.7% said arresting and handling over criminals to police as against 2 or 2.2.3% who said they have no idea. Therefore most people believe that the main role of Operation Yaki in crime control is serving as deterrent to offenders.

This agrees largely with the view of the State Coordinator of the outfit who says "…Operation Yaki plays the role of quick response to crime events in addition to punishment to offenders and patrols of highways and black spots in order to send a message to potentials offenders that we are ready for them" (Interview, June 2015).

A Personnel of the security outfit who is the leader of a patrol team of the outfit holds thus;

> Operation Yaki is a quick response Security Task Force. We patrol different places in Kaduna State, sometimes me and my boys can be directed to patrol from Rigasa through Gonin Gora to Sabon Tasha, sometimes even Kachia to Saminaka . . .we do go inside ungwas and patrol streets if we get call or information of bad things happening there, we also patrol black spots where *weewee*, hard drugs are sold and consumed and hand over such criminals to the police for further investigation (Interview, June 2015).

"Their ability to comb the typical villages to fish out the criminals has helped their assignments a great deal" says a business woman (Interview, June 2015).

It is safe therefore to say that the role of Operation Yaki is to serve as a quick responder and deterrent to criminals through regular patrols of highways, black spots, and response to distress calls. It is deducible from the foregoing that the role and mode of operation of the security outfit is expected to maximize the cost of crime and minimize the benefit thereby making crime a not-worthy venture to criminals or potential criminals.

4.4: Crime Rate in Sabon Tasha


The researcher sought to uncover the rate of crime in the study location beginning with the mandate of the Outfit on Table 9. The rest of the section runs through tables 10 to 13.

Table 4.9: The mandate of Operation Yaki is basically crime control in the whole of Kaduna state

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	76	82.6	82.6	82.6
No	5	5.4	5.4	88
No Idea	11	12	12	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

From the table above on the mandate of Operation Yaki, 76 of the respondents representing 82.6% agree with the statement that the mandate of Operation Yaki is to curb crime and criminality in the whole of Kaduna State, 5 (5.4%) of them say NO while 11(12%) have no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

Majority (82.6%) of the respondents therefore agree that the mandate of Operation Yaki is to fight crime and criminality in the whole of Kaduna State.

This view falls inline with those of personnel of the security outfit who hold that the mandate of the Security Task Force is to curb crime and criminality in all the 23 local Government Areas of the state there by providing the needed environment for peace to flourish. In the words of the 2IC (ie the Second in Command to the State Coordinator of Operation Yaki) who chose to speak in Hausa submits thus;

Translated from the Hausa Version: our mandate involves fighting crime generally. The issue of security is not limited to the protection of lives and properties. It is broad and includes many aspects. You cannot protect lives and properties without deterring all kinds of criminals from committing crimes, therefore, the mandate of Operation Yaki is crime control and security of lives and properties in order to ensure that residents of the state can sleep with their eyes closed(Interview, June 2015).


This implies that the mandate of Operation Yaki is to curb crime and criminality in the whole of the state as a way of ensuring the protection of lives and properties.

Table 4.10: Responses on whether cases of crime were rampant in Sabon Tasha before the coming of Operation Yaki

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	45	48.9	48.9	48.9
No	38	37	37	**85.9**
No Idea	13	14.1	14.1	100
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.13 above displays respondent's views on the question: were cases of crime rampant in Sabon Tasha before the coming into existence of Operation Yaki? 45 (48.9%) say Yes, 38 (37.%) say No, and 13 (14.1%) say No idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

What is deducible from the table is that majority (48.9%) of the respondents hold that cases of crime were rampant in Sabon Tasha before the introduction of Operation Yaki.

The above view of majority (48.9%) of the respondents agrees with those of some interviewees of this study who strongly hold that incidents of crime in their neighborhood were rampant before the coming into being of Operation Yaki in 2008. Some of the respondents insist that cases of crime especially armed robbery are still rampant. One such respondent is a business man whose provision shop is attached to his house and was robbed in the month of January 2015. In his words,

> With what we are experiencing today in this area, it is not correct to say crime is not rampant here…for your information, I was robbed recently in January this year and this my shop was emptied by same criminals. My neighbors can confirm to you the kind of experiences we are having in the hands of criminals in this area. So to me o, we are experiencing crimes especially armed robbery in this our area (Interview, June 2015).


It goes to say from the foregoing, that cases of crimes were rampant in Sabon Tasha before the creation of Operation Yaki.

Table 4.11: Responses on the Rate of Crime in Sabon Tasha

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
On the increase	37	40.2	40.2	40.2
On the Decrease	42	45.7	45.7	85.9
No idea	13	14.1	14.1	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

Revealed on the table above, 37 respondents representing 40.2% believe that the rate of the crimes in Sabon Tasha is on the increase, 42 (45.7%) say it is decreasing while 13 (14.1%) have No idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015.

Majority of the respondents (45.7%) believe that the rate of crime in the area is decreasing. In line with this majority view, the Dakachin Ungwan Gimbiya argued that "before, hardly a day goes by without having a case of theft, fight, or crime generally to settle here. But I think after the establishment of Operation Yaki, this is reducing because we can stay for almost a week now without having any case to settle" (Interview, June 2015). For instance, in an interview with the district head of Sabon Tasha, though one cannot dismiss completely the happening of crimes generally, it cannot be said to be as prevalent as before the creation of Operation Yaki, "the issue of crime generally is not like before, hardly can you hear about the happening of crime in Sabon Tasha , so we can say crime is not too rampant like it used to be some years back, you can do more by checking police record I believe it will prove me right" (Interview, June 2015). This implies that though there are cases of crime in Sabon Tasha, it is not as rampant as some years back.

Another respondent, a resident of the area was more specific in his submission when he opined that;

> Anybody who has been in this area for like ten years can tell you that crime has reduced here. Because before we use to record around two or more cases of robbery in this area per week but this is not so now. I think it's been long since the last time we have experience this kind of crime in this neighborhood is about


three months now if I'm not mistaken. I'm not saying we don't have crimes here at all o, but it has reduced since the creation of Operation Yaki to be sincere (Interview, June 2015).

This is supported by the official police statistics below:

Table 4.12: Rate of Crime in Sabon Tasha from 2007 to 2015

Year	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**Remark**
Crime Rate	706	637	580	470	448	424	432	406	401	**Decreasing**

Source:**The Divisional Police Station, Sabon Tasha. Obtained on 5th March, 2013 and 22nd September, 2016.**



Source: Field Work, 2015

The table above shows cases of crime in Sabon Tasha from 2007 (before the creation of Operation Yaki) through 2008 when Operation Yaki was created to 2015. Deducible from the table is the conclusion that crime rate in Sabon Tasha is on the decrease since 2008 when Operation Yaki was created from 706 cases in 2007, 637 in 2008 when Operation Yaki was created, 580 in 2009, 470 in 2010, 448 in 2011, 424 in 2012, it went up a bit to 432 in 2013, it dropped to 406 in 2014, and to 401 in


2015.. In other words, it has dropped from 706 cases in 2007 to 401 in 2015. It is deducible therefore, that cases of crimes in Sabon Tasha are on the decrease since 2008 when Operation Yaki was created.

Table 4.13:If your response above is "on the decrease", do you think the decrease in crime rate is majorly a result of the existence of Operation Yaki?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	38	40.9	40.9	40.9
No	28	30.1	30.1	71
No Idea	26	29.1	29.1	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

On the above responses of respondents on their perceived explanation for the reduction in crime rate in Sabon Tasha as displayed on table 4.16 above, 38 (40.9%) of them say Yes, the reduction in crime rate in Sabon Tasha is majorly a function of the introduction of Operation Yaki, 28 (30.1%) say No, the introduction of Operation Yaki cannot be said to be the major reason for the drop, while 26 (29.1%) have No idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015.

It is clear, therefore, that most (40.9%) of the respondents believe that Operation Yaki is the major reason why their area is recording a drop in crime rate. This view corroborates with those of the interviewees of this study who believed that all things being equal, but for the coming into being of Operation Yaki, they doubt if the area would record a drop in crime rate. This was well captured by a teacher who holds that with all the causes of crime on the increase in Sabon Tasha, there cannot be a better explanation for the reduction on cases of crime in Sabon Tasha than the coming into being of Operation Yaki. He insists that;

> Look at the major causes of crime: poverty, unemployment, consumption of drugs, marijuana; easy access to weapons, poor family training and other causes; you will agree with me that they are not decreasing rather they are on the increase in this area. Nothing seem to have changed positively with respect to crime except the coming into being of Operation Yaki in 2008 and I strongly believe that crime rate has reduced majorly because of this development (Interview, June 2015).

Suffice it to say, with the major causes of crimes on the increase, one cannot attach the reduction in crime rate in Sabon Tasha to any other factor aside the coming into being of Operation Yaki as cases of crime were seen to be high before their introduction but reducing with their coming into being.


4.5 Perceived Sense of Security in Sabon Tasha.

Table 4.14: Do you strongly feel insecure from criminals in sabon Tasha now than before the creation of Operation Yaki?

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	39	42.4	42.4	42.4
No	47	51.1	51.1	51.1
No idea	6	6.5	6.5	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

A total of 39 or 42.4% said Yes they feel insecure from criminals in Sabon Tasha, while 47 or 51.1% said No they do not feel insecure from criminals in Sabon Tasha now than before the creation of Operation Yaki, and the rest 6 or 6.5% had no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

This implies that the highest percentage (51.1%) of the respondents feel improved security from criminals now than before. "Operation Yaki has made it possible for people to travel at night within Kaduna, something hitherto unthinkable" (Interview, June 2015). However, another respondent was quick to add the need for residents to be security conscious thus;

> Even though we have seen an improvement in the security of our lives and properties in Sabon Tasha as a result of operation Yaki, this is not to say operation yaki is doing absolutely well. People should not leave every security aspect of their lives to Operation yaki as it is important for us to be vigilant to avoid disappointment (Interview, June 2015).


Impliedly, people of Sabon Tasha feel more secure now than before the creation of Operation Yaki even though they believe more needs to be done to make the security outfit more effective.

Table 4.15: Responses on whether the existence of Operation Yaki has improved the security situation in Sabon Tasha.

Responses	Frequency	Percentages (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	63	64.3	64.3	64.3
No	20	20.4	20.4	84.7
No idea	9	9.2	9.2	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

Table 4.18 above shows 63 (64.3%) say Yes the existence of Operation Yaki has improved the security situation of Sabon Tasha, 20 representing 20.4% of the respondents say No the existence of Operation Yaki has not impacted positively on the security situation of the area while 9 (9.2) have no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

This showed that majority (64.3%) believes the existence of operation Yaki has improved the security situation in Sabon Tasha therefore showing some level of satisfaction with their impact on crime control in the area. In line with this, interviewees of this study were unanimous in their assessment of the security outfit as they express general satisfaction. In emphasizing their impact, the 2IC (second in command to the state coordinator) spelled out their achievements in Hausa Language thus "**Translation:** Operation Yaki has done very well. Kaduna State as a whole has seen reduction in cases of armed robbery and other related crimes as a result of this effort(Interview, June 2015).

Similarly, the views of a respondent agrees with that of the 2IC though not in totality, as he believes Operation Yaki is doing well but needs to do more considering that issue of security is part of human society hence cannot be wiped off completely. "Sincerely speaking, I will say

Operation Yaki has done well but you know, security is a never ending issue because as you are trying to tackle this part, another is opening. So Operation Yaki is trying but they need to do more. That's what i will say" (Interview, June 2015). In the same spirit, a former councilor of Sabon Tasha Ward joins by saying "Operation Yaki is doing a very good job. Is it not clear that the Task Force is actually solving the problem of security gradually? Operation Yaki is a good idea that can still be improved upon" (Interview, 2015).

What is deducible from the foregoing is the believe by respondents of this study that Operation Yaki is impacting well on cases of crime in Sabon Tasha hence has improved the security situation in the area but its impact is not enough, hence can be improved.


4.6 The Extent to which Operation Yaki has Controlled Crime in Sabon Tasha.

Table 4.16: respondents view on how often operation yaki patrols their streets/high ways and black spots.

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid percentage (%)	Cumulative percentage (%)
very often	29	31.5	31.5	31.5
Not often	42	45.7	45.7	77.2
They do not patrol at all	16	17.4	17.4	94.6
No idea	5	5.4	5.4	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

As revealed on the table above, 29 (31.5%) of the respondents say Operation Yaki patrols their streets/high ways and black spots very often, 42 (45.7%) say Operation Yaki patrols their streets/high ways and black spots but not often, 16 (17.4%) say Operation Yaki do not patrol streets/high ways and black spots at all, while 5 (5.4%) have no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

It shows that majority (45.7%) of the respondents hold that Operation Yaki does patrol their streets/high ways and black spots but not often. It implies that Operation Yaki is pursuing its mandate of crime control in the area though its effort is short of expectation of residents. This was further confirmed by one of the interviewee thus;

> Hardly can you see them patrolling our street. I think the last time I saw Operation Yaki around here was two months ago and they were on their way to Liverpool Hotel because I learned that the owner of the hotel does assist them with some cash for fuelling. Since we don't have anything to give to them I think that's why they don't patrol our streets for us (Interview, October 2015).


However, a personnel of the outfit insists that they are doing their best within their available resources and capabilities and they do patrol based on the area assign to them to cover and particularly areas with security challenges. "We have a very large area to cover, but because of our minimal resources and members I believe we are doing well by patrolling strategically based on directives from our superiors…".

Table 4.17: Respondents view on whether the coming into being of Operation Yaki has increased the risk for criminals thereby limiting their desire to commit crime in Sabon Tasha.

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage %)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	63	68.5	68.5	68.5
No	26	28.3	28.3	96.7
No idea	3	3.3	3.3.	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

Based on the table above, 63 (68.6%) believes the coming into being of Operation Yaki has increased the risk for criminals thereby limiting their desire to commit crime in the area, 26 (28.3) hold that the coming into existence of Operation Yaki has done nothing to restrain the desire of criminals to commit crimes, while 3 (3.3%) have no idea on the subject.



Source: Field Work, October 2015


It implies that most (68.5%) of the respondents believe the coming into being of Operation Yaki has done some good to crime control in the area by maximizing the risk for intending offenders.

Table 4.18: Respondents view on whether or not Operation Yaki responds quickly to Distress Calls

Respondents	frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative percentage (%)
Yes	38	41.3	41.3	41.3
No	46	50	50	91.3
No idea	8	8.7	8.7	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

Table 4.11 above has 38 representing 41.3% say yes, 46 representing 50% say No, and 8 (8.7%) have no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

Revealing from the foregoing is that majority (50%) of the respondents believe that Operation Yaki does not respond quick to distress calls. In agreement with this, one of the interviewees submitted "they spread their numbers everywhere but when you call them, it takes them long before they arrive and sometimes the crime has happened and the criminals' gone (interview October 2015). Similarly, another respondent complained ''. . .It's important to say that some time you can call them and they will tell you they are coming, that's all. If you call again, you may discover that the number is off or they will tell you that their patrol vehicle is bad or they don't have enough fuel to come…"(Interview, October 2015). However, the slow response of men of the security outfit to distress calls has been blamed by the same on the lack of clarity of

direction by reporters of crime, poor state of patrol vehicles, weak numerical strength and traffic. This is well captured in the words of the leader of a patrol team of the security task force when he said


> . . .for example someone can call and may want to report a crime that is happening in ungwan pama, instead of giving us a clear direction to the scene, in most cases, the description is wrong only for us to get their and discover nothing there. . . some times on our way to crime scene, unfortunately we do encounter traffic hold up or go slow and as law enforcers, we can't fly or jump over the traffic so at the end of it we can arrive after the crime has been committed ,don't forget the large area we are expected to cover with our limited number and poorly managed vehicles (Interview, October 2015).

Table 4.19: Respondents' Assessment of Operation Yaki on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Ineffective	34	37	37	37
Effective	51	55.4	55.4	92.4
No idea	7	7.6	7.6	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

Table 4.19 above shows 34 (37%) ineffective, 51 representing 55.4% of the respondents saying Operation Yaki has been effective, and 7 (7.6%) have no idea.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

This implies that majority (55.4%) of the respondents believe Operation Yaki is effective in its task of crime control in Sabon Tasha. this is largely confirmed by majority of the interviewees of this study who strongly believe that the coming into existence of Operation yaki in 2008 has impacted positively to some extent on cases of crime.

4.7: Challenges to the Effective Functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.

This section analyses respondents' views on the challenges being faced by Operation yaki in carrying out its mandate of crime control in Sabon Tasha. While it was derived from majority of the respondents through questionnaire that the inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles is the major challenge being faced by Operation Yaki, it was further confirmed by interviewees of this study. In addition, poor numerical strength of Operation Yaki, brutality by the same, the fact that the security outfit is not always within easy reach, slow response to distress calls, insufficient monthly allowance, and the absence of similar security outfits in neighboring states were also revealed as the major challenges facing the effective functioning of the security outfit. The analysis flows through tables 20 and 21 below.

Table 4.20: Do you think Operation Yaki is facing certain challenges in carrying out its tasks in Sabon Tasha?

Responses	Frequency	Percentages (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Yes	67	72.8	72.8	72.8
No	10	10.9	10.9	83.7
No idea	15	16.3	16.3	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

According to the table above a total of 67 or 72.8% believe that Operation yaki is facing challenges in carrying out its tasks in Sabon Tasha, while 10 or 10.9% do not think so and the rest 15 or 16.3% had no idea whether Operation yaki is facing challenges in carrying out its


tasks in Sabon Tasha or not. It means that most people believe that Operation yaki is facing challenges against its effective functioning in Sabon Tasha.

Table 4.21: Table: challenges to the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)
Inadequate cooperation from residents of S/Tasha	5	5.4	5.4	5.4
poor numerical strength	30	32.6	32.6	38
Inadequate modern crime control equipment	15	16.3	16.3	54.3
inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles	32	34.8	34.8	89.1
slow response to distress calls	10	10.9	10.9	**100**
Total	**92**	**100**	**100**	

Source: Field Work, October 2015

on the main challenge facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha, Table 4.20 reveals 5 (5.4%) saying inadequate cooperation from residents of Sabon Tasha, 30 (32.6%) say it is poor numerical strength of Operation Yaki, 15 (16.3%) say inadequate modern crime control equipment, 32 (34.8%) say it is the inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles, while 10 (10.9%) believe it is Operation Yaki's slow response to distress calls.



Source: Field Work, October 2015

Majority (34.8%) of the respondents hold that inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles is the major challenge facing the effective functioning of the security outfit in Sabon Tasha.

However, those who say inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles, poor numerical strength, and slow response to distress calls; have their views in line with those of the interviewees of this study as the above challenges were strongly identified by those interviewed as challenges to the effective functioning of Operation Yaki. In addition, the problem of insufficient monthly allowance, brutality on residents of Sabon Tasha by men of Operation Yaki, the fact that Operation Yaki is not always within easy reach, and the absence of similar security initiative in neighboring states were added by respondents as challenges to the maximum effectiveness of Operation Yaki.

The State coordinator for example holds the lack of adequate cooperation from the public in terms of information provision and misconception of their activities by members of the public as their challenge. On the contrary, personnel of the outfit tend to be saying they are receiving good cooperation from the public but their challenges revolve around shortage of personnel, inadequate and poor maintenance of their patrol vehicles as well as the insufficiency of their monthly allowance. This was aptly put bypersonnel of the outfit thus;

> The government is doing its best and the people too are cooperating with us. The only challenge I can say is that of shortage of workers. Look at the large area and the number of people that patrol the area. Also some of the vehicles and bikes are not good enough to cover long distance; some cannot even move and are parked. But if you talk of our rifles, bullet proof vest it ok . . . the allowance is not enough, you know work like this depends on motivation because you are risking your life by facing criminals who are out to do-or-die while you are out to do only, so you need to be motivated to make you perform better (Interview, June 2015).

Similarly, another member of the outfit also holds unto the insufficiency of their allowance that

> People are cooperating with us, they do call and report to us but to be sincere, we have challenge of pay, and we need increment of allowance. I am paid 15,000 every month as allowance. I feel it's not enough and since last month we have not

> received our allowance . . . there are patrol Hilux that are parked and cannot be used because they have mechanic problem, in this our Base, we have 5 patrol Hilux but as we speak, only two are good for patrol. The two sef are not serviced regularly to meet up with the rigorous challenge of our work. The same vehicle that was used by patrol team on morning shift, they will park it at the end of their shift. Another shift would come and continue going about with the same vehicle till another day breaks and at the end, the vehicle would not get regular service. Also, the issue of fuelling, each patrol team gets 30 liters of petrol daily which is not up to full tank and is expected to patrol a large area, pursue criminals, and respond to calls from the public quickly no matter the distance. . . (Interview, June 2015).

On the part of the community, their complains hinge on brutality by Operation Yaki, slow response to distress calls, the fact that the outfit is not always within easy reach, and lack of similar security measure in neighboring state. Residents of Sabon Tasha complain that in the course of discharging their duties, Operation Yaki in most cases is brutal on them there by making life unbearable for the people in the area. This has the tendency of limiting public confidence and cooperation given to Operation Yaki. "Operation Yaki treat people bad, on many occasions, I have met members of the security torturing people in the name of security patrol. Soldiers attached to the outfit always harass people in the night" (Interview, June 2015).

The problem of slow response to distress calls and distance from the people is another area which respondents believe constitutes serious obstacle to the effectiveness of Operation Yaki. Respondents believe that the existence of only one Operation Yaki's Office (In Abakpa, Kaduna) without branches across the state tend to position the Security Outfit far from the people and limits the ability of the Outfit to respond quick and arrive crime scenes on time. In some cases,when a distress call is put across to them, before they arrive the crime scene, the crime hasbeen committed and criminal(s) gone. This is well encapsulated in the words of one of the village Heads, he says;

> I believe the problem is Operation Yaki is far from the people. Tell me where is the office of Operation Yaki here in Sabo? It is only when you call them before they start coming from where they are and sometimes they end up not coming for reasons ranging from lack of fuel or poor condition of patrol vehicle. Isn't it? So I don't think Operation Yaki can achieve much with this (Interview, June 2015).

Also brought up is the issue of lack of similar security measure in neighboring states which implies that if the activities of Operation Yaki successfully makes Sabon Tasha and Kaduna State as a whole unconducive for criminals to perpetuate their evil acts, they can easily run to neighboring states where the cost of crime is low and the benefit high. From such states, they can be coming into Kaduna, commit crime and run back to their hideout. "Operation Yaki will continue to record limited success unless neighboring states establish similar security outfits. This is because most of the criminals chased out of the state have found an abode in the neighboring states where security is lax" (Interview, June 2015).

4.8 Discussion of Major Findings and Verification of the Research Propositions

From the foregoing presentation and analysis of relevant data on the subject under investigation, the following findings or deductions can be drawn:

1. The mandate of Operation Yaki is to curb crime and criminality in the whole of Kaduna State as a way of ensuring the protection of lives and properties. In pursuing this mandate Operation Yaki plays the role of a quick responder and deterrent to criminals through regular patrols of high ways, black spots, and response to distress calls (see table 4.8 above and excerpts from interviews).
2. The rate of crime in Sabon Tasha is on the decrease since 2008 when Operation Yaki came into existence as revealed on table 4.11 where majority (45.7%) of the respondents attested to it in addition to excerpts from interviews and confirmed by official crime statistics on Table 4.12. The decrease in crime rate since 2008 is majorly a result of the existence of Operation Yaki (see table 4.13 and excerpts from interviews).
3. Residents of Sabon Tasha feel more secure now than before the coming into existence of Operation Yaki. This is revealed on tables 4.14 and 4.15 where majority (51.1% and 64.3%

respectively) of the respondents confirmed that since the introduction of Operation Yaki in 2008, the security situation in Sabon Tasha has improved than before.

4. Despite its limited patrol of streets, highways and black spots (see table 4.16) and slow response to distress calls (see table 4.18); Operation Yaki has been certified by residents of Sabon Tasha to be effective on crime control (see table 4.19) as it has been able to impact positively on crime control in Sabon Tasha to the extent that it has increased the risk for criminals thereby limiting their desire to commit crime in the area as revealed on table 4.17 where 68.5% of the respondents believe so, hence the drop in crime rate since its creation in 2008.
5. The major challenges facing the effective functioning of the security outfit in Sabon Tasha are poor numerical strength; poor maintenance and fuelling of patrol vehicles, brutality to the people,slow response to distress calls, insufficient monthly allowance, not always within easy reach, and the absence of similar security measure in neighboring states (see table 4.21 and excerpts from interviews).

Deducible from these findings therefore is the revelation that despite being faced with challenges such as poor numerical strength; poor maintenance and fuelling of patrol vehicles, brutality to the people, slow response to distress calls, insufficient monthly allowance, not always within easy reach, and the absence of similar security measure in neighboring states; Operation Yaki is living up to its mandate of crime control in Sabon Tasha as its coming into being in 2008 has contributed in the reduction in crime rate and the feeling of insecurity in the area, and the same has been assessed by residents as being effective in the area.

This discovery vindicates the two propositions of this study which say “the role of Operation Yaki has served to deter criminals in Sabon Tasha”, “poor numerical strength, and logistical challenges seem to be the major challenges hindering the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha”.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY,CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

This chapter summarizes the findings of this study and concludes.

5.1 **Summary**

The study has performed an Impact Assessment of Operation Yaki as a security outfit on crime control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State 2008-2015. The assessment was based on the mandate of Operation Yaki, Crime rate in Sabon Tasha before and after the creation of Operation Yaki and the relationship between the same and the existence of Operation Yaki, the current state of security feelings of residents of Sabon Tasha vis-à-vis before the creation of Operation Yaki, the extent to which Operation Yaki has controlled crime in the area, and the challenges being faced by Operation Yaki in pursuing its mandate in Sabon Tasha. The study involved the review of available body of literature on crime and crime control. The study also generated primary data through the use of research questionnaire and verbal interview. A sample of 100 respondents was derived from the population of Sabon Tasha using multi stage cluster sampling method. Questionnaire was used to understand the perception of respondents on the role of Operation Yaki in crime control in Sabon Tasha, the crime rate in Sabon Tasha, their perceived state of security now compare to before, and the challenges affecting the effective functioning of the security outfit in the area.

5.2 Conclusion

Apart from discovering that the mandate of Operation Yaki is to curb crime and criminality in the whole of Kaduna State by playing the role of quick responder, punisher and deterrent to criminals, it was also discovered that the introduction of Operation Yaki has played a major role in reducing crime rate in Sabon Tasha as residents feel more secure now than before the creation of the security outfit. Also discovered was that poor numerical strength, poor maintenance and fuelling of patrol vehicles, brutality on people of the area, slow response to distress calls, insufficient monthly allowance, not always within easy reach, and the absence of similar security measure in neighboring states are the major challenges facing the effective functioning of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.

It is clear from the foregoing that this study has confirmed that Operation Yaki has impacted positively on crime rate in Sabon Tasha and residents of the area feel more secured now than before, hence their satisfaction with the impact of the security outfit.

It is the submission of this study therefore, that as an innovative response to high cases of crime, the introduction of Operation Yaki is an effective security measure which can be made more effective only through the channeling of additional government attention and resources into it and collaborating with neighboring states to initiate similar security measures.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the conclusion of this study, it shows that for Operation Yaki to impact better on cases of crime in Sabon Tasha, government must channel more attention and resources towards the functioning of the outfit, and it is important that neighboring states adopt similar security measure. In the light of this, the following recommendations are proffered.

More personnel be recruited and trained into Operation Yaki to boost the numerical strength of the security outfit.

The culture of regular maintenance and adequate fuelling of patrol vehicles of Operation Yaki be developed by government to enable the outfit function more effectively and respond quicker to distress calls.

Operation Yaki should be less brutal in their dealings with residents of Sabon Tasha in order to boost their confidence on them thereby encouraging them to maximize their cooperation with the outfit especially in terms of supply of information.

The monthly allowance of members of Operation Yaki should be looked into with a view of upward review in order to motivate the personnel of the Task Force to function better.

Government should look at the possibility of having quick response offices for Operation Yaki across the state to enable easy access to men of the outfit and quicker response to distress calls.

Finally, government of Kaduna State should partner neighboring state governors and make them see the need to have a similar security measure in their states to boost the effectiveness of Operation Yaki in Kaduna State as a whole and beyond.

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Apendix "A" Questionnaire

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

Ahmadu Bello University

Zaria, Nigeria

Dear Respondent,

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

I am a Postgraduate (M.sc) student in the above mentioned Department and institution and I am conducting a research on the topic: **A Impact Assessment of Operation Yaki as a Security Outfit on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha, Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State; 2008-2012,** as a requirement for the award of M.sc Degree in Political Science.

Please, kindly tick (√) the appropriate option in the space provided against the questions overleaf. Be assured that your responses would be handled and treated with maximum confidentiality and strictly for the purpose of this research.

Thank you.

DOGARA WAZIRI FADASON

M.sc/Soc-Sci/2145/2009-2010

SECTION B: BIODATA OF RESPONDENT

1) Sex (a) male ☐ (b) Female ☐

2) Age (a) 18-25 ☐ (b) 26-35 ☐ (c) 36-50 ☐ (d) 51 and above ☐

3) Marital status (a) Single ☐ (b) Married ☐ (C) Widow/Widower(d ☐ eparated ☐

4) Occupation/Profession (a) Student ☐ (b) Civil servant ☐ (c) Self-employed ☐ (d) Applicant ☐

(e) Security personnel ☐

5) Educational qualification (a) Primary school ☐ (b) Secondary school ☐ (c) Tertiary school ☐

(d) Non-formal Education ☐

SECTION C: ROLE OF OPERATION YAKI IN CRIME CONTROL

6) Are you aware of the existence of Operation Yaki? (a) yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No Idea ☐

7) Which of the following do you think is/are the role(s) of Operation Yaki in crime control?

(a) Patrolling high ways and black spots only ☐

(b) Serving as deterrent to offenders ☐

(c) Arresting and handing over arrested criminals to the police for further investigation ☐

(d) All of the above ☐

(e) None of the above ☐

SECTION D: CRIME RATE IN SABON TASHA

12) The mandate of Operation Yaki is basically crime control in the whole of Kaduna State. (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No idea ☐

13) Were cases of crime rampant in Sabon Tasha before the coming into existence of Operation Yaki? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No Idea ☐

14) What do you think is the rate of crime in Sabon Tasha? (a) On the increase ☐ (b) on the decrease ☐ (c) No idea ☐

15) if your response above is "on the decrease", do you think the decrease in crime rate is majorly a result of the existence of Operation Yaki? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No idea ☐

SECTION E: PERCIEVE SENSE OF SECURITY IN SABON TASHA

16) Do you strongly feel insecure from criminals in Sabon Tasha now than before the creation of Operation Yaki? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No idea ☐

17) Do you think the existence of Operation Yaki has improved the security situation in Sabon Tasha?

(a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No Idea ☐

SECTION F: THE EXTENT TO WHICH OPERATION YAKI HAS CONTROLED CRIME IN SABON TASHA

8) How often do you see Operation Yaki patrolling the streets/High ways in your area?

(a) Very often ☐ (b) Not often ☐ (c) They do not patrol at all ☐ (d) No idea ☐

9) Do you think the coming into existence of Operation Yaki has increased the risk for criminals thereby limiting their desire to commit crime in Sabon Tasha? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No idea ☐

10) Do Operation Yaki respond quickly to distress calls, arrive at crime scene on time? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No idea ☐

11) What is your assessment of Operation Yaki on crime control in Sabon Tasha? (a) Ineffective ☐ (b) Effective ☐ c) No Idea ☐

SECTION G: CHALLENGES FACING THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF OPERATION YAKI IN SABON TASHA

18) Do you think Operation Yaki is facing certain challenges in carrying out its tasks in Sabon Tasha? (a) Yes ☐ (b) No ☐ (c) No Idea ☐

19) Which of the following do you think is /are the major challenge(s) against the effectiveness of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha? (a) Inadequate cooperation from residents of Sabon Tasha ☐ (b) Poor numerical strength ☐ (c) Inadequate modern crime control equipment ☐ (d) inadequate and poor maintenance of patrol vehicles and motor cycles ☐ (e) slow response to distress calls ☐

Apendix "B" Interview Guide


Interview questions on the Impact Assessment of Operation Yaki as a Security Outfit on Crime Control in Sabon Tasha Chikun Local Government area of Kaduna State.

1) What is the mandate of Operation Yaki as a security outfit in Kaduna state?
2) What role does Operation Yaki play in crime control?
3) Were cases of crime rampant in your neighborhood before the introduction of operation Yaki?
4) What do you think about the rate of crime in Sabon Tasha since the introduction of Operation Yaki?
5) What explanation/reason can you give for the decreasing/increasing rate of crime in Sabon Tasha?
6) Do you feel more secured now than before the creation of Operation Yaki?
7) Assess the impact of Operation Yaki in Sabon Tasha.
8) To what extent do you think Operation Yaki has controlled crime in Sabon Tasha?
9) What challenges do you think Operation Yaki is facing in the course of performing its task in Sabon Tasha?


Appendix "C" Interviewees

S/N	Names	Venue	Date and Time
1	Colonel Yakubu Yusuf (rtd) (State Coodinator Operation yaki)	Operation Yaki Joint Head Quarter, Abakpa Kaduna	15/6/15 11:15-11:58 am
2	A.S.P. Ibrahim Mohammed (second in command to state coordinator)	Operation Yaki's Office along Constitution Road Kaduna	9/6/15 5:11-6:05 pm
3	Mrs Hanatu Luka	Opeartion Yaki Joint Head Quarters Abakpa Kaduna	9/6/15 3:16-3:47 pm
4	Inspector Benjamin James (patrol team leader)	Civil Defense Section, Kaduna State Secretariat, Kaduna	9/6/15 2:15-3:11 pm
5	Air Craft Man (ACM) Zamani D.	Block D2 Air force Base Mando Kaduna	13/6/15 10:21-11:15 am
6	Mr Stephen Ibrahim (District Head Sabon Tasha District)	District Head's Palace, Ungwan Pama Sabon Tasha Kaduna	11/6/15 10:12-10:57 am
7	Alh. Ibrahim Lawal Umaru (Dakachin Matari Sabon Tasha)	Dakachin Matari' Palace, Curt Road Sabon Tasha Kaduna	16/6/15 11:36-12:21 am
8	Mr. Bawa Baraje (Dakachin Ungwan Gimbiya Sabon Tasha)	Dakachin Ungwan Gimbiya Palace, 58 College Road Sabon Tasha Kaduna	10/6/15 12:06-13:43 pm
9	Miss Martha Thomas	16 Jema'a Road Sabon Tasha Kaduna	17/6/15 10:18-10:42 am
10	Mr. Joshua Bassey	Kurmin Musa Close Ungwan Baro Sabon Tasha Kaduna	17/6/15 1:17-1:52 pm
11	Mr. Rueben Monday	14 Gwari Road Ungwan Sunday Sabon Tasha Kaduna	9/6/15 4:13-4:33 pm
12	Hon Solomon Bernard (Former Councilor Sabon Tasha Ward)	34 College Road Sabon Tasha Kaduna	11/6/15 2:11-2:42 pm
13	Mr. Yohana Peter	17 Dokaje Street Ungwan Pama Sabon Tasha Kaduna.	3/10/15 10:12-10:38AM
14	Mrs Felicia Stephen	9 jama'a Road, Sabon Tasha Kad.	11/10/15 5:13pm-5:22pm
15	Insp. Yakubu James	Goningora Strdeet U/Gimbiya	7/10/15 1:02-1:28pm

Apendix "D" Map of Kaduna Sate Showing Chikun Local Government Area



Apendix "E"


MAP OF SABON TASHA
7°26'0"E
7°26'30"E
7°27'0"E
7°27'30"E
7°28'0"E
7°28'30"E
7°29'0"E
7°29'30"E
7°30'0"E
10°27'30"N
10°27'0"N
10°26'30"N
10°26'0"N
10°25'30"N
N
W
E
S
Ungwa Pasa
Cementary
Ungwa Baro
Ungwa Sunday
Sabon Tasha Market
Black Street
L.E.A Primary school
Kauna Aga
Ungwa Kadara
Ungwa Rimawa
NYSC Quarters
Government Secondary School
Sabon Tasha G.R.A
Ungwa Chembera
Legend
Stream
Road
Cementary
L.E.A Primary school
Railway
Built-up Area
Government Secondary School
Sabon Tasha Market
0
0.5
1
2 Kilometers