IMPACT OF MILITARY RULE ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA: THE CASE OF GENERAL IBRAHIM BABANGIDA'S REGIME (1985-1993)

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MAY, 2011

DECLARATION

I, Michael Chinedu Ahamefule, do sincerely declare that this research study is the result of my original work. Therefore all the works and information from other authors referred to in this study, have been appropriately acknowledged in the references. I also declare, that this thesis has not been submitted to any other institution or organization for the award of any degree. I therefore accept responsibility for any misinterpretation or error found in this work.



Michael Chinedu Ahamefule

30th May, 2011

Date

CERTIFICATION

This thesis, entitled "Impact of Military Rule on Socio-economic Development in Nigeria: The Case of General Ibrahim Babangida's Regime", by Michael Chinedu Ahamefule, registration number M.Sc/ADMIN/07510/2006-07, meets the regulations governing the award of Masters of Science (M.Sc) Degree in Public Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is wholeheartedly dedicated to Almighty God, the fountain of all knowledge, by whose magnanimity I have attained this academic height and my Dad, Late Mr. Francis Ahamefule.

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My deepest and heartfelt appreciation goes to God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, whose unity (One God) had offered me necessary protection, knowledge, guidance and access to resources throughout the period of this academic exercise and this research work in particular. God actually began and ended with me.

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Irrespective of the foregoing contributions, the composition, analysis and recommendations in this work are entirely my brainwork, and any errors in presentation of facts or analysis are directly my responsibility.

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ABSTRACT

This Study was set out to examine the impact of military rule on socio- economic development in Nigeria, with a particular focus on the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, from 1985 to 1993. The specific objective of this study was to examine whether the military rule in Nigeria has been able to achieve socio- economic development in the country. Using content analysis, the major findings of this study revealed that there had been great political interest of the military in the politics and administration of Nigeria that accounted for prolonged military rule in the country. The longer period of military rule in Nigeria had greater impediments on the socio- economic development in the country. The military regime in Nigeria under General Babangida had no positive impact on socio- economic development in the country, because most developmental programmes in Nigeria under his military regime were not people-oriented and not successfully implemented in the interest of the common masses but a few elites in the country. Such programmes emanating from the military regime under General Babangida like the Structural Adjustment Programmes (S.A.P), Privatization and Commercialization; and Debt Rescheduling Scheme had rather heightened the level of poverty and created a very wide gap between the rich and the poor in the country and that such programmes had not trickled down to improve the socio-economic conditions of the generality of the citizens in Nigeria but rather created more difficulties for the common man. The political issues under the military regime of General Babangida in Nigeria were equally found to be undemocratic as to usher in the most laudable socio-economic development in the country. Thus, the formation of the Political Bureau; the constitution review committee; the constituent Assembly; the formation of political parties and elections under Babangida's military administration in Nigeria were so designed to favour a particular high class citizens in the country, but not targeted really at enhancing the socio-economic development in the country. Military rule in Nigeria under General Babangida regime had therefore, not been able to impact positively on the socio-economic development of the country. Thus, military regimes in Nigeria have not equally been found to be modernizing agents. This Study recommends that the military should stick to their constitutional role of defending the territorial integrity of the country rather than always engage in Nigeria's politics, and allow for a sustainable representative government under civil rule that could enhance the socio-economic development of Nigeria.

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Military rule is often considered an aberration anywhere in the world, because, states prefer to be ruled under democratic governments than military dictatorship (Ndoh,1997). Thus, it is expected that military governments should rarely be experienced (Dudley,1982). The military is a configuration of the Army, the Navy and the Air force, with a traditional responsibility of protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their nation states.

However, the traditional role of the military was profoundly changed to take another dimension in most of the third world countries where the military assumed the political leadership of their respective countries and developed into a new state of sophistication in terms of power manipulation and control (Ndoh,1997). Several reasons have been given for this swift shift in role performance as summarized in McWilliams (1967:18) that:

> The military can best undertake the tasks of modernization. Those military organizations or at least their leaders have acquired two essential skills: technical knowledge, and the habits of discipline and modern organization. In addition, the military may be able to overcome partisan resistance to projects for development with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of compromise.

The presence of the Nigerian military on the centre-stage of power was first noticed in the wake of the 1966 that marked the end of the first civilian administration in the country (Anyabolu, 2000). The 1966 military coup served as a prelude to the military's gravitation unto power and politics of Nigeria where they tend to introduce various developmental programmes to justify their seizure of political power (Chikendu, 2003:68). In short, the military has often

proven to be the savior of the Nigerian economy by providing the basic amenities of life through the socio-economic development programmes and projects like DFFRI, MAMSER, ADB, etc, which have for years provided the basic infrastructural facilities such as roads network, agricultural development projects, employment opportunities for the masses, credit facilities and so on (Ndoh, 1997). This implies that military rule in Nigeria has had a tremendous impact on socio-economic development of the country: Most of the infrastructural facilities in Nigeria, states' creation, local government reforms in the country, and the establishment of some tertiary institutions to enhance educational and socio-economic development were mostly executed under military rule in the country.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has suffered prolonged years of military rule, at present, than civilian rule, but the constitutional role of the military is known to be that of protecting its country's territorial integrity and sovereignty, while the provision of basic amenities of life such as pipe-borne water, electricity supply, quality roads network and health care delivery services is normally believed to be the functional and exclusive responsibility of the civilian leaders of a country. This goes without thinking that countries, like Nigeria, that suffered prolonged military dictatorship will definitely lack socio-economic development of their economies under military rule. More so, the suppression of fundamental human rights, suspension of the country's constitution and abuse of democratic stability that occur during military eras is felt to have been able to impede the level of national development in Nigeria. This study poses the following research questions:

I) Has military rule in Nigeria been able to achieve national development of the country?

II) Has military rule in Nigeria impeded or enhanced socio-economic development of the country?

III) What is the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria?

IV) Does it mean that most socio-economic development programmes and projects successfully executed in Nigeria were done under military administrations in the country?

1.3 Research Propositions

This study is based on the following propositions:

i) The greater the factors that necessitate Military intervention in politics and administration, the greater the political interest of the Military and the lesser the achievement of socio-economic development in Nigeria.

ii) The longer the period of Military rule in Nigeria, the greater the impediments to socio-economic development in the country.

iii) The greater the extent of socio-economic development projects and programmes successfully implemented under General Ibrahim Babangida's Military regime in Nigeria, the greater the impact of his administration on socio-economic development in the country.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

Generally, this study aims at finding out the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria since 1985. However, the specific objectives of this study are as follows:

i) To determine whether military rule in Nigeria has been able to achieve socio-economic development in the country, particularly under IBB regime

ii) To ascertain whether most socio-economic development programmes and projects successfully executed in Nigeria were done under military administrations in the country

iii) To examine the effect of the prolonged military rule in Nigeria on socio-economic development in the country

iv) And to proffer solutions to constant military intervention in Nigerian government and politics.

1.5 Significance of the Study

It is expected that this study will reveal the contributions of military administrations to socio-economic development in Nigeria, particularly during General Ibrahim Babangida's Military regime.

The study will also expose the likely causes of military intervention in governance of the country thereby helping the civilian leadership of the country to improve on policy measures that will ensure the stability and development of the country to avoid constant military intervention in politics.

More so, this study will be of relevance to policy makers in Nigeria on civil military relations in the country through the recommendations given at the end of the work. Other researchers on similar matters (like the researcher) will equally find this study relevant as it will enhance their academic knowledge on the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Given the prolonged and persistent nature of military rule in Nigeria, it was practically impossible to conduct this research in the whole military administrations in the country. It was

not equally possible to investigate the level of development under the military in all the Military regimes in Nigeria. The area coverage for this study was therefore delimited to the military administration under General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993).

The reason for studying General Babangida's regime is due to the long period of military rule by the regime within the period under study, and with the doubt in the understanding as to whether the military under this regime has had an impact on socio-economic development of the country.

Like in any other social phenomenon, some constraining issues were faced in the course of this study which included insufficiency of money and materials to effectively conduct this study. More so, the time frame within which this research had been done was insufficient for a scientific investigation of the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the researcher made sure that the information needed for research conclusion and recommendations were adequately obtained.

1.7 Research Methodology

This explains the justification for the methods and materials used in data collection, presentation, analysis and interpretation.

1.7.1 Types of Data

For the purpose of this work, the researcher mainly used secondary sources of data to gather the requisite information for the study.

1.7.2 Sources of Data

The secondary sources of data used in this study included the use of books, journals, articles, newspapers and related government publications.

1.7.3 Methods of Data Collection

The use of secondary sources of data collection for this study involved the exploration of content analysis of existing literature on military rule and socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria. Thus, books, journals, articles, newspapers and related government publications were used to obtain the needed information. This constitutes the major source of data for this study.

1.7.4 Method of Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data analysis here involves the use of qualitative descriptive analysis method to summarize the results of the subject under study. Through the qualitative descriptive analysis method, the researcher literally explains the major findings from the information generated through the secondary sources such that conclusion could be drawn based on such findings.

1.8 Operational Definition of Concepts

For the purpose of clarity, key concepts in this study were given operational definitions as used in this study for easy comprehension:

a) **Military Rule**: This explains governance by members of the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, mostly through coup d'état in a country. Traditionally, the military men are not trained to rule but to protect and defend the territorial integrity of their country from external aggression and internal insecurity (Ndoh, 1997).

b) **Civilian Rule**: This, as used in this work, refers to rule or governance by elected leaders who in most cases represent their people in government. It is expected, under normal circumstances, that civilians should rule any country and not members of the military (Chikendu, 2003).

c) **Socio-economic Development:** As used in this work, Socio-economic development refers to availability of the basic infrastructural facilities of life such as quality and durable roads network, pipe borne water supply; electricity supply; health care delivery services; educational facilities; employment opportunities to the masses and all other programmes that ensure the general well-being of the generality of the masses (Iyoha, 1996).

1.9 Plan of the Study

This Study is made up of five Chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction, which constitutes the background to the Study, Statement of research Problem, Research Propositions, Objectives of the Study, Significance of the Study, Scope of the Study, Limitations of the Study, Research Methodology, operational definition of Concepts, and the Plan of the Study.

Chapter two examines a review of related literature and evaluates the Theoretical framework on which the Study rests. Under the literature review, a thematic review is considered to cover areas such as perspectives of development; the nature and character of military intervention in politics; military rule as an aberration; the military as agents of Modernization, and military rule in Nigeria.

In Chapter three, the work considers the evolution of military force, military rule and socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria in a historical perspective. The chapter therefore considers the perspective on genesis of the military; the evolution of the Nigeria military; the nature of the Nigeria military; military rule and socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria.

Chapter four presents and analyses data on the impact of military rule under General Ibrahim Babangida's regime on socio-economic development in Nigeria from 1985-1993. Thus, socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria under military era were studied such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); Privatization and Commercialization Programmes; MAMSER; State Creation and Local Government Reforms; the political development and the evolution of democracy under Babangida's military regime.

Chapter five, being the concluding chapter, deals essentially with the summary of the major findings on the impact of military rule under General Ibrahim Babangida's regime on socio-economic development in Nigeria, with a set of recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines a review of related literature and evaluates the Theoretical Framework on which the study rests. A thematic review is hereby considered to cover areas such as perspectives of development; the nature and character of military intervention in politics; military rule *as* an aberration; the military as agents of modernization and military rule in Nigeria.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Perspectives of Development

The concept of development, according to many scholars, is very much resistant to any universally accepted definition, because it has been defined by various authors, scholars and analysts in their own respective perspectives. However, the common argument in all the various perspectives of development point to "one and simple fact that normally connotes change from less to more desirable state" (Shaapera, 2005). Many of such writers have argued that development is a normative concept, and must be relative to time, place and circumstances; and it cannot be reduced to one universally acceptable formula (Roodney, *1972;* Todaro; Ujo, 1995; Seers, 1969; Iyoha, 1996; Ake, 1979; Shaapera, 2005).

According to Todaro, in Ujo (1995:5), development is beyond economic indicators. It is both a physical process and a state of mind which has to do with the transformation of institutions, and that the thinking of the people (culture) must equally change. The short coming of this argument, however, is that it fails to indicate the nature of change reference to as development; whether backward change, forward, social, economic, political or otherwise.

Also, the points raised do not translate to how the military can impact on such development in an area and hence their short coming to our analysis of the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in this work.

According to Seers (1969:2), development in an area can be approached through the analysis on equality as well as growth. It can be assessed by asking such questions as:

i) What has happened to poverty?

ii) What has happened to unemployment?

iii) What has happened to inequality?

That, when the above related problems have been reduced in a society, such a society is said to have attained development.

Accordingly, though Seers did not situate his analysis within the scope of the impact of military rule on socio-economic development, it is yet still relevant as it provides lead way to part of what impact one hopes the prolonged military rule should have on the socio-economic development in Nigeria.

Iyoha (1996:22), citing Qrewa, has it to say about development as involving:

> A programme which has the objectives and strategies which are aimed at transforming the citizens in the rural areas from the victims of poverty, ignorance and disease into a contended human being, able to earn an income, capable of sustaining a reasonable standard of living for him and his family.

This shows that development in an area would be able to provide the basic necessities of life such as food, jobs, affordable and accessible health care delivery services; good, durable and motorable roads, constant water and electricity supplies, and quality education for the people within a free and participatory climate. The freedom of individuals is the ultimate aim

of development in a society. What then can one say of the impact of military rule on development in this regard, given their constant suppression of fundamental human rights and freedom.

According to Rodney (1972:1), the term development is a many sided process that has to be viewed at the individual level, group and society. At the level of individual, he stated that development implies increased skills and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline and responsibility, as well as material well being. At the level of group, development implies greater capacity to regulate both internal and external relations. Meanwhile, at the social level, development means, according to him, the ability of society to tap its natural resources for use by men in their greater number in the society.

Accordingly, Rodney (1972) categorically posits that though underdevelopment is the opposite of development, because, societies the world over have developed in one way or the other in their own capacities, it does not mean the absence of development. Underdevelopment as a term therefore, best suits a comparative analysis of development of countries or societies of the world. This makes other scholars to see underdevelopment as involving a state of economic, social, political and cultural backwardness of a society vis-a-vis others on similar level or category.

It is with the foregoing perspectives of development that the prolonged military rule in Nigeria will be viewed in terms of their impact on social and economic development in the country. This will invariably fill the existing gap in the literature reviewed, as most scholars on military intervention have failed to situate their studies within the military's impact on socio-economic transformation. They are more concerned with the causes and nature of military intervention and this does not only limit the existing literature on military rule and

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development, but also hinders proper knowledge of the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

2.2.2 The Nature and Character of Military Intervention in Politics:

Moris Janowitz (1964) argues that in comparison with Western European professional armies, there is a marked absence of a history of feudal domination in new nations, as a result of which the military profession does not have strong ties with or allegiance to an integrated upper class. In Africa, although the data are unclear, there are serious grounds for questioning the above proposition by Janowitz. In northern Nigeria, for example, many, if not all, of the army officers are sons of the traditional ruling emirs, retired army Generals and eminent men of the north. On the other hand, there is reason to suspect that in countries that have suffered a series of military coups, subsequent coup leaders are more likely to come not only from the lower ranks but also from strata lower in the social hierarchy.

Again, Janowitz (1964) explored whether there is any relationship between economic development and limitations of the political role of the military in a sample of developing nations. The empirical results are mainly negative or irrelative. Their findings are in contrast to some writings of students of comparative politics who offered the proposition that there is a positive association between economic development and democratic political competitive news. They have argued that the more economically developed a new nation is, the less likely it is that the military could hinder the competitive process in its politics.

Janowitz (1964) further notes that the military establishments in new states differ markedly in their social cohesion because of differences in training, indoctrination, operational experience, and inter-generational cleavages. He points out that skills and abilities of the officers also vary, which frequently imposes severe limitations on the military's capacity to

bargain and communicate politically with clients and publics outside of the military. According to him, certain themes characterize the professional and political ideology of the officers, although they did not necessarily constitute a single unified ideology of military regimes. Among the recurrent characteristics articulated are strong sense of nationalism, willingness to extend government control when necessary over widespread areas of *the* economy and society, a disdain of politicians, and a suspicion of politics (Janowitz, 1964:27-28).

Janowitz's short coming to our problem of study lies in the fact that much emphasis is concentrated on the military's allegiance to an integrated upper class and the effect of different military training, indoctrination, operational experience, and inter-generational cleavages on the social development of the new state. He failed to examine the nature of military governance and forms of socio-economic development programmes of the military.

Coleman and Price (1962) argued that African states lack what many other new states of the former colonial world have had, namely an army which could be a modernizing and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a last stand-by reserve which could be called in or could take over, to prevent external subversion, or a total collapse of the political order (Coleman and Price, 1962). The authors rightly observed those qualities that the armies of the new states lack which portray them as non-agents of modernization but failed to indicate the nature and characteristics of military intervention in politics, their forms of governance and the impact on the socio-economic development.

Accordingly, Luttwak (1969) describes the situation of a pre-industrial society in terms of military coup and counter coup as being motivated by certain factors:

> All power, all participation, is in the hands of the small educated elite. This elite is literate, educated, well fed and secured, and therefore radically different from the vast majority of their country men, practically a race apart. The masses recognize thus and they also accept the elite's monopoly of power, and unless

> some unbearable exaction leads to desperate revolt, they will accept a change in government whether legal or otherwise. After all it is merely another lot of "them" taking aver... This lack of reaction is all the coup needs on the part of the people in order to stay in power (Luttwak, 1969:22).

Ruth (1970) points out the fundamental reasons for military intervention in politics throughout the African continent. That "power lies in the hands of those who control the means of violence" in the absence of socially rooted, economically productive base. Such power lies, acceding to her, in the barrel of a gun, fired or silent. She added that the means of violence do not appear out of thin air. However, they must be produced and paid for. Ultimately, therefore, the military must seek alliances with those who control the means of production.

The problem with Ruth First's work in our analysis here is that she focused mainly on the development of a social base in Africa and the military's apparent protection of the interests of the new African entrepreneurial class. Less attention was then paid to the military's commitments to socio-economic development and change. Thus, Nordlinger (1970) believes that evidence for the arguments of those who depict the soldiers who stage coups as progressive forces whose entry into politics is to be commended, rather than condemned as the usurpation of civilian authority, and other factors which overshadow the officers' possible modernizing dispositions, have been ignored. Indeed, according to Nordlinger (1970) the military officers are commonly unconcerned with the realization of socio-economic change and reform, and where there are civilian organizations or strata pressing for such changes, the officers purposely oppose them. He immediately modifies this assertion by adding that "Soldiers in mufti" sometimes allow or even encourage economic modernization within social and political contexts in which workers and peasants have not been politically mobilized and in which there is hardly a "middle class" to speak of. What counts above all, in accounting for the

military conservative tendencies in protecting or failing to alter the economic and social status quo are "their determinate pursuance of their corporate interest in combination with their deeply inculcated military values that assign overriding importance to the perseveration of a particular type of political stability and attachments to their middle-class interest and identities (Nordlinger, 1970).

Norlinger still maintained that military regimes may effect modernizing changes as much as certain civilian governments, but the key variable is the officer's corporate interest and military values which combine to hinder their modernization efforts. Even though in modern times, all army officers must claim to be "card-bearing reformers", when they lack a consistency to which they are responsible, they will act much more like the country's most powerful "trade union" than like the revolutionary vanguard of the masses.

Nun (1970) maintains that the military establishment is inseparable from the society surrounding it. In new countries today, military interventionism does not threaten the "middle class" as it might do in liberal societies. Rather, it tends to represent that class and compensate for its inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group. Those who expected that increased "professionalization" of the army would induce officers to withdraw from politics by placing a barrier between them and the rest of society made the mistake of considering social phenomena in isolation. European armies became professionalized only at the end of nineteenth century, as a result of deliberate government policy dictated by the interest of self-preservation (Nun, 1970:344).

In Nigeria and by extension, Africa and in other pre-industrial societies, the process of professionalization therefore produces different results. In contrast with the pre-existing hegemony of the bourgeoisie in Europe, what seems to be occurring in Africa, as Nun (1970)

rightly pointed out what has already occurred in Latin America, is that a struggling fledging class, characterized by its own organizational weakness, is well coming in an alliance with a sector that possesses "a remarkable degree of institutional cohesion and articulateness" (Nun, 1970:328 - 329).

According to Goldsworth (1986:33), lack of a system of personal rule in some African states and the non emergence of a strong central leadership are responsible for the persistence of the central role of the military in politics. He states, in other words, that a system of personal rule in some African states has facilitated the persistence of civilian rule, suggesting that the interaction of leadership, colonial heritage and economic standing account for the persistence of civilian rule in some of these African states.

Goldsworth's short-comings to our problem of study lies in the fact that much emphasis is being placed on what facilitates persistence of civilian rule and forestalls military reign in Africa instead of equally examining the nature of military intervention, methods of rule and the impact on the socio-economic development.

The military as a class, is bent on the defense and maintenance of a decadent status quo (the dominant class that retains control of the social formation). Yet, they recognized that progressive forces may use the military, either as part of a larger social movement or in isolation. Etiey see the possibility for revolutionary forces to infiltrate the army and use it in the overthrow of the social order (Falola and Ihanvbere, 1982). According to these authors, the Buhari coup of 1983 in Nigeria was motivated by the need to forestall a left-wing coup by junior officers.

Mazuri (1973 :1-12) argues that the pre-dominance of military coups in Africa can be explained by the tendencies among some African army officers to emulate what their former course mates or contemporaries in military training institutions have done else where. He termed this as "pan-African emphaty". The military, according to Mazuri, seems to almost always maintain a silent position on their personal ambitions as it relates to intervention. The military will want to take or discuss their ambition in line with development prospect in as much as this does not indict them. The military had also claimed to intervene in order to fight the corrupt practices in the society.

2.2.3 Military Rule as an Aberration

In discussing the factors responsible for military intervention in politics, Ndoh (1997) observes that a combination of the two schools of thought is carried out. According to him, military rule is generally regarded as an aberration. A generally accepted political system is such a system that is governed, directed and controlled by a civilian political elites which has been recruited by popular choice to the decision-making structures of the state. This conception is even held by the military itself. However, they still catapult themselves into political power. They give several reasons for such involvement in the political process to include corruption among the civilian rulers, lower level of socio-economic development under civilian rule, crisis in an economy, precipitated by ethnicity or regionalism, electoral malpractices, break down of law and order, economic mismanagement among several other reasons.

The question now, according to Ndoh (1997), is who should rule a country? He presents the various arguments for and against military rule which may give us an insight into the contributions or otherwise of military rule in national development. Arguing against the

military rule, it has been argued here that the military lacks the political base to rule. By training and tradition, the soldiers have their primary role as defending the country from external attacks and to maintain peace and order in the country. The soldiers are not taught actively the art of governance and therefore separated from politics. "Because of their unpreparedness, the soldiers commit administrative blunders of monumental magnitude" (Ndoh, 1997).

Ndoh also maintains that direct involvement of the military in politics distorts the orientation of the military. It eventually leads to the emergence of a political army which is not good for war and becomes a nuisance to civil rule in time of peace. The soldiers while in politics may be prone to ethnocentricism that may eventually destroy their national outlook.

> Coups are unacceptable as forms of changes in leadership. This is because they disrupt preplanned programmes of the civilian administration. In some cases, when the military topples a democratically elected civilian administration, it embarks on a mass dismissal of civilians in government. Where people with experience in all fields of endeavor are at a premium, such mass dismissal can only have a detrimental effect on the administration (Ndoh, 1997).

An example of the foregoing argument could be given of the mass retrenchment exercise that was carried out by the military administration in Nigeria in 1975 which was counterproductive. It never achieved its intended objective. Military regimes are generally unstable. The existence of coups and counter-coups is a major weakness of the military regimes in Africa. Because of the instability in the regime, foreign investors are not easily attracted, to the country. Apart from that, military regimes are known to be dictatorial in nature. There is intolerance to any form of opposition; they tamper with the fundamental human rights of the citizens. The only way of removing either a military junta or his subordinate officers even if they should prove inefficient is through another coup d'etat (Ndoh, 1997).

It can be noted from the foregoing that a military coup does not give a country the opportunity to select a leader suitable for developmental occasions. A military government is often tolerated and followed out for fear, ignorance and temporary self-interest. However, Ndoh (1997) rightly points out that:

> In overthrowing a democratically elected civilian administration, the military juntas accuse them of being corrupt and of mismanaging the economy, and claim to have immediate solutions to the nations economic, political and sotio-cultural problems. Experience has shown that this messianic picture presented by the military is simply to win public support and consolidate their stay in office. There is the inability of the soldier to solve the problems which brought it into power. Under the military regimes in Africa, corruption and other social vices still flourish (Ndoh, 1997).

Ndoh's arguments are very relevant to our problem of study (military rule and socio-economic development) because of his incisive presentation of he nature and character of military rule and the implications therein. He observes that inordinate ambition of some soldiers is another factor that counts against the military's efficiency in governance:

> Some soldiers simply plot coups to satisfy purely selfish aims. Rapid promotion among the organizers of a coup is a major defect of military regimes in West Africa. Nigeria is an example of this, where the organizers of a successful coup become major generals over-night Coups in most cases are organized for personal aggrandizement (Ndoh, 1997).

Military rule any where, is therefore not supposed to be taken as a saving opportunity. It should not be welcome on any ground, neither should it be applauded. Thus, Finer (1975:17) argued that the second and cardinal weakness of he military as a political force is its lack of title to govern. Rule by force alone or the threat of such force, is inadequate; in addition, government that based its rule on the fact that it was materially stronger than any other force or forces in society would prove both short-lived and ineffective. Presenting his arguments in favor of military rule, Ndoh (1997) points out the fact as presented below, that:

> The above points raised cannot completely eradicate the usefulness of a military regime. Military regimes in Africa have some points to their credit. The first is reduction in the cost of administration. This is quite unlike the civilian administration where there is multiplicity of paid officers and posts.

This fact does not necessarily hold water because since the soldiers are not trained for their jobs they make unpardonable mistakes that have devastating effecte on society and the economy. The cost of this is unquantifiable (Ndoh, 1997). Also, the problem of social vices is decisively dealt with under the military regime than the civilian administration, though social vices like corruption and armed robbery still exist even under military regimes. The stress on accountability and discipline by most military regimes in Africa has helped to ensure judicious use of the scarce resources of most countries and help to reduce corruption in government or public establishments (Ndoh, 1997).

It is a known fact that there can be no democratic polity without politicians. However given Nigeria's truncated political history since independence, our politicians would have to embark on confidence enhancing programmes to convince concerned observers at home and abroad that they indeed constitute a credible alternative to the military, by demonstrating their capacity to govern Nigerians, ensuring stability and therefore promoting rapid socio-economic expansion (Ndoh, 1997).

An observer was able, however, to capture the true contemporary role of the Nigerian military officers, that" I foresee a situation where a military officer will reach the peak of his career without testing the war front. With war kept at a distance, the military are harvesting the fruits of peace-enjoyment in abundance. And when it is obvious that the civilians have lost control of the engine room of state craft, the military comes to rescue and take the captain's seat" (Sam Dialla, 19% : 8). The observer further argues that in this our contemporary Nigeria, the military

officer is a potential governor, minister, sole administrator ambassador, if not head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

This argument, as a matter of fact, is relevant to the present moment in Nigeria, where though the country is under civilian rule, the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, political and electoral crisis, corruption and other factors that are likely to invite the military men, as they usually do, for rescue reasons in politics are gradually resurging. The implication of the observation is far-reaching. And it is true that the military, particularly, the officer corps, are under-employed and under utilized in Nigeria. This provides the corps members with more than sufficient time to seat over "pepper soup and bear" to plan any evil or good.

2.2.4 The Military as Agents of Modernization

Many commentators on the role of the military in developing countries have argued that the military are agents of modernization. The underpinning argument here is that the military is an institution which is guided by clear cut principles. The advocates of this school posit that due to the nature of military training in the modernized societies of Western Europe, the military officers imbibed certain attributes such as professionalism, nationalistic ethos and are always in group cohesion. These attributes are not only necessary in carrying out their normal military activities but are also compatible in carrying out socio-political -cum-economic modernization in a country (Janowitz, 1964; Pye, 1962).

Janowitz (1964: 21) suggests that because of military peculiar organizational structural training, they are uniquely placed where it can take over political power. This organizational advantage, according to him, include the military's central command, hierarchical control, indiscipline, strong obedience to orders, specialized training, nationalistic and 'espirit de corps'.

Similarly, Pye (1962:70) agrees that in the new independent state, the military is fully equipped to do things the civilian politicians have most assuredly failed to do, because of the military training, skills, hierarchical structure, dedication to national integration and services. Military intervention and the level of socio-economic development are two related variables. Low socio-economic development is more amenable to coups than those with a reversed situation, hence military's desire is to take over power and speed the development process. To this end, Shills (1960 : 78) sees the ascendancy of the military in the domestic life of the new states as being a response to the difficulties which the new states have encounter in their efforts to establish themselves modern sovereignties.

The military is an institution of nation hood and provides the atmosphere needed for the socio-economic and political development of the modern states. This explains why Janowitz (1960:65) specifically argued that there are certain characteristics in the nature of modern military organization which dispose it to intervene in politics. To him, the African military is an out growth of the European colonial armies. Their officer corps are trained by ex-colonial powers and are "insofacto" modern institutions. The officers, he argued, while in training have imbibed qualities such as puritanical ethics, professionalism, dedication, nationalistic ethos and cohesion which make them act in unity and decisively in the execution of military and political functions. Invariably, development in an economy, according to this explanation could tetter be planned and executed or put to existence by the military.

Huntington (1957:74) argues, while commenting on the ability of the military as a modernizing agent, that because of the absence of legitimate and active political institutions, social forces confronting each other with little restraints, the army, which is in a stand by with its prestige, responsibility and material resources, moves in to restore order. Military intervention is

therefore seen as a response to external stimulus and as a manifestation of the failures of the institutions and political structures of society. Thus, Huntington (1975) argues that: "The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect no social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society"

Paradoxically, however, there are those who, on the radical strand, viewed that military participation in politics of Nigeria and other third world economies, offers an overwhelming negative impact on development on a general note. The military cannot effectively transform a society because of its undemocratic stands. Huntington (1975) holds that the military phenomena drew much attention not only to the dominance, predominance and prolongation of the military in governance or even a prominence of forces as an instrument of power but also as a gross absence of the rule of law and of course of the absence of separation of powers.

The military in Africa, as observed by Okpeh (2002:63) is administratively incapable of handling the socio-economic development task. To him, the incompetent military regime in Africa often relies on the civil society to make for their inexperience in conducting states affaires. This is a situation of common practice where the members of the intelligentsia class constitute the administrative arrow head of military regimes in Africa.

According to Okpeh (2002:63), the military has been the chief beneficiary of its intervention in politics and not the masses. She alerts that, the assumption that the military has the power and the political will to hold the country together especially in times of crisis, has shown to be in hollow, for in reality, it has polarized the country. The military has widened the north-south divide, its failure to install enduring democracy in spite of expensive and protracted transition

programmes demonstrated that it was not the political savior as it claimed. Okpeh (2002:63) maintains further that:

> The damage goes beyond political as it has taken a toll on the military by politicizing its professionalism to the background, permeating the institution and the civil society its values such as centralization and authoritarianism, institutionalized barracks culture, and as a result, political culture that upholds a command and control structure seem to have taken root in Nigeria.

The implication of the foregoing argument is that military tendencies have since taken over in both political and administrative matters in Nigeria and which are very inimical to socio-economic development in an economy. It has been argued that while democratic system allows for dialogue, debate and rational agreement rattier than physical coercion and armed violence for the reconciliation of conflict. Military revolt and the displacement of civil authorities usually suspend the operation of democracy and render the society more vulnerable to conflict and violence.

In his attempt to justify his coming to power in Nigerian politics while inaugurating the political Bureau at Abuja on January L3,1986, General Ibrahim Babangida opined that:

> We are all familiar with the political conditions which brought military regimes. Invariably, military administration has come about as a result of bad governance. Indeed, our present economic predicament can be attributed to the nature and practice of the partisan politics. It has contributed impact to the increasing cynicism and apathy of individuals, economic mismanagement as well as the apparent social chaos and disorder in our society. It has also adversely affected our capacity as a nation to realize our vast economic potentials.

Nevertheless, as Edoh (2003:89) rightly argued, the military in Nigeria can not be said to be a modernizing agent hence the country witnessed the high level of socio- economic crisis, abuse of human rights and freedom, violence as a means of resolving conflict, killings, corruption

and all forms of crimes against humanity under military regimes. This therefore dismissed the position that sees military intervention as messianic

In a related development, such argument referring to the military as a modernized institution capable of developing the nation does not properly account for the reality of military regimes in many social formations or developing nations.

The experience in Nigeria shows that most of the physical development in Nigeria is the handwork of the military. However, most decrees, programmes and practices of he military dictators are inimical to the institutionalization of the cultural values that promote the wellbeing of the generality of the people and which are tantamount to socio-economic development in a country. Gross violation of human rights, lack of freedom of the press under military rule, corruption, economic mismanagement, annulment of June 12 election, extrajudicial arrest and killings, have all combined in one way or the other to stunt, stop or erode the country's efforts at socio-political-cum-economic development under the Military administrations. The debilitating nature of our nascent democracy is also traceable to this development (Tativ, 2005). More so, Nigeria has witnessed a total disintegration within the military hierarchy of the country during the civil war and these are all pointedly against the suitability of military's claim to professionalism and nationalistic ethos in the country. The phenomena of coups and counter coups in Nigeria go a long way to suggest that the postulations of the military as highly cohesive, possessing administrative skills and technological skills, or imbibing such skills as to enhance modernization is a total misrepresentation of facts.

Understandably, a number of studies have been done in the literature on the military intervention in politics of African Countries. Most of such studies focused on title nature and character of military intervention in politics, its forms of governance and possibilities of withdrawal from the political scene. Very few writers have analyzed the Nigerian predicament and most scholars have often failed to situate their analysis of military rule within the context of the impact on Socio-economic development, especially in Nigeria. This creates an existing gap in the available body of literature which this study seeks to fill Hence, it therefore constitutes our point of departure and contribution to knowledge.

2.3 Theoretical Framework: This Study adopts David Easton's System theory to analyze the impact of military rule on socio-economic development in Nigeria. According to David Easton, the political system's approach to the study of political phenomena refers to the system of interrelationship of a set of components and processes through binding and authoritative allocations of values are made in the society. Thus, system's theory evaluates the procedure of policy and decision making in a society and how the outcome of such policies can equitably be distributed.

System's theory therefore talks about inputs into a system,which are the desires from the environment that are divided into demand and support for policies and the procedures of their implementation. These inputs are fed into the system and they undergo a conversion process via policy formulation and implementation to come out as outputs-which are the outcomes of government decisions that are, in turn, taken back through the feedback mechanism to the environment. At this stage, it is determined whether the whole system is favorable or unfavorable, depending on the impact it has on the socio-economic and political lives of the citizenry.

System's theory could be applied to the impact of military rule on socio-economic development because the military as an institution lacks the constitutional backing to effectively carryout the authoritative allocation of values and resources in a political system. Thus, inputs from the environment' which are the basic socio-economic needs of the masses, are hardly taken into serious consideration in the conversion process during military rule. The military has, therefore, not been able to implement favorable policy outputs that would impact positively on the socio-economic and political lives of the citizens in Nigeria.

Unanka (2008) captures the foregoing argument and stresses that military tendencies do not fit the tenets of neither democracy nor development in a country, because the military operates in the context of danger, calling for highly disciplined behaviour, decisiveness and speed of operation. Its authoritarian nature demands that one person decides and the others comply. The military gives no room to discussion, negotiation or consensus in the face of aggression or conflict. This does not fit the tenets of democracy nor development.

System's theory therefore gives more grounds than it may lack in the study of military rule and its impact on socio-economic development in Nigeria, particularly under General Ibrahim Babangida's regime which has been considered in this work to be generally negative, due largely to the high level of economic crises, extra-judicial killings, abuse of human rights and restricted freedoms in Nigeria under the regime. These were however, in spite of the military's immense contributions to infrastructural development, states creation and political development in the country under General Babangida's military regime.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES, MILITARY RULE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

This Chapter considers the evolution of Military forces, Military rule and Socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria in a historical perspective. Thus, the chapter deals with such issues as the genesis of the Military; the evolution of the Nigerian Army; the nature of the Nigerian Military; Military rule and Socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria.

3.2 Perspectives on the Genesis of the Military

The military is seen as an organized association of armed men maintained by a State for purposes of offensive or defensive warfare. Fredrick Engels defines the military institution as "an instrument of war, and arbitrary coercion and oppression; as a means of deterrence, as a factor of internal structure and functioning of society" (Engels, 1976). The military is therefore a social institution, having several functions interacting with other components of the social structure, and maintaining a stable place in social life and in the international system, both in peace and war.

The evolution and development of the military in Africa and the rest of the third world countries could be explained in the same way as the genesis of the military or armed forces else where. However, African armies take many forms in terms of composition, leadership and technology. Philosophers have speculated about the origin of the military in human societies; some scholars accept the emergence of the military as a natural phenomenon. Herbert Spencer argues that the origin of armies lies in wars between societies. Hence, the view erf war as an

allegedly eternal phenomenon inevitably gave birth to the military as a natural development (Spencer, 1957)

The natural tendency for the population to grow beyond the means of subsistence, which subsequently assure the permanency of bloody struggles also explained the emergence of the armies or military institutions as natural development This is because, resources are finite and people must always fight to acquire material possessions, which is true to the Machiavellian assertion that man is insatiable.

In primitive societies, there were no armed forces and conflict took place spontaneously and this engaged the whole tribes. If armed fighting occurred, temporary military organizations of the entire adult male population emerged. No separate military body existed distinct form the tribe charged with the job of fighting. In primitive non-class societies, the evil of material culture was still low. The desolation of the tribal system of fighting forces, coupled with the simultaneous emergence of class society formed the genesis of the modern armed forces. Essentially, therefore, the genesis and development of the military or armed forces are rooted in the material life of society and should be sought and found just there. For Karl Marx, like all social institutions, armed forces emerged when the development of the social contradictions and conflicts in the system of production had necessitated the creation of an instrument of compulsion. Hence, armed forces were created because they were highly needed for defending the rule of the emergent exploiting class, both inside and outside the emergent political and territorial units (Marx, 1975). Since society is developing towards a classless structure, armed forces are a transitory phenomenon which will disappear as social conflicts and confrontations disappear.

In terms of their human compositions therefore, African armies range from chosen armies to combatant groups of professionals. The first generally consisting of short term soldiers, the later constituting a long serving military elite. The leadership also varies from systems like federalism where power is dispersed to autocracies where it is concentrated.

3.3 The Evolution of Nigerian Army

The Nigerian army was an offshoot of a colonial force modeled on the British army in organizational format and professional training. At independence, the Nigerian army was seen as a traditional force whose primary function was that of defending Nigerians against external aggression and assisting in maintaining internal cohesion and security. At periods of emergency, the army could be called upon to assist in relief and welfare duties or in peace keeping abroad. An officer core was to be trained in Britain along the lines of political neutrality of the military. The military was perceived as a defense force white their training was to inculcate discipline and operational efficiency. It also was to make the officers consider politics as incompatible with the professionalism of the military (Tativ, 2005). While this colonial training of military officers went on in the colonies, British officers in the colonies were not themselves insulated from politics of the colonies .The tradition of insulating military officers in the post colonial period was enhanced by the fact that until 1965, the commander of the Nigerian army was a British officer.

Prior to independence, the resistance encountered by European explorers and settlers in Nigeria was clearly indicative of the fact that the 'traditional' Nigerian society was not devoid of the military (Achike, 1976). This resistance included the gallant military resistance staged by king Koko against the British who had supported the candidature of Akintoye as the king of Lagos.

With about 1,000 soldiers in thirty war canoes, king Koko Brass led his people in a desperate bid for survival. He destroyed the Royal Niger Company's customs control on the Niger. The company's headquarters and the port of Akassa were destroyed. With this clear resistance and open humiliation of the Royal Niger Company, the British Government came to the aid of the pitiable company. Thus, Webster, et al (1980) observed that the British Navy assisted the company and blew up Nembe, the capital and the port of Brass. It confiscated all Brass war canoes, fined the king 5,000 ponds and drove the people into the swamps where starvation and small pox epidemic killed more people than did British bullets.

The tribes of Easton Nigeria also mounted a gallant resistance. To the utmost dismay of the British, they could not capture or control the very 'small' Igbo states. It took nineteen years, from 1898 to 1917 to subdue the Igbo's, who mostly chose armed confrontation from the beginning, when the Ika-Igbo West of Niger attacked the Royal Niger Company depots. The British government took over from the company in 1900, but had no more success than the company in combating the Ekumeku, an underground resistance movement dominated by the young men, using guerilla tactics. This group opposed all forms of foreign rule and influence, whether political, economic or religious. As soon as one group was defeated, another rose up elsewhere. Ekumeku fought the British until 1911.

Military presence could also be observed in the Jihad of the Sokoto Caliphate. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Muslim world, which had once been of fame around the Mediterranean for its military skill, learning and government was in decline. Therefore, during the nineteenth century, they formed a number of reforming governments to restore the muslim world to its former greatness by renewed devotion to the ideals of Islam. This jihad went a long way to depose many Hausa ('Hebe') rulers and the subsequent enthronement of Fulani

leadership. The dethronement and enthronement were achieved by the use of force, which then connotes the prominence of military force. The jihads, among others, succeeded due to the military capabilities of the Jihadists. At the time of Uthman Dan Fodio's death in 1817, the frontiers of the caliphate were roughly established. Borno was the only place where the Jihadists had failed to overthrow the old rulers. This also depicts the presence of a formidable military force in Borno which was able to maintain the integration of the empire despite hostilities from the reformers (Webster, et at 1980).

From the Kano chronicles, we could learn the nature of the development in the societies in Hausa land. The chiefs ruled the state from the earliest times. Although, the chiefs wielded powers over life and death, they were far from being absolute autocrats. They stood at the apex of an elaborate bureaucracy of titled officials and of a separate hierarchy of territorial magnets whose position had much in common with that of the feudatories of Europe, in that they were bound, when called upon to do so, to render military service with a stipulated number of armed followers at their back So long as a chief retained control of this political and military machine, he wielded great power. Once he lost the confidence of the courtiers and 'frandees' however, he could easily be deposed and many chiefs, in fact, suffered this fate (Johnson, 1973:9).

What is of relevance to us from the foregoing historical analysis is that, as early as the seventeenth century, there had existed a military force in Hausa land. The armies had helped in the sustenance of chiefs and emirs on their thrones. The armies had equally helped in ancient state bid for expansionism, like in the year 1513, Asika Mohammed marched into Hausa land at the head of a powerful army, the Hausa states resisted Asika's incursion but were destroyed one by one (Johnson, 1973 : 13). This shows that in various Hausa states: Gobir, Katsina, Kano, Zazzau, there were armies which were defeated by Asika Mohammed. Their defeat was

because they could not all combine to fight a common enemy. The inability to combine for a common defense is out of the scope of this work. Of relevance to us is the fact that armies existed in the Hausa states of pre-colonial Nigeria.

The Jukuns also dominated all their northern neighbors between 1600 and 1700 in their bid for expansion. Their armies captured the city of Kano, came very near to taking Katsina/ and even threatened Bornu which had already developed a highly feared army. Many other examples abound, like the Tiv military force that fought in their bid to expand and finally settled in the present north central region, pushing many other weaker tribes away from the region. We are not however, interested in telling the tales of the states or ethnic groups mentioned, but in explaining the presence of military forces in such areas of pre-colonial Nigeria, with diverse orientations.

We must, however, concede that the problems of the native soldiers were diverse and serious. The most important handicap was the crudity of their weaponry. The indigenous soldiers were obliged to meet machine guns, riffles, and heavy artillery fire with bows and arrows, spears, swords, daggers, shields, clubs and dangerous guns. None of the armies ever had a 'maxim gun' (Johnson, 1973:15). The implication of these disadvantaged positions had always resulted in disaster for the indigenous soldiers. Brutal destruction constituted the eminent feature of wars and expedition against superior powers, especially the British force.

The aim of this segment of the work is not to examine the capabilities of the indigenous armies or the extent to which the indigenous armies were able to mount a successful resistance, but to establish the fact that military elements had existed prior to contact with the Europeans. Nevertheless, the ancient Nigeria, according to Johnson (1973:15), had no separate organized

army. The origin of what could be termed the Nigerian army today can be traced to 1805 when Lt Glover's boat "Dayspring" capsized at Zebba on the river Niger and he decided to make it to Lagos by road. Lt Glover of royal Navy, later sir John Glover, became the governor of Lagos. He encountered, on the way, some indigenes, mainly from the northern part of Nigeria, who were allegedly trying to escape from slave dealers. He chose 18 of them to escort him to Lagos and because of their vigor, strength and endurance during the journey, he organized them to form the nucleus of a local force known as "Glover's Hausa's". He used them to protect British trade routes around Lagos, and to mount punitive expeditions in the Lagos hinterland (Nigerian Army Museum, 1978:9)

In 1865, the British imperial government authorized the constitution of this force into a regular force to be named as the "Hausa constabulary". It was available to the Lagos colonial government for police and military duties. Its name was changed later to be the "Lagos constabulary" which it retained until its incorporation into the west African frontier force and the Lagos Battalion, in 1901. Other local forces were also raised in other parts of the territory under the British which include the royal Niger company's constabulary force in northern Nigeria in 1SJ6, and the oil River irregulars, later known as the Niger coast constabulary I eastern Nigeria, in 1891. These forces were merged in 1897 with other local forces in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia to form the West African frontier force (WAFF) (Achike, 1976:4). There were two regiment of the WAFF in Nigeria: The royal Niger company constabulary formed the northern regiment while the southern constabulary formed the southern Nigeria regiment In 1914, Lugard who had left Nigeria in 1906 was recalled form Hong Kong, and he amalgamated northern and southern Nigeria. This amalgamation included

the unification of the northern Nigeria regiment with the southern Nigeria regiment to form Nigeria regiment of the military forces.

The First World War broke out in 1914 just after the northern Nigeria regiment and the southern Nigeria regiment had been merged to form the Nigerian regiment The men of the regiment were thrown across the Nigerian-German Cameroon frontier to fight the Germans. The Regiment returned in April, 1916, and by November, 1916, set out to German east Africa for another campaign. When the Nigerian contingent returned home after the east African campaign, the troops quickly settled down for ceremonial functions, training as well as being used by the British for internal security operations. The entire regiment was granted a colour, bearing an Arabic inscription, meaning "Victory is from God alone". This has been adopted as the insignia of the present Nigerian army. During this period, King George became Colonel in chief of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). In 1928, the king as coloneHn-chief of WAFF, granted the Royal prefix to make the Royal west African frontier force (RWAFF).

The Second World War broke out in 1939, initially between Germany on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. It is note worthy, that during the war, 28 battalions and supporting troops were raised in Nigeria and 121, 652 men served in the army. They fought courageously and captured various items from the Japanese in Burma, while individual Nigerians won for their bravery and gallantry some 86 decorations, as well as 243 medals. By early 1946, Nigerian troops had all returned form Burma. In the same year, lord Montgomery of Alamein, as chief of the imperial General Staff (CIGS) visited the Regiment Demobilization was effected and the force was reduced to five battalions plus an Engineers and signal unit as well as other services sufficient for the peace time and routine functions to which the troops settled down for the next 14 years. In 1956, Queen Elizabeth of Britain who was also the

colonel-in-chief of the RWAFF visited Nigeria. During this visit, the Queen bestowed on the Nigerian regiment the prefix, Queen's own, to make the force QUNR (Queen's own Nigeria regiment). Also in June, 1956, the Nigeria regiment which had, up to then, formed part of the RWAFF, was renamed the Nigerian military forces (NMF). This was as a result of the regionalization of the RWAFF along territorial lines, in preparation for the independence of the Gold Coast Each military force became independent of the others, but remained subject to the orders of the British army council in London. By 1s1 April, 1958, the British army council in London relinquished control of the Nigerian military forces to the Nigerian government This act, while transferring the whole burden of funding the national defense on the Nigerian tax payers, made it possible for the Nigerianization of the command of the Nigerian military forces.

The Nigerian regiment from its formation was commanded at all levels exclusively by British officers. When the Nigerian nationalists intensified their struggle for independence from British rule, colonial office saw the handwriting on the wall and determined also to prepare the army for an inevitable take over of its command leadership by the Nigerian officer corps. Different methods were adopted to accelerate the Nigerianization of the officer corps of the regiment Some Nigerian other ranks (Ors) with sufficient educational background serving in the technical section of the regiment such as ordinance, Engineers, and signals were given special officer's training and were later granted Emergency commission with British Army numbers. After further training, short service combatant commission (SSC) and regular combatant commission (RQ were later granted to them. Some school certificate holders were recruited and sent to the royal military training school at Sandhurst UK and later commissioned with British army numbers.

By 1958, when the British army council relinquished the control of the Nigerian military forces to the Nigerian government the strength of the army had risen to 7,600 up from 6,400 in 1956. At this point, Nigerian officers dropped the British army number and were given Nigerian army numbers (Johnson, 1973:15). When Nigeria became a republic in 1963, the Royal Nigerian army changed to the Nigerian Army (NA) and Nigerian cadet were sent to the USA, Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan and Ethiopia for training as part of the efforts to intensify the Nigerianization of its officer corps. Also, in 1964, the Nigerian defense academy (NDA) (Nigerian equivalence of British Sandhurst) was established. In 1965, major general JTU Aguiyi Ironsi took over from the last British General officer commanding (GOC) and by 1966 there was no British officer in the Nigerian army.

3.4 The Nature of the Nigerian Military

In analyzing the nature of the Nigerian military, we had to look at the degree to which it possesses authoritarian, paternal, consensus and identity qualities (Ake, 1967). The authoritarian nature of he Nigerian army will be examined in terms of the size of the rank and file, the composition and also, the size and composition of the officer corps, hi addition, the effect of the political structure and situation on the military and how this affects the loyalty of the soldiers to the military traditions.

The Nigerian armed forces are meant to be the coercive instrument of the state, to be used for the maintenance and defense of the Nigerian state. As such, its use in the attainment of ends should be without sentiments or complains. Its nature therefore, should be as such as will elicit the support and confidence of the component units and cultural sections of Nigeria if it is not to

be seen as an instrument employed not for national ends but for goals defined by dominating politicians.

Prior to 1958, the Nigerian military forces owed their loyalty to the colonial government and her up-keep and composition were the responsibility of the war office in Britain. Recruitment into rank and file was from areas where the pay was seen as attractive. The officer corps then was made up of British officers. The military forces were insulated from the public and attempts to integrate the rank and file were made. This was done by making sure that no unit comprised of a dominant majority tribe. However, since recruitment into the technical arms of the force needed some basic educational advantage, the educational imbalance told on the indigenized from the south and greatly affected the composition of the Warrant Officers (W.Os).

In 1958, with the turn of political events, nationalist agitators had become seriously concerned with Nigerianization of the armed forces and by April of that year, control and the up-keep of the armed forces shifted form the war office in Britain to become Nigeria's responsibility. From then on, integration of the armed forces was given a free hand or at best left to the regiment tradition of the military and its ritual. What became of utmost importance was the Nigerianization of the officer corps and the result was that while by 1956, no ethnic, cultural section or regional unit dominated the officer corps, by 1960, the distribution of Nigerian officers by regional and cultural origins showed a total of fifty-five (55) officers in the army; 31 of them were from the Ibo cultural sections of the country. This ethnic imbalance within the army alarmed members of parliament to call out for the prime-minister that if Nigeria is to be united in diversity, "it would be a good idea to equalize our army officer, so that the officers in the Easton region, northern region and the western region are equalized (Miner, 1965).

In 1958, a quota system of recruitment was adopted for the rank and file, giving the north an intake of 50%, the east 25% and the west 25%. The result was that in 1960, the Nigerian army was composed of a rank and file which had between 60-70 percent northerners and officered by a corps of about 65% easterners, dominantiy of the Ibo cultural group. In 1961 however, a quota system was adopted for the intake of cadets. This was to prevent "the possibility fear that the army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the county is not represented in the army, we may harbor some fear that a particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated. But now, this country's safety is assured" (Miner, 1965:100). By 1965, when Alahi Tanko suggested this in the senate, the effect of the quota had begun to show. A third group of officers produced by the quota was more heterogeneous in nature. Out of the 482 direct, combatant and executive commissioned officers in the Nigerian armed forces, the north had 157 (35%), the west and Midwest subtracting those from the cultural section had 128 26.5%) while the east adding offices of the Ika-Ibo areas of he mid west had 195 (40.5%).

The distribution of officers in the army since 1965 gave it a national outiook and it became "generally recognized as the only non-regional, non-tribal organization in the country (Miner, 1965:167). The police force was dominated by southerners, and it was also regionalized to show the divergence in the native laws. And they were also under regional and native authority control. As regards it moral reputation, the army was seen as an institution which ensured fair play and stood for honesty. Her image was further enhanced with the court marshal of Lt Col. Into, commanding officer of 5th battalion, for improper acquisition of property of the army ordinance depot. The army was thus, seen as an institution free of corruption.

During the 1964 elections, the government had cause to call the army to quell the Tiv riots and the N.CN.C pleaded to the government for the use of the army in supervising the 1964 federal

elections, referring to it as the only public force that is independent Another example of the army's loyalty to the political system occurred after the N.P.C had boycotted the elections and was protesting that the results be cancelled and a new election conducted. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the then president, resorted to subverting the constitution from within, by his refusal to call on Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to form a government He then called for the support of the heads of the armed forces on the grounds that he was their commander in-chief. This attempt to subvert the constitution failed as the heads of the army, navy and police refused to give the support he so desired and requested from them.

However, the army was plagued by the same social forces of mal-integration from which the political system suffered. The result was that when the western regional crisis escalated to the point where the political leaders could not resolve it the ethnic factor that has been "existing in the military structure became more pronounced" (Miner, 1965). Through the rituals of military life, its insulation form the country's public and political affairs, the mixing of the rank and file and the regional and ethnic mix up of the officer corps within each unit and the headquarters, some commendable degree of planned socialization and integration was achieved. By the lifestyle of the officers and their loyalty to the government the army was eternal, and its structure was authoritarian in nature in terms of hierarchical devolution of power within the military. However, consensual values within the military were low or absent The duty of decision making was left to the civilians in power. Consequently, the members of the armed forces were socialized to have respect for the authoritarian nature of power.

The flaw in the Nigerian military as regards integration was the process on Nigerianization within the officer corps. The neglect and the ethno-regional factor within a system where politics had been regionalized and was dominated by cultural sections was to create problems

within the military when the political system began to fall apart The first generation of army officers (i.e those produced before 1956) were of a mixed origin and no ethnic or regional group dominated the officer corps. This was not the case with the second and third generations. The second generation of officers was dominantly Ibos in origin (about 68%), while the third set of army officers by the quota system had slightly less than half officers of northern origin. In addition, the rank and file was between 65-70% of northern origin. Nigerianization had not taken into consideration the ethno-regional importance in Nigerian politics and the result was that military status had come to coincide with regional or cultural origin. Consequently then, as far as the political system would provide a formula which ensured stability within the system as well as provide security to the military status of both the second and third generation of army officers, the integrative formula employed within the military could be expected to ensure its stability and loyalty to the system. The integrative formula employed within the military was effective or reinforced if no generation of army officers say their position in the hierarchical pattern of authority was being threatened. This is derived from the fact that one of the causes of mutinies is insecurity amongst a group of officers. Thus, once military status had come to be identified along ethno-regional lines, the loyalty and confidence of he military to the political system and its institutions become influenced by the ethno-regional composition of the occupants of these political institutions.

To the second generation officers, while denying the claim of the Nigerian army as the only institution that was a truly Nigerian gathering and the only one in which 'you get true Nigerianism', we cannot overlook the stability given to this gathering by the ethno-regional balance in the political system. Consequently, the problem was not in the integrative formula employed within the military, but from he political formula adopted among the political

leaders. Due to the effects of planned socialization and integration, the officer corps of the Nigerian army, irrespective of what generation they belong, always held the institutions of government in high esteem. What they held in contempt was the life style of personalities that controlled these institutions, as well as their political programmes.

The officers of the second generation had enrolled into the army not to secure career within 'a true Nigerian gathering' which offered faster opportunities to the top in a period of rapid Nigerianization. However, social forces emanating from the ill-mobilized and mal-integrated political system had permeated the military and threatened their status. Their fear was of the N.P.C. re-adjusting the regional quota in the senior ranks of the officer corps in order that the army would be made more loyal to the government of the day. Because of the fear of what would happen in a regionally unbalanced political system, these officers had come to identify the retention of military status and position with national values such as unity, honesty, fairplay and freedom from corruption. They had come to identify with the government of the N.P.C. and had neglected the other cultural sections. As a result of this, by the composition of their coup, the military had pursued national goals with ethnic symbols.

On the eve of January 15th, 1966, when the coup plotters struck, in the north under major Nzeogwu, the Sardauna, Brigadier Ademulegun and Colonel Shodeinde were killed and the coup plotters established control in that region. In Lagos, majors Ifeajuna and Okafor were routed by General Ironsi who professed his loyalty to the federal government However, the prime-minister, his finance-minister and other military officers had been killed by the coup plotters. In the west the premier had been killed while the East and Mid-West saw no action against what Nzeogwu called 'political profiteers and bigwigs' (Nzeogwu, 1967).

The coup having been failed, the NPC led Government attempted to nominate an acting prime-minister, but Dr. Orizu, the acting president refused, thus, forcing the government to hand over power to General Ironsi. rherefore, the January 15th coup, despite its failure, had with the help of Dr. Orizu, paved the way for the advent of military rule in Nigeria.

3.5 Military Rule and Socio-economic Development Programmes in Nigeria

On January 15, 1966, a well coordinated group of army officers, mostly Ibos, seized power and assassinated the premiers of the Western and Northern regions, chief Akintola and Sir Ahmadu Bello respectively (Anyabolu, 2000: 108). Major General JTU Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo, was in command of the Nigerian Army, but appeared to have no part in the January 15, 1966 plot to take over the government After the coup, Anyabolu (2000:109) observed that politician turned to Ironsi for leadership and surrendered to him complete power to crush the rebellion. General Ironsi had not sought power nor did he wish to keep it since he had already set up a commission to revise the Nigerian constitution and restore democracy.

According to Chikendu (2003: 68), the architects of the first military coup in Nigeria did not succeed in finally taking control of the government. Rather, it was the supreme commander of the Nigerian armed forces, major general Aguiyi Ironsi, who was not privy to the plan that mounted the throne. Consequently he had no readymade programme to implement and so he fumbled from one mistake to another; he was faced with many difficult decisions:

> The first being what to do with coup plotters. If he court marshaled them, he would go against the popular wish, for the coup plotters were regarded as heroes. If he left them unpunished, it would amount to enthroning indiscipline in the military, apart from the fact that Northern leaders would doubt his innocence as one of the planners of the coup in which third leaders were killed (Chikendu, 2003 : 68)

Another, difficult decision Ironsi faced was whether to adopt all-military government or to include civilians in his cabinet In the end, he decided to have two councils at the federal level, namely, the supreme military council and the Federal Executive Council, composed of the military governors and the Federal permanent secretaries, respectively (Chikendu, 2003). At the regional level, the governor was the overall legislative authority, but he appointed the regional permanent secretaries to the Executive council. According to Chikendu (2003:69):

> In his bid to secure a unified public service that would be loyal to his administration, Ironsi, on the advice of Mr. F. Nwokedi, a Federal permanent secretary whom he appointed sole administrative review commissioner, abolished the Federal Framework of Nigeria and promulgated the ill-fated decree 34 which in effect meant that the administrative class of the various Civil services was verified; the existing regions were to be abolished and in their place there would be "groups of provinces' ; regional military governors were to be replaced by military governors of groups of provinces; and military prefects would be appointed who would be in charge of the various provinces.

These, however, meant that the country would become a unitary structure rather than a federal structure. Nigerians, particularly the northerners, did not like this and they showed their disapproval by violent demonstration which started by the students of Ahmadu Bello University and which soon spread to all parts of the north, killing thousands of Igbos in the process (Chikendu, 2003: 69). Eventually, the Ironsi administration was over thrown in a counter coup, staged by northern soldiers, which brought General Yakubu Gowon to power as the new head of state. It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the *first* military administration in Nigeria had not meaningfully impacted on development in the country until it was thrown out of power in a second counter coup d'etat on July 29, 1966.

According to Anyabolu (2000:114), after the death of General Ironsi, the next supreme commander, Lieuternat colonel Yakubu Gowon was chosen as the next military leader of the country for nine years. But Gowon was almost immediately faced with the threat of civil war.

"The military governor of the Ibo-dominated Boston Region, Lieutenant colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, refused to back the new regime and demanded autonomy"for his territory. He finally called for outright secession" (Anyabolu, 2000; 114).

Ojukwu had about half of the Nigerian Army on his side, including most of the junior officers. More so, the Ibos were euphoric. With one quarter of the Nigeria's population and one-twelfth of its territory, Biafra was the richest and most developed region in the country. With only 7000 men, no tanks, no warships, and no combat air craft Gowon was at a disadvantage, it was a bloody civil war which dragged on for two and half years (Anyabolu, 2000).

However, becoming surrounded, starving and broke, the Biafrans surrendered on January 15, 1970. Ojukwu fled into exile in Ivory Coast General Yakubu Gowon quickly reintegrated the Ibos into Nigerian life, with the officials of the rebel government (Biafran soldiers) given new posts in the Federal bureaucracy, and most Ibo officers kept their ranks. The foregoing indicates, so far, that the military administration of general Yakubu Gowon successfully fought for the unity of Nigeria. According to Anyabolu (2000:116),

> Gowon initiated several national building policies, the most notable was the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), a community service institution that required one year of service by each Nigerian immediately after graduation from university or other institution of higher learning, each member of the corps had to serve in a state other than his or her home state.

This programme (NYSC) had been so planned by the Gowon military administration to ensure unity and trust among Nigerians. This unity was almost lost after the civil war where an Ibo man, for instance, considered himself to have nothing in common with a Hausa man or Yoruba, and vice-versa. At least, with NYSC programme, the different ethnic groups in the country freely interact over these years. This has, to an extent, restored the spirit of unity among Nigerians.

More so the military government under General Yakubu Gowon issued an indigenization, decree that gave right to ownership of specified enterprises and participation in certain trades to Nigerians. Thus, Anyabolu (2000:116) opines that

> In 1972, the government issued an indiginzation decree, the first of a number of Nigerian enterprises promotion decrees that barred foreigners from investing in specified enterprises and reserved participation in certain trades to Nigerians. At that time, about 70 percent of commercial firms operating in Nigeria were foreign owned.

As a matter of urgency, Gowon's military administration further created twelve (12) additional states out of the three major regions of the country; the North, East and West with a view to dislocate the conspiracy that characteristically engendered the Easterners' attempt at secession (Ojiako, 1990). In short Gowon's military regime came under fire because of widesprea d scandal and corruption at every level of national life. Nigeria's troubles were not over. Although the country's oil revenues doubled twice, after the 1973 OPEC price hikes, for most of Nigerians, life had not much improved. The great influx of money into the economy also brought massive inflation; corruption was rampant, even among the military officers (Anyabolu, *2000:117).*

In 1975, Gowon reneged on his promise to return the country to civilian rule. This move was the final act which precipitated the bloodless coup during which Gowon was deposed on July 29,1975. At the time of the coup, Gowon was attending an Organization of African Unity summit meeting in Kampala, Uganda. Gowon pledged his full loyalty to the new regime and soon left for exile in Britain.

The new head of state, Brigadier General Murtala Mohammed, began to get Nigeria back on its feet However, six Months after taking office, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated

in lagos by disgruntled Army officers; and the next in command, lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded him (Murtala).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the administrative environment in Nigeria under military rule before *1975* was not able to allow meaningful development programmes to thrive. It suffices to state here that military rule in Nigeria prior to 1975 had very little impact on socio-economic development in the country.

When Obasanjo took over after Murtala Mohammed's death, he stood firmly in support of Murtala's policies and made them workable. He learned by doing, and his administration was successful (Anyabolu, 2000:136). General Obasanjo pledged to continue the program of restoration to civilian rule and to carry forward the reforms to improve the quality of public service. Obasanjo's military rule is noted for its many reforms in public life. To introduce greater integrity among public officials, a public complaints commission was put into place in all states of the federation, and in the capital city of Lagos (Anyabolu, 2000). However, even with the publication of cases of abuse of office and corruption, little actual progress was made in stopping the growing dissolution of society and the economy by criminal elements.

The Obasanjo administration expanded the economic growth of the indigenous population which was started under General Gowon. Obasanjo used the land use Decree of 1978 to stabilize the haphazard systems of land tenure, with its frequent litigation over individual property rights. He later launched Operation Feed the Nation to counter the rapid rise in food exports. Although, all of these reforms were in place, Anyabolu (2000: 136) notes that, "none of them were successfully implemented". The draft constitution as published in October 1976, anticipating the seating of a constituent assembly in 1977, had debates during its sessions of the drafting committee which were frequently ideological in nature but proposals

such as the attempt to define Nigeria as a socialist state were firmly rejected. Committee members discarded Murtala Mohammed's recommendation for a non-party system. However, they did insist that parties applying for registration had to have national objectives and executives board whose members represented at least two-thirds of the states. The model of the new constitution, which was adopted in 1979, was based on the constitution of United States of America, with provisions for a President, Senate, and House of Representatives (Anyabolu, 2000).

Under General Obasanjo, plans were undertaken for the movement of the federal capital from Lagos to a more central location at Abuja. This was seen as a means of encouraging the spread of industrial development inland and a relieving the congestion that threatened to choke Lagos. Abuja was also chosen because it was not identified with any particular ethnic group.

Scholars have noted that heavy investment was planned in steel produce, with assistance from the Soviet Union. A steel mill was developed at Ajeokuta in Kwara state, not far from Abuja. During this time, agriculture declined but large scale irrigation projects were launched in the states of Borno, Kano, Sokoto and Bauchi, under the auspices of the World Bank Similarly, there was rapid expansion in education under General Obasanjo: "At the start of civil war, there were only five universities but by 1975, the number had increased to thirteen, with more established over the next several years. In 3975, there were similar advances in primary and secondary school education" (Anyabolu 2000).

The forgoing implies that the military administration of General Murtala/ Obansanjo had given attention to developmental programmes and protects in Nigeria. When Obansano first announced his determination to hand over power to civilians, most people laughed at him;

no one believed that a military leader would give up that power voluntarily. However, true to his promise he did turn the government over to civilian rule. Obasanjo adhered meticulously to the schedule for return to civilian rule, moving to modernize and streamline the armed forces and seeking to use oil revenues to diversify and develop the country's economy. In the 1970s, Anyabolu (2000:137) observed that petroleum production grew beyond expectations with principle experts to the United States of America. This prosperity contributed to some barrels of oil simply being evaporated, and the money from its sale went directly into the pockets of those Nigerians in a position to steal, either in or out of government In 1979 however, Obasnajo successfully handed over power to a democratically elected civilian president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

On December 31, 1983, the military overthrew the second republic with major General Muhammadu Buhari emerging as the leader of the supreme military council (SMQ, the country's new ruling body. He charged the civilian government with economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, election fraud, and a general lack of concern for the problems of Nigerians. He also pledged to restore prosperity to Nigeria and to return the government to civilian rule when conditions permitted.

As head of state, general Buhari tried to restore public accountability and to revitalize the economy without altering the basic power structure of the country. The military had become impatient with the civilian government's widespread corruption. Immediately after coming to power, the Buhari government investigated and detained the political leaders of the second republic, holding them responsible for the wide spread corruption. In 1984, Buhari launched a war against lack of discipline (WAI). This national campaign lasted fifteen months and preached the work ethic. It emphasized patriotism, decried corruption, and promoted

environmental sanitation. Buhari specified acceptable forms of public behavior, including such activities as requiring people to form lines at bus stops. Unemployment was on the rise as the recession worsened, and speeches about working hard seemed out of place (Anyabolu, 2000:145). As the price of crude oil started to drop rapidly, and with the economy in shambles, criticisms mounted. The regime attempted to stifle criticisms by harassing journalists. Many critics were arrested and the National Security Organization (NSO) was used to wantonly repress the people of Nigeria.

Buhari's biggest problem, according to Anyabolu (2000), was Nigeria's foreign debt Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proved abortive. Buhari was committed to austerity, but IMF insisted on further cuts in spending, devaluation of the currency, and other drastic measures that most Nigerians were unwilling to adopt Due to public pressure, Buhari abandoned the IMF demands. His administration did introduce a comprehensive package of austerity measures. It dosed the country's land borders for a period, to identify and expel illegal alien workers. Buhari's military administration placed severe restrictions on importers and levied heavy penalties on smuggling and other foreign exchange offences. The austerity measures made it difficult for local industries to procure essential imported raw materials, leading many of hem to close or to operate at a greatly reduced capacity. Many workers were laid *off* and government itself retrenched many workers to increase its cost effectiveness. All of lhese actions were accompanied by high inflation. The prices *of* basic food items rose, *and* life became increasingly difficult even for the affluent (Anyabolu, 2000).

The Buhari regime also placed constraints on various groups including the Nigeria Medical Association which was outlawed, and the Nigerian Students. It then promulgated two

decrees that restricted freedom of the press and suppressed criticism of the government Anyabolu (2000) buttresses it that

> Decree number 4 forbade my journalist from reporting information considered embarrassing to any government official. Decree number 2 gave the chief of staff at supreme head quarter the power to detain far up to six months, without trial, any one considered a security risk. Special military tribunals became common and replaced law courts.

The forgoing history shows that the military rule under General Mohammadu Buhari rather made the standard of living difficult for Nigerians. Within the Army, there was no confidence toward the Buhari regime. The army had been reduced in size steadily since the end of the civil war from a total of about 275, 000 troops in 1969 to about 80. 000 troops by the end of 1980s. The economic crisis, the campeign against corruption, and civilian criticism of the military all undermined Buhari's position to save Nigeria from the problem of socio-economic development as the government becamc increasingly authoritarian and proved unable to deal with Nigeria's severe economic problems (Anyabolu, 2000: 146). And in August 1985, the Buhari regime was peacefully overthrown by the SMCs third ranking member, army chief of staff, Major General Ibrahim Babangida.

The Babangida administration is credited with correcting many of the human rights abuses of the Buhari administration. IBB repealed a decree limiting press freedoms and set up judicial commissions to review cases of detainees on miscellaneous offence. He abolished the death penalty for all but armed rubbery and murder convictions and established a special Appeals Tribunal for all convictions. For a while, all tribunals were headed by civilian judges. Thus, Anyabolu (2000) maintains that: "President Babangida demonstrated his intent to encourage public participation in government decision making by opening a national debate on

proposed economic reform and recovery measures. Still in December, 1985, there was a counter-coup against the IBB regime, which failed".

Babangida's regime quickly tried to control the abuses unleashed by Buhari and to correct the excesses of Buhari's regime. The National Security Organization (NSO) was abolished in 1986 and its duties were reassigned to less threatening bodies. He also re-established freedom of the press, but there was occasional harassment by his regime too.

Babangida's administration ended the trials of former politicians, and many former officials who had been convicted were released from jail. However, in 1987, the regime (Babangida's) decreed that all politicians who had held office since 1960, and who had been convicted of criminal offences, were banned from politics. One year after seizing power, Babangida declared a national economic emergency, proposing two options to the country. First was to accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan and the conditions attached, or second, to embark on more austere economic measures that would require sacrifices. The people favored a non IMF option. As part of a 15 month plan, Babangida announced stringent pay cuts for the military, the police, and civil servants. He then proceeded to enact similar cuts for the private sector. Imports of rice, maize, and later wheat were banned.

Babangida adopted a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986 that called for greater reliance on the private sector. Major elements of the SAP included devaluation of the local oirrency; elimination of an inefficient import license system; reduction of certain government subsidies; abolition of the state agricultural commodity boards; and elimination of price controls. Under SAP, unemployment rates soared and food prices increased significantly. Numerous user fees for education and health services were imposed. The government

encouraged foreign investment and promoted privatization while the petroleum subsidy was cut back.

On April 22, 1990, a coup attempt led *by* Major Gideon Orkaa almost toppled the Babangida regime. The presidential residence and Dodan Barrack were heavily damaged by the rebellious soldiers, but Babangida escaped. Both the civilians and soldiers were implicated in the coup. Sixty-nine accused coup plotters were later executed after secret trials were held before military tribunals.

Babangida continued his *policy* towards planned transition to civilian rule in 1992. But gradually, Anyabolu (2000: 150) noted that his regime detained journalists and other critics of the military reign. Election campaigns, for elections to be held in 1993, began in earnest during the summer of 1990, by the two Government sponsored political parties, the National Republic Convention (NRQ and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Babangida and others in the military sensed that Nigeria was heading for disaster and filed a series of lawsuits alleging the elections were irregular, before the elections had taken place.

The June 12, 1993 elections were considered to be the most *free* and fair elections in all of Africa, by both local and foreign observers. As the final results of the elections were announced, the nation was poised for jubilation. Then, on June 23, 1993, Babangida suddenly nullified the elections, without giving Nigerians or the international community a reason for doing so. He simply announced to a bewildered nation that the entire presidential elections had been annulled. Tension soon became anger and the whole nation was on the brink of disintegration. In that election, chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola defeated his opponent, Alhaji Bashir Tofa, and won the presidency. When Babangida suddenly nullified *the elections, Nigeria as a nation* shattered. *There were riots* among different groups of people,

especially the youths. Protests took over most parts of the county, especially in the western region, home of the president-elect Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim. The unexpected crisis caused by the annulment of June 12 elections led to Babangida being forced out of office on August 26,1993. IBB had therefore set up an Interim National Government (ING), with Chief Ernest Shonekan briefly appointed president of the Interim National Government until General Sani Abacha stepped forward on November, 17, 1993 to overthrow the interim government

Sani Abacha installed himself as the new leader. Ten days after that, seventeen top military officers considered to be Babangida loyalists were thrown out of the Army. This ensured that there would be no military coup to unseat Abacha. Sani Abacha called himself Head of state and named as his deputy, Geneal Oladipo Diya, chief of staff of what Abacha called t*he* provisional Ruling council.

General Abacha initiated a program called the War Against Indiscipline and Corrupting (WA1Q). He suspended all the transitional programs to civilian government He also set up various panels to look into the activities of the regime of Babangida, headed by Dr. Pius Okigbo, Monetary allocations in the amount of several billions could not be accounted for. However, Anyabolu (2000:154) recalled that despite the discrepancies, no one was prosecuted.

On January 10, 1994, Abacha fixed the rate of exchange against the US dollar. Government mismanagement resulted in the closure of many factories and a general curtailment of economic activity. Rising costs of living and dramatic increases in unemployment placed a heavy burden on the people of Nigeria. The country was in chaos; the labor unions were angered by the Abacha junta and the fact that Abiola was still imprisoned. A strike in the petroleum industry, which lasted for twenty two days and spread to various other sectors nearly put the country to bankruptcy . Demanding the release of Abiola, the National

Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), led by its general secretary, Frank Ovie-kokori and Milton Dabibi, general secretary of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeira (PENGASSAN), both of whom had been released from detention after spending four years behind bars called for a national strike. The strike caused a great number of problems for Nigerians. There was no gas for cooking stoves; people resorted to kerosene stoves, especially when they could afford the inflated price of kerosene. Middle class and well to do people were broke, because the banks refused to open for business. Without money to pay for fere to work, workers had to stay at home. Many firms shut down and business activities in different part s of the country were grounded. In August 1994, the Nigeria labor congress (NLQ, headed by paschal Bafyan, called for a general strike to support the oil workers. Abacha struck back, dismissing the leadership of the NLC, and arresting several prominent labor leaders.

Manufacturing plants, including giants like Nestle Foods, Cadbury, Coca-cola, Nigerian Breweries, Dunlop, and others, either greatly reduced the scope of their operations or shut down temporarily. At the peak of the fuel crisis, due to the strike, very few companies were still in full operation. Impact on the aviation industry was devastating as scarcity of aviation fuel grounded most flights. Media and postal organizations were faced with great difficulties in distributing newspapers, magazines, mail and parcels. The sea ports were also paralyzed as employees of shipping, cleaning, forwarding companies joined in the strike (Anyabolu, 2000).

The minister of state for Petroleum and Mineral Resources stated that the country was losing 465, 000 barrels of oil per day in sales. Nigerians were sleeping in their cars in long lines at filling stations, waiting to buy gasoline. Commercial vehicles were pulled off the road s and commuters were stranded at bus stops. Nigeria could not supply adequate fuel to its

citizens. At one point, people began to steal fuel through a method called "bunkering". In some towns, like Jesse, over seven hundred men, women and children were killed when a spark ignited the fuel. The Abacha led military government worked through and with local and traditional rulers to maintain control of Nigeria, particularly in the oil producing regions. Economic necessity however, forced the workers to return to work, ending the twenty two day old strike. The Abacha government responded by publishing decrees granting itself "absolute power".

In 1995, in response to an alleged coup plot General Sani Abacha arrested and imprisoned retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Musa Yar'Adua who later died in prison, and others. In November 1995, Ken Saro Wiwa, president of Nigerian Authors and spokesman for the Ogoni minority group, a vocal political activist was hanged along with eight others. These civilians were tried on murder allegations before a military tribunal which heaped even stronger condemnation from around the world on the regime of Sani Abacha. Later, Chief Anthony Enahoro, a member of the organization of the national democratic coalition of Nigeria was arrested and imprisoned without trial for five months (Anyabolu, 2000).

The foregoing history shows the extent of abuse of human rights and economic backwardness in Nigeria under General Sani Abacha's military administration. In October 19%, Abacha announced that there would be a program to transfer power to civilians in three years and it seemed clear that General Abacha was planning to succeed himself by running for the Nigerian presidency in 1998. Five political parties registered, and all the five parties asked Abacha to be their candidate (Anyabolu, 2000:156).

During general Abacha's military rule, Nigeria was so corrupt that the country was either under sanction, or had been banned form almost all major World Organizations. The United State, for instance, had labeled Nigeria the World's largest trafficker in heroine. Neither the World Bank nor the IMF would deal with Nigeria because of its abominable human rights record. Japan had erected a trade barrier, and several European countries had trade or travel bans in place against Nigeria (Anyabolu, 2000).

In 1997, in a bid to better his image and quiet the condemnations from World leaders concerning his rule, General Abacha ordered Nigerian troops into Sierra Leone, under the ECOMOG West African intervention force. He announced his intentions at the inauguration of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia. The United Nations Security Council had elected to send ECOMOG troops into Sierra Leone in order to restore the country's first democratically elected president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, to power. A coup in Sierra Leone, led by 37 year old Major John Paul Koromah, had overthrown the government of president Kabbah and was unresponsive to the petitions of world leaders to restore order. The Nigerian forces attacked the troops loyal to Major Koromah and ousted him from the country (Anyabolu, 2000:156) Relative success in Liberia and Sierra Leone, though terribly expensive, had given a temporary boost to Abacha's reputation as a regional leader. At home in Nigeria, the move to hold presidential elections became a referendum, and elections for state assemblies in December 1997 went off smooMy, but toe tmn out ^*as low. National assembly elections ixv April, 1998 were boycotted by the opposition and showed a similar lack of participation. Abacha's army could maintain security, but as rightly observed by Anyabolu,(2000:157),

> Before further elections could be held, the dictator died suddenly of a suspected heart attack, on June 8, 1998. He was succeeded as head of state by Genial Abdulasalam Abubakar, who was Abacha's cousin and minister of Defence. General Abubakar was appointed to his new post by his fellow generals on the provisional Ruling Council

The new head of state, general Abubakar, successfully handed over power to a democratically elected civilian president Ohisegun Obasnjo (a retired military General and former head of state in Nigeria) on may 29,1999.

The historical overview so far, has shown that military rule in Nigeria had not really impacted positively on socio-economic development in the country and thus, the military institution has not proven to be a modernizing agent The above position has been captured clearer by Ndoh (1997) that since Nigeria is a nation with laws, we all have a duty to ensure that the constitution works/' In spite of its advantage over civil society, the military establishment cannot honestly be said to have done better". Every thing by military regimes, he noted, is colored by the concept of defeat and conquest as on the battle field. "Public outcry, protest demonstrations, press editorials, and debates which are time-tested organs of civil society are eventually labeled as attempts at sabotage". Ndoh (1997) therefore quoted professor Tyoden whose conclusion on the impact of military rule on development in Nigeria has shown a dear picture of the institution's (Military's) incapability to deliver Nigeria:

> While the military's control of arms has enabled it to install itself in government on a number of occasions, the Nigerian military has not been able to exploit its institutional capabilities to make for any, drastic changes in the country's social structure. The military has been basically a status quo force rather than an agent of change (Tyoden, cited in Ndoh, 1997).
>
> Under the foregoing circumstances, Ndoh (1997) observed that "those soldiers who wish to pursue a political career should first discard their uniforms and then seek the mandate of the people through the ballot box". This country can no longer accept that a few soldiers, for the simple reason that they have guns, have a better vision of what is good for Nigeria and Nigerians.

Dudley (1982:83-84) points out that ten years after the coup which had first brought the military to power (ie 1976), Nigeria was being governed by the forth military person to take

over as head of state and commander-in-chief. The Nigerian army, due to the demands of the civil war, had grown from a force of some 10, 500 men at the start of 1966 by something of the order 270, 000 men at the end of the war, particularly, in 1970. In 1965 / 66, defense spending had formed only 9.4 percent of total recurrent federal government expenditure. By 1974 / 75, some five years after the end of the civil war/ the proportion of total **Federal spending** *was* 45.9 percent and 8.5 percent of that figure went essentially into the payment of wages and salaries which meant that resources were being diverted from other sectors of the economy such as education, health, communications, agriculture, etc, to pay for a service which in some sense was totally unproductive (Dudley 1982:82).

However, it must also be noted, there are some achievements of military rule in Nigeria. Dudley (1982) posits in this direction that the basic outlines of policy have been laid down during Mutala military era. The administration's one innovation was in the field of local government where it sought to lay down the framework of a uniform system of local administration through out the federation. Apart from this, the administration's achievement was simply to bring to completion the programme of military withdrawal begun under Muhammed Mutala. The indigenization policy, states creation and many other development programmes could be identified under military administration in Nigeria (Dudley, 1982).

CHAPTER FOUR:

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data Presentation

This chapter presents and analyses data on the impact of military rule under General Ibrahim Babangida's regime on socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria. Thus, the chapter evaluates policies and decisions emanating from the military regime of General Babangida in terms of their relevance in shaping the socio-economic development of the country. This chapter therefore focuses specifically on issues like the structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); Privatization and Commercialization; Debt Rescheduling Scheme; the formation of political parties; the political Bureau; the constitution Review committee; the constituent assembly and elections under General Babangida's military rule.

4.2 Data Analysis

4.2.1 Background to the Adoption of SAP in Nigeria

The Babangida administration assumed office in 1985 against the background of a continuing slide in Nigeria's economic fortunes. The Nigerian economy suffered a decline of about 8.5 percent in the national output in 1983, and it showed no signs of recovery as another fall of 5.5 percent was recorded in the country's domestic output in 1984 (Olukoshi, 1990:64).

Similarly, inflation was put officially at 23.2 percent in 1983 and 39.6 percent in 1984. Unemployment worsened as many businesses folded up or operated well below their installed capacity. Furthermore, the country's external reserve which was put at US $ 8.50 billion at the end of May 1981, declined sharply to a point that by the end of 1984, government could not even finance two months imports at the rate of importation that prevailed at that time

(Olukoshi, 1990:66).

In spite of the major crisis-management measures adopted by the Buhari administration, the Nigerian economy continued to deteriorate in the period up to 1986. The collapse of the Buhari administration's economic recovery programme owed much to its fence-sitting posture. It could not tackle the structural roots of the Nigerian economic problems. It also failed to conclude a deal with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) on the terms of the fund as well as being unwilling to use the blue print of the "Lagos plan of Action for the Economic development of Africa, 1980-2000", a strategic blue print that was approved by OAU and E.C.A (Anene, 1995:86).

On the 27th August, 1985, the Buhari military regime was overthrown and Nigerians gave a sign of relief. But the fall of the regime paved the way for Nigeria's March to structural adjustment because, as Olukoshi (1990:86) expressed, "the power base shifted to those who were prepared to adopt a market-oriented economic recovery programme".

On assumption of power, the Babangida administration did not hide its preparedness to resume negotiations which its predecessor (Buhari) had abandoned with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (CBN, 1986:111). This intention was expressed by General Ibrahim Babangida in his maiden speech to the nation. This announcement sent a positive signal to International Financiers and gave a sign of hope to some optimists that a solution to the economic impasse was, probably, at sight. Yet, the regime was perfectly aware of the enormous domestic opposition to International Monetary Fund and all it stood for. In fact, many Nigerians publicly expressed their total opposition to the IMF loan. They cited other African countries who had swallowed the IMF pills without being able to solve their economic problems.

On 2nd September, 1985, the Babangida military regime decided to call for a national debate on the IMF and the role, if any, which the organization could be allowed to play in the management of the nation's economic crisis. The IMF was accused of attempting to foster neocolonialism, the IMF conditionality clauses were, also, exhaustively debated, and it was concluded that these conditionalities had brought untold hardship on the peoples of the developing countries (Anene, 1995:87).

During the national debate on the IMF, the Babangida military regime cleverly narrowed the discourse to the question of whether or not the country should accept an IMF loan and to a great extent, it was successful. Thus, the question of whether or not to accept the IMF conditionality clauses as the only way to revamp the Nigerian economy was excised from the debate (Dharam, 1991:17).

The Babangida administration through its 1986 budget proposals articulated and implemented measures which were related to the IMF recommendations for structural Adjustment in Nigeria. Apart from reducing petroleum subsidy by 80 percent, it committed itself to a policy of privatizing and commercializing public enterprises. On 27th June, 1986, the Babangida administration carried forward its commitment to market reforms by spelling out a comprehensive IMF-backed structural Adjustment programme whose centre-piece was the downward re-alignment of the value of the Naira. The programme was expected to run for two years from July, 1986 to June, 1988 (Anene, 1995:88).

4.2.2 Policy Objectives and Components of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

The Structural Adjustment programme placed a great deal of emphasis on price mechanism as the foundation of the regimes' management policies. According to Anene (1995:88), the Nigerian programme was worked out in close cooperation with the IMF,

complete with procedures for evaluation and implementation. The specific objectives of the programme include the following:

a. Restructuring and diversification of the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports.

b. The achievement of fiscal and balance of payment viability over the period of the implementation of the programme.

c. The creation of the basis for sustainable non-inflationary or minimal-inflationary growth.

d. The reduction of the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, the improvement of the growth potentials of the private sector (Bullion, November, 1987:30).

The core policy measures built into the adjustment programme were aimed to:

a. Redress the serious over evaluation of the Naira through the establishment of a viable second-tier foreign exchange market coupled with adjustment to the official rate with a view to attaining a convergence of the two rates.

b. Relieve the country's debt burden and attract a net inflow of foreign capital while keeping a lid on foreign loans.

c. Overcome observed public sector inefficiencies through improved public expenditure control programme and the rationalization of parastatals (Bullion , October/December, 1987:17-18).

The Structural Adjustment Programme represented a historic turning point in the efforts by the Nigerian state to manage its economic crisis. But this turning point became a disadvantage to the Nigerian people. No programme of adjustment or of development makes sense if it

makes the people indefinitely more miserable. With the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (S.F.E.M), the exchange rate suddenly shot up to an average of about N10.00 naira to $1.00 dollar in November, 1991, compared to when one dollar ($1.00) exchanged for N150, and in early 1986, one naira exchanged for one dollar (Bangura and Belkman, 1991:146). This means that there was a substantial depreciation of the Naira as well as a wide fluctuation in the exchange rate. In addition, the devaluation and fluctuation of the Naira created instability and uncertainly, resulting into unhealthy conditions for planning in terms of long term business ventures.

Anene (1995:90) adds that the high cost of foreign exchange generated inflationary pressure which resulted into the astronomical prices of a number of both imported and logically produced goods, pricing them out of the reach of the average Nigerians. The increases in the prices of goods had not only affected consumer goods but also essentially items such as plants, equipments and spare parts, etc. Critics argued that if Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was really produced by Nigerians for Nigerians, it is then difficult to conceptualize a Nigeria economist that will produce a policy package which incorporates an import liberalization formula that spells the death of infant industries (The Guardian, July 1, 1987:7).

4.2.3 Trade Liberalization in Nigeria under Babangida Regime

As a component of Structural Adjustment programme, trade Liberalization led to the reduction of prohibited import items from 74 to only 16. This development, as argued by Anene (1995:90), threw Nigeria's border open to all kinds of imported goods, not only that these foreign goods made it difficult for the country's locally manufactured ones to find adequate patronage but massive importation of finished goods seem to defeat one of the central goals of structural Adjustment programme (SAP), in terms of the utilization of available

foreign exchange to bring the needed raw materials to feed the home industries.

All that Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) of general Babangida's administration succeeded in doing was to depress the living conditions of the people by changing domestic income and prices, creating some balance in the domestic and external accounts at the expense of the country's basic social services (Review of African political economy, 1987:26).

In 1987, one of the proponents of Structural Adjustment programme (SAP), professor Dotun Philip, acknowledged that "so far, it appears that the brunt of the burden of Structural Adjustment programmes is on those with fixed income, wage earners, and the middle class" (See Bullion, January/March, 1988:14).

It therefore, becomes clear from the foregoing that Structural Adjustment programme (SAP), introduced by General Babangida's military regime, was designed to create a credible, respectful and new comprador bourgeoisie who could enforce adjustment and abscond to political power through the tightly controlled two party system that was introduced to enhance the transition to civil rule in Nigeria. This assumption becomes discordant with the belief that the military has the ability to effect modernizing changes in the socio-economic sphere of Nigeria.

However, it is equally to be mindful of certain facts and salient achievements of the military regime under general Babangida that contributed to the socio- economic improvement of lives in Nigeria. The introduction of SAP by Banagida's regime rendered administrative control on trade and foreign exchange unnecessary which implied that a good relief was made to all categories of foreign exchange users, particularly, the business sector. The removal of administrative control eliminated the adverse effects such as delays in processing import

licenses and foreign exchange applications, corrupt practices associated with controls and other social factors which used to contribute increase in cost of production in the Nigerian social and economic realm.

The proponents of Structural Adjustment Programme had observed that capacity utilization had been enhanced in a number of industries, especially those that were less dependent on imported inputs (Report of the political bureau, March 1987). However, the survey reported a decline in capacity utilization in industries which were heavily dependent on imports.

Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) forced many companies and manufacturers to look inwards, by sourcing their components parts and raw materials locally. This led to the development in the manufacturing sector with a steady growth in the volume of locally sourced raw materials in such industries as meat and its products, beer and stout, textiles, plastics products, etc.

The proponents of SAP believed that its imposition helped Nigeria to successfully reschedule a large portion of the country's external debts. This indicates that there was a gradual return of the country to credit worthiness; hence Nigeria had signed bilateral agreements with United Kingdom, France, Republic of Australia and Swiss confederation. The SAP programme also helped in diversifying the export base of the country (Nigeria) through export promotion strategy (See Anene, 1995: 92-93).

4.2.4 Privatization and Commercialization Programmes under Babangida Regime

Babangida's Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) also gave birth to privatization and commercialization as occasioned by the decline in the fortune of the Nigerian economy through the poor performance of the public enterprises.

The privatization and commercialization programmes were aimed at reducing or withdrawing government holdings in some enterprises. It was meant to improve the management and performances of the public enterprises, improve their funding and reduce the financial burden on government.

The enterprises affected by the decree No 25 of 1988 were spelt out on schedule I Privatization and schedule II of the Decree. They were listed in accordance with the degree of the proposed privatization and commercialization in categories as follows:

In category I, there were 43 enterprises in which equity held by the Federal Government were partially privatized. In category II, there were 67 enterprises in which 100% of the equity held by the Federal Government was to be fully privatized. In category III were 14 enterprises of those enterprises billed for partial commercialization. Finally category IV had 11 (eleven) of those enterprises that the hammer of full commercialization fell unto (UBA, 1987:2).

The major benefit associated with the privatization and commercialization programmes is that they made the enterprise to operate profitably and efficiently, unlike when the essentially profit oriented enterprises made colossal loses despite their dependence on government subvention funds (Anene, 1995).

Another benefit of the programme is the fresh managerial skills acquired from foreign partners. This helped to improve the enterprises by doing away with waste, corruption and political interference which often contribute to their non- performance. Also, the programme provided new jobs opportunities for employment.

On the other hand, the private sector possessed no enough technical and management skills required to take over and in some cases where government had decided to

commercialize, it was too expensive for common man to afford. Against the gross inequality on income distribution in Nigeria with which much of the wealth concentrated in a few hands, it entrenched disequilibrium in the economic system, enabling the Nigerian bourgeoisie and their foreign partners to grab the commanding height of the economy.

Moreso, the programme affected the absorptive capacity of the capital market (Bullion, October/December, 1987:19). Judging from the number and size of companies that went for full or partial privatization, it was clear that the programme proved the biggest mass transfer of share ownership in the history of Nigerian capital market. The exercise, no doubt dwarfed the indigenization exercise occasioned by the Nigerian enterprise promotion Acts of 1972 and 1977.

Finally, based on the foregoing, it could be understood that privatization and commercialization programmes as pursued by Babangida's government tended to serve certain corporate interests which was done without much regards to the middle class interests (See Anene, 1995:96).

4.2.5 Debt Rescheduling Scheme in Nigeria Under General Babangida's Regime.

General Babangida's military regime, in order to ease the country's payments deficits resorted to negotiating the rescheduling of its debts with external creditors in terms of the arrangements of maturities with new payment schedules and grace periods.

With the external debt rescheduling arrangement, the government took over the foreign debt obligation of the federal, states and their parastatals with a substantial portion of private sector external debt which stood at $ 18.45 billion (N35.5 billion) as at the end of 1986.

Debt rescheduling means formal maturities of debt service payments with new maturities applying to deferred amounts (billion, October/December, 1987:18). In a situation of

debt crises, there are three basic choices facing a debtor country, which are:

a. To repudiate further debt repayment obligation

b. To meet all debt obligations as at when they fall due.

c. Negotiate with the creditors for a restructuring settlement Management Scheme (CBN, 1986:126).

In 1986, negotiation started with the London club of creditors during the second quarter of the year, while those with the official creditors in the Paris club began in December, 1986. By the end of 1986 therefore, the country recorded the following success in the area of debt rescheduling: An agreement was reached with the steaming committee of the member banks of the London club to reschedule repayments on medium and long-term debts owed them for nine (9) years with a four (4) year grace period with interest of one-quarter percent above London inter- bank offered rate (LIBOR) and a restructuring fee of ½ percent on total reschedule amount. Also, the letters of credit opened before 26th September, 1986 were eligible to be rescheduled for four (4) years with payment in 36 equal monthly installments, which commenced on the first business day of January 1988.

The Paris club also agreed on 16th December, 1986 to recommend to their respective governments the rescheduling of:

a. All principal repayments and interests due as at September, 1986, on insured or guaranteed commercial credits and loan with repayments, beginning in November, 1992 and completed in May, 1997.

b. All the arrears as at 31st December, 1983 with repayments in 10 (ten) half-yearly installments starting January, 1990 and ending in July, 1994. Also accrued late interest would be capitalized and rescheduled on same interests.

c. (90 percent of principal due as at 30th September, 1986 on letters of credit and short term commercial credits with repayments in six (6) equal half-yearly installments beginning in January, 1988 and ending in July 1990 (UBA, 1987:3).

The Paris club also agreed in principle to meet on a later date to consider rescheduling debt service payments due after 1987 provided Nigeria complied with all agreed conditions. At the end of 1987, the value of external debt under letters of credit that were reconciled and rescheduled amounted to a principal sum of $ 2.2 billion, attracting an interest charge of $0.6 billion which was capitalized and added to the principal bringing the level of $2.8 billion. Also during the year, the sum of #2.7 million medium term public sector debt arrears was restructured and redefined.

As at September, 1990, Nigeria's external debt was estimated at about $ 32 billion owned to creditors comprising of the London Club and to Paris Club. However, negotiation on the debts owed was postponed due to Nigeria's non- application of the International Monetary Fund programme, each of which was expected to last for an average period of one year.

In January, 1991, a debt rescheduling agreement involving $ 3.2 billion was signed between Nigeria and the Paris Club. Also, an agreement –in- principle was reached with the steering committee of the London club of creditors. Under the agreement, distinction between payable, Refinanced Letter of Credit and Restructured Debt was abolished and to be known as Eligible Debt. Following the endorsement of the agreement in- principle, Nigeria began with effect from April, 1991, to pay the new interest rate of 6.25 against the 3 percent that was previously used. As at June, 1991, Nigeria's external debt stood at $33 billion (UBA, 1991).

The implication of the debt rescheduling on the Nigerian economy was that it provided in the short-run, the much needed breathing space to permit continuation of economic reforms

and it equally served as a form of economic diplomacy. Finally, the scheme did not actually extinguish the rescheduled debts but left Nigeria at the mercy of its creditors (see Anene, 1995:99).

Babangida's military regime also explored the debt to equity swap, otherwise known as the debt to equity conversion (new Nigeria March, 8, 1989:7). This method essentially involves the conversion of a portion of a country's external debts into equity. Thus, specified companies were selected and their fresh equity stocks were issued in favour of external investors who would buy off the external debts from those creditors.

It is in this regard that a debt conversion committee (D.C.C) was established in February 1988 by the Federal Military Government to work out the modalities for executing a Debt conversion programme to achieve the following objectives:

a. To reduce Nigeria's external debt with a view to alleviating the debt service burden.

b. To stimulate foreign investment inflow:

c. To serve as additional incentives for the repatriation of light capital;

d. To encourage the creation and development of export oriented industries thereby diversifying the export base of the Nigerian economy (CBN, 198:117).

The Debt Conversion Committee (D.C.C) was responsible for implementing the programme and looking into ways of diminishing its adverse economic, social and political effects. A major benefit of debt- equity swap was that it enabled an economy in trouble to acquire foreign capital and management input (Bullion, October/December, 1987:21). It equally stimulates the privatization programme. However, debt-equity Swap had not helped the military government under general Babangida to verify most of the external debt being claimed

against the country. Again, the employment opportunity that the scheme was intended to generate would be in favour of foreign labour as there was the tendency for expatriate 'experts' to be imported by foreign investors in the name of expert hands for efficiency and effectiveness (New Nigeria, March, 8, 1989:7).

There was also the political implication of excessive foreign equity. Although, huge debt conversion into equity ownership could speed up the process of privatization, it also ended up creating a problem of excessive foreign ownership of key industrial projects which foreigners were attracted.

4.2.6 The political Issues of Babangida's Military Regime

When General Babangida's administration came to power in 1985, much efforts were devoted to the task of ensuring that the 'Third Republic' which was promised to begin in 1992, was a stable and durable one. To this effect, various activities relating to this objective were carried out between 1985 and 1992, some of these activities include the nation- wide debate about Nigeria's political future, the work of the political bureau and the initiation of a five year plan for military disengagement, termed the transition programme. Significant activities within the progrmme included the activities of the constitution Review Committee, political parties and the elections.

4.2.6.1 The Political Bureau.

'President Ibrahim Babangida, in his January, 1986 budget speech, promised to set up a political Bureau to deliberate on other political problems as may be reflected to it from time to time (Newswatch, April 13.1989:14). General Babangida went further to say that the debates which the bureau members would initiate was a "Collective search for a new political order" for Nigeria (Newswatch, April 13, 1989:15).

On January 13, 1986, General Ibrahim Babangida inaugurated a 17 member political Bureau at Abuja to conduct a nation- wide debate on the political future of Nigeria. The chairman of the Bureau made a nation –wide broadcast on the 3rd of February, 1986, in which he named 28 issues that the public would be expected to discuss. These issues covered politics, economy, interest groups and the various tiers of government; later the Bureau added two other, issues, namely, bureaucracy and development as well as external relations.

In the course of its deliberations, the Bureau held a total of 149 sittings out of which it received 27, 324 contributions in form of 14, 967 memoranda, 1,723 recorded Cassettes and Video tapes and 3,933 Newspaper articles amongst others. The Bureau also visited the then 301 local government areas in the country. The Bureau noted that many people were not only unenthusiastic but, in fact, cynical and apathetic about the debate.

However, the report that justice cookery and his colleagues submitted indicated that one of the major problems with Nigerian's experiment at nation building has been the absence of effective, well defined, properly articulated and popular philosophy of governance. The Bureau therefore considered the identification of such a philosophy indispensable in the search for a new social, political and economic order of the country.

Four philosophies-capitalism, socialism, Islamic theocracy and African communism stood pre-eminent throughout the debate (Newswatch, April 13, 1989:15). The recurring decimal in defining the goals of the needed philosophy of government was that it must ensure social justice for all.

The Bureau went further to identifying five goals that a new social order was expected to meet. These goals were the provision of social justice and the welfare of the people, the eradication of alienation and the marginalization of the masses from the decision making

process, the maximization of production and the assurance of an equitable distribution of resources (Newswatch, April 13,1989:16). Also the establishment and operation of a truly democratic political system and the promotion of national unity by reducing areas of tension. These broad philosophical areas, according to the Bureau's report, could be found in each of the four philosophies that were to be adopted. But the report admits that of those four, only capitalism and socialism have the basic values to vast and modern multi- religious and multi-ethnic states (Report of the political Bureau, March, 1987:55).

The political Bureau's report believes that capitalism has its draw backs; it tends to foster poverty, ignorance, disease, squalor in the ranks of the masses as well as lead to a sharp and inequitable wealth distribution, though individual initiative is encouraged, which can lead to economic growth. The report called for the establishment of socialist system in Nigeria under the proposed system of social rights, comprising the rights to free education, health safety and welfare of all persons, employment opportunities, old age insurance and equal treatment by the law.

The report was an attempt to get the best enjoyment of the fruits of the state control of the means of production and distribution which are the hall marks of socialist system as well as enjoy the freedoms available to the citizens of an unregimented capitalist system.

However, on Wednesday 1st July, 1987," government rejected the imposition of a political ideology on the nation" (Newswatch, April 13, 1987:16). This was the position taken by the military government in its white paper in response to the recommendations made in the Bureau's report that "Nigeria should adopt a socialist social- economic system in which the state shall be committed to the nationalization and socialization of the commanding heights of the national economy" (Government's view and comments on the findings and

recommendations of the political bureau, page 13).

In rejecting the recommendations of the ideology, government believed that an ideology will eventually evolve with time and political maturity. The government's white paper argued that the goals set out in the second Development plan (1970-1974) and fundamental objectives and Directives principles of state policy in chapter two of the 1979 constitution were adequate for restructuring the socio- political order in the country. In this regard, General Babangida believed that the concept of 'a new social order' or a 'new philosophy of government' shall continue to be referred to as the principles of democracy and social justice.

Again, government refusal to adopt socialism as an ideology recommend for Nigeria had the following short comings: First, it showed that Babangida's military government had failed to understand and explain Nigerian socio- political phenomena, its historical basis and its future trends.

Secondly, it indicated that the military government had been unable to agree upon a workable socio-political formula that might reconcile Nigeria's differences and create an avenue for national unity, stability and socio- economic development.

However, the report submitted by the political Bureau had some weaknesses. Its recommendations had proved to be full of internal contradictions to create a society different from the capitalist society we know today and that of the second republic. The contradictions were associated to some of the reasons which made the government in its white paper to "reject" some of the recommendations that were made by the Bureau. Unfortunately, what the political Bureau regarded as the most revolutionary part of its report, the recommendations of socialism was rejected because government preferred a socio- economic system that would

sustain the bourgeoisie in Nigeria's third Republic and partly because the Bureau failed to define its socialist proposition properly.

For instance, the Bureau failed to eliminate from the details of the report all elements that contradict its socialist proposition such as the presidential system of government.

Also, the report did not shift the base of political power in favour of the underprivileged classes. It is not sufficient for a constitution aimed at achieving socialism to allow only five (5) percent of the seats in the various legislative bodies to be reserved for workers and five (5) percent for women, all to be chosen not by workers and women themselves but by the two political parties formed by the military government of those days. This reflected the uncertainty in the Bureau's socialist proposition.

Finally, an examination of the political Bureau's report revealed that when the people of Nigeria through the political Bureau chose socialism as a workable alternative that could resolve their mounting socio- economic and political problems under the western capitalist system of government, the Babangida military government on its side rejected the idea on the grounds that it would not impose any foreign ideology on the nation. The rejection of the new philosophy of government as recommended by the Bureau also indicated how serious the Babangida military government took to any challenges against the existing status quo.

4.2.6.2 The Constitution Review Committee

On 7th September, 1987, a 46 member constitution review committee was inaugurated by the Babangida's military regime. This committee was charged with reviewing the 1979 constitution with firm commitment to the presidential system of government and federalism (Babangida,1987:36).

The committee's major inputs were the government white paper on the report of the

political Bureau and the 1979 constitution. The constitution review committee was to look into the issues of the federal character with a view to recommending an acceptable constitutional provision that would ensure the division of power between the various levels of government. The committee was also given the responsibility to provide constitutional provisions for the formation of political parties, and determining election results (Babangida, 1987:35-42).

Furthermore, the committee was to examine an adequate role of the traditional rulers with a view to giving them a more formal advisory, function that would keep them away from partisan politics. They were to review the fundamental objectives and Directives principles of state policy with a purpose of achieving welfare for the poor in rural and urban sectors of the Nigerian economy.

Lastly, the committee was asked to examine and suggest ways by which religious intolerance and other matters such as tribalism could be curtailed through constitutional provisions and examine also the constitutional provision dealing with press freedom.

The committee submitted its report on the 1st of March, 1988. The report proposed several amendments to the 1979 constitution; some of the major recommendations made by the constitutional reviewed committee include the tenure of office of the president and state governors; a provision that would make it necessary for the legislators to be responsive to their constituencies through the provision of a recall system; the retention of the provisions on the fundamental objectives and directives principles of state policies and constitutional freedom for the press as they were in 1970 constitution. It endorsed the adoption of two party system and simplified the procedure for creating new local government to ensure that the area is well defined with a specific population. The constitution review committee also felt that most of the provisions in the 1979 constitution were very adequate and as such left them untouched.

However, the committee did not concentrate on provisions that deal with the peasantry and the working class but rather concentrated on provisions geared towards the promotion of the interests of the bourgeoisie in Nigeria. This means that he members of the constitution review committee themselves where from the upper class (Anene, 1995: 108).

Finally, an examination of the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) has revealed that the provisions of the constitution were written with the clear intention and purpose of safe guarding and consolidating the bourgeoisie' interest massively represented on the constitution review committee (CRC).

The composition of the Constitution Review Committee membership also indicated that participation into the committee was severely restricted by the Babangida government to certain class interest and groups all of whom were made up of the bourgeoisie interests. It is therefore, clear that the masses did not participate in the review of the constitution. This is to say that the interest of the masses were neglected and suppressed within the review process.

4.2.6.3 The Constituent Assembly

A 567 member Constituent Assembly charged with the duty of fashioning a constitution for Nigeria's Third Republic was inaugurated on 11th May, 1988 by General Babangida. Although the Assembly was allowed to fashion out a new constitution for the country, it was not given the powers to create states or alter state or local government boundaries.

It was not allowed also to examine ways of altering Nigeria's political order. The Assembly was equally urged not tamper with the two party system, the ban or disqualification which was placed on certain persons from participating in politics and belief in basic freedoms including the freedom of press. It was also charged to critically examine the issue of the

division of power among the three tiers of government and relate it to the mode of sharing money which will allow for a strong federal structure and a development oriented state and local government systems.

Finally, the Assembly was charged to make transitional provisions that will allow for the changes anticipated with the introduction of civilian government at the state level operating in a military led federal government between 1990 and 1992.

The Assembly deliberated for ten (10) Months and held about 87 sittings. It considered about 800 amendments proposed by 21 out of its 23 committees that worked on the 1979 constitution. The Assembly submitted its reports on 5th April, 1989. Some of the major recommendations made by the Constituent Assembly include that Nigeria be made a welfare state which the military government rejected. The report also denied the press the freedom it asked for but instead, adopted the general provisions for freedom of speech and owning media information as it has been in all previous constitutions of Nigeria (The constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, promulgation 1989, p.19).

However, the actions of the Armed Forces Ruling council (A.F.R.C) in approving and disapproving the clauses made by the Constituent Assembly confirmed the fact that the third republic was not meant for the underprivileged classes when it failed to approve of clauses 42 and 43 of the Draft constitution which provides for free- education and Medicare, the later for children up to the age of 18 and persons over 65 years as well as the disabled and the handicapped.

Furthermore, the composition of the Constituent Assembly showed that it was meant to represent and maintain the interest of the upper class. This is more to the fact that the names of who was who in the assembly indicated a composition of bourgeoisie' interest. For instance, all

the 567 members of the Constituent Assembly were made up of prominent Nigerians. The composition revealed that the most important sections of the Nigerian society were screened out of the Constituent Assembly (C.A) The interest clearly absent in the Assembly includes the representatives of the peasantry, the workers, market women, petty traders, artisans, students and all the underprivileged groups in Nigeria. The President, General Ibrahim Babangida, did not even consider the underprivileged groups when nominating the members of the Constituent Assembly.

It would be safe to argue therefore that the representation at the Constituent Assembly was largely made up of representatives not of the people but of the various networks and cliques of upper class interest centered around retired military Generals, Businessmen, Feudal Chieftains, and the new rich being produced by the Babangida regime (The African Guardian, May 23, 1988:16)

4.2.6.4 Formation of political parties

On 3rd May, 1989, the ban imposed on party politics in 1983 was lifted. This prompted the launching of political Associations in 24 hours after the ban was lifted. About 20 or more political associations were formed not later than the 4th of May which was the second day the ban was lifted.

Among the first political associations to be launched were the Ideal Party of Nigeria, the Movement of Nationalist and Dynamics, the Liberal Movement, the New Progressives, the Peoples Liberation Party, the Nigerian National Congress, Peoples Solidarity Party, Peoples Party of Nigeria, All Nigeria People Party, Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party and Democratic Peoples Congress, to mention but a few.

Application for registration of the new political associations was opened by the

National Electoral Commission (NEC) between 1st July 1989 and 15th July, 1989. Guidelines for political associations seeking registration as political parties were also provided by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The guidelines provided that no Association would be allowed to function as a political party unless it is approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and registered by the commission as a political party.

This condition was based upon meeting some requirements mapped out by the National Electoral Commission. These requirements included the production of ten (10) printed copies of the association's constitution, indicating the proposed party's name, symbol, emblem and motto. Also required from the associations were ten (10) printed copies of their programmes, including the aims and objectives. Another important aspect of the registration was the evidence of the payment of #50,000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) registration fee to the commission (Daily Times, May 15, 1989).

However, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) stringent guidelines had some implications on the political associations. Firstly, the guidelines were so many, while cost of the registration of political parties then was too high for most political associations to meet. The guidelines required such heavy financial resources that even the most ambitious political associations were put off (The African Guardian, June, 26 1989:20). The National Electoral Commission on the other hand submitted its reports of findings on the registration of political associations to the president, General Babangida, on the 26th September, 1989. The Commission's report indicated that as at the closing date for the submission of application forms, out of more than 40 political associations that emerged after the ban on party politics was lifted, only 13 of them filed their papers with the commission to seek registration as political parties. The Commission carried out a verification exercise to ascertain the viability

and acceptability of the various political associations. The National Electoral Commission's findings revealed that 6 out of the 13 associations that sought registration were recommended to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (A.F.R.C). They were the Peoples' Solidarity Party (P.S.P), leading with the highest scores of 43.9 on the National Electoral Commission's grading scale. Others were the Nigerian National Congress (NNC) with 42.62; the Peoples Front of Nigeria (P.F.N) with 41.20; Liberal Convention (L.C) with 34.98; the Nigerian Labour Party (N.L.P) got a total of 17.9; while the Republican Party of Nigeria (R.P.N) scored 17.00 (The African Guardian, October 9, 1989:12).

Based on the findings of the National Electoral Commission, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (A.F.R.C) agreed not to register any of the political associations seeking registration, instead, they were all dissolved. This was a disappointment to most associations' heads as the government allowed the political associations to waste their time, efforts, money and so on for nothing (The African Guardian, October 16, 1989: 20).

It was the view of the Babangida's Military administration and the political Bureau that two party system was most suited for organizing the Nigerian Polity along a democratic path as well as ensuring the stability of the Third Republic. The expectations that these two parties would emerge purely through mobilizing activities of a new breed of political aspirants and the associations were disappointed by the glaring falsification of claims which were favored by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) during its work of verifying the claims of the aspiring political parties. This move, according to Anene (1995:113), prompted General Babangida in an address to the nation on Saturday, 7th October, 1989 to establish a Two-party structure for Nigeria. The two government sponsored political parties were named the National Republican Convention (N.R.C) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

The implication of the imposition of a two-party system on Nigeria was to ensure that structural adjustment programme was being institutionalized at the political level. Another implication of the imposition of the two political parties on Nigerians by Babangida's military administration is that government had the total control and consolidation of the two parties. It equally disputed what the government said it would not do; that is to impose an ideology on Nigeria which it succeeded in doing by imposing the two parties, one a little to the left and the other a little to the right (The African Guardian, October 23, 1989:22).

4.2.6.5 Elections Under General Babangida's Military Regime

In August, 1987, based on the recommendations of the Political Bureau, a 10 member National Electoral Commission (NEC) was inaugurated (Hotline, September, 15 1987), The Commission was charged with the responsibility to recognize and register the two political parties; to organize and conduct all elections at the three levels of government; to monitor the financing of political parities and their campaigns and to determine the total amount of public funds to be made available to political parties.

In 1987, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) carried out its first assignment, which was the registration of voters for the 12th December, 1987 local government elections.

However, the 12th December, 1987 local government elections which were conducted on non-party basis witnessed poor administrative and security arrangement while electoral malpractices and violence were also noticed.

On 17th July, 1989, the Babangida' administration dissolved all the former 453 local government councils nation wide, thus, terminating the jobs of the chairmen and councilors five months before the end of their tenure. Professor Humphery Nwosu was then appointed the National Eelctoral Commission chairman to replace Professor Ema Awa (The African

Guardian, March 13, 1989:12). On 18th December, 1990, the Nigeria's first party–based elections within the transition to civil rule programme were conducted.

The local government election results released by the National Electoral Commission in the former 21 States of the federation showed that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) won in 12 States while the National Republican Convention won in 8 States. The two parties won equal number of seats in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and in Rivers state (Anene, 1995: 116).

The results also revealed that the Social Democratic Party (PDP) won 232 chairmanship and 2, 934 councillorship while the National Republican Convention (NRC) won 206 chairmanship and 2,558 councillorship seats nation wide (The African Guardian, December 30, 1991: 3).

The result shows that money and alliances based on ethnic, feudal and primordial values were still present in Nigerian politics.

The second elections to be conducted on party basis were the Gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections in December, 1991 whose result indicated that the affluent manipulated the election process while some candidates lost elections in states which were once considered as their parties' natural habitats. The results of the election showed that the National Republican Convention (N.R.C) had 16 states as against the Social Democratic Party's (S.D.P) 14, while 11.7 million voters turned out for National Republican Convention (NRC) as against 9.3 million for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Anene, 1995:117).

However, the results of the gubernatorial election indicated a collection of the bourgeoisie representatives in both the Social Democratic Party (S.D.P) and the National Republican Convention (.N.R.C).

The third elections conducted within the transition to civil rule programme under General Babangida's military regime were the elections into the National Assembly. They were the Senatorial and House of representative elections which took place in July, 1992. The results revealed that the Social Democratic Party (S.D.P) had a total of 52 Senatorial seats as to National Republication Convention's (N.R.C) 37; while the Social Democratic Party (S.D.P) won 314 seats in the House of Representatives as compared to National Republican Convention's (NRC) 275 (see Anene, 1995:117).

However, the result of the gubernatorial election indicated a collection of the bourgeoisie representatives in both the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (N.R.C).

Another election conducted within the transition to civil rule programme was the presidential election. A list of aspirants in the presidential race (primaries) also revealed a collection of a number of bourgeoisies interests fighting on the platform of both the social Democratic party (S.D.P), and the national Republican Convention (N.R.C). The Social Democratic Party (SDP) were having twelve (12) aspirants while the national Republican Convention (NRC) were having eleven (11) presidential aspirants.

The list of presidential aspirants had indicated a collection of the various geo-political, ethno-religious and bourgeoisie interests. Thus, the issue of where the president for the Third Republic was to come from tended not only to have sharpened the struggle among the money-bag politicians; and also that between the North and South, but it also created political awareness of the monitoring groups which had resulted in the formation of the various regional groups to work out modalities that would forge cooperation amongst them. Some of the regional groupings came under different names such as the Middle Belt Forum, Curia Forum,

Sterling Forum, Western Group, Yoruba Elders Committee and Northern Elders Committee (The African Guardian, July 20, 1992:22). These regional groupings were banned by President Ibrahim Babangida because they became avenues for office sharing and at the same time, charting the political course for the third Republic.

However, the struggle for the presidential office became very vicious between the aspiring candidates; this led to the cancellation of the first and second presidential primaries which were conducted in August and September 1992,due to electoral irregularities which include partisanship of party executive committee at various levels, use of state machinery in favour of particular candidates; undue influence and use of money, etc (Newswatch, October 26,1992:15).

At least, the problem of selection of presidential aspirants for the two parties was resolved through a convention by both parties. Chief M.K.O. Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa emerged as Social Democratic Party and National Republican Convention flag- bearers respectively. The presidential election was conducted on 12th June, 1993 (New Nigeria, June 14, 1999:3). The result of the election was not made known to the public as the election was deemed to have been annulled by General Babangida, and that marked the end of the transition to civil rule under General Babangida as he later 'stepped aside" and handed over to an interim government headed by Chief Ernest Shonakan.

The implication of the foregoing historical overview is to picture the socio- economic and political development programmes in Nigeria under the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida so as to be ale to evaluate the impact of military rule on socio- economic development in Nigeria under Babangida's administration.

4.3 Major Findings

This study was set out to examine the impact of military rule on socio- economic development in Nigeria, with a particular focus on the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida from 1985 to 1993. The specific objectives of this study were to examine the factors necessitating military rule and to determine whether the military rule in Nigeria has been able to achieve socio- economic development in the country.

Using content analysis and personal Observation, the major findings of this study revealed that:

(i) Constant military intervention in Nigeria's politics and administration enhances the political interest of the military. This implies that there had been great political interest of the military in the politics and administration of Nigeria that accounted for prolonged military rule in the country.

(ii) The long period of military rule in Nigeria is a great impediment to socio-economic development in the country.

(iii) General Babangida' Military regime in Nigeria had no positive impact on socio-economic development in the country. This is found to be because most developmental programmes in Nigeria under his military regime were not people-oriented and not successfully implemented in the interest of the common masses but a few elites in the country. Such programmes like the Structural Adjustment Programme (S.A.P), Privatization and Commercialization; and Debt Rescheduling Scheme had rather heightened the level of poverty and created a very wide gap between the rich and the poor in the country. Such programmes had not trickled down to improve the socio- economic conditions of the generality of the citizens in Nigeria but rather created more difficulties for the common man.

Again, the political issues under the military regime of General Babangida in Nigeria were equally found to be undemocratic as to usher in the most laudable socio-economic development in the country. Thus, the formation of the Political Burreau; the constitution review committee; the constituent Assembly; the formation of political parties and elections under General Babangida's military administration in Nigeria were so designed to favor a particular high class citizens in Nigeria, but not targeted really at enhancing the real socio-economic development in the country. For example, the composition of the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution Drafting Committee, etc showed that they were meant to represent and maintain the interest of the upper class as the names of who was who in the Constituent Assembly, for instance, indicated a composition of bourgeoisie' interest.

CHAPTER FIVE:

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This work evaluates the impact of the military regime under General Ibrahim Babangida on socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria. An examination of the evolution of the Nigerian military has revealed that the military institution is a teleguided institution that is constantly exposed to the whims and caprices and under perpetual subjugation by the developed nations.

An examination of the political and economic issues under General Babangida's military administration revealed that the Nigerian military has failed to impact positively on the socio-economic development of the country as a result of its determined pursuance of the military's corporate interest. All the programmes under the military regime of General Babangida, like Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Privatization and Commercialization Programme, Debt Rescheduling Scheme, the activities of the Political Bureau, Constituent Assembly and Constitution Review Committee; the formation of political parties and elections, etc, revealed that Babangida's military government pursued the interest of a group, particularly the elites, with the clear intention and purpose of safe-guarding and consolidating the bourgeois interest over that of the middle class, peasants and the unemployed.

Moreso, the military's inability to effect modernizing changes in the socio-economic lives of Nigerians has been found to be due to their bourgeois attachments and negligence to middle class interests. The military policies and programmes were meant to make the bourgeoisie more respectable and much stronger to the total disregard of the middle class. The

military has also been found to be a conservative institution bent on maintaining a conservative status quo, thus, making the conception of the military as a dynamic institution which could bring about modernization misinforming.

5.2 Conclusion

Military rule in Nigeria under General Babangida regime had not been able to impact positively on the socio-economic development of the country. Military regimes in Nigeria have not therefore been found to be modernizing agents. In short, it should be noted here, that the worst civilian regime is better than the best military regime in terms of the impact on the socio-economic lives of the citizens under such dictatorship of the military administrations across the globe, Nigeria's inclusive. In Nigeria in particular, constant military intervention in politics and administration enhances the political interest of the military. This implies that there had been great political interest of the military in the politics and administration of Nigeria that accounted for prolonged military rule in the country. This helps us to confirm the research proposition for this study which states that "The greater the extent of factors that necessitate military intervention in politics and administration, the greater the political interest of the military and the lesser the achievement of socio- economic development in Nigeria".

Specifically, General Babangida' Military regime in Nigeria had no positive impact on socio-economic development in the country. This is found to be because most developmental programmes in Nigeria under his military regime were not people-oriented and not successfully implemented in the interest of the common masses but a few elites in the country. Such programmes like the Structural Adjustment Programme (S.A.P), Privatization and Commercialization; and Debt Rescheduling Scheme had rather heightened the level of poverty

and created a very wide gap between the rich and the poor in the country. Such programmes had not trickled down to improve the socio- economic conditions of the generality of the citizens in Nigeria but rather created more difficulties for the common man. This, again helps us to confirm the research proposition for this study which states that "The longer the period of military rule in Nigeria, the greater the impediments to socio-economic development in the country". Thus, the long period of military rule in Nigeria is a great impediment to socio-economic development in the country.

5.3 Recommendations

The military should stick to their constitutional role of defending the territorial integrity of the country rather than always engage in Nigeria's politics, and allow for a sustainable representative government under civil rule that could enhance the socio-economic development of Nigeria.

Governance in Nigeria should therefore evolve socio-economic policies that would improve the living standard of the generality of citizens, but not just a few group of people.

Political programmes in Nigeria should always be made to include the interests and representatives of the middle class and the under-privileged groups. A situation whereby those groups are completely alienated from decision making process and decisions taken only by the upper class does not augur well for socio-economic development programmes in Nigeria.

The contemporary military in Nigeria should be given re-orientation to desist from politics and administration of the country. They must always see their primary duty as being that of protecting the territorial integrity of Nigeria and not governance or administration.

Meanwhile, we the citizens need to also have a change of attitudes and a dynamic better image of ourselves and conducts in order to curtail the possibility of the activities of the military in Nigeria's politics and administration.

On the whole, therefore, good governance, peace and security in the country are the keys to socio-economic development that would equally be devoid of military dictatorship in the country.

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