UNITED NATIONS

AND

WORLD PEACE:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACE-KEEPING IN THE CONGO (ZAIRE) AND THE FORMER YOGUSLAVIA

BY

NTIM GYAKARI ESEW

This is a thesis submitted to the Post Graduate School, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Science (International Relations) in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.

JANUARY, 1994

DECLARATION

I, NTIM GYAKARI ESEW, hereby declare that the materials used in this research are genuine and mine. Any works or speeches that are not mine are duly acknowledged.

That the research findings have not been submitted to any other institution or Establishment nor any publication made out of the study for public consumption.

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Candidate

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January, 1994

CERTIFICATION

This Thesis entitled 'UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD PEACE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACE-KEEPING IN THE CONGO (ZAIRE) AND THE FORMER YOGUSLAVIA: by Ntim Gyakari Esew meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (International Relations) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Chairman, Supervisory Committee	Date 10/2/94
Member, Supervisory Committee	Date
Head of Department	Date
Dean, Post-Graduate School	Date
External Examiner	Date

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family.

ABSTRACT

In this study, we compared the efforts made by the UN to bring about peace and security in the Congo (Zaire) in the 1960s and what it had done so far in the former Yoguslavia up to the end of 1993.

The UN set up peace-keeping forces acronymed ONUC and UNPROFOR for the Congo (Zaire) and the former Yoguslavia respectively.

We highlighted and compared the conditions which had existed before and those prevailing in both countries which precipitated and aggravated the crisis each of them underwent. There were similarities such as the unequal distribution of natural resources in the component units of both countries and the heterogenous nature of the population. Besides there was also crisis of leadership; peculiar to Yoguslavia alone however, was the type of government adopted and the principle of rotational presidency which became unworkable.

The UN played many and varied roles in peace keeping in the Congo (Zaire) and the former Yoguslavia. In the former, militarily, it aborted the secessionist attempt by Katanga and consequently preserved the territorial intergrity of the Congo because ONUC was given a stronger mandate than UNPROFOR. In the former Yoguslavian republics, particularly, Bosnia, UNPROFOR is helpless because it has

neither been given a clear nor forceful mandate. Besides, the UN achieved greater military success in the Congo than in the former Yoguslavia because more member nations made more troops available to the ONUC.

Each UN peace-keeping operation is supported by a lot of civilians who perform humanitarian and administrative functions. In the Congo, the UN at a certain point in time took over the whole administration of the civil service while in the former Yoguslavia it has limited itself to the performance of humanitarian functions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ONUC :	Organization des Nations au Congo
UAR :	United Arab Republic
UN:	United Nations
UNF:	United Nations Force(s)
UNFICYP:	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNPROFOR:	United Nations Protection Force (in Yoguslavia)
US:	United States
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the outbreak of World War I, there was no international organization comparable to the League of Nations and its immediate successor, the United Nations. The former came into existence in 1918, immediately after the First World War, which was a four-year holocaust of death and devastation the likes of which had then never before been seen.[1] As soon as the hostilities ended, the nations realized how costly the price of war was and the need to avert such an occurence. The League of Nations was thus established, yet barely two decades later, another war, more devastating, more terrifying, more horrifying and more harmful and costlier due to the invention of mass desctructive weapons like the atomic bomb, erupted. The League of Nations had thus failed to keep the Nations at peace.

Again, sovereign nations found it expedient to be brought together under one umbrella. This was the birth of the United Nations in 1945. In the preamble to the Charter, the Founding Fathers had declared solemnly, 'we the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind and desiring to unite our strength to maintain

international peace and security... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.[2]

Contrary to the pledge made by member nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,[3] nations or whole block of nations have often resorted to war claiming that the matter was essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.[4]

If nations could be so audacious to kick down their avowed commitment to the world body to wage international wars, it beats one's imagination that intra-national conflicts should flare up into civil wars in which millions of lives perish.

Right now around the globe, inspite of the existence of the United Nations, there are petty and major squabbles here and there. Peace talks have been dead-locked and cease-fires broken down. Few continents are spared the scourge of international or intranational war. Violence continues raging and lives are lost with the passage of each day. Nixon far back in 1983 observed that in the summer of that year, fifteen wars and a score of minor conflicts were raging around the globe. Since World War Two, there has been 140 wars resulting in the deaths of 140 million people (and that) many of these have been local conflicts.[5]

Consequently we can see that the violence of the two World Wars and scores of smaller wars has snatched peace and security from the grips of the United Nations.[6]

Peace and security in the world therefore at both the local and international levels seems to be an illusion as exemplified by the hiatuses between the success of UN peace keeping efforts.

Hardly did the Founding Fathers of the UN think that their organization would be stretched in solving, instead intra-national conflicts as its contemporary role seems to portray. The UN is becoming more active in civil wars for fear that in the world of today, there is to be much danger of escalating to major war or spilling over to take the risk of allowing brush fire conflicts run their (full) course.[7]

The UN peace keeping operations have a long and chequered history. No sooner was it established than it was called upon to face its acid test by sending observer groups to Greece in 1947. Others had been in India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948, Suez Canal in 1956, Lebanon and Congo in 1958 and 1960 respectively. Most recently UN peace keepers have registered their presence in Cambodia, Western Sahara, Namibia, Somalia and Yoguslavia among others.

Peace keeping is essential because it could give greater security to the small powers living in the interstices between the great powers. It could give order to the disorderly regions where power is disrupted... and today of all avenues to peace and security, the UN experiments in international peace keeping should be placed at the very head.[8]

The Second World War subjugated Japan and Germany militarily and drained Great Britain and France of financial strength. Another outstanding consequence was the emergence of two diametrically opposed 'super-powers' - the United States of America and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the West and East respectively and which almost immediately engaged each other in what become known in international politics as the 'Cold War'. One of the manifestations of the Cold War was each other trying frantically to bring small and middle powers under its influence. This culminated into an era of bipolarity which having thrived for some decades has now been thrown into the limbo of oblivion with the demise of communism in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. A new era has consequently dawned and that is the era of unipolarity with a super power, the US in the centre of affairs especially in the activities of the UN.

It is therefore very necessary to compare the outings of the UN peace keepers during the era of bipolarity with that of the present unipolarity. This touch of comparison will not only update the literature on UN peace-keeping but also open a new avenue in the area of peace research.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research problem is centred on the eruption and escalation of intra-national clashes which the UN has to contain in order to effectively maintain international peace and security. In spite of the existence of the global organization, the world has not been spared civil wars and the organization is still groping to find the effective means of controlling them. These civil wars are most peculiar to developing countries although they are manifesting within European Countries.

In trying to solve these domestic conflicts, however, the UN peace keepers are faced with the problem of remaining really neutral. Contemporary events show that peace keeping is becoming more and more dangerous and although peace keepers are armed, they are allowed to use their weapons only on self-defence. Is it justifiable, therefore, for UN forces to look on apathetically while rival forces from the same country tear each other apart?

Originating as it were from the debris of the Second World War, the FoundingFathers of the UN were pre-occupied with the prevention of another such catastrophe through the preservation of and finding pacific solutions to most specifically international conflicts. Consequently, even though the originators of the UN did not dream of tilting the weight of their organization towards the solution of intra-national conflicts, crises of the type in the Congo in the 1960s and now raging in Yoguslavia, it cannot hide under the cloak of its Charter to look on passively while kith and kin are at each other's throat.

Originally, as envisaged and entrenched in the Charter, the Big Five, being the permanent members of the Security Council were to be the custodians of international peace and Security and they were to apply every available means to enforce it, but with the advent of the Cold War, the record of UN peace keeping operations shows that on the contrary much has been achieved by the small and medium powers particularly the relatively neutral states like Finland and Sweden. Is the attitude of the major powers towards UN peace keeping going to change especially with the end of the Cold War?

This research will focuson the peace keeping role of the UN in the Post- Cold War era and to do that effectively, a comparative analysis will be made between the activities

of UN peace keepers in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 and now in Yoguslavia from 1991 to 1993.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The following are the objectives of the research:

(i) To point out the conflictual nature of some member-nations of the UN.

(ii) To establish the role played by the small and medium-sized powers in UN peace keeping operations.

(iii) To encourage most especially, the major powers to work collectively towards the maintenance of international peace and Security.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The choice of the topic was propelled and stimulated by curiosity and interest. The architects of the UN designed it as a centre for international peace and security. Rather, there is an illusion about the capability of the world organization to keep the world at peace. Such critics point to the many squabbles around the globe and the situations where parties to conflicts bluntly thwart UN's pacific efforts.

In spite of this gloomy picture painted by the pessimists, the UN seems to be man's only hope for international and intra-national peace and security and as such the importance of making spasmodic attempts to look at the roles played by member nations in that direction cannot be over-emphasized. The research will consequently analyse

the roles played by small and medium powers in UN peace-keeping operations.

Next is the nature of intra-national and international conflicts which is changing and assuming unproportionable dimensions, consequently, the analysis will provide the UN with the much needed alternative tools and principles to meet these challenging times and changing roles.

Finally, the global political environment has changed from bipolarity to unipolarity, hence, this study is unique since it is going to make the literature on comparative analysis of the two environments vis-a-vis the role of the UN available.

1.5 HYPOTHESES

(i) That the UN will be involved more in solving intra-national conflicts than international conflicts.

(ii) That the principle of neutrality could hardly be adherred to if the UN is to effectively maintain international peace and security.

(iii) That no matter the efforts of the UN real peace comes from the parties involved in a particular conflict.

(iv) That consensus and unity of action will be achieved more in a unipolar environment than a bipolar environment.

(v) That despite the fact that we are now in a unipolar political environment with the US playing a more dominant role in UN peace keeping operations, the 'national

question' is still a crucial factor in bringing about peace in the area concerned.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

Abi-Saab is among the pioneer researchers into UN PeaceKeeping efforts especially in the Congo. He highlighted the crisis and subsequent intervention from the legal point of view. Basing his study on the Decision Making Theory, he attempted to trace the role of law as an input of decisions and actions by enquiring in what ways and to what extent, if at all, legal considerations as understood by the decision maker at the time of decision had a bearing on the ensuing decision.[9]

Next, he identified the UN decision to send peace keepers to the Congo as the initial and most important from which all others flowed.[10] This initial decision did, in fact, act as the watershed for subsequent ones. Even though he applied the Decision Making Theory to his study, he failed to show how this initial decision affected later ones but instead justified them on the basis of legality. He diagnosed and laid bare the genesis of the crisis in the Congo barely a fortnight after gaining independence from Belgium and which made it imperative for the Security Council to adopt the Secretary General's recommendation to despatch troops there.

Expectedly, he outlined the cardinal principles of all UN peace-keeping operations viz. neutrality, use of force

only in self-defence and executive command vested in the Secretary General. He however, excluded consent of the host state since it was the Congo which extended the invitation to the UN.

In the epilogue, he pronounced his verdict thus: with the ending of Katanga secession, a major phase of the activity of the UN in the Congo came to a close. But the task was not yet achieved. We do however, hold a divergent view.

Cassese's work on UN peace-keeping comprised three sections: the first on the Charter and its implementation, the second on the consent of the host state and the last on the Secretary General and the Security Council, specifically the allocation of their powers.

In the first section, she pointed out that ideological and political differences between the US and the former USSR made the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter impossible. She however, failed to support her assertion with specific instances.

Next, she tackled the principle of the host state which she said is also necessary in the composition of the force and continuation or withdrawal of the force,[12] substantiating her stand with the UNFICYP experience.

On the powers between the Security Council and the Secretary General pertaining to peace-keeping issues, she pointed out that the former was superior to the latter.

Consequently, she expressed the view that the more decisions are taken by the Security Council the more the opportunity for a veto to be cast.[13] She however, failed to recognize that such vetoes on collective security could be over-ridden by majority votes in the General Assembly.

Besides these cited above, another work relevant to our study is by House who dwelt on the much often neglected civilian operations in the Congo. He pointed out that the Secretary General, having been given a free hand in determining which kind of assistance was necessary, created Civilian Operations in the Congo of equal stature to the Military Operations whose duties were to make essential and long term contributions of the UN to the Congo.[14] His work throws light on how the vacúum created by the sudden departure of Belgian civil servants was filled by UN technical volunteers.

Buns and Heathcote also described the Congo crisis as an acid test for the UN and opined that the terms of this trial were somewhat hard upon the UN for the mutiny of the Congolese Security forces, the Katanga attempted secession and in general the break down of effective control by the central government created a type of danger to international security with which the organization was not fully equipped to deal; emphasizing that if it should fail, it would decline into fatuity as the League of Nations

declined during the last years before the Second World War.[15] The co-authors brought to the fore how some of the cardinal principles guiding UN peace-keeping operations were violated; that of non-interference and use of force only in self-defence. Observers see the entry of ONUC into Katanga as supporting the central government against Tshombe since non-interference means giving him more time to arm himself. Consequently, they pointed out that the principle of neutrality was untenable and in future UNF should come out boldly in support of the government of the host state or the popular faction in the country. What they failed to see was that whatever peace could be so achieved might be temporarily - hostilities were bound to recur as soon as the Un withdrew its troops.

Cox, too, devoted part of his work to the analysis of the ONUC. He viewed the UN's activities in the Congo as a covet diplomacy between the US and the former USSR and observed that the latter refused to pay its assessed costs because it failed to grab the Congo into the Communist fold. He exceptionally mentioned the withdrawal of troops from the UAR, Indonesia, Mali, Guinea, Yoguslavia and Morocco after the death of Lumumba, but however failed to justify this action; for it were support for Lumumba, why then did Ghana, an ardent supporter of Lumumba still keep her troops there ?

In addition, Lefever in his study viewed the crisis as purely internal and therefore criticized the Security Council for acting with amazing rapidity in despatching a multi-national force to the Congo. Left to him, the crisis might have been allowed to run its full course. What he failed to realize was that it was not impossible for Belgium to capitalize on the situation and return as a colonial power to re-colonize or make Tshombe. secession attempt succeed. Even the posibility of either the US or the former USSR pouncing on the Congo could also not be ruled out. That might have torn the country apart. He made a point, however, which is worthy of note: that the UN's presence cannot effectively keep the peace in a crucible of unresolved conflicts like the Congo,[16] (and the former Yoguslavia). The UN consequently must go further than the mere despatching of troops to crisis situations.

Lefever's ideas are however, debunked by U Thant. To him, the ONUC averted East-West conflict, civil war and helped to preserve the territorial intergrity of the Congo.[17]

Goodrich has also made an impact on UN peace-keeping. He observed that peace-keeping operations of the UN have been the most controversial, the most highly publicised and successful.

He however, identified finance and agreement between the super powers[18] as some of the problems faced in peace keeping operations.

One of the most impressive works on UN peace-keeping has been done by Higgins. She attempted to explain as many operations as possible showing what really happened, what difficulties arose and what understandings were reached.[19]

Generally, some of the related literature on UN peace-keeping operations reviewed above are either on its over all performance in specific operations, the examination of the operations from the legal point of view or mere diagnosis of individual operations. Most of them are what Higgins refers to as references to and occasionally brief quotations from UN documents which are to support author's text.[20]

Given the rapidity at which the roles of organizations change, it is but appropriate to have an intermittent look at the UN peace-keeping operations. And this research is doing exactly that by breaking fresh ground as it adopts a comparative analysis to the study of the subject.

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For our purpose, we would consult archival materials, UN documents including bulletins and reports by the Secretariat and resolutions passed and logistics.

In addition we would avail ourselves of published and unpublished works including texts, papers, newspapers, magazines, journals and radio broadcasting. The methodology used is content analysis.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

A. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Owing to the complex nature of peace-keeping operations, we are going to use more than one theory in this study. The first is what has been used by previous researchers and what Haas refers to as contextual analysis; which is an approach that tries to bridge the epistemological chasm between those who want to derive general deductive laws on one hand and those who prefer to concentrate on the painstaking narration of discrete, if related events, on the other. He views contextual analysis as more ambitious than historical narration and more modest than the efforts of deductive science. It seeks the general within the more confined context of a given historical, regional or functional setting. It seeks the phenomenon under investigation as a general part of a 'whole' but defines this 'whole' in relatively modest and easily observable terms... the whole can also be described as the reality;

the specific reality of time, place and circumstance.[21]

In our case, the phenomenon we want to look into is peace-keeping undertaken by the UN to sustain international peace and security and to achieve this effectively, we have to examine the attitudes of member nations towards that goal pertaining specifically to manpower and financial contributions.

B. NEUTRALITY THEORY

Besides this contextual analysis, a major theory which explains the success of such operations is Neutrality Theory popularized by Marie von Grunigan. Two Schools of Thought, however, come under this theory. One of them postulates that for nations to successfully partake in peace-keeping operations, they must be neutral by having as their goal the restoration of peace only;[22] thus shelving other parochial national interests and objectives which participants might want to achieve from the conflict thereby escalating it instead.

The Second School of Thought also puts forward that nations taking part in peace-keeping operations in order to achieve the desired goal or goals must as a matter of policy refrain from any act of war and also maintain an absolute impartiality towards the various belligerents.

This should be so because the goal of peace-keeping operations is only to restore peace without any interferences in the conflict in favour of one of the parties and without using any force.[23] A point worthy of note is that most of the contemporary operations of the UN involved intra-national conflicts, mostly civil wars which have become so pervasive.[24]

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE THEORY OF NEUTRALITY

One of the basic assumptions underlying the Theory of Neutrality is the consent of the host state or parties directly involved in the conflict which might be sought before UN peace-keepers could be despatched. This assumption is however, over-ruled whenever any state invades another.[25]

Dag Hammarskjold was, however, skeptical about it since it was normally difficult for the UN to engage in such an operation without guarantees against unilateral actions by the host government which might put the UN in a questionable position either administratively or in relation to contributing governments.[26] Even though without the consent of the host state it would seem as if the operation was being forced on it and debunks the

participation of neutral states in peace-keeping operations,[27] contemporary events have proved how fragile this assumption is.

Another assumption is the impartial functioning of the force since the UN force must above all behave in such a way as not to take part in a conflict... it must not be used either to protect certain positions or one of the parties or to oblige one part to accept a certain political result or to influence the political balance.[28] Consequently, the UN force is placed in a precarious position should one of the parties prove unco-operative or hostile. Under such circumstances, therefore, it is extremely difficult to remain strictly within this task.[29]

The next assumption is the non-coercive action on the part of the UN forces who although armed do not use weapons except for self-defence.[30] They should not consequently initiate the use of weapons except when they are attacked, for according to international law, the right of self-defence pre-supposes the existence of imminent exceptional circumstances which do not permit any other solution than the use of weapons.[31]

1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS

To different people the concept of peace-keeping connotes different things. To some, it is a broad concept referring to the entire role of the UN in maintaining or restoring international peace and security. According to this definition any book on peace keeping must refer not only to UN forces but to investigation committees, Special Representatives of the Secretary General and diplomacy within United Nations systems.

Others have suggested that it is a term which has come to refer to UN forces and observer groups which are operational in a territory with the consent of its government.

Yet others have insisted that the term UN peace-keeping cannot include UN observers. There is therefore no one acceptable definition of the term peace-keeping. All these definitions and others besides may be permissible according to the purpose of the particular study. UN peace-keeping has been taken to mean operations in which personnel owing allegiance to the UN are engaged in military or para-military duties and are carrying weapons for their own defence in pursuit of duties designated by the UN as necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace.[32]

In this study however, peace-keeping would be used to mean all men comprising both armed personnel and civillians who are in crises-striken areas on behalf of the UN to bring life back to normalcy.

1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The scope of this research is limited to the periods between 1960-1964 and 1991-1993. The former falls within the Cold War era while the latter, the post-Cold War era, the Collapse of Communism in the USSR which has disintegrated and the abrogation of the Warsaw Pact.

The research also concentrates on two distinct and separate geo-political areas: Congo in Africa (South) and Yoguslavia in Eastern Europe (North). Even though this comparative analysis leaves out many of the areas UN peace keepers have operated and are still operating, it will still serve as a foundation for further research.

Since one of the case studies (Yoguslavian crisis) is an on going process, it was difficult for the pertinent primary data to be obtained.

Finance was a major constraint to the research; and this greatly affected the mobility of the researcher to places relevant to the study. The researcher, therefore had to utilize fully only materials available to him in his immediate environment.

1.11 ORGANISATION OF THE WORK

Chapter One as the introductory chapter has illuminated the background and importance of UN Peace-keeping operations in its efforts to maintain international peace and security.

For purpose of clarity and coherence, Chapter Two treats the background to the Congo Crisis while Chapter Three deals with the Civil War in Yoguslavia highlighting the Remote and Immediate Causes.

Chapter Four is a Comparantive Analysis of theRole played by the UN in the Congo and Yugoslavia and the final one, Chapter Five, endeavours to critically and objectively provide analyses of the findings and make recommendations for effective functioning of UN peace-keeping operations.

FOOT NOTES

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23. op cit p.76.

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27. op cit p. 83

28. op cit p. 157

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32. Burns, A.L. & Heathcote, N..: Peace-Keeping By UN Forces, Greenwood Press Publishers, 1963 p.3.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONGO CRISIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

To really comprehend the turmoil the Congo went through immediately after independence and to understand and appreciate the role of the ONUC better, it is only pertinent to delve a little into her colonial experience which prepared the grounds for these "teething problems" of the young state. In so doing, however, meticulous care would be taken to avoid the unnecessary reproduction of the previous academic endeavours on the Congo but instead, like Young, 'further the treatment of themes less elucidated elsewhere'.[1] Consequently, in this Chapter, we are going to examine the colonial past of the Congo paying particular attention to the Belgian administrative and educational systems and closing it with the crises which were accentuated by power tussle between Lumumba and Kasavubu mutinies in the army and secessionist attempt by Katanga who was propped up by Belgium.

2.2 THE BELGIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The Belgian administrative system was so dense that 'no Congolese, rural or urban could have failed to perceive that he was being administered by making itself felt in many ways: there was an agricultural officer per territory

supported by several African agricultural assistants and a network of 'monlteurs', coupled with some days of compulsory cultivation or other public works in the year.'[2] In fact, at independence, there were atout 10000 Belgian civil servants and officers in the administration, magistrature and army.[3] Consequently, there was just no way a Congolese could be left unscathed by the administrative tentacles of the Belgian colonial system. The Belgian domination permeated the rank and file of Congolese Society.

The Belgians, being the cream of the administration, 'over-dominated' the four highest echelons of the civil service; for example at the upper most three, there were only three Congolese as against nearly five thousand Belgians. A mirror-image was, however, perceived at the base degree where there was not a single Belgian to compare with as many as 11,000 Africans. No wonder, therefore, that the official Belgian views on the Congo since World War II have been a kind of latter day Utopia with justice and bread for all' (Belgians only).

TABLE 2.1

TABLE FOR COMPOSITION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN 1960

RANK	EUROPEAN	AFRICAN
Provincial Commissioner/District Commissioner	106	0
Administrator/Chief Police Commissioner/Bureau Chief	1004	1
Assistant Territorial Administrator/Police Commissioner/Assistant Bureau Chief	3532	2
Technical Officer/Police Sub-Commissioner/Office Supervisor	5189	800
Chief Clerk, Clerk,Office boy	0	11000

SOURCE: INCIDI Staff Problems in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries page 174.

From the table above, one could deduce that just before emancipation, there was neither a single Congolese Provincial nor District Commissioner. On the other hand, there was only one Chief Police Commissioner or Bureau Chief and two territorial Administrators/Police Commissioners. This gloom picture was a bit better with the Technical Officer/Police Commissioner grade where there were as many as 800 Africans even though this represented approximately 16% of the number of Europeans in that capacity.

Africans however, formed the bed rock of the lowest stratum where the ratio to Europeans was 11,000 to 0.

Admittedly, therefore, it is conspicuously clear that the administrative positions in the Congo Civil Service on the eve of independence were occupied almost entirely by Belgians. Before we proceed to the havoc wrought by such a policy, let us briefly examine the Belgian Colonial administrative system the back bone of which consisted of 'colonial elder statesmen many of whom served on the Conseil Colonial which was an advisory body in Belgian to whom all measures classified in terms of administrative law as legislation had to be submitted'.[5] These seasoned men had a free hand in the day-to-day running of the colony for 'there was the virtual absence of any controls external to the colonial system itself.[6] Given such a large room and a great degree of freedom to operate, some of these men, 'took seriously their role as custodians of African Welfare'.[7] As time were on, however, a university degree became a prerequisite for entry into the Colonial Service. A point worthy of note is that if Belgium had acted like France or Britain by keeping her colony constantly in mind, and if her 'scholarly community had given a critical appraisal of her colonial effort',[8] the confusion the Congo was thrown into might have been mitigated if not entirely averted. One could hardly come by words to explain this stand of Belgium's since she 'like an ice berg, the exposed fragment of

motherland, gets most of her wealth, weight and substance from the huge sub-merged Congo mass underneath'.[9] Belgium as it were neglected the proverbial goose that lays the golden egg.

Since Belgium scarcely discussed her giant colony in the metropolitan parliament, little news of affairs had been allowed to percolate to the outside world and whatever came through was rather re-assuring. It was generally thought that Belgian rule benefitted the Congolese who consequently became happy and contented. It was also believed that Belgium was following an enlightened policy of balanced development of raising the standard of living... leading the country in an orderly way towards self-government'[10] They did in fact point out that 'the standard of living of the Congo's African population has for some time been much higher and the degree of racial discrimination much lower than in neighbouring areas... (for) the Congo's Europeans are not settlers and have not had any political rights themselves.[11] Could we attribute this over all Belgian Colonial policy to Seymour Friedings credo that 'compared with other restless African areas, the Belgian Congo was (the) most docile... '[12] Young rightly pointed out that until 'the appearance of nationalist stirrings, the Congo was only a matter of concern to parliament when it required a Belgian subsidy.

This lukewarm attitude dictated the plans Belgium had for the Congo. The Colonial master, had originally thought that there should be political freedom for none because none wanted it.[13] Belgium had actually intended a gradual preparation of the groundwork for independence because 'demands for participation in the political life of the country have been relatively rare and unenthusiastic'.[14] In fact, six years prior to independence, 'it is difficult to know what they (the Congolese) say, for they are careful to say it to themselves and European listeners are little welcome. It is only certain that they say a great deal. That seemed about the much one could say or point about the evolution of opinion in the Congo and the growth of a sentiment of Congolese nationality and a desire for independence'.[15] The Belgians consequently assumed, perhaps falsely, that there was plenty of time for the decolonization process. Hence 'before the Second World War, there was still no evidence that any real thought was given to a future outside the colonial frame work'.[16] Caprasse proposed 1985 which was the centennary of the foundation of the Congo Free State, as ideal for ending colonial rule. Thus post-poning Congo's independence for twenty-five years since she attained this status in 1960.

Little did Belgium think that the process of decolonization would be initiated by the Congolese 'who had been isolated from the rest of the African continent',[17] and

'conditioned in such a way that the citizens most of whom did not know the beginning or end of what their (men) were fighting for.'[18] The colonialists believed that decolonization would remain under full Belgian control.[19] Boudowin emphasized this when he declared 'we are today resolved to lead without fatal delays but also without precipitate haste, the Congolese populations to independence in prosperity and peace. Belgium intends to organize in the Congo a democracy capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and deciding on its independence'[20] Even in the mid-fifties, the Belgium government had no intentions to grant political independence to the Congo for 'all the three major parties holding Congresses devoted to the Congo question, never mentioned (the word) independence'.[21] The PSB concluded: 'the first task is to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants. The second is to help in their apprenticeship of democracy in all domains of collective life... then the PSC also spoke of the right of autonomy and of increasing Congolese participation in decision concerning their country... The Liberals concluded: Our role is to construct the future of the Congo for the welfare of Belgians and Congolese in seeing that the promotion of the African is realized with economic expansion.'[22] That a time would come when the Congolese would be liberated and decide the destiny of his country was not made mention of by any of the political parties.

Belgians thought of co-existing with the Africans. It would not be over-statement as such if one put it that 'the Belgians obviously regarded their mission in the Congo as of indefinite duration... they neither contemplated independence nor pretended to train the Congolese for it.'[23]

Things cannot be the same ad infinitum, for the old order must certainly change, yielding place, as it were, to a new one. Consequently, one impression stands out, 'it was too foolish not to recognize until 1957, with the first communal municipal elections, the necessity for some expression of Congolese political life,'[24] even more foolish to suppose that they would perpetually remain under colonial rule. The international scene witnessed tremendous changes in the immediate post World War 2 period. One of them was the weakening of the foundations of colonialism. In fact, 'the San Francisco Conference to draft the UN Charter was a shock to the Belgian delegation (for) the inclusion of Article 73 concerning non-self governing territories was seen as a distant menace although the ratification of the Charter by the Belgian Parliament was unanimous.'[25] It had really dawned on Guy Malengrau, an influential figure in the Liberal Catholic circles who warned in 1947 that political education must replace paternalism. The Belgian Senate consequently despatched the first parliamentary mission to the Congo in 1947 to study political development.

It was therefore not until that year that Belgium, especially the Liberal Colonial Minister, Robert Godding, noted that 'the period of Colonial exploitation was over and that the principles of the UN Charter were now applicable.'[26]

It should be noted that in August, 1958, an all-European Group de Travail undertook 'a fact finding enquiry on the basis of which to announce a new government policy for the Congo.'[27] Unfortunately 'the mission made certain colossal misjudgement, of the temper of the Congolese opinion... a large number of Congolese interlocutors asked immediate independence (which) the Group de Travail concluded to mean the immediate liberation of the individual.'[28]

Whereas Congolese were thinking about political independence and a termination of colonialism, the Group de Travail painted a distorted picture to the Belgian government. At this time, however, 'there has been a dramatic and drastic change, for one can say much more, for Africans in the Congo are saying it for everyone to hear and read. New voices make themselves clear and eloquent.'[29] One therefore, wonders why the mission failed to portray the right frame of things to the metropolitan government. The resultant new policy was therefore unacceptable and unfavourable to the Congolese thus compelling the Movement National Congolais (MNC) which had been formed in Leopoldville early in the year

to submit a letter to the Minister and Ex-Governor General, Petillon, declaring: 'the undersigned... deeply regret that the Minister did not include any Congolese members in the Group de Travail... fear that without the participation of the latter, the conclusions which would emerge will reflect too unilateral a view point, inspired by certain conservatism attached to the colonialist spirit... and formulate as of now reservations concerning the final decisions which parliament will be led to take following on these conclusions.'[30] Congolese as it were, began to shake themselves for 'Belgium had failed to see that a policy of gradualism and horizontal development could not sublimate the urge for freedom among the Congolese people and particularly at a time when the process of deconlonization in Africa, as in Asia, was already for advanced. This miscalculation on the part of a nation known for its commercial shrewdress and business acumen was largely responsible for the catasrophic turn of events in the Congo after independence.'[31] After the despatch of the letter to the Minister, 'the tide of nationalism started running so strongly that every concession made to it was made to look like same puny obstacle which scarcely delays the flood before being engulfed'.[32] Like the rest of Africa, (therefore), the Congo is on the march and its people will no longer be satisfied with nice words.[33]

Belgium clung so tenaciously to colonialism that political development was at a snail's space and 'there was simply no comparison with most British and French territories, especially these in West Africa where the Colonial establishment was under constant African pressure and a broad range of policy was formulated in reaction to (although not always affording satisfaction to) nationalist demands.[34]

When it finally dawned on Belgium that it could hardly dominate the Congo perpetually, it was faced with the problem of the type of colonial policy to adopt. One school of thought favoured the building of the Congo from the base. To this belonged Governor - General Petillon who declared that 'the Congolese would be more closely associated with the Congo through beginning with the base.'[35] This is akin to the concept of grass-root politics which enables political participation by the vast majority of the rural people. It is only when the base is fully developed that independence will be meaningful to the nation as a whole. The practice where a handful of elites grant independence is always detrimental to the base.

Another favoured the establihment of a sound economic base for Africans; for to them building universities and granting political rights without first making it possible

for Africans to attain the same economic level as Europeans was to favour the formation of malcontents and agitators. This school of thought consequently favoured the practice whereby Africans too participate in the various economic endeavours in the Congo, With a sound economic base, Africans could then be orientated towards political emancipation.

A third school of thought advocated the formation of a middle class which will compromise blacks and whites and will constitute the foundation upon which future elites can solidly base themselves. They wanted, therefore, 'to build a middle class of blacks and whites who will constitute the foundation'. (for the new Congo to be born). These middle classes will be the black bourgeoisie which is beginning to develop everywhere and which we must help to enrich itself and organize itself and which like all the bourgeoisie of the world will be opposed to any disruption, internal or external.[36] This school of thought favoured the possibility of Europeans and Africans administering the colony together even after the attainment of independence. The former could then settle permanently in the Congo. In fact, they held the view that the European Community was destined to play an important role not only as technicians but as participants jointly with the

Congolese in the political institutions of the new state, a concept known as 'Eurafrica'. This was however antithetical to the belief the Africans held. They on the other hand, desired to have their destiny in their own hands. To them political emancipation meant the total transfer of power to Africans. There was no room for sharing political power.

Belgium was over-taken by events when it realized that its colonial trinity of state-church-capital had seriously been undermined. This three-fold foundation of Belgium authority began to crack in 1956 when there was a change in government in Belgium itself from a Catholic to a Socialist-Liberal coalition.[37] It should be noted, however, that prior to this time, the Trinity had seriously been plagued by causes that were to be found throughout Colonial Africa: unrest following the Second World War, the growth of towns,[38] in Elizabethville for example, black population increased by 10,000 from 1930 to 1940, it rose from 46,900 to 191,000 between 1940 and 1950 and reached 300,000 in 1955 creating new problems by the exodus from the rural areas and the resultant concentration of detribalized workers in urban centres[39] and centre extracoutumiers discontent with rates of pay for Africans in Contrast to European employees, suspicion of the church ... and an attempt by Belgium too late and too beggarly to meet them.[40]

The Church decided to abandon the active role it was playing in colonialism; for at this period no institution would like to be identified with it. With the collapse of the entente Belgian elite in the Congo gradually lost confidence in its mission and right to rule.[41]

In this circumstance, anarchy started to reign for the administration progressively lost control of the critical areas between Leopoldville and Matachi.[42] Belgium had no alternative but to decide hurriedly to grant independence to the Congo in 1960 but indeed there was a very real problem of whom to consult. This was the direct consequence of her own colonial policy. No groundwork had been done for independence to the Congo which was inevitable. The Congo was thus insufficiently prepared for independence and that there were only 17 graduates in the whole country by the time independence came... various disorders and contangion of ideas from other parts of Africa affected the Belgians and they decided in a moment of panic simply to dump it.[43] It is therefore foolish to suppose that the sudden hand over of power would by the very act itself, in some mysterious way, find an established, cordial Congolese government ready to receive it.[44] House rightly pointed out that the disastrous accession of the former Belgian Congo to independence was not the result of a faulty plan, it was the result of a lost wager.

When Belgium decided in 1959 to grant independence to the Congo, the Colony had neither a Congolese administration nor Congolese with political experience to run the country.[45] No wonder that the new state unready and unprepared began its life amidst so much turmoil and tumult... when power was hurriedly transferred into Congolese hands, the new Central government, like any other newly independent country, wished to be a master of its own house and not to submit to a status of tutelage or subordination to the former metropolitan power. Here we meet the demise of the concept of 'Eurafrica' which Belgium developed for the Congo. The Congolese lacked the experience essential for their great responsibilities - they also lacked trained civil servants capable of filling the administrative vacuum particularly at the highest levels.[46] As pointed out earlier, there was not a single Congolese in the senior echelon of the civil service at independence. Under such circumstances therefore, one cannot but fully agree with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah that if the political domination of the Congo by the Belgian government was complete and the Congolese deprived of political experience, the economic stranglehold exercised by foreign firms was no less damaging to the interests of the Congolese people.[47]

Belgium did not have a clear cut policy for the Congo. It began, as it were, as a prpperty of the Monarchy, and the passage of time and pressure made it possible for the state as a whole have a complete control over the Congo.

Besides this lopsided colonial policy, Belgium exported what may be called 'linguistic problem into the Congo. Metropolitan Belgium has two official languages: Flemish and French, but for simplicity, the latter was introduced into the colony but as the pro-flemish adherents gained control over the administration of the colony, they too decided to introduce the second official language thereby transporting the internal metropolitan politics into the Congo. Reacting sharply to this trend of affairs, Gaston Diomi remarked, 'we see no valid reason for the study of a second language, to impose the knowledge of Flemish, while it is not in the interest of the Congolese would be pure colonialism... feel in a word that imposing the knowledge of Flemish on the natives is equivalent to seeking a day to exclude from the administration those Congolese who do not speak Flemish. If by any chance we are obligated to study Flemish... we would demand that all the functionaries speak our four native languages, that all administrative documents be translated into the four languages and that we are addressed in our own language in offices.[48] If this policy had not been abandoned but left to be implemented, it would have heightened and aggravated ethnic rivatries in the Congo not to mention the economic aspect where all documents would have to be printed in the two languages, and manpower trained in

them to teach these in schools. It would also have laid the foundation for secessionist tendencies.

2.3 THE COLONIAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The educational system was orchastrated to complement the colonial policy. Africans were excluded from the administration of the Congo and so to maintain the status quo, Belgium adopted an educational system which would prevent the African from securing advanced education since by so doing the Congolese would (not) demand a growing share of responsiblity in the shaping of his own future.[49]

Primary schools were so generously distributed throughout the country that they were said to be within 'belly-range' frequent enough to ensure that a child could be sure of one square meal with his family at home.[50]

What can be deduced from this grand design is that graduates from this level of education posed no threat at all to their colonial designs and were also satisfied with such jobs as office boys, clerks etc. A primary school leaver who knew no French besides his native language would never dream of becoming either a District Commissioner on an Administrator talk less of a Provincial Commissioner. Compared with primary schools, there were less secondary/ technical schools meaning that a bottleneck had been created since not all the graduates from the former could be absorbed by the latter.

Actually, post primary institutions were not so generously available.[51] Secondary/Technical School leavers were contented with such appointments as Police Sub-Commissioners, Office Supervisors, Technical Officers, Chief Clerks or Clerks and would dare not challenge the colonial legitimacy of Belgium.

TABLE 2.2 NUMBER OF CONGOLESE IN EUROPEAN SCHOOL SYSTEM

YEAR	PRIMARY EDUCATION	SECONDARY/ADVANCED	TOTAL
1956	1 051	276	1 327
1957	1 593	380	1 973
1958	2 306	542	2 848

SOURCE: HOUSE A.H. The UN in the Congo p.15

The table above vividly explains the educational system introduced by Belgium into the Congo. It shows a proportional increase in primary schools to provide the much-needed cheap labour for menial jobs and as pointed out earlier, there were as many as 11 000 Congolese Chief Clerks, Clerks and Office boys in the civil service at independence. Secondary/Technical Schools formed a little more than 25% of the primary schools in the Congo from 1956 to 1958.

Indeed the first university for native Congolese was not opened until 1954, sixty-nine years after Belgium had taken over the Congo.[52] Consequently, Belgium rested assuredly that based on her educational system, no serious threat could originate from the Congo against her colonial policies. By so doing, however, Belgium had dug the grave of the young state. The Congo was thus hastily ushered into independence with its massive bureaucratic machinery under Belgian management and the Force Publique entirely European Officers.[53] The educational policy had already laid the foundation hence the autocrats relied entirely on themselves excluding the Congolese from posts of responsibility at all levels.[54] Right from that time the Congo was bound to face unsurmountable difficulties should strained relations compel the colonial master to withdraw her services from the Congo as events will validate what exactly happened.

To rectify the educational inadequacies Belgium will have to move fast. It is urgent to prepare an African elite capable of governing the country, presumably by studying in Europe and to reduce the educational gap between the towns and the country side so that the rural areas may be qualified to defend their interest in the Congo.[55] It was however, too late to do something about it before the dawn of independence.

2.4 THE CRISIS IN THE CONGO

Belgium finally decided to grant independence to the Congo in 1960 even though her officers were still in full control of the Force Publique. The economy too had not been liberated since it was still in the hands of Europeans. This was a calculated attempt on the part of Belgium for the Congo to still depend on the expertise of the colonial master even after independence for they were sure that the Congolese would quickly find that their administrators, professional and technical workers were indispensable.[56]

To worsen the plight of the Congo and to sink her deeper the Treasury was completely depleted and on Independence Day in 1960 the new government found itself owing the Belgian Controlled Central Bank over Two Thousand Million Francs (about one thousand million pounds)[57]

With independence built upon such a weak foundation within two weeks mutinies and riots had occurred in various parts of the Congo due initially to the refusal of the Belgian Commander of the Congolese Army to consider any improvement in the pay and conditions of the troops.[58] Leopoldville police were also angry because they believed themselves underpaid and their demands for better conditions were supported by many of their officers.[59] In reality most of the blame for the chaos in the Congo must fall directly on the shoulders of the Belgian officers of the Force Publique and subsequently on the Belgian army itself.

What has passed into newspaper currency as mutiny now appears with some exceptions (but not many) to have been no more than an attempt to defend the Congo from the Belgian Military reprisals and punitive expenditions... that the mutiny began when African other ranks set about recovering arms that had been taken from the Force Publique armouries by Belgian Officers and handed round a considerable quantity of small arms including some automatics to civilian Europeans... thereafter the Belgian Officers seemed to have connived delibrately with other Europeans in spreading panic among the Stanleyville whites with the result that the frantic calls for help were soon going out by every available telegraph or short-wave transmitter.[60] The new Congolese government had to rise up to the occasion. Consequently overnight corporals were promoted to Colonels and generals - discipline in the army completely collapsed and the Belgians sent in paratroopers all over the country.[61] Between July 11 and September 9, the Belgians had flown into Katanga over 100 tonnes of arms, including mortars, sub-machine guns and F.N. 38 automatic rifles, 25 Belgian air force planes with their crews has been placed at the disposal of Tshombe, 89 Belgian Officers and NCOs had been finally seconded to the Tshombe force and 326 Belgian officers and NCOs were then serving in the Tshombe army as 'volunteers'.[62]

Belgium had thus failed to recognize the sovereignty of the Congo by sending their paratroopers to the country without the consent of the government (could be interpreted to mean) an open declaration of war. [63]

In this explosive situation, ethnicity began to rear its ugly head. Even though ethnic loyalty in itself is a natural and indeed a necessary phenomenon, psychological liberation requires pride in one's antecedents and the Congolese has an ethnic identity as well as a Congolese and African self. However, on the negative side of ethnicity, a solidarity which feeds on hostility to others in the national community creates grave difficulties for the stable and efficient functioning of the political system. The development of appropriate political methods of harnessing the positive and shackling the negative is a vital post-independence challenge to the Congolese elite.[64] Young pointed out that the May 1960 elections particularly became largely an ethnic census, the voter was called upon to relate himself to the political process through his ethnic self-identification.

The members of the Congolese government expectedly divided into factions. This afforded Katanga Province and South Kassai to secede from the federation - thus encouraging other centrifugal political tendencies including seperatist movers within Lepoldville Province and Mamiema District of Kivu.

Amidst this chaos, the President Kesavubu announced the dismissal of his Prime Minister Lumumba: an action described as illegal because it is in the constitution that the President can dismiss the Prime Minister only with an endorsement by Parliament. It is worthy of note that after the President's announcement side-tracking Parliament, it met and nullified the Prime Minister's dismissal. Lumumba, too, thereupon declared that the President was no longer Head of State and subsequently called upon the people, the workers and the army to rise. Anarchy was thus let loose in the Congo as a result of this constitutional crisis and struggle for power.

It should be noted, however, that in the wake of the Belgian invasion both the Prime Minister and the President had sent a telegram to the UN Secretary-General appealing for an urgent military and technical assistance. Without delay, UN peace-keepers were despatched to the Congo and so all this drama took place while the UN peace keepers were already in the Congo.

The power struggle between the Head of State and his Prime Minister and the threatened secession by Katanga set the foundations for greater deeds to be accomplished by the ONUC.

The President persisted and eventually called upon Ileo to form a new government after which Lumumba was arrested, thereafter, the constitution was suspended and this afforded Mobutu the opportunity to announce that the army was taking part in the government until December, 1960.

Later events did prove that but for the presence of the UN peace keepers, the young nation might have disintegrated completely.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

THE CIVIL WAR IN YOGUSLAVIA: REMOTE AND IMMEDIATE CAUSES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we critically analyzed the antecedents of the Congo crisis making it imperative for the UN with irresistible alacrity despatch peace-keepers there. Since this work is a comparative study, there is the need also to examine closely those factors responsible for the current crisis in Yoguslavia in this chapter.

Like all modern states, what is happening in the former Yoguslavia now cannot be divorced from its history. Consequently, to get a clear picture of the recent and contemporary events in Yoguslavia, it is only too good for us to take a look back at how she came into existence as a nation.

3.2 ORIGINS OF THE COMPONENT REPUBLICS

It has to be borne in mind that the history of Yoguslavia (which comprised the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina the Kingdom of Montenegro, Dalmatia, Cariola and Baranija and Backa , is to a large extent that of those stronger powers which

have at one time or another controlled the component parts of the present state and sought further expansion through the natural gate ways; it is also the story of the resistance offered by those components to attacks on their independence and individuality and, at the same time of the efforts they have made to strengthen their own position by absorbing, dominating or uniting with each other,[1] which is also marked by ethnocultural cum traditional divergencies.

A turning point in Yoguslavia history was the Turkish invasion in medieval times. Those who were longest under Byzantine and Turkish influence and rule inherited a Greek Orthodox or Islamic tradition and were unmistakably Balkans.[3] Among these were the greater parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina which embraced Islam and Serbia which was Orthodox. However, during the Turkish invasion, the Kingdom of Serbia was not only subjugated but completely annihilated. Then their brethen, Croat and Dalmatia in the North and West who received Christianity from Rome and authority from Vienna, Budapest or Venice belonged to Catholic Central or Mediterranean Europe.

This historical experience had tremendous impact on the component regions of Yoguslavia. A classical example could be drawn from the Croats and the Serbs who 'speak variants of the same language (and) said by some to have been one people in origin and living next door to each other developed strikingly different social and value

systems and political cultures.[4] The Croats and the Serbs were so antagonistic to each other that the very way of life of a Serb and a Croat is a debliberate provocation by each to the other.[5] In fact, the history of the Serbo-Croat relations within the Yoguslav State is hardly a tale of amicable co-existence between ethno-linguistic kinsmen who are virtually identical except for religious affiliation (the Serbs being Orthodox and the Croats Roman Catholic) and script (the Serbs enjoy the Cyrillic script while the Croats use the Latin alphabet) and minor variations of pronunciation.[6]

With the expulsion of the Turks, Serbia and Montenegro regenerated with a national consciousness and loyalty to the Orthodox Church to unite with Slovenia and Croatia proud of their Catholic and Central European character,[7] thus marking the beginning of mutually exclusive partners. That the component units have not themselves remained homogeneous would be validated as later events unfold themselves.

The fertility of the land affected the economic standing of the regions and this in turn had a tremendous impact on the well being of the peasantry. The agricultural structure of Yoguslavia could be divided into three zones: the fertile plains comprising Vojvodina and Slavonia to the north-east which produce the nation's surplus food and ensure a relatively high standard of living to its inhabitants, the intermediate zone where the land normally

provides food enough for the local population and the 'deficiency' areas comprising Montenegro and the sterile Karst country of the Dinaric Alps. The inhabitants of these 'dry' areas therefore eke out their living by either migrating abroad or descending to the more favourable valleys.[9] Besides agriculture being one of the causes of the people's migration, others fled from exactions and reprisals of their Turkish masters or to defend an important frontier.[10] These movements have led indelible marks of ethnic and cultural mosaic from which have sprung many of the endemic disputes of the Balkans, for example Bosnia-Hercegovina, Vojvodina, Macedonia[11] among others.

Apart from this maldistribution of agricultural resources which resulted in discrepancies among the people's living standards in the fertile areas and those in the arid parts leading to worsening interaction, the relationship between the urban people and the rural folks too was not anything to write home about. The latter tended to look upon the former not only as collectors of taxes but also as perpetrators of force in carrying out government policies. Even the 'progress' which the town claims to offer him (the rural dweller) in the way of new farming techniques, sanitary improvement, education or political indoctrination are often resented as unwelcome intrusions.[12] Since the latter was a force to reckon with in Yoguslav politics, it reacted by passive resistance (like) the with-holding of food supplies and in extreme cases by waging guerilla warfare.

These peasants, as we would see later, became the battering ram in the hands of Tito.

In spite ofdifferent histories, maldistribution of agricultural and industrial potentialities,

> moves towards the formation of a Yoguslav state were highlighted in the linquistic literary work of Vuk Karaddzic among the Serbs and by that of Lyudevit Gaj and Bishop Strossmayer among the Croats, the disciples of Jernej Kopitar among the Slovenes were making closer contacts with the Croats and with the Yoguslav Movement in general. Even though these moves were steps in the right direction, they were not to proceed smoothly but met same obstacles on the way. One of such hurdles to be cleared was the antogonism between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Sections of the population... (in spite of this however) the Yoguslav idea advanced by leaps and bounds... with time and other factors like attempts to suppress the Croat language and nationality dwarfed the Roman Catholic - Orthodox antagonism.[13]

Prior to the formation of a Yoguslav state, however, Serbia had nursed the desire to amalgamate all the Serb elements among the southern Slave under one rule. Besides, it wanted to include in the 'Greater Serbia' Montenego, Southern Danetia, much of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Eastern Croatia and Southern Hungary.

This dates back to the 14th Century when Stephen Durham agitated for the creation of a Serbian Empire. In the 1840s, not only did the Serbian statesman, Garashanin, and others regenerate this idea but also stressed the 'sacred' role to be played by Serbia in the creation of a South Slav Union. Instead of Yoguslavia, therefore, he agitated for a greater 'Serbia.[14]

In spite of this seemingly unsurmountable obstacle on the way to nation creation, with the foundation of a South Slav nation having been laid and nurtured by the First World War by fostering closer ties among the component states in the face of 'common enemies', on 20th July, 1917, the Declaration or Corfu was signed between Pasic as Serbian Premier and Trumbic as President of the Yoguslav Committee in exile and this may be called the 'birth Certificate of Yoguslavia.[15] The Declaration was in favour of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a single nation under the Karageorgevic dynasty. The new state was to be a constitutional democratic and parliamentary monarchy with equality for the two alphabets, the three national names and flags and three religions with manhood sufferage in parliament and in the municipalities.[16]

At this juncture, it should be borne in mind that the time for jubilation and toasting was not yet due because the type of government be it federal or unitary was to be decided later.

This opportunity for the formation of a Yoguslav State was however, lost owing to jealous, narrowly pan-Serb attitude of the Serbian Premier, Pasic, in the teeth of strong opposition from the Young Radicals and when the First World War ended agreement had still not been reached.[17]

The victors of World War I had a hand in the final artificial creation of a Yoguslav State. At the end of the war, upon persuasion from President Wilson, the Croats terminated their alliance with Hungary on 29th October, 1918, and proclaimed their desire to join Serbia and Montenegro for a South Slav Nation. Even though this was opposed by the peasant leader, Radic, who agitated for a separate and independent Croatian Republic. Later Montenegro too opted to join Serbia and so under the powerful influence of France, the final declaration establishing the Federation of Yoguslavia was signed on 9th November, 1918 in Geneva.

Even though some groundwork had already been done, with this pressure from the Allied Powers, Victors of the First World War, the various sections of Yoguslav people rushed into union without any very clear idea of the lines on which it was to be worked out, and without any generally recognized bargain or contract.[18]

The Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes was finally proclaimed by Prince Regent Alexander on December 1st, 1918.

This young state which was composed of disparate elements brought together by the force of circumstances in short gun marriage [19] became perhaps the most precarious entity in Eastern Europe.[20]

3.3 THE INTER-WAR YEARS

The amalgamation of the disparate entities was not based on mutual trust. Consequently each of them retained their individual national identities instead of being identified with the general aspirations of the 'United Kingdom'. The question of the type of government to be adopted by the new state then remained unanswered and thus became a perennial problem. Opinion and parties were sharply divided between federalism and centralism. The election of 1921 could not resolve the issue since neither the Democrats nor the Radicals did not win absolute majority. They therefore had to settle for a coalition government. In course of time, however, Radic 'who had swept the boards in Croatia with a Republican federalist programme adopted the fatal policy of absenteeism from parliament; thus enabling Pacic to draft the new constitution on far more centralised lines than would have been possible if its critics has taken part in the debates.[21] The ensuring constitution from the impasse was not only unpopular but also unacceptable.

This was exemplified by the fact that the ceremony of Vidovdan was marred by an attempt on the life of the Prince Regent in Belgrade; and the Minister of Interior was murdered a month later by a young Bosnian communist thus providing the government with excellent exeuse for reprisals and the Skupstina (Parliament) by 190 to 54 votes passed decrees for the defence of the State which authorized the most drastic measures against terrorists. The fifty-eight communist members were then removed and henceforth the Communist Party was forced to lead a clandestine existence. Alliances, counter alliances and political rivalries were the cardinal features which ushered in Yoguslavia into the fold of Eastern European nations.

The Serbians took advantage of their numerical strength and the part they played in the First World War and towards the foundation of Yugoslavia by dominating the new nation politically; imposing centralism as against federalism advocated by more economically vibrant and buoyant Croatia. Economic and political powers therefore came to be apportioned between Croatia and Serbia respectively. In fact, Croats, Slovenes and other non-Serbs in the South as well as the north, the majority of the population found themselves living in what was really 'Greater Serbia' with a Serbian King, a Serbian Capital, Serbian Prime Minister throughout the inter war period

Worse of all, they were prepared to accept money and assistance from Italy and Hungary in the years to come.[26]

By 1928, the Yoguslav situation was like a keg of gun powder waiting for fire to ignite. Matters were aggravated when on 20th June a Montenegrin Pan-Serb deputy of the Radical majority party assassinated Pavle Radic, a Croat, in the Skupstina.

Truly Yoguslav was prone to crisis centering around Belgrade and Zagreb as soon as it came into being... and the crisis it was facing then was experienced about twice a year for ten years.[27] What caused the rift was public adminnistration by the more primitive Serbians who were unequal to the task of running a state which had swollen to three times the size of Serbia of 1914.[28] While Belgrade stood for unity, one King, one State, one people, Zagreb advocated for harmony, federation, one King but several state, embodying distinct but associated peoples.[29]

The crisis so deepened that the parliamentary system of government broke down (and) the Monarchy was the only institution left that could save the situation.[30]

Try as King Alexander did to preserve the unity of Yoguslavia, he failed and worse of it all, was painfully murdered by the agents of Pavelic in Marseilles on October 9th, 1934, five years before the out break of the Second World war.

A three-man regency was provided for in Alexander's will since his son, then eleven years, was not of age. One of them was his cousin, Paul Karageorgevic who failed to take advantage of the national mood of concilliation and continued in Alexander's dictatorial path. Slovenes and Moslems joined the Yoguslav Radical Union, a new political party led by Stoyadincyich who under the Prime Minister Paul, carried out flirtation with the Hitler regime in Germany since he hated Communism[31] angering the agrarians and the Democrats.

Before the outbreak of World War Two, there was a Serbo-Croatian coalition government. Machek joined Tsvetkovich Cabinet as Vice Premier. Besides, there were three other Croats in addition to two independent Serb democrats but the rest of the opposition (all from Serbia proper remained outside the coalition). The Sporazum (Agreement) appeared to have healed on old dreadful wound, however, it probably caused as much discontent as pleasure since the Croats still wanted territory.[32] This was, however, resented by the Serbs who thought that having spearheaded the formation of the Yoguslav State, they should rather have greater autonomy since this had been denied them with the new administrative units created by King Alexander, they found themselves scattered among Croats and Slovenes; an act which was repeated by the

Axis powers during World War Two after the fall of Belgrade. What the Serbian opposition did was to rock the boat by rekindling the "national hatred" which had died down due to Alexander's policies. The Croats responded by mass massacre of Serbians in their midst. The temporary marriage between the Croats and the Serbs was on the rocks.

Yoguslavia thus reached the moment when the Second World War was imminent with two of its most important nationalists substartially unreconciled and civil liberties denied to all its population as they had been for a decade.[33]

It could be discerned that after the death of King Alexander, when yet another attempt was made at federation two different problems of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Vojvodina reared their heads. First in the former, the Croat minority would prefer attribution to Croatia, the much larger Serb-element would vote union with Serbia and the Moslems would desire autonomy. In either way, the Croats and the Moslems would prefer teaming up with each other to joining Serbia. Secondly any scheme of partition by which only the solidly Serb-eastern border of Bosnia-Hercegovina would be merged with Serbia was resented by the Serbians who pointed out that the number of Serbs then left in Croatia would be vastly greater than that of the Croats in Serbia. This difficulty applied with equal force to Vojvodina which the Serbians claim on the grounds that the Serbs were the largest single element in the

population; that in the past Vojvodina had been the cultural centre of Serbian and that it was geographically and economically tied to Belgrade.[34]

3.4 THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR TWO

King Alexander's effort at an intergrated Yoguslavia failed because of mistrust among the various ethnic groups. Prince Paul was overthrown in a coup d'etat and the newly established government had hardly assumed office when the Second World War erupted; and because of an earlier flirtation with Germany and later some anti-Axis demonstrations in Belgrade, Hitler saw the disorganized state of Yoguslavia as an easy prey since the deep-rooted conflicts among the various groups swayed away any combined force to repulse the common enemy'.

Hitler's attack on Yoguslavia was so swift and decisive that between 6th and 17 April, 1941, Belgrade had fallen. King Peter and his team having fled prior to the attack set up a government in exile first in London and later transferred it to Cairo. Yoguslavia, thereafter ceased to exist as a unified Kingdom. The young nation having collapsed was partitioned by its conquerors into patch work of puppet states and occupied zones with borders and definitions which emphasized ethnic differences and invited civil strife.[35]

In fact it was the total disintegration of a ruling system, a disintegration after which it looked as if the Yoguslav State as a unified political entity would never recover.[36]

The conquerors, the Axis powers, Germany and Italy and their satellites, Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria partitioned Yoguslavia. The State of Croatia was created and this encompassed Bosnia-Hercegovina with the capital in Zagreb. On the throne, however, was not a Croatian but an Italian Prince. This arrangement favoured the Croat nationalists who over the years had been campaigning for a Greater Croatia with Bosnia-Hercegovina under their realm. The German Reich annexed the economically more viable northern third while the Southern two-thirds went to Italy. Kosovo and Macedonia came under the influence of Albania and Bulgaria respectively while Pre Komurje and Madjimurje together with Bonja and Backa were grabbed by Hungary. The Kingdom of Montenegro was restored while all these development led to the total disappearance of Slovenia from the map since Slovenes who fled were replaced by Austrians

One would have thought that the partition of Yoguslavia could have confined the various ethnic groups to their respective domains or acted as a unifying force to dispel the intruders but it rather rekindled the

pre-war days inter-ethnic hostilities and facilitated the settling of scores. This time, however, it was the Serbs who were at the receiving end. As soon as the state of Croatia was declared, the Croats decided to pay back the Serbs in their own coins. They undertook 'ethnic cleansing' of the state and this was mostly directed against the Serb, their traditional enemies. The atrocities were mostly carried out by the Croatian Fascist group known as Utashi. In Kosoro too, the Serbs were not spared. The Albanians who formed the majority component of the population tried to settle old scores with the Serbs who used to wield tremendous power in the former Kingdom of Yoguslavia. The Serbs in the areas Bulgaria annexed too suffered greatly. Bulgaria used the opportunity to treat all those living there as if they were Bulgars. The Serbs were consequently forced to 'deny' their national 'Serbian identity'. The Axis powers and their satellites as if by design, split the political force of the Serbs by scattering them among the various minor ethnic groups. They adopted this policy of divide and rule first and foremost to keep the hatred among the various ethnic groups alive and also to avert any unity of action.

The Second World War thus not only tore Yoguslavia apart physically, but socio-politically the differences between the ethnic groups became more pronounced and assumed uncontrollable dimensions.

Even though discontent existed among the various ethnic groups during the inter-war years, it never led to open confrontration. It was during the occupation that the diverse grievances developed into civil strife. In fact, during the period between 1941 and 1945, more people in Yoguslavia were killed by their fellow country men than by the German, Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces.[37] What the occupying forces succeeded doing in dismembered Yoguslavia was to water the seed of discontent among the various ethnic groups. The occupation also favoured the Hungarian and Albanian minorities in the former Kingdom of Yoguslavia hence it was not surprising therefore that they supported and collaborated with the Albanian and Hungarian forces. Even after the war had ended, these minorities continued their hostility towards the communists.

3.5 THE RISE OF TITO

Even though Yoguslavia had collapsed, there were a few patriots who felt the need for her regeneration. One of such men was Joseph Broz 'Tito', a Croat-born metal worker who was the Secretary-General of the small Yoguslav communist party which formed the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yoguslavia, the formally Supreme organ of a National Liberation Movement loosely but better known as the Partisans.

The hour for re-assertion came when Germany invaded Russia regarded by the small Yoguslav Communist Party as dear Socialist Fatherland (their) hope and beacon[38] and Tito was not a man to let this opportunity slip; consequently, spear heading activities and patriotic fervour and loyalty to a creed of social revolution directed from Moscow, Tito was successfully able to drive away the German and Italian Fascist bandits.[39] Colonel Draza Mihajlovic however, opposed the methods and approaches adopted by Tito in dealing with the Axis occupation. In spite of this, however, Tito pressed on and appealed to all Croats, Serbs and Moslems (to) sink their differences in a common struggle against the occupying powers and their allies whether Chetniks or Utashe.[40] Through thick and thin, after the Italians had been pushed out of Slovenia, Dalmatia and Mentenegro, Tito was gradually becoming a national hero; confident of (subsequent) increased strength and prestige... Tito convoked a second session of the Anti-Fascist Council at Jajce, the Medieval Bosnian capital at the end of November, 1943.[41] At the convocation there was a transformation of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yoguslavia into a Praesidium which was vested with administrative and legislative functions. In all, there were sixty-seven men who not only represented different

shades of political ideas but also the diverse ethic groups. The Committee of National Liberation then became the Provisional Government of newly emerging Yoguslavia. Tito was befittingly dignified with the rank of Marshall of Yoguslavia and then became the Premier and Minister of Defence. To pacify the government in exile, Subasic and two other members of that government were co-opted into the cabinet.

During the last time the Cabinet met in August, 1945, the Praesidium was enlarged to bring in 68 members of the last pre-war parliament who were not compromised by collaboration with the enemy.[42] In order to give Tito time to consolidate his own position and unite the state, King Peter who was still alive but exiled was advised not to return to Yoguslavia since the question of King and Monarchy will be settled by the people of its own will after the liberation of the whole country.[43] The King acceded.

Gradually, all powers in post-World War Two were vested in Tito and other Communist leaders. In fact, there was no organized political opposition and most people were pre-occupied with the basic tasks of keeping alive in the chaotic aftermath of the war.[44] After complaining very bitterly against the Communist Party, the opposition, seeing the writing on the wall and realizing that they could do little against the communists' control of power

and popular support resigned from the provisional government.[45] In the subsequent elections, 90.48% of the 7.4 million electorate voted for the programme of the Communist Party - The Peoples Front. The Monarchy having been abolished, Yoguslavia was declared a Federal Peoples Republic in November, 1945. By this act, the King in exile had no claim to Yoguslavia again.

Another Alexander was discovered in Tito who having no ethnic or parochial loyalties (and being) an internationalist in the true sense of the word[46] demonstrated that he could unite people from different parts of the country (thereby winning) the hearts of all the peasants who believed after years of suffering in a brighter future under (his) able leadership making him unique among Communist Leaders in Post-War Europe in having peasant support(and) in facing no considerable bourgeois opposition and in being genuinely a popular national figure.[47]

Tito provided the much-needed astute leadership required after a crisis and having become Yoguslav's uncrowned King and autocrat... has forged a modern state and brazenly let it down a unique path[48] by breaking away from the traditional Marxism - Lenism leadership of the Soviet Union to introduce the Principle of self-management democracy and have some flirtations with the west.

Among the revolutionary measures taken after consolidating himself in power in 1945 was the Law on Agrarian Reform which was aimed at the redistribution of Land in Yoguslavia.

TABLE 3.1 LAND TRANSFERRED FROM PRIVATE OWNERS TO LAND FUND UNDER 1945 LAW

Type of Owner	Number	Area (Hectares)
Large Estates	2 633	235 000
Banks and Joint Stock Companies	837	78 000
Church and Monasteries	2 625	164 00
Private Farmers Owing More Than Legal Maximum	8 836	122 000
Non-Farmers	14 131	362 000
Germans	98 874	673 000
Other	42 584	189 000
TOTAL	168 520	1493 000

SOURCE: 20TH CENTURY YOGUSLAVIA BY FRED SINGLETON MACMILLAN PRESS LTD. 1976 p.117

The table above shows the distribution of land in 1945. After World War Two, to rectify the situation however, Tito promulgated the 1945 Land Law which tended to reallocate land fairly as the table below shows:

TABLE 3.2 DISBURSAL OF LAND FUND UNDER 1945 LAW

Type of New Owner	Area (Hectares)	Percentage of Total Area
Individual Peasants	797 000	51
State Farms	287 000	18.3
State Enterprises	39 700	2.5
Health and Education Institutions	20 100	1.3
Nationalized Forests	380 300	24.3
Agricultural Co-operatives	47 000	2.6

SOURCE: 20TH YOGUSLAVIA BY FRED SINGLETON
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD, 1976 p.119

Comparing the two tables above, one can clearly see the dichotomy in the system of land distribution. While the former was capitalist oriented, the latter had a socialist inclination; and consequently land went to individual peasants who were the vanguard of the resistance against the Axis occupation and for the state after the 1945 reforms.

In spite of all these changes, and try as Tito did, there were many examples in which the economy moved in a direction contrary to the policies of the government-resolutions of the various organs of the party and state and socio-political communities were frequently ignored by workers councils and boards of management whose

decisions were reached in the light of sectional or commercial interests rather than of long term social and political objectives.[49]

Moreover, it was observed that all the measures taken to solve the country's economic problems were mainly on 'ad hoc basis'[50] and consequently the level of economic crisis among the various components remained unchanged. The wealthy regions of Croatia and Slovenia continued to expand while the economically under-developed areas of Serbia, Hercegovina, Montenegro and Dalmatia did not improve even though the former complained that the resources of theirs were being used to develop the latter.

In spite of the fact that Yoguslavia continued as a single nation under Tito because he had a real hold on the people,[51] the age-long animosity between the various ethnic groups which persisted throughout the period of the Axis ocapation reemerged in a new form... (expressing)itself primarily in economic terms.[52] In this economic war too the Croats found themselves face to face with their arch-enemies, the Serbs. The Croats complained against the Serbs for dominating the economy even though they generated most of the foreign income. Serbian notorious bourgeoisie were accused of having ruled and ruthlessly exploited richer, more sophisticated Croatia and Slovenia in pre-war Yoguslavia and... had recently attempted a repeat performance.[53]

The Second World War never buried the desires of both the Croats and the Serbs. While the former called for decentralization... depolitization and democratization... the latter wanted to retain the status quo-centralization. For the sake of national unity, however, Tito yielded to the demands of the minorities and granted some degree of autonomy to the various regions but still this did nothing to avert tension which erupted in 1971 against the authoritarian strains in Tito's regime which eventually fought back by casting the Croats into the role of separatists and spoilers.[54] In his usual characteristic style, Tito was able to tone it down and (even) observed in 1972 that there can be no question at all of any kind of crisis in our state.[55]

A remarkable achievement by Tito was that even though there were tensions and crises between the various ethnic groups and the Serbs, he was able to keep the fragile vessel of yugoslavia together.

people[56] and whenever there were stirrings in the country, he was shrewd and sensitive enough to perceive them and to incorporate them into his policies.[57]

Tito having clung so tenaciously to power for three decades and half eventually succumbed to nature thereby leaving Yoguslavia pregnant with internal antipathies.

3.6 THE CIVIL WAR IN YOGUSLAVIA (1991 to)

That historical experiences, fears and expectations are hard to obliterate were manifested in the relationship among the various ethnic groups which never fraternized . Each group bore one grudge or another organist the other.

Even though Slobodan Milosevic had earned the accolade of not only being the high priest of ethnic cleansing but also the man who let the nationalist genie out of the bottle,[60] two main factors would have made the breakage of the bottle an inevitability.

The first was political. The various ethnic groups did not take kindly to the political domination by the Serbs. The Croats for instance having had a taste of some degree of autronomy' during the Axis occupation wanted to enjoy the same treatment after the 'emancipation'. In November, 1968, the Albanians in Kosovo too pressed harder their demand for the transformation of their region into a seventh Yoguslav republic in which the Albanians as the local majority would in fact be politically dominant.[61] This was done through demonstrations which spilled over to Macedonia. The Serbs, capitalizing on their numerical strength, controlled and dominated all facets of political activity in Yoguslavia.

In fact the party and the police bureaucracy were seen as 'Serbian-dominated.'[62] To maintain the status quo, as mentioned earlier, but for the sake of emphasis, they always advocated for centralized system of government with all major policies emanating from Belgrade while the Croats and other minorities to have some degree of antonomy demanded for decentralization. These minorities consequently became hostile to the Serbs in their midst, for example, at a May 1968 meeting of the Republican Central Committee, two members... ventured to criticize manifestations of Albanian and Magyar nationalism in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Albanian nationalism and irredentism were being openly promoted in Kosovo and the Serbs were sufferring systematic discrimination in current employment policies in the province.[63] As evidence the critics cited the emigration of increasing number of Serbs and Montenegrins especially the intelligentsia.[64]

Another political factor was the nationalist tendencies which Bakaric prophecized in March 1966, would become the country's question number one (and which was) coming true.[65] Language was identified with nationalism and Slovenes and Macedonians advocated seriously that the language of theirs be given federal recognition which resulted in the introduction of equipment for the simultaneous translation in the federal assembly after the elections of 1967.[66]

This was granted but Belgrade viewed the minorities as being refused to be intergrated into the mainstream of Yoguslav life.[67] The minorities on the other hand regarded Commusion as a slavic tool.[68]

The second factor was economic. Yoguslavia like any other nation comprised Republics endowed with uneven distribution of natural resources. Of all the republics, Croatia and Slovenia were most naturally endowed and developed. Together with the far smaller Slovenia, Croatia was the most advanced industrially of the Republics of Yoguslavia with 90% of the ship building, 80% of oil refining capacity and 75% of tourism - major foreign currency earners.[69] Serbia itself was economically poor and so were Macedonia, Bosnia - Hercegonina and Montenegro as well as the Kosmet. Serbia allied with the less developed republics while Slovenia and Croatia too teamed up together and lodged (complaint) that they have been forced to bear single handedly the brunt of developing the less advanced republics.[70] Next, Croatia complained against Serbian - Belgrade for misappropriating hard-earned foreign currency being brought into the country by the Croats who work in other European Countries half of whom were in Germany for almost 40% of the approximately one million Yoguslav workers abroad (1973) were Croats sending out or bringing home large amounts of much needed foreign exchange.

Popular slogans therefore were 'Foreign resources to those who earned them,' 'End the plunder of Croatia.'[71] Cut of whatever amount generated, Croatia was permitted to keep only 10% of the foreign exchange. There was however, 100% increase in this rate in 1971. Besides this foreign currency problem, which was very crucial to Croatian leadership, the 1965 reforms failed to touch on former federal banks with seats in the capital and former federal funds in their safes and certain wealthy foreign trade enterprises which had been funded, financed and staffed by Serbian-dominated federal institutions and capital before the reform which were now exercising what many besides the Croats regarded as an alarming and exploitative country wide power.[72] Consequently, the Croats advocated the federalization of former federal capital and clear accounts which would allow each republic to see what it has contributed and getting from the federation and make appropriate decisions about future contributions. The Croatian leadership was defending the interest of all producers who in Yoguslav Communist theory should have control over the surplus value was being expropriated by Belgrade bureaucracy, Belgrade bank and the grasping tentacles of these Belgrade based foreign enterprises.[73]

Knowing very well that they depended upon the resources of Croatia for capital and development, the Serbs vehemently opposed the idea of federalization talk less of secession.

Should this happen, the plight of the less developed regions would worsen while the fortunate regions like Croatia and Slovenia would develop rapidly since this time all the resources would no more be dissipated.

The last straw which broke the camel's back was the Constitutional crisis in Yoguslavia in May 1991 when the eight-man (rotational) presidency in which all of Yoguslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces are represented was unable to elect a President. Croatian Jurist, Stipe Mesic, who should have succeeded incumbent President Borisav Jovic, a Serbian, failed to win a majority of eight votes . Only four republics-Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia- Hercegovina voted in favour of Mesic's leadership one vote less than he required. Republic of Serbia, historical rival of the Croats and of its autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina voted against Mesic... (who) said (last week) that if there is constitutional crisis Croatia would immediately begin the process of withdrawing from Yoguslavia.'[74]

Truly the constitutional crisis could not be resolved and civil war became imminent when on June 25th, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Serb-dominated Yoguslavia. Belgrade had to act fast for with this development, it became obvious that in Yugoslavia it is no longer whether the country would disintegrate but how soon the various republics will realize

this inevitability'.[75] Even the Macedonians whose defensive new nationalism and consequent fear of Serbian hegemony had come to weigh more heavily than the financial benefits they had gained as an under-developed region from centralized redistribution of national income... even in the new Serbian leadership... made them anti-centralist.[76] The Serbs considered Bosnia-Hercegovina as 'strategic' and consequently would not let it go easily. When therefore, Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina on February 29th, 1992 voted also to break away from 'Serb-dominated' Yoguslavia, the Serbs over there wanted the republic to return to Yoguslavia, or in the alternative be partitioned along ethnic lines. In pursuing this objective, federal troops descended on Bosnia and besieged Sarajevo and resorted to systematic extermination of other ethnic groups in what is known in local parlance as 'ethnic cleansing' through torture and starvation.[77] Besides Milosevic was aiming at creating a new Yoguslavia federation which would be made up of Serbia, Montenegro, and Serb-dominated parts of Bosnia and Croatia.

The problem in Bosnia-Hercegovina had been compounded for the Muslims and the Croats trational allies against the Serbs had taken up arms against each other.

Even though Tito's Yoguslavia is no more, for swords to be transformed into plough-shares, a problem not only facing Europe and the UN but mankind in general.

FOOT NOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONGO AND YOGUSLAVIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapters two and three had a critical examination of the antecedents of the crises in the Congo and Yoguslavia. For an effective comparison to be made between the roles played by the UN in both instances, the current chapter is going to delve into the international environment particularly during and after the Cold War era*s*. Secondly, the issues raised in both crises would be illuminated and then compared. Lastly, the chapter will close with a comparative analysis of the role played by the UN in these crises.

4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN 1960-1964

The Cold War neither started in 1960 nor terminated in 1964. Rather the period marked one of the peaks in the super power covert struggle. This period was specifically chosen because it marked the time the ONUC was operating in the Congo.

With the end of the Second World War, the two principal victors, the US and the USSR continued for a while to talk in terms of an alliance.[1] This alliance, howver, did not last long thereby causing Europe to become divided into two irregular segments appertaining to them.[2] The USSR had earlier in the twentieth Century followed the path of Socialism while the US adherred to the principle of capitalism. The Second World War ended with these two giants towering above all other nations. Naturally, therefore, there was that initial kind of good relationship and alliance between the two giants which pursued diametrically opposed socio-political and economic ideals. As time passed by, however, this relationship began to crumble as suspicion, hatred and fear began to rule the minds of both countries.

Fleming identified three variables which fanned the flames of the Cold War. The first of these was the prior pattern of interaction in which he postulated that prior to the outbreak of World War Two, the interaction between the US and the USSR had never been an intimate one.

Initially, the US wanted to monopolize the technology of the atomic bomb which it used successfully against the Japanese but soon the USSR caught up with her and blasted one thereby generating competition and enhancing perceptions of threat[3] between them.

Similarity too was an underlying factor which he said was the key[4] for if the actors could come to view one another as similar, the competition produced by changes in status might be negated by the trust produced by perceived similarity. However, if perceptions of dissimilarity were heighthened, competition would be coupled with mistrust.[5]

The Cold War manifested itself in many varied and diverse ways. Both the US and USSR competed against each other in the arms race. There were several stock piles of all kinds of ballistic missiles in both countries.

In the area of trade, the USSR viewed all the financial institutions set up at Bretton Woods including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as tools of US imperialism and foreign policy and consequently kept off their 'dreaded tentacles'.

The era of the Cold War became charged as each super power tried to create and prop up leaders in their satellite states. The USSR consolidated her position in Eastern Europe and treated with disdain 'prodigal Yoguslavia' which felt the need to fashion out a new meaning and approach to socialism. Dissidents were, however, treated unhesitatingly as defectors and punished. Episodes of this nature include Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and Czechoslovakia's disloyalty in 1960.[6]

In the same vein, the US too, did not look at 'disloyal regimes' with kind eyes and consequently, assisted in the over throw of 'prodigal' leaders as in Guatemala in 1954, Iran in 1953 and the Invasion of Dominican Republic in 1965.[7]

Like the partition of Africa nearly a century before, the whole world was partitioned between the two super powers in spite of the Non-Alignment Movement which acted as the sandwhich between the two blocs prepared to respect other's control of key stakes.[8]

In spite of this, however, there were instances when one super-power just formented and provoked riots in each other's 'safe area'. The likes of these were the American propaganda which provoked riots in East Berlin in 1953, unrest in Poland in 1956 and 'Revolution' in Hungary in 1956.[9] Just as oscillating satellites were punished, committed ones received abundant flow of aid and treated with dignity in the metropolitan news media.

Akindele rightly pointed out that the Cold War certainly posed enormous problems for structural impediments against a faithful implementation of (a) model of universal relationship in the UN Charber. East-West schism, hegemonic leadership of some regional organizations, especially the Organization of American States (OAS) and Warsaw Treaty Organisation and doctrine of spheres of influence hegemonic and religiously venerated by the two super-powers, the US

and USSR - often led to adversaries and antagonistic rather than complementary relationship between the UN on one hand and the OAS and Warsaw Pact on the other hand; in effect reversing the relationship in favour of the superiority and dominance of regional organizations.[10]

The Cold War stopped short of direct US-USSR open confrontation. The usual battle-grounds were in the UN where in most cases during the Cold War, the super powers took opposing sides and as Gambari pointed out in Europe.[11]

One could not but agree without reservation with Gambari that one of the international consequences of the Cold War was the break down of the Collective Security system envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the face of the bipolarization of the post-War World.[12] The ability of the UN to play its managerial role was consequently undermined.[13]

During the Congo crisis, the Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold, played such an important role as to prevent the intervention of either the US or USSR.[14] Neither of them, locked into conventional struggle for power in the Third World [15] therefore, got overtly involved in the Congo crises even though the US made her planes available for airlifting humanitarian supplies.[16] Even then the USSR realizing that it had lost the covet battle over the crisis to the US, failed to settle her own share of the UN expenses incurred in the Congo thereby creating a serious financial crisis for the organisation.[17]

Having had a look at the international environment in the Cold War years, let us now turn our attention to what the situation is after that.

It is too early to make a critical analysis of the post- Cold War era but one thing is, however, certain up to this point in time. That the era of bipolarity has given way to unipolarity in which all nations would have to act according to the dictates of Big America as the major power. In effect therefore, with the demise of the Cold War, and bipolarity and the birth of unipolar global political system in 1989, the US (in fact) has been transmogrified[18] (and) with the Soviet Union wobbling and sinking deeper and deeper into economic crisis, the US appears certainly to be the single power able to impose its wishes on the rest of the interest of the international community.[19]

We are in total agreement with Akinloye, who upholds that if it was difficult in the Cold War era to co-ordinate the activities of the UN and regional organizations like the OAS and Warsaw Pact, with its demise, the UN would now play a more dominant role and re-establish pre-eminence over such regional organizations.[20]

No one can dispute the fact that the Cold War undermined the capacity of the UN, particularly the Security Council, to play the managerial role earmarked for it under the Charter in 1945 but rather compelled the surfacing of the doctrine of "preventive diplomacy the brain child of

Dag Hammarskjold[21] which underpins the innovative experiment in peace keeping. Under the 1989 international situation, featuring the collapse of ideological antagonism of totalitarian systems, there has been a global democratic upsurge and East-West rapproachment.[22]

The whole world can now present a united voice against an aggressor or breaker of the peace and security of other nations just as it did against Iraq when she invaded and annexed Kuwait. The UN could not have done much under such circumstances in the heat of the Cold War. During the post Cold-War era, America's supremacy was first displayed during the Gulf War and quite recently in Somalia where she took the lead to intervene in the Civil War.

Democracies have emerged where there used to be totalitatianism. Following in the wake of the collapse of communism is the disintergration of nations. The father and cradle of communism, the USSR, now christened Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Yoguslavia, Czechoslovakia and coming nearer home Ethiopia. While some countries tore apart, Berlin and Bonn, however, re-united to form a single Germany.

Economically, Russia is close to joining the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations which had promised to bail her out of her economic predicament and to support her efforts at open market system.

With these developments, two of the erts while AXIS powers, Germany and Japan, which had never sent troops beyond their shores are to partake in UN Peace Keeping Operations for the first time.

In spite of this great hope for the future a note of caution is sounded by Martin Jacques who feels that a bipolar system involves a symbiotic relationship which in turn shapes and defines the antagonists. As a consequence

> the collapse of one does not leave the other rather extant and undisturbed. On the contrary, the victor also suffers a crisis of identity and purpose. That has been all the greater because the Cold War made the world easy, the enemy was clear, objectives effectively defined, the functions of alliances obvious. The Cold War, moreover, froze the world in a particular way. Nationalistic conflicts were subordinated to the great ideological and the US searching for a new role has been caught between a desire to leave well alone and a sense of global responsibility. Bosnia defines the post Cold War aWorld in 1993, the collapse of old discipline, the potential for evil, the uncertainty, the lack of clear objectives, the indeterminate roles, the weakness of bodies such as the UN, the vulnerability of alliances built for a previous era... fragmentation has become the new watchword.[23]

4.3 COMPARISON OF THE ISSUES RAISED ON THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICTS IN CONGO AND YOGUSLAVIA

Even though both the Congo and Yoguslavia have different historical experiences and situated in different geographical regions of the world (the former in the South and the latter in the North), economically both are underdeveloped. Despite the fact that there are variations in the issues raised on the conflicts in both countries, there are several areas of similarities. The important and volatile issues raised in both crises fall under three broad headings: political, economic and social.

POLITICAL

As was emphasized in Chapter two above, Belgium in desperation and haste granted independence to the Congo without any preparation for the herculean task of self-government ahead. The Belgians had favoured and fostered tribal associations; little wonder therefore, that most of the parties which emerged in the struggle to replace their colonial masters were ethnic-based.[24] Such development was detrimental to the intergration of the young state. The 1960 general elections were without doubt fashioned along tribal lines with the exception of Lumumba's MNC which was broad based-cutting across the length and breadth of the Congo and consequently winning seats in both the National and provincial assemblies.

The table below shows the pattern of voting during the 1960 elections.

Table 4.1 Returns of The May, 1960 Elections in the Congo (Seats Won).

Party	NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES		PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES							
	Chamber of Deputies	Senate	Leopold-ville	Equateur	Orientale	Kivu	Katanga	Kasai		
MNC/Lubua	41	19	2	10	58	17	1	25		
MNC/KBaluba	8	3	-	-	-	-	1	21		
PSA	13	4	35	-	-	-	-	-		
CEREA	10	6	-	-	-	30	-	-		
Cartel/Katangalain	7	3	-	-	-	-		-		
ABAKO	12	4	33	-	-	-	23	-		
PUNO	7	7	-	11	-	-	-	-		
UNIMO	1	2		8	-	-	-	-		
PNP	15	3	-	5	6	5	-	4		
CONAKAT	8	6		-	-	-	25	-		
Other	15	27	20	26	6	18	10	20		
TOTAL	137	84	90	60	70	70	60	70		

SOURCE: Adopted from C. Young: Politics in the Congo p.302. The PNP was a coalition of tribal groups.

Lumumba's MNC/L Lubua won 29.9% of the 137 seat Chamber of Deputies and 22.6% of the 84-seat Senate. In the Provincial Assemblies, it won 2.6% in Leopoldville 16.7% in Equateur, 82.9% in Orientale 24.3% in Kivu, 1.7% in Katanga and 41.7% in Kasai.

Since the independence elections failed to produce a party with absolute majority, Lumumba and Kasavubu had to form a coalition government', the former became the Prime Minister and head of government while the latter became the President and ceremonial head of State. These two political leaders, however, viewed each other with suspicion for Lumumba had flirtations with the East particularly the USSR while Kasavubu tilted towards the West. This ideological difference came to a head when the head of State unconstitutionally and acting ultra vires 'dismissed' the Prime Minister, Lumumba, who in turn responded by firing the Head of State and asking Congolese workers and the army to rise to the occasion. In this confusion, the army mutinied, Tshombe joined the political struggle by announcing the secession of Katanga from the Congo and other provinces like Kasai followed suit.

Unlike the Congo, Yoguslavia was not colonized by any power even though at the earliest time some parts were conquered by the Ottoman Empire and in the Second World War, she was defeated and occupied by the Axis powers and their satellites. Through the Charismatic and able leadership of Tito, Yoguslavia was able to wrestle her independence after which he stamped out all oppostion and set up a new brand of socialism which deviated from the path of Soviet-led orthodox socialism.

Thus while the Congo was plagued with political parties founded along tribal lines,, Yoguslavia experiencd a one party system, the Communist Party, which unsuccessfully attempted to bring all the ethnic groups: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Albanians and other minorities under one umbrella.

The main political issue at stake in the Congo crisis was first of all the struggle for leadership between Lumumba and Kasavubu which was fuelled by the former colonial master, Belgium, when she supplied Tshombe with military support and backed him up in his secession bid from the Congo. The Congolese army which had mutinied left the country in chaos and anarchy, there was no recognizable government to restore peace and order.

The central core of Yoguslavia's crisis was similar to that of the Congo. In Yoguslavia, it was the iron hand of Tito which held the fragile entities together. After his death and when the eight-man presidency comprising representatives from the six reputlies and the two autonomous provinces failed to endorse Croation Jurist Stipe Mesic's tenure, thereby thwarting the chance of a Croat to ascend to the throne, it became evident that the federation could no longer hold together. It also became clear to the Croats that the Serbs were unprepared to relinquish their hegemony and poltical power to any other ethnic group, leaving no alternative to them than to secede.

Croatia and Slovenia, the two provinces which were back bone of the economy of Yoguslavia - just as Katanga was to the Congo - broke away from the federation. Bosnia-Hercegovina followed suit and matters came to a head. Belgrade rejected it and unleashed the federal army on Bosnia to abort the move. The age-long animosity regenerated leading to an endless civil war.

Clinging tenaciously still to the policy of ethnic cleansing' the Serbs in Bosnia clamoured for an independent state of theirs. As the conflict heightened and prolonged, the Muslims who had been on the receiving end of the atrocities for long, decided to pierce an outlet through Croatian - held areas and consequently turned their swords against their traditional allies, the Croats. This has complicated the crisis in Yoguslavia which is now between Serbs and Croats, Muslim and Croats and Serbs and Muslims... the situation is peppered with novel complexities.[26]

The inability to resolve group conflict is common to both Congo and Yoguslavia. In the Congo, it was the political tussle between Lumumba and Kasavubu aggravated by Katanga's desire to secede while in Yoguslavia it was the hard line stand of Javic, a Serb, which brought about the political impasse, the last straw which broke the camel's back.

Another issue raised and which was peculiar to Yoguslavia was the type of government to adopt. Rich and developed Croatia and Slovenia favoured a loose confederal alliance to enable them have greater control over their resources while Serbia, the dominant republic, wanted a

federation with a strong centre;[27] since this favoured her. She had the political power to determine how the resources of the richer republics could be dissipated. It was the inability to resolve this issue coupled with the unwillingness of Serbia to abrogate political power and hegemony to a Croat that led to the disinte gration of Yoguslavia.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

In the Congo, secessionist Katanga, centre of mining activity was by and large the richest of all the provinces. House cited that out of the value of exports which amounted to $412m in 1958, 54% was from mining operations most especially copper which represented about 25% and Katanga province produced roughly 40% of the public revenue for the whole Congo.[28] Owing to its wealth, during the secession the Katanga government was strengthened by economic co-operation from the corporations operating in the province most notably Union Miniere.[29] The economic advantageous position of Katanga might have triggered off the ambition of Tshombe to secede; for the U Thant Plan of August, 1962 called for the equal sharing of tax revenues and mining royalties between the central authorities and the government[30]

In the Yoguslavia too, the bone of contention between more populous Serbia and far richer and more developed Croatia and Slovenia was economic.

These two republics resented how Serbia controlled their resources. As was highlighted in Chapter three above, Croats working abroad brought in large sums of foreign currency over which they had little or no control. Initially, they were permitted to keep only 10% of the foreign revenue generated but this was later increased to 20%. The Croats and Slovenes therefore frowned at the way the resources of theirs were used as it were to 'develop' other poorer republics of the federation. This validated their political claim for the system of government which would give them greater control over their own resources.

Even though the disparities in the distribution of wealth among the component units of both Congo and Yoguslavia was one of the remote causes of secession, in the former it was kindled and accentuated by foreign interest.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Both Congo and Yoguslavia are heterogeneous but the former is more diversified for she has always been naturally sub-divided by many different tribal groups who speak different languages and follow different customs.[31] House pointed out that ethnic and regional identity were strong factors in political alignment as was the popular appeal of such leaders as Messrs Kasavubu Lumumba Kalonji and Tshombe.[32] There are well over 200 tribes with over 700 different spoken dialects in the Congo among which the

major ones are Baluba, Bakuva, Mongo, Bakano, Ngombe, Babua which are culturally and linquistically quite different from one another and have maintained historic rivalries.[33] Not only are the tribal groupings traditional in outlook but they tend to be isolated both from one another and the central government. There being little communication among conflicting tribes, tribal warfare can be quite uncompromising and exaggerated. Immediately after independence, Congo went through a series of ethnic confrontation leading to much bloodshed.[34] Consequently there is little cultural unity among the people of the Congo to such an extent that tribal units express loyalties to tribal or familial groups... thus many people in the Congo feel closer to tribal brothers in Angola than do to their fellow country men.[35]

Like the Congo but to a far greater extent, the nationalist question in Yoguslavia became a potent factor because of the diversified nature of the population. Two social forces: the Turks and Austro-Hungarians had dominated Yoguslavia in earliest times. The former subjugated the Eastern parts including Serbia while the latter ruled the Western parts including Croatia.

The three major groups which made up the Slav were the Slovenes with their own language and the Serbs and Croats with approximately the same language.[36] There were other minorities including the Hungarians, Germans, Albanians Rumanians and Turks.

The dominant religions were Islam and Christianity. Christians on the other hand, fell into two groups: Orthodox and Roman Catholic. It happened that the Serbs by family tradition were Orthodox and the Croats Roman Catholics and this may be the only difference between them.[37] It is worthy of note that the Serbs made up of 36% of the population of Yoguslavia, one-third, live outside Serbia, 600,000 of them live in Croatia and close to 1.5million live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Within Serbia itself, there are 150 000 Croats and 400 000 Hungarian minorities living in the autonoumous region of Vojvodina and about 90% of the Kosovo autonomous region are ethnic Albanians.[38]

The nationalism problem was consequently aggravated by the desire of the Serbs, too scattered and fragmented geographically to create a 'Greater Serbia' which is impossible without large numbers of non-Serbs.[39] Hence even though there were conflicts between Albanians and Serbs, Hungarians and Serbs, that of Croats and Serbs is the most intense.[40] A stage was reached when mutual hatred and deep-seated anti-Serbian feelings became so great that virtually everyone including youths want their republics out of Yoguslavia.[41]

4.4 THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE CONGO AND YOGUSLAVIA

The UN as the custodian of international peace and security was actively involved in seeing to the realization of its objectives in the Congo.

In the on going crisis in the former Yoguslavia, too, the global organization is deeply and actively participating in finding solutions to what we may call, borrowing from the words of David Livingstone 'this open sore of'(Europe), ONUC which was the child of UN Security Council's Resolutions S/4387 of 14th July, 1960 and S/4405 of 22nd July, 1960,[42] and which as House pointed out could be divided into two: the military operations and the civilian operations otherwise referred to as the humanitatian operations.[43]

A. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the immediate post independent years of the Congo, House aptly pointed out that

> the formal government was seriously weakened: Parliament never became a legitimate institution, the executive branch crumbled when Belgium advisers withdrew, and the army was neither organised nor reliable. Non-formal political institutions did not encourage cohesion on the national level. Political parties no longer exercised power; they did not represent any regional or popular strength and they had no institutional means of exerting their influence when parliament was dissolved by President Kasavubu in September, 1960. More basically, after independence the intended political system and legal structure defined by the country's Loi fundamentale ceased to exist. Instead, individual leaders and political groups, army factions, and foreign personnel engaged in efforts to unify and control the interest groups which had influence within the government.[44]

Such was the confused and gloomy environment within which the military was to function. The military operations assumed many different dimensions which have been highlighted below.

I. PERFORMANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS

One of the primary objectives of the ONUC was the performance of internal security functions, particularly the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Some members of the organization made manpower available towards the achievement of this objective as follows:[45]

Table 4.2

Contributions to the UN Military Operations

Country	Man-Monsho of Service (August 1960 to June 1964)
India	142 704
Ethiopia	119 226
Nigeria	63 617
Tunisia	48 368
Ghana	39 203
Sweden	37 107
Malaya	37 044
Ireland	35 654
Indonesia	28 460

Pakistan	27 904
Morocco	23 668
Canada	13 322
Congo/Leo	12 953
Liberia	9 558
Norway	7 023
Denmark	4 542
Guinea	4 475
Italy	4 020
Sudan	3 652
UAR	3 059
Mali	2 292
SierraLeone	1 610
Brazil	1 563
Austria	1 334
Argentina	747
Netherlands	435
Philippines	278
Ceylon	205
Iran	198
Greece	188
Yoguslavia	91
Burma	54
New Zealand	10
Ecuador	8

In trying to maintain internal peace and security in a country where the men in the helm of affairs had reciprocically fired each other,[46] the Secretary General or his representative in Leopoldville had no option but obligation to act without adequate legal prescription or precedent.[47] Consequently, the doctrine of non-intervention was unrealistically juxtaposed with the mandate provision to render military assistance (to maintain internal peace and security) until the Congo security apparatus was able in the opinion of the government to meet fully their tasks.[48] The Secretary General's Representative in the Congo, Andrew W. Cordier, closed all the principal airports to non-UN aircrafts on September 5th, 1960 and on the following day shut the Leopoldville radio station for six days.[49] These actions, even though helped tremendously, in the maintenance of law and order,[50] worked seriously against Lumumba, for it prevented the Russians from moving troops to support him. If they had succeeded, the tables might have been turned against Kasavubu. Lumumba again was disadvantaged because the closure of the radio station cut off his calls to workers and the army to rally in his favour.[51] One of the belligerents had been disadvantaged against the principle of impartiality and neutrality.

Indeed, Edmund Gullian rightly pointed out that the presence of UN troops kept political rivals in the Congo in limbo thereby protecting the group in power and preventing a number of political figures from being killed.[52]

II. APPREHENSION OF FOREIGN MILITARY AND PARA MILITARY PERSONNEL

The Secretary General was mandated to use a requisite measure of force to apprehend foreign military and para-military personnel, non-UN political advisers and mercenaries.[53] It was also to avail itself of all necessary measures to prevent the return of these individuals or the shipment of arms into the Congo in support of secession[54] In this regard, the ONUC achieved a considerable degree of success for in its operation code-named 'Rumpuch; it apprehended 338 mercenaries.[55] It launched another operation, 'Morthor' towards the same objective.[56]

This mandate put the ONUC solidly behind Leopoldville against Katanga since the mercenaries arrested were in the service of Tshombe. The Acting Secretary General was reported to have called for a sympathetic attitude on the part of ONUC, towards the efforts of the government to suppress all armed activities against the central government and secessionist activities.[57]

III. PREVENTION OF DISINTEGRATION OF THE CONGO

Dag Hammarskjold identified the secession move by Katanga leaders as 'the most serious threat' to the territorial intergrity (and independence) of the Congo,[58] consequently, like the apprehension of foreign military, paramilitary personnel and mercenaries the means for that earlier mandate were not only changed but also strenghtened to permit the use of force[59] to crush the secession; thus:

> putting the ONUC in a position of greater support for the central government by placing the UN in opposition to the secessionist activities in Katanga, rejecting the ~~claims~~ that Katanga was soverign'[60]

With this expanded role, even though the ONUC succeeded in aborting the secession in Katanga, the UN, some scholars agree, by this, interferred with the domestic affairs of the Congo.[61]

B. THE CIVILIAN OPERATIONS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The Belgian colonial policy nurtured the Congo and made Congolese heavily dependent upon the array of social services provided by the colonial master, with a third of all male population in the wage earning sector of the economy.[62] Consequently, she was liable to the mass exodus of Belgians who used to render these services.

It became imperative, therefore, for the UN to do more than despatching bluehelmeted troops to maintain peace and security.

Like the para military operations discussed earlier, the civilian one too played an indispensable, lasting and important role in the Congo.[63] Its impact was felt through the length and breadth of the country. The various sectors which benefitted tremendously from the civilian and Technical Operations are discussed below.

I. ECONOMIC SECTOR

Great services were rendered to the Ministry of Finance in preparing and controlling the excution of the budget of public expenditure, drafting tax legislation and executing tax laws by assessing, collecting and auditing taxes.[63] UN personnel also advised on how to expend the limited income government derived judisciously due to seccessionist activities.[64] Finally, it tried to put the Congo, as House pointed out, on the first step to economic recovery.

MONETARY AFFAIRS

With the absence of a Central Bank in the Congo from October 1960 to June 1964, the ONUC and the Congolese Government set up the Monetary Council to serve as the Interim Central Bank.[65]

UN personnel made their impact felt in customs, taxation, office of the Controller of Public Finance, Budget, Accounting, Financial and Inspection Corps and the Treasury. They were heavily concentrated in the 'sensitive' areas to reinforce the effort to increase revenue receipts as shown on the chart below.[66]

Table 4.3 DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERTS TO THE MONETARY SECTOR

DIVISIONS	NUMBER OF EXPERTS
Customs	17
Taxation	9
Office of the Controller of Public Finance	5
Budget	4
Accounting	3
Financial and Inspection Corps	3
Treasury	1

II. TRANSPORT SECTOR

The Civilian Operations provided air traffic services to supply health, educational and constructional needs to the populace.[67] Besides this, it also made air transport system of chartering the best services available.[68] Public works repaired included railways and roads.

The latter involved 44 UN experts with labour provided by Congolese. By so doing, about 22 000 km of the 160 800 km were maintained at the cost of $75 per km.[69]

Among the facilities which received attention were electric power, public buildings, infrastructure for navigable waterways, runways and flood control.[70]

III. ADMINISTRATIVE SECTOR

The UN filled the vacuum created by the mass exodus of Belgian civil servants which reached alarming proportions. e.g. of 100 Belgian technicians in Civil aviation including aeronautical telecommunications only a handful were left after independence. Of 542 agricultural engineers, all of them left in July and afew returned afterwards. Of 175 Belgians holding responsible positions in the postal services, all but one withdrew. About 200 of the 760 medical doctors remained.[71]

Faced with the herculean task of organizing and staffing the administration of every government service. Robert A. Gardiner, representing the UN and the Consultative Group, worked both on the development of an administrative structure and training,[72] by examining existing ministries for organizational changes and with the Congolese government creating new ones and outlining their functions.[73]

IV. THE JUDICIARY AND LEGAL SYSTEM

ONUC assisted tremendously in recruiting foreign lawyers and training indigenous judges. Coupled with this, was the revision of the Congolese legal system.[74] The importance of the ONUC in the judicial sector cannot be over emphasized for with 189 of 210 magistrates gone from the Congo, it helped to hold together the main urban parts of the judicial system which had

> collapsed in several large areas of the country and operated with gross in efficiency in the rest.[75]

Finally, the UN legal experts participated fully in drafting a new constitution for the Congo.[76]

V. EDUCATIONAL SECTOR

Just like the other sectors, the UN brought teachers from outside into the country. They taught in schools at primary and secondary levels and advanced institutes. Other educational experts advised the central and provincial ministries of education (thereby) assisting in effort to reform education in the Congo and providing formation of qualified Congolese to carry on education in the country's educational system.[77] UN's immense contribution to the Congo could be seen in how UNESCO used $2m in budget support from ONUC to hire 560 teachers for 1962-63.

Between 1964 and December, 1965 the number it recruited rose from 780 to 783.[78]

VI. OTHER SECTORS

ONUC offered assistance in mining by training Congolese at all technical levels.[79] Besides this, it also rendered social welfare services through a UN Relief Co-ordinator who channelled emergency supplies where they were needed.[80] Baudernville, Bukane, Albertville and Stanleyville received emergency rations and medicine. Sixty-seven metric tons of supplies were transported by the end of 1965, to Kwilu and Kiwe Pronvinces.[81]

Medical services were rendered in the larger cities and towns while preventive medical care was commenced to avoid the spread of endemic diseases.[82] House cited that WHO supplied between one hundred and two hundred medical doctors each year for the Congo.[83]

VII. TRAINING PROGRAMMES

Knowing very well that its activities in the Congo would not be ad infinitum, ONUC drew up training programmes for indigenous Congolese to prepare personnel to replace its experts.[84] These include the following:

A. THE SOCIAL WELFARE TRAINING INSTITUTE

The Social Welfare Training Institute was established from the former Ecole Nationale des Cadres and provided a six-month course and four months in job training for monitors in rural development.[85] It started with thirty-trainees in 1963-64 academic year to 80 in 1966.[86]

B. THE MEDICAL TRAINING PROGRAMME

The UN and WHO established the Medical Training Programme at Lovanium which provided a course of studies to complete the medical training of "medical assistants" to become full medical doctors.[87] Besides this training at home, the UN and WHO sponsored some of the students to study abroad.

Table 4.4 The Result of Training Programme Through 1965

YEAR	Graduates from Swiss and French Universities	Graduates from Lovanium	Total Per Year	Cumulative Total
1961	-	3	3	3
1962	-	6	6	9
1963	-	5	5	14
1964	59	4	63	77
1965	52	5	57	134
1968	10	14	24	192

SOURCE: ON ONUC Records in Kinshasa.

C. OTHER TRAINING PROGRAMMES

Among the training programmes were the following.[88]

(i) The National Civil Aviation Institute

(ii) Vocational Training Institute

(iii) Meteorological Training Centre

(iv) National Institute of Mining and Public Works

(v) National Pedagogical Institute

(vi) National Mining Institute.

The Chart below shows the countries and the respective number of experts they supplied.

Table 4.5

Country	Number of Experts
France	112
Haiti	60
Switzerland	54
Spain	36
Italy	35
Greece	25
United Kingdom	22
United Arab Republic	22
Tunisia	22
Belgium	15

SOURCE: UN Resident Representative's Report of May 1, 1963 pages 3-4.

THE ROLE OF THE UN IN YOGUSLAVIA

The UN is still struggling in its efforts to find peace and security a home in ertswhile Yoguslavia, particularly in her former republic of Bosnia-Hercegorina. This nothwithstanding the role it has played so far is so vital that it cannot be relegated to the background.

As usual, the world body for international peace and security has set up a peace-keeping force acronymed 'UNPROFOR' in former Yoguslavia. The role of UNPROFOR like ONUC in the Congo can be classified broadly into two: military and civilian.

A. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

I. SUPERVISION OF CEASEFIRES

UNPROFOR found itself in Yoguslavia not at the instance of Belgrade. One school of Thought has it that the request for UNPROFOR emanated from the EC while another maintains that the Security Council responded positively to a request by Bosnia for a peace keeping force.[89]

The carnage in Yoguslavia started in 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia seceded from the Federation. The Serbs had all along been advocating for a united nation with great powers concentrated at the centre in Belgrade, and so the Yoguslav National Army mounted a blockade against Croatia. Long standing sleeping animosities were awakened and hostilities between the Serbs and Croats were set off.[90]

Matters were aggravated when on February 29th, 1992 Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina also voted to break away from the Federation. Be that as it may, the Serbs in Bosnia resisted and demanded for an autonomous state. Fierce fighting, still raging, broke our initially between the Muslims and Croats on one side and the Serbs on the other. The ensuring civil war has been exceptionally savage and bitter.[91]

One school of Thought as mentioned earlier, traces the request for UN assistance to the EC. At the on set of the crisis between the Croats and the Serbs the EC appointed Lord Owen to mediate. Having failed in this direction, the leaders of the EC sought for assistance from the UN by requesting for a peace keeping force to the troubled spots.

Another School of Thought puts the request for UN intervention on the shoulders of the Bosnian leadership. Cyrus Vance, having been appointed as the UN special envoy by the former Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller ordered his Assistant Herbert Okun to meet the leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina's nascent government Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic. Both leaders told Okun that they were going for international recognition (of Bosnia) and wanted the UN to send 10 000 peace keepers to Bosnia straight away.[92]

The UN was put in a dilemma. It has a built-in bias towards sovereign states (and consequently) wanted to keep Yoguslavia together.[93] And so how could it dispatch peace keepers to Bosnia? Were they to support the secession or crush it?

The then Under Secretary General for peace Keeping, Marrack Gulding, having assessed the situation for the prospects of peace keepers recommended that the UN should stay out of Bosnia.[94] Neverthless, when the carnage started, the UN was forced into a task which was against the instincts of its most experienced officials by deploying troops but not in sufficient numbers to fulfil the mandate handed down by the Security Council. It was supposed to conduct diplomatic negotiations to coerce the belligerents into a settlement.[95]

Cyrus Vance managed to broker a ceasefire between Serbia and Croatia and UNPROFOR was to see its adherence and to provide an "interim arrangement" until a political solution was reached.[96] The UN-monitored ceasefires in the former Yoguslavia have been flouted many times despite the presence of 14 000 UNPROFOR.[97]

Besides, UN PROFOR monitored the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Mounts Igman and Bjelasnica.[98] A point worthy of note is that

> the UN forces deployed in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia became not peace-keepers or peacemakers or even trip wires but in a perverse way accomplices to Serbian aggression... The blue-helmeted forces were a terrible mistake... They were sent there as an alternative to taking military action but once there they became hostages whose presence made military action impossible.[99]

II. PROTECTION

Again the UN provided the much-needed protection to those living around the areas UNPROFOR operated, for instance 52 Spanish UN Soldiers and 12 armoured vehicles which accompanied the UN convoy were forced to remain there as a shield against renewed Croatian shellings.[100]

Also nearly 700 refugees mostly Muslims, some Croats and Serbs were held up in the camp of a Swedish UNPROFOR unit at the north-end of Vares, 30km north of Sarajevo.[101] On another occasion, over 100 Muslims fleeing from Vares because of mass killings in Stupni Do sought for protection in a nearby UN base. In addition Swedish peace keepers kept an eye on two school buildings in the town where Croats had detained 200 Muslims.[102]

It should be pointed out that the mere presence of UN armoured vehicles gave some relief to people in the vicinity and consequently even after the delivery of relief materials by UN convoys, the peace keepers were prevented from leaving.

Finally to ensure the safety of life and property, Spanish UN troops patrolled Mostar, one of the most threatened of the country's cities.

III. NEGOTIATING FOR THE RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF REFUGEES

Included in the mandate given to UNPROFOR was the arrangement for the release of refugees, Colonel Bernt Berlin's men tried to negotiate the release of up to 600 Croat refuges rumoured to be trapped in the village of Dastransko.[103]

In line with the 'ethnic cleansing' policy of the Serbians, UNPROFOR had been assisting in evacuating Muslims from Croat-controlled areas to Muslim-controlled areas, Croats from Muslim-held areas to Croat-held areas and Serbs from either Croat or Muslim strongholds to Serb-areas, for instance Jan Thorgersen, a logistics officer of the UNHCR said 642 people were to be evacuated from Sarajevo in stages including Serbian women, children and elderly men to Belgrade,[104] and some to the Croatian Adriatic port of Split[105] and the Swedish peace keepers transported 99 Muslims South across Croat lines to Muslim-held Dabravine.[106]

In addition to evacuation the healthy, the UN has set up an Evacuation Mission to over-see the medical airlift of the sick and wounded from Bosnia. On one occasion, the UN had 15 patients for France, Kuwait and Italy and 20 for the US.[107]

IV. SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES OF THE MASSACRED

An unprecedented assignment undertaken by UNPROFOR was searching for the graves of the massacred in Bosnia and by so doing mass graves were discovered by the UN team.[108]

V. REPAIRWORK

UNPROFOR undertook the repair of electricity and waterlines and got rid of garbage.[109] Also troops from Royal Engineers working under the auspices of the UN put a compact bridge over two spans of the Bijela Bridge destroyed last year (1992).[110]

VI. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

Hardly had the former republics of Yoguslavia taken to arms when the UN backed by the West placed arms embargo on the whole region. This, however, put the Serbs in a more advantageous position than the Muslims and the Croats because they held most of the heavy weapons left behind by the Yoguslav army and had access to plenty more from Serbia. The motive behind this embargo was to reduce the death toll of the crisis even though this had been defeated since the Serbs had been favoured.

B. THE CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

Besides the military operations, as in all cases, the troops are supported by a host of civilians who perform diversified functions, which are highlighted below.

I. HUMANITARIAN AID

The UNHCR is very active in troubled Bosnia. It had been providing humanitarian aid for the winter camps and this included tents and blankets.[111]

It had also been providing food for starving people; two aid convoys, for instance, carried 250 tonnes of food and medicines for Maglaj and Tesarjvin in northern Bosnia.[112]

The relief workers, were, however not finding things easy in Bosnia. At times relief convoys would have to wait behind road blocks for days. No one can evaluate the contributions of the UN so far better than the Secretary General, Boutros Ghali; himself who pointed out that they had been able to provide food and shelter to more than 2 million refugees, and thousands and thousands of tons of food in Sarajevo and Mostar.[113]

Owing to the difficulty encountered in making relief materials reach those really in need, the UN co-ordinated the airlift of emergency supplies. In the first year of the crisis, it supplied 45 500 tons and January, 1993 4225 tons of aid reached Sarajevo by road and 4393 tons by air but in July when Muslim - Croat battles were raging everyday, only 414 tons reached Sarajevo by land compared with 4471 tons by air.[114] Moglaj area also benefitted from the air dropping of relief materials.[115]

II. MEDIATION

The former UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar appointed Cyrus Vance to the mediate in the Yoguslav crisis and find a lasting solution to the problem. He worked hand in hand with his EC counterpart, Lord Owen. They initiated and spearheaded several peace talks in London, Geneva and Brussels,[116] but made no head way. The Vance-Owen plan which was to divide Bosnia into ten autonomous regions failed to work-it was rejected.

Later, Holtensberg replaced Cyrus Vance as the UN Mediator. He too, in conjunction with Lord Owen, met with the leaders of the three warring factions in Bosnia. They modified the Vance-Owen plany by proposing to divide Bosnia into three mini-states along ethnic lines with Sarajevo left under UN governance for some years. This also did not meet the expectations of the Muslim leaders who felt cheated landwise.

C. THE ROLE PLAYED BY OTHER COUNTRIES

The crisis in the Balkans has attracted international attention and pre-occupied the minds of the major powers. Consequently all avenues are being exploited to complement the efforts of the UN in finding a solution to it.

I. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Clinton in his maiden speech to the UN reaffirmed his determination to let the US remain a fulcrum for change, a pivot point for peace and participation in the implementation of the Bosnia peace accord.[117]

Consequently, the US was ready to commit as many as 30 000 troops for peace keeping. US air craft had been flying food, medicine and blanket to Belgrade... and Ploce, a Croatian port.[118]

In addition, the US offered medical asylum for 100 critical cases plus $86m to help Croatia handle her refugees.[119]

II. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

A. MEDIATION

The crisis in Bosnia is in the heart of Europe and the EC had given it the attention it deserved. As soon as the civil war flared up, the EC appointed a special envoy in the person of Lord Owen who with his UN counterpart Cyrus Vance, as pointed out earlier, evolved the defunct Vance-Owen plan.

Lord Owen continued working with Stoltenberg who had replaced Vance as the UN special Envoy to the crisis. Their latest plan which was to divide Bosnia into three mini-states, along ethnic lines with Sarajevo under UN supervision had fallen through.

B. HUMANITARIAN AID

The EC was responsible for more than 68% (almost $1bn) worth of all humanitarian aid sent to former Yoguslavia.[120]

Besides, most of the agencies concerned about the Bosnian refugees are based in Europe. These agencies provide medicine, food, clothes, tents and other essentials to the refugees.

International agencies which have contributed humanitarian aid to the former Yoguslavia include the folowing:[122]

1. The International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC)
2. Catholic Fund for Oversees Development (CAFOD)
3. Oxfam
4. Care International
5. Scottish European Aid
6. Save the Children
7. Feed The Children
8. The Refugee Council
9. The UN Association's Trust Bosnia
10. Regal Engineering for Disaster Relief
11. Christian Aid

C. BROKERING CEASEFIRES

By October, 1991 13 aborted ceasefires had been arranged under the auspices of the EC.[123] In spite of this the EC is neither discouraged nor discontented. The crisis in the former Yoguslav is always on the agenda of the meetings of EC leaders e.g. Brussels in September, 1993.

There the French President Francois Mitterand expressed fear that if care was not taken, the conflict might engulf the whole of Europe.[124] Quite recently when the British Prime Minister, John Major, met with the German Chancellor Helmet Khol, it was prominent among the issues to be discussed.[125]

D. PARTICIPATING IN PEACE KEEPING

Member nations of the EC were actively involved in UNPROFOR which was under the Command of a French General. And it is worthy of note that it was the first time Germany was participating in peace Keeping operations under the umbrella of the UN.

III. NATO

NATO has not yet been able to translate its resolutions into action. Its defence ministers had agreed to deploy 5 000 strong peace keeping force in Bosnia for the UN quite alright,[126] but its resolution to use force against Serb positions is yet to take off. The green light for this operation would have to be given by the UN Security Council. The main stumbling block is that some member nations of NATO have troops on the ground and such air strikes may put them in jeopardy.

IV. RUSSIA

This time around, Russia too is in the picture of countries trying to find pacific solution to the crisis in former Yoguslavia. Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, for instance, flew straight... to Geneva to help with Bosnian negotiations.[126]

4.5 COMPARING THE ROLE OF THE UN IN PEACE KEEPING IN THE CONGO AND THE FORMER YOGUSLAVIA

Even though the gap between the two eases spans over three decades, there are lots of similarities and differences in the roles played by the UN in the Congo and the former Yoguslavia. Just as we dealt with the military and civilian operations separately, we are going to approach the comparison in the same manner.

4.5.1 THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

The degree and level of involvement of United-Nations peace keeping in any crisis depends on the mandate given by the Security Council. In the Congo as well as the former Yoguslavia, the UN responded positively to a request for peace keepers on the out break of civil war. Both ONUC and UNPROFOR therefore found themselves in similar crises:civil war. It should also be pointed out that in both cases, the UN could hardly adhere to the theory of neutrality and non-iterference in the internal affairs of the host nation.

In the Congo, the actions of the UN turned the table against Lumumba. This occured when the UN Representative there closed Leopoldville airport after the reciprocal firing of Lumumba and Kasavubu thereby cutting all forms of military aid the former might have received from the USSR. Similarly in the former Yoguslavia, Sarajevo airport was supposed to be under UNPROFOR supervision and a no-fly zone declared over Bosnia[127] but unlike in the Congo, this has been flouted several times[128] by especially, the Serbs to their advantage.

Differences in the mandates given ONUC and UNPROFOR would greatly account for the many variations in the roles played by each mission. ONUC performed more militaristic functions than UNPROFOR. ONUC operated in an environment where there was chaos and anarchy consequently it was given a stronger mandate - to maintain internal peace and security until the Congolese security apparatus could perform its normal functions. Based on this therefore, as noted above, the Secretary General's representative authorized the closure of the radio station and the Leopoldville airport. UNPROFOR on the other hand has not yet been given a clearly defined mandate. It is a protection force but in name, for in some instances it could not even protect itself as some of its staff left Sarajevo headquarters for the safety of Zagreb.[129]

Under such circumstances one wonders how UNPROFOR can guarantee the safety of the people it was to protect. ONUC enforced peace and made sure that areas liberated or declared 'safe' were free from secessionist attacks while UNPROFOR cannot guarantee that people living in the so called "Liberated areas" are really safe. BBC reported several battles between Muslims and Croats in spite of the presence of UNPROFOR.[130] One Western diplomat pointed out that if the Croats wanted to resort to war, the UN peace keepers (UNPROFOR) could not probably prevent it.[131] The presence of UNPROFOR is therefore not felt at all by the belligerents for after more than 18months, the peace keepers sit uneasily between furious Croats and Serbs determined to keep control of territory acquired by force.[132] Worse of all, its soldiers are spat upon in the streets of Zagreb; in besieged Sarajevo, they attract derision from Bosnia leadership. To the Serbs they present a hostile international community.[133] It is the result of a weak mandate that is why UNPROFOR has not been able to liberate Sarajevo up till now. The kind of protection UNPROFOR is providing is just guarding refuge camps, school buildings and small enclaves.

In the Congo, ONUC apprehended foreign military and para-military personnel, non- UN political advisers and mercenaries. Besides it was to ensure that all those arrested never returned to the Congo.

Most of those involved were got in Operations 'Rumpuch' and 'Morthor'. In contrast, although the UN has introduced a new dimension in peace keeping by setting up a tribunal to try war criminals in the former Yoguslavia, UNPROFOR has not been given the mandate to arrest those involved. Paradoxically, therefore while ONUC had the mandate to arrest, those apprehended went scot-free and UNPROFOR which has a tribunal to try war criminals has no mandate to arrest.

One distinctive characteristic of the UN role in the former Yoguslavia, particularly Bosnia, is the imposition of sanctions. In the Congo, crisis, the UN did not come out openly to impose sanctions on the whole country or on the secessionists. What it did was the extension of the mandate to arrest criminals to include prevention of the shipment of arms into the Congo to aid the secessionists. The UN, therefore made its stand clear that it was on the side of the government. On the other hand, the action it has taken in Bosnia has not achieved the desired objective as pointed out earlier; if anything at all, it is working against the Muslims and the Croats.

Another noteworthy endeavour of ONUC was the prevention of the disintegration of the Congo. Right from the onset Dag Hammarskjold did not want the young state to fall apart; hence he personally undertook trips to the Congo to ensure the effective functioning of ONUC.

To cap it all, the Security Council bucked him up with the mandate to use force to retain the territorial intergrity of the Congo. In the case of the former Yoguslavia, however even though Boutros Boutros-Ghali has not been mandated to apply force, the UN, as usual, wanted to safe-guard the unity of the federation. Matters were worsened by European nations which had already given recognition to the break away republics. Under such circumstances there is hardly anything UNPROFOR can do: the genie has already been let out of the bottle.

The military role of the UN in the former Yoguslavia is more diversified and more innovative than what it played in the Congo three decades ago. It has now stepped into the supervision of cease fires among the warring factions. While negotiations in search of peace are going on from one European city to another, any time the mediators are able to broker some peace, UNPROFOR sees to it that it is adherred to. But the question is, 'What has been the attitude of the warring functions to UNPROFOR?' It is resented by all the belligenents consequently they do not adher to these ceasefires.

Akin to ceasefire supervision, is the evacuation of refugees which is also a recent development, UNPROFOR in spite of its poor record in other aspects has been faring well in not only transporting refugees to their kith and kin but also negotiating for their release. Besides the movement of refugees to areas of safety, UNPROFOR has been airlifting

the sick and wounded from Bosnia to some European countries and the US. ONUC on the other hand never undertook such ventures in the Congo.

Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, the presence of UNPROFOR is not having any impact on the atrocities being committed in the former Yoguslavia. People are killed and buried en masse consequently to bring this cruelty to the notice of the world at large, UN PROFOR has been locking for the graves of those so buried.

4.5.2 THE CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

Pertaining to the civilian operations, ONUC was more deeply involved in the internal affairs of the Conge than UNPROFOR in the former Yoguslavia, particularly Bosnia. A great number of Belgian civil servants left the Congo following the mutinies in the army leaving only a handful. The civil service structure, therefore completely collapsed. The situation was aggravated by the struggle for power between Lumumba and Kasavubu.. ONUC unlike UNPROFOR therefore took full control of the Congo. First and foremost, it managed the economic sector by drawing the national budget and executing it. It also ran the administrative and educational sectors by engaging the services of qualified expatriates. Others include the health and judicial sectors which were also taken care of.

The UN therefore replaced the Belgian government temporarily in the administration of the Congo. Even though the conditions in Bosnia are nothing but chaotic, the UN is not at all involved in the running of the country. In Bosnia, there is the Muslim-led Bosnian government and the Serb-proclaimed government. The vacuum in the economic, administrative and other sectors which may be created may be Croats working in now-Muslim-dominated areas who are fleeing and vice versa. The situation now has not called for mass of expatriates to run the affairs of Bosnia.

One area in which the roles of the UN dove-tail is in the provision of humanitarian aid. Once there is war, people are bound to be displaced. Just as it did in the Congo crisis, the UN is providing relief materials like food and medicines including much-needed winter clothes for the Bosnian refugees.

In addition, while in the Congo, the UN rehabilitated infrastructural facilities, in Bosnia it has undertaken the repair of electricity and water lines including the clearing of garbage.

The UN used the stick in the Congo which in contrast doesn't seem to work in Bosnia. It is, therefore offering the belligerents with the carrot to achieve peace. The UN special envoy, consequently, has been working tirelessly to bring the warring factions to agreeable terms.

At this juncture, it is important to emphasize again that the UN enforced peace in the Congo while its policy in Bosnia is not clearly defined - it is neither peace enforcement nor peace keeping. Bosnia seems to be an exceptional case for the general policy of the UN in the post Cold War, period seems to be peace enforcement. The Secretary- General Boutros-Boutros - Ghali, however is pessimistic of the success of peace enforcement and declared that the UN might have to return to its intervention by consent.[134]

Another dimension is that the UN is currently placing more emphasis on peace keeping consequently there now is a Special Under Secretary-General solely responsible for peace-keeping operations.

4.5.3 COMPARATIVE ROLE OF OTHER COUNTRIES

During the Congo crisis, neither of the two super powers, the US nor the USSR came out overtly to support any of the factions although covertly the former would have aided Kasavubu and the latter Lumumba but because of the Cold War. Now that it is over, both of them are trying to find solutions to the Bosnian crisis. The US in in favour of the use of force, particularly striking Serbian positions by air and is ready for that. Besides, she has aided in the air lifting of relief materials to the beleaguered parts of Bosnia since the land routes are at times not easily accessible due to unnecessary blockade mounted by the warring factions.

The US has also offered financial aid and medical asylum for some of the wounded in the conflict. In the heat of the Cold War, however, Russia would not have taken US manoeuvres in Bosnia kindly even though the former Yoguslavia was her prodigal son. Russia on the other hand, prefers a round table conference approach to the solution of the Bosnian crisis and she is playing a tremendous role towards that direction, while it failed to contribute financially.

The European Community too is deeply committed to finding a settlement to the Bosnian crisis since it is a volatile issue. It has contributed a lot in terms of material aid and like the US has offered medical asylum to the wounded. Besides, its troops are serving under the auspices of the United Nations and even UNPROFOR is under the Command of a French General, just as Africa and third world countries contributed troops for ONUC. On the contrary in the Congo crisis, the major powers did not contribute any troops to ONUC due to the Cold War. The motives could have been given different interpretations by either NATO or the Warsaw Pact which in turn might have turned into something else.

Unlike the Congo crisis, NATO is ready to deploy its air strikers to Bosnia against Serbian positions. One of the obstacles is that most member nations of the EC have their forces on the ground and embarking on this might endanger them.

Another stumbling block is that the Security Council has to give its approval before they can go into action. In the Congo crises, the Secretary-General was mandated to apply force for the unity of the Congo but since Yoguslavia has already disintegrated, the UN does not see the necessity for the use of force in Bosnia.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This work set to find out the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of world peace and security.

For effective comparative analysis therefore, in Chapter Two we critically examined the background to the Congo crisis which erupted immediately after the attainment of political independence. To begin with, we highlighted the Belgian administrative system which was left in the hands of the officials in the Congo. The home government hardly formulated policies for the Congo. A prominent feature of the administration which we pointed out was the monopolization of the top echelon of the civil service by Belgians while the lowest echelon was reserved for the indigenous Congolese.

Another observation we made was that Belgium as a colonial power had no plans for the Congo since she falsely assumed that there was still time for colonialism. The educational system was tailored to fit the administrative system and consequently we pointed out that while primary schools were scattered throughout the country, secondary, post-secondary and technical institutions were hard to come by. When the time, therefore, came that Belgium had no alternative but to grant political independence to the Congo, she was still in full control of the economy as well as the military.

Congolese independence was therefore built on a weak foundation for colonialism did not bury the tribal rivalries and animosities.

We pointed out that the crises in the Congo were premeditated by the mutiny in the Force Publique which called for the rapid promotion of Congolese Soldiers. Discipline consequently, collapsed and Belgians despatched troops to the Congo and some to assist Katanga in her secession bid.

Ethnicity too, we emphasized, was a factor in the Congo crisis. Most of the political parties founded in the wake of independence were tribally based. The political marriage between Kasrubu and Lumumba eventually fell apart thereby culminating in a power struggle which cost the life of Lumumba.

Similarly, Chapter Three had a look at the remote and immediate causes of the Yugoslavian civil war. It opened with the origins of the component republics and their historical experiences which had profound effects on them. Even though dialectical similarities existed between the Serbs and the Croats, they had been arch-enemies. The First World War, we stressed, seemingly over-shadowed the animosities among the various ethnic groups since they had to unite aginst the common enemy. During the inter-war years, therefore, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was born.

The Second World War, however, had a devastating effect on Yoguslavia. It disintegrated and the Germans created the Kingdom of Croatia with its capital in Zagreb.

Eventually, however, Tito emerged and as a charismatic leader, helped to repel the Axis Powers and their satellites. He resurrected the South-Slav nation and his able leadership held the fragile vessel together until after his death. The constitution of the former Yoguslavia provided for an eight-man rotational presidency with one of them being the primus interpares perm term. When, however, it came to the turn of a Croat to assume the Presidency, the Serbs declined. Seeing that they had no stake in the federation, the Croats and the Slovenes seceded. And when Bosnia too followed suit, the former Yoguslavia had never seen peace ever since.

In Chapter Four, we dealt with the comparative analysis of the role played by the United Nations in the Congo and the former Yoguslavia. Before this was done however, since the international environment in the 1960s when the United Nations operated in the Congo differed from that of the 1990s when it is operating in Yoguslavia, both environments were closely examined. In the 1960s, the Cold War was raging and consequently the major powers never partook in peace keeping operations of the United Nationas. Both the US and the USSR viewed each other's moves with suspicion consequently, neither of them overtly came forward to declare her stand in the Congo.

The 1990s marked the early stages of the Post Cold War era when Communism had collapsed in the USSR which had disintegrated. Besides, the Warsaw Pact had also been abrogated. With these developments, we observed that the world had moved from bipolarity to unipolarity with the US at the helm of affairs. All the major powers are now actively involved in UN peace keeping operations.

Furthermore, a comparison of the issues raised in both conflicts was made. We discovered that both countries were heterogenous and nationalist tendencies high among the various ethnic groups exemplified in the Congo by the tribally based parties and in Yoguslavia by the Croats and Slovenes to have some kind of autonomy. Economically, some of the provinces or republics in the Congo and Yoguslavia respectively were richer than others in terms of natural resources and this also heighthened the nationalist feelings.

Then the role played by the UN in both countries were examined separately. In the Congo, evidence was produced to validate the hypothesis that the principle of neutrality could hardly be adhered to if the UN is to effictively maintain interational peace and security. The operations were sub-divided into a) military and b) civilian. The military operations in the Congo were more of enforcement than those of the UNPROFOR since the

been clamouring for more funds because its resources are over-stretched due to expanded peace keeping operations, adequate funds be set aside for that purpose and for this to be possible then member nations should try to settle their huge outstanding financial obligations to the UN.

That logistically the UN should be self-sufficient and this boils down to the availability and provision of adequate finance.

That troops made available for UN peace keeping operations should not only be readily at hand but also have similar training.

That the lives of troops serving with UNPROFOR are so endangered that UN peace-keepers be provided with adequate protection. Violators caught however could be tried by the War Crimes Tribunal.

That once UNF has been set up, officials delegated to be in charge of the operations be given power over the purse to avoid unnecessary delays in the procurement of the necessary things.

That it should strictly keep to the principle of intervention by consent for the safety of UN troops to avoid what is happening to UN peace keepers in Bosnia.

That intra-national crises are complicated and usually difficult to solve. Consequently, before the UN gets involved in such conflicts, it should really try to understand the nature of the particular crisis and

if possible weigh its chances of success or otherwise. This is better than getting involved in conflicts and withdrawing or retreating ignominiously mid-way.

That right now, there seems to be a conflict between the UN and the US as to the best approach to the solution of intra-national conflicts. While the UN would like to keep the tradition of peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy, the US on the other hand, would prefer the use of force. Hence, the US as a member of the UN should be ready and prepared to work under its auspices. This is better than presenting herself to be above the UN. The Us should not dictate the pace in peace-keeping, it should rather wait for the UN to do that.

That with the demise of the Cold War, the Collective Security System envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should now be fully enforced.

Should the foregoing recommendations be implemented, we are optimistic that the UN would be able to discharge its ever growing roles effectively in these fast changing times.

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