LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCE: A STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND ORIENTATIONS IN NIGERIA, GHANA, AND SIERRA LEONE

by

OGA GODWIN AJENE

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

1984

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In executing this work, I was fortunate to receive the help of several institutions and countless individuals. Special thanks are due the Rockefeller Foundation which made my study at the University of Wisconsin possible. Through an extension of its generosity, the Foundation made available to me a research grant which facilitated my field-work in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. For these, I am grateful. My appreciations also go to Ahmadu Bello University for granting me an extended leave and fellowship; the Institute of African Study at the Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone for extending its services to me; the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs for granting me access to its Library facilities; and the University of Ghana, Legon for allowing me to use their library and other facilities.

Among individuals at the University of Wisconsin, my special appreciation goes to Professor Fred Hayward, my advisor who provided encouragement and guidance during the entire course of my graduate work. His comments and suggestions were invaluable. Professor Crawford Young provided extensive critical commentary which contributed immeasurably to whatever cogency the work possesses. Professor Bernard Cohen offered the benefits of his

theoretical insight and editorial acumen on the draft of the first chapter. To thank these men for their contributions to this work and to my general intellectual growth seems only to understate my appreciation.

Other individuals whom I met on the research trail and deserve mention include: Professor Kwame Arhin of the Institute of African Studies; University of Ghana Legon; Mr. Kofi Drah and Dr. Kwaku Danso-Boafo, both of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon; Mr. Obed Asamoah and Mr. J. A. Laryea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ghana; Dr. Ahmed Dumbuya and Dr. Macbaily Fyle both of Fourah Bay College. To all these, I am sincerely grateful.

Finally, my indebtedness to my friend, Rosa Johnson and to my family can never be repaid. They must take solace in knowing that they gave me reason to complete this work.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate decision-maker's perceptions of foreign policy issues and how those perceptions are responsible for differences in the decisions and behavior of states. The effort is an attempt to answer the questions of why States with seemingly similar characteristics and interests reach different decisions on issues of foreign policy. The obverse of the problem manifests itself in countries with different characteristics which reach similar decisions. These questions and the answers to them have both theoretical and analytical significance, which we explore below.

From a theoretical vantage, the task of any foreign policy study is to posit relationships between variables that have explanatory, and possibly predictive value. In the conventional literature on the foreign policy of African states, the causal variables in decisions have diverged broadly between individual personality factors, usually referred to vaguely as "idiosyncratic variables," and global systemic ones.[1] In the case of the latter, the most fashionable aspect is dependency. Between the two

explanatory poles are variables deduced from individual or universal characteristics of African countries. While these variables are suggestive, the pattern of relationships among them remains unclear. Most analysts have tended to link the objective characteristics of different states directly to the foreign policy decisions, with various consequences.[2] The broader implications of the approach can be seen within the context of the questions posed earlier. At the macro level, if the common characteristics of African countries, such as their common dependency status, formed the direct explanation of their foreign policy decisions and behavior, then one would expect them to reach similar decisions on most issues. On the other hand, if the decisions are directly explained by the micro variables of individuality or uniqueness, then one would also expect them to reach different decisions, consistently. however, neither of these seem to be the case. This, suggests that there is a missing link in the assumed explanations of decisions and the actual decisions. The study focuses on the concept of perception in the attempt to bridge that theoretical gap.

The analytical mode adopted to accomplish the above task, to the extent that it focuses on the decision-makers' perceptions of issues and what they consider to be the pertinent factors in their decisions, incorporates a

phenomenological perspective. This involves the objective analysis of subjective variables. This perspective contrasts with what many analysts, in their objective wisdom might deem to be relevant factors, irrespective of the considerations of the decision-makers. However, this is not to suggest that the considerations of decision-makers cannot be reflected accurately in a rational and objective analysis. In a sense the decision-maker like the researcher is an analyst and if both were constrained by the same analytical rules, the choice of analytical focus would not be problematic. However, since we do not yet know the universal rules by which decision-makers are constrained, and since the epistemological questions of objectivity and subjectivity are largely unresolved, the problem of choice exists. On the other hand, the choice between the two approaches is not a clear-cut one. Indeed, they are not mutually exclusive. For instance, the initial assumption that the organizational framework of the decision-maker should form the basis of explaining their decisions, is that of the researcher. However, the emphasis that is placed on a particular perspective ought to be guided by its relative utility to the problem at hand. The fact that our problems calls for emphasis on the phenomenological approach, which has been largely neglected

in the literature constitutes the analytical significance of the study.

In a sense, the approach calls for the analyst to place himself in the shoes of decision-makers and examine the basis of their decisions on their own terms. This involves the presentation of his reality constructs relating to the issues under examination. These reality constructs, which we have broadly termed perceptions, may incorporate the more objective variables which analysts have identified to exist at the societal, systemic, governmental, and idosyncratic levels. In a narrower sense, perception offers more than a conceptual tool for phenomenological analysis. It may also be regarded as an intervening variable in the relationships between objective variable and decisions. The underlying assumption here is that where decision-making is limited by availability of information or, in some cases, too much of it, the realities which the decision-makers construct are similarly constrained. This constraint reflects on the definition of the issues; the context in which they are placed; the nature and cluster of objective variables that become relevant and the roles which they define for their countries on the specific issue. These, in turn, account for decisions on specific issues and for differences in the decisions made on the issues, in different states.

A preliminary illustration of the above propositions with two issues on which African states had to decide, is in order. The Nigerian Civil War fought between 1967 and 1970, once brought to the attention of African states and the OAU forum, challenged member states to decide whether to support unity in Nigeria or to recognize the secessionist Biafra. Among the countries that chose to recognize Biafra were Ivory Coast and Tanzania. The two countries represent opposite poles in ideological and historical spectrums. Ivory Coast, a former French territory is characterized as a moderate African state with a capitalist economy. Tanzania, on the other hand, was a British colonial territory that has been characterized as a radical populist state with a socialist economy. But if it appeared that the objective differences between these countries were irrelevant to the decisions in which their leaders made, so were the similarities. The two countries had enjoyed stable leadership over time; they were both single party states. However, they shared these characteristics with a third country, Guinea which chose not to recognize Biafra. These indicate that understanding the characteristics of these countries is by itself insufficient guide to the decisions which their leaders make. The analytical clue to the differences, it is suggested, may be provided by the intervening influence of

perceptions by the decision-makers regarding their definition of the issues and the relevant context in which they placed them. Most instructive in this respect is President Nyerere's polemic on the Nigerian issue.

In a secret document released in 1968, the Tanzanian President set out to debunk what he perceived to be false historical analogies to the secessionist conflict in Nigeria.[3] After rejecting, wholly or in part, analogies to the Nigerian conflict of other issues such as the incorporation of Gibralter into the Spanish state; the American Civil War; the Katanga secession crisis and the African "domino theory" of secession crises, he went on to outline his perception of the conflict by placing it within the context of human rights; he wrote:

> In this connection we could learn a good lesson from our former masters. For European governments are not often very polite to European regimes which fail to show respect for basic human rights within their own countries.4/

On the basis of this inference, Nyerere then, outlined his views of what the responsibilities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and individual African countries ought to be in the conflict.

Most African leaders do not set out quite clearly and unambiguously their perceptions of foreign policy issues as Nyerere did, but they leave us with significant clues in their policy statements and press releases to indicate that

differences in perception do in large measure influence differences in foreign policy orientations. Additionally, the role which national leaders perceive for their countries on specific issues influence their behavior on those issues.[5] Those countries that perceived the Nigerian conflict as an attempt force boundary revision in an African state and were opposed to it, were likely to support the Nigerian side. Leaders who view the role of their countries as one involving mediation in a conflict are likely to be more concerned with the threat of international escalations as a dominant perception than interpretations that are partisan.

On the second issue, African leaders who perceive non-alignment to involve independence of choice and action may not view inconsistencies between partiality to one of the power blocs and the neutralist theme in non-alignment. Similarly, while some observers believed that non-alignment was a Machiavellian scheme designed by non-aligned states to obtain foreign aid from the power blocs, several states believed that their effort was an attempt to balance the influence of the power blocs in their countries.[6]

Elaborations of these perceptual differences and the policies that flow from them requires an analytical approach that takes into account the consideration of decision-makers. The approach, as we said earlier, is not

exclusive of the 'objective' personality, institutional, structural and other environmental factors that, in conventional literature have formed the focal variables in explaining the foreign policies of African states. Indeed the significance of the approach is that it sharpens the relationship between those variables and decisions, which otherwise remain tenuous. The decision-makers, whom we focus on in this investigation, illustrate the point. The often reached conclusion that leadership idiosyncracies constitute an explanation of the foreign policy decision of African states is highly suggestive, but little else is known about the nature of its importance. Yet elements of those idiosyncracies that could affect decisions may involve the displacement of deep-seated psychodynamic features, or they may involve cognitive processes. Each of these aspects represent areas that can be fruitfully explored and elaborated.

The aspect of the individual variable that is elaborated in this study is the cognitive one, specifically its perceptual dimension. There are both theoretical and analytically based justifications for the perspective. The theoretical justifications are explored later in this chapter. The analytical ones inhere in some observed characteristics of African states. The first of these is the suggestion in many studies that idiosyncratic factors

play a dominant role in foreign policy. In this regard, William Zartman's often quoted observation that there is "a personal nature to the presidential foreign policy leadership..." might also suggest that individual perceptions of the leaders would be important influences on foreign policy.[7] The further suggestion that there is "an incomplete awareness of the ideas of national interest as a policy criteria" also suggests that perceptual rather than analytical criteria would, largely, form the bases of policy choices.[8] Most African countries are also purported to have organizationally handicapped foreign service machinery.[9] This means that the pattern of routinization necessary for organizational response to stimulus from the international environment is limited. The effect of these for decisions and policies may be that they are largely based on the perceptions of the leaders.

The interface between the perceptions by decision-makers and the operational context of foreign policy decisions should add refinement to our understanding of foreign policy in Africa. Yet, most scholars have focused almost exclusively on the latter aspect. Thus, while the literature on African foreign policies is replete in suggesting the environmental factors that are alleged to determine foreign policy, very little is known about how those factors enter the calculations of decision-makers in

specific situations.[10] However, these studies are useful in pointing out the objective conditions which perceptions are formed and a review of their findings is in order. In the remaining part of this chapter we shall also review some existing studies on perception and then present the conceptual and analytical scheme upon which this study is based.

Studies of the Foreign Policies of African States

In their pioneering study of African diplomacy, Vernon McKay and his associates considered three possible ways of organizing the study. These includes (1) a series of studies of the foreign policies of individual AFrican states, (2) a series of case studies of particular issues that had major effects on African diplomacy such as the Congo Crisis and apartheid in South Africa; and (3) a comparative study, dividing the determinants of African diplomacy into geographical, historical and personality factors. The authors chose the last approach by concentrating on the economic, cultural, military and political determinants. The contributing analysts focused on such specific aspects as the role of national interest and ideology; internal and external economic forces art work in Africa. Additionally, African arms and armies were

analyzed and the extent to which they were factors influencing the makers of foreign policy were examined.[11] Other determining factors that were examined included the significance for foreign policy of the cultural and psychological processes that affect Africa's rapidly changing societies; the internal political processes and the impact of pressures from the great powers.[12]

The collections in the study represented important pointers as to where some sources of foreign policy perceptions might be, but they fall far short of actually explaining or predicting the behavior of African states. Like capability analysis, understanding the parameters within which policy is formulated and behavior generated is important but it is an inadequate basis for inference about policy and behavior on specific issues.

Another study which focused on a series of individual African states included an introduction which was on the determinants of the foreign policies of African states, reminiscent of McKay Study.[13] Each of the contributing analysts then focused on individual countries and their foreign policies, specifying in each case what they considered to be the major determinants of policy. A general weakness of the studies is that no efforts were made to indicate the transformational process by which alleged determinants became influences on policies. Thus,

there is no certainty that states which have similar determinants of policy will necessarily behave in the same way and conversely, it is conceivable that states with different determinants of policy will behave in quite similar fashion. Another important problem of linking determinants to behavior relates to what mix of the numerous and often conflicting determinants becomes active in a particular issue.

These problems clearly manifest themselves in the various analyses. For example, Alaba Ogunsanwo in examining the foreign policy of Algeria placed the greatest emphasis on "the persistent influences of the way the country achieved its independence." The behavior of Algeria is thereby explained by the dominant factor of the country's history of violent and anti-colonial struggle.[14] Similarly, Egypt's "activism" in foreign policy is explained by Boutros-Ghali as stemming from its geopolitics. Being at the cross-roads of fArican, Arab and Mediterranean politics, according to Boutros-Ghali, presupposed four foreign policies including Africanization, Islamization Arabization and Neutralization.[15] The author recognized the tensions inherent in these different policies by pointing out the incompatibilities: namely Islam versus Neutralism; Islam versus Arabism; and African unity versus Arab unity. However, through an underhanded

introduction of another determining factor -- the common struggle against colonialism, he was able to resolve, in theory, the contradictions.[16] Negussay Ayele, focusing on the foreign policy of Ethiopia, introduced seven determining factors in the foreign policy behavior of that country, namely: (1) the geopolitical position of the country; (2) the historical self-image of its people; (3) the available human and material resources, (4) the political system and (5) the personality of the late emperor; (6) the needs and interest of its people; and (7) the pressures and influences from the external world. These forces determined four guiding principles: namely, support for the principles of collective security; peaceful coexistence; non-alignment and Pan-Africanism.[17] Like Negussay Ayele, Olajide Aluko pointed to several factors determining the foreign policy behavior of Ghana. These include the size of the country, its economy, the nature of ethnic composition, the legacy of its colonial past; its status as the first independent country in black Africa; the different personalities, background, orientation and outlook of its various leaders, and external factors such as the cold war, the Congo Crisis and colonialism in Africa.[18] Ladipo Ademolekum examining Guinea's foreign policy points to the special circumstance of Guinea's independence from France, and ideology as the prime movers

in the foreign policy behavior of that country.[19] Both Nicole Delorme[20] and John Okumu,[21] examining Ivory Coast and Kenya respectively, point to the needs for economic development as the primary determinants of the foreign policies of the two countries. Olajide Aluko again examined Nigerian foreign policy and suggested that the country's foreign policy grew out of her past and out of the past of the leaders of the country. He added that it was also a response to the external environment in which the country had to operate since its independence. These factors generated a foreign policy with three component parts; namely, policy towards her immediate neighbors, an African continental policy and a policy of non-alignment.[22]

The collection of studies may be considered a representative sample of African states since different categories of states were included. The traditional distinction between Francophone and Anglophone states were represented by Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Algeria on the one hand, and Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Egypt on the other. Other kinds of distinctions such as large versus small states; 'radical' versus 'moderate'; and regional -- East, West, North South and Central are all represented. Apart from the general statements of determinants of foreign policy that was made in the introductory chapter, there is no general conclusion that

synthesizes the disparate findings on the different countries from which some pattern may be discerned. Moreover, the different conclusions regarding the determinants of foreign policies of each of the countries demonstrates that our commonsense assumptions about determinants and policy may be faulty. On the one hand, the whole range of determinants that Aluko suggested in the introductory chapter may appear to have relevance to all the countries in the study; on the other hand, any one of them may be randomly selected and evidence gathered to indicate that it is the most important factor in policy. In three of the studies, at least two or more determinants were suggested. Where this was the case, there was no indication as to which one was the most salient. Of the remaining studies, only one dominant factor was considered. In these cases, other than attempting to justify them in terms of policies, there are no suggestions as to why other determinants might be unimportant. The problems of relating determinants of policy to behavior are therefore highlighted by each of the approaches. Where two or more determinants are considered, the indication of which one of them is most salient becomes difficult, and Aluko points this fact out when he stated that

> The foreign policy of any country is an interaction between internal and external factors, we have to state here again that the

> task of identifying the most salient of these is extremely difficult.23/

Of course, Aluko did not attempt to resolve the difficulty. The studies that focused only on a single determining factor perhaps chose the easier route, but the process by which we select the most important determining variable must be guided by the subjective considerations of the decision-maker and not the hunch of the analyst. All this suggests that an approach to the study of the foreign policy of African states that focuses primarily on the determinants in explaining their behavior necessarily leads us into a quagmire. There is no direct connection between what we may consider, a priori, to be determining factors and foreign policy. Foreign policies are the result of policy-makers' perceptions of issues, interacting with their perceptions of the opportunities and constraints engendered by those issues. The behavioral correlates of those perceptions are the actions or inactions of decision-makers. This is the starting point of our theoretical assumption, which we shall elaborate later. Before we do that, there are other issues in different categories of studies that we need to examine.

A different group of studies comprises the myriad of individual efforts at explaining the foreign policies of African states by examining the domestic sources of

policy.[24] Many of these studies were inspired by the theoretical formulations of James Rosenau.[25] The questions that have been generated by his formulation in these studies center around which of the numerous sources is the most potent explanation of foreign policy; whether the foreign policy making process of African states, largely small countries, is similar or different from those of the big powers; whether external factors are more important than domestic ones. In his conceptual formulation, Rosenau suggested that all foreign policies can be interpreted in terms of five sets of variables: (1) idiosyncratic ("all those aspects of a decision-maker -- his values, talents and prior experience -- that distinguishes his foreign policy choices or his behavior from that of every other decision-maker"); (2) role ("the external behavior of officials that is generated by the role they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants"); (3) governmental ("aspects of government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices ..."); (4) societal ("non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior"); and (5) systemic ("non-human aspects of a society's external environment ... that condition or otherwise influence the choices ...").[26] He hypothesized that these variables will have varying potency depending

on the nature of the society: large-small; developed-underdeveloped; and open-closed.[27] He also gave a tentative ranking of the variables for each category of the society and the issues.[28] Cohen and Harris have pointed out some weaknesses of the framework. Among these are the observation that the variables are not clearly specified and that the typology can be criticized on the ground that the variables are not operationally defined. They also suggest that the ranking scheme might be premature.[29] Similar conclusions were reached by Grundy and Farlow who, in their study of Ghana, found that "our present case study not only suggests a different ranking [from Rosenau's] but indicates that the set of variables are not clear-cut as implied nor as applicable to the fluid political situation of a developing society."[30]

Another problem with the formulation is one that is common to most such efforts. Many of the categories in the typology such as the distinction between small and large; developed and underdeveloped; open and closed polities may be continuous rather than dichotomous categories. In spite of these problems, various authors have attempted to apply the formulation as an approach to the study of the foreign policy behavior of African states. Kenneth Grundy and Robert Farlow, in their study of the internal sources of external behavior in the foreign policy of Ghana modified

the rankings of the Rosenau variables.[31] For the category of a closed, small and underdeveloped polity to which they had assigned Ghana, Rosenau had suggested that the following ranking of the variables: indiosyncratic, systemic, role, governmental and societal. However, in their study on Ghana, the authors found that the variables ranked in terms of their relative potency as follows: societal, idiosyncratic, systemic and role-governmental.[32] They also modified Rosenau's framework by fusing the role and governmental variables. Their argument for this was that in developing countries where structures are unstable and subject to much change, it is difficult to find a set pattern of action stemming from role determinancy. The case of Ghana which they examined is illustrative of this point. For the period that they were examining, because a military coup had supplanted the civilian regime of Nkrumah, many governmental structures were substituted by an ad hoc regime with few formal limitations.[33]

Skurnik, who studied the foreign policy of Senegal, a country in the same category with Ghana in terms of Rosenau's classification, came up with a ranking of the variables that was different from that of Grundy and Farlow and also that of Rosenau.[34] Like Grundy and Farlow, Skurnik did not employ the framework uncritically. Approaching the framework somewhat differently from Grundy

and Farlow, Skurnik integrated the concept of issue areas, found in Rosenau's original formulation, for the comparative ranking of the variables. He selected only three variables, namely: systemic, domestic and idiosyncratic. The domestic variable was not a category in Rosenau's original formulation. Skurnik arrived at it by collapsing three variables: namely, role, governmental and societal. His reasons for these are that the distinctions between societal and governmental factors are difficult to make. Furthermore, like Grundy and Farlow, he argues that in developing countries, attempts to discriminate between societal, role and governmental variables are difficult because societal factors tend to be inarticulate or intermittent. Also governmental factors are controlled through centralization and roles are almost non-existent.[35] By contrast to Rosenau who ranked the idiosyncratic variable first, for all the issue areas in a closed polity, Skurnik found that the idiosyncratic variable ranked lowest in potency for all the issue areas that he examined. The two aspects of territorial issue area that he examined yielded different ranking of the variables. The systemic variable was found to be the most potent in the status and non-human issue area, whereas the domestic variable was most potent in the human issue area.[36] The different conclusions reached in these studies point to the

difficulties involved in applying Rosenau's original pre-theoretic formulation as a basis for understanding the foreign policy behavior of African states. As mentioned earlier, the categories in the framework such as closed and open societies might be continuous rather than discrete categories. As Skurnik observed, there is an inherent difficulty in the distinction between open and closed societies, to which Rosenau ascribed differences in the relative potency of societal and governmental variables. The assumption underlying Rosenau's conclusion was that officeholders who are unrestrained by well-developed and entrenched bureaucracies, pressure groups, literate electorate and widespread participation in the political process will necessarily indulge in their own biases and idiosyncracies. Even in the absence of internal structures that could restrain decision-makers, it is possible that other domestic forces, such as need to develop, and external influences might exist which could mitigate the freedom with which decision-makers choose to act in foreign policy matters.

Aside from the difficulty of separating the variables that are alleged to explain the foreign policy of African states, differences in the ranking of variables highlight a more fundamental problem. The process by which particular variables become important in these analyses largely

reflect the evaluations of individual researchers. To minimize the possibility that difference in variable ranking is the artificact of the researcher, we suggest that the subjective evaluations of decision-makers, with respect to the constraints and opportunities they encounter in foreign policy-making, provide the basis for assigning relative potency to variables.

Another group of studies focuses on the internal sources including governmental and societal processes. Among these studies are those that examine party political processes; governmental institutions such as the foreign ministries; non-governmental institutions such as the press and their relationship to foreign policy. Ibrahim Gambari examining the relationships between party politics and foreign policy in Nigeria between 1960 and 1966 came to the conclusion that

> domestic politics established their primacy over all other factors affecting Nigeria's foreign policies .... The position taken by the government and opposition and other groups were motivated largely by the desire to maintain or gain domestic political power and influence at the expense of the other group.37/

In testing this proposition, the author was careful to select for examination those foreign policy issues that were most in dispute since little is known about issues on which there might have been widespread consensus. This suggests that the conclusion that "the positions taken by

the government and opposition and other groups were motivated largely by the desire to gain domestic political power and influence at the expense of other groups" might have been overstated. The proposition is properly located in the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making developed by Allison,[38] and Art's criticism on the issue is apt when he observed that where belief systems and mind sets are widely shared, the model is contradicted.[39] Another study that focuses on the internal sources of foreign policy behavior examines the relationship between Nigerian Federalism and foreign policy.[40] In his study, Akinyemi examines specific foreign policy issues such as the Congo Crisis, Nigerian-Ghanian relationship, irridentism and Pan-Africanism and suggests that attitudes taken by political groups on these issues were conditioned by their views on the Nigerian political system, which has their roots in the different regions of the Federation; and the ways in which they attempted to persuade the government to adopt their attitudes on foreign policy were conditioned by the Federal structure.[41] Furthermore, the author sees a congruence between the desires of the Nigerian Federal state and some principles of the Organization of African Unity, arguing essentially that the organizational form which O.A.U. took was a triumph of Nigeria, based on the nature of its federalism, over the unitary desires of

Ghana.[42] What we do not know for sure is whether the same process was at work in Ghana, thus galvanizing it towards unitarism at the continental level. A more serious problem with the thesis is that it is non-falsifiable.

In his own study of Nigeria's internal politics and foreign policy between 1960 and 1966, Gordon Idang examined the official principles of the Federal government, the perception and attitudes of the foreign policy-makers and the actual practice of foreign policy.[43] He then examined the degree of congruence and inconsistencies between these three aspects.[44] The study, in attempting to examine the perceptions of the policy-making elite is unique. However, in separating principles from perceptions and actual practice, the study failed to show the continuous interaction between the three aspects during the course of the development of an issue and how those developments modify aspects of the principles, perception and the outcome. The study was most useful as a critique than an explanation as to why certain foreign policy behavior occurs.

Another study focuses on the effects of regime change on the external behavior of Ghana. In their study of the impact of the 1966 coup in Ghana on that country's external behavior, Kenneth Grundy and Robert Farlow found that there was change in almost every aspect of Ghana's foreign policy

including new orientation towards East-West relations; intra-African affairs; controversial non-African issues; and international and regional organizations. They attributed these changes to societal factors.[45] Another study, however, has examined the impact on foreign policies of changes resulting from military coups and concluded that foreign policies remain unchanged after military takeovers.[46] The conflicting conclusions may in part be attributed to differences in analytic approach. The latter study was quantitative while the former was non-quantitative. However, more significant for our purpose is the explanations for changes or stability in foreign policy that follows the events of a military coup. The societal factors suggested by Grundy and Farlow as explaining the changes in foreign policy of Ghana would be a valid explanation if different sorts of decision-makers perceived them in the same way. This also means that those factors would have compelled the pre-coup leaders to re-align their policies accordingly and there would be no need for changes after the coup. In sum, societal factors and other environmental constraints on decision-makers are important but only to the extent that they are perceived.

Another group of studies attempt to explain the foreign policy of African states by focusing on the foreign policy bureaucracy, specifically, the foreign service.

Perhaps the best research effort in this category is Maurice East's study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[47] East placed his study in the theoretical perspective of the capacity or incapacity of small states to act in world affairs. From his study, he found that small states are handicapped by the incapacities of their foreign ministries stemming from historical, organizational and international factors. East suggests a direct link between one aspect of these handicaps and the behavior of small developing states. He argued that many aspects of the foreign policy of small or developing states are determined, in a very real sense, by the actions taken in international organizations. "A country's position on an issue may simply be that they support resolution XXX of the O.A.U. on this issue or that they are in full agreement with the Security Council resolution YYY on that issue."[48] One implication of this assertion is that the only foreign policy issues which small or developing countries involve themselves in are those for which international organizations have passed resolutions. On the contrary, there are contingent issues on which these countries are taking positions, in the absence of guiding resolutions of international organizations. Moreover the resolutions of international organizations are usually formulated with inputs from these countries. Additionally, the resolutions

are usually so broadly stated as to lend themselves to partisan interpretations.

Another implicit assumption of the East study is that a well organized and capable foreign ministry would facilitate a rational policy formulation and execution. As various studies have shown, organizational response to stimulus does not necessarily follow a pattern that can be strictly described as rational. More important, however, the findings regarding the incapacities of the foreign service organizations necessarily suggests that personal perceptions of decision-makers acquire an added significance in explaining foreign policy. Admittedly, incapacities such as those found by East, and other factors stemming both from the internal and external environment, may modify the perceptions of decision-makers but they do not replace those perceptions.

Another approach to the study of the foreign policy behavior of African states falls within the dependency perspective. Dependency analysis was only recently transferred to Africa from Latin America in an effort to explain the problems of development and political economy that the countries of the continent faced after the high expectations of the pre-independence period evaporated in the post independence period. At the initial phase of the analysis in Africa, most scholars involved with it did not

separate their concerns for underdevelopment from international politics or foreign policy as a sub-discipline. The analysis left inferences for students of foreign policy to draw. Patrick McGowan and Dale Smith reviewing the competing theories of dependency defined the concept as "an asymmetrical structure of control relations wherein a controller, such as a state, multi-national enterprise, or parent, regularly and hence predictably, changes or maintains the behavior of the controlled, such as another state, an economic sector, or child."[49] The foreign policy implication of the definition is obvious. The foreign policy-makers in a peripheral state do not have direct control over their decisions. In other words, their foreign policies represent subordinate "compliance" to the dominant countries.[50] In spite of these provocative implications for foreign policy embedded in the propositions of the dependency paradigm, the perspective has been slow to catch on with scholars studying African foreign policies. Some analysts do, however, make claims to the perspective in their studies and a review of the more significant ones among them is in order.

In his study of dependency and foreign policy in Africa, in which he used Uganda as a case, Yasphol Tandon pointed to both domestic and external factors. For domestic factors, in Uganda, he suggest the "apparent

formlessness and internal violence of the last ten years since independence, which, at close crutiny, turn out to be the birth-pangs of a society that was unable to give birth to an indigenous middle class."[51] As for the external factors, he suggests the "seventy years of imperial rule which produced a dependency relationship with the West as well as certain internal maladjustments."[52] After associating these factors with the foreign policy of Uganda, Tandon reached an apparently contradictory set of conclusions. On the one hand, he suggested that:

> What Uganda demonstrates best of all is the invalidity of the proposition often made with respect to the foreign policies of small states that these are conditioned, mostly, by domestic factors.53/

On the other hand, however, in the latter part of his conclusion he indicated that:

> The central point of the discussion in this paper is that the post-Independence foreign policies of African states cannot be divorced from their internal developments and Uganda's example shows this very clearly.54/

In one sense, the contradiction reflects the complexity of establishing a relationship between dependency and foreign policy. Because the assumption of dependency is that the foreign policy of a dependent state is the result of externally induced compliance, the influence of domestic factors must either reinforce the tendency to comply or they must exist at minimal or inconsequential levels. In

the classic statement of a way in which they reinforce each other, Johan Galtung suggested that domestic elites whose interests are in harmony with those of the dominant countries put pressure on their governments to pursue compliance policies.[55] In Tandon's study, however, the opposite tendency seemed to be the case. According to him, Ugandan society was "unable to give birth to an indigenous middle class."[56] An important domestic requirements of a dependent foreign policy is thereby compromised. On the other hand if the influences of both domestic and external factors are sufficiently evident in the foreign policies of small states, a linkage approach similar to that suggested by James Rosenau might help the analyst to avoid the dangers of forcing data into a particular perspective, with contradictory consequences.[57]

In another study, Timothy Shaw focuses on Tanzania and admonishes other dependent African states who, in their foreign policies, tacitly accept their inherited dependent relationship with affluent states. According to him, the distinctiveness of the Tanzanian leadership lies in its creative rejection of such a passive relationship.[58] In spite of this "creative rejection" on the part of Tanzania, Shaw goes on to suggest that systematic variables determine most of the country's foreign policy and the goal of the

leadership has been to maximize choice, given its position of fundamental subordination.[59]

Nnoli, also focusing on Tanzania, divides the country's foreign policy into two phases.[60] The first phase, which began with independence in 1961 and lasted to the Arusha Declaration on February 5, 1967, was according to him essentially an extension of the pattern of interaction with and attitude toward the external environment which prevailed during he colonial period. He described its features to include:

> the dominance in the national economy of foreign ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange; the consequent foreign exploitation of the indigenous resources; various forms of socio-cultural and political dependence which sustained these ownership and exploitative relations; the external orientation of the national economy; the confinement of national participation in the international division of labor to primary production and the importation of manufactured goods; confidence in the salutory nature of external conditions; high hopes of benefits from foreign relations; and appeals of the humanitarian sentiments of the advanced countries as the major means of international influence.61/

Self-reliance according to Nnoli had to change all these characteristics of the first phase and the effort required, among other things, "national effort to disengage from the deleterious external relations inherited from colonial times through nationalizations.... perception of external environment as hostile to Tanzania's interests; and search

for areas of interdependent and joint rewards."[62] The main achievement of self-reliance, according to him, is that the activities of the second phase were conducted within the context of a framework dominated by the country's policy of self-reliance as the major national orientation toward the national and international environments.[63]

Both the works by Shaw and Nnoli, though carried out from the dependency perspective, contain an implicit critique of the approach. The suggestion by Shaw that Tanzania creatively rejected her inherited relationship with affluent states, and Nnoli's assertion that the second phase of the country's foreign policy was formulated within the framework of self-reliance would indicate that the orientation of foreign policies of dependent states to the dominant ones is neither an article of faith nor an irreversible effect of economic subordination. Indeed, as Richardson points out, resentment about economic dependence might prompt defiance rather than compliance foreign policies.[64]

A further challenge to the asserted relationship between dependence and foreign policy, apart from the numerous domestic factors reviewed earlier, concern the range of foreign policy priorities of states. Theoretically, we expect foreign policy priorities of dominant states to be reproduced in dependent ones.

However, the foreign policy issues that are most important to the dominant states are of lower priority to dependent ones. Conversely, those that are of high priority to dependent states are of peripheral concern to the dominant ones. Thus, while many African states may list the problems of apartheid or global economic inequalities as major concerns and structure their policies to deal with those problems, the dominant countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union may be more concerned with military strategic issues and disarmament. This does not mean that the foreign policies of dependent countries may not coincide with those of dominant ones. It is quite conceivable that from a divergent range of priorities and national interests similar policies may emerge, but we cannot determine on the basis of these similarities that dependency explains the policies of the "subordinate" countries. Indeed, we suspect that the range of issues and policies which dependency would explain is very limited and of peripheral concern to the dependent states.[65]

A final study that needs to be examined focuses on the "co-optation of a less developed country's policy-making."[66] In this study Ronald Libby examined how between 1969 and 1972 the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which Ghana formulated its economic policy. He

traced the strategies by which the process of co-optation took place. These include the placement of a team of Harvard Development Advisory Service Economists in the planning and the economic policy-making units of government; the formulation of an internal coalition by the Advisory Service; and the mobilization of alliances resulting in an intergovernmental coordinating committee that formulated the basic framework for Ghana's economic policy, and also co-opted the policy process by coordinating external contacts with the government.[67] Libby goes on to suggest that the unpopular measures of the group might have led to the downfall of the Busia government.[68]

The descriptions of the processes of co-optation offered may be unassailable but the further unanswered questions raised by the study is significant. This concerns the efficacy of the strategy offered by the coordinating committee, which was perceived by Busia as more helpful than the other unstated alternatives, including refusal to be coopted. The acceptance of cooptation, even when we reject its implications, only highlights other values that are perceived as over-riding. We doubt that Busia would have accepted the committee's work if he perceived the process involved in it as inherently threatening to his regime. The decision-maker who is co-opted must be pre-disposed, perceptually, to the

goals of the co-opter, otherwise the relationship between the process and the goals are separated. This means that we still need to know the perceptual predisposition of Busia, as against those in his administration who rejected the setting up of the committee and its goal.

The various studies reviewed indicate variables at different levels in the objective environment of the decision-maker that influence foreign policy. These included structural; institutional and societal variables operating at the levels of the bureaucracy; state and the international system. In highlighting the environmental constraints on decision-making these studies represent enormous and important contributions. However, in inferring foreign policy directly from these variables, the studies imply that the environment of decision-making is similarly viewed by all decision-makers. Individuals make policies and, since individuals perceive the world differently, understanding foreign policy requires a further step of examining how decision-makers reconstruct their "reality" of the environment. This is why we prefer to look at perceptions as means by which the objective environment and policy are mediated.

Studies of Perception and Issues

Various scholars have suggested the importance of the relationship between perception and foreign policy decisions. Charles Herman noted that "foreign policy results from the decision makers' perceptions of present or expected problems in the relationship between a nation and its international environment [both human and nonhuman]."[69] Also Harold and Margret Sprout assert that environmental factors are "related to policy decisions only to the extent and in the manner that they are perceived and taken into account in the decision-making process."[70] The suggestions about important relationships between perception and foreign policy decisions has not been matched by studies undertaken by scholars in the field of international politics. Until the seminal works of Robert Jarvis and a few others, the insights into perceptual influences on foreign policy decisions and behavior was dominated by psychologists.[71] The implication was that certain basic assumptions of psychologists were carried over into the analysis of foreign policy.

Robert Jervis has outlined five faults that were the consequences of the psychology dominated literature.[72] The first of these faults is the greater attention to emotional rather than cognitive factors. This means, according to Jervis, that "wishful thinking, defense mechanisms and

other motivated distortions of reality are focused on to the relative exclusion of the problem of how even a perfectly unemotional and careful person would go about drawing inferences from highly ambiguous evidence in a confusing and confused world." The second fault is that almost all the data supporting the theories are derived from laboratory experiments. Jervis questions whether the processes that are revealed by the laboratory experiments can be determined to be at work in the real world. The third fault is that, because of a strong policy bias in the analysis, the element of conflict of interest is played down. Fourthly, the structure of the international system and the dangers and opportunities peculiar to the setting are often overlooked. According to Jervis, this bias leads psychologists to analyze only the views of those statesmen with whom they have little sympathy. Finally, most of the analyses do not account for the ways that highly intelligent people think about problems that are crucial to them. After outlining these problems Jervis goes on to analyze how perfectly intelligent people can misperceive the intentions of others. He then applies the concept of perception and misperception to develop a spiral model of the arms race.[73]

Although Robert Jervis' work on perception may be considered the most inclusive by a scholar in the field of

international politics, there are a few other scholars who have worked in the area. John Steinbruner, though concerned with cybernetic processes of decision-making, clarified that process by also analyzing the cognitive processes in perception and misperception.[74] Ole Holsti in his analysis of crisis escalation showed how the European leaders in the weeks preceding the Second World War misperceived each others' intentions and capabilities.[75] Kenneth Boulding suggests national images as the basis of perception and, in an article written in 1959, he argues that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation: "It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like that determines our behavior."[76] John Stoessinger examined 13 case studies of situations arising between the United States and the USSR and China where misperception had important effects on foreign policy. The aspects of perception that he examined included each state's self-image and each state's perception of the adversary's character, power capability and intentions.[77] Raymond Bauer, focusing on the problems of perception in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, speculated on perceptions that are institutionally conditioned. He argued that "not only the people but also their institutions," including research

strategy and questions, facilitate the misperceptions between the Soviet Union and the United States.[78]

Other studies focus more specifically on important personalities and attempt to assess their perceptions either through their "cognitive map" or "operational codes." Ole Holsti, in his study of John Foster Dulles, hypothesized that an individual's "cognitive map" may heavily influence his diagnosis of the situation, his search for different action alternatives and subsequent prescription and choice that lead to a foreign policy decision.[79] With the hypothesis, Holsti established a connection between Dulles' belief system and his perception of the Soviet Union.[80] In a study of Henry Kissinger, STephen Walker established connections between Kissinger's "operational code" and American foreign policy, by examining his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations.[81] Also using the "cognitive mapping approach" David McClellan examined the instrumental beliefs of Dean Acheson.82

In all these studies, there were attempts to relate the pros of perception in some concrete way to issues of foreign policy. The general tendency was to examine issues that contained elements of crisis or competition, hence the cold war issues and other crisis engendered issues were popular case studies. However, some scholars have suggested a broader range of conditions under which the

approach may be useful. Ole Holsti, for example, suggested four conditions including: innovative decision-making situations; long range policy planning situations; decision under stress; and decisions made by individuals at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid.[83] Reviewing the approach from the perspective of the individual decision-maker, Russett and Starr list similar conditions to include: "non-routine situations such as crisis"; "decision made at the top of the governmental hierarchy"; "long-range planning."[84] These conditions suggest that a wider range of issues, including non-crisis ones, can be examined through the analysis of perception.

Issues themselves have been the subject of analysis as explanatory variables in studies of foreign policy and scholars have approached them differently. Many of these efforts have centered around devising typologies for issues. Rosenau in one study defined foreign policy generally as a distinct issue area[85] and in another study offered a typology of issue areas within foreign policy, based on the tangibility of means and ends.[86] Bernard Cohen suggested a typology of foreign policy issue based on geographical and functional distinctions;[87] Theodore Lowi devised a typology based on resource allocation;[88] Herman suggested variations of issues according to the degree of threat, the amount of time available for reaching

decisions, and the degree of surprise in threatening foreign policy situations.[89] Brewer suggests that the issue context within which foreign policy occurs also affects it and outlined variations of context to include: prior involvement in the general issue in which the given issue is a part; whether or not there are concurrent problems related to the given problem.[90] In a slightly different vein, Cohen and Harris outline three context of issue definition: the "historical context" which seeks to understand the perception of leaders by examining the historical precedent within which they define the issue at hand; the "sequential context," which involves the perception of decision-makers with respect to the pattern of commitments and constraints over time, which are held to be relevant to the issue at hand. They also suggest the "concurrent context," which involves the perception of decision-makers with regard to other problems competing for time and attention and the constraints they impose on the alternatives applicable to the issue at hand.[91]

Profound epistemological questions are raised by typologies and definitions of issue contexts that are reflections of the analysts' views of relevance. As Cohen and Harris rightly observe, "if we could establish that the convenience of political scientists individually and collectively is commensurate to the perceptions or

experiences of these participants [decision-makers], then we might have greater confidence in the distinctions we draw between issues and context."[92] To add, there would also be a universally accepted classification of issues. However, the fact that different decision-makers define issues differently and since it is their perceptions and definitions that impact on foreign policy, their definitions should provide the criteria of relevant classification. From this perspective, our approach to the analysis of issues is very similar to that advocated by Cohen and Harris and our concern with perceptions of issues embraces an approach that is distinctly phenomenological.[93] The implications of this is that instead of examining the behavior of states in terms of the objective factors which, allegedly, influence that behavior, we do so in terms of the decision-makers' subjective perception of the "objective factors" and the influences of those perceptions on policy.

By focusing on perception the familiar level-of-analysis problem is raised. Perception becomes an explanatory variable at the decision-making level. Various scholars have suggested other levels, however, and disagreements center around the number of levels and which of them contain the most explanatory variables. Arnold Wolfer propcsed two levels (the state and individual);[94]

Kenneth Waltz, concerned with war, adds a third level of relations between states;[95] Robert Jervis lists decision-making; bureaucracy; the nature of the state; and the international levels.[96] David Singer argued that the perspectives offered by different levels are largely irreconcilable and that details gained by focusing at one level are sacrificed at another.[97] Most scholars agree, however, that the state should be the focus when issues of foreign policy are raised. At the same time, the foreign policies of states are made by their decision-makers and it would be more meaningful to focus on these decision-makers as representatives of their states. The focus on decision-makers has an additional advantage. At the other levels, the explanatory variables reflect the objective situation as understood by the analyst, but at the level of decision-making, the analyst is able to examine the processes by which specific objective variables become inputs that explain policies and behavior.

A related problem concerns the unit of analysis. The literature on decision-making suggests that individuals ultimately make decisions. The focus on perception adds further texture to this assumption. But it also suggests that decisions may be the result of individual perceptions which may be widely shared among a core of decision-makers and a whole nation-state. Studies of perceptions have

therefore not been confined to individual decision-makers. There are studies of perception that encompass states as the unit of analysis. These include studies on national images that were sponsored by UNESCO at the end of World War II.[98] A variant of this perspective is the work of Holsti on the perception of national roles.[99]

Whether perceptions take place at the level of individual decision-makers or more broadly at the level of nation-states, one of the important implications of the studies of perception is that variations in foreign policies of states may in large measure be explained by differences in perceptions. If there were no significant variations in the way decision-makers view the world, there would be no need to examine perceptions in order to explain foreign policy and behavior. We would be content to examine the more "objective" structural institutional and other environmental variables and expect to predict with accuracy the behavior of states. However, African states with quite similar environmental predictor variables have often reflected divergent policies on issues. Perception therefore becomes an important bridging theme in the gap between objective environmental factors and policy.

Conceptual Scheme

The implications of suggesting perception as a conceptual tool for analyzing foreign policy are profound. The concept contains a built-in bias against pure rationality and many scholars believe that when perception becomes the focus, questions of policy validity are raised. Hence, Russett and Starr stated that:

> problems of perception make meaningless the notion of ideally rational choice of alternatives. From all [that] information, only some of it will be perceived or selected. The interpretation of the information will depend on the specific individual decision-makers' belief system and images.100/

As Jervis observed, perception is no less constrained in its validity than policies arising from scientific inference, especially in "a complex world of ambiguous information."[101] He goes on to observe that balanced attitude structures do not reveal irrationality if the cognitive consistency, a process by which perceptions are maintained, can be explained by the actor's well-grounded beliefs about the consistency existing in the environment he is perceiving."[102] This means that Zartman's summary conclusion that foreign policy decisions of African leaders descends to a level of whims, emotions and accident" is unenlightening.[103] There is structure and meaning in those decisions that warrants systematic examination and this leads us to the assumption that the foreign policy

behaviors of African states are influenced by the perceptions of their leaders on specific issues and on the many dimensions of these issues. On the basis of this, the thesis is proposed that variation in foreign policy may partly be explained by differences in perceptions.

Perceptions are the "reality" constructs of decision-makers based on well-structured internal cognitive processes interacting with the stimulus objects in their external environment. Work done by cognitive theorists reveals some of the internal processes and there is consensus on such aspects as inferential memory, a process by which "facts" are stored in memory and inferences are drawn which are based on them. There is also a general agreement that the way by which the mind makes inferences about what obtains in the external world is constrained by a consistency principle in which already held beliefs are kept internally consistent with one another. Furthermore, cognitive theorists believe that the limited capacities of the mind constrains it in its ability to assimilate the complexities of reality and change. In effect, the mind copes by maintaining simplicity and stability and its belief structure. These are not the only cognitive operations in perception. The findings are vast and in many cases inconclusive but there is enough ground to take its precepts as a warranted assumption.[104]

The analytical focus on decision-makers' perception of issues, defined as the "construct of reality" around an issue, involves, the determination of how these issues are defined such definitions encompass the relevant subjective values associated with the issues. The scope of values integrated into their definitions are part of the distinctive perception of decision-makers. Our understanding of that scope is also enhanced by other values that are either left out of the definitions or separated from the issues and rationalized in other ways. Other variables that clarify decision-makers' perceptions of issues include the relevant analogies that are brought to bear on the issues, and the time frame within which they place the issues -- whether long-term or short term.

Issues may also be perceived as involving competition or cooperation. This together with the decision-makers' perceptions of their nation's roles (leadership, follower, mediator or adversary) in specific issues interacting with their definition of those issues are the most important variables which, in our perspective, influence foreign policy and explain variations. The operational linkage between perception of issues and foreign policy and behavior is summarized in the following figure.




Figure 1. The operational linkage between perception of issues and Foreign Policy and Behavior

References - Chapter I

[1]A good conceptual formulation of the idiosyncratic variable may be found in James Rosenau "Pretheory and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Barry Farrel Approaches to Comparative and Rational Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 143. In the literature on African foreign policy, it is used very generally to suggest that decisions are simply subject to "the whims and caprices of the leaders." For this interpretation, that has been generally taken for granted, See William I. Zartman "Characteristics of Developing Foreign Policies" in William Lewis (ed.) French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identify (New York: Walker and Company 1965), p. 183.

[2]For a detailed review of the literature, see pages 10-26.

[3]See Julius K. Nyerere "Nigeria/Biafra Crisis (Dàr-es-Salaam: Government Printer 1969).

[4]Tanzania was one of the four African countries that granted recognition of sovereignty to Biafra. See Ibid., p. 8.

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[7]See William I. Zartman op. cit. p. 183.

[8]Ibid. p. 185.

[9]See Maurice East Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretical Obsevations based on a study of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Science 4, 4, December 1973, pp. 491-508.

[10]An exception is Ibrahim Gambari who approached the problem of Nigerian foreign policy from a decision-making approach. The approach is however different from ours because the author used the bureaucratic model of decision-making. See Ibrahim I. Gambari Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Nigeria Under the First Republic (Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980).

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[12]Ibid., p. 196.

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[15]Boutros Boutros-Ghali "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in Olajide Aluko, ed. ibid. p. 41.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Negussay Ajele, "The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia." in Olajide Aluko, ed. ibid. p. 46.

[18]Olajide, Aluko, "The Foreign Policy of Ghana" ibid.

[19]Ladipo Ademolekuon "The Foreign Policy of Guinea" in Olajide Aluko, ed. ibid. p. 98.

[20]Nicole Deforme, "The Foreign Policy of Ivory Coast" in Olajide Aluko, ed. ibid. p. 118.

[21]John Okumu, "Kenya's Foreign Policy" in ed. Olajide Aluko, ibid., p. 136.

[22]Olajide Aluko "Nigerian Foreign Policy" in ed., idem p. 163.

[23]Ibid., p. 163.

[24]Some of these studies include Gordon Idang Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press 1973) Ibrahim A. Gambari op. cit.

[25]See James Rosenau, "Pre Theory and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Barry R. Farrell, ed. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1966), pp. 27-92.

[26]Ibid., p. 43.

[27]Ibid., p. 48.

[28]Ibid.

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[30]Kenneth Grundy and Robert Farlow "Internal Sources of External Behavior" Journal of Asian and African Studies, 4, 3, (July 196) p. 170.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid. p. 171.

[34]William A. E. Skurnik The Foreign Policy of Senegal (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972).

[35]Ibid. p. 261.

[36]Ibid. p. 260.

[37]Ibrahim A. Gambari op. cit.

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[41]Ibid. p.3.

[42]Ibid. p. 4.

[43]Gordon A. Idang op. cit p. 3.

[44]Ibid. p. 3.

[45]Kenneth Grundy and Robert Farlow op. cit.

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Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, 1, (1975), pp. 17-46.

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[48]Ibid. p. 499.

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[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid. p. 207.

[54]Ibid. p. 209.

[55]See Johan Galtung "A structural theory of Imperialism" Journal of Peace Research (No. 2), 1971, pp. 88-117.

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[59]Ibid. p. 215.

[60]Okwudiba Nnoli. Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania (New York: Nok Publishers 1978).

[61]Ibid. p. 16.

[62]Ibid. p. 304.

[63]Ibid. See, also Timothy Shaw op. cit. p. 214.

[64]See Neil Richardson op cit. pp. 80-93.

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[68]Ibid. p. 89.

[69]See Charles Hermann, "Policy Classification: A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" in The Analysis of International Politics, ed. James Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice East (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 72.

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[94]See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1962) pp. 3-24.

[95]Kenneth Waltz Man State and War (New York: Columbia University Press 1959).

[96]Robert Jervis. Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics op. cit. p. 15.

[97]David Singer in James Rosenau, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy op. cit.

[98]Ibid.

[99]Ole Holsti, "National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy" op. cit.

[100]Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr op. cit. p. 301.

[101]Ibid.

[102]See William Zartman, in ed. William H. Lewis op cit. p. 183.

[103]For an incisive analysis of the cognitive basis of foreign policy decision-making See John Stienbrunner op. cit.

[104]For similar distinctions see Timothy Shaw in Kenneth Ingham op. cit. Also, See Ahamadu Sesay "Sierra

Leone's Foreign Policy Since Independence: Part Two"
Africana Research Bulletin XI, 1, 2, (March 1981) pp. 3-49.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING OF THE ISSUES

The analysis of perceptions requires an examination of various aspects of the issues that different decision-makers respond to. In this study the issues that we examine include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Angolan conflict and Non-alignment. The specific analytical concerns involving these issues include: for ECOWAS, the nature of expected benefits and the behavior that stems from those expectations; the actor-relevant inputs in the decisions, whether or not, to recognize the MPLA during the 1975-76 Angolan crisis; and the relevant aspects of perceptions of non-alignment that relate to the behavior of different countries toward the power blocs. In order to place these concerns in perspective, this chapter outlines some theoretical and historical dimensions of each of the issues.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975, was broadly conceived as an attempt to integrate the economies of the sub-region. The

effort was based on the widely shared belief that the goals of development in the region could be more easily achieved through integration. However, because the scheme neither proposes nor anticipates political union as an objective, the goals of the scheme in practice become relevant only to the extent that they are perceived to be consistent with national policy objectives.[1] From this perspective, issues in ECOWAS can be viewed as problems of foreign policy for individual countries. This also suggests that different perceptions of leaders in different countries would exist regarding national interests and objectives in pursuing particular ECOWAS policies. Two preliminary examples are illustrative of the point. In 1974, when the diplomatic ground-work for the scheme was being made, the Nigerian leader, General Yakubu Gowon suggested to two neighbors outside the region, Chad and Cameroon, to join.[2] The motive behind this was to create an economic and security buffer for Nigeria within the context of ECOWAS.[3] Similarly, Leopold Senghor, the Senegalese leader, suggested that Zaire, a central African country, be included in the scheme. The aim here was to facilitate an economic counterweight to Nigeria's potential dominance of the scheme.[4] These perceptual considerations are largely neglected in studies of ECOWAS. At the base of these considerations there are structural and historical

conditions in the region which must form the background of a study like this. This section, therefore, focuses on the structural preconditions for integration in the region. Additionally, we shall examine the historical antecedents of ECOWAS; trace the diplomatic process in its evolution; and outline the areas of agreement.

If the pre-conditions which are theoretically deemed to be requisite for the success of integrative efforts were taken seriously, then the outlook for the success of the West African experiment was doomed from the start. The sub-region does in large measure exhibit the very opposite of the requisite conditions for the success of integration. Among the more important of the integrative potentials are the structural conditions of the symmetry of units, the adaptive capacity of States; elite value complementarity, and complementarity of needs.[5]

With regard to the structural condition of units symmetry, West Africa exhibits wide divergence in size. This fact was noted by the Economic Commission for Africa when it observed in a study "that the West African Sub-region is the most varied in Africa as to size of countries, degree of economic development, language and economic internal and external links."[6]

The lack of symmetry between the ECOWAS states is evident in almost all the indicators of size. Nigeria

alone, with a Gross National Product of $20,810 million, controls 60 percent of the total share of the Gross National Product of the ECOWAS countries. The size of its Gross National Product is five times the size of Ghana which has the second largest share. The Gambia which has the smallest Gross National Product controls only .26 percent. Sierra Leone, one of the countries in our study, controls 1.56 percent. These disparities are also manifested in other areas of economic power and activity such as the percentage share of manufacturing in total gross domestic product, and share of manufactured exports as total of exports. Demographically, Nigeria's population of nearly 80 million is three-fifths of the total population of the sub-region and Ghana, which is the next most populous country, has only 8 percent of the total. These are some of the realities of the disparities between the states in West Africa and if symmetry of units were necessarily an absolute condition for the onset of an integrative effort then we probably would not have seen ECOWAS. However, it was not an absolute condition and indeed some scholars have argued the reverse of the symmetry condition.[7] Following Karl Deutsch' proposition of a "Core" area that would act as the focus of integration schemes, George Abangwu asserted that "there must emerge a dynamic centre of gravity within the prospective integrative area: a country

or group of countries willing to bell the cat and act as leaders in the process of integration."[8] Nigeria's central role in the formation of ECOWAS, which we shall examine in greater detail later, would seem to lend greater credence to the "Core" hypothesis as the pre-condition for integration in the circumstance of West Africa.

Another characteristic of the region, that is also theoretically contentious as a pre-condition of integration, is the level of economic development.[9] The theoretical condition that a certain level of economic development is requisite for integration is negated by a low level of per capita income which both limits purchasing power and the potential for industrialization. The level of industrial activity and the range of industrial products in the region are very low and limited. The average per capita income stands around $100. The country with the highest income per capita, Ivory Coast, has $250 and the lowest, Upper Volta, has $60. The country with the highest percentage share of manufacturing as a total of its Gross National Product, Ivory Coast has only 13 percent. In many of the countries, the figures are too low to be statistically significant. Theoretically, these conditions would suggest very low probabilities for an integrative scheme. On the other hand, the compelling need to develop these areas through economies of scale would suggest a

positive pre-condition for integration. Furthermore, as one OECD study observed,

> it is probably advantageous if the industrial sectors of the partner countries are not only of similar size but also small.... A small industrial sector means small vested interest that might oppose integration for fear of the adjustments possibly resulting from the removal of protection inside the integration area... Secondly the smaller the industrial sectors at the beginning of integration, the larger the scope for capturing the benefit of specialization through regional investment planning.10/

Evidence does suggest that, in spite of the generally low level of industrial activity in the region, the disparity that exists between the countries has created the pressure for protection. An illustration of this is the fact that while the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce pushed vigorously the ECOWAS idea, there was constant pressure by their Sierra Leone counterpart on their government for a national focus in commerce.[11]

Another problem in the existing economic structure of the West African Sub-region is the nature of their export commodities and direction of their trade. Because all the countries are exporters of primary agricultural products and minerals, their export products are competitive rather than complementary. Additionally their transportation systems were designed during the colonial periods to service exports to the former metropolitan powers. This means that the liberalization of trade within the region through

the removal of barriers in the sub-region would not significantly increase commercial transactions between them. A related problem is the heavy reliance of many of the states on import duties as a form of revenue. For example Benin relies on import duties for about 55 percent of its revenue and Nigeria gains as much as 18 percent from import duties. The removal of trade barriers would mean the loss of revenue. The ECOWAS treaty does provide for a mechanism for compensating losses resulting from the establishment of a common tariff but even this has not provided enough incentive for the removal of trade barriers.[12] If trade barriers were removed, the region would still have to contend with the fact that the bulk of their import needs would have to originate in non-ECOWAS third countries.

If the economic conditions in West Africa were low predictors of integration, the political situation made the problems intractable. The recency in the attainment of national sovereignty created, among the States, a high sense of nationalism. The desire to consolidate independence through Nation- and State-building is at the same time cumbersome and in conflict with the regional goals of integration. The preeminence of nation-building in West Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, as a political objective stem from two characteristics of the countries: first, each of the countries contain a

multiplicity of ethnic groups and loyalties to these groups have been in constant conflict with the newly independent nations. In Nigeria alone, there are at least 270 distinct ethnic groups. Secondly, because the boundaries of the countries were drawn without regard for ethnic boundaries, many groups were split between two or more countries. For example, the Fula group exists in at least six West African countries; the Yorubas are split between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin; and the Ewe between Ghana and Togo. These conditions have created problems of national integration for national leaders either in the form of irridentism, as was the case among the Ewe in Ghana in the early 1960s, or secession, as was the case in Nigeria in the late 1960s. The response of national leaders has been to embark on political experiments, with divergent effect and consequences. In many states these experiments resulted in the one-party State, with each expounding variations of radical populism as the ideology of State. The lack of success in these experiments is underscored by the level of political instability that takes the form of coup d'etat. Of the sixteen West African countries, eleven have had at least one military coup.[13]

All these political conditions, in different ways, made the prospects of integration in West Africa very low. If the imperatives of nation-building that resulted from

multiplicity of ethnic groups is nationalism, it was also counterproductive for integration and Ernst Haas understated the point when he observed that: "the political imperatives of State- and Nation-building are of such magnitude as to make the preoccupation of regional collective action seem to be beside the point."[14] The point could be more accurately stated for West Africa that nationalism was directly opposed to integration. The means which the leaders employed to achieve their goals of State- and Nation-building, ideologies which were at odds with each other, also broke down the theoretical requirements of elite complementarity as a pre-condition of integration. Although many of the differences arising from ideological differences have been transitory, as the leaders that promoted them are removed, the inherent instability of the system is also counterproductive to successful integrative effort. This point was succinctly stated when Timothy Shaw observed that:

> Coup d'etats have upset cooperative regional linkages and have often led to unstable governments for whom foreign policy is subordinate to the need for political survival.15/

The economic and political problems that have undermined the prospects of regional integration in West Africa are compounded by cultural ones. Language

differences between the English-speaking and French-speaking countries accentuate some of the more intractable problems.

Against the background of these structural problems were numerous attempts to integrate the region. On the one hand, the earlier attempts would appear to provide a background for cooperation that should make the all encompassing ECOWAS easy, on the other hand, the chequered history and the fruitlessness of these earlier attempts may also be a historical guide that ECOWAS might go the same way. It is therefore worthwhile to examine these earlier attempts and also trace the evolution of ECOWAS itself.

Integration in West Africa and the Evolution of ECOWAS

ECOWAS emerged as one of several earlier attempts by the various countries of the West African sub-region to integrate various aspects of their economies. The efforts predate the independence of these countries. Because the countries were parceled out to three colonial powers, pre-independence integrative efforts followed the divisions of colonial occupation. The French colonial territories were geographically contiguous and generally had a better history of close cooperation. They were joined together in the Federation of French West Africa (Fédération d'Afrique Occidentale Française). The countries included Senegal,

Dahomey (now Benin), Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali, Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Niger. With the headquarters in Dakai, Sengal, the Federation was closely governed as one administrative and economic unit. The British territories which included Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, widely separated by the French territories, were governed as separate administrative units during most of the colonial period. There were, however, some links between the units. These included a common currency, which was managed by the West African Currency Board; a jointly operated airline (the West African Airways Corporation); a common educational system maintained through the operations of the West African Examination Council; and a jointly operated West African Palm oil research institute. After the British territories became independent, most of these links were severed. The only surviving link was the West African examination council.

The situation in the French territories was somewhat different. During the 1950s, when the colonial powers were under the greatest pressure to decolonize, the French tried to persuade their West African territories to become members of the French community. In the alternative, they could, individually, opt for independence. Thus, while many of the territories, including Mali and Senegal, favored a federation associated with France, most of the

other countries preferred individual association with France. However, when France, through the Loi Cadre (the enabling law) proposed a referendum in 1958 through which the countries could individually opt for independence, it was only Guinea that voted for independence. In 1959 Dahomey (now Benin), Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta declared their intention to seek independence together as Mali Federation. Ivory Coast, the more prosperous of the territories, preferred a looser association and initiated an association of consultative states known as the Council of Entente States (Conseil de l'Entente). Dahomey and Upper Volta disassociated themselves from the Mali Federation and joined the Entente States. The Mali Federation attempted to bring the remaining two countries, Senegal and Mali, into a federated political union after independence, but the attempt eventually broke down in August 1960.

While the political formula for post independence association between the French territories was a source of great diplomatic rancour during the period immediately preceding independence and after, the common economic institutions that had been in place dictated continued cooperation among the States and with the French. In the early 1960s, therefore, a West African Customs Union (UDAO - Union Douanière des Etats de l'Afrique Occidentale) was

formed. Its membership included Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sengal and Upper Volta. The Union never really operated well and in 1966, it was replaced by UDEAO (Union Douanière des Etates de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), with the same membership as UDA). UDEAO, like its predecessor, did not achieve much and was again transformed into CEAO (Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest). The diplomatic inertia that created these successive organizations were never sustained when it came to the implementation stages. However, certain common institutions that were the relics of French colonialism persisted. For example, most of the territories are members of the Franc zone which is managed by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO - Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest). Additionally, the former French territories, with the exception of Guinea were associate members of the European Economic Community (EEC) before 1966, when other non-French territories sought membership. Beyond the West African sub-region, the former French West African territories were joined to their counterparts in Africa. The first of these associations was the African and Malagasy Union (UAM - Union Africaine et Malagache) which was formed in 1961. The organization was transformed in membership and later became known as the African and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM -

Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauriciene). The association was more important as a political than economic grouping and has since undergone several changes of name.

Although the history of cooperation between the former British territories was not comparable to that which existed between the Franophone States, there were political and functionally specific associations. The most noteworthy of the political associations was the short-lived Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana initiated as a nucleus of his design for African unity. The functionally specific organizations include the Niger River Commission, which associated Nigeria with several Francophone countries, the Lake Chad Basin Commission associated two ECOWAS states, Nigeria and Niger with Chad and Cameroon. The other river or lake basin commissions brought together only Francophone States and these include: The Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Valley (OMVA - Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal) formed by Senegal, Mauritania and Mali in 1972. The Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authority (Autorite de Developpement Integre de la Region du Liptako-Gourma) brought together Mali, Niger and Upper Volta in 1971. The Mano River Union (MNU) joins Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

In addition to the river and lake development associations, there are groups formed around common primary commodity products. These associations include the African Groundnut Council (Conseil Africain de l'arachide) formed in 1964. The members of the council include the Gambia, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Upper Volta. Other associations include the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), and the health related organization called OCCGE (Organization de Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte contre les Grandes Endémies).

The existence of all these associations would appear to have laid the groundwork for a region-wide cooperation but as suggested earlier, their history and achievements provide some clue to the futility of excessive optimism. In the first place, many of the associations were formed to fulfill the diplomatic objectives of particular countries. The Council of the Entente was initiated by Ivory Coast as a diplomatic alternative to the desire of many former French territories to federate at the end of French colonialism. The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was initiated by Kwame Nkrumah to rally a group of states to his grand scheme of African Union on a continental scale. Despite the diplomatic sources of some of the organizations, the objectives which they outlined were potentially beneficial but very little was achieved either because the diplomatic

purpose for which they were set up fizzled away with new political alignments or when insurmountable obstacles were encountered during implementation stages. All these add up to a general feature in the integrative efforts in West Africa that have achieved very little.

The formation of ECOWAS is different from all its predecessors in the sense that it encompasses the entire region. Early indications about its possible success, however, does not point out any significant difference from earlier attempts at cooperation in West Africa.[16] In the rest of this section we will trace the diplomatic processes in its evolution. The first initiative for creating a region-wide community came from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). West Africa was delineated as one of several regional groupings of African states for purposes of coordinating industrialization policies. The Commission convened a conference in Lagos, Nigeria in 1963 and proposed among other things a plan for the location of two iron and steel plants in the region. It was agreed at that conference that one of the locations for the two plants would be in Liberia and the second location was not decided on. Liberia however requested a second meeting of West African leaders to discuss the issue. In a conference of the leaders that was convened in 1965, the jostling by different countries to have the plants located in their

territories produced no solution. Instead, it was decided that the development of industries in the region should be placed within the context of "general, institutionalized economic cooperation."[17] As a result of that decision, another meeting was held in Niamey, Niger to discuss the form the proposed new grouping would take. At another meeting in 1967, twelve countries signed the Articles of Agreement for the establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa. Additionally, an interim Council of Ministers for the community was established and during the inaugural meeting of the council late in 1967, a temporary secretariat was set up. The secretariat was charged with the responsibility of preparing a draft treaty; identifying priority areas for cooperation; and preparing the ground-work for a meeting of the Heads of State in Monrovia in 1968. The Heads of State meeting in Liberia signed a protocol creating the West African regional group. This effort did not go beyond the signing of the treaty and for the following four years there was a diplomatic lull. Part of the reason for the loss of momentum was the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War which came to the center of African diplomatic activity. Moreover, Nigeria was one of the two countries that had been delegated at the Monrovia Conference to prepare studies on areas of cooperation. Its

preoccupation with the Civil War made it impossible to fulfill its obligations to the incipient community.

At the end of the Nigerian Civil War, interest was again revived for the creation of a regional grouping. This time, the initiative came from Nigeria. The diplomatic process was started with the signing of an agreement of cooperation between Nigeria and Togo in 1972. Following that agreement, a joint delegation of the two countries visited West African capitals to push the proposals. This was followed by a series of ministerial meetings, first in 1973 in Lome, Togo and another in Accra, Ghana in early 1974. In Monrovia, another meeting in early 1975 finalized arrangements for a summit meeting of the Heads of State at which a treaty could be signed.

The first summit meeting of West African States was held in Lagos in May 1975. The meeting brought together eleven heads of governments and representatives of four countries of the West African sub-region. A draft treaty that had been prepared during the various ministerial conferences was signed by all the countries after slight modifications. The aims of the community which were outlined in Article 2 of the treaty stated that:

> It shall be the aim of the community to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in all fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,

> *monetary, and financial questions, and in social* and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to progress and development of the African continent.18/

The objective of the community was a common market and to achieve this objective, the treaty called for, among other things, the elimination between member states, of customs duties; abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among member states; the establishment of a common custom tariffs and common commercial policy toward third countries; abolition as between member states of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital. The treaty also called for harmonization in agricultural policies; transport; energy; marketing; research; economic and industrial policies.

The ECOWAS treaty called for the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development but the delicate question of the formula for contribution to the fund by member states was resolved in a protocol that was prepared at the ministerial meeting held in Accra in July 1976. Among the other issues that were discussed during the preparation of the protocols were the issue of re-exportation of goods within the region of goods originating in third countries; the assessment of revenue losses by member States resulting from trade

liberalization; and the definition of the concept of products which originate in ECOWAS countries. All the issues, except the last one, were resolved and formalized in a protocol which was endorsed by the Heads of States meeting in November 1976.

The ECOWAS treaty provided for several institutions, including the Authority of Heads of Government, which was the supreme organ of the organization. It is "responsible for, and has the general direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the community...."[19] The body was expected to meet once a year. Subordinate to the Authority of Head of Government is the Council of Ministers which consists of two representatives from each country. The Council gives recommendations to the Authority on policy questions and gives direction to all subordinate institutions. It was expected to meet twice a year. Other institutions include a permanent secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary is appointed by the Authority to serve a four year term, and is assisted by two Deputy Executive Secretaries, appointed by the Council of Ministers. He is responsible for the day to day administration of the secretariat, the preparation of annual reports and the conduct of studies required for the operation of the community. The staff of the secretariat

are accorded the status of international civil servants and owe their loyalty entirely to the community. The other important institutions are the Tribunal of the Community; the Committee of West African Central Banks; and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. Additionally, a number of specialized sectoral commissions were created.

The ECOWAS treaty provided for a lengthy transition period within which all the goals of the community will be realized and several important steps have since been taken. However, many goals remain to be met and where agreements have been reached, many states have failed to implement them.[20] Among some of the important steps that have been taken are the appointments of Aboubakar Diaby Quattara of Ivory Coast and Romeo Horton of Liberia to head the Secretariat and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, respectively. Also a formula for contribution to the community's budget was accepted and calculated on the basis of a coefficient calculated as one-half of the ratio of the GNP of each Member State to the total GNP of all Member States plus one-half of the ratio of the per capita income of each Member State to the total per capita income of all the Member States. Other signs of progress include the decisions, at the Summit of the Heads of Government in May 1979, to freeze, at existing levels,

customs tariffs on goods which are produced in Member States; an agreement on the free movement of persons within the ECOWAS states; and a protocol on non-aggression.

In those areas that progress appears to have been made, there have been problems. The Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development is in itself in need of funding.[21] Also, the integrity of the Director of the Fund, in managing the Fund, has come into question.[22] The protocol on the free movement of persons within the region was never implemented by all states and even countries that implemented it have retrenched through border closures and stiff requirements for entry. More importantly, many States have defaulted in meeting their financial obligations to the community.

The formation of ECOWAS against the odds suggested by structural and historical conditions indicates that certain perceptions of benefits to be derived from it were over-riding. As we suggested earlier, since political union is not anticipated in the effort, perceptions of benefit have a national context. It is therefore necessary to examine the motivations of individual countries to participate since the realizations of expected benefits will in the long run, and to a large extent, determine whether or not the community survives.

The Angolan Conflict

Embroiled in a destructive anti-colonial and civil conflict in 1975 and 1976, Angola was at the center-stage of African international relations and diplomacy. The conflict not only polarized African states, but also brought in the two adversary super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as active participants in the conflict. In this section, we will trace the evolution of the conflict; examine the various interested parties; and outline the involvement and role of African states through the OAU.

Located at the central, south-west section of Africa, Angola occupies a physical area of 1,246,700 square kilometers. It is composed of eighteen provinces, one of which, Cabinda, is separated from the others by the oceanic outlet of Zaire and the River Congo. The Cabinda enclave is surrounded on its landward side by Zaire and Conge People's Republic. The rest of Angola is bordered to the north and east by Zaire, to the east by Zambia and the south by the UN mandated territory of South-West Africa. According to the 1970 population census the country has 5,646,166 people. The major ethnic groups in the territory are the Ovimbundu; the Mbundu; the Kongo; the Lunda-Chokwe; the Nganguela; the Hambe; the Nyaneka and the Ovambo.

"they only multiplied like invisible brooms, hovering in the basement or plotting outside the house sometimes quarreling, sometimes cooperating but watching and waiting for the day when they might sweep into power."[25] Beginning in 1961 with a series of violent uprisings in Luanda and in the Northern Bakongo province, Africans in Angola opened a phase of confrontation with Portugal that was to last for a decade and a half.

The early 1960s was a period of decolonization in Africa. The larger colonial powers were disengaging themselves from their colonial possessions and granting independence, in most cases, under carefully worked out arrangements that guaranteed their continued influence. Portugal, on the other hand, was entrenching itself and in effect retained the largest colonial empire in Africa. To cope with the increasing pressures of African resistance, Portugal had increased its forces from a few thousand men in 1960 to about 142,000 in 1969. Of these numbers, 60,000 were in Angola. Additionally, Portugal was expending a little more than half of its annual national revenue on defense and security, the most part of which was designed for the maintenance of its African territories. From 1966 when nationalist activities intensified, the cost of the war to Portugal would have been sufficient to force its retreat from the territories. However, it was able to use

weapons and aid facilitated under NATO agreements, although the NATO pact stipulated that aid to Portugal be used exclusively in Portugal for defense purposes. Most NATO countries, however, gave tacit support for the use of the weapons in Africa and moreover, Portugal argued that its territory extended to Africa. The nationalist guerillas on their part received arms from the Soviet Union, China,Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian countries and various private sources. They also received aid from the OAU through the organization's liberation committee.

While the pressures on Portugal during the decade of the 1960s, at the UN and from the activities of the guerillas, prompted moderate official constitutional changes in 1971 and 1972, there were no indications that Portugal was willing to relinquish its territories. The decisive factor that was to hasten the outlook of Portuguese colonialism in Africa was the bloodless coup in Portugal on April 29, 1974, in which young military officers organized the Armed Forces Movement. The Movement, in overthrowing the dictatorship of Marcello Gaetano, aimed at "democratization at home and decolonization in Africa." While events that followed the coup snowballed towards the objectives for which the coup had taken place, the leader that was installed following it, General Antonio de Spinola, was not prepared to accept

the full implications of the coup. He continued for some months to reject African claims to independence. By mid-July 1974, the growing schism over the ultimate objective of the April coup led to the removal of Spinola who had to reverse his earlier position on the future of African territories by conceding the right of the colonized peoples to their full independence. By the end of July, the date of independence for Guinea Bissau was set for September and that of Mozambique for 1975.

The withdrawal of Portugal from Guinea Bissau and Mozambique and the transfer of power to the nationalists in those territories was made with little or no hostilities between rirval nationalist groups. In Angola a smooth transition was hampered by deep rooted ideological and ethnic rivalry between nationalist contenders to power. The rivalry facilitated the internationalization of the conflict, bringing in such tacit or active participation as Cuba, South Africa, U.S.S.R., and U.S.A. Furthermore, it threatened to split the OAU.

Parties to the Conflict

The central actors in the Angolan Conflict were the various liberation movements. The ability of the movements to form a common front, in opposition to the Portuguese,

and subsequently, to form a government of national unity, was hampered by a complex interplay of ethnic, class ideological and personal factors. The differences arising from these factors were further compounded by the polarization in Portuguese politics; the Cold War; and the politics of African unity. In the following section, we shall trace the emergence of the major liberation movements, and indicate the main points that kept them divided. Furthermore, we shall examine the part played by the polarization in Portuguese politics; the super powers; third countries; and the Organization of African Unity.

The FNLA (Frente Nacionale de Liberação de Angola)

The liberation movement that became known as FNLA was organically the successor of nationalism among the Bakongo in the early 1950s. In its earlier form, this stream of nationalism was represented by parochial monarchists led by Eduard Pinock who wished to revive the stature of the Kongo monarchy as a symbol of ethnic nationalism. To this was added a group of less monarchically-centered ethno-nationalist among Bakongo emigre in Leopoldville, led by Barios Necaca. Together, these groups formed the political organization, UPNA (União das Populacões do Note de Angola) in 1957. In 1958, the movement was transformed into a broadly based organization, transcending its ethnic

boundaries and was renamed UPA (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola). It was under the aegis of the organization that Holden Roberto, who was later to become its President, travelled to Ghana and the U.S. in 1958 and 1959 to lobby for the support of African States, the U.S. and the UN for the cause of Angolan independence.[26]

Born on January 12, 1923 at Sao Salvador, Holden Roberto spent his early childhood in the Conge (Zaire). Educated at the BMS school in Leopoldville and graduating in 1940, he acquired his nationalist consciousness interacting with other Bakongo emigres and Congolese nationalists including Patrice Lumumba whom he met in 1949. However, it was not until a three-week visit to Angola in 1957 that his consciousness was transformed into political activism.[27] After the visit he started to make contacts for representation to the UN. In 1958, he travelled to Ghana for the "All-Africa People's Conference" where he met with Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, George Padmore, among others. He had learned that the idea of Kongo nationalism inherent in UPNA did not appeal to these men and to win their support, he circulated a manifesto for the all-inclusive UPA when the conference began in December. In 1959 he visited Guinea and arranged to be attached to the Guinean delegation to the UN in August. After his return from the US in 1960, he attended the second

All-Africa Conference in Tunisia where he met with the rival MPLA, but refused to merge his organization with it.

With the Independence of the Congo (Zaire) in 1960 and with the support of Patrice Lumumba, UPA acquired a legitimate existence. The leaders of the movement set up an office in Leopoldville, campaigned among the Angolan emigre and broadened the ethnic base of the organization. Roberto returned to Leopoldville after two weeks of Congolese Independence, acquiring a new prominence and effectively becoming the leader of the organization. The prominence of both Roberto and his organization, notwithstanding, new rival organizations sprang up among the Bakongo exiles. These included Aliazo (Alliance des Ressortissant de Zombo) which developed as a negative reaction to the options and actions of those who created UPNA. A second organization, Ngwizako (Ngwizani a Kongo) was formed by the die-hard monarchists within the original UPNA. There was also the Nto-Bako Angola, formed with the support of those leaders within the Congolese Abako party, who had designs for a transcendant pan-Kongo nationalist objective.[28] Finally there was the MDIA (Mouvement de Defense des Interest de l'Angola). Between 1960 and 1961, attempts by these organizations along with MPLA to form a common front with UPA were unsuccessful.

1961 was a year of rebellion in Angola. It is still a matter of debate whether the sequential violence that started in 1961 with the "Maria's War," the northern violence and the Luanda riots were spontaneous uprisings or masterminded by the various liberation movements.[29] However, the events brought a new phase to the character and direction of the nationalist movements. The response of UPA to the rebellion and subsequent Portugese reprisals was to create new auxilliary structures. Holden Roberto sent a group of young men to be trained in Algeria and created a military wing to his organization, the National Liberation Army (ELNA). Additionally, by organizing Angolan emigre workers, he created a labor union, LGTA (Liga Geral Trabalhadores de Angola) to complement the work of his party. Also created was SARA (Serviço de Assistência aos Refigiados de Angola) to coordinate medical relief work for the refugees that had swelled following the northern violence.

By late 1961, UPA had started to carry out guerilla operations in northern Angola. But in addition to facing the Portuguese authorities, the organization was contending with the Bakongo factions of Ngwizako, MDIA and Nto-Bako who had become moderates and were cooperating with the Portuguese in rooting out UPA militants. Roberto continued to reject the overtures from leaders of the MPLA for the

formation of a common front. He, however, formed an alliance with Aliazo which had dropped its parochial title and was renamed PDA (party Democratico de Angola), In March 1962. The UPA/PDA alliance thus became known as FNLA. One week after the front was formed, the leaders of the alliance formed an Angolan government in exile, GRAE (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilo).

The MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola)

The emergence of the MPLA is traceable to nationalism and the ferment of Marxist thught among the urban intellectuals in the Luanda-Mbundu region of Angola. Its organizatoinal predecessor was the Angolan Communist Party (PCA) which was formed in 1955, essentially as a cell of the Portuguese Communist Party.[30] Following the formation of PCA, its leaders created a nationalist front party, PLUA (partido da luta dos Africanos de Angola). It was the various leaders in the two organizations that formed the MPLA in December 1956. Soon after its creation, the Portuguese secret police PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado) set about to decapitate the MPLA, along with other nationalist organizations. Among those arrested in 1960 was Dr. Agostinho Neto who later became the leader of the movement. The crackdown by PIDE forced the MPLA, like UPA, to become an exile organization.

The leadership of MPLA came from the ranks of assimilado or mulatto families. They shared the common privilege of Portuguese university education. Dr. Agostinho, who was among these privileged group was a son of an Mbundu Methodist pastor. Born on September 17, 1922 he completed a secondary education in Luanda; served as a personal secretary to the Methodist bishop, Ralph Dodge; and worked in the public health service in Luanda. After that, he went to Portugal to pursue medical studies at the University of Lisbon. As a student in Lisbon, he was a member of an anti-Salazar youth organization MUDJ (Movimento de Unidade Democratica Juvenil). For his political activities, he was arrested and jailed in 1952 and again in 1957. He, however, completed his studies in 1958, returning to Angola the following year. His subsequent arrest by Portuguese authorities in June 1960 prompted protests during which Portuguese troops fired upon and killed several villagers. While Neto was being held, the other founding leaders of MPLA, Mario Pinto de Andrade and Virato da Cruz were lobbying for the cause of Angolan freedom in Europe. In 1959 da Cruz and other associates sent a telegram to their UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammerskjold requesting him to use his office to persuade the Portuguese government to "put an end to constant atrocities and cruel assassinations against the African

peoples of Guinea and Angola, set free prisoners, and cease preparation for armed repression."[31] The MPLA leadership also participated in the second "All-Africa Peoples Conference" held in Tunisia, where they made the initial attempt to join a common front with UPA.

In February 1960 Sekou Toure of Guinea permitted the MPLA to establish a headquarters in its capital, Conakry. From there the MPLA launched a program to unite all Angolan nationalist movements; broaden its external support by sending a delegation to China; and establishing links with the liberation movements of other Portuguese territories. These objectives became imperatives following the wave of violence inside Angola in 1961. While MPLA was successful in seeking association with the liberation movements of other Portuguese territories through the trans-territorial CONCP (Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas); winning the support of the Casablanca bloc of Arican states, it was unsuccessful in getting UPA to accept the formation of an Angolan common front. Thus, to place itself within the context of the emerging phase of nationalism, the MPLA moved its headquarters to Leopoldville in October 1961.

In Leopoldville the MPLA continued to press UPA leaders for a common front. At the same time, it was broadening its base and like UPA, created auxilliary

organizations. For example, its CVAAR (Carpo Voluntario Angolano de Assistência dos Refugiados) became the equivalent of UPA's SARA.

By the end of 1961, the rivalry between MPLA and UPA had severely limited the individual contributions of the liberation movements in the guerilla war. However, following the OAU recognition fo the FNLA/GRAE in 1963, the Congolese government of Cyrille Adoula ordered Neto to close MPLA offices in Leopoldville. the MPLA headquarters was thereby relocated in Congo-Brazzaville where the wounded organization recouped under the support of the leftist governement of Fulbert Youlou and his successor Masemba Debat.

UNITA (União Nacional para a Indepêndência Total de Angola)

The formation of UNITA (União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) in March 1966 symbolized the completion of the ethnic equation that formed part of Angolan nationalism and the struggle for leadership. Jonas Savimbi, who initiated the formation of the movement reasoned that the MPLA was largely Mbundu; the FLNA/GRAE, essentially Bakongo. This, according to him, left "outside the political struggle more than half of the population." What was, therefore, needed was a movement that represented the interests of the majority among the Ovimbundu, Chokwe

and Ovambo in the south central region.[32] These areas were less open to the currents of nationalism and political consciousness that permeated the Bakongo or the Luando-Mbundu regions. Yet the 1950s witnessed the emergence of self-help organizations with overtly political outlook. Some of these organizations formed by rebels from missionary seminaries and protestant schools included JCA (Juventude Crista de Angola), formed in 1954; OCA (Organização Cultural dos Angolanos); UNATA (União dos Naturais de Angola); AASA (Associação Africana do Sul de Angola); and Ukwashi Wa Chokwe.

These organizations were the regional predecessors of UNITA and while fermenting political consciousness in the area, the emergence of UNITA is not directly traceable to anyone of them. Indeed Jonas Savimbi who formed the movement was a member of UPA between 1961 and 1964. Born on August 3, 1934 at Muhango to a prominent Ovimbundu family, Jonas Savimbi attended a local protestant mission school at Chilesso and went on to the Silva Porto secondary school.

In 1958, he was among a pioneer group of students that were sent to Portugal by the United Church of Christ. Under pressure from the Portuguese police to serve as a paid informer, Savimbi left Portugal in 1960 for Fribourg, Switzerland and subsequently to the University of Lausanne.

While in Portugal, he was also contacted by both the MPlA and UPA leaders who were seeking to broaden their political base. In 1961 he joined UPA and rose rapidly to become the Secretary-General of the movement. In that position, he started to build a base of personal loyalists among the Ovimbundu and Chokwe exiles in the Congo. With the recognition of the UPA/GRAE by the OAU in 1963 Savimbi became GRAE's foreign minister and in that position cultivated relationships with Arab states and some African states.[33] He also undertook secret missions to Moscow, Budapest, Prague and East Berlin in quest for personal support. By the middle of 1964, the power struggle between him and Holden Roberto had reached a head and on the eve of the OAU summit in Cairo in July, he called a press conference and resigned from GRAE. Following that he undertook an extensive visit to the far East after which he returned to Zambia from where he launched the political strategy for the formation of his organization. The result of this was the formation of UNITA in the eastern town of Muangai in March of 1966.

With the formation of UNITA, the ethnic equation in the Angolan drama had been completed. UNITA was predominantly Ovimbundu Chokwe and other groups in the south central region; the MPLA represented the Luanda Mbundu; and FNLA was predominantly Bakongo. One

qualification, however, is that each of these movements had a sufficient following outside its ethic boundaries to lay claim to the leadership of an inclusive Angolan nationalism. Beyond ethno-regional distinctions, there were other peculiarities of the three movements. The MPLA was largely an urban based, multi-racial organization that was led by intellectuals. The FNLA and UNITA, on the other hand, were largely rural, ethnopopulist and uniracial organizations. There were also ideological differences. The MPLA articulated a Marxist world view; FNLA defined a liberal democratic world view, with the objectives of agrarian reform, economic development and African Unity. UNITA's perspective which as a reaction to both, articulated a purely Angolan nationalistic view. These differences were reinforced by peronality differences between the leaders of the three movements and made unity among them inherently difficult.

Portuguese Alignments

Superimposed on, and compounding the differences between the liberation movements was their relationship with various factions in the Portuguese military and colonial population. Until the 1974 coup in Portugal, the FLNA was associated with the exiled Portuguese FAP (Frente de Acçao Popular) and FPL (Frente Portugal Livre). These

least thirty organizations and a realignment of forces intent on capturing power in Angola. While the MPLA retained its support of the PCP, and the sympathy of the new military junta in Luanda led by Rear Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the FNLA retained its support among the Portuguese democrats. A white separatist group in Angola organized the PCDA (Partido Cristão Democratico de Angola) as a multi-racial party in conjunction with such African groups as MDIA (Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola); Partido Democratico Nto-Bako de Angola; and A Provincia de Angola, all of which had collaborated with the Portuguese colonial authorities during the earlier phases of the anti-colonial war.[34]

By 1974, though Portugal had indicated a willingness to grant independence to Angola, the war with the authorities and between the various movements intensified as they were armed by the various Portuguese factions, as well as other forces. Of the extraneous forces in the conflict were alliance with the liberation movements stemming from Cold War politics. Although the support of the United States and the Soviet Union for FNLA and MPLA respectively, ebbed and flowed, the two movements reflected the basic Cold War division in the conflict.

The United States

The relationship of the FNLA with the United States dates back to the early 1950s when that organization was still UPNA and represented parochial Bakongo nationalism. In 1952, the Angolan nationalist emigres in the Congo contacted the U.S. consulate in Leopoldville to seek advice regarding their cause. The U.S. at that point indicated to them that very little could be done since Portugal had not been admitted into the United Nations. With the admission of Portugal to the world body in 1955, the leaders that later formed the UPNA circulated a petition which read, in part: "The people of the Kongo Kingdom insistently request to be placed under the authority of the United Nations in the trusteeship of the United Stats of America..."[35] Subsequently, Roberto who became president of UPA visited the U.S. as the first Angolan nationalist leader in 1959. While in the U.S., he made wide ranging contacts through the American Committee on Africa. Among those he met then was Presidential Candidate John Kennedy.[36]

U.S. response to Angolan nationalism as a whole was complicated by a major conflicting demand on the policy-makers. The principle of the, "rights of colonial people to self-determination" which was advocated came into sharp conflict with U.S. commitment to its NATO allies, of which Portugal was one, and particularly, her military

interest in the Portuguese Azores. The dilemma resulted in occasional vacillations and policy duality. Evidence of vacillation was reflected in alternate support for Portugal and for nationalism in the United Nations.[37] As evidence of duality, the U.S. routinely provided assistance to Portugal under the aegis of NATO and at the same time channeled covert CIA assistance through Congo (Zaire) to FNLA, as a fall back option between 1962 and 1969. Under the Nixon administration CIA aid to the FNLA was "deactivated," leaving Holden Roberto on $10,000 annual retainer.[38] This reflected the implementation of President Nixon's "Tar baby" option which called for U.S. communication rather than confrontation with white regimes in South Africa. The option was based on the perception that "military realities ruled out the chances of nationalist victory."[39]

After the coup in Portugal in 1974 and the breakdown of the Alvor agreement between the liberation movements, the U.S. reassessed its policy.[40] In January 1975, the National Security Council's "40 Committee" authorized a covert grant of $300,000 to the FNLA. By March the colonial war had turned into a civil war with the MPLA and FNLA forces fighting each other. The war intensified by July with the balance tilting in favor of the MPLA. Over the objections of Assistant Secretary Nathanial Davies and

several academics,[41] the U.S. committed another $6 million to the FNLA and UNITA, through Zaire and Zambia. Subsequent assistance increased to at least $32 million.

Several factors explain the support of the U.S. for the FNLA over the other movements. The leaders of FNLA were better known to U.S. official being the first to have contact with them. But more importantly, however, the movement represented an ideological stream in Cold War divisions that was more acceptable to the U.S. Added to this was U.S. relations with zaire whose leaders favored the FNLA. In June 1975, the Zairian President Mobutu charged the U.S. with complicity in an attempted military coup and expelled the U.S. ambassador. As Marcum suggested, "Helping the FNLA therefore might be one way of helping restore U.S.-Zaire relations."[43] The MPLA on the other hand was perceived as an agent of Communism. The bases of this perception include the initial location of MPLA headquarters in Guinea, then pro-Soviet; the evolution of the organization as an off-shoot of the Portuguese Communist Party; and the Marxist ideology of the leadership.[44] The subsequent assistance of the MPLA by the Soviet Union reinforced the U.S. perceptions of the movement. At the same time, the eventual direction of the MPLA might have been the self-fulfilling effect of U.S. perception of the organization. U.S. support for UNITA

came much later in 1975 after it had formed an alliance with FNLA. Before that, the National Security "Committee" which voted $300,000 for the FNLA had rejected a proposal to give $100,000 to UNITA. Partly explaining this, as Marcum observed, is the orientation to favor past connections and habits. Additionally, UNITA at that point was perceived to be in a no-win situation.[45]

The U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union has generally and consistently shown support for liberation movements either through its voting in the United Nations or directly through military and economic assistance. But it has also tended to support those liberation movements whose ideological leanings appear compatible with hers. Thus for most of the Angolan conflict it sided with the MPLA. It is estimated that in 1971, about 70 to 80 percent of the MPLA's arms came from the Soviet Union and East bloc countries such as Czechslovakia.[46] Up till the time of the Portuguese coup in 1974, it is estimated that approximately $63 million had been committed to the MPLA. However, the general flow of Soviet assistance to MPLA declined by 1972, ceasing completely by 1974. The explanation for this may be found in the disarray of the MPLA, which was torn by factionalism during the period.

In August 1974, the Soviet Union made a contribution to the fund of the OAU liberation committee, but faced with increasing prospect of being shut-out from the unfolding drama in Angola, direct assistance to the MPLA was resumed in October. By the time the civil war peaked in October 1975, the Soviet Union had provided assistance to the MPLA, estimated at worth $80 million, enough to give that organization the military edge, hitherto held by FNLA.

Cuba

Cuba prides itself as evidence of a successful revolutionary struggle in the third world and has always been willing, with support from the Soviet Union, to aid liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. The involvement of the Cubans on the Angolan scene date back to the early 1960s. In 1964, Holden Roberto conferred with the Cuban revolutionary, Che Guevera in Algiers but no lasting relationship appeared to have been struck between them. During a visit to Congo Brazzaville in 1965, Guevera met with the MPLA, conferring with Agostinho Neto. The Cubans that were training MPLA forces during that period became involved in training MPLA forces as well. In January 1966, Cuba accorded the MPLA formal recognition by allowing it to participate at the "Trans-continental

Conference" in Havana, as the exclusive representative of Angola.

Following the escalation in the Angolan Civil War in March 1975, an estimated 230 Cuban military advisers were dispatched to assist the training of MPLA forces. An additional 200 infantry instructors were received by the MPLA in August. By late September and early October, at least one battalion of Cuban troops backed by shiploads of heavy arms arrived in Angola and became active combatants on the side of the MPLA. It is not clear whether the Cubans would have become so directly involved without the direct intervention of South AFrican and Zairean forces.[47] What is clear, however, is that once South Africa and Zaire intervened, the Cuban response off-set what would have been FNLA/UNITA advantage.

South Africa

During most of the anti-colonial war, the South Africans were the most consistent ally of the Portuguese at the United Nations. Its invasion of Angola in October 1975 stemmed from its fears that in the event of an MPLA victory in Angola, the UN mandated territory of Namibia (South West Africa) which it controlled would be wide open to insurgents of the liberation movement of that territory, SWAPO (South West African People's Organization). Also the

vulnerability of South Africa itself would be increased. For their part, UNITA and FNLA leaders, in desperation had made contacts with the South Africans for assistance as early as May 1975. The resulting informal alliance coupled with the direct involvement of South African forces were later to prove the greatest liability to both the South African objective and those of the two liberation movements. It swung the opinion and support of several African states in favor of the MPLA.[48]

The Role of African States and the OAU

The Angolan conflict was also caught up in the political preferences of individual African countries as well as divisions in pan-African international politics. Those states most concerned with developments in Angola were the contiguous countries, including Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia. Zaire being the earliest refuge and base of the liberation movements had both the advantage of nurturing a preferred organization and stood most to lose from the failure of that organization. UPA/FNLA, which was the first on the scene, enjoyed the blessing of successive Zairean leaders although it was caught up, along with its other Bakongo rivals, in the turbulent politics of late 1950 and early 1960 Congo (Zaire). The MPLA was allowed to locate its headquarters

in the Congo in October 1961 after moving from far away Conakry, Guinea. While the UPA/FNLA cultivated good relations with successive central governments, the MPLA enjoyed better relations with leftist opposition leaders such as Christophe Gbenye and Antoine Gizenga. UPA's advantage of good relations with central government leaders such as Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Cyrille Adoula was less than compensated for by MPLA ties with Abako officials in the crucial lower Congolese province. On the eve of the inaugural OAU summit in 1963, Holden Roberto formed an alliance which excluded the MPLA and created the Angolan Government in Exile FNLA/GRAE. With the eventual recognition of FNLA/GRAE by the OAU, the Adoula government asked the MPLA to close its headquarters in Zaire.

The relocation of MPLA headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville with the consent of the leftist government of President Fulbert Youlou became an opportunity for the Congo-Brazzaville leader to play an active role in the Angolan conflict. In response to the formation of FNLA/GRAE, Youlou convened a meeting of leaders of several liberation movements including the FNLA, MPLA, MDIA, MNA and the separatist Cabinda liberation movement, MLEC (mouvement pour la libération de l'Enclave de Cabina). Both FNLA and MLEC dropped out of the discussions and the MPLA, the remaining two organizations

along with Ngwizako formed the FDLA (Frente Democratiça de Libertacao de Angola). The alliance was later to prove costly to the unity of MPLA itself.[49] By the middle of 1963 the MPLA was an organization, largely in disarray and if it had not been for the continued support of Congo-Brazzaville it might have lost a critical launching pad for its resurgence in Angola.

Zambia was the third African country to be directly involved with the liberation movements. Being continuous to Angola and also a landlocked country, Zambia had an interest in the outcome of events in Angola. Zambia, itself became independent in October 1964 and beyond the "principles of good neighborliness" which the leader of the new nation later professed, Kenneth Kaunda had an interest in guaranteeing the exit of his country's copper through the Angolan port of Lobito and also preventing the rise of Communism next door.[50] He had established a cordial relationship with Holden Roberto when they first met at the Acrra "All African People's Conference" in 1958 and had been more sympathetic to the FNLA than MPLA. With the formation of UNITA in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, whose nationalist ideology appealed to him, suport for UNITA gained ascendancy in Lusaka. The relationship between Kaunda and UNITA, was however, not trouble-free. For a time in the late 1960s Savimbi was expelled from Zambia

because of the persistent sabotage of the Benguela railroad by his movement. Overall, however, Kaunda became more concerned with uniting the liberation movements as a preventive strategy against the ascendancy of Communism in Angola.[51]

As a group, African states in the Organization of African Unity reflected the basic divisions among the liberation movements. In the early 1960s, the "radical" Casablanca bloc of states supported the MPLA, while UPA was supported by the "moderate" Monrovia bloc of states.[52] With the ascendancy of radical liberation movements in other Portuguese territories and their eventual independence, this group was added to the old Casablanca bloc of states in supporting MPLA with which they were formally linked through the trans-territorial CONCP.

The fortunes of the liberation movements within the OAU swung with the group that gained advantage. When the OAU itself was formed in 1963, it was largely a victory for the Monrovia bloc. Following that, FNLA/GRAE also gained mometary advantage which was reflected in its recognition by the OAU the same year. However, the OAU recognition was largely of symbolic effect. Although it demoralized the MPLA which was forced into seeking alliance with FNLA. While resisting the MPLA request, the FNLA was also weakening as an organization as various sectional leaders within

it began to stake personal claims to leadership in what had been recognized as the future government of an independent Angola. Perhaps most devastating to the FNLA/GRAE was the resignation of Jonas Savimbi on the eve of the Cairo summit of the OAU. At the Summit Conference, Nkrumah reopened the recognition issue. The Guinean President Sekou Toure who was the chairman of the session named three countries sympathetic to the MPLA: including Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, and the United Arab Republic to serve as conciliators between FNLA/GRAE and the MPLA. The diplomatic ascendancy of the old Casablanca group thus won in bringing the MPLA back into OAU discussions. Indeed between 1966 and 1972, because the Guinea-born Secretary General of the OAU, Diallo Telli and other officials held Roberto responsible for the failure of the liberation movements to unite, the OAU fund that was made available through its liberation committee was preferentially extended to the MPLA. In 1971, the OAU officially de-recognized the FNLA/GRAE. Between 1972 and 1973, with the resurgency of FNLA and the disarray in the MPLA, President Mobutu launched a diplomatic offensive on behalf of the FNLA among leaders of Zambia, Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville. This produced the OAU consensus in which the three liberation movements were recognized and a committee was set up to examine how they could be united.

However, toward the end of 1975, and with the intensification of the civil war, the OAU consenus began to crack resulting in the stalemate at the extraordinary summit held in January 1976.

Real national and personal interest underly the Angolan tragedy but a large part of the behavior of the different factions and states may be the complex result of perceptions and misperceptions.

Non-Alignment

The exaltation of non-alignment as a foreign policy stance has since independence become an indispensible menu in the major foreign policy statements of African leaders. While the concept brought together several Afro-Arab-Asian countries in successive conferences since 1961, it has not only evolved through different phases, when particular issues were of major concern, but it has also meant different things to different countries. [53] As a background to the analysis of the perceptions of three countries, of issues in non-alignment, this section will be devoted to tracing the development of the concept. Additionally, we will outline the areas of concern and consensus.

While one analyst pointed to a conference held at Bogor in 1954 as the beginning of a movement among a

concert of nations that identified themselves as "non-aligned,"[54] others point to the Bandung Conference of the following year.[55] There is, however, a consensus that an initial purposive credo of the movement crystalized at the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The Bandung Conference which was the first large gathering of Afro-Asian states brought together twenty-five countries. The groundwork of the conference, which had been prepared at the Bogor Conference, was designed to increase interaction and promote cooperation among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. However, the final outcome of the conference was a communique that outlined directives on a range of issues. The issues that were focused on were largely regional. The following conference, held in Belgarde in 1961, had the same number attending as the previous conference, and expanded the agenda of non-alignment. In contrast to the regional concerns of the Bandung Conference, the Belgrade Conference broadened the scope of its concern to global international issues including the cold war; issue of the recognition of Communist China; peaceful coexistence; and the use of nuclear weapons.[56] The Belgrade Conference was significant for the non-aligned movement in several respects. First, it was a watershed between the expectations of independence for a plethora of colonial proto-states and an

international arena in which the differences and awesomeness of economic and military power negated the significance of national sovereignty. Secondly, and as a partial response to the first point, the Belgrade Conference helped to solidify a base for identity in the non-aligned movement and, thirdly the initial role and function of the movement was defined at the Conference. Subsequent conferences merely broadened the membership and agenda of the movement.[57] For example, while only twenty-five countries participated at the Belgrade Conference, the figure had doubled at the Cairo Conference, which attracted forty-seven. The figure continued to increase as newly independent nations joined the movement and in Lusaka in 1970, fifty-four members attended the Conference; in Algiers, 1973, seventy-five attended and in Colombo, 1976, there were eighty-six members. The number has since stabilized around that figure. The Belgrade Conference had broadened the agenda and resolutions of the non-aligned states. Subsequent declarations of the movement reads like the "what is what of global international conflicts and issues."[58]

Just as the starting point of the nonaligned movement is in dispute, so are the reasons or circumstances for its emergence. The most common reason given for the emergence of the non-aligned movement is the evolution, after the

Second World War, of bipolarity as an international regime. The protracted conflict that pitched the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, against each other in a nuclear stalmate was viewed as potentially dangerous to the nascent states of Asia and Africa. These countries, according to this view, feared the consequences of being drawn into the power game of the two power blocs. Non-alignment was therefore an assertive response that rejected the game.[59] Proponents of this thesis have, therefore, attempted to separate the principles and practice of non-alignment to determine which of the countries, that profess non-alignment, are qualitatively and in "fact" non-aligned.[60] While super-power rivalry contributed and accentuated the development of non-alignment, there are other contributing factors. Colonialism provided the common historical source of identification for most of the non-aligned countries while non-alignment provided the arena for the articulation of disparate concerns of the state.s

Another strain of extremity in the explanation of the emergence of non-alignment is the contention by a Yugoslav diplomat that

> In the search for the sources of non-alignment, one has to go much further in time than determined dates. These sources have to be sought primarily in the processes that created conditions for changing the existing

> international political and economic relations. These processes were ushered in by the October Revolution.61/

This view represents the attempt of Eastern bloc countries, especially those of them in the non-aligned movement, to find a common ground between non-alignment and their ideological preferences. By contrast, many Western analysts, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, were profoundly suspicious of the movement. As Crabb observed, Western analysts explained the emergence of non-alignment by reference to "lack of realism in the evaluation of global issues." This lack of realism, they believed to be deeply "rooted in a moral obtuseness" that prevented these countries from understanding the "nature of the communist menance."[62] Additionally, there was the suggestion that the non-aligned bandwagon was a self-serving option designed by some countries to play the West against the East in order to obtain foreign assistance from both.[63]

The different attitudes of the West and Eastern block countries either overstate or oversimplify the complex and disparate needs that created and sustain the non-aligned movement. Somewhere between the different perspectives lies the vast, complex and real needs of the different countries in the movement and nothing can be more instructive than the agenda of the Belgrade Conference, the declaration of subsequent conferences which became

increasingly more extensive. With only twenty-five countries attending the Belgrade Conference, the meeting covered such broad and wide ranging issues as (1) respect for the right of people to self-determination: the fight against imperialism and liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism; (2) respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity of states: non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states; (3) an end to racial discrimination and apartheid; (4) general and total disarmament: banning nuclear tests; dealing with the problem of foreign military bases; (5) promotion of peaceful coexistence among nations with different political and social systems; (6) study of purpose and composition of the United Nations and implementation of its resolutions and (7) study the problems concerning uneven economic development and improvement of international, economic and technical cooperation.

This range of issues goes beyond the issue of super-power politics which is usually presumed to be the wellspring of non-alignment. In fact very little attention was given to the issue at the Bandung Conference. The issue came to the centerstage of discourse among non-aligned states just as it was of concern to the two super powers who were trying to contain each other by stockpiling nuclear weapons and courting allies among the

nascent states. By contrast the dominant focus, in recent times, of the non-aligned states concern the "low politics" of North-South economic disparities.

The driving force in the evolution of the non-aligned movement can therefore be located in the multifarious needs of the different countries whose largely common history of recent colonial status bound them together. That heritage also launched them into an international arena of power politics in which, individually, they were insignificant. In this regard, the evolution of non-alignment can be regarded as a search for identity. In its active form, it was the articulation of the different interests of the countries that were members of the movement.

The role of colonialism in the evolution of non-alignment derives from the inherent nature of colonial domination. It implied the subjugation of people and the denial of their identity. Non-aligment in the post-colonial states was therefore partly an attempt to reassert that identity. Thus, in Africa, non-alignment was reinforced by other concepts such as Pan-Africanism and African Personality. However, the implications of these concepts, including non-alignment itself were in dispute. At the minimum, there was agreement that the concept implied freedom of choice and action in national and international affairs. Indeed to attempt to define the

concept beyond this minimal requirement is to take the preferred narrow view of a particular state or group of states. It will be useful, however, for us to examine variations in the theme of non-alignement.

The various themes which emerge from non-alignment reflect diverse perception of national interests and concerns. The point was well understood by an observer of the Belgrade Conference who depicted the maneuvers in that conference:

> Some are busiedly inclined to favor one of the two super powers; others are involved in cold wars of their own -- the Arabs against Israel, India and Afganistan and Pakistan, Ghana against Togo and Ivory Coast, Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and so on.64/

The basic consensus, in the non-aligned movement, of independent choice and actions facilitates variations in choice and level of activity in international affairs. Different countries have different designations for the level of activity which their non-aligned posture grants them. We thus have such designations as "positive," "active" and "dynamic" neutrality. For instance, Nkrumah in describing his country's non-alignment as "positive neutrality" explained that Ghana did not "choose to play the role of a silent spectator in world affairs or in matters which affect [our] country's vital interest and the destiny of African people.[65] [Our] policy of positive

neutralism is not a passive or neutralist policy. It is a positive policy based on our firm belief in positive action."[66] Speaking with the same intention to act, but with an entirely different objective, an Indonesian leader suggested that the key element in that country's "active and independent" policy is "to do [our] utmost to prevent a next war which [we] believe will only result in the extinction of human civilization."[67] Morocco perhaps represented the mainstream of non-alignment in Africa when its leaders emphasized that its policy of "non-dependence did not mean that Morocco seeks to remain in isolation. On the contrary, Morocco intends to maintain friendly relations with all countries."[68] The peculiar problems of Israel are highlighted by its policy of "nonidentification" which it equated with "an independent foreign policy prompted by the necessity for the state to recognize its responsibilities ... for making its own contribution toward the preservation of international peace."[69]

On the question of the relationship of the non-aligned states to the superpowers, there are also divergences in attitudes. In the non-alignment movement, there is an ideological spectrum covering from highly pro-Soviet states to those that are pro-Western. During the Belgrade Conference, the group of Militant African Socialist states, which included Ghana, Mali and Guinea were pro-Soviet. The

best articulation of the pro-Soviet strain in the non-aligned movement was expressed by Fidel Castro who argued that:

> Different ways of dividing the world have been presented at this meeting. For us the World is divided into capitalist and socialist countries, imperailist and socialist countries, imperialist and neocolonized countries, colonialist and colonized countries, reactionary and progressive countries, governments that support imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and governments that are against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism.70/

For Castro and most of the socialist countries in the non-aligned movement, the true world of non-alignment is the socialist world, while the rest is the enemy of non-alignment. The socialist countries therefore justify their close association with the Soviet Union in these terms. In reality, however, there are countries close to the middle on the scale of attitude towards both the West and the East. These would include a large number of the Arab states who reject the Western democracy and socialism at the same time. On the other end of the spectrum are those countries such as Liberia and a large number of former French African territories who have maintained very close ideological relations with the West. In many countries, political instability has resulted in periodic swing from one end of the spectrum to the other.[71] In spite of the different ideological preferences of these

countries, there is a common thread in the insistence that the freedom to choose preferences is an integral part of non-alignment. Thus Julius Nyerere expressed his country's non-alignment as a policy which rejected the idea of *friends choosing enemies for them.* Similarly Prime Minister Nehru, once observed that non-alignment meant "an independent nation functioning according to to its own lights" whereas alignment meant "being regimented to do something which you do not like and thereby giving up a certain measure of your own independent judgement and thinking."[72] The former Premier of Algeria went so far as to say that for Algeria "we are aligned with nobody, not even with non-alignment."[73] The same view was shared by Nigeria's first Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was opposed to all kinds of blocs.[74] The most pragmatic formulation of the non-alignment stance was expressed by President Banda of Malawi who stated that

> When the West is doing what I think is right for Malawi, I will align with the West. When the East is doing what is good for Malawi, I will align with the East.75/

A final point in this background analysis concerns the implications of non-alignment for the policies of the countries in the movement. The different views and concerns encompassed by non-alignment should and does have divergent policy implications. However, many scholars

believe that most of the countries in the movement are in fact aligned. The apparent contradiction stems largely from the tendency of the analysts to impose their definition on a concept for which there is little agreement. Typically, this approach begins with the assumption that non-alignment is a response to the power politics between the super powers and the policy expectations of all non-aligned countries should reflect a balance in transactions involving such indicators as trade, aid, investment, diplomatic and military ties with the power blocs. The approach neglects the diversity of concerns and interests of the countries that profess the concept. It is, therefore, not surprising that studies using this approach generally find little connection between "conceptual" and "practical" non-alignment.[76] An alternative approach that examines the phenomenon intersubjectively is more likely to indicate the true nature of the relationships between specific conceptualization of non-alignment by individual leaders and the practices or policies that stem from it.

The danger of imposing the analyst's definition on the concept exists even in selecting a specific issue in non-alignment for examination. However, an issue such as relations with the power blocs is so central to non-alignment that different perceptions of it and the

policies that stem from those perceptions may be examined. Moreover, since much work on the concept has been done based on the relations of the non-aligned countries with the power blocs, important theoretical conclusions may be facilitated by focusing on a comparable aspect. In our analysis for the various countries, our concern with non-alignment will therefore pay particular attention to the aspect that deals with the relations of these countries with the power blocs.

References - Chapter II

[1]The Economic community envisages, as an ultimate objective, a common market. For details of the functional scope of ECOWAS, See Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWS), (Lagos: Government Printer 1975).

[2]See West Africa No. 3381 (May 24, 1982).

[3]The security motive in Nigeria's interest in ECOWAS was stated by Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner for External Affairs See Daily Times 5, (August 1970).

[4]See West Africa No. 3381 (May 1982)

[5]For theoretical elaborations of the pre-conditons for integration see Phillip Schmitter "A revisited theory of Reginal Integration" International Organization, 24 (4) (1970); Also "Three Neo-Functional Hypothesis about International Integration" International Organization 23 (1) (1969); Karl W. Deutsch et. al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957); Leon Lindberg and Scheinbgold, Stuart, Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Harvard University Press 1971).

[6]Quoted in John P. Renninger, Multinational Cooperation for Development in West AFrica (New York Pergamon Press 1979) p. 45.

[7]See Karl W. Deutsch et. al. op. cit. p. 138.

[8]See George Abangwu, Ernest Haas, Phillipe Schmitter and Hans Singer "Pre-Conditions for Regional Economic Integration" International Developmetn Review 19 (September 1967), p. 131.

[9]See John Renninger, op. cit. p. 48.

[10]Quoted in John Renninger. ibid.

[11]For the views of Tommy Hope, The Chairman, Sierra Leone Chamber of Commrce, See Daily Mail (Freetown January 22, 1976).

[12]See Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS op. cit. Article 25.

[13]The countries that have been free of coup d'etat include Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Guinea. Of these Guinea has had an attempted invasion of her territory by mercenary elements.

[14]See Enerst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration" International Organization 30, (April 1976), p. 179.

[15]See Timothy Shaw "Regional Cooperation and Conflict in Africa" International Journal, 30, (Autumn 1975) p. 683.

[16]Among some of the problems, the ECOWAS fund that was supposed to compensate for losses to member states, was itself in need of finding See West Africa 3381, 24 May 1982. Additionally the protocl which enforced the free movement of persons has not been uniformly implemented. The process of total liberalization has not made significant headway.

[17]See Economic Cooperation in Africa: Programe of Activities for 1967-68_ (E/CN 14/386 1967)

[18]See ECOWAS Treaty op cit. Article 2.

[19]Ibid.

[20]A recent report of the Economic Commission for Africa details the "Stagnation and regression" in the process of economic integration in West Africa. E.C.A.: Economic Integration in West Africa 1982. p. 4.

[21]West Africa May 24, 1982.

[22]Ibid.

[23]The material that were found to be most useful for this section include Colin Legun and Thomas Hodges After Angola: The War in Southern Africa London (Rex Collings 1976); John Marcum The Angolan Revolution (2 volumes) Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press 1969 and 1978; John Stockwell In Search of Enemies A CIA Story, New York W. W. Norton 1978, Basil Davidson "independence of Portuguese Africa: Background and Emergence in 1974" in Africa Contemporary Record Londo Rex Collings 1975; Christian Rotholm and Richard Dale eds., Southern African in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics New York: Free Press 1972.

[24]See Gwendolen Carter Independence for Africa, New York: Praeger 1960, p. 99.

[25]See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Vol. I op. cit. p. 120.

[26]Holden Roberto assumed leadership in 1960 the movement had hiterto been led by his uncle Barios Necaca.

[27]Roberto was quoted as saying that during a three week visit to Angola in 1951 his witnessing of the brutalization of a helpless old man by a calloused Portuguese chefe de posto shocked him into political activism. See John Marcom. Vol. I op. cit. p. 65.

[28]For details on emergency of Abako and Kongo Nationalism, See Crawford Young Politics in the Congo (Princeton, NJ: Prinecton University Press, 1965), p. 505.

[29]For the debate on the organizational sources fo the violence, See John Marcum Vol. I op. cit. p. 129.

[30]Ibid. p. 28.

[31]Ibid. p. 43.

[32]For details of Savimbi's rationale for forming UNITA, see John Marcum Vo. 2., op. cit. pp. 165-166.

[33]Elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict featured in the split between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi charged Roberto with accepting Israeli assistance and attempted to use that for securing assistance from Arab countries.

[34]The Angola Military Junta under Admiral Rosa Coutinho sympathized with the MPLA wich it described as "left-leaing movement of progressive ideas." It was also responsible for the crackdown of white separatist party PDCA during October 1974.

[35]Quoted in John Marcum Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 61.

[36]While Roberto had met John Kennedy in 1960, a fact finding mission for the Presidential Candidate led by Averel Harriman in September 1960 did not meet with the MPLA leadership who had tried in vain to meet and tell the mission of the "deplorable tragedy" facing all Angolans. See John Marcum ibid. p. 94.

[37]In 1962 the U.S. voted in support of a UN resolution which affirmed Angola's right to self-determination (United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1742 (XVI), January 30, 1962). In December of the same year, it voted against a resolution which included the request that all states refrain from offering assistance that could enable Portuguese goverment to continue its regression of the peoples of its colonial territories. (United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1807 (XVII) December 14, 1962).

[38]See John Marcum op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 237.

[39]The "Tar Baby" option was adopted following a reassessment of U.S. policy in the Region. The product of the policy re-evaluation was the Kissinger Study. See Mohammed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen eds. The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Memorandum 39, (Westport, Conn. Lawrence Hill and Co. 1976).

[40]Ibid.

[41]See John Marcum op. cit. Vol. 2 p. 263.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Agostinho Neto himself blamed two factors in the U.S. perception of his movement, namely: the location of MPLA headquarters in Guinea between 1960-61), and charges of communist influence within the MPLA by Holden Roberto ibid. p. 14.

[45]Ibid. p. 257.

[46]Soviet aid is based on U.S. intelligence estimates See John Marcum ibid. p. 263.

[47]Fidel Castro justified the direct Cuban involvement as a response to the South African intervention, ibid. 275.

[48]Nigeria, Tanzania and Ghana were among those countries that dramatically altered their orientations in the conflict following the South African Invasion.

[49]The alliance between the MPLA and the moderate Bakango groups led to the split between the more radical elements in the MPLA, let by Virato Cruz and Agostinto Neto.

[50]For excerpts of Kaunda's "Principles of Good Neighborliness" see Colin Legum op. cit. pp. 33-34.

[51]The expression of this fear of communism was the theme of Kaunda's visit and discussions with U.S. officials in 1975.

[52]The dividing line between radical and moderate has not been a consistent one. There has been a constant flux resulting from changing domestic political situations and international realignments.

[53]See Nazli Choucri "The Non-Aligment of Afro-Asian States: Policy Perception and Behavior" Canadian Journal of Political Science 2, 1, (March 1969), p. 4.

[54]See Cecil Crabb Jr., The Elephant and the Grass: A study in Nonalignment (New York: Praeger 1965), p. 3.

[55]Nazli Choucri, op. cit. p. 5.

[56]Identification with non-alignment is not necessarily acceptance of the group as a bloc. Non-alignment was intended among other things to enhance the identify of the individual states. The issue has been a subject of controversy in the movement. For different positions of the non-aligned states in the debate, See Cecil Crabb op. cit. p. 9.

[57]See, For example, the declarations of the fifth Summit Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 1967 in A. Singham ed. The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics (Westport Conn: Lawrence and Hill 1977), pp. 234-272.

[58]The view that non-alignment is a response solely to the cold war is effectively dispelled by Shepard. See George Sheperd, Jr. Non-aligned Black Africa: An International Sub-System (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington 1970), p. 6.

[59]This perspective is encountered in Nazli Choucri "The Non-alignment of Afro-Asian States" op. cit. and Gordon Idang Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy op. cit.

[60]See D. Belovski "Non-alignment and the foreign policy of Yugoslavia" in A. Singham , ed. op. cit. p. 6.

[61]Ibid.

[62]See Cecil Crabb op. cit. p. 39.

[63]Ibid. p. 40.

[64]Quoted in Cecil Crabb ibid. p. 9.

[65]See Africa Digest 7, (February 1960), p. 132.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Quoted in Cecil Crabb op cit. p. 8.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Quoted in Singham, op. cit. p. 15.

[71]Examples of the swing in orientation inside such countries as Ethiopia, Ghana and Benin.

[72]Quoted in Cecil Crabb op. cit. p. 11.

[73]Ibid. p. 12.

[74]Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa was opposed to all blocs including the constitution of the non-aligned movement as a bloc.

[75]Quoted in Cecil Crabb, op. cit. p. 12.

[76]See for example Nazli Choucri op. cit.
See D. Belovsk

CHAPTER III

NIGERIA: LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Nigerian Leadership and the Domestic Political Environment

The issues in our investigation and the time-span covered for each corresponds to three separate administrations in Nigeria. We therefore begin the analysis of the perceptions by the country's leaders of those issues by first identifying the leadership and their domestic, political and decision-making environments.

The focus on the formation of ECOWAS between 1970 and 1975 corresponds to the military administration of General Yakubu Gowon. The critical decisions on the Angolan conflict between 1975 and 1976 were made by succeeding military administration of General Muritala Mohammed. The period of non-alignment covered, between 1960 and 1966, corresponds to the first independent Nigerian government, which was the civilian administration of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.[1]

When Nigeria attained national independence from Britain in October 1960, it operated a federal constitution, and the government was based on the Westminister model of parliamentary democracy. However,

the features of Nigeria federalism imposed severe strains on the smooth functioning of the parliamentary system. The federation comprised three regions, North, East and West, of unequal sizes. The North was larger and more populous than the other two regions put together. This in effect gave it a political veto at the federal level and as long as regionalism was a popular sentiment and majority rule a political formula, there was no way that politicians from the other two regions, either individually or in concert could hope to lead the country.[2] Indeed, because of the unique evolution of the regions: each administered separately; with different cultural and educational influences; and dominant ethnic groups within them, regionalism became such a powerful force that the political parties that evolved were also regional.[3] The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) which, as its name implies, was the party of the North, was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani; the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) was based in the East and was dominated by the Ibo; while the Action Group (AG) which was based in the West was dominated by the Yoruba. Other minority parties in these regions which evolved either as a result of disaffection with the dominant parties or based on sentiments of ethnic minority elements with the regions include the National Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt

Congress (UMBC), in the North; and Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP), in the West.

The parliamentary system required substantial majority seats in the legislature for effective government. The NPC which was naturally the majority party, by virtue of the size of the Northern electorate, still needed an alliance with one of the other parties to form an effective government. The party, therefore, formed a coalition government with the NCNC and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the deputy leader of the NPC became Prime Minister.[4] As the opposition leader, Obafemi Awolowo of the AG, in a telling observation, remarked that the coalition was "an enforced association of incompatibles" because the program and ideologies of the two parties were diametrically opposed.[5]

In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that the complex interaction between the features of Nigerian Federalism and the parliamentary system would operate to decentralize foreign policy-making or render decision-making altogether impossible. On the contrary, however, the formulation and execution of foreign policy, in spite of the enormous rancour it generated, was highly centralized. As various analysts have observed, the foreign policy leadership during the Balewa administration "was made up of a handful of Federal Ministers, the

Ministers of State and top bureaucrats in the Ministry of External Affairs, with Sir Abubakar always dominating." In our consideration of non-alignment, therefore, we shall be focusing on the leadership of Balewa.[6]

The political environment under which the ECOWAS decisions were made was quite different from that sketched above. In the first place, the Gowon administration which made the decision was a military regime. Secondly, after 1970, the tensions on decision-making created by both the nature of Nigerian Federalism and the democratic process had, temporarily, been removed by the creation of new states in 1967 and the proscription of political activities earlier in 1966 when the military first took over power.

Nigeria had its first military coup d'etat in January 1966 and General Yakubu Gowon (then Lieutenant Colonel) came to power in a counter-coup in July of the same year. For the following four years, Nigeria gradually moved in the direction of political chaos which included a major civil war. The end of the civil war and the generous reconciliation which followed, coupled with the promise of national prosperity that was the result of massive oil revenues brought some measure of stability to the country. It was during this period that the Gowon administration started to focus on foreign affairs, including the initiatives for the formation of ECOWAS.

Under the administration, the bureaucrats assumed enormous power both in the formulation and execution of policy. The two policy-making organs of the government were the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The FEC which included senior civil servants (permanent secretaries) and their commissioners formulated policies and made recommendations to the SMC which was composed of the military service chiefs and the head of state. The main actors in the administration that promoted the ECOWAS idea included the Commissioner for Economic Development, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji; the external affairs commissioner, Dr. Okoi Arikpo and the head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, who indicated that he did not need any persuasion by bureaucrats about the necessity of the community.[7]

The leadership of General Yakubu Gowon ended abruptly in July 1975 following a bloodless coup d'etat in which General Muritala Mohammed came to power. The dissatisfactions which set the stage for the coup and the efforts of the new administration to address them provided the domestic political environment within which the Angolan decision was made. The enhanced leadership of General Gowon which followed the end of the civil war and the post-war reconciliation effort began to wane after 1973. Among the factors that contributed to the decline were:

the inability of the administration to prepare and set a program for a return to a democratically elected civilian government. At the end of the civil war, General Gowon had promised to return the country to civilian rule in 1976. He later postponed the date to 1978 and finally suggested again that the date was unrealistic, without further suggesting a realistic date. Indeed, the reasons he gave for reneging on the promises left the impression that he was insincere about handing over power to a democratically elected government.[8] The other unresolved issue which corroded the popularity of the administration included the problem of widespread corruption at all levels of government, including the armed forces and particularly the military governors of the states.[9] The scale and level of corruption which was brought out by a scandal over the import of cement, coupled with mismanagement in the economy had created contradictions which Gowon himself characterized as "want in the midst of plenty" had been a source of dissatisfaction with the government.[10] Other reasons for dissatisfaction include the failure to resolve the controversial population census upon which the distribution of government resources would be based; and dissatisfactions with the number and composition of states in the federal system. By 1975, the frustrations over the inability of the Gowon administration to deal with these

problems made the coup, in which General Mohammed emerged as leader, a welcome change.

The new administration came to power, charging that the previous government "had become too insensitive to the true yearnings of the people" and set out to deal with the problems.[11] Within a period, a little short of eight months during which General Mohammed was in power, he set in motion a process that was to return the country to democratic rule in 1979; embarked on a massive purge of government agencies to rid them of corrupt officials; set aside the controversial census figures and temporarily settled the issue of states by creating nineteen states out of the original twelve which had been created by Gowon in 1967. It was during these widespread changes that the Angolan decision was made.

The decision-making environment in the Mohammed administration was different from that in the previous government. Whereas the FEC formulated policies and made recommendations to the SMC in the Gowon administration, during the rule of General Mohammed the situation changed. The SMC formulated policy and passed directives down to the FEC about implementation. This curtailed the power of the permanent secretaries who were also removed from the FEC. Furthermore, many of the permanent secretaries had become victims of the massive purge of the bureaucracy. General

Mohammed's control of the foreign policy was further enhanced by the fact that his External Affairs Commissioner, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Garba, who was one of the leaders of the coup that brought him to power, was also a member of the SMC. The two of them, with advice from sources outside the bureaucracy, constituted the Nigerian leadership in the Angolan crisis.

Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS 1970-1975

States exist in what Kenneth Waltz accurately describes as a self-help system.[12] The shared goals of development in West Africa which is assumed by experts and leaders in the region to inhere in a strategy of regional economic integration, has relevance which is nationally perceived and defined. In taking the initiative in late 1970 to revive the idea of West African community, Nigerian leaders perceived that benefits would accrue to their country and that defined their action. These perceived benefits were economic, security and political in nature.

Several analysts expressed skepticism about the economic benefits that Nigeria could derive from pursuing a regional economic community. In the 1960s when the idea was first suggested, Gerald Helleiner argued that Nigeria would gain little or nothing from it.[13] When the Government of General Yakubu Gowon again took the initiative in early

1970, Dotun Phillips also suggested that Nigeria would gain little or nothing and that its crusade for its formation was "an exercise in futility."[14] On the other hand, General Gowon and his advisors, including his Commissioner for Economic Development, Adebayo Adedeji believing that the decade of the 1970s would mark Nigeria's industrial takeoff viewed the West African region as an indispensible market for both raw material and finished goods.[15]

The basis of this optimism was the enhanced economic position of the country. Before the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War which lasted between 1967 and 1970, oil had become an important revenue earner for the country. Although the revenue yield from oil was a modest $213 million, its value had surpassed other major exports such as cocoa, cotton, rubber and groundnut. The interlude of the war, however, lowered the production of oil but soon after the war, both the output and revenue earned per barrel spiralled. Whereas, pre-war output stood at a high of 600,000 barrels per day, it rose swiftly, beginning in 1970, to a daily output of about 2 million barrels by 1975. The price hikes of about 180 percent that started in 1973 sent revenues soaring. The result was that between 1971 and 1975 revenues rose from $860 million to $6.9 billion. A trade deficit of $38 million in 1973 was wiped out the following year with a surplus of $136 million, freeing

substantial amount for capital investment. An overall growth in the economy which stood at a high of 8.5 percent in 1972/73 rose to 12.5 percent in 1974/75.

These economic indicators led officials of the Gowon administration to envisage a development plan that would among other things lay the basis for the country's industrial take-off. Thus in the development plan drawn for the period 1975-1980, 6 billion was allocated to the industrial sector. This was over thirty times the amount allocated to the sector in the earlier plan. The amount was expected to develop petroleum related industries, iron and steel, cement, sugar, paper and pulp.

General Yakubu Gowon and his advisers believed that the profitability of these ventures would depend on a West African market that would be both a source of raw materials and finished goods. Dr. Adebayo Adedeji who led the country's crusade for the formation of ECOWAS argued that it would give Nigeria "access to some raw material which are either not available in the country or available in poor quality."[16] He suggested that the proposed iron and steel industry would have to rely on iron ore from Guinea and Liberia. Additionally, administration officials believed that joint industrial projects for items such as sugar, cement in the countries where the raw materials

existed would amount to savings in foreign exchange for the country.[17]

When the initial diplomatic contacts that would bring about an all inclusive community that would facilitate Nigeria's national objectives met with little response from leaders in the region, the Gowon administration started a different approach. The administration decided to proceed by dealing with individual countries that were willing to form an economic association with Nigeria and also signing trade pacts with them. The first of these associations was with Togo. A treaty signed between the two countries in April 1972 was described by the Togolese leader as the "embryo of a West African Economic Community."[18] By the middle of 1973, Nigeria had signed bilateral trade agreements with ten of the fourteen West African states. Furthermore, the Gowon administration undertook to work out joint projects with several countries including the purchase of 10 percent share in the iron ore company, Mifergui-Nimba & Simandou, of Guinea in June 1973. In return for this, Nigeria was guaranteed one million tons of high quality iron ore every year. Other joint ventures include a sugar factory in the Republic of Benin in which the Nigerian government owned 46 percent of the equity share. A joint cement factory was proposed for Togo to tap the abundant limestone in that country. This was expected

to free the foreign exchange that was being spent for massive imports of the product from Europe.[19]

These practical steps underlined the economic interests of Nigerian leaders in pursuing the formation of a West African community. However, the further interest in having a less competitive access to the regional market of Nigerian products required the elimination of trade barriers and the establishment of common tariffs region-wide.

Events in Europe also persuaded Nigerian leaders that there were other benefits to be derived from the formation of the community. In early 1972, Britain, which was the country's major trading partner, along with Denmark and Ireland successfully negotiated agreements to join the European Economic Community (EEC). The entry of Britain in to the EEC meant that those countries, including Nigeria, which enjoyed preferential trade agreements with it were suddenly faced with the common tariff wall of the EEC. For its products to be competitive with those of other less developed countries that had negotiated associate membership with the EEC, Nigeria needed to enter into a similar arrangement. On the other hand, there were both ideological and economic implications in association. Ideologically, Nigerian leaders have successively opposed association on the grounds that it represented a

neo-colonial relationship. Even the pro-Western government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's first head of government, had rejected the concept in 1962 when Britain first applied for membership of the EEC. He suggested, in its stead, regional economic groupings within Africa, coupled with the diversification of the country's external trade.[20]

The EEC did not help to dispel the perception that association with it did not imply neo-colonialism. The associate arrangements that it worked out with different African groups had very discouraging implications. Firstly, it negotiated different terms for different groups even though all of the groups were exporters of primary products. For example, the nineteen associate members that signed the Yaounde Convention secured better treatment than that offered the East Africans under the Arusha Agreement of the still-born Agreement with Nigeria in 1966 under the Lagos Convention. This led critics of association to suggest that the EEC's designs implied the political "balkanization" of Africa.[21]

A second point concerns the economic implication of association. In negotiations for associate status, the EEC generally stuck rigidly to the principle of reciprocity. Under this condition, in return for granting favorable trade terms that are applicable to non-associate countries,

the associates undertook to grant the most-favored-nation status to the countries of the community. Critics viewed this arrangement as guarantee that perpetually subordinated the associate members to the role of primary export producers, with no prospects of industrialization. The influential Nigerian daily newspaper, the New Nigerian, warned the government against signing a Yaounde type of agreement with EEC because "this would have the effect of roping us in to join the host of client states in a scarcely veiled neo-colonialist division of labor between Europe and Africa."[22]

The Gowon administration shared this view and for it, EEC signified three reinforcing imperatives for the formation of ECOWAS. First, the need to safeguard a potential regional market for its expected industrial products required negotiating with EEC in concert with the countries of the region within the framework of an economic community in which trade barriers were removed and a common external tariff established. This was considered important because the terms of reciprocity that the EEC insisted on for its associates would shut out Nigeria's access to the regional market due to more competitive products from the EEC. It was for this reason that the Nigerian head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, insisted that the country would make any sacrifice to effect a West African Common

Market before negotiating with the enlarged European Common Market.[23]

Beyond the perceived consequences of association with the EEC in the absence of a West African Common Market, Nigerian leaders also believed that better terms could be obtained from the EEC as a bloc. To secure what the administrations' trade commissioner described as remunerative trading arrangements for our products,"[24] General Gowon believed that, as he put it, "Unless all African nations come together and pool their resources together... Africa can never achieve any partnership of equality and friendship with any powerful region of the world."[25] In another instance he emphasized the same theme by suggesting that "only through joint cooperative efforts can the African states hope to benefit economically from any arrangement with either the EEC or any other powerful economic regional grouping in the world."[26]

A final point is that the successes of the EEC and the desire of Britain to join it was inspirational to the expectations of the Gowon administration that a similar success could be achieved through a West African community. In an interview with the news magazine, West Africa, several years after the formation of ECOWAS, General Gowon admitted among other things, that the experience of post-war recovery in Europe through the EEC influenced his

interest in pursuing the integration scheme in West Africa.[27] From this perspective, Britain's entry into the EEC in 1972 hastened this interest. The President of the Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Mines, and Industry who had been promoting the idea of ECOWAS with the encouragement of General Gowon, told a meeting of the West African Chambers of Commerce in 1972 that the lesson to be drawn from Britain's attempt to enter the European community, was that all African countries should also come together to pool their resources for regional development.[28] An imperfect parallel between Nigeria's interests in ECOWAS and Britain's entry into the EEC was also drawn when the Nigerian commissioners for finance suggested that

> If Britain with her unique history, geography and past achievements could brush everything aside to embark on a new experiment on economic integration, then African countries and other third world countries should come together to form similar regional markets...29/

In sum, the relevance of the European community for the interest of the Gowon administration in pursuing the formation of ECOWAS had two complimentary facets. In the first place, the success of the community provided the historical analogue to the perception that a similar organization in West AFrica would be beneficial. Secondly, and more importantly, ECOWAS was perceived as the vehicle by which the challenges posed to Nigeria's economic

interests by the EEC could be resolved. the nature of these challenges included the potential losses by Nigeria of revenue, due to Britain's entry into the EEC, and the loss of a potential West African market, due to the countries in the region individually seeking associate relations with the community. The formation of ECOWAs, in the view of the Gowon administration would meet these challenges, by providing a collective framework for negotiating favorable terms, especially terms that would safeguard trade between the associate members.

Politically, ECOWAS for the Gowon administration represented an arena of diplomatic leadership. The Nigerian preoccupation with a civil war between 1967 and 1970 had placed it beyond the pale of African diplomatic initiative. At the end of the war, therefore, the administration was anxious to start playing an active diplomatic role in Africa. ECOWAS, in this regard was an aspect of a much broader effort by the Gowon administration to reassert the country's international political stature. These interests led to diplomatic processes which Herskovits describes vividly:

> ...From 1971 and moving in ever-widening circles Gowon and his foreign ministry...tackled its neighbors, first: Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Cameroun, Togo. State visits led to long-term interest-free loans, bilateral agreements on building NIgerian-financed roads across borders and reviving moribund efforts at economic

cooperation through projects dealing with power, communication and transport.30/

In spite of these bilateral diplomatic iniatives, the Gowon administration still felt that there was a political need to pursue the formation of a region-wide community. The administration believed that the cohesiveness of the Francophone states and their collective association with France undermined the potential influence of Nigeria in the region. It was believed, therefore, that a community that cut across the linguistic barriers of former French and English colonial territories would reduce the influence of France among the Francophone countries.[31]

To win over the West African states, especially Francophone states, to join the West African community, Nigeria embarked on a mixture of active but low-keyed diplomacy and generous offers of benefits from her oil resources. The diplomatic style was the consequence of two factors. First, General Gowon believed that the support of Ivory Coast was indispensable for any regional arrangement that would include the Francophone states because of its dominant position among the group.[32] Yet relations between the two countries were badly soured by the diplomatic recognition granted to the secessionist Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War. The Gowon adminsitration was therefore very anxious to effect a reconcilation. He recalled that

his "personal commitment to peace and unity in the sub-region and Africa as a whole made him offer reconciliation to those countries which supported Biafra."[33] He further recalled his first meeting with the Ivorian leader, Felix Houphouet-Boigny: "It was coolish and you could see in him tenseness... but I did my best to reassure him that I was sincere about reconciliation and even thanked him for looking after Ojukwu (the secessionist leader)..."[34]

A second factor which explains the low-keyed nature of Nigeria's diplomatic effort to bring about the formation of ECOWAS was its size and economic potential. Many of the countries in the region feared that they would be swamped by Nigeria's size and economic potential. General Gowon also recalled that many of the leaders of the Francophone countries indicated to him that they had been warned by France about the possibility of Nigeria stifling them. For this reason, the administration proceeded very cautiously and as Gowon himself indicated later, "I don't think that I gave them any cause to think that one day I would wake up and use my size and economic power to sweep over the neighboring countries."[35]

In substantive terms, Nigeria promised to sell crude oil at concessionary prices to the West African states whose terms of trade were badly affected by the oil crisis

of 1973. More concrete financial aid was given to those states that were most affected by the Sahel drought, including Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta.

Aside from the economic and political considerations that motivated Nigeria's interest in ECOWAS, Nigerian leaders also perceived security benefits in the arrangement. As Aluko points out, it was firmly believed that as long as there are weak states on Nigeria's borders and depending on extra-African powers, especially France, for their political, economic and military survival, the country's security could not be assured. This consideration led General Yakubu Gowon to invite Cameroun and Chad, both members of the Central African sub-region, to join ECOWAS.[36] The Foreign Minister Dr. Okoi Arikpo also indicated that the administration was prepared to assist neighboring states in establishing joint development projects for security reasons.

As our analysis so far shows, Nigeria played a dominant role in the formation of ECOWAS. Nigerian policy-makers were in no doubt about the leadership role which they perceived for the country in the formation of ECOWAS, General Gowon himself had said that the ECOWAS idea agreed with his thinking and that he "did not need any convincing by the bureaucrats about the role Nigeria should play in such a group." He therefore "did everything

possible to see the birth of ECOWAS."[37] However, the nature of the leadership displayed was a mixture of moderation and quiet persuasion through the offer of incentives.

Nigeria and the Angolan Conflict 1975-1976

The Angolan conflict was the first foreign policy test for an administration that came to power primarily concerned with a number of unresolved domestic issues. In July 1975, the military rule of General Yakubu Gowon was terminated by bloodless coup d'etat from which General Muritala Mohammed emerged as Nigeria's new leader. On assumption of power, General Mohammed's immediate concerns were the problems of widespread corruption; the controversy over the number of states in the Nigeria Federal system; the disputed population census figures; and the framework and timetable for a return to parlimentary democracy. The Angolan conflict was a distant concern and it was not until November that the administration's perceptions and attitudes crystallized in the form that became distinctively identified with it. The event that precipitated greater concern with the Angolan conflict on the part of the administration was the incursion, in late October of South Africa, into Angolan territory.

Between January and November 1975, Nigerian government official perceived the greatest problem in Angolan conflict to involve the intense rivalry between the three liberation movements. In the struggle which was aimed at gaining control of the Angolan national government, due to be independent in November 1975, Nigerian leaders clearly favored UNITA and pledged military support for its leader Jonas Savimbi in the middle of 1975. They, however, believed that the interest of Angola would be better served by attempting to resolve the conflict by bringing the three liberation movements together to form a government of national unity. They also believed that lack of agreement between the three movements would provide opportunities for the superpowers to escalate the conflict and so favored the OAU mediation effort which they hoped would insulate the conflict from open and intense involvement by extra-African forces.[38] Nigerian leaders were aware that the United States and the Soviet Union were already involved in the conflict but the more visible and open support given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union was particularly resented. On November 8, 1975, the Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner, Joseph Garba, indicated that the administration:

> deplored the support given by the Soviet Union to one of the liberation movements to declare independence unilaterally... Such flagrant

> interference in the internal affairs of Angola was inimical to the African initiative to resolve the crisis.39/

The South African invasion which took place on October 23, 1975, altered Nigerian leaders' perception of the conflict but it took three weeks for the perceptual adjustment to be made. During those three weeks, it gradually became evident to the leaders that the South African forces were not just involved but were fighting on the side of FNLA and UNITA. This altered their perceptions and their definition of the conflict moved from that of internal rivalry between nationalist movements to that of international confrontation with apartheid and racism. The international dimension of the conflict was highlighted when the government announced that it was no longer possible to pursue its policy of reconciling the warring parties "since divisive international forces have made deep inroad into the fighting in Angola."[40] To provide the contextual setting for the confrontation, the administration announced that

> There is now abundant evidence of racist South Africa's troops in the conflict. The factions fighting against MPLA are backed not only by racist South Africa but by other interests which are clearly against Angolan independence and African freedom.41/

The administration was aware before November 1975 that the conflict had been fueled by arms supplied by various

external forces but the new factor of South African involvement, in the perception of the administration, also moved Nigeria and other African countries from their roles as mediators to that of participants in the conflict. The sense of confrontation inherent in the administration's new perceptions of the conflict was suggested when the government noted that:

> As members of the OAU, committed to fighting racism and supporting Angolan independence, the Federal government condemns in very strong terms this collaboration with South African Regime and its backers, whose interest runs against the interest of the Angolan people as a whole.42/

Once the issue was perceived largely as confrontation with apartheid and racism, associated with South Africa, other enemies were quite easily identified: as for the liberation movements, the relationship between the FNLA/UNITA alliance with South Africa meant that the Nigerian government could no longer accept them as nationalist movements who were seeking aid from foreign sources to assert their claims to national leadership of an independent Angola. The original preference for UNITA was negated by its association with South Africa. On the other hand, the MPLA which had been perceived as the agent of the Soviet Union was now perceived as representing the interest of the Angolan people.

The administration of General Mohammed was also incensed by the role of Zaire in the conflict. Two negatively reinforcing perceptions underlie the attitude. The first perception flows from Zaire's support for the FNLA which, as already indicated, was associated with South Africa. Although Zaire's support for the government precedes the South African involvement, the Nigerian government viewed its role as fostering the interests of apartheid and "neo-colonialism."[43] Secondly, the administration of General Mohammed perceived Zaire as a potential rival in the dominance of African international affairs. An official of the administration suggested this perception when he observed that "a new epoch was slowly developing in African affairs in which Nigeria and Zaire would be two giants of Africa" and that "we cannot stand aside and let Zaire expand its sphere of influence into Angola"[44] The combination of those perceptions led the Nigerian government t cite Zaire for specific censure by invoking an OAU charter:

> The OAU charter upholds the unviolability of borders and we are witnessing in the Angolan conflict a violation of this charter by a member country (Zaire) for the interest of OAU solidarity, such violation should not be allowed and it is the duty of all member countries to preserve this solidarity in the face of the current threat to it.45/

As for the super-powers in the conflict, while the federal government perceived their presence, very broadly as a "threat not only to Angola but to world peace" and urged "all interests fostering such division to stop such activities,"[46] it did not consider the role of the Soviet Union as inimical. The role of the Soviet Union which had once been "deplored" was now positively valued. This was in evidence when General Mohammed in his speech at the special OAU summit in January observed that:

> We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African people for liberation. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression and to fight for national liberation and human dignity.47/

The administration also justified the role of the Soviet Union in terms of Nigeria's experience in the civil war over Biafra, in which the Soviet Union had provided aid for the Federal side. "The alignment of forces" that placed the United States on the side of the South Africans tied racism and "Western interests" as common enemies of Africa, in the administration's view. Thus in contrast to the "heroic role of the Soviet Union":

> The U.S.... has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive U.S. administrations branded as terrorists, it even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese government and we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American administrations continue to support apartheid

> regime of South Africa whom they see as defender of Western interest on the African continent. How can we now be led to believe that a government with a record such as the U.S. has in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our interest?48/

The association of U.S. and Western interests in the Angolan conflict with the South Africans also evoked definitions of U.S. role that was long-term in perspective and broad in scope. Western interests, apart from those of South Africa, were associated with the negatively valued concept of imperialism. Some officials close to the Mohammed administration defined Western role in Angola as part of a sequence of imperialistic strategy. Hence one of them wrote:

> Imperialism has adopted several disguises in Africa. In Congo, now Zaire, it employed the UN under the cover of preserving Congo's unity. It employed armed occupation as in the Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola; racism as in Rhodesia and South Africa and annexation in violation of international convention as in Namibia.49/

From the perspective of the adminstration, therefore, the role of the United States and the West in the conflict was perceived as motivated by imperialism and any suggestion of containing the Soviet influence as a motive was considered a "bogey." In the definition of the conflict that cast light on this perspective, Samuel Ikoku wrote:

> Angola will go down in history as a major battle between national iberation and world imperialism. The issue is simple, even though the processes are complex. Who wins Angola -- African Nationalism or Western Imperialism?50/

Once the Mohammed administration perceived the U.S. as an enemy in the confrontation, it did not expect to perform any diplomatic favors for it. Thus when President Ford wrote to African leaders suggesting that they insist on the withdrawal of Russian and Cuban advisors from Angola to obtain the withdrawal of the South Africans, the Mohammed administration considered it "a most intoleratble presumption and a flagrant insult on the intelligence of African rulers."[51] In an unusual step, the administration published an angry reply in which the U.S. government was accused of "arm-twisting."

Most African states were alarmed at the knowledge of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict but many of them did not view its consequences for their efforts in trying to reconcile the liberation movements as NIgerian leaders did. Thus, while General Mohammed argued that the problem had gone beyond what he described as "a simple solution in the African tradition...",[52] several countries still believed that a government of national unity was still a desirable objective. For these countries, Nigerian leaders believed that they were being used by "imperialists and racists" and vowed that Nigeria would "do everything

possible to stop African countries from bing used by imperialists and racists."[53] In echoing the perception of the administration with regard to African states that had failed to recognize the MPLA, the editorial of an influential news magazine suggested that:

> The unfortunate implication of the reluctance of the majority of the member states of the Organization of African Unity to recognize the popular Republic of Angola is that neo-colonial forces are still the dominant forces in independent Africa after almost two decades of our political independence.54/

The Nigerian government viewed the Angolan conflict within the context of an overall process of decolonization and the struggle for racial equality in Southern Africa. From this perspective, an independent and nationalistic Angola would join Mozambique in the order of elimination that would eventually include Zimbabwe, Namibia and finally South Africa. The association between South Africa and the FLNA and UNITA alliance meant that the objectives of total independence and racial equality in the region would be jeopardized if the alliance was allowed to form a "government of national unity" in conjunction with the MPLA. It was with this understanding of the situation that led General Mohammed to argue at the Special Summit of the OAU in January 1976 that "if the colonialists succeed in Angola then our hopes for Southern Africa will have been dashed."

The perceptions of the various aspects of the Angolan conflict by Nigerian leaders had several policy implications. The shift in perception of the conflict as one involving internal rivalry between the liberation movements to one of confrontation between MPLA and African states, on the one hand, and apartheid and racism, on the other, also shifted Nigerian Angolan policy. The policy of reconciling the warring liberation movements shifted to active support for the MPLA. At the OAU special summit of January 1976, General Mohammed was the major spokesman for the states insisting on the recognition of the MPLA government in Angola. The Nigerian government also actively lobbied other African states to support the MPLA. An MPLA representative, Lopo do Nascimento, visited Lagos twice in December 1975 and Nigeria provided $20 million in aid and pledged further financial and material assistance. The administration indicated that it would be willing to send troops to Angola if the MPLA authorities requested it to do so.

While the Nigerian leaders' perceptions of the Angolan conflict influenced their policy of support for the MPLA government, the nature and level of involvement in the Angolan issue was influenced by the leaders' perceptions of Nigeria's role in Africa. Most Nigerian leaders believe that the country should play a leadership role in black

Africa because of its population and resources, but the conception of leadership which the Mohammed administration held differed significantly from that of previous Nigerian leaders. The perception of leadership role for Nigeria, in Africa which General Mohammed held was unrestrained by the sensitivities of those African countries who fear that the country, because of its wealth and resources, might act to impose its view of African affairs on them. Thus, when the external affairs commissioner told members of the diplomatic corps in Lagos in January 1976 that Nigeria should provide leadership in African cause of her size and resources, he was stating a position of power politics, reminiscent of classical "realism."[55] General Mohammed gave consent to that definition of leadership when he said that if persuasion failed to bring in line erring African countries, "other methods" would be employed. That perception of leadership had several implications for the behavior of Nigerian leaders in the Angolan conflict. First, Nigeria assumed an active role in pursuing its policy preference of support for the MPLA by attempting to persuade other African countries about the justness of its cause. It also resulted in verbal attacks on those African countries that insited on promoting the idea of a government of national unity, particularly Zaire and Senegal. Another implication of the administration's

perception of Nigeria's leadership role was that instead of working for compromise over African issues within the OAU, the OAU became an instrument for pursuing Nigeria's African interest.[56]

Nigerian Non-Alignment 1960-1966: Independence of Choice and Pro-Western Policy

Those who approach non-alignment from the vantage point that a country professing it must steer a middle course in its relations with the West and Eastern bloc countries have unduly imposed their definition on a concept for which there is minimal agreement between adherents as to content and meaning. The attempts to impose the analyst's model of non-alignment, based on a perfect balance in relations between the power blocs, reveal a concept that is impracticable in reality and barren in content. Yet, there is no reason not to believe the leaders of the non-aligned states when they profess non-alignment and claim to practice it. The task of the analyst then is to seek an understanding of the concept as the leaders perceive and practice it.

Analysts employing their own objective criteria have variously described Nigerian's non-alignment between 1960 and 1966 as a "smokescreen for adherence to pro-Western positions";[57] "partiality to the West";[58] and "political

non-alignment and economic alignment."[59] By contrast to these descriptions, it is our intention to demonstrate that Nigerian leaders' policies toward the power blocs were not only consistent with, but influenced by their perceptions of non-alignment.

Nigeria became independent from Britain in 1960 and most analysts agree that during these formative years of independent foreign policy, foreign affairs was dominated by the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, with the advice of very close associates.[60] For him non-alignment affirmed Nigeria's independence, which had just been attained, and also meant an independent judgement as to which policies were inherently right and served Nigeria's best national interest. Thus in his median address on the issue, he told the parliament that:

> We shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone: so far as it is possible, the policy on each occasion will be selected with proper independent objectivity as to what was in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the federal government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.61/

Much of the criticisms by analysts and pressures from opposition groups to Balewa's practice of non-alignment stem from their integration into that concept the notion of neutrality but the Prime Minister separated these two concepts and once observed that his policy "has never been neutrality, but rather non-alignment."[62] His Foreign

Minister, Jaja Wachuku, interpreted it by stating that "we shall be the final arbiters of our attitude."[63] This echoes the earlier quotation in which the Prime Minister had stated that "The policy on each occasion will be selected with independent objectivity."

By shunning the idea of neutrality in his perception of non-alignment, Balewa did not see any inconsistencies between the concept and his largely pro-Western preferences. The nature of the influences of perception on policy was the modifications on policy that arose from the clash of perceptions and the concessions that key decision-makers were willing to make to radical and parliamentary opposition groups. As Gordon Idang observed, "Balewa had a knack for compromise," but the concessions that he made to his opponents did not challenge fundamentally his values and perceptions of what was "right" in an issue."[64] On the other hand, there were sufficient policy alterations resulting from alternative perceptions to invalidate the overstated observation that the opposition had its say while the government had its way."[65]

The most important value held by Balewa that influenced his perception of "right" or the largely pro-Western choice in his non-alignment policy was his admiration for the Western democratic values, particularly

those of the British and the Americans, coupled with his distrust of communism. He had studied at the London University Institute of Education in the early 1950s and during that time, he developed great admiration for the British way of life. He later confessed the effect of this experience when he stated that "I returned to Nigeria with new eyes because I had seen people who live without fear, who obey the law as part of their nature, who know individual liberty."[66] Again in a statement to the U.S. Congress in July 1962, Balewa noted that:

> no one who visits the United States of America will fail to notice the effects of a free society and a democratic system of government in which the rulers are the embodiments of the will of the people and where the activity of those who rule are reviewed frankly from time to time by the entire population. We admire the American way of life and we respect the people of the United States for their love of freedom. Like you, we in Nigeria cherish individual liberty.67/

He added, within the same paragraph that "we will continue to base our attitude to the problems of the world on an unflinching respect for truth and the desire to find out and support what is right."[68] His consideration of what is "right," thus, proceeds from his preference for Western democratic values. On the other hand, he was deeply adversed to and distrustful of communism. He once told a foremost Nigerian female educationist, Mrs. Ransome-Kuti that "I myself am convinced that communism is an evil thing

and I have no sympathy for any Nigerian who knowingly or unknowingly allows herself to be used for spreading its doctrines."[69] At another instance, Balewa told the Nigerian Parliament that:

> I should like to state that I and my colleagues are determined that while we are responsible for the government of the Federation of Nigeria.... We shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communistic ideas into Nigeria.70/

While the value preferences of Balewa influenced his perceptions of non-alignment and issues on it, we need to qualify the extent of that influence. Perceptions are constrained by processes that are internal to individuals, as well as factors in the individual's external environment. Even if there were an absolute connection between value preferences and perceptions, we would still expect the level of intensity with which those values are held to make a difference. To illustrate, while the leaders of the three major political parties of Nigeria's first republic held political values that were closer to the West than the Eastern bloc, they demonstrated different levels of attachment to those values. Their perception of non-alignment also differed. Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC, was the closest to the position of a balanced relationship between the power blocs. On the other hand, Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (A.G.), stated

the most pro-Western position by arguing that Nigeria was a democracy and therefore held basic values which were pro-Western and anti-Communist.[71] Earlier, he had told his party congress that neutrality whether "passive, positive or independent, was an unmitigated disservice to humanity." For him, the non-aligned countries that professed neutrality were "no more and no less than the projection, consciously or unconsciously of deep seated prejudices which these countries have had towards Western democracies."[72] This view was closer to that of Balewa's but in the odd alliances of Nigerian politics, the Action Group was the institutional parliamentary opposition while Balewa's NPC party and Azikiwa's NCNC formed the coalition government. As Gambari rightly observed, in the coalition between NPC and NCNC, it was the latter that had to "smooth the sharp edges of its foreign policy position."[73] The perception of non-alignment by Balewa thus became the dominant influence on policy.

As we indicated earlier, Balewa defined non-alignment as independent judgment as to what was "right" and was in Nigeria's interest but the basic problem was that on many issues, Balewa admitted that there was lack of sufficient information. The consequences were that decision were based on a perceptual psycho-logic that may be described axiomatically as the "safety of the familiar." This

process was in evidence in decisions on non-alignment related issues of diplomatic relations, political conflicts, economic relations and strategic policies.

In the area of diplomatic relations, when Nigeria became independent in 1960, it was very reluctant to open diplomatic missions in Soviet bloc countries. Within the first fifteen months after independence, diplomatic missions were established in London, Washington and Bonn. It was not until 1963 that Nigeria opened an embassy in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union established her diplomatic mission in Lagos in April 1962, there were restrictions on the number of embassy personnel it could have. The same restriction did not apply to the embassy of the United States. The Prime Minister, under pressure from critics, justified his bias by arguing that : "I hope that [the] House will appreciate that some of these countries that are opening [embassies] are completely new to us but others we have been in association with for a very long time."[74]

Another diplomatic aspect for which Balewa's non-alignment policy was questioned by critics was the nature of post-independence relations with Britain. Britain, for various reasons, desired special relations with an independent Nigeria, and there is overwhelming evidence that the Balewa administration desired and

embraced those relations as well.[75] However, various aspects of those relations had implications for Balewa's stand on non-alignment. Within the diverse contexts of these relations, critics charged that a defense agreement signed with Britain two years before independence tied it to Britain and effectively to NATO and was thus inconsistent with Nigeria's policy of non-alignment.[76] The Balewa administration believed that the pact was in the interest of Nigeria and beyond the pale of non-alignment of which he had stated that the government would "not associate itself with any power bloc as a matter of routine."[77] When the document came before the parliament for approval in November 1960, the government explained the necessity of the pact by pointing out, that Nigeria required outside assistance for officer training, for staffing and administration during the interim period of Nigerianization.[78] The Defense Minister Alhaji Ribadu who moved the motion for approval argued that the pack "in no way derogates from the full sovereignty and independence of action of Nigeria."[79] The pact also included a provision granting Britain access to "facilities for topicalization trials of aircraft both above land, and sea and over-flying and air staging facilities." The government Minister of Finance, Okotie Eboh, also justified the treaty on the grounds that Nigeria required well trained and equipped

military in order to fulfill its responsibilities to the United Nations and added that "no Nigerian would like to hear in the case that is going on in the Congo today that Ghanaian soldiers are better than Nigerian soldiers."[80]

The parliamentary assault on the pact was led by the opposition leader, Obafemi Awolowo, who was a signatory to the original document that was prepared during the constitutional conference in London in 1958. His attack of the document was based on the allegation that signing the document in 1958 was made a condition for fixing the date of independence. Additionally, he objected to the 1960 document, not for what it contained but for the "unknown and hidden document," part of the original Pact which according to him was an attempt "to swindle this country of its sovereignty."[81] Awolowo alleged that the original agreement contained provisions for leasing sites to Britain that would be used as military bases. He therefore argued that though the document under consideration did not contain provision for military bases, it was implied.[82] For this reason, he concluded that "the country is already irrevocably committed to military alignment and involvement with Britain.[83]

Sufficient pressure was generated and mounted against the defense pact that the administration abrogated it in January 1962. However, it would be wrong to assert that by

this act, the government perceived the pact as inconsistent with its policy of non-alignment. Indeed while abrogating the pact to placate the opposition, the original intent of it was reaffirmed. In the official text of the press release in which the government announced the abrogation of the Pact, it noted that:

> The British and Nigerian governments have been consulting together about the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement. They have noted with concern that the scope and purpose have been widely misunderstood. In particular, fears have arisen that in consequence of the Agreement, Nigeria's freedom of action might be impaired and that she may be drawn into hostilities against her wished. The text of the Agreement shows that these and other anxieties which have been expressed are wholly without foundation. Nevertheless, in order to end misunderstanding, the two governments have thought it wise to reconsider the need for a formal Agreement.... Each Government will however endeavor to afford the other at all times such assistance and facilities in defence matters as appropriate between partners in the commonwealth.84/

We have quoted most of the statements announcing the abrogation of the Defence Pact to show that even though the government yielded to pressure by abrogating the Agreement, the intent of it was in no way jeopardized and the government did not feel in any way that its policy of non-alignment had been harmed or furthered. The last point was clearly demonstrated by the government's reaction to to a motion congratulating it on the abrogation of the Pact "which was detrimental to its policy of non-alignment." A

government spokesman denied that the pact was detrimental to Nigeria's policy on non-alignment and accepted the resolution only after it had been amended to exclude the offensive words.[85]

Several analysts observed that by abrogating the Defence Pact and modifying certain policies in relations with the communist countries such as establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; lifting the ban on communist literature and travel to the Soviet Union, the Balewa administration had moved towards "political non-alignment."[86] As our analysis of the Defence Pact issue suggests, the administration never felt it was aligned in the first place. The policies which it pursued were felt to be consistent with non-alignment and were indeed influenced by their definition of non-alignment, which for Balewa was the pursuit of those policies which were right and in Nigeria's interest. Whatever concessions the administration made to political opponents and critics, the basic pro-Western choice in his non-alignment policies were never seriously undermined. Further evidence of this is indicated in the pattern of economic relations. Three aspects of these relations, trade, aid and investments are particularly illustrative.

Investment policies are related to non-alignment in the extent to which they favor development ideologies of

the West or the East. Nationalization and public investment policies conform with the economic ideology of the East, while private investment represent the open market ideology of the West. The position of the Balewa administration with regard to the investment issue was to advocate and pursue a liberal economic ideology that welcomed private investment. In a statement that made clear the position the Finance Minister, Okotie Eboh argued that:

> A new nation like Nigeria cannot be built on the basis of nationalization. I need perhaps only refer to examples of America and Canada to illustrate how rapid and orderly development has been achieved by private enterprise efforts; including a large measure of foreign capital, but without the overhanging threat of nationalization. ...Nationalization, based on quasi-communist ideas is alien to our philosophy.87/

Nnamdi Azikiwe, who as leader of the NCNC had advocated "Fabian Socialism." But after the party joined with Balewa's NPC in the governing coalition and Azikiwe became the Governor General, he accepted the position of the senior partner in the coalition. In a speech from the throne, he declared that "My government has no plans for the nationalization of industries to any greater extent than the public utilities of this country are already nationalized."[88] Indeed, the NCNC leader after Azikiwe, Dr. Michael Okpara, in an attack against Awolowo's

opposition party, the Action Group (AG), charged that "those who are advocating nationalization are communists and they should have the courage to say so."[89] Awolowo had insisted on wide-scale nationalization that would cover basic industries and commercial enterprises. The government's view of creating the necessary atmosphere for attracting foreign investments prevailed, and this was revealed in the first Six Year Plan. The plan called for an expenditure of £676.5 million, half of which was to originate as foreign loans and grants. Additionally, the governement projected that about £200 million of private investment would be needed during the period.

The link between aid and non-alignment relates to the commitments of "strings" that are attached by donor countries to recipients. Many analysts seem to suggest that by balancing the sources of aid between the Eastern bloc and Western bloc countries, the effects of these commitments would somehow be neutralized and the recipient country would, from that perspective, become "truly non-aligned." The Balewa administration believed that aid was necessary for purposes of development. It also believed that all aid came with strings attached and the choice to be made was between strings that were acceptable and those that were unacceptable.[90] However, while greater caution attended the consideration of aid from Eastern bloc

countries, there was a tendency to accept aid in good faith from Western countries. This was evident when a Soviet Union offer of a £20 milion interest free loan was rejected by the Balewa administration shortly after independence. On the other hand, when the United States offered a £2½ million agricultural loan in 1962, the Minister of Economic Development declared

> There is a certain amount of uncertainty in the minds of some of our people as to what will be the consequences of external loans and grants. Some of us have been quite rightly suspicious as to the real reasons why the highly developed countries give loans and grants to underdeveloped countries... We do not know whether the grants and loans will eventually lead to the control of our political and economic affairs by the countries which give us the assistance.91/

Nevertheless, he announced that the federal government had decided to accept the American desire to help, adding that:

> I hope that we shall be proved right. One must have confidence in a country like the United States, in spite of the doubt which may exist in the minds of some of us....92/

The faith in the intentions of Western countries might partially explain the, largely, Western dominance of aid received by Nigeria between 1960 and 1966. In the first year of independence, Nigeria had accepted aid from Britain, Canada, West Germany, Japan, United States, Netherlands and New Zealand. The only Soviet bloc assistance accepted before 1965 were scholarships for

Nigerian students: 15 million Polish loan granted in June 1962.

Table 1

Foreign Governmental Aid to Nigeria 1962-1964

Foreign Government	£ M
British Government	25.19
United States Government	45
West German Government	8.5
Swiss Government	1.5
Netherlands Government	4
Israel Government	1.17
Italian Government	9
Polish Government	15
Total	103.86

Source: Nigerian National Development Plan, Progress Report, 1964, p. 31, Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Lagos.

The use of trade figures as indicators of non-alignment is frought with problems. In the first place the colonial orientation of commerce in formerly dependent territories means that the metropolitan countries such as Britain and France enjoyed the greatest share of trade with their territories. A policy of non-alignment in the immediate post-colonial period was not likely to alter the orientation. Secondly, there is the issue of commodities needs. Even if non-aligned countries wanted to diversify their trading relations to include Soviet bloc countries, the limited needs for the primary commodities of non-aligned countries, coupled with the less competitive nature of finished goods originating from the Soviet bloc

countries are limiting factors in their commercial relations. However, there are countries such as Ghana that substantially increased their share of commerce with Soviet bloc countries to warrant an examination of trade as a minimal indicator of non-alignment policies.

Nigeria's foreign trade during the Balewa administration revealed a predominantly Western orientation. About 70 percent of her imports came from Western countries. On the other hand, less than four percent of imports and one percent for exports were traded with Eastern bloc countries. Nigerian trade with the U.S. grew steadily during the period while it remained stagnant with the Soviet Union. The move by the Balewa administration to sign trade agreements with Poland in 1961; Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in 1962; Hungary and Soviet Union in 1963 did not alter, significantly, the commercial relationship with the countries.

Although parliamentry opposition did make the predominantly Western orientation in Nigeria's external trade a political issue, there is an aspect of it that cast some light on the administration's attitude as it relates to non-alignment. When the British government decided to seek a membership in the EEC in 1961, Nigeria and other ex-British territories that were its major trading partners were faced with the prospects of loosing primary market for

their commodities. The choice these countries had was to associate with the EEC. For Nigeria, association would facilitate preferential market in an expanded European market. It also carried the prospects of participation in the Overseas Investment Fund which was set up by the EEC to assist underdeveloped countries. Finally, Nigeria could compete more favorably with other African primary producers that were already associate members. However, the cost of these gains was attachment to the decision-making body of what officials perceived as a Western bloc. After months of indecision on whether or not to associate with the EEC, the Prime Minister came out in October 1962 and in rejecting association with EEC, told Parliament with some regret that

> I must frankly tell you that we may have to go through a period of great difficulty. We shall probably suffer some loss in revenue from our exports during the next few years. We may not succeed in attracting the volume of foreign aid which we had earnestly hoped to obtain from countries of the EEC. These possibilities will without doubt affect our ability to carry out our Development Plan.93/

Gordon Idang has suggested that the decision not to associate with the EEC was the result of pressures from radical groups.[94] Anglin, on the other hand, suggested that it was a decision made by civil service advisors which reinforced the political instincts of the politicians, although he excluded the Prime Minister.[95] An alternative

explanation can be found in Balewa's attitude toward bloc politics. He was opposed to power blocs including a bloc of non-aligned states. As Philips rightly observed, Nigeria's membership would make it a partner in helping to create a third economic bloc competing both with the United States and Eastern Europe.[96] For Balewa, therefore, the immediate advantages to be gained were outweighed by his primary distaste for bloc politics. He was therefore predisposed perceptually to accept the decision not to associate.

Conclusions

In reviewing the actions of Nigerian leaders concerning the issues in this study, it may be noted that the intervening influence of perceptions demonstrates the hazards of inferring the foreign policy decisions and orientations of African states directly from their objective characteristics. What the Nigerian orientations on the issues examined illustrate is that particular perceptions of issues by decision-makers may involve definitions, contexts, clusters of objective variables and ultimately decisions that may bewilder the "rational" analyst. In ECOWAS, the benefits which Nigerian leaders expected were circumscribed by a particular view of their nations' economic prospect: political and security

considerations. The economic benefits of ECOWAS were viewed to inhere in the opportunity for economic expansion by the creation of a regional market. Security benefits of ECOWAS were viewed to exist in the strengthening of the economies of weaker neighboring states; and the political benefits were viewed to exist in the opportunity to demonstrate diplomatic leadership. There were several related aspects of these perceptions. The most important of these include the view that existing conditions of the economy, which was enjoying large revenues from oil warranted the pursuits of the perceived economic benefits. Also, it was viewed that events in the international system, specifically the British entry into the EEC justified the pursuit of ECOWAS. The significance of these perceptions becomes more revealing when alternative views are presented. It may be argued, for example, that the economic prospects of the country which Nigerian leaders perceived in the oil boom was unwarranted since the overall structure of the economy rested on a fragile base. With no self-sustaining industrial or agricultural base, it would appear as if developing these and satisfying the national market ought to assume priority over the creation of a regional market in which Nigeria would still account for more than 50 percent. This point also breaks down the related concerns of the Nigerian leaders with the EEC and

British entry into it. Without the industrial base with which to satisfy the regional or even national market, the attempt to create and protect that market from the reverse preferential relations of the EEC with individual associates appear meaningless. These arguments are not intended to suggest that ECOWAS might not be useful or viable. Instead they are intended to indicate that alternative perceptions of benefits and the policy orientations that spring from them are possible.

Similar observations could be made with respect to the Angolan issue and non-alignment. On the Angolan issue, once Nigerian leaders perceived the conflict as one which pitched African states against South Africa, the ground was set for the decision to recognize the MPLA. Other variables that were taken into account supported that orientation. These include the linkage of the decision to the progressive posture in domestic policies, the sudden interest in Zaire as a competitor. On non-alignment, the definition of the policy as one involving freedom of choice allowed for the influence of personal values as predominating factors in national orientation. Like ECOWAS, both no-alignment and the Angolan issue yield alternative perceptions in terms of the definitions, context and the variables associated with the decisions. In the following chapter we shall examine how these

alternatives or similarities present themselves in the decisions of Ghanaian leaders.

Table 2

Direction of Nigerian Exports: Selected East and West Countries

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Exports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Exports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Exports
(a) WEST						
U.K.	197.9	42.0	227.2	37.8	292.5	36.9
U.S.	60.9	12.9	40.3	6.7	69.9	8.8
Canada	4.8	1.02	6.7	1.11	28.3	3.57
Japan	4.2	0.9	7.2	1.2	12.7	1.6
Belgium	11.3	2.4	14.7	2.4	20.4	2.6
France	18.9	4.0	28.1	4.7	59.8	7.5
W. Germany	41.3	8.8	75.7	12.6	81.6	
Netherlands	63.5	13.5	76.0	12.6	75.3	10.3
Totals		85.4		79.2		80.8
(b) EAST						
USSR	0.1	0.02	4.5	6.7	0.1	0.01
Czechoslo-vakia	1.2	0.3	0.2	0.03	3.3	0.42
Poland	3.1	0.7	6.2	1.03	5.1	0.64
Totals		0.93		0.28		1.07

Sources: African Contemporary Record (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

Table 3

Nigerian Imports: Selected East and West Countries

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Imports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Imports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Imports
(a) WEST						
U.K.	206.7	36.4	220.3	31.0	219.2	30.6
U.S.A.	41.9	7.4	81.0	11.4	103.3	14.4
Canada	7.6	1.33	5.1	0.72	8.1	1.13
Japan	69.6	12.2	86.3	12.1	34.4	4.8
Belgium	8.3	1.5	9.3	1.3	9.5	1.3
France	18.8	3.3	27.8	3.9	42.9	6.0
W. Germany	37.6	6.6	63.0	8.9	82.6	11.5
Netherlands	25.7	4.5	28.6	4.0	27.0	3.8
Totals		73.2		73.3		73.6
(b) EAST						
USSR	0.1	6.02	0.1	0.01	1.3	0.2
Czechoslo-vakia	7.4	1.3	7.1	1.0	7.5	0.9
Poland	2.5	0.4	6.4	0.6	4.0	0.6
Totals		1.8		1.66		1.6

Sources: Africa Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

References - Chapter III

[1]In sequence, the Balewa administration was replaced by Major General Aguyi Ironsi in January 1966 after a military coup. This was followed by a counter coup in July 1966, in whch General Yakubu Gowon came to power. Gowon's successor, General Muritala Mohammed was killed in an abortive coup in February 1976 and his successor, General Olusegun Obassanjo handed over power to the civilian administration of President Shagari in October 1979. The latest military take over brought to power General Mohammed Buhari on January 1, 1984.

[2]Students of federalism and representative government have suggested that unbalances in a federal structure constitutes problems for democratic rule Kenneth Wheare, for example, suggested that "it is undesirable that one or two units should be so powerful that they can overrule the others and bend the will of the federal government itself... there must be some sort of reasonable balance to ensue that all units can maintain their independence within the sphere alloted them and that no one can dominate others. See Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 52.

[3]For the historical evolution of the regional entities see Kalu Ezra, Constitutional Development in Nigeria (London: Cambridge University Press 1964) Also James Coleman Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press 1960)

[4]The fact that the leader of the NPC, Sir Ahmadu Bello elected to remain as premier of the north underscored the importance of the regions in the first Nigerian Republic but also he was glad that he did not have to go to Lagos for the reasons which, as he put it "Lagos was alien to our [northern] ideas of life" See Ahmadu Bello My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1962), p. 85.

[5]Chief Obafemi Awolowo cited in Gordon Idang, op. cit. p. 39.

[6]Several explanations have been offered for the abscence of cleavage among the decision-making group in the coalition government. Both Gordon Idang and Mahmud Tukur argue that the southern members of the coalition cabinet accepted the positons of their senior partners in the coaltion to retain their influential position. Additionally, they argue that the conciliatory nature of the Prime Minister made it easy to reach a working

compromise with him. See Gordon Idan op. cit. p. 48, and Mahmud Tukur "Nigeria's External Relations: The United Nations as a forum and policy medium in the conduct of Foreign POlicy" (unpublished) M. A. Thesis, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburg, n. d. p. 19

[7]General Yakubu Gowon, interview West AFrica No. 3361 (May 24, 1982), p. 1364.

[8]In reneging on his promise to return the country to civil rule in 1978, Gowon suggested that the problems of corruption and pvoerty had to be solved before handing over power to elected government. Realistically, the intractable nature of these problems and their solutions as a condition for handing over power meant that Gowon was intent on holding on to power indefinitely.

[9]General Gowon had vindicated one of the Governors, Joseph Gonwalk of Benue-Plateu state from charges of corruption made against him by a businessman, Mr. Aper Aku, through a sworn affidavit.

[10]For details of the cement scandal See Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings 1975), p. 8.

[11]For part of the broadcast to the nation by General Muzitala Mohammed on July 30, 1975 see Africa Research Bulletin (July 1975) p. 3697.

[12]See Kennth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), p. 134.

[13]See Gerald Helleiner "Nigeria and the African Common Market." Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 3, No. 9 (November 1962).

[14]Dotun Phillips cited in Olajide Aluko Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin 1981), p. 14.

[15]This optimism was reflected in the Second National Development Plan. For details see Second National Development Plan 1970-75 (Lagos: Governmetn Printer 1970), pp, 79-83.

[16]Quoted in Olajide Aluko Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, op. cit. p. 15.

[17]Personal interview with Kolade Oladimeji, Lagos June 15, 1982.

[18]See West Africa 21, July 1972.

[19]In late 1974 several government agencies ordered a total of 20 million tons of cement which was to be delivered within a period of twelve months. This congested the port facilities. For details of the scandal surrounding the deals, See Colin Legum African Contemporary Record 1976, p. 802.

[20]See Claude Phillips The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1964), pp. 116-117.

[21]The concept was popularized by Kwame Nkrumah who charged that association with the EEC implied collective neo-colonialism. See Kwame Nkrumah Neo Colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism (New York: 1965), p. 18.

[22]Quoted in West Africa 30, July 1971.

[23]See Daily Times, Lagos, June 3, 1973.

[24]See New Nigerian Kaduna, Nigeria, October 20, 1973.

[25]West Africa February 4, 1972.

[26]Ibid. November 27, 1972.

[27]Ibid. May 24, 1982.

[28]Ibid. September 1, 1973.

[29]Daily Times (Lagos) September 25, 1972.

[30]Jean Herskovit "Africa's New Power" Foreign Affairs Vol. 53, No. 2 (January 1974), p. 321.

[31]Personal interview with Kolade Oladimeji, Lagos, June, 1982.

[32]West Africa, May 24, 1982.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid.

[36]See Olajide Aluko Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 13.

[37]West Africa May 24, 1982.

[38]Personal interview with Joseph Garba, Kaduna, July, 1982.

[39]See Africa Research Bulletin, January 1975.

[40]Quoted in Mark Delancey "Nigerian Views of the Angolan Conflict" Bulletin of the Southern Association of Africanists, 4, 2 (Summer 1964), p. 42.

[41]Ibid. p. 43.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Quoted in Afriscope 6, 1 January 1976.

[45]See Mark Delaney op. cit. p. 43.

[46]Ibid.

[47]For details see Text of Speech by His Excellency General Muritala Head of the Federal Military Government at the Extra Ordinary Conference held in Addis Ababa on 11 January 1976 (Lagos: Government Printer 1976).

[48]See Sam Ikoku "Angola A Study in Neo-Colonialism" Afriscope (Lagos) 6,2, February 1976 pp. 43-48.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin January 1976.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Federal Military Government News Release No. 1466, 29 November 1975.

[53]Afriscope 6, 1 January 1976, p. 7.

[54]See Federal Military Government News Release No. 88, 21 January 1976.

[55]Ibid.

[56]The same point was also suggested by Olajide Aluko. See Olajide Aluko Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 234.

[57]See Gordon Idang op. cit. p. 49.

[58]See Claude Phillips op. cit. p. 101.

[59]See Douglas Anglin "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment" Journal of Modern African Studies 2,2, (July 1970), p. 497.

[60]See Gordon Idang, op. cit. p. 48.

[61]See Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa "Nigeria Looks Ahead" Foreign Affairs October 1962, p. 139.

[62]See Gordon Idang op. cit.

[63]See House of Representative Debates (H. R. Debates) April 14, 1962, p. 29.

[64]See Gordon Idang op cit. p. 48.

[65]See Epelle in Nigeria Speaks (London: Longmans 1964), p. 4.

[66]Balewa Quoted in Ronald Segal Political Africa (London: Steven & Sons 1964), p. 4.

[67]See Nigeria Speaks op. cit. p. 104.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Quoted in Gordon Idang op. cit. p. 50.

[70]See Nigeria Speaks op. cit. p. 10.

[71]Quoted in Ibrahim Gambari, op. cit. p. 16.

[72]Quoted in Claude Phillips op. cit. p. 16.

[73]See Ibrahim Gambari op. cit. p. 23.

[74]H. R. Debates April 14, 1962, p. 12.

[75]See Ibrahim Gamberi op. cit. p. 33.

[76]For a good study of the debate concerning the Agreement. See Gordon Idang "Politics of the ratification and renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement" African Studies Review Vol. 13, No. 3, (November 1966). Also Ibrahim Gamari, op. cit.

[77]See Nigeria Speaks op. cit. p.

[78]See Claude Phillips op. cit. p. 43.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ibid. p. 44.

[81]Ibid. p. 45.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid. pp. 99-100.

[85]See H. R. Debates, November 1960, p. 41.

[86]See Douglas Anglin op cit. p. 248.

[87]H. R. Debates, November 1960, p. 41.

[88]See Claude Phillips op. cit. p. 250.

[89]Ibid.

[90]See Douglis Anglin op. cit. p. 250.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid. 251.

[93]Quoted in Gordon Idang Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 139.

[94]Ibid. p. , Also Ibrahim Gambari op. cit. p.

[95]Douglas Anglin op. cit., p. 261.

[96]See Claude Phillips op. cit. p. 114.

CHAPTER IV

GHANA: LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND FOREIGN POLICY

The Ghana Leadership and the Domestic Political and Decision-Making Environments

Ghana, since attaining national sovereignty from Britain in 1957, has witnessed several changes of leadership. Most of these changes came about through military coups.[1] The foreign policy issues in our study and the periods covered for them fall within the administrations of two leaders that had the longests stay in power. The period covered for non-alignment coincides with the regime of Kwame Nkrumah, while other other two issues, ECOWAS and the Angolan Conflict fall within the military regime of Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. Before analyzing the perceptions of the leaders, in the two administrations, of the respective issues, we shall briefly examine their domestic political and decision-making environments.[2]

The pre-eminence of Kwame Nkrumah as the leader of the pre-independence politics of Ghana was, on the eve of independences unquestionable. His Convention People's Party (CPP), which rested largely on the support of young men and was a splinter of the first organized political

opposition to British colonialism in Ghana, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), had routed its parent opposition in the 1951 election.[3] The victory eventually made Nkrumah the leader of government business in a constitutional arrangement designed to give Africans greater participation within the colonial framework. Further, electoral victories were registered by the CPP in 1954 against the rear-guard of the UGCC (renamed Ghana Congress Party - GCP) which was led by professionals and businessmen: and six other parties that were based on local discontent.[4] Finally, the emergence of federalist and separatist sentiments among the Ashanti and the Ewe, respectively, led the British to call for a pre-independence election in 1956. The Federalist sentiment had crystallized in a political movement called the National Liberation Movement (NLM) supported by the powerful Ashanti chiefs, intellectuals and the rank and file of Ashantis. The CPP, again, won the election decisively and when Independence was granted, the party controlled 72 of the 104 parliamentary seats.

In subsequent political developments, Nkrumah took steps to further consolidate his personal rule. The elaboration of these political developments is an instructive background to the leadership of Nkrumah as the locus of decision-making.

The independent constitution had envisaged an open democratic rule and provided a modicum of regional autonomy to appease the advocates of Federalism, especially among the Ashanti, the Ewe and the northern ethnic groups. However, immediately following independence, Nkrumah, gradually initiated policies that effectively centralized the country, stripped it of democratic rule and entrenched his personal rule.

The first move in the centralization of authority was the abolition of regional assemblies. The process was begun when Nkrumah's party, the CPP, captured a majority of seats in all regional assemblies. This was made easier when the opposition boycotted the regional elections. Since Nkrumah was opposed to any form of Federalism, the CPP-controlled regional assemblies promptly passed a bill that cleared the way for their demise. The National Assembly approved the motion killing the regional assemblies and making Ghana a Unitary state.

At the center, Nkrumah, in a move to silence opposition, started a process of co-optation. Leaders of opposition were offered posts in a national "coalition" government. Among those co-opted were those leaders that had defected from the CPP before Independence. These include Joe Appiah, Victor Owusu and William Ofori Atta. Through legislation enacted in December 1957, the Avoidance

of Discrimination Act, parties that were based on "religious considerations" were outlawed. The Act, however, struck at the base of all effective opposition to CPP and Nkrumah's leadership. The traditional chiefs who remained the most effective opposition were threatened with removal. This, the government could easily do by invoking any of the legal provisions in its arsenal.

The most crucial instrument which Nkrumah devised to silence opposition and assert his supremacy was the Preventive Detention Act which was enacted in 1958. In theory, the Act enabled the Governor General to detain any citizen of the country if he was "satisfied that the order was necessary to prevent that person acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state." In practice, however, it was the Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, who had to be "satisfied" and as Bretton points out, "his perception of threats to the security of the state centered on threats to the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah."[5]

Three other political developments that strengthened the one man rule of Kwame Nkrumah were the establishment in 1960 of a Republican constitution; the formalization of one party rule; and the establishment of socialism as ideology of state. The Republican constitution which was approved by a plesbite held in April 1960 abolished the post of Governor General and combined the post of Prime Minister

and head of State in the person of Kwame Nkrumah. This in itself was not unusual except for the enormous powers that the new constitution vested on the President. Article 55 of the constitution endowed the President with powers "to give directions by legislative instrument." As executive head of government, he was also given the powers of "appointment dismissal and disciplinary control of the public service..." and the Civil Service Commission had no guarantees restraining the powers of the chief executive. These in effect merged the legislative and executive functions of government. Furthermore, through the Judicial Service Act of 1960, the President was empowered to make appointments for all posts in the Judicial Service and also retained disciplinary authority over circuit judges and district magistrates. Although there was a requirement that removal of judges of the Supreme Court or High Court be submitted to Parliament, the presidential control of that body was such that the constitutional stipulations were in practice meaningless.

Apart from the fact that the majority in Parliament belonged to Nkrumah's party, the CPP, he had an instrument which could be used to cow dissenting members. In an Act enacted in 1959 called the National Assembly Disqualification Act, no person was qualified for election to parliament if a preventive detention order was in force

against him or had been in force at any time within five years preceding an election. Also the Seat of a member of Parliament was declared vacant if the President invoked an order against him, under the Preventive Detention Act. These measures together with the Emergency Powers Act of 1961; the Public Order Act of the same year; and other specific legislations that insulated the person of the President from criticism had combined to make Kwame Nkrumah a constituional dictator.[6]

Undoubtedly must of the legislation that was enacted were a response to emergencies. For example, the opposition to Nkrumah's rule and the alarming recrudescence of political violence in Ashanti inspired, the more repressive measure of them all -- the Preventive Detention Act. Additionally, there was an attempt on Nkrumah's life in 1961 when a grenade was hurled at him, and also there were a series of bombings in Accra in September of the same year. However, the measures and their effect far outweighed the emergencies that called for many of them. They had the effect of vesting enormous powers on a single individual. By the end of Nkrumah's regime in 1966, an estimated 908 persons were in detention and many more in political exile.[7] Many of the people that had fallen victim of the Preventive Detention Act include early associates of Nkrumah such as P. K. Quidoo; W. A. Wiafe;

Taiwa Adamafio and Ako Adjei. Also prominent opposition leaders such as Joseph Danquah; Obstebi Lamptey; Victor Owusu; Joe Appiah and Fred Sarpong were thrown in detention.

The fate of any remaining institutional opposition to Nkrumah was sealed in 1964 when a carefully orchestrated plebicite aimed at determining "whether Ghana was to become a one-party state and whether the President should have powers to dismiss judges of High Courts at any time," was overwhelmingly approved.[8] The significance of declaring a one-party state is the absolute control which Nkrumah had, from then on. The nature of the party and its relationship to Nkrumah was best described by Henry Bretton who wrote

> It [the one-party amendment] had legalized the political machine of which tattered organizational shell of a party was but one of several parts carefully hedged in, meticulously controlled and inhibited and carefully pruned of all vestiges of political independence. The members and the functionaries were as much under the thumb of Nkrumah as were all other persons or groups in the state.9/

Another observer wrote that "CPP without Nkrumah was inconceivable."[10] His personality and his ideas held the party together and those ideas were to be infused into the party through the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, established at Winneba in 1961. The institute offered a two-year course in Scientific Socialism and Nkrumaism and became a short-cut to jobs and political appointments.

A parallel development was the movement, beginning in 1960, towards proclaiming Socialism as the ideology of state. Several scholars have offered different explanations for the orientation: Scott Thompson, looking at Ghana's foreign policy, suggested that the Congo Crisis and the failure of Nkrumah's policy there, signified by the death of Lumumba, decisively influenced his decision to move towards Socialism as a national ideology; Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer attributed the decisive move to the failure of Nkrumah's economic policies between 1957 and 1960.[11] However, a more plausible explanation was given by Adu Boahen who argued that while the factors suggested by the various authors might be catalysts, Nkrumah was always intent on moving his country toward socialism.[12] From this perspective, it was the same expediency and temperance that enabled him to cooperate with the colonial administration during the transitional period between 1952 and 1957 that also suggested to him that he needed, first, to attract foreign investment, and complete his gigantic Volta River project before embarking on Socialist transformation.[13] At the same time, he was placing, in strategic positions, a core of his Socialist followers. These include John Tettegah who was made General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress (TUC); T. D. Baffoe, editor of Ghanian Times; Heyman, editor of Evening News; Tawia Adamafio, Secretary

General of the CPP; T. O. Asare, Executive Chairman and Managing Director of Ghana Commercial Bank; and Barden who was made the Director of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.

The blueprint of the Socialist plan was published in 1964 and laid emphasis on "the modernization of agriculture and rapid expansion of industry as a foundation of a socialist society."[14] The political significance of the new Socialist strategy was that it blended at the top with Nkrumaism as a national religion. The phenomenon imbued Nkrumah with super-human powers and he himself believed it enough to accept such appelations as "Osagyefo" (Savior), "Showboy" "His Messianic Dedication," and "Fountain of Honor."

With such power vested in one man it becomes almost irrelevant to discuss a decision-making environment outside of the overall political setting. However, a brief examination of the influences that flowed into Flagstaff House is in order, even if to show that only sycophants and men whose ideas coincided with his had Nkrumah's ear.[15] One difficulty in identifying Nkrumah's advisers on specific issues was his reliance on alternating circles of advisers. As Bretton observed "...there was no telling which adviser of the pool available or which group would be utilized by the President for a given purpose."[16] However,

among the most visible advisers on foreign affairs were Kojo Botsio, who shared Nkrumah's Pan-African vision and represented the country at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and subsequently became his Foreign Minister in 1963; Ako Adjei, though of lesser influence with Nkrumah, was foreign minister between 1959 until his detention in 1962; Michael Dei-Anang was responsible for African and foreign affairs and publishing. Others include Alex Quason-Sackey and F. S. Arkhust, both of whom were career civil servants and represented Ghana at the United Nations, at different times. The path of these men diverged from that of Nkrumah from 1960. Foreign advisers also had access to Nkrumah and the most important of these were George Padmore, the West Indian Pan-Africanist; the British Geoffrey Bing, and the Nigerian Socialist Sam Ikoku. The advice of these men were sought and remained useful as long as their ideas coincided with that of Nkrumah.

Institutionally, the Ministry of External Affairs was relegated to the background in the formulation of policy, especially after 1960. It became known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the African division was carved out and made an autonomous Bureau of African Affairs, headed by Nkrumah loyalist, Michael Dei-Anang; and under the tight control of the President.

Since so much centers around the man, it is necessary to sketch a profile of his life and his ideas. Born in the Southwest Village Nkroful village of Nzima in Ghana in 1909 to a blacksmith, Nkrumah was raised a Roman Cahtolic. He was educated at Achimota College in Ghana and Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, where by February 1943 he had obtained two Master's degrees. After ten years stay in the United States, he left for Britain in June 1945. His studies in the U.S. brought him in contact with such disciplines as the History of Political Thought; Social History, Education, Theology, and Social Philosophy. His arrival in London in 1945 coincided with the intensification of Post-War anti-colonial sentiments that were crystallizing in organizational forms in the colonial territories and abroad. In his intellectual search for the colonial question and the problems of imperialism, he recalled that he had been influenced by Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini.[17] Other influences on him include George Padmore, a West Indian writer and one time associate of the Communist International, who was a strong advocate of the rights of Africans everywhere. He was also captivated by Marcus Garvey's slogan of "Africa for the Africans" and his back to Africa movement; W. E. B. DuBois, the black American scholar and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. Nkrumah had a brief association with the British

Communist Party. In 1946 he became the secretary of the West African National Secretariat set up in London with the objective of stimulating African nationalism. By the time that he returned to Ghana in 1947 his ideas were set about bringing the "political kingdom" to Ghana and other dependent countries of Africa through "positive action." He was vehemently anti-imperialist and saw in the horizon Scientific Socialism and subsequently "Nkrumaism" as the solution to the problems of colonialism and neo-colonialism.[18] His pan-African ideas led him to a design of Union Government for Africa. Many of these ideas were espoused in books that were written by Nkrumah or others, using his name.[19]

Nkrumah's rise to prominence, immediately followed his return to Ghana in December 1947 when he was made General Secretary of the newly formed United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The party had been formed by Joseph Danquah, a lawyer in concert with other professional Ghanaians as a nationalist movement. Nkrumah was clearly different from these men and it was obvious that they would not tolerate his radical views for too long. As Secretary General, he had been able to gain the following of young school leavers, organized into youth movements. The rupture between Nkrumah and the leadership of the UGCC came in 1949 with the founding of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP).

Immediately following that, in January 1950, Nkrumah led his followers in "Positive Action"[20] against the colonial administration and was sentenced to a prison term of one year. Within that year, his colleagues Komla Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio had led the party to victory at the polls and the colonial governor Arden-Clarke released Nkrumah from prison to make him the leader of government business. From then on Nkrumah, tactfully, cooperated with the colonial government until Independence was achived in 1957. His hold on and dominance of independent Ghana, which we examined earlier, ended abruptly in February 1966 when the Ghanaian military took over power in a coup d'etat.

The administration of Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, which came to power in January 1972, was a military regime. It had supplanted the first civilian government preceding the military coup d'etat against Nkrumah in 1966. Colonel Acheampong justified the coup against the government of K. A. Busia in terms of "... the malpractices, corruption, arbitrary dismissals, economic mismanagement that characterized the Nkrumah regime..."[21] He also pointed to specific grievances such as dismissals in the army; denial of amenities and facilities to the armed forces; dismissals of over 1000 civil servants; and the disorganization of the Trade Union Congress (TUC).[22] These justifications, in large measure, reflect the actual state of affairs when

Acheampong took over.[23] The administration of Dr. Busia had alienated several sections of the Ghanaian society, including the civil service; student organizations; the press and the judiciary. He had abolished the Trade Union Congress, interfered with the functioning of the judiciary, and sacked civil servants indiscriminately, causing insecurity in the bureaucracy.[24] The demise of the government was hastened by widespread official corruption and an inability to heal an ailing economy. In 1971, the failure of an austerity measure to stem the downward slide in the economy led to hoarding, scarcity and soaring prices. Additionally, the country's external debt was automatically doubled to $1000 million as a result of the devaluation of the credi.

In view of the foregoing, the administration of Colonel Acheampong received a very popular and broad support when it took over. The government moved swiftly to announce a revaluation of the cedi; cancelled some foreign debts; restored the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and launched "Operation Feed Yourself" as a mobilizing slogan for revitalizing agricultural production. By 1973, the success of the economic policies initiated by Acheampong were evident in higher agricultural outputs. Additionally higher cocoa prices in the world market brought some relief in the form of foreign exchange earning needed for

importing essential consumer items. Still unresolved, however, was a definition of the relationship of the military government to the polarized Ghanaian political society. In theory, the country was ruled by the collective leadership of the National Redemption Council (NRC) which included three Major-Generals: D. K. Addo; N. A. Aferi; and D. C. K. Amenu. However, power within the Council resided in an inner core of younger officers, with the most prominent being Colonel Acheampong, Major A. H. Selormey, Major Kwame Baah, Major Roger Felli and Major K. B. Agbo.[25]

In an attempt to devise a working arrangement with the civilian population, Acheampong attempted in February 1972, to form a nine-member "National Advisory Council" which included top civil servants who had served in the Busia Government. The attempt brought to the surface the inherent tensions within the Ghanaian body politic of the post-civilian government which the new administration had to face. The council was criticized by ex-Nkrumah supporters and the Ghanaian left and was suspended. The line of discord was therefore drawn between Nkrumahists and Busiaites. In the interim, the NRC fell back on what became known as the "Third Force" in Ghanaian politics, which include the Justice Party (the opposition to Busia) and ex-Unity Party (the opposition to Nkrumah before the

declaration of One Party State), by appointing their respective leaders, Joe Appiah and Komla Gbedemah as roving ambassadors.

The death of Nkrumah in Guinea on April 27, 1973 was received in Ghana by both opponents and supporters with a sense of loss.[26] The Acheampong administration negotiated the return of his remains to be given a state burial in July and proposed to launch "Operation Reconciliation" but no concrete action came out of the proposal because of the difficulties of reconciling the various political groups. In 1974, Acheampong again named a 36 member "Consultative Advisory Committee" which would advise the Government on Matters of National Policy. Two of these would be appointed by the head of state in addition to six service and army commanders Others would include two representatives each from the youth movement; the civil service; the Council of Churches; the police service; and one each from the Trade Union Congress (TUC); Women's Organization Chamber of Commerce National House of Chiefs; the Manufacturer's Association; the Medical Association; the Muslim Council; Timber Association; the universities; the farmers; and one each from the regions. The committee was again still-born as a result of criticisms that the appointments injected the old and discredited order into the new regime. The failure of this effort left the NRC

under the leadership of Acheampong to steer its own course. In many areas of foreign and domestic policy the course which NRC charted was very similar to that of the late Nkrumah. Ghana's external policy was once again "based on non-alignment and positive neutrality,"[27] there was an active African policy. Domestic policy showed a leftward orientation, although stripped of ideological specification. From 1974 on, the manifold problems of corruption, ostentation and lust for power and repression were beginning to pervade the administration. After a controversial proposal for "Union Government" in which Acheampong sought to institutionalize his rule by bringing the civilian and military into a permanent constitutional framework for governing the country drew widespread opposition, he was deposed in a "palace coup" in which fellow officers forced his resignation in 1978.

As indicated earlier, Acheampong was the undisputed leader of the inner core of the NRC which comprised of young military officers. Their outlook was militant and their perceptions of African and global problems guided Ghana's foreign policy between 1972 and 1978.

Ghana and the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS

In its perception of ECOWAS, the political, economic and military interests of the NRC leadership coincided. Politically, it viewed ECOWAS as part of the country's long standing commitment to African unity. Economically, the NRC expected Ghana to gain from economic liberalization in the region through an expanded market for the country's goods, and also to gain easier access to other regional commodities that were in short supply. Additionally, ECOWAS was perceived as a framework that would secure the eastern and western borders of the country.

Ghana's active involvement in foreign affairs that characterized the Nkrumah years had been moderated during the successive governments of the NLC and Busia. When Acheampong came to power in 1972, as head of the NRC, he sought to bring Ghana out of the "obscurity" into which it had withdrawn following the overthrow of Nkrumah.[28] The NRC leadership believed that Ghana would takes its proper place, at the forefront of African diplomatic initiative and ECOWAS was perceived as an issue for which the country's claim to leadership could be pursued.[29] Thus the traditional rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana over leadership became an important motivation in the latter's efforts. But, because of the objectives of the two

countries, in ECOWAS, met, Acheampong was "at pains to be seen to be working independently of Nigeria," as Colin Legum observed.[30] He had come to power a year after the Nigerian leadership had taken the initiative to revive the idea of a region-wide economic community. Moreover, the economic standing of Nigeria, in the early 1970s gave that country more diplomatic clout with other countries in the region than would acrrue to Ghana. Additionally, the traditional claim of Nigeria to leadership, which successive Nigerian leaders modestly played down until 1975, was based on the size and population of the country. Ghana's claim on the other hand, was based on the fact that it was the first country in black Africa to become independent. This, according to Nkrumah, gave Ghana a historic role to lead Africa. The NRC subscribed to that view in 1972 and proceeded to involve the country actively in African affairs.[31]

One immediate obstacle for the Acheampong administration in the West African region was the legacy, which it inherited from previous regimes, of damaged relations with neighboring countries. The main source of discord between Ghana and its neighbors prior to NRC rule was the expulsion, between 1969 and 1971, of over one million citizens of these countries who had been working in Ghana without work permits. The major concerns of the

countries most affected, including Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Upper Volta, was the fact that most of those expelled were not allowed to take all their personal belongings with them.[32] Ghana's relations with Togo were also unstable, undergoing periodic reversals. A greater consideration of the problem with Togo will be examined later, under the NRC's security considerations in ECOWAS.

Upon taking power in 1972, Acheampong condemned the expulsion order as "Anti-Africa" and promised to restore cordial relations between Ghana and her immediate neighbors. By the end of 1973, relations with these countries had been normalized and Acheampong took the next step by actively canvassing the various leaders to cooperate in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States. The efforts of the NRC leadership consisted of discussions with several heads of governments, including President Kerekou of Benin. William Tolbert of Liberia and President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. Additionally, a trade agreement was signed with Mali and Togo. The agreement with the latter incorporated the setting up of a joint permanent commission which would be responsible for finding ways of harmonizing political, legal and social policies. Also, the two countries undertook to implement a joint cement project.[33]

Apart from the poltical objective in pursuing a vigorous pro-ECOWAS policy, the Acheampong administration perceived economic benefits in the incipient community. The NRC leadership believed that Ghana's industrial development would be furthered through the liberlization of trade in the region.[34] Ghana is among the more developed, industrially, in the region and the NRC leadership viewed in ECOWAS, a potential market in which Ghana would control a major share and which would contribute to the country's industrial expansion. This optimism was partly the result, in 1973, of an economy that recovered significantly from its 1971 slump. As indicated earlier, the poor state of the Ghanaian economy was among the justifications given for the coup d'etat in which the NRC came to power. By the end of 1971, the country's foreign exchange, needed for the importation of essential industrial and consumer goods, had fallen to the dangerously low level of $38 million. Additionally, the Busia government had incurred foreign debts amounting to more than $1040 million and it had failed to convince creditor nations to reschedule payments. The devaluation of the cedi by 44 percent; import restrictions and budgetary restraints as stabilization measures had largely failed by the time the NRC came to power in January 1972. The policies initiated by the NRC coupled with the better world market prices for the

country's foreign exchange earner, cocoa had contributed to turn the economy around by the end of 1973.

Among the policies which the NRC initiated were the repudiation of some foreign debts; the revaluation of the cedi the launching of "operation feed yourself" as part of a general policy of "self-reliance." "Operation feed yourself" was a mobilizing slogan for citizen participation in food production which would eliminate the necessity of food imports and thereby ease pressures of trade deficits and balance of payment problems. By 1973, although the target of total self-sufficiency in food was far from achieved, production of rice and maize reached 75 percent of the targets set for them. Other accomplishments of the policy of "self-reliance" include the construction through voluntary communal effort, of irrigation projects at different parts of the country; the establishment of nurseries and livestock breeding schemes to boost local raw material for industry.

Apart from the success which resulted from these policies, the positive economic outlook of the country was enhanced by record world prices, in 1972 and 1973 of cocoa. The price of the commodity had risen by almost 98 percent between 1970 and 1972, earning about $650 per ton. With the high production level in 1973, reaching 400,000 tons, cocoa contributed to raise the export value of the country

by ¢200 million higher than the previous year. The results were that the trade deficit which existed at the end of 1971 was wiped out and the country enjoyed a surplus of ¢174 million in 1973. Furthermore the country's foreign exchange holdings had risen from ¢38 million to ¢160.

By 1973, the NRC leadership felt that the country was economically secure enough to make major international financial commitments. In addition to making a special contribution of $350,000 to the OAU Liberation Committee, Ghana provided the newly independent country of Guinea Bissau with a financial grant of $50,000 and pledged similar assistance to other African countries "still in the enslaved areas of the continent in their fight to liberate themselves."[35]

The economic upturn also persuaded the administration that "self-reliance" could be extended regionally through cooperation in the proposed economic community of West African states, in ways that would benefit the country.[36] To pursue this reasoning, the Acheampong government, in August 1973, announced that the Ghana Export Company, a government sponsored enterprise, was to establish wholesale shops in neighboring countries.[37]

An additional incentive for the NRC leadership in pursuing the formation of ECOWAS, like their Nigerian counterpat, was the application of the British government

to join the EEC in 1971. As was indicated earlier in the case of Nigeria, Ghana was also opposed to the necessities of associating with the EEC, in the early 1960s, when Britain first tried to join the European community. Indeed, Nkrumah at that time was most vehemently opposed to association and launched a campaign to dissuade other African countries from such arrangement, which he considered to be "a scheme designed to attach African countries to European imperialism."[38] He had also warned Britain in 1962 that if it joined the EEC in a way that would prove disadvantageous to Ghana, instead of associating, Ghana would withdraw from the sterling area to "safeguard [our] trading position."[39] However, until the rule of Acheampong, successive Ghanaian leaders, after Nkrumah reviewed his position and at various points explored ways by which Ghana could become an associate member of the EEC. The National Liberation Council which came to power after the overthrow of Nkrumah accredited its ambassador in Netherland and Brussels, de Graft Johnson, to the European Commission and instructed him to study how Ghana could become an associate member of the community. A similar study was undertaken by the succeeding administration of Busia in 1970. After the NRC took over power in 1972, it did not abandon, outright the considerations of its successors to associate with the EEC,

but it became evident that the administration preferred to make the formation of ECOWAS a prior objective to negotiating with EEC. The benefit of this, in the view of the Ghanian leadership, was that greater benefit would accrue to the country through collective negotiations under the aegis of ECOWAS.[40] Secondly, it hoped that the apparent contradiction between its ideological orientation, policy of non-alignment and unilateral negotiation and eventual association with EEC would be resolved by negotiation along with other countries. Finally, like Nigeria, the Ghanaian leadership expected that by negotiating under the umbrella of ECOWAS, the EEC's conditons of reverse-preference in trade would not hamper its desire to expand the country's trade in the West African sub-region.[41]

The Ghanaian leadership also viewed the Economic Community as holding the potential benefit of reducing and eventually eliminating smuggling of Ghanaian cocoa and food produce to neighboring countries.[42] The government is the sole purchaser of cocoa from the farmers and because the prices which it pays are not competitive with those that could be obtained through extra-legal transactions across the borders in Ivory Coast and Togo, smuggling activities to these countries resulted in large losses of revenue to the government. In the fiscal year 1972/73, it was

estimated that government losses from those activities stood at about ¢200 million. As a result of these the administration felt that the cooperation with these countries would, in the short-run, minimize the effects of the problem and that harmonization of financial and trade policies through ECOWAS, would eventually eliminate the necessity of extra-legal trade.[43]

The interest of the Ghanaian leadership in ECOWAS was also spurred by security considerations. Acheampong believed that cooperation in the proposed economic community would ease the tension between Ghana and her neighbors over boundary problems, particularly in the eastern frontier where the irredentism of the Ewe in Ghana's Volta region has, since independence, been a persistent problem for Ghanaian leadership.[44] The genesis of the security problem in the country's eastern frontier was the partition of German Togoland into British and French administered territories after World War I. The British half of the territory was administered as part of British Gold Coast (Ghana), while the French half was governed as an autonomous unit, with its capital at Lome. The resurgence of nationalism which followed the end of of the Second World War was, in the colonial territories, accompanied by a movement in the two territories for unification. The most prominent leaders of the movement,

including its founder, Daniel Chapman, were from the British territory. When Kwame Nkrumah came to power, he sought to integrate permanently the British half into Ghana and also to use the pan-Ewe movement in that half of the territory to annex the French half as well. The issue of the British territory appeared to have been solved in 1956 when a United Nations sponsored plebicite asked voters in the territory to choose between continued trusteeship status and integration with the soon to be independent Gold Coast. The results favored integration and for Nkrumah, this represented an initial step toward total absorption of the rest of Togo into Ghana. The French and pan-Ewe leaders in Togo, on the other hand, were opposed to Nkrumah's moves, and believing that the question in the plebicite for the British half of the territory was loaded and rigged, continued to hope for reunification of an independent Togo. Sylvanus Olympio, who emerged as leader of independent Togo in 1960 was, however, more concerned about Nkrumah's designs on his territory than pursuing the concept of Greater Togo. Meanwhile, strong anti-Nkrumah sentiments among the Ewe in the Volta region of Ghana resulted in sporadic violence and made it difficult for Ghana "to digest the British Togoland on a permanent basis."[45]

In view of the above, Nkrumah might have been justified, for security reasons, to wish to absorb the

entire Togo, just as Olympio would have been justified to ensure the sovereignty of his country through unification. However, Nkrumah's concerns were less those of his country's security. Instead, he was more concerned with territorial grandeur, which was part of his design for the entire continent of Africa. Thus, while he argued that "the unity of Ghana and Togo is natural and inevitable," because the unnatural colonial divisions had to be corrected, Olympio countered with the argument that ex-British Togoland should join with the Republic of Togo.[46] In 1960, Nkrumah decided to back his intentions with actions and directed his British Chief of Staff, General Henry Alexander, to draw up a plan for the invasion of Togo and to conduct military maneuvers at the border, shortly before the territory was due to be independent. Nkrumah was finally restrained from carrying through the invasion by General Alexander, civil servants and also the prospects of UN and French intervention.[47] His policies succeeded in drawing the otherwise nationalistic Olympio into a military understanding with the French in 1960. This understanding, it turned out, did not prevent the assassination of the Togolese leader on January 13, 1963. Nkrumah was implicated in the assassination and several previous attempts that had failed.[48] The sense of outrage and condemnation of Nkrumah by other African leaders which

followed the assassination might have weakened Nkrumah's resolve, subsequently to go through with his efforts to absorb the territory, but the incident left a permanent scar in the relations between the two countries. Moreover, the irredentism of the Ewe on both sides of the borders has continued to pose security problems for both countries.

The Ghanaian leaders who emerged after Nkrumah reversed most of his policies and by 1966, the sovereignty of Togo was guaranteed but the country continued to be a temporary refuge for dissident Ghanaian politicians and pan-Ewe leaders from Ghana's Volta region, dissatisfied with what they consider to be economic neglect of their region by successive governments in Accra. Thus, while the problem emerged partially through what Nkrumah regarded as "unnatural colonial boundaries" and his attempt to solve it through boundary revision, for the NRC leadership, it was a national security problem caused by political dissidents who easily found asylum in a neighboring country. Ghanaian leaders after Nkrumah, attempted to solve the problem through periodic border closures. However, whenever this measure was effective, it resulted in further unrest in the Volta region because it stemmed smuggling of cocoa into Togo where, as we indicated earlier, it earned a high income. During 1973, there were periodic threats of

secession and in July the Acheampong administration announced that it had arrested some chiefs for inciting some people in the region to secede and join Togo.[49] The Ghanaian leadership, in the face of the Voltaic problem believed that cooperation with Togo and other West African countries within the Economic Community of West African states was a possible solution. Between 1973 and 1974, Acheampong met periodically with the Togolese leader, Gnassingbe Eyadema, and each time the two leaders pledged to cooperate in promoting ECOWAS and also to combat smuggling and currency trafficking.[50] The two countries also signed several trade agreements, to allow for a possible exchange of a wide range of goods and to set up a joint commission to examine ways of harmoninzing political, legal, social and cultural policies. Additionally, they undertook to implement a joint cement project.[51]

In sum, Ghana's active involve in promoting the Economic Community of West African states is based on the perceptions by the leadership, of what General Acheampong described as "the potential and beneficial impact on Ghana."[52] As our analysis indicates, these benefits inhere in national political, economic and security considerations. Active diplomatic involvement in promoting the community, in which Ghana's international image would be enhanced was considered the political benefit. Also the

community was viewed as potentially beneficial in solving the manifold problems of the economy; facilitating better terms for Ghanaian export produce through collective negotiations with the EEC; and providing a regional market for the country's goods. Finally, the community was viewed as potentially beneficial in solving the country's security problems, especially those associated with irredentism in the Volta region of the Country.

Ghana and Angola: Pro-MPLA Orientation and the Moderating Influence of a Mediator

Ghana prides itself in being at the forefront of African liberation and the Acheampong administration perceived its support for the liberation movements in Angola as part of the country's long standing commitment.[53] However, the complex turn of events in the territory in which the three liberation movements turned against each other posed a decision problem for the administration between September and December 1975. The nature of the problem was how to reconcile the inclination to support the MPLA as a result of the administration's perceptions of the conflict and the significance of Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA government with the perception of their role in the OAU's reconciliation committee. The latter perception imposed a moderating influence on the administration until

december 23, 1975 when a decision was finally made to support the MPLA.

Ghana's active commitment to African liberation which characterized the Nkrumah years had largely become less of a priority during the successive administrations. After Ignatius Acheampong came to power in 1972, he revived Nkrumah's famous axiom that "Ghana's independence [is] meaningless unless it [is] linked up with the total liberation of Africa"[54] and sought to pursue a vigorous policy toward African liberation. This active involvement was in evidence when Acheampong called for the formation of "Volunteers for African Freedom" that would assist liberated parts of colonial territories.[55] He also restored May 25 of every year as Africa Liberation Day in Ghana. The inaugural celebrations of Africa Liberation Day in 1972, the first since the fall of Nkrumah, was marked with militant anti-colonial and anti-apartheid speeches coupled with fund-raising campaigns to aid freedom fighters. The commitment of the administration was also demonstrated through financial contributions to the individual liberation movements and to the OAU Liberation Committee, far in excess of Ghana's assessed obligation to the fund. In January 1973, following the meeting of the body at Accra, in which the Ghanaian Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Major Kwame Baah, was made chairman, Ghana

contributed $380,000 to the committee. Also in July 1974, the administration donated $50,000 to Guinea Bissau and pledged similar support for other liberation efforts. Additionally, the government announced that it would establish an information center in Accra, the Ghanaian capital, for the liberation movements to disseminate information in Ghana, Africa and the world in order to sustain the mobilization of world opinion against "the enemies of Africa."

The administration's overall support for liberation movements extended to the three factions in the Angolan conflict, in their common struggle against the Portuguese. However, following the outbreak of fighting between the factions in 1975, Ghana's initial assessment, which followed that of the OAU Reconciliation Committee, of which it was a member, was that the faction with the largest following was UNITA. However, the Ghanaian leadership, like the OAU Reconciliation Committee believed that the factions should form a government of National Unity.[56] This was also the position of the OAU, as a whole, prior to the breakdown of consensus in November.

The invasion of Angola by South Africa in October, in support of the UNITA/FNLA helped to tilt the umbrella support which the Acheampong administration had given to the three movements, in favor of the MPLA. He was

vehemently anti-apartheid and had earlier rejected the intention of his predecessors to open a "dialogue" with South Africa, on the grounds that it "made [Ghana] the collaborators of the evil system of apartheid."[57] A similar perception was brought to bear in the assessment of the alignment of forces in the Angolan Conflict, which was expressed by Colonel Roger Felli when he stated that:

> The OAU and South Africa's interest on the continent do not coincide. The other factions [UNITA/FNLA] that have also agreed on the expediency of an alliance with South Africa cannot, in our view, win the support of the organization. The logic of developments in Angola therefore indicates a clear unequivocal and principled support for the MPLA as the faction that truly represents the interest of Africa and that of the people of Angola as a whole.58/

The Ghanaian leadership made a distinction between the interests of the South African and those of the liberation movements that aligned with them and viewed their alliance as largely one of expediency. As for the South Africans, they viewed their thrust into Angola as an attempt to create a buffer to prevent the takeover of Namibia and the eventual liberation activities in South Africa itself.[59] They also believed that UNITA and FNLA were more concerned with capturing power in Angola than pursuing the interests of the South Africans but in joining forces with the South Africans to obtain that objective, they became the unwitting allies of their policies, of which the Ghanaian

leadership was opposed.[60] This distinction coupled with the perception of the country's role in the OAU reconciliation committee led them to temper their recognition of the MPLA with the expression of hope that UNITA and FNLA should eventually be reconciled with the MPLA.

In their perception of the conflict, the Ghanaian leadership also reviewed the interests of the U.S. and Zaire as distinct, but coterminous with that of South Africa. They believed that Zaire's involvement in the conflict was out of concern for secruity in her Southern borders and that the country wished to see a friendly government in Angola in order to secure her southern province. As for U.S. role, the Ghanaian leadership viewed U.S. involvement as "due to their mistaken conception of the Conflict as an East-West confrontation." Thus an official of the government speaking to a group of U.S. Information Service Directors in Accra in January, 1976, appealed to the U.S. government to "refrain from considering Angola as a ground of contest with the Soviet Union."[61] However, since the diverse interest of the U.S. and Zaire coincided with that of the South Africans, they proved, in the view of Ghanaian leaders, to be inimical to the interests of the Angolan people and African liberation. On the other hand, the role of the Soviet Union, in

fostering the MPLA forces against all those on the same side as South Africa was viewed as "a positive contribution to African Liberation."[62]

The Ghanaian leadership was also affected in its policy on the Angolan conflict by the cross-pressures stemming from its role in the OAU, and the attitude of the Nigerian government in the conflict. The influence of Nigeria, in recognizing the MPLA, on Ghana was not in the former persuading the latter to adopt the same policy as has been suggested by one observer.[63] Instead, the Nigerian action represented, for the Ghanaian leadership, the pre-emption of what it perceived to be its traditional position on African issues.[64] It was through this indirect influence that the Nigerian action could be considered significant in Ghana's eventual orientation. As we indicated earlier, Ghanaian and Nigerian leaders consider themselves as rival claimants to leadership of African affairs. In that rilvalry, Ghana prided itself for being at the forefront of African liberation and traditionally took a single-handed and uncompromising approach to issues of liberation. Nigeria, on the other hand, traditionally, preferred to work through the OAU and took a more accommodation position. With the Angolan issue, the situation was reversed with Nigerian leaders taking the more uncompromising position. This left pressures on the

Ghanaian leadership to modify their policy of reconciliation which it did on December 23, 1975.

Finally, the perception of the Ghanaian leadership of their country's role in the OAU through its membership of the organization's reconciliation committee exerted some influence on the timing and the nature of their decision to recognize the MPLA. Membership of the committee, in the view of the Acheampong administration bestowed prestige and leadership of African Affairs, on Ghana.[65] Since that conception of leadership was within, rather than outside the framework of the OAU, Ghanaian leaders had hoped to reconcile the different views within the organization, as well as, the factions of the liberation movement. This role conception was a significant factor in explaining the delay in Ghana's recognition of the MPLA. As we have indicated, Ghanaian leaders in their perception of the conflict were predisposed to favor the MPLA, especially after the invasion by the South Africans, on the side of that faction's opponents, and also after the traditionally more restrained Nigerians accorded it recognition in November. In the end when Ghana finally recognized the MPLA government in December, it was because the influences of the South African and Nigerian factors were overbearing. However, even after the announcement to recognize the MPLA was made, the lingering influence of their role perception

was in evidence. Thus, the Ghanaian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs told the OAU Extraordinary Session that:

> While recognizing the MPLA, the Ghana movement has at the same time not abandoned the ultimate objective that Angola should have a reconciled people.66/

This qualification was, however, intended to sustain Ghana's leadership image in the role of mediator of the divergent views within the OAU itself. But, just as reconciliation between the liberation movements was impossible, so was finding a consensus within the OAU. The inability of the organization to reach a consensus, for the Ghanaian leadership, did not represent failure of their perceived role but was due, as the Foreign Affairs Commissioner charged, to the confusion caused at the Extraordinary Session by the Western bloc,[67]

In summary, our analysis suggests that three aspects of the perception of the Ghanaian leadership influenced their decision on Angola. They viewed the invasion of that country by South African forces, on the side of the FNLA and UNITA, as meaning that the true representative of the Angolan people and African interest was the MPLA. This perception is tied to their negative valuation of South African policies and opposition to it. Secondly, they viewed Nigerian attitude and behavior in the conflict as a challenge to the traditional position of their country on

African affairs. The two factors provided compelling motivations toward a pro-MPLA orientation. However, both the timing of the decision to recognize the MPLA government and qualifications to it, were the result of the perception of their leadership role within the Organization of African Unity.

Ghana and Non-Alignment 1960-1966: "Positive Neutrality" and Pro-Eastern Policy

Nkrumah's cooperation with the British in the peaceful transition that led to Ghana's independence in 1957 continued for the next three years untainted. One analyst viewed this period as an earlier phase of Ghana's non-alignment in which the country was pro-West.[68] The western powers, on their part, viewed Nkrumah's orientation during the period as "a model of non-aligned leader."[69] For Nkrumah, however, cooperation with the Western powers in the three years following independence was an expedient step necessary to consolidate his power at home before pursuing his non-alignment policy of "positive neutrality," which he defined as "active involvement in world issues on the side of those who favor peaceful settlement of disputes."[70] From late 1960 when he achieved his major domestic objectives of indigenising the civil service; laying, what he considered the framework of Ghana's

industrialization through a U.S. pledge to help build the massive Volta dam project; and consolidated his power under the new republican constitution, Nkrumah began to pursue actively his version of non-alignment.

Nkrumah envisaged in non-aligment, a bloc of states that would counter-balance the two power blocs by what he termed a "moral force"; enhance his personal stature on the international scene; and provide him with a forum for voicing his views on international issues. The policy implications of these perceptions were policy orientations that were pro-East. In the rest of this chapter, we shall examine the various aspects of these perceptions and the policy implications.

Nkrumah found his opportunity to express his views on non-alignment to other leaders in the movement during the September session of the United General Assembly in 1960. The session attracted such leaders as Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nassar of Egypt and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. To these leaders, Nkrumah suggested that the non-aligned states constitute themselves into a cohesive and organized bloc.[71] For many of the leaders the proposal was viewed as contradicting the purpose of non-alignment and while they had forced Nkrumah to retract from that objective, his views had not completely changed in 1961

when the group met in Belgrade. He told heads of states that:

> Even though we are not here to constitute ourselves into a third bloc, yet, by this very conference we are constituting ourselves into a moral force, a distinct moral force which should be a balancing force and influence between the East and the West in the cause of peace.72/

Apart from organizational concerns, Nkrumah also viewed non-alignment as a forum where his personal international stature and influence could be enhanced. As Thompson indicated, "Nkrumah was more eager to make an impact as a world statement than an African President" during the General Assembly Session in 1960.[73] The significant influence of the older leaders of the non-aligned states must have persuaded him that leadership of the non-aligned movement was imperative. From this perspective, non-alignment was perceived by Nkrumah as a means of gaining influence and his diplomatic efforts reflected that objective. Thus, when Nassar and Tito called for a preparatory meeting of a non-aligned conference, Nkrumah asked his aide at Flagstaff House, Michael Dei-Anang to repare a brief for the Ghana delegation to the meeting instructing them that they make a strong bid for the conference to be held at Accra for "prestige reasons and the need to emphasize Africa's importance in the geopolitics of non-alignment."[74] Nkrumah

felt that if his effort to host the conference proved unsuccessful, the claim for leadership of non-alignment ought not extend beyond the circle of Nehru, Tito, Sukarno, Nassar and himself. For this reason, in a subsequent instruction to his delegation, they were informed that if they failed to attain their objective of getting Ghana to host the Conference, it should at least be sponsred by the "Big five." Since Nkrumah and Nassar were the only African leaders considered among the "Big five" Nkrumah's willingness to accept sponsorship by the other three meant that he might have been more concerned about challenges to his status, coming from Africa, and outside the circle of the "Big five" than "Africa's geo-politics."[75] Within the circle itself, his efforts in trying to host the conference and the reasons he gave, and indicated above, suggests that he viewed non-alignment as an arena of power politics and influence. However, Nkrumah failed to realize his objective of hosting the conference. India, which was one of the "big five" had been opposed, altogether, the idea of a conference, and refused to co-sponsor one. In a cable to Nkrumah, his chief delegate wrote:

> India is very unpopular... By her insistence... it has become impossible to agree, even among ourselves, that the five states...should be co-sponsors [moreover Indonesia, UAR and Yugoslavia are unwilling to carry the idea forward, as it[would amount to discrimination

> even among the 22 states which have agreed to participate.76/

Once Nkrumah's claim of leadership of the non-aligned movement was frustrated by his failure to host the conference and obtain a select sponsorship of it, he began to use the movement as a forum for expressing his views on contentious international issues. The positions which he took on those issues reflected the boundaries in his definition of non-alignment; the states acceptable to him within that definition; and those that were the subject of his attacks.

Among the issues which Nkrumah introduced into the proposed non-aligned conference that was eventually held at Belgrade were such issues, that divided African states, as the Congo and the Algerian conflicts. Additionally during the Conference itself, Nkrumah touched on a wide range of issues, covering the Cold War such as disarmament, the status of Germany and the admission of China into the United Nations.

As for the Congo conflict, Nkrumah's objective of seeing Lumumba triumph in the Congo crisis had failed with the assassination of the deposed Congolese leader in February 1961. His strategy of promoting the Lumumbaist position in the non-aligned Conference was his insistence, cabled to his chief delegate at the preparatory meeting

that: "[you] should at all cost work for admission of Algeria and Gizenga's government into the conference.... It is imperative for tactical reasons that Gizenga's government be admitted to [sic] conference. You should work for this without fail."[77] Gizenga had established a government in Lumumba's name and Nkrumah had recognized his government on February 15, two days after the death of Lumumba was announced. African states had been divided on the issue and Nkrumah was now ready to use the non-aligned forum to attack the opponents of his pro-Lumumba-Gizenga stand. Furthermore, his insistence on the inclusion of the Algerian Provision Government in the conference was intended to exclude the bulk of African states, particularly the Francophone states that had not recognized the Algerian government from the conference.

These issues brought to the fore, a consideration of the countries to be invited into the non-aligned conference. India had sought a broad participation of countries including: European neutrals, some Latin American countries and African countries, particularly Liberia; Libya; Nigeria and Tunisia. These African countries, Nkrumah felt to be outside his definition of the non-aligned and the memorandum that his chief delegate cabled him was designed specially for his orientation. The five African states, he wrote: "are committed and are

aligned, and therefore Ghana as well as Indonesia, UAR and Yugoslavia would not agree."[78] As it turned out, Ghana won the admission to the conference of Algeria but failed to have Gizenga's government attend. Some of the African countries stayed away from the conference any way, not because Nkrumah was successful in keeping them out but because of their perceptions that the orientation of the conference did not attune with their definition of non-alignment.[79]

As indicated earlier, the conference provided Nkrumah with the opportunity of expressing his views on a wide range of issues related to the Cold War. He proposed a general and complete disarmament; the acceptance and recognition of two German states; the immediate signing of a peace treaty with Germany by the great powers; and the admission of china into the United Nations. Additionally, he proposed that colonialism be completely liquidated by December 31, 1962, and that Africa be declared a nuclear-free zone. In line with his earlier suggestion that the non-aligned states constitute themselves into a third bloc, he proposed that three deputies be appointed Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, each representing East, West and non-aligned countries.[80] However, some of the suggestions clearly favored the East and made even a minimal agreement on a universal

non-aligned stance among the conference attendents impossible. Outside the diplomatic circle of non-alignment, Nkrumah's policy preferences, from 1961 onwards, reflected a pro-Eastern bias. The evidence of this may be found in his domestic policies; deterioration in relations with the Western powers, specifically Britain and the United States, on the one hand and increased cooperation with East bloc countries, on the other.

We argued in the last Chapter that domestic policies are related to non-alignment in the extent to which their orientation favors the ideology of the East or the West. In Ghana, that orientation was stated and justified by an editorial member of the party newspaper, The Spark:

> In as much as we accept the doctrine of Scientific Socialism, we are naturally drawn more closely to the Socialist countries than the Capitalist world..... For us, non-alignment and pan-Africanism remain touchtones of our ideology. It is this that separates us from other Marxist Communists. Thus also we are aligned to all those who uphold Scientific Socialism, we are non-aligned with any of the powers in the Socialist World.81/

The evolution of Socialism in Ghana was inspired by Nkrumah who attributed "[my] revolutionary ideas and activities" to influences on him, of Hegel, Engels, Mazzini and "particularly" Marx and Lenin. Although, the small nucleus of "The Cirlce" in his CPP organization shared his Socialist outlook when the party was formed, it was

anti-colonialism rather than Socialism that galavanized the mass support which earned him leadership in the nationalist movement.[82] In order to move the Ghanaian masses toward Socialism, therefore, Nkrumah had to rely on a vanguard party organization. In 1959, he announced the existence of a small group within the CPP, called the Party Vanguard Activists (PVA's). It was established "as a virile functionary unit of the party whose duty it [was] to propagate selfless devotion to the cause of the party" and this was part of "organizational measures to safeguard its socialist aims...."[83] Other measures included the merger of the party and trade unions such as the Trade Union Congress; the United Farmers Council; the National Cooperative Council; the National Council of Ghana Women; and the National Association of Socialist Student Organization, into a single monolithic organization. Furthermore, Nkrumah declared that: "the Party is the State and the State is the Party."[84]

The establishment of the Ideological Institute at Winneba in 1961 was expected to "train Socialist Ghanaians capable of taking into their hands the key posts of all sectors of the apparatus of the state and the economy."[85] The institute gave students a two years course in 'Marxism' and Leninism in addition to Nkrumaism. The latter was defined by the Defense Minister as "...a nonatheistic

Socialist philosophy which seeks to apply the current Socialist ideas to the solution of our problems...."[86] In his own original definition, Nkrumah stated that

> In Ghana, we have embarked on the Socialist path to progress but it is Socialism with a difference. Some have called it "Nkrumaism." It is not Socialism for the sake of Socialism, but practical solution of the country's problems.87/

Although these definitions coupled with Consciencism, Nkrumah's Socialist tract published in 1964, indicated that his Socialist ideas suggested an African framework, his campaign which started in 1961 tended to favor the "Scientific Socialists" in his party. Those who had opposed Socialism, including such party leaders as Komla Gbedemah, Krobo Edusei and Botsio were removed from cabinet positions in September 1961. This was followed by arrests and detention oo 50 leading politicians from both the CPP and the opposition. The removal of Gbedemah also eliminated the only strong challenge to Nkrumah's leadership and socialist campaign. During the following year, Nkrumah posted the "Scientific Socialists" in the PVA as editors of the major newspapers, including The Spark, the Ghanaian Times and The Evening News. Others were placed in charge of radio and the Bureau of African Affairs.

The economic aspect of Nkrumah's Socialist policies was revealed in the "Program of Work and Happiness" which

formed the basis of the "seven-year development plan" initiated in 1962.[88] The program which was "based on scientific principles" rested on two assumptions: first, that Socialism, "because of the heritage of imperialism and colonialism is the only system by which Ghana can progress," secondly, "that Socialism can be achieved only by rapid change in the socio-economic structure of the country."[89] "The Seven-Year Plan" which was prepared in 1961 under the chairmanship of the Hungarian Marxist economist, advocated a mixed economy for a twenty-five year transition period.[90] During the period "public and private enterprise will each have a recognizable and even, important contributions toward economic growth."[91] Nationalization was not, immediately, envisaged since the evolutionary process of socialization of industry during the transitional period would render such expedience unnecessary.

In the interim, the plan recognized five sectors of the economy: state enterprise; enterprises owned by foreign private interests; enterprises jointly owned by state and foreign private interests; cooperatives; and small-scale Ghanaian private enterprises. In the huge capital expenditure of 1000 million envisaged in the plan, 40 percent was to originate as foreign private capital. Moreover, the Volta River project which involved dam for

generating power and an industrial complex for smelting bauxite, was to be financed through credits from the West. For Nkrumah these aspects of his plan did not contradict the Socialist path which he had chosen. The plan rejected the suggestion that "vigorous state and private sectors within the same economy are incompatible."[92] One of his aides argued that priority of Marxist theory in developing countries are not "the reorganization of the ownership of existing property" but "the building up of the nation's productive assets" and that with time, private enterprise would be surpassed.[93] As for the Volta project Nkrumah justified his reliance on U.S. capital in terms of a "dual mandate," arguing that the project was a "living proof that nations and people can cooperate and coexist among themselves despite differences of economic and political opinions."[94]

Within the general framework of Nkrumah's policy of non-alignment were deterioriating relations with the West, from late 1960, and ascendant friendship and cordial relations with the East bloc countries. The good working relations which Nkrumah had with the British during the terminal phase of colonialism translated into cordial relations in the three years following independence. There were no major international issues to drive a wedge between the two countries and Nkrumah notified the British of his

major foreign policy initiatives in Africa. Relationship with Britain was considered "special." Other Western powers enjoyed the same warm relations with Ghana that Britain did. The United States was among the first countries to open a diplomatic mission in Accra. It provided several aid packages to Ghana, during the period, through International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and International Development Service (IDS). Additionally, in 1960 President Eisenhower informed Nkrumah of the willingness of his government to participate in the Volta River project. On the other hand, although there were no indications to suggest that relations with the East bloc countries were bad, Nkrumah did not make any deliberate effort to establish "special" relations with them. However, because of the ideological and perceptual predispositions of Nkrumah, it was only a matter of time before the situation reversed itself. The turning point came in late 1960 and early 1961 with the press war between Britain and Ghana over Nkrumah's dictatorial measures at home; the deposition of Lumumba in the Congo; and the frustration with Britain over the problem of colonialism in Southern Africa. Nkrumah blamed the West for the fall of Lumumba arguing that their policy was a "calculated attempt to balkanize the Congo in order to perpetuate colonialist and neo-colonialist privilidges and to halt the march to

freedom in Southern Africa."[95] On the issue of colonialism, Nkrumah's disagreement with Britain started when his proposal to Britain that it fix the year 1962 as the target date for ending colonialism was rejected, on the grounds that the pace of decolonization in each territory would proceed according to its circumstances. Nkrumah also had specific objections to British support for Portuguese policies in Angola, and its handling of the Rhodesian Constitutional and Independence proposals.

Britain's decision to apply for membership of the EEC in 1961 was a source of further aggravation to Nkrumah. Because Britain was Ghana's major trading partner, Ghana was in danger of losing substantial export revenues to EEC tarriff walls. The solution which would require Ghana's association with the EEC was unacceptable to Nkrumah because he regarded it as "a scheme to attach African countries to European imperialism."[96] The cumulative effect of the various disagreements which Nkrumah had with the British was that relations between the two countries remained largely strained throughout the rest of Nkrumah's rule. In September 1961, British army officers in the Ghana Armed Forces, including the Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Henry Alexander were dismissed; Nkrumah threatened to withdraw from the Sterling area, and at

another point threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth over the Rhodesia's constitutional impasse.

Ghana's relations with the United States had deteriorated rapidly after 1961. In 1960 after Nkrumah's speech in the United Nations in which he outlined his proposals for world peace, Christian Herter, then U.S. Secretary of State observed that "Nkrumah was very definitely moving towards the Soviet bloc."[97] While the United States expected to use as leverage, Ghana's request for aid to fund the Volta project, to alter his pro-Eastern orientation, Nkrumah was largely undaunted and wasted no opportunity to take a statnd against U.S. policies in the Congo, Cuba and South East Asia. In April 1961, he condemned the United States as the aggressor in Cuba, over the Bay of Pigs incident. Also, his book, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, published in 1965 described the United States as the citadel of neocolonialism and blamed her for causing misery in all troubled spots of the world.[98]

Just as Ghana's relations with the West started to deteriorate from late 1960, they warmed up with East bloc countries. In April 1960, a large delegation of top government officials from Ghana, led by Kojo Botsio visited the USSR. A second visit by John Tettegah and Taiwa Adamafio in August led to a promise from Krushchev that if

the West delayed over the Volta Project, the Soviet Union would help build it. Furthermore, the Soviet Union made available 160 million rubles to aid Ghana develop her fishing industry; establish various industrial enterprises; and built medium capacity hydro-electric stations. Plans were also made for technical cooperation and increased trade.

As Thompson observed the visit of President Leonid Brezhnev to Ghana in February 1961 was an important symbolic turning point.[99] Brezhnev was on a visit to Guinea when the death of Lumumba was announced. It was after that announcement that Nkrumah extended an invitation to Brezhnev to include Ghana in his itinerary. In the joint comminique that was issued after the visit, Nkrumah and Brezhnev indicated their "similarity of points of view...on the the most important problems of international policy."[100] The visit of President Brezhnev was succeeded by an extensive tour of East bloc countries by Nkrumah in July 1961. Taking with him a large entourage of twenty-seven of his leftist supporters, Nkrumah visited the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany and China. If the trip was meant to bring Ghana's non-alignment policy into balance, as Ghanaian official believed, the substance of joint comminiques and the symbolism of the trip signified a

pro-Eastern orientation. For example, a joint comminique in the Soviet Union recorded that "The Soviet Government informed the Ghanaian Government of the proposals of the USSR on the German problem. The Goverment of Ghana appreciated the proposals of the Soviet government concerning a peace treaty with Germany and the settlement of the West Berlin issue on the basis of that treaty."[101]

The implications of Nkrumah's perceptions of non-alignment and policy orientation highlights some of the problems in the traditional indicators of non-alignment: namely, aid, trade and UN roll-call votes. For example, the fact that Ghana received aid from the United States totalling $165.6 million while the share of aid from the Soviet Union, during the period under review amounted to $82 million might suggest that Ghana had closer relations with the United States. However, Nkrumah had different evaluations of aid from the two countries. The terms of aid from the Soviet bloc was considered "better" and "more impressive." On the other hand, U.S. aid, the bulk of which went into the River Volta project, were considered by Nkrumah as "commercial loans, not free grants or gifts" and so did not entitle the U.S. and other donor countries to any political influence.[102]

Another consideration relating to the complex relationship between aid and Ghana's non-alignment is that

although total U.S. aid was larger than that of the Soviet Union, much of the U.S. aid was committed or received by 1962. After that Nkrumah did not request aid from the United States until 1965 when the United States government turned down a Ghanaian request for food aid (under the P.L. 480 program). By contrast, Soviet aid was spread over the period and as Fritz Schatten observed, even the mention of the possibility of securing Soviet aid was attended with "ecstacies of admiration and gratitude."[103] However, Soviet commitments were totally inadequate for the faltering economy and Nkrumah, again, contacted the U.S. government, reluctantly, in 1965 over a massive aid package from OECD countries.

In trade, the West also controlled the largest share of Ghanianan import and export trade. However, Nkrumah made a conscious effort to increase Ghana's commercial transactions with the East bloc countries by establishing the Committee for Economic Cooperation with Eastern Countries (CECEC). Formed in 1961, the organization consisted of top civil servants. Its aim was "to expedite economic arrangements with the Eastern countries." Although the efforts of the body were handicapped by inconvenient payment arrangements and non-competitiveness of goods originating in East bloc countries, there was a significant increase in trade between these countries and

Ghana. Thus, while by 1966, 11.8 percent went to East bloc countries, that figure represented at 60 percent increase. Also imports from East bloc countries between 1960 and 1964 grew at 350 percent. Equivalent figures for the West were in decline as following tables below show.

Ghana's behavior at the United Nations between 1960 and 1966 reflected a disjunction between the orientation of Nkrumah's non-alignment and the orientation of the country's delegation in New York. While his policy orientation was pro-East and opposed to many African states, the Ghana mission at the UN maintained some autonomy from the general current of Nkrumah's policy. The analysis of group voting in the organization by Bruce Russett showed Ghana to have the highest solidarity voting with the cluster of Afro-Asian states that included such countries as Nigeria, India and Ethiopia.[105] Furthermore, the close cooperation of the Ghana mission with their Nigerian counterparts was quite contrary to the existing animosity between the two countries on questions of non-alignment.

An obvious explanation of the disjunction is the perceptual differences between Nkrumah and the leadership of his country's mission at the UN. However, if the activities of the organization were proximate to Nkrumah's control at Flagstaf House, his personal perceptions would

have prevailed and produced a policy orientation consistent with his brand of non-alignment. The monolithic control of external affairs from Flagstaff House, coupled with Nkrumah's pre-occupation with issues of unity on the continent and the ad hoc focus on the UN made it difficult for the administration to respond routinely to requests by the mission for instructions.[106] The result was that the mission developed an autonomous response that diverged from Nkrumah's orientation.

From our perspective, this had two implications: first, the use of UN roll-call votes as a quantitative indicator of non-alignment, by itself may not reflect the actual orientation of a country's policy. Secondly, the disjunction between Ghana's overall orientation and that of its Mission does not reflect the often made dichotomy between theory and practice of non-alignment, but a disjunction between perceptions of complimentary leaders located at different points of policy implementation, handicapped by communication. The behavior of Ghana at the UN, therefore, remains a distinct qualification to the general orientation of Ghana's non-alignment. Alex Quaison Sackey described that orientation as one of "perfect non-alignment."

Conclusions

The decisions and policy orientations of Ghanaian leaders on the various issues, further illustrate the intervening influences of perceptions in the relationships between objective variables and decisions. In pursuing vigorously the formation of ECOWAS, Ghanaian leaders, like their Nigerian counterparts expected economic, political and security benefits. The economic benefits were perceived to exist in the expanded market, for Ghanaian products, that ECOWAS would facilitate. Underlying that perception of beneft was a view similar to that of the Nigerians, that the existing optimistic outlook of their economy would yield a national advantage within a regional market. From this perspective, they also shared the concerns of the Nigerians over the British entry into the EEC and the imperatives of concerted negotiations with that organization. In terms of political benefits, since they perceived them within the context of their historical diplomatic competition with Nigeria, they pursued their ECOWAS diplomacy parallel rather than in concert with Nigeria.

The modification of certain assumptions underlying the perceptions of benefits by Ghanaian leaders could easily lead to alternative behaviors. It may be argued, as we did in the case of Nigeria, that the optimism with which

Ghanaian leaders viewed their national economy in the early 1970s was misguided. A justification for such argument may be that the fortunes of the cocoa based economy being consistently out of control of Ghanaian leaders, those fortunes being subject to the flucations of world market prices. The validity of such an argument would also render the perceived benefits and resulting policies meaningless.

On the Angolan issue, the timing and the context of the Ghanaian decision to recognize the MPLA were the result of several perceptual influences. Ghanaian leaders were aware of the South African involvement in the conflict and were predisposed to recognize the MPLA at the same time that the Nigerians did, if not before. However, they were restrained by their participation in the OAU mediation effort to bring the liberation movements together. They perceived that participation as providing the country a leadership role within the organization. On the other hand, the pressures from the Nigerian decision to recognize the MPLA which posed an alternative concept of leadership spurred the Ghanaian leadership to recognize the MPLA in January 1976. The decision and its specific content reflected the cross-pressures arising from the perceived implication of the South African involvement; the Nigerian decision, and the country's participation in the OAU mediation effort.

On the issue of non-alignment, the perceptions and orientations of the Ghanaian leaders were the direct opposite of the Nigerian case. Whereas, Nigerian leaders perceived non-alignment as independence of national choice on global issues and orientation towards either of the power blocs, the Ghanaian leaders envisaged in non-alignment, a purposive bloc of states organized as a third force in world politics. They framed the purpose of non-alignment within the context of such international issues as disarmament, colonialism and neo-colonialisms. They assumed that there was consensus among non-aligned states as to the relevance and specific view of the relevant issues in non-alignment which, in turn, defined their orientation. That orientation, on balance favored the Eastern bloc.

There is an internal logic to the decisions and orientations of Ghana on the various issues. However, the logic in each case was constrained by a particular perception of the issues which, in turn, defined the variables that were relevant in their decisions and orientations. Those perceptions and orientations that flow from them become significant when alternatives to them are posed. In the following Chapter, we examine the alternatives posed by Sierra Leone in the perceptions and orientations of its leaders.

Table IV

DIRECTION OF GHANAIAN IMPORTS: SELECTED WEST AND EAST BLOC COUNTRIES

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Imports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Imports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Imports
WEST						
U.K.	113.0	23.9	93.4	27.4	101.2	28.8
U.S.	26.3	7.9	30.2	8.9	59.0	16.8
Canada	6.4	1.9	8.7	2.6	2.3	0.7
Japan	21.7	6.5	18.3	5.4	18.7	5.3
W. Germany	19.7	5.9	36.4	10.7	26.0	7.4
France	7.3	2.2	11.8	3.5	15.2	4.5
Netherlands	26.0	7.8	11.8	4.9	17.9	5.1
Totals		66.1		63.3		68.4
EAST						
USSR	5.1	1.5	16.8	4.9	20.4	5.8
Czechoslo-vakia	4.0	1.2	11.0	3.2	5.1	1.5
E. Germany	2.4	0.7	4.0	1.2	3.9	1.1
Poland	4.8	1.4	8.1	2.4	4.1	1.2
Totals		4.4		11.7		9.5

Source: African Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

Table V

DIRECTION OF GHANAIAN EXPORTS: SELECTED WEST AND EAST BLOC COUNTRIES

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Exports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Exports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Exports
WEST						
U.K.	101.3	31.4	74.0	23.0	67.5	25.2
U.S.	58.2	18.0	67.6	21.0	38.7	14.4
Canada	4.8	1.5	5.8	1.8	6.5	2.4
Japan	6.9	2.1	11.5	3.6	13.2	4.9
France	2.4	0.7	2.6	0.8	2.0	0.7
W. Germany	36.4	11.3	36.1	11.2	19.7	7.4
Netherlands	31.9	9.9	32.9	10.2	18.1	6.8
Totals		75.0		71.7		61.8
EAST						
USSR	13.5	4.2	17.8	5.5	25.4	9.5
Czechoslo-vakia	1.7	0.5	0.1	0.03	5.3	2.0
E. Germany	2.1	0.6	2.2	0.7	5.2	1.9
Poland	3.9	1.2	6.1	1.9	4.1	1.5
Totals		6.6		8.1		14.9

Source: Africa Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

References - Chapter IV

[1]In the alternation between civilian and military rule in Ghana, the ouster of Kwame Nkrumah was succeeded in 1966 by General Joseph Ankrah who was later replaced in the ruling National Liberation Council (NLC) by Lt. General A. A. Afrifa. In October 1969, the Military returned power to the civilian government of Dr. Kofi Busia. The latter was overthrown in 1972 by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong who was also replaced in the ruling National Redemption Council (NRC) by Lt. Colonel Akuffo. NRC rule was terminated in a countercoup in 1968 by Lt. Jerry Rawlings, who handed power to the civilian government of Limann, only to overthrow it a year later.

[2]For some detailed background studies of Ghanaian politics, See David Apter, Ghana in Transition, (New York: Atheneum 1963) Dennis Austin Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, (London: Oxford University Press 1970), Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic 1960-1966, 1960-1966, (London: Methuen and Co.) 1976.

[3]In the 1951 elections, Nkrumah's Party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) won 34 seats out of the 38 elected seats.

[4]The other parties in the election were: The Ghana Congress Parts (GCP); Northern Peoples Party (NPP); Muslim Association Party (MAP), Togoland Congress (TC); Anlo Youth Youth Organization (AYO); Ghana Action Party (GAP) and Ghana National Party (GNP).

[5]See Henry Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 48.

[6]Under a 1961 amendment to the criminal code, it became a criminal offense to undertake anything that would make the presdient an object of hatred, ridicule or contempt. See Parliamentary Debates October 13, 1961.

[7]The figures represent those still in detention at the termination of Nkrumah's rule, released by those who ousted him and quoted in Trevor Jones Ghana's First Republic, op. cit. p. 33.

[8]In the plebicite, 92.8% of the electorate appeared to have voted. This in fact, was unlikely since opponents campaigned for a boycott.

[9]See Henry Bretton. The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah op cit. p. 61.

[10]Ibid. p. 168.

[11]See Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 Princeton: Princeton University Press 1969, p. 162; Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer Ghana: End of An Illusion, (New York: Monthly Review Press 1966), p. 83.

[12]See Adu Boahen Ghana: Evolution and Change in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (London: Longman 1975), p. 208.

13The River Volta Project: For details see Tony Killick, "Volta River Project" in A Study of Contemporary Ghana eds. Walter Birmingham, 1 Neustadt, E. N. Omaboe, (London (1960).

[14]See Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer Ghana: End of an Illusion (New York: Monthly Review Press), 1966, p. 109.

[15]The Flagstaff House combined the Presidential Palace with the nerve center of Nkrumah's administration and was described appropriately by Thomas Hodgkin as "Center of a Palace Regime" See Thomas Hodgkin "African Angels" New Statesman, London, 23, June 1967.

[16]See Henry Bretton The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah op. cit. p. 108.

[17]See Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Thomas Nelson 1957), p. 45.

[18]These ideas crystallized in his book Neo-Colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism, (New York: Thomas Nelson 1965).

[19]His other works include Africa Must Unite New York: Praeger 1963; Consciencism New York: Monthly Review Press 1965; I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology, New York Praeger 1961; Towards Colonial Freedom (London Hienemann, 1962).

[20]Positive action was a strategy of civil disobedience which Nkrumah defined as encompassing "Legitimate political agitation, newspapers and educational campaigns, and in the last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence," See Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography op. cit. p. 112.

[21]Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin January 1972.

[22]For details See ed. Colin Legum Africa Contemporary Record (London Rex Collings 1972-73), pp. B595-597.

[23]Ibid.

[24]The civil servants were dismissed on the grounds of inefficiency, but political motivations were paramount, as the Sallah case showed. For details see Richard Rathborne "Ghana" in West Africa States: Failure and Promise London: Cambridge University Press 1975 ed. John Dunn.

[25]Both Kwame Bath and Major Roger Felli, at different time, became the External Affairs Commissioners during NRC rule.

[26]The emotional response of Ghanians to the announcement of the death of Nkrumah who had been discredited and had been living in exile in Guinea since his overthrow is recounted in Colin Legum ed. Africa Contemporary Record. 1971-72 p. B601. Also see p. A40.

[27]The successors to Nkrumah revised his concept of "Positive Neutrality" and termed it "balanced neutrality" with a pro-western bias. Acheampong reversed this in 1972.

[28]Interview: Mr. J. A. Laryea, Ministry of External Affairs, Accra November 192 Also See Speeches of General K. Achaempong (Accra: Governmental Printers 1977), p. 8.

[29]Ibid.

[30]See Africa Contemporary Record 1973-74, p. B655.

[31]In several instances Ghanian leaders duplicated the efforts of their Nigerian counterparts. For example both Achempang and Gowon, in 1972 wrote separate letters to leaders of West African states to urge them to participate in the proposed community. See Olajide Aluko Ghana and Nigeria: A Study in Inter-African Discord, (London: Rex Collings, 1976), p. 258.

[32]Victor Adegoroye, the Nigerian High Commissioner in Ghana in 1970 claimed that over 140,000 Nigerian nationals were ejected from Ghana without being allowed sufficient time to sell their immovable property or take with them their moveable possessions. See West Africa 19 November 1971.

[33]It will be recalled from our earlier chapter that a similar agreement had been reached with Nigeria. See page 114.

[34]Interview: Mr. K. Anang Ministry of Finance, Accra November 1982.

[35]See Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74 p. B655.

[36]See "Speeches of General K. Achaempong" (Accra Government Printers 1977), p. 43.

[37]See West Africa September 10, 1973.

[38]Quoted in Olajide Aluko Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70 op. cit. p. 196.

[39]Ibid. p. 197.

[40]The Achampong administration was convinced by the end of 1972 about the dire necessity of some form of association with the EEC and believed that the best way to secure better terms under such arrangement was to negotiate in concert with African countries, particularly, with the framework of ECOWAS Personal Interview with Mr. J. A. Laryea. November 1982. Ministry of External Affairs, Accra.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]The seriousness of the secession threat was brought home to the Achaempong administration when disturbance in the Volta Region in 1973 was linked to influential chiefs in the region.

[45]See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 11.

[46]Ibid. p. 84.

[47]Ibid. p. 84.

[48]For details of the various intrigues, See ibid. pp. 229-237.

[49]See Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, p. 561.

[50]Ibid.

[51]A similar proposal to undertake a joint cement project was made between Nigeria and Togo in 1973.

[52]See "Speeches by Colonel L. K. Acheampong" (Accra Government Printer 1972).

[53]Ibid.

[54]See Africa Contemporary Record, 1973/74, p. B655.

[55]See "Speeches by Colonel L. K. Acheampong" op. cit. p. 29.

[56]Ibid., 1977, p. 8.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Quoted in the Daily Graphics, January 12, 1976.

[59]Personal interview with Mr. J. A. Laryea Ministry of External Affairs Accra, November 1982.

[60]Ibid.

[61]See Daily Graphic January 21, 1976.

[62]Personal Interview with Mr. J. A. Laryea Ministry of External Affairs. Accra, November 1982.

[63]See Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, p. B766.

[64]Personal interview with Mr. J. A. Laryea Ministry of External Affairs, Accra, November 1982.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Quoted in the Daily Graphic January 12, 1976.

[67]See Ghanaian Times, January 19, 1976.

[68]See Olajide Akuko ed. The Foreign Policies of African States op cit. p.

[69]See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 42.

[70]See Kwame Nkrumah "African Propsect" Foreign Affairs October 1958.

[71]See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 178.

[72]Ibid. p. 181.

[73]Ibid. p. 178.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Indeed Nkrumah sought to exclude Senegal, Nigeria, Liberia and Tunisia from the Conference on the grounds that they were not non-aligned.

[76]See Scott Thompson, op cit. p. 179.

[77]Ibid. p. 180.

[78]Ibid.

[79]The two political group of states, Monrovia and Casablanca, each had broadly different definitions of non-alignment and the majority in the Monrovia group boycotted the Belgrade Conference.

[80]See Scott Thompson op. cit. 181.

[81]Quoted in Carl Rosberg and William Fiedland ed. African Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964), p. 157.

[82]For details of the activities of "The Circle" see Colin Legum "Socialism in Ghana" in Carl Rosberg and William Friedland, ibid. p. 136.

[83]Ibid. p. 138.

[84]Ibid. p. 140.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid. p. 141.

[87]See Kwame Nkrumah Africa Must Unite op. cit. 119.

[88]See "Program of the Convention People's Party: Work and Happiness" Accra 1962. Reprinted in David Apter Ghana in Transition op. cit. pp. 393-421.

[89]For details fo the Plan See "Ghana First Seven Year Development Plan (Accra: Government Printer 1962).

[90]The plan was drawn up by Dr. Joseph Bogno in conjunction with leading Ghanian economists.

[91]See Ghana's First Seven-year Development Plan op. cit.

[92]Ibid.

[93]See The Economic Bulleting of Ghana Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 14.

[94]See Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion op. cit. p. 126.

[95]See Kwame Nkrumah Challenge of the Congo London 1967, p. 111.

[96]Quoted in Olajide Aluko Ghana and Nigeria op. cit. p. 196.

[97]Quoted in Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 166.

[98]See Scott Thompson Ghana and Nigeria op. cit. p. 186.

[99]See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 166.

[100]Ibid. 167.

[101]Ibid. 176.

[102]See Olajide Aluko Ghana and Nigeria op. cit. p. 184.

[103]See Fritz Schatten Communism in Africa (London 1966), p. 161.

[104]For details of the activites of the Ghana Mission at UN, See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 289.

[105]Ghana showed a coefficient of .88 solidarity voting with the Afro-Asia group compared to .82 for Ethiopia; .75 for India and .58 for Morrocco. For further details See Bruce Russett "Discovering Voting Groups in the U.N." American Political Science Review 60, 2, 1966.

[106]The Ghana mission often complained of the failure of the home government to respond to its cables requesting instructions. See Scott Thompson op. cit. p. 41.

[107]For our critic of the literature of the distinction between theory and practice of non-alignment see pages 131-132.

[108]See Scott Thompson Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit. p. 289.

CHAPTER 5

SIERRA LEONE: LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION OF ISSUES AND POLICY

The Political and Decision-Making Environment

From April 1961, when Sierra Leone became independent, the country has been ruled successively by the Margai brothers, Milton and Albert; a brief interregnum of Military rule; and President Siaka Stevens. The period of non-alignment under consideration falls within the regimes of the Margai brothers, while the periods covered for the other two issues in our study, ECOWAS and the Angolan conflict fall within the administration of President Siaka Stevens.

The political evolution of the country and the successive administrations follow the general pattern of constitutional and political development in British West Africa, although with features unique to Sierra Leone.[1] Constitutionally, Sierra Leone, like the other other territories evolved through a gradual process of indigenous participation within the framework of British over-rule, until 1961 when an independent and unitary constitution became operative. Institutionally, the independent constitution left a British model of parliamentary

democracy which allowed for party competition. Politically, the forces of ethnic, class, sectional and personal interests often operated to undermine the constitutional and institutional orders. Under these circumstances, the nature of leadership assumed an added importance and became the deciding factor in national orientation.

The inherent divisions within Sierra Leonean politics was brought out in the decolonization process. The landmark in that process was the 1947 constitutional proposals which gave Africans a majority in the governing legislative council. Prior to the proposals, the hinterland of the country which was designated a protectorate enjoyed a measure of self rule under powerful chiefs but had very little part in the British rule over the entire country. On the other hand, the Creole elite in the colony, which encompass Freetown and its environs had some influence in the colonial administration of the entire country, through their representation in the central legislature and colonial bureaucracy. The constitutional proposals of 1947 which provided for a total of twenty-three members, with an African majority of fourteen, out of which, ten went to the protectorate and four, to the Creoles in the colony, brought to the political arena the mutual resentment between the two groups. The Creoles were

a small and closely-knit group of ex-slave returnees from Britain, the Americas and elsewhere in Africa. They were well-educated and viewed themselves as British citizens. They also viewed the Africans in the Protectorate as inferiors and therefore regarded the constitutional proposals, which gave them a majority, as a threat to their political advantages and rejected it.[2] The elite in the Protectorate, on the other hand, were scornful of what they regarded as the pretensions of the Creole, and received the constitutional proposals as an opportunity to supplant their political advantages.

The protectorate itself contained inherent divisions between various ethnic groups, with the major ones being the Mende and the Temne.[3] There were also other divisions between the traditional elite, constituting the powerful chiefs and an emergent educated elite.[4] The common resentment of these groups for the Creoles focused their concerns on the Protectorate Colony divisions as the arena of political conflict. This suited the British who feared that political polarization and conflict between the Protectorate elite and populist elements there would facilitate precipitous changes in the central government.[5] They were therefore intent on adopting the proposals. In their effort to limit the participation of the Protectorate elite in the proposed council, the Creole leadership

suggested modifications in the literacy requirements of which they set very high standards.[6] This was expected to limit the opportunities of the protectorate chiefs, most likely to gain seats in the council and also to draw a wedge between the chiefs and educated elites. They failed in their objectives and with the constitutional proposals due to come into effect in 1951, political organizations emerged, reflecting the division between the protectorate and the colony. The Creoles united various interest groups into the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL) in 1950. In response, the elite in the Protectorate formed the Sierra Leone Protectorate People Party (SLPP) which was later modified as the Sierra Leone Peoples Party. Ne NCSL was led by professional Creole elite and headed by Dr. Bankole-Bright. The SLPP on the other hand was led by members of the chiefly class among the various ethnic groups in the protectorate and headed by Dr. Milton Margai.

The significance of the constitutional development was that the evolution of political parties and political leadership in Sierra Leone were focused on capturing or maintaining political privileges from internal opponents rather than such motivations as anti-colonial nationalism or pan-African ideologies that characterized other British West African territories. Thus, the manifesto of the NCSL declared: "We object to foreigners [i.e. protectorate

Africans] prepondering in our legislative Council."[7] The objective of the SLPP, on the other hand, was to put an end to the long standing Creole dominance of the central government.

The decline of the Creole as a dominant force in the politics of Sierra Leone which followed the implementation of the 1951 constitution was sealed in the general election of 1957. In that election the NCSL failed to gain a single seat, even in the colony. However, another Creole based party, the United Progressive Party (UPP), which was less inspired by the unrealistic goal of maintaining the status quo, sought to capitalize on the inherent fissures of the alliance in the protectorate. It contested the 1957 elections and gained some seats in the north as well as in the colony. However, this was less of a threat to the SLPP than the threat from within the party. The almost total reliance of the party on the chiefs coupled with its increasing southern bias led to a split in which Milton Margai's brother, Albert, formed another party called the Peoples National Party (PNP). Another offshoot of the inherent weaknesses of the SLPP alliance was the splinter of another group which formed the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM) in the diamond producing region of the country.[8] Between 1958 and 1960, the PNP along with the UPP performed the role of official opposition to the SLPP government of

Sir Milton Margai. In 1960, an ex-Minister in the SLPP government, Siaka Stevens brought together a variety of politicians from the SLPP, PNP, UPP and KPM to form the All Peoples Congress APC. In the first general elections after Independence, the APC proved to be formidable opposition to the SLPP, winning twenty of the sixty-two seats.

In subsequent developments, Milton Margai moved to co-opt political opponents into the SLPP and was proving very successful in undermining the base of APC support when he died in 1964. Upon his death, his brother Albert Margai took over leadership of the party and the Prime Ministership. His succession had been opposed by several top party members, many of whom he excluded from government.[9] Furthermore, he abandoned the mediatory policies of his brother, which had held the fragile SLPP coalition together. He, therefore, found himself at odds with a large section of the SLPP as well as the other parties which he had inadvertently united because of his attempt to introduce a one-party state. By the time the 1967 general elections were held, it was clear that he would not win. After the APC leader, Siaka Stevens, was invited to form a government, Albert persuaded the Military Commander, Brigadier Lansana to take over and declare martial law. Brigadier Lansana himself was immediately

deposed by subordinates, headed by Juxon-Smith who formed the National Reformation Council, proscribed political organizations and instituted a series of inquiries into the abuses of office in the Margai government.

The rule of the National Reformation Council was terminated in April 1968 when junior non-commissioned officers in the force overthrew Juxon-Smith and brought to power the APC government of Siaka Stevens. The APC government incorporated opponents of Albert Margai and gradually decimated the SLPP. Twenty-six SLPP members of Parliament were subsequently removed on petition enabling the APC to win those seats in elections that were marked by violence. In the next general elections which were held in 1973, the APC won all eighty-five seats in the Parliament, virtually making Sierra Leone a one-party state. The expansion of the APC itself had led to divisions within it which culminated in the formation of the United Democratic Party in September 1970. The party was immediately banned and its leaders detained. Thus, the APC under the leadership of Siaka Stevens has since 1973 maintained monopoly of power through a combination of coercion and distribution of political patronage, and the manipulation of political symbols.[10]

The political developments which we have traced were, in general, the result of complex interaction among

historical and structural factors, including: British colonialism and the design for decolonization; the division between the protectorate and the colony; ethnic divisions, especially between the larger Temne and Mende groups; underlying structure of traditional authority; class divisions and generational divisions. However, the particular directions which the political developments took were the result of the orientations of the leaders that emerged. It is therefore necessary to trace the background and general orientations of the three leaders in our study.

Milton Margai, the country's first Prime Minister was the son of a wealthy merchant and grandson of a Paramount chief. He was the first Protectorate student at the Fourah Bay College from where he went on to Britain to qualify as a medical doctor. He returned to Sierra Leone in 1928, joined the Government Medical Service and was posted to the Protectorate where he served as medical officer for the following twenty years. During this medical career, he also served as a political adviser to the powerful chiefs. With the support of the chiefs, he rose into prominence in such organizations as the Protctorate Educational Progressive Union (PEPU) and the Sierra Leone Organization Society. These organizations, formed to promote the social and political objectives of the chiefs and the educated elite in the protectorate, eventually became the base of

the SLPP. Milton Margai, with the support of the powerful chiefs became the President of the party and also the Prime Minister of the country.

As leader, he was a self-effacing and conservative man, unwilling to ruffle the traditional basis on which authority rested.[11] Unlike other contemporary African leaders such as Nkrumah or Sekou Toure, he did not see the wisdom in capitilizing on populism as a basis for leadership against the traditional order or against colonialism. Thus, during the debates in the protectorate assembly on the 1952 populist riots he registered his disapproval:

> ...I stress firmly that we should register our strong disapproval of such action taken by some lawless people and ask government to adopt the firmest measures to quell these things.12/

Milton Margai preferred the expression of local discontent to be channeled and contained within the traditional order. He failed to see the anachronism of the chieftaincy institution which had come under the stress of pressures from the new participatory process and insisted that "the position of chieftaincy is very necessary and must continue."[13] His background precluded, as Kilson observed:

> Understanding or sympathy for the kind of expedient democratic outlook required for a political leadership whose claim for power rested upon an organized mass basis. Sir Milton's

> thought was alien to the kind of autonomous, self-interested rationality to the political needs and orientations of the masses.14/

In his attitude toward colonialism, he demonstrated a similar conservation. For him, self-rule from colonialism was not a right to be fought for but a demonstration of those qualities which satisfied the imperial power that self-rule was deserved. On the eve of the 1957 general elections, he told Sierra Leoneans in a broadcast:

> We [SLPP] leaders were the first Ministers in Sierra Leone. We were the pioneers. The evidence of how well we have done our jobs is seen in the readiness with which Her Majesty's government has agreed for us to take another step toward self-rule.15/

As leader of Independent Sierra Leone, Sir Milton Margai's conception of leadership was rooted in traditional forms of authority this led to what Kilson described as "autocratic influence" over the definiton of party and national policy.[16] However, he did not elevate his power to the level of a personality cult that characterized the Nkrumah regime in Ghana. His self-effacing leadership suited his opponents some of whom he did not hesitate to quieten through detentions. At the same time, his mediatory approach to split within his party coupled with cooptation of various opposition leaders into his government left him the undisputed leader of his country until 1964 when he died.

Sir Albert Margai who succeeded his brother was in several ways his opposite. In contrast to Milton's self effacing and quiet style, Albert was more disposed toward charismatic leadership and had a domineering presence. Unlike Milton who, though wealthy, did not display it, Albert not only gave conspicuous evidence of wealth but also made the pursuit of it, by all means, a virtue. Like Milton, who became the first person from the protectorate to qualify as a medical doctor, Albert had gone to Britain in 1944 and came back in 1948, the first protectorate man to qualify as a barrister.

Upon his return from Britain, Albert joined the SLPP. His more militant approach to issues of chieftaincy colonialism and the nature of the party alliance led to a split between him and his brother. In the ensuing struggle, Albert's failure to wrest leadership of the SLPP from his brother led to the formation of the PNP in 1958[17] While Milton relied on the chiefs, Albert relied on the younger supporters among clerks, teachers, professionals and skilled workers in the hinterland. After the failure of the PNP to make electoral gains aginst the SLPP, Albert was induced to join the United Front, an all party coalition formed for the Independence Conference in London in 1960. He thus returned fully into the SLPP as a cabinet

minister. This also brought about a split between him and his most important ally in the PNP, Siaka Stevens.

In his attitude toward chieftaincy, he was not opposed to the institution but resented the way his brother had used it to his political advantage. He had been responsible from the inclusion of a few radical nationalist vocabulary in the 1951 SLPP manifesto but his anti-colonial feelings nowhere approached those of more militant nationalist leaders elsewhere on the continent.[18]

The death of Milton Margai left no clear successor but Albert moved in quickly to fill the vacuum. Party members who opposed the move were excluded from government. These coupled with his lack of tact in dealing with opponents left the SLPP split and his battle with his own party became a major pre-occupation. At the same time, he aimed at building a centrally controlled party machine. His last ditch effort to maintain himself permanently in power was his invitation to the army to declare martial law following his defeat by the A.P.C.

Siaka Stevens who eventually came to power in 1968, unlike the Margai brothers came from a humble parentage. Also, he did not attain the educational levels of the Margai brothers. He was essentially a self-made man who rose to political prominence as a trade union leader. As a prominent figure from the Protectorate, he was also a

leading member of the SLPP during the early phases of decolonization. In the subsequent split within that party, he along with Albert Margai became the leading members of the PNP opposition to SLPP. In opposition, Siaka Stevens like Albert, was opposed to the manner in which the SLPP had used the chieftaincy institution. At the same time, he considered the institution an indispensible part of Sierra Leonean body politic.[19] Although he symbolized a political orientation that was militant, his militancy did not go nearly as far as that of Nkrumah or Sekou Toure.

The major aspects of his militancy were on the issues of British expatriates in Sierra Leonean administration; economic policy; and the framework of post colonial relations with Britain. On the issue of expatriates, which became politically contentious at the terminal phase of colonialism, Milton Margai had indicated that he would not replace the British expatriates simply because there were qualified Sierra Leoneans. Siaka Stevens, on the other hand, stressed the priority of Africanization of the civil service, as soon as there were qualified Africans, although he left the proviso that the would "give every encouragement to expatriates who had specific contributions to make."[20] In the area of investment policy, while he did not consider shutting the "Open Door" policy of Milton Margai, he believed that the procurement of capital

investment "should be pursued with care."[21] In his attitude to the British, while retaining a deep respect for that country, he objected to the idea of a defense agreement with the former colonial master and he presented the only dramatic opposition to the terms of the independence agreements in 1960. The obverse of this attitude was his belief that Sierra Leone should broaden its relations to include non-western countries

Siaka Stevens' leadership style has been one that seeks to unify through the institutional mechanisms of the one-party state. This approach has been coupled with patronage, cooptation and coercion.

The machinery for executing foreign policy under the three leaders was the Ministry of External Affairs. The various leaders retained almost absolute control of the organ and independent-minded Ministers heading it were quickly replaced.[22] The parliament, despite occasional questioning always yielded to the wishes of the leaders on issue of foreign policy.

Sierra Leone and ECOWAS: National Objectives and Diplomatic Opportunity

The leadership in Sierra Leone shared with other leaders in West Africa the view that regional integration would promote development region-wide. Thus, the country's

vice-president told delegates to a conference of the West African Chambers of Commerce in October 1972 that the proposed Economic Community of West African states was analogous to the European Community; and that in its beneficial effects, it would increase national incomes and improve the standard of living of people in the region.[23] However, Sierra Leone, like other states in the region, had specific national interests in ECOWAS and from this standpoint, the leadership viewed ECOWAS as a diplomatic opportunity for pursuing their national objectives.[24] During the early 1970s when the ECOWAS initiative was revived, the state of the national economy and the state of relations with neigboring countries provided the context within which the benefits to be derived from ECOWAS were perceived and defined.

The economic motivation of Sierra Leone in ECOWAS during the early 1970s was not some expected future benefits from integration. Instead, it was the extent to which the diplomatic atmosphere created by proponents of integration offered immediate benefits to an ailing economy.[25] During the late 1960s and most of 1970s, the Sierra Leonean economy remained in stagnation. In 1971, it was characterized by the Governor of the country's central bank as "stagflation" and described as "economic stagnation coexistent with inflation."[26] As an import and export

oriented economy, the main sources of revenue include import duties, and to a large extent on the value of trade surplus that it can generate. However, Sierra Leone, since the early 1970s has consistently suffered trade deficits. The deficit which stood at a value of Le 8.1 million in 1970 rose to Le 51.4 million in 1974 and Le 71.6 in 1976.[27] The consequences have been the need for increased dependence on aid and loans both for import support and for purposes of development. These problems were the result of factors both internal and external to the country. The mainstay of the country's export trade are minerals, specifically diamond, iron ore, bauxite and rutile, which together account for about 75 percent of its export earning. The mining industry employs only about 40,000 of the country's total population of 3 million. The rest of the population is, largely, engaged in subsistance agriculture. A small proportion of the population is engaged in producing cocoa, coffee and palm oil, which together accounts for 16 percent of exports.

The level of extraction and world market prices for the country's principal minerals increased during most of the 1970s, but so did the demand for imported consumer goods and food.[28] The mining operations carried out, largely, by a few private investors could not, autonomously, create any forward linkages by stimulating

other areas of economic activity that would satisfy the ever increasing consumer needs of government and mine wage-earners.

Agriculture which represented the most widespread activity, employing three-quarters of the population, as indicated earlier, contributed only a yearly average of 16 percent to export. The problems of agricultural output in Sierra Leone, like most developing countries, are myriad. Some of these include the small-scale of agricultural holdings, averaging four acres; the low per acreage yield; the crude and inefficient techniques employed in production; and the lack of price incentives. These factors have led to the marginal contribution of agriculture, a sector deemed to be the bedrock of development, to the economy. In Sierra Leone, the gap between food production and consumer requirements led consistently to a high import bill. In 1973, importation of rice amounted to Le 6.1 million, a tenth of the import bill. It rose to Le 17.1 million in 1974.

In the industrial sector the main productive activity is in the area of import substitutes, including such products as cigarettes, paints, plastic products, beer and liquor. Productivity in these areas showed a decline through most of the 1970s because of shortages in the foreign exchange required to import the primary products.

Beyond these problems, smuggling activities across the Liberian border made the more preferred imported items available and in some cases, at cheaper prices. The negative effect was not confined only to domestic industry but on revenues to government.[29]

Compounding the inherent problems of various aspects of the economy was budgetary indiscipline. Government projected budget surpluses generally tended to be wiped out by extra-budgetary expenditures, made through supplementary provisions. In 1970, the supplementary expenditure amounted to Le 8.7 m, which also was the equivalent of 19 percent of the total estimated expenditure. Capital expenditure tended to be directed towards dubious and expensive projects. Most of these were contractor financed, with capital raised mainly as short-term, high interest-yielding loans. In 1971, the country's external debt stood at Le 46 million, Le 18. 5 million of which was incurred that year. Of the total debt, 28 percent were contractor-credits. By the end of 1975, the country's external debt amounted to Le 114 million, with the debt-servicing obligations for the year amounting to Le 22 million. This represented 25 percent of total government revenues and 20 percent of earnings from export.

The foregoing statements of the economic condition in Sierra Leone were, by themselves, sufficient to place the

economy in a state of incipient crisis. The problems were, however, exacerbated by external conditions. The rocketing prices of oil which started in 1973 had debilitating consequences for the already fragile economy. The United Nations classified the country as one of the twelve worst hit by the oil crisis. It was faced with the dual problem of paying for the higher prices of oil as well as higher prices of other imports which themselves had increased as a result of the oil crisis.

It was against the background of these economic problems that the Sierra Leonean leadership viewed its benefits in the diplomatic efforts of the Nigerian government to promote ECOWAS. In early 1973 a powerful delegation led by the Vice President Mr. S. I. Koroma visited Nigeria to trade diplomatic cooperation in the proposed community for an assistance package. Sierra Leone requested reduction in proceeds of Nigerian crude oil, supplied to the country's refinery by the Shell BP, Nigeria Company. Additionally, it requested technical and capital assistance. A subsequent delegation detailed the requests to include Le 15 million in budgetary assistance loan; Le 35 million annually as a long term loan for the supply of crude oil; Le 32 million for the development of the sugar industry and Le 37.8 million for the development of a fertilizer industry. Attached to the initial request were

proposals for reciprocal trade agreements on a list of commodities as constituting the realistic approach to regional cooperation. The Nigerian side while agreeing to study the proposals attempted to link the imperatives of the proposed community to the question of association with the enlarged European Economic Community.

As indicated earlier, the issue of association with the EEC features in Nigeria's perceptions of benefits in ECOWAS. The Sierra Leoneans, on the other hand, conceded that consultations may be required with "all African Commonwealth countries in negotiations with the European Community" but that the particular vital interest of a country would form the basis for the course of action to be taken.[30] Indeed, Sierra Leone could afford to be undaunted with respect to what some countries, including Nigeria and Ghana considered to be challenges posed by British entry into the European Community. In January 1972, the Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone told an audience that the British entry into the European Community was unlikely to have adverse effect on 78 percent of the country's export which comprised of diamonds, iron ore, bauxite and rutile, all exempt from import duties either in UK or in the European Community. On the other hand, associate membership would be beneficial, in the form of free movement of capital from the community to associated

states, under the Yaounde Convention.[31] In effect, the Sierra Leonean leadership was satisfied to negotiate under the existing terms of association whereas leaders in Ghana and Nigeria were looking ahead to a prospective convention (eventually negotiated at Lome) for obtaining terms of association satisfactory to them.

Another aspect of the benefits which Sierra Leonean leaders perceived in ECOWAS was the diplomatic opportunity to normalize relations with various countries in the region. At the same time, because of the relative weakness of Sierra Leone within the proposed community, the country's objective of normalizing relations with the immediate neighbors, lIberia and Guinea became an effort to revive a pre-existing notion of an economic union between the three countries. These, partly, explain the interest of the country's leaders in pursuing, concurrently, cooperation in ECOWAS and integration through the Manu River Union in the early 1970s.[32]

When Nigeria and Togo started the diplomatic efforts to rally other West African countries around the idea of ECOWAS, relations between Nigeria and Sierra Leone were at an all-time low. The subject of discord between the two countries during the late 1960s was the Nigerian Civil War. During the War Sierra Leone had taken a position that favored the rebellious Biafran side. While Sierra Leone

went short of extending diplomatic recognition to Biafra, which several African countries had done, the country's leaders took some concrete steps which were viewed by Nigerian leaders as hostile. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in 1969, Prime Minister Siaka Stevens circulated a memorandum on the Nigerian Civil War calling for a cease-fire and a settlement of the war to be mediated by the commonwealth. The Nigerian delegation was infuriated by the action of Sierra Leone in not consulting them before submitting the memorandum. They thus dismissed the move as "illogical and impracticable because it treated both sides in the war as equal and sovereign states."[33] Again in September 1969, during the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, Sierra Leone together with those countries that had extended recognition to Biafra (Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia) abstained on an O.A.U. resolution which called for the unity of Nigeria. Furthermore, during the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Sierra Leonean foreign minister Mr. C. P. Foray invited the United Nations to call for a cease fire in Nigeria and encourage both parties to the conflict to negotiate a settlement.[34] For the Nigerian leaders who had been attempting to portray the conflict as an internal problem, the various actions of Sierra Leone leadership was viewed as a "hostile and

unwarranted interference."[35] The result was that relations between the two countries were strained in 1969. The Nigeria High Commissioner to the country was recalled and a 10,000 cash offer by Sierra Leone, in the latter part of 1969, to the Nigerian Government to aid the resettlement of refugees from the war torn areas was turned down.[36]

With the end of the war in early 1970, Sierra Leonean leaders became anxious to normalize relations with Nigeria. The initial contact was facilitated in a meeting arranged by President Sekou Toure of Guinea in March 1972. However, Nigeria's interests in the formation of ECOWAS and the environment created by the diplomatic initiative provided the more durable basis for the normalization of relations.

Sierra Leone's relations with Ghana during the latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s was also strained. One of the leaders of the coup d'etat in Sierra Leone that temporarily prevented the rule of Siaka Stevens in 1967, Major Jumu had fled to Ghana in the wake of the counter-coup that eventually brought Stevens back to power. The main source of discord between the two countries was the refusal of the Ghanaian authorities to extradite him. In an apparent retaliatory move, the Sierra Leone Government expelled some 146 Ghanaian fishermen on the grounds of national security. The resulting hostility between the two countries resulted in a bitter press war.

With the coming to power of Ignatius Acheampong in Ghana in 1972 and his policy of promoting African Unity and cooperation in the region through ECOWAS, the opportunity was created for reconciliation with Sierra Leone.

As indicated earlier, ECOWAS also provided a partial incentive for normalization of relations between Sierra Leone and her immediate neighbors, Liberia and Guinea, within the framework of an Economic Union known as the Manu River Union (MRU). Although the necessity of such a union and its inherent benefits had been recognized and framed as a national objective since the mid 1960s, its formation in 1973, and at a time when relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia were at a particularly low ebb, reflected the partial pressure of ECOWAS on the leaders in the three countries involved to normalize relations and harmonize their economic policies.[37]

Relations between Sierra Leone and Guinea had largely been built on the security needs of President Siaka Stevens and the desire of Guinea to have a friendly neighbor. Beyond that, the two countries remained ideologically and economically apart. The genesis of the security base of the relations was the granting of political asylum to Siaka Stevens and his top supporters following the coup in 1967 that prevented him from continuing as Prime Minister. Once returned to power, Siaka Stevens continued to rely on

Guinea whenever there was a threat to his security and his government. In March 1971, he revealed the existence of a defense pact between the two countries. Immediately following that, a "split" within the country's army provided the occasion for inviting into the country 100 men of Guinea's forces with the objective, as President Stevens put it, "to strengthen loyal men in the Sierra Leonean armed forces and to restore law and order."[38] The Guinean forces remained in Freetown until 1973 and the dependence on that country for security made for very cordial relations between the two leaders. However, the effort of Stevens to expand cooperation through an economic union did not yield any agreements until 1980 when Guinea joined the Manu River Union.

Sierra Leone's efforts to promote the M.R.U. received more favorable response from Liberia, and at a time when relations between the two countries was sour. The main reasons for the poor state of relations between the two countries was the security problem created in Sierra Leone by the exodus of opposition leaders, many of whom were granted asylum in Liberia between 1969 and 1971. President Stevens believed that the exiles were engaged in subversive activities and were planning an invasion with the knowledge of Liberian leaders. His press conference in which he alleged this, coupled with his protest letter to President

Tubman, infuriated the Liberian leader. Compounding the existing mistrust between the two leaders was the apparent violation by Sierra Leone of the terms under which Liberia agreed to return the 1967 coup leader, Force Commander David Lansana for trial. Under the terms of the extradition agreement, Lansana was to be tried only for those charges for which he was being returned to Sierra Leone. However, once he was there, various charges were levelled against him, including treason for which he was sentenced to death.[39] These factors had a chilling effect on the relations between the two countries and contributed to the refusal of Liberia to participate in a tripartite defense pact with Sierra Leone and Guinea. At the same time, their common concern for the relative weakness of their individual countries within the proposed ECOWAS motivated their efforts to revive and cooperate in the Manu River Union. Thus, almost concurrently with the on-going negotiations to form ECOWAS, Sierra Leone and Liberia set up a joint committee to explore areas of economic cooperation in April 1971. After the death of President Tubman in July of the same year, his successor, William Tolbert, and President Stevens invited the United Nations Development Organization (UNIDO) to explore the feasibility of a customs union between the two countries. In October 1973, the two leaders signed the Manu River Declaration

which brought into existence the Manu River Union. The objectives of the Union which were similar to that of the broader regional economic community, aimed at the liberalization of trade between the two countries; the harmonization of external tarriff, and cooperation in agricultural and industrial policies.[40] Although part of the declaration stated that: "In view of the great importance of extending economic cooperation within Africa, the Union shall be open for participation to all states in the West African sub-region which subscribe to the aims and objectives of the Union,"[41] the intention of the signatories, however, was to eventually include only Guinea which was contiguous; had comparable capabilities and would be an equal participant.[42]

The Union became administratively operational in 1974, with the establishment of a secretariat headed by a former Liberian Minister, Dr. Cyril Bright. When the ECOWAS agreement, which had similar objectives with the Union, was signed, it was not an expansion of the Union. Instead the MRU became a unit for negotiations within the larger community while at the same time vigorously pursuing its independent objectives.

In conclusion, the perception of benefits in ECOWAS for their country by Sierra Leonean leaders was not informed by the possible effects of the objective of the

regional community such as liberlization of trade; free movement of labor and regional industrial policy. Because of the country's economic problems; the small size of its population relative to such larger ones as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana, the country's leaders viewed their interest in ECOWAS in terms of the benefits that could be derived from the diplomacy itself. The process was expected to provide the benefit of diplomatic interaction as well as a bargaining concept for tangible economic assistance from the more prosperous states.

Sierra Leone and Angola

The orientation of the Organization of African Unity on the Angolan issue provided the perceptual policy cue for the leadership of Sierra Leone until January 1976 when the OAU consensus broke down. At the crucial emergency summit meeting of the organization in Addis Ababa, the Sierra Leonean delegation which was led by the vice president had been prepared to restate the earlier position of the OAU that the liberation movements be reconciled to form a government of National Unity.[43] However, the split in the OAU had made that position a partisan one, even though the leadership of the delegation viewed their role at the conference as one which affirmed confidence in the organization. Subsequently, because the conference had

failed to reach an agreement, leaders in Sierra Leone began to rely more on diplomatic influence and available information on the conflict in Angola itself. Diplomatic contacts with Julius Nyerere and Sekou Toure coupled with an independent re-assessment modified their perceptions and on January 28, 1976, barely two weeks after the OAU emergency Summit, the country became the twenty-fourth to recognize the MPLA. By that action, it also became the first country to break ranks with the OAU states that had insisted on pursuing a government of National Unity for Angola.

President Siaka Stevens' general attitude towards issues of liberation in Southern Africa is one of committed opposition to colonialism. In 1973, he told a Chinese delegation that:

> We from Sierra Leone make this solemn pledge that we will...aid and support our brothers in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola in every way possible...and forever wipe out colonialism and neo-colonialism...from the continent of Africa.44/

In a similar tone, the election manifesto of APC, of the same year stated that: "We are opposed to any form of colonialism and it is our resolve to join forces with all subjected peoples everywhere in fighting to eradicate the spectre of colonialism and neo-colonialism from the world."[45] However, on specific details of policy on these

issues, he preferred to take his cue from the Organization of African Unity and such informal groups as the "frontline states." His perception of the Angolan conflict until January 1976 were, therefore, influenced by those considerations which, until October 1975, framed the OAU consensus§; namely, to recognize the three liberation movements; coordinate assistance to them through the OAU liberation committee; support the idea of a governrment of national unity; and condemn foreign intervention in the conflict. In effect, though the conflict had been complicated by such factors as the physical presence of foreign forces, including Cuban, Zairean and South African at the time of the emergency summit on January 12, 1976, the Sierra Leonean leadership continued to view the problem largely in terms of unity among the liberation movements. Related to this was the perception that there was sufficient agreement on the issue among O.A.U. members for the organization to influence the course of events. On the basis of these perceptions, the country's delegation presented a five part plan which included a request to the OAU to (1) call upon those states which had recognized the MPLA to exploit the goodwill which they had secured with that faction to see the need for reconciliation; (3) that the OAU call upon those who have influence with UNITA and FNLA to impress upon them also the need for reconciliation;

(3) that the OAU impress upon all parties, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA, to check foreign intervention; (4) that the OAU call for immediate cease fire to be supervised by the organization; and (5) that a delegation be dispatched to U.S.A., Western Europe, U.S.S.R. and Cuba to inform them of the OAU's decision.[4¢]

As a consequence of their perceptions of the issues, when the crucial moment came for voting whether to recognize the MPLA or to support the call for a governrment of national unity, Sierra Leone voted for the latter resolution but the leaders did not believe that in their action they had become partisan in an organization that was bittlerly polarized. Instead, they viewed their action as affirming their faith in the organization.[47] This perception was echoed in a laudatory commentary by the Daily Mail:

> By standing steadfastly behind the OAU position that all warring nationalist movements in Angola form a government of National Unity to guide the destiny of the country, Sierra Leone has proved beyond any doubt that Africa must come first.... We rejoice that Sierra Leone is one of the twenty-two African countries of the forty-six which have total faith in the Organization of African Unity.48/

The events which unfolded after the emergency session coupled with the diplomatic activity which it spawned resulted in a reassessment. Because the leaders in Sierra Leone had anchored their perceptions of the conflict on the

rationale of pre-existing O.A.U. consensus the breakdown of that consensus meant that other factors subsequently assumed importance as influences on their perceptions and policy. During the two weeks following the emergency session, these influences included the diplomatic activity spawned by the O.A.U. stalemate, and the available information on the course of events in Angola itself.

The impasse in the voting by the OAU member states had theoretically been broken, immediately after the conference, with the recognition of the MPLA by Ethiopia, which had abstained from voting during the conference, because it was the host country. Technically, however, since the decision was post factum coupled with the fact that Uganda had abstained because of Idi Amin's position then, as chairman of the organization, the OAU position still remained a stalemate. The stalemate resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity in which the pro-MPLA states, by gaining an apparent majority also captured the diplomatic initiative. In Freetown, the post-conference diplomacy of the pro-MPLA group was pursued by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who sent his foreign minister, Ibrahim Kaduma and by Sekou Toure of Guinea who extended an invitation for a state visit to President Stevens after the Addis Ababa Conference. The main impact of these diplomatic contacts was to focus the perceptions of Sierra

Leonean leaders on a particular context of the conflict in Angola itself and on the context of the country's relations with Guinea. In substance, President Stevens became persuaded that with the military fortunes of the MPLA in the War, the recognition of that movement would hasten the end of the War and facilitate reconciliation. Thus on January 28, 1972, he announced to an audience consisting of members of the diplomatic corps that

> ...after careful consideration of all available facts and in the light of developments, the recognition of MPLA would help put an end to the misery and suffering of the Angolan people.49/

Reinforcing the decision was the perception that the recognition of the MPLA which President Toure of Guinea supported would make for a cordial atmosphere during his impending visit to that country. Thus the announcement for the recognition of the MPLA was made one day after the Tanazanian foreign minister left Freetown and one day before President Stevens was due to arrive in Guinea. The comminque which was issued at the end of the visit focused mainly on the Angolan issue and reflect the centrality of the issue in the visit.[50]

By recognizing the MPLA on January 28, three weeks after the emergency session at the OAU, Sierra Leone became the twenty-fourth country to do so and the first to break ranks with the original twenty-two that voted for the

resolution that called for government of National Unity in Angola. Its decision also provided the effective simple majority that had evaded the OAU conference. As we have shown, their original deicision was based on the pre-existing consensus in the OAU and not necessarily on preference for any of the liberation movements or considerations relating, directly, to existing foreign involvement in the conflict. In this regard, the motivations for their decisions were different from many of the countries with whom they voted. It was, therefore, not coincidental that they were the first to alter their position. The basis of their perceptions and policy in the conflict were in a crisis, with the division in the OAU and they were among those most vulnerable to influences arising from the changing tide of events and the ensuing diplomatic activity.

Sierra Leone and Non-Alignment 1961-1967: A Pro-Western Policy

The balance of Sierra Leone's non-alignment policy under Milton and Albert Margai favored the West but the differences in the personalities of the two leaders left distinctive marks on the nature of that balance. While Milton Margai viewed non-alignment as a guarantee of the sovereignty of his country within the context of historical

relations with Britain and the rest of the West, Albert viewed non-alignment as an opportunity for diversifying the sources of foreign aid to his country, beyond the Western orbit.

As our earlier analysis of the personality of Milton Margai reveals, he was a conservative leader, not disposed to innovation either in domestic policy or foreign affairs. His orientation in non-alignment was anchored securely on the pre-existing pattern of relations between his country and the West, particularly Britain, for which he had a positive valuation. For example, during the Independence Conference in London in 1960, he told the British:

> I can safely say we from Sierra Leone come to this conference with a record of cordial and peaceful relations with Her Majesty's Government and people at U.K. which can hardly be surpassed or even matched by any other colonial or previously colonial territory.51/

The United States benefits from the "cordial" relations between Sierra Leone and Britain. It had established a consulate in Freetown two years prior to Independence. The status of the consulate was raised to an Embassy on the eve of Sierra Leonean Independence, becoming one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the newly independent state. Relations with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was, for Milton Margai, beyond the pale of policy consideration. In 1963, the Soviet Union, however,

sought and was allowed to establish a diplomatic mission in Freetown but Milton Margai never reciprocated up to his death in 1964. It was his brother who finally established a diplomatic mission in Moscow in 1965.

Milton Margai's domestic economic policy also reflected the reaffirmation of the investment policy left behind by the British. The policy after independence was characterized as one of "Open Door" and enunciated as one which welcomed investment from all sources. The only proviso was that the investors obey the country's laws and tried to employ Sierra Leoneans. The policy which was essentially laissez-faire, favored the open market ideology of the West and was indeed an "open door" invitation to Western investment. It was also a policy that protected from nationalization existing private Western investments which included the dominant mining operations of Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) and Sierra Leone Development Corporation (DELCO).[52]

In the political sphere, Milton Margai, while attempting to secure his position in office as Prime Minister, did not act to tinker fundamentally, with the foundation of competitive parliamentary democracy that had been left behind by the British. In his paternalistic view of being the leader of the entire country, Milton Margai was willing to use detention and the threat of it to deter

opposition members who veered from the norms of what he considered to be "loyal opposition." In a violent clash between his ruling SLPP and opposition APC, opposition leaders were threatened with jail sentences. In a subsequent incident of violence, shortly before independence, opposition leaders including Siaka Stevens, M. O. Bash-Taqi, Wallace Johnson and fifteen others were detained. At the same time that these measures were taken, Milton Margai was willing to demonstrate that his intention was not to do away permanently with opposition. Thus during the debates on the detention in the House of Representative in which the body voted that the detention was justified, Milton Margai observed that he did not expect the detainees kept longer than was necessary and that as soon as he was satisfied that the country was out of danger, they would be released.[53] He kept his promise and the opposition leaders were released shortly afterwards. This was followed by a statement, issued by leader of the opposition, Siaka Stevens, in which he stressed the willingness of his party to abide by the laws.[54]

In addition to his general tolerance of the opposition, Milton Margai readily compromised and also offered generous patronage to members of the opposition. The inclusion of Siaka Stevens in a 1962 government

delegation to the United Nations General Assembly is illustrative of the extension of favors to the opposition leaders. In addition, opposition members could obtain personal loans and favors for their constiuency from the government.[55] These favors, in some cases had the effect of inducing conversion into the ruling SLPP and in others, ensuring "loyal opposition." In the latter case, Milton Margai was willing to ensure conditions of electoral fair-play. This was demonstrated by a memo he sent to provincial resident ministers shortly before the District Council elections in 1963.

> In order to...permit the people freedom of thought and speech, it is of vital importance that the paramount chiefs themselves afford all possible facilities within their means to each and every candidate thus leaving no cause for any grievance of partiality....56/

The significance of the domestic economic and political policies of Milton Margai is that they remained consistent with his general bias toward the West. While introducing elements of traditional autocracy into his conception of leadership, his tolerance of opposition and commitment to competitive democracy was grounded in his identification with Western liberal democratic ideology. This was complimented by his "Open Door" economic policy.

When Albert Margai succeeded his brother, he pledged to pursue a vigorous policy of non-alignment, which he

viewed as the expansion of his country's relations to include eastern bloc countries. This he also viewed as a means for securing more foreign aid for his country.[57] In pursuing this policy, Albert did not intend to alter the patterns of existing relations with the West, although certain aspects of both his domestic and foreign policies reflected his disposition to break out of the traditional order.

In foreign affairs, he more readily assailed certain policies of the British, which he, like his brother considered "a special friend." At the same time, to pursue his policy of non-alignment, he opened an embassy in the Soviet Union in 1965, with accreditations to other East bloc countries. This sparked a wave of diplomatic activity between Sierra Leone and the Soviet Union. Following the opening of the Mission in 1965, Albert was host to a visiting Soviet delegation in March. This was followed in April by the signing of a trade agreement and in September, a cultural and scientific agreement. The aim of the latter agreement was to

> expand cultural relations between the two countries in the interest of the further development and strengthening of the friendly relations between the people in Sierra Leone and the people of the Soviet Union.58/

In a subsequent development, the two countries signed a protocol, in October, to the trade agreement reached in

April. Under the agreement, organizations were to be set up by both countries to handle delivery of machinery and equipment from the Soviet Union.

The militancy that inspired Albert's outlook and orientation in non-alignment also reflected on the domestic scene. In the economic sphere, since his policy was not guided by and docrinnaire ideology, he did not lose sight of the benefits of the "Open Door" policy under which major foreign investors were encouraged to locate and operated in Sierra Leone. However, he was cognizant of those areas where the skills and resources of Sierra Leoneans were adequate. He, therefore, moved to confine to his countrymen the areas of retail trade, hitherto controlled by Lebanese and Indians whose enterprises had started during colonialism and prospered under Milton Margai.

On the political plane, Albert was also willing to break out of the traditional order, under which the operations of a two party democracy had become an article of faith in Sierra Leonean politics. He thus moved, though without success, to establish a one-party system of government. Initially, he did not express his commitment to the idea although he had consistently threatened to "liquidate" the opposition.[59] By late 1965, visits by Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure who advocated a one-party system for Sierra Leone had sparked sufficient debate for

Albert to declare his intentions. Thus in December, he expressed his belief in the reasonableness of a one-party system and charged that "those who opposed the idea were persons who did not suffer from their livelihood and did not know the degree of suffering of the people."[60] He had been working relentlessly towards the goal of a one-party system and after the declaration of his support for the idea, he met with Siaka Stevens, the opposition leader, to seek agreement on the one-party proposals. Shortly after that, a member of Parliament, Paramount Chief Bai Tonkolili tabled a motion in the House of Representatives on December 20, which stated:

> To ensure the solidarity and rapid development of this country, BE IT RESOLVED that government give serious consideration to the introduction of a unitary (one party) system of government in this country.61/

During the succeeding weeks, the vacilliations of the opposition on the issue coupled with increasing evidence of strong opposition to the one-party proposal delayed its implementation. In retrospect, the attitude of the APC opposition party in alternatingly criticizing the idea and pledging to study the proposal was intended to give the party time to capture the advantages of implementing the one-party system.

Apart from the stalling effects created by the attitude of the opposition party, there was evidence of

widespread public opposition to the proposals. Public opposition was loudest in Freetown where such prominent figures as the Anglican Bishop of Sierra Leone, Reverend S. M. Reiner; the General Manager of the Electricity Corporation and former associate of Milton Margai, Bruno-Gaston voiced their reservations.[62] Additionally, students at Fourah Bay College expressed their opposition to the proposal in a resolution. The fall, in February 1966, of the Government of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, which had been hailed as an example of a one-party system gave critics of the proposal an added weapon. Albert's enthusiasm for the one-party system was, however, not dampened by these developments and in March 1966, he announced a government decision to set up a committee that was "to collate and assess all views on the one-party system both in and out of Parliament and to make recommendations on the type of one party system suitable for Sierra Leone and the method by which it should be introduced."[63] When the representations in the committee were announced, it was not clear by their composition that they would have proposed the one-party system.[64] However, leaders of the APC went to court to obtain an injunction restraining the committee from meeting. This was granted and until his exit from office in 1967 Albert never achieved his goal of establishing a one-party state. It

was the APC government of Siaka Stevens that finally implemented the measure in 1978.

Although Albert had failed to realize his objective of establishing a one-party system, his willingness to pursue it reflected a disposition towards innovation that was consistent with his orientation in non-alignment. Yet his approach to issues of both domestic and other foreign policies were not informed by a coherent ideology and so it is doubtful that he perceived them as being interconnected. The consequences of this left various aspects of his country's non-alignment policy in favor of the west, although he had imprinted on that policy the mark of his differing personality and perceptions. Evidence derived from foreign aid and trade relations provide the overall picture of the country's non-alignment and the differing impacts of Milton and Albert Margai. However the qualifications which we suggested in earlier chapters with regard to the significance of aid and trade also applies here.

In the area of foreign aid, the presumption by Milton Margai of an existence of a special relationship between Britain and his country led to expectations that Britain and the rest of the West would, not only, be forthcoming but that it could fulfill the aid requirements of the country. Prior to Independence, he told a conference of

his party that "we have won confidence at the colonial office so much that we shall always be granted our wants."[65] The result of this confidence was that after Independence Sierra Leone's request for aid went primarily to Britain and that country was indeed the major aid donor to Sierra Leone. British aid to that country by 1967 totalled about £7.5 million. Various portions of this aid were given as grants and loans. Of the total amount, the first £3 million, received in 1961 was an Independence grant and the next large amount totalling £3.5 million was a commonwealth assistance loan. This was received in 1962. Again in 1963, the British government under the scheme of the Commonwealth Development Corporation provided a £2.3 million loan for the development of the Guma Valley Water resource. Under the same scheme, the British government provided a loan and held equity holdings amounting to £275 thousand in the Paramount Hotel. The remaining part of the aid received were distributed as a £1 million loan for the construction of Lungi Airport and £561 thousand as interest free loan for general development purposes. In addition to these grants, the British provided technical assistance to the country during the period, at a total cost of £1 million.[66]

The other major aid donors to Sierra Leone were the United States and West Germany. U.S. aids activities were

in the form of the Peace Corp Volunteers, which were first provided in January 1961; and the provision of food and medicine for distribution by the Catholic Relief Service, under the U.S. PL 480 feeding program. Additionally, the U.S., through the Agency for International Development (AID) provided technical assistance to Sierra Leone, under an agreement signed in May 1961. Finally, the JFK building at Fourah Bay College remains a towering monument to U.S. aid to Sierra Leone. The contributions of the West Germans, on the other hand, was in the area of road construction, for which they provided loans and grants.

As our evidence suggests, the British were by far the largest aid donors to Sierra Leone between 1961 and 1967 and while they might have been satisfied with their contributions, the expectations of Sierra Leonean leaders were far from fulfilled. During a visit to London 1962, Milton Margai, through his Minister of Information, Mr. J. Nelson- Williams, requested aid totalling 164 million.[67] In an apparent ridicule of the request a report in the London Economist characterized it as "the biggest thought to emanate from West Africa in a month of Sum."[68] On the other hand, Sierra Leonean leaders were increasingly venting their dissatisfaction with the level of British aid. A member of Sierra Leonean Parliament, Mr. Barthes Wilson, for example observed during a parliamentary debate in 1964

that Sierra Leone "cannot get any tangible loans from the British and that even the way the small loans were handed out was in many ways insulting to the integrity of the country."[69] Furthermore, Britain was asked to demonstrate that it took interest in the country.[70] The frustration with the amount of aid received from Britain and the rest of the West was partly responsible for the support which Albert Margai received in pursuing his own brand of non-alignment policy of broadening the sources of aid.

Prior to 1965 Soviet aid to Sierra Leone was clandestinely provided in the form of scholarships through the opposition APC party. The number of beneficiaries were about forty a year until 1966 when the number was reduced to twelve. The trade agreements which Albert Margai signed with the Russians in December 1965 was expected to make available machinery and goods worth £1 million, to be exchanged for Sierra Leonean produce. Additionally, the Soviet Union indicated a willingness to provide, subsequently, aid and grants worth $28 million to Sierra Leone.

In trade, the balance of relations that had been the legacy of British colonialism, and which favored the West was undented. Trade with the West during the period averaged 95 percent of total Sierra Leonean trading relations. Of these, trade with Britain accounted for the largest share, amounting to an annual average of 70

percent. Exports to East bloc countries were so negligible to be insignificant. The following table provides the complete picture.

At the United Nations, the pattern of autonomy that characterized the missions of Nigeria and Ghana were repeated for Sierra Leone. The country's mission to the world body, led by Gershon Collier, had a high solidarity voting score with the African group. The mission, also in contrast to the muted response of Milton Margai on issues of colonialism, was vehement in its attacks on the subject.[71] On the other hand, on key issues of the two Chinas, Sierra Leone under both Milton and Albert Margai failed to recognize mainland China and instead established diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Conclusions

The decisions and policy orientations of the Sierra Leonean leadership, like those of Nigeria and Ghana, demonstrate the influences of perceptions on the direction of national policy. While sharing the belief, with the other countries, that there were economic benefits in ECOWAS, Sierra Leone leaders appeared more skeptical of the long term rewards of it. Instead, they perceived long term benefits in the, comparably, smaller Manu River Union. Because of the doubts they had with ECOWAS, they framed the

expected benefits of it within the context of the immediate gains to be made through the ECOWAS diplomacy. This was also the function of their perceptions relating to the relative performance of their economy which was largely viewed to be in poor shape. In addition, and related to the economic benefits which they perceived in ECOWAS was the diplomatic opportunity which it provided for mending strained relations with some countries in the region. The consequence of this was that Sierra Leone viewed and participated in ECOWAS as bargaining and diplomatic ends rather than a process toward the creation of a regional market.

On the Angolan issue the perceptual cues for the decisions and policy orientation of the Sierra Leone leadership was provided by those considerations that framed the OAU consensus. The breakdown of that consensus at the extra-ordinary OAU summit in January 1976 and its implications did not become obvious to Sierra Leonean leaders until after the summit when the post summit diplomacy that followed exposed them to alternative interpretations of the conflict. The result of this was the reversal of the decision not to recognize the MPLA during the summit meeting in January 12, 1976.

On non-alignment our examination of the different orientations of the leaderships of Milton Margai and his

brother Albert is most instructive of the influences of perceptual differences on decisions because both leaders were situated in similar environments. For Milton Margai non-alignment was an area of "non-decision." This allowed his values, which favored the existing pattern of relations with the west, to remain the governing regime. Albert, on the other hand, brought non-alignment within the focus of decision and his perceptions of it suggested a policy which aimed at diversifying the sources of foreign aid to his country. Since this perception of the issue involved in non-alignment did not challenge, fundamentally, the values that governed pre-existing relations, the policy only superimposed itself on the existing foundation of the country's relations, which remained tilted in favor of the West. The implications of the perceptual differences and policy between the two Sierra Leonean leaders become even more significant when decision-makers are situated in different decision-making environments.

Table VI

Direction of Sierra Leonean Imports:
Selected West and East Bloc Countries

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Imports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Imports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Imports
West						
U.K.	33.3	39.5	37.6	37.7	28.4	28.4
U.S.	4.3	5.1	4.9	4.9	6.3	6.3
Canada	1.7	2.0	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.1
Japan	7.6	9.0	10.0	10.0	10.3	10.3
France	2.6	3.1	3.5	3.5	7.4	7.4
W. Germany	2.8	3.3	7.9	7.9	6.2	6.2
Netherlands	6.7	7.9	7.3	7.3	6.3	6.3
TOTALS		69.9		73.1		67
East						
Czechoslo-vakia	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.5
E. Germany	1.7	2.0	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.6
Hungary	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	1.8	1.8

Source: Africa Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

Table VII

Direction of Sierra Leonean Exports:
Selected West and East Bloc Countries

Selected Countries	1962 Annual Value in US$M	1962 Percent of Total Exports	1964 Annual Value in US$M	1964 Percent of Total Exports	1966 Annual Value in US$M	1966 Percent of Total Exports
West						
U.K.	32.4	69.5	67.6	71.2	51.6	62.5
U.S.	0.1	0.2	1.4	1.5	5.0	6.1
Canada	--	--	--	--	0.3	0.4
Japan	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
France	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.4
W. Germany	5.8	12.4	6.0	6.3	5.2	6.3
Netherlands	7.8	16.7	7.6	8.0	9.7	11.7
TOTALS		99.8		88.2		87.9

Source: Africa Contemporary Records (London: Rex Collings, 1970)
Percentages Computed

References - Chapter V

[1]The material that I have found useful as background sources include Martin Kilson Political Change in a West African State, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press 1966); John Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone 1947-67, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1970); John Cartwright Political Leadership in Sierra Leone (Toronto: University of Toronto Press); Gershon Collier Sierra Leone: Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation, (New York: New York University Press 1970); Fred M. Hayward, "The Development of a Radical Organization in the Bush" Canadian Journal of African Studies 6, 1, 1972, pp. 1-28; Fred M. Hayward and Ahmed Dumbuya "Political Legitimacy. Political Symbols and National Leadership in West Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies December 1983, Christoper Fyfe, A Hitory of Sierra Leone London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

[2]For reflections on the various attitudes, see Gershon Collier op. cit. p. 15.

[3]Other ethnic groups include the Mande; the Fula and the Lolo.

[4]The power of the chiefs derived from the British paternalistic concept of lcoal government which truncated the traditional basis of authority and made the chiefs accountable only to the colonial administration. British supervision of the use of power by the chiefs was however limited except when the rise of populism posed imminent dangers to colonial rule. For a detailed and incisive analysis of the power and status of the chiefs, See John Cartwright Politics in Sierra Leone op. cit. pp. 26-34.

[5]For further details see Martin Kilson, op. cit. p. 158.

[6]Ibid. pp. 164-165.

[7]"Manifesto of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone" (Freetown 1951), p. 10.

[8]For a detailed discussion of the development of KPM, see Fred M. Hayward "The Development of a Radical Political Organization in the Bush: A Case Study in Sierra Leone" Canadian Journal of African Studies Vol. 6, I, 1972, pp. 1-28.

[9]Four of the Ministers who had petitioned against Albert Margai's succession and were eventually excluded from his cabinet included Karefa-Smart, M. S. Mustapha; Y. D. Sesay, and S. L. Maturri. These were also likely candidates to succeed the deceased Milton Margai.

[10]See Fred Hayward and Ahmad Dumbuya op cit.

[11]For an excellent discussion of the personality attributes of Milton Margai, See John Cartwright Political Leadership in Sierra Leone, op. cit. pp. 91-100.

[12]For Excerpts of Margai's views on the riots, See Martin Kilson op. cit., p. 190.

[13]Ibid., p. 255.

[14]Ibid., p. 254.

[15]Daily Mail, Fretown, May 30, 1957.

[16]See Martin Kilson op. cit., p. 246.

[17]The contest between the Margai Brothers was staged at the Annual Party Conference held in 1958. The narrow victory which Milton Margai won prompted him to pack future conferences representatives of Native Administration which formed the base of his support. For details, See Martin Kilson op. cit. 2244.

[18]For details see "The SlPP Road: Statement of policy issued by the Executive of the Sierra Leone People's Party" Freetown, I95I. Also, "Election Manifesto of the Sierra Leone People's Party." Freetown 1957.

[19]Legislative Council Debates, No. 8 of Session 1955-56, Freetown 1958, cited in Martin Kilson op. cit. p. 255.

[20]Ibid., p. 253.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Until the appointment of Abdulai Conteh to the Foreign Ministry portfolio in 19773, the average length of stay in the office was eighteen months.

[23]For excerpts of Vice President Koroma's address, see Sierra Leone Trade Journal, Freetown Vol. 13, 1, 1973.

[24]A Sierra Leonean official believed that this was the objective of not only Sierra but of all the states ECOWAS. Personal Interview Ahmad Kumala Ministry of External Affairs, Freetown, September 1982.

[25]Nigeria and Togo were the two countries that revived the initiative for integration in West AFrica in the early 1970s.

[26]"Speech delivered by Mr. S. L. Bangura, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the Governor's Banquet given in Freetown, Friday, 28th January 1972." Also reprinted earlier in Bank of Sierra Leone: Economic Review Vol. 6, Freetown, (Dec. 1971), p. 18.

[27]The economic indicators were based on comparisons and computations of data from Sierra Leone Economic Trends, Freetown: Bank of Sierra Leone Research Department Series 1970-1972; Economic Review Freetown Bank of Sierra Leone Series 1979-1972, Trade Statistics Freetown Central Statistics Office, 1974, Africa Contemporary Records op. cit. 1969/70; 1973/74 Sierra Leone Trade Journal, Freetown, 1970-1975.

[28]The increase in production and prices between 1970 and 1971 was a temporary rise. The market was generally unstable through the first halp of the 1970s. For details on the trend between 1970-71. See Economic Review, Bank of Sierra Leone, Vol. 6., 1971, p. 44.

[29]Smuggling undercuts government effort to raise revenue from import duties.

[30]See Excerpt of the Press Conference in Sierra Leone Trade Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2., 1973, p. 42.

[31]See Speech by Mr. S. L. Bangura, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone op. cit., p. 13.

[32]The objectives of of the Manu River Union, essentially duplicates those of ECOWAs. In its report an ECA evaluation mission observed that the commitment of states to smaller communites such as MRU and CEAO make these states turn ECOWAS into "a grand debating forum" See ECA: Economic Integration in West Africa.

[33]See Africa Contemporary Records, 1969/70, p. B599.

[34]Mr. C. P. Foray who was Foreign Minister at the time of the Nigerian Civil War suggested, retrospectively, that the government's assessment of the conflict might have been based on inadequate information. Personal interview: Freetown September 1982.

[35]See Africa Contemporary Records 1969/70, p. B599.

[36]See Africa Research Bulletin, September, 1969.

[37]Economic cooperation between Sierra Leone and her immediate neighbors had been deliberated since the early 1960s. An initiative to create a Free Trade Area in 1965, between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea collapsed the following year.

[38]For excerpts of the Broadcast by President Siaka Stevens, See Ahmadu Sesay "Sierra Leone's Foreign Policy since Independence" Africana Research Bulletin Freetown Institute of African Studies, Vol. II, March 1981, p. 10.

[39]Brigadier Lansana was freed after an appeal against the death sentence.

[40]See A Short history of the Manu River Union (Freetown: MRU Secretariat (no date)) Also text of the declaration can be found in Sierra Leone Trade Journal, Vol. 14, 1, March 1974.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ivory Coast was considered a possible member but Leaders in Freetown appeared less concerned with it than liberia and Guinea.

[43]This approach to decision-making is a variation of that suggested by Maurice East in which Resolutions of International Organization provide the cue for policy. The difference, however, is that the bases of those resolutions acquire an autonomous logic in the perception of the decision-maker. For detailed discussion of East, see. p.

[44]See Ahmadu Sesay, op. cit. p. 31.

[45]See A.P.C. Election Manifesto Freetown 1973, p. 10.

[46]See Daily Mail, Freetown, January 15, 1976.

[47]See Daily Mail, Freetown, January 17, 1976.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Statement of President Siaka Stevens to members of the Diplomatic Corp and the Press Quoted in We Yone, February 1, 1976.

[50]Quoted in Ghanaian Times, Accra, February 2, 1976.

[51]See Mee Sir Milton Margai Freetown, Government Printer (No Date), p. 23.

[52]For details of Margai's "Open Door" policy See John Cartwright Political Leadership in Sierra Leone, op. cit. p. 74.

[53]See John Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, op. cit., p. 135.

[54]Ibid., p. 137.

[55]This tendency contrasts with the 'zero-sum' character of the political game that marked post-colonial Africa.

[56]Quoted in John Cartwright Politics in Sierra Leone op. cit. p. 170.

[57]The idea of broadening relations as a defining character of non-alignment has persisted to date in Sierra Leonean conception.

[58]See Treaties and International Agreements Freetown, Government Printer, 1965, p. 79.

[59]For details see John Cartwright Politics in Sierra Leone op. cit., pp. 210-211.

[60]Ibid., p. 216.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid. p. 220.

[63]See "Sierra Leone Government White Paper on the Proposed Introduction of a Democratic One-Party System in Sierra Leone" Freetown Government Printer, 1966.

[64]For a detailed list of the forty-member committee See John Cartwright Politics in Sierra Leone, op. cit., p. 222.

[65]Ibid. p. 100.

[66]For the sources of aid, see British Capital Aid and Technical Assistance to Sierra Leone from Independence April 27, 1961, Freetown: Ministry of Development (no date). Soviet Block Aid to Developing Countries OECD, Paris 1969.

[67]See The Economist, London, June 23, 1962.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Quoted in Ahmadu Sesay, op. cit. p. 29.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ambassador Collier told the General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1961, that "Africa was under the sword of the imperialists. Our hearts go to the suffering Africans in Angola who are fighting for their liberation from the shackles of Colonialism." See United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 1961, p. 487.

CONCLUSION

The three preceding chapters outlined some of the major considerations of leaders in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone affecting their decisions on three issues of foreign policy. Objectively, the three countries have a great deal in common: They are all former British colonial territories; they are all multi-ethnic states; their economics are largely based on the exchange of primary exports for processed imports, and the leaders in the three countries share the common goal of economic development. In answering the question why the three countries manifested different behaviors and orientations on issues of foreign policy, we proposed and showed that their behaviors were mediated by the perceptions of their leaders. In effect, it was perceptual differences between the leaders rather than significant differences in the characteristics of the countries that were responsible for the disparity in their foreign policy decisions and orientations. The following analysis will summarize some of the findings and explore their theoretical implications.

On the issue of the Economic Community of West African States, we focused on the nature of benefits that each country expected, the considerations behind those expectations and the resulting policy orientations.

Leaders in the three countries shared a common perception that ECOWAS would provide economic benefits for their countries so their policies were broadly supportive of the incipient community. However, in specific detail, there were some important differences. Leaders in Ghana and Nigeria perceived the economic benefits of ECOWAS in the context of the long term advantages of national economic expansion that would be facilitated by the creation of a regional market. Underlying these perceptions is the apparent recovery of the Ghanaian economy in the early 1970s and the oil-fueled economic boom in Nigeria during the same period. Sierra Leonean leaders, by contrast, perceived the economic benefits of ECOWAS within the context of the immediate and possible rewards facilitated by the ECOWAS diplomacy. Here the consideration of the Sierra Leonean leaders was that of rescuing their economy from the immediate and existing problems.

A complementary aspect to the above distinctions and considerations were the different perceptions of the impact of British entry into the European Economic Community. Both Ghanaian and Nigerian leaders associated the enlarged European Community with their concern for integration in West Africa. There were two mutually reinforcing aspects of this consideration. Firstly, the leaders in both countries feared the loss of export revenue earning that

would result from the tariff wall of the enlarged EEC since Britain was the major importer of their products and had preferential trading agreements with them. Since their products would face stiffer competition from the other developing countries, they believed that negotiations with the enlarged community ought to be pursued in concert and within the framework of a regional community. Secondly, leaders in the two countries believed that negotiations and subsequent association, by individual countries with the EEC, in the context of reciprocal and preferential agreements, would be detrimental to their perceived advantages in the regional market. Leaders in Sierra Leone, by contrast, were less bothered by these considerations. They expected neither losses from British entry into the EEC nor greater rewards through concerted negotiations.

Security considerations also featured in the perception of benefits in ECOWAS by leaders in Nigeria and Ghana. For the Nigerian leadership, the security considerations in ECOWAS were generalized in the assumption that economically weak neighbors provided fertile ground for the activities of more powerful countries that posed a direct threat to their country. For Ghanaian leaders, the security considerations were more specific. They were concerned with the recurrent tensions between their country

and Togo which was the interactive effect of internal political dissent of the Ewe, who are ethnic kin of the Ewe in Togo. Sierra Leone, by contrast, was less motivated by security considerations in ECOWAS. Instead, it focused its security interests within the framework of the Manu River Union, which includes Liberia and Guinea.

Political considerations also featured in the perceptions of benefit in ECOWAS by leaders in the three countries. The basis of these considerations, however, differed. For Nigerian leaders, ECOWAS was part of a broader effort to demonstrate leadership and diplomatic initiative. The background for this consideration was the belief that the civil war fought between 1967 and 1970 had made the country the object of diplomatic focus rather than the natural and active leader in African diplomatic initiative. Like Nigerian leaders, their Ghanaian counterparts perceived the political advantages of ECOWAS as an opportunity to demonstrate diplomatic leadership. Unlike Nigeria where the background to that consideration was largely internal, in Ghana the background had distinctly internal and external components. The internal background was provided by the policies of the previous administration of Busia. Aspects of these policies included the position taken by Busia that "Dialogue" with South Africa was worthy of exploration, and his expulsion

of citizens from other countries in the region that were living in Ghana. These policies not only strained relations with neighboring countries but the succeeding Acheampong administration believed that it was un-African and that it had diminished the international stature of Ghana. The external background to the diplomatic efforts of Ghana in ECOWAS was provided by what the country's leadership perceived to be the historic rivalry between their country and Nigeria over leadership and diplomatic initiative in African International Affairs. For Sierra Leonean leaders, apart from the economic benefits which they perceived in the ECOWAS diplomacy, the process itself was viewed as an opportunity to mend strained relations with countries in the region, particularly Nigeria. The background to the state of relations with Nigeria was that country's civil war in which Sierra Leone indicated sympathy for the Biafran side.

Aside from the benefits which the various leaders perceived for their country, their behavior in the ECOWAS diplomacy was influenced by the way they viewed their country and its role. Nigerian leaders perceived their country as the natural leader in the region, by virtue of its population, size and resources. At the same time they believed that their strategy in trying to achieve their goals was, not to impose their will but to pursue a quiet

diplomacy which they coupled with offers of incentive. Ghanaian leaders, on the other hand, viewed their country as the first to be independent in the region, and by virtue of that the leaders in diplomatic initiative. They therefore assumed the role of aggressive fore-runners in the ECOWAS initiative. Finally, Sierra Leonean leaders viewed their country, largely in terms of its sovereign integrity and perceived their role as that of sovereign and active participant in African diplomatic affairs.

On the Angolan issue, Nigeria recognized the MPLA in December 1975. In January 1976, early enough for the crucial OAU special summit, Ghana took the same step. Sierra Leone followed, two weeks after the OAU summit. While Nigeria's decision to recognize the MPLA was unqualified, Ghana and Sierra Leone granted the recognition with the qualification that the MPLA reconcile its differences with its opponents. Both the timing of these decisions and their specific content were the result of perceptual differences between the leaders, with regard to the definition of the issue; its context; and the roles of their respective countries.

Nigeria's decision to recognize the MPLA in December 1975 was the result of the South African invasion of Angola, on the side of UNITA and FNLA. For Nigerian leaders, that incident changed their perception of the

conflict from one involving internal conflict between the warring liberation factions, to an external conflict between independent African states and South Africa. By extension, the factions supported by South Africa were placed outside the internal settlement which the resolution of the conflict had originally called for. The underlying basis of this perception was, for Nigerian leaders, the historical commitment to oppose South Africa because of its apartheid policies. Other reinforcing considerations in the Nigerian decision was the perception that it represented an extension of the progressive domestic policies of the Muritala regime which had ousted the Gowan administration and initiated widespread changes. Finally, the decision was made within the context of the perceptions of national self-image and a new leadership role in Africa. This role aimed to counter the growing influence of Zaire as well as to bring smaller African countries within the OAU in line with the views of the Nigerian leadership.

The Ghanaian leadership had much the same perception of the conflict as Nigerian leaders but the timing of their decision and the specific content of it were influenced by two forces in their perceptions, pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, they viewed the South African invasion on the side of UNITA and FNLA as warranting support and recognition of the MPLA. Additionally, they

were under both political and diplomatic pressure from Nigeria to recognize the MPLA. At the background of the political pressure was the rivalry between the two countries for diplomatic leadership. The diplomatic pressure came in the form of direct appeals to Ghanaian leaders by their Nigerian counterparts. On the other hand, the inclination of the Ghanaian leadership to recognize the MPLA was moderated by a perception of their leadership role that was defined by their participation in the OAU mediation committee. It is this leadership role perception that in effect underlined the difference between Nigeria and Ghana on the Angolan issue and which affected the timing and nature of their decisions. While Ghanaian leaders perceived the leadership role of their country within the framework of the OAU, the Nigerian leaders perceived the leadership role of their country on the issue outside the organization. Ghana's decision to recognize the MPLA shortly before the crucial extraordinary session of the OAU in January 1976 reflected the resolution of the perceptual dilemma of its leaders. In recognizing the MPLA, Ghanaian leaders left a suggestion that the warring factions should eventually reconcile their differences. This contrasted with the Nigerian decision which left no room for reconciliation between the MPLA and its rivals.

The decision of the Sierra Leonean leaders to recognize the MPLA two weeks after the OAU session contained the same trappings as that of the Ghanaians, but the timing of their decision reflected entirely different considerations and perceptions. Leaders in Sierra Leone were informed largely by those assumptions concerning the conflict that formed the basis of existing OAU consensus. These included the assumption that the liberation movements could and should be encouraged to form a government of national unity; and that the OAU had a major role in the reconciliation effort. Their awareness of major escalations in the conflict together with the entry of South Africa did not alter their perceptions. Instead these factors, for them, dictated the greater imperative of the OAU reconciliation effort. The breakdown of the OAU consensus at the extraordinary summit session in January necessitated a re-evaluation of the issue by the Sierra Leonean leadership. Because of the centrality of the OAU split itself, the issue for them became one of deciding between African Unity and disunity. In their decision not to recognize the MPLA during the special session of the OAU, they in effect equated peace and unity in Angola with African Unity. However, after the summit neither African Unity nor peace was achieved in Angola and the diplomatic activity which followed exposed the Sierra Leonean

leadership to alternative implications of the conflict. Among these was the incipient victory of the MPLA and the moral consequences of that victory which was detailed by President Nyerere through an emissary he sent to Sierra Leone. Also under consideration was the context of relations with neighboring Guinea whose leader recognized the MPLA and upon his return from the OAU summit extended a State invitation to President Stevens. It was under these circumstances that the Sierra Leonean leader announced his government's decision to recognize the MPLA on February 12, 1976. The decision also made Sierra Leone the first of the original twenty-two OAU states, that had rejected unilateral recognition of the MPLA, to alter that decision. In altering the decision, the Sierra Leonean leader, like his Ghanaian counterpart left the suggestion that the liberation movements should reconcile. This point of similarity is attributable to the perception common to leaders in both countries that the OAU had a significant role to play in the conflict.

In non-alignment, the orientation of Ghana favored the East while that of Nigeria and Sierra Leone favored the West. There were however subtle perceptual differences between the leaders in the three countries that distinguish the specific detail of their orientations. The Nigerian leader Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa perceived non-alignment

as involving independent judgement as to which policies were inherently right and served his country's best interest. For Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader, non-alignment involved "positive neutrality" which meant that Ghana would be actively involved in world issues, on the side of those who favored peaceful settlement of disputes. For Milton Margai of Sierra Leone, non-alignment reaffirmed his country's independence to maintain the good relations with the West that sprang from his favorable valuation of the country's colonial relations with Britain. Milton Margai's brother and successor, Albert Margai, who came to power vowing to pursue a policy of non-alignment perceived it as a strategy of diversifying the sources of foreign aid to his country. In the following pages we shall summarize how these perceptions became related to the specific orientations of the three countries.

In the case of Nigeria, the perception of the leadership that non-alignment implied independent judgement as to those policies which were inherently right and served the countries' best interest, opened the considerations about rightness and national interest to personal biases and values of the leadership, while the context of the disputes over those biases and values was provided by the governmental institution of competitive party democracy. The values and preferences of the Nigerian leadership

favored the West and the judgement about rightness of policies and national interest were based on the familiarity and comfort of those values rather than a complete awareness of the issues themselves. This was the case in several issues such as the Congo crisis of which Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa frankly admitted lack of knowledge and information, yet made the decision to support the Western position. The values and preferences of opposition leaders in the Nigerian government were not significantly different from those of Balewa. But both the way he defined non-alignment and the arena of political competition provided them with the opportunity to dissent. Since the basis of dissent was not over values, the conclusion by Ibrahim Gambari that the dissenting positions of the opposition parties were aimed at capturing electoral votes, is sustained.[1] The opposing views facilitated by the political process had some impact on the overall balance of the country's orientations in non-alignment. It accounted for the revocation of the Anglo-Nigerian defense agreement and the belated establishment of diplomatic relations with the East bloc countries. These were however limited concessions because the overall balance of relations with the power blocs favored the West.

The Sierra Leonean leader Sir Milton Margai has, justifiably, been compared with Sir Abubakar, in terms of

attitudes, values and personality.[2] Their two countries were competitive party democracies and the orientation of their non-alignment policy was pro-West. Yet there were subtle differences between the countries on the issue. While the Nigerian leader expressed his perceptions of non-alignment, with the result that his policies became subject to influence by the political process, the fact that non-alignment under Milton Margai was relegated to an area of "non-decision" insulated it from the influence of the political process. In effect the underlying values of the Sierra Leonean leadership that governed the country's immediate post independence relation with the power blocs did not come under the same scrutiny as in Nigeria. The further effect of this was that the pro-Western policy of Sierra Leone under Milton Margai was not tamed in the same way that the Nigerian orientation was. Milton Margai never established a diplomatic mission in the Eastern bloc and the country recognized Taiwan over Communist China. The succession of Albert Margai to his decased brother's position also brought into focus the issue of non-alignment. He indicated a definite perception of non-alignment and for him, it involved the diversification of the country's relations beyond the Western orbit in order to increase the sources of aid to his country. The context of his perception was provided by the frustration

with the amount of Western aid to the country and the attitude of Albert Margai towards innovation. The implication of Albert Margai's perceptions was that the overwhelmingly pro-Western orientation of Sierra Leone under Milton was modified. This modification was indicated by the establishment of a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union in 1967 and the onset of intergovernmental aid and contact between the Soviet Union and Sierra Leone. On the other hand Albert Margai's values were pro-Western and since his perception of non-alignment did not challenge those values, the balance of the countries' relations remained largely pro-West as well.

Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader, as indicated earlier, perceived non-alignment as implying positive neutrality. In his own elaboration, this meant that Ghana would be involved in global issues on the side of those who favored peaceful settlement of disputes. Additionally, he envisaged in non-alignment, a bloc of states that would counter-balance the power blocs with what he termed a "moral force." This last aspect of his perception, which was an objective failed, not because Nkrumah did not try to achieve it but because he was presumptuous that most states in the non-aligned movement shared his perception that non-alignment necessarily implied "positive neutrality." Indeed, as the Nigerian case showed, non-alignment for many

countries guaranteed the independence of their individual countries to choose their preferences. With the failure of Nkrumah to achieve a concert of states with a common purpose, he was left with his own particular perception and definition of that purpose. These perceptions were framed within the context of his personality and value orientations. From the personality standpoint, his desire to achieve personal stature and prominence on the international scene focused his attention on the organizational imperatives of non-alignment. In specific orientation of his non-alignment, his values and ideas acquired from contact with the works of Marx, Engels and Mazzini predisposed his orientation toward the Eastern bloc. It was the cross interaction between his values, personality and issues in the international environment, particularly, issues of colonialism, the Congo conflict and apartheid in South Africa that provided the context of his orientation. However, Nkrumah was not unaware of the expediency of requesting and accepting Western assistance for purposes of development. He also saw the need for ideological compromise in domestic policies. But these were justified within his broader policy orientation.

We have shown that differences in foreign policy decisions and orientations between African states are related to differences in the perceptions of national

leaders. There remains a few theoretical implications growing out of the analyses that warrant examination. Though the conceptual focus of our study indicates the uniqueness of individual decisions, a higher order of generalization is suggested by the fact that what is learned about the influence of perception can serve as a point of departure for the studies of the foreign policies of African states.

The usefulness of the conceptual and analytical focus is underlined by the theoretical quest for explanatory variables. In this regard, our analysis may form part of the broader effort to locate variables explaining the foreign policy of African States. On the other hand, the influence of perceptions in modifying the relationship between independent variables and foreign policy requires a modification of the analytical strategy under which most existing studies are justified. James Rosenau provides the most explicit justification of that strategy:

> If most researchers were to gather and present their data in the context of their views about the extent to which individuals, roles, governments, societies and international system serve as causal agents in foreign affairs, then though these views might represent a variety of pre-theories, it should be possible to discern patterns and draw contrasts among diverse types of policies and situations.3/

It is suggested, instead, that if most researchers were to gather and present their data in the context of the

views of decision-makers, (to the extent that we can determine them), comparison of their findings regarding causal variables would be better facilitated. This does not preclude the analyst from approaching the research problem with prior assumptions and pre-theories, but the usefulness of those assumptions and pre-theories ought to be tested in the analytical process.

Our study, by focusing on perceptions, would appear to have presumed the importance of a variable at the "idiosyncratic" level. This, as we indicated earlier, is warranted since it is individuals that make decisions. More than that, however, we have focused on perception, phenomenologically, both as an organizing concept and as an intervening variable. As an organizing concept, it enabled us to outline the variables both inside and outside of the decision-makers, including those at the societal, systemic and governmental levels which became important in their decisions.[4] For example, we showed that concerns with economic development, which is a variable at the societal level, was involved in the decisions of the leaders in all three countries, on the issue of ECOWAS. Furthermore, Nigeria's concern with South African involvement in Angola; the similar concern of Ghana coupled with pressures on her from Nigeria, and her role in the OAU mediation effort; Sierra Leone's concern with unity in the OAU on the Angolan

issue, were all variables at the systemic level. At the idiosyncratic level, we discern the role of personal values and personality factors in the non-alignment orientations of the leaders in the three countries. Governmental variables were also shown to have played a part in the non-alignment policies of Nigeria.

As an intervening variable, perceptions influenced the configuration of those variables which each decision-maker deemed to be relevant to the issues and modified the way in which they were associated. We shall paused for a moment to illustrate these two aspects of our findings.

On the issue of ECOWAS, the cluster of factors deemed to be relevant for the decisions were broadly similar for the three countries; in the sense that they represented variables largely at the societal and systemic levels. At the societal level, the decisions on ECOWAS was commonly motivated by the desire for economic development. In addition to this, security considerations were involved in the Ghanaian decision. At the systemic level, the three countries were motivated by the diplomatic rewards that would flow from involvement in ECOWAS but there were differences in other aspects. The concerns of Nigeria and Ghana over the implications of British entry into the EEC was not shared by Sierra Leone. Also the security

considerations, at the systemic level that motivated Ghana and Nigeria were not considered by Sierra Leone.

On Angola, the dominant factors in the decisions of the three countries originated at the systemic level. For Nigeria, the societal variable is added. In spite of the broad similarities, detailed analysis indicated different clusters of the factors deemed to be relevant. The systemic concerns of Nigeria were the role of South Africa and the different countries, including African States that were involved in the conflict. By contrast, Ghana was concerned with her role in the OAU mediation effort which restrained her willingness to recognize MPLA; the diplomatic impact of Nigeria's support for MPLA which put pressures on her to do likewise; and the role of South Africa which it could not side with. Sierra Leone's systemic concerns were with unity in the OAU; and the context of her relations with Guinea.

On non-alignment the cluster of the variables were also different for each country. In Nigeria, the most relevant factors were found to exist at idiosyncratic and governmental levels. In Sierra Leone, they existed at the idiosyncratic and societal levels, and in Ghana, they existed at the idiosyncratic and systemic levels. Fine distinctions were also found in the nature of the idiosyncratic variables. For Nkrumah and Albert Margai,

personality factors along with values were indicated, while values alone were more strongly indicated for Milton Margai and Balewa than personality factors.

The foregoing illustrations indicate that by focusing on perceptions, it was possible, not only to identify the levels at which causative variables existed, but also greater conceptual clarity of the levels was attained through the discrete variables that were identified. It is however, premature to rank the levels in order of importance because it is not yet known under what conditions variables at each level have a combining or independent effect. It is suggested that by examining a broader range of issues and decisions on them, useful data would be provided on the discrete aspects of the variables and the relationships among them.

Turning to the intervening effect of perception on the relationship between objective variables and specific decisions, our study showed that even where there were broadly similar motivation for specific policy the context in which individual leaders placed the issue made for different orientations. In ECOWAS for example, the motivation common to the leaders in the three countries was the imperatives of economic development. But they placed their expected benefits within different contexts. Leaders in Nigeria and Ghana placed their benefits largely within

the context of the long term effects of integration. Sierra Leone by contrast placed her benefits largely within the context of the immediate rewards of the diplomatic effort to bring about integration. These differences had consequences for other variables that become relevant including those relating to the perceived implications of British entry into the EEC; and the individual appraisals of the national economy. To put the last point in perspective, it may be stated that the difference between the states and prospects of the economics of Ghana and Sierra Leone were perceptual rather than substantial. The same could be said for the Nigerian economy if it had not been for the massive oil revenues. Yet, it is significant that these perceptual differences were also reflected in differential orientation towards the expected benefits of individual countries. It is ironic that while economic integration in Africa is pursued as a long term objective to strengthen the collective weakness in their economies, those countries that are most likely to pursue that long term objective are those that perceive relative advantages in the existing state of their economies. This suggests that perceptual changes involving individual evaluation of national economies is likely to affect expected benefits of integartion as well as its overall prospect.

Another way by which perceptions intervened between the objective variables and decisions is illustrated by the historical context within which the issues were placed. Because Nigerian leaders placed the Angolan conflict within the context of their historical commitment to opposing apartheid, the motives of the liberation movements that sought and obtained South African assistance became secondary; so also were the imperatives of unity in the OAU. On the other hand, Sierra Leone's commitment to unity among the OAU states assumed primacy over other considerations. Ghanaian leaders were, by contrast, constrained by their participation in the OAU mediation effort which they perceived as part of their commitment to leadership in African diplomacy. On non-alignment, while Balewa and Milton Margai perceived their relationship with the UK and the rest of the West as part of their commitment to known and historical friends,Nkrumah perceived his orientation as part of his committed opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. These illustrations indicate that perceptions represent an important intervening variable that can account for differences in the foreign policy behavior of African States.

From a broader theoretical standpoint, the study confirms one of the more general observations that the foreign policy of African States may be explained largely

by variables at the level of individual decision-makers.[5] In identifying perception, which has been recognized in international relations theory particularly by Robert Jervis and others,[6] we achieve refinement in the specific relationships between an individual level variable and the foreign policy behavior of African States. Furthermore, by employing the phenomenological approach to foreign policy analysis, which has been suggested by Cohen and Harris,[7] our study sharpens the relationships between foreign policy behavior and some of the objective variables that were identified in the various studies of African States some of which we reviewed in the first chapter.

The interplay between issues, leader's perceptions of them and their objective environments explains a good deal of the differences in decisions and foreign policy behavior of states that we may objectively characterize as similar. When viewed from this perspective, the characteristics of the foreign policy decisions and behavior of African States appears to be the response of sane men that are constrained by their values, the information available to them and the way they view that information.

References - Conclusion

[1]Ibrabim Gambari, Party Politics and Foreign Policy, op. cit. p. 5.

[2]See John Cartwright, Political Leadership in Sierra Leone, op. cit. p. 111.

[3]See James Rosenau, "Pre-theory and theories of Foreign Policy" in Barry Farrell (ed), Approaches to comparative and International Politics, op. cit. p. 51.

[4]For the definitions of these variables, See James Rosenau, ibid. p. 43.

[5]See William Zartman, "Characteristics of Developing Foreign Policies," op. cit. p. 183.

[6]See Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, op. cit.

[7]See Bernard Cohen and Scott Harris op. cit.

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