THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS: THE CASE OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMME, IN NIGERIA 1985 - 1993

BY

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
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
This study is dedicated to my wife Rose Ukada Nwosu (Mrs.) for her wonderful love and understanding. Without her by my side, my failures would bring me to despair, and my triumphs would lose their joy.

DECLARATION


I, Lucky Azoronyealu Nwosu hereby declare that this thesis is a product of my individual research work and has been composed by me. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been presented for any higher degree elsewhere. All quotations in this study are distinguished by quotation marks and the sources of information are specifically acknowledged by means of references.



Students Signature



Supervisor's Signature



Internal Examiner

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CERTIFICATION

The Internationalisation of Domestic Political Process: The case of Transition to Democratic Programme in Nigeria 1985 - 1993. A research Work carried out by Lucky A. Nwosu meets the requirement that is governing the award of M.Sc. in International Relations (Political Science) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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ABBREVIATION

A.E.B.	-	American Express Bank
A. B. N.	-	Association for Better Nigeria
A.C.R.A.	-	Advisory Council on Religious Affairs
A.F.R.C	-	Armed Forces Ruling Council
A.N.C.	-	African National Congress
C. D. S.	-	Centre for Democratic Studies
C. H. O. G. M.	-	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
C. I. S.	-	Community of Independent States
E.C.	-	European Community
E. E. C.	-	European Economic Community
E. C. O. W. A. S.	-	Economic Community of West African States.
F. M. G.	-	Federal Military Government
G.N.P.	-	Gross National Product
I. B. B.	-	Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida
I.B.R.D.	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
I. G. O.	-	Intergovernmental Organisations
I.M.E.T.P.	-	International Military Education Training Programme.
I. M. F.	-	International Monetary Fund
I. N. G.	-	Interim National Government
L.C.	-	Letters of Credit

L. P. A.	-	Lagos Plan of Action
MAMSER	-	Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Reliance
N.A.F. T. A.	-	North American Free Trade Area.
N. A. M.	-	Nonaligned Movement
N.A.T.O.	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N. D. S. C.	-	National Defence and Security Council
N. E. C.	-	National Electoral Commission.
N.E.C.	-	National Election Monitoring Group
N. G. O.	-	Nongovernmental Organization
N.N.S.C.	-	Nigerian National Supply Company
N. P. F.	-	Nigerian Police Force
N. R. C.	-	National Republican Convention
O. A. U.	-	Organization of African Unity
O.E.C.D.	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
O.I.C.	-	Organization of Islamic Conference
S. A. P.	-	Structural Adjustment Programme
S. D. P.	-	Social Democratic Party
T.C.C.	-	Transition Council Chairman
U. N. O.	-	United Nations Organisation
U.N.F.P.A.	-	United Nations Fund for Population Activity
U.S. A.	-	United States of America
U.S.I.S.	-	United State Information Service
V. W. O. N.	-	Volkswagen of Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

The International factor has been the forgotten dimension in most studies of democratic transition in Nigeria. Growing work on this problem, both theoretical and empirical, has continued largely to ignore international influences and effects on the causes, processes and outcomes of transition in Nigeria, between the years of 1985 - 1995. Yet the internationalisation of Nigeria's transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy is clearly a dimension of some importance. The direct impact or indirect influence on democratisation of international organisations of one or other super-power or other states in the African region and of non-governmental organisations on Nigeria's transition is point of focus. The crucial overall consideration is the interaction between this external environment and internal Nigeria military government, during the transition.

The factor of international community on Nigeria's transition programme apparently explains the vulnerability of Nigeria's internal political systems to international influence. The interest of the international community stems from Nigeria's position and influence in African continent and her foreign policy objectives. While the interest of international forces especially the multi-national corporations as well as international organisations on the transition can not be over emphasised.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS: THE CASE OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC RULE PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA 1985 - 1993

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Nigeria provides an example of a country in which the political leaders have been carefully managing a transition to democracy. Nigeria in the 1980s undertook both structural reforms of its economy and the restoration of democracy. Before this, there had been several attempts at planning transitions from one regime to another in Nigeria. These include the series of constitutional conferences held in Lancaster House, London between 1957 and 1958, the setting up of the constitutional review study group by General Ironsi in 1966, General Gowon's Ad-Hoc Conference on constitutional proposals for Nigeria of 1966, General Murtala Mohammed's constitutional Drafting Committee of 1975 to 1976.

Two of these attempts, the pre-independence and that of Murtala Mohammed reached their logical conclusions. The Principal aim of this study is to find out whether international community exerted significant influence on the transition programme embarked by General Babangida between 1985 to 1993, and if so, why? In addition to winning the confidence of the international community by declaring its commitment to human rights, the government of General Babangida sought to win acceptance of the

human rights, the government of General Babangida sought to win acceptance of the structural adjustment programme by declaring its intent to return Nigeria to participatory civilian rule. Almost side by side with the introduction of the structural adjustment package, the regime spelt out an elaborated political transition programme based partly on the report of the political bureau which was established in 1986 to co-ordinate a national debate on the country's political future.

The initial purpose of the regime's commitment to return the country to a civilian rule was to stabilise support of the government by giving Nigerians something to look forward to, and to distinguish Babangida from his predecessors as well as to gain the support and acceptance of the international community. Danjuma (1994) argued that the military had always been committed to guiding any future transition to civilian rule. According to him:

> Soldiers have no business going into government unless we are going to play politics, and playing politics means you must ensure that there is going to be an orderly step-by-step transition from the military to the civilian regime. No government, which is worth its name, can be indifferent to its successor.

The above assertion suggests that, the military government wanted to turn power over not only to civilians but also to politicians who would follow the democratic systems developed by the Babangida regime.

Giving the uncertainty that is commonly seen as marking democratic transition in a developing country such as Nigeria, and its attendant political, social, and economic

implications, Geoffrey Pridham (1992) argues that:

> Regime change as one would expect, hypothetically calls into question policy continuity in all the aim areas. Moreover, the very process of transition through the uncertainty it creates throws policy assumptions into confusion. How much in practice it produces changes of policy direction may be influenced by the speed and extent of system transition, but it is *almost certainly determined or constrained by socio-economic conditions on* the domestic front and standing commitments so far as external policy is concerned.

Such uncertainties because of their impact on policy, including foreign policy, are likely to generate concerns on the part of other nations with whom Nigeria has established relations. Some of the nations may wish to handle such concerns by trying to influence the way and manner the regime structures and implements its transition programmes. The poor economic situations in which the countries in transition often find themselves tend to encourage such interference by other nations. This is because the poor economic situation often produces internal discontent and social fragmentation, a condition vulnerable to or conducive for external intervention.

Against the background of Vibrant civil society, a vociferous press, and multiple centres of power, Nigerians have shown a strong national commitment to democracy, and the country has been more innovative than most in Africa in its attempts to ameliorate the effects of cultural pluralism through constitutional engineering. Nevertheless, the democratic experiments of the first (1960 - 66) and second (1979 - 83) republics ended ignominiously in coups d'etat. As a result Generals have ruled Nigeria for all but ten of its thirty-five years of independence.

The period under review 1985-93 began with the establishment of political Bureau, which sought the views of Nigerians on the type of constitutional framework that will be desirable for the country. The programme grew out of almost 15 months of well-organised national debate under the auspices of the political Bureau in which Nigerians from all walks of life participated. This was accompanied by a series of events such as the release of a government white paper on the bureau Report, the announcement of a transition programme, the setting-up of a constitution review committee, Non-partisan local Government Council Election, indirect election and nominations into a constituent Assembly.

The Babangida Government also faced a particularly severe implementation problem of the transition because it depended on the military for its continued existence and unfortunately too, next to nothing was known about the dynamics of Babangida's relations with the international community as his official pronouncements portrayed him a democrat yet he nursed the ambition of continuing in office.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW.

Relevant approaches in the international affairs literature have nowhere dwelt as such on the question of regime change or transition in the meaning used in this study. Some works have looked either more broadly at political change or different types of political systems or more narrowly at regime change in the sense of governmental or leadership change within a given system, although usually concerning the effect of regime

properties on the conduct of foreign policy. However, such approaches both complement the inner-directed focus of regime transition theory and comparative politics, but also confirm some of the conclusions.

These approaches are grouped by way of developing the framework for this study. Firstly, there is the general notion of penetrated systems, which featured, in earlier works.

PENETRATED SYSTEMS

Originally, this notion formed part of dependency theory in explaining the structural position of developing states in the international system. The phenomenon of interdependence suggests a degree of penetratedness. Rosenau (1987) argues that a penetrated system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals (p. 65).

This involves a certain fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue-areas. Although Rosenau recognised the need of some differentiation as between those states where penetration is well developed and those where it is limited.

Rosenau also noted that penetrated systems are not static, they come into being, develop and disappear as capabilities attitudes or circumstances change. For him, penetrating agents could be either other states or international organisations. An example of the former would be the USA in Postwar Western Europe (70 - 71).

The concept of "penetrated system" suffers, however, from being too loose as a working definition. It is still not, for instance, fully clear how this condition differs from a "normal" degree of permeation of national systems by the international environment. If applied to specific problem, the concept of penetrated system has however, some bearing on the question of regime change. For instance, one question arising so far from the discussion is, does domestic transition make regimes especially vulnerable to international influence? Thus it may be hypothesised that a new regime is particularly concerned with its own legitimisation and eventual stabilisation, and to this end seeks to harness direct support from outside organisations or actors. E.g. economic aid from IMF etc. Similarly if regime transition is internally contested, or there develops a struggle over systemic models to be adopted, then domestic actors may well look to different, even rival outside powers.

This line of reasoning leads to two further points of differentiation. The extent to which outside actors respond will probably vary according to the geopolitical situation of the country in transition. Also, it is conceivable that if such penetration is significant in regime transition then it may become a formative influence on the new system, supporting the argument that the mode of transition is a primary determinant of regime consolidation.

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

International affairs approaches have usefully differentiated between types of external environment with respect to linkages, and in this sense; they enlarge on a notion touched on by regime transition theory. For Rosenau (1966) a linkage is any recurrent

sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another in an output/input fashion, an approach to the functional paradigms of Almond, Apter and Easton about political systems. Resenau was thus concerned with patterns rather than boundary crossing events with short-lived repercussions i.e. with the recurrence rather than the occurrence of events. This does not, of course, accord strictly with the idea in transition theory that well-timed events might have some catalytic effect on authoritarian regime collapse. It is also conceivable that some linkages might be effected by regime change itself. Such problems only reveal the difference between the broad problem of linkage politics approaches and the specific concerns of transition theory.

Rosenau then sub-divides the domestic and international environments and categorises different types of linkages according to these, such as the contiguous (any cluster of polities that boulder geographically upon a given polity) the regional (centre regions), the cold war or East/West blocs and the organisational (international organisations) (P 60 - 3).

The intention is to curb the tendency to regard polities as having undifferentiated external environments, so making it different to presume that events abroad operate as constants rather than as variables in the functioning of polities.

Thus we may suppose that certain external sub-environments might come more into play than others might over cases of regime transition, and here, too, we need to consider a time-period environment as undoubtedly conditioning their salience and influence. A more elaborate attempt drawing on functional political model is the framework of analysis

for assessing foreign policy systems. Brecher (1992) argues that it is not sufficient to develop categories but necessary to identify crucial variables and establish relationships among them. Brechers research design involves dividing inputs into the operational environment, for example, external and internal, communication especially the media, and the Psychological environment i.e. the attitudinal prism, elite images, the process into formulation and implementation and then outputs simply defined as the substance of discussion. The internal operational environment includes political structure, type of political regime, character of party system, civil-military relations and their control over each other, and the extent not continuity and stability of the authority structures in the system. (PP 1 - 9).

While these systemic features summarises familiar structures that may undergo alteration with regime transition, other variables among inputs relating to mode of communication and elite outlooks highlight possible qualitative changes accompanying the move to liberal democracy. For instance, the psychological environment encompasses ideology and tradition as well as personality factors, the last notably prominent in authoritarian system of policy.

As Brecher concludes, elite image is the decisive input of a foreign policy system... the reason for this pivotal role is that decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself, image and reality may coincide or may diverge (PP: 11 - 12).

This could apply to the outlook of authoritarian rulers in the phase of pre-transition, as not corresponding comfortably with the changing external context. Equally it may be said that transition actors, among other things, adopt a different perception of reality, presumably one which may coincide better with the international environment.

REGIME FRAGMENTATION AND VULNERABILITY.

Some works have pursued the question of regime fragmentation and vulnerability and with this, of constraints deriving from either internal or external environments. Hagan (1987) presents in new directions in the study of foreign policy, an agenda for comparative research on political influences, looking above all at the problem of regime fragmentation and vulnerability. In measuring regime characteristics, his dominant concern is with political constraints, as when pronounced political divisions within a regime and the occurrence of strong political pressures threatening to remove the regime from power are likely to have a broad impact on foreign policy (PP.363).

Similarly, in other study, Geller (1985) has focused on regime coherence and its effect on foreign policy behaviour, constraints arise, notably with certain levels of domestic strain, such as when internal instability produces conflictual rather than co-operative foreign policy (P 45).

This line of thinking prompts a number of different though related enquiries into the problem of democratic transition. Thus, as noted earlier, an internally contested transition is almost bound to be projected on to the international stage. Partisan domestic

actors will look to external agents for support to protect given political and also perhaps economic interests. Those agents will respond according to a calculation about their chances for influence, with national or partisan interests in mind and, behind those, how far this case is salient or essential on strategic grounds.

Other considerations arising from the question of democratic transition relate to the effective pursuit of foreign policy and also its continuity. It is likely that the very process of transition will entail a marked, and at times, may be exclusive concentration on domestic affairs i.e. creating the new regime to the neglect of foreign policy. An active or effective foreign policy is therefore unusual at this point of time, when political elite becomes introspective. On the matter of continuity, a change of regime does present the possibility of a break here, since leaders of a new liberal democracy will probably show different priorities or at least value judgements from their authoritarian predecessors.

Alternatively, embarking on transition might actually speed up developments in an area of foreign policy or it might open the way for an overdue shift away from past conditions. At the same time, constraints from the international environment may act as a persistent pressure for continuity in the face of domestic change or upheaval. This is most evident in the existence of integrative international organisations. That is, integration through a close and progressive interweaving of national economics and regular and routine political relations as well as a variety of trans-national links both creates new networks and generally results in a growing interaction between domestic and external actors.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

In fact, one obvious and rather important omission in the international affairs literature on external/domestic linkage is the international economy. This is alluded to by functionalist theories of regime transition, but it is hardly incorporated in work dealing with political change. One exception is New Directions in the study of foreign policy (Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau 1987) where Kegley argues for introducing political economy approaches in comparative foreign policy studies not least because international economic relations bear upon the distribution of economic surplus within the nation and as a broad range of policy actions are undertaken to control transactions across national boundaries (pp 36 - 41).

This does not help us particularly with regime transition, except perhaps by reminding us of the sometimes profound influence of international economic developments surrounding the transition period and serving to condition the prospects of a successful outcome. This point may either be expanded to refer to socio-economic modernisation pressures or contracted by noting the impact of certain interventions by international economic organisations such as the international monetary fund.

In the case of modernisation pressures, one may of course refer back to pre-transition and the onset of liberalisation (often economic before political) under authoritarian regimes. Such a change of policy direction is invariably made under some form of compulsion and is therefore somewhat defensive, notably as a strategy for maintaining (Vulnerable) regime legitimacy. Depending on its timing, this move may

become part of a process of authoritarian regime disintegration. Thus, the international economy may acquire an indirect influence both over the pre-transition phase as well as the transition process itself. But political determinants (policy choice, strategies of transition actors) are crucial intermediary variables.

While the focus on the outer direction of linkage action is still largely true of recent literature in international affairs, this has nevertheless moved some way towards handling a two-way effect. This is particularly with respect to international organisations and their influence and instrumentality in providing constraints or policy opportunities.

These indeed look at the inner direction of linkages. For instance, Karns and Mingst (1987) hypothesis that "the existence and outputs of IGOs (Intergovernmental Organisations) do make a difference in the behaviour of states, but that the impact varies along a series of different dimensions, depending on issue areas and also individual states (P 455).

In this respect, variables include the national attributes of a state, the nature of the domestic political system and the characteristics of the international organisation. It is also noted that IGOs owe the institutional components of many regimes, for IGOs can be treated as variables within a complex interdependence system that impinges on national governments; they provide opportunities for national decision-making at the same time that they add to the constraints under which states must operate.

In conclusion, despite some difficulties in applying the broad approaches of linkage politics to the particular process of democratic transition, they do nonetheless offer new

angles on relevant linkages. Furthermore, it is apparent that systems in transition are indeed more subject to international influences than usual, since transition to democracy is invariably regarded at the time as not a "normal" situation, even as an historical one. This may well create a greater readiness for "boundary crossing" activity, by external actors, depending on how the situation evolves.

Referring to interaction between "outer directed" and "inner-directed linkages, the international affairs literature provides some clues, given its predominant concern with the first. One might adopt the idea of different kinds of environments, as subdivisions of the external and internal environments, and view them as interacting. But, in so doing, we have still to answer the key question raised by Gourevitch:

> The international system, be it in an economic or politico-military form, is underdetermining. The environment may exert strong pulls but short of actual occupation, some leeway in the response to that environment remains. A country can face up to the competition or it can fail...the explanation of choice among the possibilities therefore requires some examination of domestic politics (Gourevitch, 1978: p. 900).

A purely international system argument relies on functional necessity to explain domestic outcomes, this is unsatisfactory because functional requisites may not be fulfilled and so some variance in response to external environment is possible.

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

Some attention has been given to the kinds of international influences that impinge on domestic political development. One of the few comparative politics surveys to pay attention to international influences on the state categorised these as three folds. They

include ideas, economy and organisation (Hagne and Harrop 1987). They maintain that the level of ideas is both the most fundamental and the most prosaic...what happens in one country thereby alters the situation in all others, referring to major historical events, although this point is taken further in looking at the diffusion of specific policies across nation-states (P.42).

The above position leads to discussion about how far systemic trends, in particular the cross national fertilisation of values favouring democratisation, in a given area, such as the move to democratic regimes in Latin America, having a self-reinforcing dynamics. Hence we may hypothesise that the prospects for democratic transition can be affected in a differential manner with even positive and negative variables combining in one given scenario. In other words, it cannot be assumed that different external sub-environments will necessarily harmonise in their impact on regimes in transition.

A second line of approach is to utilise the conventional concerns of comparative politics: structures, elite political parties and interest groups, issue and policies, and even cleavages and political culture. Obviously this denotes various possible sources of reaction to influences or impacts deriving from the external environment(s), similar to Brecher's framework for unscrambling the internal operational environment. An important empirical example of this approach is Gourevitch's own "politics in hard times' (1986) which looks at why different countries make different choices in response to world economic crisis. He tests this problem with respect to sectional interest and political organisations and interest groups and other associations as well as state structures. Gourevitch concludes that

the power of the variables changes over time and that their relationships are not constant; he argues for an eclectic, dynamic and indeterminist treatment of the interaction of the international context with the economy, society and the political system (P893).

Thus, one may speak of actor oriented or sectoral linkages in the decision process, as with parties transitional links and, of course, those cultivated by different elite groups, including economic ones, with outside actors. These may have a direct bearing on the transition process. For instance political parties, whether supportive of liberal democracy or anti-system, may benefit from the support of external actor, whether a fraternal party or even a foreign government. Similarly, the question of cleavages should include an international dimension, namely, whether and to what degree an international cleavage is salient. Work on political culture, has usually taken insufficient account of the influence of international problems, and at least, there must be a strong case for looking at elite political culture in this sense over matters of regime transition.

From the foregoing, it is evident that by focusing on many of the same problems, comparative politics is very complementary to linkage politics theory in international relations. Since together they combine both inner directed and outer-directed linkages, it is essential, therefore, to marry their concerns.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

From historical literature one usually expects new empirical insights into the kinds of questions so far raised. This is to some extent reinforced by most of the literature being in the form of country studies. However, comparative history has produced some relevant

results and the first and in some cases the best studies of the specific impact of the international environment on domestic politics have come from historians in the field (Almond 1989, 239).

In a review of this work, Almond came to the view "that the penetration of domestic politics by the international environment is not only a matter of dramatic events but is a constant process at medium and lower levels of visibility, affecting political, economic and social stability in both positive and negative ways (Almond 1989 P. 254).

The task here, as before, is to see how far such works have a bearing on our study of regime change and especially the dynamics of the transition process. Primarily, this has more often than not dwelt on external constraints impinging on the internal characteristics of states. Thus, Hintze pursued a complex interplay between the international context, social and political structures, military technology and foreign policy in interpreting the development of the European State System, and drew conclusions about a relationship between constitutional systems and geostrategic situations and international power politics. (Almond, 1989 PP 242-5).

This general approach, while perhaps tending to overstate the impact of international power politics, serves to illustrate abundantly the dynamics of the domestic/international interplay in action. And such historical work might at least help in avoiding the pitfalls of the circular reasoning.

At a more basic level, historical analysis helps to identify the actual salience and influence of international factors in regime change. In doing so, one may adapt Almond's

hypothesis about the penetration of domestic politics. That is, a distinction may be drawn between developments (as continuous or longer term) and events (one off occurrences). This departs from Resenau's view of penetration, but the point here is that the relatively brief period of democratic transition, as an occasion of high uncertainty, to borrow a phrase from transition theory may indeed be particularly or even temporarily open to the impact of outside events. What therefore matters here is their timing. At the same time, such events may either be a culmination of developments or perhaps more pertinent to our study they may interact with domestic developments in a way that instigates the shift to democratisation.

PHASES OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS.

As to phases of the transition process, the concern of this study is with placing these in a wider context. For instance, pre-transition developments when the authoritarian system in question begins to disintegrate and eventually collapses or is overthrown may link longer-term change with the immediate shift to transition. This phase may overlap with the kind of penetrative pressures or at least highlight their effects. Whitehead (1992) suggests that such international pressures may interact with divisions within authoritarian systems increasingly on the defensive, while Pridham (1992) applies this to the role of European organisations in pre-transition.

The latter found the decisive variable as the scope or potential for interaction with domestic conditions (such as oppositional activity, public response and weaknesses or divisions within the regime).

External developments or events can also be decisive in the inauguration phase of transition, notably in the Greek and Portuguese cases. As Pridham(1992) reveals in his review of the later, it is how such occurrences interact with the dynamics of a domestic situation open to system transformation. On balance, he sees the international context as more important than the domestic does in determining the actual process of transition in Portugal. But there is nothing deterministic in this and the other cases of the impact of external influences, the latter were confining conditions, but domestic actors still exerted a choice in their course of action and in its timing (Pridham 1992: 22).

But transition events may also contribute to the outcome of the process, in securing the option of liberal democracy. Pridham (1992) buttressed this argument with best single example from five

European countries. According to him, the 1948 national election in Italy, when the clear - cut victory for the Christian Democratic (DC) both crystallised the pro-system direction of transition dynamics and clarified Italy's international allegiance to the West. (Pridham 1992: 23).

Altogether, then, distinguishing between its different phases does facilitate any assessment of the overall rhythm of the transition process. Thus we can identify key points of time when its evolution might have taken a different course and in turn measure here the likely impact of external factors.

Turning to Inner-Directed linkages, the common geopolitical environment of the Southern European transitions is emphasised by Segal (1992); in reference to the Northern

Mediterranean flanks strategic importance. This is largely confirmed according to him, by the national studies, although differences emerged between the Eastern Mediterranean cases, notably, Turkey as more vulnerable to externally inspired destabilisation, and those in the western Mediterranean. Italy is really in a separate sub-category, for her crucial geopolitical location in the centre of the Mediterranean was enhanced by the then emerging cold war in the later 1940's. Inevitably, one by-effect of geopolitical considerations was to lead an anticommunist theme to regime transition in most of these cases, although to differing degree.

The national cases taken together underline the relevance of different time contexts concerning the impact of the international environment.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMS OF EXTERNAL PENETRATION.

Socio-economic forms of external penetration are less easy to evaluate, whether seen as deriving from organisations or from broader developments. Pridham (1992) demonstrates this fact with the example of Spanish transitions and maintains that economic modernisation occurring a decade or more beforehand created its own pressures in favour of political liberalisation and later democratisation. Referring to Turkey"s case, he reveals that the internationalisation of the economy as well as system penetration through links with western Europe at different levels also opened the way for influences promotive of democracy, these coming into play particularly during the transition process (Pridham Geoffrey 1992: 25).

In the same vein, Tunji Olagunju et al (1993) argues that underdevelopment poses a serious problem for transitions especially as it relates to the asymmetries of the international economic order and the constraints they necessarily impose on the terrain of choice open to African and Latin American countries as they pursue political and economic reforms as part of their transitions. Furthermore, they tried to resolve the relationship between economic liberalisation and democratisation in Africa, and to discover if economic stabilisation programmes cannot scuttle or undermine the process of democratisation in Nigeria (Tunji Olagunju et al 1993:4).

To reconcile the issue above, they contend that the cause was partly in delay or even a failure of transition promises to usher in a revived and revitalised booming national economy and the short term sacrifices that economic restructuring demands. Believing that the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was not necessarily antagonistic to the democratisation.

Basically therefore economic internationalisation may well have some effect on a national transition programme. Similarly, internal economic changes such as nationalisation, or on the contrary, greater investment from abroad, also affect outsiders. New markets may be created or closed because of new domestic economic policies emanating from transition fall outs. But for all the changes, some may have a positive impact on the transition as the outside forces who stand to gain from the regime change economic policies shall support the change.

Writing on the economic context of democratic transition and democracy in Africa, Nigeria as a case study, Doyin and Alokan (1992) maintain that the economic predicament of most African countries is precarious. They enumerated a number of contributing factors to this state of affairs as pursuance of wrong domestic economic policies, worsening terms of international trade especially the persistent crash of commodity prices and the adoption of the prescriptions of the IMF and IBRD (the Bretten Wood Institutions) which insist on short term stabilisation before growth, rather than long term development which the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) emphasises (Dayomi and Alokan 1992: 359).

Arguing further on the democratisation process in Africa, Dayomi and Alokan (1992) contend that, the political development within the globe was influencing most African countries to democratise. They stated:

> The call for and the emergency of democratisation process in Africa is also linked to political changes elsewhere, notably Eastern Europe which has put pressure on African governments to democratise politics as part of the requirements that have to be fulfilled to qualify for aid from the international community or debt forgiveness for their major creditors: P.360.

The attempt by external actors to exercise policy influence is of great importance in the above context. This observation by Dayomi and Alokan is made more concrete especially for the fear that more and more external aid would now go to the New democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly the former Soviet Union, now Community of Independent States (CIS) instead of African hence the romance of democracy by most authoritarian regimes in Africa. However, the question remains, whether democracy

especially the multi-partism type will pave the way for economic prosperity or whether democratisation of polity can solve the economic problems of African Countries which are of structural nature.

In its related development, Kunle Amuwo (1992) in his work on Democratic Transition in Africa and the international environment contends that the impetus for the democratisation drive in Africa could only have come from the West. He identifies two strands of external influence. The first one is the East European experience which according to him aided and facilitated the long time struggles of Africa's civil society against its plethora of autocracies and dictatorships. The second strand he opined is provided by international capitalism which has been policing the small global like never before with the demise of the war saw Treaty Organisation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) becoming hegemonic. (Kunle Amuwo 1992: 9).

The foregoing means that the consequent overthrow of civil or military autocracies in the East, and the installation of popularly elected governments, the fact of NATO becoming hegemonic and its rapid deployment force almost unchallenged brought a kind of support from the East which further encouraged various key interest groups in Africa to accelerate the process of self empowerment and democracy.

Such interactive dynamics involving on the one side economic change (modernisation) and on the other hand political change (democratisation) is explored comparatively by Sidjanski in his analysis of national interest groups and their involvement in the EC Network.

Furthermore, on examining outer-directed linkages, it becomes all the more evident that eventually as (Haggad and Webb 1994) argues, desegregating internal and external factors is somewhat artificial and that the boundary between them is blurred. However, as a point of departure, one directional focus in identifying relevant determinists of the transition process, and the operational environment of international financial institutions have important and fairly early effects on their transition. They content that two reasons accounts for international financial institutions involvement in transitions, first, the clients of international financial institutions are member governments, and as such any dealings with a country are through its government or with government approval and introducing non-economic calculations runs the risk of politicising already delicate operations and weakening both the design of programmes and the commitment of governments.

Despite these legitimate concerns, external aid and lending agencies, and particularly the international financial institutions are concerned with the political economy of transitional governments for obvious reasons. First both prudential considerations and their mandate to promote economic development, demand that they evaluate the prospects that a given political transitional programme will be sustained. This is a fact because there is no sense lending to a military government that lacks a democratic interest or capacity to pursue a transitional programme to its logical conclusion. (Haggard and Webb 1994: 29).

Again a reform programme undertaken under difficult political circumstances, such as those in transition in new democracies, must be designed with particular attention to

improving its political viability. Haggard and Webb (1994) further argued that:-

> The process of democratisation poses difficulties for the management of economic policy because of the re-emergence of social demands on the government; this dilemma is particularly acute during periods of economic crisis, yet governments that aggressively launched adjustment programmes following the democratic transition could exploit a trade-off between political gains and temporary economic losses by relying more on the assistance of international financial institutions (P.30).

By the foregoing, it is obvious that external aid agencies and international financial institutions play important and influential roles in democratic transitions. They help both to launch and consolidate transitions by changing the trade policy machinery or strengthening the central Bank or budgetary process of a transition regime.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER:

Embarking on democratic transition usually opens the way for a different political structure, and distribution of power and for new political elites usually with different views and expectations of this environment. This in turn makes it possible for external influences to operate more openly and freely so far as the transition is concerned. Focusing on this outer-direction also tends to emphasis the relevant short term perspectives of the transition process. Geoffrey Pridham (1992) states that while geopolitical pressures perhaps made probable the outcome of liberal democracy, the intrinsic uncertainty of transition as seen at the time only intensified the way in which domestic actors among other things, looked outwards. (Pridhan further stressed that this was more apparent in the Italian and Portuguese cases than it was seen with Greece and Spain by virtue of the systemic outcome

of transition being contested or less taken for granted in the former countries (Pridham 1992: 25).

When we look at domestic actors, there is much evidence of their boundary crossing behaviour. For example, international support could prove very desirable for democratic oppositions during transition. Also, there are several notable examples of transition actor (Political figures also political parties) incorporating designedly an international dimension to their transition strategies by looking to external allies to bolster their internal positions.

In general, parties are a prominent instance of non-governmental organisations seeking outside reference points in their struggle for both political power and also system support. This tendency is rather nationally variant. Pridham (1992) mentions that it was strongest in the Iberian cases and for different reasons less important in the others.

With non-political elites, the pattern is somewhat different. Economic circle has an obvious interest motive in looking outwards for commercial opportunities, whether or not they consciously thought in terms of encouraging political system change. On specific matters, interest groups sought to enhance their own legitimacy through closer involvement.

As to military elites Pridham (1992) argues that any answer has to be rather national-specific depending on their role in the previous authoritarian system and the manner of transition. He further illustrated his point with Italy. According to him, the military elites served to discredit the military particularly in post-war Italy but also in

confrontation with non-military elites (Pridham 1992: 25).

If there is a common pattern, it is that international influences favouring the military's retraction from politics also promote democratic transition. As Verney and Couloumbis (1992) show, the Turkish factor served to direct the military's attention away from domestic politics in the transition period. Similarly, in post-Franco Spain, there was the belief that the military's involvement in NATO would help to recondition their political outlook to conform with the new democracy (Verney and Couloumbis 1992: 111).

In conclusion, we are now in a better position to make an overall assessment of the importance of the international context for transition. By and large, these comparative studies confirm, this makes a significant difference both in generally promoting trends of democratisation and in loading the dice in favour of successful transition to liberal democracy. More specifically, international influences also contribute in important ways at crucial moments of the transition process.

Broadly speaking, these conclusions are more or less equivalent to the functionalist and genetic schools of regime transition theory. Taken together, they present a convincing argument for not underrating the international context in studies of regime transition.

Whether the international context is secondary to domestic developments is less clear-cut than originally assumed at the outset of this particular project. As different national transition experiences shows, there are different national cases and different kinds of external actors, with different degrees of influence, as well as different time contexts and different phases of transition. Despite similarities of experience and common patterns

and different phases of transition. Despite similarities of experience and common patterns this variation does make for some caution in generalising in any way about the relative value of internal and external factors.

Finally, it is clear from most works reviewed that the focus here on democratic transition cannot exclude some consideration of the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. This is not merely because in given cases, it is difficult to determine exactly when transition actually ended. It is also necessary as some effects of external actors or influences carry through well into the consolidation period. This was notably true of the impact of international organisations as certain national studies demonstrate. The impact of regional integration increases with time, particularly with regard to its structural effects on states and their economies, as distinct from the politics of regime transition. On the other hand, some decisions by external actors more obviously had an impact turning the transition process itself.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

This study probes into the influences of the international community on Nigeria's Transition to liberal Democracy and to analyse the extent of political, social, economic and military content of such influences. It is assumed that the interaction and relationship between Nigeria and the international community had a far reaching effect on the Transition Programme and the array of civil associations, intellectuals, Opinion leaders as well as the entire Nigeria citizenry most of whom have coalesced in social movements to

demand for political reform.

Nigerians have periodically demonstrated a striking attachment to political freedom despite the persistent military rule. This desire for democracy and the persistent military rule have always provoked international reactions and the consequent intervention into Nigeria body politics. Therefore, the international context of Nigeria's democratisation process has been an important factor and a subject of discussion by some segments of Nigerian populace. In view of the foregoing, this study sets out to address the following specific questions.

1. What is the extent of influence of the international community on the Nigeria's transition to democracy?
2. Does the influence of the international community have an impact either directly or indirectly on the processes, policies and the outcome of the transition programme?
3. Does the interest of the international community in the transition programme and actions based or impinge on Nigeria's position and influence within the African continent and West African sub-region?
4. Do certain international forces have interests in the outcome of the transition and what roles have they played in the process of the transition that have negative or positive implications on the transition?
5. Is Nigeria's Democratic transition vulnerable to the forces of international system

as a result of her dependence on that system and low level of the development of her democratic institutions and structures.

These issues and other related problems form the basic problems this study sets out to address.

1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

The theoretical framework employed in this study is the Regime Transition Theory. The concept of Transition has several connotations. Basically, it always results in definite change of place, nature and state of being of the subjects that have undergone such epoch of defining experience. It is a historical structuring of the subject and defines both the character and possibilities of the subject. It is a dynamic process in any living organism or institution. The case of Nigeria is not an exception to this general rule.

Ordinarily, the concept of transition denotes movement from a given state to another, which state can be an epoch, a social formation or a government or regime as the case may be. All the same transition can arise in an attempt to cater for the unknown future or because of existence of a blue print which needs practical transformation into reality.

Although theories of regime transition have, somewhat like comparative politics, focused essentially on domestic political systems, they do allow us to develop different hypotheses for our line of enquiry. Thus, the international context is recognised as one of the conditioning variables of transition, although, it has to be admitted. This is more often assumed than incorporated adequately in theoretical work. Nevertheless, the very

definition of democratic transition offers clues about the scope for international factors.

Broadly speaking, democratic transition runs from the point at which the previous authoritarian system begins to be dismantled, through the constituent phases of the new democracy to its inauguration and early operation (Geoffrey Pridham (1992) maintains that the initiation of transition may be explicit such as with a strategic decision by key political actors to embark on this process; it may even be marked visibly by a major event serving to redirect a country's politics such as military defeat, death of the dictator; or less clearly, this process may be preceded or prepared by a phase of pre-transition in which the outgoing regime disintegrates and the course is set for eventual regime change (Geoffrey Pridham 1992: 5).

Here, international factors may well highlight this phase in that the external environment may be either progressively unfavourable to the vulnerable authoritarian system in terms of prevalent values (such as a given country like Nigeria) or promotive of democratisation through cross-national socio-economic change of a modernising kind. In the view of this study therefore, democratic transition does not end merely because it is in place.

Common to definitions of democratic transition is emphasis on its intrinsic uncertainty making the process open or even vulnerable to the impact of events as from the international environments. As Whitehead (1988) points out:

> After any transition from authoritarian rule the emergent democracy will be a regime in which not all significant political actors have impeccable democratic credentials, and where democratic rules of procedure have yet

> to be internalised by the society at large. Many established institutions have to be restructured, some demoted, some virtually created a new, to make them conform to democratic rather than authoritarian modes of governance. New and inexperienced political actors enter the stage, while long-established parties and interests find themselves in quite different basis than before... In short, the transition phase is often one of acute uncertainty and high anxiety for any social actors (pp 6 - 7).

At this point, we should note there have been two schools of regime transition, theory: those called functionalist, emphasising environmental factors and in particular the state of socio-economic development; and others termed genetic, stressing political variables and hence significant scope for political actors and their strategic choices. Pridham (1984 PP 1 - 29) maintains that, in the former case, the time scale is obviously longer. for functionalist theories have usually hypothesised that the chances of democratisation in a given case depend crucially on a fairly advanced level of socio-economic development or modernisation. This explanation has been criticised for being too deterministic. However, theories which incorporate such environmental factors and focus on their interaction with political choice and action are rather more convincing. Clearly, in both schools of thinking there is a room for external factors to come into play, while this very interaction is obviously similar to the concerns of linkage politics. Here we turn to various theories of democratic transition and group them according to their relevance to our study.

Firstly, several early theories have dwelt on problems of historical sequence and conditions and, inevitably, these present some scope for the international context. On the side of political choice Rustow, (1970 pp. 337-63) posits what he called dynamic model,

according to his dynamic model for transitions to democracy noted major impulses from outside towards democracy and that foreign influences are almost always present. His background condition which must precede all the other phases of democratisation is national unity, which immediately introduces an international dimension. Furthermore, Rustow's different phases of democratic transition allude to this same dimension. While his decision phase really concentrates on the domestic game (except in cases of foreign occupation) notably the formulation of a new constitution - his preparatory phase which precedes that (a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle) and the eventual habituation phase leaves some room for international influences, even if they are strictly secondary, such as the external linkages utilised by domestic transition actors.

As for functionalist theories, Kircheimer (1965) argued in his thesis of confining conditions in regime change. According to him, this is the one specially applied to revolutionary breakthroughs. This thesis has bearing on our study. This underlined the dictates of socio-economic conditioning. What matters in this context is the interrelation between socio-economic conditioning and the discretionary element left to the decision of the regime. The social and economic frame of the particular society, that lays down a conditioning perimeter within which the original choice has to be made and solutions have to be sought (PP 965-966).

Here, he was referring to domestic conditions and structures, but this may well be extended to the regional frame of the international economy and constraints deriving from it, particularly, where this frame is moving along the path of transitional integration.

Secondly, more recent theoretical work has begun to pay some attention to the question of regional international contexts and transitional organisations. For instance, Schmitter, P. (1985) in his work the consolidation of political democracy in Southern Europe Commented that:

> Why have the liberalisation/ democratisation of southern Europe got off to what seems to be a better and more reassuring start (than Latin America)? A partial explanation is that the international context in that part of the world and at this point of time is more supportive of such an outcome. But such international factors cannot be made to bear the entire explanation burden... external factors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role, with the obvious exception of those instances in which a foreign occupying power was present (PP.4 - 5).

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Moreover, the political rhythm in the replacement of regimes at the national level is sometimes accelerated or deflected in new directions by socio-economic trends, unexpected events, cyclical disturbances and shifts at the international level e.g. war, terrorism, trade depressions, changes in international allegiances (O'Donnell, Schmitter 1 - 85: 64).

Similarly, Morlino (1986: PP.45 - 5) has drawn attention to the need to treat autonomously the possible role of international actors, at least in two specific senses, the first sense could be considered passive and mechanical that the country belongs to a geopolitical area already completely democratised, and entry to supranational economic organisations within the region which influence the political forces of the country... the second modality of influence by the international factor is more direct... the possibility that in different but concrete ways (e.g. economic aid to the government or to certain

democratic forces, diplomatic pressure from external actors) the internal legitimisation of the regime is helped.

Thirdly, some work on democratic transition have sought to identify types of external actors and hence specific forms of international constraints on this process. One direct effort at relating comparative theory to practice is the essay on "international aspects of democratisation Whitehead (1986) PP.5 - 9) while agreeing that domestic political forces operate with a high degree of autonomy and that international factors are normally secondary (at least they maybe mildly supportive or destructive), He further notes that the unpredictability and uncertainty characteristic of regime transition tend to encourage parties engaged in it to enlist international support if only for symbolic endorsement.

A distinction should be drawn here between types of external actors, different foreign governments, international or integrative organisations, and also between government and non-governmental agencies, such as transnational parties or interest groups and others. In this sense, the question of models of democracy in the socio-economic as well as political meaning of the term, becomes highlighted, given that systemic and ideological variants invariably determine the extent of its promotion from outside.

In this vein, Whitehead (1986 PP. 44) maintains that the boundary between exercising legitimate external influence and improper intervention is far more blurred than most governments are willing to admit. He contends that, there are three components of the international promotion of democracy; pressure on undemocratic governments to

democratise themselves; support for fledgling democracies that are attempting to consolidate; and the maintenance of a firm stance against anti-democratic forces that threaten or overthrown established democracies (Whitehead, 1986: 44)

Instruments for influencing this process can thus vary and may be moral, economic military and political and diplomatic, or indeed combination of all.

In the same volume, 'O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue, with respect to opening up authoritarian regime that:-

> Ideological constraints at the international level have some effect on actor perceptions of the long-term viability of a given regime, and the negative impact of a downturn in the international economy can accelerate matters. Nevertheless, it seems to us fruitless to search from some international factor or extent which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalisation, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse (P.18).

Once more, international factors are viewed as secondary or dependent variables, their influence or impact largely conditional by opportunities presented by domestic developments. Pasquino, (1986. P.70) explores this point by concluding that the international climate can provide the impetus for transition, but that it cannot produce a successful domestic outcome unless many other conditions are simultaneously present.

Hence, the interplay of international factors with domestic processes is often crucial, and here national variation is likely. Fourthly, transition theory has also focused on cause and effect relationships. Here we are approaching more closely the dynamics of the democratisation process. Morlino (1987; P71) suggests that the international dimension in the move to democratic transition has enormous potential

relevance and maybe the crucial "intervening variable" that account for the crisis and the breakdown of the transition.

In the same vein Baloyra (1987) refers to direct causal factors in the external environment e.g. the impact of international economic disequilibria on regime performance as contributing to the deterioration rather than breakdown of regimes.

Although in some cases external setback, notably military defeat may precipitate events, he goes on to schematise patterns of democratic transition, underlining the importance of timing and locus. He thus distinguishes between early internal, delayed-external, delayed-internal and late-external variations in the sequence of events. For example, delayed-external refers to deteriorative in the previous regime, with the endgame precipitated by external factors that produce the breakdown as well (Boloyra, 1987: P. 197 - 8).

This argument takes us back to the pre-transition phase marked among other things by the liberalisation of authoritarianism. Again Morlino (1987) comments that there is a particular difficulty in establishing causality. According to him:

> It is very difficult empirically to identify only one effective cause. It is more realistic to frame hypotheses based on more than one of the reasons for crisis discussed herein. However, given the importance of the coercive factor, its determining impact on the outcome of the crisis, and the fact that these constitute the focus of military concern, the conflicts and the eventual isolation of the military from other political actors and from society weigh more heavily than other causes. (P.71)

While he was generalising from the Portuguese experience where external events were found to be decisive though not necessarily conclusive, Morlino was mainly concerned

with cause and effect in terms of type of transition. As he has noted:

> Normally, the international factor has a notable influence on the modalities of the transition and on the type of new regime established. In fact, however, it is difficult on this question to go beyond a few general indications because the ways in which the international aspect is influential vary enormously, namely they are very different one from other. Formulating general hypotheses which are appropriate is really difficult, if not impossible (91).

Above all, this line of reasoning rejects treating the international dimension as simply one cause when analysing democratic transition. In this same view, the problem of causes has been broached more directly by Falk (1981) in assessing the global setting and transition to democracy recognising again the complexity in the interplay between the external and the internal; According to him:

> It is difficult to establish convincing causal linkages. At the same time, the interaction between the global setting and national political development involves a plethora of elements difficult to assess in terms of their relative importance. At the same time, the clustering of regional and sub-regional tendencies toward and away from democratisation lends substance to the contention that the global setting is an important element in any adequate account of the cause of the political development for any particular country (p.66)

Similarly, Aziegbe (1992) in his analysis of the future of Democracy in Nigeria, maintains that transition could emerge in order to maintain continuity at the level of ideological and structural building. According to him, its processes can be grouped into various levels of transformation of political structure, values and norms. One of such processes requires and involves a major restructuring and reordering of social and political institutions and values. He also contends that transition entails revolutionary break from

the past and the present, particularly in the spheres of ideology and structure. This type of transition process is hardly planned, and even when and where it is planned, he argues, the planning is not done by those in control of the power structure, but counter-elites and social forces whose world-

view and conception of society is diametrically opposed to that of those in hegemonic positions in the current regime.

Giving the concept of transition and its process, Aziegbe (1972: 389) observes that the transition process is simply concerned with evolving political institutions, administrative structures and modes of political practice that makes for a more efficient system.

In this case, the approach to transition is basically reformist. This contention seems simplistic to our analysis in this study.

As a whole, theories of democratic transition provide various directions for examining the problem of international impacts and constraints on democratising regimes. Above all, they argue strongly for unscrambling the international dimension, for vague references to the international climate as broadly positive or negative. Then there is a convincing case for dividing the transition process into sub-phases such as transition, inaugural intermediate, as far as the varying potential for the impact of international factor is concerned. One may take this point further by asking whether there is more potential for inner-directed than there is for outer-directed linkages in transition process.

Moreover, in this respect, a basic distinction should be drawn between the long-term and short-term impact of international factors. The former may have a pervasive albeit indirect effect, as with socio-economic change in the external environment prior to transition; while the latter's impact may be direct, as a military defeat or setback in helping to overturn an authoritarian regime or in the form of external events during the sensitive transition process.

Finally, a distinction has to be made between "power" and "influence" impinging on regime change. Attention is really more on the second. Indeed, Whitehead (1984) deliberately chooses the term "influence" since internal forces possess a substantial degree of autonomy, although when these are finely balanced external actor may determine the outcome by weighing in on one side or the other).

On the other hand, the term "power" may well be more opposite when referring to democratic transitions taking place in countries under foreign occupation. On specifics, these theories help to identify particular linkage mechanisms, such as the role of the military but also other actors of a political and economic kind. A significant variation on this point would be how far major transition strategists in individual countries purposefully or overtly include on international component in their role of inaugurating and establishing a new democracy.

The principal lesson from regime transition theory is therefore to differentiate over the problem of the international context of democratisation and to indicate ways in which this may be pursued. At the same time, it is apparent that, while external influences are

as a rule secondary to the role of domestic actors in the transition process, the impact of the former should not be under-rated and at certain points this may be crucial.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

This research is essentially a descriptive and historical analysis of the processes and problems of democratic transition in Nigeria between 1985 - 1993. The crucial overall consideration is the internal and external factors that influenced the process.

The method used is therefore historical, descriptive and analytical in nature. Through this method, the historical background of the subject under investigation is brought into focus and our problem put into proper historical perspective.

The study is essentially a library research and data were gathered mainly from primary and secondary sources, such as Newspapers, Magazines, Books, Journals and Government Publications as well as publication of relevant organisations. The information collected from these sources were subjected to content analysis.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The international context of domestic regime change has been a forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transitions. Growing works on this problem, both theoretical and empirical have continued largely to ignore the international influences and effects or the causes, processes and outcomes of transition to liberal democracy particularly in

Nigeria. Yet the international context of transition from military authoritarianism to liberal democracy is clearly a dimension of some importance as the Nigeria example has demonstrated albeit in differing ways.

The world is organised into sovereign nations, enshrined in the charter of the United Nations and fully free to make their own choices regarding domestic political policies. The role of external actors, foreign governments, international organisations, foreign banks and business, human rights groups, and the like is not to make domestic decisions for other countries. By holding out "carrots and sticks", they can influence the set of opportunities that domestic decision-makers face, and in this respect they can influence national decision-making. The carrots and sticks normally have a political dimension, but political analysts sometimes underestimate the potency of simple international approval or disapproval of a country's course of action.

Being a chief executive is lonely, and international approval and understanding from other leaders or prestigious international institutions can sometimes be important. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are often cited as leading channels of foreign influence on economic and political policies. The role of external actors and the extent of their influence is usually prominent during a transition programme of any given country. A country like Nigeria is believed to have shown extreme political sensitivity to international organisation especially the IMF.

The point here is that external actors and ideas are frequently influential in determining national political policy regarding the set of opportunities that national leaders

face during transition. The political dimension of transition to democracy encompasses the form of government, the timing of transitional governments, the role of foreign interest groups and the role of history and tradition in shaping public expectations during transition programme is important.

The Nigerian example reveals in a more concrete way, the direct or indirect impact of international organizations, or one of other superpowers or other Nations within the African region, the pull of United Nations, and the commonwealth of Nations and of the non-governmental organizations.

The significance of this study therefore lies firstly in its attempt at filling this gap by directing intellectual attention to the factor of international context of Nigeria's transition to democracy between 1985-93.

Secondly, its significance lies in its attempt to take into adequate consideration the interaction between this external environment and the internal military regime change.

Thirdly, the study is also significant in that, it attempts to probe into the linkages that exists between the international organisations as an integrative institutions, and one which intensifies bilateral links between the actual and also prospective member states.

Finally, there is a significant need to investigate what societies have in common and what influences their political pronouncements, reactions and contributions in

acknowledging the defects of democratic system which can and should be remedied. This study hopes to be of relevance by complementing the already existing body of knowledge on Nigerian international relations.

1.7 HYPOTHESIS

The hypothetical construct for this study with its causal link can be stated as follows:

1. The intrinsic uncertainty makes democratic transition process open and vulnerable to the impact of events from the international environment.

2. The chances for democratisation in a given country depend crucially on a fairly advanced level of socio-economic development or modernization of the country.

3. National Unity introduces an international dimension in a transition democratising state.

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4. Transition to democracy is accelerated or deflected in new directions by socio-economic trends, unexpected events, cyclical disturbances and shifts at the international level, such as war, trade depressions, terrorism and changes in the international allegiances.

5. The unpredictability and uncertainty characteristic of transition to democracy tends to encourage parties engaged in it to enlist international support.

6. That international climate can provide the impetus for transition and no democratic transition is made without active interest of an outside state.

7. The more integrated the state in transition is with the international system, the greater the impact will be from outside forces, yet no democratic transition is determined by the international system.

8. The international dimension in the move to democratic transition has enormous relevance potential and may be the crucial intervening variable that accounts for the crisis and the breakdown.

Transition to democracy constitute the independent variable in this study while the international context is seen as the Dependent variable.

1.8 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY

The study therefore consists of five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and discusses the objectives and significance of the study as well as the theoretical and methodological issues raised by the topic. A framework for the analysis contained in subsequent chapters is also presented. This chapter had also exposed the various literature that were related to the subject investigated in the study. This was in order to provide a broad exposure of views related and even relevant to our subject matter. It also defined the various concepts which we had used, while our theoretical construct was further discussed.

Chapter two looked at the internationalisation of Nigeria's transition programme generally. It was done within the context of historical perspectives, geopolitical situation of Nigeria and some significant international events. We traced the impact of international economic system, Nigeria's inherent capitalist economy and the international aid and grants to Nigeria during the period under review. The chapter also looked at the effect of some significant events that occurred within the globe during the transition such as the dismantled apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of Soviet Union as a political bloc and the emergence of US as the only world super-power.

Chapter three focused on the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic transition politics to international system. We also discussed the nature of Nigeria's inter-dependence, the level of development of her democratic institutions and structures. We also looked at the political uncertainties during the transition and Nigeria's foreign policy projection. We also analyzed the ING and its external relations.

Chapter four discussed at length the manifestations of international forces on Nigeria's transition to liberal democracy. We revealed certain international forces and their interest on the possible out come of the transition and the roles they played in the process of the transition. We also discussed Nigeria s position and influence in African continent to ascertain if this was responsible for the internationalisation of the transition programme. We also analyzed the visit of America's Vice-President to Nigeria in 1991,his actions and pronouncements in respect of the transition. We also looked at the effects of sanctions announced by the west on the transition economy.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter that summarises and combines the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

2.INTERNATIONALISATION OF NIGERIA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we address the factors that tended to encourage the internationalisation of the transition programme in Nigeria during the period under review. These factors include Nigerian's geopolitical location, historical, cultural and economic factors. We also look at the nature of democratic transition and the scope for external influences. These we believe will help to put the issue of internationalisation of Nigeria's domestic political process in clear perspective.

2.2 RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTORS

The transition to democratic rule of General Babangida's administration was the product of dual pressures originating from "within" the Nigerian political system and from "without", that is, the international system. Nigeria in the post civil war period provided a good example of an "Open" political system that was "penetrated" on a consistent basis by a set of international actors. This form of penetration became an integral part of the domestic political process which obviously informed the internationalisation of the transition programme between 1986 - 1993.

The major powers, particularly United States, Great Britein and the Soviet Union operating at the international level were in a position to and did influence Nigeria's international status, the goals of the political system, and the conduct of its domestic political actors while the minor powers, such as South Africa, Ghana and the Niger Republic had indirect impact on Nigerian's internal politics particularly its politics of transition. The reason for the impact of minor powers was because they successfully carried out a transition programme which brought pressures to bear on Nigeria to follow suit. And in the post-war period, both sets of powers became important at different junctures in the conduct of daily domestic political struggles and help in their internationalisation. But it was the USA that emerged as the most important and consistent outside influence on the Nigerian transition programme. As analysis of foreign policy and the interdependence school of international relations have shown, no state is immuned from international influences. Yet the extent and nature of external influences depend on a number of variables, which at best can be categorised although not quantified. They break down into many groups.

2.3 GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION, SIZE AND POPULATION OF NIGERIA

The physical location of Nigeria within the West African sub-region, her size and population accounted for the pressure exerted on the nation by the international system to democratise. As a developing nation, Nigeria is caught up in the same major feature of the

post-war international system, the cold war and the division of Africa. This meant that if Nigeria should fall into Soviet sphere of influence, then America and Western European interests both politically and economically would suffer a set back and could seriously complicate NATO strategy.

Jibrin Ibrahim (1992) buttressed this argument when he noted that:

> The French administrators were alarmed at the growing activism of those they considered as "Communist agitators" and they mobilised chief and all the candidates who had lost the party nominations to Haman: Dior: and Ojibo Bakary to form a conservative party... (p. 53)

The population and size of the country equally accounted for the internationalisation of the transition programme. Nigeria as the most populous nation in Africa and endowed with rich mineral and material resources has traditionally been subject to international interest. Since Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa set the basis and criteria for Nigeria's international relations on October 7, 1960, during Nigeria's admission into the United Nations, the country's basic foreign policy goals have not really been abandoned by any succeeding regime. Similarly it is evident that every Nigerian administration since independence while not abandoning its bilateral obligations has remained committed to the principles of multi-lateralism and especially those principles enshrined in the charter both of the organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN).

All the foregoing suggests that out side forces played a part in the process of regime change due to essentially the physical location of Nigeria within the West Africa sub-region, its population as well as its traditional vulnerability to international influence.

2.4 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS

In as much as this study is concerned with Nigeria's transition, there is an obvious problem in asking about the nature of Nigerian state. Thus questions of ideology and political system are necessarily complex, but it is relevant to know if outside forces have interest in the outcome of the transition, and thus played a part in the process of change. Coulcumbis (1983) argued that the external impact is in fact greatest at the time of transition, especially when there are major divisions among the elites of the state (p. 39).

The ideological choice made during the transition under study obviously played a key role in determining the nature of the international influence on the transition programme. The Nigerian state can also be understood in terms of political culture and the extent to which it has traditionally been subject to external influences. Nigeria's political history has had long strong links with the western powers which gave the US and Europe a special link with Nigerian political elites to enlist their support for democratisation of Nigerian polity. The United state is the dominant world superpower. This enabled her to intervene in Nigeria's domestic politics. As Nigeria developed it became increasingly subject to different and probably more intense types of pressures from the international economy. The Nigerian political ideology since the second republic has been fashioned towards the American model which of course made American intervention on the transition programme imperative.

2.5 ECONOMIC FACTORS

Trade is obviously not immune to changes in the nature of the political system, but is often remarkable just how pragmatic states can be. Even, there are also economic issues that are related to politics, as indeed is shown by the ups and downs of Nigeria-West trade. In the case of the Nigerian transition, the most obvious evidence of linkage to international economy was the refusal of the IMF and World Bank to contemplate granting loans to Nigeria until they were satisfied about the transition to democratic rule.

Tunji Olagunji (1993) has rightly argued that underdevelopment poses a serious problem for transitions especially as it relates to the asymmetries of the international economic order and the constraints they necessarily impose on the terrain of choice open to African and Latin American countries as they pursue political and economic reforms as part of their transitions. (p. 44)

Pressure was put on Nigeria by the international economic system to democratise governance before loans could be granted to her. According to Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1994) the World Bank and IMF demanded to be included in any reform programme in Nigeria if the country wanted any assistance from them.

Therefore, it could be argued that the Babangida regime adopted reform programme because it knew that it could only re-enter the international credit market if it reached some kind of settlement with the IMF and World Bank. As the government attempted to implement its adjustment programme, it amended the political transition programme in order to sustain the economic reforms dictated by the international financial institution.

Indeed, economic reform in Nigeria was predicated on such a political transformation. The Babangida regime could not afford to lose the support of the international community.

Again Tunji Olagunji (1993) posits that in Nigeria, the transition has come under great political stress as a result of the structural Adjustment Programme of the Babangida Adminsitration (p. 46).

Writing on the economic context of democratic transition and democracy in Africa with Nigeria as case study. Doyomi and Alokan (1993) maintain that the economic predicament of most African countries is precarious. They further enumerated a number of contributory factors to this state of affairs as pursuance of wrong domestic policies, worsening terms of trade especially the persistent crash of commodity prices, and the adoption of the prescriptions of IMF and I.B.R.D. (the Bretten Wood Institutions) which insist on short term stabilization before growth, rather than long term development which the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) emphasised (p. 359).

Thus, most African nations and particularly Nigeria was in the extremely difficult position of having to retain at least nominal support of organisations whose interests would be hurt by the very reforms proposed or the transition.

It is hard to attribute these specially to democratic transition, but the point is that new political systems may well have some effect in changing international economics. Similarly, internal economic changes such as SAP or on the contrary, greater investment from abroad, also affect outsiders. New markets may be created or closed because of new domestic economic policies. Movements of labour, and different influences of prices and

wages, all may be linked to developments abroad but also affect foreigners doing business in a specific state like Nigeria.

The internationalisation and dependency of Nigeria economy accounted for the pressures from the international system. Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1994) buttressed this argument when they stated that the 1986 annual budget of Nigeria did not, however satisfy the multilateral or Nigeria's creditors. The Paris club and soon after, the London club declared that no debt would be rescheduled until Nigeria signed a standby agreement with the IMF, which presumably would include devaluation of her currency and actively and truly pursue a transition programme that will usher in democracy. (p. 476).

As a result of this international pressure, Nigeria floated the idea of a two-tier exchange rate system and set up a transition implementation committee. The internationalisation of Nigerian economic system and its dependency on the western economy brought about the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme, and the concomitant exacerbation of the fiscal crisis which put a great deal of pressure on the government with all the adverse political repercussions.

The Babangida regime received significant inflows of capital immediately after announcing the democratic transition package. In addition to winning the confidence of Nigerians and the international community, by declaring its commitment to human rights, the government sought to win acceptance of the structural adjustment programme by declaring its intent to return Nigeria to civilian rule. Almost side by side with the introduction of the structural adjustment package, the regime spelt out an elaborate political

transition programme based partly on the report of the political Bareau established in 1986 to co-ordinate a national debate on the country's political future.

In conclusion therefore, the internationalisation of Nigeria's economic system as a result of colonialism and oil boom as well as a way of seeking for loan from IMF, World Bank, Paris and London, clubs brought about the external influence on the transition programme.

2.6 THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ON THE TRANSITION

Democracy by its current meaning and implication defies cultural boundaries. Therefore, democracy represent a new world civilisation whose emerging features endanger existing authoritarian profile. According to Szymon Chodak (1991) this new civilization is world-wide. While the old civilization was mostly determined by rulers and dominating cultural elite, the character of the new one is determined by changing expectations of the population everywhere on the planet. It is engendered by mass movements and common desires, by new aspirations, forceful redefinition of social justice and social contract (pp. 12 - 34).

It therefore follows that democracy then becomes a response to the problems of global social, economic and political disarticulation. The political is most typified in Nigeria. Again, given the unique history of Nigeria, democracy has to be more of an

attribute of social structures than mere features of political institutions.

The impetus for the democratisation drive in Nigeria could only have come from the Western and the Eastern Europe. Kunle Amuwo (1992) argued that two strands of external influence accounted for this new democratic drive. The first strand according to Amuwo was the one offered by the East European experience. The overthrow of autocracies in the East, and the installation of popularly elected governments. This experience Amuwo said, aided and facilitated the long-time struggles of civil society against plethora of autocracies and dictatorships. The consequent wind of support from the East further encourages various key interest groups to accelerate the processes of self-empowerment. (p 9).

The second strand Amuwo contends is that provided by international capitalism that is becoming more and more triumphant. The capitalist west, led by the USA has been policing the small global village like never before. With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the North Atlantic treaty organisation (NATO) has become hegemonic and its rapid deployment force almost unchallenged. America and its allies now fund institution that claim to be establishing democracy in Africa(pp 10).

Similarly Theodore Von Lave (1987) maintains that a more enabling and more favourable internal environment for democracy in Africa may have been created by, amongst other factors, the fall of brutal dictatorships in Argentina,China, Philippines and South Korea, the gradual dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and the demise of bureaucratic Socialism in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (p. 3).

Kunle Amuwo (1992) enumerated a number of official pronouncements of Western leaders to accelerate democratic drive in Africa. According to him, the western leaders enunciated a number of political conditionalities of aid to African countries to encourage democracy. They include the statement of the French President, Francois Mitterand, who said.

> It is clear that traditional aid will be more lukewarm towards regimes which behave in authoritarian manner without accepting the evolution towards democracy and it will be enthusiastic to those who take this step with courage and as far as possible for them. (p. 12).

The U.S. ambassador to Kenya had stated that:

> There is a strong tide flowing in our congress which controls the purse strings to concentrate our economic assistance on those of the world's nations that nourish democratic institutions, defend human nights and practice multi-party politics (p. 12).

The Canadian Prime Minister followed suit.

According to him:

> For Canada, the future course is clear. We shall be increasingly channelling development assistance only to those countries that show respect for fundamental human rights. Canada will not subsidise repression and shifting of democracy (p. 12).

In the same vein Bernard Cassen (1991) observed that London, leading the European community, which distributes some $2.5 billion as aid to Africa demands, henceforth, three conditionalities: respect of human rights; movement towards democracy and a sane social and economic climate and politics.

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Furthermore, Britain's foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, intimated that the country's assistance will favour countries tending toward pluralism public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles (p. 12).

All the foregoing, it could be argued that the external environment was becoming more favourable to Nigeria's democratic construction. The logic is that the demise of communism signifies the triumph of capitalism and democracy. Nigeria as a developing Nation relies heavily on western aid to manage the political affairs of the nation as such must succumb to the demands of the donor countries in the areas of democracy. Nigeria as a member of some significant international organisations must pursue policies that conforms to the charter of such organisations. Nats Agbo (1995) reveals that it was however, 20 years after the Singapore declaration that the commonwealth came out with a more pointed declaration in Harare, Zimbabwe. The now famous Harare commonwealth Declaration of 1991 committed member states to subscribe to the principles of democracy and democratic processes (p. 19).

In the same vein, Geoge Obiozor (1985) argued that, at the time the Babangida regime assumed office, several international developments were unfolding which at the time were bound to affect the way the country's external relations were carried on. According to him:

> The emergence to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his twin principles of Perestroika and Glosnost had started to make themselves felt at the time the Babangida regime was established and the transition policy adopted (p. 18).

Arguing further, Obiozor maintains that what this meant was that the tenor of international politics began gradually to change, the international organisations began to regain their influence and relevance and the entire basis of post war politics, especially the crippling effects of the superpower cold war was to be radically altered. Obiozor also traced the recent world developments that affected the policy of transition. They include the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Eastern Europe as a political coherent bloc, the dissolution of the WARSAW PACK, the jettisoning of state socialism across the world and the near universal embrace of multi-party democracy, the uncrippling of the security council of the United Nations under U.S. hegemony and the wars in Yugoslavia and parts of the former Soviet Union (p. 20).

Babangida's resolve to pursue a transition programme was no doubt influenced by these developments in the globe. The Babangida regime has had to grapple with the ripple effects of these developments. Nigeria's ability to respond to the changing context of international politics had a special significant effect on the Babangida's transition programme. This was because as the most populous African country and the biggest black nation, Nigeria must play a leadership role in Africa. The international system had specific set of effects and pressure on Nigeria's transition. Taking together, the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, the dissolution of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a political bloc, the pressure of industralised states on the authoritarian state in Nigeria and the political conditionalities for aid and the hegemony of America over World polities were the external factors that created the conducive environment for Nigeria's democratisation.

2.7 THE NATURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The transition period could be divided into various distinct phases that correspond to the major stages of evolution from authoritarian to competitive politics. First we begin our analysis from the political Bureau that deliberated on the transition Blue print. Tunji Olagunji et al (1993) contend that the decision to establish the political Bureau was contained in the 1986 Budget speech of President Babangida.

The events and expectation that led to its establishment therefore was best characterised by the high-point of the attempt to define and chart the pathways to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Tunji et al also revealed that the National Institute Memorandum entitled "Need for National Direction", the Aide memore on a political programme and the civil service committee on political programme all put together were the explorations in search of a consensus on the political programme (p. 109).

Thus, the political programme in embryo which emerged out of the these initial explorations constituted, in the framework of the political and socio-economic agenda of the initial phase of the transition. The political Bureau in this sense arose out of the need to define the methodology, and theory of the transition. Its establishment was also based on the presumed advantage of building the substantive content of a transition programme.

The next phase of the transition programme was the designing of the time-table for the political transition. Again Tunji Olagunji (1993) argues that the sequences of events in the proposed time table would allow for the appropriate lessons to be learnt, and also create more time for the requisite adjustments to be put in structural, institutional and cultural reforms to take root before the disengagement of the Babangida administration (p. 171).

In the same vein, the cumulative thrust and focus of this time table has been aptly summarised by Oyovbaire (1993) when he stated that the transition to civil rule programme consists of the following very closely interwoven parts.

a. Establishment or re-establishment of a number of critical political, social and technical institutions intended to enhance the democratic and development process, namely; the National Electoral commission.

b. An improved revised version of the 1979 now (1989) Presidential constitution based on the recommendations of the political Bureau, the Constitution Review Committee and the constituent Assembly, code of conduct Bureau, the National Population Commission and a transformed civil service which can respond positively to the requirements of Presidential leadership and politics.

c. A number of actions and processes intended to undermine, or eliminate, antidemocratic forces and undue excesses in political culture and behaviour. These include the economic policies of structural adjustment and a self-reliant productive development, especially at the level of rural economy.

d. Other actions and processes include, the restriction of hitherto overbearing role of traditional leadership and traditional values in politics and governance, the banning or disqualification from holding political and public offices of certain categories of politicians and establishment of mass-based and military-based organisations for political education and general enlightenment. (p. 161).

By the foregoing, it could be observed that the commencement of the 1989 constitution and the hand-over of power were being effected in phases. It started with the installation of elected local governments, followed by the election and swearing - in of the state governments, and ending with the election and swearing - in of the Federal government.

Only the provisions of the constitution relevant to each phase were brought into force with it, so that the entire constitution only came into force with the installation of an elected Federal government scheduled for 27th August 1993.

B.O. Nwabueze (1993) commenting on the transition observed that the arrangement of the transition into phases meant that until the president is sworn-in, the powers of the Federal Military Government (FMG) remained as absolute, unlimited and as supreme as ever, the democratically elected local and state governments been entirely subordinate to and dependent upon it, just as when the states were ruled by military governments appointed by it. (p. 8)

The nature of this transitional arrangement provoked international reactions. Some external forces saw the arrangement as implying the institutionalisation of a diarchy system

of government. The Americans saw such arrangement as negating democracy especially the American model. It was on this basis that the United States of America began to bring pressures to bear on the country's political system.

Godfrey Ikhemuenhe (1993) sees the workshop on leadership development organised by United states information services (USIS) in collaboration with the Volkswagen of Nigeria limited (VWON) with new breed political leaders in Nigeria and executives as target participants as one of such political pressures on Nigeria or attempts aimed at changing the course of events in Nigeria's political system.

This argument tends to buttress the fact that a supreme constitution can not exist alongside an absolute military government which the international community see as an aberration.

The next phase of the transition was the design of a new constitution for the Third Republic. Again Tunji Olagunji (1993) maintains that one of the events in the transition time-table was the establishment in the 3rd quarter of 1987, of the constitution review committee. Thus in line with the transition time-table, the Federal Military Government established in 1987 a 46 member constitution review committee (CRC) to review the 1979 constitution. In related development, with the necessary modifications and approval by the Armed Force Ruling Council (AFRC) the draft constitution submitted by the Constituent Assembly was promulgated as the constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria to come into effect on 1st October 1992.

The party formation process was another identifiable phase of the transition. The decision to allow only two political parties to constitute the benchmark of the reformed party system having been made, the task of stipulating the conditions which political associations seeking recognition and registration as political parties had meet was entrusted to the National Electoral Commission (NEC).

Olagunji further reveals that a fall-out from NEC's report and recommendation on party registration was therefore, the dissolution of the thirteen political associations and the decision by AFRC to establish de novo two political parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Thus the formation of political parties which was followed by Party Primaries was part of the nomination process for elective public offices. (p. 180).

In summary therefore, the publication of the Report of the Political Bureau together with the white paper on it marked the end of the exploratory design phase of the transition. In spite of the exciting challenges of the transition and the prospects and possibilities its design held for democratic consolidation in Nigeria, the very idea of a sequential and self-adjusting transition came to grips with limitations necessarily imposed on it by the idea of a time-table with fixed terminal date. B. O. Nwabueze (1993) arguing on the rationale of the democratic character of the transition stated that:

> Nigeria has been seriously attenuated by the fact that they were conducted on the basis of two parties established by Decree, with constitutions and manifestos drawn up for them by the Electoral Commission; in the result, what the parties stand for in terms of policies, objectives and ideology is hardly understood by the members, the Nigerian Electorate let alone the

wider international community (p. 7).

But the programme instead was girded with an iron belt bristling with draconian decrees, arrest and detention press censorship, banning and threats. Osaze Ehonwa (1991), observed that Decrees were used in twisting and turning the programme according to expediency, the contours and contents of the political rights of Nigerians lost much of their distinctness (p. 11).

This infringement upon the right to participate was one of the most glaring and problematic violations of political rights of Nigerians in the transition programme. Various individuals, groups and organisations were barred from participating in the transition either by decree, by being proscribed or through ostensibly purely administrative means. The uncertainties that characterised the implementation of the transition programme and the outright violation of peoples right informed another aspect penetration of external factors into the transition. The Human right groups operating in Nigeria as non governmental international organisations mounted considerable pressure on the government to influence the out come of the programme. In the same vein, former top government functionaries enlisted the support of their friends and colleagues abroad to intervene into the transition process. These and other related transition fatigue brought the issue of international factor to bear in the transition.

The democratic opposition was another domestic group that had close link with international politics. Laurence Whitehead (1992) maintains that when opposition parties undertake realignments or negotiate pacts, there is usually a substantial international

infrastructure of support... thus, in all, democratisation involved the reopening of debates that had long been closed by repression, debates that simultaneously concerned the redefinition of domestic freedoms and of international alignments. The question linking the two parts of the debate is; so what kind of a nation shall we become ? in such a context it becomes artificial to desegregate internal and external factors (p. 53 - 58).

The above argument is related to our theme in the sense that in the Nigerian case it is also possible to argue that a full transition to democracy has been difficult to execute and that even to a large extent, that the 1985 - 95 transition was inconclusive. Since 1985, there has not been an alternation of power from the initial dominant post civil war elite (i.e. the military) to an alternative party and the 1979 constitution has been implemented in bits and piece over the last 15 years.

2.8 EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF THE TRANSITION POLICY

There were at least four external factors of the Nigerian transition policy that shaped the transition. They ensured that the particular characteristics of Nigeria or its regime, were tied into the world system, whose evolution thereby was transmitted back into the process of transition in Nigeria. The first key factor was the value attached to Nigeria's geographic position by the United States and N.A.T.O. members, in the context of U.S world and especially Africa Policy and the cold war.

A second was the stigma attached to the regime's origins, nature and record and the permanent effort of the regime to escape its predicament, this could only be achieved under

a constitutional democracy, once the state was embarked on the path of constitutional reforms and a redefinition of Nigeria's external policies.

A third referred to the political culture of the transition, duplicating in external alignments the battle between pro-democracy groups and military authoritarian. The pro-democracy group looked to the 1960's Enlightenment and the 1979 liberal constitution as the source of values while the authoritarians in the regime looked to the 1976-79 military junta.

A fourth feature was the sharpening dichotomy between the regimes aspirations to assert its interests in external affairs, and its ever widening penetratedness by the Western world that it both feared and desired to join.

The key factor over the period of transition was the continuity provided by the Western alliance. The United States remained Nigerian's Prime military partner and the pillar of Western defence. Through the military agreements concluded with the Babangida regime, the United States dominated the training of Nigerian military personnel. Similarly, Babangida's increased responsibility in international affairs brought about by his self-willed, Vigorous Pursuit of a useful lever in international politics highlighted international interests in his transition policy.

Reacting to the Babangida's quest to dominate world affairs, Seyi Awofeso et al (1991) revealed that

> Nigeria, under General Babangida has been fighting for the executive chair in key world institutions. ECOWAS and OAU seats apart, the Nigerian government is hotly contesting with Ghana and Zimbabwe for African bloc

> vote in its bid to sponsor a candidate as successor to United Nations Secretary-General... already Chief Eleazor Anyaoku, a Nigerian diplomat, holds the highest post in the commonwealth, as secretary General.(p.28).

Thus Babangida made Nigeria's internal politics vulnerable to international influence. This was because Nigeria has to resort to intensive lobby with some key world leaders to realise its objective and at the same time had to convince such leaders that Nigeria was truly engaged in a transition programme. It is a known fact that most of those world leaders accepted Nigeria's leadership for the sake of the transition they wanted Nigeria to accomplish.

In the same vein, the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic politics was occasioned by some diplomatic commitment of Nigeria to external affairs. Obie Chukwumba (1991)also observed Nigeria's international engagement which accounts for the external factor during the transition. They include, keeping of 3,000 Nigerian soldiers in Liberia under the umbrella of ECOMOG, the 1991 OAU summit in Abuja, Technical Aid Corps programme (under which scores of Nigerian graduates were sent to African countries to work for 200 dollars a month, payable by the Nigeria government), concert of medium powers for which Nigeria hand picked militarily strong countries in the third world to join her in a prestigious military concert to match the super powers.(p.29).

It could therefore be argued that, the Babangida's international engagement during the transition programme, sold Nigeria to the outside world, and thus attracted foreign influence to the transition. Similarly Babatunde Olugboji (1991) revealed that the Nigerian foreign Minister, Ike Nwachukwu embarked on numerous trips to over 20 countries,

spanning three continents on an aggressive political and economic campaign to seek support measures from the international system for Nigeria's transition (p.31).

The above revelation meant that the much diplomatic burden was too heavy on Nigeria's transition. In the same way, Nigeria's continental politics proved burdensome for the country's political reform. The series of support emanating from the various countries the minister visited also brought different political ideologies to the transition which to lesser extent accounted for the transition fatigue.

The external determinant of the transition policy was also the issue of maintaining peace in Nigeria by a diplomatic investments which was a way of keeping the outside world safe and useful for Nigerians. Again Sei Awofeso maintains that Babangida's regime succeeded in keeping Nigeria's borders safe indeed from envious neighbours but have not succeeded in keeping the recipients of Nigeria's aid useful to Nigerians. Among such diplomatic investments included, exporting of barrels of oil to Sierra-Leone at about three dollars below world market price, construction of a higher school and some agricultural projects at 10 million dollars financed by Nigerian government, several hundred tonnes of asphalt transported to Ougadogou at Nigeri's expense, and financial assistance to Ghana to hold non-Aligned Summit in Accra(p.30)

This diplomatic investment created conducive environment for the transition as there was no reported outside attack on Nigeria through her borders either sponsored by the pro-democracy group or those banned from participating in the transition.

2.9 SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AFFECTING THE REGIME CHANGE

While one can not statistically distinguish different mechanisms by which the international climate becomes transmitted to particular countries, the proportions of other democracies in a region and in the world matter separately for the survival of democracy in any particular country. As Przeworski (1991) pointed out:

> The larger the proportion of democracies on the globe and in the region during a particular year, the more likely is democracy to survive in any particular country. The global effect is about twice as large as the regional effect but, these findings indicate spreading of ideas operates independently of the direct influence of western governments and various international institutions.(p.ix).

Nigeria as a political force within the west African Subregion where democratic transition was thriving at the time had to join others like Ghana and Niger Republic to democratise governance.

Ibrahim Gambari (1994) in an interview observed that, in the last seven years of the century, Russia is falling and its component parts themselves further disintegrating into sub-unit and the sub-units further disintegrating Gambari argued that apartheid has fallen, the Israelis are talking to the Arabs and so on, all these developments in the world attest to changes going on in the world. Again the United States for its own domestic reasons and its new status as the only super power following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern bloc is approaching democratisation as a foreign policy objective. Military rule is an aberration and not the norm particularly after the end of the cold war and with

the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.(p.19)

By the foregoing it could be argued that, given the anathema the world has attached to military dictatorships therefore, it could be possible to rationalise the opposition of the liberal world to the Nigerian military Government and consequently urging her to democratise. Again with the decline of the East -West confrontation resulting from changes in Soviet policy, Nigeria's economic and financial aids from soviet to the military ruling class dropped . The advantage of real or supposed East-West completion to secure financial, diplomatic or military aid which all too often was employed to neutralize internal and external pressure for change, changed .

The hostile climate in western countries particularly in the United States about the transition programme in Nigeria was a clear indication of pressure on Nigeria to democratise. The world is changing rapidly in the context of democracy. In the same vein Eboe Hutchful (l991) writing on the theme, International Dimensions of the Democratisation process in Africa observed that.

> the transition to democracy in Africa is occurring in the context of simultaneous and multiple transitions in the global order. Six developments occurred in the globe that affects transition in Africa. The disappearance of an alternative hegemonic order in the form of the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc .(p.134

The above argument suggests that with the dismantling of the Soviet Union, America was left as the only super power and as such has to force her political ideology on the other countries of the world without challenge.

Hutchful further argued that the second development is the achievement by the United States of military hegemony at the same time as its economic decline become more and more apparent with the dismantling of the military economy. The third development related to contradictory process, the globalisation of the capitalist economy accelerated by the removal of political barriers to capital expansion and rationalisation, the emergence at the same time of a tri-polar economic dispensation, the EEC, the North America Free Trade Area (NAFT) and Japan and the Pacific Rim, and growing pressures to enhance competitive efficiency among the main capitalist powers.

These pressures are likely to grow as economic competition replaces the military competition of the cold war period. Again capitalism has become a single economic policy of the world. This type of economic policy symbolized by the USA emphasis minimal state, heightened individualism, maximization of short-term profit, the triumph of money free enterprise and the use of workers as simple commodity. All result to enrichment, progress and development or rather could be negative or positive.

The fourth development continued Hutchful, is the re-emergence paradoxically within and in spite of this globalisation process of nationalism and ethnic and sectarian feeling as an international force. The reformation of states and reshaping of state boundaries in the former Soviet zone and Africa is in a manner reminiscent of the nineteenth century and the period of African decolonisation. The growing multi-lateralism via a reshaped United Nations dominated once again by America and the Western powers and endowed with anew philosophy of interventionism.

An important aspect of those, was the attempt to broker peace in conflict regions such as South Africa, Cambodia, the middle East and El Salvador less to promote genuine democratic change than to advance the pax Americans. The American intervention in Nigeria's domestic political transition highlighted obvious shortcomings in the overall Western support for the re-introduction of political pluralism in Nigeria. The overriding concern was, the success of the democratic transition in Nigeria and this depended to a large extent on how much diplomatic and material support the United States and her allies in the West were prepared to give.

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This significant international development was a factor in the transition under study. Various organisations such as the pro-democracy groups, Human right organisations and other civil organisations were inspired into action by democratic ideals brought by the proliferation of antonymous organisations.

Writing in the same vein on the new world order and socio-political transition in Africa Bashir I.L (1992) stated that developments in Western Europe that affects transition in the globe could be traced to recent developments in the Soviet Union. According to Bashir,

> In the Soviet, the clamour for independence among the Soviets has further added to the new configuration of global diplomatic map. The other dimension has to do with the Europeanization of Europe.(p.405)

With the foregoing therefore, it goes to show that combined with significant developments, in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, these world multiple transformations were endowing the process of democratisation with considerate uncertainty

and unpredictability. While rooted in indigenous forces, the movement in Africa and indeed Nigeria has nevertheless been profoundly influenced by some of these internationally significant developments and remains extremely vulnerable to international events.

Indeed, any understanding of the process of democratisation in Nigeria must appreciate the many growth points of democracy on the continent, its interrelationship with democratic struggles in the global arena, and the essentially contested meanings of the concept of democracy itself. We therefore argue that the impact on Nigeria of the democratic movements in Eastern and central Europe, Latin America, the collapse of Soviet Union and the emergence of United States of America as the only world super-power were sufficiently well-known not to require further discussion. All these world significant political developments facilitated and shaped Nigeria's march towards democracy.

2.10 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODERNISATION PRESSURE

Political factors and the changes in the globe are not the only relevant issues bearing on transitions to democracy in Africa and most importantly Nigeria. Trade is obviously not immune to changes in the nature of the political system, but is often remarkable just how pragmatic states can be. No doubt, colonial rule transformed Nigeria's pre-capitalist formation, particularly with respect to such socio-economic activities as agriculture, health, Education, Transport and mining.

Colonial development planning was critical in shaping this inherited political economy. It did so by entrenching structural distortions like the dependence of the economy on export production of primary commodities, import substitution, industrial development strategies. The lopsided growth of sectors of the economy, as in the emphasis on urbanisation and neglect of the rural areas. The colonial experience with development planning was obviously carried over to the independence period. That colonial development planning has persistently affected all other socio-political developments of the country, including the socio-economic implementation of the transition. The factors of socio-economic modernisation pressures was apparent in the management of the transition.

Sabo Bako(1993) argues that economic modernisation is the rationale behind the foreign pressures on dictatorial governments in Africa, maintaining that intensification of popular struggle for democracy in Africa has drawn international attention. Bako further observed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies has led to the withdrawal of material, financial and military assistance to left-wing dictatorial regimes in Africa. Bako concluded by noting that reasons for Western European and United States pressures for democratisation in Africa is to create a democratic atmosphere for the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank inspired and dictated economic adjustment programmes (p.4-7).

In the same vein, Chidozie Ogene (1995) argued that groups aggregate the interests of individuals and also articulate these interests. They transform the needs and aspirations of individuals in to societal norms. They also transform economic power into social power

into political decisions. Ogene further postulated that economic interest groups comprising business organisations trade associations and the like from abroad have more influence than other groups in recruiting political decision-makers, represent community values, prevent or promote change, socialise the citizen, provide an opportunity for acquiring and exercising political skill, veto or support government policy and mould public opinion...(p. 5).

Thus, these external economic group interests exerted direct and significant influence on the government. This is achieved by affecting international economic policy such as political economy during transition and aid legislation or Decrees and by trying to affect relations with particular countries. Similarly Nigeria endowed with natural resources offers economic space to western Europe and America. Nigeria could therefore be expanded both as a market and as a source of raw materials. This expansion could only be possible in a free market economy which liberal democracy could offer, hence the pressure from the external forces on Nigeria's transition . The United States responses to Nigeria questions are said to be determined by her calculations of national interest, namely interest in military, political and economic security.

In the same vein, Eboe Hutchful (1991) maintains that more important than any economic competition between Africa and the former Soviet bloc is the common danger faced by democratic transitions in both regions from the global economy on a parallel processes and are insisting that the two go together.

Similarly Rashid Faruque (1994) in his work, Nigeria ownership abandoned reveals that Nigeria, without proper accommodation to multilateral lending institutions and a sound

political reform programme, the prospects for further credit were bleak. These events set the stage for the structural adjustment programme and transition to democratic rule.(242).

Again Gambari (1993) postulates that the world is dominated by economic giants like United States, the North Atlantic Free Trade Union and Japan and China, This Union means that sooner than later a single European market will emerge. In a world dominated by these economic giants. Nigeria can not afford to be an island especially in the world that is changing rapidly in the context of democracy. Gambari concludes that Nigeria must embrace democracy for her own good and in terms of the national aspiration.(p.81)

All these implies that Nigeria faced a socio-economic modernisation pressure from the external system during the transition under study. The international economic financial system and aids were been so hostile to the interests of the development Nigeria, particularly her transition process, all were aimed at influencing the transition to democracy in the country. However, Nigeria's political economy during the early stage of the transition period also witnessed a massive flow of foreign loans and grants from the international financial system which enabled the state to restore its shattered fiscal base and thereby strengthened its capacity to discharge crucial social economic and other obligations as well as salvaged its crumbled legitimacy and advanced the transition programme.

In summary, we have attempted in this chapter an analysis of Nigeria and the international environment during her democratic transition within the period under review . This was done within the context of the historical perspectives, geopolitical situation of Nigeria and some significant international events. We concluded by analyzing the

international economy and socio-economic modernisation pressures on the transition.

We noted that in the historical perspective that the Babangida regime laid a good foundation for a transition to democracy which in turn attracted the attention of the international community acting in different ways to influence the transition. It was also noted that the geopolitical or rather the physical location of Nigeria within the West African sub-region accounted for the type of pressures Nigeria faced from the external forces as well as the political ideology.

Similarly, we have observed the intervening variables that accounted for the unprecedented pressures mounted on Nigeria by the international community. Such variables were significant events in the globe such as the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of Soviet Union and the emergence of US as the only world super-power among others.

In conclusion, we traced the international economy and socio-economic modernisation pressures, observing that on gaining independence, Nigeria inherited a capitalist economy from colonialisation hence her economic base is tied to the West . We also observed that international aid and grants have been used to mount pressures on dictatorial regime of Babangida to democratise.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE VULNERABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

3.1 INTRODUCTION

We have in the previous chapter demonstrated that the international factor was a very important influencing factor to the transition programme in Nigeria between 1985 to 1993. The influence we reasoned was as a result of several political, economic and social interests. We also noted the factors of international Organisations as well as what international pressures that were most conducive to the democratic transition process of Babangida's regime.

We intend in this chapter to advance the analysis of these interests further by focusing on the vulnerability of the democratic transition to international system in order to discover if this was as a result of Nigeria's interdependent nature and low level development of her democratic institutions and structures. Also to be discussed would be the political uncertainties during the transition and external policy continuity of Nigeria. In the same vein we shall discuss the Interim National Government and its external relations, especially its Bilateral links with other countries such as USA, Europe and Africa. We shall also analyses the sources of external influence in such areas as political,

diplomatic and economic.

Using the above issues as a case study of the transition from dictatorship to liberal democracy. We believe that an assessment of developments within Nigeria during the transition could be significantly enhanced by taking account of the effects of Nigeria's relationship to the international system. This relationship was not perceived solely in terms of the one-way external input into the domestic areas, but would be treated as a complex two-way process in which domestic actors react to and often in turn react upon their international environment. Keeping in mind that the separation of domestic from international variables is a distorting device of primarily theoretical utility.

3.2 THE VULNERABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICS TO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Transition to Democracy, with varying degrees of external involvement, have become the principal form of politics in the international system. Most of these politics erupt in Africa and Latin America. Thus far, very little has been published about how the domestic forces in a modern democratic transition seek to attract or discourage foreign intervention. The internationalisation of the Nigerian transition to democracy, however, bore little resemblance to situations elsewhere. In this case, foreign intervention resulted primarily from economic, social, political and ideological concerns.

Barely a year after President Babangida's speech at the inauguration of the Political Bureau in January 1986, and despite a lack of substantial diplomatic recognition or even covert help from foreign countries, the Nigerian transition to democratic rule ranked as one of the most important foreign issues in public opinion surveys throughout Europe and America. In contrast to the lack of popular attention accorded other transition processes of comparable or greater political reforms in Africa.

The spectre of mass violence in Nigeria especially during the annulment of June 12 1993 Presidential election brought forth unprecedented amounts of external pressure that substantially altered the nature and duration of the transition. Concern about the detention and welfare of the politicians of international repute inside Nigeria was evident throughout Africa, but so were the apprehensions about another possible civil war in Nigeria and consequently Balkanization of the country, especially if this were to be achieved through foreign intervention . The fundamental difference between the prevailing attitude in Africa and public opinion in European and the United states centred on the issue of whether the restoration of democracy was a necessary condition for the survival of the Nigerian state.

Shortly after the Babangida's military coup that ousted General Buhari in August 27, 1985, the new regime sought unabashedly to maintain close relations with the international community. By the foregoing, Babangida(1985) in his maiden address to the nation, stated that:

> the ousted military government conducted our external relations by a policy of retaliatory reaction. Nigeria became a country that reacted to given situations, rather than taking the initiative as it should and had always been

In addition to foreign aid, Nigeria offers the largest market in Africa, and its capitalist economy was among the most hospitable to western investments. Writing in the same vein John J Stremlau (1977) reveals that on a more basic level, there was in Nigeria a deep national commitment to a free enterprise system, a widespread admiration for western democracies, where many of the modern elite had been educated and a suspicion of soviet intentions in Africa(p.7).

The above revelation meant that Nigeria offers to the West a fertile ground for economic investment which liberal democracy flourishes and nourishes. The external forces, thus found such ground worthy of investment, hence they seek to influence her political ideology. nevertheless a fundamental issue has been that the West look unto Nigeria for leadership in the areas of international security and economic development within African region, as well as democratisation of governance.

Another point that seemed obvious for the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic transition to democracy to the international system was the series of summits held in Nigeria within the period under review during which so many government official statements were made in favour of democracy. This pronouncements attracted in great measure the attention of international community to the transition. This was because, in the broadest sense, Babangida viewed the country's international prestige as a function of the extent to which Nigeria was considered a leader of black Africa. As it has been pointed out in so many quarters, "Africa is Nigeria's natural sphere of influence. To Shirk this manifest destiny is not to lead the logic of history" for this reason Babangida was at one

time or the other, the chairman of OAU and ECOWAS while other Notable Nigerians occupied exhausted positions at international organisations such as Joe Garba, Emeka Anyaoku and Ibrahim Gambari. This and other related situations brought Nigeria's internal politics to international focus.

Similarly, Babangida on assumption of office called the international system into Nigeria's domestic politics. According to the President Babangida first address to the nation.

> Nigeria hereby makes a renewed request to the non-aligned movement to regroup and reinvigorate its determination to restructure the global economic system, while we propose to the industrialised nations to positively consider the debt plight of the developing countries... we shall remain members of the various multi-lateral institutions and inter governmental organisations which belong to and do what must be done to enhance the membership and participation within them (p.19).

This and other subsequent statements of the president brought in the international dimension of the transition as soon as the process began. Having led foundation for the internationalisation of the domestic transition process in Nigeria, the international community developed a voice in the whole process. One of the early manifestations of the international community's increasing attempts to develop a voice of its own on the issue of the Nigerian transition was the visit of Dan Quayle the Vice President of United States of America to Nigeria in 1991. When Dan Quayle was to leave he gave a symbolic $200,000 to Nigeria in aid of democracy.

Similarly the lack of enthusiasm by the United States on the planned visit of President Babangida to the US in 1991 diplomatic sources had it, was part of the ploy to

arm-twist the regime to disengage from power. When President Babangida announced a third shift in the hand over date, the news was received with anger in Western Capitals. Collistu Oke (1993) stated that

> The European Community (EC) apparently reflecting the mood of western countries then, expressed displeasure over the shift saying that nothing should be done to shift the August 27 date. The EC delegate to Nigeria Mr. Zimmer Baldwin, had defended the EC stance on the transition hiccup saying that what was said was in line with the aspirations of the Nigerian people (P.22).

In the same vein, one hundred and thirty five international observers from Britain, France, Denmark, Switzerland, China, India, Canada Italy, Belgium Czechoslovakia and U:S monitored the June 12 1993 Presidential election. The EC. commitment to the process also showed through its donation of project vehicles to the National Election Monitoring Group (NEMG). all these concern of the external forces especially the donations made the transition vulnerable.

The political implications of the Vulnerability were more ominous. According to Emeka Obiagwu (1993) British Foreign Secretary has maintained that no new British aid would be given to Nigerian until an elected civilian government was sworn in and its work unhindered (p.8).

Similarly, Biodun Ladepo (1993) observed that the white House in its protest against the cancellation of the election in Nigeria took the following measures, suspension of the posting to Nigeria of a newly appointed Defence Attaché and the withdrawal from Nigeria of the American Embassy's security officer, as well as suspension of the International

Military Education Training (IMET) programme for the country.(p.1)

Nigeria suffered immediate financial and economic consequences from economic sanctions which had harsher effects on the Nigerian economy. The possible long-term consequences are far more serious as EC was Nigeria's main trading partner. The American and European Governments announced some economic sanctions which included a loss of 450 million Dollars in industrial and economic aids to Nigeria.

Other external pressures included press and radio coverage critical of the Babangida regime in Europe and America. Meanwhile Nigerian political and business elites in exile formed a visible lobby or pressure groups which acted to sensitise the policies of Europe and American governments while maintaining regular contact with Nigeria's internal scene.

In the same vein, the enormous influence America and Europe had in the international capital market enabled them to frustrate the debt relief and rescheduling efforts of the Nigerian government, especially when America and Britain have a superior say in the affairs of such bodies like IMF and the world Bank.

Because Nigeria's vulnerability to international influence was shared by many other African states, the Federal military government's role in organising diplomatic opposition to the west earned the respect and confidence of many African states. Commenting on the international impact of these activities, Norbert Ifediora (1993) says the interference is justified. Hinging US position on the aphorism that "might is Right". Ifediora further argues that the super power does not support an unpopular leadership in any part of the

world. He explains that interference could be as a result of several motives like economic, political, restoration of democracy and protection of human rights p.17).

Since the internal opposition forces in Nigeria were handicapped by the government's absolute control of the security forces, the Western countries were the only forces that could prevent oppressive rule in Nigeria. Nor was there a dearth of morally defensible grounds for such an additional political conditionality. In the first place, it was the very logic of the original package of the democratisation conditionality to ensure that the end-product of the process was the emergence of stable democratic polity in Nigeria.

Secondly, Nigeria had given absolute endorsement to the demand of the Africa National Congress (ANC) of South Africa that the transition in that country should be seen to be democratic and to guarantee the emergence of a stable democratic order which would benefit our follow Blacks in that country. The logic of this wisdom of Nigerian government was that it should first guarantee these very liberties and opportunities for its fellow citizens.

There were other salutary and more mundane reasons for the Western powers active interest in both the content and manner of the execution of the transition programme in Nigeria. According to Gilbert Bluwey (1993)

> First a cardinal objective of the democracy increment is to promote international exchange of capital, goods and services by guaranteeing stable and secure political environments in all countries (p.47) .

In the same vein Kelvin Callwood, (1991) maintains that All investors want a stable environment where their money can work, when Americans see Africans in places like

Benin, Zambia and Nigeria elect governments that do not regard business as an enemy, these places become a lot more attractive to American companies (p.7).

But the governments that accept business as a blessing are neither the erstwhile disciples of Marxist-socialism, nor the ideologically un-definable military juntas. However, because of their control of the security apparatus of state and indeed, the bulk of the economic resources of the state, these illegitimate regimes are not likely to permit fair-play at the pools unless an international search-light be on them with threats of economic and diplomatic sanctions.

The foregoing accounts majorly for the intervention of Nigeria's domestic politics by the external forces which of course made the transition vulnerable to the international system. It is therefore clear that the system outside can equally work to enhance democracy. Specific payments, encouragement and even threats from outside forces made significant difference in the transition. The vulnerability of the Nigerian democratic transition to international system became apparent and unavoidable. Political transition is no longer a domestic concern since the advent of new world order.

The vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic politics to international system illustrates the mutually reinforcing linkages between many of the domestic and international variables. For example, the sanctions which followed the ECOMOG War in Liberia seriously exacerbated inflationary and related pressures in the Nigerian economy. Nigeria's leadership role in ECOMOG Liberia also precipitated the insistence of the international community for Nigeria to restore democracy, hence ending any hope the junta entertained

of gaining legitimacy through civilian "Window dressing".

Exiles posed an interesting methodological question with respect to classification among domestic or international pressures, as they were clearly in a hybrid category. To a greater extent they played a linking role, serving to transform internal opposition into international issues. For instance the escape of chief MKO Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the annulled June 12 1993 Presidential election to Britain and America helped to arouse public awareness in those countries concerning Nigerian's political crisis.

Altogether, external disapproval played an important role internally by reinforcing passive resistance to the junta and never allowed it to develop a viable political base thereafter. Of particular importance was the role played by the European community(EC) and the U.S who issued a proclamation, suspending the entry into those countries of immigrants and non-immigrants who formulated or implemented policies that impeded the transition to democracy in Nigeria as well as their immediate families. This measure as well as freezing the foreign accounts of the military juntas did not simply provide comfort to the domestic resistance from the military.

This was also used by groups and individuals inside and outside Nigeria which called for an immediate move towards civilian government to facilitate the unfreezing of Nigeria - E C - US relations. In conclusion therefore, all these factors suggest that it would be of limited utility to try to attribute the military's decline to primarily domestic factors. Rather it was the interplay between external and internal pressures that created a situation in which the regime, lacking a firm basis in domestic and international support was unable

to withstand any major blow. It then could be argued that Nigeria's transition to democracy was vulnerable to the international system hence the "step aside" of the junta's leader, General Babangida.

3.3 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES

From 1970 to 1980, Nigeria enjoyed fairly rapid economic development. Its economic potential, industrial power and population grew considerably. Industrialisation brought about trade-unionism and the right to collective bargaining. It also led to rapid urbanisation and rising expectations. The rise of socio-economic problems occasioned a gradual increase in the significance of functional-ideological cleavages despite persistent cultural and ethnic divisions. More over, the liberal constitution of 1979 provided a suitable normative structure for expression and organisation of all kinds of ideas and ideologies.

Following the inception of transition programme, Nigeria established formal structures needed for the actualization of the transition process. The structures so adopted had external influences that shaped the functions and operations of the democratic institutions. Formal political structures is crucial in any scheme of political transition as they deal with the problems and uncertainties that characterised the transition programme.'

The political structures which Nigeria borrowed from the western state system tended to influence the processes and outcome of the transition in so many ways. (1) Violence and threat to life and property (2) the under utilization of human and material resources (3) the dwarfing of the personality of the average individual, i.e. lack of true

consciousness.(4) A disoriented intellectualism which was satisfied to subordinate Nigeria, her people and resources to the more advanced nations.(5) Over dependence of Nigeria on foreign nations which were hesitant to give aid for the effective development of Nigeria's political system.

The Nigerian political structures were imported from the West and as such had great influence of external factors in there operations. Eme Awa (1994) argues that the structural arrangement of the Nigerian transition programme of Babangida was determined by the West. Throughout the period of the transition, two parallel developments occurred, one functional, and the other dysfunctional, that the functions influenced the growth of external intervention. He further stressed that the relatively unified administration with its legal system, common currency and expanding system of communications, trade and education fostered a new sense of belonging together. At the same time however, this interaction tended to awaken a new foreign consciousness (p.146).

The processes of political structures and modernisation radically changed the Nigerian political situation during the transition. As new political elites, particularly for the acquisition of modern skills, jobs, promotion, and new political status, they appealed increasingly for the political support of their foreign counter parts in the struggle. For a while these international growing cleavages were marked by the common course of foreign intervention to Nigeria's domestic politics, external context became a central feature of the transition.

The major political structures which were necessary for the running of the transition programme and subsequently had external influence include: the Parties, legislature, the Executive Branch, the judicial and law enforcement system, local government, the mass media CDS and MAMSER. During his visit to Nigeria to actualise America's commitment to democracy in Nigeria, the Vice President Dan Quayle, travelled to the centre for Democratic studies (CDS) in Bwari Abuja, where he emphasized his support for Nigeria's new generation of civilian political leaders by declaring that:

> I am a new breed of politician, Democracy is sweeping across the globe. It has come to Eastern Europe. It is coming to the Soviet Union, Its come to Latin America and it will come to Nigeria. Democracy empowers the people. In a democracy, the people give the right and the consent to be governed, with democracy, I am convinced that you will have a better life for one and all in Nigeria(p.5) .

Also in his reaction to the visit of the American Vice president, the U.S Ambassador to Nigeria ,Lannon Walker (1991) said:

> We have accomplished a very substantive agenda which contend on democratisation, the return to civilian rule .....The Vice-President made it very clear... as we watch Nigeria return to civilian rule in 1992, just how strongly America feels about democracy - not only in Africa but world wide- and how much we put upon the Nigerian experience.(p.5).

It was on the foregoing that the CDS Dirctor-General, told the vice President and his delegation about C.D.S's goal

> ....to achieve a Nigerian variants of the universal phenomenon - democratic life. Since inception, over 100,000 new-breed politicians from the national chairmen of the two political parties to their colleague at the national... have been exposed to CDS organised courses (p.5).

Taking together therefore suggest that it was in response to the pressure from the US that six key federal transition institutions were created. They included, National Population Commission (NPC), the code of conduct Bureau (CCB), the National Electoral Commission (NEC) , the Directorate of Social Mobilisation etc.

Writing also on the transition to Democracy in Nigeria, Dayo Adeleye (1989) observed that it was in line with the Federal Government of Nigeria pursuing the American model of democracy that the President Babangida announced a long time table beginning from the third quarter of 1997 with the establishment of MAMSER, NEC and CRC ... the President pointed out, this was to ensure an adequate learning process for new breed politicians (p.219

Thus, the transition process was increasingly influenced by the ideas of the new political leaders who depended heavily on borrowing American democratic models. More directly, the many political structures which had the function of training the new breed politicians were re-oriented to make it possible for the trainees to acquire skills in political management and to embrace the American political ideology.

Another political structure refers to the question of the mobilization of the people and their participation in the major decisions structures of the nation as well as participation in the management of political activities. Again Eme Awa(1994) maintains that to mobilize people is to increase their level of awareness or cognition and their perceptual ability as well as to render them more effective citizens who can apply their energies positively to help promote democracy. Generally speaking, mobilization involves

the deliberate socialization of the people with a view to infusing into their minds ideas which will help render them more efficiencies and active people. educate them to acquire values and attitudes...(p. 121).

In the same vein, Fred Onyeoziri (1989) argues the same way of achieving democratic goal is to engage in political re-socialization as with West Germany, Italy and Japan after the world war II. Further more he maintains that political mobilisation involves socializing the population into acquiring democratic habits respecting democratic norms, and learning to prefer democratic procedures to non-democratic ones (p.9).

By the foregoing , mobilisation is seen in this context as the commitment and support of the people within a society or nation. It tends to relate people tightly together in a form and give them new reference groups and common goals such as playing the role of the watch-dog to be sure that the various institutions established to realise objective of the transition function in such a way as to promote the political interest of the whole nation.

Linking social mobilization to American influence, Albert Michael (1991) cautions that political mobilisation is American, aimed at reflecting a grouping of people along ideas and value systems. Albert Michael further argues that:

> the seeming hegemony of democracy is little more than a facade, hiding, as it does, a titanic confrontation... neo American model, flamboyant, media-oriented and lousy with international cultural projection... of the American way of life vehicled by all audio-visuals (p.23).

Thus, in line with the American influenced transition to achieve a moral force for

popular participation, the MAMSER established by the Babangida regime enabled most individual Nigerians to realise their identity. It also enabled them appreciate and tolerate varying social attitudes and practices which occurred within the broad framework of the law and constitution patterned in American model. Similarly, it could be argued that Nigerian Nation lack a political mobilization culture hence it borrowed the American model that influenced the outcome of the transition. This point is buttressed by the fact that Nigeria witnessed during voting where the masses for the first time in the history of Nigeria abandoned ethnic cleavages and voted along the line of value system.

Another political structure that was influenced by external forces was the political party formation. The transition under study adopted American model of two party system. Writing on the adoption of the grassroots democratic two party system. Tunji Olagunju (1993) stressed that a fall out from the NEC's report and Recommendations on party Registration was therefore, the dissolution of the thirteen political associations and the decision by the AFRC to establish de novo two political parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Paty (SDP) (p.215).

Thus, the formation and adoption of two party system was influenced by the American system of two party system which emphasizes liberal democracy and Republicanism in the same vein, the establishment of legislative houses both state and Federal as well as the Executive Branch, the Judicial system and law enforcement system were all borrowed, patterned and influenced by the United States of America. The composition of the legislature was stimulated by the American mode because it was

composed of the representatives of the important segments of the Nigerian society both geographical and functional constitutions were available in each state.

By the foregoing Rotimi Suberu (1992) argues that, the institution of a mandatory two party system is intended partly to help transcend the dangers of religious, regional and ethnic divisiveness in the country and again lifting of American system of democracy to Nigeria (p.321).

It could be argued in this study that the transition programme's Federalist agenda was vitiated by the constraints arising from the country's weakly articulated political structures, structurally underdeveloped economy and culturally segmented society. The generous construction of Federal legislative competence under the 1989 constitution, the tendency for a military to subordinate to federal administration system to a Unified command structure, the arbitrary and repeated dissolution or redeployment by the centre of the leadership at state and local levels and the creation and proliferation of new and increasingly unliveable states and local areas by Military fiat, have combined to uphold the fact that the external intervention into the domestic politics was as a result of low level development of her political structures and institutions.

Similarly, religious institutions, even more than the creation of new states and local governments also emerged as another source of foreign intervention for it was emotive issue in Nigeria Federalism. The announcement early in 1986 of Nigeria's full membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) was widely regarded as the proximate cause of external context of the regime change and contemporary religious polarisation in

Nigeria. Following the violent controversy over the OIC membership, the Babangida administration established an Advisory council on Religious Affairs (ACRA), comprising equal numbers of Christian and Muslim figures, to mediate religious harmony in the country and fashion appropriate modalities for the government's future involvement in religious affairs.

The Administration was, however, subsequently compelled to undertake a fundamental re-definition of its religious obligations by a series of disturbing events. This included the inactivity of ACRA owing undoubtedly to the Christian community's opposition on secular grounds to a government sponsored body on religious affairs, the spate of vituperative Christian agitation against alleged continued Islamisation of the Federal government the apparently anti-Islamic abortive putsch of 1990 the government became manifestly more vulnerable to foreign influence.

In conclusion therefore, the several institutional innovations, and the development of an innovative three-tier Federal structure as well as the operation and pattern of all the political structures were directly or indirectly sponsored and manipulated by external forces as a result of the weak political structures, institutions and the underdeveloped economic system of Nigeria.

3.4 POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES OF THE TRANSITION AND EXTERNAL POLICY CONTINUITY OF THE REGIME

Instability could be easily exported and imported covert action, as far as we know was of a more varied type. It ranged from spreading rumours and intoxicating public opinion, to financing right-leaning. Those with a fertile fiction may add backing, organising and conceiving coups or assassinations. Interestingly, the expected outcome of those behind such attempts was to stabilise a situation perceived to be running out of hand.

This explains the real situation of events as soon as the presidential Election of June 1993 was cancelled by the Babangida regime. The development of events in Nigeria takes us to the general notion of penetrated systems and moreover, the phenomenon of interdependence which suggests a degree of penetratedness. Rosenau (1987) argued that penetration involved more than interdependence. For Rasenau, a penetrated system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilisation of support on behalf of its goals (p.435).

The above involves a certain fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue-areas, The line of reasoning here is that, the extent to which outsiders acted and reacted to the annulment of June 12 Presidential Election concerned with political divisions within the regime and the occurrence of strong political pressures threatening the Nigeria Nation. In their assessment of the situation and proposals for action, the international community took into account not only the political division but also the

strategic importance of Nigeria in the international system.

For instance, the Clinton Administration in United States of America was said to be concerned on the fear of a possible derailment of the democratic transition in the country, which could affect the democratic transitions in the rest of Africa. So the US joined forces with the domestic forces to mount pressures on Nigeria Military Government to conclude the 1993 election and respect the mandate of the people to democratise governance.

In the same vein, the US demonstrating their commitment to democratisation in Nigeria, suspended its co-operation with the Nigerian Military institution. It expelled Nigerian Military officials studying in the US and suspended the issuance of visa to military men and their families. In another related development, the American Express Bank (AEB) directed all its branches world wide not to honour letters of credit (LC) or other forms of transactions by any Nigerian bank. The measure was apparently linked to the threat by America to implement sanctions against Nigeria as demanded by Chief M.K:O:Abiola to press the military Government to conclude the June 12 Presidential election and declare him the winner. Also the 12 member European community (EC) imposed trade sanctions on Nigeria in support of Abiola's plea to them in London. The EC's action was salutarily designed to drive home the message that the democratisation process in Nigeria could not be aborted.

All these and their related actions taken by the west, penetrated into the Nigerian domestic politics and inturn aroused the Nigerian populace who reacted in form of violent

demonstration, looting and killing. The external forces tended to be more interventionist to the political crisis in Nigeria which of course the penetratedness into the domestic system resulted into rising political chaos and threat of war. Thus the action of the military Government resulted the action of international system that brought uncertainties that beclouded the transition to democracy.

However, the political uncertainties that marked the transition was variable to the external policy of the transition. The development of Federal Government Foreign policy institutions paralleled the country's growing international interests. By necessity therefore, the process was rapid. Stremlau (1977) writing on the international politics of the Nigerian civil war argued that:

> The first indications of any planning for the conduct of foreign relations under an independent Nigerian Government did not appear until 1956, when a sessional paper anticipating a future foreign ministry was prepared under British advise (p.4).

The above assertion clearly indicates that Nigerian foreign policy since inception had had external penetration, especially as the foundation was laid under British advise. Since independence, Nigeria has continuously maintained a consistently broad outline of foreign policy objectives irrespective of which regime was in power. The degree of activism in foreign policy by the various regimes was often dictated in part by external forces and availability of resources to finance foreign policy objectives and the personalities of the Head of Government .

Above all, transition to constitutional Government and its foreign policy to some extent presupposes that since the transition was beclouded with uncertainties, threat of war and chaos in the face of external forces, Nigeria's foreign policy may change. Secondly, there was also the implicit supposition that a return to participatory democracy that was penetrated by the international system during the transitions process may drastically alter Nigeria's foreign policy.

Although, the Nigerian foreign policy during the transition expected to change as a result of antagonistic postures of the West remained the same. By the foregoing, Ibrahim Gambari (1990) argued that:

> the cardinal principles of Nigeria's foreign policy were articulated by Prime Minister Balewa during Nigeria's admission into U.N In retrospect, the policy had hardly changed through the Ironsi, Gowon, Mohammed, Obasanjo, Shagari, Buhari and even Babangida(p.6).

By this postulation, it could be argued that what has happened has been varying emphasis on different areas depending on the perceptions of policy articulators and the resources available. Yet the recent dynamism especially during the transition of global politics itself such as geo-political considerations, allies and democracy have invariably affected the emphasis and scope of Nigeria's foreign policy, but definitely not the cardinal objectives. Notwithstanding the benefit of hindsight and empirical evidence and the changing global politics.

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course new emphasis on certain areas especially when the international environment become critical of the transition fatigue. Key policy areas such as ECOWAS, Africa, Non-Aligned movement and other world key issues were sustained.

Goe Garba (1987) maintained also that the challenge of Nigeria's foreign policy took somewhat different in 1987 than they did at the end of 1983 (p.6) we therefore conclude by noting that evidence available over the eight years of Babalangida's transition and its conduct of independent foreign policy was not in the least indicative that there was radical changes or shifts in policy rather, no doubt emphasis shifted at different times to create rooms for divergent opinion seemed at realising the objective of the transition.

However, the Nigerian foreign policy during the Babangida's transition remained the same with Africa being its central focus. Though the transition altered this stance due to the pressures from the international system.

3.5 THE INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Following the Military service chief's decision to ask General Babangida to step aside, the second stage of the transfer of power took place in the early hours of 27th August 1993. The Transition Council Chairman,(TCC) Chief Earnest Shonekan has been appointed by general Babangida and was named the Head of the Interim National Government. With the Swearing-in of chief Earnest Shonekan as Head of the Interim

National Government; The Interim National Government was born, replacing the F.M.G.

President Babangida's 26th June 1993 broadcast to the Nation, in which he explained the reasons for the annulment of the June 12 Presidential Election also announced that August 27th Hand - over deadline still remained operative and that a fresh election would be held before. The main problem ultimately faced by Shonekan was thus the need to adjust the Nigerian political system to changing realities for the junta had been an anachronism.

By 1993, the Babangida's attempt to turn the clock back had significantly fortified threat perceptions particularly amongst the international community. It was in order to pacify the now external outburst that the pledge of handing-over to civilian government on 27th August 1993 that the ING was established. In order to keep that pledge while not leaving behind a power vacuum, the regime of Babangida decreed the establishment of the I.N.G with responsibility for completing the transition to full democracy.

It is significant to note that neither the United States nor Great Britain saw it fit to sour diplomatic relations with Nigerias I.N.G. In the same vein chief Shonekan was well received at the commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) held in Cyprus. Mukhtari Usman (1993) observed that:

> the Head of ING dialogued with British Prime Minister John Major as well as London club of creditors for rescheduling of Nigeria's debts, therefore, the common wealth of Nations reception of Shonekan was an indication of ING's international acceptability and satisfaction of Nigeria's ING (P.1).

Thus, by continuing their diplomatic recognition, the common-wealth of Nations necessarily acknowledge that the Interim National Government was a legitimate power in Nigeria. Similarly, quoting the statement of Nigeria's secretary of Foreign Affairs, Chief Matthew Mbu in Limassol Cyprus, Mukhtari Usman (1993) stressed that the ING delegation seized the opportunity of the meeting to brief international leaders at CHOGM of the efforts of the ING. According to Mbu, Matthew (1993).

> "we had many chances to explain the situation in Nigeria and the progress made by the ING since August 1993 by bringing about political stability and an assurance that Nigeria was not going to split p.2)".

By the foregoing therefore, it could be argued that the international acceptability of the Shonekan ING was to create a conducive environment at the international system to assist Nigeria achieve liberal democracy. The European and American attitude towards the ING carried particular weight, because of the exaggerated prestige as defender of democratic institutions which they have acquired in dictatorship Nigeria.

From the first day, America and the European countries support provided external legitimisation of the ING, indicating that Shonekan's civilian cabinet was regarded in a very different light from its military predecessor. Official visits during the tenure by the Head of the ING outside Nigeria emphasised the acceptance of the government.

However, strongly placed in domestic politics with major opposition groups in sight, the ING had no time on its side. Its domestic and external policy horizons could not be stretched well into the future. This meant that it was never better placed to play the game of nerves with Western allies over the receding winning post during the EC and

America and their sanctions. The international acceptability of the ING of Earnest Shonekan notwithstanding, on 17th November, 1993, the Nation and the international community were startled by the announcement of the resignation of chief Earnest Shonekon as Head of state after 82 days in office and of the appointment of General Sani Abacha to succeed him.

3.6 THE SOURCES OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON THE TRANSITION

With the growing appreciation of vulnerability to international pressure came indications of domestic disaffection with Babangida's regime. As soon as the June 12 Presidential election was annulled, major and rapid changes were made in the structure and content of Nigeria's propaganda operations in order to overcome past criticism and win greater favour at home and abroad. The opinion within governmental policy circles was becoming increasingly polarized as to the appropriateness of the transition policies adopted for crisis management. External actors played an indirect role both in initiating and implementation of the transition programme of Babangida.

In fact, the Babanigada's transition indicated that significant shift of international orientation accompanied the regime change from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. The international system acted as a powerful catalyst both of regime change and of national redefinition in contemporary Nigeria. It has achieved this influence not through military occupations, but by offering an elaborate structure of economic and social incentives. Thus although the key actors involved in that regime change may have been overwhelmingly

internal, their strategies and calculations were strongly shaped by the pressure of externally designed rules and structures.

In analyzing the sources of external influence on the transition from the economic perspective it is revealed that, Nigeria was obliged to initiate a rigorous structural adjustment programme supervised by international agencies. During the IMF debate, representatives of the IMF and the IBRD were invited to monitor the debate about the economic crisis and the way forward. A major contradiction arose between the stringent policies advocated by these agencies and the populist measures advocated by representatives of mass organisations. The debate revealed that the state in Nigeria was virtually bankrupt as to successfully implement a transition programme.

However, the democratisation process had enabled democratic and Republican movements to come to the forefront. The contradictions between the policy imperatives of international agencies for retrenchment and cuts in public spending and the successful implementation of the transition programme be reconciled with popular welfarism demands. The compatibility of the structural adjustment with the process of democratisation became a source of international influence to the transition. The political conditionalities for democratisation and harsh economic policies canvassed for Nigeria played vital roles in shaping the transition.

Politically too, the western governments played a more active role in the transition . Gestures and pronouncements by the United states and Europe after the annulment of June 12 election demonstrated outright support especially in form of sanctions against the

military government to embrace full democracy. It is in this light that Ifeanyi Alia (1993) stated that the international community were reacting to impose sanctions on Nigeria. As a popular tool, sanctions have been applied to bring any recalcitrant member state of the international community back on tract.(p.16)

The outcome of the 1993 presidential election in Nigeria was decisive as it had a number of serious consequences for both attitudes and policies of US and Europe towards Nigeria. The United States was the dominant superpower which enabled them to intervene into Nigeria domestic politics. Other NATO and EC members also took an active interest. As a developing nation, Nigeria became increasingly subject to different, and more intense types of pressures from the international economy.

Nigeria's diplomatic relations were affected by the transition processes. The implementation of the transition led to some less of coherence in alliance foreign policy of Nigeria. The main concern of Nigeria's diplomacy in Africa during the crisis that engulfed the transition was thus to isolate US and EC and make certain that their initiatives did not shatter the regional consensus or directly subvert the fragile Federal Military coalition in Abuja. The Federal Ministry of External Affairs perception of the OAU Summit in Abuja. The basic position of the ministry of external Affairs acknowledged that it would be many years before Nigeria possessed the economic strength to provide an alternative to dependence on the West and that, in the meantime, if Nigeria appeared too ambitious this would prove counterproductive the sanctions notwithstanding.

Perhaps the most critical factor in evaluating Nigeria's diplomatic relations as a source of foreign influence will be the Freedom guaranteed by the constitution and the rights arrogated to those who must discharge those duties. In the military regime of Babangida, the foreign policy formulation and extension fail squarely within the domain of the Executive Branch. Thus the Nigerian transition programme under Babangida typically reflected an increased level of political mobilization and conflict. Pressure from outside and inside were coupled with uncertainties.

The mobilization became so pronounced after the annulment of June 12 election. The opposition group and Human rights activities quickly mobilized around several central issues of the sanctity and irrevocability of the June 12 election. Predicating their stand on the momentous significance of the mandate as a watershed in the history of elections in Nigeria. Increasingly, the human rights clock worn by the regime at its inception became ill-fitting as many people were arrested and detained.

Increasingly under the military government of Babangida, police officers were implicated in arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, and extra-judicial killings. The abuse of human rights orchestrated by widespread demonstrations as a result of the June 12 election. The annulment attracted international pressure on the regime. The emergence and autonomy of multiple interest groups and associations contributed to the interest of international community on the events in Nigeria and of course the consequent ousting of Babangida's regime and its inclusive transition programme.

Thus we saw in operation the kind of interaction between outer-directed and inner-directed concerns typical of "Linkage Politics" behaviour. Looking at a specific and relatively brief period of Babangida's transition. It allowed us to observe fairly closely how the linkage worked out in the different phases of that process. What emerged was that the balance between the concerns of domestic actors and those of external ones were sometimes uneasy and were not always onesided.

As the Babangida's transition indicated, there then developed a convergence of interests between the internal and the principal outside powers concerned, namely the US and EC.

In summary, we have in this chapter traced the vulnerability of Nigeria's internal politics to external forces. We maintained that, this development was as a result of many variables which included the Nigeria's interdependent nature and low level development of her democratic institutions. We also noted the political uncertainties that beclouded the transition. We also argued, that despite the transition crisis, Nigeria's foreign policy objectives were never shifted drastically rather some changes in the emphasis. We in the same vein concluded that such variables as political, diplomatic and economic accounted as the sources of foreign influence on the transition.

Similarly, we analysed the existence of ING and its external relations to uncover its international acceptability. That the annulment of June 12 Presidential election and its attendant civil strive that visited it brought into focus the further internationalisation of Nigeria's domestic transition programme.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 MANIFESTATION OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON THE TRANSITION

4.1 INTROUCTION

We have in the previous chapter examined the issue of Nigeria's transition to democracy and the internationalisation of the processes. This was done in order to situate the linkage that existed between the transition to democracy and the international system in its historical context. We therefore intend in this chapter to widen our analysis by examining in its empirical form the interest of international forces and the roles they played in the processes of the transition that had negative or positive implications on the transition. We shall therefore examine the following issues in relation to the Nigerian transition to democracy . International Organisations, and what international pressures were most conducive to the democratic transition.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

International Organisations have over the years become important international actors. The concept of international organisation developed many centuries ago and emerged from deepening political, economic and social crisis and conditions of different epochs. There are two categories of international organisations, viz. the traditional and the modern ones. The two categories have a common origin. An international organisation operates in a situation in which there are contacts among states. They occur or are born

where there is recognition of certain problems that are common to all the states that they need to come together to organise and solve those problems.

International organisations are divided in two major types - the intergovernmental organisations (IGO) and the non-governmental organisations (NGO's). The two types are usually concerned with four broad objectives, namely, Promotion of contacts among the various groups within the international system, Reduction and control of conflicts among them, Encouragement of collaboration and co-operative activities for social and economic benefits and co-operation to protect members against external threats. International Organisations today do not only concern themselves with world peace and security, but are also beginning to seriously address universal problems such as economic development, science, culture, the mass media, hunger, disease, disasters, disarmament, self and group determination from colonial bondage, racism and apartheid, information and most recently democracy.

Nigeria's commitment to the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Commonwealths of Nations and other international organisations such as non-aligned movement has been demonstrated through the years. Because Nigeria is convinced that the usefulness of international organisations could be better enhanced by a determined restructuring of the institutions and procedures of such organisations. Nigeria has therefore become actively involved in the various committees that have been set-up, either at the United Nations, or at the now expanded co-ordinating committee of the non-aligned movement. This commitment to the principles of international organisations has

over the years made Nigeria's domestic politics vulnerable to international influence.

Bolaji Akinyemi (1991) writing on the relevance of international organisations in both domestic and external affairs of world politics maintained that:

> the treatment of a country's policies is no longer a matter of domestic concern alone and ..., the United Nations can be an effective forum for decision-making on matters of national and international concern.(p.22).

The UN System is the most universal in scope among all other international organisations, and is open to all Sovereign states which agree to its charter and Universal declaration on human and peoples rights. The UN has become permanent feature since inception of the contemporary international system, providing various fora for mutual intercourse between international actors and thus influencing state actions.

The internationalisation of Nigeria's domestic politics occurred since Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa set the basis and criteria for Nigeria's international relations on October, 7th, 1960 during Nigeria's admission into the United Nations. The country's basic foreign policy goals have not really been abandoned by any succeeding regime. Similarly, it is evident that every Nigerian administration since independence while not abandoning its bilateral obligations has remained committed to the principles of multi-literalism and especially those principles enshrined in the character both of the OAU and U.N.O.

By the foregoing, the impact of the UN and other international organisations on the Nigerian transitional process can be understood in terms of her political culture and the extent to which it has traditionally been subject to the principles of international organisations and of course external influence since independence. Thus, the pressures

from the international organisations on Nigeria's transition could better be understood from the statements, actions and pronouncements of officials of such international organisations.

It is on this light, that the former secretary General of UN Boutro Boutros-Ghali (1996) while addressing the world Economic forum in Davos, Switzerland maintained that:

> the global mission of democratisation can be accomplished only by acting at all the levels at which power is wielded in international society, the UN must act to promote democracy not only within states and among states, but also within the global society in which we shall be living.(149).

By the above secretary general's pronouncement therefore, it becomes evidently clear that over the years and more recently too, the UN has been waging pragmatically and empirically a diplomatic effort on behalf of democracy within states. This point is further buttressed by the fact that the UN general assembly gave more credibility to democratic governments than authoritarian regimes.

Boutros-Ghali (1996) also in his address highlighted the dual role of UN when he stated that, this diplomacy is most immediately apparent in the mandates entrusted to the "Blue Helmets" most peace-king operations now envisaged both the restoration of democracy and the protection of human rights.(150).

This new trend in the UN is visible in most of the major operations conducted by the organisation since the end of the cold war, especially in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, El-Salvador and of course the Cambodia. The task of promoting democracy has not only been entrusted to the peace-keeping sphere, by assigning to such operations responsibility for national reconciliation but also consolidation of democracy.

It could then be argued that the use of peace-keeping force at work today is the imperative of democracy. Since the UN is the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations, it become a challenge to Nigeria to democratise as other member states of UN were doing. This became necessary as a result of the role the United Nation can play in an international society that was becoming increasingly globalised.

With this recent development within the UN at encouraging democracy, the organisation provided electoral assistance to Nigeria on request. The organisation equally adopted various approaches at influencing the Nigeria's transition process. It is along this line that Boutros Ghali again appealed to the international community and especially the member states of U N that.

> the United Nations still has a long way to go in promoting democracy within states. It must be to provide states with the technical assistance they need in order to adopt their institutions, educate their citizens, train future leaders and draft legislation that respect human rights.(p.152).

The United Nations renewed vigour in championing the course of democracy especially in Nigeria was aimed at realising the goal of ethical values, as much as economic realities that underline, legitimise, structure and govern the Nigerian society. This new trend could as well establish a linkage between democracy with development. Paradoxically, democracy is becoming a means of helping the Weakest states gain stability and become stronger. It is against this background the Federal Government of Nigeria , during the transition under review secured a soft loan of $78.5 million for its population and family life education programme from the United Nations fund for Population

Activities (UNFPA).

Other international agencies like the UNESCO also supported the governments population programmes in line with its new policy to support and encourage the military government to carry out its transition programme successfully. Reporting on the kind gesture of the organs of UN towards promoting democracy in Nigeria Ngozi Ikeano (1992) maintains that the gesture was in line with the new policy of United Nations to support the regimes engaged in transition programme in order to accelerate their (GNP) Gross National Product(p.1).

In another related development, the IMF and Paris club suspended debt relief to Nigeria until the country stabilizes its polity and democracy. Bisi Ojediran (1993) reveals that Nigeria's chances of securing a loan facility of over $1.6 billion from the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and subsequent debt relief from her $27 billion external debt burden was ruined by inconsistent and epileptic transition policy implementation (p.1).

Thus, this insistence was as a result of inconsistency in the implementation of the transition programme. It was reported that Nigeria reeled under unending transition programme which was suspect to the international community. The action was therefore aimed at mounting pressure on the government to conclude its transition process and hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government.

Similarly, Kate Ogbemudia (1995) observed that World Bank loans to Nigeria dwindled towards the end of the transition programme, and attributed this to identified loopholes in the implementation of the transition programme.

In the same vein, Olusegun Obasanjo (1990) argues that:

> democracy is man's expansion of freedom and it is synonymous with his progress, stressing that, if democracy does not necessarily lead to rapid economic growth, it is necessary to point out that economic performance does not obey military command either (p.6).

From the stand point of General Obasanjo and of course the supports of new world democracy by the United Nations as well as pressures from the international financial institutions in the field of democratisation especially their outlines of what could be a new social and democratic order, Nigeria's domestic transition programme was internationalised. This falls within the framework of the global society to strengthen and enhance development through democracy. It is argued here that, the policy of democratisation the United Nations and other international organisations are pursuing along with there financial commitment to transition programme in Nigeria is in principle with the deliberate actions aimed at promoting and influencing liberal democracy in Nigeria.

This was apparent for the sake of development and acceptability within the international system. It is pertinent to observe in this study, that it is not clear what other forms of pressure or influence the other international organisations such as O.A.U, ECOWAS, Commonwealth of Nations etc. exerted on the Babangida's transition programme. This could be largely due to non-commitment and loose membership of these international organisations.

In conclusion, Nigeria's transition programme clearly demonstrated an external penetration of international organisations into its domestic political process. This was made

possible by Nigeria's membership of international organisations and her believe in multi-literalism. The poor state of her economy to sustain the transition programme and the uncoordinated manner by which the transition was carried out. The change of perspective which faced UN with new imperative of incorporating the democratic idea into the globalization of international life by engendering new forms of solidarity. All provoked the international dimension.

4.3 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF NEW DEMOCRACY AND NIGERIAS TRANSITION TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Changes in the international system and time could be argued to have accounted and informed majorly for the manifestation of international factor on Nigeria's Transition to democracy during General Babangida's regime. There is no doubt, that the character, nature and texture of democratic politics in Nigeria at the time were largely based on the function of how domestic actors of change adopted, adapted and deftly utilised the positive contributions of the international environment for the ultimate objective of erecting a democratic society within the Nigerian Nation. Expressed differently, the external world supplied some of the means, yet key domestic actors determined the end or the use to which the means were supplied.

The new international order is only so politically. In economic and financial terms, the order still dates to the end of the second world war. In a new international division of origins of the good, the bad and the ugly, reminiscent of the old international division of

labour the impetus for the democratisation drive in Nigeria could only have come from the west and thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev and Eastern Europe.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union preceded by the universal triumph of Gorbachev's twin reform process of Glassnost and Perestroika heralded the end of the cold war which had been on its icy course since the end of the second world war. Apart from this, the unprecedented global recession also took its toll on the aid budget of the Nigerian Military government. Above all, the disintegration of communism put paid to the west's dreaded nightmare of proletarian internationalism. So with aid drying up, the collapse of Berlin wall, the hurricane of greater freedom and self-determination engulfed the dictator regime in Nigeria .What is more? it is no longer defensible for a western world that was celebrating the demise of communist orthodoxy to prop up despot in Nigeria, so there emerged a propelling need for democratisation.

The international climate and pro-democracy movements in Nigeria facilitated the establishment of transition programme in Nigeria, by the Babangida regime. The end of the cold war brought about a change in the geopolitical alliances in Africa. Consequently, military, technical, materials, personnel and logistic support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was withdrawn from most African countries. It is on this light, that Sabo Bako (1994) commenting on the theme, Foreign Power and Democracy in Africa maintains that the prospects for democracy in Africa have greatly increased due to the foreign pressures brought to bear on dictatorial governments in Africa.

Bako further observed three important interrelated reasons that accounted for this, they include, intensified popular struggle for democracy in Africa which has drawn international attention, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies as well as the reduction and withdrawal of economic and military assistance by the US and its allies to right-wing dictatorial government (Sabo Bako 1994:5.)

In the same vein, Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis (1993) using a case study of the mid 1970s transition from dictatorship to parliamentarism in Greece attempted to illustrate the hypothesis that an assessment of developments within a state can be significantly enhanced by taking account of the effects of that state's relationship to the international system. This relationship according to them will not be perceived solely in terms of the one-way external input into the domestic arena sometimes implied in analysis focusing on foreign intervention, instead they argued that it will be treated as a complex two-way process, which domestic actors react and often in turn react upon their international environment.(p.103).

It therefore follows that, the transition from one regime to another offers a particularly promising field for the examination of such causal relationships. A regime change in Nigeria was a critical moment in the history of the political system which threw into dramatic relief of the complex rage of factors behind the political development in the nation since the inception of the transition programme. The transition programme initiated in Nigeria in 1985 highlighted the importance of both internal and external variables and the need to decompartmentalise the variables, so that they are assessed not only as separate

categories but also as mutually reinforcing influences and pressures.

This interplay of variables was strikingly illustrated when domestic developments within Nigeria in 1993 , when the transition which was slated to terminate in order to usher in a new democratic government was annulled after the Presidential election by the military government of Babangida. The annulment which had its root on the domestic political system of Nigeria had a significant ripple effect on Nigeria, interacting with the international system and domestic opposition movements . The processes led to series of ruptures with the existing regime of Babangida.

Similarly, the orchestrated collapse of the Soviet Union and its European allies left United States as the only super-power of the world and as such, the world is therefore living the life of the west. The logic is that the demise of communism signifies the triumph of capitalism, and who ever says capitalism says democracy, The foregoing signifies that the beginning of the long script of democracy in Nigeria had western origin and flavours.

It is so to be admitted that Theodore Van Lave (1987) argues that

> Global civilisation is western, because the science, technology, global trade and democracy it advances is originally western and is promulgated most dynamically by western nations and as such the world is living the life of western democracy.(Theodore Van Lave 1987:4).

It there follows that, the west led by America was using diplomatic and economic measures to promote democracy in Nigeria. In line with the American hegemonic super-power, and her concerted effort towards promoting democracy in Nigeria and as well, influencing the process and outcome of the transition programme. America's Ambassador

to Nigeria at the time, Lannon Walker (1991) concludes that America has accomplished a very serious substantive agenda, which centred on democratisation, the return to civilian rule and economic reforms in Nigeria. He expressed his country's desire for democracy in Nigeria, when the envoy said, as we watch Nigeria return to civilian rule in 1992, the vice President of US made it very clear, just how strong America feels about democracy not only in Africa but world wide and how much store we put upon the Nigerian experience.

Arguing on the reasons of US activities towards restoration of democracy in Nigeria and the entire globe, Godfrey Ikhemuenhe (1993) maintains that the Americans pride themselves as the custodian of democracy in the world, they are therefore ready to put their foot down at the risk of losing their self-respect on matters that determine democratic principles. Showing their concern about the outcome of transition programme in Nigeria is understood from the fact that, the outcome is capable of affecting the democratic transitions in the rest of Africa.

This argument is strongly buttressed by the fact that Nigeria is the most populous black Africa with rich human and material resources, Nigeria, it is believed offers both strategic and economic space to America, this means that Nigeria could be expanded both as a market and source of raw materials if the American ideology is planted in Nigeria's democratic system. It could also be argued that the US is presently the acclaimed global cop of democracy and as such should demonstrate that it remains non-plused to democracy and can not be fooled by mere pretence. This argument is significant when considering the

Babangida's official pronouncement and his appreciation of democratic principles. The Nigerian Military Government of President Babangida has promised the world of nurturing and midwifing true democratic programme through the transition taking place in Nigeria and as such the U.S government wanted the Nigerian military Government to show and convince the world that she is really committed to the quick restoration of democracy which she has promised, by action and not by words and political rhetoric.

In his reaction to the assertion of the Vice President of America, Dan Quayle who was on diplomatic visit to Nigeria to mount pressure on Babangida to democratise governance in Nigeria, President Ibrahim Babangida (1991) stated that

> we are all living witnesses to the recent events in the world which bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the forces of democracy can not be chained for too long and certainly not forever.

Similarly, while welcoming the American Vice President, Dan Quayle, Omo Omoruyi (1991) the C.D.S Director-General reiterated Nigeria's commitment to the transition programme and the principles of democracy, when he said, his centre was established to promote democracy in Nigeria to achieve a variant of the universal phenomenon - democratic life.

At any point of time, the US Executive has many issues to care of, both on the domestic and on the international fronts, duly for the demise of Soviet Union. The main priority of the United State during the transition to democracy in Nigeria seems to have been to prevent a shift of the transition programme. There were also a series of goals which were of equal importance to the U.S like opposing anti-Americanism promoting a

liberal economy or a favourable environment for foreign investment . By and large, the reasons for the international reactions to the transition in Nigeria stems from the developments in the international system. The domination of American political culture and economy over the rest of the world. Moral encouragement for the new leaders initiated by the US Vice President and his public display of support for the new democracy, the economic support e.g. organising a jumbo of loan through IMF and the huge amount she expended on the transition programme as well as the extent the Nigerian military Government of President Babangida convinced the entire world about his governments commitment to the transition programme . All these gave rise to the international penetration of the transition.

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Similarly, Bolaji Akinyemi (1991) argues that the new international order must prescribe free and open electoral systems for all countries. It must reinforce the express prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of all countries.(p.21)

Also speaking during the opening of second conference of Attorneys General of the Federation of Nigeria held in Abuja, the Vice President of U.S Dan Quayle (1991) said the democratic revolution is spreading all around the globe and without question, Nigeria is part of this global revolution.(p.12).

Observing the constraints to the new international order. Bolaji Akinyemi (1991) declares that there is a plethora of weapons available to the international community which can be activated against governments with odious policies that violate international norms. He further recommended three basic weapons. Firstly the United Nations-sanctioned

economic embargo, the United Nations. Suspension of the right to participate in United Nations activities and the United Nations-Sanctioned arms embargo. The new international order must avoid the present practice where revolution against dictatorial regimes must not interfere with profits to be made from trading with such regimes(p.22).

By the foregoing, it is evident that the new international system of new democracy greatly influenced the dictatorial regime of Babangida to tow the line of democracy. The new international system of democracy demands an effective monitoring and punitive system by the international community on the issue of democracy. It is against this background that Nigeria witnessed international isolation during the epileptic period of the transition.

In conclusion, the interest and influence of the new international system had a far reaching effect on the transition and its out come. This was necessitated by the Soviet Perestroika which led to the abdication of global responsibility by the Soviet Union in both those areas where the responsibility was enforced, such as in the former Eastern Europe, and those areas where the responsibility arose from ideological considerations rather than military occupation. Examples of the letter are Angola, Ethiopia and several political parties and movements which relied on the Soviet Union for military economic and diplomatic sustenance.

Secondly, it has led to democratisation of Eastern Europe, parts of Africa and Latin America and to mounting pressure for democratisation in those parts of Africa under military such like Nigeria. Given the new prospects for international life, Nigeria can not

be in isolation, therefore, it became important not only to promote the democratic idea, but Nigeria has also to think globally which is a compelling obligation to reflect on a new approach to collective living.

The flood of loans to Nigeria occasioned by the new international system was an extension of the orchestrated Western plan to encourage democracy in Nigeria which will usher in peace and human rights which the new system seeks to achieve.

4.4 THE BLURRED BOUNDARY BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

When democratisation comes about in the course of invasion or decolonisation as in the case of Sierra Leone and South Africa respectfully, the separation between the domestic and external factors at work should be fairly clear-cut. But if the operative process is the incorporation of an incipient democracy within a larger and securer democratic polity, the boundary between the two categories will by definition be dissolved. And in the case of Babangida's regime change, the distinction between internal and external causes were blurred.

Writing on a related theme, "Democracy by convergence and Southern Europe, Laurence Whitehead (1993) argues that during the transition phase it may be reasonable to concentrate on the parts played by various political actors, the most important of whom will typically be domestic. During the consolidation phase more long-term structural

constraints become more determinant. these will often embody some combination of domestic and international elements... where on authoritarian regime reaches the point of termination, some form of disintegration of the authoritarian coalition is almost certainly involved, together with some strengthening and realigning of the forces of democratic opposition. Internal processes likely to trigger a disintegration of the authoritarian coalition typically include: succession crisis, defection of sections of the business community and/or the professional classes. and institutional shifts within the Armed forces involving a "return to barracks" in order to protect institutional integrity.(pp. 52-53).

Clearly these are all very general alternatives, and each specific situation presents some complex combination of the various features. Although these alternatives appear at first to represent overwhelmingly domestic routes to democratisation, closer examination of the Nigeria's experience indicates that there was a significant international input, and that the internal/external boundary can be highly permeable. This can be illustrated by a brief consideration of the international factors affecting the transition.

Nigeria's authoritarian regime of General Babangida sought to prolong the existence of his regime by bolstering its cohesion and by wrong footing his challengers. The international posture of the regime played an important part in this process. During the period of international isolation of Nigeria, the posture of the regime was to turn away from the hostile, outside world and the government sought cohesion through invocations of nationalism. "The West can not love Nigerian more than Nigeria's. In that condition, Nigeria sought the security of a protective international alliance which served to shelter the

authoritarian regime of Babangida from both internal and external disintegration.

The alliance with China and the Eastern bloc-stressed strategic consideration such as the offer of military weapons and training as well as common ideological front and economic ties or incentives. Thus Babangida relied on the Chinese alliance and secured a bilateral treaty with France that helped stabilise the Interim national Government. The democratic opposition was another apparently domestic category that was closely linked to international polities. The two opposition parties (SDP and NRC) undertook realignments or negotiated pacts, there was a substantial international infrastructure of support. There was a wide range of international support ranging from good offices abroad, to funding and even direction of local opinions .

Among other things, many key opposition politicians operated from exile as Abiola toured and worked from London and Washington to canvases international support for democracy, The period of transition was a time of great political uncertainty in Nigeria. It was caused by the fact that the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) had no clear plan, beyond vague references to democracy. The type of regime they wanted to install in place of authoritarianism. Hence the AFRC split into factions (reformers, radicals, populists and moderates) which vied with one another and with civilian political elites for the opportunity to impose the type of regime they favoured on Nigeria.

The struggle among these elite factions military and civilian resulted in a shift of power from one to another at the state levels and as such the country enjoyed a period of temporary ascendancy and control even though the centre remained the same. The

adaptation of the open ballot system in preference to the secret ballot system which had hitherto been the practice in the past Nigerian elections by the Babangida regime was another area of marked interest to the international community. This system tagged "Option A 4" a locally derived electoral system was of a significant interest to the external world who watched with keen interests to its workability in Nigeria. Again it is, for instance, argued that it was capable of exposing voters to possible attacks by the opposition which could result to break down of law and order and vulnerable to foreign intervention.

The adoption of diarchy as a form of governmental administration which was to finalise the military withdrawal from Nigerian polities was another phase of the transition that provoked external interest to the transition. The leading proponent of the thesis in Nigeria was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe(1984) . According to him, the government at any time will be constituted by a combination of both the military and the civilians (p.99

The logic of Azikiwe's thesis was that there must be at least one military, either nominated or elected in government such that the military will always be represented in government. Such a governmental arrangement was in conflict with American model of liberal democracy. This political arrangement was suspect to the international community hence they were quick to react to the annulment of the 1993 Presidential election.

Having observed all these, it is important to examine some aspects of the transition process that had negative implications for a democratic stable republic and therefore subject to international influence. The way and manner the government executed its programme pointed to this. Right from the beginning of the transition programme, there

seemed to be elements of What Fred Onyeoziri (1992) referred to as "a guided democracy". According to Onyeoziri, this had the implication of restricting popular participation in the whole process of the transition.(p.9)

A few examples will illustrate our point here, for instance, the people viewed that, the Political Bureau collated views as part of preparation to ensure an orderly return to civil rule were never made available to the people until the government formed its opinion on the views. This was to be a secret government paper until otherwise decided. An unauthorised publication of excerpts from the report led to the prescription of the Newswatch magazine of Lagos on 6th April 1987. This government action did not go down well with the Western governments who see freedom of the press as synonymous with democracy.

Moreover, the mode of constituting the membership of the constituent Assembly that considered and ratified the 1989 constitution was not democratic. Some members were handpicked by the government itself while some were elected through electoral colleges. The elections that brought some of the chairmen and councillors that constituted the electoral colleges to offices were allegedly not fair and free. This selection of some members of the constituent Assembly was undemocratic and was seen by the international community as a ploy by the government to design a constitution that was to perpetuate the military junta in power.

Despite the election anomalies, there was party primaries and local and state government elections. Senators and state governors were sworn-in and there existed a

period of ascendancy and control. Immediately after the elections, the civilian elite were partially in control. This faction was led by chief Earnest Shonekan who had been selected by the AFRC to head the transition council composed of prominent high ranking officers not involved in the electioneering. Those who had in one way or another distanced themselves from any of the political parties. Chief Shonkan was the natural choice not only to head the Transition council but to be named Nigeria's Interim President after the annulment of the election because he was a highly respected senior officer of the Transition council.

Despite having appointed a provisional government of fairly broad coloration, Shonekan was never able to consolidate his power and gain control of the situation. At the earlier stage, his authority was disobeyed by individual members of the government especially state governments from the Southwest. At the same time a huge wave of strikes washed over Nigeria. Shonekon then resigned and his Minister of Defence, General Sani Abacha was appointed to the Vacant Head of State and commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This was another extension of a military rule.

Furthermore, before then, the administration proceeded to institute three new structures. First, the council of Ministers was dissolved and in its place, a transitional council was established. Secondly, the Armed Forces Ruling Council was dissolved and in its place, a National Defence and Security Council was established. And thirdly, the National Assembly which had been elected since July, 1992, was inaugurated and endowed with authority to participate in the power process of the administration. These

developments represented not only profound intervention but also introduction of new elements into the transition programme. The establishment of a Transitional Council with its leader as Head of Government introduced into the transition process, through the back door, a form of parliamentary Prime Ministerial system unanticipated by the Framework of the transition.

With the election for parliament and the installation immediately thereafter of Nigeria's elected Parliamentarians and state Governors as well as Local Government chairmen the phase of processing toward democracy was truly on course. Throughout the consolidation phase of the Parliamentarians when the role of the military as the guardian of the transition was expunged from the constitution, the domestic civilian Political elite continued to exploit their links and contacts in the international environment in order to solidify Nigeria's nascent democracy as well as to enhance their electoral prospects within the system. The most important strategy pursued by domestic political elite designed to consolidate democracy in Nigeria was the efforts by the pro democracy parties and elected parliamentarians to get the country admitted to the world democratic nations.

In conclusion, while there was no doubt that the relationship between the international and domestic environments during the transition to democracy was invariably an interactive one (outer-directed elite responding to inner-directed pressures and vice-versa). It can be concluded from the Nigerian case that the international context was the more important of the two factors. The international context provided the overall confining conditions with which all Nigerian domestic actors had to deal.

4.5 INTERNATIONAL CONDUCIVE PRESSURES ON THE TRANSITION

If it is accepted that international pressures can help create democratic conditions, then some thought needs to be given to the best kinds of pressures. Although some have argued that the international system is often to blame for authoritarianism in the first place. Writing on the theme "Foreign Power and Democracy in Africa, Sabo Bako(1993 argues that

> That super-powers contributed significantly to the flowering of authoritarianism in Africa. The United States and its allies - Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal-subverted democracy by opposing and distabilizing popular democratic governments through economic blockage, political blackmails, assassinations, fomenting internal discontent, civil wars and military coups etc(p.20).

The case of Congo in the 1960s as well as Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s were cases that may have informed Bako's point. It is such interference that partly contributed in turning popular left wing regimes into left-wing dictatorships and anti-democratic regimes. Most importantly, however, is the political, economic, military and material assistance the super powers and their allies offered to highly repressive regimes in Zaire, Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Somali etc by the United States and its allies and Uganda Under Idi Amin, Somali under Siyaad Barre, Ethiopia under Mengistu Mariam, Sudan under Nimeri by Soviet Union China and their allies. This interference in the internal affairs of African countries and the assistance offered to authoritarian governments without doubt, contributed to the subversion of democracy in

Africa.

External factors are, to some extent very important and conducive, but they are useful and productive only in so far as domestic actors, agents and the agencies of change do not expect the proverbial "manna from heaven". To this point, Samuel Huntington (1991) stated that:

> The world-wide democratic revolution may create an external environment conducive to democratisation, but it can not produce the conditions necessary for democratisation with a particular country(p.16).

The above assertion therefore suggests that states should not be persuaded to imitate others to borrow extraneous democratisation simple to please certain western states. On the contrary, it should be assimilated by a given culture depending on the characteristics and circumstances of people.

It is also clear that the system outside can equally work to enhance democracy. Specific payments, encouragement and even threats from outside can make a significant difference. The case of Nigeria showed that mild intervention can fail. To buttress this point Callistus Oke (1993) reveals that the world's interest in the democratic march of Africa's largest country Nigeria manifests in the flood of loans for the administration of Babangida. And because of his public declaration to democratise governance, President Babangida was said to have been pampered by the West. The visit of Dan Quayle, the immediate past American Vice President to Nigeria in 1991 is seen as an extension of the orchestrated Western plan to encourage the administration along the democratic path. When Dan Quayle was to leave he gave a symbolic $200,000 to Nigeria in aid of

democracy. The U.S. total investment in Nigerian democracy to date is put at $40 million (p.22).

In another related development, certainly, democratic forces can be usefully supported and unwanted outside pressures deterred or neutralised. But the judicious use of such weapons depends on the good sense of the outside forces. Again Godfrey Ikhemuemhe (1993) maintains that the grave implications of the diplomatic impasse between Nigeria and two super powers, America and Britain is that Nigeria may lose much of the economic support it has enjoyed from their magnanimity. The enormous influence they have in the international capital market places them in a vantage position to frustrate the debt relief and rescheduling efforts of the Nigerian government(p.36)

It seems that the most successful states amenable to external pressure are precisely those most tied into the international economy and providing fertile ground for international investment as in our Nigerian case. In the same vein, Tajudeen Adigun (1995) reveals that options are narrowing for foreign exchange transactions by some banks, following the American Express Bank Limited termination of correspondent banking services designed to ease hard currency supply for import deals by customers... for instance, the American Express Bank has directed all its branches world-wide not to honour (LCS) letter of credit or other forms of transaction by any Nigerian bank. The measure is linked with threats by US to implement specific sanctions against Nigeria to press its displeasure over the persisting political crisis (P.8).

Furthermore, Yinka Oduwole (1995) stressed the stand of the government. According to Yinka, the government said it would nonetheless react with firmness to any negative clandestine interference, evidence of which it has adequately been informed of (P.3).

That was interaction to the pressures from external forces. To be sure, these elements of the Western market economic system were used to mount pressures on Nigeria. However, it is a question of making the best use of their influence rather than keeping it out entirely. In the modern, increasingly integrated world, principles of non-intervention and sanctity of state sovereignty can never be perfectly defended especially if the state desires economic modernisation and prosperity.

Against this background, Gilbert K. Bluwey (1992) argues that there exist obvious shortcomings in the overall Western support for the reintroduction of political pluralism in Africa. Bluwey maintains that the success of the democracy wave in Africa depends in a large measure on how much diplomatic and material support the international environment are prepared to give. (P43).

In the same vein, writing on the necessary international pressures conducive to democracy in Africa, Kunle, Amuwo(1992) argues that external environment is more hostile than favourable to Africa's democratic construction; but internal conditions are no less so. There are very formidable roadblocks and impediments. Yet there is no reason to despair; rather the aggregate of unfavourable external and internal democratic factors are out to push new leaders and popular and democratic movements to run a government

of partnership. The agenda will be to skilfully use mainly internal resources and goodwill, with doses of some from the external environment, to develop the economy and enhance social justice, social equity and public accountability. This appears as the only credible route for Africa to take in order for the supreme will of the people to triumph (pp 26 - 27).

Broadly speaking, Democratic transition runs from the point at which the previous authoritarian system begins to be dismantled, through the constituent phase of the new democracy to its inauguration and early operation. The initiation of transition may be explicit such as with a strategic decision by key political actors to embark on this process.

Transition may be marked visibly by a major event serving to redirect a country's politics e.g. military defeat, death of the dictator, or less clearly, this process may be preceded or prepared by a phase of pre-transition in which the outgoing regime disintegrates and the course is set for eventual regime change. Here international factors may well highlight this phase in that the external environment may be either progressively unfavourable to the vulnerable authoritarian system in terms of prevalent values or promotion of democratisation through cross-national socio-economic change of modernising kind.

Nigerians transition may have been highlighted by the two above factors. In the view of this study therefore, democratic transition ends not merely once the constitution is in place but also when the democracy begins to function with popularly elected government. Democracy in the other hand has several dimensions and unless these are taken together, its essence may be missed. First democracy may be defined as a

government based on public assent (in this case, consent is the basis of democratic government) this means that the people should actively and effectively participate in their own government. They are able to do this through the establishment of democratic institutions. Under a democratic rule, people have access to the institutions which represent their interests and they are entitled to articulate their views on the basis of full information made available to them. Thus democracy makes it possible for the people to participate in and influence the decision which affect their lives.

It is on the basis of the foregoing that Olayiwole Owolabi (1992) observed that Africa has been witnessing a wind of change blowing across the continent. This is in view of the peoples realisation of the potentials of democracy. The desire for the change is manifested in the struggle for political reforms that will usher in pluralistic democratic governments and guarantee popular participation in decision-making and public accountability (P. 257).

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It could then be argued that the reasons of popular demand for democracy in Africa and the huge clamour for change was brought about by the people's disenchantment with and protest against injustice, oppression, tenacity of office and lack of freedom occasioned by the preponderance of military dictatorships.

Therefore, in our analysis of the transition of Babangida's regime and its domestic and international influence, we shall analyse the concept through the inner directed linkages (domestic factor) and outer-directed linkages (External) This is to discover the pressure that was conductive to the transition.

The history of Nigeria prior to the era of colonial adventurism writes Akindele and Ajila (1992) shows that of a continuous transition from stage to stage. According to them:

> ...the issue of societal transition from stage to stage has gained currency within the physiology of Nigerian policy and her unstable political landscape which has made militarism part of the paraphernalia of political existence of her citizenry (P.85).

The above assertion is implicitly discernible from the experimentation in social engineering of the Babangida's transition. Its quest for a healthy third civil democratic governance, the attainment of which to this study represents political development of the citizens. Based on our content analysis of the foregoing, we argue that democratic transition in Nigeria had its inner directed influence on the conduciveness of the democratic transition. Thus the people's quest for freedom from the shackles of civil-military-civil rulership cycle or unstable political landscape. To buttress this argument Jacques Robin (1991) maintains:-

Democratisation is a constant and complex labour. Participatory democracy is also and mainly the action of the citizen himself in his daily life, his town, his transport his work, his health, his communication, his education his cultural life, his environment. (P.21).

Again to buttress the point of inner-directed conducive pressure for transition in Nigeria, Kunle Awuwo (1992) writes that a close reading of the internal political landscape of Africa reveals a paradoxical phenomenon: there is a definite structure of authoritarian rule that has thrived for as long as colonial history... that is spanning the colonial period and the post independence years. Juxtaposed with this structure and ferociously contesting it

is a sustained movement, at various levels of organisation, resistance and sophistication, for democratisation in Africa (P.19).

All the foregoing suggests that internal variables created a conducive pressure for Nigeria to democratise. This was occasioned by the wherewithal of democratic transition that treated the governed as political robots whose past, present and future could be bargained at will in manners reminiscent of the scramble for Africa and the Philosophy of dark ages politicking.

The outer-directed linkages that brought processes to bear on the transition included international economic order; Foreign aids and international assistance the country need to adapt political institutions. The Western countries developed special aid package to Nigeria in order to help the democratisation. The international environment laid a sound foundations for the development of democratic culture. In addition, to create conducive pressure for Nigeria's democratisation process,, the western countries gave direct assistance to civil groups which sought to promote political education and to defend constitutional rule. This was done in the form of seminars, group and state visits to Nigeria.

In conclusion therefore, and looking at a specific and relatively brief period of Nigeria's democratic transition, it is pertinent to observe fairly closely how the interdependence and modernisation has turned the world into a global village. What emerges is that the balance between the concerns of domestic actors and those external ones was sometimes uneasy and not always on one side. During the transition process,

there developed a convergence of interest between the military leaders and the principal outside power concerned, namely United States and Britain. The Nigerian case clearly showed a deep desire for market economies and close integration with the international capitalist economy.

4.6 EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INTEREST AND THE TRANSITION

The commonplace observation that political instability scares away foreign investors and pulls the brakes on national economic development is obvious especially during transition. Trade is obviously not immune to change in the nature of the political system, but it is often remarkable just how pragmatic states can be, writing on the international issues between economics and politics. Gerald Segal (1993) observes that:

> There are economic issues that are related to politics, new political systems may well have some effect in changing international economics (P.31).

Similarly, internal economic changes such as nationalisation, or on the contrary, greater investment from abroad also affect outsiders. This implies the economic issues affects political system of a country especially during transition that is usually marked with uncertainties. There is always the interaction between the domestic and international activities that accelerates or retard the pace of transition. During the transition of General Babangida, there was marked poor inflow of foreign investment into the country which may have been unconnected with uncertain political climate during the tale end of the transition.

The Guardian newspaper of 21st October (1992) remarks that soon after the establishment of the two political parties, SDP and NRC the Federal Military Government spent close to N1, billion in funding their capital and recurrent expenditure. A breakdown of the figure shows that each party received N1 million cash for its up keep allowance. Another N269.9 million was received by each party for capital and recurrent expenditure.

A year, later, September 1991, the Federal Government disbursed N100 million to each party for the conduct of ward congresses in the newly created states and Local Government Council Areas. In May 1992 both parties received N100 million for organisation of the National Assembly primary elections and prepared for senate, House of Representatives and Presidential intra-party elections, while they received N75 million to offset the cost of the Presidential primaries.

The above government gesture brought about increased money in circulation, especially in the increased money supply and its spread, which went into the hands of individuals. This development increased their purchasing power and the level of demand which had a high potential for inflation. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) put the level of inflation at 27 percent. Usually worsening inflationary pushes the CBN into liquidity mop-ups on banks by the use of stabilisation securities. This development had for reaching effects on investment. Apart from the fact that the high expenditure on the transition programme led to reduction savings and investment, the high lending rates which CBN's panicky mop-up exercises caused increased production cost and scared away international investors.

Writing in the same vein on the economics of Banangida's transition programme, Stephan and Webb (1994) revealed that in January 1996, armed with its interpretation of the outcome of the national debate, the Babangida government in the budget address, announced what it hoped would be the basis for introducing on IMF/World lBank-Sanctioned adjustment Programme and insisted it would be home grown. They maintained that Babangida addressed the three critical issues that the Word Bank and IMF demanded be included in any reform programme, although not in the manner that the multi-laterals had hoped. First, he declared that the government would continue its policy of realistic adjustment of the external value of the naira. The value of the currency did not change, however, instead a 30 percent levy was placed on all imports: (Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb 1994): 475).

Writing further on the economic principles that guided the transitional programme and its outer directedness, Haggard and Web (1994) sees trade liberalisation as the second issue that had been isolated as critical, was not addressed in a way that the multi-laterals found persuasive. According to them, although Babangida admitted that the import licensing system led to corruption and inefficiency, he only promised to make the system work better. The Nigerian National Supply Company, (NNSC) which the Buhari government had refused to abolish, was disbanded, and a package of incentives for exporters was announced.

The third issue according to Haggard and Webb, the budget did reduce the petroleum subsidy. It also committed the government to a number of other fiscal measures

to limit Nigeria's chronic overspending and budget deficits. In particular, the government promised to pay unparalleled attention to implementing its expenditure control programme (Haggand and Webb (1994: 476).

General Babangida in speech declared that "we cannot afford to allow the machinery of policy implementation to jog along at its leisurely pace during the next twelve months. Government is therefore determined to pursue at all levels of administration, a strategy of close monitoring of all policies and programmes enunciated in this budget (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1986. P.4).

Finally, the Babangida regime committed itself to privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises. As a first step, non-statutory transfers to all economic and quasi-economic parastatals were reduced 50 percent. It also promised to divest holdings in agriculture, electronics and all non-strategic industries. Overall, Babangida was pleased to note that he had for the first time in recent memory, balanced the budget.

The 1996 budget that was a launching pad for political transition as well as economic reformation did not however, satisfy the multi-laterals or Nigeria's creditors. The Paris club and soon, after, the London club declared that no debt would be rescheduled until Nigeria signed a standby agreement with the IMF, which presumably would include devaluation. In response, Nigeria floated the ideas of a two-tier exchange rate system that would, in effect, partially devalue the currency. The World Bank was apparently willing to support such a programme, although it could not, by itself, endorse

the two tier scheme, in part because of pressure from the IMF and the U.S. treasury.

Finally, on August 27, 1986, the regime formally announced the adoption of a comprehensive Structural Adjustment Programme in co-operation with the World Bank and with IMF clearance. The Nigerian Structural Adjustment Programme had as its centre piece devaluation of the naira through a two tier system. The first Tier foreign Exchange market was used temporarily to handle debt servicing and official transfers to international organisations at the prevailing nominal exchange rate of the naira. All other transactions were to be handled through the second-Tier foreign Exchange market, where the naira was determined on the basis of bids submitted by Banks for the foreign exchange that the central bank supplied to the market. The strategy was to ensure that through the general convergence of the administratively determined first-tier exchange rate and the market determined second tier rate, the naira would be drastically devalued. At the same time, the government would phase out import licenses.

Although the IMF has traditionally opposed multiple exchange rates because they are so cumbersome, it signed a letter of intent with Nigeria. IMF was Convinced that the two tier system was the best way forward and that the government would move rapidly to unify the rates. The standby agreement allowed Nigeria to draw approximately SDR650 million. However, the government announced that it would not actually take any money from IMF, thus deferring to the majority view expressed during the national debate and assuaging some of the popular fears about the diversion of new loans. Even though Nigeria did not take the IMF's money, the IMF had the same monitoring and importing

responsibilities that it would in any standby agreement (Haggard and Webb 1994: 478).

Therefore, as an authoritarian regime, the Babangida government rarely allowed debate before adopting a specific policy procedure and often did not even announce that a partial measure was about to be implemented. Thus, interest groups in the society can only bring their political influence to bear once a policy is adopted, and the regime is then faced with the problem of implementing on unpopular policy. Indeed, economic reform in Nigeria was predicated on political transformation.

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In writing on the political economy of Democratic transition in Nigeria, Adetula (1992) maintains that the problem identified in the economy, of Nigerian transition are located within the contradictions arising from the character of the neo-economical Nigeria state and its dependent capitalist economy. He emphasised that the orientation and nature of the Nigeria bourgeoisie has not changed. Apart from some window dressing and Pseudo-nationalist tendencies, the dependent capitalist economy is still in serious crisis with declining industrial and agricultural production, massive unemployment, inflation, huge foreign and domestic debts and balance of payment crisis, (Victor Adetula 1992: 348).

Adetula further argues that the SAP was not helping matters and its components such as privatisation, commercialization, export promotion etc. have exacerbated the problems of the economy and also bred authoritarianism on the part of the government. He reasoned that since the economy was the basis and most important foundation of all social and political life, the peoples of Nigeria have responded deliberate neglect by way

of growing apathy to the political transition.

Adetula further revealed that the administration of General Babangida spend a huge sum of money on MAMSER and other transition programme institutions e.g. NEC, SDP, NRC, National Republican Commission NPC, DFRRI, The Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS), The Revenue Mobilisation Commission (RMC) etc. He concluded by observing that the deteriorating conditions of the Nigerian Masses forced one to doubt the seriousness of the Babangida administration on the possibility of a democratic rule in Nigeria. He observes that while the state's machinery for coercion is being adequately equipped to ensure a successful political transition, the transition has no plan to restructure the economic and change the life of most Nigerian Masses whose social maladjustment are now easily interpreted as disturbance of the transition to civil rule (Victor Adetula 1992: 348).

Taking together, we could argue that the economy of the transition was influenced by two variables of domestic and international leverages. From the domestic front, the transition faced tremendous pressures owing to inflation crimes, unemployment and devaluation of currency that was occasioned by the principal demands of the transition.

Internationally, the transition also faced economic pressures from the West acting through the IMF and World Bank mounted pressures to the Babangida regime to adopt some economic reforms that were foreign and their implementation complex to the local demands. This point is further buttressed by the neo-colonial and dependent capitalist economy of Nigeria especially during the transition.

4.7 U.S. AND BRITISH RESPONSE TO EVENTS

At the risk of simplifying too much, one could divide the U.S. and British response into two broad categories: Knowing and acting. The first implies, of course, being informed through the C.I.A., other intelligence - gathering agencies, the embassies) of anything having to do with the priorities in this respect the U.S. and Britain governments seem to have been aware of many plans, projects and intentions of local actors well in advance of their materialisation (e.g. the failed coup of Major Orkar and the annulment of June 12 1993 election and cancellation of Party primaries.

In many instances Nigeria got contradictory report from the different government agencies. In most of the cases, the information led to no further action although its knowledge was occasionally sufficient to arouse the suspicion of local actors that the U.S and Britain had been meddling or had the intention to meddle in domestic affairs. Clearly many times, the suspicion showed a lack of perspective.

At any point of time, the U.S. Executive has thousand of thing to take care of, both on the domestic and on the international fronts. The capacity of the president, the secretary of state and other top officials as well as their British counterparts to process information and react to it is obviously limited. It is not surprising that benign neglect was the standard behaviour in many cases. However, in some particular instances, the U.S and Britain leading other European countries decided they should try to influence events at the margin.

taking into account the susceptibilities of leaders and public opinion in Nigeria when deciding, about actions to be taken e.g. in a written statement released to the press at the time, Michael McCurry, the U.S. State Department Spokesman said:

> The President, Bill Clinton has issued a proclamation suspending the entry into United State of immigrants and non-immigrants, who formulate or implement policies impeding a transition to democracy in Nigeria. (Michael McCurry 1993, p.14).

Commenting on the political implications of a statement credited to Director of USIS on Nigeria's transition, Godfrey (1993) suggest that it is tempting to presume that the actions were targeted at undermining the political sovereignty of the Nigerian State. American and the European Union interest and influence on the transition in Nigeria has far political reaching effect and impact on the domestic situation.

The statements of USIS in Lagos could be said to have created the consequent pressure on the military regime of Babangida to conclude the transition. There was increased determination by the international community through alliance with internal forces to put pressure on the regime to conclude the election. The most interested powerful, and proximate outsiders were strongly opposed to the military and as such use all available method to influence the transition. The influence took the form of payments to political parties, planting stories in the press, or even more violent acts such as sanctions and withdrawal of diplomatic relations were applied by America and its allies. It is clear that the reactions of the international community in collaboration with the internal forces added both diplomatic and economic pressures on the military to conclude the transition.

America and its European allies used economic factors to influence the transition. During transition and its consolidation, new market may be created or closed because of new domestic economic policies brought about, by changes in government. It is against this background that Fashola (1993) drew a relationship between America intervention in the transition and as well protection of the economic interest in Nigeria, according to Fashola, Americans cannot fold their arms and watch their investments in Nigeria go to ruins due to political impasses (Mashud Fashola 1993: 31).

By the foregoing, it is clear that America's intervention into the transition programme in Nigeria was to influence their democratic ideology on Nigerians on one hand and to use politics of interventions to guide its economic interest in Nigeria.

Writing an economic sanctions imposed on Nigeria by America and its European allies, Godfrey (1993) maintains that the political crisis occasioned by the transition programme had a far reaching effect on the Nigerian economy. He stated that there was a linkage between the internal and external forces, all acting in collaboration to influence the possible out come of the transition. He identified the use of sanction to influence the regime as having brunt from the external front on Nigerian Economy. The American government announced some economic sanctions which included a loss of 450 million dollars in industrial and economic aids to Nigeria. The consequent implications of the diplomatic impasse between Nigeria and the West especially the two super-power-America and Europe, Nigeria lost much of the economic support it has enjoyed from their magnanimity ((Godfrey Ikhemuemhe 1993: 36).

The enormous influence the Americans and Europeans have in the international capital market places them into a vantage position to frustrate the debt relief and rescheduling efforts of Nigerian government unless the regime accepts to democratise governance in Nigeria. The Americans and Britains have a superior say in the affairs of such bodies like the IMF and the World Bank. If we accept in this study that international pressures can help create democratic conditions, then some thought needs to be given to the best kinds of pressures.

Although the international system is often blamed for authoritarianism in the first place especially within the African continent. Yet it is clear that the system outside can equally work to enhance democracy. Specific payments, encouragement and even threats from outside played or made significant impact during the transition programme under review.

External factors were very important and to some extent created conducive environment for democratisation. Though the transition programme came under government political, economic and social stress as a result of political and economic policies of the transition, yet, the action, reaction, linkages and penetratedness of the international system was not so much to the extent that they were able to impose uniform conception of the world on the Nigeria society.

While the salience of the international context of democratic transition may thus be easily recognised, analysing its real impact or influence on the Nigerian transition process is no easy task either theoretically or empirically. This is partly due to the absence of adequate analytical tools and also problems of evidence deriving from the confidential

nature of some political activity, crossing the boundary between Nigeria and the international community.

In summary therefore, as a relatively medium power state occupying a geopolitical significant position within the West Africa sub-region Nigeria has been highly permeable to international system influences. But as the international system evolved so too did Nigeria's position within it. Despite Nigeria's long history of foreign influence, the intimacy of the post-war relationship with the United States and Britain, following their activities during the war was qualitatively different, reflecting the emergence of the new bipolar system which allowed a sole super power to dominate in each sphere of international system.

Changes in the climate of superpower relations have also been significant overtime. The passage from cold war to détente diminished the relevance of the anti-Communist state in Nigeria, because of the Soviet assistance during the war. Then in the 1980's, the rise of Gorbachev and the breakdown of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe created an atmosphere which finally allowed the reconciliation of the civil war antagonists in Nigeria.

This is not by any means to suggest that Nigeria has only been the object of international development, a positive recipient of outside influences. Our analysis of the Babangida transition programme and his dictatorship has shown that events involved a complex blend of internal and external factors interacting with and reacting upon each other.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

We have in this study examined the internationalisation of Domestic Political Process. Focusing on the Transition to Democratic Rule Programme in Nigeria from 1985 to 1993. To guide us in this respect, we have relied on the "Transition theory" as our theoretical mode of analysis. Through this process we situated and traced the factor and the extent of influence of the international system on the Nigeria's transition to democracy.

We also traced the impact of the international community too uncover if the influence either directly or indirectly affected the processes, policies and the outcome of the transition programme. Similarly, we examined the interest of the international community on the transition programme. We also revealed the actions of the international community to uncover if such actions were based on Nigeria's position and influence within the African continent.

In the same vein, we tried to ascertain whether the international forces had negative or positive implications on the transition programme. Also in our study, we analysed the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic politics to international system. This we attributed to the level of development of Nigeria's democratic institutions and structures.

Having made an overall assessment of the internationalisation of Nigeria's domestic transition politics, we analysed the impact and therefore argued that by and large, the

external factors made some significant impact both on the Government's resolve to democratise governance by setting up transition programme and the processes and policies it adopted.

We also examined how the international system generally promoted the trends of democratisation in Nigeria and to a greater extent loaded the dice in favour of successful implementation of the transition. We therefore, attempted in all the chapters to examine fully the whole of transition theoretical postulations. The study therefore consists of five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction and discusses the objectives and significance of the study as well as the theoretical and methodological issues raised by the topic. A framework for the analysis contained in subsequent chapters is also presented. This chapter had also exposed the various literature that were related to the subject investigated in the study. This was in order to provide a broad exposure of views related and even relevant to our subject matter. It also defined the various concepts which we had used, while our theoretical construct was further discussed.

Chapter two looked at the internationalisation of Nigeria's transition programme generally. It was done within the context of historical perspectives, geopolitical location of Nigeria and some significant international events. We traced the impact of international economic system, Nigeria's inherent capitalist economy and the international aid and grants to Nigeria during the period under review. The chapter also looked at the effect of some significant events that occurred within the globe during the transition such as the dismantled apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of Soviet Union as a political bloc and

the emergence of US as the only world super-power.

Chapter three focused on the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic transition politics to international system. We also discussed the nature of Nigeria's inter-dependence, the level of development of her democratic institutions and structures. We also looked at the political uncertainties during the transition and Nigeria's foreign policy projection. We also analyzed the ING and its external relations.

Chapter four discussed at length the manifestations of international forces on Nigeria's transition to liberal democracy. We revealed certain international forces and their interest on the possible out come of the transition and the roles they played in the process of the transition. We also discussed Nigeria's position and influence in African continent to ascertain if this was responsible for the internationalisation of the transition programme. We also analyzed the visit of America's Vice-President to Nigeria in 1991,his actions and pronouncements in respect of the transition. We also looked at the effects of sanctions announced by the west on the transition economy.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter that summarises and combines the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

Attempts by the Babangida Administration to achieve democratic rule in Nigeria faced several problems of varying magnitude from different segments of the Nigerian society. Efforts mostly began with elaborate political transition programme with specific time table that was to lead to the final disengagement of the military from the helm of affairs. But the attempt was not made productive at the end of the day.

The nature of the transition programme, the attitude of Nigerian politicians and political parties, the role of the civil society and the military played in one way or the other contributed to intervention of external forces to the transition. The consequent derailment of the transition provoked external influence to a greater extent. From the above summary of the external influence on the transition to civil rule in Nigeria between the years 1985 to 1995, the conclusions drawn from our study can be stated as follows:

That this National study of Nigeria's transition programme during Babangida's regime confirmed that the international actors made a significant impact on the transition through their actions and reactions. The external influence generally promoted trends of democratisation and to a greater extent loaded the dice in favour of a transition to liberal democracy in Nigeria. More specifically, the international influences also contributed in important ways in adopting the transition programme and at crucial moments of the transition process, acted decisively to keep the programme on course. That Nigeria belongs to a geopolitical area that faces international pressures to democratise governance

and her entry to supranational organisations also influences the political system of the country.

The second mode of influence as observed in this study by the international actors was more direct type. i.e. the use of economic aid and diplomatic pressures to influence the transition. This combined effort at economic and diplomacy by external forces was visible in some of the policies which appeared to have created particular difficulties to the government each time actions were taken to disrupt the transition. In the same vein the controlled nature of the political liberalisation provided a focal point for opposition challenges who took advantage of the political opening to international system to mobilize against the Babangaida's effort to derail the transition programme.

The influence of the international community on the transition was present and constant especially giving the age of growing interdependence, the external factors played a vital part in making the trip from authoritarian rule to democratic government. This process though certainly complex, as well acutely apparent in Nigeria when so many countries were making their way either from military or communism to possible pluralist democracy.

Also the influence of international system on Nigeria's transition programme we concluded apparently explained the vulnerability of Nigeria's internal political systems to international influence. We also noted that the interest of the international community stems from Nigeria's position and influence in African continent and the West African sub-region. We also contended that the international forces, especially the multi-National

corporations, the Bretten-wood institutions and other international organisations had interest in the possible outcome of the transition and as such played vital roles in the processes of the regime change. This stand point we contended is owing to Nigeria's natural and human resources as well as her population which all put together was essential in international system.

Also given the new prospects for international life, the idea of global democratisation had assumed full significance. Thus globalisation of the economy was accompanied by the progressive globalisation of democracy. Nigeria as a member of the international community must act along with other nations in the area of democracy. While there was no doubt that the relationship between the international and domestic environments during the transition was invariably an interactive one (inner - directed elite responded to outer-directed pressures and vice-versa).

It can be concluded from the Babangida's transition that the international factor was the more important of the two broadly conditioning variables. And the transition outcome notwithstanding the scope for choice open to domestic actors, the international context provided the overall confining conditions with which all Nigerian domestic actors had to deal. Nigeria's bilateral linkages with U. S. and E.U.'s economic framework strongly militated in favour of a west-European-style democratic transition. We concluded that the most important pressure for the creation of the transition came from institutional actors such as NATO, EU, IMF and the World Bank which were able to influence domestic elite by promising to give or withhold diplomatic, financial and moral support unless progress

toward the preferred outcome was visible against the backdrop of the annulled June 12 Presidential election.

It was also noted that Nigeria's socio-cultural settings and political evolution as a nation was responsible for the influence of international system on her transition programme. It was observed also that the question of transition from military to democratic rule was one of the central precipitating factors of the coup d'etat that brought General Ibrahim Badamosi Banagida to office.

Also in our analysis of the Report of the Political Bureau, we concluded that the first major legal instrument which set out the Babagida's programme for transition to civil rule was the transition to civil Rule Decree 1987. One glaring explanation that showed for the external, factor on the transition was traced to the broadly spaced transition programme that proceeded with political learning institutional adjustment and re-orientation of political culture of Nigeria. This fine transitional programme we noted provoked the interest of the international community hence they kept watch to witness its logical conclusion.

We also contended that Nigeria's geo-political location in the West African sub-region as well as her population and the low level development of her democratic institutions economy and foreign policy all contributed to the attention her transition received from the international community. Another factor we reasoned was the impact on Nigeria of the democratic movements in Eastern and central Europe, Latin America, the collapse of Soviet Union and the emergence of United States of America as the only world super-power.

We also concluded that the international aid and grants were used to mount pressures on Nigeria by the international financial institutions and organisations. Most of them declined to assist Nigeria on her economic reforms unless the country was seen to have democratised governance. We noted however that some countries and international organisations assisted and sponsored various projects in Nigeria to influence the transition.

We also concluded that the interest of the international community on the transition in Nigeria impinged on the country's position and influence in African continent. This we reasoned was because, as the most populous nation in Africa, the out come of the transition in Nigeria was to determine to a great extent the result of similar transition programmes in other African countries. This was from the point of view of the notion that as a country, seen as the leader of African continent, the rest of African look up to Nigeria to initiate the move of democratisation in Africa.

It was also concluded in this study that US and European nations see Nigeria as a fertile land for trade and economic expansion, therefore, they sought to influence the outcome of the transition for economic reasons and as such played positive roles during the transition process. In the same vein, we concluded that at the beginning of the transition, the external factors were very important and created conducive environment for Nigeria to democratise especially the way and manner in which General Babangida was pampered by the west as well as the activities of foreign Governments and non-governmental organisations was capable of enhancing a development of democratic culture.

We similarly concluded that because of General Babangadia's public declaration to return Nigeria to civil rule during the visit of America's Vice President, Dan Quayle to Nigeria in 1991, we contended that, it was an extension of the orchestrated western plan to encourage and influence democratisation in Nigeria. We also reasoned that the impact of the sanctions announced by the west on the Nigerian economy and their devastating effects influenced the Nigerian government policies and decisions on the transition. The social implications of the external factor of the transition showed that the programme came under great political, economic and social stress as a result of SAP, as well as the annulment of June 12 1993 election and its attendant violence.

We also concluded that the vulnerability of Nigeria's domestic politics to international system was as a result of her foreign policy objectives. We equally observed that the transition stalemate notwithstanding, Nigeria's foreign policy objectives never shifted, rather some emphasis were changed. We also maintained that ING had international recognition despite the domestic crisis that visited the regime and its short term.

That the internationalisation of Nigeria's domestic politics stems from Nigeria's colonial experience during which her domestic politics was linked to the west and more recently, the internationalisation of Nigeria's economic system. That Nigeria suffers from staggering ethnic, political and economic divisions which result into international interest in her affairs. That the transition programme and, in particular, its electoral process lacked credibility because of the exclusionary way it was conceived and implemented. That it is

difficult to establish convincing causal linkages. At the same, the interaction between the global setting and Nigerian Political development involves a plethora of elements difficult to assess in terms of their relative importance.

That the clustering of African region and West Africa sub-regional tendencies toward democratisation lends substance to the contention that the global setting is an important element in any adequate account of the course of the political development in Nigeria. That embarking on transition might actually speed up developments in an area of Nigeria foreign policy.

That constraints from the international environment acted as a persistent pressure against, or continuity in the face of domestic change or upheaval. That the penetration of Nigeria domestic polities by the international environment is not only a matter of dramatic events but was a constant process at medium and lower levels of visibility, affecting political, economic and social stability in both positive and negative ways.

- That outside forces had an interest in the outcome of the transition, and thus played a part in the process of the regime changed. That the physical location of Nigeria within the West African sub-region is important to the type of pressures Nigeria faced from the outside world during her transition to democracy.
- That the ideological choices made in the transition obviously placed a key role in determining the nature of the economic system. That the UN has been waging pragmatically and empirically a diplomatic effort on behalf of democracy in the world at large and Nigeria in particular.

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That economic factors were not the only ones that matter for the durability of democracy, but international conditions predict regime survival better than does the level of development. That the United States for its own domestic reasons and its new status as the only super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern block approached democratisation as a foreign policy objective.

That while the quest for democracy is rooted in indigenous forces the movement for democracy in Nigeria was influenced by some international developments. That the pressure from the West was to create a democratic atmosphere for the implementation of the IMF and World Bank inspired and dictated economic Adjustment Programmes.

That Africa has remained the centre piece of Nigeria foreign policy irrespective of her transition programme and pressure from the international community. That the UN uses peace keeping to encourage democracy in the present era.

That changes in the international system and time accounted majorly for the manifestation of international factor on Nigeria's transition to democracy. That American and the European Union interest on the transition in Nigeria had far political reaching impact on the domestic situation.

That external factors were very important and created conducive environment to democratisation in Nigeria. That shifting of the terminal date of the transitional programme shocked the faith of Nigerians and the international community, hence their reaction.

- that the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election plunged the country in what was indisputably the one of the most political crisis in Nigeria.. That Nigeria's image abroad is suffered as a result of political crisis caused by the annulment.

- That based on extensive American assistance and guidance, the Nigeria Government Undertook to rehabilitate the economy and initiated a series of reforms designed to lay a democratic foundations in Nigeria.

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5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

From the above observations drawn from our analysis about the international community and the transition to democracy in Nigeria, we like to recommend the following:

- That the government should make it a point that Nigerians should be involved in major internal and external policy formulations. This can take the form of National debates, symposia, discussions and public participation in deciding issues that affect the running of transition programmes in Nigeria. Police and security forces should be trained to safeguard and uphold the human rights of all Nigerians irrespective of ethnic background and religion.

- Democratic institutions should be set up and maintained to promote research and development in order to enhance democratic culture. Private ownership of the

mass-media especially electronic media should be encouraged or allowed for a balanced view and objective reporting on the activities of the government during transition programmes.

Nigeria should shelve on IMF or World Bank loan as well as aid and grants from the West while an alternative to SAP, recommended by the O. A. U. and the Lagos plan of Action should be adopted. This is because many countries that have taken such a loan find it difficult to survive severe economic hardship, unemployment, inflation, retrenchment and general untold hardships which are detrimental to democracy. An intensive value re-orientation programme such as MAMSER WAI should be employed to bring sanity to Nigerian polity and the sustenance of democratic values.

The Judiciary should be independent and re-orientated. It has over the years been accused of being partial, slow, corrupt, politicised and always singing praises for those in the mantle of leadership. That the involvement of private citizens and interest groups in influencing foreign policy is more pronounced than in a military regime, since this representations are made through elected representatives who must be responsive to the yearnings of their constituencies.

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APPENDIX

THE TRANSITION TO CIVIL RULE DECREE: 1987 AND TIME TABLE

The first major legal instrument which set out the Babangida Administration's programme for the transition to civil rule was the transition to civil rule (Political Programme) Decree 1987, otherwise known as Decree 19 of 1987. It empowered the Federal Military Government to take measures necessary to ensure the implementation of Political Programme set out in schedules 1 to 6 of the Decree. Section 8(1-3) of the Decree also stipulated offences against the smooth implementation of the Political programme, while section 9 provided for the establishment of a special tribunal to try all offences under the Decree[2].

The Political Programme as set out in the schedules to the Decree is as follows:

SCHEDULE 1

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PROGRAMME FOR 1987:

3rd Quarter - 1987:

Establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilisation.

Establishment of a constitution drafting Committee

4th Quarter - 1987:

Elections into local governments on non-party basis.

SCHEDULE 2

PROGRAMME FOR 1988

1st Quarter - 1988

Establishment of Nationa Population Commission.

Establishment of code of conduct Bureau.

Establishment of code of conduct Tribunal

Establishment of constituent Assembly

Inauguration of National Revenue Mobilisation Commission.

2nd Quarter - 1988

Termination of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

3rd Quarter - 1988

Consolidation of gains of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

4th Quarter - 1988

Consolidation of gains of structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

SCHEDULE 3

PROGRAMME FOR 1989

1st Quarter - 1989

Promulgation of a new constitution

Releases of new fiscal arrangements

2nd Quarter - 1989

Lift of ban on party politics

3rd Quarter - 1989

Announcement of two recognised and registered Political Parties.

4th Quarter - 1989

Election into local governments on Political Party basis.

SCHEDULE 4

PROGRAMME FOR 1990

1st and 2nd Quarters - 1990

Election into state legislatures and state executives.

3rd Quarter - 1990

Convening of state legislatures

4th Quarter - 1990

Swearing-in- of state executives

SCHEDULE 5

PROGRAMME FOR 1991

1st Quarter - 1991

Census

2nd Quarter - 1991

Census

3rd Quarter - 1991

Census

4th Quarter - 1991

Local Government elections

SCHEDULE 6

PROGRAMME FOR 1992

1st and 2nd Quarters - 1992

Elections into Federal legislatures and convening of National Assembly.

3rd and 4th Quarters - 1992

Presidential Election

Swearing-in of new President and Final disengagement by the Armed forces.