THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN NIGERIAN'S DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE 1993-1998

BY

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
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MARCH 2000

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me and that it is a correct record of my own research work. It has not been presented in any previous application for a higher degree.

All quotations are indicated and the sources of information are specifically acknowledged by means of reference.



SANI STORES YAKUBU

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled "The role of International Community in Nigeria's Democratical Struggle "1993-1998" meets the regulations governing the award of a master degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy of the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria and its approved for its contributions to knowledge and literary presentation.

Chairman Supervisor Committee — Date: 10-7-2006

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my noble parents the late Alhaji. Sani Stores who died on 11th April, 2000 and Hajiya Hafsatu(Gaje) Sani who nurtured me from cradle through my tertiary education. Also to Dr. Suleiman Sani for upholding the prestige of the family.

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ABSTRACT

This research work seeks to ascertain the level of influence the International Community had in Nigeria's Democratic Struggle 1993-98. The research is based on content analysis i.e. analysis of available relevant documents like journals, magazines, bulletins, gazettes and periodicals.

It was discovered that the international community had actually contributed significantly in the process of democratisation in Nigeria. Equally of note is the internal struggle which kept mounting substantial pressure of the military to democratise. The solution to international pressure and sanctions was finally identified and upon implementation Nigeria regained its prominence in the committee of nations and its sub-regional prowess reactivated.

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ABBREVIATIONS

-	O.A.U.	Organisation of African States.
-	C.W.	Commonwealth
-	U.N.	United Nations
-	CWAG.	Commonwealth Action Group
-	USAID.	United States Agency for International Development
-	E.V.	European Union
-	A.C.P.	African Caribbean and Pacific
-	U.A.C.	United Africa Company
-	I.T.T.	International Telephones and Telecommunications
-	C.N.N.	Cable News Net Work
-	B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation
-	I.B.B.	Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida
-	F.D.I.	Foreign Direct Investment
-	W.T.O.	World Trade Organisation
-	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
-	C.P.P.	Communist People's Party of Ghana
-	COSATU.	Congress of South African Trade Union
-	A.N.C.	Africa National Congress
-	I.M.F.	International Monetary Fund
-	U.S.A.	United States of America

- N.N.D.P. Nigerian Nationalist Democratic Party
- N.Y.M. Nigerian Youth Movement
- N.C.N.C. National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon
- N.P.C. Northern Peoples Congress
- FEDECO Federal Electoral Commission
- N.P.N. National Party of Nigeria
- A.G. Action Group
- N.P.P. Nigerian peoples' Party
- P.R.P. Peoples' Redemption Party
- U.P.N. Unity Party of Nigeria
- G.N.P.P. Great Nigeria Peoples Party
- S.A.P. Structure Adjustment Programme
- MAMSER Mass Mobilisation on Socio-economic Reconstruction
- DIFFRI Directorate of Foods Roads and Rural Infrastructure
- N.E.C. National Electoral Commission
- C.D.S. Centre for Democratic Studies
- S.D.P. Social Democratic Party
- N.R.C. National Republican Convention
- C.L.O. Civil Liberties Organisation
- A.B.N. Association for Better Nigeria
- I.N.G. Interim National Government
- C.D. Campaign For Democracy

-	C.D.H.R.	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
-	M.D.J.	Movement for Democratic Justice
-	N.M.A.	Nigerian Medical Association
-	A.S.U.U.	Academic Staff Union of Universities
-	N.A.N.S.	National Association of Nigerian Students
-	N.B.A.	Nigeria Bar Association
-	U.S.I.S.	United States Information Service
-	O.A.S.	Organisation of American States
-	A.B.U.	Ahmadu Bello University
-	C.G.D.C.N.	Concerned Group for Democratic Change in Nigeria
-	O.H.R.D.N.	Organisation for Human Rights and Democracy in Nigeria
-	C.U.S.O.	Canadian Universities Services Overseas
-	C.W.	Commonwealth
-	U.S.$	United States Dollar
-	W.B.	World Bank
-	=N=	Nigerian Naira
-		Pound Sterling
-	C.B.N.	Central Bank of Nigeria
-	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
-	N.D.L.E.A.	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
-	D.8.	Developing Eight (Association of 8 developing countries)
-	U.S.S.R.	United Soviet Socialist Republic

- N.L.C. Nigeria Labour Congress
- NADECO National Democratic Coalition
- P.T.F. Petroleum Trust Fund
- NUPENG National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas
- U.D.P. United Democratic Party
- YEAA Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha
- U.N.C.P. United Nigeria Congress Party
- G.D.M. Grass Roots Democratic Party
- M.A.N. Manufacturing Association of Nigeria
- P.Z. Paterson Zochunis
- U.T.C. United Trading Company
- G.D.P. Gross Domestic Product.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The conception of this work draws its inspiration from the important roles played by various organisations, regional political/economic groupings, individual nation states of different capacities, corporate transnational corporations and personalities in the ongoing democratisation process or democratic reforms in Nigeria. Contemporary global politics which is characterised by integration and globalisation of ideas, concepts, advancement in information technology and mutual interdependence, it is obvious that no nation can stand as an island. A nation ought to develop the capacity to co-exist in a symbiotic sense with other nations and evolve rational and acceptable ways and means of conducting its internal and external affairs to conform with contemporary realities.

There is no doubt that other actors in the international arena have a measure of influence in the foreign policy of other sovereign nations who are equally participants in the global system. For instance, the United Nations has a charter which every subscribing member of the organisation will have to accept and adopt. Some of the general principles of the U.N are; respect for sovereign entity of other nations; respect for general principle of human rights; right to recognise political units, principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and right to transact business among nations; right to enter into treaties and abrogate them; right to enlist in a regional or sub-regional organisation - etc.

The synthesis of the overall relations among nations gives birth to co-

oporation, disagreement, severe relations and seldom to conflict and war between actors (Hans Morgenthau[1].

The wind of change passing through Africa warrants that actors in the global system should incorporate some democratic ethics in order to participate fully in world politics and consequently make a giant strive to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Military dictatorship has been out fashioned and is considered a great burden in contemporary global system. Globalisation can be infered as skill and acquisition of information technology and advancement in telecommunication, industrialisation, lowering of trade barriers, trade liberalisation(openness) or complete absence of governmental interference, adequate infrastructure, good stable and democratic governance, internationlised financial and capital market Institution and acceptance of rules of world trade organisation(WTO) and other international liberal trade and finance regulations for an effective and gainful participation in global markets[2]. The drive for democracy and free enterprise are the two values that all nations but a few have to contend with to be able to make a significant impact in the ever increasing Americanisation of the globe. The relevance of America in the world system cannot be overemphasized. There is growing Americanization of the world. Globanization today is synonymous to Americanization. American ideas are becoming increasingly globalised. The political philosophy raining across the globe stems from America. The economic system: banking and finance; information technology vis the internet and E-mail are becoming acceptable around the globe. International media organisations (C.N.N;

B.B.C, SKY, A.B.C. etc) are all over the place propagating the gospel of democracy and expressing American or western conception of things for their selfish ends which other people around the globe consume despite the selfish intentions of the West.

In a similar vein some giant transnational corporations with headquarters in metropolitan centres of capital wax some influence in the conduct of international relations. For instance, I.T.T had a hand in toppling Idi Amin from power. Texaco, Unilever, Shell, Elf and U.A.C shape the economies of some developing nations. These multinational corporations control commanding heights the economies of some third world countries. Euro American multinational Corporations have considerable influence in socio economic policies among third world countries. Equally in the domestic and foreign policy decisions of these states. The home government of the M.N.Cs also use them to achieve certain foreign policy objective. Individuals like Bill Gates are richer and more influential in global affairs than some developing states.

At 43 Bill Gates is the chairman and CEO Microsoft Corporation, and has net worth of $85 billion making him the richest man in the world[3]. His personal fortune at one point, reached $100 billion[4]. The annual revenue and profit of his software company hits 30% each year[5]. The company's products dominate international software market. In 1997 94.5% of world's software consumption came from microsoft. It is estimated that by 2001 the figure will hit 96.7%[6]. Microsoft was the major sponsor of world trade organisation (W.T.O) Conference

in Australia in November 1999.

In International Economic Relations, owners of capital call the shots. Bill Gates as an individual obviously makes greater impact and influence in global economic relations than many third world states. Such a person, considering the volume of resources at his disposal, can influence foreign policy decisions of many states.

Euro-American nations their companies and individual owners of capital and certain multilateral organisations have played a vital role in transplanting democracy and liberal tendencies in other states, Nigeria inclusive, by way of pressure they mount on the Abacha military regime and sanctions that followed and by stimulating the emergence of pro-democracy groups through the funds they extended to them

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.

Most African states and third world nations in general have come to be associated with coups and counter coups leading to persistent military control of the apparatus of the state. At varied stages of their political development most African states have been under military dictatorships. The first coup in Africa was in Egypt in 1952. That earlier move created or rather paved the way for subsequent military uprisings and takeovers all over Africa at different periods. It became a sort of contagious things. Zaire 1962, Sudan 1956, Libya 1967; Nigeria 1966. Ghana 1965, Sierra leone, Benin Republic, Togo, Mali all had military leadership. Ghana and Nigeria have been going at same phase as far as military intervention is

concerned until recently.

This persistent military take over of political power has become a major cause for concern especially in Nigeria more so considering the leadership role Nigeria plays in Africa. The country is a role model for most African states. With the largest economy and market, its population size accounts to roughly 80 percent of the entire sub-region. It is the continents leading exporter of crude oil, it possesses the most extensive educational system, has a relatively developed human resources base, and it is the biggest commercial and manufacturing centre in the West African subregion. Geographic and historical factors have given Nigerian added advantage. The country encompasses diverse climatic, ecological and topographical types and has an equally diverse range of human and natural resources. Historically Nigeria has invested alot in the promotion of a Pan Africa Vision of West African economic Integration (ECOWAS) and hosts the secretariat as well as support greater part of the financial expenditure of the organisation (Sabo Bako 1999)[7].

Economically, Nigeria is the most well endowed in the sub region. It is looked upon to as a "big brother" the actions of which others are willing to imitate. Other African states and the world at large have a lot of expectations on Nigeria. The Western world, led by America has the belief that if Nigeria can have a stable democratic regime other African states will follow suit and as a result of which they will have a safe investment.

To the dismay of America and the West, Nigerian military have come to be

associated with politics more than their traditional role of protecting the territorial integrity of the country. This is a major obstacle to the development of true and viable democracy in Nigeria. There is a consensus that the military class has dealt a severe blow to the economy and all other aspects of human endeavour including human rights and popular rule (i.e. democracy).

The successive military regimes after the Nigerian civil war 1966-1970 had demonstrated their willingness to dominate the political scene. General Gowon was pushed aside by Murtala and other colleagues partly due to his desire to perpetuate himself in power. Gen. Murtala and Obasanjo designed a political time table and the later fulfilled the promise by handing over to Shehu Shagari. Shagari regime only lasted for 4 (four) years, after which there was another military takeover. Internal squabbles and power struggle among the military boys lead to counter coup. In a palace coup Babangida overthrew Buhari and became the new Head of State and took the title of President. Some political analysts reasoned that the adoption of the title President, in a way, translate to Babangida's desire to maintain the seat and struggle to become a life President.

From inception the regime of Gen. Babangida had been a transitional regime. A deliberate and calculated design to pursue a prolonged transition to civil rule for 8 years was adopted. The transition process was characterised by mischievous deceit of banning and unbanning of old breed politicians who were initially seen as the bane of the Nigerian Nation. After eight years of serious dribbling Babangida landed the country in a serious political stalemate with the annulment of June 12,

1993 Presidential election. The country was in a serious crisis under Chief E. Shonekan when Abacha came in. Perceived as a messiah by some, considering the severity of the political situation in the country. Abacha started sluggishly by adopting a prolonged solution to the political stalemate. On taking full charge of the situation, the new military man began unfolding his selfish plan for the country. Abacha gradually began expressing his dictatorial tendencies and continued to manifest his lust for power.

This project is intended to present an indepth analysis of Abacha's political transition programme. It intends to identify the specific roles the various international organisations played to scuttle Abacha from achieving his selfish plans of staying in power. It will also analyse the strategy adopted by General Abacha.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.

This research work is intended to dwell on specific roles played by primary as well as secondary actors in the global scene to institute democracy in the polity referred to as Nigeria particularly during the period 1993-1998.

- The role played by the United States by providing funds to prodemocracy campaigners to mount persistent pressure on the government through internal media campaign and exposing the anti-democratic traits and bad human rights record of the regime.

- Equally divastating to Abacha regime was the suspension of Nigeria from the

commonwealth as a result of its inhuman posture.

- Britain suspend all forms of military assitance to Nigeria.

- Nigeria lost its traditional friends like Britain, United States, Canada due to its undemocratic record.

HYPOTHESES.

This research is predicated on the following hypotheses

- The international community has a direct influence on democratic struggle in Nigeria.

THEORETICAL FRAME WORK.

The frame work of analysis adopted in this study is power theory. Power in this sense denotes how best a nation can utilise its might, resources, people, technical skills effectively to achieve its objectives. The power theory takes cognisance of the existence of a number of sovereign political actors with specific but unequal powers, the existence of some small, intermediate and super powers, there is persistent competition among nations, as well as periodic confrontations and possible conflict among them[8]. According to John Stoessinger, power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations[9]

In the conduct of foreign policy, national interest is an important element. In the conduct of their external relations, nations adopt a common principle, of no

eternal allies neither eternal enemies. Individual national interests are eternal and the promotion, of those interests becomes the primary pursuit of these nations[10] President De gaule of France declared, "nations have no feeling but only interests[11]" The Brookings Institute defined national interest as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts[12]. Contemporary international political scene is pervaded by tactical schemes, manipulations and intimidation to secure compliance or score a foreign policy objective.

END NOTES

1. Hans Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations. International Politics as a struggle for power p. 246.
2. Thisday Newspaper, May 3, 2000.
3. Time International Magazine November 15, 1999 p. 50.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid p. 48.
6. Ibid p. 50
7. Sabo Bako. Nigeria and West African Subregion handout for MIAO Students (1999) P.43.
8. John Stoessinger. The Might of Nations. World Politics in out time (1966) p. 76-78.
9. Joseph Frankel. National Interest (1970) p. 18.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid p. 19.
12. The Brookings Institution. Major problems of the U.S Foreign Policy 1953, 54 & 55 p. 378-9.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW.

In recent times, western liberal democratic systems have been gaining ground in most developing societies. Military coups and counter coups have been out fashioned and outgrown. A large body of literature exist in the academics bordering on state and democracy as well as on political transition.

Political transition in Africa are classified into three broad categories: transition from one party state, apartheid and the military. The various means strategies and tactics adopted in the three cases can also be through transformation, transplacement and replacement as the case may be. This important development has attracted the attention of many scholars. Some literature have dwelt on the military in politics, mode of transition and even give credit to the military. Others have criticised military involvement in politics and have condemned their mode of political transition as directed at protecting their vested interests.

Aka (1999)[1] contend that the military have done a great deal in Africa to promote democratic governance. His, is an attempt to put into proper perspective military contribution to democratisation on the continent. Just as the army can jeopadise democratisation it can also intervene to push democratisation forward. Within less than a decade in post cold war period soldiers were increasingly intervening through various means, including coups to protect civilian incumbents

and disobeying orders to shoot protesters agitating for political change in favour of democracy[2]. Consensus needs to be forged between soldiers and civilians around reforms to install civilian supremacy, while respecting the military's need to maintain professionalism and have some voice in national security policy. Most arguements about military's bias against democracy is in the final analysis derived from the nature of the army. Soldiers violate human rights, conduct transition programme in an antidemocratic manner, but the military is an inherently authoritarian establishment. Soldiers move by orders.[3] Given its inherent nature it is naive to expect the military to change its operational mode and conduct public affairs in any manner contrary to authoritarian fashion it knows too well. Philip C. Aka (1996) condemned some scholars who have associated military rule and democracy amounting to unacceptable contradiction of terms.[4] The real contradiction according to him is to expect military governments, created through the ferocity of violence to conduct public business in a democratic manner. On soldiers and political institutionalisation, Aka maintained that there is nothing autocratic about army retarding political institutionalisation. In many societies the opportunity the army has for political creativity may be the last real chance towards reforms. Institutionalisation is not an exclusive preserve of civilian regimes. He insisted that institutionalisation should not be narrowed down to political parties.[5] In Nigeria under General Babangida, the administrative system was restructured, states created, local governments reorganised and the economy reshaped. Military rulers can be instrumental in bringing about social transformation and opening the door

for more democratic governance, like the case of Burkina Faso and Niger. Also Ghana and recently Nigeria witnessed a smooth transition under military. Bratton and Van de Walle (1998)[6] maintain that every action in favour of democracy between 1990-1994 by a prodemocratic military government resulted in the installation of a freely elected government. In a similar vein Huntington writes "There are military coups but there are also military governments and political parties which have come out of the womb of the army.[7]" As witnessed in Mexico and Turkey where political generals created a political party and the political party put an end to political generals.[8]

Philip Aka, Huntington and Boatton and Vande are seen as military apologists. Their positions have been critised by various scholars as simplistic and escapist. That the military are worse as political leaders. They are the most corrupt, inept and form the vanguard for institutional destruction and distortion. In Nigeria Gen. Babangida only succeeded in destroying public institutions by allowing corruption to permeate this institutions. Experience has also shown that the military have destroyed the economies of most African states they ruled.

O. Oyediran (1979) stated the manner most African states including Nigeria gained independence through constitutional negotiations had been the genesis of the subsequent political crisis in Nigeria.[9] Military interventions experienced in Nigeria were the brain child of series of contradictions within the polity, so also political instability. He traced the process to the constitutional background, North-South and ethnic conflicts, minority group politics and finally the chain of immediate

antecedents and the structural dilenmas of the Nigerian military. In a similar vein Pendleton Herring (1967) gave an insight into the polarised party system and the voting pattern during the First Republic. Nigeria as a potential democratic force despite all odds has a productive population, formidable resource base. These inherent features were seen as a bedrock of a virile, and sustainable democracy.[10] He lamented on those vices that might not warrant sustainable democratic process, the multiethnic complexity, illiteracy, under- industrialisation and or underdevelopment of major sectors of the economy. Herring made a final remark that for democracy to thrive and function effectively it must proceed from diversity toward a measure of agreement adequate for working purposes. Along the same line Kyari Tijani (1980) opined that the problem with Nigeria is simply arrogance of power based on complete lack of accountability from its leaders, corruption, lawlessness and police brutality.[11] In his analysis of 1979 general elections, he declared that the election was rigged all other corrupt tendencies graced the elections. The general political process in Nigeria was devoid of accountability, and parochial Primordial appeals were made to initiate reaction of the common man in favour of the ruling class. If this trend persisted Nigeria will be economically and politically worse off. Mike Kwanashie (1986) also talked about the desire and ambitious nature of our military officers to capture and perpetuate in power. Exposing the military to internal politics is another major factor to military takeover power and general political instability[12]. Since independence the military has been called to duty on occasions that were supposed to be purely political. During 1964

federal elections, the army was drafted to maintain law and order and suppress political disturbances so also during TIV riots and other similar internal disorders. Claude Welch noted that between 1958 and 1985 there had been a total of 65 successful power seizures largely by soldiers in Africa. The struggle to control state power and its use for class formation remains the central issue in Nigerian politics and political economy. As a result of this factor since attainment of independence the country has witnessed 3/4 of its political existence under military rule. This singular process contributed immensely in undermining democracy. The military was transformed from what was termed a refuge for up country illiterates to a powerful arm of Nigerian bourgeasie whose material interests are in consistent conflict with those of other segments of the class, leading to coups and counter coups. The trend, up to early 90s, had been connivance between the western capitalist nations and factions of African military elites to topple governments for their mutual benefits, particularly when the domestic ruling elites begin to prove incapable of steering the economy as directed. In his contribution to the role of Nigerian military and democratisation process, John Ayam (1986) centred on the interest the military want to protect after their programmed political transition. These interests may be core or peripheral that have direct linkage with the stability of democratic process in the polity[13]. Actually the factors/forces that compel the military to embark on transition may be as a result of fission within the military. Elements that are bitterly against military involvement into politics and governance could force the military to move in that direction. Instability within the military could

then compel disengagement process. The government of General Gowon suffered from such crisis. He further argued that the friction within the army may be as a result of societal forces; ethnic divisions could prove to be potentially divisive force especially where one ethnic group dominates the political scene. Under General Ironsi the tension that followed the January 15th 1966 coup prompted the July 66 countercoup that generated the initial idea to transit to democracy which Gowon reneged thereby triggering another coup detat by young elements in the army led by General Murtala Mohammed.

The military are societal elites who cannot be isolated from the general society. Charges of corruption, abuse of office, mismanagement could trigger transition process. Ayam further stated that the objective for which the military staged a coup could be another explanation. Murtala/Obasanjo regimes had the objective of sanitising the corruption ridden public service and returning the country back to democracy in 1979. According to Hassan A. Salihu (1999) unelected regimes have been responsible for stagnation or stunted economic growth which the African continent has so far recorded.[14]

Western democracies are now emphasising on the linkage between democratic transition to the economic assistance they dish out to developing nations.[15] There is a strong tie between disbursement of aids, grants, and loans and democratisation. The United Nations which is largely under the control of United States and the West entirely has been throwing its weight behind democracy.[16]

The recent wind of democracy blowing across Africa seems to be aftermath of the failure of unelected regimes. In African context the concept of democracy is seen more in terms of economic empowerment, rather than the earlier postulation that the experience of Soviet Union with Pestroika and Glansost inspired wind of change in Africa[17]. Salihu further contends that it is becoming increasingly acceptable that economic impoverishment meted out to citizens by the military despots that have ruled the various countries ignited prodemocracy movements and subsequent democratisation process we are witnessing today. The hash economic conditions brought about by one party state did also triggered agitations for genuine democratisation. To further buttress his position, Salihu gave the recent experiences as in Zaire, Togo, Gambia, Nigeria (under General Abacha) and others. The process was intended to maintain the unelected regimes in power. In other cases the tendency is towards diarchy or military guided democracy. He further elaborated on the Nigerian situation. The transition to democracy in Nigeria was in stages and spanning over a period of five or more years. The transition process started from the lowest level to the highest level with every stage being carefully and tactfully monitored to ensure no stone was left unturned in the self succession bid of the incumbent military man.

Kayode Soremekun (1998) has the opinion that the international forces which seek to democratise Africa certainly go beyond the well known agency of international organisations, the media, international financial institutions and nongovernmental organisations as well as conservative forces in London, Paris, and

Washington[18].

In what he termed the recession of the cold war Kayode demonstrated the linkage between current democratization process in most parts of the globe to the recession of the power play between Moscow and Washington[19]. From the view point of the United States, the enemy out there has disappeared and it is time to focus seemingly on the high minded ideal of democracy[20]. In a related literature, Ebenezer Obadere (1999) discussed extensively on democratic transition and political violence in Nigeria[21]. The annulment of June 12 presidential election and its consequences, which generated spate of violence throughout the country, especially around Lagos and South Western Nigeria where Abiola comes from. Obadere concluded that the military in Nigeria seems disposed to use the pretext of political instability to prolong the transition programme and to delay handing over to civilians. Neither of these bodes well for the future of democracy in Nigeria[22].

P.F. Wilmot (1979) reviewed one party state in Ghana under Dr. Kwame Nkurumah. Under colonial regime the Convention People Party(C.P.P) was a formidable force to reckon with in Ghanaian nationalist struggle. The political ideology of the C.P.P. under Dr. Kwame Nkurumah was inclined towards a United Africa. There were other political parties who had shown some measure of commitment in fighting colonialism like Ashanti Youth Organisation. C.P.P. gained the upper hand due to its nationalist posture. In 1956 election, the party had 100 percent of the seats in the colony. 62% in Trans Volta Togoland, 38% in Ashanti and 43% in the North. As a national government, its performance in economic

development was so impressive that it served as an inspiration to other African countries and to black men everywhere[23].

The party started exhibiting repressive tendencies to political opponents and in its drive towards one party state in 1948 they had to employ repressive means and cruckish methods to win elections. Like the colonial power before it, the C.P.P was learning how to divide and rule. The nationalist party now found itself competing with the enemies of nationalism to exploit subnationalist factionalism in the interest of higher nationalism. Having been taught by the colonianist that they could rule without the people they resorted to dividing the people. The C.P.P was clearly involved in rigging electoral contest. In fact everything else including party ideological education had to be pushed aside to face electoral contest[24]. P.F. Wilmot also quoted Nkurumah "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things else will be added unto to."[25] The C.P.P after capturing political power alienated the masses which can be seen in the concentration of power at the top and in the aparthy and indiscipline at the base. Power was effectively concentrated in the central committee and especially in the hands of the life chairman who personally selected the eight members in addition to himself. The regional and constituency conferences had their key officers selected by the National Executive Council and the Central Committee. The members of these two conferences tended to tell headquarters what it wanted to hear. In fact in Winneba Ideological Institute Dr Nkurumah emphasized that "Central leadership must permeate all the activities of the state[26]." This over centralization led ultimately to the undermining of his

authority. One result of this state of affairs was the incredible spate of rumours and anonymous letters of complaint to Dr. Nkurumah. Denied legitimate channels of communication in party structure, the people turned to the perverted channels of rumour-mongering and character assassination in order to gain contact with the party leader and the central committee.

The elite at first competed with each other to insinuate themselves into the grace of the leader. Then, as the competition became more intense, they sought to discredit each other in order to increase their personal access to, and influence with the leader. Where performance of a function requires competence, the requirements for access are loyalty and personal devotion.

P.F. Willmot concluded that moving too late to excise the corrupt elements from the party, Nkurumah found that these elements were the party. In any event, it was the leader, in whose name his lieutenants had committed their crimes, whose name is held upto the people as a source of fear and calumny.[27] Eventually when the army's trumpet sounded, it was precisely the most loyal lieutenants who return to make their peace with the military and shouted the loudest in denouncing the dictatorship and corruption of Nkurumah.[28]

P.F. Willmot also made an effort to reflect on Guinea's one party state under Sekou Toure. The Democratic party of Guinea (PDG) was the umbrella under which Sekou Toure rose to power[29]. Idea of democracy was based on the fundamental ideas of the political philosophy of the P.D.G. It rejected representative democracy in which according to Sekou Toure "the people recover

their sovereignty on election day, whereafter they return to the condition of slaves.[30]"

Sekou Toure's arguments in favour of the one party state were based on the following fundamental premises especially the communal nature of African life, the need for a high level of political participation and democratic centralism. It is immediately obvious that competition in a multiparty system runs counter to the idea of communalism. The historical reality of such competition in the African context has been the direct opposite of a deep sense of solidarity and fraternity. Mutual respect, concern for the common good and a high conception of equity and social justice.[31] As can be inferred from the basic premises of the philosophy of the PDG the role a social group was allowed to play in politics was determined by its degree of collaboration with and democratization by the colonial power. The military in Guinea were integrated at every level of society. The basic philosophy defining the role of the military is that the soldier is a 'militant under arms.' The Guinean army is completely politicised. The head of the Guinea Armed Forces is a member of the National Political Bureau which is the executive arm of the congress. As a result of this integration, military take-over was excised from Guinea political scene. Hence the modern or westernised elite has presented a special problem for the P.D.G[32] as exhibited in their activities against the state.

Structurally, the P.D.G is a highly articulated series of interactions which make possible the effective translation of its political theory into political action. The chain of hierarchical integration in the party structure stimulated socio-cultural and

economic - development from the local committees (at the lowest level) through the National Congress (the highest administrative body). The National Congress makes policy and the National Political Bureau is the executive arm of the Congress.[33]

Gradually, after independence, the elite sabotaged the organic integration process in Guinea. The elite did not accept the subordinate role cut out for it by the leadership of the PDG. The elite had developed the anti-social individualistic attitudes of its colonial mentors. It had developed the class consciousness, though not the economic power of the western elite.[34] They responded to call of saboteurs and fled in their thousands to France, Ivory Coast and Senegal. In exile, they tried scuttle the regime through constant efforts to overthrow it. In 1970 the Portuguese invaded Guinea with the collaboration of the elite at home and abroad. Guinea's economy, its political system and its military balance had been under constant pressure from these forces (neocolonial elite and their collaborators). Other African elite group in power became hostile to Guinea. With the dramatic opposition of Guinea's internal cohesion and its situation in a divided Africa articulated with western imperialism, there was always the possibility of the will and resolve of Guinea's leaders collapsing. The clash between market women and economic police in 1977 was seen as a crack in Guinea's integration, as a result of which Sekou Toure reconciled with reactionary elements like Houphuet Boigny and Senghor[35]. There were also projected visits by the President of France and reciprocal one by Sekou Toure. The danger according to P.F. Willmot was that Guinea despite its impressive history might be drawn into the mainstream of

conservative/neocolonial group in Africa and betray the cause of pan Africanism and the destiny of the peoples of Africa.[36]

Kenya under Arap Moi is a typical case study of one party state. Besides the parliamentary constitutionalization of a one party autocracy and the vesting in Moi of unlimited power of life and death over his fellow country men and women[37] (Arthur Nwankwo 1990) Moi did not only inherit Jomo Kenyatta's repressive rule but also succeeded in cementing the dependent neocolonial structures. While Kenyatta was discriminatory in his selection of political victims. Moi seems to have declared war on the entire citizenry[38]. The aftermath of 1982 failed coup further aggravated Moi's intolerance of the opposition and subjugated the security of the nation to American and British control. He rounded up all suspected opponents of his regime, workers, students, teachers, other members of the intelligentsia, journalists, doctors, lawyers and even peasants and clamped them in jail. After some hasty and highly secret trials by kangaroo tribunals many of them received capital punishment. The surviving ones like the reknown historian Maina Wa Kinyatti received doses of inhuman treatment and subjected to excruciating anguish in Moi's torture chambers[39] Repressive rule and silencing of any form of opposition begets escalating tension and mounting opposition. The existence of reformers within the regime and their activities towards multipartysm further paved the way for reforms. The activities of Mwakenya (new Kenya) Movement can be sited as a good case study.

We would like to consider few cases on the African Continent and outside,

where similar struggles were involved in the process of evolving a political transition programme and entrenching a lasting democratisation. According to William Cobbett, Barry Munslow and Morris Szeftel(1988). The 80s have seen a massive intensify cation of the struggle against evil apartheid regime both in South Africa and in larger Africa. The struggle also incorporated wider spectrum of society. Maixist, Ploretariat, christians and migrants even whites. In some cases the use of capital was involved to aggravate the situation. Foreign capital began to doubt that apartheid is the best guarantor of its profits. Afro-American business class met with A.N.C. members in Lusaka in 1986 thereby endangering the position of racial capitalism and manifestation of serious challenges ahead of it.[40] The regime was coming under intense pressure to the point that top functionaries talked about inevitable ending of apartheid. Western nations were becoming increasingly in patient for reforms. An array of companies have sold out their South African holding as a result of internal struggle and of international solidarity and pressure. Thereby disputing the state's assertion that unrest was only attributable to the activities of small group of agitators and instigators. the state embarked on detaining serious anti regime members who were bent on subverting apartheid. At a time there were up to 30,000 detainees in various detention Camps without trial. The resultant effect was growing opposition, the residents resorted to more passive yet powerful forms of resistance. There was proliferation of African working class in the forefront of the struggle for democracy and justice. The emergence of the new trade Union federation, the Congress of South African, Trade Unions(COSATU)

which gathers working Class forces into a powerful centre. The A.N.C has become a major force shaping politics in South Africa. Its leaders in prison and in exile have come to be regarded as national leaders. Its colours have become the national colours and its principles have come to stand for a democratic alternative in South Africa.

Richard M. Levin (1988) also remarked that the democratic struggle in South Africa has entered a decisive phase. P.W. Botha ushered in a political reform with double edge combining what is termed reform measures with the full deployment of its repressive and legal apparatuses[41]. As the tempo of massive resistance increased the state's capacity to develop a coherent strategy is in question, the initiative has been lost and no amount of repression can apparently regain it. According to A.S. Mohammed (1999). Between 1974 and 1990 more than thirty countries in Southern Europe, latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government. This "global democratic revolution" is probably the most important political trend in the late 20th century[42]. In certain cases military authoritarian regimes initiated the transition process as in General Morales Bermudez in Peru, in a similar vein General Fernando Matthei, Head of the Chilean Airforce warned "if the transition toward democracy is not initiated promptly, we shall ruin the armed forces in a way no Marxist infiltration could".[43] There are cases where authoritarian leaders believed that they would not lose office having made commitments to restore democratic institutions and being faced with declining legitimacy and support, could attempt to renew their legitimacy

in anticipation that voters would continue them in power, India, Chile and Turkey serve as good examples. Egyptian epileptic democracy could be categorised as reforms initiated by the ruling cabal to entice the west and to open avenues for increased legitimacy, reduce U.S or other sanctions and open the door to economic and military assistance, I.M.F loans, invitations to Washington and international gatherings. In countries like Spain, Brazin, Hungary and Turkey reformers believed that democracy was the "right" form of government and their country should join the club of developed and respected countries through evolving a democratic political system. A.S. Muhammad (1999) said in Soviet Union Gorbachev did not intend to end communist power, the reforms were designed to improve and to moderate, but also to bolster the existing system and make it more acceptable to their societies. In 1989-1990 Gorbachev's liberating reforms appeared to be stimulating comparative upheaval, protests and violence in the Soviet Union. Moving forward toward full scale democratization would mean not only the end of communist power in the Soviet Union, but very probably the end of Soviet Union. Reforms or transformation appeared to have taken lead largely due to his (Gorbachev) greatly improved relations with the West and his global image as a creative humane leader[44].

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is an attempt to review some literature relevant to our topic. The literature reviewed fundamentally centered on democratisation/political

transition programmmes. However the role of international community which is the point of departure of this work seems to have been ignored.

ENDNOTES

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25. Ibid p. 31

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29. Ibid. The political theory of the Democracy party of Guinea p. 35

30. Ibid p. 38

31. Ibid p. 39

32. Ibid p. 41 paragraph 2

33. Ibid p. 42

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40. Review of African Pol. economy No. 40 Dec 1987. Editorial Democratic struggles and apartheid Barbarism p. 3.

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CHAPTER TWO

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter is aimed at providing a historical background to the Nigeria's drive towards democratisation. The chapter will also analyse the various political transition programmes.

Present day Nigeria is the creation of British Colonial regime. Hitherto Nigerian area was inhabited by fragmented multiplicity of ethnic groupings at different stages of political, socio-economic development. Some of these precolonial societies have traces of democratization, the TIV society exercised village democracy, to some extent even the larger political entities have some minimum standard of democratisation. Then the colonial regime came about with its total undemocratic setting, subjugating the people to colonial control, forced labour, and exploitation. Distortion of cultural and political heritage was the major preoccupation of colonial government.

The repressive nature of colonialism necessitated some form of resistance from King Jaja of Opobo and Sultan Attahiru of the Sokoto Caliphate. Mention must be made of Aba women's riots in Eastern Nigeria in the late 1920's.[1] These resistances were geared towards self determination and end to colonial hegemony.

After the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria in 1914, the Nigerian Council was formed. This was a forum that brought together

politicians and were occasionally briefed by the Governor on political affairs. Inspite of that agitations to participate more in the affairs of the state escalated. By 1922, the Cliford Constitution came into force. The constitution was meant to co-opt the nationalist leaders into the colonial government. The major feature was the creation of legislative council with 30 members nominated by the colonial authority while 4 were elected, 3 representing Lagos and one representing Calabar. For Northern Nigeria the Governor makes laws for them. The Clifford Constitution also gave rise to the first ever political party in Nigeria the Nigerian Nationalist Democratic Party (NNDP) under the leadership of Sir Herbert MacCauley. In 1933 Lagos Youth Movement was formed, adopted Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1937 with Barrister H.O. Davis as its Secretary General. In 1938 NYM defeated N.N.D.P in a Lagos council election. As a result of continued struggle by the foremost nationalists political consciousness and participation was aggravated. In 1944 the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon NCNC was formed by the new elite group under Mr. Nnamdi Azikwe. The major preoccupation of N.C.N.C. was to capture political power and lead Nigeria towards independence. Militant radical nationalism was started by this new group.[2]

Nationalist struggle culminated in the final departure of the colonial elites marked by Nigerian independence in October 1st 1960. As a transition period from colonialism to self rule elections were organised, the three dominant parties each had a significant representation particularly in their respective domains (the regions) and at the centre. The alliance between Northern People's Congress (NPC) and

N.C.N.C produced the government at the center.

Manifestations of our inherent differences and acrimonies brought the government down in a bloody coup of January 15th 1966. There was a counter coup in July 1966. The July Coup produced Colonel Yakubu Gowon as the new Head of State.

General Gowon was faced by deep internal crisis that lead to Nigeria Civil War from 1967-1970. At the end of the war, pressure to democratise was mounted on Gowon as a result of which he promised to evolve a transition process that will end his regime in 1976. His failure to keep his promise and usher in a democratic regime motivated another set of military officers to take over the apparatus of governance. General Murtala Mohammad became the new Head of State. One of the major pronouncements of the regime was the need to transit to democracy. Murtala did not live long to see to the implementation of his transition timetable. He was assassinated and was succeeded by Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo as the new Head of State.

Obasanjo implemented to logical conclusion the transition timetable initiated by Murtala. Five political parties were registered by then Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECCO). They are N.P.P., U.P.N., P.R.P., G.N.P.P. and N.P.N. N.P.N clinched control of Federal Government and the military hand over to them and returned to the barracks Shehu Shagari was inaugurated as the new president. He held this position for four years. Shagari's tenure restored Nigeria's lost glory. The international community became more serious about Nigeria. The prestige and

respect blossomed in international organisations.

In December 1993 a coup d'etat terminated the civilian regime of Shagari. Gen. Buhari took over power. The path to democracy was seriously injured or totally distorted. The new military regime had no plan to transit to democracy until it was ousted in a palace coup by the then Chief of Army Staff General Ibrahim Babangida.

IBB'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME.

President Ibrahim Babangida's transition to civil rule programme may clinch the prize for the costliest exercise in the restoration of democracy, ever undertaken in Nigeria. Over Forty Billion Naira was expended. Equally, it is the most prolonged and abused of all democratic arrangements in the history of Nigeria.

The Babangida transition was not based on the true and genuine needs for a peoples democracy. It was a self styled manipulated charade that was to perpetuate the status quo, by its policy formulators, implementors and participants. The transition was spear-headed by the corrupt regime and the military class for two reasons.

First is their desire to acquire political legitimacy for the regime and guarantee its survival in a country where there has continued to be a growing public disenchantment with military rule.

Second, to cultivate the support of the dominant class of old politicians, the business community and critical segments of the Nigerian society and thereby

provide the requisite political atmosphere needed for the pursuit and realisation of I.M.F/World Bank directed capitalist economic reformist policies of S.A.P in the country.

Ademola Oyinlola summed up that thus, "never in the history of this country has governance been personalised by one individual or groups to the benefit of a few and to the insensitivity for the needs of the majority."[3] The Babangida transition was characterised by uncertainty, frequent change in rules by decrees, banning and unbanning of politicians etc.

General Babangida launched his transition programme on 1st July 1987. In his address at the launching, he declared that it was the desire to install a viable and virile democracy and contain the problems associated with the past politics in Nigeria that the transition is designed. The regime set up the Political Bureau with the aim of fashioning out a political ideology for the country. The administration, because of its gimmick of instituting a virile democracy pretended to have embarked on mass political re-orientation and the building of a democratic culture in Nigeria. The regime had to set in motion necessary machinery that will lend sincerity of purpose to the transition agenda. General Babangida had to assure political success, the democratic values of tolerance, participation and accommodation which had eluded us in the past, would have been sufficiently learnt. Finally, the regime believes that the stability of this nation is very much linked to political education of the military. Such education will enable us respect our nations constitution as sovereign. The package of political education was to heighten the

values of professionalism as well as restrict the military to the traditional roles of the defence of the nation. Accordingly the machinery set up included the political bureau set up in 1986 which was to co-ordinate a national debate on the political future of the country, there was the constitution review committee, a constituent assembly, the directorate for foods, roads and rural infrastructure (D.I.F.R.R.I), the directorate for mass mobilisation, social justice and economic recovery (MAMSER), the national electoral commission (NEC), the centre for democratic studies (CDS), The Transition to Civil Rule Tribunal, National orientation movement, the National Population Commission and the Code of Conduct Bureau. There is also the better life for rural women programme.

The inauguration of the two government sponsored political parties the Social Democratic Party (S.D.P) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) was the climax of the structural requisites put in place by the Babangida regime in support of the transition programme. All these structures were also heavily funded by the regime and they displayed a spending pattern that did not suggest the existence of economic hardship.

The government in 1989 dissolved the 13 political associations that sought recognition and registration as political parties for what it terms "money bag" influence on these associations. This, ostensibly was to show the regimes commitment to equitable politics between the rich and poor. The government establishment of the S.D.P and N.R.C drawing up their constitutions and manifestos, funded the parties, built the secretariat of the parties national, state and

local government levels at huge cost, and provision of other logistics etc. Government also maintained a very visible control mechanism in relation to the parties in a manner that lends credence to the view that they were government parastatals than political parties, e.g. The operation of the parties were closely monitored by the government. This was with particular reference to the recruitment of members, and organisation of congress of the parties at various levels to elect party officials and candidates, which were not only monitored by government security agents, but were sometimes brought under the control of government dictated guidelines .

The transition concept of "new breedism", which identified the need to replace old politicians with new crop of "new breed" politician was to chart the course for a new political order. A blanket ban was consequently placed on all old politicians, baring them from participating in the politics of the transition programme. Certain categories of Nigerians, particularly radical intellectuals, outspoken and courageous critics, public commentators, workers, student and trade unionists were identified and described by the regime as "extremist", "trouble makers" and "confusionists", were accordingly barred from the political transition process. In place of the old politicians and these so called extremists the regime declared its preferences, faith and favour for the so-called new breed politicians.

The introduction of the open-ballot system, aimed at solving the problem of the electoral mal-practices and manipulations associated with the secret ballot system, operated in the past was another main feature of the transition programme.

Others were in the introduction of a number of reforms into the country's local government system to enhance their autonomy, efficiency, effectiveness and promote popular participation. There was also the adoption of the option of the option A4 formula of choosing presidential candidates which according to a C.L.O report, "is a military option that can only work in a regimented set up not true democracy[4]. It can be seen from the above analysis that the transition programme packaged by Babangida was un-workable. There were many of structural defects, which paved the way for the annulment of June 12 1993 elections and the re-emergence of military regime once more. It can be seen that even if the programme would have ultimately ended in civil rule, actual democratic rule would still have remained a remote possibility.

The military institution remains the greatest single threat to the transition programme of General Babangida, this is because of the repression as well as assault on the political, civil and legal rights of the people. The military by constantly violating laid down rules and laws through promulgation of decrees to justify their repressive tendencies have shown that they are a liability. The military transition of Babangida failed to provide the free political atmosphere needed for the resolution of political differences and contradictions. The Nigerian transitional experience under Babangida also show that the military tend to nullify and abolish all legitimate avenues and conditions for free political association and activism as well as the reconciliation of social interest[5]. For example by the combined effect of decrees 1 and 13 of 1984, the military turned it self into a political monster

accountable to no one, it could violate the most fundamental right and no court would be permitted to entertain any question arising from its acts.

Also in October 1990, N.E.C Chairman Prof. Humphery Nwosu announced that the December 8 Local government elections would be by open ballot. The local government (Basic Constitutional and transitional provision) Decree No. 15 of 1989 specifically provided in section 48(2) that elections would be held by secret ballot. When advised of this fact government reacted through Prof. Jery Gana, Chairman of M.A.M.S.E.R) that "well, it is illegal but we can amend to accommodate it also".[6] Though the C.L.O. filed the suit challenging the use of open ballot system two days later the suit was dismissed before the December 8 elections. Tell news magazine was also closed down on May 2, 1993 by Babangida security apparatus for carrying out a story titled "Transition 21 traps against hand over"

The stringent condition set by government to political association for registration between 1988 and 1989 cast a lot of doubt on the transition, the setting up of the government club of S.D.P and N.R.C was a tragedy for the third republic because, it did not evolve from the people and was a marriage of an incompatible alliance that was doomed to fall from the onset in short it showed the shaky foundation on which the transition was built, the polarization of only two ideological blocks under the little to right and little to left slogans was a ploy to deceive opportunities into the government club of N.R.C and S.D.P. The formation of the party negates all known principles of democracy known in world politics.

Another reason why the Babangida transition cannot lead to true democracy is the class character of the ruling military regime and the class character of the Nigerian bourgeoisie, both which have consolidated their position with the structural adjustment programme.

The class composition was such that the ruling military/civilian alliance was not to relinquish power, under any guise to any outsider within the traditional ruling blocs. The transition was tailored to protect the elites and their wealth, therefore no genuine attempt were made by the political class to fight the military, force her out or make her follow the true path of democracy.

The 1989 coup led by Mamman Vasta and the April 22, 1990 coup led by Gideon Orka were a vote of no confidence passed on the Babangida regime and his policies including the transition programme by a segment of the military. The desperate cancellation of the August - September 1992 presidential primaries also serve as a move to check-mate the transition and prolong his selfish interest and that of the ruling class.

Inspite of all these contradictions inherent in the political economy of the transition programme, it was evidently clear that there were general shift and deviation from true democratic values. The emergence of Moshood Abiola and Bashir Tofa ultimately using the unpopular option A4 formula at both the Jos and Port-Harcourt convention of the S.D.P and N.R.C respectively was characterised by accusation of rigging and malpractice.

To worsen matters the activity of (A.B.N), Association for Better Nigeria,

believed to be sponsored by the regime cast a lot of doubt on the transition especially, the association's continued mobilization for prolongation of military rule under Babangida.

The events before the June 12 presidential elections are clear manifestations of a disjointed, haphazard, ill intentioned motive to perpetuate military rule.

As part of his plan to ensure the military are in perfect control even after he stepped down, I.B.B ensured that General Sani Abacha remained the Defence Secretary.

Pressures from both internal and external forces prevailed on Gen. Babangida consequence of which in August 27 1993 the military strong man relinquished power. The appointment of a Kangaroo Interim Government (ING) headed by Chief Earnest Shonekan marked the end of Babangida's 8 years of military dictatorship.

The I.N.G was to face myriad of problems among which are crisis of legitimacy and lack of authority. The country was at the badge of collapse as a section of the polity does not pay allegiance to the Interim National Government (the Southern Western States).

Earnest Shonekan and his team were sacked by the Secretary of Defence in the I.N.G. General Sani Abacha. Abacha's Coup took us to a new phase in Nigerian history and history of democratic transitions in Nigeria.

GENERAL ABACHA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

INTRODUCTION

General Abacha is one Head of State many Nigerians grossly under estimated. Ironically, he has exhibited the greatest capacity to survive both at home and within the international community. There were series of workers strike aimed at frustrating the junta to relinquish power. The nation was at a time in total black out there was no water, electricity and fuel supplies all aimed at restoring June 12 presidential elections. The government did not react immediately, some saw it as cowardise, while some view it as a mark of failure.

When he made the declaration that enough is enough, Abacha descended on the striking workers, prodemocracy activists and all form of opposition ruthlessly. By the time he crushed these opposing groups and even perceived enemies of his regime, he installed fear on the minds of Nigerians and everybody was silenced. He started with M.K.O. Abiola by the time Abiola declared himself the president of Nigeria, he was declared wanted by the regime and was abducted and put under house arrest, Sultan Dasuki the most exalted traditional ruler in Nigeria and the most powerful was removed from office that sent shivers and fears to members of his class. General Yar'adua was also put under detention for urging Abacha to speed up transition to democracy. The Abacha regime accused General Obasanjo and Yar'adua for conspiracy to topple the government using certain elements in the military in 1993. This malicious allegation resulted to passing of death sentence by a special military tribunal which was later committed to life sentence for Yar'adua

and 15 years jail term for Obasanjo.

The rational behind silencing of all forms of opposition at all cost was to remove all impediments to General Abacha's rule as he consolidates in power and realised what he was missing before he took control of apparatus of government. The paraphanalia of power was getting into him, he became power thirst and could do anything to retain that power. He could sacrifice enormous state resources to cling unto power at the peril of Nigerian people who linger in abject poverty.

ABACHA'S POLICIES/PROGRAMMES

No government ever survived by repressive policies alone. As one of its strategies to lure support from fellow country men and women, the regime of general Sani Abacha woed into its fold people of high repute and integrity in the society. It was in that endeavor Gen. Buhari (a former Head of State) was brought into their camp. The introduction of Petroleum(Special) Trust Fund(PTF), failed Banks tribunal also by ensuring steady fuel supply constituted some of the major popular decisions taken by the regime to muster support from the public. Some analysts posited that these programmes were aimed at paving ground for launching Abacha's presidential ambition. As time goes on actions and utterances from government circles vindicated the earlier claim as Abacha and his cronies began to exhibit the General's selfish plan for the country. Abacha Cabal initiated the constitutional conference to discuss on modalities on political transition, the mode of transition and the system of government to be adopted. Abacha and his cohorts

used all resources and power available to them to penetrate the members of constitutional conference. Some were given cash gratifications, favours and some were promised top government appointments if they succumb to Abacha's agenda of adopting a prolonged transition to civil democracy. The Constituent Assembly was divided into two, those in government camp and the opposition group lead by late General Yar'adua. There were series of cash trading, one group trying to outsmart the other. It was in that struggle Yar'adua was engulfed into coup planning and had been in government detention till his death in December 8, 1997. Abacha men took charge of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. Earlier on as one of their tactics to maintain Abacha perpetually in power half of the members of the Constituent Assembly were nominated by government to pursue a designed agenda. The leadership of the assembly was also imposed to pursue and accomplish a pre-planned agenda. At the end of their deliberations, the assembly members resolved that the military should hand over power to a democratically elected government by October 1998.

A prolonged route to democracy was adopted. Abacha group found their way. The next step would be how to manipulate the political transition programme in favour of Abacha. Some of the methods adopted in this respect included persistent media campaign and propaganda depicting Abacha as the only messiah Nigeria has. Due to ungovernable nature of Nigerian state and coupled with perpetual crisis and threat to break up only Abacha was fit to preside over Nigeria affairs. The media propaganda claimed that Abacha had transformed the economy

positively. Another tactic deployed was planting bombs at strategic places by government operatives and blame NADECO for it. This correspond to proverbial saying "to give dog a bad name in order to hand it." There was an explosion in Ilorin during launching of Family Support Programme in Kwara State, Lagos has witnessed many, Kaduna too witnessed bomb explosion in Dubar Hotel. Liabilities for such acts were shifted to the opposition. There were thousand and one write ups in our daily newspapers and magazines urging Gen. Abacha to continue in power[7]. "Abacha lays out a complete network of cheer leaders and seemingly populist programmes to persuade Nigerians to hand him a bland cheque to inscribe Exit 2010"[8]. Abacha's methods and tactics are unique, with alternate employment of the carrot and stick he has managed to succeed where almost everybody gave him very little chance to[9]. In his dealing with trade unions Abacha has shown another side of himself which is the perfect understanding of the Nigerian mentality. For two weeks the General did not react and when he choose to deal with NUPENG he descended heavily on them. The game plan was to allow the people feel the impact of the fuel scarcity occasionally by the strike. All Nigerians wanted was fuel and became less interested in why NUPENG had go to on strike in the first place. By so doing Abacha succeeded in pushing the blame from himself to the NUPENG executives. He employed same tactics with ASUU.

Abacha was so smart, he penetrated virtually all the segments of Nigerian society. He percified the traditional rulers with limousine car gifts and those major traditional rulers not known to oppose Abacha were on the vision 2010 team and

are expected to take the transformation message to the grassroots. With regards to soldiers the PTF has promised to spend 20 percent of its annual portfolio on improving their welfare and improvement in pay and facilities. This carrot was to ensure the support of his immediate constituency ensuring that they will not disrupt his transformation plans. Lecturers were also taken care of. After his protracted battle with the lecturers Abacha seems set to appease them with the plan to increase their salary by as much as 200 percent[10]. What the General seeks to achieve with this is to sell the impression that his administration needs not to be forced into improving the lives of its citizens.

ABACHA'S STRATEGY TO RETAIN POWER;

" CARROT AND STICK APPROACH "

The two front runners for leadership of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) Adams Oshiomole and Sylvester Ejiofor are both on the vision 2010 committee. The civil society is woed by the feeling of relief that P.T.F essential commodities will get to them soonest. If this happens most Nigerians long used to steep prices might then be unwilling to join the effort to stop Abacha from succeeding himself. Even politicians who felt touched by excluding them from the transformation process were incorporated into vision 2010 committee. Umaru Shinkafi, Bamanga Tukur fall into this category. Adamu Chiroma, Tom Ikimi, Abubakar Rimi were given ministerial appointments. The inclusion of the publisher of a leading newspaper group and two editors of leading newspapers into the vision 2010

committee, journalists will be eventually convinced to see sense and support the enthronement of true and lasting democracy under Abacha. Also leader of Lagos Market Women Alhaja Abibat Mogaji was in the vision 2010 committee. Centre of opposition and boiling point of antijunta hegemony was bribed with a military governor whose populist policies generated support for the regime.

Abacha also through Gen. Oladipo Diya succeeded in woeing support of some Yoruba traditional rulers into their fold. The Abacha junta also despite its clamp down an authentic leaders of the Yoruba has secretly courted other ethnic yorubas. The intention was to divide them and create a new yoruba leadership that would be both loyal and subservient to it[11].

Media campaigns continued on daily basis on the achievements of Abacha regime particularly on the economy. For the first time in 10 years budget surplus was deliberated in Nigeria in 1996. Government's assertion in this regards is subject to criticisms from economic and political economy experts.

Party formation and composition of party leadership was skewed to pave way for Abacha boys. The registration of parties process was carefully streamlined to frustrate and side line genuine political associations with credible politicians who could if allowed to be registered distabilise Abacha's self succession bid. Government advisers on party system advised against registering any credible association. All Nigeria congress due to their popularity among Nigerians.

Radical or Socialists, oriented associations like P.R.P United Democratic Party (U.D.P.) were completely negated.

Unknown, unpopular associations with shallow grasp of rudiments of democracy, party formation and party system were registered. That development was not by chance but a calculated design to make Abacha life President of Nigeria. Abacha surrounded himself with incompetent officials, errand boys who could not articulate neither visualise the dangers ahead.

Some of the strategies adopted by Abacha cabal was the formation of retrogressive group to counter the activities of pro-democracy associations. They employ propaganda devices to justify Abacha's self succession. Enormous resources was pumped to finance the activities of YEAA. A Youth organisation manned by renowned crooks, rascals an agents of distabilisation and mischeap. Another group containing elderly elements like Tanko Yakasai and Brig. Abba Kyrari was floated to counter G34 an association of prodemocracy elites. YEAA an Abacha campaign outfit organised a two (2) minion man march in march 1998 in Abuja to give a false picture of Abacha's popularity to local and international observers. Over =N=800 million was reported to have been spent to sponsor the march. The self succession plan was characterised by prodigal spending on useless unproductive ventures.

PARTY PRIMARY ELECTIONS

The five political parties that emerged were Abacha's surrogates. The leadership of the 5 parties were planted by the government. Everything was preplanned before their various conventions. The U.N.C.P. appeared to have been

given preference. This was demonstrated by the series of elections conducted from local government up to primary elections at state level. Unprincipled politicians and bureaucrats struggling to grasp political power rushed enmass to join the U.N.C.P. because it was a sure ticket to capture power[12].

UNCP sphere headed nominating Abacha as party Presidential flag bearer even though he was not a party member other parties followed suit. Only Grass roots Democratic (GDM) was their some sign of opposition.

In its April 20 1998 National Convention in Maiduguri, The Grassroots Democratic Party (GDM) one of the junta's recognised parties was to produce its presidential flag bearers. The contenders were M.D. Yusuf, Tunji Braithwaite and General Abacha. There was strong protest from supporters of Yusuf and Braithwaite against including Abacha's name among the contestants. Braithwaite lamented "This is armed robbery in operation[13].

The party constitution was amended to give room for Abacha a non-party member and a military man in uniform. Abacha was nominated in absentia by one Amos Yadukso from Plateau State. Braithwaite withdrew from the race in protest leaving Yusuf and Abacha. Abacha polled 1368 votes to Yusuf's alleged 408 votes. Abacha was declared winner.

With the G.D.M. episode Abacha was the sole candidate for five parties, he became a consensus candidate in a multiparty democracy. What a ridicule to multipartism. They continued with the campaign. Isa Muhammed U.N.C.P. Chairman declared "There is no alternative to Abacha"[14]. Posters carrying images

of the late dictator were paraded throughout Nigeria. Abacha was portrayed as the only human being capable of presiding over affairs of Nigerian state.

NIGERIA'S EFFORT TO PROFEL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Although Nigeria is susceptible to the International forces interest which seek to democratise the continent, the country's leaders have also been able to exploit the contradictions inherent in these forces and interests in order to stall the consummation of the democratic ferment in the country. The regime's foreign policy posture changed as a counter to western pressure. To this end Nigeria acquired some new friends in France, North Korea, China, Russia, Libya, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey and many others.

In contrast, the socialist government in France in May 1997 took a conciliatory line toward Nigeria, including ruling out the possibility of excluding Nigeria from playing in the 1998 world cup soccer tournament to be held in France (despite EU measures banning sports links). General Abacha also attended the December 1996 Francophone summit in Bukina Faso and in January 1997 announced that French would become a second official language of Nigeria. The French government has on several occasions granted visas on humanitarian grounds" to member of the Nigeria government theoretically covered by the ban on visas. It has been reported that the French are planning to oppose renewal of visa restriction.

As a result in softer French line Nigeria has moved the European office of

the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to Paris from London.

Also in the same vein, the Dutch also faced criticism on the ground that a Nigeria delegation was given visa when Netherlands was holding the presidency in the EU. Nigeria was invited to attend a meeting in Mastrict of government leaders from 15 European bloc and its seventy ACP parties. The European parliament objected to the invitation but the Dutch Foreign Secretary said that the visa restrictions only applied to "Nigerian authorities travelling to Europe for private reasons." The Dutch spokesman went on to say that the boycott was not intended to hinder important political discussion on the future relation between ACP and the EU. The Dutch were of the opinion that Nigeria is a very prominent member of the ACP group without Nigeria, the talks between ACP and the EU would be less significant[15]. Abacha regime was exaggerating its achievements to the world and was canvassing for support through economic gratifications to its new friends. all these were attempts to get more support to pursue the self succession plan.

End Notes

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CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will be devoted to analysing the role of International Community in Nigerian Democratic Struggles 1993-1998.

To prove the claim that the international community, particularly, the Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America and Britain actually played a major role in the democratisation of Nigeria during the period under review. This work does not negate the internal forces in the struggle to entrench democratic ethics in Nigeria. There is no doubt these internal struggles played a major role. Some of the organised opposition and threat to the ruling junta headed by General Abacha included the Civil Liberties Organisations (C.L.O) Committee for Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), Association of Democratic Lawyers, M.D. Yusuf and his associates within the GDM and later the Movement for Democratic Justice (MDJ), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) NADECO, Campaign for Democracy (CD) and Nigerian Medical Council (NMA) etc, kept the Abacha regime on its toes throughout the transition period up to his death. These organisations withstood all sorts of humiliation, victimisation, assault and assassination attempts. They challenged the regime on the way and manner it was handling the transition process, human rights abuse, rule of law and the need for a verile democracy.

The end of the cold war demonstrated the linkage between the democratization process in most parts of the globe to the collapse of socialism or the end of the cold war era[1]. From the United States view point the enemy has disappeared and it was time to focus seemingly on the high ideals of democracy[2]. Successive U.S. administrations are indebted to plans for the fulfillment of the democratic agenda, but such plans could not be articulated until the end of the cold war as witnessed during the tenure of George Bush and now Clinton. The organisation of American States also lent its weight to the world wide democratic momentum. In June 1991 in Santiago, the O.A.S. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on representative democracy. This resolution transformed the O.A.S. into an organisation for which democracy is a condition for membership and an objective[3].

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The defeaning call for democracy from the international community is one of the realities our foreign policy had to contend with[4]. The general feeling in the International arena was that Nigeria was not progressing enough towards democracy.

In November 17 1993, General Sani Abacha took over power. The coup received widespread condemnation at home and among the Committee of Nations. The United States, Britain, Canada, South Africa and multilateral organisations like the United Nations, Commonwealth were in the forefront in attacking the new

military elites[5]. In its first policy pronouncement on the coup the U.S. Government issued a proclamation restricting entry into the United States for Nigerian government officials, their families and military personnel (Soremekun 1998)

The activities of exiled Nigerians abroad since the inception of the regime (Abacha regime) arose world opinion on the dictatorship in Nigeria to the extent that a United Nations fact finding mission was constituted to visit the country to observe for itself the happenings in Nigeria (Soremekun 1998, Saliu 1999)[6].

FIFA

The decision by FIFA to annul the hosting of the 1995 Junior World Cup in Nigeria was not unconnected with the protest against the military coupled with the fact that the United States is believed to be teleguiding the affairs of the organisation.

THE UNITED STATES

Furthermore, the U.S also suspended $450,000 aids for military education and training, altogether almost $2.8 million bilateral assistance and a million dollar grant were put in the cooler. In an editorial of the voice of America immediately after the coup of November 18 1993 expressed the feeling of U.S citizenry "The United States expressed deep disappointment with the people of Nigeria at the military regime's continuing refusal to respect their will, that is why the U.S will continue to enforce the sanctions that were imposed following the annulment of the

June 12 1993 presidential elections. Also at the inauguration of president Nelson Mandela of South Africa in May 1994 General Abacha was snubbed by Al-Gore U.S Vice President and given a cold treatment not befitting a leader of the most populous black nation on earth and the major contributor towards dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. Chief M.K.O. Abiola who went based on personal invitation from Mandela held talks with the United States delegation.

As the military regime of Gen. Abacha clinged unto power relations with the rest of the world particularly the United States was getting weaker, sanctions continued to mount and Nigerias International image further degenerated. In November 1995 the U.S broadened pre-existing restrictions on military links by banning the sales and repair of military goods. Also promulgated a policy that Nigerian Government officials visiting the U.N or any international financial institution within the U.S remain within 25 miles of that organisation.

In 1997 the U.S congress passed a bill that decertified Nigeria based on its role in narcotics trafficking. Also under section 481 of the foreign assistance act the congress veto against loans to Nigeria in six multilateral development banks. The U.S government also cut its assistance through U.S I.D.[7] direct flights to Nigeria were banned for safety reasons. All these appeared more political than actual. Anything that has to do with Nigeria or in favour of Nigeria was nipped in the bud in protest to military regime.

In his A.B.U. Zaria address October 7 1998 U.S Ambassador to Nigeria William Twaddell made mention of U.S law enforcement agencies have documented

a direct link between 4-1-9 and Nigerian heroen trafficking networks and those dubious acts attenuate Nigerias International reputation and its ability to develop normal economic relations with the rest of the world. Also Reverend Jesse Jackson U.S. president's special envoy for the promotion of human rights and democracy in Africa in his visit to Nigeria March 8-11-1999 stressed that "There are high stakes in this democracy being successful." adding that "all the world is looking at Nigeria[8]."

Relations between the US and Nigeria hit a low in September 1997 when armed soldiers and police broke up a farewell party being observed by Nigerian human rights and pro-democracy group for out-going US ambassador Walter Carrington. Carrington won the admiration of the human-rights community for his outspoken stand against the Nigeria government's excesses. The Nigeria government had allege that he was involved in the series of bombing for which a treason trial against Soyinka and others was instituted in March 1997. These allegation have been angrily denied by the US government which also protested vehemently at the disruption of the farewell party.

A draft "Nigerian Democracy Act" first introduced in November 1995 was re-introduced in congress in June 1997 by Representative Donald Pyne. Proposing sanctions beyond those already in place. Including a ban on air links and on new investment in the energy sector and a freeze on asset of members of the Nigeria government held in the United State.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES.

The European Union adopted a common position on Nigeria. In its meeting of November 20, 1995, and December 1995, its members states agreed to impose air restrictions on members (including civilians) of the Nigeria Provisional Ruling Council and their families in addition to members of the Nigerian military and security forces and their families[9]. To expel all military personnel attached to the diplomatic mission of Nigerian in member states and to withdraw all military personnel attached to the diplomatic mission of EU members in Nigeria; to deny visas to official delegations in the fields of sports and to national teams; to introduce prospective embargo on arms, ammunition and military equipments and to suspend development cooperation except to projects through non-governmental organisations and local civilian authorities. These sanctions renewable six month remain in place.

A C P

The ACP-EU joint assembly (at which representatives of the European parliament and of the African Caribbean and pacific, (ACP) countries met twice a year) has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning human rights violations in Nigeria and calling on EU member states to put pressure on the Nigerian government[10]. In March 1997 after hearing representatives of exiled Nigerian opposition group including Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka and NADECO leader Chief Anthony Enahoro, the assembly called upon the European council to introduce an

embargo on Nigerian oil. The European parliament also adopted in November 1996 a resolution supporting an international oil embargo.

BRITAIN

Being Nigeria's, former colonial master Britain had to throw its weight in favour of democracy in Nigeria in both bilateral and multilateral fora, following May 1st election in Britain and in line with a statement that human right would be at the heart of its foreign policy. The new labour government immediately began to take a much stronger stance on Nigeria than the conservative had done. Criticising Nigeria's leadership as "hostile and definitely unhelpful"[11] in his statement Britain foreign secretary Robin Cook in July 1997, criticised the transition programme stating that the process of establishing political parties has been one sided so as to guarantee that there would be one serious candidate - (resulting in) the transition of General Abacha to president Abacha[12]. The British government said they cannot accept that. Britain has strongly supported Nigeria's continued suspension from the Commonwealth and has also indicated more sanctions on Nigeria.

CANADA

Canadian reaction to Nigerian situation went from subtle to brazen opposition. A few examples will suffice.

In recognition of the June 12 elections, the Canadian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Christian Stewart met Professor Wole Soyinka on June 12th, 1995

and pledge her country's support for a quick return to democratic rule[13].

In his opening address at Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) in Auckland on 9th November, 1995, the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Cretan, called on member states to emerge with a common and united position against what he called flagrant violation of basic principle of democracy and the basic tenets of human rights in Nigeria.

The Canadian government actively encouraged the activities of anti-Nigerian government elements on its soil, and in some cases, has given them financial and logistic support, through Canadian non-governmental organisations. Some of these organisations include the Montreal-based Nigeria Action Network, the Concerned Group for Democratic Change in Nigeria (CGDCN), the organisation for Human Rights and democracy in Nigeria (OHRDN) and the Canadian University Services overseas (CUSO).

The Canadian government was also access to have aided the escape of some prominent Nigerians outside the country. The Canadian government has since down their embassy in Nigeria[14].

THE COMMONWEALTH

Following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni environmental activist, Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth and was given two years within which to comply with the terms of 1991 Harare Commonwealth declaration which commit Commonwealth members to democratic

governance failing which it would face expulsion[15].

At the same meeting (CHOGM) adopted the Milbrook Commonwealth action programme on the Harare Commonwealth declaration which included a commitment to take measure in response to violations of the Harare principles. A commonwealth action group (CWAG) was appointed to deal with the persistence violations. committed itself to examining in the first instance Nigeria case.

On April 23, 1996 following the second C.W.A.G. meeting recommended that (CW) member states implement subtle sanctions against Nigeria including visa restrictions and denial of educational facilities to members of the ruling junta and their families, withdrawal of military attache from Nigeria and cessation of military training an embargo and the export of arms, a visa based ban on sparting contacts and the down grading of diplomatic and cultural links.

A mission from CMAG finally visited Nigeria for two days in November 1996 although the Nigeria government insisted that the visit was not a fact - finding mission, which had already been embark on by the UN, but a continuation of dialogue and discussion. The government refused to allow members of the mission to visit political prisoners or members of pro-democracy and human rights movements, ensuring that all meetings were with government supporters. The Canadian delegation did not join the mission The CMAG met several times in 1997. In July 1997 for instance the CMAG held public hearings on the situation in Nigeria - a first for the Commonwealth - to which Nigeria human-rights and opposition groups as well as international groups, including human rights watch

were invited to make submissions.

Finally, in February 1997, African Heads of government from Commonwealth countries except Nigeria met in Gaborone, Botswana at a round table on democracy and good governance in Africa. The concluding statement stated that: Heads of government affirmed their commitment to the principles contained in the Harare commonwealth declaration which included the protection and promotion of democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, they stressed particular the universally accepted ingredient of democracy which included the rights of a people to elect freely their government. The primary of the rule of law and the independence of the Judiciary, the rights of freedom of expression and association; and the transparency and accountability of government.

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AND ITS MEMBERS

African countries remained generally reluctant to condemn Nigeria's human rights record in strong terms in the period under review. In October 1996, an OAU spokesman stated in response to proposals by US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher during an African tour that "we have to be very careful about isolating Nigeria"[16], preferring "diplomatic pressures' to sanctions. Also in October an assessment team from the OAU came to evaluate Nigeria's peace keeping capability. During the OAU summit in Harare in June 1997, Nigeria's internal problems were not mentioned either by OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim

or by newly elected OAU Chairman Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The reluctance may have been influenced by the fact that Nigeria is one of the largest financial contributors to the OAU while Salim was seeking re-election.

Most African countries maintained close relations with Nigeria. Nigeria and Ethiopia signs cooperation agreement in October 1996 for example, while a high level delegation of Nigeria military officers travelled to Namibia in March 1997 for a one week familiarization visit. The former Tunisian ambassador to Nigeria at a farewell dinner given to him by the Nigerian government advised the Nigerian government to ignore "the ranting of the west".

West African countries like Ghana, Ivory Coast and Senegal despite their unwillingness to endorse Nigeria's intervention in Sierra-Leone were not prepared to speak out against Nigeria in other areas.

UNITED NATIONS.

In April 1996, the United Nations Commission in Human rights adopted a resolution in which it requested two thematic special rappoteurs (on the independence of Judges and lawyers and the extra-judicial summary or arbitrary execution) to submit a report at the next session of the commission in 1997 and an interim report of the General Assembly in 1996 extended negotiation with the Nigerian government for the special rappoteurs to undertake a mission to Nigeria finally collapsed shortly after before the 1997 session due to the Nigerian government failure to agree to their standard term of reference.[17]

Despite the Nigerian governments lack of cooperation the special rappoteurs eventually published a report on the basis of information supplied by other organisations. The hard-hitting report concluded among other things that, "the rule of law is on the verge of collapse"[18], and Nigeria was in violation of a member of international obligation. The report made a series of recommendation in particular urging the commission to appoint a special rapporteur on Nigeria.

On April 7, 1997, the Commission adopted a resolution (Number 53 of 1997) expressing with deep concern human rights situation in Nigeria and prevailed on the chairman of the Commission to appoint a special rappoteur on Nigeria.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE IMPOSED SANCTIONS IN NIGERIA.

As a result of multiple sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the international community, Nigerian Economy has suffered a serious set back.

According to the former Secretary to the Federal Government, Alhaji Aminu Saleh, in 1994 he put the loss at over =N=20 billion, the figure according to the source arose from declining economic fortunes, lack of foreign investment portfolio and increasing divestment by foreign investors since 1993 when the uncertainty began to dictate the pace[19].

Diplomatic sources put the loss occasioned by the annulment and the consequence face-off with the European Union (EU) alone at over $30 billion. The sources also cited the stoppage of commonwealth aid programmes, development aid grants, technical assistance, manpower training and endowment fund for

democracy from western nations - Canada, and the United States, divestment as instance where Nigeria has lost a fortune.

In corroborating the above points, Dr. Kayode Familari said; "There is a big loss to the economy in terms of manufacturing output. This invered economic growth and the GDP." He said due to the political crisis, there is capital flight leading to loss of technical and foreign assistance as a result of the sanctions placed on the nation. That the economy itself has been suffering from prolonged or stretched recession"[20].

In similar vein, the former Governor of Anambra State, Chukwuemeka Ezeife, said "we have lost a lot and our economy is in trouble"[21]. He further said that Nigeria had lost "economically, politically, socially and psychologically."

In the wake of the June annulment, the United States had announced preliminary sanctions targeted at the military, Britain trailed her soul mate by freezing aid and sought the cooperation of European Union leading to stoppage of development assistance worth $96 million as at late 1993.

Before the annulment in 1993, the official rate of the Naira was =N=21.99 to one dollar and =N=32 at a parallel market. A pound exchanged for =N=51.50 by 1997, the exchange rate shot up to =N=85 to a dollar and =N=160 to a pound[22].

Also affected by the sanctions is Nigeria external debt which rose from 28.7 billion dollars in 1993, to $29.4b in 1994 and $32.6b in 1995[23] which indirectly can be linked to the sanctions, for Nigeria's inability to ganner enough resources from oil revenue to service these external debts giving birth to unprecedented hike in the

debt portfolio.

Managing Director of Enterprise Stock Brother PLC, Mr. Alex Osunde bemoaned what he described as the parlous state of the economy which he linked with the political impasse coupled with the violation of human rights[24]. "The hostile environment has become a permanent feature. This is a country where recession subsists for so long. It is obvious that the economy is becoming comatose as a result of the sanctions, he said. He continues that manufacturing giants like PZ, UTC and UAC, are gradually turning to property investment. He added that this shows the country is in a dare stress and something must be done about it.

According to Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) economic review July-Dec. 1993 stated that the political crisis in the last quota of 1993 culminated in the persistent depreciation of the naira, excessive budget deficit, continued inflationary spiral and escalation of interest rates[25]. The net of which was noticeable decline in G.D.P from 3-6 percent in 1992 to 2.9 percent by end of 1993. Capacity utilisation stood at 28.89 percent compared to 35.77 percent in the first half of 1993. Foreign aid was at a state of stagnation.

IMF & W.B.

The IMF and the World Bank blacklisted Nigeria as part of the international pressure to democratise. To this end loans worth $2886.33 million being proposed by the World Bank to finance forestry, rural infrastructure, irrigation and secondary education projects in Nigeria between 1994-95 was stopped[26].

The (CBN) Central Bank of Nigeria, in 1994 reported increase in the number of trade dispute from 9.4 percent to 17.5 percent compared with 6.6 percent in 1992[27].

The volume of oil exports to the United States, the largest buyer of Nigeria oil, dropped to 257.3 million barrels valued at =N=91.89 billion in 1994. Indicating a reduction by 2.6 million barrel compared to the previous year[28].

The CBN also confirmed that the increase in the total value of exports in the past five years was reversed in 1994 owing to the fall in average price and the slow down in oil sector[29]. Consequently, the value of Exports decline from =N=218.8 billion to =N=206.28 billion in 1994 representing drop of 5.7 percent.

The impact of the sanctions was further highlighted following the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other of his kinsmen in 1995, Nov. 10.

The additional sanctions though hunted also has greatly affected some governmental programmes. The diseases control unit of the Federal Ministry of Health which handles the campaign on AIDS collapsed because of the withdrawal of assistance from the United State.

Also the quarterly allocation which used to come to the Unit through the US Agency For International Development (USAID) has dried up gone with that is the Unit's campaign in all the states of the federation which, hitherto were carried out in form of workshops lectures, sermons and training sessions. Part of the grant usually made available to University researchers was no longer forth coming. Opportunities to travel out and mix freely with members of the academia in

international seminars, workshops seized to exist.

As a result of the decertification of Nigeria - NDLEA enjoy only counted support from the American government in curbing the Narcotic trade.

The same attitude informed the United States governments declaration of Nigeria airports unsafe for flight between the United State and Nigeria. A Nigeria Airways officials said "ban on flights between the two countries has cost Nigeria a lot of revenue."

POLICY SHIFT TO ASIA.

As a result of hostile posture from Euro-American axis, Nigeria shifted diplomatic attention to the South East Asia. An observer of unfolding events in Nigeria might not dissociate the policy change to the annulment of June 12 presidential elections and the reactions pressures and consequences that have been brought to bear as a result of it.

The most prominent aspect of Nigerian new foreign policy direction was the development of ties with the Republic of China. In 1996 Chinese Vice Premier and foreign minister visited Nigeria. A return visit was undertaken by high powered delegation from Nigeria. There was an agreement allowing Chinese companies to partake in oil exploration and production in Nigeria; the refurbishment of the long neglected Nigerian Railway Corporation; the dredging of seaports at Calabar and Warri; and the development of mass housing projects. Trade exchange between Nigeria and China in 1995 had reached $210 million during 1994, indicating an

increased economic interaction[30]. Furthermore, the then First Lady Maryam Abacha led a large delegation to the Fourth World Conference on Women, also Nigeria's Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi led Nigerian delegation to the Third session of Sino-Nigeria Economic, Trade and Technological Cooperation - Commission in China in 1996[31].

Also another platform, the D8, was founded and Nigeria was a founding member. The D8 was an association of developing nations in Asia and Africa with the aim of fostering diplomatic, commercial and industrial ties among the member states. It was part of an attempt to protect western domination of their economies[32].

Other Asian Tigers like Malaysia from where Nigeria borrowed the concept of visioning, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran form part of the D8.

The Prime Minister of Turkey Nicmettin Erbakan led a delegation to Nigeria in 1996 with the objective of strengthening economic and cultural ties between the two countries. As the end of the visit, a trade pact was signed aimed at increasing the yearly turnover of bilateral trade to over $500 million. General Abacha instructed the opening of an embassy immediately in the Turkish Capital Ankara[33].

Nigeria moved towards strong ties with Iraq and Libya when they were wallowing almost helplessly under the suffocating sanctions of the United Nations. When North Korea had been rendered an international beggar nation by incessant flood and when China was seeking rescue from western media blackmail for her human rights records, Nigeria had to go close to these nations for support and bilateral relations.

The policy shift to Asia was dictated largely by national prestige and economic necessity. Western media propaganda was parading Nigeria .a pariahnation, damaging its credibility as a result Nigeria was becoming increasingly diplomatically isolated among its traditional friends including South Africa. In position of sanctions was formidable threat to our economy there were calls for extension of sanctions to include petroleum. Hence Nigeria had look for new friends and not to rely heavily on a single bloc for all her needs.

GENERAL FINDINGS.

The following observations can be made from the analysis above.

- The International Community played a significant role in the struggle for democratization in Nigeria.
- Internal struggles equally played a very important role in the fight against military dictatorship and unrelented efforts to democratise.
- Sanctions imposed by the United States and Commonwealth are more critical.
- These findings have corroborated my hypothesis that "The International Community has a direct influence on democratic struggle in Nigeria" which is the aim of the research.

RECOMMENDATION.

The ultimate goal of the various struggles by both the local as well as International actors was to attain democracy and liberalism in Nigeria. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that Nigerians ought to stand firm and be resolute in their defence of the hard earned democracy. Nigeria had come a long way from colonialism to independence through various military regimes. Finally we are fortunate to be governed by elected representatives. The process of transition has claimed lives of eminent personalities as well as the masses in the country. The economy has suffered, political institutions and structures received some battering. Economic crisis manifested in the collapse of local manufacturing industries, control of the commanding heights of the economy by neocolonial forces in collaboration with comprado elites in our society.

Nigerians cannot continue to depend on the international community to institute democracy and civilised governance. The people should struggle to maintain this democracy. The key to success in this regard remains in political education, awareness, socio-political consciousness, removal of obstacles to freedom of expression, understanding of our various differences with a view to accommodating one another; de-emphsize tribal and religious sentiments; preach the gospel of nationalism and promotion of the interest of the country above all other interests; economic empowerment of the people, security of lives and property and meting of appropriate sanction on perpetrators of violence, ethnicity and all forms of vices that are likely to hinder integration among our people.

Any military intervention should be followed by general resistance from the masses as well as the working class in both the public and private sectors. Nigerians should come out in the streets to resist any form of military intervention under any guise. Also the military should be enlightened to stick to their traditional role of defending the territorial integrity of the country.

As dividend of democracy, the international community should give all the necessary assistance and encouragement for a vérile democracy to prevail in Nigeria. This should be done in form of grants, aids, debt forgiveness, debt rescheduling and direct foreign investment (F.D.I) into our economy. The international community should help to reduce the economic sufferings and abject poverty bedeviling our people. Job opportunities should be provided by the establishment of new industries. The international community should encourage the present civilian regime to uplift the socio-economic status of the people for a lasting democracy.

Some of the fears nursed against democracy are among others, misrule, lack of good governance and nepotism. Others include the spate of violence against fellow citizens for holding different opinions on issues of common concern, as witnessed in the various riots in Lagos, Ibadan, Sagamu and Niger Delta area. Equally volatile is the recent sectarian riots in Kaduna, which spilled over to Kachia, Aba, Owerri and some neighbouring villages. Deep rooted ethnicity and tribal acrimonies should be discouraged. The new elected leaders should find a lasting solution to these crises.

The present regime of President Obasanjo must prove that it is better than military regime otherwise people will be disillusioned. To have credibility Nigeria ought to sustain democracy. It is on record that Nigeria spear headed enthronment of democracy in Liberia and also Nigeria saw to the reinstatement of democratically elected government of Tejan Kabba in Sierra Leone. We must therefore put our house in order, and sustain the leadership role earned for decades. The steps taken by President Obasanjo towards regional integration are in the right direction. Obasanjo must put all efforts in place to consolidate the already existing cordial relations and integration among ECOWAS member states. As manifested by closer relations with countries in the subregion particularly Ghana. Currently Ghana and Nigeria are looking into solid investments in oil and mineral sectors of the two economics. Ghana is to purchase 30% of Nigeria's liquified Natural Gas[34]. The two countries are also looking towards common Central Bank and common currency.

As part of Guinea Commission, comprising some West African States like Nigeria, Benin Republic, Republic of Guinea and Ghana. Nigeria has also taken bold initiative to resuscitate the Chad Basin Commission also comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Central African Republic.

Nigeria is a leader in Africa and must work towards that direction. Apparently President Obasanjo has realised the important role Nigeria ought to play to ensure prosperity, good governance, regional security, civil democratic rule and greater integration in Africa and particularly in West African subregion.

Finally two things now remain to be seen first whether democracy will usher

in prosperity, better standard of living and good governance. The second issue is whether the military and their collaborators in civil society will allow democracy to thrive. I share the belief that the worst civilian regime is better than the best military regime. Democracy is the bedrock of advancement of society, people are free to exercise their rights and exhibit their skills. The combination of the two begueze socio economic and political development. We remain to see whether democracy will lift us forward in the new millennium.

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