An Assessment of the Military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State (2010-2015)

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AUGUST, 2016

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA NIGERIA

AUGUST, 2016

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation titled **An Assessment of the Military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State (2010-2015)** has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other Institution.

_____ _____

Wasiu Femi OMOJARABI Date

Certification

This dissertation entitled **An Assessment of the Military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State (2010-2015)** by Wasiu Femi OMOJARABI, meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to all those who lost their lives in the ‘man inhumanity to man’ on the Plateau and those struggling constantly with all that they have for the sake of peace.

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List of Acronyms

ABU:	Ahmadu Bello University
AVP:	Alternative to Violence Project
CCTS:	Committee for Conflict Transformation Support
CEDDERT:	Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training
CEPID:	Centre for Peace Initiative and Development
CIMIC:	Civil Military Cooperation
CPP:	Community Peace Partnership
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Rehabilitation
DFID:	Department for International Development
DPI:	Damietta Peace Initiatives
EBO:	Effect Based Operation
ECOSOC:	Economic and Social Council
EPRT:	Emergency Preparedness and Response Team
EU:	European Union
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FOBs:	Forward Operation Bases
FOMWAN:	Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
GOs:	Governmental Organisations
HD:	Humanitarian Dialogue
ICIN:	Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria
INEC:	Independent National Electoral commission
INTERCEP:	International Centre for Peace Charities and Human Developments
JDPC:	Justice Development and Peace Caritas
IBRD:	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
KIL:	Kashim Ibrahim Library

LGA:	Local Government Area
MARWOPNET:	Mano River Union Peace Network
MTD:	Multi-Track Diplomacy
NAM:	Non- Aligned Movement
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBS:	National Bureau of Statistics
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIEO:	New International Economic Order
NPC:	National Population Commission
NSRP:	Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Project
PACT:	Pan African Conflict Trainees
PPPN:	Plateau Peace Partnership Network
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STF:	Special Task force
UNICEF:	United Nations Children Fund
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Children Organisation
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
WANEP:	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WIPNET:	Women in Peacebuilding Network
WHO:	World Health Organisations

Abstract

Since 2001, Jos North LGA in particular and Plateau State in general has been confronted with series of ethno-religious conflicts which have led to loss of lives and properties. The incessant nature of the conflict led to the drafting in of a special military command dubbed "Special Task Force" to quell the conflict. Within the same area of study, various Non-Governmental Organisations were found to have been involved in the process of peacebuilding. This research therefore assesses the interventions of the military Special Task Force (STF) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in peacebuilding initiatives in Jos North with a view to unravel the impact their intervention has had on the peacebuilding process. The objectives of the research therefore are: to examine the various peacebuilding initiatives of the STF and the NGOs, to ascertain if there are areas of collaborations between the two agencies and to assess the impact that the interventions of the two agencies has had on the peacebuilding process in Jos North. Both primary and secondary sources of data collection were utilised for this study. Three survey instruments were used to collect the primary data namely; in-depth interview, questionnaire and participant observation, while the secondary data were collected using documentary method. The data derived was therefore quantitatively and qualitatively presented and analysed. The research adopted Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory as an explanatory framework to analyse the diverse agencies involved in the peacebuilding process with greater emphasis on the role of the military as an arm of government and Non-Governmental Organisations as a part of civil society. The research found thatboth agencies have and still are carrying out various peacebuilding initiatives such as interreligious dialogue, medical outreaches, peace talks, peace rally among others in the study area. The research also established the fact that both the STF and the NGOs collaborate in the area of information sharing, joint hosting of peace talks and peace rally among others. The research also shows that the initiatives of the two agencies have impacted positively on the peacebuilding process and very importantly, in view of the mistrust for the military in peacebuilding process, the military actually has a very fundamental role in peacebuilding as demonstrated in the area of study. In view of the findings, the research proffers the following recommendations: first, there is a need for improved partnership and collaboration between the military and the NGOs so as to further entrench the peace attained so far in the area; secondly, government must make efforts to address the underlining factors that breed violence in the area through the provision of employment opportunities to tackle poverty and inequalities; thirdly, there is the need for individuals to volunteer for peace in their communities so as to sustain the peace process.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Prior to the outbreak of the first major violence in Plateau State in 1994, the peaceful nature of Jos North Local Government Area in particular and the State in general was a known fact for a very long time. It is this peaceful nature and the serenity of the State that earned it the title "Home of Peace and Tourism. In 2001, another violent conflict took place in Jos North which later spread to other areas within the State. From this period, violence became incessant in the area as it occurred in 2002, 2004, 2008 in different parts of the state. These violent conflicts led to the loss of lives and propriety worth millions of naira. Also a breach in social cohesion and mistrust among the different religious and ethnic groups that had lived together for many years grew.

Governments both at the Federal as well as the State have made several efforts to quell the conflict as well as in building lasting peace. Among the actions taken by government includes; the setting up of several commissions of inquiry like the Fiberesima Commission of 1994, the Nikki Tobi commission of 2001/2002, the Bola Ajibola commission of 2008/2009 among others to ascertain the remote and immediate causes of crisis, identify persons or groups that engineers such crisis and recommend measures to prevent future occurrence. The imposition of curfew which spanned several hours in the area, the use of the police and military to quell violence whenever they arise were notable among governmental initiatives to halt violence. However, all of the aforementioned efforts did not stop violence in the area as conflict became a recurring decimal of the area.

Consequently, the Federal Government of Nigeria on the 21stJanuary, 2010 instituted a military Special Task Force (STF) mandated to restore law and order in the area in aid of civil authorities in line with section 217 (2c) of the 1999 constitution.The force was initially designed to last for 90 days and made up of only the men and officers of the armed forces. However, their structure changed later to include paramilitary agencies like the, Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Prison Service, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, etc. In the wake of the decline in violence within Jos North coupled with the need to build durable peace in the area, the STF remained in the city performing some peacebuilding functions like organising community football matches; organising interfaith meetings and so on.

The need to build a durable peace in the study area also witnessed the growth in the number of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), youth bodies, women organisations among others. In line with this, several NGOs had played and have continued to play the role of peacebuilding in Jos and its environs. Notable among these NGOs are: League for Human Rights, Justice Development and Peace Commission/Caritas (JDPC), The Young Ambassadors for Community Peace and Interfaith Foundation (YACPIF), The Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID), International Centre for Peace Charities and Human Developments (INTERCEP) among other NGOs.

These NGOs have been involved in several efforts towards building durable peace in Jos and its environments. This they have done *inter alia*, awareness campaigns, matching for peace, interfaith dialogue, the protection of the rights of the less privileged, skill acquisition and capacity building programmes.

In their different capacity to bring about positive peace in the area, the STF and the NGOs have had to collaborate in certain areas. This collaboration can be seen in the area of joint organisation of dialogue that is geared towards building bridges across warring communities and groups. Also there have been peace rallies and football matches that are jointly hosted by the STF and some NGOs.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The involvement of the Nigerian military in peacebuilding along with civil society organisations poses a problem of compatibility largely due to the orientation of the army for interstate confrontations. Also suspicion and mistrust arise due to the negative experiences Nigerians have had with military involvement in civil matters as demonstrated in Odi, Bayelsa State; ZakiBiam in Benue State among others where military intervention in civil matters led to serious abuse of human rights. In Jos North and other parts of Plateau State, there arose perceptions by certain groups that the military is partial in its intervention and thus has no role building peace in the state.

This research therefore investigates the intervention of the military STF and NGOs in peacebuilding initiatives in Jos North LGA with a view to ascertaining the impact that the involvement of the two agencies has had on the peace process between 2010 and 2015.

1.3 Research Questions

i. What are the various initiatives carried out by the STF and NGOs towards peacebuilding in the area of study?
ii. Are there areas of collaborations between the two agencies in peacebuilding process in the area of study?
iii. What is the impact of their intervention on the peace process in the area of study?

iv. What are challenges encountered in building peace in the area of study?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

In order to answer the above mentioned research questions, the following research objectives have been raised:

i. To examine the various peacebuilding initiatives carried out by both the STF and NGOs in the area of study.

ii. To ascertain whether or not there are areas of collaboration between the two agencies in peacebuilding process.

iii. To assess the impact of their interventions on the peacebuilding process in the area of study.

iv. To suggest measures of overcoming challenges encountered in building peace in the area of study.

1.5 Research Propositions

In accordance with the research questions and objectives raised, this research is built around the following propositions:

i. TheSTF and NGOs are fully involved in various community-based peacebuilding initiatives.

ii. There are no areas of collaboration between the STF and NGOs due to differences in organisational mandate.

iii. The intervention of the two agencies has had a positive impact on the peace process in the study area.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Several studies had been carried out on the crises in Jos North however most of the studies concentrated on the role of judicial and legislative arm of government, religious groups, interfaith groups and community-based organisations in peacebuilding in Jos and Plateau State. Therehas been no study on the role of the military in peacebuilding process in the study area. Similarly,to be best knowledge of the researcher, no work had been done to explicate the dimension of collaboration between the military and civil organisations inpeacebuilding process in Jos North. This research therefore is significant in that it makes a modest contribution in explicating the importance of the intervention of the military in peacebuilding process as well as their collaboration with Non-Governmental Organisations in the peace process in Jos North LGA of Plateau State.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research focuses on the Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State. It covers only the area of peacebuilding efforts of the military represented by the STF and the civil society represented by NGOs between 2010 and 2015. The research assesses the activities of three NGOs among several NGOs in the study area. They are the Damietta Peace Initiatives (DPI), the Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria (ICIN) and Justice Development and Peace Commission/Caritas (JDPC). They were selected due to their grassroots focus in the peacebuilding process.

The rationale for adopting 2010 as the base year is that the STF was instituted in that year and this study is expected to terminate in 2015. Jos North was chosen due to the centrality of the

metropolis in the crisis situation in terms of the casualty recorded and because it is the centre in which the STF was drafted.

The first limitation to this study is the difficulty encountered in accessing some of the informants for in-depth interview. The research selected two sector commanders of the STF within Jos North for interview as well as the Commanding Officer of the Military Police. The research also selected field soldiers of the STF for interviews and questionnaire administration. All requests to interview these personnel were turned down and instead the researcher was directed to the STF spokesperson as he was said to be the interface between the force and the general public. The researcher went further to get link from colleagues of these commanders but request for interviews were turned down again maintaining that it was an organisational procedure for only the STF spokesperson to relate with researchers and media practitioners.

Another limitation to the study is the challenges faced in reaching the informants from the NGOs selected for this study asappointment with the researcher and his team were severally postponed. Theresearcher had to relocate temporarily to Jos North so as to be able to interview all the informants from the NGOs. The researcher had to also attend some of the peacebuilding workshops of the selected NGOs so as to get access to the informants. Also limitations were posed in the area of covering the entire wards of the local government. Hence, the researcher had to employ ten research assistants who helped in administering the questionnaires as well as assisted in some of the interview sessions. Despite the close monitoring of the questionnaires by the researcher and his team, only 319 (83.1%) of the questionnaires were filled and duly returned.However, since the return rate was above 80% the analysis was based on it.

1.8 Organisation of Chapters

This research is organised into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction comprising the background to the study, statement of research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, research propositions, significance of the study, scope and limitations and chapter organisation of the study.

Chapter two deal with the literature review and theoretical framework while chapter three is an explicit explanation of the methodology used for the study. This involves the methods of data collection and that of data analysis. Chapter four is the presentation and analysis of the intervention of the STF and NGOs in peacebuilding initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State while chapter five is the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature in the field of peacebuilding along with a review of the theoretical perspective that fits into the study. The chapter presents the concept of peacebuilding, theoretical issues in peacebuilding; the dimensions to peacebuilding; the role of the military and NGOs in peacebuilding as well as military and NGOs collaboration in peacebuilding. Also, the chapter presents the theoretical framework (Conflict Transformation Theory), the limitations of the theory and its relevance as an analytical framework for this study.

2.2 Concept of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is one of the three instruments of peace aside peacekeeping and peacemaking (Galtung, 1975). It is a process of preventing violence conflict from occurring, limit escalation where it has occurred and also take measures to avoid a relapse to conflict where truce has been achieved (Ghali, 1992). The essential meaning of peacebuilding is highly contentious. The meaning of peacebuilding one renders depends on the particular concept and definition of peace one adopts. The conception and definition one adopts will influence the consequent understanding of peacebuilding as well, what one perceive as the cause of a conflict will also influence what meaning will be given to peacebuilding (De Coning, 2005; Paffenholz,2009; Holt, 2011; Alger, 2014).

When trying to determine what peacebuilding is, the discussion invariably focuses on what structures and relationship lend themselves to a peaceful society beyond the mere absence of

war (Holt, 2011). Holt goes on to assert that peacebuilding definition ranges from normative approach to conflict resolution to a programme-driven definition. However, she opined that peacebuilding can only be described but not defined; she therefore described peacebuilding as "any activity undertaken during the period of transition from war to peace, the sum of which amounts to a situation where peace is sustained" (Holt, 2011: 19). She went further to identify peacebuilders as the UN, World Bank and NGOs. The major setback of her conceptualisation is its neglect of the role of the military and the local community in peacebuilding process. Similarly, her definition sees peacebuilding only as a post-war process whereas peacebuilding can exist even without a war.

Rigby (2006) offers another important conceptualisation of peacebuilding. According to him:

> Peacebuilding is a generic term referring to all those activities and initiatives that are intended to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in the aftermath of violence and destructive conflicts. It is only possible where the citizens enjoy a degree of human security such as the possibility of a reversion to organized and large scale violence is minimized (Rigby, 2006: 15).

Rigby's conception of peacebuilding is useful in that it concerns itself with human security and sustainable peacebuilding. It is however found wanting in capturing the other spheres of peacebuilding. By subjecting peacebuilding strictly to post conflict initiatives, he failed to recognise initiatives carried out prior to conflict or as preventive measures to violence.

In another conceptualization, Randle (2006: 19) sees peacebuilding as "the process of putting humpty dumpty together again by building the economic, social and institutional structures necessary for a country to function in a way that provides for at least a modicum of security and well-being for its citizens". This view is highly useful in that it encompasses almost all the aspects of peacebuilding such as human security, economic empowerment, structural

development etc. though it failed to bring the gender context to the fore and as well render an explanation as to who and which institutions is to put the 'humpty dumpty' together.

In their own conception, Barnett, Kim, O'Donnel and Sitea (2007) see peacebuilding as external interventions to prevent eruption or return to armed conflict. They viewed peacebuilding as a post-conflict phenomenon aimed at returning society to order. This definition is highly faulty in the light of many conception that peacebuilding cannot be imposed from outside, it can only be initiated by outsiders but the task of a lasting peace can only be carried out by the community themselves. By failing to discuss the importance of the locals in the peacebuilding process, their conception is limited in scope. Several scholars like Murithi (2009) and Holt (2011) had argued that peacebuilding cannot survive without the involvement of the local people.

The problem of an acceptable conception and view of peacebuilding is not only among scholars; even organizations are caught up in the web for the search of a common definition to peacebuilding. The difference in definition is due mainly to differences in organizational mandates. According to the UN, "peacebuilding is more than the elimination of armed conflict, it involves therefore the creation of a positive peace, elimination of the root causes of conflict so that actors no longer have the motive to use violence to settle differences" (UN Secretariat in Barnett*et al.*, 2007) For the UN, peacebuilding focuses on the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace.

The European Union prefers the term Conflict "Prevention and Management, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction" where the former refers to the desire to prevent the outbreak of violence that is imminent and the facilitation of a broader peace process; the latter is concerned with

the reestablishment of a working economy and institutional capacity. Peacebuilding gained so much international relevance because it falls within the larger humanitarian drive and the desire for a peaceful world.

Like a political symbol, peacebuilding draws everyone without necessarily having the same interest but the same goal. Barnett *et al.* (2007) emphasizes that the different conceptualization leads to differences over appropriate strategies and priorities to bring about peace; some highlight democratic elections, transitional justice and rule of law programmes, others highlight demobilization and private sector reform. This divergence in the name of the same concepts goes to show the problem associated with obtaining a reliable conceptualisation for the concept as well as an acceptable technique to bring about creating peace.

Peacebuilding is a process rather than a precise activity and in that sense must be viewed as a continuum. The International Alert sees it from this process perspective:

> As the employment of measures which consolidate peaceful relations and societal institutions in order to contribute to the creation of an environment which deters the emergence or the escalation of tensions which may lead to violent conflicts (in Lilly, 2002:7).

According to Murithi (2009), peacebuilding involves the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. He goes on to stress that the process involves the strategies to prevent violent conflicts from igniting, escalating or relapsing and that institutions and mechanisms of negotiation, mediation, forgiveness and reconciliation are central to the peacebuilding processes. This perspective of peacebuilding emphasizes peacebuilding as a post-conflict effort, by leaving out the pre-

conflict efforts, his conception is found wanting. Similarly, Shnabel and Ehrhart (2005) views post-conflict peacebuilding as:

> A complex and multi-dimensional, genuinely political process of transformation from a state of war or violent conflict to one of stability and peace, requiring according to Annan "a multifaceted approach, covering diplomatic, political, economic and psycho-social dimensions, and it aims at the installation of both negative and in the long run, positive peace" (Shnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 2-3).

In his own evaluation, De Coning (2005) sees peacebuilding as a complex system consisting of multiple short, medium and long term programmes that simultaneously address both the causes and consequences of a conflict. According to him, in the long term, peacebuilding programmes assist in stabilizing the peace process and preventing a relapse into violent conflict. In the long term, the programmes collectively and cumulatively addresses the root causes of a conflict and lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace requiring a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors which includes; governments, civil society, private sector, international institutions/agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations. De Coning's postulation is encompassing and comprehensive the only problem is its focus on peacebuilding as a top-down approach whereas several scholars have viewed peacebuilding as majorly a bottom-top approach; another shortcoming is his failure to see the primary importance of the local community in the actual process of peacebuilding (Ibeanu, 2006; Jegede, 2011).

Ibeanu (2006) laid emphasis on the indigenous initiatives as the basis upon which any peacebuilding effort can succeed. He argued that peacebuilding seeks to strengthen the prospects for peace through initiatives that foster and support sustainable structures and processes with potentials to enhance peaceful co-existence, decrees the likelihood of the

outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuity of violent conflicts. He reiterates that the central focus of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence and/or break the cycle of violent conflicts. In furtherance to that, Albert (2001) opines that the ultimate aim of peacebuilding is human security which harmonises humanitarian objectives with those of political, economic and social wherewithal. The views of both Ibeanu and Albert are useful in that whatever the approach or mechanism employed, the ultimate aim of any peacebuilding process must be human security. However, Ibeanu fails to see the fact that most indigenous groups do not have the financially and professional capability to engage in meaningful peacebuilding process without the support of some international organisation or governmental institutions.

A very important concept used in place of peacebuilding which has also gained currency among scholars and practitioners on peace is "preventive diplomacy". According to Ghali (1995) preventive diplomacy refers to "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the latter when they occur" (UN, 1992). On his part, Lund (1996) views the concept of peacebuilding as "actions taken in vulnerable places to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change" (in Alger, 2014:24). The pitfall of the definition is that Lund only succeeded in seeing it as actions that are none military but did not capture what those non-military actions are. As for Ghali's conception, if actions are taken after a conflict has occurred, it no longer fits as a preventive action but as a corrective or at best as a failed preventive action.

A scholar who takes a divergence view on the hitherto post-war connotation of peacebuilding is Rechler (1997: 61). He sees peacebuilding as a pre-war phenomenon which he conceptualised as:

> Preventive measures that aim to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; promote and implement human rights and the rights of the minorities, and to promote durable development and the realisation of a just and fair social order in which there is no discrimination based on race or sex.

This shows a very clear departure from the view of many other scholars. It is a useful view of peacebuilding, it is however found wanting in that the issue raised by Rechler are normative such as human rights, rights of minorities, fair social order. He did not expatiate on how these social goods like justice, fair social order can be attained. Peacebuilding, according to Holt (2011) lends itself to trends which encompass theories ranging from political theories, economic theories to religious theories. The first, she says, emphasises on building infrastructure for peace, the second emphasizes developmental approach built around financial security while the third is a people-centred approach which is concerned with reconciliation and forgiveness. Holt further affirmed that peacebuilding can be seen from two angles; the macro and the micro level. At the macro level, the consideration is on creating structures that will make peaceful management of conflict possible. At the micro level, the emphasis is on the unification of warring parties and the transformation of antagonistic relationship into cooperative ones.

The Report of the UN which popularized the concept of peacebuilding (An Agenda for Peace, 1992) listed the following activities as peacebuilding activities:

> Disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human

> rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

The report serves as the search light beaming the path towards understanding peacebuilding, yet it has failed to bring to fore the role of women in peacebuilding. The listed activities fall heavily under the security and political restructuring along liberal democratic line without considering the economic and the grassroots perspective (Paffenholz, 1997).

In summary, the concept of peacebuilding just like peace is a process which entails a lot of activities. The lack of agreed conception is due to the differences in background, mandates or even what the cause of the conflict is thought to be. While post-conflict peacebuilding is important, pre-conflict peacebuilding is equally as important if not more important because it is cheaper and less destructive. The body of literature reviewed shows less consideration for the role of women in peacebuilding as well as the neglect for the importance of the local community in peacebuilding process.

2.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Peacebuilding

There are basically two theoretical perspectives to peacebuilding. These are:

(a) Liberal peacebuilding
(b) Sustainable peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding conceives peacebuilding as short to medium term initiatives aimed at the establishment of institutions as a precondition for the rebuilding of states and societies after wars and creating the preconditions for a liberal democratic peace (Paffenholz, 2009). Peacebuilding within this theoretical perspective is seen as state building, characterised by the fast establishment of security, democratic political structure and economic reforms. Peacebuilding from this spectrum ends when a post-conflict country is perceived by the

international community as being capable of guaranteeing minimum security to its people (Paffenholz, 2009).

Sustainable peacebuilding on the other hand is aimed at establishing positive peace and it is attributed to John Paul Lederach, who viewed peacebuilding as reconciliation within societies. To him, peacebuilding can be achieved through the establishment of structures, processes and training of people within a generation-long time frame. Paffenholz (2009) therefore integrated both conceptions into his own definition. He noted that:

> Peacebuilding aims at preventing and managing armed conflict and sustaining peace after large scale organised violence has ended. Peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional efforts, its scope covers all activities that are linked directly to this objective over 5-10 years. Peacebuilding should create conducive condition for economic reconstruction, development and democratisation as precondition for legitimate democratic order, but should not be equated and thus confused with these concept (Paffenholz, 2009:7).

Building sustainable peace involves not only laying foundation of new institutions but also entails efforts to promote attitudinal and cultural changes. This sustainable peacebuilding perspective is also supported by Rigby (2006:2-3) where he emphasised that sustainable peacebuilding involves (1) the existence of an effective ceasefire (2) functioning administrative system (delivery of basic amenities and a level of law and order sufficient for assuring people's sense of physical and psychological security) (3) non-violent conflict management (4) the development of a working economy (inclusivist and employment generation one) (5) promotion of a culture of inclusivity (post settlement conceive by peace constituencies as inclusive to the point of maintaining and mobilising popular sentiment in favour of the peace) (6) dealing with the past (rebuilding cooperativeness in the parties, a new civic culture) (7) reconciliation initiatives (vital to create forums for dialogue to take place across the boundaries of divided communities, such that the seeds of new forms of co-existence can be sown).

The local population is argued to be essentially at the centre of focus in peacebuilding process. In essence, peacebuilding is not something that can be imposed from outside (Randle, 2006; Rigby, 2006; Murithi, 2009). In his postulation, Randle (2006) posits that all what outsiders can possibly do is to empower indigenous peace constituencies. Though, he was critical of military presence in peacebuilding, he was not totally against military role in peacebuilding. For according to him, the military can aid in construction and rescue work. As well, the military can provide security and have the organisation and equipment to carry out some of the physical tasks that may be needed to get the country moving again after a destructive conflict. A case is Egypt and Libya under interim military leadership after the fall of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gadhafi respectively. He however warned that military actions should be taken only as a last resort.

The arguments of both Randle and Rigby shows lack of trust for the military as an agent of peacebuilding because of their training and mandates which usually is political not humanitarian. The major shortcoming of their position is that it is really going to be difficult to just start rehabilitation or reintegration without first demilitarising and demobilising the warring parties. This is because the role of humanitarian agents which are traditionally peacebuilding agents cannot be carried out in an atmosphere of hostility, hence, the need for military to quell the violence first and then humanitarian agents can come in.

Within the liberal peacebuilding perspective, State institutions are usually boycotted by external interveners which according to Barnett *et al.*(2007) is due to wealthy nations belief that "liberalisation, largely defined as the movement toward democracy, markets and the rule of law is the best way to develop a positive peace in poor ones". They argued that the Liberals equalisation of liberalism with peace is not necessarily true. Thisis because, liberal

peacebuilding rather than eliminate the root causes of conflict, engender liberal democracy which only rekindles the conditions for conflict. In order to prove that point, they posited that 50% of countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years and 72% of peacebuilding operations leave in place authoritarian regimes. They reiterated therefore that the implementation of peacebuilding in particular areas must not be settled by some bureaucratic power but by the recipient states themselves.

The creation of state institutions is a serious agenda for all agencies that is to carry out peacebuilding initiative. Since peacebuilding is synonymous to state building according to the liberal perspective, building a functional, capable state is germane. However, that throws up a dilemma, for to build a strong state, peacebuilders must avoid installing authoritarians; in contrast, leaving behind a weak government might degenerate into a relapse to conflict (Barnett *et al.*, 2007) The loophole in this proposition is that it only looks at conflict as a large scale state concern thereby treating the state as if it is the smallest possible level, whereas, the local communities are there as well as the opposing party to the state.

In his own exposition on peacebuilding as an ethical process, Murithi (2009) maintains that it requires a close partnership, respect and dialogue among all the actors. He is of the view that peacebuilding can only succeed if done on an ethical ground. Similarly, he maintains that "peacebuilding is not something that governments and inter-governmental organisations can do to its people. Rather, it is something that governments and their people have to do together". Peace therefore cannot be entrenched without the involvement of local populations in the design, planning and implementation of the initiatives.

Another issue raised by Murithi (2009) is that peacebuilding is essentially a context-specific issue as such requires adopting a very country or region specific approach to addressing a particular situation. The specific political, economic and social context must also be borne in mind. In a similar vein, Assefa (2009) likens peacebuilding to building a house whereby you start from the foundation, starting from the grassroots to the state level. The process involves NGOs, women groups and youth groups working together for peace and reconciliation in their society. Just like Murithi, he opines that peacebuilding must be place-specific as what worked in one region may not necessarily work in another. This point is proven to be self-evidently true as the real people who started fighting must be involved in the process of building peace once again as shown in the study in Jos North.

The stages involved in peacebuilding are sufficiently explicated by De Coning (2005). He categorises the stages into three namely; (1) stabilisation phase (2) transitional phase (3) consolidation phase. According to him, peacebuilding starts with the end of hostilities, usually with a cease fire agreement. The stabilisation phase has dual purposes; establishing a safe and secure environment and managing the immediate consequences of the conflict through emergency humanitarian programmes. At this stage, internal actors are preoccupied with basic survival and the re-organisation of their social and political systems. Thus, external actors play prominent role here and it takes about 90 days. The relevance of this stage was also demonstrated in the study area whereby the military (STF) was drafted initially to last for just 90 days.

The transitional phase starts with the appointments of an interim government, followed by some form of election or legitimate traditional process to select a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or

otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. At this stage, the humanitarian focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. It spans between one and three years. The consolidation stage is aimed at supporting newly elected government and the civil society with broad range of programmes aimed at reconciliation and nation-building, boasting socio-economic reconstruction, consolidating the rule of law and security sector reform and supporting development programmes across the political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding (De Coning, 2005).

Despite the strength of this postulation, it has only viewed peacebuilding as a post-conflict phenomenon whereasevidence exist in the literature that pre-conflict peacebuilding is equally as important. Also, by taking the state as the smallest possible minimum for analysis is faulty because there exists other levels and actors like warring groups and even individuals in conflict analysis.

Francis (2006) identifies two schools of thoughts in peacebuilding. The first is the top-down where intervention efforts are carried out by powerful outsiders acting as experts, importing their own conception and prescription and ignoring local cultures and capacities. The second is peacebuilding from below which favours respect promotion and use of local human and socio-cultural resources in building peace. For analytical purposes, they can be easily separated but in reality, to have a sustainable peace enshrined, both have to be used together. It is within this context that Albert (2001: 10) argues that:

> Often the outcome (in conflict situation) is a mere pile of peacebuilding stones, rather than a sustainable peace…building sustainable peace is not just a matter of direct intervention… it also requires indirect intervention through development and relief aid, media coverage, or any other activity relating to existing or potential violent conflict.

He further stressed that peacebuilding has to do with repairing relationships, institutions and social facilities and putting in place schemes that can help the disputing communities to be re-united. Also, that with the end of the Second World War was the establishment of Bretton Wood Institutions namely, IMF, IBRD (now World Bank), and GATT (now WTO). He stressed that these institutions were pre-conflict peacebuilding structures in a post conflict sphere. Peacebuilding is usually seen as a post conflict phenomenon, with efforts that are short and medium term but not long term. The lessons learnt in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia led to a reconceptualization of it to include preventive measures since 1995 (Paffenholz, 2009).

Within the international system, peacebuilding can be analysed within the existing theories such as realism, idealism, structuralism, etc. this is because all International Relations (IR) theories are focused on regulating the international system of states thus maintaining peace as security, order and justice. For realist, peacebuilding refers to maintaining stability through hegemonic power and through the preservation of interest. For idealists, peacebuilding aim at achieving peace between nations on the basis of the establishment of norms and standard and through a super entity like the UN which can help in monitoring and regulation. Within the Marxist-Structuralist paradigm, peacebuilding focus on achieving a radical change in the international system, while for the Post-Structuralist, it is about understanding differences and including the discourses on everyday peace of ordinary people into the international debates in an emancipatory sense (Paffenholz, 2009).

In order to achieve the goal of building peace, Notter and Diamond (1996) identified three distinct activities. These are; political, structural and social. Political peacebuilding is about agreements; it deals with establishing political agreements that provide the overall context for

understanding the relationships of the various parties and their resources. It involves building legal infrastructure that can address the political needs and manage the boundaries of peace system, as well as negotiations, fact-finding missions and technical working groups. Structural peacebuilding activities on the other hand involves the creation of middle-level structures which entails economic, military and community infrastructure that supports and creates a new peace system. The activities herein involve creating structures which include systems of behaviour, institutions, concerted actions-that supports the embodiment or implementation of peace culture. Economic development programmes, strengthening democracy and governance, supporting the creation of indigenous NGOs which support peace.

The social peacebuilding is the human, grassroots portion of the process. It deals with feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values and skills as they are held and shared between and among peoples. The activities herein involve; programmes of training or dialogue, or supporting community-building programmes (Notter and Diamond, 1996). In all of the three set of activities, none can exist without the other. For instance, a mere signing of a peace treaty cannot really guarantee sustainable peace. It has to be supported by structures as well as the human relationship to carry on the peace long after seize fire. Unfortunately, government concentrates only on the political peacebuilding at the expense of social and structural peacebuilding.

The Berghorf Foundation (2012) has criticised Western or international organisations for being too bureaucratic, short-termist and financially dependent on governmental donors and therefore accountable to them instead of being accountable to the people. They stress that the need to address social justice is at the heart of transformational peacebuilding, it must

therefore abide by the principles of partnership, multi-partiality and inclusiveness. Ultimately, peacebuilding must not be seen as a rapid response tool but a long-term process which requires time and follow up (Best, 2007)

2.2.2 Dimensions to peacebuilding

Three dimensions to peacebuilding can be identified. They include; stability creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing the socio-economic dimensions of conflict (Barnett *et al.,* 2007, Dunmoye, 2007). The first stage is characterised by cease fire and monitoring combatant, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration programs, security sector reform and arms control for heavy and light weapon system. This stage is characterised by altering structural contradictions. It involves state-building, democratisation, reform of structures that produce the conflict, social justice, human rights among other things (Berghorf Foundation, 2012).

The second dimension concern restoring key state institutions. Peacebuilders either replace the state or partner with it to rebuild basic facilities, public administration, rule of law systems, transportation and communication network, recreate educational and health infrastructure (Barnett *et al.*, 2007). This stage deals with the non-material effects of the conflict aimed at establishing transitional justice (Berghorf Foundation, 2012).

The third dimension involves a peaceful building of society's ability to manage conflict and develop the socio-economic infrastructure necessary for economic development. Peacebuilders at this level are involved in trauma counselling, transitional justice and reconstruction, community dialogue, strengthening civil society organisations, increasing human rights, promoting environmental awareness, assisting with gender empowerment,

building bridges between different community and promoting economic development (Barnett *et al.,* 2007). In the view of BerghorfFoundation (2012), this third stage involves strengthening individual peace capacities; breaking stereotypes; empowering formerly disadvantaged groups and healing trauma and psychological wounds of war. To achieve best results, peacebuilding measures must combine the three dimensions by bringing former conflict parties together to work on improving their economic situation and thus changing individual attitudes.

In another exposition, Barnett *et al.* (2007)categorises the activities involved in peacebuilding into the following: (a) security and military (b) social, economic, developmental and humanitarian (c) political and diplomatic (d) justice and reconciliation. They affirmed that different countries and agencies focus on different aspect of the peacebuilding practice and that the variation is due to the expansion of the mandates of organisations into post-conflict area, reflecting bureaucratic inertia and building on existing areas of comparative advantage.To Lilly (2002) peacebuilding ranges from micro-level changes in the opinions and behaviour of conflicting communities to macro-level institutional changes that address the structural causes of conflict. Among the organisations involved at the macro-level is the UN and its agencies as well as continental and sub-regional mechanisms. At the micro-level, indigenous leadership structures, non-governmental and ecumenical groups are active (Murithi, 2009).

Another dimension to peacebuilding is what Holt (2011) identifies as political, economic and religious/philosophical. On the political side, politics and the development of institutions of some form of representative government is important. This is hinged mainly on liberal democratic structure. For instance, the EU posits that security can be attained and maintained

through spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights. Thus, the thrust of EU, US, UN and even World Bank is on the universalization of liberal ideas as a requisite for peace.

On the economic paradigm, poverty is seen as a major source of conflict. The need therefore to open up markets and enhance the economies of countries is seen as a major means to achieving peace (Holt, 2011).From religious and philosophical perspective, peace is seen as a people-oriented concept, in which religion provides not just a spring for violence but the subtle ground for peace (Holt, 2011). Holt postulation is confirmed in Jos North whereby a study carried out by Korb (2011) concluded that 80% of the agencies involved in peacebuilding in the area are faith based.In practical term, civil society role in peacebuilding is strongly influenced by both the liberal as well as the sustainable peacebuilding dimensions. The major problem however is that the "the professionalization of the civil society peacebuilding has side lined indigenous local efforts for social change and peace and has created dependencies from outside intervention" (Paffenholz, 2009: 18).

2.2.3 The Evolution of Different Approaches to Peacebuilding

The quest for peace at the global level has been of great concern to states engaged in international politics. This claim is confirmed by Alger (2014) where he narrated that diverse approaches were employed in the 19th as well as the 20th centuries to bring about peace on a global level. In the 19th Century, the first tool for peace was diplomacy whereby states maintained embassies in other states and the second tool is the balance of power principle in which each state try to get as much power as any other states so as to prevent the use of the power of one state as a threat to the rest of the states.

Within an institutional framework, The League of Nations provided three other peace tools. These include; collective security, peaceful settlement and arms control/disarmament. Collective security runs contrary to the balance of power system which rather than ensuring peace led to aggression. It provided a basis in which a threat to one state is seen as a threat to the rest of the states thus collective action against the aggressive state. Peaceful settlement of disputes requires states to submit any disagreement to the council for arbitration or judicial settlement. The third tool under the league is arm control or disarmament. Arm races were thought to be the reason for World War I hence, the need to control or reduce the amount of it in possession (Alger, 2014).

Within the United Nations Charter, three additional tools were added. They were; functionalism, self-determination and human rights. Functionalism as a peace tool was to enhance economic and social cooperation that might disrupt normal relationship and even lead to violence. The charter recognised how the economic depression of the 1930s led to strikes, extreme social unrest and violence which contributed to the emergence of totalitarian and aggressive regime in some states. This recognition ultimately led to the creation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) alongside the Security Council.

The second tool under the UN which is self-determination became important as a means to help countries hitherto placed under Trusteeship to develop self-government and to assist them in the progressive development of their political institutions. This culminated in the granting of independence in 1960 to most colonial states.

The third tool is that of Human Rights which inevitably led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947. Sequel to this declaration is the International Treaty on Civil and

Political Rights of 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, treaties on genocide, racial discrimination, women's rights, child's rights, rights of refugee, forced labour and so on (Alger, 2014).

United Nations practice between 1950 and 1989 introduced new set of tools for tackling issue of peace. According to Alger (2014), the cold war period was characterised by the threat posed by the supposed "police men" of the world. Consequently, the UN developed six additional peace tools to deal with the situation. These tools were: (1) peacekeeping (2) economic development (3) international economic equity (4) international communication equity (5) ecological balance (6) governance for the commons.

Peacekeeping as a peace tool involves the deployment of military under the UN command with the mandate to ensure a seize fire and establish buffer zone within a conflict region. This has been employed in; Congo, Cyprus, The Middle East and so on. The efficacy of these missions is highly debateable as many of the countries sooner return to violence after peace agreement are signed (Barnett *et al.*, 2007).

Economic development as a tool for peace became necessary as a result of the independence of many erstwhile colonial states. The need to design economic strategy along western pattern was seen as the only way these new countries can develop which is a *sine qua non* to peace (Alger, 2014). However, the western development strategy did not reduce the poor-rich gap but increased dependence of these countries. The third tool was an agitation by the developing countries to have favourable terms of trade as against aid. Hence, the call for an international economic equity, which was then predicated on Non-Alliance Movement (NAM) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the

platform in which the developing countries called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The next UN practice was the International Communications Equity geared towards giving a fair reportage of the African issues was necessitated by the frustration of developing countries on the issues of NIEO. Consequently, UNESCO mandates saw the need to have a clear understanding of one another's way of life so as to prevent violence. Ecological balance as a peace tool meant the need to safeguard the environment for all which also hold the potentials for international peace (Alger, 2014). The problem with this tool is that the industrialised nations who produce most of the hazardous gas that affects the environment were and still are not willing to take responsibility for the damage to the environment. The last peace tool under the UN practice within that period is Governance for the Commons. This refers to areas outside the territorial boundaries of states that are taken as spaces available to all. These include oceans, space as well as Antarctica. The law of the sea emerge from this tool as well the International Seabed Authority.

The last set of tool for global peace is found under the UN practice between 1990 to the present. The tool involved here are humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy and in 2005, the UN supported Kofi Annan's proposal to establish a peacebuilding commission, support office and fund (Barnett *et al.*,2007). This tool forms part of the efforts to support peacebuilding which are both pre conflict as well as post conflict in nature. It is under this present effort that the key concept for this research (peacebuilding) falls.

Aside the organisational evolution of the different approaches as demonstrated under the League and the United Nations, Paffenholz (2009) categorises the evolution of the different approaches to peacebuilding into five schools. These are (1) Conflict Management School (2)

Conflict Resolution School (3) Complementary School (4) Conflict Transformation School (5) Alternative Discourse School.

The conflict management has as its major thrust to end wars through different diplomatic initiatives. The theoretical approach of this school is referred to as "outcome-oriented" in which leaders of the conflict parties are brought to the negotiation table to primarily manage armed conflict on a short term basis. This approach believes in the use of both finance and military force. It concentrates solely on the leaders of the warring parties (Alger, 2014).

Conflict resolution school focuses on finding the underlying causes of conflict and rebuild destroyed relationships between parties. It does not focus on just the leaders of the warring parties but the society as a whole. It is situated within the Human Needs and the Protracted Social Conflicts Theory. The aim is relationship building and long-term resolution-oriented approaches. The activities performed include dialogue projects between groups and communities, peace education, conflict resolution training to enhance peacebuilding capacity of actors from one or different groups and conflict resolution workshop (Alger, 2014).

The complementary school is a congruence of the two other schools. It emphasizes both top as well as bottom approaches. This model is also called "contingency model for third party intervention in armed conflicts". The aim of the approach is to de-escalate conflict from phase to phase. Within this paradigm, the emphasis is not which mediators are the most effective but who is more effective at different stages of the conflict. Another strand of this school is the multi-track diplomacy approach expanded by Luis Diamond and John McDonald (1996).

The conflict transformation was first developed by John Paul Lederach in 1997. His submission was to build "long term infrastructure" for peacebuilding by supporting the reconciliation potential of society. Third party intervention should concentrate on supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts. Sensitivity to the local culture and a long-term frame are also necessary.

The alternative discourse school seeks an alternative approach to peacebuilding. The argument of this school is that peacebuilding is normatively borne within the liberal peace context, hence losing touch of the real world and needs of the people. Alternative Discourse School (A.D.S) focuses on the everyday peace of ordinary people. The school focus on ordinary people, oppressed voices, the analysis of power structures and an assessment based on realities instead of normative assumptions (Paffenholz, 2009).

2.3 The Role of the Military in Peacebuilding

The military is the logical partner for security provision in peacebuilding involvement. However, military functions are steadily increasing in complexity and oftentimes overlap with those of civilian aid providers. For instance, military officers have successfully participated in negotiating cease-fires and peace settlements in Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia (Rana, 2004) In addition, armed forces have monitored cease-fires and elections, enforced no-fly zones and demobilization efforts, secured relief convoys and supported civilian actors by providing logistics support, establishing camps for displaced persons, and lending engineering expertise to reconstruction projects (Gordon, 2001 and Rana, 2004). Civil military cooperation can effectively bridge the gap between the intervention force and the relief organizations and civil institutions, and can become an effective force multiplier (Mockaitis, 2004).

The role of the military in peacebuilding is a highly contestable position. While some scholars see the military as partner in peacebuilding, others see them as spoilers and as such not a welcome partner in humanitarian activities. The end of the cold war saw the rise of internal war across the world due to the growth of separatist movements in former USSR, Kosovo, Czechoslovakia, Slovenia, etc. The international community became more ready to avert humanitarian crisis or help resolve intractable wars more than ever before (Lilly, 2002). The armed forces drafted for these conflicts have had to shift how they conduct their missions to "encompass a wide range of tasks that fall under the rubric of peace operations" (Lilly 2002: 3).

Clarke (2010) sees the military as a partner but only limitedly. He argued that the military performs essential role in peacebuilding either by the armed forces of the conflict country or by foreign forces. He cited examples of military presence in; Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan among other cases. He maintained that the trend since 1989 is that military sent on peacekeeping operations soon transform into peacebuilding operations. The presence of the military at the beginning of peacebuilding leads to other organisations leaving the task on the military and the presence of the military in large troops creates a sense of an occupied territory and an occupied people. This he said also led to the slow development of the civil society and must be avoided if need be because the military are not trained for high political operations such as peacebuilding.

According to Clarke (2010), fundamental issues need to be addressed when the military becomes involved in peacebuilding. These issues are: (1) the military must not be used as a substitute for political engagement in peacebuilding problem (2) if the military is to be deployed, it should be heavily done in the early stages and drawn down thereafter, not vice-versa. He submitted then that the only way peacebuilding effort can succeed is to engage in a

comprehensive approach which include Effects-Based Operations (EBO); Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR); Security Sector Reform (SSR). In all of the process, civilian agencies must operate side by side with the military component (Clarke, 2010).

Rigby (2006) in his own analysis shows lack of trust for the military in peacebuilding. Thisis because, the military is trained as combatant and not as humanitarian officers and by training they are not used to treating those they encounter with dignity. He affirmed that there can simply be no military solution to a political problem and unless a military intervener hand over power to indigenous civilians, they risk becoming an occupying force, hence, an obstacle to deeper peacebuilding processes. He emphatically stated that "other than enforcing and monitoring a ceasefire-the rest…that is not a job for the military". Basically, his rejection of military role is borne out of the point that human security problem stems not so much from conflict but from the violence involved in the pursuance of conflict through the use of military might. His postulation has been rejected since after the cold war whereby the military role has not stopped at the level of mere enforcing and monitoring ceasefire. In fact, the military has been involved in serious humanitarian activities in recent years such as; medical outreach, provision of relief materials, peacebuilding sensitization among others. These activities have been carried out by the military in Afghanistan as demonstrated by Sedra(2004), Klingebiel and Roehder, (2004). The peacebuilding role of the STF in Jos North is also an evidence of the importance of the military to peacebuilding.

On a positive note for the military, Goodwin (2006) argued that despite the dislike of the humanitarian agencies for military involvement in humanitarian work, in volatile circumstances, the military might be the only agency able to provide effective response, this

is due to the fact that the military can defend themselves and can act in more aggressive manner if need be. She reiterated that often security issues require the presence of a strong military and police contingent that might run counter to other agencies with more pacific and altruistic purpose and this accounts for the dislike of the military by NGOs in humanitarian processes.

The submission of the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (2006) is that although the military as an organisation have a valid role in peacebuilding which must be limited to establishing the physical security necessary for reconstruction and reconciliation. The committee also posited that any real lasting peace depends on the presence of democratic processes in civil society of which the military is not democratic. Thus, the question is that what role has the military in peacebuilding? It is often wrongly assume that if civilian action is not working, military solution will, the real thing is the need to look for non-violent alternative option, because when soldiers enter a country to enforce peace, civilian deaths are inevitable, hence, local populations cannot accept the same soldiers as peacebuilders once the conflict is over (CCTS, 2006)

2.4 Concept of Non-Governmental Organisations

NGOsas a concept is usually contrasted with such terms as “non-profit” “voluntary” and “civil Society” organisations. Non-Governmental Organisations are primarily known for two different but interrelated types of activities. The first being the delivery of services to people in need and second, the organisation of policy advocacy, and public campaigns in pursuit of social transformation (Lewis, 2009). According to Crowther (2001), NGOs refers to formal organisation of people who are engaged in activities that are not primarily for their own benefit. This rendition is lacking in that it is not adequate to view NGO as essentially selfless,

by the very fact that they seek to promote their organisational sustenance and promote certain goals, they cannot be viewed as a self-less organisation.

Despite their supposed positive contribution in advancing the standard of living of the disadvantaged as defined by Vakil (1997), NGOs are being criticised in many fronts. The criticism falls in the realms of they being self-interested actors whose agenda rather than those of the local people is being promoted. They have equally being criticised for their inability to live up to expectations in providing assistance in emergency situations; a lack of coordination leading to duplicate of efforts, limited understanding of local circumstances among international NGOs and a naïve approach to the cause of conflict and instability (Lewis, 2009).

Essentially, though NGOs are not part of government but by their very nature, they may support or subvert government's actions. Clark (1991) posits that NGOs "can oppose, compliments or reform the state but they cannot ignore it". This is also corroborated by Morris-Suzuki (2000: 68) where he maintains that "NGOs may pursue change but they can equally work to maintain existing social and political systems" from the foregoing, it can be said that NGOs activities can be placed at either right or left side of governments but that they cannot be neutral.

Martens (2002) maintains that the notion of NGOs can be understood under two approaches. The first is the juridical and the second is the sociological. Under the juridical, NGOs are viewed as legal entities recognised by international bodies such as the UN. For instance, he cited article 71 of the UN charter which provided for the UN to work closely with NGOs where such a need arises. In the same vein, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Resolution 1296 of 1968 sees NGO as "any international organisation which is established by intergovernmental agreement including an organisation which accepts members designated by government authorities provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organisation" (cited in Fischer, 2012). From this perspective, NGO is seen mainly to have played important role in international conventions either through policy drafting or its assessment.

The weakness in the definition is that NGOs are only conceived as international, thereby leaving out the chance for grassroots Non-Governmental Organisations. Also, by defining NGOs as organisations established by intergovernmental agreement, it has totally lost its essence as a non-governmental body. Rather, what ECOSOC defined is IGOs and not NGOs. Under the sociological context, Martens (2002) stresses that NGOs is usually defined based on what it is not rather than what it is, thus concept such as; "non-profit making", "non-violent" etc. are used to define NGOs. In this context, NGOs is usually seen as anti-government. It is this kind of notion that prompted Judge (1995) to suggest that rather than call it Non-Governmental Organisation, it could be called "Necessary to Governance Organisation". In the light of the foregoing, Martens (2002) argues that the term Non-Governmental Organisations is misleading since it becomes a "catch-all word" for everything that is simply not governmental. Rosenau (1998) in clearing the controversy affirmed that their non-violent character is the major attribute that distinguishes NGOs from other groups outside the government.

Martens (2002: 10) went further to offer his own definition of NGO as "formal (professionalised) independent societal organisations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level". The problem with Martens definition

is that it leaves people with the problem of grasping what he meant by common goals. If by common goals, he meant the goals of the society, it is misleading because no NGOs can have the mandate for all the problem of the whole society. It has also been argued that NGOs are not totally free from a particular interest which could be their organisational goal, that of funders and donors, or that of the executives of the organisation.

According to Lewis (2007), the work of NGOs can be divided into three components. Theyare; implementer role, catalyst role and partner role. He explains that the implementer role involves mobilising resources to provide goods and services to people in need. This he said can be found in the area of healthcare, emergency relief, human rights and so on. The catalyst role can be seen as NGOs ability to inspire, facilitate or contribute to improved thinking and action to promote social transformation. The activities under this category include; grassroots organising, gender and empowerment work, lobbying and advocacy work; etc. The third category involves the increasing partnership of NGOs with governments, donors and the private sector on joint activities such as capacity building projects and programmes.

Crowther (2001) argues that donors and International Non-Governmental Organisations prefer to work with NGOs because they serve as alternatives and they offer new structures outside old and failed systems. They also provide channels for bypassing corrupt governments and mainly because they are perceived as neutral in politically sensitive times. He specifies what exist in the literature regarding what the roles of NGOs are. Theyinclude; the ability to negotiate and rebuild broken relationships, the potentials to tackle conflict, insecurity and trauma through creativity and innovation. Similarly, they are able to remain

active in places and times when other organisations and parties cannot act like during ceasefire.

Gary (1996) categorises NGOs into four types namely, (a) Community-Based Organisations-which are small, intimate organisations that are run by the members and relies on locally generated resources (b) Service or intermediary NGOs – with paid staff providing services to some beneficiaries (c) Intermediary NGOs involved in policy and advocacy (d) international relief and development NGOs-with large, professional staffs, huge budgets and offices in many countries. For an organisation to be qualified as an NGO, it must meet four practical criteria according to Park (2002). These are: (1) Citizen participation which must differ it from governmental organisations (2) Inclusiveness: NGOs should draw their membership from all strata of the society irrespective of qualification, gender, religion etc. (3) Volunteerism (4) Public interests which distinguish them from business organisations.

2.4.1 The Emergence of NGOs in Nigeria

The literature on the emergence of NGOs in Nigeria put it that it was in the 1980s that there was a high proliferation of NGOs in the country (Jegede*et al.*, 2011). The rise in NGOs within this period is as a result of three things. The first is the worsening socio-economic condition brought about by the oil glut and the Structural Adjustment Programmes. Within this period, NGOs emerged basically to "fulfil the responsibilities abdicated by and to occupy the space vacated by the retreating and downsizing state" (Jegede, *et al.*, 2011: 20). The second reason they argued, is the nature of the military rule which trampled on civil and political rights against the yearning for democracy, hence, the rise in pro-democracy organisations. The third reason they advanced is the global reconfiguration of development assistance, which was increasingly being channelled through NGOs as against the state. Jegede*et al., (*2011) further maintains that the rise in the number of human rights and pro-

democracy groups became even more widespread due to the obnoxious rules of the Abacha's regime.

The historical development of NGOs in Nigeria can be divided into three phrases as argued by (Ibeanu 2009 cited in Jegede*et al.*, 2011). The first phase is that of the old, voluntary, religious groups, trade and ethnic organisations established in the late colonial period and early years after independence. The second phrase is that of rights-groups that emerged in the context of military rule and the third phrase is the post-military organisations established to address democratic consolidation and specific social problems such as health and human trafficking.

2.4.2 The Role of NGOs in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Non-Governmental Organisations recognition within the UN as provided for both in Article 71 of the charter as well as Res. 1296 of ECOSOC has given them such a partnership in the area of the commission on Human Rights; Commission on Sustainable Development and the Commission on the status of women (Stahn, 2001). NGOs have also worked with UN agencies such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UNCTAD, UNCEF, UNDP, UNHCR, etc. Despite their involvement at all of these agencies, Stahn (2001) stresses that their importance has been most felt in the area of peacekeeping. This he says is due to the need to engage them in civil and political tasks of peacebuilding.

Stahn (2001) formulated three reasons for the increase in the role of NGOs in peacebuilding. First, he maintained that the military is not best suited to interact with civil society, hence the need to involve NGOs in peace missions. Secondly, he argued, that since NGOs have become chief providers of public welfare and source of employment, it naturally led to their increased involvement. Thirdly, NGOs are usually in the conflict area prior to the outbreak of violence

which makes them better informed about the situation than any outsider. He equally affirmed that more than other peacekeeping bodies like the military, the NGOs stayed much longer even after the conflicts, for instance, in the initial stage of a conflict (which is characterised by starvation, disease and death), the role of NGOs lies in the provision of water, food, sanitation equipment and shelter. In the long run, their tasks extend to community building such as health care training or repatriation assistance.

Nesbit (2003) on her part categorises the activities of NGOs in conflict resolution into four. These are:

Advocacy: Actions here involves early warning from when conflict is likely to erupt; attracting media attention to violent conflicts and encouraging warring parties to engage in peace.

Policy Work: The activities of NGOs in this area involve general lobbying for human, women and/or children's rights. The activities here also involve call for change in certain local institution and also the need to democratise.

Relief and Humanitarian Aid: This includes such activities as food and medical services provision to affected populations and caring for displaced persons.

Empowerment/Transformation: The activities here include trauma counselling, spiritual healing, reforming local institutions to span groups in conflict, rebuilding the local economy, seeking justice and retribution and building local capacity.

Civilians and humanitarian actors usually belong to either international organizations (IOs), including UN agencies, or international, regional, or local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). During peace operations and disaster relief, IOs interact primarily with official

government institutions and less directly with the local population. In order to administer aid most effectively, collect and disseminate information, and recommend or take action on the ground, IOs benefit from partnering with NGOs that, in many cases, have established ties to society and oftentimes possess relatively dependable relationships with local groups and individuals (Nesbit, 2003).

NGOs have unique advantages in engaging the local population through "their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial communities, foster mutual confidence, and provide peaceful mechanisms for dispute resolution" (Jeong, 2005: 217). This is because of their understanding of the realities on ground, NGOs representatives are able to "reach across their counterparts from other agencies into a web of indigenous officials and resources in order to build and maintain a sustainable infrastructure that has a better chance of ameliorating not just the manifestations, but also the causes, of conflict" (Aall, 1996: 439). This postulation is corroborated by this study in which the NGOs formed a kind of partnership network in the study area under the name "Plateau Peace Partnership Network" (PPPN). Through this body they interact, share ideas and information.

Operationally, many NGOs have moved beyond the traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, shelter, and emergency health measures to monitoring human rights, substituting for local government, and encouraging the creation or reconstruction of civil society by bringing together the conflicting parties. Example of this is the Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), an NGO whose activities are mainly bringing communities together to dialogue on how to foster peace on the Plateau. The substance and outcome of peacebuilding often hinges on exactly those conflict resolution skills honed through knowledge of and engagement with

particular indigenous communities. This community-centred peacebuilding approach can effectively help access need, employ skills and administer aid at the grassroots level.

Maintaining good relationships with the local population and knowledge of local culture has become a prerequisite for successful peacebuilding and reconstruction. For instance, Fallows (2005) attributed many problems in the American effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq to a severe shortage of Arabic-speakers and interpreters familiar with local customs. Therefore, enhancing the operational capabilities of local NGOs and ensuring their physical security are a precondition, but also an increasingly difficult challenge to effective peacebuilding.

2.5 Military and NGOs Coordination in Peacebuilding Activities

Like many other scholars, Lilly (2002) shares the view that peacebuilding is not the core competence of the military. However, enhancing cooperation between the military and humanitarian agencies can be helpful according to her. This mind set arise from lessons learnt in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone that only cooperation between these two institutions can guarantee a successful peace. "While advancing towards coordinating their activities, military and humanitarian actors generally also respect the need to maintain a healthy distance so as not to undermine the achievements of their respective mandates' (Lilly, 2002: 2).

The military are not expected to act in humanitarian role says Lilly (2002) except in three situations (1) when there is a desperate humanitarian need (2) as a last resort when there are no alternative options (3) only if the military acts in accordance with civil direction. For many aid agencies she writes"the military is by definition partial because it serves particular political objectives. Yet while military forces are inevitably political, it depends on the kind

of military mission in question" (Lilly, 2002:13). Whatthis suggests is that the scholar shares the same line of scepticism on the desirability of military in peacebuilding operations.

The first stage of a peacebuilding effort starts with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). According to Lilly (2002), the implementation of DDR calls for high level of coordination between the military and humanitarian actors. The aim of disarmament is to reduce the availability of small arms through weapons collection schemes, demobilisation concerns the disbanding of armed groups and reintegration involves the re-insertion of armed combatant into society. He affirmed that the first two stages (disarmament and demobilisation) are the responsibility of the military on peace operation while aid agencies complete the more long term goal of reintegration of former 'soldier' into civilian life and that the real measure of the success of peacebuilding is at the reintegration stage. This point of view of Lilly is also shared by Cotton (2009).

The usual problem encountered in the process of coordination is in the area of incompatibility, time frame and poor communication (Lilly, 2002). From the above, it shows that for a successful peacebuilding to be attained, both the military and humanitarian actors must have proper coordination.

The University of Notre Dame (2010) identifies three levels of activities within civil military relations in peacebuilding. These activities are: collaboration, coordination and communication. At the level of collaboration, the activities include: (1) expanding warning, early response systems (2) fostering active participation of civil society in SSR and DDR (3) jointly identifying what types of activities could better the programme, support human security and peacebuilding and who best could carry out these programmes. At the

coordination level, the activities are (1) shared conceptual understanding of the driving factors in conflict (2) shared forums to plan policies and programmes. At the communication level, the range of activities includes military-led forums to inform local NGOs of military protocols to civil society-led forums to share information and design coordinated strategy.

According to Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005), for peacebuilding to be effective, a thorough reform of the security sector is indispensable. The security sector according to OECD DAC Guideline cited in Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005) includes; core security actors, security management and oversight bodies (legislature, finance ministries, ministries of defence, etc.); justice and law enforcement institutions (judiciary, prisons, Ombudsman, etc.); non-statutory security forces (party militias, guerrilla, armies, etc.) The factor that will influence the civil military relationship is the degree to which the military force is perceived (by its humanitarian partner) to be engaged in combatant action that may affect their neutrality (Olike*r et al.*, 2004 cited in De Coning, 2005).

In discussing the role of the military within a UN peace operation, De Coning (2005) posits that the primary responsibility of the military is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the other actors can operate. The secondary role, he said is for it to make available its resources in support of the overall mission objectives in terms of providing transportation, medical services, camp building, weapons storage/weapon destruction services (De Coning, 2005).

De Coning designated three types of civil military coordination. They are: (1) liaison and information management (2) mission support and (3) community support. The first coordination is concerned with the exchange and management of information involving

activities such as joint assessment, joint planning and attending/hosting coordination meetings. Mission support on the other hand involves transportation, providing specialised equipment/expertise to the civilian components of the mission, while community support refers to those actions military units undertake to support local communities to build confidence in the peace process, for instance the provision of free medical services.

The civil society is praised for being at the forefront when it comes to peacebuilding because they are able to build broken relationship especially in the crucial phase of post-conflict reconstruction and in bringing warring parties to the negotiation table (Konteh, 2007). He cited the examples of the Mano River Union Peace Network (MARWOPNET); Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET); West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and so on and the role they play in peacebuilding. Kontehcited how the women of MARWOPNET initiated a dialogue between Liberia and Guinea war leaders.

Further works on the role of civil society in peacebuilding is that of Paffenholz (2009). He situated what the role of civil society is within the theories of international relations and the conflict schools. Within the realist (conflict management) school, the role of civil society is limited. This is based on the assumption that the lower the number of actors involved in negotiations, the easier it is to reach agreement. This postulation is however faulted by Wanis and Kew (2006 cited in Paffenholz, 2009) in their research which spanned 15 years and analysed 22 peace negotiations. Theyestablished that there is a positive correlation between the degree of civil society involvement in peace negotiations and sustainability of peace agreement.The story is different within the idealist (conflict resolution and conflict transformation) paradigm. The resolution school focuses on external actors while the transformation school focuses on internal actors.

The UN Handbook on civil military coordination stipulates that humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in any undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. They must not implement task on behalf of the military nor represent/implement their policies, free flow of communication between agencies and the media must not be impeded. The document also warns that the decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate (UN, 2007). Also, it is germane that humanitarian workers must not present themselves or their work as part of a military operation and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers (Paffenholz, 2009).

2.5.1Challenges to Coordination in Peacebuilding Activities involving the Military and NGOs.

The relationship between the military and their civil partners is not trouble-free. According to UN (2012) the challenges to effective coordination is in the area of mandates, timeframes, decision making structures and funding arrangements. Specifically, the funding for peacekeeping missions comes from accessed budget contributions, hence, they are predictable, whereas, the funding sources of partner agencies come from voluntary contribution, and these set the stage for challenges in time of planning. According to Schirch and Cortright (2014), the problem arises when military units take up traditionally civilian development missions. They cited the provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan or when security forces view humanitarian missions as a channel for intelligence gathering.

The area of mission objectives is also another area of controversy in civil-military peacebuilding coordination. Fast (2014) maintains that NGOs operate independent of

government and provide assistance based on two pillars namely; impartiality andproportionality.That is, assistance is given, category blind (non-discrimination) and delivery according to need (proportionality). The military on the other hand is part of government and cannot maintain similar neutral ground. Due to the necessity to be different from the military and even UN, NGOs in Afghanistan paints their vehicle pink. This goes to show an extreme indication of the need to separate military peacebuilders from civilian ones.

According to UN (2007), any civil military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity. The challenge in civil military coordination is the consequence of how too close a relationship with the military could jeopardise the humanitarian principle of neutrality and impartiality. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. The UN document warned that coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains but not hinders humanitarian access.

In a nutshell, humanitarian intervention in which the military and civil society organisations are to cooperate must be done within the civil principles of impartiality and neutrality. However, due to the difference in mandates between the military and civil bodies, the time frame, finance and mission objectives, problems occur during periods of planning. Despite the challenges, for a peacebuilding effort to be successful, it must involve a comprehensive approach in which there is information sharing and early warning coordination between the two institutions. There is therefore a role for the military in peacebuilding if the entire process is to be a success.

2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: Conflict Transformation Theory

Thisresearch employs John Paul Lederach strand of Conflict Transformation Theory as an analytic framework.Lederach (1997) constructed his own strand of conflict transformation theory by building actor-approaches to peacebuilding which he termed "Peacebuilding Pyramid". The peacebuilding pyramid provides a method to describe different actor's role within different levels of society. The levels are: the top level, the middle-range level and the grassroots level (Lederach 1997:38). Lederach argues that one must understand the role of actors, what actions are best taken at each level in order to determine how effective the approach to peacebuilding is. Since each of the three levels play a unique role in peacebuilding, different peace processes must be adopted at each level of the hierarchy. Various activities must be integrated into a comprehensive peacebuilding framework.

The top-level elites are the primary "representatives" of their people. Top-level leadership includes key principals of the state, religious and military leaders. Peacebuilding approaches at the top-level focuses on achieving cease-fire or cessation of hostilities as a first step. In such highly visible environment, the negotiations face challenges in maintaining publicly articulated goals while at the same time trying to move towards the conclusion of negotiations (Lederach, 1997:44). Peacemakers such as international organizations, regional actors or civil society organizations tend to act as mediators in order to bring the leaders to the bargaining table. If the top leaders manage to agree, this will hopefully lead to the framework of imprinting peace agreements and ending wars.

The middle-level has an important role in peacebuilding according to Lederach because it connects the top and the bottom-levels. The middle-range level has therefore the greatest

potential to bring people together in building peace. The middle range includes NGOs and GOs but also ethnic and religious leaders. The middle range is also a part of a broader network that links various religious groups together, as well as academic institutions and humanitarian organizations (Lederach, 1997:41). Their status and influences often derive from their relationship with others as they are typically recognized and respected within this broad network. This makes them have a remarkable capacity to influence the decision of policymakers (Lederach, 1997:41).

Three central middle-range approaches to peace are: problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and peace commissions. Problem-solving workshops focus on the interactive problem solving workshops which provide opportunities for actors to analyse their problems. The approach often allows parties in deep-rooted or violent conflicts other alternatives to generate new opinions for conflict resolution (Lederach, 1997:46). They provide "a politically safe space for floating and testing ideas" (Lederach, 1997:47). The second peacebuilding function involve training youth, women, warring leaders, community leaders, etc the essential skills of resolving social conflicts. The third type of peacebuilding activity involves the formation of peace commissions. Peace commissions often feature prominent individuals representing different sides of the conflict. They are established to prepare and facilitate negotiations and reconciliation efforts between fighting actors (Lederach, 1997:50).

The grassroots-level represents the population, citizens who form the base of a society. Grassroots also include people involved in local communities. It is an important level because of its heavy weighted mass. Local communities often are split into several groups, sometimes hostile. Grassroots initiatives often deal with deep-rooted hatred and animosity between

fighting actors. Factors such as social and economic insecurity, political discrimination and human rights violations are primarily experienced at the grassroots levels. The grassroots level faces different challenges from those confronted by the elites and the middle-range actors. This bottom-up approach to peace features several approaches targeted at the general population. In fact, many transitions towards peace are driven largely by pressure from the grassroots level (Lederach, 1997:52) and therefore actions taken at this level are crucial in reducing conflicts destructiveness.

Overall, Lederach views peacebuilding as a long-term process of systemic transformation from war to peace. Key dimensions of this process are changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict, brought about over different time-periods and affecting different system-levels, or 'tracks'.Lederach's theory places reconciliation at the heart of developing long-term infrastructures for peacebuilding within societies. For Lederach, reconciliation comes from truth, justice, mercy and peace. Consequently, he stresses the need to rebuild destroyed relationships, focusing on reconciliation within society and strengthening its peacebuilding potential.

2.6.1 Major Assumptions of Conflict Transformation Theory

The major assumptions of Lederach conflict transformation theory are:

1. Peacebuilding is a comprehensive process which involves all the strata of society. It involves not just the political class and the cease-fire agreements they sign but the local people and the reconciliation they try to arrive at.
2. There are three levels of actors in peacebuilding, namely; the top-level (official government, military and religious leaders), the middle range level (NGOs,

academics, ethnic leaders, etc.) and the grassroots level (community leaders, local youth leaders, etc.).

3. The top level actors are concerned with cease-fire agreements, negotiations with warring groups. The middle level actors are concerned with peace workshops, research and training on conflict resolution. The grassroots level actors are concerned with trauma healing, grassroots training.
4. There must be a proper and simultaneous link in the activities of all the actors involved in peacebuilding. Hence, peacebuilding is a collaborative affair.
5. Peacebuilding aims at not just a limited resolution of key issues but a transformation of the relational, cultural and attitudinal relationships of warring parties.




Fig 1: Lederach's Peacebuilding Pyramid.

Figure 1 shows that each of the three levels can be characterized in terms of certain common features. The top-level elite leadership comprises of the key political, military, and religious leaders in the conflict. By virtue of this high profile, they are often locked into positions regarding the conflict's substantive issues. The middle-range leadership, including leaders of mid-level Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) andGovernmental Organizations (GOs), comprises those who function in leadership positions but are not necessarily connected with formal government or major opposition movements. Leaders in this level serve as an important connection between the top and grassroots levels.Finally,leadership at the grassroots level includes those involved in local communities, members of indigenous NGOs carrying out relief projects, health officials, and refugee camp leaders. These grassroots

leaders represent the masses, those who often experience a day-to-day struggle to find food, water, shelter, and safety in violence-torn areas.

2.6.2 Relevance of the Theory

In spite of the aforementioned lapses in the approach used for this research, it is found highly relevant in explaining the actors and actions of the military and civil society involvement in the peacebuilding process in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State. First and foremost, the actors identified as actors in peacebuilding roughly coincide with those found in the peacebuilding process in Jos North. The role of government in the peace process is enormous. According to Best (2007), both the federal government and the state government instituted several commissions of inquiry into the Jos crises as well as a number of conferences to tackle the problem of the crises. Similarly, the drafting of men of the Nigerian army and air force to support the Nigerian police by the federal government played an essential role in quelling the conflict when the conflict was at its peak.More importantly, the Special Task Force (STF) which was stationed in Plateau State since 2010 by the government shows the importance of the military as a special governmental actor in peacebuilding process.

Similarly, the role of citizens in the peacebuilding process cannot be undermined. The youth especially are the once trained as peace ambassadors and on some occasions, they have been responsible for mutual protection from conflict situation. A good example is Muslim youth standing to protect Christians from attack and vice versa. The role of religious leaders in peacebuilding cannot be overemphasized when the peacebuilding process in Jos North is discussed. This was demonstrated by Korb (2011) where she concluded that peacebuilding initiativesin Jos are carried out by 80% religious organisations. Interfaith groups comprising of Muslim and Christian Clerics have also played essential role in the peace process.

The essential role of NGOs and educational bodies in the area of research/training and education for peace cannot be overemphasised. According to Best (2007) NGOs were highly involved in the peace process in Jos. He cited the role of; the Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID), Civil Liberty Organisation, Community Action for Popular Participation, International Centre for Coventry Cathedral, Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria among others in building peace in the area.

Another very important relevance of Lederach's conflict transformation theory to this research is its focus on sustainable peacebuilding which is the crux of this study. Relatedly, Lederach emphasised the importance of grassroots in peacebuilding process which he stated that for a peacebuilding process to be successful, it must be comprehensive in that all levels of society must be carried along.

2.6.3 Limitations of Lederach'sTheory

Lederach's theory has not been without its critics. Paffenholz (2001) problematizes the limited role of outsiders and uncritical discussion of 'the local', stressing the need to focus on direct support to Track III actors. He further highlights the limited attention given to the political system of the conflict-affected society and the specific regional and international context of peacebuilding. Also, by classifying religious leaders under both top level and middle level actors thereby blurring the actual level they belong.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology of this research. Thus the chapter discusses the location of the study which is Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State. The chapter also discusses the sources of data, the study population, the sampling procedure, the method of data collection as well as technique for data presentation and analysis.

3.2 Location of the Study

This study is situated in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State. The local government area was created in 1991 following the creation of additional states and local government areas by the thenGeneral Ibrahim Babangida administration. The study area is made up of 14 federal electoral wards and as at the 2006 census, the area has a total population of 429,300 (National Population Commission, 2006). The administrative headquarters of the area is within Jos metropolis. It is a cosmopolitan area comprising of Hausa, Yoruba, Fulani, Igbo, Urhobo, Birom, Afizere, Anaguta, Tivs, among other Nigerian tribes (Higazi, 2011).

Jos North forms the capital of Plateau State, together with parts of Jos South and Jos East. It is located near the centre of the Jos Plateau. The area is 1250 m (about 4100 ft) above sea level. With average monthly temperatures ranging between 21° and 25° C (69° and 77° F), Jos is considerably cooler than other cities in Nigeria and serves as a cool highland resort in a setting of scenic beauty. Jos is the centre of Tin and Columbite mining and smelting in Nigeria (Krause, 2011). Other industries include those dealing in steel rolling, burlap spinning and weaving, food and beer production, chemical manufacture, furniture

manufacture, and printing. Jos is located at the terminus of a spur (first built in 1915) of the railway from Port Harcourt to Maiduguri and at a highway junction linking the city to Bauchi and Zaria. (Roder, 2009) (see appendix 'F' and 'G' for the maps of the study area).

Due to the question of indigeneship and other problems associated with ethnic integration, the study area has been thrown into incessant violence since September 2001. As a result, the area has witnessed segregational settlement pattern in which certain areas are referred to as "No go areas" for the other religious and sometimes ethnic groups (Omede, 2012 and Osaretin, 2013). For instance, AngwanRogo and Rikkos became a 'No Go Area' for Christians while JentaAdamu and Angwan Soya became a 'No Go Area' for Muslims.

3.3 Sources of Data

There are two sources from which data for this study were generated. They are; primary and secondary sources.

For the primary source, the data for this study were generated through the following methods:

1. Survey Questionnaire
2. In-depth Interview
3. Participant Observation

For the secondary source, data were generated from existing literature documented in academic books, journals, periodical, published articles, magazines, newspapers and internet materials. These materials were accessed and collected from the following places; KashimIbrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Postgraduate Library of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, ABU Zaria, Faculty of Social Sciences Library, Department of Political Science Library, University of Jos, Centre for Conflict Management

and Peace Studies, Jos among others. The internet was also used extensively to get online journals and reports. Also, the reports and documents of the United Nations, the Special Task Force (STF) and NGOs were reviewed and used to corroborate the responses from the questionnaires and oral interviews.

3.4 Population and Sample Size of the Study

A population according to (Chein, 1981 in Nachmais and Nachmais, 2009) "is the aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated sets of specification" Jos North being the area of study has a total population of 429,300 as at the 2006 census (National Population Commission, 2006).

The sample size on the other hand is any subset of sampling units from a population. It is derived where a subset include any combination of sampling unit that does not include the entire set of sampling units that has been defined as the population (Nachmias and Nachmais, 2009).

For this study, the sample size of 384 is chosen as representative of the total population of 429,300. This choice is arrived at using the Morgan and Kreiche's formula (Morgan and Kreiche, 1970). To arrive at that sample size, the formula:

$S=X^2 NP (1-P) \div d^2 (N-1) + P (1-P)$

Where:

S = required sample size.
X^2 = the table value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841).
N = the population size.
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample size).
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05)

3.5 Sampling Procedure

The area of study is made up of fourteen (14) wards. The wards have varying number of polling units as sub-division of the wards. The polling units are usually allocated based on three qualifications; the population size of an area, the age distribution of an area and population density of a given area (Interview, 2015). Based on the inability to get the ward population of the given wards in Jos North, because the "2006 population nationwide was not counted and graded based on ward population" (Interview, 2015) this research made use of polling units availability in a particular ward as cluster of convenience. Thus, the number of polling units indicates difference in size and it is then used as a unit or cluster for representativeness. The wards and their units are thereby presented in table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1: Distribution of Wards and Polling Units in Jos North LGA of Plateau State

S/N	**Wards (in alphabetical order)**	**No of Polling Units**
1	Abba Na Shehu	29
2	Ali Kazaure	38
3	Gangare	20
4	GarbaDaho	26
5	Ibrahim Katsina	25
6	JentaAdamu	24
7	JentaApata	24
8	Jos Jarawa	37
9	Naraguta A	31
10	Naraguta B	106
11	Sarkin Arab	17
12	TafawaBalewa	11
13	Tudun Wada/Kabong	65
14	Vanderpuye	11
	Total	**464**

Source: INEC, 2008

The area of study comprises of fourteen (14) federal wards as indicated in table 5 and 464 polling units. The sample size for each of the wards is derived with the formula below:

$$\text{Ward Sample Size} = \frac{\text{Number of Polling Units}}{\text{Total Number of Polling Units}} \times \frac{384}{1}$$

Table 3.2: Distribution of the Selected Wards and their respective Sample Size

S/N	Wards	No of Polling Units	Sample Size $(\frac{N}{TN} \times \frac{384}{1})$
1	Abba Na Shehu	29	24
2	Ali Kazaure	38	31
3	Gangare	20	16
4	GarbaDaho	26	22
5	Ibrahim Katsina	25	21
6	JentaAdamu	24	20
7	JentaApata	24	20
8	Jos Jarawa	37	31
9	Naraguta A	31	25
10	Naraguta B	106	88
11	Sarkin Arab	17	14
12	TafawaBalewa	11	9
13	Tudun Wada/Kabong	65	54
14	Vanderpuye	11	9
	Total	**464**	**384**

Source: Researcher's Calculation

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the sample size across the wards of the study area. The study employed the **multi-stage cluster sampling technique**. At each of the units within the ward level, simple random sampling technique was applied whereby the first house was selected at random from the first street up till the last street in the given community. The individuals selected in households were adult males or female. In areas where houses were not properly arranged into a linear street pattern like Tudun Wada/Kabong, Ali Kazaure, Jos Jarawa, the administering was done based on a rigorous application of the selection criteria stipulated in this study which is the multi-stage sampling technique in which at each of the stages, respondents were selected using a simple random technique.

After administrating the questionnaire, out of the 384 questionnaires distributed, only 319 were successfully retrieved that is 83.5% of the total questionnaire distributed. However out

of this number, only 304 were validly filled and returned that is 79.2%. The Table below shows the retrieval rate of the questionnaires from each of the ward.

Table 3.3: Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaires

S/N	LG Wards	Questionnaire Administered	Questionnaire Retrieved	Valid Questionnaire
1	Abba Na Shehu	24	21	20
2	Ali Kazaure	31	27	26
3	Gangare	16	16	16
4	GarbaDaho	22	20	19
5	Ibrahim Katsina	21	18	16
6	JentaAdamu	20	17	15
7	JentaApata	20	20	20
8	Jos Jarawa	31	26	25
9	Naraguta "A"	25	17	17
10	Naraguta "B"	88	69	66
11	Sarkin-Arab	14	10	9
12	TafawaBalewa	9	8	8
13	Tudun Wada/Kabong	54	41	40
14	Vanderpuye	9	9	7
	Total	**384**	**319**	**304**

Source: Field work,2015

3.6 Category of Respondents Selected for the Study

The first category of respondents for this study comprised of military personnel selected specifically due to their direct involvement in the peacebuilding process. The selected personnel were two spokespersons of the STF under two different commands for the purpose of balance of view. Two other senior personnel of the STF (Commanders of two of the sectors) within Jos North and the Commanding Officer of the Military Police were also selected for interview. Similarly, interviews were conducted with the three selected Non-Governmental Organisations which are: Justice Development and Peace/Caritas; Islamic Counselling Institute of Nigeria and Damietta Peace Initiative. Interviews were conducted with the heads of each of these NGOs as well as two other personnel (project managers

andfield workers) so as to get in-depth view of their roles in peacebuilding as well as where they have collaborated with the STF in Jos North.

The threeNGOs were selected based on two criteria. First, the researcher being a resident of Jos North observed that the NGOs have been active in the peacebuilding process for a long time. The second criterion is that the NGOs were selected based on their focus area. They focus on the local populace in carrying out their peacebuilding initiatives. They also have an inclusive, community-based peacebuilding process.

The second category of respondents is the questionnaire which was administered to male and female of adult age residents within Jos North LGA. They were selected based on the multi-stage sampling technique using simple random at each of the cluster.

3.7 Techniques for Data Collection

Data for this study were derived using both primary and secondary sources. The data from secondary source was collected by clearly reviewing literature on the concept peacebuilding, dimension to peacebuilding, theoretical perspectives in peacebuilding, the concept of Non-Governmental Organisations, the role function and types of NGOs, the activities of military and NGOs in peacebuilding among others. Data were collected from scholars who had written on the subject matter. Their views were further subjected to counter or supporting views from other scholars.

For the primary data, questionnaire items were designed with both structured and unstructured questions. The structured questions provided options for respondents to select from while the unstructured questions were designed to elicit the view of respondents.

The interviews were scheduled with informants whereby the researcher and his team tape recorded responses from informants. Quick jotting of points were equally made by the researcher so as to complement the recorded version. Subsequently, the taped responses were transcribed after carefully listening to the record on two occasions. The relevant responses that border directly on the question asked were written out and either quoted directly or paraphrased in the analysis.

3.8 Techniques for Data Presentation and Analysis

Data gotten from the field work were presented in tabular form with simple percentage distributions which are immediately followed by interpretation and analysis of the tables. The interviews were tape recorded, transcribed and the data analysed using a combination of analytical skills in which responses from questionnaires were corroborated with interview responses and supporting documents.

CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SPECIAL TASK FORCE AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONSINTERVENTIONS IN PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN JOS NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA: DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is the presentation and analysis of data collected through both secondary and primary sources on the subject under study. Findings are drawn therefrom and verified against the research propositions. The data presented in this chapter are in three sections. The first section presents descriptive statistics of frequencies and percentages of respondents based on the questions raised for the research followed by analysis of each of the tables. The analyseswere corroborated by interviews and views from scholarly accounts. The second section contains summary of major findings while the third section verifies the research propositions vis-à-vis the available data.

4.2 Demographic Distributions of Respondents

Table 4.1: Distribution of Respondents by Age

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18 - 28 Years	114	37.5
29- 39 Years	150	49.3
40 - 50 Years	29	9.5
51 years- above	11	3.7
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Field work, 2015

Table 4.1 shows the ages of respondents where 37.5%are between 18-28 years, 49.3% are between 29-39 years, 9.5% are aged between 40-50 years and the remaining 3.7% are 51 years and above. This shows that majority of the respondents are between the ages of 29 and

39 years. From the table, it can be inferred that the research received response from all adult categories in the study area. Another inference that could be drawn from the table is that most of the respondents (86.8%) are of youthful age that is, 18- 39 years. This therefore indicates that Jos North has a youthful population. The implication of this is that the community has a population young enough to cause or be used for violence and also young enough to support peacebuilding initiatives. This was demonstrated by Obaje and Nwabufo (2013), that youth in Plateau State are tools for the perpetration of violence as well as a veritable tool for peacebuilding.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	187	61.5
Female	117	38.5
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.2 shows the gender distribution of respondents. The table shows that 61.5% of respondents are males while 38.5% are females. This therefore shows that majority of respondents are males, however, the view of females were not left out. The next table presents the religious affiliation of the respondents.

Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Religious Affiliation

Religious Affiliation	Frequency	Percentage
Christianity	195	64.1
Islam	109	35.9
Traditional Religion	0	0
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

On respondents' religious affiliation, table 4.3 shows that 195 respondents (64.1%) are Christians and the remaining 109 (35.9%) are Muslims. None of the respondents are affiliated to traditional religion. This indicates that Christianity is the dominant religion in the study area. From the polling unit distribution in table 3.1, it is noticeable that most wards with large number of polling units and by inference, large population like Tudun Wada/ Kabongand Jos Jarawa are predominantly Christian settlements, while places like Sarkin Arab, GarbaDaho, Gangare which are dominantly Muslim areas are relatively smaller. Table 4.4 presents the distribution of respondents by occupation.

Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Civil Service	53	17.4
Business	106	34.9
Farming	7	2.3
Teaching	18	5.9
Students	48	15.8
Artisans	57	18.8
Others	15	4.9
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.4 shows that 17.4% are civil servants, 34.9% are into various types of businesses, 15.5% are student respondents while 18.8% are artisans namely: mechanics, barbers, tailors, welders, etc. Majority of respondents therefore are business persons. This is because Jos is a largely commercial city with most people engaged in petty, middle to large scale businesses. The high number of student population can be justified by the presence of a university, a polytechnic and colleges of higher learning within the area of study.

4.3 Activities of the Agencies: STF, DPI, ICIN and JDPC

4.3.1 The Special Task Force (STF)

The special Task Force (STF) dubbed "Operation Safe Haven" was drafted into Jos on the 21stof January, 2010 as a result of the explosion of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos and its environment (Interview, 2015). At the time it was drafted in, the mandate of the force as contained in the force bulletin is:

> To restore law and order in Plateau and parts of Bauchi States in aid of civil authority, it is also to protect law abiding citizens and commuters on federal and major roads

> within its area of responsibility, in order to establish a peaceful and conducive environment (STF Today, 2014).

In an interview with the spokesman of the STF, the mandate was further expatiated thus:

> To restore and maintain law and order in aid of civil authorities in the state, to secure and facilitate the free movements of goods, services and persons across all roads within the area of operation of the STF. The STF, Area of Operation covers the whole of Plateau State and two contiguous Local Government Areas in Bauchi state which are TafawaBalewa and Bogoro (Interview, 2015).

The spokesman however reiterated that although Plateau and the two LGA in Bauchi were the areas of operation of the STF, from inception, the activities of the outfit had exceeded these boundaries into other parts of Bauchi aside Bogoro and TafawaBalewa and even to Nasarawa and Kaduna States.

The force is made of nine sector commands, five Forward Operation Bases (FOBs) and one Strike Force Base. Each sector is headed by a Sector Commander. From 2010, STF has had eight Commanders and four spokespersons. Deployment of men and officers of the force are in two forms, some static, others are patrol deployments. Deployments are usually rotated to prevent the likelihood of abuse of human rights (Interview, 2015).

Since its set up, the STF has been largely involved in the process of peacebuilding activities which include health campaign, parleys with community, religious leaders and other stakeholders in the peace process in Jos. Very importantly, the force Stations check points at every 500 metres radius across its area of operation for immediate response to conflict and disturbances wherever they occur (Interview, 2015).

4.3.2 Damietta Peace Initiatives (DPI)

The Damietta Peace Initiatives (DPI) is an NGO under the Franciscan order of the Catholic Church (DPI Newsletter, 2014). The inspiration for the peace programme of this NGO was the encounter between Saint Francis of Asisi and the Sultan Al-Malik Al-Kamil of Egypt during the 5th crusade in Damietta, Egypt. Some of the activities organized and implemented by the DPI include:

i. Training on alternatives to violence in Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Nasarawa. (For AVP Nigeria with funding from the International Committee of the Red Cross: ICRC, 2002 – 2006)

ii. Training on Women and youth advocacy and peace building for youths in Kaduna South Local Government Area of Kaduna State (February 2004).

iii. Training on Communication Skills and assertiveness for Peace for Development Initiatives (PDI) (2006 – 2007).

iv. Training on volunteerism (Volunteering for a better world) for Peace for Development Initiatives (PDI) (2006 – 2007).

v. Training on Disaster preparedness and Transforming Violence for religious leaders and youth groups (July 2008).

vi. Facilitators for Bridge Builders Association of Nigeria's peace building activities in Northern Nigeria (January 2008 – Date)

vii. Facilitators for Damietta Peace Initiative Africa (Nigeria Project) on alternatives to Violence Project and training of PACT Enablers (February 2008 – Date)

viii. Involved in the community cohesion activities in Nasarawa and Congo-Russia communities in Jos (2010)

ix. Training on Mentoring for Youths for AfriGrowth Foundation (2008 – Date)

x. Trauma Awareness and Healing workshop for Damietta Peace Initiative Africa, Nigeria Office and DPI collaborating organisation in Jos 9th – 11th March, 2012 (Source: Damietta Peace Initiative Newsletter, 2014).

4.3.3 Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria (ICIN)

Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria (ICIN) is a non-governmental and non-profit making organization founded in February 2006 as a result of several challenges experienced in Jos communities from September, 2001 crisis. The activities of the NGO started in July 2007 with Peace and Trauma Healing seminars, training and assisting the poor and needy especially women and young girls. These groups were aided with relief materials and support services during the fasting period and annual love feast programme to cater for the needy irrespective of tribe, race, class or religion (ICIN bulletin, 2014).

The Islamic Counselling Initiatives of Nigeria (ICIN) in partnership with the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) seek to consolidate peaceful co-existence in Plateau state. ICIN is working in the project implementation areas (PIAs) of Bokkos, Jos-North and Wase LGAs. ICIN established the peace structure known as Community Peace Partnership (CPP) in May, 2014 at the community level and CPP at the local government level in November, 2014 (Interview, 2015). In view of its success in the beginning, the NGO consolidated on the achievements made through step down meetings and activities designed to build the capacity of communities to manage conflict non-violently. ICIN continued monitoring and evaluation through the monthly supervisory and monitoring visits of the CPP in order to track progress made in actualization of project goals and activities, to improve performance and assess the impact of the project on the peace situation in the target LGAs (Interview, 2015). It is important to note that Christians are integral parts of ICIN.

Activities ofICIN

- Peace and trauma healing workshops
- Poverty alleviation projects
- Food relief during disaster
- Malaria, cholera sensitization and awareness
- Computer training and capacity building for youth and women (photocopying and other business units)
- Gender, good governance and community peacebuilding initiatives
- Early warning and emergency response to conflict/emergency situation in the areas of operation.(Source: ICIN Newsletter, 2015)

4.3.4 Justice Development and Peace Commission/Caritas (JDPC)

The Justice, Development and Peace Programme of the Catholic Church came into being as a result of the Pan-African Justice and PeaceConference held in Lesotho from 29th May to 3rd June, 1988 where thirty resolutions were passed. Prominent among the resolutions passed was the urgent need to establish permanent Justice and Peace structures at National and Regional levels by the different Episcopal Conferences, especially for those where there were none or where the structures were weak (JDPC, 2014)

Consequently, a national workshop was organised in Jos (15 - 19 April, 1996) for all those involved in Justice and Peace from all the dioceses of the Nigerian Church. This gathering was to plan strategy that will take the plan of action to the grassroots, so that the Church, which has been the voice of the voiceless, will back up its utterances by marvellous deeds in favour of development, peace and justice. As a part of the Justice, Development and Peace programme in Nigeria, JDPC are building long term peace in the state which just like ICIN,

Muslims are also members of the commission. The NGO was set up and registered as Corporation for Social Justice and Development for Peace. Under the NSRP, the NGO is carrying out projects aimed at bringing peace to Jos North and to the larger Plateau with its area of operations being in Jos North, Wase and Bokkos Local Governments Areas of Plateau State (Interview, 2015).

Activities of JDPC

- Creation of conflict management and peace teams known as Community Peace Partnership (CPP) in the areas of operations of the NGO which include Rikkos and Tudun Wada in Jos North, Bokkos and Wase.
- Humanitarian activities during flooding in Wase and Jos North.
- Training of peace workers as well as security agents and the media on their expected role in the peacebuilding process.
- Periodic visitation to security personnel to share information where necessary.
- Early warning and emergency response to conflict/emergency situation in the areas of operation.

4.4Various Peacebuilding Initiatives of the STF, DPI, ICIN and JDPC

The research revealed that the STF and the NGOs studied had carried out certain initiatives in the peacebuilding process. Tables 4.5 to 4.8 discuss the awareness level of respondents concerning the STF the NGOs as well as unravel the specific areas that the peacebuilding is being carried out.

Table 4.5: The Awareness of Respondents on the Initiatives of the STF in Ensuring Lasting Peace in Jos North

Aware of Initiatives	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	259	85.2
No	45	14.8
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.5 shows the awareness of respondents regarding initiatives of the STF in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North. A total of 259 respondents representing 85.2% are aware of STF initiatives in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North while the rest 45 (14.8%) are not aware. This implies that an overwhelming majority of the respondents are aware of the initiatives of the STF in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North.

TheSTF Headquarters is located in Jos North alongside three other sector commands of the force (Sectors 1, 2 and 4) and Forward Operation Bases (FOBs) thereby making the presence in the study area conspicuous. A visit to Jos North automatically creates the awareness of the presence of security men (the STF) in the city with mounting of road blocks and check points everywhere. In an interview, an informant disclosed to the researcher that "the STF has engaged in community parleys and dialogue, youth groups have been organized to play football competitions. Rallies have also been carried out within the city of Jos tagged 'Walk for Peace' aside medical outreaches to communities needing health care services" (Interview, 2015).

Table 4.6: Some of the initiatives

Initiatives	Frequency	Percentage
Check points at close range	163	62.8
Peace talks /football competitions	71	27.3
Organizing interfaith dialogue	14	5.6
Medical outreaches	11	4.3
Total	**259**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.6 revealsthe initiatives carried out by the STF towards peacebuilding in Jos North. 62.8% of respondents said it is the presence of check points at close range; 27.3% said it is in the introduction of peace talks and football competition. Another 5.6% said it is in the organisation of interfaith dialogue by the force, while 4.3% said it is in the area of medical outreaches to communities in dire need. This therefore implies that the dominant initiative adopted by STF towards peacebuilding in Jos North is the presence of check points at close range. The football competition and peace rallies organised by the force also constitute a significant initiative which shows that the STF has also engaged properly in what is traditionally known as non-military functions.

The response above is supported by interview with the STF spokesperson who affirmed that the STF has mounted road blocks "at every 500 metres radius in all the area of its operation." The preponderance of the mounting of check points as the major activity thus identified by respondents agrees with the mandate of the STF which is "…to protect law abiding citizens and *commuters on federal and major roads* within its area of responsibility…" (STF Today, 2014) (Researcher's Emphasis). This also goes in line with the position of scholars like Randle (2006), Rigby (2006) and Clarke (2010) who maintains that the role of the military in

peacebuilding should be predominantly peacekeeping activities like forming buffer between warring parties, demilitarizing and demobilizing the conflict parties through such initiatives as road blocks and check points.

Peace rallies and football competition have also been organized along with NGOs. For instance, the training of Community Peace Partners (CPP) by NGOs like the Justice Development and Peace Caritas (JDPC) and the Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria (ICIN) usually involves personnel of the STF (interview, 2015) Table 4.7 seeks to understand the awareness level of the respondents on the role of NGOs in the peace process in the study area.

Table 4.7: The Awareness of Respondents on the Initiatives of NGOs in Ensuring Lasting Peace in Jos North

Aware of Initiatives	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	230	75.7
No	74	24.3
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.7 shows that an overwhelming majority of the respondents totalling 230 (75.7%) are aware of the initiative of NGOs in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North, while the remaining 74 (24.3%) are not. This implies that the role of NGOs in Jos engaged in the peacebuilding process is a well-known phenomenon amongst the population of study.

The response here can equally be supported by the fact that there are over 20 NGOs in Jos carrying out various peacebuilding initiatives. Some of these NGOs are faith-based (such as, Apurimac Onlus, Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria, ICIN, JDPC, DPI,

etc.), others are non-faith-based (such as Search for Common Ground, Institute for Governance and Social Research, Centre for Peace Initiative and Development, League of Human Rights, etc.) Some still are interfaith NGOs (such as Interfaith Peacebuilding Initiative, YACPIF, etc.) Due to the need for coordinated function in the peacebuilding process, these NGOs formed themselves into what is known as the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network (PPPN). The inference can then be drawn that with the presence of all of these NGOs in Jos, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of respondents are aware of NGOs role in peacebuilding in Jos North. Table 4.8 seeks to know the kind of peacebuilding initiatives carried out by these NGOs in the peacebuilding process in the study area.

Table 4.8: Some of the initiatives

Initiatives	Frequency	Percentage
Providing relief materials to affected communities	61	26.6
Seminars/workshops on peace	124	54.0
Interfaith dialogue/peace tournament	34	14.8
Skills acquisition trainings	11	4.6
Total	**230**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

On the varied initiatives adopted by the NGOs towards peace building in Jos North, 26.6% said it is by providing relief materials to affected communities in the crises, while 54% said it is through seminars/workshops on peace, 14.8% said it is through interfaith dialogue/peace tournament, while the remaining 4.6% said it is through skills acquisition trainings. This shows that the main initiative adopted by the NGOs towards peacebuilding in Jos North is through the organisation of seminars, peace talks and other such trainings aimed at

entrenching the culture of peace. Also important in their initiatives is the distribution of relief materials to communities affected by crises situations.

Interviews with all the selected NGOs corroborates this position that seminars and training on peace is their major activity. One of the informants responded that:

> Our activities include training of Community Peace Partners on conflict management and transformation, training on early warning response, as well as seminar and peace talks which are held in communities from time to time. We also collaborate with other NGOs to organise football matches for peace (Interview, 2015).

The relief materials being the second highest with the respondents can be justified with the strong involvement of some of the NGOs selected in humanitarian services such as supporting affected communities with relief materials. Two of the NGOs for this study, (JDPC and ICIN) have special department for Emergency Preparedness and Response Teams (EPRT) whose functions is to respond to emergency situations and factor out ways to support peacebuilding through relief materials. Both of these NGOs are presently carrying out their work under the umbrella of the Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) of the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).

4.5 The Collaboration between the STF and NGOs in the Peacebuilding Process

This study reveals that both agencies under study have had to collaborate in certain areas in the process of building peace in the study area. The data generated regarding this are presented in table 4.9 and 4.10.

Table 4.9: Awareness of Existing Collaboration between the STF and NGOs in Jos North

Aware	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	131	43.1
No	173	56.9
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.9 reveals that 43.1% of respondents are aware of thecollaboration between the STF and NGOs in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North, while the remaining 56.9% said they are not aware. This implies therefore that majority of respondents are not aware of ways in which the military and humanitarian agents are collaborating in the peacebuilding process in Jos North. It also affirms that each of the organisations is carrying out its functions independent of the others or perhaps their collaboration might be unknown to ordinary members of the communities.

This position also appears tenable as this interview suggests. According to the STF, "we have interactions with NGOs, but not all are very interested in the peace process. Some are driven by the margin of profit rather than the passion and desire to work for peace" (Interview, 2015). As a result of this position, the STF maintains that it collaborates only with NGOs that have the structure, finance, staff and capacity to sustain the peace process, hence, the less collaboration with NGOs.

Similarly, not all the NGOs collaborate with the STF. For instance, JDPC and ICIN responded that they do collaborate with the STF while DPI was silent on the matter. This shows that although both agents collaborate, the collaboration is a limited one. This is owned

to the fact that while ICIN and JDPC works in the area of emergency response with DFID which makes them interact much closely with security personnel, DPI area of focus is on dialogue and construction of community projects to support community cohesion. Table 4.10 seeks the nature of collaboration that exists between the two agencies.

Table 4.10: Ways in which they Work Together to Ensure Stable Peace in Jos North

How They Collaborate	Frequency	Percentage
Joint hosting of peace talks/rallies	106	80.9
Information sharing	17	13.0
Training of STF persons by NGOs	8	6.1
Total	**131**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

On ways that the two agencies are working together to ensure stable peace in Jos, table 4.10 reveals 80.9% of respondents saying it is in the area of joint hosting of peace talks/rallies, 13% sayingit is through information sharing, while the remaining 6.1% sayingit is through training of STF personnel by NGOs. A good number of respondents indicate the joint hosting of peace talks, rallies and peace matches as a way that both agents collaborate in the peace process. This is because that area of collaboration is well known to the general public being that many of them participate in some of those rallies or peace talks.

One of the informants reiterated that "part of the peace partners we trained include personnel of the STF". Oneother NGO studied equally maintained that "we have organized training on effective communication and objective reporting for media practitioners and security agents" (Interview, 2015) Yet, another, informant stressed that they collaborate with the STF in the area of information sharing, reporting cases that goes beyond their mandate to the government or the STF as the case maybe. On the part of the STF, the spokesman maintained

that they "collaborate with NGOs in the area of information gathering, conflict mitigation and resolution, dialogue and facilitation" (Interview, 2015). From the foregoing, it suffices to say that there exists collaboration between the STF and NGOs in the peacebuilding process in Jos North. Since it has to do with interaction between the agencies in question, the general public are not much aware of the collaboration as indicated in table 4.9 where majority responded in the negative. Table 4.11 seeksthe perception of respondents on the impact that the intervention of the STF and NGOs has had on the peace process in Jos North.

4.6 Impact of the Interventions on the Peace Process

Table 4.11: Whether or not the Intervention of the STF and NGOs have Positive Impact on the peace Process in Jos North

Positive Impact	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	243	79.9
No	61	20.1
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.11 shows 79.9% of respondents assesses that the interventions of the STF and NGOs in Jos North has had a positive impact on the peace process, while the remaining 20.1% believe that it has not. From this, it can easily be inferred that the role of the STF and the NGOs has had a positive impact on the peacebuilding process.

This feat is also confirmed by a more than high level of reduction in the number of attacks in Jos North since 2010. In fact, there has not been any outburst of ethno-religious conflict since 2010 in the area under study as against what existed prior, notably; 2008, 2004, 2002 and 2001 when there were large scale disruptions of life and property within Jos North and its

environs. Although, other forms of violence took hold of Jos North from 2010, this changing pattern of violence is that of insurgency inflicted by Boko Haram on major parts of northern states. However, one of the informants disclosed that "during some of these bomb attacks by Boko Haram both Muslims and Christians youths were quick to rally round one another and work together for peace seeing Boko Haram as their common enemy" (Interview, 2015).

In the light of the foregoing, the impact of the STF and NGOs interventions cannot be overemphasized. Owing to the recurrent conflicts in Jos North, there was the usual partitioning of cities along religious line (Balogun, 2005). However, due to various peace talks, seminar, peace matches across the divide, the hitherto "No Go Areas" are now becoming a thing of the past. For instance, the researcher noticed the return of Muslim water peddlers and hawkers in areas hitherto known as "No Go Areas" for Muslims such as GadaBiu, Alheri, Utan, Angwan Soya, etc. also, Christians were found in AngwanRogo, Rikkos and Yan Shanu carrying out their businesses. Also, free movements of persons had become the defining characteristic of the area of study as against tension that defined people's movement hitherto. All of these developments can be attributed to the role of the STF in quelling tension and that of NGOs in building right relationship of cohesion, reconciliation and trauma healing. Table 4.12 seeks the nature of impacts on the peace process.

Table 4.12: Some of the Impacts of the STF and NGOs Interventions

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Gradual return of peace to Jos North	102	42.1
Growth in the number of vigilante group	53	21.7
Improved social (religious and ethnic) cohesion	71	29.3
Others	17	6.9
Total	**243**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork,2015

Table 4.12 shows the viewsof respondents on the impact of the STF and NGOs on the peace process in Jos North. It reveals that 42.1% feels that their impact is in the gradual return of peace to Jos North, 21.7% feels it in the growth in the number of vigilante group otherwise known as neighbourhood watch, while 29.3% feels it is in the improvementin social (religious and ethnic) cohesion. As can be deduced from the table, the main impact of their intervention is the Gradual return of peace to Jos North which as posited in table 4.11, there has been no outright ethno-religious crisis within Jos North since 2010 when STF was drafted into Jos and its environs. Another remarkable reason given is the rise in the number of neighbourhood watch and vigilante groups who have become part of community effort to ensure lasting peace (McCain, 2012). The vigilante groups are usually supported by STF in the areas of training. Also, some of the vigilante groups came up due to NGOs prompting communities to form groups to prevent skirmishes from growing into large scale violence.An informant maintained that “vigilante are a very important part of the peace process in Jos North, mostly composed of youth of both religion and have ensured that minor conflict do not degenerate into large scale crisis” (Interview, 2015).

Ethnic and religious tolerance which was hitherto lost due to the incessant conflicts is said to be returning as people now freely move around doing their businesses without fear and mingling freely with people of other faith thereby rebuilding the social relations of mutual trust that the area was historically known for. The finding shows that there exists a clear impact of both agencies on the peace process in the study area. Table 4.13 seeks whether other agency aside the military and the NGOs play any role in the peacebuilding process.

Table 4.13: Other Bodies PlayingImportant Roles in Ensuring Lasting Peace in Jos North

Bodies	Frequency	Percentage
Religious leader/faith based organizations	172	56.6
Community leaders/community based organizations	40	13.1
Youth and women movements	27	8.9
Media	45	14.8
Others	20	6.6
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

On which of these bodies have played equally important roles in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North, table 4.13 reveals that 56.6% of these bodies are religious leaders/faith-based organisations, 13.1% are community leaders/community based organisations, 8.9% are youth and women movements, while 14.8% is the media. This shows that religious leaders/faith based organizations have played equally important roles in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North as they have been seen to play an overwhelming role in peacebuilding. Religious leaders being the highest participant in the peace process as demonstrated by the responses agrees with one of the experts who maintained that "religion is both a cause and a remedy to

the plateau conflict" (Interview, 2015). This position is much in tune with Appleby (2000) who stressed the role that religion plays in both violence and reconciliation. Korb (2011) also found out that 80% of peace works on the Plateau are faith based. In another work, Pam and Korb (2011) demonstrated extensively how religion has been used to bring and preach peace in Jos and its environs.

Other bodies such as community leaders, youth movement and the media have also played important roles. For instance, a new media house was set up in 2013 named "Unity FM". Its main objective is to spread the message of peace and unity through radio broadcasting, similarly, the Jos FM which was known formerly as PRTVC FM changed its name to "Peace FM" in line with the need to sensitize the public about peace and the need to shun violence.

Table 4.14: Views of Respondents on Withdrawalof STF Jos North

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Violence will return	96	31.6
There will be calm in the city	44	14.5
Nothing will happen because peace has already being restored	137	45.1
Others	27	8.8
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.14 revealsrespondents' perception on how the STF had performed thus far and the effects their withdrawal from Jos North may have on the peace process. 31.6% of respondents feels that violence will break out if the STF is withdrawn from Jos North, 14.5% feels that there will be calm in the city if STF is withdrawn while 45.1% feels that the peace has

already being restored hence, nothing (in terms of violence) will happen. This shows that majority are of the view that the STF has been active in the peace process (as indicated in table 4.5 and 4.6). Hence, their withdrawal from the area would not lead to break down of law and order since the peace culture has already been entrenched. This position also agrees with table 4.12 where the majority posits that there is a gradual return of peace to Jos North which can thereby be inferred that even the withdrawal of the military from the streets will not necessarily culminate into violent conflict.

A counter view point is held by the STF spokesperson who maintained that "if STF leaves, trouble will return because the salient issues that causes violence such as unemployment, poverty and government neglect are still wide-spread" (Interview, 2015). He also stressed that although the ordinary man is genuinely ready to live and support the peace process, they most times have a preconditioned mind towards the peace process and that might not help the peace process. Another important view is that there will be calm in the city if the STF is withdrawnperhaps the military are beginning to look like an occupying force. This view is similar to that of Clarke (2010) that the military must not stay long else it will be perceived as an occupying force by civilians.

In a nutshell, what the response here portends is that the STF is seen as a very active agent in the peacebuilding process in the area of study as indicated by 76.7% of respondents. This clearly is demonstrated in that while 45.1% feels the STF had already restore peace in the area, hence their job is done; 31.6% feels their withdrawal could lead to breakdown of conflict. Either way, the STF is being viewed as an important agent in peacebuilding process.

Table 4.15: Engagement of Communities in Peacebuilding Process by STF and NGOs

Engagement	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	241	79.3
No	63	20.7
Total	**304**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Table 4.15 indicates the view of respondents as to whether the STF and NGOs involve the local communities in the peacebuilding process. 79.3% are of the view that the STF and NGOs engages members of Jos community in the peace building process, while the remaining 20.7% feels they do not engage the people. This clearly shows that an overwhelming majority are of the position that the peace process is a people-centred one in which communities owns the peace process themselves supported by the STF and/or NGOs. This position fully agrees with interviews from both the STF and all the NGOs sampled for this study. The spokesman of the STF asserted that "we try not to be at the fore because this is a civil matter and our mandate is *to restore and maintain order in aid of civil authority*" (Interview, 2015) (Researcher's Emphasis). He also emphasized that since the presence of the STF is transient, the command always engage the local populace to take control of the peace process. The NGOs equally maintained the same posture. An informant stressed that "we train the Community Peace Partners who are then expected to train others in their community" (Interview, 2015). As the informant argued, the peace process must be owned by the people even after they might have left the scene.

In another interview, an informant confirms that inter-community dialogues are only carried out on the invitation by those communities and that the communities are given the room to chart the way forward for a peaceful coexistence in their community. The informant cited

examples of the Nasarawa versus Congo-Russia dialogues which were initiated by the two communities on their own volition in which the two community agreed that one Muslim and one Christian houses that were burnt during the crisis be jointly built by the community.

Table 4.16: Some Roles Played by Members of Jos Community in Ensuring Lasting Peace

Roles Played	Frequency	Per cent
Vigilante/Neighbourhood watch	50	20.7
Community peace builder	110	45.7
Agreeing to participate in peace talks	59	24.3
Providing relevant information to security agents and NGO's	22	9.2
Total	**241**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2015

On the roles played by members of the community in ensuring lasting peace, table 4.16 reveals that the activities of the local community can be seen in different area. 20.7% says it is in the formation of Vigilante/Neighbourhood watch, 45.7% said they played the role of community peace builder, 24.3% said that they volunteered as participants in peace talks, while the remaining 9.2% said they provide relevant information to security agents and NGOs. This shows that the main role played by members of the community in ensuring lasting peace is in the role of community peace builders.

This response tallies with the position of all of the NGOs. An informant maintained that:

> We train PACT enablers, who are expected to train others and also within their community network suggest and design projects which will enhance social

> cohesion. The role of our organisation is to support such project as the case maybe (Interview, 2015).

This therefore shows that each community is made to own the peace process in its own community through the training of the Pan African Conciliation Team (PACT) enablers who in turn are to train other enablers within their community. Collectively, they report any matter to the NGO. By doing this, not only does the community supports the peace process but communities are the designer of ways that they can live in peace with other communities and even with people of other religion and ethnic makeup within their community. Another informant stressed that:

> Each community is expected to conduct projects with communities from the other divide. For instance, to organise a football tournament for peace last year, Kabong*(a Christian community)* had to meet with youths from Sarkin Arab *(a Muslim community)* to form a team. Each team must therefore be composed of diverse groups (Interview, 2015) (Researcher's Emphasis).

The role of vigilante is confirmed both by the STF as well as the NGOs, in which the STF for instance recognizes genuine groups of neighbourhood watch and supports them where such need arises. Their role is also confirmed by one of the informants who maintained that Muslim members of vigilante group watch over Churches on Sunday and their Christian counterpart take turn to watch over Muslims during Friday prayers in Mosques. Similarly, youth within Sarkin Arab, Ali Kazaure, Gangare and Nasarawa communities took turn to host one another to both Salah and Christmas celebrations.

Through all of these activities, it can be affirmed strongly that there has been an impact of the STF andNGOs in building lasting peace especially that the process is controlled by the communities themselves. By being community-driven in nature, the peace process agrees with the views of Albert (2001) and Murithi (2009) who both argued that the focus of

peacebuilding must be to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict non-violently. The use of sport by some of the NGOs is also very inclusive in that it helps to instil the spirit of peace in the people (Lalo, 2012).

4.7 Challenges Faced by the Two Agencies in Building Peace in Jos North

Peacebuilding is a process which takes time to accomplish. Hence, in the process of building peace; challenges arise within organisations involved in peacebuilding. Challenges also arise in interaction between organisations in peacebuilding process. Likewise, challenges arise in organisations interaction with the local community. The STF asserts that the challenges it faced in building peace in the area of study are enormous. However, the major ones are impatience on the part of the people, lack of trust from some quarters, logistics and operational challenges as well as the nature of agitations from the people (interview, 2015). He disclosed that "some people openly said they do not want the deployment of the STF in their community, but the same people later ran to the STF asking for their presence…even though, we do not get hundred per cent cooperation from the people, the percentage cooperation we get is enough to build peace on the plateau" (Interview, 2015).

Another challenge faced in the peacebuilding process is that of participation of women. An informant from one of the NGOs asserts that "participation of women has been low especially in Muslim communities" (Interview, 2015). An informant from another NGO stressed that the challenge they encounter in building peace is in people asking to be paid before they volunteer for community development projects. He then maintained that since their NGO do not pay people to work for peace it is sometimes difficult getting people to volunteer. He however maintained that that culture is changing now as people now willingly make themselves available for peace work and community dialogue. In a similar

vein, an informant disclosed that, “when we go into communities, you see stakeholders demanding financial inducement for participating in peacebuilding. Unfortunately there is nothing in our budget for stakeholders’ payment. So this always poses a problem as those stakeholders are not willing when next we come into their community” (Interview, 2015)

Also, challenges arise in the area of limited information sharing between the NGOs and the STF. An informant explained that the reason is that the mandate of the STF differs from theirs. He stressed that while the activities of their NGO are overt that of the STF is covert. The challenge is that information that could help them in certain communities is not shared with them. Also, the STF delays in replying some of their letters and sometimes do not reply at all (Interview, 2015). Another problem he identified is that of inadequate funding whereby budget for a workshop swells because the numbers of people they plan for are exceeded when they get to the venues for workshops. He gave an instance of a workshop in Tudun Wada whereby fifty (50) persons were budgeted for but one hundred and fifteen (115) persons turned up (Interview, 2015).

Finally, the fact that people always wait for government or outsiders to do things for them is a problem. An informant stresses that things that people could otherwise do for themselves they believe it is the work of government. Hence, they are usually unwilling to carryout community development projects and peacebuilding initiatives except they are prompted to do so. He reiterated that this kind of mind set slows down peacebuilding projects (Interview, 2015)

4.8 Summary of Major Findings

1. The major peacebuilding initiative of the STF is in securing communities with the stationing of check points at every 500 metres radius around the city. Other initiatives include; organising peace talks, football competition, parleys and town hall meetings/dialogue with religious and community leaders, as well as medical outreaches and relief support to communities in dire need of assistance.
2. The contribution of NGOs is in the area of seminar and peace workshops, interfaith dialogues, provision of relief materials to communities affected by crises situations as well as skills acquisition and peace football matches.
3. There exists collaboration between the STF and the NGOs in the area of information sharing, joint peace workshops and peace rallies, as well as training other agencies like the media and security on ways to improve in the provision of the needed service to the people.
4. Although there are collaborations between the STF and the NGOs, some areas of mistrust exist. While the STF feels most of the NGOs are not driven by passion but the margin of profit, some of the NGOs do not feel the STF give them enough attention when they desire to collaborate with them.
5. There is a remarkable and sustainable peace in Jos North owing to the activities of both agencies. This can be seen in the area of increased cohesion among different communities in Jos North and the absence of total break out of violence in the study area since 2010.
6. The process of peacebuilding is comprehensive in that it involves the whole strata of the community such as; religious leaders, community leaders, media, youth and women movements among others. It is also a process that involves the ordinary people at all

level to own the peace process even when the STF and NGOs might have left. As a result of the involvement of the ordinary people in the peace process, the peace is a sustainable one.

7. There exists a very fundamental role for the military in peacebuilding as against the perception by many scholars like Randle (2006), (Rigby, 2006) and (Holt, 2011) that there is no room for the military in peacebuilding.
8. The major challenges encountered in the peacebuilding process are that of the attitude of the people not fully volunteering for peace work and even when they do, they usually demand payment to work for peace in their own community.

4.9 Verification of Research Propositions

Three propositions were set out for this research. They are to be tested against the available findings.

The first proposition is that "STF and NGOs are involved in various peacebuilding initiatives in Jos North". This study confirms that there has been numerous projects and programmes carried out by both agencies. These initiatives include medical outreaches to communities in need, seminar and workshops on peace, organisation of peace tournament, the training of vigilante groups by the military as well as the mounting of check points at very close range by the STF. Other initiatives include organising inter-community football matches aimed at breaching the tension that exist among those communities, engaging in media suasion for communities to live together in peace and harmony and training women, youth and the vulnerable in different skills such as tailoring, knitting, baking, computer appreciation etc.

The second proposition is that "there are no areas of collaboration between the STF and NGOs due to differences in organisational mandate". This proposition was found to be half

true. This is because both agencies collaborate in various ways through information gathering and sharing, early warning preparedness and response, co-hosting peace dialogue and football competition for peace and NGOs reporting cases of skirmishes to the STF, NGOs training security personnel as part of Community Peace Partners. Despite these areas of collaborations, a lot of limitations to collaboration exist. For instance, the STF is selective in the NGOs it collaborates with. The force maintained that most of the NGOs are not in business for the sake of peace work but just to make profit out of the situation. Hence, it accepts to collaborate only with very few NGOs among many others requesting collaboration. Also, one of the NGOs maintained that it has had no interaction with the STF since its activities largely involves organizing "Peace Football Competitions" "skill acquisition" "community peace project" among non-military related activities. From this finding therefore it can be concluded that although both agency collaborate, the collaboration is a limited one.

The third proposition is that the intervention of the two agencies has had a positive impact on the peace process in Jos North. This proposition was upheld to be self-evidently true as there is a gradual return of peace to the area and a better character of social interaction and cohesion. Notably among many yardsticks to measure this impact is the absence of any outright outbreak of violence in Jos North since 2010 when the STF was drafted in. This feat was achieved in that the NGOs studied either have Community Peace Partnership (CPP) in communities who report any likely trouble to the NGOs, the NGOs on their part either address the matter, channel it to government or to the STF as the circumstance dictates. The STF on its part swings into action promptly thereby preventing the escalation of minor skirmishes into full blown conflict.Also due to their intervention, the social relations has improved, the hitherto myth of "No Go Areas" is gradually being demolished because the

NGOs uses the media, their workshops, community football competitions, peace dialogue and trainings, as well as other channels of communication to preach peace. The STF equally engage in media suasion for peace much as it watches over the communities through: the stationing of check points, regular community patrol, road blocks and prompt response to distress call.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings of this research. As a concluding chapter of the work, the chapter comprises of three sections; the summary of the work, a conclusion and recommendations which are derived from the findings of the research.

5.2 Summary

This study set out to investigate the impact of the military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations interventions in peacebuilding initiative in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State. The research progressed in line with the Conflict Transformation Theory designed by John Paul Lederach that peacebuilding is a comprehensive process which must involve many sector of the society from governmental agent like the STF to non-governmental agents like the NGOs, to religious body, media, community organisations and simply members of the local community.

With the aid of both primary and secondary data, such as books, journal etc. and interview/questionnaires, the research established that: the two agencies under study had been active in the peace process with both engaged in such activities as protecting community at a very close range, the organisation of peace seminars, training and workshops that are geared towards preventing the outbreak of crisis as well as building the right relationship for reconciliation, social cohesion as well a peaceful society where the poor can have economic stability through skill acquisition which will in turn prevent attitude of violence. In a similar way, both the STF and the NGOs have engaged in medical outreach as well as the

distribution of relief materials to communities that have any point in time have needs for such support.

The study also found out that there exist some level of collaborations between the military and the civil society in the peacebuilding process. This collaboration is largely in the area of information sharing, training of civilian vigilante groups by personnel of the STF so as to work efficiently in the area of community watch and protection in line with the agreed standard, also there is the training of security personnel by NGOs working under the NSRP mandate. This training involves security personnel in the Community Peace Partnership (CPP) network in which there is criss-crossing of information between the two agencies so as to maintain tranquillity in all of the communities.

The research also found that the process of peace is largely owned by the people themselves due to the nature of community peace builders that are used by the NGOs. Initiatives come from the people themselves withthe NGOs acting in support of such community projects. In line with that, community dialogue are not imposed on communities rather NGOs only go to communities where they are called upon, rather than imposing peace project on them. It is also in the same light that the research found out that the process of peace building in the study area is a holistic and comprehensive one which involves all strata of the community namely; the media, community leaders and organisations, religious leaders, youth and women groups among others.

5.3 Conclusion

Peacebuilding is an essential element for societies that are just emerging from years of protracted conflicts and the attendant mistrust and hate for those in the communities that are

referred to as “the others”. In rebuilding any of such society, the primary role of the military or police as the case may be is to demobilise, demilitarise and rehabilitate the militias which in most cases are the youth. The presence of Non-Governmental Organisations on the other hand is to build on the effort of the military by rebuilding the social and economic relations that would engender an atmosphere of peace. Hence, the role of the military is expectedly restricted to only the early stages of conflict at which point they withdraw and allow civil organisations (CBOs, FBOs, NGOs) to take charge of the other process of peacebuilding which are humanitarian in nature such as medical supports, peace talks and seminars, peace rallies, organising dialogue among the warring parties and so on.

In Jos North Local Government of Plateau state, the community was thrown up into serious conflict due to many factors; economic, political, ethnic, religious, etc. Several efforts were put in place by both the federal as well as state government to bring about lasting peace. Suchefforts include;setting up of commissions of enquiry, the imposition of curfew at several times to forestall violent activities, the use of police and the military and finally the drafting in of the Special Task Force (STF) in January 2010 to last for 90 days, however the changing pattern of the conflict in Jos, which became more of insurgency in 2010 led to the presence of the force five years down the line. In the course of this period, the STF has been engaged in what would hitherto be referred to as civil organisation’s boundary, that is, the humanitarian services being carried out by the force.

In the light of this background and the findings reached by this study, it can be concluded that the military have an essential role in peacebuilding beyond only high security engagement. It can also be affirmed that the role of NGOs and other Civil Society Organisations cannot be overemphasised as demonstrated by this study in which through NGO works many value of

communal leaving which were lost as a result of the conflict in the study area are gradually returning.

Furthermore, although there are collaborations between the military and the NGOs in the study area in the peacebuilding process, the collaboration is a limited one and is riddled by mutual mistrust by both parties. The NGOs recognises the need for collaboration within themselves so as to support the bigger goal of a peaceful Jos North as demonstrated in the formation of the Plateau Peace Partnership Network (PPPN) and as the study reveals many feels the need to collaborate with the military in many ways through advocacy to the force, and sending of invitation to them for partnership; the force on the other hand is selective in its collaboration as it maintains that not all of the NGOs are involved in genuine peacebuilding efforts.

Finally, the peace so far attained in the study area is a sustainable one this is because the reconciliation process is built from the grassroots and supported by both the STF and NGOs. The communities in most cases are the engineer of the peace talks and dialogue in their own community. Therefore, the work concludes that there is a very important impact of the role of the STF and NGOs in the peacebuilding process as their collaboration has led to a more peaceful and safer Jos North.

5.4 Recommendations

In view of the findings of this research, the research comes up with the following recommendations:

1. State government should make frantic efforts at addressing the lingering factors that trigger conflict in the area. This can be done by periodically organising community

dialogue comprising of various ethnic and religious groups to air their views and communicate their pressing needs and fears within Jos North. By doing that mistrust and feeling of being marginalised will be allayed.

2. Government and well to do individuals should create employment opportunities, skill acquisition programmes as well as empower women and youth with skills. This will make them less likely to involve in conflict as they will be busy seeking their ends.
3. The STF should be much more open to the people so that the people can see them as part of the society and not an occupying force. By becoming friendlier, the ordinary people will find sharing information with the force much easier than if it is perceived as an intruder or occupying force.
4. The NGOs should go more into empowering the poor with loans, train more persons in different skills for this will keep the teaming youth away from violence. Also, those that have being trained should be empowered so that the message of peace that they have learned will be translated better.
5. Individuals should also make effort to 'fight for peace' by engineering processes of living peacefully with their neighbours. Other communities should borrow a leaf from youth who voluntarily form neighbourhood watch so as to guide their community from intruders and prevent minor skirmishes from blowing into violence. People should also know that building peace cannot be imposed by either the STF or any NGO. They must therefore work selflessly for the sake of having lasting peace in their community which will translate into a peaceful plateau in the long run.

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Appendix "A"

Questionnaire

Department of Political Science and International Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
Ahmadu Bello University
Zaria – Nigeria.

Dear Respondent,

I am a postgraduate student in the above named department, conducting a research on the topic: **The Intervention of the Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations in Peacebuilding in Jos North LGA, 2010-2015**

I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions by ticking and comment where required. Meanwhile, be assured that your responses will be treated with high level of confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this research.

Thank you.

Wasiu FemiOMOJARABI
M.SC/SOC-SCI/22420/2012-2013

SECTION A: BIODATA

1. Age Bracket: (a) 18-25years [ ] (b) 26-33years [ ] (c) 34-41years [ ] (d) 42 years and above [ ]
2. Gender: (a) Male [ ] (b) Female [ ]
3. Religion: (a) Christianity [ ] (b) Islam [ ] (c) Traditional Religion [ ]
4. Occupation: (a) Civil Service [ ] (b) Business [ ] (c) Farming [ ] (d) Teaching [ ] (e) Others _____
5. Local Government Ward _____

SECTION B: VARIOUS INITIATIVES OF THE STF AND NGOs

6. Are you aware of the initiatives of the STF in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North? (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]
7. What are some of these initiatives? Please specify

   _____

   _____
8. Are you aware of the initiatives of NGOs in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North? (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]
9. What are some of these initiatives? Please specify

   _____

   _____

SECTION C: COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN THE STF AND NGOs

10. Are you aware of the collaboration between the STF and NGOs in Jos North (a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]
11. In what ways are they working together to ensure stable peace in Jos?

    _____

    _____
12. Do you agree that the collaboration between the STF and the NGOs has a positive impact on the peace process in Jos North (a) Yes [ ] (b) [ ]

SECTION D: IMPACT OF STF AND NGOs INTERVENTION ON PEACE

13. What are some of the impacts of their Intervention?

    _____

    _____
14. Which of these bodies have played equally important roles in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North? (a) Religious Leaders/Faith Based Organizations [ ] (b) Community Leaders/Community Based Organizations [ ] (c) Youth and Women Movements [ ] (d) Media [ ] (e) Others, specify _____

15. What do you think will happen if the STF are withdrawn from Jos?

    _____

    _____

16. Are the STF and NGOs engaging members of the Jos community in the peacebuilding process? (a) yes [ ] (b) No [ ]
17. What are some of these roles played by members of the community in ensuring lasting peace?

    _____

    _____

Appendix "B"

Interview Questions topersonnel of the Special Task Force (STF)

Department of Political Science and International Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

Ahmadu Bello University

Zaria – Nigeria.

Topic: "An Assessment of the Military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State(2010-2015)"

1. Is peacebuilding included in your mandate in Plateau State?
2. What has being your initiatives in ensuring lasting peace in Jos North?
3. In what ways have you had to work with NGOs in building durable peace in Jos North?
4. What kind of response do you get from people in this area?
5. Are the ordinary people ready to live peacefully with one another?
6. Many argue that the military role in conflict is limited to peacekeeping and thus they do not have any role in peacebuilding. What can you say to this?
7. It is said that the level of peace attained in Jos is due to your efforts. What can you say to that?
8. In the course of building lasting peace in Jos North you have had to work with NGOs, which of the NGOs have you partnered with and what is the nature of your cooperation?
9. Are your efforts towards maintaining lasting peace yielding positive results? In what ways please?
10. What can you say concerning NGOs in the peacebuilding process?
11. What measures are you taking to prevent a relapse to conflict in Jos North?
12. What are the major challenges to your efforts at ensuring lasting peace?

Appendix "C"

Interview Questions to Selected Non-Governmental Organisations

Department of Political Science and International Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

Ahmadu Bello University

Zaria – Nigeria.

Topic: "An Assessment of the Military Special Task Force and Non-Governmental Organisations Interventions in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Jos North LGA of Plateau State(2010-2015)"

1. Is peacebuilding a core part of your goal or it is a goal that was necessitated due to the violence in Jos North?
2. What are the initiatives you have carried out towards ensuring lasting peace in Jos North?
3. In the course of building lasting peace in Jos North you have had to work with the STF, what is the nature of your cooperation?
4. What motivated the collaboration with the STF and how did it start?
5. What kind of response do you get from the ordinary people in this area; do you think they are willing to live in peace?
6. It is usually said that the military role in conflict is limited to peacekeeping and thus they do not have any role in peacebuilding. What can you say to this?
7. Are your peacebuilding initiatives yielding positive results? In what ways please?
8. What measures are you taking to prevent a relapse to conflict in Jos North?
9. What are the challenges you face in your cooperation with the STF?
10. What are the major challenges to your efforts at ensuring lasting peace?

Appendix "D"

List of Informants

S/NO	Names	Agency	Date and Time
1	Capt. Ikedichi, O. Iweha (Spokesman)	Spokesman, STF Headquarters, Jos	16/03/2015 11:50am-2:01pm and 18/03/2015 12:10pm-1:39pm
2	Dr.YakubuSankey (Country Adviser)	Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)	02/04/2015 8:52am-9:33am
3	Mr. Augustine Jang (Field worker)	Damietta peace Initiatives (DPI)	10/03/2015 7:20pm-9:09pm
4	Baba Tabat (peacebuilding department)	Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)	20/03/2015 11:00am-12:52pm
5	Miss Ada Ohaba (peacebuilding department)	Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC)	23/03/2015 11:10am-12:15pm
6	Mr.GayusDachet (Programme Manager)	Damietta Peace Initiatives (DPI)	02/04/2015 12:35pm-2:09pm
7	Mr.Ojo Michael Emmanuel (Project Manager)	Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria (ICIN)	17/03/2015 5:32pm-6:45pm
8	HajiaFati Suleiman (Director)	Islamic Counselling Initiative of Nigeria (ICIN)	17/03/2015 5:04pm-5:28pm
9	Mr. Augustine Davou (Field worker)	Young Ambassador for Community Peace and Interfaith Foundation (YACPIF)	16/04/2015 6:00pm-7:06pm
10	Mr. Gambo Michael (Volunteer)	YACPIF	19/04/2015 4:25pm-5:50pm
11.	Mr. Isa Nda	NPC, Jos North	11/02/2015


APPENDIX "E"

List of Research Assistants

S/ NO	RESEARCH ASSISTANTS	WARDS COVERED
1	Sylvanus Boniface	Naraguta B
2	Noel Tuamen	Tudun Wada
3	Ibrahim SaiduFika	GarbaDaho
4	Edward Wali	JentaApata
5	SalisuInusa Hassan	Naraguta B
6	Friday Barry	Vanderpuye
7	William Weng	Kabong
8	OnesimusMajidadi	Kabong
9	UsmanShehu	Sarkin Arab
10	Michael Adeleke	TafawaBalewa

APPENDIX "F"


Map of Plateau State



Source: Krause, Jana (2011): A Deadly Cycle of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Plateau State Nigeria

APPENDIX "G"

Map of Jos North



Source: Krause, Jana (2011): A Deadly Cycle of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Plateau State Nigeria