

**THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS IN PEACE BUILDING
IN ZANGON-KATAF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF
KADUNA STATE NIGERIA**

BY

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Declaration

I humbly declare that, this thesis titled “**The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State Nigeria**” has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree at this or any other Institution.

Name of Student

Signature

Date

Certification

This thesis entitled “**The Role of Traditional Rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State Nigeria**” by Usman Thomas Irmiya meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

With sincere heart, I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my late mother Mrs Rhoda Sheyin, and the entire victims of ethno-religious conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

Acknowledgement

It is a normal tradition that at the end of every academic exercise of this nature, one is indebted to a number of individuals whose valuable contributions in one way or the other have made it possible for a successful completion of such programme. In a situation like this such individuals are too numerous to be mentioned.

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Abstract

Across Africa and the developing world traditional rulers are held in high esteem as custodians of culture and traditions. The influence and control gained by Nigerian traditional rulers might not be unconnected with the value systems of most of the ethnic groups of the areas within which the traditional rulers are based. Traditional rulers put a lot of effort through various peacebuilding initiatives to ensure peaceful coexistence among their subjects in their respective domains. The study examines the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Questionnaire and interview instruments were used to source for primary data. Human Needs Theory was adopted as a theoretical framework to guide the study. The choice of the theory is informed by the fact that, there are certain needs that are necessary to individuals' survival, which serve as precondition for meeting other needs. Among these basic needs is safety and security. People must meet these basic needs before they can think of anything. The study found out that, manipulation of ethnicity and religion constitutes the major source of conflict. There are other equally important causes of conflict in the LGA. They include: poverty, unemployment and political differences etc. The findings further revealed that, traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area have played some specific roles, and are still playing some specific roles in peacebuilding. These specific roles are; dialogue and conflict reconciliation through holding regular series of meetings with leaders of ethnic and religious groups in their chiefdoms; creating awareness on peaceful co-existence among different groups in their respective chiefdoms; relief materials were provided to the displaced victims of conflict in some of the chiefdoms. They ensured the return of the people that were internally displaced during the 2011 post-election violence to their houses. However, peacebuilding is not a stage in time of conflict rather; it is a dynamic social process, which takes place before, during and after conflict. Since conflict is inevitable in every human society, peacebuilding will still remain a dynamic social process.

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List of Acronyms

CAN	Christians Association of Nigeria
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
EC	European Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMCMCDF	Inter-Faith Mediation Centre of Muslims-Christians Dialogue Forum
INGOs	International non-Governmental Organisations
IPL	International Peace League
MZL	Middle Zone League
NA	Native Authority
NGF	Northern Governors Forum
NGOs	non-Governmental Organisations
NIREC	Nigeria Inter-Religious Council
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNTACT	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UK	United Kingdom

US United States

WB World Bank

CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Conflict is inevitable in every human society; conflict generally exists whenever and wherever there is the pursuit of incompatible goals, as well as scarce status and resources. Nigeria is often referred to as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. The plural nature of the country makes it susceptible to manipulation and therefore, ushers in a constant feeling of distrust between and among the component units, as well as ethnic and religious groups that made up the polity, sometimes leading to violent and deadly clashes between and among these groups, thereby undermining peace and security of lives and properties of its citizens, and the country in general.

Violent ethnic and religious conflicts are part of the most persistent issue in Nigeria. In the history of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria, Kaduna State can be described as a conflict prone area. It has experienced quite a number of violent conflicts, mostly expressed in ethno-religious forms. The major examples of violent ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna State included the Kafanchan-Kaduna crises in 1987, Zangon-Kataf riots of February and May, 1992, Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, Kasuwar Magani (Kaduna) 1994 (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). There are fifty-eight (58) ethnic groups in Kaduna State who are predominantly Muslims and Christians. Most of these ethnic groups are situated in Southern Kaduna, and some of them cut across local governments. For instance you can find one or more than two ethnic groups in more than one local government area (Hayab, 2014).

The area known as Southern Kaduna is well-known for its recurrent violent ethnic and religious conflicts and unrest. As discussed by Suberu (1996), “Ethnic minority tensions and conflicts in Southern Kaduna have probably engendered far more serious violence than any other forms of communal instability in recent Nigerian history” (p48). “The zone has occupied a volatile position in the twentieth century history of inter-group conflicts and tensions in Northern Nigeria, it has experienced complex conflicts, occasionally violent, and mostly assuming an ethnic form” (Kazah-Toure, 1999: 111).

The area is composed of numerous but relatively small ethnic groups, many of which are predominantly Christians, also known as Northern Minorities. The Southern Kaduna area is also inhabited by Hausa and Fulani who are predominantly Muslims, and also considered non indigenes by the other ethnic groups in the area. The relationships that often exist between the Southern Kaduna ethnic groups, and the Hausa and the Fulani on the other hand have been hostile, at some points leading to violent ethno-religious conflict (Kazah-Toure, 2003). Zangon-Kataf Local Government is also known for its frequent ethnic and religious conflicts. There was an outbreak of violent ethno-religious conflicts in 1987, the February and the May 1992 that engulfed Zango town in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, the 2011 inter-communal conflict, that erupted in Kamuru town between Bajju and Ikulu over the ownership Kamuru town, and recently, the 2011 post election violence which sparked up violent conflict in some part of the state, and Zangon-Kataf Local Government in Particular.

Violent conflict constitutes a clog in the wheel of progress and development of an individual and the community at large. Therefore, sustainable peace and security is fundamental to the progress and development of every society. This is due to the fact that, incessant conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government constitute a hindrance to peace and security of the citizens

of the area. Despite all efforts by the government to nip in bud, the prevalence of conflict in the LGA, through the deployment of security personnel whenever there is breakdown of conflict. However, the subsequent setting of many judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate the causes of conflicts proved abortive.

Traditional rulers as non state actors are being regarded as custodians of culture and tradition of the nation. Traditional rulers are close to the people at the grassroots level, and traditionally accepted by their people based on the customs and the traditions of their respective domains, and also officially recognized by the government of their respective states. Traditional rulers have been and are in the forefront of efforts to prevent and mediate during conflict in their respective domains. During violent conflicts traditional rulers are often seen over the media calling for their subjects to end violence.

The 1999 constitution does not provide any official role for traditional rulers. In practical terms, traditional rulers do not have any official role to play in the political machinery and governance in contemporary Nigeria. At best, they serve in an unofficial capacity as mere advisory body to the local, state and federal government functionaries (Amusa, and Ofuafor, 2012). Traditional rulers through multiple peacebuilding initiatives ensure peaceful coexistence among their subjects, due to their continuous direct contact with their subjects, which placed them in vantage position in maintaining law and order, in their respective domains. The contemporary role of traditional rulers is security and peace, at the same time local government use them for the attainment of peace and security in their areas as security and peace officers (Odoh, 2009; 2014). However, the Federal Government in its 1976 guidelines for local government reform provides for the establishment of committee in each of the local government area, and the traditional rulers are represented in each of these committees. The committee is

required to hold meetings to consider and make recommendations in all matters concerning the police and preservation of peace in the area (Guidelines for Local Government Reforms, 1976).

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The diversity and pluralism that constitute the trademark of Nigeria's social and political life provides distinct setting for manipulation of ethnic and religious identities by the elites. Violent conflicts have become a common feature of inter-group relations in Kaduna State. It is even more in Southern Kaduna and Zangon-Kataf in particular where group identities, especially those constructed around ethnic and religious identities are politicised and manipulated in inter-group relations.

Despite the continuous occurrences of the phenomena in Nigeria, there is no clear-headed long-term perspective within which violent conflicts can be contained. From the colonial government to the present and at both local and national levels, what essentially prevails is the fire-brigade approach with a very short-term framework to bring the violence that comes with the conflict to an end (Oyedele, 2007). In the same vein, one can equally assert that, despite all efforts by the government to bring the conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area to an end, whenever there is breakdown of conflict, through deployment of security operatives and subsequent establishment of judicial commissions of inquiry to unravel the causes of conflict, yet conflicts continue to rear its ugly head in the area. Hence this might not be unconnected with failure of the government to prosecute the perpetrators of these conflicts in the local government area.

Peacebuilding is not an exclusive preserve of government and inter-governmental organisations. Non state actors equally partake in ensuring peaceful co-existence among groups, through multiple peacebuilding initiatives at federal, state, and local government levels (Ibrahim,

2010). The 1976 Guidelines for Local Government Reform states that Emirs and Chiefs should be responsible, as hitherto in assisting government in the maintenance of peace (Guidelines for Local Government Reforms, 1976).

Most of the violent conflicts that occur in Nigeria start from the localities in which the traditional rulers have a firm base. In many cases, the traditional rulers put a lot of efforts through various channels to help control conflicts, and also find a way of ensuring peaceful co-existence among groups in their respective domains. Some of these conflicts included the mass demonstration against Chief Ladoke Akintola-led A.G. tour of Kano on 15th May, 1953; the 29th March 1966 violent demonstration against the Unification Decree of the General Aguiyi Ironsi Military Regime; the Maitatsine Riot of 18th-29th December, 1980; the 13th October 1991 Reinherd Bonnke Riot; the 6th December 1994 Akaluka beheading incident; the 30th May, 1995 ethnic disturbances of Sabon Gari Market (Ibrahim, 2010).

The traditional rulers have been intervening in conflicts in the case of the Tiv-Jukun conflict that has been in existence since 1922. Similarly, the Kaduna State Council of Emirs and Chiefs was involved by the government in controlling the 1987 Kafanchan crisis, Zangon-Kataf crisis of February and May 1992 (Ibrahim, 2010). There are mixed perceptions on the role of traditional rulers, though traditional rulers are largely seen as peace builders. In conflict circumstances they do compound and conflagrate emergencies. Thus, the study examines the specific roles traditional rulers play in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State as exemplified in the previous studies.

1.3 Research Questions

Considering the spate of violent ethnic and religious conflict and the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding, in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area the study is anchored on the following research questions.

- i. What are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
- ii. What specific roles do traditional rulers play in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
- iii. How effective are the roles of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
- iv. What challenges do traditional rulers face in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

- i. To investigate the causes of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area
- ii. To examine the specific roles traditional rulers play in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area
- iii. To ascertain the effectiveness of the roles of Traditional Rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area
- iv. To ascertain the challenges traditional rulers face in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

1.5 Research Propositions

- i. Traditional rulers play specific roles in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

- ii. Traditional rulers face challenges in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

1.6 Justification of the Study

The justification of this study is that a huge gap exists on the role of Traditional Rulers in peacebuilding. Most of the existing literature on peacebuilding pays more attention on the role of government and its agencies e.g. Security Forces, International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), Regional and sub-regional Organizations, International and domestic non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Civil Societies Organisations (CSOs), and Community Based Organisation (CBOs). Emphasis placed on Traditional Rulers is on politics, campaign, election, voter's mobilization, thereby ignoring the role they play in peacebuilding. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no work of this nature has been conducted in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

Beside these, the study is significant in the sense that, traditional rulers have been criticised for playing a supportive role to any government in power and also soliciting votes for politicians, and at the same time, cannot justify the huge amount of salaries being paid to them by the government. However, due to the volatile nature of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area have played and are still playing significant roles in ensuring lasting peace and security as well as peaceful co-existence among different groups in their various chiefdoms.

Furthermore, even where there is a vast literature on the roles of traditional rulers in peacebuilding, emphasis is laid on the pre-colonial peacebuilding activities of traditional rulers, and also of those established traditional political institutions of Northern and Southern Nigeria, without focusing on newly established chiefdoms in Southern Kaduna area and Zangon-Kataf

LGA in particular. The roles of traditional rulers in peacebuilding, in most of the literature reviewed, have not been wholly and directly incorporated into the broader scope of peacebuilding, but only focus on some specific areas that were studied not as component of peacebuilding

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The topic under study “The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf LGA of Kaduna State” focuses only on those area of peacebuilding. The study area has a total number of eleven (11) wards and also total number of four (4) Chiefdoms, and as a result of this the research covers seven (7) wards out of the eleven wards (11) as well as the four (4) Chiefdoms in the local government area. The Divisional Police Officer and Chairman of Local Government Area were interviewed. Also in the third phase of the interview, ethnic and religious leaders, youth’s and women leaders were covered through interview.

The limitation of this study is that, from the onset, the study intended to conduct a Focus Group Discussion (FGD), but in the course of carrying out the field work, the researcher was unable to bring together the respondents that would have made up the Focus Group Discussion category. This was due to the fact that, the respondents gave different reasons and schedules, due to their personal engagements. The only option left was for the researcher to follow them to their various areas of residence.

1.8 Research Methodology

The breakdown of the research methodology is as follow:

1.8.1 Sources of Data

For the purpose of this study, both secondary and primary data were sourced.

Secondary Sources of Data: These constitute academic materials from published and unpublished works, text books, journal articles conference proceedings and papers, newspapers, magazines, all sourced from Kashim Ibrahim Library, ABU, Faculty of Social Sciences Library, other source are: the internet sources, Kaduna State Government Report and Judicial Commissions of Inquiry from Kaduna State Government Printers, materials from Kaduna State Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs and other sources of aggregate data such as census data.

Primary Sources of Data: Primary data was collected through the use of the following survey instruments:

Structured and Unstructured Questionnaire: For the purpose of obtaining data through the administration of questionnaires, both open and close ended questionnaires were used in carrying out the survey, on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area. The questionnaires were administered to the individuals that were selected through the sampling procedure that was employed by the study to elicit responses from the citizens of the Local Government Area. Sampling for this purpose was based largely on probability sampling technique. This was so because of the nature of the study and for this reason probability sampling is suitable for this study.

In-depth interview: The use of in-depth interview was quite critical to this study. The approach helps the researcher to elicit responses from the respondents and also it permits for elaboration. Largely, open ended questions and face-to-face in-depth interview was employed to obtain the relevant information for this study. The interview was guided by interview guide/questions. Notebooks and a voice recorder were used during the in-depth interview for the purpose of recording and note taken.

For this purpose, the researcher's knowledge of the key actors in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area as well as of the leadership of the various ethnic and religious groups and associations was of immense assistance. The most important personalities that were interviewed are those that are involved in peacebuilding in the Local Government Area. Four (4) paramount traditional rulers in the area were interviewed, Chiefs of Bajju, Atyap, Ikulu and Kamantan alongside one (1) Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and one (1) Local Government Area Chairperson. Nine (9) leaders of ethnic groups identified for this purpose were those of the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, Fulani, and Bajju. Other equally important individuals that were identified are four (4) religious leaders representing Christianity and Islam. Three (3) youth's leaders, one (1) women leader and three (3) leaders of neighbourhood watch. See Appendix "F" p. 139

1.8.2 Population and Sample Size of the Study

Zangon-Kataf LG being the study area, sample size of 450 was chosen as representative enough of the total population of 318, 991 of the Local Government Area. This choice was determined by Chreiche and Morgan criterion of 384 and above to represent the total population of 1,000,000 and above (Chreiche and Morgan 1970). The area also has a total number of eleven (11) wards.

1.8.3 Sampling Procedure

The area of the study is Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area with total number of eleven political wards (11). Based on 2006 population census, the population of the local government area is estimated to be 318,991, which was used to determine the sample size of 450. The study's sample population was drawn from the 11 wards which has a combined population of 318, 991 as obtained from Information Division Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area. The

study **employed multi-stage sampling technique**. However, for representativeness, two-third, that is 7 out of 11 wards were selected to represent the 11 wards in the LG, using the following formula, $2 \div 3 \times 11 = 7$ thereby giving us a total number of seven (7) wards. The wards were selected using **simple random sampling technique**, using balloting or lottery method. The 450 questionnaires were proportionately allocated to each ward based on its population, using the formula $K = N \div TN \times SS \div 1$ express as, ward population \div total population \times sample size \div 1, to determined the appropriate and proportionate number of questionnaires that goes to each ward.

Systematic sampling method was applied in administering questionnaires, by using streets and households that constitute a word. The households were selected at regular intervals, which involve a random start, and then proceeds with selection of every household from the point on wards. That is to say, the first household was selected at random upon which the house was selected for administering questionnaire. In areas not properly delineated into streets, the researcher randomly select the household by considering the selection interval. And in each selected household, simple random sampling technique was applied in selecting individual that the questionnaire was administered to. Individuals that were selected in each household are adult male or female. The LG and its wards, are presented in table 1.1

Table 1.1 Distribution of Wards and their respective Populations in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

S/NO	Wards	Population
1	Gidan Jatau	32,605
2	Gora	28,645
3	Kamanton	34,017
4	Ikulu	58,181
5	Madakiya	28,871
6	Ungwan Rimi	28,012
7	Zaman Dabo	21,539
8	Zango Urban	11,763
9	Zonkwa	34,536
10	Zonzon	17,500
11	Ungwan Gaya	23,322
	Total	318,991

Source: Census 2006

The area of the study comprises 11 wards and has a total population of 318,991 as demonstrated in tables 1.1. The study employed multi-stage sampling technique. However, for representativeness two-third that is 7 out of 11 wards were selected to represent the 11 wards in the LG, using the following formula, $2 \div 3 \times 11 = 7$ thereby giving us a total number of seven (7) wards. The wards were selected using simple random sampling technique, using balloting or lottery method. The 450 questionnaires were allocated to each ward using the formula $K = N \div TN \times SS \div 1$ express as, ward population \div total population \times sample size \div 1, to determined the appropriate and proportionate number of questionnaires that goes to each ward.

Table1.2: Distribution of selected Wards and their respective Populations

S/NO	Selected Wards	Population
1	Kamanton	34,017
2	Ikulu	58,181
3	Madakiya	28,871
4	Ungwan Rimi	28,012
5	Zango Urban	11,763
6	Zonkwa	34,536
7	Zonzon	17,500
	Total	212,880

Source: Derived From Table 1.1

Table 1.2 indicates the selected wards for the study, and their respective populations. The table indicates a total number of two hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred and eighty (212,880). The sample size for each of the wards is derived using the formula: Ward population = Number of population per ward ÷ Total Number of the population of the selected wards x 450×1= sample size. The sample size for each of the wards is presented in the table below.

Table 1.3: Distributions of the Selected Wards and their respective Sample Size

S/NO	Names of Selected Wards	Population	Sample Size
1	Kamanton	34,017	72
2	Ikulu	58,181	123
3	Madakiya	28,871	61
4	Ungwan Rimi	28,012	59
5	Zango Urban	11,763	25
6	Zonkwa	34,536	73
7	Zonzon	17,500	37
	Total	212,880	450

Source: Derived From Table 1.2

Table 1.3 illustrates the sample size of each of the wards, selected for the study. The sample size of each word is derived by applying the formula: $\text{Ward population} \div \text{Total population} \times 450 \times 1 = \text{sample size}$. **Systematic sampling method** was applied in administering questionnaires by using streets and households that constitute a word. The respondents were selected at regular intervals, which involve a random start and then proceeds with selection of every respondent from the point on wards. The first house was selected at random upon administering questionnaire. In areas not properly delineated into streets, the researcher randomly select the respondents by considering the selection interval. And in each selected household, simple random sampling technique was applied in selecting individual that the questionnaire was administered to.

1.8.4 Population of the Study

The population of the study include: all adult male and female cutting across all cultural and religious groups living in the local government. The first category of the respondents and the information that was sourced came through the administration of questionnaires, which was administered to citizens of the Local Governments Area. The second category comes through in–depth interview, which formed additional research technique for the area under study. The interview is formed into three segments. The first segment of the interview covered four (4) traditional rulers from four traditional institutions in the LG. One (1) Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and one (1) Local Government Chairperson were interviewed who are members of peace security committee in the local government area. The third segment of respondents that was interviewed covered (9) nine leaders of ethnic, four (4) religious leaders, three (3) youth’s leaders, one (1) women leaders, and three (3) leaders of neighbourhood watch. See Appendix “F” p. 139

1.8.5 Research Assistants

Five research assistants were used to help the researcher in the administration and retrieval of the questionnaires. The research assistants happened to be relatives of the researcher, two of them are holders of Higher National Diploma (HND), two are holders of National Diploma (ND), and one is a holder of National Certificate of Education (NCE). The table below represents the breakdown of their wards coverage.

Table 1.4: Research Assistants' (RA) Ward Coverage

S/N	Names	Wards Covered by Each (RA)
1	Eleazer Haruna	Kamanton and Ikulu
2	Victor Bala	Madakiya and Unguwan Rimi
3	Sunday Peter Sarki	Zango Urban
4	Josephine Patrick	Zonzon
5	Usman Caleb Dambo	Zonkwa
Total	5	7

Source: Field Work, 2016

1.8.6 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

Data was presented by tabulation, which is a method of transferring data from the instrument of data collection and arrange in tabular form. The data was analysed through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. Triangulation was adopted to analyse the data quantitatively and qualitatively. Through quantitative method, the study adopted simple percentage and frequency distribution table, and made summation of the information that was generated from the field, through the use of questionnaires. Through the qualitative methods, the interviews that were conducted were tape recorded, interpreted and analysed.

1.9 Conceptual Clarifications

Conflict: conflict denotes struggle over scarce values and status among groups in the society. Conflict often manifest in violent form, violence therefore denotes employment of illegal method of physical coercion for personal or group ends.

Ethno-religious conflict: this refers to all disputes that evolved from ethno-religious sectarian differences, often between people of similar ethnic group who coincidentally also share some religious or sectarian affiliation and those of opposing primordial characteristics which is

associated with ethno-religious violence. Any of these ethnicity or religion can precipitate crisis with one immediately transiting to another.

Peacebuilding: peacebuilding is an umbrella term for all work geared toward social change at all level of society and in all level of conflict (Schirch, 2008). It means creating tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-habituated system to be peace system. It can be done before, during or after violence erupt (Notter and Diamond, 1996).

Traditional Rulers: traditional rulers are those “traditional heads of an ethnic groups or clan who are the holders of highest primary executive offices in an indigenous polity, or who have been appointed to the position in accordance with the custom and tradition of the area concerned by the instrument or order of the state government, and whose title are recognised as traditional rulers by the government of the state” (Ola and Tonwe, as cited in Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013: 130).

1.10 Organisation of Chapters

The study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one deals with general introduction and background to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, research propositions, justification of the study, scope and limitations of the study, methodology, definition of concepts and organisation of chapters. Chapter two dwells on the review of the existing literature and theoretical framework. Chapter three focuses on the historical background of Zangon-Kataf LG and overview of conflict in the area. Chapter four dwells on the analysis and presentation of the data that was collected from the field, on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area. Lastly, chapter five focuses on summary, conclusion, and recommendations base on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The literature on conflict and the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Nigeria is vast and still expanding. This chapter reviews a select few and provides the theoretical framework that guides the study. The review is undertaken thematically as follows:

2.2 The Concept of Traditional Rulers:

For centuries before the advent of the colonialism, governance in different parts of present day Nigeria was synonymous with traditional institution and their rule, local government administration generally centred on traditional rulers, who were considered repository of religious, legislative, executive, and judicial functions (Afigbo, 1972). In essence traditional rulers constitute the core of governance. The geographical sphere of influence and authority of traditional rulers in pre-colonial Nigeria were essentially localised and no traditional ruler ever had jurisdiction over the entire geographical area of modern Nigeria (Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013).

As regards to the concept of traditional ruler, just as no concept in social sciences enjoys monopoly over acceptable definition, the concept of traditional ruler also does not enjoy acceptable definition; this is because in some parts of Nigeria the concept predates colonialism, while in other parts the concept can be tied to colonialism as well as post-colonialism. Besides, “there is no single definition of traditional systems of authority in Nigeria principally because of the variegated nature of its indigenous political system” (Ohiani, 2009:3). Webber cited in Ohiani (2009), sees traditional authority as that form of domination that rest upon routine behaviours which have, over the years, come to be regarded as an inviolable norm of conduct upon piety for what actually, allegedly or presumably has always existed. The definition by

Webber means that, traditional authority is that form of hegemony which derives its legitimacy based on customs and traditions of the people. This form of authority is no longer applicable in modern state system. Traditional rulers are only regarded as the custodian of culture and tradition of their people. In this regard, the institutions and set of practice of traditional ruler-ship, has been in existence for long period of time, and it is worth preserving.

However, traditional institutions can be referred to as indigenous political arrangements, whereby leaders with proven track records are appointed and installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs (Orji and Olali, as cited in Nweke, 2012: 206). By implication, before a person is appointed to the position of traditional ruler, he must be a man of integrity, sanctioned by native law and custom of that particular community. This definition failed to come to reality with present day Nigeria, whereby people of questionable character that cornered public fund, after retiring from public office are appointed as traditional rulers. Adewumi and Egwurube, as cited in Ohiani (2009: 4), defined traditional rulers as,

individuals occupying communal political leadership position sanctioned by cultural mores and values, and enjoying the legitimacy of particular communities to direct their affairs. Their basis of legitimacy is therefore tradition, which includes; the whole range of inherited culture and way of life; a people's history; moral and social values and the traditional institutions which survives to serve those values; traditional religious ideas surviving as autonomous religious or influences of Christianity and Islam; the kingship systems and the other social institutions

By this submission, a traditional ruler refers to a traditional head of an ethnic community, whose staff of office conferred the highest traditional authority on the incumbent since before the emergence of colonialism. The definition is found wanting because it fails to look at the office of traditional rulers beyond pre-colonial and colonial to post-colonial era. Therefore, Ola and Tonwe (as cited in Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013: 130), see a traditional ruler as

the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the holder of the highest primary executive office in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to the position in accordance with the custom and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order of the state government, and whose title is recognized as a traditional ruler by the government of the state

However, Africa indigenous political systems can be referred to as, those institutions of governance that were in existence prior to colonialism. Thus, traditional systems of authority or indigenous polities are those systems/polities which existed before the advent of colonial rule, Ohiani (2009:3) sees them as “indigenous state systems pre-dating colonialism”.

In practical terms, traditional rulers do not have any official role to play in the political machinery and governance in contemporary Nigeria. At best they serve in an unofficial capacity as advisory body to local, state, and federal government functionaries. Odoh (2009, 2014) confirms that, the contemporary role of traditional rulers among many is security and peace and at the same time local government use them for the attainment of peace and security in their areas as security or peace officers. The Federal Government in its Guidelines for Local Government Reform provides for the establishment of a police committee in each of the local government area. The traditional rulers are represented in each of these committees and it is required to hold regular meetings to consider and make recommendations on all matters concerning the police and preservation of peace in the area (Guidelines for Local Government Reforms, 1976).

2.3 The Concept of Conflict:

Conflict constitutes an inevitable aspect of human interaction, and cannot be avoided. Social and political interactions involve two opposing forces that are relentless tendencies which are conflict and cooperation. Therefore, an inherent difference of people who live and interact with one another and pursuing conflicting interests makes conflict inevitable (Dunmoye, 2012;

Kaoje, 2003). Thus, Dunmoye (2012) opines that, “as human beings interact with each other in social setting, and seek to promote their material well being and survival in the midst of scarce resources, they either cooperate for the purpose of mutual benefits, or disagree over the usage of factors of production and the process of production” (p. 15). However, “when incomparable goals are pursued simultaneously by individuals, groups, communities, and conflict is said to exist” (Dunmoye, 2012:16).

Conflict in a general sense denotes a scenario whereby individuals, groups, communities, and nations with divergent aspirations who pursue incompatible goals for which disagreement is eminent and if not properly manage may erupt into violent and destructive nature. “Conflict is a type of interaction that is characterized by antagonistic encounters or collision of interests, ideas, policies, programs and persons or their entities” (Dunmoye, 2012, 16). Conflict is a “situation, in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspective just goal” (Wolf, as cited in Olu-Adeyemi, 2006:2). Sometimes conflict is as a result of struggle for power and material gain by leaders and the followers alike. Because of vested interest the conflicting parties prefer conflict to cooperation and violence over negotiation. Thus, conflict can be described as a situation or condition of disharmony in an interaction process (Olu-Adeyemi, 2006). (Coser, as cited in Otite and Albert, 1999) states that

Social conflict may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to neutralized, injure or eliminate their rivals. Such conflict may take place between individuals, between collectives, or between individuals and collectives.

2.3.1 The Liberal Perspective on Conflict

Liberal perspective on conflict sees conflict as Dunmoye explained, “inescapable feature of society. Just like cooperation, conflict is seen as inherent in the social structure of the

society, sometimes even functional to the survival of the society (Dunmoye, 2012: 17). Conflict is a “pervasive feature of social systems and that social system is a mingling of associative and dissociative process. Conflict is inherent nature of human being and which is residing in his biological make up, system without conflict will show no life process” (Simmel, as cited in Turner, 1975:619). Coser (1957) sees conflict as functional, progressive, and productive and even brings about creativity. Therefore, the perspective perceives conflict as much more than class struggle, and also as a reflection of more than just conflict of interest but conflict arising from hostile instincts which can be exacerbated by conflict of interest, or mitigated by harmonious social relation and contracting instincts for love. He also states that, “conflict within society and between groups in a society can prevent accommodations and habitual relations from progressively impoverishing creativity” (Coser, 1957:197). However, the perspective argued that, whether conflict is violent or not, conflict serves to maintain or re-establish the equilibrium of the society.

The clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be, the conflict between vested interest and new strata and groups demanding their share of power, wealth and status, has been productive of vitality; note for example the contrast between the frozen world of middle ages that accompanied the thaw that set in with Renaissance civilization (Coser, 1957:198).

Conflict not only generates new norms, and new institutions, conflict can have both functional and dysfunctional consequences and that, “a particular type of conflict that is evaluated negatively is recommended for elimination through structural and policy change” (Dunmoye, 2012:17). Conflict is sine quo non for the survival of society. In fact, conflict can operate to maintain the basis of integration in social system.

2.3.2 The Marxian Perspective on Conflict

The Marxian perspective of conflict was committed to changing social structures by altering the course of social processes, and also committed to activating conflict which would change the structure of society (Turner, 1975). Conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the existing structures but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict. Thus, enshrined in this perspective is the theories and history of society which view social behaviour and transformation as the function of antagonism between opposing interests and forces. Class conflict is the driving forces of history, being at the roots of all major changes in law, institutions, morality and religion. And society can only progress through the elimination of class struggle (Dunmoye, 2012).

However, in the views of the Marxist, the degree of inequality in the distribution of scarce resources between the haves and the have not is the objective determinant of conflict in the society. According to Marx, (1848) “the more unequal the distribution of scarce resources in a system, the greater will be the conflict of interest between dominant and subordinate segments in a system” (cited in Turner, 1975:621). Therefore, the social relations that always exists in the society reveals conflicts of interest; these conflicts of interest are as a result of the unequal distribution of scarce resources in the social system. Latent conflict of interest will eventually lead to overt and violent conflict among social groupings in the society; such conflict will lead to bi-polarity. Since small minority holds power and exploits the large majority, the eruption of conflict leads to social re-organization of power relations within the system. This re-organization is once again conditions of conflicting interest which set into motion inevitable process of bi-polar conflict and system re-organisation (Turner, 1975).

2.3.3 Ethnic/Ethno-Religious Conflict

Conflicts between ethnic groups are not inevitable nor are they eternal. "They arise out of specific historical situations, are moulded by particular and unique circumstances, and constructed to serve certain interest by idealist and ideologues, visionaries and opportunists, political leaders and ethnic power brokers of various kinds" (Ukiwo, 2003:185). Nnoli defines ethnic conflict as the "product of struggle and wealth among members of constituent ethnic, unless this struggle is properly managed, it tends to explore into violence" (Nnoli, 2003:1). Ethnic conflict "erupts when claims of one party to land and territory become incompatible with the desire of others to satisfy their basic interest and needs within the same physical territory" (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006: 106). Blagojevich (2009) in his own words asserts that,

ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge; a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fears, resentment, and hate toward others; an inter-ethnic competition over resources and right (p. 3)

Ethnic conflicts can be categorized as latent and manifest. The latent forms of ethnic can be seen as grievances or underground vexation that are non-violent but nonetheless, can lead to sporadic violence if not checked. Latent forms of conflicts might be visible to the observer, but inter-ethnic hatred is usually subtle and can be convey through competitive party politics, judicial redress, media protest and in some cases, peaceful demonstration. The manifest forms of conflict are those that are violent in nature, where channels of negotiation are closed and governments fail to address or mediate inter- ethnic conflicts (Mkotama, 2015).

Ethno-religious conflicts are part and parcel, and most recurring phenomena in Nigeria. From colonial and post-colonial epoch, the phenomena have permeated the polity up till upon Nigeria return to democratic rule in 1999. It is argued that, "Nigeria presents a complex of

individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main bases for violent conflict in the country” (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005:7)

According to Jega (2002) Nigeria “is one of the nation in the world whose political landscape has been inundated, suffused with and deeply enmeshed in spectrum of recurring complex conflict ranging from resource, communal, to political and ethno-religious conflicts”(p. 33). “Nigeria is usually characterized as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously and violently contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions in the country” (Smith and Robinson, as cited in Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 1). “Northern Nigeria ranks as the major hotspot of ethnic and religious contestations and conflicts in the country” (Toure, 2011: 3). That, ethno-religious categories assert their influences in northern Nigeria in the early 1980s when Maitatisne riot ushered in a regime of religious fundamentalism. The category is often used to describe conflicts that involve intersection of ethnic and religious identities (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

The Middle-Belt identity is more acceptable among elite from ethnic groups that have a majority Christian population. The elite in the area have been claiming of marginalisation by the Hausa and Fulani majority in the North. Most of these ethnic and religious conflicts have assumed a dangerous and divisive trend (Toure, 2003). It is also argued that, religious cleavages occupy a centre stage in ethnic differentiation, thus, conflicts between Hausa/Fulani and minority ethno-religious groups are described as ethno-religious. (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

However, the falling back of individual and group into identity to mobilize ethnic and religious sentiments and solidarity in a view to gaining or retaining relevance in the scheme of things has a tendency to precipitate violent ethno-religious conflict. Thus, violent ethno-religious

conflicts have for years plunged southern Kaduna area and by extension Zangon-Kataf Local Government in the precipice of instability, it has endanger human killing and maiming of people, internal displacement, loss of investment, and severed inter ethnic and religious relations in the area.

Ethno-religious conflict occurs when “ultimate goal of conflict is of ethnic and religious nature. Such conflicts are often associated with ethnic and religious sentiment. Thus, all crises that have ethnic and religious undertone are ethno-religious conflict” (Yakubu 2005, as cited in Emmanuel and Charles, 2013: 39). Ethno-religious conflicts are those conflicts “emanating from ethnic and religious differences, attachment, or sentiments which divide the conflicting parties along ethnic and religious lines in the quest to ascertain identities and assert their influence” (Emmanuel and Charles, 2013: 39). Ethno-Religious conflict is regarded as a relation that is characterized by clash , contention, confrontation, battle, rivalry, controversy, disagreement, and mutual suspicion among members of different ethnic and religious groups in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (Salawu, 2010; Uhummwangho and Epelle 2011; Nnonyelu 2013).

Bako (as cited in Gambo and Omirin, 2012) sees interreligious conflict consisting of “different ethnic groups belonging to Islam and Christianity, battling along majority/minority and indigene/settler divides within a framework of ethno-religious domination and struggle for liberation” (p. 130). He further affirmed that, this form of conflict exists between minority Hausa and Fulani Muslim group resident in predominantly non Hausa Christian areas, in the northern town and cities. Instances of conflicts are those between Hausa and Southern Kaduna ethnic groups from Kafanchan; Hausa and the Kataf ; Hausa and Sayawa; Hausa and the Jukun; Hausa and the Birom over ownership of towns, sharing of religious space, land, market, fishing ponds, rulership, chieftaincies and participation in local government elections.

Making emphasis on the interconnectedness of ethnic and religious identities, they are often mutually reinforcing and sometimes compounded or hyphenated as ethno-religious (Osaghae and Suberu 2005). Ethno-religious identity has historical and political origins. They stemmed from the old regional structures of Nigerian federation; where identity was shaped by elite that belong to dominant ethnic groups (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Ethno-religious category initially evolved from regional formations. This category has fit in well in distinguishing the predominantly Christian south and Muslim north. The category has made it easier in differentiating the dominant Muslim group in the North and non-Muslim minorities group in the region. Unlike the south where majority groups are distinguished from the minority on the basis of ethnicity, majority-minority distinctions in the north have been largely religious than ethnic (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Ethno-religious conflict has the inclination to spill over from their immediate environment into other localities of the country, which proved to be the most violent instances of inter-group conflict in Nigeria. Ethno-religious conflict mostly occurred in the Middle-Belt region, where Muslim Hausa and Fulani group have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups in a dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities. Thus, it is often difficult to distinguish between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin (International IDEA, as cited in Osaghae and Suberu 2005).

2.3.4 Causes of Conflict

Conflict is not without causes and one of which is, the manipulation of ethnicity in the pursuit of scarce resources, which often leads to violent and destructive conflict between different ethnic groups. When ethnicity is usually manipulated, conflict become difficult to alleviate and serves as source of aggressiveness, violence, conflicts, and bloodshed (Dunmoye,

2012). Next to ethnicity is religion, when ethnicity and religion interact, they aggravate conflict, most especially when their boundaries are coextensive. According to Dunmoye, (2012) religion is not only a subject of manipulation by the elites; it is a reality that renders it susceptible to manipulation.

Another issue is boundary dispute; colonialism creates arbitrary boundaries, in this kind of demarcation many ethnic groups find themselves in different administrative units, which breed problems of identity and loyalty, and also the pressure on land encourages land grabbing couple with unclear demarcation of boundaries either by state or any authority concern. Therefore this serves as a source of constant dispute between communities. Political representation also causes conflict, which is more severe especially where two or more communities that belong to different ethnic and religious groups are caged in the same electoral constituency. Since political representation is often view as having a link with access to resources, employment, social infrastructure, and political appointment, therefore the phenomenon of representation serves as a serious source of competition and conflicts. In addition disputes over farm lands which often occur between farming communities and nomadic Fulani herdsman which are more prevalent in the northern part of Nigeria (Dunmoye, 2012).

Furthermore, the case of marginalization of ethnic minorities also constitute a source of conflict in a country which has an estimate of more than three hundred ethnic groups, with three dominant ones namely, Hausa with Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, while others are regarded as ethnic minorities, “ethnic minorities in Nigeria often feel marginalized in the socio-economic and political processes” (Dunmoye, 2012: 24).

2.4 The Concept of Conflict Management

Conflict is a social phenomenon and inherent attribute of social interactions “the inevitability of conflict in human society gives the recourse to the mitigation of conflicts, and at least to manage them if not totally resolving them when they arise” (Ezirim, 2009:290). “Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions, the problem, then, is not to court the frustrations of seeking to remove inevitability rather, of trying to keep conflicts in bounds” (Zartman 1997 as cited in Ezirim 2009:290). Conflict can be minimised or managed through conscious, careful and systematic management. “Conflict management should not be viewed as a simple, linear, or structured process, and conflict is frequently managed directly by the society in which it occurs” (Miller, 2005:23).

Thus, conflict management may be perceived as a wider concept, involving “conflict resolution and transformation when necessitated, and it is more of long term arrangement involving institutionalised provisions and regulative procedures for dealing with conflict whenever they arise” (Otite and Albert, 1999:11). Conflict management is a wide range of activities through an interventionist efforts to address or prevent the destructive and negative effect of ongoing conflict which can be violent or non violent by being proactive Miller (2005), Rahim (2002), Best (2012), Akpru-Aja (as cited in Ezirim, 2009). In addition, conflict management can be seen as a “process of reducing the negative and destructive capacities of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in the conflict. It covers the entire area of handling conflict by being proactive; it encompasses conflict limitation, containment and litigation” (Best, 2012:95).

However, it is equally important to know that, conflict management can be introduced at all levels of conflict spiral and that it is widely used in crisis management and conflict situations. According to Best (2012), there are wide range of non-violent methods of managing conflict.

These methods are available at the individual, family, group, community and international level. Peaceful method of conflict management exists in two broad categories, which entails method that aim to prevent the occurrence of conflict. Instances include; undocumented community based trust confidence building measures, communication, good governance, inter-party collaboration etc. The second category is reactive, dealing with responses to situation that have already turned conflictive, or are potentially so. These include; third party interventions, like mediation, conciliation, brokerage, arbitration and litigation.

Conflict can be managed by variety of techniques as Miller (2005) argues. Conflicting parties are brought together to establish a mutual agreement, governments or, third parties to a conflict may directly intervene to impose a decisions, a new initiative or programme and institutions (e.g. election) are implemented to address the conflict in question. Conflicting parties are compelled to abide by the earlier agreed and established means of conflict resolution or, eliminate or instil fear among the conflicting parties. Conflict management can also be seen as a broad spectrum of “conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding for intervention” (Boutros-Ghali cited in Ken, 2009: 104).

Conflict management is geared toward capacity building remedies to support peace processes. The initiative may arise from a complete mix of International non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), bi-lateral and multi-lateral, regional and universal initiatives. Also, conflict management should be non-violent by creating institutions of government both at the centre and local levels, employment generation, and that, there should exists a new form of co-existence i.e. by bringing the conflicting parties together to see each other as fellow citizens, and there should be a new invented civic culture. By and large, conflict management when actively conducted is therefore, a constant process. Therefore, it is vital that in all spheres of life, efforts

are made to create the space necessary for dialogue to take place across the boundaries of divided communities so that, the need of new form of co-existence can be sown” (Rigby, 2006:3). Conflicts are rarely resolved completely; they are reduced, or contained. Conflict management when actively conducted is, therefore, a constant process (Miller, 2005).

2.5 The Concept of Peacebuilding

“Peace is often seen as the absence of war or, war is the absence of peace. There is peace because there is no war and, there is war because there is no peace” (Ibeanu, 2012: 3). This conceptualisation has been found wanting, it does not say anything about the meaning of peace by first, offering the meaning of war, and also by mere seeing the existence of peace as independent of war. Peace exists during the time of war, a situation where there is peaceful interaction between countries that are engage in active war. The Palestinians and Israelis have been able to establish peaceful use of water resources even as the war between them has raged (Ibeanu. 2012).

According to Ibeanu (2012) “Peace is a process involving activities that directly or indirectly linked to increasingly development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and wider international community” (p10). Peace has been categorised into two, positive and negative peace. “Negative peace is the absence of violence, absence of war and ‘positive peace’ is the integration of human society”. (Galtung, as cited in Grewal, 2003: 2).

“Negative peace is what is perceive in the world dominated by one nation or United Nations, equipped with coercive power and readiness to use it, which may be used to bring about integration” (Grewal, 2003:3). Galtung believes that this method is not going to work with general and complete disarmament. Example of negative peace and proposals are “multilateralism, arms control, international convention, balance of power strategies etc.

Example of positive peace and proposals include, improve human understanding through communication, peace education, international cooperation, dispute resolution, arbitration, conflict management etc.” (Grewal, 2003:3). The notion of negative peace and positive peace are not mutually exclusive, one cannot proceed towards laying the foundation for positive peace without first establishing negative peace. In other words, negative peace is necessary although it is an insufficient condition for achieving positive peace (Murithi, 2009: 5-6)

There are diverse interpretations of peace. Based on the instrumentalist interpretation, peace is seen as a means to an end, that is to say, the absence of war, serves the ends of social progress and development. While the functionalist angle viewed peace as playing social function and also a product of other social structures. Peace is said to have a social function of integrations and order (Ibeanu, 2012). The loophole of these perspectives is that, they do not take into cognisance the fact that peace is an end in itself, which the vast majority of human beings would rather prefer to war and conflict. The philosophical definition opined that “peace is a natural, original, God-given state of human existence. Peace is the pre-corruption state of man in society, as God established (Ibeanu, 2012: 5).

On the other hand, the sociological definition of peace brings to the fore and addresses the social context. Sociologically, peace refers to a “condition in which there is no antagonism, there is no social conflict and individuals and groups are able to meet their needs and expectations” (Ibeanu, 2012:6). However, sociological perspective peace is broadly divided into two, namely structural-functionalist and dialectical materialist responses. The structural – functionalist tradition perceives peace as a composite of function and structures that perform them, in order to survive. A society needs to educate its children, produce goods, governs its

affairs and provides security of members. These functions require a number of structures such as schools, industries, parliaments, courts, armed forces e.t.c.

By and large, the dialectical materialism is of the opinion that, to fully understand society, we should look at the process which society produces and distributes the means of material existence, and struggle among social classes. The society is divided into classes, the dominant and the oppressed classes, the exploitative relations give rise to struggle between the two classes. This angle assumes that peace is not practicable in as much as society is divided into antagonistic classes and there is a persistence of objective, structural and revolutionary violence. Peace is workable in societies in which there is no existence of classes and society produces enough to give each according to his need. The political perspective views peace as a political requisite that ensure the existence of justice. Politically, peace entails political order that is the institutionalisation of political structure” (Ibeanu, 2012).

The concept of peacebuilding like any other concept in social science, defied any universally acceptable definition, and does not enjoy common practice as well as terminology. In essence, peacebuilding means different things to different scholars, actors, and agencies both in conceptualisation, terminology, practice and approach. Originally, Johan Galtung (1976) coined this concept in contrast to the terms such as “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking”. Galtung defines it in relation to structure of peace; he limits his scope to inter-state relationships (Oda, 2007).

The concept of peacebuilding was popularised by former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in (1992) in *An Agenda for Peace* as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict”, since then, peacebuilding has become a catchall concept, encompassing multiple actions and at times contradictory perspectives and agenda (Barnett et al, 2007). Boutros-Ghali

used the term peacebuilding as part of a continuum, ranging from preventive diplomacy to peace-making, to peacekeeping and finally to post-conflict peacebuilding” (Notter and Diamond, 1996). However, the definition of Boutros Boutros-Ghali has been proved to be inadequate; he based his continuum on the emergence of large scale violence in a conflict, and his framework is also based on the more traditional power politics perspective of conflict (Notter and Diamond, 1996).

Tschirgi as cited in Durke and Courtier (2009) and Miller (2004) believe that, post conflict peacebuilding geared towards addressing the proximate cause of conflict, through policies and programmes, like conflict resolution, prevention, stabilization, and consolidation of peace after a violent and destructive conflict, with the aim to avoiding relapse to conflict. In the same vein, peacebuilding entails

those activities and processes that focus on the root causes of the conflict, rather than just the effect; support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of the war torn society; encourage and support interaction between all sectors of the society and repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and trust; recognise the specifics of each post conflict situation; encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design and, implementation and support sustainment of activities and processing; and promote processes that will endure after initial phase has passed” (Spence, as cited in Lambourne, 2004:3).

Thus, the arguments of Lambourne (2004) and Ropers (2002) take a long term focus and incorporate the goal of negative and positive peace (absence of physical violence and positive peace absence of structural violence outlined by Johan Galtung 1969). They view the term post-conflict peacebuilding as strategies designed to promote a secured and stable lasting peace and the need to overcome the root cause of conflict, and strengthen elements which link the parties to each other. That is a process related measure, which emphasises the need for a long term work,

in which the basic needs of the population are met, and violent conflict does not recur. Rigby (2006) associates peacebuilding with human security;

peacebuilding is a generic term referring to all those activities and initiatives that are intended to create conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in the aftermath of violent and destructive conflict. The achievement of such a durable, and self-generating peaceful conditions is only possible where the citizens enjoy a degree of human security such that the possibility of reversion to organised large scale violence is minimised” (p. 2).

Rigby believes that in order to ensure sustainable peace and human security, there are factors that are necessary preconditions. There must be physical security necessary for longer-term peacebuilding initiatives to take root. Some functional administrative systems should be put in place to serve as conveyor belt for delivery of amenities, law and order to enhance people’s sense of physical and psychological security. For Randle (2006), peacebuilding refers to putting Humpty Dumpty together again, rebuilding the economy, social institutional structures necessary for country to function in a way that provides for at least a modicum of security and wellbeing for its citizens.

Miller (2005) argues that “connection between security and development is an accepted tenet in peacebuilding, and the implication of this mutually reinforcing relationship is extensive. Peacebuilding involves a wide range of initiatives, providing humanitarian relief to victims; protecting human rights; generating an environment of trust in order for social relations to function properly; establishing non-violence modes of resolving present and future conflicts, fostering reconciliation among the various parties to a conflict; providing psycho-social or trauma healing services to victims of severe atrocities; repatriating refugees and resettling internally displaced persons.

Going by various conceptions of peacebuilding offered by various scholars, peacebuilding is often seen as external intervention without recognizing the fact that peacebuilding can be

conducted by the members of the community involve in the conflict, and also see it as post-conflict activities, after a violent and destructive conflict had ensued, thereby not taking into cognisance of the fact that peacebuilding can predate and also take place during conflict. Conteh-Morgan (2007) criticizes the current peacebuilding which is characterized by language of power, exclusion or defence of an international order that does not adequately address issues of emancipation and inappropriate imposition. He also maintains that, in most cases of peacebuilding, “reconstruction efforts after conflict termination, it is the integrity of the state that is often given security. Insecurity is, in other words, is synonymous with an attack on the integrity of the state” (Conteh-Morgan, 2007:70). Peacebuilding is associated with alleviating human insecurity which involves,

transforming the social and political environment that foster intolerable inequality, engenders historical grievances, and nurture adversarial interaction, the development of social, political, and economic infrastructures that produce tolerable inequality and/or prevent future violence. The focus is on dismantling structures that contribute to conflict in particular (Conteh-Morgan, 2005:72).

While, Randle (2006) believes that peacebuilding should be citizens centred, the task of peacebuilding has to be carried out primarily by the citizens of the country concerned, in accordance with their own values and tradition. Outside agencies can only play an enabling and supportive role if this is to be genuine peacebuilding rather than pacification and imposition of possibly inappropriate political and social structures, and that, civilians are better placed than the military to engage directly with the population and take their direction from them. Peacebuilding is undertaken not only by state authorities and UN organisations which are located outside of the society in question, but also by actual members of the society, it believes that peacebuilding should come from below, in which peacebuilding is broadly defined as “practice by non-state actors utilising various resources, to create amicable relationship with national, ethnic, racial,

religious, or political orders. To build a social structure which are able to promote a sustainable peace (Oda, 2007: 6).

It is argued that, peacebuilding “keeps its focus on social systems and not just armed factions or official government. Peacebuilding activities are not restricted to certain point along the continuum of violence”, peacebuilding is about “creating the tangible condition to enable a conflict habituated system to become a peace system” (Notter and Diamond, 1996:3). Peacebuilding is a “process of making sure that a country or society creates conditions for sustainable peace” (Mpangala, 2004:8). Such condition can be created when the country is already in the state of peace. In such a situation the conditions are created in order to prevent conflict from erupting and therefore, peace is sustained. According to (Lederach, as cited in Durke and Courtier, 2009) peacebuilding is a

comprehensive concepts that encompasses, generates, sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages need to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relation. The term, thus, involves wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal accord. Peace is seen not merely as stage in time or condition, it is a dynamic social construct (p. 5).

There are different terms and concepts used by various actors, agencies to described peacebuilding. Different agencies use a wide variety of terms that are related, but are not necessarily synonymous to peacebuilding, even more confusing, some use the term peacebuilding, in slightly different ways. The reason for this variation owes partly to prevailing organisational mandates and networks, and that organisation’s core mandate will heavily influence its reception to, definition, and revision of the concept of peacebuilding (Barnett et al, 2007). “The UN secretariat continues to build on formulation of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s original formulation; actions to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Barnett et al, 2007:37)

Furthermore, by another name, the UN refers to peacebuilding as conflict prevention, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sees peacebuilding and conflict management as virtually synonymous, and uses both concepts interchangeably. Outside the UN system, there is greater terminological diversity, the European Union (EU) are more likely to avoid peacebuilding in favour of the concept of conflict prevention and management, and rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Barnett et al, 2007).

However, different agencies within the government of United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Germany, France and Japan use different terms. The UK and USA use the concept of stabilisation, reflecting their security missions; but North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) uses the term peacebuilding. The UK foreign and Commonwealth office and Department for International Development prefer post-conflict reconstruction, rather than peacebuilding. By and large, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs prefers post-conflict prevention but the Canadian government prefers peacebuilding. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the term conflict prevention while Japan’s International Cooperation for Agency favours peacebuilding while Japan’s Defence Agency prefers to use reconstruction assistance. France and Germany jointly prefer the term civilian crisis management and conflict prevention as often used by European Community (EC). However, having seen that, various agencies use the term differently based on the organisational mandate. There are even greater divisions regarding the specific activities that an agency adopt to achieve peacebuilding programme (Barnett et al, 2007).

The UN secretariat’s unit, peacebuilding is all encompassing, from security to socio-economic oriented activities, to political-diplomatic and security-military of peacebuilding. UNDP stresses socio-economic areas, while World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)

focus on economic development. The EU tends to lean on political and diplomatic aspects of peacebuilding activities with growing activities on conflict assessment and early warning activities (aspect of security and military terrain). The UK laid much emphasis on security and military sector. The US has a strong interest in democratization and economic recovery. Japan tends to focus on broad post-conflict reconstruction, while France and Germany channelled their attention on immediate post-conflict stabilisation and economic reconstruction. (Barnett et al, 2007). By and large, there is also confusion about how to spell peacebuilding: it is peace building, peace-building (Schirch, 2008:3).

2.5.1 Types of Peacebuilding

There are three distinct types of peacebuilding activities, all of which are necessary to achieving transformation; political peacebuilding, structural peacebuilding, and social peacebuilding (Barnett et al, 2007).

Political Peacebuilding; Political peacebuilding represents the outermost super structure; which is about agreement which include formal negotiation and diplomacy. It deals with establishing political arrangements that provide the overall context for understanding the relationship of various parties and their resources. It is about building a legal infrastructure that can address the political needs and manage the boundaries of a peace system. Its activities include; negotiation, fact finding mission, technical working group etc. Governments focus their attention on political peacebuilding activities.

Structural peacebuilding; It is about building economic, military, social, and cultural infrastructures that support the culture of peace, and provide concrete and realistic avenues, through which a new peace system might express itself. Activities of structural peacebuilding comprise; economic development programmes, strengthening democracy, good governance,

voter education, disarming warring parties, police training, building schools, and supporting the creation of indigenous non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which support peace. Structural peacebuilding is not the exclusive domain of governmental actors or non-governmental actors both can be effective in this realm.

Social Peacebuilding; is the grass roots portion of the peacebuilding process. Social peacebuilding is about relationship. It deals with feelings, attitudes, opinion, beliefs, values, as they are held and shared between people who are committed to engendering a new “peace culture” within the fabric of communal and inter-communal life. Human infrastructure is built through programs or training or dialogue, or by supporting community building programmes, for instance “government to date has not been able to successfully carry out social peacebuilding program” (Notter and Diamond, 1997:3).

2.5.2 Peacebuilding Paradigms

There are two different peacebuilding paradigms liberal and sustainable peacebuilding. Liberal Peacebuilding was built on the idea of liberal peace. “Democratic liberalism is based on the notion that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law abiding in relation to other political systems” (Tzirras, 2012:1). The liberal peace, as well as liberal peacebuilding has become prominent after the end of cold war, because of the prominence of the western ideology (Tzirras, 2012). Liberal peacebuilding focuses on the democratic rebuilding of state after armed conflict (Paffenholz, 2009). Liberal peacebuilding is the dominant form of internationally-supported peacebuilding” (Lemay-Hebert, 2013:1). The argument of this paradigm is that, peacebuilding ends when a “post-conflict country is perceived by the international community as able to guaranteed minimum security to its people, as well as to establish working democratic structures through internationally observed and recognized elections” (Paffenholz, 2009:5).

Peacebuilding in this sense is equated with state building, and that its focus is almost entirely on the period after large scale armed violence has ended. Peacebuilding came to entail the fast establishment of security, democratic political structures and economic reforms (Paffenholz, 2009). The liberal peacebuilding include; democracy promotion, the rule of law and good governance, promotion of human rights, and economic reform, (Lemay-Hebert, 2013).The paradigm has been criticised for being rooted in the historical experiences of Western Europe. The approach was successful in Europe and Japan, today it has fallen for two reasons. The international context has changed dramatically from state centred system, to a globalised context. Secondly, liberal peacebuilding strategies systematically underestimate the influence of local or national development features, as well as the competing dynamics favouring violence or peace in post war society”(Kurtenbarch, 2010).

Sustainable peacebuilding centred on sustainable reconciliation within societies. Sustainable peacebuilding occurs when one understands the true nature of things, class, gender, ethnic equality and so forth (Conteh-Morgan, 2005:72). Diamond, (1997) sees sustainable peacebuilding beyond the level of resolving the dispute, “there must be some attention to changing the relationships and the conditions under which those relationships are shaped” (p. 1).

Sustainable peacebuilding for Diamond should focus on love, reconciliation, justice, healing; deep changes in assumptions, beliefs, and structures, transformation, political will, lasting peace, true collaboration, creative synergy, partnership, healthy relationship patterns, shared power, "we together" rather than "us or them" thinking, and so forth (Diamond, 1997: 2) Sustainable peacebuilding seeks to get solutions, improve working relationships and provide frameworks for ongoing relationship, mediation, negotiation, alternative dispute resolution, and problem-solving (Diamond, 1997).

Sustainable peacebuilding work, seeks not just to resolve the problem, but change dynamics of relationship and system of relationships that, if not addressed, could insure future and recurring problems of a similar nature (Diamond, 1997). It looks at underlying patterns of assumption, belief and behaviour. It seeks to build relationships that are cooperative and flexible, able to create new forms as needed to address problems as they arise, reconciliation and healing, visioning, partnering, and leadership development (Diamond, 1997).

Summarily, initially peacebuilding was seen as external interventionist effort in a conflict habituated system after a violent and destructive conflict has taken place, action to identify and support structures which tends to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict. And also see peacebuilding as merely securing the integrity of the state. The pioneer conceptualisation of peacebuilding centred peacebuilding initiatives to external intervention without recognising the peacebuilding can be conducted by the citizens and the community involves in conflict. Thus, it is also seen as activities conducted by government and non-governmental agencies.

Peacebuilding is most often used as an umbrella term to encompass other terms such as conflict resolution, management, mitigation, prevention, or transformation (Shcirch, 2008). Conflict management and peacebuilding can be summarised as the creation of structures of peace that is based on cooperation, thereby addressing the underlying causes of conflict so that they become less likely. It is also dynamic, having something to contribute in every phase of conflict, and always changing in the process of peacebuilding efforts. Peacebuilding can be introduced at all level of conflict spiral and it is widely used in conflict and post-conflict situations. Peacebuilding span broad spectrum of conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and post conflict reconstruction for intervention. Conflict can be manage by variety of techniques

as conflicting parties are brought to establish mutual agreement through a third party intervention, a new programmes and initiatives are implemented to address the conflict in question.

Peacebuilding may be perceived as a concept involving a wide range of activities dealing with a conflict habituated system. Peacebuilding is a constant process, and an effort to create space necessary for peace to take place across boundaries of divided communities. The term precedes and follows formal accord and seen not merely as a stage in time or conditions, it is a dynamic social construct.

2.6 Peacebuilding: An Overview

Peacebuilding can be conducted by local elite, governmental, non-governmental as well as external actors. Peacebuilding is a complex process that consists of multiple range of activities that address both causes and consequences of conflict (Coning, 2011). Although, Boutros-Ghali popularised the concept of peacebuilding, the UN peacebuilding mission was not the first to take the broader task. “The Marshall plan was concerned with the effective recovery of Europe so as to prevent a third European war and that was effective peacebuilding” (Holt, 2011). Peacebuilding as a process of transformation is recollection of the development and nation-building project of the post-war and cold war era (Holt, 2011). However, after the cold war the UN was able to engage in peace operation in Cambodia. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTACT) (1992-1993) was engaged in UN peacebuilding operation (Holt, 2011). Subsequently, the UN observer in EL-Salvador (1991-1995), was set out to strengthen rights support the separation of the military from the state, though with limited success in military and police reform and electoral process, however, it has recorded in building the capacity of mechanism to protect human rights (Holt, 2011).

In tandem with UN, several governmental and non-governmental actors championed a numbers of issues, which came to be subsumed under the new human security agenda. The campaign to ban out personnel landmines, to regulate small arms and, light weapons, and to establish an international animal court, were part of the emerging international commitment to human security (Tschirgi, 2003). As part of it peacebuilding activities, the security council devoted portion of its deliberation to crises in Africa by employing traditional instrument such as sanctions in an effort to end various conflict (Tschirgi, 2003). The UN has played a positive role in Central American peace processes. It took an integrated approach, peace and democracy, peace-making through political mediation, electoral observation, and institutional reform. The UN peacebuilding is encapsulated in its support for democratic governance and institutional building in post-conflict countries, which has a central component in its effort at building sustainable peace. The instances of UN involvement in peacebuilding Central American came through the United Nations Development Programme in UN peace operation in El-Salvador and Guatemala peace settlement, and initiated democratic transition in the course of the 1990s (Santiso, 2002).

Peacebuilding can be approached through power sharing according to Lake and Rothchild (1996), that is conceding to ethnic minority leaders and activist appropriate share of cabinet power, civil service, military, and high party positions. This is done by state voluntarily to reach out to include minority representatives in public affairs, thereby offering the group as a whole an important incentive for cooperation (p.58). Former South-Africa president, Nelson Mandela, agreed to include power sharing positions in the interim constitution, in an effort to reconcile the economically dominant local white community, as well as build confidence among mostly white investors abroad (Lake and Rothchild, 1996).

The church also play a role in peacebuilding, for instance in Northern Ireland “the Clergy have officiated at funerals of people killed as a result of terrorisms, tended to the bereaved and known individuals killed or maimed as a result of the conflict” (Southern, 2009: 89). Many faith-based non-governmental organisations have made a significant contribution to ethno-religious reconciliation in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) which consist of inter faith mediation of both Christian and Muslim cleric; the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre of Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum (IMCMCDF) based in Kaduna and the International Peace League (IPL), a university of Jos student organisation that encourage pluralism and understanding across religious and ethnic boundaries (Omotosho 2014).

Peacebuilding can also be established through the process of enshrining human rights. The UN and other international organisations have made human rights an integral part of their peace-making and conflict resolution initiative in countries bedevilled by internal wars and other serious conflicts, as well as promoting the interest of indigenous minority and other vulnerable groups all over the world (Osaghae, 1996:171). In Nigeria, conventional human rights approach, which emphasises individual rights, was adopted following the recommendation of the commission appointed to enquire into the fears of ethnic minorities, and the means of allaying them (Oasghae, 1996: 171). The commission believed that, the entrenchment of a bill of rights, with its guarantee of in equality, liberty and non-discrimination against the minorities (Minority Commission as cited in Osaghae, 1996). This supported the argument of Lake and Rothschild (1996), which stated that “in order to foster stability and constructive ethnic relations, the right of the minority must be secured, and that, confidence-building measures be undertaken by local, elites as the most instrumental” (p. 56).

In Plateau state Nigeria, the government in its peacebuilding efforts, has constituted several judicial commissions and peace conferences on the ethno-religious conflict. In 2001 broad based peace conference was organised around the justice Niki Tobi Commission, where the communiqué was signed by all groups except the Hausa (Korb, 2011). The Plateau State Government in 2002 organised four days peace summit and the Federal Government also organised a month-long conference in 2004 during the state of emergency. In the same vein the former Plateau State Governor, Jonah Jang convened a stake holder summit after November 2008 crisis, though not religiously implemented (International Crisis Group African Report, 2012). The sole administrator of plateau as part of his peacebuilding effort visits trouble spots, and all LGs in the state, conducted inter-face discussions with various ethnic, religious and interest groups. Then followed by constituting of three committees charged with the responsibility of restoring peace in specific trouble areas of the state, and conducted the plateau peace conference in 2004. The peace conference was premised on the philosophy of the increasing desire of plateau people to have peace and live in peace with each other (Danfulani, 2006).

As part of the measures to integrate the people and clear from their psyche, the feeling of alienation which divided the city, promote peace, peaceful co-existence and integration of various communities divided along sectarian divides. The Kaduna State Government hosted the fourth international conference on cities in transition (Newswatch Times, 2014). According to Aminu 2014 as cited in Newswatch Times (2014) “the conference had established contact and platform for co-operation especially in the area of education, agriculture, gender development and others. The inter-faith mediation centre which works to promote tolerance between Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria, in order to create a peaceful society. The organisation has

facilitated Kaduna peace declaration of religious leader, signed by 22 senior Christian and Muslim religious leaders after the shari'a crisis in 2001 and the miss world riot in 2002, and also facilitated the Yelwan Shandam peace affirmation in 2005 in Plateau state to bridge divisions and foster commitment to peaceful co-existence in the religion (Inter Faith Mediation Centre, 2015).

Moreover, in 2003, NIREG hosted a conference in London that brought over 150 Nigerians and friend of Nigerians and mobilises Nigerian as regards the issue of peace. Two people who have fought on opposite sides pastor James Movel Wuye and imam Muhammad Nurudin Ashafa who once led religious youths Leagues, whose members directed violence against one another in year long civil conflict that caused distrust (NIREG, 2004). By and large, A Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum (MCDF), a charity organisation to enhance Christians-Muslims dialogue which was the combine efforts of two former enemies- a Christian James Movel Wuyeh and Muslim imam, Muhammad Nurudin Ashafa who served as joint national coordinators of MCDF based in Kaduna. They embrace non-violence, reconciliation and advocacy of peaceful relations between their communities and sought to encourage others to join this goal. In the same vein, in order to address conflictual issues in March 2003, the MCDF and the US Institute of Peace jointly promoted a five day dialogue work in Kaduna. Participants came from the Christian and Muslim communities, with one youth leader from both faiths chosen from 30 Nigeria's state to take part (Haynes, 2007)

2.7 The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding

The role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding process is as old as the institution itself. Peacebuilding is part and parcel of African pre-colonial social system geared towards reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships. The methods, processes

and regulations are deeply rooted in the custom and traditions of the people of pre-colonial Africa, which seems to restore a balance to settle conflict and eliminate disputes (Choudree, 1999 as cited in Golwa, 2013). In this regard traditional rulers play a vital role in peacebuilding at the grassroots level as part of the cultural heritage of the people.

The institution of traditional rulership plays critical and proactive roles in promoting and sustaining social cohesion, peace and order as well as peaceful coexistence in societies. Pre-colonial African societies had conflict management techniques which are unique and are peculiar to individual communities which are imbedded in the different cultures from time immemorial (Golwa, 2013). Traditionally, conflicts are mainly managed by traditional leaders, by often bringing the parties in conflict together to discuss the causes of the conflict, find solution and reach a settlement (Rukuni et al, 2015).

The guiding objectives of the traditional justice system presided over by traditional leaders in Africa, is to restore peace and harmony within the community. And this is achieved by ensuring that, disputants and their respective supporters are reconciled, thus at the heart of traditional African adjudication system lays the notion of reconciliation (Rukuni et al, 2015). In almost all the cultures in Cameroon, according to (Nwoye 2006 cited in Rukuni et al, 2015) peace is equated with freshness, health, wellbeing, harmony, calm and tranquillity.

Furthermore, in the Zimbabwean situation, mechanisms aimed at promoting reconciliation exist; this involves truth telling and request for forgiveness to achieve both reconciliation, and to challenge perpetrators of human rights, which often differ from the Western legal system that emphasises prosecution and retributive justice (Nwoye 2006 as cited in Rukuni et al, 2015). Traditional rulers in Zimbabwe have played a pivotal role in settling community disputes across rural Zimbabwe. This is due to the fact that they are regarded as

custodian of traditional laws, and are engaged in dealing with violence which might be political, domestic or anti-social behaviour (Rukuni et al, 2015).

In the traditional pre-colonial Nigerian society, conflict may generally exist whenever or wherever incompatible goals are pursued by individuals and groups. But the mechanism for peacebuilding process may differ from community to community. In pre-colonial Nigeria, traditional rulers exercise governance, power, and authority or influence over their subjects. These institutions of traditional rulers were virtually the only institution of governance which played critical a role of dispensing justice, enforcing contract and resolving conflict (Olusola and Aisha, 2013).

As part of effort in peacebuilding in pre-colonial Nigeria, the traditional rulers take part in internal security of their domains. For instance, in the emirate system in the Northern Nigeria, the Emir was the political, spiritual and administrative head of the Emirate and he assigned specific duties to a number of institutional heads like the Waziri and senior officials. They are generally assisted in securing their domain by subordinate chiefs appointed by them (Mohammed, 2003). This attest to the fact of using official traditional method of communication as a mechanism in peacebuilding in pre-colonial Nigeria, which is a communication between the paramount chiefdom and its vassals enclaves, which start either from the top to bottom or vice-versa. The ward head for instance will communicate to the district head, and if the matter brought before the district head is beyond his authority, he will in turn forward the matter to the emirate council. And this method is maintained religiously to avoid any break of communication and also to ensure discipline and orderliness at all times in the emirate (Saidu, 2015).

The process of peacebuilding in Esaland, is the process of maintaining normal relation between people, which requires the reconciliation of differences, offering apology and

forgiveness on past harm. This peacebuilding process began with individual household leaders, the compound heads, village heads and the kings; all had similar responsibilities in their respective domains. Also included were the title chiefs who guarded their communities' laws and customs, and applied appropriate sanction against any breach (Egbafo and Aghallino, 2012). Violent conflict is the last resort in settling dispute in Esaland, concerted efforts were always made to prevent conflict, no war was fought until to all avenues to prevent it had been exhausted, and envoy made of chiefs and elders and some war captives were exchanged between estranged communities for amicable settlement of conflicting issues (Egbafo and Aghallino, 2012).

Whenever there is conflict between Esaland communities, "settlement is normally reached through diplomatic channel in order to stop hostilities. This was normally done by a higher authority or buffer village when stalemated" (Egbafo and Aghallino, 2012: 62). For instance when the "Ewu and Ekpoma war reached a stalemate in 1813, the Onojie of Iru sent a delegation bearing the symbols of an olive branch on both parties to end the war" (Egbafo and Aghallino, 2012: 62). "Arrangements leading to the settlement and preventing issues that led to wars in Esaland were handled by elders in council through the use of an Okoven, oath, the use of negotiation and the singing of peace treaties" (Egbafo and Aghallino, 2012: p62). By and large, in Esaland, neighbouring chiefdoms were united by shared common farm boundaries and farm together and lived communally. They also carried out hunting and trapping together in small groups (Okunofua, 1999 as cited in Egbafo and Aghallino 2012).

With the emergence of colonial rule, the roles and offices of traditional political institutions changed, their power and authority were usurped by the colonial authorities, and also, the subsequent introduction of indirect rule where chiefs and warrant chiefs were used as the case may be in order to maintain the organic unity of the Nigerian society (Aisha and Olusola,

2013). During this period, traditional rulers were not much more than agent of colonial masters who ensure peace and security and as well as maintenance of law and order. In Northern Nigeria for instance, as Blench et al, (2006) state that, the British through the use of intermediary like the district heads were responsible for maintenance of law and order, and collection of taxes. They also engaged in educating people about governmental policies. This fundamentally raises the questions as how such an agent could still be referred to as a traditional ruler when the very sacred bounds which might have existed between the chief and his community had been annulled and the very checks imposed on him/her by the pre-colonial societal values that produce and restrained him/her had been shattered (Yahaya, 2014).

The district and village heads performed the roles of traditional rulers in their respective domains and command a wide range of respect. The judiciary, the Native Authority Police and the prison were under the direct control of traditional rulers, and enjoyed full support from the colonial authorities in maintaining law and order (Aisha and Olusola, 2013). However, in the South-West of Nigeria, the local chiefs such as Obas and his Chiefs were used as intermediaries. The Oba and his Chiefs were representatives of the colonialist, often presided over local courts, settled local matters, and applying customary laws with the full support of colonialist (Adeola, 2011 as cited in Aisha and Olusola, 2013)).

The British imposed their hegemony by assigning roles to traditional rulers in the bid to penetrate their subjects; these roles were different from initial roles in the pre-colonial era as traditional rulers rule in accordance with the directives of colonial authorities (Aisha and Olusola, 2013). Lugga (2007) states that, the roles of traditional rulers during the colonial period were strengthened through the system of indirect rule, Emirs and Chiefs were regarded as the only legitimate spokesmen for their people in Northern Nigeria. The domineering role of

traditional rulers in the pre-colonial era became weakened as their authority was undermined with loss of prestige from their subjects (Afigbo, 1972).

With the emergence of independence and crop of educated political elite in Nigeria, the authorities of traditional rulers were relegated to the background through series of constitutional changes; the traditional rulers have not been given any official role but only advisory role as members of peace and security committee in their respective Local Government Areas. Despite unofficial role in the constitution, the traditional rulers have and are still playing a role conflict peacebuilding in post independent Nigeria.

2.7.1 The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Nigeria

The place of traditional rulers in modern Nigeria cannot be over looked as regard the issue of peacebuilding as Dunmoye (2009) opines that, traditional rulers can play the role of fostering harmony in their communities either as individuals or as group. Traditional rulers bring to bear in various ways the issue of peacebuilding such as peace and security, information and intelligence gathering as part of early warning, conflict mediation and resolution, reconciliation dialogue, trust and confidence building initiative, encouraging coexistence through peace education and poverty eradication etc.

However, scholars, policy makers, non-governmental organisations, security agencies etc made various submissions as regard the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding. They argue that, despite the fact that traditional rulers lack official capacity in Nigeria legal document, the traditional authority and leadership has remain a strong force to be reckon, and at the same time they are expected to ensure peace and harmonious co-existence, and maintain solidarity amongst groups in their domains (Amusa and Ofuafor 2012; A Group of Concerned Citizens of Netzit (Southern Zaria) Origin (1987).

Odoh, (2009); Ohiani, (2009) and Abdullahi (2013) point to the fact that, right from colonial period to the present day Nigeria, traditional rulers and political institutions have demonstrated and proved to have a long life span and resilience, as well as relevance. The persistent struggle by communities to get their Chiefs recognized by the state government, and also the competition and clamour among elite from such communities to occupy vacant chieftaincy stool, seems to confirm the argument that, traditional rulership in Nigeria has not become an outdated system, in spite of the stands of both the radicals and the liberals who regard the systems a mere institutional relic. Agalamanyi (2009) also emphasised the role of traditional rulers in the position of leadership; they are peacemakers, comforters and judges in their own domains. And that the most pre-condition for any kind of positive development is peace which the traditional maintain.

The traditional rulers through information and intelligence gathering, share and always cooperate with intelligent community, in the area of sharing intelligent information, some of which are highly valuable in nipping in the bud, what could have created intolerable ethnic, religious and/or political clashes (Mohammad, 2009). Another area is security, through neighbourhood watch, where traditional rulers organized residents in particular community or neighbourhood to watch out for criminal or any suspicious behaviour, arrest or report suspect to the police, and consequently providing communal security through the patrol of the community at night. And inevitably help the police and, consequently providing a greater support based within communities to help identify criminal trends in order to proactively respond to them and bridge the communication gap that used to exist between the police and the community they serve (Mohammad, 2009).

However, in terms of both inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts traditional rulers are seen to have played and are still playing paramount role in peacebuilding across different localities in the post-colonial Nigeria. Traditional Rulers in Katsina played a significant role towards managing Shiites crisis in Katsina State. The Emirate Council discovered through the traditional security system that, the Shiite group is normally non violent and advised government against using force to contain the sect's activities. The central mosque where the emir prays was left at the disposal of the sect to preach what they wanted as well as sending learned Islamic scholars as emissaries to the sect to preach on the need for peace as enshrined in Islam (Lugga, 2007).

Traditional rulers of the mainly Muslim Northern States have been meeting periodically, since 1987, on the issue of religious disturbances in Northern Nigeria. At the inaugural meeting of their Forum in Kaduna, in June 1987, their stated purpose/objective was the formation of a "Committee of Elders" which would "monitor significant areas, and developments that likely lead to tension and hostilities and find preventive measures through tackling their causes" Daily Times June 17th 1987 (cited in Lugga, 2007). Furthermore, as a result of bloody unrest in Katsina and Bauchi, the traditional rulers met again on July 24, 1991 and constituted a committee to find both causes and solution to the bloody unrest. They also called on religious fundamentalists and their cohorts to exercise restraints, eschew violence, intolerance and overzealousness in their religious pursuits. In addition, they also charged Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religion or political inclinations, to learn to live with one another, for meaningful development in the best interest of the Nation (Lugga, 2007).

In a memorandum addressed to the Federal Military Government, the traditional rulers urged the Government to promulgate a decree banning religious fanaticism before the planned

transition to democracy in 1992. The traditional rulers met again in the wake of the December 26, 1994 decapitation of Gideon Akaluka and the near lynching of Christian Azubuike in Kano and Sotoko respectively. The meeting, which was held in Kaduna, was intended to forge a common response to the problem posed by religious fundamentalism in the region (Lugga, 2007).

The traditional rulers in Kano have over many decades successfully managed a mutual conflict between the Qadiriyya sect and Tijaniyya sects that continued in the post-colonial period over the issue of conversion from one sect to the other. Despite the conversion of traditional rulers of Kano from the traditional Qadiriyya order to Tijaniyya order, they continued to cooperate with the other religious leaders. This intra religious conflict did not affect the mutual cooperation between them and the traditional authority (Lugga, 2007).

The 1970s was a decade of tense relationship between Muslim groups in Nigeria. The emergence of Izalatul Bidi'a-wa Iqamatis Sunna aggravated the already tensed situation. The Emir had managed disputes that arose from time to time. He embraces all the religious groups, the Emir's palace is visited by a number of Islamic scholars including the Imams from various groups and sects. Whenever a problem arises among Muslims, the Emir assembles Islamic scholars to iron out their differences and reach a consensus (Lugga, 2007). Apart from promoting unity among Muslims, he also extended the privilege of offering traditional leadership to other ethnic groups residing in the Emirate. This heroic unity in diversity policy innovation won him the respect, love, loyalty and friendship of many ethnic groups both in and outside the Emirate (Dalhatu and Hassan 2000 cited in Blench et al, 2006).

Another instance is the ancient city of Kano which is known for myriad conflicts, the traditional rulership and religious groups involved in peacebuilding initiative, thereby creating a

structure known as *Zauren Sulhu* (Conflict Resolution Palace). This brings together elders and leaders of different groups both indigenous and non-indigenous to resolve conflict amicably and accountably. Many of the disputes that could have led to religious and ethnic clashes are repeatedly resolved amicably through dialogue between the settlers in the state (Riruwai and Ukiwo 2012),

Gbong Gwom Jos, in his contribution to peacebuilding has appointed a Hausa community leader as a member of the Jos Traditional Council. All community leaders keep a register of movement of people into their domains to curb the arrival of strangers who could foment trouble (Blench et al, 2003). The Dagwom Rwei of Barikin Ladi in his role in managing 11 September 2001 tension that built up in Barakin Ladi town and surrounding villages, had to mobilised his subjects to resist the temptation of being drawn into a crisis. He took a pragmatic and symbolic action by buying white handkerchiefs for each traditional ruler and community leader, leading a procession through the LGA capital and major settlements for several days. Everywhere they went he would explain to people the advantages of not being drawn into the conflict (Blench et al, 2006). Another example is during the Plateau state crisis in 2001, Ardo Gidado Idris and Ardo Abubakar Idris of Gashish and Panyam respectively liaised with the district heads and successfully prevent reprisal attacks (Blench et al, 2006).

2.7.2 The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Kaduna State

In Kaduna state which has a high incidences of violent complex ethno-religious conflicts. The Emir of Zazzau has been in the forefront, in an effort to prevent and mediate conflict. The Emir of Zazzau had appeared in the media calling his subjects to end violence. Emergency meeting have been held between the Emir and the council, district heads, government functionaries, elders in the communities and security agents (Blench et al, 2006).

The emir of Zazzau maintains that, traditional rulers should not be relegated in field of maintenance of law and order, whatever the kind of government in power. Traditional rulers have better acquaintance with the general public in their domains, they are preservers and custodian of law and order. They have been skilful in solving the problem of their subjects and in controlling any kind of human disturbance and disputes (Idris, 1995). Blench et al (2006) affirms that “the role of traditional rulers with or without constitutional provision is the maintenance of peace at all levels whenever peace is threatened and they are able to do this because they are custodians of their people (p. 32). In confirmation of this, the emir of Zazzau stated that, through their district heads the traditional rulers perform among many roles, law and order, disturbances, boundary disputes, subversive activities bearing on law and order and local dispute.

The Emir of Zazzau Alhaji Shehu Idris plays his role in the maintenance of peace and harmony among Muslims and Christians in the Emirate which is composed of a multitude of tribes with different religious beliefs. The Emir had appointed Christians as district heads in areas where majority of the inhabitants are Christians (Dalhatu and Hassan 2000 cited in Blench et al, 2006). In the 1992 Zangon-Kataf ethno religious crises, which resulted in killing hundreds of people and destruction of properties, the intervention of the Emir arrested the widespread of the conflict. A call for reprisal attack by the people in Zaria was calmed by the address of the Emir. He pleaded with the people to be calm and tolerant, and that without peace and understanding in the society there would be no mutual confidence and the life of people would become insecure (Dalhatu and Hassan 2000 as cited in Blench et al. 2006).

During a peace conference convened by the Northern Governors’ Forum (NGF) on ‘The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution’ in Kaduna, the Emir of Zazzau states that, the Emirate hold meetings monthly, in each of the 17 Local Governments

under the emirate, the Security Committee which composed of district heads , represented at these Local Government Security Committees gives advice to ensure that law and order are properly maintained from the grassroots up to the national level. The Emir also asserts that the traditional rulers have indispensable function which is a catalyst for the unity and progress of Nigeria. Thus, their assigned responsibilities are that of promoting unity and better understanding among the people by speaking with one voice, (Dalhatu and Hassan 2000 as cited in Blench et al, 2006).

As part of the effort to ensure mutual and peaceful coexistence between farmers and Fulani pastoralists, the District Head of Rahama of Zaria Emirate appointed Sarkin Fulani of Rahama district, and also assigned him as a member of the district's security committee chaired by the district head. He reports all cases of insecurity to the committee or directly to the district head if the matter requires urgent attention (Blench et al, 2006). This initiative was replicated by upgrading Sarkin Fulani (Haruna Jangidi) to the position of district head of Ladduga district in Kachia Grazing Reserve. He reports to the Chief of Ikulu, a non-Muslim leader in southern Kaduna, the district head is a member of the Ikulu Chiefdom this has facilitated mutual understanding and the development of trust between different ethnic groups (Blench et al, 2006).

In its peacebuilding activity, the Ikulu Traditional Council brought Ikulu and Fulani districts together who share common boundary in its course to ascertain the circumstance surrounding the assassination of a clergy man. The chiefdom subsequently involved security agency in the investigation process, and it was found out that, there had been a serious disagreement between a pastor and a Fulani man over a piece of land (Ikulu Traditional Council, 2012).

In the same vein, in an effort to ensure peace and security and an atmosphere devoid of tension, between sedentary Ikulu farmers and Fulani herdsmen. In 2013, the Ikulu traditional council provided a situation report to the Kaduna state government. This was as a result of rumour over tension between two Fulani and Ikulu districts, who share a common boundary, over the discovery of dead body of an Ikulu man. The traditional council in its security situation report provides that, the two communities were living peacefully without molestation on either side (Ikulu Traditional Council, 2013).

Therefore it can be argued that, the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding process is as old as the institution itself. Peacebuilding is part and parcel of African per-colonial system geared towards reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationship which is deeply rooted in the custom and tradition of the people. Traditional rulers have contributed in various ways in the area of peacebuilding, through information sharing and intelligence gathering, which help and nip in the bud what could have create ethnic and religious conflict. They organised neighbourhood watch in their domains. They called on religious fundamentalist and their cohorts to exercise restraint, eschew violence, intolerance and overzealousness in their religious pursuit.

Traditional rulers in their peacebuilding efforts ensure peaceful co-existence between and among different religious groups, as well as different religious sects. They also incorporate other ethnic groups in their domains by making the leaders of such ethnic groups members of their traditional councils. They are also in the fore front in an effort to end violence, and also appear in the media calling their subjects to end violence. They also held meetings with members of different groups in their domains in order to ensure peaceful coexistence among groups whenever there is conflict.

Traditional political institutions in Nigeria have been criticized for playing a legitimising role for every government in power, whether it is military or civilian regime. The traditional rulers in Nigeria play a role in the choice and emergence of electoral candidates in contemporary Nigeria, in spite of their supposed non-affiliation to any political parties. During the electioneering processes, rivals political aspirants patronise palaces of traditional rulers in their communities to receive royal support and endorsements, which undermine their supposed non-affiliation to any political party. The institution promotes “tribalism” which is a potential threat to ethnic and religious conflict as well as peace and security. Within the context of this study, the traditional ruler in Sanga LGA, instead of being a custodian of peace and security in his domain, turns out to be the perpetrator of conflict, which manifested itself into ethno-religious form. The personality clashed between chairman of Sanga Local Government and chief of Numana over the location of the local government secretariat, and Chief of Numana interference in the LG’s administration affairs. Thus, the agitation for the change of name of Numana chiefdom to Gwantu chiefdom was spearheaded by the chief of Numana (Kaduna State Government Report, 2002). In the same vein, the contest over rulership of traditional institutions of Kurama and Godogodo chiefdoms, as already cited in chapter three of this study, served as a sources conflict rather than builders of peace (James, 2007).

2.8 Gap in the Literature

However, despite the existing literature on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding right from pre-colonial period down to present day Nigeria and Kaduna state in particular, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no such body of existing literature on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area, as well as documented materials as regard the subject matter. Moreover, no studies titled “The Role of Traditional

Rulers in Peacebuilding Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State”. The point of departure here is that, with specific focus to role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding, the study contributes to the existing body of knowledge by looking at the specific roles traditional rulers have played in peacebuilding Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this study the Human Needs Theory is adopted to serve as guide, to explain the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf LG. The theory has been a corner stone for conflict resolution scholars. The theory was first developed by Abraham Maslow and later conceived by John Burton (1990) in his conflict resolution activity.

Abraham Maslow identifies five categories of basic needs common to all people; individuals must meet the needs at the lower levels of the pyramid before they can successfully be motivated to tackle the next levels. On the basis of this pyramid of human needs, some needs are more urgent than others, which are psychological, safety and security, belongingness and love; self esteem and need for personal fulfilment. Maslow suggests that the first and most basic need people have is the need for survival: their physiological requirements for food, water, and shelter. People must have food to eat, water to drink, and a place to call home before they can think about anything else. If any of these physiological necessities is missing, people are motivated above all else to meet the missing need. After their physiological needs have been satisfied, people can work to meet their needs for safety and security. Safety is the feeling people get when they know no harm will befall them, physically, mentally, or emotionally; security is the feeling people get when their fears and anxieties are low (Cengage Learning, 2009).

Furthermore, after the physiological need, the need for survival, safety and security need have been met, the third level of the pyramid is needs associated with love and belonging. These

needs are met through satisfactory relationships-relationships with family members, friends, peers, and other people with whom individuals interact. Satisfactory relationships imply acceptance by others. Having satisfied their physiological and security needs, people can venture out and seek relationships from which their need for love and belonging can be met. Once individuals have satisfactorily met their need for love and belonging, they can begin to develop positive feelings of self-worth and self-esteem, and act to foster pride in their work and in themselves as people. Self-actualization, which is a person's desire to become everything he or she is capable of becoming-to realize and use his or her full potential, capacities, and talents. This need can be addressed only when the previous six have been satisfied (Cengage-Learning, 2009).

John Burton's theory of needs was built on the work of Maslow, in which he sees conflict resolution in a specific sense. It refers to the facilitated analysis of the underlying sources of conflict situations by the parties in conflict. The term also encompasses the process whereby institutional and policy options are discovered that meet the needs of the parties, thus establishing the basis for a resolution of the conflict (Burton, 1986). He further argues that, achieving a resolution is not the result of a compromise or an enforced decision. It is an outcome that develops out of an analysis of the total situation by the concerned parties to meet their needs.

John Burton in his application of the theory of needs, put emphasis on current social and political conflicts, he looks at how universal human needs are often neglected, leading individuals and groups to use violence to claim their rights and satisfy their needs. He outlines his own needs as distributive justice, safety and security, belongingness and love, self-esteem, personal fulfilment, identity, cultural security, freedom and participation (Daniels, 2005).

2.8.1 Basic Assumptions of the Theory

The theory posits the existence of certain universal needs which must be satisfied if people are to prevent or resolve destructive conflicts (Rubenstein, 2015). Thus the theory is based on the following assumptions.

There are fundamental needs that all human beings have and that, if violated may cause conflict. In order for individuals and groups to live and attain certain wellbeing, they need essential or basic needs

Human needs theory argues that, conflict and violence are caused by unmet human needs. Violence occurs when there are no mechanisms or ways for individuals and groups to meet their basic human needs.

Violence is tragic expression of needs, which all actions undertaken by human beings are attempt to satisfy their needs. Thus, if individuals and groups are able to connect their needs and those of others, they will be able to look at other ways of meeting their needs, thereby avoiding violence and destruction.

Another great promise of the theory is that, the theory provides a relatively objective basis, of transcending local, political, and cultural differences, for understanding the sources of conflict, designing conflict resolution process.

2.8.2 Limitations of the Theory

The theory is not without some pitfalls, first is the problem of definition of human needs, for instance, how can one define human needs? How can one know what needs are involved in conflict situations? How can one know what human needs are being met and unmet? Are human needs cultural or universal in nature? If they are cultural, is the analysis of human needs beneficial beyond a specific conflict? Are some needs inherently more important than others? If some needs are more important, should these be pursued first? Marker (2003). There are several

discrepancies between various theorists. Many people believe safety and security need as the first basic need than psychological need, because the rate of insecurity may even make one lose the appetite and care less about psychological needs. There is wide range of question and uncertainty surrounding the human needs approach to solving conflicts. Thus, the attempt to establish an objective basis for socially and politically salient needs in human nature has been criticised as indefensible essentialist, de-contextualised and ahistorical.

2.8.3 Relevance of the Theory to the Study

Despite these limitations, the theory is still applicable on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Ktaf Local Government Area. Traditional rulers have been playing some roles in peacebuilding initiatives such as, conflict mediation and reconciliation. The traditional rulers in efforts to ensure lasting peace and security in their respective domains focus on the source of conflict and looked at how best the parties can have their needs met and those of others. Traditional rulers in their peacebuilding initiatives bring different groups in their respective domains and emphasise common humanity where differences are accentuated, and also work to unify human beings from different background and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how others need and feel the same way we do.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF CONFLICTS IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the background of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, geography of the local government area, people of the area, economic activities of the people, and an overview of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

3.2 Evolution of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

The evolution of present Zangon Kataf local government Area can be traced to former Zangon-Kataf district, which originated from the former larger division of southern Zaria. The name used to refer to the areas found far south of Zaria (Turaki, 1993). The Southern Zaria refers to geographical area south of Zaria in the former Zaria province. The inhabitants of this area form just a small part of the non-Muslim areas known as the Middle Belt (Turaki, 1982: 12).

Zangon-Kataf district was one of the districts created following the colonial territorial organisation which occurred at the end of 1907. Zaria province was divided into 32 districts, and subsequently reduced to 22 by 1920 (Aduwak, 2006). This area now forms part of southern Kaduna. Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State is one of the additional local governments created in the federation on the 27th May, 1989 out of the former Kachia Local Government. The Local Government is made of four (4) Chiefdoms which are: Atyap, Bajju, Anghan, and Ikulu chiefdoms (Information Division Zangon-Kataf LG, 1999).

3.3 Geography of the Local Government Area

The Local Government is approximately 5,625 square kilometres, the Local Government is situated between latitude 9°25 North and 10°20 North and between longitude 7°45 East and 8°40 East. Zangon-Kataf Local Government area is bounded on the North by Kauru Local Government, to the south by Jema'a Local Government and on the West by Kachia Local

Government Area; it is bounded on the East by Kaura Local Government Area (Information Division Zangon-Kataf LG, 1999).

3.4 People of the Area

The inhabitants of the area form part of the non-Muslim area (Turaki, 1993). The people that make the area are: Atyap, Bajju, Kamanton and Ikulu. The origin of tribes in this area is believed to be from Bauchi or Jos Plateau. According to Meek (1931), closely associated culturally, and to some extent linguistically, with the Katab are the Kaje, Kamantan, and the Ikulu. The Katab, Kamantan, Ikulu and a section of the Kaje, were situated in the former Zaria province, and were under the jurisdiction of the Fulani Emir of Zaria. The indigenous people of the area are classified as Benue Congo or semi Bantu group (Yahaya, 1980). Languages spoken in the area are Tyap (atyap), Jju (Bajju), Ikiulu and Kamanton. Zangon-Kataf District was a very large district, before it was split into smaller districts. The various settlements are closely situated, as the various ethnic groups see themselves as neighbours (Aduwak, 2006). The Atyap moved to the area through the process of migration, from Karigi near Kauru. Also, some Bajju believe that, they originated from Miango in the Jos plateau area. The Kamantan and Ikulu have tradition of movement from neighbouring areas to their present settlements (Kazah-Toure, 1991).

The Kataf are situated in the south west of former Zaria emirate, where they occupy 200 square mile of land according to (Meek, 1931). Prominent among the Kataf settlement are: Zango, Samarun-Kataf, Gora and Mabushi. The Bajju have a settlement pattern that is dispersed, it is believed that, the Bajju settled in Kurmi-bi after leaving the Jos-Plateau plains. The Bajju also have settlement in Jemaa and Kachia Local Government. Prominent among the Bajju settlements are Zonkwa, Kurmin-bi, Madakiya, Unguwan Rimi, Abet, Farman, and Fadiya. The Ikulu and Kamanton are both believed to be offshoot of Kadara (Temple, 1922 as cited in

Aduwak, 2006). The Ikulu have settlement that is almost surrounded by hills, such as Kamurun Dutse and Dutesn Bako. They have boundaries with Kadara and Gwari to the North-West, Samika to the North-East, and the Bajju and Atyap to the South-East. The various societies that make up Zangon-Kataf LG have a lot in common, from their dialects, socio-political setups, and to their economies (Aduwak, 2006).

The economic activities of the people can be termed agrarian, because virtually all of them with the exception of the Ikulus depended heavily on agriculture. The rainy season is usually a very busy one for these people. The Bajju according to temple, as cited in Aduwak (2006) were good agriculturalists and breed a considerable quality of livestock, in which they sell on market days to earn currency to purchase goods they do not produce. The rural Bajjus were predominantly subsistence agriculturalists, who raise livestock, including goats, poultry, and hogs. Staple crops include maize, millet, guinea-corn, soy beans, rice, yam, cocoa yam, and several varieties of beans. This is also applicable to Kataf and Kamantan. The ikulu were blacksmiths and iron workers, and also practice little agriculture. Politically, none of these groups can be said to have had a single authority with and influence over all members of a particular group. Authority was based on the family unit, above which no leader could exercise authority. Under the British, this system was broken down and new balance of political force created (Yahaya, 1980).

There were small Hausa settlement town located along trading routes in territories belonging to the people of different ethnic groups in the south, south-east, and south-west, in place such as Kauru, Jemaa, Zangon-Kataf, Kagorko, Kachia, Jere, and Lere. These Hausa settlements either owed allegiance to Zazzau or were Hausa vassal states (Kazah-Toure, 1991: 54). Presently, the Local Government is heterogeneous in nature, in terms of its ethnic and

religious make up. There are four major ethnic groups in the Local Government Area namely Atyap (Kataf), Bajju (Kaje), Ikulu and Kamantan. Others are Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv etc (The Information Division Zangon-Kataf LG, 1999). Zangon-Kataf Local Government has a projected population size of about 318, 991 based on the 2006 projection (National Population Commission, 2010)

3.5 Economic Activities of the People

The dominant economic activities of the people of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area are agriculture and commerce. Being a rural local government; the communities are mostly agrarian who engage in subsistence farming as well as for commercial purpose. Crops produced in the area are yam, soybean, cocoyam, mangoes, maize, guinea corn, cassava and millet, there is also poultry farming and cattle rearing. The Local Government is home to international livestock market at Katsit, which mostly deals on pigs and serves as a trade centre for traders from different parts of the country and abroad, such as Cameroun, Niger and Chad. The Local Government also has tourist attractions such as river wonderful (Water fall) at Matsirga and an ancient cave at Kabam which used to serve as a hideout for warriors during wars with neighbouring villages (The Information Division Zangon-Kataf LG, 1999).

3.6 Background of Conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

Nigeria is often regarded as a deeply divided state, in which major political issues are violently contested along the fault lines of complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions (Smyth and Robinson 2001 cited in Okpanachi, 2010). It is by virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities, that Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The high point of the crisis in Nigeria seems to have been the civil war in the late 1960s, which ensued shortly after independence in

1960. The circles of violence involving communal and ethno- religious conflicts have continued unabated, and which can be traced to, upon Nigeria's return to civil rule in 1999. Among these conflicts were the one in Sagamu near Lagos on 17th July 1999 between the Hausa and the Yoruba ethnic groups, and the subsequent reprisal attacks in Kano. The 26th November, 1999, Yoruba and Hausa traders clash over the control of the strategic Mile 12 Market in Ketu, Lagos (Akinyele 2001, cited in Ukiwo, 2003). The Ile-Ife and Modakeke intractable intra-ethnic violence of the military era also resurfaced in March 2000 (Okafor, 2007).

Furthermore, there was breakdown of conflict between Ijaw ethnic group on one hand, and Aitum and Itsekiri community in the Warri South Local Government of Delta State on the other. In Anambra state, was inter-communal clash between the Aguleri-Umuleri (Okafor, 2007). The adoption of Sharia in January 2000, which has its roots since the controversial enlisting of the country into the Organisation of Islamic Conference, in the predominantly Muslim northern states, has regenerated the longstanding animosity between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Conflicts have also erupted between Middle Belt groups jostling for political and economic power (Ukiwo, 2003). The Tivs were engaged in conflict with the Jukun in October 2001 over politics and control of land (Ukiwo, 2003).

Another trigger of conflict is indigene/settler dichotomy, which affect relative rights of different groups in Nigeria. **The phenomenon** is usually and inextricably bound up with other sources of ethnic and religious tension in Nigeria. In recent years disputes over who is an indigene and who is a settler have boiled over into bloody ethnic and religious clashes (Human Rights Watch, 2006). In Plateau, the line between indigene and settler is bitterly contested in some parts of the state. Most controversially, the state and local governments have labelled the members of some Hausa and Jarawa communities that were founded during the first half of the

19th century as non-indigenes. And the settlers have refused to accept the label. And this compounded the existing religious and interethnic tensions to the point of bloodshed (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Kaduna is known to be a volatile state. Unlike most states of Northern Nigeria, Kaduna is quite complex. Its ethnic and religious diversity cum Christian and Islamic dichotomy provide a veritable ground for ethno-religious violence. In the 1980s, ethnic and religious tensions in Kaduna state began to mobilise distinct religious overtones and the additional dimension of Muslim versus Christian dichotomy (Kazah-Toure, 1999). The escalation of political violence was witnessed in Kasuwar Magani (1980), Zangon-Kataf (1984), Kafanchan (1987) and Zangon-Kataf again (1992), Kaduna crisis of 1992 and 1996, the 2000 sharia riot, the 2002 violent religious protest by the Hausa Muslim group against Miss World Pageant, and the 2011 post election violence (Bonnat, 2012; Alber et al, 2011).

In Kaduna, the issue of indigene/settler conundrum has added to its already volatile mix of overlapping tension. Local officials in different parts of the state have aggravated sectarian tensions by refusing to issue indigene certificates to people who do not share their religion (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Christians complain that, it has become impossible for them to obtain certificates of indigeneity. Instead, some Christian indigenes of the city have been issued certificates of settlers'hip (Human Rights Watch, 2006). For instance in Barnawa district in Kaduna South Local Government, anyone who bears Christian name is a settler. And by implication, if you are given a settlers'hip form you are not an indigene of that area, so you are not eligible for any quota. It could be for a job or for admission to an institution of higher learning (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

In the same vein, is the discrimination against Hausa Muslims in Zangon-Kataf. Atyap rejection of their Hausa neighbours claims to indigene status is also fuelled by a belief that, the Hausa have an inherent predilection for the domination of others and seek indigene status only in order to subjugate and marginalize the Atyap (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Hausa community leaders in Zangon-Kataf complain that their community is systematically discriminated against by the local government officials who are predominantly from the Atyap tribal extraction. The Hausa ethnic group were denied the right to compete for jobs, and other opportunities made available through the local government administration (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Conflicts often acquire the character of ethno-religious violence, especially in Southern Kaduna, where religion and ethnicity largely coincide. “Southern Kaduna area can be described as an area that has gradually witnessed higher rise in conflicting interactions between the Hausa and the non-Hausa groups” (Yahaya, 2012). Historical memories of past inter-group relations, manipulative role played by the political classes, economic inequality, colonial legacy, perceived domination of certain ethno-religious group by the other, often come into play, and serve at least, immediate trigger of violent conflict. These factors made the Southern Kaduna to occupy a volatile position in the history of inter-group conflicts and tensions in Northern Nigeria. The area has about forty ethnic groups who are predominantly Christians, and also, a component of what is referred to as northern minorities. There is a Muslim population who are mostly Hausa and Fulani, and also minority in the area, although part of the majority at the regional and national levels (Kazah-Toure, 1999).

These ethnic groups experienced limited conflicts amongst themselves. Inter-ethnic disputes and conflicts were based on the question of land, control of fishing and hunting areas and the ownership of other resources. Armed clashes occasionally occurred, such as the ones

between the Bajju and the Ham, but these were on a small scale (Kazah-Toure, 1999). “Inter-ethnic conflicts featured more in the relationship between the Southern Kaduna zone and the neighbouring emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate such as Zazzau (Zaria), which was feudal, predominantly Hausa and Muslim” (Kazah-Toure, 1999: 113).

The phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict in Southern Zaria now Southern Kaduna predates colonialism, and the nature of relationships that existed between the Muslims-Hausa and Fulani and non-Muslim- the indigenous people of Southern Kaduna was characterised by pre-colonial pattern of dominant relationships between the two groups, which involved enslavement of the non-Hausa by Muslim Hausa group (Turaki, 1982).

This violent conflict that ensued between these groups might not be unconnected with the pattern of pre-colonial conquest, and control, and this can be traced back to at least the mid-nineteenth century when southern Kaduna’s non-Muslim communities were raided, enslaved by the Hausa and Fulani Muslims of Zaria Emirate. During pre-colonial epoch, the emirates had been violent and destructive in dealing with the communal polities, in terms of both human life and property (Kazah-Toure 1995). Prior to the arrival of the British colonial masters in Northern Nigeria, southern Zaria was in a state of war with the Fulani rulers of Zaria and Jema’a. This state of war was characterised by slave-raiding and religious proselytisation. And occasionally, wars of territorial expansion or annexation (Turaki, 1982).

However, the series of massive slave raid against the southern polities that were carried out in 1849 and 1897 by the emirate rulers were heavier in scale and scope, and in the process thousands of people were either killed or captured as slaves (Kirkpatrick, as cited in Toure, 2003). These acts of aggression devastated, destabilised, and to an extent, led to the depopulation of the communities, with serious economic, demographic, and other consequences” (Omotosho,

Yohanna, as cited in Toure 2003: 32). Thus, “stubborn resistance by various polities to violent slave raids and military and political aggression by the emirate forces, continued. Until the British colonial conquest, no other external power had been successful in establishing political control over the people” (Kazah-Toure, 1999: 155).

The British colonial conquest ushered in the 1900s, also heightened hatred and strife between the indigenous people and Hausa/Fulani in the area. “The British created Zaria province and declared most of the communal polities in the southern zone as part of it” (Toure 2003: 35). Military base was established there for launching attacks on the communities that were resisting the British, and the several ethnic groups were placed under the jurisdiction of the emirate within the native authority” (Hyne, as cited in Toure, 2003: 35). The nature and manner by which the natives of the polities of the area were subjugated under the indirect system of government, through the emirate of Zaria, and with the subsequent introduction of military to suppress the so called pagans, categorically served as trigger of future violent conflict in inter-group relations. The historical experienced of slave raids against the pagans people increased suspicion and physical attacks on both the Hausa and Fulbe traders and travellers in those territories (Acting High Commissioner, as cited in Toure, 2003).

It is against this background that some resistance to the British by the natives took on an anti-Hausa character. Various ethnic groups embarked on blocking roads, raiding caravans, and attacking itinerant Hausa traders, passing through their homelands Orr 1907 (cited in Kazah-Toure 1999). Bonnat 1985 explains the stiff resistance of the non-Muslim peoples such as the Agworok as being due to their history of struggles against emirate expansionism (cited in Kazah-Toure 1999). “In 1915, the Kaje (Bajju) and Kaninkong rose up against the rule of the Emir of Jema’a, but were subdued by the British punitive patrols” (Turaki, 1982: 194).

Ethnic groups such as Bajju, embarked on blocking roads, raiding caravans, and attacking Hausa itinerant traders passing their home land, because the Hausa were generally suspected and perceived as collaborators of British (Orr, as cited in Toure, 2003). Another conflict broke out in 1922 in a Bajju community between the Bajju and Hausa, based on the directives given by the clans' elders to the youths and segment of the society. The reason for the revolt and attacks on the Hausa was oppression by the Hausa. The Bajju of present Zangon-Kataf LGA refused to pay taxes, and refused to comply with force labour demands, and physically attack any Hausa found (Kazah-Toure, 2003).

There was the Kagoma rebellion against the Fulani rule as reported by Turaki "The Kagoma rebelled against Fulani rule and refused to pay taxes in 1934. They wanted the Fulani District Head, Madakin Kagoma to be removed...The Chief of Fadan Kagoma vehemently protested against this policy and refused to obey and take orders from Fulani 'superior'. But the rebellion was crushed by British political officers" Turaki. 1982: 194–193). In 1942, political protest was recorded among the Kajes of Zagon-Kataf District, which was triggered by the discriminatory practices of the Native Authority (N.A.) system. Another protest was reported among the Katafs of the same district in 1948 (Yahaya, 1980).

There was a case of Zangon-Kataf unrest of 1946, which was occasioned by many factors, such as the used of the native court to victimise the educated elite in the area by the emirate's aristocrats. Among the issues constantly pursued by emergent educated elite in the area were, ethnic group in the area were excluded from allocation of stalls at the main market monopolized by the Hausa, exploitation of force labour directed mostly at the non-Hausa women, and also who were conscripted to sweep market monopolised by the Hausa. Also, the issue of force supply of grains by the natives for the feeding of families of district officials and

their horses. And discriminatory attitude on ethno-religious grounds, in terms of treatments of Pagans and Christians etc Zangon-Katab Unrest 1946, (as cited in Toure, 2003).

It is clearly; shown that, during every political protest by natives, the British patrol proactively crushed the protest. “What kept down the uprising of the non- Muslim group was the fear of British patrols. Hausa Fulani rule was seen by British political officers as a ‘divine rule’ which must be supported and protected. Opposition to Fulani rule was actively suppressed by the used of armed force” (Turaki, 1982: 195).

Another major factor that at best served as a source of conflict in Zangon-Kataf was the nature of colonial policy. The colonial administration by its policies and attitudes created a serious socio-political conflict between the Muslims and the non-Muslim groups. In addition, the creation of a Christian community whose identity was with the world Christian community and also by protecting and promoting Islam in the Muslim community whose identity was with the world Muslim community. As a result of these, the colonialists created two communities under its colonial structure (Turaki, 1982).

Colonial policies toward the Muslims and the Christian, led to the institutionalisation of socio-political conflict between two communities, namely, the Muslim world and the Christian world (Turaki, 1982: 168). Colonialists built two communities in Northern Nigeria along religious lines. The religious factor became the determinant of social status, political recruitment and participation, and social acceptance and accessibility. Islam as a religion and Muslim as adherence of Islam were given a superior status and socio-political roles. Prejudice and discrimination against the non-Muslim Group in the northern system was based upon this religious factor. Colonial attitudes towards the non-Muslims who became Christians or educated along western lines were very unfavourable (Turaki, 1982). The colonial state exploited

differences between sections of the colonised population and created divisions among the people by pitting groups against one another – especially through the manipulation of primordial ideological and political differences (Kazah-Toure, 1991: 161).

Inequality and conflict did exist between the Muslim and the non-Muslim groups during the pre-colonial period, but these social facts were institutionalised by the colonial administration (Turaki, 1982: 173). The British decision to place the Atyap and other indigenous tribes under the system of indirect rule further entrenched violent conflict in inter-group relations (Philips, 2000). The emirs were placed at head of the NAs. The emirate aristocracy was imposed as overlords on the peoples of the zone. Right from 1907, when the first set of Muslim Hausa-Fulani rulers were posted into the zone as District Heads and other Native Authority (NA) officials, there were continuous outbreaks of peasant revolts in such places as Kachia, and these took ethnic forms (Kazah-Toure, 1999).

With the emergence of missionary activity, the indigenous people accepted Christianity. These minorities began to have self-awareness and political consciousness that developed more strongly during the period of nationalist agitation, which subsequently developed into political movements and demands in the post-independence era. The activities of Christian's missionaries created a close association between the Christian religion and the ethnic identities of various groups in opposition to the Hausa and Fulani, who are overwhelmingly Muslims. In the same vein, Suberu (1996) argued that, historically, the leadership of these minority populations has been dominated by mission educated elite. Today these ethnic minority elite occupy a frontline position in the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which has persistently and violently attacked the hegemony of Muslim Hausa and Fulani elites in the north and the in the whole of Nigeria. This development according to Yahaya, (2014) has immensely contributed in sowing

the seeds of future disharmonies that assumed religious dimension and later characterised inter-ethnic group relations in similar socio-political settings.

The activities of Christian missions in southern Zaria created a serious conflict between the Muslim and political officers on the one hand and the non-Muslim groups on the other. The rise of new identity, political consciousness and aspiration impose a serious threat to the legitimacy of Hausa-Fulani rule and hegemony. They also rejected their inferior status and positions in the colonial situation (Turaki, 1982: 173).

Turaki further emphasised that

Christianity and education in southern Zaria were instrumental in the development of political consciousness and self determination. The people became awakened the oppressive and the autocratic rule of the Fulani rulers. Their social development through Christianity and education had resulted in the development of new ethnic identity, which no longer relates to their ascribed subordinate position under both colonial and Fulani rule (Turaki, 1982: 217).

Conflict in inter-group relations was further deepened with the formation of political organisations, which led to the emergence of local elites. “These were elites who were brought up with memories of hostile relationships that existed between the Zazzau and Jema’a, and pagans now Christians group” (Yahaya, 2014). As Kaza-Toure (1999) discussed, within the terrain of politics, the Non-Muslim League, led by an emerging Christianised elite was organised under the umbrella of ethnicity and religion. In 1950 it was transformed into the Middle Zone League (MZL). It excluded the Hausa from its ranks. In January 1954 it organised demonstrations to protest against Zaria's dominance, and the non-Hausa groups were up in arms in a joint anti-Hausa revolt which was suppressed. According to Bannes (2007),

The Middle Zone movement was fostered by the missionaries, and was sparked by adverse reactions. A reflection of the shared perception on the part of the participants that what they had in common was a desired to be free of the Muslim political control that to be implemented throughout the northern region as prelude to decolonisation.

During the 1980s which coincide with the period of military rule in Nigeria, violent conflicts continue in southern Kaduna area and Zangon-Kataf. Inter-ethnic conflicts have been heightened by the economic crisis which started in Nigeria in 1982, and worsened with the introduction of the SAP from 1986. This reduced people's wealth and they tended to perceive their enemies as those who belong to other ethnic or religious groups. The SAP had been characterized by a collapse of basic social infrastructures, growing rural poverty, retrenchment of workers, rural youth's unemployment, in an area with a shortage of land suitable for farming (Kazah-Toure, 1999). Some instances of these conflicts are:

The 1984 Gure and Kahugu inter-communal conflicts over drinking place, farmlands and economic trees (Kaduna State Government Report (1984). On 6 March 1987, there was a Muslim-Christian clash among students at Kafanchan, the biggest town in Southern Kaduna (Kazah-Toure, 1999: 135). Kafanchan 'Fantsuwan' Development Association (2011) claims that,

Kafanchan has a history replete with crisis and disturbances, 1987, 1996, and 1997. A violent conflict engulfed the residents of Kafanchan Township and neighbouring towns and villages. The fundamental cause of the conflicts is the question of ownership of Kafanchan town. The colonial imposition of ownership of Jemaa emirate in 1933 through its infamous system of indirect rule is the genesis of the problem bedeviling Kafanchan.

There was another ethno-religious conflict between indigenous ethnic groups and Hausa/Fulani over the demand by the indigenous people over change and restructuring of Jema'a Emirate. The death of the 11th emir of Jema'a was seen by members of the indigenous people, as an opportunity for them to intensify their struggle and realise their desire for a self rule over their chiefdoms. And that their struggle for self-rule dated back to colonial period. On other hand the Hausa and Fulani Muslims who are apparently the minority in Jema'a Local Government Area advocated for the maintenance of emirate system which is founded on Islamic principles (Kaduna State Government Report, 1999).

There was a personality clash between the chairman of Sanga Local Government and chief of Numana, over the location of the Local Government secretariat, and chief of Numana interference in the LG's administration. Also, there exists an agitation for the change of name of Numana chiefdom to Gwantu chiefdom, spearheaded by the chief of Numana (Kaduna State Government Report, 2002). In the same vein, the contest over district headship of Yarkasuwa in the former Lere District in 1986, constituted another cause of conflict between the Hausa and Fulani group and Kurama ethnic group. The Hausa and Fulani were opposed to the candidature of a prominent Kurama, who dared to contest for the district head's office reserved for the Hausa Fulani of Lere town (Bonnat, 2012).

Another conflict was Godogodo inter-communal conflict, which might not be unconnected with the imposition of Gwandara, and Hausa and Fulani settlers over the indigenous Nindem, Kanufi, Numana, Nunku, and Numbu tribal communities in the Gofogodo and its environs territory. The causes of the inter-communal conflict was first, the creation of Godogodo chiefdom and the appointment of an immigrant settler, Gwandara man as the first Chief against the wishes and prayers of the indigenous people. Secondly, was the question of ruling houses which became a very contentious issue, and many communities in Godogodo area contested the inclusion of Gwandara, Hausa and Fulani of Jagindi Gari among the ruling houses of Godogodo Chiefdom, and the complete exclusion of the indigenous communities (James, 2007).

In the vein, were the 2001 Yarkasuwa communal disturbances, the causes of the conflict were the imposition of District Head of Kudara as the pioneer Chief of Kurama Chiefdom over the District Head of Yarkasuwa, who happened to be the choice of the section of the Kurama people, which eventually enraged the section of the Kurama people. However, the intense protest and opposition against the installation of District Head of Bisallah at Yarkasuwa, which is the

Headquarters of Kurama Chiefdom, and the largely Christian Kurama tribe in the Chiefdom were against the appointment and the installation of Muslim District Head albeit a Kurama by ethnic extraction (James, 2007).

In 1992, rivalry between Hausa and Atyab, based on economic and political interests, and specifically a tussle over the relocation of a market, exploded in Zangon-Kataf. Old grievances were unearthed and led to a bloody ethnic conflict (Kazah-Toure, 1999). Marketing had been an exclusive preserve of the Hausa population of the town. A decision made by local government officials composed largely of Atyap elites, did not augur well with the Hausa Muslim community in the area. The decision was done partly in order to allow for expansion of the market, partly to break the traditional monopoly of trade in the hands of Hausa (Philips, 2000). The February 1992 conflict over relocation of Zangon-Kataf weekly market, from the old to a new site, led to loss of lives and property. The estimated number of people that lost their lives was 95 from both sides of the isle, and sixteen million naira worth of properties were lost in the course of the riots (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The immediate cause of the first riot was the decision of the then chairman of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area to remove the Zangon-Kataf weekly market from the old site in the heart of Zango town to a new site, without first complying with all constitutional requirement, as well as ensuring that basic infrastructural facilities were put in place in the new market site. The new site also falls within an area constituting urban area, and it was not within the jurisdiction of the local government area, and the local government does have the power to use and occupy the land for public purpose without first obtaining approval from the state government, under whose area of jurisdiction the land falls (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992: 10). For these reasons, the LG have been indicted for not complying with all necessary

requirements of the constitution and other relevant laws in relocating the market from old to new site, which served as trigger of conflict between groups in the area. However, the issue of market relocation to a new site has been a long standing phenomenon as far back as 1986, when Zangon-Kataf Local Government was under Kachia Local Government (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The action of individual like Alhaji Danbala A.T.K in relation to the court order which he obtained on behalf of the people of Zango town, who were opposed to the relocation of the market to a new site also added insult to injury. His insistence on ensuring that, the order issued by court in restraining the Local Government from moving the market from the old to a new site, was duly published and complied even after the market had taken off. He went further to aggravate the situation by waving up the court order to some Hausa youth at the new market site, on the market day, which arouse a wild jubilation by one faction and resentment by the other (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992: 12).

The laxity of security agency in the local government area also worsen the situation, the police have prior intelligence report of possible breakdown of law and order, of which the superior officer intimated the police headquarters in Kaduna. In spite of the intelligence report before hand, the police inactively neglected to deter the LG chairman from going on with the plan to relocate the market. He went further and added an insult to injury by attaching police men to help with smooth relocation of the market to a new site (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The first remote cause of the riot was the inadequacy of the old market situated in the heart of Zango town to serve the demands of present twentieth century commercial activities. The old market lacked public conveniences, sufficient stalls, and drainage facilities, and

discontents of the Katafs with the old market, since most of the stalls were owned by the Hausas with no room for expansion (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The historical memory of the past dominant relationships; resentment was still lurking in the psyche of the Kataf people, resentment towards Zaria Emirate system of government, which has been in place since advent of colonialism, and was entrenched under the system of indirect rule (Kaduna state government report, 1992). The main resentment of the Katafs over the system was that they have distinct culture and religion different from that of their rulers under the emirate system in Zaria, which they regard as being basically Islamic in nature. The then district head of Zangon-Kataf who had been in office for twenty-five years, a Kataf and Christian was vehemently considered as a puppet of the Zaria emirate system, hence the Katafs clamoured for a graded chief like that of Moroa, Kagoro, and Jaba (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

Religious intolerance and disregard for one another by both the Kataf and the Hausa constitutes another trigger of conflict in the area. The use of derogatory terms by the Hausa to refer the Kataf as Arna (infidels) was found it abusive by the Kataf. On the other hand, the Hausas were strongly opposed to breeding sale, and consumption of pork, and brewing of local beer within the Zango town (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992). Alongside this was the issue of asymmetric intermarriages, the Kataf were not happy with the way and manner the Hausa ethnic group married their daughters without corresponding gesture from the Hausas who refused to allow their daughters to marry the Katafs relying on Islamic laws and principles (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992). By and large, the phenomenon of indigene/settler dichotomy and marginalisation in the area whereby the Hausa complained that they were treated, by the Atyap as if they were not citizens of the area and also, they were not involved and consulted, in connection with issue of local autonomy or chiefdom (Toure, 2003; Dauke 2004).

The second riots started on 15th of May 1992, and spilled out of Zango into Kaduna town and its environs, and thereafter spilled into Zaria and Ikara . In the course of the riots many lives were lost and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed not only in Zango town but within Kaduna and its environs, Zaria and Ikara. The estimated number of people that lost their lives was one thousand five hundred and thirty five, and the extent of properties destroyed was four hundred and twenty one million, six hundred and ninety three thousand, four hundred and thirty five naira (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The conflict quickly spread beyond Zangon-Kataf to other parts of the state assuming a new dimension of Muslims versus Christian's conflict, where many people lost their lives. The effects of the riots were felt not only in the city of Kaduna, but in the rest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (**Philips, 2000**). **This confirms the statement made by Osaghae and Suberu (2005)**, "Ethno-religious conflicts have tendency to spill over from their initial theatres into other localities, states, or even regions of the federation" For two days the town of Zangon-Kataf was submerged in violent and destructive conflict between the Hausa and Atyap on May 15, 1992 with ethnic Hausa suffering most of the casualties with 1,528 officially counted dead, while the Atyap suffered few casualties (Kazah-Toure, 2003)

The immediate trigger of the second conflict might not be unconnected with the Kataf uprooting of crops on Hausa farmlands which eventually, the Hausas retaliated against, by uprooting crops on some Kataf farmlands. The insistence of the Katafs to take back the farmland led to constant skirmishes on the farmland belonging to the Hausas (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992: 16).

As usual, the remote cause of the second conflict was the lackadaisical attitude of the police, the failure of the police to arrest the perpetrators of the previous conflict and confiscate

dangerous weapons in Zangon-Kataf Local Government. “one of the surprising aspects of the February, 1992 riots is that, not a single person was arrested or weapons confiscated, even though, many lives were lost and properties worth hundreds of thousands of naira damaged or burnt” (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

The letter of the eight Kataf village heads and elders addressed to then Zangon-Kataf Local Government aggravated the situation. That is to say, the petition to the local government authority by Kataf elites to take back the ownership of their farmlands, that were confiscated by the emirate council through the then Hausa District Head of Zangon Kataf and shared out to their kith and kin exacerbated the situation (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992: 27). The Hausas also were also culpable, in their letter to Jama’atul Izalatul Bidi’a Wa’ikamatul Sunna, Zangon Kataf division to the Sultan of Sokoto for a solution to the problem of the people of Zango town, of which the sultan had no any official capacity to address the situation but can contribute to peace on moral capacity (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

Another factor was the lingering clamour for the creation of chiefdoms. Diverse ethnic groups in the area for long time have clamoured for the creation of chiefdoms. According to the then chairman of Chikun Local Government, who was one of the advocates of creation of chiefdoms among Southern Kaduna ethnic groups asserts that “I however, conceded that those crying for Chiefdoms are doing so more for reason of identity...they want to break away from the historical ties to the Zaria emirate (Kaduna State Government Report, 1992).

In 2001, inter-communal conflict erupted over ownership of Kamuru town, between the Ikulu and the Bajju. The causes of this dispute might not be unconnected with lack of proper and recognized boundary between the two tribes, as well as the planned renaming of Kamuru station, to Kamuru-Ikulu. And also, the subsequent appointment and installation of Ikulu man as the

District Head of Kamuru precipitated the mounting of roadblocks at sharp corner and Zagom along Fadan Kamantan-Kamuru high way (Kaduna State Government Report, 2001). As discussed by James (2007),

the lack of an acceptable defined and recognised boundary between the Bajju and the Ikulu people, because of interpenetration of migratory settlement across the psychological ethnic boundaries. These interpenetrative and integrative settlements made possible, the continued and sustained across boundary by payment of taxes and levies leading to claims and counter claims on land ownership, with the Ikulu claiming the Bajju and have intrude into their land while the Bajju have claimed to have settled in the Kamuru area and its environs when nobody occupy these place (p, 169).

With the outcome of presidential election of April 2011, and the trend of result collation in favour of the People Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, sparked off violent conflict. The riots were predominantly in the Northern parts of the country, in states like Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Zamfara and Kastina. However, as the result being announced on National Television live broadcast, it was downed on the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) supporters that, their candidate was losing. As such they poured into all the nooks crannies of Kaduna and Zaria and engaged in the destruction of properties spontaneously (Kaduna State Government Report, 2011).

The riot which was more political in nature at its onset, along the way the riot turned religious as mosques and churches were destroyed, vandalized or burnt down. This has been the tradition in Kaduna state, as any civil unrest always turned into ethno-religious conflict. Following this was the reprisal attacks particularly in Southern Kaduna in attempt to avenge the killing and destruction that took place in the Northern part of the state. Officially assigned number of dead was 815 and monetary cost of destroyed properties was almost more than thirteen billion naira (Kaduna State Government Report, 2011).

CHAPTER FOUR
ROLE ASSESSMENT OF TRADITIONAL RULERS IN PEACEBUILDING: DATA
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses materials from the sources indicated in chapter one in the light of which findings are drawn and related to the assumptions earlier posed. Data from the questionnaires are presented in tabular form showing number of respondents, frequencies and percentages of their responses on question earned. Deductions therefore are backed up with related data obtained from the interviews.

4.2 Data Presentation of Responses in Frequencies and Percentages

Table 4.1: Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaires

S/N	Wards in LG	Questionnaire Administered	Questionnaire Retrieved	Valid Questionnaire
1	Kamanton	72	72	70
2	Ikulu	123	121	120
3	Madakiya	61	58	55
4	Ungwan Rimi	59	55	54
5	Zango Urban	25	25	22
6	Zonkwa	73	71	69
7	Zonzon	37	35	35
Total		450	437	426

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.1 indicates that, a total of 450 questionnaires were administered in all the selected wards that make up the local government area, based on their respective population as calculated in chapter one (Table 1.3). Out of the 450 questionnaires administered 437 or (97 %)

were retrieved and only 426 were properly filled representing (95 %) and thus, were considered to be valid for data analysis.

4.3 Bio-data of Respondents

Table 4.2 Distribution of Respondents by: Age Bracket

Category	Frequency	Percentage
18 - 29Yrs	56	13.1
30 - 39Yrs	154	36.2
40 - 49Yrs	153	35.9
50-yrs and above	63	14.8
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

As displayed in Table 4.1, 56 or 13.1% of the respondents are within the age bracket of 18-29 years, while 154 or 36.2% are within ages 30-39 years. 153 representing 35.9% falls within the age bracket of 40-49 years and the rest 63 representing 14.8% are 50 years or above. This shows that, the researcher collected data from all categories of population in the local government area, on the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf local government area. The majority of the respondents' ages, range from 34 and above

Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by: Gender

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Male	294	69.0
Female	132	31.0
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

As can be seen in table 4.3, a total of 294 representing 69.0% of the respondents are male and the rest 132 representing 31.0% are female. This implies that, in most of the respondent chosen, men filled the questionnaires more than their female counterparts.

Table 4.4: Distribution of respondents by: Religion

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Christianity	348	81.7
Islam	76	17.8
Traditional Religion	2	0.5
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

From the responses in table 4.4, 347 representing 81.7% of the respondents are Christians, while 76 or 17.8% are Muslims, and the rest 2 or 0.5% are into traditional religions. The data reveals that, Christians have the higher population in the study area. This is because Christianity is the dominant religion in the study area.

Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by: Occupation

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Student	73	17.1
Civil Servant	144	33.8
Business	102	23.9
Farmers	73	17.1
Others	34	8.0
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field work, 2016

On respondents' occupational status, that is table 5.5, total of 73 or 17.1% are students while 144 or 33.8% are civil servants as against 102 or 23.9% that are in business while 73 or 17.1% are farmers and the rest 34 or 8.0% are in other occupation. This shows that most of the respondents are civil servants, followed by students, business men and farmers. It is important to know that, the study captured every segment of the study population based on the occupation of the respondents.

Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents by: Educational Qualifications

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Primary	50	11.7
Secondary	226	53.1
Tertiary	150	35.2
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.6 shows that, a total of 50 or 11.7% of the respondents are holders of primary education while, 226 or 53.1% are holders of secondary education and the rest 150 representing 35.2% are graduates of tertiary education. It obvious from data majority of respondents attained secondary school follow by tertiary education.

4.4 Questions on the Causes of Conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by: Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	374	87.8
No	52	12.2
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.7 indicates that, a total of 374 representing 87.8% of the respondents are aware of prevalence of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Southern Kaduna, while the rest 52 or 12.2% are not aware. Therefore, majority of the respondents are aware of the prevalence of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State. This is related to the fact that, the relations between the indigenous people and the Hausa is the one that involves conflict. What is certain is that the history of inter-group relations in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area is marked by a great deal of conflicts. Over the past decades the Kaduna State experience many crisis among them is Zangon-Kataf ethno-religious conflicts.

Ethno-religious conflicts have occurred mainly where and when Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups....., in a “dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities in which it is often difficult to differentiate between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin” (International IDEA 2000 cited in Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Table 4.8: Distribution of respondents by: Do you agree that ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	241	56.6
Agree	99	23.2
Strongly Disagree	13	3.1
Disagree	30	7.0
Don't know	43	10.1
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work. 2016

Table 4.8 shows that, ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State, 241 or 56.6% were in a strong agreement while 99 or 23.2% were in agreement as against 13 or 3.1% that strongly disagree while 30 or 7.0% disagreed and the rest 43 or 10.1% said they are unaware. Contrary to majority responses, which show that ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflict in Zangon Kataf Local Government Areas of Kaduna State, Agwam Ikulu stated that “there is lack of understanding between followers of these two religions, and looking down on one tribe by the other tribe (Interview, 2016). In the same vein, the Chief of Kamanton also has it that, “lack of respect for other people’s identity that is when others tend to despise other people identity, it is bound to infringe on social cohesion (Interview, 2016). That is to say, religions in themselves do not cause conflict, but lack of knowledge of what is religion and understanding between their followers. In other words, the fact that a country has several ethnic or religious groups does not make conflicts inevitable. It is only when mobilization around identities occurs or they are politicised that they constitute the basis for conflicts (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Chief of Kamanton also states that, “there are many reasons that account for conflicts in Zangon-Kataf LGA; ethnic domination among tribes, imbalance in the provision of governmental services and ethnic marginalisation from the government, and all these things have been established in the mind of the people, (Interview, 2016). According to DPO Zangon-Kataf LG “there is also tendency to dominate, when certain group of people tend to dominate the other, these are the major cause of conflict (Interview, 20116).

Ethnicity and even religion themselves were not the causes of the conflict, but instead that politically and economically motivated disturbances were exacerbated by the fact that several different kinds of social divisions - religion, ethnicity, economic, social and political traditions, language, etc. coincided and became mutually reinforcing. The divisions in the society could not be bridged, as individuals on one side of the social divide felt they had little in common with those on the other side, and each side felt that the state was dominated by those sympathetic to the other side”(Philips, 2000).

The district head of Zagom, a Bajju District in Ikulu chiefdom in the same fashion asserts that “the reason behind conflict in Zangon-Kataf was politics. An example is the 2011 post election violence which some disgruntled elements hid behind religion and ethnicity and instigated the youths to go and unleash mayhem in the society” (Interview, 2016). This corroborates with the argument of Nnoli, that the various factions of the African petty bourgeoisie have exploited the feeling of ethnic solidarity on behalf of their selfish interests (Nnoli, 1998). Added to this “the elite in Kaduna metropolis manipulated people by mystifying their material interest under the cover of ethnicity and religious phrases” (Yahaya, 2004: 118).

Table 4.9: Distribution of respondents by: Are there other causes of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Unemployment	91	21.4
Poverty	81	19.0
Political differences	125	29.3
Others	129	30.3
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work

Table 4.9 demonstrates that, 91 or 21.4% said unemployment while 81 or 19.0% said poverty. “There is the issue of poverty and unemployment among the youths; people are living in abject poverty and also inequality (Interview, 2016). Akinwale, (2010) attests to this that, “besides religion, poverty has become a major root cause of Nigeria’s violent conflicts, given the emerging flows from the economics of violence in the country. The unemployed and underemployed youths have embarked on a range of violent activities in search of livelihood”, Uhunmwangho (2011) lamenting on the issue of insecurity as well as the phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict posits that, “the situation is worsened by the increasing number of unemployed Nigerians some of whom are ready recruits for criminal activities”. The failure of Nigerian leaders to establish good governance, forge national integration and formulate real economic progress has led to poverty and unemployment. This has resulted into communal, ethnic, religious conflicts that have characterised the Nigerian state. Poverty has therefore served as a nursery bed for many ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria, because the country now serves as a reservoir of poor people (Salawu, 2010).

However, 125 of the respondent who constitute 29.3% said political differences is the other cause of conflict, that is to say majority believe that the other cause of conflict in the local government is political differences. Agwam Bajju confirms this when he says that, “the fact is that we have lived in peace over the years, the only thing that causes conflict is politics. Politicians and their utterances, differences in political leaning degenerate into conflict” (Interview, 2016). Also the district head of Zagom a Bajju District in Ikuklu chiefdom in similar fashion asserts that

no religion would sit down and send it followers to go and clash with the other religion, unless there is a reason, and the reason is politics, example is the 2011 post election violence, which some disgruntled elements hid behind religion and ethnicity and instigated the youths to go and unleash mayhem in the society (Interview, 2016).

Rirui and Ukiwo (2012) opine that (inflammatory statement and utterances of politicians considered offensive by a particular community are typical trigger of violence” he also affirmed that “the causes of conflict are seldom of religious differences. More commonly, conflict result from the politicisation of religion and its manipulation for economic and political purposes. Key drivers of violent conflict are the perception of encroachment by other faiths into a particular faith’s assumed sphere of influence.

The rest 129 or 30.3% said there are other causes of conflict. The other causes of conflict in this LG is land dispute, Fulani herd men and farmers (Interview, 2016). Chief of Ikulu also asserts that, one of the causes of conflict and challenge we face is the nomadic Fulani herdsmen encroaching into the natives’ farmlands claiming that the land belong to the government (Interview, 2016). However Dunmoye (2012) attests to the fact that disputes over farmlands and grazing lands constitute another of cause conflict, conflict often occur between sedentary

communities and the itinerants Fulani herdsmen who are often accused of destroying cash and food crops.

According to Wakilin Fulani of Anghan Chieftdom “another cause of conflict in this LG is impunity, because the perpetrators of this conflict over the years have not been punished by the government (Interview, 2016). This fact is supported by Yahaya’s assertion that, “This act of impunity by the elite/petty bourgeoisie was partly aided by government’s indecisive action over the years to deal with those responsible for fomenting conflicts in the state, largely because the state itself has been sucked in such conflict (Yahaya, 2004: 118).

Another cause of conflict is the failure of trust between the natives and the Hausa community in terms of business. The Hausa man’s failure to keep his own side of business entered into with the natives (Interview, 2006). By and large, is the asymmetric relationship in terms of intermarriage between the Hausa ethnic group and the indigenous ethnic groups. The Hausa man sees himself as superior to the natives, so he does not allow his daughters to marry the natives but only marries the daughters of the natives (Interview, 2016). According to chief of Ikulu, “based on my status as a traditional leader of this chieftdom, the other cause of conflict in this LG is a lack of inter-marriage between the Hausa and the natives, and this lack of asymmetric relationship shows that, there is lack of tolerance between the Christians and the Muslims in the LG (Interview, 2016). This is confirmed by Kazah-Toure (2003), there have been inter-marriages, mostly of the women from the other groups to the Fulbe and partly to the Hausa. Perhaps, mostly due to religion, by which Muslim men are allowed to marry non-Muslim women (but not Muslim women to non-Muslim men) Fulbe women have not married in the other communities rather, to the Hausa.

4.5 Questions on the Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

Table 4.10: Distribution of respondents by: Have traditional rulers played any role in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	355	83.3
No	71	16.7
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.10, on whether traditional rulers play any role in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government, shows a total of 355 representing 83.3% said yes while the rest 71 or 16.7% said no. However, going by the majority responses, the data has shown that, traditional rulers have played some roles in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area. However, according to Rirui and Ukiwo, (2012) “Traditional rulers are expected to intervene early to facilitate resolution before conflict issues leading to violence”

Table 4.11: Distribution of respondents by: What specific role have traditional rulers play in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area, please specify?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Dialogue and Conflict Reconciliation through holding peace meetings with leaders of ethnic groups, clergymen and Imams	136	31.9
They create awareness on peaceful coexistence among their subjects	118	27.7
Maintenance of peace and security in their Chiefdoms	74	17.4
They intervene during conflict and visit communities in their domains and advocate for peace	37	8.7
Others	61	14.3
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

The table 4.11 indicates that, 136 of the respondents representing 31.9% believe that dialogue and Conflict Reconciliation through holding peace meetings with leaders of ethnic groups, clergymen and Imams is one of the specific roles traditional rulers have played in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government. The Agwam Bajju attested to this fact

we have been holding series of meeting with ethnic and religious groups to create awareness and understanding among the people and the various communities, we try to disseminate information, we even held meetings at the Local Government. And when there is conflict in other places we take all necessary action so that the conflict does not come into our chiefdom (Interview, 2016).

Another different respondent also attests to this fact, “after the 2011 post election violence, the Agwam does not relent; he endeavours to restore the past glory of his chiefdom. The chief called on different groups in his place for peace meetings, the Ardos, the Hausas,

Yorubas, Igbos even the Bajju people in order to ensure peaceful coexistence (Interview, 2016). The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Chairman Bajju Chiefdom confirms that “the Chief calls people to live in peace with one another, both Christian and Muslims and even pagans in his palace (Interview, 2016). Another respondent maintains that, “the traditional rulers also conduct monthly meetings in the local government and also give report on the state of security in their chiefdoms and give advice on security matters in the local government” (Interview, 2016). In the same vein, the chief of Kamaton affirms that,

we often call people and try to find out what is the cause of this conflict and go between to see and bring out a solution to the situation on ground, we have formed an interreligious harmony group that comprises both the Hausa, Fulani and the Kamanton. The group is saddled with responsibility of going around district to district and village trying to educate people on why people should live in peace with one another, we also dialogue and appeal to the conscience of the people to see reason why we should continue to live together in peace (Interview, 2016).

According to Shehu, (n.d), “traditional rulers are always in the forefront of effort to prevent and mediate during conflict in their domains. They always convey emergency meetings with their district heads, religious leaders, elders in various communities and security agents to mediate and resolve conflicts”. They play a role by gathering their subject and advise them on how to be patient with one another. They pass information about peace and educate people on how to establish businesses in order not to be idle (Interview, 2016).

The chief of Ikulu also affirms to this, he says, “in my chiefdom, the chief and all the ethnic and religious groups often meet to look for the cause of misunderstanding and find out how to solve the problem. We had numerous meetings with the Bajju people after the 2001 ethnic conflict on how to reconcile and dialogue, and also, forgive one another (Interview, 2016).

Furthermore, after the 2011 post election violence, the chiefdom distributes relief materials to the victims of the conflict in Ikulu Chiefdom and resettled those that were displaced

by the conflict, and majority of the displaced victims are back in Kamaru town “. (Interview, 2016). During the post election violence in 2011, the Bajju traditional chiefdom has been pleading with the Hausa and Fulani that were displaced during the conflict to come back to Zonkwa and surrounding villages. Agwam Bajju has been working to resettle the victims of the 2011 post election violence (Interview, 2016). During the 2011 post election violence, the Atyap Chiefdom had meetings with the Fulani and advised them not to leave the Chiefdom, and even those that were attacked in other places took refuge in the Chiefdom, even right now we have people who are displaced from Zonkwa living in our chiefdom (Interview, 2016).

The chiefs of Atyap and Kamanton state that, their chiefdoms became a safe havens and exit points for the internally displaced victims of post election violence (Interview, 2016). The specific role played by the chiefs is that, after 2011 post election violence, the chiefdoms became a refugee camps for the displaced victims of the violence, where all the displaced Hausa and Fulani were accommodated before finding suitable place to be resettled (Interview, 2016). Coning supports this specific role of traditional rulers in conflict management and peacebuilding that, “another dimension of peacebuilding covers the relief and recovery as well as return, resettlement and reintegration of populations displaced during conflict including internally displace persons (Coning, 2011).

Searching through the literature, it has been established and also goes in consonance with the role of traditional rulers played in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf LG, as reported by Blench et al (2006), “the emir of Zazzau and the Zazzau emirate council have been in the fore front of effort to prevent and mediate during conflict. The Emir has appeared in the media calling his subjects to end violence. Emergency meetings have been held between the Emir and his council, district heads, religious leaders, government and security agents”.

While 118 or 27.7% said they create awareness on peaceful coexistence among their subjects. A certain response corroborate with statement above that, the traditional rulers create awareness among different groups, they call all the ethnic and religious as well their district and village heads and join hand preach peace (Interview, 2016). According to district head of Zagom “whenever there is any breakdown of conflict in Ikulu chiefdom, the traditional ruler in Ikulu Chiefdom always call on the district and village heads, we have a terrain of information in terms of peace awareness. At the same time the Chief call on the religious leaders in his chiefdom and inform them to go and plead with their followers to live in peace with one another” (Interview, 2016). During the 2011 post election violence the district head of Zonkwa and Agwam Bajju called on the head of Hausa community as a measure to prevent the conflict that broke down in Kaduna from coming to his chiefdom (Interview, 2016). It is also reported that, “the chief mandated the district and village heads in his chiefdom, to go and advice their subjects to live in peace with one another” (Interview, 2016). Added to this, “when there is rumour of conflict in other Chiefdoms the Agwam Bajju calls on his district and village heads, religious and ethnic leaders to discuss and find a way of preventing it from coming into the chiefdom (Interview, 2016). According to Rirui and Ukiwo “the pyramidal structure of the Kano Emirate system is configured to transmit information from the ward level through the village and district to the emirate level”.

Further more, 74 or 17.4% believe that traditional rulers maintain peace and security in their chiefdoms. “In terms of security, we have neighbourhood watch in every district and village, thus, the traditional ruler organise neighbourhood watch groups to ensure peace and security and monitor any unfamiliar face in a given community” (Interview, 2016). Another added that, “the chief also called all the different ethnic and religious groups after the 2011 post

election violence and shared the responsibility of ensuring peace and general security of the chiefdom (Interview, 2016). According to Muhammed (2012), traditional rulers organised residents in a particular community or neighbourhood to watch out for criminals and any suspicious behaviour, arrest or report suspects to the police and consequently providing communal security, they usually patrol their communities at night. Muhammed also maintained that “the traditional rulers collaborate with the police in providing credible information about the activities of suspected criminals as well as for the settlement of dispute amongst the people for proactive policy (Muhammed, 2012). Ideally, the traditional authorities are also expected to notify local governments, state government and security agencies of potential threat to peace and security (Rirui and Ukiwo, 2012). Blench also reported that, “all community leaders keep register of movement of people into their domains to curb the arrival of those who could be resisted (Blench, 2006).

However, 37 or 8.7% believe that intervention during conflict and visiting communities in their domains, and advocating for peace is another specific role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding, “the chief always visits the localities where the conflict took place, meets with the victims and encourage them, and also assist them as well as preach the need for cordial relationship among the people in Zonkwa (Interview, 2016). “The chief of Kamanton (Anghan) inaugurated an interreligious harmony group which took off in a Juma’at mosque at Fadan Kamanton to go preach and sensitise people on peaceful coexistence and visit the Muslim community in the chiefdom” (Interview, 2016). Thus, the Chief of Ayap also contributes to the Juma’at mosque building project in Zango urban, the Chief had allowed the use of the chiefdom’s letter headed paper by the Muslim to go and solicit for fund to the extent that the Muslims Hausa community gave him an award (Interview, 2016).

While 61 or 14.3% said they played other specific roles. One of these roles is, “whenever there is rumour of conflict somewhere Agwa (Chief) of Atyap always draws the attention of his subject as part of effort to prevent the conflict from coming to his chiefdom (Interview, 2016). Another role of the Chief is that “he also attends cultural festivals and gives advice to his subjects on the need for peaceful co-existence” (Interview, 2016). However, during Sallah festivals the Chief sends Sallah’s greetings to the Muslims community and receive them during any festival and urged them to live in peace with one another (Interview, 2016). By and large, before the breakdown of 2011 post election violence the Chief of Bajju had gone around the 18 districts in his Chiefdom and preached peace and advised his subjects that there is no nation or people that can develop on their own (Interview, 2016). Another respondent added that, “during the 2011 post election violence, the chief ensured that no conflict take place in Zangon-Kataf chiefdom, the Chief through the media informed the people that both the Christians and the Muslims are living in peace” (Interview, 2016).

In summary holding meetings with leaders of ethnic groups, clergymen and Imams, creating awareness on peaceful coexistence among their subjects, maintaining peace and security in their chiefdom as well as visiting Churches and Mosques are the specific roles traditional rulers have played in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

Table 4.12: Distribution of respondents by: Do the role play by traditional rulers in managing conflict and ensuring lasting peace in this Local Government effective

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	364	85.4

No	62	14.6
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.12 shows that, the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government is effective. 364 or 85.4% responded that it is effective, while the rest 62 or 14.6% believe it is not effective.

Table 4.13: Distribution of respondents by: If yes, how effective is the role played by traditional ruler in ensuring lasting peace in this chiefdom?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Very effective	228	53.5
Effective	145	34.0
Not very effective	2	.5
Not effective	3	.7
Don't know	48	11.3
Total	426	100.0

Source; Field Work 2016

Table 4.13 shows the responses on the effectiveness of the role being played by traditional rulers in conflict ensuring lasting peace in this chiefdom. 228 or 53.5% of the respondents said very effective, while 145 or 34.0% said effective as against 2 or 0.5% who said not very effective while 3 or 0.7% said not effective. This shows that the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in the LG is very effective. Agwam Bajju corroborates the statement above that “all the effort we have made contributes positively in harmonising relationships in the chiefdom (Interview, 2016). Another respondent confirms that “after the 2011 post election violence, the people that were displaced by the violence regularly come to

Zonkwa for commercial activities on market days, because after the 2011 post election violence, the Hausa and the Fulani ethnic groups for very a long time completely stopped coming to the market for commercial activities. But now, if one enters Zonkwa town one will see that most of the Hausa youths are everywhere, a lot of them often come to market for commercial functions (Interview, 2016). In the same vein, after the 2011 post election violence, the Ikulu Chiefdom distributes relief materials to the victims of the conflict in Ikulu Chiefdom and resettled those that were displaced by the conflict and majority of them are back in Kamuru town (Interview, 2016). It is effective in the sense that, it prevented immediate reprisal attack from the native in 2003 when they were attacked the by Fulani in Yangal village. Both the Fulani and the Kamanton people were sensitised on peaceful coexistence, the traditional ruler sympathised with the victims and urged them to be patient, since then there was not any attack in the chiefdom (Interview, 2016).

Another respondent argues that, “if not because of the traditional rulers, the money that was stipulated for arms deal to fight the phenomenon of Boko Haram, and was not spent on weapons but diverted to private and personal accounts of the politicians, the level of insecurity would have gone beyond the vicinity of Boko Haram insurgency. The traditional ruler as custodian of the people knows who is an alien and who is a citizen in his chiefdom, and in the entire Ikulu Chiefdom there is no police station” (Interview, 2016). Thus, the interreligious harmony group that was initiated in Anghan chiefdom to go round the chiefdom to enlighten people about peaceful coexistence and was replicated in other chiefdoms in the LG. This initiative was used to call the attention of the Fulani herdsmen to stop the reprisal attacks that was reoccurring in 2013. In the surrounding villages there are quite a number of Fulani herdsmen rearing their cattle, who after the 2011 post elections violence, were displaced and stay away for

long time from to the Local Government Area, and this implies that, the role played by traditional rulers in peacebuilding is effective in Zangon-Kataf LG (Interview, 2016). According to CAN chairman Zangon-Kataf LG “it is effective in the sense that there was a peaceful celebration of 2015 Charismas and other cultural festivals, and however, after the 2011 post election, people in LG were unable to celebrate Christmas for the fear insecurity (Interview, 2016). It is effective in the sense that, it removed discrimination which has improved the level peaceful coexistence in Anghan chiefdom; because the Chief has demonstrated that every individual in his chiefdom is a member of the chiefdom (Interview, 2016).

Table 4.14: Distribution of respondents by: Do traditional rulers face challenges in ensuring lasting peace in this Local Government Area?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	347	81.5
No	79	18.5
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

A total of 347 representing 81.5% of the respondents believe that traditional rulers face challenges in ensuring lasting peace in this Local Government, while the rest 79 or 18.5% do not believe so. This shows that an overwhelming majority believe that traditional rulers face challenges in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

Table 4.15: Distribution of respondents by: If yes, what are these challenges that traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Lack of fund	51	12.0

Lack of total Co-operation from their subjects	39	9.1
Lack of support from the government	86	20.1
Lack of adequate security personnel in their chiefdoms	157	36.9
Others	93	21.9
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.15 shows that 51 of the respondents which represent 12.0%, responded that, lack of fund is one of the challenges that traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government. This is corroborated by interviews as follows; the problem that traditional rulers face in peacebuilding is lack of finance, in terms of payment of salaries of district and ward heads, as well as lack of prompt payment of the traditional rulers salaries. According to Agwa Atyap “there is lack of commensurable attention from the government, and failure of timely payment of salaries to both district and village heads who are voices of the chiefdom in their various district and villages” (Interview,2016).

While 39 or 9.1% of the respondents assert that, the challenges that traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace in this Local Government is lack of complete cooperation from their subjects. “There is lack of total cooperation from their subjects; they do not get complete support from their subjects, most especially some of the youths. Another challenge faced by the traditional rulers is the uprising against Agwam Bajju by some disgruntled youths against the backdrop of reprisal attack in 2013 by unknown gun men; some of the youths took the law into their hands by shattering the windows in the chief place, since is averse to conflict and perceived that the chief condones the act of reprisal attack (Interview, 2016). It is also added that, “lack of

complete cooperation from the people, because people are unwilling to accept the role they played in perpetuating conflict” (Interview, 2016). Also, “lack of complete cooperation from some of the members of the other tribes, there is lack of complete understanding and cooperation between the Bajju and Ikulu (Interview, 2016).

While 86 or 20.1% believe that one of the challenges is lack of support from government. There was is lack of cooperation from the police too, when a suspect is handed over the police he easily buys his way out from the police station (Interview, 2016). 157or 36.9% believe that another challenge faced by traditional rulers is lack of adequate security personnel in their chiefdoms, “lack of government support as regard to the issue of security, this corroborated with the following statement “there is no police post and where there is, there is no adequate police personnel in the chiefdoms” (Interview, 2016).

By and large, the rest 93 or 21.8% believe there are other challenges. Instances of these other challenges is the attitudes of some of the displaced persons, some do not want to come back, and others have refused fully come back (Interview, 2016). Lack of adequate security personnel in the chiefdoms, is the major challenge traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf-Local Government Area.

Table 4.16: Distribution of respondents by: What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the role traditional rulers play in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Government should support traditional rulers in conflict management and ensuring peaceful coexistence	100	23.5

There should cooperation and unity between the people	78	18.3
Government should post adequate security personnel in their chiefdoms	54	12.3
Government should assist the traditional rulers with fund	30	7.1
Government should provide employment for the youths	90	21.1
Others	74	17.4
Total	426	100.0

Source: Field Work, 2016

Table 4.16 shows that, 100 which represent 23% of the respondents assert that, government should complement the effort of traditional rulers in creating awareness on peaceful co-existence among different groups in the LGA. This relate to the fact given by a respondent, “government should come in and organise peace education programmes for the youths as well as the elders, and also government should take punitive measures on whoever is found wanting as regard the issue conflict of in the LG” (Interview, 2016). While 78 or 18.3% said there should be more co-operation and unity between people. This corroborates with the assertion of the Agwa Atyap “there should be a level of cooperation from both the Muslims and the Christians (Interview, 2016). While 54 or 12.3% believe that government should post adequate security personnel in the chiefdoms, “government should provide adequate security personnel in the chiefdom as well as provide employment to the youths” (Interview, 2016).

However, 30 or 7.0% of the respondents stated that, government should assist the traditional rulers with fund. And 90 of respondent representing 21.1% assert that, government should provide employment for the youths. This fact is supported by Agwam Bajju “youth’s

empowerment and employment, poverty eradication through the establishment of skills acquisition centres for the youths as well as provision of loan for the youths after training, because the politicians use the youths during conflict (interview, 2016). And the rest 74 or 17.4% had other suggestions.

This shows that majority of the respondents believe that, government should complement the effort of traditional rulers in creating awareness on peaceful co-existence, as the main way of improving the effectiveness of traditional rulers, in ensuring lasting peace in the Local Government Area. Furthermore, provision of employment opportunities to the youths, the need for cooperation and unity between the people and the traditional rulers as well as, provision of adequate security personnel in the chiefdoms.

4.6 Discussion of Major Findings

The followings are the summaries and discussion of the major findings of the study:

1. The study has established that there is the prevalence of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Although, manipulation of ethnicity and religion are important causes of conflict, political differences, poverty, unemployment and failure by the government to prosecute the perpetrators of conflicts in the local government area are equally important causes of conflict in the Local Government Area.
2. The study also found out that, traditional rulers have played and are still playing some specific roles in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area. They dialogue and conduct conflict reconciliation, through holding series of meeting with leaders of ethnic and religious groups in their chiefdoms regularly. They create awareness on peaceful co-existence among their subjects, provided relief materials to victims affected by 2011 post election violence

and ensuring their return to their houses as well, as are the specific role traditional rulers played in managing conflict and ensuring lasting peace in the Local Government Area.

3. Another finding of the study is that, the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Local Government Area is effective. This is in the sense that majority; of the people that were displaced in 2011 post election violence have been resettled in some of the communities affected by 2011 post election violence in the LGA. In addition, individuals from the Hausa ethnic group are conducting their commercial activities in some the communities that were affected during the 2011 post election violence. Also, the Fulani herdsmen are going about rearing their cattle in almost all the villages in LGA.

4. Another finding is that, traditional rulers face some challenges in peacebuilding effort in the Local Government Area. Some of these challenges are: lack of total cooperation from their subjects, most especially the youth, lack of funding and prompt payment of their salaries by government, as well as lack of complete or sufficient security personnel in their chiefdoms.

5. Lastly, the study found out that, majority of the respondents believe that, government should complement the effort of the traditional rulers in creating awareness on peaceful co-existence. This is considered a major means of improving the effectiveness of the role of traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in the Local Government Area. Again, government should improve the finances of traditional rulers and as well provide adequate security personnel in the local government area.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the summary, conclusion, and recommendations of the entire study, the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

5.2 Summary

The study sets out to examine the role of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government area of Kaduna state. The phenomenon of conflict in Southern Kaduna area, by extension Zangon-Kataf Local Government area, is traceable to pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial Nigeria, down to present Nigeria. Most of the conflicts that often occur in the area mostly expressed themselves in ethno-religious form.

There have been efforts through diverse peacebuilding initiatives by traditional rulers since colonial and post-colonial Nigeria to ensure lasting peaceful coexistence among regions, diverse ethnic and religious groups that make the polity. In this regard, Southern Kaduna and Zangon-Kataf Local Government in particular with quite a number of diverse ethnic groups of different sizes, largely Christians who constitute the majority. On the other side of the divide, are Hausa and Fulani who are predominantly Muslims are also considered minority and non indigenes. Frequent ethno-religious conflicts have been an apparent feature in inter-group relations in the area, unlike the frequent antagonistic relationship that often take place between the majority Christians group and the minority Muslims group, there is seldom phenomenon of inter-communal conflict between and among majority ethnic groups in the area. Hence, in order to ensure lasting peaceful coexistence in the area, traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf Local

Government through multiple peacebuilding initiatives have played some specific role and are still playing some specific role in peacebuilding in the area.

Manipulation of ethnicity and religion by the elites in the local government area constitute the important cause of conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government. Political differences, poverty, unemployment and failure by the government to prosecute the perpetrators of conflicts in the local government area are equally important causes of conflict in the local government area. However, traditional rulers have played some specific roles in peacebuilding, and these specific roles have been effective in ensuring peaceful co-existence among different groups in their various chiefdoms. Traditional rulers face challenges in their peacebuilding efforts, which limit the effectiveness of their roles in peacebuilding in local government area, and some of these challenges are: lack of maximum cooperation from their subjects most especially the youths, and lack of finance. In order to improve the effectiveness of the roles of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in the local government area, there should be some level of cooperation among the different groups in one hand and between the traditional rulers and their subjects on the hand. Government should also complement the effort of traditional rulers in creating awareness on peaceful coexistence.

Survey research method was employed to collect the necessary data. Quantitative method was adopted to analyse information that was collected from the field, through the use of survey instrument such as questionnaire to collect data from the citizens of the Local Government Area where two-third, that is seven (7) out eleven (11) wards that make up the Local Government Area were selected through simple random sampling. Systematic sampling method was employed in selecting household in every street that constitute a ward, and simple random

sampling was adopted in selecting individuals that questionnaires was administered to in every household that was selected for the study.

Qualitative method was used to analyse information collected from in-depth interviews, official documents from government ministries, traditional chiefdoms and, other scholarly exegesis. The analysis was done systematically by collaborating information on their similarities and differences. The interviews were conducted across seven (7) sampled wards out of the eleven (11) that makeup the local government area. Four (4) paramount traditional rulers that come from the four traditional institutions in the local government were interviewed; both the Zangon-Kataf Local Government Chairman and the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) were interviewed. Leaders of ethnic and religious groups, youths, neighbourhood watch, and women were equally interviewed. Furthermore, the information gathered from the survey instruments were presented thematically according to the research questions which were developed into objectives and assumptions. Human needs theory was employed as a scientific tool to analyse the study, on the basis of the roles, traditional rulers play in peacebuilding Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area.

5.3 Conclusion

Conflict is part and parcel of every human society, thereby making it occurrence inevitable, whenever and wherever there is pursuit of incompatible goals, as well as scarce status and resources. Zangon-Kataf Local Government is well known for its violent ethnic and religious conflicts. That is to say, there is prevalence of conflict in Zangon-Kataf LGA. Although, manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the factors that are responsible for the prevalence of conflict in the LGA, political differences, poverty and unemployment, by and large, failure by

the government to prosecute the perpetrators of conflicts in the local government area, are equally important causes of conflict in the area.

Thus, traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf LGA have played some specific roles in ensuring peace and security in their respective domains. They have been and are in the fore front of efforts to prevent and mediate during conflicts. In order to ensure that there is peace and security in their domains, the traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf in specific terms, have played and are still playing some role, in ensuring peaceful co-existence among different groups, through holding regular series of meetings with leaders of ethnic and religious groups. They dialogue and conduct conflict reconciliation. They create awareness on peaceful coexistence among their subjects, and also provided relief materials and facilitate the return of internally displaced victims of 2011 post election violence in some of the areas that were devastated by conflict. The role played by traditional rulers in peacebuilding Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area has improved and enhanced the level of peace and security in the local government area. Despite efforts to ensure lasting peaceful co-existence among different ethnic and religious groups in the local government area, traditional face some challenges in their peacebuilding initiatives. Traditional rulers do not received maximum co-operation from their subjects, mostly the youths.

However, peacebuilding efforts of traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf area do not stop at a single initiative, but variety of initiatives and activities, it precede the conflict and follow after the conflict in ensuring lasting peace and security. However, peacebuilding is not merely seen as a stage in time but a dynamic social process.

5.4 Recommendations

1. The government of Kaduna state and Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area, as a matter of priority, should complement the peacebuilding efforts of traditional rulers in Zangon-Kataf Local Government. That is, through the creation of awareness on peaceful coexistence among diverse ethnic and religious groups in the local government area, through the employment of all available channels of communication within their reach.
2. Government and non-governmental organisations, as a way of ensuring peace and security in the Kaduna state and Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area, should organise conferences and seminars on peacebuilding at regular intervals, for traditional rulers and other relevant actors in the field of peacebuilding.
3. Traditional rulers should not relent in their peacebuilding activity, and should emphasise co-operation and amicable settlement of dispute, between and among diverse ethnic and religious groups in their respective domains.
4. Kaduna state and Zangon-Kataf Local Governments should also provide adequate security personnel, police outposts, arm and ammunitions, as well as patrol vehicles in various chiefdoms in the local government area, as a measure of being proactive whenever there is breakdown of conflict in the area.
5. Government should also encourage the efforts of traditional rulers in peacebuilding. That is, government should ensure prompt payment of their salaries and allowances, as well as that of district and village heads. In addition, they should assist them with special fund and other logistics, for their peacebuilding activities.

6. Government should provide employment opportunities to the youths, and also provide skills acquisition centres for the youths in various communities in the local government area, in order to make them engage in meaningful ventures.

7. Traditional rulers, in an effort to ensure lasting peace and security in the Local Government Area, should focus on the sources of conflict, and look at how best the parties to conflict can have their needs met and those of others.

8. By and large, traditional rulers in their peacebuilding initiatives as a moral duty should frequently bring different groups in their respective domains and emphasise common humanity where differences will be accentuated, and also work to unify human beings from different backgrounds and cultures, thereby creating a common understanding of who we are, and how others need and feel the same way we do.

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Appendix “A” Questionnaire

Department of Political Science and International Studies

**Faculty of Social Sciences
Ahmadu Bello University
Zaria – Nigeria.**

Dear Respondents,

I am a postgraduate student in the above named department, conducting a research on the topic: **The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State**

I would be grateful if you could answer the following questions by ticking and comment where required. Meanwhile, be assured that your responses will be treated with high level of confidentiality and used only for the purpose of this research. Thank you.

**USMAN THOMAS IRMIYA
MSC/SOC-SCI/21268/2012-2013**

Section A: Bio-data of Respondents

1. Age Bracket: (a) 18-29years [] (b) 30-39years [] (c) 40-49years [] (d) 50 years and above []
2. Gender: (a) Male [] (b) Female []
3. Religion: (a) Christianity [] (b) Islam [] (c) Traditional Religion []
4. Occupation: (a) student [] (b) Civil Servant [] (c) Business [] (d) Farmer []
(e) Others _____
5. Educational Qualification: (a) Primary [] (b) Secondary [] (c) Tertiary []

Section B: Questions on the Causes of Conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

6. Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
 (a) Yes [] (b) No []
7. Do you agree that manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government area? (a) strongly agree [] (b) agree [] (c) strongly disagree [] (d) disagree [] (e) don't know []
8. Are there other causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area, please specify? -----

Section C: Questions on the Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

9. Have traditional rulers played any role in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area? (a) Yes [] (b) [] No
10. What specific role have traditional rulers played in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Governments Area, please specify? -----

11. Does the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area effective? (a) Yes [] (b) No []
12. If yes, how effective is the role played by traditional ruler in ensuring lasting peace in this local government area? (a) very effective [] (b) effective [] (c) not very effective [] (d) not effective [] (e) don't know []
13. Do traditional rulers face challenges in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area? (a) Yes [] (b) No []
14. If yes, what are these challenges that traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace Zangon-Kataf Local Government? Please specify -----

15. What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the roles of traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Zagon-Kataf Local Government? -----

Appendix “B” Interview Guides

Interview Questions for Traditional Rulers in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State on: The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

1. Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
2. Do you agree that manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
3. Are there other causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area Kaduna State?
4. Have you played a role in ensuring of lasting peace in your Chiefdom and the Local Government Area?
5. For how long have you been playing a role in ensuring lasting peace in your Chiefdom?
6. What specific role have you played in and ensuring of lasting peace in your Chiefdom and the Local Government?
7. Was the role you played in ensuring lasting peace in your Chiefdom and the Local Government Area official or unofficial?
8. What specific conflict is your role effective in ensuring lasting peace in your Chiefdom?
9. What challenges do you face in ensuring lasting peace in your Chiefdom and the Local Government Area?
10. How were you able to overcome these challenges?
11. What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the roles of traditional rulers in peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government?

Appendix “C” Interview Guides

Interview Questions for Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in Zangon-Kataf Local Governments Area of Kaduna State on: The Role of Traditional in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

1. Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
2. Do you agree that manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area?
3. Are there other causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
4. Are you aware of any role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
5. For how long have they been playing this role of ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
6. Was the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace effective in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
7. What challenges do traditional rulers face in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
8. What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the role being played by traditional rulers in ensuring lasting peace in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Appendix “D” Interview Guides

Interview Questions for Local Government’s Chairman of Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area on: The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State

1. Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf-Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
2. Do you agree that manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
3. Are there other causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
4. Are you aware of any role being played by traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful co-existence among different groups and communities in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
5. For how long have they been playing this role?
6. Was the role of traditional rulers effective in ensuring peaceful co-existence among various groups and communities in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
7. What challenges do traditional rulers face in ensuring peaceful co-existence among various groups and communities in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Areas of Kaduna State?
8. What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the role of traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful co-existence among various groups and communities in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Appendix “E” Interview Guides

Interview Questions for Leaders of Ethnic, Religious Groups and other Relevant Respondents in Zangon-Kataf Local Governments Area on: The Role of Traditional Rulers in Peacebuilding in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area

1. Are you aware of the prevalence of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
2. Do you agree that manipulation of ethnicity and religion are the causes of conflict Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
3. Are there other causes of conflicts in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
4. Have traditional rulers played any role in ensuring peaceful co-existence among different groups and communities in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
5. What specific role have traditional rulers played in ensuring peaceful co-existence among different groups in Zangon-Kataf Local Government area of Kaduna State?
6. Was the role played by traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful coexistence improved the level of peaceful coexistence among groups in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
7. What challenges do traditional rulers face in ensuring peaceful coexistence among different groups in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
8. What do you think can be done to improve the effectiveness of the role being played by traditional rulers in ensuring peaceful coexistence among different groups in Zangon-Kataf Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Appendix “F” Interviewees

S/N	Names	Position/Status	Date of Interview
01	HRH Yohanna S. Kukah	Agwom Ikulu: Chief of Ikulu Traditional Council	10/02/2016
02	Mr. Linus Sidi Magaji	District Head of Zagon: A Bajju District in Ikulu Chiefdom	11/02/2016
03	Hussaini Suleiman	District Head of Ladduga: A Fulani District in Ikulu Chiefdom	11/02/2016
04	Joseph Yohanna	Youth's Leader Ikulu Chiefdom	13/02/2016
05	Solomon D. Lallom	Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Youth's Leader	13/02/2016
06	Ishaku Magaji	Commandant Neighbourhood Watch: Ikulu Chiefdom	13/02/2016
07	Ignatious Odieje	Wakilin Igbo (Chief of Igbo) Ikulu Chiefdom	14/02/2016
08	Ikira Abu	Wakilin/Sarkkin Hausawa Ikulu Chiefdom	14/02/2016
09	HRH Mallam Nuhu Bature	Agwam Bajju: Chief of Bajju Traditional Council	15/02/2016
10	Mrs Grace B. Dauke	Acting Chairperson Zangon-Kataf LGA	15/02/2016
11	Chief Joe Jackson Edeh	Eze Ndigbo: Chief of Igbo in Bajju Chiefdom	15/02/16
12	Ezekiel Laran Oduleye	Chief of Yoruba: Bajju Chiefdom	15/02/2016
13	DSP Mark Jek	Divisional Police Officer (DPO) Zangon-Kataf LGA	16/02/2016
14	Mrs Patricia Damina	National Secretary: Bajju women Association	16/02/2016

15	HRH Mallam Adamu Alkali	Agbian Anghan: Chief of Anghan Traditional Council	17/02/2016
16	Rev. Jerry Dauda	Chairman Inter-Religious Harmony Group: Anghan Chiefdom	17/02/2016
17	Honourable Iliya Kure (JP)	Commandant Neighbourhood Watch: Anghan Chiefdom	17/02/2016
18	Mallam Musa Ladan	Wakilin Fulani: Anghan Chiefdom	17/02/2016
19	Alhaji Ahmadu Mu'azu	Youth Leader Representing Hausa Community in Anghan Chiefdom	17/02/2016
20	Rev. Markus Bako	Chairman Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN): Bajju Chiefdom	22/02/2016
21	Alhaji Surajo Yakubu	Wakilin Hausawa: Atyap Chiefdom	23/02/2016
22	Alhaji Ardo Rabo	Wakilin Fulani: Atyap Chiefdom	23/02/2016
23	Idris Adam	Secretary Jama'tul Nasarul Islam: Zangon-Kataf LGA	24/02/2016
24	HRH Dr. Harrison Bungon	Agwa Atyap: Chief of Atyap Traditional Council	25/02/2016
25	Venerable John Bwankwot	Chairman Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN): Zangon-Kataf LGA	25/02/2016
26	Joseph Timbuwak	Youth/Neighbour Watch Leader: Atyap Chiefdom	26/02/2016
