THE FAILURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION:

A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM)

BY

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
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DECEMBER 2000

DECLARATION

I, Muhammed Haruna, hereby declare that this project was written by me and is a record of my research work. All quotations are well indicated and the sources of information used in the review or in support of my arguments are well acknowledged by means of references.



Muhammad Haruna

CERTIFICATION

This Research thesis, THE FAILURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: THE CASE OF UNOSOM BY Muhammad Haruna No. MIAD – SOC – SC – 21642 **meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Masters of International Affairs and Diplomacy (MIAD), by the Department of Political Science / International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University (A.B.U.), Zaria, is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.**

Project Supervisor	Date
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DEDICATION

TO MY FAMILY.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praises be to Allah whose mercy and protection made this goal possible in my life. I thank Him for the life and good health He bestowed on me.

I sincerely acknowledged the fact that several people, too numerous to mention, have contributed in one way or the other to my successful completion of this course in general and the project in particular. I register my gratitudes to them all but suffice I mention some notables among them.

First, I feel highly indebted to my Supervisor, Dr. Hudu A. Ayuba for patiently and strenuously going through every piece of this work, despite his tight schedule. Your invaluable assistance, guidance and support is highly acknowledged. Thank you sir.

I also acknowledge the concern and kindness of my Administrative Secretary, Alhaji Ismaila Moyi Kaura. Throughout the period of this course, he ensured that matters were made easy for me in the office so that I could devote more time for the course. On many occasions, he rendered financial assistance towards the successful completion of the course. I thank him very much, may the Almighty reward him, amin.

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I can certainly not forget the contributions of a friend, Bishir Hassan, who is the Manager of Masanawa Filling Station, Batsari Road, Katsina. At a time when petrol was "gold", Bishir Hassan made it a duty to reserve

enough fuel for me each week, to facilitate my movement to and from Zaria, throughout the year.

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ABSTRACT

This work focuses on the role of the United Nations in the area of Peacekeeping Operations. The work beings with a discussion of the emergence of the UN itself, its purposes and principles as well as its charter, which all centred on the maintenance of World Peace and Security. The research then examines the general causes of war as well as the remote and immediate causes of the Somali Crises.

Using the UN intervention in the Somali crises (UNOSOM), the work summarises the bitter experience of the UN troops in their peacekeeping endeavours.

In line with that particular experience the work highlighted the reasons for that failure and attempted to suggest ways of preventing future occurances.

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
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COMPLETED AND ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 PREAMBLE

Conflict and war are constant features of man's life. Throughout the history of mankind the world has witnessed different conflicts and wars in different magnitudes. Right from the Hobbesian Society therefore, where life was nasty, brutal and short, to the present computer age, attempts have been made to end conflict and war. All such attempts have had their different measure of successes and failures, depending upon the time and situation involved.

Of significant importance however, is the fact that before the World War 1, there was no attempt by any person, group or organization to take responsibility of maintaining world peace. It was the destructive effects experienced during the World War 1 (1914 – 1918) and the fear of re-occurrence that led to the establishment of the League of Nations on 10th January, 1920, mainly to prevent wars in the future. Within only two decades, events unfolding indicated that in-spite of the formation of the league, the world was on the eve of facing another major conflict. The league could therefore not stop the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. Having failed in its primary objective of maintaining world peace and prevention of war, the League of Nations had to collapse, thereby giving way for another experiment in the maintenance of world peace.

When the Second World War was approaching its end in 1945, the representatives of the allied nations met in San Francisco, drafted and signed the United Nations chapter. The United Nation Organisation however became a reality on 24th October, 1945.

Having existed for over half a century now, some analysts are of the believe that the United Nations has very little or even nothing to show and as such, will be bound by the same fate as the League of Nations due to some disappointing records. Even though its failure may not be registered in the outbreak of a third world war – from which we may be saved by the effectiveness of modern instruments of distraction – still, according to this view, the organisation is likely to pass into gradual disuse, save possibly in dealing with matters of minor importance outside the main interests of the major powers[1]. While others conclude that its failure in the field of peace and security and the present trends of International Relations, indicates the likely declining importance of the United Nations as an organisation for maintaining international peace and security – a goal that is more likely to be achieved by a return to the old system of balance of power – the United Nation still has an important, though modest, role to play in dealing with problems of a non-political nature, many of which have came to assume critical proportions as the result of technological development and growing interdependence[2].

However, a lot of other analysts and observers are of the view that the organisation is performing an increasingly important role in the achievement of common purpose set forth in its charter. Even though holders of this view are disappointed by it's inadequacies and failures, they tend to see its future in terms of a more effective organisation and greater willingness on the part of governments to make use of it. They further argued that what is fairly certain is that so long as the state institution retains its primary purpose as a form of social organization, International Organisation in some form will be necessary in dealing with matters of common concern that can not be satisfactorily handled by individual state action.

What then is peace keeping? And what is United Nations peace keeping operation? In the views of a Canadian general and a one time commander of UN peace keeping, the term peace keeping simply refers to the "process of de-escalation".

United National Peace Keeping Operation on the other hand refers to an extra ordinary military art because it calls for the use of soldiers not to fight to win, but to prevent fighting, to maintain cease-fires, and to provide order while negotiations are still being conducted[3].

However, the fundamental function of United Nations peacekeeping operations is far more political than military, from which follows a number of consequences. First, the mandate of peacekeeping force must be compatible with

the national security interest of the countries concerned, including those contributing troops. Secondly, the consent of the host government or governments, on whose soil the force is to be stationed, is necessary for entry of the forces. Third, the force itself should resort to violence only when necessary, to depend itself and to carry out its primary political mission. Furthermore all principal parties in the conflict must be willing to cooperate with the force. If they are absolutely determined to fight, peacekeeping operation can not stop them, but when they are willing to observe a cease-fire, UN forces or observers can reassure each side that the other is also under observation for honest performance[4].

It is the intention of this research work to examine very extensively, the concept of UN peacekeeping operations with specific interest on why the operations have failed in certain cases. For concrete analytical purpose therefore, this research intends to take Somalia as a case study. The research intends to unfold the specific roles and functions played by the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Somalia and the respondents reaction from the warring factions and provides an explanatory framework which facilitates the understanding of international peacekeeping. The work also hope to provide a general perspective that can help the reader gain insight into the complex logic of international peacekeeping.

It is hoped that concepts, hypothesis or propositions, findings and recommendations of this research will guide future researches on this crucial subject matter.

It is however needful at this stage to have a brief comment on the organization of this research. Chapter one will comprise the general preliminary work such as the general introduction, statement of research problem, scope and limitations, research methodology, significance of the study, theoretical framework, research objectives, research hypothesis and literature review.

Chapter two of this research shall be on the emergence of the United Nations, purpose and principles of the organisation, the charter which empowers it to maintain international peace and security, evolution of peacekeeping, the making of peacekeeping and limitations to the use of force.

Chapter three shall consist of the historical background of Somalia, historical and immediate causes war and crisis in Somalia and its implications. The chapter will also cover the dimension of the crises.

Chapter four shall be on the presence of the UN in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the UNOSOM II, the UN's functional role and reactions from warring factions, breakdown of the peace process and the factors responsible as well as the effects of the UN's failure in Somalia.

Chapter five shall comprise the summary, recommendations and conclusion.

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

It is the concern of this research to:

- Uncover the major factors responsible for the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations, in spite of the enormous human and material resources at its disposal.
- Use the United Nations experience in Somalia and uncover the factors responsible for the failure of UN peacekeeping operation.

1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The central concern of this research work is to examine the effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in conflict areas, with specific attention on the Somali crisis.

Some of the limitations of this research work include the inability of the researcher to travel to Somalia and obtain data primarily sourced.

1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this research work, secondary data collection method will be used. As such it will involve a content analysis of newspapers and magazines, journals, seminar papers and available books.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Peace is an important prerequisite for the survival of man. The maintenance of world peace should therefore be the concern of all. Presently, the United Nations Organisation is the only organ responsible for maintenance of world peace. But as

we shall see in this research work, the UN has failed to maintain peace in certain specific conflict situations.

Because of the pressing desire for the maintenance of peace, the world should not be seen to allow the failures of the UN unaddressed. It is the significance of this research work therefore, to first establish the cases of failures in UN peacekeeping operations, analyse it and suggest ways of checking these failures.

This research is also expected to have an intellectual significance in the sense that it will add or increase the already available material on the UN peacekeeping, particularly on Somalia, the main focus of the study.

In addition, it is hoped that this work will contribute to the understanding of the UN as an institutional framework through which the age long desire of man for peace worldwide can be achieved.

To the international community, the study is significant as it will affirm the view that domestic peace is a necessary condition for world peace hence the need to centralize the maintenance of world peace in a world organ like the UN, notwithstanding the regional initiatives gaining grounds in recent times.

1.6THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For the purpose of sound analytical ability, the structural functionalist system theory will be used as the theoretical framework of this research work.

Beginning with the system theory, the word system is used in political science to describe a number of things; viz;

(i) It is used as an integrated set of relationships based on hypothetical set of political variables such as an international system involving a world government.

(ii) It is used as a theoretical framework for the coding of data about political phenomenon.

(iii) It is also used to describe a set of relationships among political variables in an international system, alleged to have existed in academic discussions and writings.

(iv) It is used to describe any set of variables and interactions.

System theory was defined by Dougherty as a series of statements about relationships between variables which are assumed to interact with each other in ways that changes in one or more variables affect all other variables.

Another scholar of International Relations called Anatol Rapapart restates this definition by suggesting that a whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence is called a system and the method which aims at discovering how this is brought in a widest variety of systems has been called General System Theory[5].

All systems have boundries, for instance Nigeria has its own boundry. The international political system is a concrete example of a system, as it shares all the

characteristics, and it has the states as component units with each state involved in a dynamic interaction and at the sometime pursuing its own interest. Among the core proponents of the system theory include ROSS Ashby, MORTON A. Kaplan etc.

The features of the system theory can be identified in terms of the structure. There are the features of inputs which refer to the demand made by actors in the international political system.

There are also the features of output which refers to the conversion of demand into policy decisions or results e.g. to intervene in times of conflict or not.

In addition, there is the presence of conversion which refers to the structures and institutions that are instrumental in converting demands into policies e.g. the United Nations Organisation.

The feedback refers to the reactions of state to policy decisions reached e.g. group not happy on the method and manner of United Nations Operations, while the environment refers to the factors which affect the functioning of the system.

Structural functionalism as a theory on the other hand is used to describe any condition or state of affairs resultant from the operations of the type under consideration in terms of the structure through time[6]. For instance the inability of the UN peace keeping force to intervene at the right time may lead to more intense hostilities.

The concept of functionalism was borrowed by social science from the biological science to show that like the biological beings, social set ups also have functional structures. Within a political system, there exist component units that carry out specific functions or roles for the persistence of the entire systems over time. It also focuses on the interrelated functioning of the various components making up the whole.

To buttress the above point, Hampel[7] argued, "For any social system, there is a set of functional requirements and operational conditions that must be satisfied if the system must continue to exist".

In his view, George Modelski defined international system as a social system having structural and functional requirements. International system consists of a set of objects together with the relationships between these objects, and between their attributes. In other words international system contain patterns of action between collectives (nation state) and between individuals acting on their behalf.

A combination of the two theorem as discussed above, emphasizes the need for harmony and division of labour to ensure the proper functioning of the international system.

Thus a careful application of their theory in this research work enhances a full explanation and understanding of the complexities of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

1.7RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research work is intended to achieve the following objective:

(1) Identify the roles of the UN in the maintenance of world peace.

(2) Determine role of the UN in peace keeping operation.

(3) Critically assess the role and failure of UN peace keeping in Somalia.

(4) Problems hampering successful peace-keeping operations.

(5) Suggest possible future options towards world peace-keeping.

1.8RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

For the purpose of this research work, it is expedient to postulate some hypothesis to give us a sense of direction and understanding of the work.

(i) That the internal or domestic peace of one or more states is fundamental to world peace and stability.

(ii) That the contemporary peacekeeping realities renders the classical notion of peacekeeping largely ineffective and necessitates alternative strategies of conflict control.

(iii) That the failure in United Nations peace-keeping operation is a product of malfunctioning of any of the structures in the peacekeeping system.

1.9DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

It is needful for the purpose of this research work, to define some concepts in accordance with their operational application in the work.

(i) **BUFFER ZONE:** This refers to an area in between two conflicting groups, which belongs to none of the parties and which reduces the risk of war between the groups.

(ii) **CHARTER:** A written statement which describes the rights and permission to a group of persons to do something

(iii) **CEASE-FIRE:** This is an act of observing an agreement between warring factions or groups to stop fighting.

(iv) **CONFLICT:** This is an act of fighting, quarrelling, struggling or even disagreement between state or human groups with or without necessarily, the use of force.

(v) **DIASARMAMENT:** This refers to taking away of weapons from conflicting groups. It is also to reduce or even abolish having the possession of weapons by warring factions by the UN forces.

(vi) **FORCE:** This refers to strength, physical power or violence. It is the ability to compel or oblige obedience.

(vii) **HOSTILITY:** Aggressive feeling or behaviour, enmity act of war or fighting towards a group of people or among factions and groups.

(viii) **NEGOTIATION:** Seeking agreement through discussions, on how to settle an issue or dispute.

(ix) **OBSERVER MISSION:** A team sent to see and notice, or watch carefully, by observing the activities of groups in a dispute and sending

such findings as information to the united Nations, without taking part in the dispute.

(x) **PEACE**: This simply refers to the absence of organized violence between such major human groups as nations, racial, ethnic and religious groups. It can also be referred to as a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human groups and nations.

(xi) **PEACE KEEPING**: This is an act deliberately embarked upon to maintain and restore peace and prevent war and conflict among states and political groups.

(xii) **PEACE ACCORD:** It is a formal peaceful agreement between groups of people in war or conflict on stopping hostilities.

(xiii) **PEACE ENFORCEMENT**: This is the act of making sure that peace laws and rules are observed either by the use of force or threat of force.

(xiv) **PEACE MAKER**: Person who embarks on dialogue, and persuasion of people, groups or states to make it possible for peace to reign.

(xv) **POWER**: Though this concept was subjected to various types of definitions, its simplest definition suggests ability. That is the ability of one to have his will carried out by either threat of force or actual use of force. To scholars like Karl Deutsch, power is an instrument through which all other values are obtained, just like people use net for catching

fish. He further argued that for many others power is the value in itself, i.e. the prize of the fish.

(xvi) **RESOLUTION:** This refers to a formal decision for or against a particular issue. It also refers to a formal statement of opinion agreed on by a committee or assembly by means of voting, aimed at solving or settling problems.

(xvii) **SECURITY**: this refers to the measures taken to ensure the safety of lives and property against violence or threat of violence.

(xviii) **TREATY:** It is a formal agreement between nations, organization and factions, particularly to end conflict and hostilities between each other.

(xix) **VETO POWER:** This is the right or power to over-rule a decision or proposal by any member of the Security Council.

(xx) **WAR**: This is an organized group violence among political groups, especially sovereign states, carried on by armed force of considerable magnitude for a considerable period of time.

1.10 LITERATURE REVIEW

So much has been written about the conflict in Somalia and the writers have diverse views about peacekeeping and the role of the United Nation in resolving the Somali crisis. This research work intends to look at the concept of peacekeeping as an approach to international peace and security and then proceed

to clarify concepts. This is expected to ensure a sound basis for analysis of the failure of United Nations peacekeeping operation.

To begin with a correct grasp of the United Nation itself, the charter of the - United Nation and the statutes of international court of justice and basic facts about the UN will be reviewed in order to have a clear picture of the reasons why the UN was created and what it stands for.

Peacekeeping has been defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help in resolving conflicts and restore peace in areas of conflict.

The United Nations Organisation was formed in 1945 after the San Fransisco declaration/conference. The main reason behind its formation was to maintain international peace and security. However, the purpose of the UN are set out in article 9 of the charter.

(i) Maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measure for the prevention and removal of threat and in conformity with the principle of justice and international law adjustment or settlement of international disputes.

(ii) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal right and self-determination of people and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

A one time Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, observed that peacekeeping can only be palliative if it is not made to serve as a prelude to, or accompany negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement. He added that experience has shown that the mere continuance of a peacekeeping operation does not by itself generate movement towards a settlement. Post cold war initiatives demonstrate that peacekeeping and peace making are being linked in the manner suggested by Perez de Cuellar.

Toby Trister Gate, in his book the US, the UN and the Management of Global Change shows that the UN has no monopoly of peacekeeping and as such other regional and international organizations can anytime and anyhow without prior knowledge of the UN, intervene in conflict in any part of the world.

Trister further argued that regional organizations and other multilateral agencies and countries that are capable of helping should at anytime help out. It is in this contention too that even though the United State intervention in the Rwandan crisis has often been misinterpreted to mean different things, that after a detailed criticisms of the United Nations as a total failure, he is now of the opinion that the US should control the UN. He concluded that "it seems that irrespective of who controls the UN, it can be most effective in areas where two superpower's vital interests are not at stake in world order which will have to address the difficult questions of what the international community wants the UN to do and be[8].

The Peacekeeping Approach to Conflict Management of Celestine O. Bassey argued that intervention by other international organizations, agencies, countries or multinational agencies has tended in some cases, as seen in the Rwandan experience, to undermine the real value of negotiation since the sense of urgency which might otherwise have led the parties to a negotiated settlement no longer exists.

Lawrence A. Onoja, in his book Peacekeeping and International Security in a Changing World attempted to differentiate between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. He argued that at one point the United Nations Security Council felt that it was better to use force to resolve the Somalian conflict than to separate the forces fighting in the country. Peace enforcement, he pointed, means physical fighting in Somalia. It is also an acceptance that peace keeping as a concept and accepted international practice of the United Nations has failed[9].

Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams in Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities, argued that the United Nations peace efforts in Somalia fell far below expectation. They pointed that the UN failure in Somalia precipitated a rapid and decisive retreat from UN peacekeeping worldwide. They maintained that sequel to the massacre of the UN peacekeeping personnel in Somalia, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council led by the US became increasingly reluctant to commit their troops or their money to UN peacekeeping

efforts. They concluded that the final phase of the UN operations in Somalia, the UNISOM II, was a failure both conceptually and operationally[10].

Dan Vale in his article the United Nations is out to control, spelt out plainly that the UN has failed in its peacekeeping mission and needs reforms immediately, he argued that a bit of what has plagned the UN peacekeeping includes incompetent commanders, undisciplined soldiers, alliances with aggressors, failure to prevent atrocities and abuse. Furthermore the manipulation of the UN by the United States especially after the collapse of Soviet Union is further complicating issues.

In conclusion, even though the UN peacekeeping has achieved some measure of success in some conflict situations like the Congo crisis, their position was and still is, fragile and vulnerable to different kinds of hazards as in the case of Somalia and Rwanda.

END NOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

UNO AND PEACEKEEPING

2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

With the collapse of the League of Nations, due to its inability to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, it became obvious that a new course had to be charted to maintain world peace and security. A dominant role was played by the elite class of great powers – including the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and, in the second rank, France and China. The big three had borne the brunt of the military struggle, and would obviously constitute a power oligarchy in the postwar world. Considering the requirements of international security, it was clear that the collaboration of the military giants was vital to the United Nations.

The great powers were keenly aware of their corporate indispensability, and were inclined to make most of it. They had functioned as a kind of Global Executive Committee in preparing the blue prints for adaptation at San Francisco[1].

On the other hand, the smaller states also contributed constructively to the drafting of the UN charter. They, however, were realistic in their approach for not challenging the status or principle of great power leadership. Indeed, they even welcomed it and relied upon it, but with some efforts to confine it within some tolerable bounds.

On the 24th of October, 1945, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) was born with a clear mandate "to maintain international peace and security and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace and bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principle of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situation which might lead to a breach of the peace"[2].

The emergence of the UNO therefore represented a renewed effort to achieve world peace through an international organization, as distinguished form world government. Like its predecessor, the league, the UNO was dedicated to the proposition that it makes sense to try to eliminate war by improving the mechanisms and procedures of international relations and promoting higher standards of national behaviour. This was clearly expressed in a statement credited to the then US president Roosevelt on June 15, 1944 that:

> We are not thinking of a super state with its own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power. We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and making impossible, deliberate preparation for war and to have such forces available for joint action when necessary.....the hope of a peaceful and advancing world will rest upon the willingness and ability of the peace-loving nations,

large and small, bearing responsibility commensurate with their individual capacities, to work together for the maintenance of peace and security[3].

The deep-felt needs and intentions which inspired the founding of the UNO, are proclaimed in the preamble to the charter:

> WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to re-affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in lager freedom,
>
> AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
>
> HAVE RESOVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS. Accordingly, our respective governments through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited

their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present charter of the UN and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

2.2 PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNO

The purpose of the UNO are set forth in Article 1 of the charter. They are:

(i) To maintain international peace and security;

(ii) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

(iii) To cooperate in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; and

(iv) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.

To fulfill the purpose for which it was establish, the UN acts in accordance with the following principles, as set forth in Article 2 of the charter;

(i) The organization is based on the principle of the Sovereign equality of all its members;

(ii) Members are to fulfill in good faith, the obligation they have assumed under the charter;

(iii) They are to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;

(iv) They are to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.

(v) They are to give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the organization is taking preventive or enforcement action;

(vi) The UN is to ensure that non-members act in accordance with these principle so far as is necessary for maintaining international peace and security;

(vii) The organisation is not to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. This provision does not, however, prejudice the application of enforcement action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

Inspite of all these however, the world has continued to witness wars and crises. For instance between 1945 and 1994, as reported by Momoh (1994), atleast 95 wars have taken place, killing over fifteen million (15,000,000) people, with about eight million (8,000,000,) serious disabilities and about ten million (10,000,000) widows[4].

These developments have, since 1945, been the major headache of the UN, via the Security Council, which is empowered by the UN charter vii, to use

military means to enforce the peace against any state threatening international peace and security.

2.2 THE CHARTER EMPOWERING THE UN TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

The most important international document is the charter of the UN, which came into effect on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco. Of vital importance among all the proclaimed principles and purposes, is undoubtedly, the task of preventing world war in the future and maintaining international peace and security.

Part 1 of Article 1 of the charter stated categorically, the principal purpose of the organization when it proclaims that the organization was setup to "maintain international peace and security and to that end to have effective collective measures, for the prevention and removal of treats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." In pursuit of this purpose, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the charter envisaged that all the members of the UN "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations."

The priority nature of the UN tasks of maintaining international peace and security is also evidenced by the powers vested in the Security Council and especially in it's permanent members, as the organizations' principal organs bearing the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security[5]. It is

therefore obvious that the task of maintaining international peace and security (IPS) has retained, till recently, its top priority nature for the entire world community and it justifiably occupies the central place assigned to it by the UN charter.

In his report on the activities of the UN in 1983, the then UN secretary general J. Perez de Cueler, noted that " the charter of the UN clearly gives priority to dealing with IPS, and to the commitment of all nations, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to cooperate within the frame work of UN towards this end. It is weakening of this commitment --- that has, perhaps more than any other factor, led to the partial paralysis of the UN as the guardian of International Peace and Security [6].

The UN charter also envisage a situation where the maintenance of peace in a particular region by peaceful means may prove difficult. In such cases the Security Council is empowered to decide what measure, not involving the use of armed forces, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. In accordance with Article 41 of the UN charter, the measures may include the interruption of the economic relations by rail, sea and air as well as other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Mindful of Article 42 of the UN charter, should the development of international disputes result in the emergence of situations where no other way of preventing breach of the peace or act of aggression would be adequate, it may

become rightful for the Security Council to resort to such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. In establishing effective action to stop and guard against acts of aggression and breaches of peace, the UN members conferred in the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of IPS, and resolved, as contained in Para 1 of Article 24, that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf. Under Article 25 of the charter, members of the UN resolved, "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council".

In the discharge of its principal responsibility of maintaining IPS, one question that scholars raise has to do with separation of powers between the organizations two principal organs – the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The UN charter empowers the General Assembly to discuss any question or any matters within the scope of the present charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present charter[7]. The charter confer such wide power on the General Assembly on the one hand, and limits the organ's competence on the other, by retaining the Security Councils priority on certain issues.

According to Para 1 of Article 12, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regards to the dispute or situation in respect of which the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned to it in the present charter.

An exception is however made for cases where the Security Council may request such recommendations from the General assembly.

The General Assembly is also empowered to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of IPS, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regards to them. At the same time, in accordance with Para 2 of Article 11 of the charter, any such question on which action is necessary is referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly has the right to discuss any matter relating to the maintenance of peace and security brought before it by any member of the UN (mindful of Para 2 of Article 35 and exception stipulated in article 12) and make recommendations with regards to them. Under Para 3, Article 11, the general assembly may also call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger IPS.

2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

The term peacekeeping has no single universally accepted definition. It is defined variously, defending on the situation and other prevailing conditions. With regards to the UN however, "peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved the deployment of primarily military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to help control and resolve armed conflicts between hostile parties"[8].

Sam Momoh in his book Global disorder and the New World, saw peacekeeping as a tension diffusing operation, carefully designed to provide the belligerent a stabilized situation and a conducive environment for the peaceful resolution of disputes in conflict. The classical definition of the concept of peacekeeping, in most cases also encompasses general categories of deployment of multinational forces such as ceasefire, monitoring, buffer zones supervision and observer mission, general police and law enforcement function.

Though some scholars try to link the concept of peacekeeping to the UN charter, the term is expressly no where to be found in the charter. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as belonging to "chapter six and Half" of the charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (chapter VI) and more forceful action, such as embargos and military intervention (chapter VII).

Inspite of the absence of a clear-cut provision for peacekeeping in the charter therefore, it became pertinent to device some means to either halt or curtail disputes that resulted to armed conflict. The charter itself, does set out procedures that could enhance peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33-38) which permit the security council to assist parties to resolve issues while Article 39-51 authorise the use of force for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in line with this that peacekeeping operation evolved to bridge the gap between the charters provisions for reconciliation and those for enforcing action.

The UN handbook (1986) sees peacekeeping operation as essentially-holding actions designed to halt or curtail the fighting in a conflict, while concerted efforts are made to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table or otherwise provide the time to create climate necessary to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Though peacekeeping operation is mostly employed in supervisory or monitoring cease-fire, its nomenclature nevertheless continue to change as applied or adopted to a variety of situations e.g. the final settlement of conflict such as UNTAG in Namibia (1989-1990), enforcement capacity such as ONUC Congo (1960-1964), Operation Liberty in Liberia (1990-97) and also Sierra Leone (1997 to date).

The primary prerequisite for deployment of peacekeeping force is that there should first be a cease-fire. The consent of the aggrieved parties is required not only for the operation establishment but also in broad terms, for the way it will carry out its mandate. The parties are also consulted about the countries which will contribute troops to the operation. Other conditions for the modus operandi of the force is that, the operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and should not in any way take side with any of the conflicting parties. The peacekeepers have no right of enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defense as a last resort.

Though the origin of UN peacekeeping can be traced to the first deployment of military observers in the UN truce supervision organization (UNTSO) in 1945,

it was not until the suze canal crisis of 1956 that a full fledged peacekeeping force was established. In 1960 a larger force was sent to Congo. Since then, about one hundred (100) UN peacekeeping operations have taken place world-wide.

2.4 THE MAKING OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

The UN has no army of its own. Each peacekeeping operation must be designed to meet the requirements of each new situation; and each time the Security Council calls for the creation of a new operation, a fresh arrangement has to be made altogether.

The 15-member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, and determines its mandate. Such decisions require at least nine votes in favour and are subject to a veto by the negative vote of any of the council's five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, Britain and the United States). The Secretary-General makes recommendations on how the operation is to be launched and carried out, and reports on its progress; the Department of peacekeeping operations. (DPKO) is responsible for day-to-day executive direction, management and logistical support for United Nation peacekeeping operation world-wide. The Secretary-General chooses the force commander and asks member states to contribute troops, civilian police or other personnel. Supplies, equipment, transportation and logistics support must be secured from member-states or from private contributors.

With regards to finance, the usual practice is for the UN peacekeeping costs to be shared by all member states in accordance with the charter. The General Assembly accordingly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account, the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In response to a request from the Secretary-General, countries may volunteer personnel, equipment, supplies or other support for peacekeeping mission. Contributing personnel to peacekeeping is not obligatory; a troop-contributing country retains the right to withdraw its personnel from an operation.

2.5 LIMITS TO THE USE OF FORCE

Central to either peacekeeping or peace-enforcement, is the question of the use of force by states. The use of force by states is ancient, but contemporary international law has attempted to regulate it. Customary rules of international law therefore developed to cope with the use of force. The United Nations itself, as a post-war response, has by its well developed charter, been in the fore front of regulating the use of force at international level. Article 2 part 4 stated that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN".

But the UN charter concedes the impossibility of the total exclusion of the use of force. Consequently, it concedes and preserves the right of self defense and enforcement action as a collective security measure.

In furtherance of the principle that states should refrain from use of force in their international relations, the General Assembly adopted the declaration of principle of international law in 1970. The declaration imposes a number of duties on states restraining the use of force. It criminalizes war of aggression with international obligation under international law. The declaration also abhors the organization of territory through the use of force. But more fundamentally is the need to pursue negotiations and carry out obligations in good faith in relation to international peace and security.

The use of force by states has been affected by sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. This principle also affects peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It should however be noted that in peacekeeping, the parties at times willingly invite the establishment of the imposition force. It is therefore an exercise of sovereignty by states. On the other hand peace-enforcement negates these principles but is allowable within the general charter provision in the maintenance of international peace and security.

2.6 THE POLITICS AND WORKING RELATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMONG MEMBER NATIONS

As a political institution embracing every state and empowered by its comprehensive mandate to consider virtually any issue, the UN occupies a unique

position. Its position in the world is similar but not analogous to that of national governments within states. Understanding the UN and a national government is crucial to understanding what the UN might be expected to accomplished[9].

Unlike national governments, the UN has very little autonomy. For instance, it depends on the assessed and voluntary contributions of member states for its funds. Even if a state fails to pay its assessed contribution it loses no more than its right to vote in the General Assembly. Also military forces are available to the UN only if member states assigned them to the World Institution. The UN must depend on the voluntary working cooperation of its member states to achieve its purpose. In contrast, national governments can tax individuals and has the means to compel compliance with its decision[10].

Another major difference between the UN and national governments is that the letter is generally only one of several established political institutions. Political system within states generally include interest groups, political parties, and courts, as well legislative and executive bodies, while the UN, despite its several principal organs and substantial bureaucracy, stands alone within the global political issues, since there are no global institutions truly analogues to national interest groups and political parties[11].

An issue in conflict is the appointment of political power within the UN system. Although there are several dimensions to this conflict, it is primarily between north and south. The "North" is the industrialized and relatively affluent states of North

America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The "South" is a large and diverse group of less developed countries (LDCs) from Africa, Asia and Latin America. These two groups not only use the UN institutions as an arena for confrontation and negotiation about the shape of international economic order, the rights and duties of the economically privileged and underprivileged, and the transfer of resources from the north to the south. They also vie for the control of the institutional machinery itself to shape the structure and processes of the UN system for the future[12].

One of the principal elements in both the north-south dialogue and the projected new order is equal participation by developing states in the decision making process. The global fairness revolution is concerned with the structure of the international economic relations. The developing countries want substantially more control, commensurate with their needs and number of the processes and structures of redistribution and rule making in a new order[13].

Another major politics in the UN in carrying out the objective of maintaining peace and security is among the great powers, on the 'Veto' embodied in the charter preventing the Security Council from using force against anyone except by a vote seven out of the fifteen members (15) including the "Concurring Votes" of all the five permanent members. The veto is recognition of the fact that the limit of the UN's power to use its own police force is a limit short of world War. If the disagreements among the great powers should ever reach the point where one of

these powers must be disciplined by military action, the UN would no longer be in the picture, and the fatal third World War would already be beyond hope of remedy. The Veto is a safeguard against fatally big ideas in the UN itself - big ideas of enforcing peace in a situation where no human agency could enforce it[14].

An influential political disappointment in the UN is that the peace treaties to end the second World War did not come through quickly. It was expected that the victorious powers would impose peace on the defeated Axis and the UN could start from there...the powers have not been able to agree on peace terms for the principal Axis Countries. Treaties were signed only with the East European allies of Germany that came under Soviet control, and these treaties have been a continued bone of contention between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union[15].

The years went by and the powers could not agree on treaties for Japan or Germany. In Japan there were no Soviet troops, and so the Western Powers could make their own peace with that country, leaving it still at war with the U.S.S.R. (later the Soviet Union also made peace with Japan and that country was admitted to the UN). In Germany, part of the country is under soviet control, and that control cannot be lifted except by a peace in which the Soviet Government will join. The Western Powers have made as much peace as they can with the part of Germany not controlled by the Soviets. The Germans finds it a poor substitute for freedom and reunion[16].

These stubborn remains of World War II create a political problem that threatens world peace – problems such as the Berlin blockade and the disputes about how to unify Germany.

Further disappointment of the politics in peacekeeping operation among member nations is the frequent use of veto by the five permanent members of in the Security Council. At San Francisco, the Great Powers agreed in insisting on the veto right. None of them wanted to be committed without its own consent to fighting a war even to enforce peace. They also agreed that the right of veto in the Council should apply to everything except procedural questions.

The theory advanced by the Great Powers in support of such sweeping rights of veto was that once the Security Council takes jurisdiction over any international dispute, even in an effort to reach a peaceful settlement, a chain of events is set in motion that may end with military enforcement action. One exception was made, this was the provision that if one of them were a party to a dispute it must abstain from voting, while the Council tries to reach a peaceful settlement. In some other decisions, the Soviet delegates has voted "No" to a proposal that happens not to conform to the Soviet line of policy[17].

While in the Assembly the smaller nations, who naturally resent the Veto Powers, have a majority of the votes, and the Assembly has voted from time to time to admonish the powers about their use of the veto.

In the UN there has to be free speech. Every member has the right to say whatever he wants to say, right or wrong, honest or dishonest. That means politically, the UN can be used, and have often been used by adversaries as a platform for their propaganda. Their opponents sometimes feel that if only they could be thrown out, it would clear the air. No more big lies, no more campaigns of hate and vilification. Peace and quite would settle over the council and the Assembly. But it would be the same kind of peace and quiet that we find in the inner councils of a nation at war, where the enemies are outside and only friends are inside[18].

In the long run, all governments that are freely set up by the people "depend on the consent of the governed". The UN was not designed to pave the way for any dictator to conquer the world. If any world government should grow up under the benevolent auspices of the UN, it would depend on the consent of the people of the world. The people of the world are not prepared to give the UN or any other authority enough powers to add up to a recognizable federal government of the world.

During the Suez and Hungarian crisis 1956-57, there were some criticisms of the UN on the ground that it had a "double standard" of judgment since it procured the withdrawal of the Israeli, French and British troops from Egypt but did not get the Soviet troops out of Hungary[19].

The fact that the UN was not authorized to make war on the Soviet Union on Hungary's behalf, reflects, as the Secretary-General declared, "the profound will of the people of the world to avoid general war".

All these encompass the existing politics and working relations among member nations in peacekeeping activities. Members utilize the privilege to flex their potentials and strength.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE SOMALI CRISES

3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA

The Somalia Democratic Republic is located in the eastern most part of Africa, i.e. the area called Horn of Africa. It is bordered by the Indian Ocean on the east, Djibouti on the Northwest, Ethiopia on the West and Kenya on the southwest. It covers an area of 246,300 square mitres (638,000 square kilometers). The Capital of Somalia is Mogadishu, which is also the largest city and the commercial center of the country.

Somalia is one of the poorest countries of the world. About half of the total population are nomads engaged in raising livestock. Most of them travel to parts of Kenya and Ethiopia to grace their animals. Other nomads, who are settled cultivators and herdsmen, are largely in the Southern part of the country. Permanent settlements are small and widely scattered.

The official languages in Somalia are Somali and Arabic, but English and Italian languages are also spoken. Islam is the official religion and they all belong to the Sunni Islamic sect.

Somalis economy is largely based on livestock and agricultural production, though only 13 percent of the land is available for crops. Banana is the main export and commercial crop while sugarcane, sorghum, maize and fruits are also grown in different quantities.

Somalia also has a small scale manufacturing sector which is dominated by small scale meat and fish processing plants, textile and shoe factories as well as leather tanneries. There is also a petroleum refinery.

The country was colonized by France and later Britain (British protectorate of Somaliland) between December 13, 1887 to June 26, 1960. it was also colonized by Italy (Italy Somaliland) between 1889 to 1943 and later 1950 to 1st July, 1960. Between 1943 and 1950, the territory was however occupied by Britain after which it was handed back to Italy by the United Nations in April, 1950.

Somalia or even the entire Horn of Africa is an area where the legacy of artificial delimitation of boundaries by the colonial powers in the 19th centaury is seriously felt today. This is inspite of the fact that Somalia is a country with almost completely homogenous citizen interms of language, culture and religion. But it is however important to understand properly, the role of lineage system in the society and its contributions in the crises that bedeviled the nation. There are approximately one hundred clans of varying sizes comprising six major clan families. There are also a number of smaller groups including coastal Arabo-Somalis, some of Bantu origin and several "outcaste" groups. The great majority of Somalis belong to Somaale clans, who generally consider themselves superior to the sab and other groups. This constantly led to rivalry and competition for resources as well as fighting, particularly among somaale clans and sub-clans.

3.2 GENERAL CAUSES OF WAR AND CRISIS

Strong incentives, to many men, are derived from the desires to triumph for honour and for power. Under the influence for national self-esteem, every great country believes it is superior to all others in fighting capacity and in courage. Englishmen in times of peace Chafe at the thought that their Navy, the greatest in the world, has no opportunity of showing its merits. Germans similarly, have longed to show the excellence of their Army. Every man believes that the fighting forces of his own will prove, on the battlefield, to be far better than the enemy has supposed, and will win honour at the expense of the enemy. This is a wide spread popular feeling, probably more operative among ordinary citizens than among those who direct policy or have a close knowledge of public affairs. On the other hand the pleasure in the contemplation of the power which victory will bring operates most among those who have an intimate knowledge of modern history or current politics.

War is felt to be the ultimate test of a nations sovereignty, the ultimate proof of its vigour and of its right to exist. In war there can be no doubt that both sides are in earnest; to force one's will on the enemy in a terrific contest and regarded as unanswerable evidence of superiority in those qualities of courage and determination which most men honour above all others and above all others' wish to be known to posses.

With this desire to prove the nations sovereignty goes the feeling which makes it so difficult to give way in negotiations, the fear of the seeming craven or mean-spirited. Even if reasons clearly show the desirability of giving way, even if the point is one which would be readily conceded if not demanded with overt or covert threats, it become impossible to give way as soon as fear may be supposed to be the motive. The feeling of shame that would accompany yielding under such circumstances is one of the strongest reasons for the popular clamour in favour of war which arises as soon as a crisis becomes acute[1].

Besides all these motives, a passionate devotion to the nation, conceived as an entity with a life of its own, surviving the lives of the present citizens and passing on to their children, the better or worse for what is done now. With this passionate devotion goes a desire for self-sacrifices, for immolation to future an end greater than any thing in any individual life. This impulse of heroism for the welfare of the nation is more wide spread than any other kind of subordination to something out side self, with the sole exception of parental affection. It is by far the noblest of the motives that make for war, and it ought not to be combated by merely material consideration such as the economic exhaustion produced by war.

The approach to the causes of war assumes that wars are caused by military organization which go to war in order to obtain certain goals. These goals may vary from war to war, and they may change over time. Thus, for any political community there will probably be several goals of war. At any given period in the

history of the political community, if sufficient data are available, the order of the importance of thee goals, can be ascertained[2]. Whether the officials of the political community determine the goals and send the military organization to war in order to achieve those goals, or whether the leaders of the military make the decision as to the goals does not alter the nature of this approach.

Thus, the approach assumes that wars are caused by the decisions of men as members of organization whether military organization, governing body, religious, tribal or ethnic organization.

Through this approach six major reasons or causes of war are delineated.

1. Subjugation and tribute
2. Land
3. Plunder
4. Trophies and honour
5. Defense
6. Revenge

These six also represented a classification scheme for grouping a wide range of possible goals.

Raoul Naroll (1966) who refers to the causes of war as "Military Expectations" state his approach as follows:

"An Anthropologist as an observer from the outside probably can not say with certainty what the causes of primitive warfare are, however, it is possible for him to make a much simpler and very useful set of observations about what the members of a war party in a particular culture have in mind when they set out for the attack (Naroll 1966 : 17)".

However, the assumed approach here differs from Naroll in that the emphasis is upon the goals selected by decision makers, and not upon the expectations existing in the mind of warriors[3].

According to Quincy Wright, defensive purposes are always present in war; that social purposes are never found without defensive purposes; that economic purposes are never found without both defensive and social purposes, and that political purposes are never found without defensive, social, and economic purposes.

SCALE OF CAUSES OF WAR[4]

Naroll's Scale	Wright's Scale
Political control	Political
Prestige (Wright's social)	Economic
Plunder (Wright's economic)	Social
Defense	Defense

Newcomb (1960), and Wright (1942), have argued that centralize political communities conduct war for political and economic objectives, and that un-centralized political communities go to war either to defend themselves or to satisfy social objective. However, economic objectives are less advanced than social or prestige objectives[5].

Therefore, in correlating types of political systems with causes of war the arguments of the above social scientists can be tested if it is formulated into the following hypothesis: the higher the level of political centralization, the more advanced the reasons for going to war (the dependent variable can also be phrased

as "the greater the number of reasons for going to war"). The dependent variable is dichotomized so that all societies that go to war for political control are in one category and all remaining societies are in another category[6].

The relationship between political centralization and reasons for going to war is shown in Table 1. The data confirm the hypothesis. The phi coefficient is + 0.68, and it is significant at the 0.001 level. There are no centralized political system which go to war for political control and only seven centralize political system which do not go to war for political control. (Four of these seven are Chiefdoms rather than states). Of the nine centralized political system which go to war for political control, only two-Marshallese and Mendes – are Chiefdoms[7].

Vayda (1956 ; 262-67). Explains this almost exclusive relationship between centralized political communities and political control by delineating two conditions which must exist for subjugation to occur as an "after match of victory". First, the victorious political community must be politically centralized to the extent that it can utilize force to control its own members. This must be present in order for the political community to super impose itself upon a conquered people. The super – imposition or control must be advantageous to the conquerors – advantageous in the sense that the skills possessed by the conquered people and the products they produce are of value to the victorious political community. Since defeating and subjugating in every political communities is one way of eliminating rival groups, in addition to being a means of rapidly expanding the size of the

political community and obtaining desired skills and products, a political community which subjugates neighboring peoples clearly has an advantage in inter-societal struggles over political communities which do not extend political control over neighbouring groups[8].

TABLE 1: MOST SOPHISTICATED REASONS FOR WAR

POLITICAL SYSTEM	DEFENSE, PLUNDER OR PRESTIGE	CONTROL	
Centralized	No Society	No Society	Total
	7 Ambo Aymara Japanese Monachi Mutar Savamacca Sema	9 Aztec Egyptians Hawaiians Javanese Lau Marshallese Mende Mossi Thai	16
Uncentralised	30 Abiopon Albanians Amba Andamanese Chero kee Comox Fox Gisu Ila Jivaro Kazak Kurtatchi Motilon Mundurucu Nandi Orokaiva Papago Plains Cree Santa Ana Somali Tehuelche Tibetans Timbiva Tiv Tiwi Toradja Trumai Wishram Yukaghir		
Total	37	9	46

0 = 68 x2 = 20.98 P< .001

3.3 HISTORICAL AND IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF WAR AND CRISES IN SOMALIA

The country was colonized by France and later Britain (British protectorate of Somaliland) between December 13, 1887 to June 26, 1960. It was also colonized by Italy (Italy Somaliland) between 1889 to 1943 and later 1950 to 1st July, 1960. Between 1943 and 1950, the territory was however occupied by Britain after which it was handed back to Italy by the United Nations in April, 1950.

Somalia or even the entire Horn of Africa is an area where the legacy of artificial delimitation of boundaries by the colonial powers in the 19th centaury is seriously felt today. This is inspite of the fact that Somalia is a country with almost completely homogenous citizens interms of language, culture and religion. But it is however important to understand properly, the role of lineage system in the society and its contributions in the crises that bedeviled the nation. There are approximately one hundred clans of varying sizes comprising six major clan families. There are also a number of smaller groups including coastal Arabo-somalis, some of Bantu origin and several "outcaste" groups. The great majority of Somalis belong to Somaale clans, who generally consider themselves superior to the sab and other groups. This constantly led to rivalry and competition for resources as well as fighting, particularly among somaale clans and sub-clans.

To have a correct and clear grasp of the Somali conflict, one should examine the historical antecedents involved, particularly as from 1940. It was earlier

pointed out that in the colonial era, Somalia was divided into two (British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland).

The establishment of one Colonial regime in both the British protectorate and the former Italian Colony encouraged political organizations to transcend the earlier barriers of colonial boundaries. The first political party was the Somali Youths League, which was founded in Mogadishu in 1943. The party advocated for an establishment of a democratically elected government and abolishing of the "tribal system".

The defeat of Italy in the Second World War made it possible for Britain to take over control of the Italian Somaliland, including Ethiopia. After taking over Ethiopia, Britain declared the Ogaden region, having a dominant Somali population, a "reserved area" and placed it under military administration. Thus with the exception of Djibouti, the Horn of Africa came under one colonial power, Britain, at the end of World War II[10]. This in turn intensified inter-territorial contacts between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, leading to greater exchange of political ideas.

By the end of World War II, the question of what to do with the "reserved area" and the former Italian Somaliland colony become a topical issue in the United Nations and in the Horn of Africa itself. Already, Ethiopia was pressurizing for the return of the "reserved area" to it. This pressure provoked protests and counter protests by the Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa. In 1946, the

aspiration for the emergence of a Greater Somalia was given a boost by what came to be known as Bevin plan.

Bevin, who was the British foreign secretary, advocated for the merging of British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the "reserved area" in a single Somalian State. The idea was highly welcomed by the Somalis entirely but was denounced by Ethiopia and the British government in Kenya, which contained substantial Somali population in its borders. The USSR also apposed the plan accusing Britain of harbouring sinister motives. All these ensured the collapse of Bevin plan and Ethiopia resumed control of the "reserved area" in 1948.

A four power Commission was then set up by the UN consisting of Britain, USA, USSR and France and charged with the responsibility of visiting Somalia with a view to ascertaining the wishes of the people of Somalia. Before the arrival of the Commission in Mogadishu the Italian community had organized a pro-Italian consortium which advocated for the return of former Italian Somaliland colony to Italy as a Trust territory. Thus on arrival to Mogadishu, the commission was greeted with demonstrations and counter demonstrations, which eventually led to riots, and many causalities recorded.

The four powers Commission reported its findings to the council of ministers. And despite the manifest opposition to the return of Italian control in Somalia, the commission decided in favour of Trusteeship under Italy. This was endorsed by the UN in 1949, and by 1950, Italy resumed control of her former

colony under the tutelage of the UN, with a definite target of Independence after ten years.

Meanwhile in the North, i.e. British Somaliland, there was no definite time table for Independence and as such political activities were more relaxed. Emphasis was more on development rather than politics. But because of pressures and high level of political activity in the south, the Italian government was forced to set up Legislative Council and a Somali-dominated government in 1956. Consequent upon this, Britain also set up a similar council in the north in 1957 and encouraged the Somalis to shoulder important responsibilities of government. Towards the end of 1959, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution granting the Trust Territory independence in July 1, 1960. This decision had traumatic consequences on the British protectorate. The political parties intensified their pressure on the British to also announce a date for independence. They also demanded for the Unification of the Trust Territory. In June 1960 the Protectorate's Legislative Assembly voted unanimously for the union of the two territories. In July the same year, British Somaliland and the Trust Territory were merged to form an Independent Somali Republic.

After Independence the two Legislative Assemblies were merged into one based at Mogadishu, the capital of the new Republic. The two biggest parties in the north, namely the United Somali Party and the Somali National League, merged

with the Somali Youth League in the south and formed a coalition Government headed by Dr. Abdul-Rashid Ali Shermerke as Prime Minister.

From their viewpoint, the Somalis in the new Republic considered the attainment of independence as only a half-won battle. The Ultimate union of all the Somali inhabited area was the real goal and it was to become the focal point of the post-independence period.

Thus the post Independence government in Mogadishu was pressurised to support the secessionist movements then operating in northern Kenya and eastern Ethiopia. At the same time, the new government had to work out a system that would minimize the differences bequeathed by the former colonial powers. The north, for instance preferred the continuation of the British legal system while the south was attached to the Italian one[11].

The post Independence government in Mogadishu hoped that Kenya's Independence will be preceded by the unification of northern Kenya with Somali Republic. Infact, during Kenya's pre-independence conference in London, the British government yielded to pressures and promised to send a Commission to northern Kenya to ascertain the wishes of the people.

The Commission investigated the problem early in 1963 and reported that the Somalis in northern Kenya were in favour of joining the Somali Republic. But because the British did not want to offend the Emperor of Ethiopia who wanted to maintain the status quo in the Horn of Africa, in addition to the threat by Kenya

politicians to pull Kenya out of commonwealth should the British Unite northern Kenya with Somali Republic, the colonial secretary announced in 1963 that northern Kenya was to remain an integral part of Kenya; the dispute was to be solved by the sovereign states of Kenya and Somalia.

This decision brought a lot of disillusionment and disappointment on the part of Somalia. Diplomatic relations was severed and Somalia began to establish closer ties with the USSR and China. Pan Somalism consequently assumed a militant character. Thus immediately after achieving political independence Kenya found itself embroiled in a series of armed conflicts with the Somali Republic.

In 1964 there was another war between Ethiopia and Somalia. Even after the war, hostilities remained intense and led to enlargement of the armed forces and acquisition of modern weapons on a large scale by both countries, with Ethiopia aided by the USA and Somalia aided by the USSR.

The 1969 Revolution: In the meantime, political squabble, corruption and the authoritarian style of leadership of President shermerke and Prime Minister Abdul-Razak Haje Hussein caused a lot of public discontent. On 15th October, 1969, President Shermarke was assassinated. The Prime Minister who was then on overseas tour, hurried back to Mogadishu to arrange for election of a new president.

Just before the election however, the army intervened on 21st October and toppled the civilian government. The Prime Minister and other prominent

politicians were arrested and detained. The National Assembly was dissolved and the task of policy making devolved on the new Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), constituted mainly of the army and the police.

The country was renamed the Somali Democratic Republic and Major General Said Barre became the President of the SRC and Head of State. On his first anniversary in office, Barre announced his intention to adopt socialist ideology in the Republic with the following goals; (i) elimination of ethnic rivalry, (ii) establishment of a socialist state (iii) suppression of corruption and (iv) attainment of economic independence.

In the arena of Internaional Politics, the Somali Democratic Republic played an important role in the Organization of African Unity. In 1974, Said Barre became the OAU Chairman. This OAU leadership brought Barre face to face with the difficult task of reconciling his country's pan Somali aspirations with the article III of the Organization's charter, which advocates for respect of national boundaries as inherited from colonial powers.

In 1974, the Barre's government helped in the formation of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in the Ogaden. In the same year, a revolution had removed emperor Haile Salassie in Ethiopia and Mengistu Haile Mariam took over. Although this region was also moving favourably disposed to socialist ideas, it refused to concede any territory to Somalia.

The Orgaden conflict: In the mid 1977, the WSLF fought the Ethiopian army in guerilla action, with the overt support of Somalia. Soon after this, the regular Somali army waged a full scale war against Ethiopia. Thus relations between Somalia and Ethiopia were severed in 1977.

The Somali forces moved rapidly and with the retreat of Ethiopian forces, the Ogaden was for a while put under de factor Somali rule. But while Ethiopia was re-grouping to strike back, Somalia attracted sharp criticisms from many countries for its overt military aggression against Ethiopia and its irredentist ambition in the entire Horn of Africa.

Soviet Union itself, who would not want a war between two socialist countries was not happy with the Somali action against Mengistu's Ethiopia. Thus despite its enormous military, economic and educational assistance to Somali previously, it supported Ethiopia in the Ogaden war. By November 1977, all the Soviet and Cuban advisers in Somalia were expelled, which led to the exit of about 6,000 Soviet military and civilian advisers in one week.

This action made a sudden and major alteration in the "cold war" aspect of the Ethiopia Somali conflict. But despite the happiness of the USA and other western nations on the loss of this important base by the USSR, they refused to immediately trust Somalia. But the ties were however, strengthened later. In addition, Somalia failed to win the support of fellow African countries except

Egypt and Sudan. African countries stuck to the principle of respecting frontiers inherited from colonial administrations.

In 1978, Ethiopian forces attacked Somalian forces in the Ogaden and drove them back. On the 10th February, 1978, the Somali government declared a State of emergency and ordered mass mobilization. By then the expeditionary force sent to the Ogaden was costing Somalia an estimated 2m dollars per day, mostly contributed by oil-rich Arab States, and was despite all the efforts in retreat. On 9th March 1978, as a result of a major defeat in the region, Somalia announced its withdrawal.

This defeat and humiliation suffered by Somalia was followed by an attempted coup d'etat on 9th April 1978. After some fighting in Mogadishu the attempt was put down, but not without casualties. Some of the plotters escaped to Kenya, which included Col. Abdullahi Ahmed, who alleged that president Barre was surrounded by an ethnic clique and had sent Somalis of the other ethnic groups to die in the war. Later the exiles in Kenya formed the Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF). In September 1978, sentences were passed on the arrested plotters and 17 of them were sentenced to death and actually executed on 20th October 1978.

But meanwhile, hostile relations with Ethiopia, since the Ogaden war, continued into 1981, with limited fighting and full support of the guerillas by Somalia.

million people became refugees in Kenya and other neighboring societies. In fact the International Committee on Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) at one time said they were using 1/3 of their total resources in Somalia.

Consequent upon all these, the Northern part of Somialia decided to declare succession and named itself British Somaliland. But they could not gain recognition by any Nation of the World. In the southern part also, different groups joined hand together to fight General Barre. Later the alliances broke down and they started fighting themselves. The dominant leaders were Muhammed Fara Aideed, a well-trained military officer and politician. The other personality was Ali Mahdi Muhammad, who remained a force to reckone with even today in the Somali politics.

Thus the anarchy, clan, sub clan and factional conflict as well as civil war ensured that almost every developmental effort in Somalia was put to a stand still. The long simmering resentments against General Barre, his Marehan clan and others allied with his regime hardened and broadened to include most of the Somali clans and sub-clans. Barre and his supporters therefore had to flee Mogadishu.

On January 26, 1991 the United Somali congress (USC) announced on radio Mogadishu that it had taken over the country in order to ensure the security of Somali people. This led to a lot of carnage in the capital Mogadishu. The SNM radio later announced the capture of the capital of Gedo region and Said Barres

birthplace, and claimed to control key areas in the North. The USC executive committee met and appointed 52-year-old Ali Mahdi Mohammed as a new President. It proposed the setting up of an interim government, retaining Omar Arteh Ghalil as Prime Minister, pending a conference of all rebel groups, the formation of a people salvation committee and free elections[12].

The overthrow of President Barre had left a power vacuum that needed to be filled. At that very time there were people that were on standby to replace Barre, given the slightest opportunity. But no doubt, they lacked the effective power base to replace Barre in that crises-riden atmosphere. This therefore resulted in serious fighting for the control of capital city, Mogadishu. Two main factions were involved in the fighting. One of them was supporting the Chairman of Somali National Congress (SNC), General Muahammad Fara Aideed and the other supporting the interim President Ali Mahdi Muahammad. Later the fighting spread to other parts of Somalia, involving one group against the other/others. There was widespread destruction of lives and property which made Somalia completely un-governable. There was wide and senseless anachy all over. The war proved to be one of the worst African tragedies as about 4.5 million people, comprising about half of the population of the country were suffering from hunger and malnutrition, while more than 1.5 people were rendered homeless.

END NOTES

(1) BERTRAND R. (no date) Justice in war time Russel Press Ltd Nottinghan pg. 61/62

(2) The Mwecika Higi of Northern Nigeria fought with other Higi political communities, the number of goals or causes of war and other importance of the goals varied from one political community to next (Otterbein 1968c).

(3) KEITH F. OTTERBIEN (1970). The evolution of war; a cross – cultural study. Hraf Press U.S.A. Pg. 60-62.

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(5) Opcit Pg. 63

(6) Ibid Pg. 64

(7) Ibid Pg. 65

(8) Ibid Pg. 68, 69

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(10) NWECHUE RAPH: Africa Today Africa Books Limited (1991) Pg. 1666

(11) Ibid Pg. 1667

(12) Ibid Pg. 1676

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 THE UN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM I)

The proceeding chapter dealt with remote and immediate causes of war in Somalia. What appeared, in the beginning, like a mere struggle to replace deposed Barre, turned out to be one of the worst tragedies ever experienced in Africa. The chaos, the deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting as well as the extent of physical destruction compounded the problems and severely threatened stability in the Horn of African region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area[1].

Consequently, the UN had to come in by March 1991. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) formally came into effect in April 1991 and lasted up to March 1993. It was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and to provide protection and security for UN personnel and equipment. It was also to monitor the supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs.

In August 1992, UNOSOM's mandate and strength were enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian conveys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. In December 1992, when the situation in Somalia further deteriorated, the Security Council authorized Member States to form the United Task Force (UNITAF) to

establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNITAF worked in coordination with UNOSOM I to secure major population centers and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed.

The maximum strength reached by UNOSOM I was fifty four (54) military observers and eight hundred and ninety three troops, supported by international and local staff. Contributor countries interims of military and civilian police personnel were Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.

The amount of money said to have been expended on the UNOSOM I was forty two million, nine hundred thousand dollars (42.9 million).

However, right from the very beginning, the factions in Somalia did not seem to have confidence in the UN. This was partly because the UN did not seem to have a proper grasp of the real causes of the conflict in historical perspectives, and as such, were not in good position to make peace. There is also the likely hood that powerful states within the organization tried to establish Somalia as their strategic base in the Horn of Africa. This was sequel to the fact that during the reign of Said Barre, Somalia played a beautiful brides game to both now defunct USSR and its NATO opponent during cold war. This made the super powers suspicious of Somalia. Among others, this contributed a lot to the difficulties faced by the UN in Somalia.

One aspect of understanding the dimension of the UN's contributions in Somalia is through its humanitarian activities. Six main UN agencies, the Food and Agric Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organisation (WHO), were all in Somalia, trying to reduce the magnitude of human sufferings which was caused by the conflict[2]. As the violence and casualties increased, the weak economy of Somalia collapsed and much of its food production was destroyed. The violence also made foreign assistance impossible and foreign aid workers had to be evacuated. Thus the presence of UNOSOM I was considered by many as a failure because the situation continued to deteriorate. In November 1992, as thousands of Somalis were dying of starvation, and the fighting which caused the famine continued, the then US President George Bush (Snr.) offered to send US forces to Somalia to secure the delivery of humanitarian relief. This was endorsed by the UN Security Council in December 1992.

Thus the US-led military intervention called "Operation Restore Hope" came into force.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Somali National Movement (SNM) had already declared the Independence of Somaliland Republic in the north, which was relatively peaceful. But the world refused to recognize this independence. Due to this purported independence, they refused to cooperate with the UN or participate

in meetings with southern leaders. All these means that other dimensions relating to self-determination were being added to the conflict, in addition to the problem of governance and authority.

The UNOSOM I, ostensibly a traditional peacekeeping mission-demonstrated the limitations of classical peacekeeping in a hostile environment[3]. Securing the consent and cooperation of the parties involved proved difficult and tedious. To add to its mistakes, the UN authorized the expansion of the UNOSOM I to 3,500 and later 4,219 without consulting the parties. These actions antagonized the parties and jeopadised the initial agreement. Furthermore, there was little the mission could do to enhance a smooth operation given the fact that the central government in Somalia had collapsed and that the warring factions routinely attacked UN peacekeepers through guerilla tactics. As the crisis worsened, the UN peacekeeping force was unable to fulfill its mandate of monitoring the ceasefire, protecting the UN personnel and safeguarding its relief assistance activities.

4.2 THE UNOSOM II

The second and final phase of the UN operation in Somalia was the UNOSOM II, which was a failure both conceptually and operationally[4]. It was established to take over from UNITAF in March 1993. Even though it was termed a peacekeeping operation, the UNOSOM II was actually the first UN peace enforcement mission[5].

The UNOSOM II had a duration of two years that is March 1993-March 1995. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task began by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, Stability, low and order. Its main responsibility included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing resumption of violence, seizing unauthorized small arms, maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance, continuing mine-clearing and assisting in repatriation of refugees in Somalia. UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

The UNOSOM II had a maximum authorised strength of 28,000 military and civilian police personnel. There was also a provision for approximately 2,800 civilian staff between March 1993 – February 1994.

Contributors of military and civilian police personnel were Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bostwana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Therlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab

The envoy also had the functional mandate to persuade the Somali National Movement leader to abandon their secessionist bid, on his visit to Kismayo in Southern Somalia and Hargaya, the capital.

After reaching agreement with the warring the factions on the deployment of monitors for the cease five, the UN planned to bring in its guards to protect supply of relief materials. Under the UN special envoy to Somalia Mr. Mope Shanun, the technical mission was given the function to participate in monitoring both a cease fire signed by the main rival factions led by Gen. Farah Aideed, and interim President Ali Mahdi, and the distribution of humanitarian relief.

The factions however endorsed the agreement on a cease-fire, disarmament and a general agenda for a reconciliation. This agreement gave the functional responsibility of the cease fire and disarmament operation to UN. In carrying out this mandate, the UN (under the US's Operation Restore Hope) raided the Bakara arms market in Mogadishu, carting away several truckloads of light and heavy weapons. About 900 marines backed by armoured vehicles took part in the operation. As well, a smaller arms market called "Argentine market" was also raided.

The UN put forward a proposal for setting up a national government, at a peace-broker conference, which was signed by 15 Somali rival factions. A committee was set up and given the mandate to prepare a charter to define the form

of the central government. The central administration would also include setting up 18 autonomous regions in the country, including the break away northern Somalia. The proposal was a compromise between the majority factions which favoured a government with central autonomy and a minority led by Gen. Farah Aideed, which advocated for greater regional autonomy.

Somalians were put in serious anxiety as UN forces functionally bombed arms depots and radio station controlled by the major warlord, General Farah Aideed. Gun battle banged between the UN peacekeepers and armed factions loyal to Gen. Aideed.

While the US-led military aircraft continues unremitting attacks on targets around the General's headquarters in Mogadishu, the UN carried out the attacks in retaliation of the killing of Pakistani troops, which it blamed on General Aideeds militia men. But in a twist to the drama, the UN expanded this to include defeat of the Aideed forces.

Helicopter gunships manned by US moved into the headquarters and attacked arms depots and a former cigarette factory suspected to be a nest for snipers.

In reaction to these, Aideed and his supporters demonstrated outside the UN military headquarters chanting anti-American and anti-UN slogans. Hours after the demonstration, panicky Pakistani soldiers fired into the crowd killing 20 and

unknown Anti-America Islamic Salvation Movement has claimed responsibility for the American attack.

The occupation of Kismayu by the militia of Gen. Morgan was seen by Gen. Aideed and his supporters as having been "facilitated" by the Americans. Gripped by an Anti-American frenzy they spilled onto the streets of Mogadishu, half of which Gen. Aideed controlled. They put up barricades, using tyres and pelted the American troops with stones and metal scraps, and the French and Egyptian embassies were attacked and looted.

The conference attended by about 300 representatives of Somali Warlords and other interest groups, came amidst growing internal pressure on the warring factions to restore peace. The broad base nature of the conference was a deliberate attempt to break the political monopoly of the warring factions. Gen. Aideed walked out of the conference due to news reaching him on Gen. Morgan's occupation of Kismayu. Aideed had all blame on the American and coalition forces for supporting Gen. Morgan by not playing a neutral function in the War torn Somalia. The Aideed dominated Somali National Alliance had demanded the trial of Gen. Morgan, as a condition for it to return to the conference, in addition to the immediate withdrawal of UNISOM.

As a result of the continued disagreement between UNISOM and Gen. Aideed, UN and US forces began pulling out from the war-torn Somali capital Mogadishu. According to the commander of the US troops, Major-Gen. Thomas Muntgometry

"its hard when you come here to feed people and you wind up fighting for your life". Similarly South Korea also withdrew its military contingents to the UN force for fear of drastic changes that might threaten the security of the unit.

Issa Mohammed Said, Foreign Affairs Secretary for Gen. Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) disclosed in Mogadishu that "we are ready to sit down with factions in any discussion about Somalia, but what we refused to adhere to is foreigners to decide upon our future government". Contrary to this view, the UNISOM has made a new initiative for the formation of a transitional national council, which all the factions in Somalia agreed on, and ready for inauguration.

UNISOM was largely disappointed with the adamant attitudes of Gen. Aideed who refused to negotiate with it, and had stopped sending representatives to the weekly security advisory committee which brought together delegate's from main Somali Clans and UN officials. To Aideed, foreign interference in Somalia is antithetical to his wishes and therefore, he was not obliged to listen to UNISOM dictating for his people in Somalia.

4.4 BREAK DOWN IN PEACE PROCESS AND THE FACTORS RESPONSIBLE.

The break down in peace process and factors responsible in the Somali conflict can easily be traced to the ugly relationship between the warring factions and the UN, caused by negligence of the principles guiding peacekeeping operation.

The UN special envoy James Jonah stepped into Somalia with a mission to broker a ceasefire agreement between the warring factions. He held talks separately with the two main factional leaders, president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohammed Farah Aideed of the USC. Only Ali Mahdi Mohammed consented to peacekeeping force in Somalia, while General Aideed totally rejected and opposed any form of foreign military intervention, on the concrete ground that "it is entirely an internal conflict which only Somalis themsalves can resolve". It is noted here that one of the major factions in Somalia have refused to allow any form of military intervention by the UN.

While the UN's special envoy argued to the factions, especially Gen. Farah Aideed, that the UN presence in Somalia will only have the mission to distribute food and medicine to the starving Somalis. He supported this by presenting to the General, a 12 million dollars UN humanitarian aid plan to Somalia. Neither General Aideed nor president Mahdi would want to risk being called the "Butcher" of Mogadishu by turning down such a mouth-watering package for a population dying as much from hunger as from fire-spitting guns. This was the diplomatic means UN used to have the consent of the factions to have her presence registered in Somaliland.

The UN further requested from the warring factions, the need for ceasefire, and the deployment of monitors for the ceasefire. UN also planned to bring in UN

guards to protect the supply of relief materials, as well as to guarantee the safety of relief workers.

The relationship soon turned sour and Somalia was gulped with fear as UN team bombed arms depot and radio station controlled by War Lord, Gen. Farah Aideed. Gun battle between the UN peacekeepers and armed faction loyal to Gen. Aideed continued, while the US-led UN military aircraft continued unremitting attacks on targets around the General's headquarters in Mogadishu. The UN declared a mission of "defeat of Aideed forces" and also declared Gen. Aideed wanted with a price tag of $25,000 placed on his head.

Rightly, the fears of Gen. Aideed came true. The UN has totally deviated from the mission of relief distribution to "the defeat of Gen. Aideed and his forces". Thus peacekeeping has turned to "hunting of Gen. Aideed".

The UN had deliberately refused to pursue her mandated mission, but rather became a party to the dispute. The declaration of war against Gen. Aideed negates the process and principle of restoring peace.

The occupation of Kismayu by the militia of Gen. Morgan, a newly emerged major faction in the Somali dispute, while the UN forces folded their arms and watched, was being seen by Gen. Aideed and his supporters as having been "encourage" by the American dominated UN forces". This area (Kismayu) was very close to Gen. Aideed's base.

Here is another clear negation of the principle of neutrality. The UN offered a clear support to the newly emerged forces of Gen. Morgan and other factions, while Gen. Aideed was faced with different blows. The UN was seen to render support indirectly to other factions encouraging them against that of Gen. Aideed. The price tagged on the head of the General revealed all about UN's perverted mission in Somalia. They refused to play the role of peacekeepers, but that of a party or faction to the dispute.

All these culminated to the outright call by Gen. Aideed and his supporters for the withdrawal of UNISOM from Somalia. "It is Somali affair, which Somalis can solve themselves".

The UN's misplaced and perverted mission, lack of neutrality, her inability to reach an acceptable agreement with all warring factions, are factors that led to the UN's (UNISOM I & II) failure to restore peace in Somalia. UNOSOM lacked sincerity of purpose to most Somalis. It was Aideeds hunting, and not peacekeeping operation.

One fundamental issue which the UN Security Council failed to address was the arithmetic of political power in Somalia. General Aided was in the threshold of capturing political power and thus viewed the transitional mechanism as a threat to his position[7]. He simply viewed the UN peacekeepers as his enemies and thus power was being taken away from him. His action, while condemnable, must be

viewed within the parameters of the objective realities presented by the prevailing circumstance[8].

Thus, as an opposition leader, when General Aideed refused to cooperate with UNOSOM II, we must realize that he was afraid of his position. This therefore resulted in not only propaganda war against peacekeepers through his Radio Station, but also physical violence. "As a world body that could mobilize the best of brains in the world to confront any situation, we sincerely believe that the UN seemed to have had limited vision of the Somali episode. In our candid opinion, the transformation of UN peacekeeping operation from UNOSOM I to UNITAF worsened the crisis of confidence[9].

4.5 EFFECTS OF THE UN's FAILURE IN SOMALIA

The Somali war is certainly one of the worst conflicts ever experienced in the African continent. The war has had far reaching consequences on Somalia, Africa as well as UN's approach to peacekeeping operations. One fundamental consequence of the UN's experience in Somalia is that the US, and by extension other member states, were prompted to re-evaluate and re-define their peacekeeping policy. In may 1994 President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which established strict conditions for the US's participation in the UN and other peacekeeping operations and indicated that the US would reduce its UN peacekeeping assistance from 31 percent to 25 percent. The PDD-25 also indicated that the US would wield its power on the Security

Council to prevent the establishment of what is considered to be ill-defined and imprudent missions. Furthermore, the other four permanent members of the Security Council have largely taken cues from the US.

This consequence did not only have regional or continental significance, but was felt globally. For instance the direct ramification of this international community's retreat on peacekeeping was most pronounced in Rwanda. As a result of the failure to mobilize the necessary political will or the financial and human recourses, the international community failed to intervene to prevent the genocide that ensued unabated. In fact the Security Council initially responded to the spiral violence by reducing the authorized strength of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) by almost 90 percent from 2,548 to a mere 270[10].

Rwanda was however not the only casualty of this retreat on international peacekeeping by the international community. Generally, the UN Security Council has scaled down UN peacekeeping in both size and scope. Although the Council established 15 operations from 1995 to mid 1999, only four of these represented intervention in new conflicts. There is therefore a general reluctance on the part of the UN Security Council to authorized large scale and multi functional peacekeeping operations.

The loss of able-bodied Somalis as well as the unquantifiable property destroyed in the conflict cannot easily be forgotten as a direct consequence of the war. For instance the United State Accounting Office in its 1989 report, pointed that the

looting, jailing, rape and mass murder by the Somali Army from 1992 was widespread and that the Military bombarded populated areas in many parts of the country. The Africa Watch estimated the total killings during the period at more than 50,000. Since then there has been considerable evidence of mass graves around the major towns of Somali land[11].

However, despite all attempts by the UN, OAU the Arab League and other international organizations, the Somali conflict is still not over. Recently, an interim president, Abdulkasim Hassan Salad, was elected by an electoral college, comprising most of the parties to the conflict, to head the war-torn country, pending general elections.

Immediately after the said election in neighboring Djibouti, some of the parties out rightly rejected Salad. For instance the northern part of Somalia, who had earlier declared independence of the area in the name of Somaliland, have come out and condemned salad as being part and parcel of the dictatorial and discredited regime of Said Barre. The Somaliland forum recently asserted its statehood within the frontiers of the state of Somaliland as inherited from the colonial borders of British Somaliland. This can also be seen as a consequence of this historic conflict because of the relative peace enjoyed by the people in the area since 1995. In the Somaliland therefore, the vast majority of the people want independence not just peace settlement. But in the rest of Somalia (the former Italian colony), guns still

END NOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This attempt at examining the UN peacekeeping operation with particular reference to the Somali conflict has in no small measure exposed a lot of lessons and revelations with regards to the operations of the UN, its efforts towards maintenance of world peace and security and uncovered some of its areas of strengths as well as weaknesses in the area of peacekeeping. This chapter intends to review the earlier analysis made in this research work with a view to suggesting ways and means through which the UN can improve its performance in the discharge of its main objective of maintaining world peace and security.

5.2 SUMMARY

This research work started by reviewing the various views expressed by different scholars with regards to the concept of UN peacekeeping in general terms. The research was able to trace the power of the UN to maintain international peace and security from the charter establishing the organization. The work also discovered the political rivalry among member nations in UN peacekeeping operations and the power game using the **veto** clause enshrined in the charter.

Of vital importance in our findings, is the fact that the UN is based on the sovereign equality of all member states, and that the organization is not to

intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. This however, does not prejudice the application of enforcement action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

Our research has also been able to identify the roles played by the most important agencies of the UN in the operations of the organization, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The UN charter as we have seen, has empowered the General Assembly to discuss any matter within the scope of the UN charter or relating to the powers and functions of other organs of the organization. The Security Council on the other hand, is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining world peace and Security. In the discharge of its chief responsibility, the Security Council is empowered to use air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore world peace.

From the data collected, we have come to understand that the 15-member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and determines its mandate. It was revealed that such decision require at least nine votes in favour and are subject to a **veto** by any of the councils five permanent members. The financial requirements involved are normally taken care by member states in accordance with the charter.

However, this has often been a source of weakness to the organization. In almost all its operations, the UN depends on the voluntary contributions of member

states. If any member state fails to pay its contributions it looses nothing more than its right to vote in the General Assembly.

This research also identifies a major political problem, which often affects effective maintenance of world peace and security by the UN. This problem has to do with the **veto** embodied in the charter which prevents the Security Council from using force against anyone except by seven out of fifteen members, including the concurring votes of all the five permanent members.

From the data collected, the researcher was able pinpoint the remote and immediate causes of the war in Somalia. The most important remote factor in the Somali war was the fact that a homogenous society in terms of tradition, culture, tribe and even religion like Somalia, found itself being colonized by different colonial powers at different times in its history. These different colonial powers and their activities in the land, saw the beginning of suspicion and distrust among natives.

The immediate cause of the conflict however, had its roots from the authoritarian and corrupt regime of President Siad Barre. The maladministration that characterized Barre's government, the lack of social and economic development, the gross abuse of human rights, brute force, the policy of divide and rule, blatant corruption as well as nepotism ensure the emergence of irresistible opposition against Barre. In the process of challenging this dictatorial and corrupt regime of Barre, new dimensions had to come in. These new dimensions and

variables ensured that the struggle against Barre was not carried out by one organized force. With the demise of Barre in 1991, different warlords emerged, each struggling to capture political power.

The data collected shows that the UN went to Somalia to monitor ceasefire in Mogadishu, provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at seaport and airports of Mogadishu and ensure the safe supply and distribution of humanitarian relief materials. However, the research revealed that the UN operation in Somalia did not follow strictly, the process and principles of peacekeeping. They could not remain completely neutral in their operations. To a certain reasonable extent, they supported the factions of president Ali Mahdi Mohammad and that of General Morgan but remained antagonistic to General Aideed and made him the scapegoat of the Somali conflict.

The UN did not seek the full consent of the host state or factions on the mission of their presence in Somalia. Rather than providing a solution to the conflict, the creation of UNOSOM I and later II, further complicated the political question at stake in Somalia. The research also proved that the UN's functional role protected certain positions of some factions and parties to the war, and obliges the Aideed's faction to accept the result of defeat from other factions. Furthermore, the attempt to use force in its operation in Somalia, as evidenced in UNOSOM II, made matter worse.

Consequent upon all these, the UN's operation in Somalia proved to be a complete failure. The UN troops proved clearly incapable of keeping and maintaining peace in Somalia. UNOSOM I and II cost the UN a whopping sum of 42.9 million US dollars and 1.6 billion US dollars respectively.

From the findings of the research work, the answer to the hypothesis posed in chapter one of this work can be confirmed as follows:

(i) It has been confirmed that the internal peace of one or more state is fundamental to world peace and stability and vice versa. We have seen how the carnage in Somalia clearly threatened the peace in the Horn of Africa and by extension, the whole continent.

(ii) We have also confirmed that the contemporary peacekeeping realities renders the classical notion of peacekeeping largely ineffective and necessitates alternative strategies of conflict control. In this chapter an attempt will be made to propose some alternative strategies to avoid failure in future operations.

(iii) The research also confirmed that the failure of UN peacekeeping operations is a product of some of the structures in the peacekeeping system.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Sequel to the various findings made by this research work, I hereby recommend the following steps to avoid failure and enhance success in future UN peacekeeping operations.

1. The UN peacekeeping operation must, with all seriousness and as an antidote to future failure, strictly abide and comply with the principles of peacekeeping operations.

2. It is necessary that operational strategy and method to be adopted by peacekeepers should be in relation to the situation in the field. There should not be a stereotyped method of operation, since situations varies.

3. It is strongly recommended that the UN should have its ready-made forces, recruited, trained and kept under the auspices and control of the UN. The force should be specifically trained on peacekeeping and be drawn from all member nations on a representative formula. However due to the size of the troops that could be mobilized on world scale, the forces can be based on regional levels, to cater for the region's needs.

Of recent, the UN is now encouraging the emergence of regional giants to champion peacekeeping in their respective regions eg. Nigeria (ECOMOG) South Africa (SADACC) etc. One of the formidable lessons of the successful ousting of the John. Koromah-led military regime in Sierra-Leone is the fact that peacekeeping operation at a sub-regional level is feasible and realistic. And this in

a way lends credence to the UN in its assumption that regional and sub-regional organizations are important partners in the maintenance of global peace. It is highly recommended that the UN should go a step further in establishing its own force in each region.

4. Closely related to the above, the UN should work out modalities of operation where regional organizations like the OAU, EU, NATO etc can work in conjunction with the UN's forces to maintain and keep peace in their respective regions. It is envisaged that this will go a long way in:

(i) Eradicating the unwillingness of member states to provide troops for peacekeeping operation.

(ii) Eradicating the fear from factions or host states or conflicting parties of foreign interference in their internal affairs and threat on their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Host state may easily accept such forces because they are made up of troops from their very region. The story is likely to change when the troops are drawn from far away especially from the super powers.

5. It is also recommended that the UN peacekeeping should use a preponderance power against an identified aggressor who violate and abuses human rights in a conflict or war.

6. Funding of UN activities particularly peacekeeping operations need to be given special attention. I strongly recommend that new patterns of funding have to

be evolved in order to save peacekeeping operations from financial embrassement. Funds may be sourced through donations made by corporate bodies, individuals and governments. It is clearly evident that member-state's funding of the UN is lopsided, with the super powers particularly USA, contributing such large sum of funds which makes it possible for it to over-influence all UN activities. Participating nations, as argued by General Erskine (1991), can at times be asked to maintain their troops until such a time when the authorizing organization would be buoyant enough to write off the expenses.

7. It is also recommended that consultations and compromise should be encouraged by the UN and really be held in high esteem. The beauty of this is that when countries participating in peacekeeping consult among themselves and allow for compromise, the level of cohesion they will exhibit in the course of managing a peacekeeping mission will be high. Tendencies such as making contradictory statements or sabotage, which weakens group cohesion and thereby arming a recalcitrant regime or faction are likely to be eliminated. The principle is however not time or stage specific. It is supposed to be adhered to until an operation runs its course.

8. Closely related to the point raised above is the fact that peacekeeping operations are generally difficult assignments. For an operation to be worthwhile, it is recommended that all participating countries must agree on the central objectives and strategies to accomplish them. Additionally, all nation–states must

know how many troops and in what combinations they can spare. The USA knew how many troops she could spare for Somali operation and their requirements. But when the objectives appeared unachievable, she pulled out and seduced the UN to inherit the messy situation.

9. It is also recommended that the Security Council should harness the UN operations by accepting and acting based on situational field report from the field commander. In situations of emergency and gross violation of human rights however, the field commander should be given the power to use military action. This will remove the regulatory mechanism, which may be unnecessary during situations of emergency.

5.4 CONCLUSION

From this research work, it has been clearly established, that the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia was a failure. Beyond Somalia, peacekeeping is generally becoming weaker and if nothing concrete is done urgently, especially with the sudden emergence of a unipolar structure after the cold war, the entire UNO is facing a threat of total collapse like its predecessor, the League of Nations.

Although the UN has tried in preventing the out break of major wars, the reason is not far fetched. It was able to do this because the parties in conflict and their communities are the weaker third world and developing nations who do not have strong military powers. With the method of UN peacekeeping operation

today, the UN may not be able to prevent an outbreak of a major war when great powers are involved.

However, one fundamental question that needs to be serious addressed is on how the UN can regain relevance as the world entered a new millennium. The unipolar world has dealt a fundamental blow to the UN as a collective security system, and unless a way is found to restrain the propensity to unilateralism of the only present super power, the United Nations may be shunted aside into a second rate position in the matter of protecting world peace and security. Unless a way is found to re-impose respect for the principles that the UN stand for, or re-formulate them to conform with the new unfolding reality, the United Nations will progressively lose effectiveness as an instrument for world peace and security in this millennium.

In fairness to the UN however, our research findings should not be used to completely write off the UN as a total failure. Since its inception, the UN has recorded commendable achievements particularly in the area of conflict resolutions rather than its prevention. It is to the credit of the UN that since 1945, the world has not witnessed any major war in the real sense of the word.

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