FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

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A Thesis Submitted to the Post-Graduate School', Ahmadu Bello University, in Partial Fulfilmment of the Requirement for the Degree of doctor of phylosophy (History).

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DECEMBER. 1991

D E C L A R A T I O N

I, Ogaba Danjuma Oche, declare that the materials used in this study are genuine and the research findings have not been submitted to any other institution or establishment nor any publication made out of the study for public consumption

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D E D I C A T I O N

To Papa, without whose unending insistence the mere thought of pursuing a degree as advanced as this would not so much as have flickered in my mind, and

To Mama, Ori, Agwube, and Oche for their encouragement.

COMPLETE TEXT DIGITIZED

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

My gratitude and appreciation go to two people without whom this thesis would definately not exist in it's present form.

Firstly my sincere thanks go to my Supervisor, Dr. W.L. Hinjari, for his guidance and insightful criticisms especially in relation to the "level of analysis problem" which dogs many students of the social sciences. His comments were like breaths of fresh air in this lonely academic quest.

I am also grateful to Mr. Nathaniel Okama for painstakingly typing this work. His speed and meticulousness were simply astounding.

ABSTRACT

This study has been undertaken to investigate the causes that underly the inability of the OAU to successfully resolve interstate conflicts that have bedevilled the continent of Africa. The study holds the assumption that African states are products of colonial: and as such, most if African conflicts (which are largely disput- over territory) have their root causes in colonialism, A situation has otherefore arisen whereby the component states of the African regionalsystem ina constant attempt to redefine their boundaries.

The OAU, which is *seen* as the organizational representation of the African regional system, advocates a maintenance of the status quo, as at the time of indi i ce, as a means of averting slaims and counter - claims to the redefinition of boundaries which could lead to chaos, This insistence on the status quo however has not succeeded in preventing the delopment cf conflicts which have attracted intervention a n d b y external powers.

This scenario establishes the fact that the C regional system a r e not o n l y m u t u a l l y a f f e c t i n g b u t a l s political p h e n o m i n a a f r i c a n r e g i n a l s y s t e m a r e a c t e upon by forces external to th< system. It therefore becames imperative when analysing intra - African politic: to place it within the larger global context in order to have & more comprehensive understanding of interacting variables that affect the political phenomena being observed.

Within this broad framework of sis this study has attempted to investigate the ineffectiveness of the OAU at resolving

conflicts within the contexts of the African and the global state systems.

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CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic that the contemporary structure and configuration of African States is a direct result of imperialism and colonialism. Much of the process of interaction between African states, in their peaceful and especially conflictual aspects, can also be attributed to the forces of imperialism and colonialism. Ready examples of the conflictual aspect, which this researdh deals with, tend to manifest themselves in the various civil wars, liberation struggles, violence resulting from military coups detat, boundary disputes, and wars of secession that have become characteristic of African politics.

In order to have a clear understanding of this state of affairs, it is necessary to briefly reflect back on the history of Africa. The demarcation of Africa's spheres of influence in order to facilitate the penetration and subsequent exploitation of Africa and her resources was formalized at the Berlin conference of 1884-85. According to Arthur Gavshon

> "the map makers ruled straight lines on school atlases, carving up huge chunks of Africa into neat colonial compartments. In effect, this division set the illogical frontiers that now demarcate the states of post-colonial Africa"[1]

Needless to say, the result is the motley of state that now now make up Africa. Of the boundaries that demarcate African states today 44% of them run along parallels and meridians 30% are direct lines, arcs or curves, and a mere 26% derive from natural boundaries such as mountains, valleys etc.[2]

The haphazard manner in which the boundaries were drawn not only brought into being the territorial entities that we referred to as states in Africa, but the genesis of many inter-state conflicts can be traced to this phenomenon. This claim is not an attempt to deny the fact that conflict (and peace) is an inherent aspect of human interactions, nor the fact that conflict constitute one of the axioms of inter - state relations. It is, however, evidential that imperialism as manifested in the Berlin conference as well as colonialism did bring about a halt to an independent process of state formation that was occuring in Africa. It could be further argued that if this independent process of state formation had been allowed to proceed there would have been, at least, a reduction in the number of conflicts that we have in Africa today. Walter Rodney, putting if quite lucidly, stated that

> "colonialism blocked the further evolution of national solidarity, because it destroyed the particular Asian or African states which were the principle agents for achieving the liquidation of fragmented loyalties" 3

Rodney further specifies that colonialism used force to either eliminate or suppress the surviving feudal states of North Africa, and that the French wiped out the moslem states of the Western Sudan, Dahomey and some Kingdoms in Madagascar. The British also eliminated the Mahdist Sudan, Asante, Benin, the Yoruba Kingdoms, Swaziland, Matabeleland, and the East Africa lake kingdoms.[4]

The products of this process of transformation have been aptly reffered to as "state based territorialism "[5] largely because the majority of the states are not conterminious with nations.

The boundary demarcation process did not take into consideration the heterogeneous composition of African ethnic groups. Thus a salient feature of boundary demarcations in Africa is the fact that one or more ethnic groups may overlap the boundaries of different states.

It has been argued that pre - colonial African states were characterized by a balance in terms of the multiplicity of ethnic groups with fairly equal power distribution within one state or the preponderance of one or more ethnic groups within a state.[6] As we observed above, this balance was radically altered by the penetration of western forces. Thus, with the sole and significant example of Somalia which has just one ethnic group, the generality of African "state - based terriforialisms" tend to possess a multiplicity of ethnic groups that frequently overlap between states.

This provides an explanation for the alien nature of African state boundaries. Alien in the sense that they were superimposed on pre-existing state structures regardless of the geographical and territorial definitions of these states, and alien in the sense that they were superimposed by extraneous forces in order to facilitate a given end which was the systematic exploitation of Africa's resources. This background provides the basis for an understanding of the fragility of African states.

With the independence of African states from the late 1950's through the 1960's came the break up of the European colonial empire in Africa. There was the severance of direct political control over the former colonial territories, but with their huge investments

and interests the former colonial powers have persisted in maintaining indirect control over the African governments. This type of leverage manifests itself in different forms. In it's mildest forms economic and political influence are utilized and in it's more extreme manifestation direct military intervention is a feasible recourse.

With the attainment of this shadowy form of independence, turbulence in the form of conflicts has attended the political relations between many African states. These conflicts can be traced to a variety of causes, but most of them arise from boundary disputes. It has been estimated that 32 boundary disputes in Africa were, as at 1970, unresolved.[7] This figure may represent only a fraction of the potential sources of conflicts in Africa.

Regardless of the causes, or nature of these conflicts, they nevertheless present ample opportunities for intervention by extraneous powers; namely the former European colonizing powers, and the newer and more powerful entrants to the African political scene; the United states and the Soviet Union.

A very brief overview might serve to illustrate the cluttered nature of conflicts and interventions on the African continent.

At different times France, Belgium, Morocco, South Africa, Cuba, Uganda and Libya have either directly intervened in African conflicts or engaged in cross-border incursions as the case might be.

The conflict in the Western Sahara, which Morocco is trying to annex, and which is suspected to contain large deposits of phosphates and strategic minerals, has not only invited direct French intervention but has also brought Morocco and Algeria to the verge of war.[8]

Libya has intervened unsuccessfully in Egypt, Sudan, Niger, Uganda, Tunisia, the Central African Republic, the Western Sahara and Chad.[9] Ethiopia, with the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union fought to suppress Eritrean and Somali seperatism. Idi Amin's Uganda invaded Tanzania only to be repelled. There have been civil wars in Nigeria, Chad, and Angola. On numerous occasions, the racist government of South Africa has launched raids into the neighbouring states of Mozambique and Angola.[10] One, therefore, gets a very concise picture of the conflicts that have chequered the continent of Africa.

It was in an attempt to prevent, contain, or to resolve such conflicts that the member states of the organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.). at it's founding in 1963, incorporated certain principles into it's charter. The principles which the African nations pledged to observe in Article III of the charter include:

(1) The sovereign equality of members states.

(2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states

(3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.

(4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.

(5) Unreserved condemnation of subversive activities

(6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the dependent African territories.

(7) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.[11]

With specific regard to realizing the desire to settle all disputes between member states by peaceful means the Comission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was set up. Nevertheless the intractable nature of certain conflict situations, coupled with the deliberate and premeditated interventions of foreign powers in pursuit of their interests has rendered the peaceful resolution of conflicts, which was envisaged by the founding fathers of the OAU at best a Herculean task.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

The OAU was established primarily to provide a framework within which common African problems could be solved and policies developed or disputed. It was also established to provide a forum for the release of inter-African tensions. As stated in the charter of the OAU, it was to serve as the primary organisation within which disputes between African states can be resolved peacefully.

At the time of the founding of the OAU a substantial number of African states had been granted political independence. As noted earlier, African interstate relations came to be inundated by claims and counter - claims to boundary as well as territorial readjustment not to mention secessionist and irredentist movements which by and large resulted in conflicts. As also, noted earlier, three pivotal principles that were incorporated into the OAU charter were:

(1) Non - interference in internal affairs of states

(2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.

(3) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

The first two principles established the OAU recognition of the invi olability of the member states as they emerged after independence. The third principle ,as is self evident, advocates peaceful means by which African conflicts should be resolved; basically within the framework of the OAU.

Given this scenario the OAU, in the decade of the sixties, actually recorded commendable successes at ameliorating; if not resolving, conflicts within or between states. Worthy of note is the position taken by the OAU in the Nigeria - Biafra civil war. The importance of the OAU's position lay mainly in it's proclamation against the recognition of Biafra by member states and external powers, thereby making it difficult for any foreign power to side directly with Biafra. The OAU also succeeded in resolving the dispute between Algeria and Morocco which involved claims by Morocco over parts of the Algerian Sahara.[12]

With the advent of the 1970's and 1980s the earlier successes of the OAU have become eclipsed by very apparent failures in the areas of conflict resolution. The inability of the OAU to constitute an effective forum for the resolution of conflicts has proved to be it's most salient disability. It is assumed by some that the OAU is no longer a serious forum for resolving conflicts and disputes

by African leaders. Instead of performing such a function there has been a markedreverse tendency towards politicizing the resolution of conflicts within the OAU. The failure of two attempts to hold summits in Tripoli, Libya, in 1982 present glaring examples of this.

The impotence of the OAU in resolving regional conflicts is further exacerbated by the factor of foreign intervention. This is a factor that has become charasteristic of African conflicts. The OAU has unfortunately demonstrated neither the disposition nor the capability to stem it.

Considering the fact that the OAU, as a regional organization represents an extension of state power rather than a challenge to it, the problem lies in the extent to which it can act as an effective regulator of interstate conflict. Based on this consideration the problem from which this research derives is the inability of the OAU to successfully resolve or control inter-state African disputes. The objective of the research, therefore, is to attempt to find possible solutions to this problem in order to strengthen the OAU as a regional organisation.

1.3 STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses that I have developed for this study are premised on the axiom that the OAU, as the institutional representation of the African regional system, has it's functions regionally defined, in that it's focus of operation is within the environment of the African regional system. This system is itself acted upon by forces extraneous to it, viz, forces within the global international system.

The hypotheses are:

(1) The ineffectiveness of the OAU at conflict resolution is partially a consequence of an institutional characteristic. This characteristic involves a low level of discretionary powers below the level of the Assembly of Heads of state and Governments.

(2) The diffused nature of power at the strategic decision making level of the Assembly of Heads of state and Governments increases the likelihood of a politicized decision making process. This is a derivative of the fact that states enter international organizations with a view to enhancing their national interests or, at a minimum, to protect them.

(3) A conflict resolution process that is augmented by the manifestation of power by the international organization, e.g a multinational force, will lead to a greater restraint towards (a) the intensification of the conflict by both disputants, and hence (b) the propensity of either disputant to seek foreign intervention.

1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Taking the global international system as a whole, there are various levels of analysis upon which a study can focus. These levels include the total international system, international

organizations, regions, nation - states, domestic groups etc. Because the topic under study is the O.A.U., the level of analysis. For this reason functionalism, with its emphasis on the formation of international organizations and their peace promoting roles, serves as an adequate theoretical framework.

In essence functionalism posits that the performance of functional tasks by individual states can be redirected or given up to international organizations thereby providing, in embryonic form, the development of institutions that will direct the activities of states away from warfare toward functional or task oriented interdependence, and subsequent integration. Thus functionalism, as opposed to the power or realist theory of politics, carries a utopian content because there is the implicit proposition that warfare can be reduced if not eliminated altogether. While realism gives primacy to competition and conflict as the principle features of international politics, functionalism opposes the assumption that individual state interests are primary, and attempts to substitute that thesis by the argument that through active, peace - oriented co-operation, war can be avoided.

James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff outline two assumptions upon which theories of functionalism and integration developed.

The first is that:

> "Political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system". 13.

Factors that underpin the cohesiveness of such systems include "procedural consensus" or general agreement as regards the framework of the system and the processes whereby resolutions are made, and "substantive consensus" or general agreements concerning the resolutions or outputs of the system.

The second assumption states that:

> "Political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence or threat of force" 14

In other words the advocates of functionalism argue that the usurpation of power by an international organization will not only result in an increase in the organizations cohesiveness but will also increase the organizations ability to control conflict between its member states.

The theory of functionalism has been dichotomized by various writers as either a process (David Mitrany[15] Ernst Haas[16]) or a condition (Amitai Etzioni[17], Michael Haas[18]). Some scholars even see it as both (Donald J. Puchala[19]). As a process the theory focuses on the dynamic of states coming together to attain the end goal of integration. In this respect the theory concentrates on the functional needs that compel states

to come together, as well as factors that can accelerate or impede this process of integration among states to form an international organization.

As a condition the theory focuses on the achieved state of integration which is institutionalized by the formation of an international organization. In this respect the theory looks at the component structures of the organization and their functions. In addition the theory looks at the extent to which such organizations are capable of fulfilling the functional needs of its member states, and to promote peace between it's member states.

In rejecting what he calls the "doctrinaire determinism" of realist and world government theorists, Inis claude (1970) clearly presents certain philosphical assumptions that underpin the formation and operation of international organizations. Fundamentally, theorists of international organization hold the thesis that states are not captives of a certain destiny but have the freedom and means to shape the relationship between states, even if the present international system remains constant in it's fundamentals, hence the international state system is malleable [20]

Claude identifies a nexus between the movement to alter international relations through international organizations, and the liberalist ethos which presents the possibility of making economic and social reform through the political means of democracy. Liberalism postulates that men are not inexorably constrained by the laws of a social system - that however compelling may be the restraints and determinants imposed by the structure of the arena within which they operate, men yet retain the possibility of empirical manoeuvering within the limits of the system and perhaps of achieving the ultimate transformation of the system [21]

When elevated to the level of international relations therefore, the international organization becomes the institutional expression of liberalism based on the assumption that there is room for some freedom of action within the international system.

The following is a literature review on the theory of functionalism.

1.2: FUNCTIONALISM AS A PROCESS

In his seminal work on functionalism written between the two world wars David Mittrany argued that the problem faced by the states of the world was one of coming together based on a commonality of interests without actually infringing upon the interests of each, He acknowledged the existence of diverse and sometimes conflicting interests among states but argued that this could be circumvented by

> "binding together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common" 22

The functional dimension, which is conterminous with the common interests of states, would in effect determine the form of institution that would develop at the international level. Those institutions, which would comprise experts in specific functions from different countries, would lead to a percieved dissolution of international boundaries as different countries come together in the performance of certain functions. Mitrany envisage the net result of such functiona cooperation to be the proliferation of various functional organization at the international level and ultimate world peace.

This state of peace, he adds, cannot be attained unless the state agree to give up some degree of sovereignty to the functional organisation. He describes the sovereignty to be transferred as inclusive of some of the functions already performed by the state, the most important of which is security. He argues that

> "There can be no real transfer of sovereignty that is necessary until defense is entrusted to a common authority ..... By entrusting an authority with a certain task carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority" 23.

Mitrany was therefore concerned not only with the process of international interaction, but also with the process whereby power is actually transferred from the states to the international organization.

Ernst Haas argues that the functionalist theory contains prescriptive aspects in that it claims to have identified the causes of the "unwanted" aspects of international society as well as the mean to attain "a normatively superior state of affairs". To this extent he describes functionalism as a reformist ideology that involves the

entrustment of tasks to international agencies that would have functional jurisdiction. The result would be integration and growth in the number of functional agencies that would relieve the national governments of the performance of certain tasks. This, he argues further, would lead to the evolution of a "universal welfare orientation", and a general reduction in the propensity of states to go to war. As a corollary to this he contends that integrative experiences and success in one functional content will be transferred to other functional contents that giving rise to the "spill over" phenomenon [24].

Haas acknowledges the contention that rages among scholars as regards the definition of the term "integration" as referring to a process or a condition. In his terms integration is defined as

> "a process that links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible further concrete system. If the present international scene is concieved of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments.... then integration would describe the process of increasing the interaction and mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environments provided by their nation-state members" 25

Michael Clarke in his article, uses the broad concept of transnationalism and contends that it provides the basis for the development of wther concepts such as interdependence, integrationism, international organization and regime construction, in addition to world order theories.[26]

He attributes the growth in the phenomenon of transnationalism and it's study to three main reasons. Firstly, he maintains that the posts world war two period provided an essentially stable

economic and political global condition that permitted the development and spread of transnational organizations. This, he further contends, produced a triple system of relationships whereby states interacted among themselves, states interacted with the transnational organization, and a new system of transnational organizations interacting among themselves [27].

Secondly, the rapid revolution in transportation and communications catalyzed the process of the formation of international organizations and it similarly had an impact upon the role being played by international organizations in world affairs [28]

The third reason he gives is that the phenomenon of transnationalism became of methodological importance to scholars because

> "transnational organizations have more specific functions than states, a narrower index of power (financial assets, membership etc) and a clearer criterion of growth. Thus the susceptibility of transnational phenomena to measurement suggested that greater rigour would be possible than was normally the case in studying state - centric affairs " 29

Clarke contends that the significance of transnationalism in world affairs can be determined by it's impact on the structure and processes of the international system. Structurally transnationalism can be been as the development and proliferation of international organizations, which on their own represents the introduction of new structures in what was a traditionally nation-state international system [30]. This gives credence to the arguments that the structure and component units of the international system are in a constant state of flux.

In process terms, the impact of transnationalism is encapsulated in the concept of interdependence which, Clarke argues, is a reflection of the complexity of the modern world. This is exhibited by the process involving the linkage of the domestic interests of various states "which are percieved as being costly to break"[31].

Robert J. Lieber defines integration as basically "forming parts into a whole or creating interdependence"[32]. Lieber states that integration can be analysed from two perspectives. The first is that of the process or condition of integration within a single country, and the second pertains to the process of integration between two or more separate countries[33].

Lieber argues that the theory of functionalism is premised upon a pluralistic thesis which posits that

> "a larger community can be developed if crucial expectations, ideologies and behavioral patterns of certain Key groups can be successfully refocused on a new set of central symbols and institutions. Once crucial tasks are given to a supranational body, the interdependence of the economic processes will produce pressure for the granting of further supranational powers involving regulation and adjustments in order to meet successfully the tasks required by the initial shift of powers" 34

Flowing from this thesis Lieber points out the assumption held by some scholars that due to the absence or lack of development of certain preconditions, the attempts at integration will either meet with little success, or proceed at a very slow pace if applied to less developed countries. These preconditions include a high level of socio - economic demands. which are generated by an advanced industrial base and urbanization, economic development, a pluralist social structure, and a low level of ideological politics.

These factors, such scholars contend, were found wanting in the less developed countries [35].

But Lieber makes the interesting point that regardless of such hypothetical preconditions, integrative efforts among the less developed countries have not altogether failed, and some have in fact proved successful. He attributes such success to the fact that many underdeveloped countries are geographically small and as such possess narrow resource bases, which in effect limits their ability to industrialize. Thus he argues that

> "the necessity for the material benefits of integration may be so compelling as to force nations into integrative efforts regardless of the inappropriateness of certain background conditions" [36]

In a highly abstract article, Amitai Etzioni (1969) utilizes the epigenetic (or accumulation) approach to describe the growth of international organizations. He describes this approach as one in which the unit or organization exists in it's embryonic form and, over time, different parts whichperform different functions are added on (or accumulate) until the entire unit is complete [37].

Etzioni uses three perspectives in the analysis of the epigentic formation of international organizations, which are, the locus of power, initiation, take off and spill over, and the sequence of epigenesis.

As regards the "locus of power", he maintains that attention should be concentrated on the extent to which power is equally distributed among the component units of the organization, or is concentrated within a few units. He refers to this as the degree of elitism. He argues that the degree of elitism should be treated as a continuum because an international community may be formed in a variety of ways;

> "a new community is formed when a nation more powerful than the other potential members guides' the unification process"

He adds that

> "while many organizations might be established by one or a few elites, the control center of others is formed through a merger of many units, each contributing a more or less equal part" 38

Treating the concepts of initiation, take off, and spillover he applies them primarily to the initiation or formation of the international community to the point whereby the organization becomes self sustaining. These correspond roughly to *movements* initiating integration, the establishment of an international bureaucracy, and the spillover or "secondary priming involving the fusion of functional organizations that underwent separate epigenetic developments 39

Concerning the sequence of epigenesis Etzioni argues that

> "the sector most responsive to the functional needs of the individual societies that are merging will come first in the unification sequence" 40

He contents further that after take off unification would be expected to proceed on the basis of the needs of the emerging political community rather than on the internal needs of the merging units. The degree of unification of the emergent political community would therefore be a function of the extent to which the member units share common needs.

In his book titled Political Unification (1965) Amitai Etzioni defines a political community as one that possesses three kinds of integration; an effective control over the use of the means of violence; a center of decision making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community , and finally that the community is the dominant focus

of political identification [41] If precise measures could be developed then assertions about the level of integration of a particular international system would amount to a composite score of the three kinds of integration.

Using the concepts monofunctional organizations, bloc, empire, and political community as major international system types, Etzioni postulates that a close relationship exists between political integration and the "social scope" of that international system type. By social scope Etzion refers to "the number of social sectors of the member units that the shared system penetrates (e.g only military or both military and economic) and the importance of these sectors to the survival of the units and the realization of their interests "[42]. This leads him to hypothesize that "the higher the level of integration the broader the scope"[43].

Phillipe Schmitter posits that the best means of determing wether an international institution is actually gaining or loosing in the scope or level of it's authority is through a conceptual method involving a series of "crisis provoked decisional cycles"[44]. Such cycles, which can either be internally or externally induced, compel the nations and the regional authority to collectively revise their strategies and to determine wether to expand or contract the authority of the regional institution. Schmitter argues that if a regional organization fails to respond to a crisis then it has disintegrated. On the other hand if it does respond by utilizing previous strategies then it has attained a state of "stable self maintenance"[45].

Schmitter goes on to provide six alternative responses which and international organization can give. These are (1) spillover, or an increase in both the organization's scope and level of committment (2) Spillaround, or to increase the scope while holding the level of authority constant, (3) Build up, or to increase the decisional autonomy of the organization while denying it entry into new issue areas, (4) retrench, or to increase the level of joint deliberations between the states and the organization but denying the organization entry into certain areas, (5) muddle - about, or to let the bureaucrats of the organization debate and make a wide variety of suggestions on issues but to decrease the actual power to allocate values, (6) Spill - back, which involves a retreat in both the scope of function and the level of authority of the organization to a status-quo ante situation [46].

In another publication Ernst Haas describes political community as a state of affairs characterized by " the likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic claims"[47]. He contends that the process of attaining this condition among nation - states is called integration. In this case Haas uses conflict resolution as an indicator for judging process towards integration.

Haas posits that an inspectron of negotiation processes in international organizations reveals three distinct modes, each indicative of a certain measure of integration. The first type, which is typical of classical diplomatic negotiations is that of accomodation on the basis of the "minimum common denominator".

This is a process whereby antagonists negotiate by exchanging concessions that is of roughly equal value. The minimum common denominator , or the extent beyond which the transactions will not go, is equivalent to what the least cooperative bargainer wishes to concede. The second mode, accomodation by splitting the difference, is similar to the first but the services of a mediator in the form of 'a secretary general or ad hoc group is employed. In this case the final bargaining positions are struck, and conflict is not resolved on the basis of the least common denominator [48]. Such a mode of negotiation it associated with international economic organizations where gains and losses are indicated in monetary terms. The final mode involves accomodation on the basis of elevating the common interests of the antagonists. This procedure comes closest to political community because the "parties succeed in redefining their conflict so as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national governmental agency" [49]. In terms of method this process involves the participation of institutionalized mediators with an autonomous range of powers. Haas stresses that each of the three modes of negotiation not only relate to an intensity of integration, but is also characterized by a specific institutional mechanism.

Johan Galtung defines integration as "the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor". He distinguishes between two types of integration; one "whereby a new actor of the same kind is created, and integration that leads to a new actor of a different kind" [50]

The first category involves a fusion of actors as is the case when two municipalities come together to form a bigger one. An example of the second category would involve two or more nations coming together to form a supranational organization.

Galtung's definition of integration encompasses two dimensions. The first deals with the changing internal relations between the original actors, which brings into question the capability of the original actors to produce a new actor. The second dimension deals with the external relations of both the original and new actor to other actors, which raises the question of the recognition that will be accorded to the new actor by other actors in the environment.

The consequence of the cross cutting of these two dimensions and their questions is the emergence and refinement of two frequently used concepts; domain and scope. Domain refers to the number of people involved in the integration. Galtung dichotomizes between internal domain, or the number of actors that the new actor is capable of absorbing, and external domain which is the number of actors that recognize the new actor. Similarly scope, which refers to the number of functions involved in the integration, is dichotomized. By internal scope, Galtung means the scope of internal interactions necessary to maintain the capability of functioning of the new action. On the other hand external scope means the scope of interaction with external actors [51]

Galtung argues that the integrative process is only complete when there is a coincidence of internal and external domains, or when "the images formed by self (new actor) and by others coicide" [52]

Integration is therefore better understood as a two-way dynamic involving the accretion of original actors, and the critical recognition by external actors of the formation of a new actor.

Galtung further distinguishes between geographical, and functional or social integration. In the former case actors integrate because they are in geographically contiguous territory while in the latter case there is pre-existing social relations before interaction takes place. These social relations may either be of a concrete type involving interdependence, interaction and exchange, or it may be of an abstract nature where nothing needs to be exchanged such as ethnic affinity [53].

Using nations as the building blocs of the integrative process Galtung determines three principal patterns. First, there is territorial integration on the basis of vicinity or geographical closeness, secondly, there is organizational or vertical integration which involves joining nations together on the principle of division of labour. This, he says, is usually referred to as (neo.) colonialism. Lastly, there is associational or horizontal integration whereby nations come together for reasons of affinity or similarity. This is usually referred to as functionalism, and it results in the formation of international governmental organizations [54]. Using sophisticated hypothetical formulations Galtung concludes that in the contemporary would organizational and associational integration tend to increase more rapidly than the territorial types.

In his article, Charles Pentland tries to develop a broad conceptualization of integration in which functionalism is primary.

sfines integration as "the process whereby two or more states
a new entity which can in some sense be described as a political
munity "[55]. This definition gives rise to two basic questions;
: kind of community results from the process of integration, and
: conditions aid or retard the process of integration?

As regards the first question he separates the contending schools thought into those who argue that integration results in the rmation of a supra-national authority, and those who argue that s result is a form of international community characterized by creased interaction and cooperation across state boundaries. He abels these two general views as the "state model "and the "community model" respectively.

As regards the second question pentland similarly discerns two trends. On the one hand there are those scholars that argue in favour of such factors as technology, economy, and society as the prime catalysts of integration. On the other hand there are those who emphasize the primacy of politics, and the activities of political elites in propelling integration [56]

Based on these cross - cutting distinctions he identifies two major schools of thought on international integration. The first and oldest is federalism which basically posits the distribution of power between two or more levels of government in an ungoverned international system [57]. The second school of thought is pluralism, and it's thesis is that the integrated political community represents a set of independent states between whom interaction and communication is so intense that war, as a means of conflict resolution, becomes inconcievable [58]. The intesnity of interactions is supposed to

represent the structural bonds of an integrated community. The third school of thought is functionalism. Itfs whole point, Pentland argues, is the "flexible creation and adaptation of institutions to social and economic needs"[59]. This presents the picture of a network of organizations that caters for specific sets of social, and economic needs.

Neofunctionalism, which is the last approach, holds the assumption that the integration of a particular sector of the international economy under a supranational authority will have "spill-over" effects causing other sectors to become integrated in similar manner. This should result in the ultimate formation of a single economy governed by a single supra-national authority.[60]

Pentland argues that functionalism still retains a major position among the four approaches by citing five contributions of functionalism to international integration theory. First, it represents a more realistic middle - range theory "between the high road of model building and the low road of 'pure induction". Secondly, functionalism measures the success of integration by the quality and problem solving nature of policy outputs, rather than establishing quantifiable measures of structures and processes. Thirdly, functionalism focuses on the "non-controversial," need related aspects of international society thereby precluding the intrusion of politics[61]. Fourthly, in terms of envisioning an end state of integration, functionalism is flexible because it is is need related and constricted by the bounds of the state. They assume that different needs will give rise to a variety of institutional forms, which are also subject to change at different speeds. As a corollary to the above, functionalism serves to direct

the attention of scholars from seemingly malfunctional organizations to more hopeful ones [62].

1.42 FUNCTIONALISM AS A CONDITION

Michael Haas analyzes international organization within the context of a structural functional approach to international relations. He describes international organizations loosely as consisting of "inter governmental institutions , members of which percieve each other to be basic units of the the world polity"[63]. He maintains that an institutional organization can be analyzed as a dichotomous variable. As a dependent variable it reflects world organization, and as an independent variable it is capable of altering world organization [64].

Michael Haas also identifies eight functions that are performed by international systems which he subsumes under two categories. Under the category of input functions he includes articulation, aggregation, socialization, recruitment, and transaction. Under the category of output functions he includes rule making, rule application, and rule supervision. A description of structures that perform these function range from the level of particularistic units to universal organisations [65].

The inputs into international organizational structures would generally consist of internationally relevant demands which would be made by national decision makers and spokesmen for non - governmental, regional or universal organizations. On the output side Haas distinguishes between two types of rules; procedural rules which specify the constitutional structures and practices through which inputs flow, and substantive rules which are outputs of the political system in terms of reward allocation,

and the resolution of conflicting interests[66]. He argues that international organizations do engage in substantive rule making but that the institutionalization of such rule making functions is at a low level because the rules are hardly ever observed[67].

Karl W. Deutch describes integration as a condition characterized by

> "a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack" 68.

Deutsch identifies three different facets of integration which he terms domain, scope, and range. The domain refers to the geographical areas and the different groups of people that are to be integrated. By scope he means the aggregate of different facets of behaviour to which the integration is meant to apply. The range denotes the

> "rewards and deprivations for the component units, by which an integrated relationship is maintained among them"[69]

Deutsch argues that the degree of cohesion of an integrated system can be tested by the extent to which it is capable of withstanding "stress, strains, support disequilibria, and disruptions"[70] Thus the degree of cohesion of an integrated system is directly proportional to the system's ability to withstand such strains.

Donald James Puchala defines regional integration as the coming together of two or more states to form a new and larger entity. This definition he maintains, subsumes a number of phenomena which include; "a, the merger of territories symbolized and accomplished by the obliteration or de-emphasis of international frontiers within

the integrated region. (b) The merger of governments symbolized and accomplished by the establishment of new institutions of government at the regional level. (c) The merger of political systems symbolized and accomplished by the emergence of political groups and processes at the regional level. (d) The merger of economies symbolized and accomplished by the removal of intraregional barriers to economic intercourse (e) The merger of societies and people which results in the emergence of regional class and social structures, and the growth of common identifications"[71]

Puchala argues that regional integration carries external and internal implications. Externally, the international system has to cope with the entry, and participation of a new actor in the form of an international organization. Internally the alteration of domestic political processes might be required in response to changes in governmental jurisdiction over certain functions.[72]

Puchala concludes by stating that regional integration can be analyzed in it's dynamic dimension which involves the process of social economic, and political merger. It can also be looked at in it's static dimension which involves the condition whereby a new political unit is formed in the international system.[73]

Louis Deree and Harry Targ discuss regional integration in cognitive terms as a:

> "thought (which) describes a committment to certain patterns of social, political, and/or economic organizations at a level more comprehensive than the state, but less than the entire world" 74

They explain that this co mmittment is manifested by the formation of supranational organizations that serve to manage economic competition or political conflict between states in a specific geographical area. They also contend that the "regiionalist vision" is predictive in that it posits a certain desired and state. These include the ending of physical violence between states, and the increase of mutually beneficial interactions between states. The goals will become permanent through the establishment of international organizations that are functional in character [75]. They point out that the most significant by-product would be the creation of a state of "shared consciousness" among both the elites and the mass publics of the integrated states [76].

Inis Claude divides the basic assumptions of functionalism into three broad parts. Firstly, war is regarded by functionalists as a consequence of the material conditions of global society which is characterized by economic and social deficiencies [77]. In this sense functionalism borrows from the materialist determinist perspective of marxism. Based on this premise, functionalism sets out to alleviate warfare by tackling global economic and social miseries through the development of a network of functional organizations.

Secondly, functionalism assumes that war is a result of the institutional inadequacy of the international state system. This is characterized by arbitrary and rigid vertical divisions "whose separateness is jealously gaurded by sovereignties which are either able to solve the fundmental problems or willing to permit them to be solved by other authoritities [78]. The road to peace which functionalism proposes involves breaking down the barriers of sovereignty through the

establishment of agencies whose territorial jurisdictions are conterminous with their problem areas.

Finally, by focusing attention on areas of common interest, and developing habits of cooperation, functionalism aims to alter the subjective conditions of mankind attitudes, habits, thoughts, feelings etc) which have been returned by the allegiance of the nation state system [79]. This form of constructive collaboration is expected to render war obsolete.

A.J.R. Groom analyzes functionalism from the perspectives of both it's prescriptive and descriptive aspects. His analysis is deductive in that he starts with the assumption that literature on international relations can be classified under two competing general models of world society, which are the billiard ball model and the cobweb model.

Essentially the billiard ball model holds the state as the basic unit of analysis whereby they are percieved as discrete atomistic, and legally equal sovereign entities. The nature of interactions between the states is based upon their hierarchy of interests and their power [80]. Hence they are concieved of as billiard balls of different sizes knocking into each other.

The cobweb model, under which Groom subsumes functionalism, concieves of the world as a varriety of cross - cutting and over-lapping systems. These systems not only include that of the nation - state but also those that develop along functional dimensions [81] From this assumption Groom extracts the descriptive elements of functionalism which seeks to interlink groups along functional lines thereby enhancing some of the properties of cooperation and inter-dependence. This way peace will be enhanced because it is no longer

imposed through a "threat system" such as the balance of power or any form of bi polar arrangement"[82]. It therefore becomes a "working peace system".

In it's prescriptive aspect functionalism aims to eliminate war. Groom puts forward the contention that "if individuals, groups or states need to cooperate in order to secure an end which can only be achieved through cooperation" then there would be a concommittant desire to suppress, or eliminate war if only to attain their desired ends[83]

Paul Taylor discusses the ways in which functionalism fulfills the four requirements of a theory which are description, explanation, prediction, and prescription.

It's descriptive aspect lies in it's presentation of the central principles of integration. Functionalism portrays the contemporary international society as being inundated with conflicts between nations in persuit of conflicting goals that are dictated by nationalism and politics. Such conflicts are sustained by the misplaced loyalties of their citizens. The functionalist's description therefore focuses on attitudinal change among the citizens. The experience of successful integration and the expectation of probable welfare gains produces a shift in loyalty away from the state and unto a higher authority[84].

In fulfilling the requirement of explanation, functionalism elevates the axiom that one of the conditions of stability at the level of the local community is a certain minimum of agreement" to the level of the international society[85]. The functionalist explanation holds the view that the optimistic aspects of life that permit local consensus

can also be achieved at the international level.

As regards prediction functionalism posits that people's perceptions of what is important in the realm of politics will be affected by what they do, especially with regard to material welfare. The main point of the prediction is that the people's "experience of carrying out tasks in common will weaken value differences between two or more groups" thereby creating grater social amity and cooperation between them.[86] Finally, the prescriptive aspect of functionalism envisages "a working peace system" characterised by functional cooperation as opposed to interstate violence and warfare.[87]

In another article David Mitrany argues that as a working system the contemporary nation state has no precedent in history. It is unique to the extent that there is a massive concentration of functions in the central government. These functions can be summed up under the two broad categories of "national security" and social security", both of which are consumed in the practice of national planning. Such functional concentration by the central government has led to an "untamed scientific and technological revolution" whose ideological progenitors are democratic liberalism and marxism which catalyzed social transition in the nineteenth century.[88]

He describes these theories as archaic because the world is undergoing a historical turning point due to the rapid change produced by science and technology. Mitrany proposes functionalism as an alternative theory for the new international society. He argues in favour of it's applicabilityat both the national and international level.

At the national level "functional devolution can serve to check a cankerous executive centralization", while at the international level" it's scope must be to concentrate sectors of activity under some collective authority" which will result in a gradual merger between both levels and the formation of the substance of an international society and government.[89]

William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman contend that functionalism can refer to serveral disparate modes of political analysis, and that there is no broad distinctive functional approach. They distinguish between eclectic and empirical functionalism. Eclectic functionalism refers to the mode of analysis in which the political scientist is concerned with the functions of a political phenomena in addition to a certain aspect of that phenomena. For instance an eclectic functionalist dealing with international institutions may focus on the international court of Justice. This form of functionalism may "provide a list of activities in which x is engaged, or it may provide answers to more or less explicit questions with respect to how x contributes to the performance of certain purposes or activities".[90]

Empirical functionalism, on the other hand, is based on the premise that in every social system individuals have a variety of demands that require satisfaction. For empirical functionalists, the activities of organizations are significant to the extent that these demands are satisfied.[91]

Patrick Morgan (1981) argues that regional integration is the most "serious and successful effort to supersede the nation state."[92]

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But he points out that the term integration is bedevilled with a problem of definition. Some scholars regard integration as a condition while others regard it as a process. This problem is further complicated by the fact that there can be various degrees or levels of integration as a condition, or various stages of integration as a process [93].
A further difficulty he cites is the possibility of integration occuring in a number of different sectors - economic, political, scientific, military with varying speeds and degrees of success. All these factors compound the problem of formulating a definition that encapsulates all the facets of integration.

Morgan, however, lists ten factors which may have an enhancing influence on the integrative process. These include:

(1) Geographical proximity.

(2) Social homogeneity of the peoples involved.

(3) Transactions or interactions among the peoples involved.

(4) Mutual knowledge of each other among the peoples involved.

(5) Shared functional interests.

(6) The communal character of a people.

(7) The structural frame or system of power and decision making in the emerging community - democratic or authoritarian, decentralized or centralized.

(8) Degree of sovereignty - dependency of the community.

(9) Governmental effectiveness.

10) Previous integrative experiences of the peoples and governments involved [94].

Charles Lerche and Abdul said (1979) argue that institutions generally develop in response to the more compelling needs of society at any given point in history. Their position is that the first and second world wars, coupled with the increasing social, economic and political vulnerability of the nation - state has threatened the stability of the international system. The combination of these factors have catalysed the process of transnationalism and the growth of international institutions, which have subsequently come to assume the role of international actors themselves [95]. They define international organizations as;

> "institutions whose structures, composition, and interests transcend national boundaries but whose membership is composed of states" 96

Based on this definition they differentiate between three major types. The first type are bloc actors whose members have common security and/or bloc interests and sometimes attempt to streamline their foreign policy objectives. The second type are international organizations which may be general or specialized in function and orientation, and possess nation - states as members. The third type are regional associations whose membership are generally geographically defined. These associations may be general or specialized considering the problems and issues for which were created [97].

The authors argue that the effectiveness of the organizations and their ability to act within the international system is

affected by the interests of the members states and the issues that prevail within the international environment.

Bruce M. Russett distinguishes between universal international organizations, organizations that are limited to a particular geographical area, and those that comprise states which share a common interest. He argues that the emergence of conflicting interests between states will necessitate the formation of institutional structures that will facilitate "negotiation, compromise, and coordination to common or compatible policies"[98].

He bases his argument on the premise that institutions provide frameworks for communication. He defines an institution as

> "a set of channels for processing information, solving problems, and transmitting communications"[99]

These functions have the effect of producing responses from the political units that comprise the organization, but he concedes that it may not necessarily lead to a non - violent resolution of conflicts. An important aspect of communication within international organizations, he stresses, is that the representatives of governments develop "new perspectives and personal friendships" with other representatives, which they would possibly not have developed in an extraorganizational context.

Lynn Miller discusses the formation and categorizations of intrnational organizations on the basis of the principle of security. He defines security in a broad sense to include, not only external military threat, but also political tension and economic instability [100]

It is the security orientation that provides the impetus for states to merge and form, international organizations.

Based on the security principle Miller develops three hypotheses. First, the organizational structure may be designed to settle disputes among it's members either through diplomacy or through the use of a peace - keeping machinery. Second, the organization may be designed to contain threats that have their origins in the external environment. Third, the organization may be designed with functional security as it's prime focus. In this sense the goal would be the improvement of the economic, technical, social welfare and interdependence of it's member states [101].

Based on these hyptheses, Miller develops three main types of regional organizations. Firstly,-there are "cooperative organizations" which:-

> "have arisen as the expression of some sort of regional solidarity in the face of the politics of the outside world, and which also possess the machinery, at least in embryo, to control the use of force within their own region" 102.

Examples of this type of organization are the OAU, and the organization of American states. The second type are alliances which involve states that are bound together by multilateral defence treaties. The last type are functional organizations which do not perform military functions but tend to be oriented toward economic and social welfare [103].

Inis claude Jr. poses the argument that the qualitative growth of international organizations, i.e their capacity to expand and achieve dominance over nation states, should be judged by the criterion of their usefulness rather than in terms of their competitiveness with

nation - states.[104] In this regard questions should relate to the utility, and serviceability of international organizations rather than their authority over nation - states.

He contends that an important aspect of the utility of these organizations concern their role as international institutions within which states can attempt to influence or control the actions of other states. Attempts by some states to bring the collective influence of other states upon antagonistic state, he concedes, may be self-regarding. But, on the other hand, he argues that it may be system rewarding to the extent that the states realize that they have a stake and an interest in the maintenance of system stability .[105] He adds that two important facts to bear in mind are that the period that witnessed the growth of international organizations was also one in which there was a proliferation of new states and intensification of the danger of warfare.[106]

Joseph Frankel in his book makes the point that international institutions are manifestations of twentieth century forces and ideas which prevailed after the balance of power system stopped functioning. He argues that there exists an ambivalence in the functioning of international institutions because they are engaged in the pursuit of common international objectives and international order, on one hand, while on the other hand states enter these institutions with the satisfaction of their own national interests as a prime consideration.[107] This ambivalence is highlighted by the fact that there does not exist an ideal condition in which the interests of member states are harmonious. He buttresses that point by stating that

> "As is the case with international law, institutions succeed in direct proportion to their distance from power politics; the less they affect the power positions of states, the more are these states likely to cooperate " 108.

He makes the point that international institutions were created basically to control and circumscribe the use of force in world politics but this has not been a particularly successful venture. In this field what the institutions have done remain largely in the realm of rhetoric by making statements of goals and aspirations. But he adds that these statements have not altogether been without effect. Institutions have been established for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and states have been encouraged to use these institutions instead of resorting to force. But the problem he identifies with this is dual in that; the institutions are largely procedural and recourse to these procedures will not necessarily lead to a settlement, and simultaneously most interstate disputes are political and not legal in nature [109].

Frankel notes that most of the organizations that have developed, in the post war era have been either regional or functional organisations with a narrow focus, and not universal or global organizations. He also puts forward the proposition that if international institutionalization is seen as an indicator of greater international interaction, then the bulk of post - war international interaction has been taking place at the non-global level since the non - global organizations out number the global ones [110].

R.A. Akindele argues that in an international system that already has one universal organization like the U.N., the ideal would be to have regional organizations which would be complementary to the universal organization in the performance of peace - keeping functions.

Akindele defines a region, and a regional organization, as

> "a cluster of interests - economic, political, ideological, linguistic etc - which are percieved to be common among some but not all states, and which are significant enough to warrant collective expression in permanent institutional forms" 111

He rests his argument on the fact that the world is very heterogeneous, and the maintenance of peace by one universal organization would be problematic. Such a function would, therefore, have to be performed at the non - universal level of the region where a stronger sense of solidarity exists [112].

Charles Reynolds explains that the development and growth of international organizations occured in stages. By the onset of the first world war a large number of technical service organizations already existed e.g postal and telegraph unions. Such organizations focused on problems that could not be solved by single governments, and were controlled by frequent confrences of national delegates" [113].

The two world wars provided the impetus for the creation of permanent international organizations that were concerned with providing solutions for major international problems (political and economic) which were felt to be the causes of interstate conflicts. This, he argues, was innovative in the sense that it provided permanent institutions for diplomatic initiatives aimed at avoiding war. It helped to circumvent the problem of convening ad hoc conferences in response to crisis situations.

The value or ideological elements embodied in these institutions are strongly prescriptive. This is because they relate to the attainment of a desired future state of affairs characterized

organizations as actors in the international system [117].

Padelford, Lincoln and Olvey differentiate between two types of international organizations, the universal organization found in the U.N., and the less than universal organizations which are of a regional and limited nature. They maintain that the regional organizations, because they comprise a limited group of states, tend to be more cohesive and provide greater assistance to states. Furthermore, it is much easier for states to integrate on a limited, regional basis than through a universal organization [118].

The authors develop fourbroad categories of regional organizations. Firstly, there are orthodox regional organizations such as the OAU, EEC, and the Organization of American States. Secondly, there are macro- regional organizations that have specific geographical objectives, although their membership may include states in different regions. Thirdly, there are associations with membership drawn together on the basis of historic, political, cultural or other ties, an example of which is the commonwealth. Lastly, there are purely functional organizations that weare developed for economic reasons; ready examples are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Organization of Petroleum Expoiting Countries [119]

The functions performed by these organizations include one or more of the following. Establishing machinery for consultation through multilateral diplomacy. Encouraging and arranging the peaceful settlement of disputes between the member states without external interference. Facilitating and improving political, economic, and

cultural relations. Lastly, they enhance mutual security [120].

The authors add that the structures that are established to carry out these functions among the various types of organizations and their ability to carry out these functions differ according to the degree of sovereignty their member states yield to them.

The authors identify three factors which they think constitute the bases for the development of organized cooperation. First, organized cooperation depends upon the awareness of a mutuality of interests and purposes among the member states. They argue that the national interest is the prime motivating force for the integration of states. States will join international organizations if they percieve it to be in their national interest to do so. Second, conditions like the geographical propinquity of states may provide the basis for integration. Lastly, shared aspirations among states and/or the presence of external threats can stimulate the formation of international associations [121].

Evan Luard concentrates on the process(es) whereby institutional change may be achieved in international organizations. The prime reason for his focus is the problem concerning the relationship between international organizations and national governments. This problem, he claims is most salient in the field of security although it is manifest in other areas of activity also. He argues that because of the strinking distance in the modern world "a lot of functions that were hitherto performed at the nation-state level can now only be effectively conducted at the interactional level, hence the importance of international organizations" [122].

Luard contends that the occurence of change depends to a large extent on the existing institutional structure and distribution of authority of the organization. He identifies four types of authority; hierarchiecal authority, federal system, and functional distribution of powers.[123] Under these categories the relationship of the international organization to national authorities is similar to the last two types. This is because, like a federal system, the international organization is similar to a weak center as compared to it's regions, and because functional divisions exist between the international organizations and the nation - state on one hand, and within the international organization itself on the other hand. Furthermore, unlike the first two types, the nation - states are not subordinate to the authority of the international organization.

Luard goes on to identify four instruments or procedures through which change can be achieved in international organization. The first procedure is that of "direct decision -making", which is a process that involves the possession of institutions that are directly involved in the initiation and implementation of change; such as legislatures at the national level and assemblies at the international level.[124] He cautions, however, that this is the least likely form of change to occure in international organizations for a number of reason. Firstly, it is difficult to effect changes within international institions or changes in the relations between international organizations and the member states. Secondly, the ultimate authority is the Assembly which he describes as an "amorphous body representing many radically oppsed vie

Thidly there is the absence of a well defined hierarchyof authority such that the international organization does not possess sanctions at it's disposal in order to enforce decisions. Fourthly, the influence process is weak in international organizations. The time span for decision making is quite short and deliberations are carried out in secrecy , without the knowledge of the home population. Such a process does not leave much allowance for the impact of public opinion or the mass media [126].

The second process of change is that of "bureaucratic decision making". In this case the cumulative impact of bureaucratic decisions may gradually influence structures and processes within the organization without any specific bureaucratic decision [127].

The third process of change involves indirect decision making. This is similar to the second type but is manifested as the end result of several decisions and actions on a specific situation, whereby a new pattern of activity and power is created [128].

The fourth process of change is one in which one section of the organization grows in influence over the other, or the international organization develops more influence over it's member state [129].

However feasible these processes of change may be, they will encounter obstacles, and Luard lists five of them. Firstly, there are pre-existing forms of esistance in the organization such as the vested interests of particular groups for whom change might not be in their interest. Secondly there will be resistance if the change involves a transfer of loyalties from the nation to the international organization.

The implication of this is the loss of sovereignty and power which the nation - state jealously guards. The third obstacle may be organizational interia, or a state in which the system and process of the organization are so firmly established as to be resistant to change [130]. Fourthly, there might be political difficulties in implementing change. An example of this is the problem of having to obtain a majority vote in the General Assembly of the UN before a bill is endorsed [131] Lastly, the very structures of an organization may not render it amenable to change. This obstacle becomes greater when the charter of the organization makes change difficult [132]

Linda Miller concerns herself with the effectiveness with which regional organizations are able to manage infra - state conflicts. She maintains that three types of conflict are significant from the perspective of international organizations. These three types are "colonial wars, internal conflicts involving a breakdown of law and order, and proxy wars and internal conflicts involving charges of external aggression or sub version" [133].

She contends that there are two types of international organizations that can have an impact on the regulation of internal conflicts, the first type are groupings of states such as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity. Such organizations are characterized by their "continental or hemispheric basis, a set of decision making institutions and established procedures for pacific settlement of disputes" [134]. The second type are collective defence arrangements examples of which are NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact.

Such organizations are characterized by geographical bases that conform to strategic needs, and highly developed military as opposed to non - military functions. She describes both types of organizations as political arenas within which competing governmental interests are acted. In the event of such interests converging, the states will arrive at a consensus regarding responses to internal conflicts.

She analyzes three case studies of conflicts involving the collaborative responses of the UN the OAU, and OAS on one hand, and the UN and NATO on the other hand. The case studies were the Congo crisis, the civil strife in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and the unrest between Furlarsh and Greek communities in Cyprus in 1963.

She deduces that various constraints are placed on international organizations. Examples of these constraints are rival factions trying to use the organization against each other, or differences in the perceptions of member states as regards the extent of external involvement in a conflict. Other constraints include restricted memberships, jurisdictions and resources, as well as ideological differences between member states.

She concludes by advocating a restructuring of sub-global organizations in such a way that super power influences are eliminated and the regional organizations become more autonomous and stronger. Barring this, she forsees a continuation of the prevailing pattern of ad hoc responses to internal conflicts [135].

A.J.R. Groom contends that any patterned and sustained interaction is likely to give rise to some form of organization [136].

The organizational form is therefore a manifestation, or an indicator of a system of transactions.

In addition to being the "nodal point" in a network of transactions, the organizational form also makes up the forum for decision making. Groom deduces that "since the study of decision making is crucial in any attempt to describe and explain behaviour, the institutional aspects of the organization become of geat interest and relevance"[137].

He puts forward the truism that patterned interactions or transactions (organizational forms) between actors can be analyzed on the basis of it's component parts. But he argues that the whole may be greater than the sum total of it's parts. This is because, analytically, the organizational framework encompasses more than just it's institutional form to include systemic inputs from the environment. This is because the insitutional form itself exists in an environment.For this reason he states that international institutions are "both evidence of and actors in, systems of transactions"[138].

A.Le Roy Bennett (1977) cites five common characteristics of intergovernmental organisations (IGO's) which include; (1) a permanent organization to carry on a continuing set of functions; (2) voluntary membership of eligible parties ; (3) a basic instrument stating goals, structure, and methods of operation; (4) a broadly representative consultative conference organ; (5) a permament secretariat to carry on continous administrative, research and information functions [139].

These IGO's are usually established by a treaty which more often limits the operation of the organization to the "level of consent, recommendation, and cooperation rather than through compulsion or enforcement".[140] He states that the interfion of this constriction of the IGOs' powers is to safegaurd soverèignty, hence he asserts that nation states will continue to act as the dominant political units within the international system, and that international organizations will act more as adjuncts to the nation-state system than as units of an emerging political system.

Nevertheless, as adjuncts, he gives two major roles of international organizations. Firstly, they possess the principal role of providing a means of cooperation among states in areas where such cooperation will be beneficial to all or a large number of states. Secondly they provide forums for communication between states which not only aids the process of conflict resolution by peaceful means, but also adds a new dimension to the practice of diplomacy [141].

Inis claude looks at international organizations as exhibiting a dualistic character in terms of it's purposes. On the one hand he argues that the international organization represents a means whereby the nation-state system can function more satisfactorily. From this point of view the international organization provides modernized methods that supplement, and to some extent, replaces old ways of conducting inter-state relations. To this extent it provides new agencies for simulating and facilitating voluntary cooperation and the harmonization of their policies, improved channels for negotiations, and a more adequately organized framework for diplomacy [142].

On the other hand Claude argues that international organization can be seen as a process that tends toward the direction of world government. This is a situation in which the national-state can be transcended and substituted by a totally new system.

1.5 RELEVANCE OF STUDY

Most studies that touch on the role of the OAU in conflict resolution (Markakis [143], Wolfers [144], Legum [145], Cervenka [146], Woronoff [147]) tend to focus on the period immediately after it's formation, viz 1960's. These works tend to be quite descriptive of both the organizational structure and functions of the OAU. Where they do describe the mediatory function of the OAU in certain African conflicts it is done primarily to give examples of some of the functions that the organization is supposed to perform.

The relevence of this research derives basically from it's focus on three aspects of African international relations. These aspects are;

(a) Inter-state conflicts in Africa

(b) Foreign intervention in these conflicts.

(c) The efficacy of the OAU at resolving such conflicts.

Furthermore, the research will attempt to situate case studies within the context of the economic, political, and strategic relations of the African state system in relation to the international system during the time period that the research covers.

To quote Inis Claude;

> "Legal and structural analysis of institutions is indispensable but it contributes little to understanding unless international organizations is placed squarely in the political context where it operates.

> International organizations must be considered in terms of it's inseparability from the political forces and trends of the times. Their actual operations can only be understood with reference to the world of politics, and the ultimate results can be properly evaluated only in terms of their impact upon that world" 148.

1.6 CASE STUDIES

The focus of this study will be on three major conflict situations that have attracted the involvement of the OAU, and the intervention of external forces. These are the Chadian conflict, the war over the Ogaden region, and the Western Sahara conflict.

The case studies have been chosen for the primary reason that they are conflicts that have not been totally solved. The Western Sahara and Chad conflicts are on going disputes, while that between Somalia and Ethiopia may be said to be in a state of quiescence. The time period to be covered by the research will span from 1963 to the present time.

1.7 PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

The description of the assumptions that underlie the pacific settlement of disputes has been very lucidly presented by Inis Claude in his book entitled "Swords Into Plowshares". He states that this approach to conflict resolution is premised upon the general assumption that warfare is, in itself, a method of settling disputes between states. The problems thus becomes one of persuading states to use other methods to solve their disputes. The new method would involve the provision of a "functional equivalent of war"[149]. The task of the international

organization becomes one of providing a variety of alternative means, and to encourage, or even insist upon, their usage by the disputants. This is done with the main intention of preventing the increase in the use of violent means towards resolving the dispute.

This general assumption carries with it three important derivative assumptions. The first is that war is used as an instrument for the settlement of disputes because of the passions that are used by the dispute. The ready solution would therefore involve imposing a delay on the use of violence. This delay is expected to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, it provided a "cooling off" period during which rational judgement is expected to prevail, and the passage of time is expected to produce a healing effect. Secondly, the delay is meant to provide time, to be used in the active pursuit of a non- violent settlement [150].

The second assumption is that war is caused by misperceptions arising from ignorance and a misunderstanding of facts involved in an international dispute. Here the important thing would be to bring the objective facts to light. The third assumption is that war puts at stake the pride of peoples and governments thereby preventing them from using more reasonable solutions. In this instance, reasons of prestige are seen to be paramount [151].

Given these assumptions the importance of the pacific settlement of disputes lies in it's interposition of a neutral third party through whom negotiations can be conducted between belligerent states. In carrying this out, the various methods which are cited below may be adopted.

(i) GOOD OFFICES:

This is a procedure whereby a third party, with the agreement of the disputants is allowed to bring the conflicting parties together in an attempt to make them arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. Good offices are used mainly in instances where the disputants have broken diplomatic relations. The good Office terminates as soon as the disputants have been persuaded to resume negotions [152].

(ii) MEDIATION

This procedure goes a bit further than good offices in that the mediator actually participates in the negotiations, and offers proposals toward the settlement of the dispute itself. The process comes to an end as soon as the dispute is settled, or one of the parties finds the proposals unacceptable [153].

(iii) COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY:

These are basically fact finding commissions that investigate points of fact regarding a particular dispute. They report to the parties on matters concerning disputed facts. These commissions have proved to be especially useful in the case of boundary disputes [154].

(iv) COMMISSIONS OF CONCILIATION:

This involves the submission of a dispute to a pre-existing conciliation commission for examination. The commission then suggests a solution to both parties. Neither of the parties, however, is under any compulsion to accept the proposed solutions [155].

(v) ARBITRATION:

Under this procedure the disputants are free in their selection of an arbitrater. Arbitral procedures operate on the assumption that there is aggreement on the part of both disputants to accept the awards of the arbitral tribunal. Before the procedure begins it is stipulated wether the awards should be made on the basis of law or fact. If it is based on the former then the decisions have to come as close to legal principles as possible. If it is based on the latter then the decisions and settlements should be made on the basis of the available facts without reference to legal principles [156].

1.8 SOURCES AND REFERENCE

The sources of reference for this research with include official OAU publications, government publications, books, manuscripts, journals, newspapers, and periodicals.

1.9 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The limitations of this study lie in three areas. The first concerns access to official OAU publications, specifically those that deal with voting patterns within the council of ministers and the Assembly of Heads of states.

The second limitation concerns the continuing nature of the conflicts under study. Two of them are still being fought, and as regards the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict, irredentism still constituted an integral aspect of Somalia's foreign policy, so one cannot rule out the possibility of it, flaring up at some future date.

The results of this research, therefore, cannot be regarded as conclusive.

Lastly, because social scientific inquiry strives towards inductive reasoning and the formulation of generalizable theories, one might wonder wether three case studies are a sufficient number upon which to make generalizations. Nevertheless, three have been chosen for the reason that it represents a manageable number which will facilitate a fair depth of inquiry.

2.0 CHAPTER SEQUENCE

This research will consist of six chapters of which this proposal will be the first. The second chapter will describe the structure and functions of the OAU by situating it within the salient postulates of the theory of functionalism. This chapter will also include an evaluation of the OAU within the African state system, and the impact of the global system upon it. The third, fourth and fifth chapters will focus on the Chad, Western - Sahara, and Ethiopia Somalia conflicts respectively. The sixth and final chapter will be the conclusion.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY FROM THE FUNCTIONALIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter the functionalist theory of international relations was introduced as the theoretical framework that will be used in the analysis of the activities of the OAU in relation to the three case studies. The primary aim of this chapter is to situate the OAU, as a regional organization, within the parameters of the functionalist theory. For this purpose the chapter has been divided into four parts.

The first part will consist of a brief review of the historical, as well as the ideological trends that led to the formation of the OAU as an African regional organization. The second part will relate the OAU, as a regional organization, to the main postulates of functionalism and the role of international organizations. The third part will consist of a description of the organizational structure and functions of the OAU. Finally, the fourth part will attempt to evaluate the impact of the global and African state systems upon the functioning of the OAU as a regional organization.

2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE OAU

The formation of the OAU has it's roots in the ideology of pan Africanism. The Pan Africanist movement was basically a reaction to foreign imperialist domination of the African continent. In it's ideological dimensions it expressed a demand for an end to political economic and cultural domination of the Black world by white imperialists. This was manifested in the post world war two era by strident movements within African states for self - determination [1].
In order to achieve their goals the Pan - Africanists emphasized cooperation and unity amongst Africans.

Prior to the establishment of the OAU there had been previous attempts at the formation of an African regional organization aimed at promoting African Unity, and the solution of African problems by Africans. However, because of the political, cultural, and economic divisions among African states, these attempts were not all embracing in the sense that they failed to incorporate all the existing independent states, nor were they long lasting. The establishment of the OAU in 1963 represented the culmination of these previous attempts.

Among the early attempts at forming a continent wide organization was the convening of a conference of Independent African states by Ghana which was held in Accra in 1958. Also in November 1958 Ghana and Guinea drafted a charter,

which was later signed by Mali, which provided for a Union of African states and the holding of an All - African People's Conference in Accra[2].

After 1960, with the increase in the number of African states that had gained independence, there were other attempts at regional unification. These attempts however, became bedevilled with problems of ideological differences, and rivalries between aspirants to leadership positions. On these bases two different groups came to be identified with regard to the ends that were to be achieved and the means adopted in achieving those ends. There were the moderates which included countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire) and a few other Franco-phone countries. They advocated a gradual functionalist approach to the development of African unity; and the formation of a loose association of African States. On the other hand there were the radical, revolutionary states like Ghana and Guinea. They advocated for the establishment of a strong political union in the form of a United States of Affica.[3]

Some moderate states initiated the formation of the Union of African States and Madagascar in December, 1961. This group later became known as the Brazaville Group because of the meeting place at which the group was formed. Members of this group included Congo (Brazaville), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Dahomey. There was, therefore,

the deliberate creation of a power bloc within Africa [4].

In reaction to this occurence Morocco convened a conference in Casablanca on January 7th, 1961. The states that attended the conference included Ghana, Guinea, Mali Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and the Algerian provisional government. These states represented the more radical of the groups in the Pan - Africanist movement. They adopted a charter which later became known as the Casablanca charter. This charter provided for a joint military command and an African common market. The group advocated the socialist development of African states around a strong central authority. Their position was supported by the newly created Pan - African movement for East, central and Southern Africa [5].

In response to this president William Tubman of Liberia invited nineteen other African countries to meet in Monrovia from May 8 to May 12, 1961 in order to discuss the formation of a new group. These countries included the original twelve of the Brazzaville Group. The countries were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast (Cote d' Ivoire), Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and the host country Liberia [6]. This group, which came to be known as the Monrovia Group, accepted the idea of cooperation among African states but rejected immediate political union or the leadership of any single country [7].

Thus prior to the formation of the OAU, the African political scene was charaterized by divisions between African states and occasional attempts at compromises.

Despite the differences hat persisted between African states however, the ideal of establishing a continental organization remained. On the initiative of leaders like Emperor Haile Selassie, who had remained neutral all along, moves were made which were aimed at resolving the differences between the Monrovia and the Casablanca Groups. These efforts resulted in the meeting of Foreign Ministers from thirty African countries in Addis Ababa in May 1963, in order to prepare the agenda for a conference of African Heads of State and Governments. The countries that were represented at this meeting were Algeria, Burundi; Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville) (Zaire), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast (Cote d' Ivoire), Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania. Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika (Tanzania), Tunisia, Uganda, Egypt, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) [3].

Their deliberations revolved around the creation of an organization of African states, collective defense, apartheid and racial discrimination, decolonization, cooperation among African states in economic, social, educational, cultural, and scientific fields. They also held discussions on the effects of economic groupings on the development of Africa, the creation

of a permanent conciliation commission, and the role of African states as a regional bloc in the UN [9].

The foreign Ministers' conference paved the way for the summit conference of all Heads of State and Governments of independent African countries on May 15th, 1963. The conference was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the chairmanship of Emperor Haile Selassie. The participants at the conference approved a charter that established the OAU. The charter was signed by the thirty one Heads of State and Governments on May 26th 1963.

2.3 THE OAU AND THE THEORY OF FUNCTIONALISM

The preceding section was a brief review of the trends that led to the formation of the OAU. The review is considered as a necessary precursor for three main reasons. Firstly, it provides the historical basis upon which discussions about the OAU can begin. Secondly, it acquaints us with the fact that when the OAU was formed, differences and splits existed between African states. These difference were evidenced by the formation of different grouping of states. Thirdly, the desire for unity and functional cooperation provided the driving force behind the establishment of the OAU. This section will therefore attempt to situate the OAU, as a regional organization, within the parame ters of the main postulates of functionalism, and the roles and functions of international organizations. In order to accomplish this, one principal piece of literature written by Inis Claude [10] shall be used.

Inis Claude discusses a number of assumptions that inform the theories of international organizations and functionalism. He contends that international organizations are dualistic in nature. On the one hand they represent a means for the improvement of inter-state relations. The international organization:

> "provides modernized methods to supplement and in some measure to replace old ways of conducting inter-state relations, new agencies for stimulating and facilitating voluntary cooperation of states and the harmonization of their policies, improved channels for negotiations, and a more adequately organized framework for diplomacy" 11.

On the other hand, he says that international organizations can be seen as a process initiating steps in the direction of world government.

For the purposes of analyzing the OAU only the former assumption will be adopted. This is because the latter assumption is predictive of a phenomenon that is expected to occur at the global level, and, in addition, it cannot be used to focus on just one organization since the prediction is based on a trend involving more than one international organization.

As was discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the primary reasons for the formation of the OAU was to provide an institutional framework for the conduct of African inter-state relations and cooperation. As a fundamental aim of the OAU it is stated very clearly in Article II of the charter. It states that:

(1) The organization shall have the following purposes;

(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states.

(b) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

(c) to defend the sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

(e) to promote international cooperation having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(2) To this, the Member states shall coordinate and hamonize their general policies, especially in the following fields;

(a) political and diplomatic cooperation;

(b) economic cooperation, including transport and communications

(c) educational and cultural cooperation;

(d) health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation;

(e) scientific and technical cooperation, and

(f) cooperation for defence and security.[12]

Thus the OAU as a regional organization, provides an arena within which common African policies can be developed. It also provides a forum for airing inter - African tensions and problems.[13] As an emphasis on the cooperative purposes for which the OAU was set up Emperor Haile Selassie said in a speech marking the signing of the OAU Charter in 1963 that:

> "..... all together we have cleared the grounds for concerted action on all our common problems. Experience has taught us that no matter how much one would sustain hardship and struggle by oneself one would not survive or solve ones problems alone. Only in the determination of our purpose and our will to solve it together can we discover strength and wisdom to guide us beyond the horizon where-in lies a better life for our peoples" 14.

In addition to this, R.A. Akindele has put forward the argument that the OAU was founded not only to serve as the principal organ for conducting and promoting inter-African political and economic cooperation, but also "for the conduct of collective African relations with the external world in respect to those issues over which there is broad agreement [15]. He cites four obligations of member states as enunciated in the charter of the OAU, which suggest that the OAU has an external role to play. These include the obligation of member states to (1) defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence (presumably against aggression from within or outside Africa); (2) to promote world-wide international cooperation with due regard to the UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (3) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (4) to adopt and pursue a policy of non-alignment vis-a-vis the superpowers [16].

Inis Claude's second assumption dwells on the malleability of the international system. In this regard he states that " theories of international organization have been built, consciously or not, upon the assumption that nations are not prisoners of destiny but reasonably free agents. It's theory is that the relationship of states can be modified, even while the present system remains unchanged in it's fundamentals [17].

This assumption is important in relation to the OAU in two respects. First, it is the core assumption upon which Pan-Africanism as an ideology was based, and secondly this assumption

is entrenched in the charter of the OAU. Prior to the formation of the OAU two main trends developed in the African political scene. There were various nationalist movements that agitated for the formation and consolidation of independent states within the existing colonial boundaries. At the same time there was the development of a Pan - African movement which sought to unite the various states and groups in pursuance of general and particular goals[18]. The political and ideological dimensions of the Pan - Africanist movement incorporated the demand that the political economic, and cultural domination of Blacks by white colonial and imperial powers be ended. The primary objective of the Pan - African movement included; (a) complete independence for the whole continent; (b) the development of a fraternal alliance of Africans based on a loyalty which would transcend all tribal and territorial affiliations; (c) the creation of a united Africa based on a federation of sub-regional groups within which there would be a limitation of national sovereignty; and (d) non - involvement of Africans as partisans in international power politics[19].

The Pan - African ideology and movement can thus be seen as an attempt to alter the systemic relationships between the African region and the global state system, with specific reference to the colonial powers. By gaining independence the African states altered the political nature of their relationships with extra - African states. The attainment of independence and unification between African states on a continent - wide basis will similarly

change the nature of relationships within the African regional system. By advocating a policy of non - alignment in relation to outside powers, Pan - Africanism assumes the possibility of achieving change within the African regional system on the one hand, and between the African regional system and the global system on the other hand without fundamentally affecting the relationship between the dominant powers.

This assumption is also entrenched in the charter of the OAU [20]. The first three statements of the preamble to the charter state that

> "We, the Heads of African states and governments Assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
> Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny; conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, ..." 21

The premable of the Charter, with specific reference to these statements, gives an indication of the perception and understanding of the African Heads of State in their ability to charter out an alternative, and more desired future for the continent.

In his third and final assumption Inis Claude states that all the theory of functionalism "is essentially an assertion and defence of the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major pre-requisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war [22].

This assumption also informs the charter of the OAU. Pursuant to Article II of the Charter (stated above) which emphasizes

political, economic, and social cooperation. Article III of the charter makes reference to the resolution of conflicts.

The Article states that

> "The Member states, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:
>
> (1) the sovereign equality of all member states;
>
> (2) non - interference in the internal affairs of states;
>
> (3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for it's inalienable right to independent existence;
>
> (4) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
>
> (5) unreserved condemnation, in all it's forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other states;
>
> (6) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
>
> (7) affirmation of a policy of non alignment with regard to all blocs"[23].

Thus, as indicated in the charter, the OAU does not only possess the function of promoting intra- African political, economic, and social cooperation, but based upon that, it has the function of resolving intra-African conflicts, thereby promoting peace. The assumption is that political, economic, and social cooperation are preconditions for peace.

2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OAU

This section which seeks to describe the structure and functions of the OAU, will be written within the framework of the characteristics of international organizations that have been developed by A. Le Roy Bennett in his book entitled International Organizations; Principles and issues. The structure(s) of the OAU that correspond to each characteristic will be discussed under that characteristic.

A. Le Roy Bennett indicates that international governmental organizations and international non - governmental organizations display five common characteristics. These characteristics are (1) a permanent organization to carry on a continuing set of functions, (2) voluntary membership of eligible parties, (3) a basic instrument stating goals, structure, and methods of operation, (4) a broadly representative consultative conference organ, and (5) a permanent secretariat to carry on continuous administrative, research and information functions. In addition he states that such organizations are "established by treaty and usually, in order to safeguard state sovereignty, operate at the level of consent, recommendation and cooperation rather than through compulsion or enforcement."[24]

The first characteristic is the presence of a permanent organization to carry on a continuing set of functions.

Article I of the Charter of the OAU clearly establishes the OAU as the regional organization within which African inter-State relations are to be carried out. Article I of the Charter states that:

> "(1) The High contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an organization to be known as the Organization of African Unity.
>
> (2) The organization shall include the continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa" 25

A brief recapitulation on the decade preceding the formation of the OAU shows the predominance of two trends in the African political scene. The first trend consisted of the widespread nationalist movements that agitated for the formation and consolidation of independent African states within their existing colonial boundaries. The second trend was the Pan African movement which aimed at the unification of all such states and groups in the pursuit of continental goals. African leaders were hoping for a type of unity and solidarity. However, the form such an association or organization should take became an issue of controversy. Thus the period before the establishment of the OAU was characterized by the formation of groups and counter groups which culminated in the establishment of the OAU in 1963.

The establishment of the OAU was a consequence of the realization of two facts. Firstly, that without solidarity between African states, African problems could not be solved by Africans or by outside powers. This realization arose from

the circumstances surrounding the Congo crisis [26]. Secondly, there was the realization of the fact that in the absence of African solidarity, the cold - war and other divisive external influences could sweep the continent [27]. It was therefore the need to develop greater cohesion among African states and to avoid foreign influence in the solution of African problems that provided the incentive and the basis for the establishment of a permanent international organization.

Bennetts second charateristic states that there must be "voluntary membership of eligable parties" Articles IV, V, and VI deal with membership, and the rights and duties of member states. They are as follows:

Article IV

Each independent sovereign African state shall be entitled to become a member of the organization.

Article V

All member states shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.

Article VI

The member states pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter [28].

Although it states that each independent African state is entitled to membership, in practice only states under majority rule can do so, thereby precluding states like south Africa from

joining. Any state which is qualified for membership may inform the Administrative Secretary General of it's desire to become a member, After recieving the notification the Secretary - General circulates copies of it to member states so that they can arrive at a decision. The response of each member state is then sent to the Administrative Secretary-General who, upon recieving the required number of votes, communicates the decision to the state seeking membership. According to the Charter, admission into the OAU is done on the the basis of a simple majority of assenting votes being communicated to the Administrative Secretary-General and not necessarily through a formal voting procedure on the floor of the Assembly.[29]

Conversely any member state that intends to relinquish it's membership has to submit a written notification. After this the application lapses for ayear before the membership of a state is withdrawn. The one year lapse is supposed to provide a "cooling off" period during which the member-state might decide to effect a change.[30] Within the Charter itself no provision has been made for either the suspension or dismissal of member states.

Pursuant to Article IV, Article V guarantees that "all member states shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties". As a result of this provision, every member state is entitled to have representation in all the major bodies of the OAU. They also have the right to run for elections into any of the ad hoc committees that may be set up by any of the major bodies.[31]

Each member state can convene an extraordinary session of both the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers. However, this will only take place if the request carries the support of a two - thirds majority of all the member states. Each member state can nominate it's nationals to any function within the framework of the Organization and the General Secretariat. Member states also have the right to recieve certified copies of ratifications of member states from the Government of Ethiopia, and Communications from the Administrative Secretary - General. In addition, each member state has the right to request for an amendment or revision of the charter. Finally, every member state has the right of one vote in each of the organs of the OAU [32].

According to Bennett's third characteristic, aninternational organization has to possess "a basic instrument stating goals, structure, and methods of operation". In the case of the OAU this instrument comes in the form of the "Charter of the Organization of Africa Unity"[33]. The Charter states precisely the goals, structure, and methods of operation of the Organization. According to Article II, paragraph I of the Charter, the OAU has the following goals;

(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;

(b) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts; and to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

(c) to defend their Sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

(e) to promote international cooperation, having due regard to Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [34]

Article VII gives a description of the structure of the OAU. It states that :

"The Organization shall accomplish it's purposes through the following principal institutions":

(1) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government;

(2) The Council of Ministers;

(3) The General Secretariat;

(4) The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration [35]

The rest of the Charter describes the structures of the various organs of the OAU and their functions. Generally, policy is formulated by the decision making body of the OAU which is the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments. The organization has an Administrative Secretariat and a number of specialized agencies that implement the policies of the organization under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. Each of the specialized agencies is composed of the minister of the governments of member states who are responsible for that particular activity in each member state.

Bennett's fourth characteristic of international governmental organizations is that there should be "a broadly representative consultative conference organ ". In the OAU the Assembly of Heads of state and Government, and the Council of Ministers play this role.

The functions of these two organs are laid down in the charter. The scope of discussion of the Assembly is not restricted to the activities of the OAU alone. This body can discuss issues of far reaching consequence in Africa's political, economic, social or military spheres, Article IX of the Charter states that:

> "The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of States and Governments or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request of any member state and on approval by a two - thirds majority of the member states shall meet in extraordinary session" 36

The main function of the Assembly is to provide a forum for discussion. The conclusions of the deliberations of the Assembly are usually registered in the form of resolutions except in cases of appointments, elections and other procedural matters [37].

Although it is not stated in the Rules of procedure of the Assembly or the Charter, the result of deliberations by the Assembly can also take the form of declarations. This has only been done in regard to very important issues such as subversion, decolonization, apartheid, and dialogue with South Africa. An example of this is the 'Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern African'. This was adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 1975, and was adopted by the Assembly at the Kampala summit in July 1975 [38].

Article X of the Charter stipulates, in relation to the Assembly that:

(1) Each member state shall have one vote

(2) All resolutions shall be determined by a two - thirds majority of the Members of the Organization.

(3) Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority . Whether or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all Member states of the Organization.

(4) Two - thirds of the total membership of the Organization shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly .[39]

The agenda for discussion by the Assembly is prepared by the Council of Ministers from a draft which is submitted to them by the Secretary General. Regardless of this, the final decision concerning the topics for discussion rests with the Assembly. It may choose what and what not to discuss. In the Rules of procedure of the Assembly it is stated that the agenda of the Assembly shall comprise:

(1) items which the Assembly decides to place on it's agenda;

(2) items proposed by the Council of Ministers;

(3) items proposed by a member state;

(4) any other business.[40]

According to custom the Assembly elects the head of the host government ad it's Chairman. Along with the Chairman are elected eight Vice - Chairmen. The Chairman maintains the position until the next meeting of the Assembly. Apart from discussing political, military - social, and economic issues, other functions of the Assembly include the following:

(1) to review the structure, function and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which may be created in accordance with the Charter;

(2) to appoint the Administrative Secretary - General of the organization and his assistants;

(3) to establish the specialized and Ad Hoc Commissions;

(4) to decide questions which may arise concerning the interpretation of the Charter;

(5) to decide on the admission of new members;

(6) to approve amendments to the Charter;

(7) to approve the regulations concerning the functions of the Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration.[41]

The Council of Ministers is the organ in the OAU that is directly subordinate to the Assembly. The Council of Ministers is composed of the foreign Ministers of members states or other ministers of the member states. John Markakis [42] has argued that the functions of the Council are not easily definable. Although it is charged with the responsibility of implementing the decisions of the Assembly, the Council has no machinery to execute policy. On the other hand the charter states that the Council is in a supervisory position over the General Secretariat and the specialized commissions, both of which have the power to execute policy. In addition, the Council is not supposed to be a decision making body, because that is the function of the Assembly. Despite this the Council has taken decisions on a wide variety of matters. An example of this is the councils decision in 1965 that committed the member states to a diplomatic boycott of Great Britain.

In spite of this contention, the charter does stipulate certain functions that the council is supposed to carry out. According to Article XIII of the Charter, the function of the Council of Ministers are:

> " (1) The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.
>
> (2) It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate inter-African cooperation in accordance with the instruction of the Assembly and in conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter" 43.

The council is empowered to approve the reports of the various specialized commissions. It also approves the budget of the organization, and gifts and donations that are made to the organization. It has the powers to accord priviledges and immunities to personnel of the secretariat when they are on duty in the territories of member states [44]. The rules that govern the functioning of the Council are stipulated in Article IV of the Charter:

> "(1) Each member state shall have one vote
>
> (2) All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of the Council of Ministers.
>
> (3) Two - thirds of the total membership of the council of Ministers shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council" 45

The Rules of procedure further specify that regular meetings of the Council shall take place twice a year. The first meeting, which takes place in February, is an ordinary annual meeting.

The second meeting, which takes place in August, is specifically for the preparation of the agenda for the Assembly. But the reality has been that while the February meeting has always been regular, the second meeting has always been adjusted in order to precede Assembly meetings which have taken place at different times over the years.

The meetings of the Council of Ministers have always been held in closed sessions. One reason for this is the fact that over the years the Western media have tended to blow up small disagreements within the Council as crises that are indicative of the Organization's impending collapse. For this reason, only the final outcomes of the Council's sessions are relayed to the public. Despite this the Council can, by a simple majority vote, hold an open session [46].

At each session a Chairman, two vice - Chairmen, and a rapporteur are elected by secret ballot. The provisional agenda of the Council is drawn up by the Administrative Secretary-General and communicated to the various member states at least thirty days before the opening session. The agenda usually comprises the report of the Administrative Secretary-General, items decided by the Assembly or the Council, and items proposed by the specialized Commissions or any member state [47].

The Rules of procedure provide for an emergency meeting of the Council in the form of an extraordinary session. This is done at the request of any member state, but it has to obtain the support of a two - thirds majority vote from other member states. During the first fourteen years of the OAU the Council

has met in ten such extraordinary sessions.[48] The reason for the high number of such meetings is that during emergencies, the convening of the Council of Ministers is always the initial response. The normal procedure followed by the Council under such circumstances is to grant hearings to the parties that are directly involved. After this they draft resolutions that reflect the consensus of the members of the Council and if the need arises, they appoint a committee to carry out whatever action is indicated in the resolution. On the other hand it may prepare resolutions on the same topic for submission to the Assembly and/or give directives to the Secretariat and the specialized Commissions if their actions are necessary. John Markakis contends that the greatest value of the council in such emergencies is that it offers a ready meeting place for all concerned and a forum for a swift exchange of African opinion, as well as providing the means for the official expression of whatever measure of consensus is obtainable on any given, issue among the members.[49]

Bennett's fifth characteristic is that international government organizations possess a "permanent secretariat to carry on continuous, administrative, research and information functions". The institutions that have equivalent functions within the OAU are the General Secretariat and the Specialized Commissions.

One of the Key organs in the OAU is the General Secretariat [50] and it is headed by an Administrative Secretary General. [51]

The Administrative Secretary General is appointed by the Assembly for four years and he is directly responsible to the Council. As the title suggests, the founding fathers of the OAU were interested in curbing the powers vested in this office. They laid emphasis on it's non - political nature by giving it the title "Administrative". The desire for a weak Secretary General may have arisen as a consequence of the role that was usurped by dynamic international civil servants, such as Dag Harmarskjold of the UN, in various world crisis. This may have given rise to fears that, over time, an OAU Secretary General with such powers might decide to start making rather than implementing policies.

The Administrative Secretary - General directs the activities of the General Secretariat and is it's legal representative. The Rules of procedure governing the General Secretariat states that the secretary General has the right to call ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers. But what this means in actuality is that the secretary General can only call extraordinary sessions after a majority of the members of the council have requested it. The ordinary sessions are called on dates previously agreed upon by the Council. The Secretary General acts as the accounting officer of the organization, and he is responsible for the proper administration of the budget. He submits quarterly statements on contributions, paid and outstanding, to member states. In addition to these he drafts the provisional agenda of the meetings of the Council and the

Assembly, and has the responsibility of communicating it to member state. Lastly, the Administrative Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, can abolish those branches of administrative and technical offices as he may deem necessary for the adequate functioning of the General Secretariat.[52]

The Rules of procedure describe the General Secretariat of the OAU as a central permanent organ of the Organization of African Unity, (which) shall carry out the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the Organization, those that might be specified in other treatics and agreements among the member states, and those that are established in these Regulations.[53] In practice the General Secretariat Serves as the administrative branch of the OAU. The Rules clearly designates this organ as the "General Administrative Secretariat". It's functions include:-

(i) Keeping in custody the documents and files of the meetings of the Assembly, the Council of Ministers, of the Specialized commissions and other organs of the Organization of African Unity.

(ii) within it's possibilities, the General Secretariat shall place at the disposal of the specialized commissions the technical and administrative services that may be requested. In case a session of a specialized commission is held outside the Headquarters of the Organization, at the request of a Member state, the General Secretariat shall conclude agreements of contracts with the Government of the Member state on whose territory the session of the specialized commission is being held, to guarantee adequate compensation of the disbursements incurred by the General Secretariat;

(iii) recieves communications of ratification of instruments of agreements entered into between Member states;

(iv) prepares an Annual Report of the activities of the Organization;

(v) prepares for submission to the Council, a report of the activities carried out by the specialized commissions;

(vi) prepares the program and budget of the Organization for each fiscal year, to be submitted to the Council of Ministers, for it's consideration and approval '54.

In terms of personnel the General Secretariat is divided into five staff categories, (a) Political officers (Administrative Secretary-General, his four assistants, and the President and Vice- President of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration) who are nominated by the Assembly (b) professional officers; (c) technical staff members of the conference divisions, such as interpreters and technicians; (d) general services staff members; and (e) locally recruited members of staff [55]

In the employment of staff a quota system is used which ensures that every member state has representation in the general Secretariat. In previous times the Secretary General was directly responsible for the rearuitment of staff, but this procedure has been changed. The recruitment board has now been expanded to include the Administrative Secretary - General , and the heads of the four main departments which are the political; economic and social; amdinistrative and cultural, soience, education and research departments. The method of employment involves the communication of a notice of vagancy to the foreign Ministries of member states

through their enbassies in Addis Ababa. The governments of the member states then forward candidates for recruitment [56]. This method of employment, however, has the effect of militating against the development of a truly international, and neutral civil service. Because the recruitment of staff is done only with the consent of the government of the member state, the OAU staff consists more of civil servants who are on secondment and subject to be recalled any time, than neutral international civil servants. Because of this the General Secretariat has become politicized with civil servants trying to advance the interests of their home governments [57].

The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established as the organ with the primary objective of settling all disputes among the member states of the OAU. At the African summit conference at Addis Ababa in 1963, it was decided that a protocol defining the composition and conditions of service of this commission should be worked out. The protocol was worked out and endorsed at the 1964 summit conference in Cairo. This protocol commits member states to the peaceful settlement of disputes by either negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The commission consists of twenty-one members and is elected by the Assembly for a period of five years. The commission has juris diction over disputes between states only to the extent that the parties involved agree to use it's services. Once either party refuses to do so the matter is referred to the Council of Ministers [58].

The protocol provides for a President, two Vice-Presidents, and eighteen commissioners, thereby making up the twenty-one members. The President and Vice-Presidents are appointed by the Assembly on a full-time basis while the others are part-time. It is stipulated that they must all possess recognised professional qualifications. These officers are collectively responsible for consulting with the parties to any dispute over an appropriate mode of settlement.[59]

Another group of important institutions within the OAU are it's specialized Commissions. These are commissions that have been established by the Organization to coordinate intra-African activities in specific functional areas. Article XX of the Chater states that:-

> "The Assembly shall establish such specialized Commissions as it may deem necessary including the following;
>
> (1) Economic and social commission;
> (2) Educational and Cultural Commission;
> (3) Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission;
> (4) Defence Commission;
> (5) Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.[60]

It is significant that since the establishment of these commissions two more have been added. These are the Commission of Transport and Telecommunications and the Commission of African Jurists.[61] The first meeting of each of these commissions was devoted to adopting the rules of procedure. These rules, which are similar for each commission, were prepared by a committee of experts and recommended to the commission by the General Secretariat.[62] According to the Rules of Membership, each

each specialized commission is composed of the Ministers concerned, or other Ministers or plenipotentiaries designated by the governments of the member states [63]. The functions of the specialized Commissions are carried out in accordance with the provisions of the charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers [64]. This rule initially provided friction between the members of the commission and the Council of Ministers. The members of the specialized Commissions argued that one group of Ministers could not be responsible to another group since they were all of equal rank. Furthermore, they argued that the Council of Ministers, comprising mainly Foreign Ministers, did not have the functional competence to supervise the work of Ministers in other fields. However, the Council of Ministers ruled, in 1964, that the works of the various commissions should be submitted to them for discussion and approval [65].

This discussion on the specialized commissions concludes the formal description of the component structures and functions of the OAU. However, there is one last tendency that Bennett ascribes to international governmental organizations that is important to discuss with reference to the OAU. He says that in order to safegaurd state sovereignty, (international governmental organizations) operate at the level of consent, recommendation, and cooperation rather than through compulsion or enforcement [66]. In the case of the OAU there is no provision, either in the Charter or the Rules of procedure, for the enforcement of resolutions

passed by the Organization. In the same vein the member states, wether they approve or do not approve of a resolution, are under no obligation to abide by that resolution. This has had the effect of reducing the OAU resolutions to mere recommendations. Emperor Haile Selassie once described OAU resolutions as "respect for the basic ideas which bind us together".[67]

The omission of any enforcement clauses suggests that the founding fathers deliberately wanted it that way. It has been argued that African nations gained independence after protracted struggles. Upon attaining independence the new states also faced the problems of having a multiplicity of struggles, usually ethnic, within their territories. There was therefore the logical tendency for the ruling elites to jealously gaurd their newly acquired sovereignty on the one hand, and to consolidate their positions within the new states on the other hand[68]. The insitution of the Assembly of Heads of state and Governments, within which all African Heads of state are regarded as equals, can thus be seen as a reflection of this African reality. Article III of the OAU Charter adheres the OAU to the principles of the Sovereign equality of member states, non - interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.

Zdenek Cervenka, however, argues that the binding force of OAU resolutions should not be assessed from a legal perspective alone. The resolutions, he says, "represent the collective

consensus of the opinion of Heads of state, reached by exerting influence on one another. Though lacking legal, binding force by virtue of the fact that they represent political agreements of Heads of state, often reached through tough bargaining. They carry considerable political weight, the more so as most of them are adopted unanimously [69]. This argument notwithstanding, the OAU by and large operates at the level of consent and recommendation.

2.5 THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL AND AFRICAN STATE SYSTEMS ON THE OAU

In his book Swords Into Plowshares , Inis Claude argues that:

> "legal and structural analysis of institutions is indispensable but it contributes little to understanding unless the international organization is placed squarely in the political context where it operates, International Organizations must be considered in terms of it'sinseparability from the the political forces and trends of the times. Their actual operations can only be understood with reference to the world of politics, and the ultimate results can be properly understood only in terms of their impact upon that world" 70.

This view constitutes a kind of retreat from the main tenets of functionalism. This is because it brings to light the importance of practical politics in the analysis of international organizations, while functionalism emphasizes the cooperative aspects of interactions between nations and the development of international organizations as a result of such cooperation.

Neverthless, this quotation aptly expresses the need for the analysis of international organizations within their political

contexts. This derives from the fact that all organizations exist and operate within an environment. For this reason it is necessary to place the OAU within it's environmental context and to describe and evaluate the impact of this environment upon it's functioning. Because the OAU operates within the context of the African state system, which is a part of the large global system, and is acted upon by it, the systems theory will be employed. Various scholars have written about the African region as a sub-system within the larger global system [71], and have sought to analyze intra - and extra - African relations utlizing that perspective.

William Zartman has defined a sub-system as "a major component of the global system, either a geographical group of states that exhibits regional characteristics, or a large multi-national state such as China, India, the U.S. or U.S.S.R."[72]

To aid in the identification of sub-systems a number of characteristics have been attributed to them. These characteristics are (1) the region is delimited in terms of a geographic region that serves both as a territorial base and as an area of identification; (2) it is recognized by other members of the international system as constituting a distinct and identifiable segment of that system; (3) the members of the subordinate regional system consider and identify themselves as integral units of that system; (4) the system should possess an institutional capability for promoting coordination and/or cooperation on problems of mutual concern (5) the interdependence of the system should be such that a major change in one aspect of it's processes will have an effect

on it's other components; (6) intra - systemic actions and responses should predominate over external influences when the system is functional; (7) the collective power of the regional system should be relatively inferior to that of the international system; (8) Changes in the international system should have a greater effect on the regional system than the reverse situation; and (9) there should be some institutional or formal means for interaction between the regional and international systems[73].

Within this framework, the OAU can be seen as the institutional representation of the African sub-system. This is because it fulfills the fourth and ninth characteristics enumerated above. The OAU provides the insitutional capability for promoting consideration and cooperation on problems of mutual concern within the African subs-system. It also acts as an institutional means for interaction between the African regional system and the international system.

These two characteristics that the OAU fulfills holds the implicit assumption that there exists a dynamic relationship between the OAU and the African sub-system on one hand, and between the OAU and the global system on the other hand. In other words, by virtue of their interrelatedness whatever impact the global system has on the African sub-system ultimately effects the OAU.

The concepts of interrelatedness and autonomy of the sub-system becomes of relevance here. The interrelatedness of a sub - system indicates a state in which a change at one point of

the system affedts other points in the system. A system can be said to be aurtonomous to the extent that intrasystemic actions and responses to changes within it predominate over external influences [74].

According to Paul Saenz recent events have shown that when the African sub - system is functional, significant changes in one state is capable of eliciting responses from other states within the system. Examples of events that led to the display of this form of interrelatedness include the changes of government in Algeria in 1965, and Ghana in 1966. He adds that conflicts within or between member states of the OAU have displayed the region's autonomy. He cites the disputes between Algeria - Morocco, Ethiopia - Somalia, Somalia - Kenya, and Ghana - Upper Volta as having generated greater continental and intra-systemic responses than external responses. [75] The OAU, within this context has, as two of it's main objectives, the promotion of the continents autonomy, and the interrelatedness of it's member states. Article II, paragraph 1, of the Charter tries to safeguard the autonomy of the continent by stating, as one of it's purposes, to defend the sovereignty, territorial intogrity and independence of African states. The second paragraph of Article II tries to promote the interrelatedness of African states by exhorting them to "coordinate and harmonize" their policies in political, ecohomic and social fields.

If the predominance of intra - systemic responses and reactions to a given event or change within the system is an indicator

of greater autonomy and interrelatedness, then a reverse situation in which extra-systemic responses are greater indicates a lower level of autonomy and interrelatedness. Using this as a basis, one can evaluate the impact of the global and African state systems upon the functioning of the OAU.

The impact of the global system on the African sub-system and consequently on the OAU has taken place in a number of ways. The most direct means by which the global system has impacted upon the African state system has been by way of foreign intervention. In this case the foreign powers intervene directly in order to protect certain vested interests. A recent example is the Belgian and French interventionin the Shaba province of Zaire in 1978.

On the one hand African states may invite foreign powers to aid them in conflicts against their antogonists as Ethiopia did by using Cuban and Soviet military assistance against Somalia in 1977. Paul Saenz argues that "occasionally the capabilities of the system are exceeded by it's responsibilities and it has become dysfunctional. Under these circumstances individual African states usually seek extracontinental assistance and subject the system to foreign penetration, which threatens it's autonomy and interrelatedness".[76] In other words, where the capabilities of the system are overburdened the system can no longer perform it's functions and the door becomes open to external influence.

On the other hand, foreign powers may not be invited in order for them to intervene. A number of foreign powers, specifically the United states, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union already have vested political, economic, and strategic interests in Africa and are therefore disposed to intervene.

Through intervention in African affairs and the subsequent inability of the OAU and African states to prevent this, there is a loss of autonomy. It means that the boundaries of the African state system are permeable to external powers.

There are anumber of reasons that underlie the ability of external powers to intrude into African affairs. One basic reason is that despite their sovereignty and legal status, African states, in varying degrees, continue to have ties of dependency to the former colonial powers. These ex-colonial powers have in reality not ceased to dominate the control of the economies of these newly independent African states. In it's basic form this type of dominance tends to maintain the African states as producers of raw materials to be exported, and net importers of manufactured goods.

In order to maintain this situation and prevent the rise of groups that may try to alter it, these foreign powers try overtly or covertly to manipulate African politics. France is an example of a former colonial power that has been actively involved in the politics of her former colonies. According to Ellen Ray et al

"France adopted a neo - colonial strategy of granting statutory independence while clutching to what is absolutely essential to it; the economic benefits obtained from it's former colonies.[77] The authors state that the extent of economic dominance in client nations can be determined by considering the percentage of the modern sector on of the economy of the client state that is controlled by the dominant nation. On this basis they calculate that France controls 50% of the modern sector in Ivory Coasts, 55% in Cameroon, 57% in Senegal, and 65% in Gabon.[78] In addition to this the former colonies supply low priced raw materials that are essential for the economic survival of the former colonial powers. Using the example of France, she imports aluminum from Cameroon, Phosphates from Senegal, oil from Gabon, and Uranium from Niger, just to list a few cases.[79]

The loss of such economic dominance over the former colonies would have a great impact on the economy of the former colonial power itself. It is for this reason that certain regimes in African states are so strongly supported in spite of their corrupt and sometimes repressive nature. It is also for the this reason that former colonial powers like France still maintain troops in Africa on a permanent basis.

After independence France signed defence treaties with all of her former colonies with the exception of Mali and Guinea. The terms of agreement placed complete responsibility for their external protection on France. Most of the treaties specify that the Franco -phone states may call on France for aid against

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both international and external threat.[79] France can therefore successfully play an interventionist role without incurring excessive risks.

R.A Akindele gives four additional reasons for the preoccupation of the global community of states with Africa. Firstly, in terms of numbers, African states make up approximately one - third of the total membership of the United Nations. This translates into the formation of a very important voting bloc within the UN. Secondly, as was stated earlier, the African continent possesses very important mineral resources. The exploitation of these resources continues to attract foreign interests. In addition to this, the fact that most African countries are still primary producers of raw materials and not industrial products, makes them a market for the industrial goods of the foreign powers. Thirdly, within the context of the cold war struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Africa is percieved as an arena for the enhancement of competing and conflicting interests. Lastly, Africa's strategic position is of vital importance to both power blocs, especially the west. The Mediterranean sea, the Red sea, the Indian Ocean Littoral and the Cape of Good Hope are important sea routes for the transportation of oil from the middle East to Western Europe and America.[80]

The intrusion of foreign powers into the African region is enhanced by the relative military weakness of African states collectively. In the period between 1970-75 Africa was responsible for just 1.30% of the total world military expenditure.

While the world total average for military expenditure stands at $82.78 per capital, that of Africa is $10.00 per capital, making it the region with the lowest per capital military expenditure in the world.[81] These figures bring to vivid light the very low military capability that African States possess. This fact is made more glaring when one considers that a very substantial proportion of Africa's military expenditure is spent on infrastructure like barracks, and the payment of the salaries of armed forces personnel. Thus, African states can be seen to lack the military resources that are necessary for the defence of the continent against external aggression.

This state of affairs has led Zartman to conceptualize that the level of power in Africa is low, both within the system and toward outside states. This means that African states have little capability of influencing decisions of other African and non - African States.[82] This situation is exacerbated by what he calls the "diffused distribution, of power". This is a situation in which the distribution of power between African states is on a relatively equal basis. The various states possessing relatively equal power capabilities.

The factors that have been discussed above collectively represent the main forms of impact that predominating forces within the global system have on the African state system. The OAU, being the institutional representation of the African state system, similarly represents a reflection of the weaknesses that are inherent in that system. The low power capability

of the African state system also obtains in the OAU where for years there has been great reluctance toward the establishment of a collective defense system. The net impact of extra systemic intrusion into the African system has been in the degree of autonomy that inheres in the system [83].

The relationships that exist within the African state system has also had an impact on the functioning of the OAU. The first form of impact relates to the sovereignty of African states. The assumption that underlies the formation of international organizations is that a certain amount of Sovereignty is given up by the member states to the organization. This is translated into the jurisdiction that the organization develops over certain functional areas of cooperation between the member states. In the case of Africa the ideology of Pan Africanism that served to unify the various nationalist movements prior to the 1960's tended to fragment upon the attainment of independence. The newly independent African states were concerned more with the consolidation and full exercise of their Sovereignty. As such they were not tolerant of any attempts that could infringe upon that hard won sovereignty. They were more preoccupied with immediate problems like the forging of national unity, creating national identity, and struggling to place their countries on the modernization path. The problem that this created for the OAU lay in the reduction of the de facto power and jurisdiction it was supposed to exercise in facets of inter-African affairs.

Another factor that has had an impact on the OAU has been the differences between Francaphone, Anglophone, and Arab states. Taking into consideration one dimension of this problem. There have been arguments to the effect that the relationship between the Arabs of North Africa and the rest of Black Africa tend to be very weak. Apart from the factor of race, one reason for this may be economic disparties that exist between North Africa and Africa South of the Sahara. This has been generated to a large extent by Western interests and investments in the economics of that region, and the region's strategic position on the Mediterranean Sea littoral. In contrast the Black African states are not as economically developed as their Northern counterparts. A Psychological rift is also formed by the vast geographical separation which the Sahara desert creates.[84]

The other dimension concerns the differences that occur between the Angolophones, Franchophones, and Arabs regarding important decisions to be made in the OAU. An illuminating case in point was the controversy that surrounded the appointment of a new Secretary - General after the resignation of the Cameroonian Nzo Ekangaki in 1974.

At the OAU summit meeting in Mogadishu in 1974, two candidates were presented to succeed Ekangaki. They were Mr. Omèr Artah, Somalia's foreign Minister, and Mr. Vernon Mwaanga, Zambia's Foreign Minister. Although Mr. Arteh came within one vote of the required majority, he was blocked by the opposition minority.

The Arabs and Francophones, who are usually divided,voted in favour of Mr. Arteh, while the Anglophones, including Zaire, voted in support of Mr. Mwaanga.

Two main reasons were deduced for such a voting pattern. The first was that the supporters of Mr. Mwaanga thought it would be potentially catastrophic for the post of Secretary General to be held by Somalia's Foreign Minister while Somalia was embroiled in an intractable border dispute with Ethiopia where the Secretariat of the OAU is located. The second reason was that a number of African states were becoming worried over the increasing influence that the Arab states were developing within the OAU. This reason was buttressed by the fact that Somalia, which was a Muslim but non - Arab state, had recently made the decision of joining the Arab league, and they might be put in the position whereby they could advance Arab interests. On the other hand the Francophone support for Mr. Arteh derived from their desire to prevent the Anglophones from strengthening their position in the OAU. They preferred the post of Secretary General to be occupied by a Francophone African. The eventual compromise candiate was found in the person of William Eteki Mboumoua, a Cameroonia.[85]

Another factor which has had an impact on the functioning of the OAU has been the preoccupation of most contemporary African leaders with domestic issues rather than issues of continental concern. This factor is coterminous with the emergence of the military as key political actors in African countries.

The African Political landscape has been characterized by coups, counter coups, and domestic unrest. There is the tendency on the part of the military rulers to concentrate on solving the problems that brought them to power as well as consolidating their power in order to forestall further coups. Related to this has been the diversion of precious funds to the military establishment in most African countries instead of using it for more functional, welfare oriented ends.

The effect of this preoccupation with domestic security on the OAU is, aside from the depletion of funds that are channelled to the OAU, a reduction in the attendance of Heads of states at OAU summits. As example of this is the 13th Heads of states' summit meeting in port Louis, Mauritius, in which only 10 out of 47 Heads of states actually participated.

From the outset of independence some African states have articulated conservative foreign policies while others have articulated radical foreign policies. In the early 1960's this division was manifested by the Casablanca and Brazzville Monrovia grouping. Over the years a mainstream middle-of-the-road postion developed among OAU member states, and the ideological polarisation that marked the early years of the OAU was substantially reduced.

But, as professor S.K.B. Asante argues, following the 1976 extraordinary summit at port Louis, Mauritius, the OAU experienced an ideological division which split the member

states into "progressives" and "moderates". He argues that this division has been intensified by countries like Libya. He cites the example of the August 1982 summit in Tripoli during which Col. Gaddafi Mooted the idea of forming an alternative grouping of radical states. Also at the November 1982 Ministerial meeting in Tripoli, the Libyans claimed to have the support of what they termed "radical countries" in their attempt to seat Goukouni Weddei's delegation from Chad. They claimed that Hissen Habre's delegation was backed by moderate and conservative states. Although Asante concedes that these tendencies cannot be divided into neat ideological groups, nevertheless they are reminiscent of what was prevailing in the early years of the OAU when the organization comprised the radical Casablanca, and moderate Brazzaville and Monrovia groups.[87]

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to show the usefulness of functionalism as a heuristic device for the analysis of the OAU and it's activities. To achieve this, the structure and functions of the OAU were analyzed within the basic precepts of functionalism. Furthermore the latter part of the chapter attempted to show that, as an organization, the OAU operates within an environment and is, therefore, acted upon by forces emanating from the environment. In this case the global state system and the African state system are collectively seen as the environment within which the OAU operates, and which has impacts on the OAU.

However, this throws into light the important question of the extent to which this analysis challenges or enhances the functionalist philosophy of international organization. Essentially this analysis actually gives more credence to the functionalist philosophy than it detracts. In it's essence functionalism accedes to the fact that states interact within the global state system, and it's component regional systems, on a power political basis. The functionalist theory, however, puts forward the axiom that there is a coexisting network of interaction among states that occurs along functional lines. The prescriptive element in the theory therefore emphasizes the development of organizations along such functional lines in order to supercede the already existing power political relationships and ultimately establish "a working peace system".

FOOTNOTES

(1) Fore more on Pan - Africanism as a force in the formation of the OAU see Adekunle Ajala Pan - Africanism: Evolution Progress and Prospects New York: St. Martins Press 1973 See also Claude Ake "Pan. Africanism and African Government in Review of politics Vol. 27 No. 4 1965 P. 532 - 542

(2) Africa Today London: Africa Journal limited 1981 P. 35

(3) K. Mathew "The Organization of African Unity in India Quarterly, Vol. 33 No. 3 1977 p. 309

(4) Ibid p. 310

(5) Africa Today Op cit p. 36

(6) Ibid p. 37

(7) For a description of the main elements that characterized African regionalism see Berhanykun Andemicael The OAU and the UN New York; African publishing Co. 1976

(8) Africa Today Op cit p. 37

(9) For a comprehensive analysis of the discusseions and deliberations in the foreign Ministers' and the Heads of State summit conference see Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 47 - 64.

(10) Inis Claude Swords into Ploutchares London: University of London Press, 1970.

(11) Ibid p. 8

(12) Louis B. Sohn (ed) Charter of the Organization of Afrion Unity in Basic Documents of African Regional Organizations Vol. I New York; Oceana Publications Inc. 1971.

(13) For a discussion on the importance of the OAU as an organization for the conduct of African diplomacy see Colin Legum "The Organization of African Unity. Success or failure" in International Affairs Vol. 51 No. 2 1976.

(14) Quoted from Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 63.

(15) R.A. Akindele "Reflections on the preoccupation and conduct of African Diplomacy" The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 14 No. 4 p. 559.

(16) Ibid p. 559

(17) Inis Claude Op cit p. 12

(18) Berhanykun Andemicael Op cit p. 9

(19) K. Mathews Op cit p. 309

(20) For a discussion of the charter of the O.A.U see Chime Chimelu Integration and Politics Amongst African States Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African studies, 1977

(21) The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 62

(22) Inis Claude Op cit p 345

(23) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p.63

(24) A. Le Roy Bennett International Organizations: Principles and Issues Englevood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice - Hall 1977 p. 3

(25) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 63

(26) For a detailed account of the Congo crisis and various proposals put forward for the establishment of an African force see Kwame Nkurmah Challenge of the Congo New York: International Publishers, 1967.

(27) Berhanykun Andemicael Op cit p. 10

(28) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 64

(29) Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 66

(30) Ibid pp. 67. For a critical look at the membership clause of the Charter and some of it's loopholes see James H. Polhemus "OAU membership and the changing African International system" in Nigerian Journal of International studies Vol. 1 No. 1 1975

(31) Ibid p. 67

(32) Ibid pp. 68 - 69

(33) See appendix for the full copy of the Charter

(34) "Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 63

(35) Ibid p. 64

(36) Ibid p. 64

(37) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 21

(38) Ibid p. 22

(39) "The Charter the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 64

(40) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 21

(41) Ibid p. 21

(42) John Markakis " The Organization of African Unity" A progress Report" in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 4 No. 2 1966 p. 144

(43) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 65

(44) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 25

(45) "The Charter of the organization of African Unity" Op Cit p. 65

(46) John Markakis Op cit p. 145

(47) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 25

(48) Ibid p. 26

(49) John Markakis Op cit p. 146

(50) For a discussion of the provisional Secretariat of the OAU set up immediately after the signing of the Charter in Addis Ababa, see James Polhomus "The provisional Secretariat of the OAU, 1963 - 64" in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol 12 No. 2 1974 pp. 287- 295.

(51) For a detailed discussion of the political circumstances surrounding the appointment of OAU Secretary - General over the years see Michael Wofers Politics in the Organization of African Unity London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1976. Also for an analysis of factors that circumscribe the power and autonomy of the OAU Secretary General see B. David Meyers "The OAU's Administrative Secretary General" In International Organization Vol. 30 No. 3 1976.

(52) "Functions and Rules of the General Secretariat" Part II, Rules 6 - 11.

(53) Ibid part I, Rule 1

(54) Ibid part 1, Rule 2

(55) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 27

(56) Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 80

(57) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 30

(58) "Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, "Article II.

(59) Ibid Article III

(60) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit P .66 Article xx.

(61) Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 82

(62) For more discussions on the specialized Commissions see Colin Legum "The Specialized Commissions of the Organization of African Unity" in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 2 1964 pp. 586 - 590.

(63) "The Charter of the Organization of African Unity" Op cit p. 66 Article xxi.

(64) Ibid p. 67 Article xxii

(65) Adekunle Ajala Op cit p. 83

(66) Le Roy Bennet Op cit p. 24

(67) Quoted in Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 22

(68) John Woronoff Organizing African Unity Metuchen, N.J. Scarecorw Press 1970 p. 159.

(69) Zdenek Cervenka Op cit p. 22

(70) Inis Claude Op cit p. 6

(71) Such Scholars include; Paul Saenz "The Organization of African Unity in the Subordinate African Regional System" in African Studies Review Vol. 113 No. 2 September, 1970; Lynn H. Miller "Regional Organizations and Subordinate Systems" in Louis J. Cantori and Steven Spiegelleas "The International Politics of Regions, Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice - Hall 1970, William Zartman "Africa as a subordinate state system" In Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz Leds) Regional politics and World Order San Francisco; Freeman, 1973.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHADIAN CIVIL WAR

3.1 . INTRODUCTION


This chapter sets out to analyze the Chadian civil war and the efforts of the OAU at resolving the conflict. The first part of the chapter will be devoted to a brief analysis of the background to the Chadian civil war. The second part will focus on the growth and development of the crisis. This section will look at the rise of rebel movements in Chad and the factor of foreign intervention. However, much of the emphasis will be on the efforts of the OAU at resolving the conflict. After this the impact of the Chadian civil war on the effective functioning of the OAU as a regional organization, and the implications that it holds for the theory of functionalism will be looked at. This will be followed by the conclusion.

3.2 . BACKGROUND TO THE CHADIAN CIVIL WAR

A serious problem that Chad has been facing since it attained independence in 1960 stems from the ethnic diversity of it's population. It is estimated that Chad has up to 200 different ethnic groups although three major ethnic groups can be identified. There are the Sara in the South who make up 34 per cent of the total population; the Arabs of the Sahel who make up about 27 percent of the total; and the Tobou nomads of the Sahara who make up about 18 per cent of the population and are found mainly in the North.

map 1

CHAD



Source: African Affairs
No. 51 November 1975
pp. 25

The Christians constitute roughly 10 per cent of the population and are concentrated in the Southwest. The reminder of the population worship native religions [2].

Since the occupation of the country by France, the French language, which is the official language, has been the binding force that has kept Chad together, even though Arabic is spoken in the North and Sara in the South. Education is conducted in both Arabic and French [3].

The colonial past of Chad, coupled with it's ethnic, religious, and racial diversity may be said to be the root cause of the Chadian conflict. Prior to the French incursion at the turn of the century there was no single cohesive unit known as Chad. There was the dessert area which was controlled by the Muslim Tobou and Arab nomads; the central Muslim sultanates of Kanem Borno, Borguirmi; and Ouaddai; and the Southern decentralized states of the Sara who were constantly subjected to slave raidings by sultanates in the North. [4]

France's incursion in this region stemmed from her desire to link her west African and North African colonies. She also wanted to curtail interference in her West African empire by the independent sultanates, similarly she wanted to curtail Libyan influence in the region through the Islamic Sanussiya Movement. To this effect there was the Anglo- French agreement of 1899, which divided Africa into British and French spheres of influence, placing all the territories west of the Sudan at the disposal of France. [5]

The Sanussiya Movement was established in 1843 by Mohammed Ben Ali - a - Sanussi, who extended the influence of the movement from Arabia to West Africa through an intricate network of religious lodges. The Shaikhs of these lodges were trained in Libya and acted as arbiters in tribal disputes and were considered as moral and religious leaders in their communities. [6]

The Sanussiya movement established very strong links with the tribes of northern Chad. The French, in order to forestall any religious revival, closed down many of these lodges after a series of wars with the Sanussiya sect in 1902. Nevertheless, strong ties had already been established between the Libyan Sanussiya and the ethnic groups of Northern Chad through religion and intermarriage [7].

Hostility to the French was extreme in the North and sporadic fighting continued from 1902 till 1920. The resistance by the Tobou was organized by the Sanussiya movement. The French withdrew temporarily in 1917. They launched another offensive when the Italian invasion of Libya diverted the attention of the Sanussiya, and consequently the Derde (leader) of the Tebous surrendered in 1920 [8].

During the period of colonial rule, although development was limited in Chad as a whole, the bulk of it took place in the South while the North was seriously neglected. The French encouraged a large number of blacks in the South to convert to Christianity and acquire Western education. For instance, there were only three secondary schools in the whole country with eighteen teachers, and they were all situated in the South. In the north there was no provision for education except for the traditional Muslim type.

There was one attempt to start a modern Islamic school in Abeche but it was stopped by the colonial administration for fear that it would turn to a center for nationalist agitation and propaganda.[9] Development in Chad was thus very limited and lopsided in favour of the South.

However, certain contradictions did emerge within the pattern and process of colonial development in Chad. The French, in order to give Chad a basis for economic exploitation, and the people a money income which to pay tax, decided to expand cotton cultivation throughout the southern provinces in 1928. The French administration made the traditional chiefs responsible for ensuring that production quotas were met. In aid of this the administration increased their powers by allowing them to use forced labour on private land. In addition to accentuating the development of the South in relation to the North, it had the immediate effect of inducing disaffection among the people who resented the increase in the powers of their chiefs. This widespread disaffection, coupled with the educational exposure of the Southern Saras gave rise to pre-independence nationalist movements there. Thus by 1960, when Chad became independent, the Christian, French speaking, educated minority from the South became the ruling elite.

When political parties were legalized after the second world war, Gabrielle Lisette, an administrator from the West Indies formed the Party Progressiste Tchadien (P.P.T.) which had a Sara following. In 1957 the P.P.T. led a coalition of parties to victory

in the territorial assembly elections and Lisette became the head of Chad's first autonomous government [10]. Thus the P.P.T. led coalition brought Chad to idependence in 1960. But because Lisette was an unpopular figure, especially among the Northern muslims, due to the fact that he was a foreigner, he handed over leadership to Franc is Tombalbaye who was a Christian, Sara School teacher. Tombalbaye therefore became the first president of Chad while Lisette was the vice - President. At independence all other parties that were not with the P.P.T. coalesced into the Party National African (P.N.A).

Upon assuming power one of Tombalbaye's first acts was to purge Lisette from office. He was refused entry into Chad after an official trip abroad on the grounds that he was not a Chadian [11]. At that time the P.P.T., with Tombalbaye at it's head, was strong and well organized. It had followings in the cotton growing regions in the South, and in the Muslim areas of Batha, Guera, and Chari - Baguirmi. The only region where the P.P.T. had no branches was in the Borku - Ennedi - Tibesti (B.E.T.) region in the North. The inhabitants of this region are a mixture of Arabs, Tobous and other muslims [12].

In 1961 Tombalbaye forced a merger between the P.P.T. and the P.N.A., which led to the formation of the Union Pour Progress du Tchad (U.P.T.), thereby creating a one party state. He subsequently replaced the parliamentary system of government with a Presidential system with himself at the head. He thereafter banned all opposition political parties and eliminated most of Lisettes supporters.

Tombalbaye's rule came to be characterized by high-handedness. He went on to reorganize the bureaucracy and made the Saras the dominant ethnic group within it. He stationed young Sara civil servants outside the Sara prefectures, in areas whose people they knew very little about. The consequence was that they were very strict in their administration, especially with regard to tax collection [13]. The result was that the Sara administrators gained enmity among the muslim Arabs and blacks in the Central and Northern Zones. Initially this enmity was a direct response to the brutality being meted to them by the Sara administrators but as the economic conditions and hardships continued the enmity took on a religious and ethnic bias against the Saras. As economic conditions continued to deteriorate, opposition toward Sara domination increased. It was such discocord that sparked off the Forth Lamy riots in 1963, in which up to 500 people were estimated to have been killed [14]. It was as a challenge to the oppressive domination by the Sara of the South that armed rebel. movements started in the North.

On 29 July, 1968, Tombalbaye embarked upon a cultural revolution which was aimed at students, intellectuals, and civil servants who were critical of his administration. In an attempt to return to cultural roots he replaced all French and Christian terms and names with Sara ones. The name of the capitals Fort Lamy, was changed to Ndjamena, and Tombalbaye himself changed his first name from Francois to Ngarta. He renounced Christianity and in the process introduced the cult of Yondo [15], which was a type of Sara initiation ceremony that entails a lot of painful physical and psychological ordeals. All Sara Youth were made to undergo the ritual in addition to people who were seeking high government positions.

This had the dual effect of engendering dislike from the northern Muslims and reducing Tombalbayes support among his fellow saras.[16]

In the early part of the 1970's Tombalbaye became paranoid and decided to eliminate all Sara opposition to his rule. To facilitate this he establihsed a parliamentary enquiry commission which he empowered to conduct house searches, make arrests and bring to trial people accused of treason.[17]

To summarize things in a nutshell, the balance sheet of Tombalbaye's administration had very little to any for itself by way of national unification. Under Tombalbaye the Northern part of the country remained as poor and ignored as it had been for years. On the other hand the South, which constituted the mainstay and tax base of the economy, derived very little benefit from the government.

3.3 THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHADIAN CIVIL WAR

1. THE RISE OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

Opposition movements developed in the Northern part of the country as early as the 1960's. The most popular of these movements was the Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad (Frolinat). Frolinat was founded in 1966 as a successor movement to the Union Nationale Tchadienne (U.N.T.) by Ibrahim Abatcha. This movement represented unified leadership and organization for different rebel movements that had sprung up in different parts of the country, but mainly in the North.

Originally Frolinat encompassed a party led by Ahmed Moussa and Ibrahim Abatcha's UNT. Soon after it's creation there was a split because the constituent movements were too ideologically far apart. Abatcha's group kept the name Frolinat and set up it's base in Algiers, Algeria. Ahmed Moussa's group became the Front de Liberation Tchadienne (F.C.T.). The latter group had a regional following in Ouaddas province with the intension of seceding. The movement set up it's base in Sudan but never operated very actively from there [18].

Nevertheless, under the leadership of Frolinat a well coordinated guerilla movement developed throughout the Northern, Central, and Southeastern regions of Chad. It's program included a call for an end to neo-colonialism, and equal rights for all groups in Chad. The guerillas rapidly took over the countryside while the towns remained in the hands of the government.

Ibrahim Abatcha died in combat in mid - 1966 after which Dr. Abba Siddick assumed the mantle of leadership. He proceeded to reorganize the Frolinat by introducing a command structure within which there were two Fronlinat armies. The First Army was located in the East of Chad. This army was led by General El Baghlani [19]. until he was purged by Abba Siddick. Upon leaving Frolinat Baghlani took his troops along with him and set up

bases in Southern Ouaddai while he had his headquarters in Sudan. His army assumed the name "Vulcan Army". After purging Baghlani, Abba Siddick appointed El Hadj Issaka as the new leader of the First Army but he was deserted by his men in 1971 and thereafter he was replaced by Abou Haga.[20] The First Army had it's base in Sudan and, because of that, it's level of activity depended upon the relationship between Chad and Sudan.

Dr. Abba Siddick's headquarters was located in Tripoli; Libya, and because of the distance separating himself and the actual fighting in Chad he was remote, isolated, and not really in direct control. Effective control of the second Army therefore devolved unto two Tobou leaders; Goukouni Weddei and Hissen Habre. Goukouni Weddei was the youngest son of the Derde and he had been fighting with Frolinat before he was joined by Hissen Habre. Hissen Habre was from the Ankara group of Tobous and he had trained in France as a lawyer where he imbibed Maoist doctrines.[21]

Frolinat gradually improved it's fighting position over the years but it's area of operation was still basically limited to the north of the country. They raised money for a number of years by raiding caravans, holding hostages and sometimes collecting tarriffs from traffic that passed through the area they controlled.

One kidnapping that the Frolinat committed and turned into a much publicized affair was the abduction of a French authropologist called Madame Claustre. This kidnapping also turned out to be one of the factors that led to a split

between Goukouni and Habre. In 1974 Habre's troops captured several Europeans in Bardai, and among them were Christophe Staewan a German doctor, and Madame Francoise Claustre. The German government readily paid a ransom for the release of Staewan, but the French government, given their support for Tombalbaye, refused to give in to Habre's demands. Eventually a ransom of $ 2.4 million was paid in late 1975, after Habre had executed another Frenchman called Pierre Galopin. However, Habre still refused to release Francoise Claustre in spite of the majority Frolinat opinion, led by Goukouni Weddei, that she should be released. She was eventually set free in Tripoli in January 1977.[22]

With opposition from the Frolinat becoming increasingly stronger, Tombalbaye decided to call on the French to intervene He based his decision on the military defence agreement that was signed between Chad and France when Chad gained independence. The French intervention, which helped to prop up Tombalbaye's regime, took place from August to November 1976.[23]

Elections were held in April 1969 and Tombalbaye was re-elected after gathering 93 per cent of the votes. Thereafter, the peace which the French military intervention helped to establish rapidly deteriorated. The rebels had regrouped and reorganized themselves and launched another assault which was on a much larger scale than previously. Tombalbaye was compelled to ask for French military intervention once more in March 1969 but the French government agreed to send troops only

on the condition that the intervention process would be accompanied by a Mission de Reforme Administrative (M.R.A.)[24]

The establishment of the MRA was based on a report carried out by the French Major Galopin. By and large, the report attributed the rebellion by the northerners to the abuse of power among the Sara ruling elite.[25] The reforms that were carried out by the MRA included the dismissal of corrupt civil Servants, the restoration of the customary powers of traditional chiefs, and the reinstallation of sultans that had been removed. The MRA was mainly operational in the central and eastern parts of the country, and although it helped to reduce discontent to some extent, the Fronlinat used the whole affair to their advantage. They cited the administrative reforms as evidence of neo-colonialism.

In 1970 the French government decided that it would withdraw it's forces from Chad as soon as possible. This decision alarmed Tombalbaye and he therefore decided to implement certain policies that were designed to improved his position in relation to the rebels on one hand, and his people on the other. For the first time he officially recognised the existance of the rebellion. He thereafter proclaimed 1971 as the year of "National Reconciliation."[26] and called on the rebels to help restore National unity. At a PTT congress in March 1971, he called for free public discussions by all sectors of the national community, In a further display of liberalization he gave half of the ministerial portfolios in his government to Arabs

and other Muslims. In May and June, 1971 he set 1,500 political prisoners free [27].

In June 1971 a phased French withdrawal began. They completed the military withdrawal in June, 1972 leaving behind 430 technical military assistants who were attached to the Chad army [28]. However, in August 1971 the government announced that there had been a Libyan backed attempt to assassinate President Tombalbaye and overthrow the government. [29] This incident marked a turning point in the relations between Chad and Libya. It also brought about a change in Tombalbaye's reconciliatory attitude toward the rebels. This incident gave the chad goverment an excuse to break offdiplomatic relations with Libya temporarily. Tombalbaye's goverment had long suspected that Libya supplied funds and arms to Frolinat because although the French intervention force managed to contain Frolinat incursions, they never really defeated the movement nor were they able to cut off their supply of arms.

By the time the French were about to finish their withdrawal Tombalbaye felt he had to do something in order to regain control. Thus, in the last months of 1971 Tombalbaye and his Ministers decided to write off the far north as an economically worthless and occasionally troublesome area in favour of greater industrial development in the South. But the assumed motive behind the decision was that Tombalbaye had struck a financial agreement with Col. Gaddafi of Libya, whom he had decided to restore

diplomatic relations with. Under the agreement Libya undertook to withdraw support for Frolinat and to grant Chad 23,000 million FA Francs in return for an area of 27,000 square miles in Northern Chad called the Aouzou strip which is suspected to contain considerable deposits of Urgnium. The Aouzou strip, which Libya claims as a result of an agreement signed by Pierre Leval, for France and Mussolini, for Italy, was annexed by France during the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911. The Italian force that was sent to ward off the French arrived too late to prevent the annexation. By the end of world war two the French had occupied all of Southern and Western Libya. When they withdrew from Libya in 1949 they refused to leave the Aouzou strip. The French regarded the area as vital to the security of their forces stationed in Algeria, and by that time Algeria had already started agitating for independence from France. Gaddafi argues that the Leval Mucsolini agreement is a legal document which proves that the Aouzou strip is an integral part of Libya[30] Gaddafi has further argued that all the borders on the African continent had been drawn by colonial powers regardless of ethnicity or cultural background and as such they are products of colonial agreements. He argues that since all the boundaries are products of such agreements, the Leval - Mussolini agreement should be accorded equal validity.

Considering the role that Libya has played in providing support for Frolinat, it is important to briefly examine the background to Libya's involvement in Chad. Under King Idris the Libyan government did not actively support Frolinat. Although Libya had provided Abba Siddick with a base in Tripoli, they still maintained diplomatic relations with Chad.

The reasons for this apparent contradiction between policy and practice were that, firstly, there exists an ethnic and cultural affinity between the people of Southern Libya and those of Northern Chad. Secondly, the founder of the Sanussiya movement in Libya was the father of king Idris, therefore the King had the duty of not only encouraging the spread of Islam South of Libya, but also to see to the protection and non - persecution of adherents to the faith.

Neverthless, the Libyan government under king Idris basically regarded the conflict as a problem that was internal to Chad, and as such it would not take sides officially. However, this position changed markedly when Col. Gaddafi attained power in 1969. Gaddafi believes in the Sanussiya movements aim to spread Islam, and consequently Libyan influence, to the South. Furthermore, Gaddafi looks at Chad from a geo-strategic perspective whereby Chad, as an extension of Libya, would give him access to Sudan and Southern Egypt. [31]

Col. Gaddafi percieved Tombalbaye's government as illegitimate for two reasons. Firstly, it was a minority government which, he believed, had no legitimacy since it catered for the interests of only one section of the population to the detriment of the Muslim majority who make up about 45 per cent of the population. Secondly, Gaddafi believed that Tombalbaye was there primarily to serve French neo-colonial interests. This position was manifested in a release by the Libyan government on it's recognition of the Frolinat movement. It stated that:

> "The attitude of the 1st September Revolution (that brought Gaddafi to power) to the agent regime in Chad is natural. It is an extension of the courageous and honorable attitudes of this revolution to the cause of freedom for mankind everywhere, and it's support of right against wrong without fearing anyone." 32

Given the fact that Tombalbaye fits the image of a neo-colonialist "agent", Gaddafi remained opposed to his continued stay in power.

The decision by the Chad government to cede the Aouzou strip to Libya, and the appropriate policies that should be adopted towards Libya precipitated a split between Goukouni, Weddei and Hissen Habre. Habre was violently opposed to the Libyans because of their occupation of the Aouzou strip, while Weddei and Abba Siddick remained pro - Libya.

In April, 1975 Tombalbaye was toppled and killed in a military coup. The leader of the coup, General Odingar, released the then commander in Chief of the Army, General Malloum, from

prison and invited him to become President of the Supreme Military Council (C.S.M.) Despite the fact that Tombalbaye had been overthrown, the domination of the North by the South still existed since the upper cadres of the military still comprised mainly Southern officers.

Regardless of this fact General Malloum set about trying to create national reconciliation. He appealed to all the people who were in exile or armed rebellion to return to Chad as a pre - condition for the re - launching of national development. He formed a government that consisted of equal numbers of Christians and Muslims, as well as civilians and military personnel. He released political prisoners and restored religious freedom. He also decided that the constitution should be suspended and political parties should be banned until national reconciliation had been achieved [33].

The new regime initially obtained widespread support but this later waned. The regime failed to attract the support of the major Frolinat leaders who had come to mistrust the very army that had fought against them under Tombalbaye. Frolinat's Abba Siddick denounced the new regime variously as "Tombalbayeism without Tombalbaye", and as "a neo - colonialist military dictatorship"[34].

The Chad government announced it's decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Libya on 6th February 1978. The reason they cited was the "increase in logistic support which the Tripoli regime is granting to the Chadian rebels and to the mobilization of the Libya armed forces helped by foreign elements"[38].

To compound the already difficult military situation, at the end of March, 1978, some fifty soldiers of the Nomad Guards mutinied, charging that Malloum's government was discriminating against muslims in the armed forces [39]. This mutiny put the government forces in state of total disarray. Thereafter a communique was issued by the Frolinat announcing the fall of Fada and Faya - Largeau. This in effect meant that the whole of the BET region had fallen to rebel forces.

General Malloum presented complaints against Libya at the OAU and the UN security Council, using Libya's occupation of the Aouzou strip and her arming of rebel forces as the main arguments. Nevertheless the complaints were withdrawn when Libya ordered the rebels to ceasefire and organize peace talks. At a meeting held in Sebha, Libya on 24th February, 1978, Gaddafi and Malloum signed a document aimed at ending the rebellion and providing for further talks between General Malloum and some representatives of Frolinat [40].

The talks took place in Benghazi, Libya, in March 1977 and ended with aneleven point agreement [41]. Unfortunately, the agreement broke down almost immediately. Goukouni Weddei because of his powerful position, refused to make any concessions. In April fighting resumed and the rebel forces were advancing toward Ndjamena but were repelled by massive French intervention. At this point an agreement between Malloum and Habre was reached in August 1978. The agreement provided for a "Government of National Union" with General Malloum as President and Hissen Habre as Prime Minister. Ministerial positions were shared out on an equal basis between the North and the South. Ironically, the agreement failed to last long as Habre demanded that posts in government parastatals should also be shared out on an equal basis. Malloum disagreed, contending that those posts were professional ones which should be filled by people who had adequate training. Malloum tried to persuade Habre to let a situation evolve whereby, as more Northerners became qualified they would eventually fit into these positions. Habre refused, and two months later withdraw his Northern ministers from the Cabinet and Secretly prepared for war [42].

The tensions erupted into a civil war in Ndjamena in February, 1979, leaving about 500 people dead and over 1,000 wounded. The civil war had the effect of breaking up the Frolinat into splinter groups which took part in the fighting.

With the brief civil war it was evident that Malloum was clearly loosing grip over the leadership of the armed forces. A ceasefire was agreed upon with sudanese and French mediation but Ndjamena still remained effectively divided between Malloum's government forces and Habre's supporters.

The war took a turn when Goukouni Weddei arrived in Ndjamena and announced his willingness to conduct negotiations aimed at forming a new government. At this point Nigeria became engaged in mediation efforts. A conference was held in Kano in March 1979. This led to an agreement in which Goukouni Weddei became the new Head of State in place of General Malloum. France agreed to an immediate withdrawal of all it's troops, while Nigeria agreed to provide a peace - keeping force [43]. The substitution of Goukouni Weddei for General Malloum as Head of State brought about an end to the domination of Chad by the Southern Saras.

During most of 1980 the conflict that raged in the Northern two thirds of Chad was primarily between Habres Forces Armees du Nord (FAN) and Weddei's People's Armed Forces (FAP). Among nine other factions that were active in the civil war was the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) of Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue. He was in control of the Southern part of Chad, and he attempted to secede but his efforts failed as the fighting spread to Njamena causing the flight of about 70,000 refugees into Cameroon.

In April and May, 1980, there were efforts by some African Heads of State, notably President Eyadema of Togo and President Omar Bongo

of Gabon, to negotiate a settlement between the factions but these attempts failed [44]. In November 1981, as a result of Habres successes in battle, President Weddei called on Gaddafi to send Libyan forces to support him. Gaddafi sent troops and by the end of 1981 almost all of Chad was firmly under the control of the Libyan backed government forces. Habre, thereafter, fled across the border with his troops to Sudan. Here, with Sudanese and Egyptian help he regrouped his forces.

It was at this point that the U.S., under the Reagan administration, started becoming involved in the Chad conflict primarily in an attempt to check the spread of Gaddafi's influence. The U.S. increased military and economic aid to Libya's neighbours; Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Niger. In addition to this the U.S. exerted Pressure on the O.A.U. through Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt and Zaire to take action that would bring an end to the Libyan occupation of Chad [45].

The OAU in turn, was able to assemble a peace - keeping force with U.S. and French assistance, after arriving at an agreement between the factions in Lagos in 1982. In the meantime in Sudan, Hissen Habre was able to consolidate and strenghten his forces with the aid of the U.S, Sudan, and Egypt. Thereby becoming a credible contender for power once again. In Chad, Goukouni Weddei requested that Libya should withdraw her troops after recieving guarantees of an OAU peace keeping force. However, Habre seized the opportunity to march back into Ndjamena with his troops as soon as the Libyan forces had withdrawn. The OAU peace-keeping force, which was stationed at major points did not attempt to prevent his advance.

On his part Habre avoided any direct clash with the peace-keeping force by maneuvering around them until he occupied Ndjamena [46]. Goukouni Weddei and his troops were consequently forced to flee to the Northern part of the country in order to start military campaigns against Habre.

ii. FOREIGN INTERVENTION

This section of the chapter deals primarily with outside countries that have directly intervened in the Chad conflict for either economic strategic, or possibly, political reasons. In the case of Chad two main countries stand out; they are France and Libya. To a lesser extent, and in more recent times, the United states has also intervened.

France and Libya have both pursued different policies in Chad which have necessitated their direct intervention in the conflict. As a former colonial power that seeks to maintain it's strategic position through a variety of economic and military arrangements, the French intervention in Chad is best understood through an all embracing Africa policy. Together with other Franco - phone states, Chad constitutes part of a military strategic network which France needs to preserve. On the other hand Libya has a mixture of economic and strategic motivations which Col. Gaddafi has tried to legitimize with religious reasons. Within this context, a key factor is Libya's claim to the Aouzou strip which it annexed in 1973, Libya's policies in relation to Chad are geared primarily towards legitimizing it's occupation of this area of land. Lastly the role that the U.S. has played in Chad can be understood within the context of the global east - west rivalry. The reasons, and nature of the intervention of

each of these countries in the conflict shall be examined in turn.

(a) FRENCH INTERVENTION

France's aim in conquering the territory that became Chad was to unite it's nothern territories with it's central and West African territories. In order to help the territory develop a strong administration capable of maintaining internal order, the French government developed the meagre economic resources that Chad possessed but only to the point that it would offset the cost of administration [47].

In the recent past certain discoveries in Chad have enhanced the possibility of the presence of an economic motive behind French intervention in Chad. An American oil corporation, CONOCO, reported in 1978 that Chadian oil reserves could equal that of the North Sea or even Saudi Arabia. The bulk of the reserve it reported, is situated in the Southern part of Chad and East of Lake Chad. Further deposits were also reported to exist around the Libyan border with Chad. [49] In addition to this there have been speculations about the existence of Uranium deposits in the Northern parts of Chad, especially the Aouzou strip.

But the fact that France's intervention in Chad predated all these discovereries points to the position that French interests in Chad have been over and above all strategic. Chad's geographical position acts as a buffer state which partly shields other French protected African states, the most immediate of which

are Cameroon, Niger, and the Central African Republic. But, in order to understand the strategic importance of Chad to France, one must understand the nature of France's military and strategic interests and activities in Africa.

France's strategic objectives in her former Africa colonies can be divided into three parts[49]. Firstly, only a few of the former French colonies in Africa inherited an army because it was the policy of the French government to set up separate armed forces in her colonies. Instead France engaged in the practice of absorbing Africans directly into the French colonial army[50]. Thus at the outset of independence the French created small national armies to replace France's colonial forces. These armies were small and they required French assistance, both in training and equipments, in order to be functional.

Beyond the creation of such small armies the French had two further objectives. The first was to ensure the security of the newly independent states, and the group of leaders to whom power was being transfered. The second goal was the continued integration of the Franchophone states within the framework of French geo-strategic interests[51]. Thus there was to be a kind of division of labour between the new national armies and gendarmeries which would ensure internal security, and France whose intervention forces would protect the region against external aggression.

In order to concretize this conception, new defense arrangements in the form of a serries of Defense and Military Assistance Agreements were formalized between 1960 and 1961 when most of France's colonies

began to attain independence. [52] Some of these arrangments were on a bi-lateral basis, while others were negotiated in the form of collective sub-regional defense agreements. All the Francophone states except Guinea maintain military assistance agreements with France, and others (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Togo, and Cameroon) are protected by Defense Agreements. [53]

Although the full contents of these agreements have never been published, three main provisions have been determined. The first provision is that all the African officers and men of the French colonial army were to be transferred to the territories of their origin. To assist in this process the French government gave basic grants of hardware, vehicles, and military equipment to help the national authorities build up their own armies. Secondly, France agreed to train African soldiers, and to continue the supply of military equipment. Thirdly, it was agreed that France would give military aid in the internal and external defense of the new states and the ruling groups [54].

Thus, at the outset of her colonies' independence, France based military garrisons in Ouakam (Senegal), Port Bouet (Ivory Coast), Niamey (Niger), Fort Lamy (now Ndjamena in Chad), Bangui (Central African Republic). Libreville (Gabon), Diego Suarez and Tnato (Malagasy). Additionally, at that time, there were 18 French military missions, with a total of 2,500 officers. There were also 2,600 cadets from Black Africa training in French military institutions [55].

In present times these military installations in Francophone Africa have been crucial to France for a number of reasons.

Firstly the military installations are vital for logistics. Secondly, they form part of a global military communications system that France has developed and maintains. Lastly, France's joint military maneuvers with the Francophone countries have not just provided training for the African soldiers, but it also represents a form of symbolic support for her ex-colonies [56].

Within this general picture of French strategic interests in Africa, Chad assumes a central position. The French military base in Chad is France's second most important in Africa apart from her base in Djibouti. The French air support system at the base in Ndjamena, is of very crucial strategic importance in the ability of France to launch speedy interventions to any part of Africa. An example of this is the fact that Ndjamena is the base from which the French airlifted the intervention forces that effect the overthrow of Bokassa and installed David Dacko in the Central African Republic [57].

France maintains a permanent detatchment of soldiers that number over 2,000 men. Apart from this France also maintains about 500 military and technical advisers attached to the Chadian army. [58] Chad is also a beneficiary of the defense agreements signed between France and her former colonies in 1960, which provides for French intervention in the event of external attack. (See table 3.1)

Furthermore, Chad has been completely dependent on France for all it's military aid to Chad was substantial from the beginning of Chad's independence in 1960. From 1960 to 1973 Chad recieved the greatest amount of French military aid in Black Africa which totalled 50%

of all French military aid to Black Africa. In 1974 alone Chad recieved "three times as much French military assistance as any other Black African State".[59]

The above factors, in addition to the volatile situation in Chad have disposed France to intervene there. For this reason the use of French troops in Chad have been the most extensive in Africa. It has been argued that the level of French commitment to the various regimes in Chad stems from an attempt to demostrate to other French allies in Africa the extent to which they are prepared to go in preventing the success of radical insurgent movements. It has also been argued that the power vacuum created by a conflict, such as in Chad, would attract other powers into the area. French intervention therefore prevents such an attraction. Some examples of French intervention in Chad would serve to illustrate these points.

On 28th August, 1969, President Tombalbaye made an urgent reguest for French military assistance in suppressing Frolinat rebellion in the Northern part of Chad [69]. A government white paper issued the next day justified Tombalbaye's request by stating that the "teleguidance of trouble from outside" alone was enough for Tombalbaye to call for French military aid. At the same time it rejected claims that a revolutionary situation existed in Chad, arguing that Chadians may be discontented but they were not oppressed. The paper argued that an "outside threat, aimed at conquering Chad in favour of another colonialism, clearly justifies the appeal of the Chad government for French troops"[61]. The white paper further contended that Chad had only a "symbolic army"

at the time of independence. The paradox it identified was that France spent more than $20 million a year maintaining it's ground and air forces in Chad, while Chad, several year after gaining independence, was spending about one - tenth of this to maintain it's armed forces [62]. French military aid was therefore seen as indispensable to face up to an isurgency which was completely redefined as intervention from outside.

The immediate French response to this request was to send 20 aircraft full of paratroopers to fight alongside almost 1,000 French soldiers and airmen who had their base in Fort Lamy. The French government justified it's intervention with the contention that it was implementing the Franco - Chadian Defense Agreement of 1960 which ont entitles the Chad government to call for French military assistance against external aggression or internal disorder [63].

Although the French government is not always obliged to fulfill any call for military intervention, in practice most of the reguests have elicited some response from France. The French have to take cognizance of the demoralizing effect that any refusal might have on other countries that have defense arrangements with France.

As a further reason for intervention the French government has cited the "Domino Theory" which holds the assumption that if a rebellion succeeds in one country, it will be tried in another. This was one of the justifications the French government gave for intervening in Gabon after the violent overthrow of governments in Congo, Brazzaville and Dahomey [64].

One unstated reason for French intervention is the concern over Soviet penetration of the traditional French sphere of influence in Africa. Further, there has been the emergence of socialist regimes in Sudan and Libya. These two states border Chad to the North and the East, and it is in these areas that the fighting has been strongest in Chad. France's concern over Chad's neighbours is underscored by the fact that even under previous conservative regimes in both Libya and Sudan, Chad rebels were allowed to use them as bases for operations. The Ouaddaï revolt of 1967, which led to the break in diplomatic relations with Sudan for a while, was sustained from the Sudan border. Additionally, the outbreak of the rebellion in the BET region was made possible with the help of Libya [55]. In the same vein, France is opposed to direct U.S. military intervention in order to prevent the evolution of such conflicts into an east - west con confrontation. U.S. and Soviet military involvement could lead to an escalation of violence and superpower committments to both sides.

Between 1978 and 1980, French military invervention in Chad was virtually continuous. In 1978 the government of General Felix Malloum called in French troops after serious setbacks suffered by Chadian troops at the hands of Frolinat rebels. The French intervention in this instance was so decisive that between May and June 1978, Chadian forces intercepted Frolinat Columns in the towns of Ati, and Djaada thereby stopping the advance of Frolinat troops towards Ndjamena [66].

The French military intervention that was carried out in Chad in July, 1983 demonstrated the strength and coordinative ability of

the network of military facilities and bases which France has developed in Africa over the years. The intervention was prompted by the capture of the Northern town of Faya - Largeau by the rebel forces of Goukouni Weddei. Thereafter. a contingent of 500 French marine paratroopers were sent in by President Mitterend of France to back up Hissen Habre's government forces .[67] In addition to this, French transport aircraft also convenyed an unspecified number of Zairois troops to the Chadian town of Abeche. These were in addition to 2,000 Zairois troops that were already present in Chad [68].

The French foreign Minister, Mr. Claude Chesson, later confirmed that France was ready to increase military support for Chad with the transfer of Jaguar fighter bombers, based in Gabon, to Najamena [69]. On 15th August, 1983 a chartered airliner carrying more than 450 French reserves flew from paris to a French military base in Bouar, Central African Republic, which is 100 miles South of the border with Chad. The forces that had been assembled in Bouar, which numbered about 2,000 men, were to constitute a standby reserve contingent that would replace the troops already fighting in Chad. Altogether the intervention involved about 3,000 men and several thousand tons of equipment which were flown over more than 4,000 miles [70]. It was described as the biggest intervention operation engaged in by France since they intervened in Algeria in 1960.

The significance of this intervention can be seen in the fact that the operation depended on coordination between five French military bases (located in Gabon, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Senegal and Djibouti) that provide logistical support for the French rapid

intervention force, which is based in France [71]. It could be for similar geo - strategic reasons that Chad itself could be used as a staging ground in the event that French interests may be threatened in other parts of the continent, hence the strategic importance of Chad to France.

Generally speaking, the disposition of French intervention in Chad has been to provide support for whatever faction has been likely to bring about stability on terms that have been compatible with French interests. As was stated earlier, the fact that France's intervention in Chad predated the discovery of substantial quantities of mineral resources is an indicator that French interests in Chad have been primarily strategic. Chad's geographical position gives France a foothold in the central part of Africa, and it enables the French military garrison in Ndjamena to launch speedy interventions in different parts of Africa. It is for this fixed strategic reason that at various times the French government forces have fought on the sides of both Goukouni Weddei and Hissen Habre.

TABLE 3.1

FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN BLACK AFRICA

[redacted]meroon 1959 - 64 Counter - revolutionary war against UPL

[redacted]enegal 1959 - 60 Support for President

1962 Senghor during Break up of Mali Federation and attempted Coup by Maudaou Dia.

Congo 1960 and 1962 Suppression of riots

Gabon 1960, 1962 Suppression of riots

and 1964 Prevention of military Coup against President Mba.

Chad 1960 - 1963 suppression of riots and minor uprisings

1968 - 1975 Counter - revolutionary war against Frolinat

1977 - 1980 Counter-revolutionary war against Frolinat

Mauritania 1961 Supression of riots

1977 - 1978 Air Supporting Counter - Revolutionary operations against Polisario

Niger 1973 Prevention of Military Mutiny/Coup

Djibouti 1976 - 1977 Operations Lovada and Saphi against Somali irredentism

Zaire 1977 Suppression of Shaba

and 1978 rebellions

Central 1979 French Coup against African Republic Bokassa (Operation Barracuda)

Source: Robin Lackham "French Militarism in Africa" in Reveiew of African Political Economy. No. 24 May - August 1982 pp. 61

(b) LIBYAN INTERVENTION

The reasons behind Libyas intervention in Chad can be found in her economic, strategic and political interests in the area. Libya's main interests in Chad lies in it's occupation of the Aouzou strip. Libya has always maintained that her southern border was incorrectly delimited. Libya bases her claims on the accord negotiated on 7 January, 1935, between Benito Mussolini and Pierre Laval in which France made some territorial concessions to Italy mainly in the Tibesti region of Northern Chad. This treaty was never formally ratified, neverthless it has served as the basis for official maps used in Libya since 1975 [72]. It is, however, important to realize the fact that, although the Aouzou strip is said to be rich in minerals, especially uranium, Libya's claims to this portion of land predates the discovery of such minerals or Col. Gaddafi's rise to power. The claims to the Aouzou strip has been a constant element in Libyan foreign policy since she attained independence in 1951. (See Map 1)

It was not until 1973 that Libya forces occupied the Aouzou strip. The Frolinat refused to accept Libya's occupation of the strip, but there was little they could do since they recieved material support from Libya in addition to the use of offices in Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya's intervention in Chad also has further specific and broad strategic underpinnings. Firstly there had been a long standing "Cold war" between Col. Gaddafi and the late Anwar Sadat of Egypt. Col. Gaddafi looked at Sadat as a betrayer of Arab unity and the Palestinian cause by virtue of Egypt's rapproachment with Isreal.

Furthermore Gaddafi percieved Egypt to be a major threat to his regime and he therefore wanted to pre-empt this threat. Militarily the western Egyptian frontier is heavily defended whereas the Southern frontier with Sudan is not [73]. In order to incite a rebellion against Sadat a foothold had to be obtained in Chad.

In a speech to the Arab people's Congress in Tripoli on 20th January 1981, Gaddafi described Libya's pre - emptive move to ward off the Egyptian threat by stating that;

> "Libya has intervened militarily in Chad in response to Frolinat, ending the war which lasted many years and resolving the conflict in Chad in the interests of the friendly forces and the people's Forces represented by Frolinat which led the armed struggle for thirty years and defeated the racist and reactionary forces and imperialism backing them. For the secession led by Habre and behind it Sadat, his stooge Nimeiry, and the French agents in Africa.... The war in Chad was against the Jamahariya .... we have crossed the border in self defence when an act of force was used to impose a pro - imperialism regime hostile to the Chadian people" 74.

Thus the control of Chad remains very important to Libya even in the absence of Sadat because Egypt's Southern border is only 250 kilometres away from Chad In addition to this, control over Chad can give Libya the opportunity to put pressure on Sudan.

Another reason put forward by Libya for it's intervention in Chad is that it constitutes part of an overall strategy for liberating Francophone African countries from French imperialism. In a speech on 8 February, 1981, Gaddafi stated that;

> "French forces who installed Bokassa, overthrew him and reinstated Dacko in the Central African Republic. France has no friends. It has colonial interests. Other African regimes all face rebellion. The presence of French forces is in itself a factor that both creates peace and stability because these forces are behind the coups carried out in Africa to secure colonialist interests" 75.

The strategic interests that Chad holds for Libya led to an attempted merger between the two countries in January 1981. At the end of a four day visit to Tripoli by Goukouni Weddei, the Libyan and Chadian Governments issued a communique announcing that they were going to work towards "complete unity between the two countries ..... in which the power, the wealth and the arms will be in the hands of the people and it's instruments, the congressess and people's committees"[76]. The communique also mentioned the reconstruction of the Chadian army by Libya and the opening of the borders between the two states. This attempted merger was condemned by various factions in the Chad civil war and by the OAU committee on Chad.

Apart from the factors that have been identified above the Libyan intervention in Chad has also been partly motivated by political reasons which have ethnic and religious roots. Right from the outset both king Idris and Col. Gaddafi have given priority to the promotion of Islam and Arabism. From Gaddafi's point of view it was essential to intervene in Northern Chad in order to protect the Muslim population in the North from continued domination and oppression by the Southern Christians. Thus, when Gaddafi came to power he readily supported the Frolinat which had been struggling for five years against President Tombalbaye. Prior to Gaddafi, King Idris had been giving covert support

to the Frolinat while maintaining relations with the Ndjamena government. Gaddafi's support, however, was more open with the provision of arms and funds.

In a speech to the Arab people's congress in Tripoli on 20 January, 1981, Gaddafi tried to justify Libyan intervention and attempted merger with Chad on the basis of ethnic and religious links [77].

When looked at from a wholistic perspective, Libyan intervention in Chad can be seen as a stepping stone for Gaddafi's grand political design of establishing an Islamic empire that encompasses all the Saharan states. This goal of an Islamic empire constitutes the central thrust of his strategy toward Arab and Islamic states which is clearly set out in his "Green Book". In this regard Gaddafi told the Arab People's Congress in Tripoli in 1981 that;

> "..... the main and most pressing issue is to achieve Arab unity from the Atlantic to the Gulf, and at least, unity between several Arab countries such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. Then work can be done to achieve unity with Chad" 78

The variety of reasons that have been described above gave Gaddafi reason to actively intervene in the Chad confact in June 1980. Libya intervened on President Weddei's request for aid against Habre's forces. In addition to intervening in the conflict, Libya also obtained the opportunity to maintain a permanent military presence in Chad. The agreement which was signed on 15th June 1980, provided for military supplies and close collaboration between the two countries once peace had been achieved.

The actual intervention itself started in August 1980 due to the serious logistical difficulties that were involved in moving such

massive quantities of arms and men. By the end of 1980 the size of the Libyanforces present in Chad was said to be in the region of 6,000 men [79]. One interesting aspect of the intervention was that a substantial proportion of the force comprised an "Islamic Legion:" This was a special unit in the Libyanarmed forces consisting mainly of foreign recruits conscripted mainly from North African states, the middle East, and countries as far away as Pakistan [80]. The function of this legion was to aid in the propagation of Islam.

The above account attempts to sum up the strategic, economic, and political reasons behind Libya's intervention in Chad. While it is well knownthat Libyan has intervented in Chad for the above reasons, the Libyan government constantly tries to justify her intervention in Chad by citing either religious or anti - imperialist motives.

(c) UNITED STATES' INTERVENTION

Although the role played by the U.S. in Chad has been minimal compared to both France and Libya, certain political and strategic reasonshave nevertheless precipitated their entry into the conflict. These reasons can be dichotomized into globalist and regionalist perspective

According to the first perspective the Libyan intervention in Chad is seen within the global perspective of the east - west power struggle. Thus the U.S. and other NATO powers have tended to look at it in terms of cooperation and collusion between Libya and the Soviety Union in an area of strategic importance to the Soviet Union. [81] Regardless of this accusation, Gaddafi has strongly denied any collusion with the Soviet Union.

The strategic importance that Chad holds for the US, from a regionalist perspective, can be seen in the context of NATO geopolitical strategy against the Eastern bloc nations. It is in the ultimate interest of the U.S. to keep Chad firmly under French influence, and, by extension, within the western sphere of influence.

Furtheremore , the U.S. has economic interests in Chad itself. Initially the search for strategic minerals brought the US, to Chad, and in 1977 the U.S. had four oil companies (Exxon, shell, Conoco, and Chevron) pospecting for oil in Chad. In 1976 alone the U.S. spent $25 million on research efforts in Chad. [83]

The request for U.S. military assistance in prosecuting the Chad civil war dates as far back as July 1977 when Vice President Mamari Djime, under President Malloum, made a trip to the U.S. The purpose of the visit was specifically to press for arms and financial support. In response, a U.S. state department communique stated that the U.S. supported Chad's concern for it's territorial integrity against outside aggression. Later, in September 1977, President Carter announced that he was approving a limited military assistance program for Chad. Under this programm Washington would not directly supply Chad with war planes nor send American military advisers. Instead the U.S. would channel military equipment through friendly African States namely; Egypt, Somali and Sudan [83].

In July 1983 the U.S, under the Reagan administration, announced a $ 10 million military aid package for Hissen Habre which was to be used by the Zaire military contigent that was stationed in Ndjamena. It was also discovered that in the previous year, 1982, the U.S. chanelled $ 10 million in secret funds through the C.I.A. to help Hissen Habre recapture Ndjamena from Goukouni Weddei [84]. The justification which the state department cited for sending the military aid was that there was an immediate danger from the Libyan backed forces of Weddei, Furthermore , if Ndjamena fell to Weddei there would be a "serious risks of Col. Gaddafi using Chad as a base for subverting neighboring states. In making this justification it was understood that the U.S. was making a veiled reference to Sudan where the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force was due to hold exercises in August, 1983. [85]

The role played by the U.S. in Chad can be seen to derive more from an attempt to keep Chad within the Western orbit than for reasons of economic exploitation, although that is also a reason. The U.S. percieves Libyan intervention, not only as an extension of Soviet and East bloc intrusion into a traditionally French and Western sphere of influence, but also as a calculated attempt at spreading it's own version of a militant Islamic movement.

iii. <u>O.A.U. MEDIATION IN THE CHADIAN CIVIL WAR</u>

As regards the conflict in Chad three fundamental principles of the OAU were being infringed primarily by foreign intervention. These principles are; (1) the peaceful settlement of disputes,

(2) non - interference in the internal affairs of states, and

(3) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for it's inalienable right to independent existence.

Mediation efforts by the OAU, or by countries under the aegis of the OAU, did not really proceed concretely until 1978 when Libya organized meetings at Sebha and Benghazi. Prior to this a number of fruitless attempts had been made at mediation.

In January 1970 the Libyan foreign Minister announced that Libya had offered to mediate between the Chad national government and the Frolinat. The Libyan foreign Minister, Mr. Ahmed Boussir, said that "Libya has entered into contact with the government of President Tombalbaye and with the French government. She has proposed that the Chadian Head of State meet with the representatives of the revolutionary organizations, with the participation of French representatives as observers."[84] The role of the French government would be to guarantee the application of the agreements which would be made between the two parties . The Minister further suggested that the meeting should be held in the frontier region between Chad and Libya.

This Libyan offer of mediation was rejected by Chad on the grounds that there was no reason "to justify the opening of negotiations on the situation in Chad since the position is no longer urgent and improving all the time". This constituted the first attempt at mediation which was rebutted by the Chadian government.

Following this attempt the Libyan government granted formal diplomatic recognition to the Frolinat shortly before the arrival in Libya of President Hamani Diori of Niger, who had earlier offered

to mediate with Libyan and Chadian approval. In response to this offer Libya sent a delegation to Niamey, Niger, in November 1970 The LibyanDelegation awaited the arrival of the Chadian delegation for three days after which they went back home [87]. The refusal of the Chadians to turn up for this meeting was directly connected to the diplomatic recognition that Libya had accorded to the Frolinat movement.

Much later in 1979, the OAU scheduled to hold a meeting between General Felix Malloum and the Frolinat rebels in Libreville, Gabon on 10 August, 1977, but the meeting was called off without any explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to hold in Lagos on 16 August between Gaddafi and Malloum but the participants failed to attach any importance to it when sources said that the Chad President would be represented by his Foreign Minister while it was not known who would represent Gaddafi [88].

Meanwhile the OAU mediation committee set up by the Chairman, President Omar Bongo of Gabon, decided to have a sub-committee to study all aspects of the dispute. The sub-committee comprised three jurists and three cartographers chosen by the member states of the Mediation Committee - Algeria, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Cameroon According to the arrangements, the sub - committee, which was headed by the Gabonese Foreign Minister Mr. Martin Bongo, would visit the disputed Aouzou strip to study the border layout with the help of documents provided by both countries [89]. While the Chadian demands to the OAU included the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Aouzou strip, and an end to Libyaninterference in Chad's

internal affairs, Libya rejected the charges of aggression and occupation and claimed to have maps proving that it was not violating Chad's territorial integrity. In other words she had maps showing the Aouzou strip as part of Southern Libya and not Northern Chad.

After the Frolinat forces in the North of Chad had secured their hold on Faya-Largeau, a summit was convened, on Gaddafi's initiative, in the Libya town of Sebha on 23rd and 24th February 1978. The summit was attended by General Malloum, Col. Gadaffi, President Ibrahim of Sudan [90]. None of the leaders of the the Frolinat factions was present. The meeting confirmed the cancellation of suspended dipomatic relations between Chad and Libya, which was earlier announced by the Chadian government. After the meeting a communique was issued stating that it had been agreed upon to call another meeting on March 21, between the Chadian government and the various factions of the Frolinat, with the Vice - President of Sudan acting as Chairman [91].

Although this initial summit at Sebha arrived at some positive conclusions, a stumbling block was created by the ommission of the three Frolinat factions at the Sebha summit. Although a second meeting was fixed for March between the Chad President and Leaders of Frolinat, it was far from certain whether Frolinat would agree to meet President Malloum and talk, or to continue with the war, On the other hand the Sebha meeting could be seen as a diplomatic success for Libya. The reason for this was because Libya managed to enlist the participation of the four countries most directly concerned with the Chad war. Seen at a regional level, this move was designed to prevent big power

meddling in the Chad conflict. In an attempt to strenghten the Sebha agreement the Libyans also promised financial loans to Chad in addition to economic cooperation. [92]

Nevertheless, the Sebha conference did not in any way settle any of the major issues which were responsible for the Chad civil war. The agreement was condemned by Hissen Habre and Abba Siddick for not having touched positively on the Libyan occupation of the Aouzou strip. The only really substantive outcome of the Sebha agreement, in relation to the war, was the official recognition by the Chad government of Frolinat. This recognition, itself, was only given after Frolinat forces had launched a massive offensive against government outposts in northern Chad. [93]

After the Sebha talks, a secret meeting was held in Tripoli in July, 1978. The meeting was attended by officials from Chad, Sudan; Niger and Libya, with Frolinat representatives also in attendance . The talks, chaired by the then Sudanese Vice President, Abu Ibrahim, was originally scheduled for 6 June, but was delayed by a boycott of the Chad government and Frolinat after a ceasefire breach in March. At the conference the Chad government and Frolinat representatives rejedted a reconciliation plan which was submitted by Sudan, Niger, and Libya, after which the talks were suspended in order to give both sides more time to determine their willingness to reconcile [94].

Meanwhile, at the OAU summit held in Khartoum Sudan in August 1976, another five - nation committee was set up to investigate counter allegations, made by Chad and Libya. The Chadians claimed

that Libyan troops were fighting with Frolinat, while Libya charged that Chad was relying on French forces to suppress a "popular uprising". After the OAU summit further talks were held in Khartoum with an agreement between President Malloum and Hissen Habre being arrived at on 29th August. Under this agreement a ceasefire and the formation of a government of National Unity, amongst other things, were agreed upon. The C.S.M. was dissolved and general Malloum, who had hitherto been referred to as Head of State, assumed the official title of President while Hissen Habre was appointed the Prime Minister. On 3, August Habre formed a new government that had equal regional representation. [95]

The Khartoum agreement was promptly condemned by members of Frolinat. In Algiers Abba Siddick said he has no confidence in Hissen Habre and that his presence in Ndjamena would do no more than reinforce Malloum's authority, Goukouni Weddei also condemned Habre as "an agent of French imperialism" who wanted to turn the revolution and popular struggle in Chad into one between Christians and Moslems [96].

Exactly one year after the Libyan conferences had failed, Nigeria entered the scene by organizing successive meetings aimed at bringing about reconciliation. Given the polyglot nature of the Nigerian society, and her geographical proximity to Chad, Nigeria percieved that a resolution of the conflict in neighbouring Chad was also in her interest. The then Nigerian Chief of Staff, Brigadier Shehu Yar Adua, paid a visit to Njamena in early 1979, during which he persuaded President Malloum and Hiseen Habre to attend a conference involving all

the rival parties to the conflict which was to be convened in Kano. In the meantime Nigerian troops were to assist the French forces in Ndjamena to maintain a ceasefire in the capital [97].

At the end of the conference it was agreed that on 23rd March, 1979 the government of President Malloum would be dissolved. Therefore, shortly before 23rd March, General Malloum and Hissen Habre handed in their resignations. Thereafter, Goukouni Weddei was made the President of a new provisional Council of State. The Council comprised of members with 2 representatives from each of the parties that signed the Kano agreement. They were Goukouni Weddei and Afchick Ibn Omar for Frolinat, Mahmat Nowi and Mahamat Saleh Ahmet from the Forces Armees du Nord. Abdulkadir Kamougue and Cassadwane Parma from the Chad Armed Forces; and Abdekadir Abderaman and Idris Moustapha representing the movement for the Total Liberation of Chad [98].

The function of the Council of State was to administer national affairs until the formation of the "Transitional Government of National Unity" after the next meeting of the parties in Kano on 1st April 1979. Observers from Cameroon, Libya, Niger and Sudan were sent to ensure that the ceasefire was respected while their safety was in the hands of a neutral force comprising exclusively of Nigerian troops.

After the second Kano conference a new government was unilaterally formed which recieved widespread condemnation. Of the 20 Ministers and 10 Secretaries of State that comprised the new government, 10 were nothern Muslims, 3 were Muslims from Central Chad, and the remaining 7 were Christians. Most of the infuential Southerners that

were included in the government were seen as moderates while the more influential members were the northerners. This new government, headed by Mohamad Shawa, argued that through it's formation it had filled a political vacuum. It maintained that the government represented a good regional and ethnic balance with two members representing almost every prefecture in the country. Mr. Shawa, who was a member of the Frolinat Third Army, was a compromise candidate. The posts of Defense Minister and Minister of Interior were given to Hissen Habre and Goukouni Weddei respectively, while Major General Djogo was made the Vice Premier [99].

Libya denounced the new government as illegal, while Dr. Abba Siddick and General Malloum also objected to the formation of the new government on the grounds that it had not included the representatives of other factions that attended the second Kano conference. Furthermore, they argued that the new government's two main figures were representative of only one ethnic group and were therefore perpetuating the divisive policies of the previous regimes. [100]

Because of the lack of legitimacy and widespread condemnation of this government a third conference aimed at reconciling the various parties involved in the conflict took place in Lagos. The conference was attended by Liberia, Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, Cameroon, and Central African Empire. In a communique issued at the end of the conference the participants expressed their shock and concern at the establishment of a Government of Transitional National Unity in Ndjamena, contrary to the provisions of the first Kano conference. The communique appealed to the Ndjamena government to dissolve itself in order to bring other

groups into the government by 25 June, 1979. On this particular point the communique stated that "in the event of various Chad groups failing toreach agreement on forming a government of national unity in line with the Kano resolutions, then the states participating in the Lagos conference will not be morally bound to continue their efforts to find a just and permanent solution to the Chad problem"[101].

A source of frustration to Nigerian hopes of achieving peace, as well as Libya's aims in Chad, was the continuing presence of French forces in Chad. General Djogo, the Vice Premier of Chad, said that he had asked Paris for a provisional freeze on French intentions to withdraw it's troops after the formation of the provisional government.

The Lagos conference also elicited an unofficial communique from factions that were present at the conference but were not part of the Transitional Government. They were represented by Dr. Abba Siddick, Ahmat Acyl, who headed the Vulcan army operating from the east, Mr. Adoum Danna from Sudan, Mohammed Abba and Mr. Agerro Sanoussi.[102] These representatives banded together and collectively condemned the French presence in Chad and vowed to unite in the struggle to remove the Transitional Government in Ndjamena.

The Transitional Government's first action, after the summit, was to ask the French to remain, or at least temporarily to halt any moves to withdraw their forces. This move rendered the 800 strong peace - keeping force from Nigeria ineffective. The government then dispatched troops to the South to deal with a possible move for secession by forces under Col. Kamougue. In response to this the Nigeria government

announced a blockade of oil supplies to Chad, thereby forcing the French forces deployed throughout Chad to move toward Ndjamena in order to be closer to the supply of petrol. In retaliation the Transitional Government demanded the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Chad while the French troops remained.[103]

Meanwhile, at the OAU summit held in Monrovia, in July 1979, there was controversy over whether the Chad delegation representing the Transitional Government in Ndjamena should be seated or not. The seating of the Chad delegation was opposed by Nigeria and Libya, while other countries like Sierra Leone expressed doubts over the authority of the conference to determine the authenticity of the only Chad delegation. The issue was eventually settled by a decision not to seat any Chad delegation until a new peace - making effort by President Nimeiri had been given a chance.[104]

In August the Sudanese Vice President, Rashidat Tahir Baki, recieved a delegation from Chad which delivered a letter from President Shawa. The letter contained an approval of the Sudanese efforts to convene a reconciliation summit which would take place in Lagos.

From August 17th - 31th the conference was held in Lagos and an agreement was reached on the formation of a government which would include all the warring factions in Chad. A ceasefire was declared and all the forces were ordered to withdraw 100 kilometres from the city of Ndjamena. The agreement, which was entitled the "Lagos Accord on National Reconstruction in Chad", brought together 11 rival groups. It called for the establishment of an effective neutral force composed of troops of one or more countries not having a common

border with Chad. This force would be overseen by an independent monitoring commission which would be headed by the Secretary General of the OAU.

As a result of the conference Goukouni Weddei was appointed president of Chad while Lt. Col. Kamougue was made Vice President. By so doing the two most important people representing the north and South respectively, were brought together in the most senior positions in the government. After the conference, the Chad leaders unanimously condemned the continued presence of French troops as constituting an impendiment to finding a peaceful solution to the Chad conflict. As at that time there were an estimated 2,500 French troops that had not been engaged in any fighting.[105]

On 18th November 1979, a Government of National Union (GUNT), which was to administer Chad for 18 months, was formed. The government was representative of all of Chad's dissident factions. The cabinet represented an almost equal balance between northerners and Southerners, and with the exception of Habre and Kamougue, many of the Ministers were leaders of groups that were generally favourable towards Libya. The discussions between the groups focused mainly on the issue of the eventual balance of power in Chad. Each of the groups that were still armed, with those of Weddei's FAP, Habre's FAN, and Kamougue's FAT being the most powerful.[106]

After the formation of the GUNT, three major problems surrounded it's stability. These were the demilitarization of Ndjamena; the arrival of the peace-keeping force; and the formation of a national army.

The demilitarization of Ndjamena had proceeded at a slow pace because none of the armed groups had been willing to surrender their hard won positions in the capital. The unanimous decision that the French troops should leave while the peace-keeping force had not arrived would create a power vacuum. Lastly, as regards the formation of a national army, each of the main groups wanted it's forces to constitute the core of the army. The general fragility of the new government was underscored by the deep hostility that had been engendered over the years between the various groups.

It was later announced by the Congolese Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Pierre Nze, that the peace - keeping force in Chad would be composed of troops from Benin, Congo and Guinea. But initially, the only force that appeared was a Congolese Battalion of 500 troops who were confined to their barracks.

In March there was a four day outbreak of fighting between Weddei's FAP and Habre's FAN. The French troops were not allowed to take part in any of the fighting while the Congolese troops were restricted to the barracks.[107] The fighting rendered invalid the main conditions of the Lagos Agreement because Ndjamena had not been demilitarized, the arrival of a full peace - keeping force had not taken place, and the fighting precluded the formation of a united national army. In the midst of the fighting, President Eyadema, of Togo, arrived in Ndjamena on 5th April where he was taken to the headquarters of both armies to discuss a ceasefire with Weddei and Habre. A ceasefire was announced and it was agreed that fighting would stop at midday on 8 April, but this also broke down.[108]

After President Eyadema had gone, the Secretary General of the OAU, Mr. Edem Kodjo, came to Chad with a five - point plan that was drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the OAU, President Tolbert. The plan provided for a visit to Chad by President Nimeiri to arrange a ceasefire; an appeal to the international community to desist from acts which might encourage or aid directly or indirectly the warring factions; a visit to Chad by the Secretary General of the OAU to appeal to the warring factions to bring an end to their hostilities; a request to the Presidents of Togo, Sudan, Nigeria, and Congo to serve as a mediation committee to try to bring about peace; and an appeal to the international community to help the Cameroon Government cope with the unflux of about 100,000 refugees from Chad.[109]

In addition to this the Secretary General announced that it planned to make a second attempt to send a three - nation peace-keeping force to Chad. It was suggested, however, that the arrangements concerning the financing of the force would have to wait until the OAU summit in Freetown.

At the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in Freetown, it was agreed that $ 60 million would be allocated to cover the costs of the peace - keeping force. The resolution at the end of the conference requested member states able to provide men for the peace - keeping force to do so. It reaffirmed the validity of the Lagos Accord as the only valid program for the settlement of the Chad crisis. The resolution furthere stated that if the OAU was unable to raise enough money for the peace - keeping force, a request would be made to the U.N. Security Council for assistance.[110]

After the Freetown conference the OAU sub-committee on Chad held two meetings in Lome on 13th October and 28th November 1980 under the joint Chairmanship of the OAU Chairman, President Siaka Stevens, and President Eyadema of Togo. After the October meeting a mission went to Ndjamena for talks with the Chad leaders, while Weddei recieved them, Habre did not.[111] At the second meeting in November Weddei was in attendance while Habre failed to turn up. The leaders of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Togo, Benin signed a five - point agreement with Weddei which provided for a ceasefire to become effective by 15th December; a commission to supervise the ceasefire made up of representatives from Benin, Congo, Guinea, Togo. Sierra Leone and the OAU Secretary General; a neutral peace - keeping force to be provided by Benin, Congo, Guinea, and Togo; if necessary the UN to be consulted to provide assistance for this force; Ndjamena to be demilitarized, and all military forces withdrawn to points 5 kilometres beyond the capital; and appropriate action to be taken against any party violating the ceasefire. The signatories to this agreement adopted a second document calling on the Heads of State of the subcommittee to monitor the implementation of the agreement; inviting Nigeria to convene a conference of the signatory members of the 1979 Lagos Agreement; demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Chad; and urging all countries to abstain from intervening in any way in Chad's internal affairs.[112]

Hissen Habre - who refused to attend the talks, went to explain his position to President Ahidjo in Yaounde. He maintained that he would refuse to sign a ceasefire as long as Libyan troops remained in Chad.

But by mid December, 1980, Ndjamena came under the complete control of Weddoi's Libya backed forces. After his forces had been defeated Habre decided to sign a ceasefire agreement in Yaounde on 16th December, while still insisting that the GUNT was illegal. [113]

In june 1980 Weddei had signed a mutual defence pact with Gaddafi [114] thereby making the support he was already recieving from Libya open. The pact also provided the legal basis for the intervention that Libya was planning. In November 1980, Weddei went to Tripoli to request for more aid from Gaddafi. [115] Thereafter Libyan military forces, including the Islamic Legion, entered Chad and reached Ndjamena in December, As far as France was concerned the Libyan invasion proved to be a setback to French credibility in Francophone Africa. It was clear that the French had miscalculated because, as late as 5th November 1980, the French minister for cooperation in charge of French relations with Africa, dimissed the possibility of a Libyan invasion as negligible. Furthermore, Gaddafi went ahead to invade Chad, in spite of a warning given by Giscard d 'Estaing on 13th December against any intervention in Chad by foreign troops. [116]

In early January 1981, a special summit was organized by 12 African nations on the furture of Chad. The states, which were represented by their leaders, included Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Togo, Guinea, Benin, Congo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Libya. A few days before the opening of the conference Goukouni Weddei declared that he would not attend the meeting and would ignore

whatever decisions were taken because the situation in Chad was back to normal. However, he later changed his mind and attended due to Nigeria's insistence.

The final communique of the summit called on all countries to avoid interference in Chad's affairs. The summit also called for weddei to arrange for general elections to be held in Chad in 1982, and asked the Secretary General to organize a special Pan - African conference to assess Chad's needs for reconstruction and the rehabilitation of refugees. [117] This communique, however, was not representative of the views of most of the leaders at the conference. Seven of the twelve leaders wanted the summit to end with a declaration condeming the intervention and occupation of Chad by Libya as a blantant violation of the 1979 Lagos Agreement, and of the OAU charter. President Kountche of Niger argued that the summit failed to arrive at any decision. He added that there could be no peace in Chad unless Libyan troops were pulled out and interference in Chad's internal affairs stopped. [118]

As if in disregard of this conference on 6 January 1981 Libya and Chad announced that they were going to work towards a merger. The treaty stated that the frontiers between the two countries would be opened, and it affirmed the continuation of libyan support for the Republic of Chad. [118].

The merger attempt was described as impossible by Col. Kamougue while Abba Siddick strongly condemned it. The OAU subcommittee on Chad and the 8 members of the 17th summit Bureau of the OAU convened

a conference which attracted the attendance of 12 Heads of State. The communique, issued on 14th January condemned the merger attempt and urged a return to the terms of the Lagos Accords. It also called upon Libya to withdraw it's troops, and decided to send OAU observers and an OAU peace-keeping force comprised of troops from Benin, Congo, Togo and Guinea to supervise security in Chad while elections were being organized. [119]

The response of the Giscard government in France to the Libyan invasion and the proposed merger was similarly to condemn them as violations of the Lagos Accords. [120] They maintained that the Solution to the Libyan intervention and the Chad civil war could only be found in the implementation of the Lagos Accords. The French military response was to offer arms and troops to strenghten the defenses of Chad's Francophone neighbours. They increased the number of military units in the Central African Republics, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Senegal while new military cooperation agreements with Niger and Cameroon were pursued. [121] These moves marked a hardening of French policy in West and Central Africa where, in the past, it had vacillated. France saw the necessity of restoring her influence and confidence among Francophone African leaders.

It was coincidental that at the same time that Libya and Chad announced their merger, Elf - Aquitaine, a French oil company that was dominated by the French Ministry of Industry, announced that it had reached an agreement with Libya on an oil exploration contract. This also coincided with rumours in Paris that France had quietly approved the Libya invasion of Chad in exchange for a guaranteed supply of oil.

and that the two countries were moving towards an unofficial partition of Chad. The French government responded to this by placing an embargo on the Elf Aquitaine contract, and delayed the shipment of French arms to Libya.[122] The reason for France not taking a radical stand on this issue was the fact that France depends heavily on the importation of petroleum, and Libya is a closer source than the Middle East. Furthermore, Libya constitutes a market for French arms and aeronautical industries.

An OAU subcommittee meeting on Chad was scheduled to take place on 18th April in Lagos, to discuss the progress made on the implementation of the Lome resolutions concerning an OAU peace-keeping force in Chad. The meeting was, however, postponed in order to allow more time for technical details to be worked out.

Following the cancellation of this meeting Presidents Shehu Shagari, and Chadli Benjedid of Algeria met in Lagos to discuss the Chad problem although no official statement was made public.[123] In the mean time GUNT'S foreign minister, Ahmat Acyl, confirmed that Libyan troops would remain in Chad until the country's different factions were welded into a national army. He also added that the Libyans would help ward off threats by non - African forces located in Sudan and Central African Republic. By this statement he was making reference to the presence of French troops in Bouar, and the Egyptian military assistance that was being given to Habre in Sudan.[124]

On 22nd and 23rd May, the OAU convened a mini summit at Ndjamena which was attended by President Siaka Stevens, the OAU Chairman,

Goukouni Weddei, and President Sholu Shagari and Col. Gaddafi. The meeting was marred by a disagreement between Sierra Leone and Nigeria over the Libyan presence in Chad. President Siaka Stevens endorsed the Libyan presence in Chad. Nigeria, on the other hand, seeing the problem as no longer one of the imposition of peace in Chad but the maintenance of peace without the presence of Libyan troops, wanted a full Libyan withdrawal from Chad. Col. Gaddafi on his own part, argued that the OAU could not withdraw his troops because the arrival of his troops in Chad had hastened the end of the civil war, and as such he felt that the conference was unnecessary. He however conceded that the withdrawal of Libyan troops would be contigent upon Weddei's decision. Goukouni Weddei, in turn, buttressed Gaddafi's position by stating that the Libyan troops would only be asked to go when his government decided that their help was no longer needed, and that would only happen after the Frolinat opposition had been defeated. [125]

In September 1981, Goukouni Weddei went to France to solicit French support. Francois Mitterrand , the new socialist President, emphasized that France was prepared to assist in the reconstruction of Chad, but they wanted the Libyan troops to be replaced by an OAU peace - keeping force which the French government would be able to assist on a "material, financial and Logistical level, to the exclusion of all military participation". [126]

In what could be seen as an attempt to elicit the cooperation of Libya for the OAU plans, Mitterand lifted Giscard's embargo on

Elf - Aquitaine oil exploration contract with Libya, and French sale of arms to Libya.

The Mitterand government's overall policy to Chad could be seen to be three-pronged. They tried to strengthen bilateral relations with GUNT; They supported the OAU peace plans for Chad, and they adopted a more conciliatory approach to Libya. In Mitterands calculus, if the authority of the GUNT were stabilized Weddei would percieve less need for Libyan support. On the other hand, French diplomatic exppport for the OAU, and pressure from the OAU on Libya would provide Gaddafi with the opportunity to withdraw. [127]

On 30th October 1981, Goukouni Weddei requested the departure of Libyan troops from Chad and on 3rd November, Gaddafi ordered his troops to withdraw. The reasons for Weddei's decision remain purely speculative, nevertheless it is thought that Weddei feared that Gaddafi was planning to remove him and have him replaced by a more pliable, pro - Libyan leader. [128]

On the other hand three major reasons can be adduced for Libya's decision to withdraw. Firstly, the war had imposed a financial burden on Libya. In the face of falling petroleum revenues, Libya had spent roughly $ 2 billion in prosecuting the war, and about 1,000 Libyans had either been killed or wounded. Secondly, the next OAU summit was scheduled to take place in Tripoli, and Gaddafi wanted to become the Chairman of the OAU. If Gaddafi did not withdraw his troops from Chad before the OAU force entered, it would seem as if he was in conflict with the OAU. Thirdly, Gaddafi wanted to project

his image as having been a peace - keeper in Chad. The manner of the Libyan withdrawallends credence to this reason. Instead of withdrawing slowly, considering the two-month time period given to him by Weddei, Gaddafi's forces were withdrawn from most of Chad in less than two weeks. The assumption was that the speedy withdrawal would provoke attempts by different factions to fill the power vacuum. In aid of this the Libyan troops left behind large quantities of arms in areas that were easily accessible to Habre(s forces such as Bilitine and Ouaddai prefectures, but they took all their equipment from Ndjamena and other points in Southern and eastern Chad where the GUNT forces were strong.[129] Furthermore, with the incfeased probability of a renewed civil war in Chad, Libya would have a good reason for a futhure intervention in Chad. It should be emphasized however that the Libyan withdrawal did not include the Aouzou strip, where Libya still maintained a force of about 3,000 men.

President Weddei therefore had the problem of maintaining the Security of his government until the OAU peace keeping force was actually deployed in Chad since the Libyan departure had created a power vacuum. To add to Weddei's problems the legality and ligitimacy of the GUNT was put to question when President Eyadema poihted out that the Lagos Accord of 1979 gave the GUNT an 18 month deadline within which to organize elections and help restore the country to constitutional rule.[130] But even Eyadema's argument could be questioned because at this time it had become

clear that the Kano agreements, which provided the international legal basis for the GUNT, had been set aside. This was because the agreement stated that no country having a common border with Chad was to be involved in peace - keeping activities within the country, yet Nigeria had offered to supply troops for the peace-keeping force.

The Nigerian offer to supply troops for the force reflected the perception that they actually had a stake in maintaining peace in Chad and limiting outside intervention. An Islamic fundamentalist uprising had occured in the city of Kano in 1980 which served to heighten Nigeria's fears and concern regarding her actual vulnerability.

It was therefore in her own interests to curtail Libyan intrusion into Chad. In this respect the Nigerian External Affairs Minister, Prof. Ishaya Audu, stated that:

> "we have never especially liked the presence in Chad of Libyan troops nor those of any other foreign country. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that the Libyan troops have brought a brief period of peace. For this reason their role must be appreciated in a positive fashion. That said, in the interest of Chad and those of Libya, the more rapidly Libyan troops leave Chad - and that applies to all other foreign presence - the better is Nigeria's position. The OAU having invited us to help in the establishment of the inter - Affican force that will have to replace the Libyan troops, we will play our role in this respect like anyone else".131

The U.S. government was supportive of the OAU peace-keeping force for the primary reason that it would replace Libyan forces in Chad. While Hissen Habre was in Chad the U.S. had provided him with financial and logistical support basically because he was the

main opponent of the Libyan presence in Chad. In December 1981 the U.S. Secretary of state, Alexander Haig, met with Ishaya Audu to discuss U.S. contributions to the peace - keeping force. The U.S. agreed to provide $ 12 million for logistical help. [132]

The states that were taking part in the peace - keeping force held a meeting in Nairobi in late November, where they decided that the troops had to be deployed by 18th December. At the meeting Goukouni Weddei emphasized that if the OAU force failed in it's task, he would feel free to request for Libyan assistance once again.

Later in December the Foreign Ministers of Benin, Nigeria, Zaire, Togo, Chad, Senegal and Gabon met in Lagos for two days under the Chairmanship of the Kenyan Foreign Minister, Robert Ouko. They produced a peace - keeping formula in which seven countries - Togo, Gabon, Guinea, Zaire, Senegal, Benin and Nigeria - were to provide troops for a 6,000 man peace keeping force, with Nigeria contributing the largest number of soldiers and logistics for keeping the troops in place. They also were to have a Nigerian commander while the other nations would contribute 14 unit commanders. [133]

In mid December 1981 President Weddei issued a statement saying that the presence of an African peace - keeping force, which had been assembling in Chad, would make no sense if the troops would not fight against the rebel forces that were trying to topple his government. He stated further that he did not "need troops massing here increasing our difficulties if they're not going to ensure the defense and security of the country." [134]

The paradox was that the OAU had always maintained that the peace - keeping force would play a passive role and not interfere on the side of any faction. President Weddei even sent a delegation to President Shagari in an attempt to persuade him to allow the OAU force to fight on the side of the GUNT. President Shagari, however, maintained the position that the OAU force could not fight because they were being sent to keep peace.

Meanwhile, Hissen Habre and his FAN seized the opportunity provided by the departure of the Libyan forces to launch a massive war against the GUNT forces. Within the first few weeks Habre's forces had captured large portions of Northern and eastern Chad. After having captured the towns of Triba, Guereda, and Adre, on 19th November the town of Abeche fell to Habre's forces. The significance of the capture of Abeche lay in the fact that it is the capital of Ouaddai prefecture, and a large stockpile of Libyan arms and ammunition was captured there.[135] While Habre's forces were advancing, the OAU maintained that it's peace-keeping force would not fight.

In mid - January 1982 President Weddei announced that Faya - Largeau, the provincial capital of the North had fallen to FAN forces. By the end of February 1982 the FAN had captured Mangalme and Guelo thereby putting them in effective control over two - thirds of Chadian territory comprising most of the north and the east.

During the fighting the OAU subcommittee on Chad had a meeting on 11th February 1982 in Nairobi which was attended by the Presidents of Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea, Zaire, Zambia, and the Central African

Republic. The final communique of the conference gave the two warring sides until 26th February to apply a ceasefire and until 15th March to open negotiations aimed at national reconciliation under the auspices of the committee. Furthermore the two sides would have until the month of April to draft a constitution leading to the organization of legislative and Presidential elections in May and June .[136]

President Weddei later rejected the resolutions, accusing the conference of denying the existence of a legitimate administration in Ndjamena, and reducing the whole Chadian problem to one of factions. On the other hand, Habre hailed the peace plans of the OAU. It was evident, however, that Weddei's primary gripe was the fact that the OAU was not willing to fight on his side.

At the conference the OAU also decided to withdraw it's forces on 30th June 1982. A number of reasons influenced this decision but the primary one was that of finance. Despite U.S. and French financial and logistical support, the costs of sustaining more than 4,000 troops by three governments, Nigeria, Zaire, and Senegal .. proved to be very difficult. The three governments providing the troops waited to avoid the risks of engaging in combat with any of the armed factions. Furthermore, the GUNT was very shaky, and Weddei had proved to be very reluctant to compromise with the other factions. On the other hand, Habre's FAN was clearly the most powerful and best organized faction in the conflict. Moreover, Habre increasingly gained the respect of African Heads of state because of his opposition to Gaddafi.

By May 1982, Weddei's refusal to cooperate with the OAU's peace plan by negotiating with Habre, had caused the GUNT to loose much of it's legitimacy. Between February and May Habre's forces captured Salal, Moussolo, and Massakary. On 19th June 1982 the FAN invaded Ndjamena and Goukouni Weddei fled first to Cameroon and then on to Algeria.[137]

In his campaign back to Ndjamena, Habre tactically avoided having any combat with units of the OAU peace - keeping force. There were about 2,000 Nigerian and Zairois troops based in Ati, midway between Ndjamena and Habre's headquarters at Abeche, but they were completely circumvented. The FAN even issued a statement that as long as the OAU force remained neutral and passive, the FAN would not engage them - in combat.

The OAU force, on it's part, failed to act for a number of reasons. Firstly, the seven governments that initially agreed to contribute to the force could not agree on the method of financing the whole operation. Goukouni Weddei refused to accept Togo's participation in the force because president Eyadema had supported reconciliation between Weddei and Habré. In the end only three of the original seven countries sent troops for the force. The result of this was that a fewer number of troops with minimal amounts of weaponry and transport were deployed.

Secondly, the OAU failed to clearly and precisely define the role of the peace-keeping force. The text of the charter of the OAU force defined it's role as being "to assure the defense and security of the country while the government forces are integrated ".

The text failed to specify whether the force could be used in fighting factions that were opposed to the GUNT or wether it would simply engage in policing functions. In the field of battle, however, it was evident that the tactic of the OAU force was to establish a ring between government troops and pro - government factions (about 35,000 men) on the one hand, and Habre's FAN (about 4000) on the other. The OAU force itself numbered about 4,000[138] and as such it's success depended largely upon the refusal of anyone to attack rather than it's strength.

The frustration of Goukouni Weddei over the role of the OAU force was evident when he stated that the Chadian government thinks it is vain to continue to support and keep such a force in its national territory, since "it does nothing to safeguard the security and integrity of Chad ..... For us the text signed between the Chadian government and the OAU on the coming into Chad of the neutral force is clear; it stipplates that this force must assure the security and integrity of Chad. On the ground it has been passive and therefore useless".[139]

In August 1982, Col. Gaddafi attempted to host the OAU but it proved to be abortive due, primarily to the issue of the seating of a delegation from the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Before the abortive summit it was reported that Libya would press to have Goukouni Weddei recognized as Chad's legitimate representative but this came up against opposition from other member states. Gaddafi, and the other member states that were present, later agreed to

merely count Chad as present for the purposes of attaining a quorum so that the conference could hold. They were able to do this because the Chadian charge' d 'Affairs in Tripoli had originally been appointed by Weddei and was retained by Habre, as such he was considered the Chadian representative.[140] The summit came to an end, however, after being unable to attain a quorum. In October, Gaddafi sponsored Goukouni Weddei's establishment of a rival government at Barda; just South of the Libyan occupied Aouzou strip.[141]

Col. Gaddafi tried to convene another summit in November from which the SADR voluntarily kept away in order to ensure a quorum but as events unfolded, the summit eventually collapsed. Immediately after the conference opened, the question of Chad representation was raised. The Ivory Coast delegate categorically stated that unless Habre's delegation was seated, he would leave the conference. The Council therefore set up a credentials Committee - Tanzania, Ivory Cost, Lesotho, and Togo - to examine the issue of which of the two Chad delegations should be seated while the Council did other work. This attempt failed as Ivory Coast repeated her demand. At this point Nigeria's foreign minister Prof. Ishaya Audu, stated that according to the rules of procedure, all delegations invited to the meeting should have the right to attend and as such Habre's delegation should be seated.[142]

On 13th November 1982 the fourth day of the conference, an agreement was reached on establishing a new credentials committee consisting of representatives from Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, Tanzania and Mali. The Committee proposed that the issue of Chad's representation

should be referred to the Heads of State summit, but the Senegalese delegation declared it unacceptable and announced that they were suspending participation at the conference. This triggered a spate of walk outs, and at the end of the day 14 countries had walked out of the conference. They included Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Zaire. [143]

The issue was thereafter suspended till the Heads of State summit for deliberations. A number of Heads of State arrived in Tripoli but they were below the number needed for a quorum. On 24th November the OAU Secretariat announced a proposal which was put forward to Habre's delegation. It stated that:

> "The Ndjamena government, which was officially invited by the OAU Secretary - General in accordance with the OAU Charter and rules of procedure, is entitled, and has the right, to occupy Chad's seat in the 19th Summit.
>
> The Ndjamena government should be requested to voluntarily absent itself from this session of the summit in Tripoli, and declare that publicly.
>
> Meanwhile no attempt should be made to impose any other Chadian delegation" [144].

Hissen Habre rejected the proposal on 25th November, and because the presence of 31 OAU members did not constitute a quorum, the conference could not continue.

In his closing speech Gaddafi clearly made his position known by saying:

> "Brothers, it is evident that the African summit conference will not be held in the future. There seems no possibility of holding a future African summit conference unless those present here tonight decide to bring in the delegations of the GUNT and of the SADR. This is the only possibility open to us for holding a summit conference with quorum under the OAU Charter ....."145

In 1983 the OAU Secretariat appealedto all the parties in the conflict to ceasefire and negotiate. But Habre maintained his stand that he would not negotiate as long as Libya was involved in the conflict. On the other hand, Gaddafi and Weddei welcomed the ceasefire, citing that it was an attempt to resolve the conflict within an African framework. However, the fighting continued into August thereby leading to a massive French intervention at the request of Habre.

At the 19th OAU summit, which was held in Addis Ababa, Hissen Habre took up Chad's seat. Col. Mengistur Haile Mariam, the new OAU Chairman, organized a meeting of the OAU summit bureau to discuss the escalating conflict in Chad. The Bureau ended up calling for a ceasefire which Habre's government rejected on the grounds that GUNT forces were being backed by Libya. Ironically though, Goukouni Weddei's GUNT expressed satisfaction and confidence in the OAU summit Bureau. Commenting on the issue Col. Mengistu stated that the Chad problem had acquired an international d mension because of foreign intervention, and if it were not checked, Chad's peace in addition to Africa's Security would be threatened. [146] Thus, throughout 1983 the

OAU failed to make any concrete moves in the direction of resolving the conflict.

In November 1984 there was the announcement of a withdrawal agreement between Libya and France which committed both countries to a phased withdrawal of their forces by Mid - November, 1984. In the event of either side failing to do so, the other side's troops would remain.[147] This prompted Habre to accuse France of colluding with Libya against the Chad government. In spite of this agreement, however, Libya still maintained troops in the Aouzou strip. Taking cognizance of this fact the French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, accused the Libyans of having failed to implement the withdrawal in full, adding that the Libyans still maintained about 3,000 troops in Chad (referring to the Aouzou strip). He added, however, that the Libyans had kept a promise not to advance beyond the 16th parallel. Later on, the French President Mitterand, speaking at the 11th Franco - African summit in Burundi on 11th December, described the 16th parallel as "a theoretical line that has become practical for the purposes of preventing infiltration."[148] This statement by the French President gave some credence to speculations that France and Libya had tacitly agreed to a division of Chad.

A mini - summit on the Chad conflict which some African leaders had planned to hold in Brazzaville failed to take place. However, the leaders of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Zaire

held an informal meeting on 14th August while attending the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Congolese revolution. Only divergent views were presented at this meeting, and Zaire which had sent troops to support Habre wanted an outright condemnation of Libyan intervention. Ghana's special Presidential Adviser referred to Habre and Mobutu as traitors, while Sudan's under secretary for foreign Affairs appealed to all "peace - loving countries to side with Chad to help it replace the Libyan aggression which is backed by a super - power."[149] Most of the countries present nevertheless, wanted a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Chad.

After months of negotiations Habre agreed to attend reconciliatio meeting at Addis Ababa in early January 1985, with the understanding that the meeting would be between his "government" and "opposition leaders", and not "all factions" as was earlier written. Goukouni Weddei arrived for the meeting on 8th January with a delegation of 130 members. He was personally recieved by Mengistu and given a full state welcome. This caused the failure of the meeting because Habre was infuriated at the type of reception that was given to Weddei, [150] and consequently refused to attend.

After this failed attempt at reconciliation, the French foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, travelled to Chad, Ethiopia and Libya in order to urge the OAU to form a, Pan - African observer force for Chad but his proposals were turned down.

When President Abdou Diouf of Senegal was elected OAU Chairman in 1985 he actively tried to incorporate France in the

search for a solution to the Chad conflict. In early 1986 he paid a two day visit to France where he discussed the Chad problem with President Mitterand. After the meeting he said that the Chad problem can not be solved without France.[151]

In April 1986 a reconciliation between Habre and Weddei was organized by Presidents Diouf and Nguesso of Congo to take place in the Congolese town of Loubomo. At the last minute Weddei failed to turn up for the talks claiming that President Diouf had referred to Habre as the legitimate President of Chad who was recognized by the OAU and the interna tional community, while he (Weddei) was referred to as the opposition leader. He maintained that he was ready to hold talks with Habre only if they were both treated as equals.[152] In response the OAU Chairman criticized Weddei as irresponsible " stating that " it is now clear that it is president Habre who wants peace, cohesion, the unity of Chad, and the territorial integrity of his country."[153] This statement was interpreted by top ranking OAU officials to mean that the Organization would no longer recognize GUNT as a party to the dispute but as a mere opposition movement.

There was another blow against the GUNT when President Nguesso, of Congo, announced his government's recognition of Habre's government in Chad.[154] The implication of this move could be seen in the fact that the OAU Chairman, and the Congolese President were both mandated by the OAU to mediate in the Chad conflict. The Congolese action was nevertheless seen by the GUNT as an abandonment of that role.

In conclusion, the trend has been that an increasing number of countries, in and outside Africa, are giving recognition to Habre's government thereby giving it greater legitimacy. In view of this fact the OAU has had no other option but to recognize the fait accompli of the Ndjamena government's legitimacy.

3.4. THE IMPACT OF THE CHADIAN CIVIL WAR ON THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE O.A.U. AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

In order to make an analysis of the impact that the Chadian civil war has had on the OAU, the assumption established in chapter two, concerning the impact of the global and African state systems on the OAU shall be used. According to the systems perspective that was used it was established that the predominance of intra - systemic responses and reactions to a given event within the system is an indicator of greater autonomy. On the other hand, a reverse situation in which extra - systemic responses are greater indicates a lower level of autonomy and interrelatedness.

When this postulate is transposed to the context of the African state system it could be held to mean that if the responses of the OAU to an event predominates over the responses of external powers or individual African states then there exists a greater degree of institutional autonomy and a more effective functioning of the O.A.U. as a regional organization. If, however, the reverse is the case then

it could be said that the O.A.U. is displaying a lesser degree of organizational effectiveness.

With reference to the Chadian conflict, extra - systemic actors, France and U.S., and an intra - systemic actor, Libya, have made more predominating responses, in the form of military intervention, than the OAU has. It was established that as a former colonial power, French intervention is best understood through it's wider Africa policy. Together with other Francophone state, Chad constitutes part of a military strategic network which France needs to maintain.

Given the volatile situation in Chad therefore France has been disposed to intervene. As a result the use of French forces have been more extensive in Chad than anywhere else in Africa. The evidence shows that France has intervened very actively and effectively in the Chadian civil war with a view to preserving her interests. In August 1969 President Tombalbaye requested for French military assistance in suppressing Frolinat rebellions in the north of Chad. France responded by sending 20 aircraft full of paratroopers. Between 1978 and 1980 French intervention in the Chadian civil war was virtually continuous. French intervention in May and June 1978 was decisive in intercepting and defeating Frolinat columns. Finally the French intervention that was carried out in July 1983 demonstrated the strength and coordinative ability of five French military facilities and bases across west and central Africa.

Another extra - systemic actor that has been involved in the Chadian civil war is the U.S., American involvement in Chad has not been of a military nature but it has been directed at curtailing the spread of Libyan influence. This accounts for the support that the U.S. has been giving to Hissen Habre. In 1982 the U.S. channelled $ 10 million to Habre in order to help him recapture Ndjamena. Also in July 1983 the U.S. provided Habre with a $10 million military aid package.

The main intra - systemic actor that has actively intervened in the conflict has been Libya. Her interests have been identified to be economic, strategic and political in nature, stemming primarily from her occupation of the mineral rich Aouzou strip. The interests that Chad holds for Libya led to an attempted merger between the two countries. This attempt was condemned by the various factions and members of the OAU and eventually had to be abandoned.

Active Libyan intervention in the Chadian civil war started in June 1980. On this occassion Libya intervened on the then President Weddei's request for military aid against Habre's forces. Ever since then Libya intervention has been continuous.

In contrast to the intervention of these three actors, the response of the OAU to the conflict has been limited largely to the realm of diplomacy. In terms of actual intervention by the OAU through the establishment of a multinational force, the record of the OAU in this conflict has been poor.

In 1979 Nigeria individually stationed an 800 strong peace-keeping force in Chad. But this was not effective when compared to the other groups involved in the fighting in terms of numbers or motive as they were not engaged in any fighting.

In December 1981 the OAU deployed a multinational peace-keeping force to Chad. This force, however, was largely ineffective as the troops never engaged in any fighting, and because of financial reasons the deployment lasted for a limited time period. The ineffectiveness of this force threw into light the predominating impact of the extra - systemic and intra - systemic actors that that have been identified. The reason for this is that prior to the deployment of the OAU force, both French and Libyan troops withdrew from Chad. This withdrawal coupled with the inactive nature of the OAU force created what was percieved by the various factions to be a "power vacuum" which Habre quickly capitalized upon to seize power.

By and large the impact of the intervening actors in the conflict has led to the ineffectiveness of the OAU as a regional organization to mediate in the dispute. It is clear that the response of these actors to the conflict have, individually or collectively, been predominant over the response of the OAU. This factor has restricted OAU mediation largely to the area of diplomacy.

With regard to the impact of the Chadian civil war and the OAU mediation efforts on the theory of functionalism, two assumptions that were developed in chapter two will be employed.

The first assumption posits that international organizations provide improved channels for negotiations, and a more adequately organized framework for conducting diplomacy. The second assumption holds that functionalism proposes that the development of international social and economic cooperation is a major pre-requisite for the solution of war.

With reference to the first assumption the OAU has succeeded in providing an institutional framework for the conduct of diplomacy between the factions in the Chadian conflict. OAU attempts at resolving the confliot has occured largely through diplomatic negotiations. This can be seen as a strength of the OAU as a regional organization because it provides a means of communication between the belligerents.

This does not mean, however, that the OAU diplomatic efforts have been totally successful. Over the years, diplomatic efforts by the OAU to end the dispute have been obstructed by differences between member states of the OAU over which factions to support and, ultimately, in whose favour peace should prevail in Chad.

An attestation of this was the inability of the OAU summit to achieve a quorum in Tripoli due to splits over which Chadian faction the OAU should recognize.

The quiescence that presently prevails with reference to the faction that should be recognize by the OAU is due more to the fait accompli of Hissen Habre having caputured power than to any

unanimity of views among OAU member states.

With reference to the second assumption, no evidence was found to suggest that the OAU has tried to encourage economic and social cooperation between Libya and Chad in order to resolve the conflict. This fact is probably due to the nature of the conflict. The conflict started as an intra - state civil war and was later compounded by the problem of the Libyan occupation of the Aouzou strip and her active support for various factions. In addition to this is the fact that Chad has been embroiled in war for the better part of her life as an independent state; about 19 years, Chad, as a state, has barely had enough time or financial resources to develop her economic base to her full potential in order to engage in meaningful economic relations with other states. ⁷ On this score, therefore, the OAU should not be indicted for not having employed or encouraged this strategy for resolving the conflict. Rather it should be understood that the minimal resources that Chad has or gets goes into prosecuting the war.

5. CONCLUSION

This Chapter has dwelt at length on the Chadian civil war. The section on the background to the crisis consisted of a brief narration on the background to the war. The roots of the conflict were found to lie primarily in the economic and political discrepancy that existed between the North and the South. This was exacerbated by the factor of ethnic domination by the the Southern Saras over the Northern ethnic groups for several years.

The next section looked at how these differences that have existed in chad helped to fuel the development and growth of the conflict. The first subsection looked at the rise of rebel movements in the North. The next subsection looked at the motives behind the intrusion of the major powers involved in the dispute, France, Libya, and the U.S. It was found that France has strategic, and to a lesser extent, economic interests in Chad. On the other hand Libya possesses economic, strategic and political interests in Chad. The motives behind U.S. involvement have been found to be mainly political and strategic. In this regard the U.S. has been mainly interested in circumscribing the spread of Libyan influence thereby keeping Chad firmly under French, and by implication western, influence.

The next subsection looked at length at the various attempts by the OAU to mediate in the conflict. The most significant finding has been the lack of consensus among OAU member states over which faction to give full support in the dispute. This finding was highlighted by the botched OAU summits in Tripolic in August and November 1982. The most significant aspect of the OAU mediation process came in 1982 when the peace - keeping force was deployed. However, because of inadequate funding and lack of a precise definition of it's role, the OAU force was ineffective.

The last section dwelt on the impact that the Chadian civil war has had on the effective functioning of the OAU as a regional organization and on the theory of functionalism. With regard to the effective functioning of the OAU it was found that the two

extra - systemic actors, TFrance and the U.S., and the one intra - systemic actor, Libya, have made more predominant responses, mainly in the form of military intervention, to the Chadian civil war than the OAU has. In contrast to the military intervention of these actors, the response of the OAU to the conflict has been restricted to the realm of diplomacy whose effectiveness has been affected by differences between member states. The net result has been a reduction in the effectiveness of the OAU in resolving the conflict.

With reference to the implications of the Civil war and the OAU mediation efforts on the functionalist theory of international organization, the major findings have been that firstly, the strength of the OAU as a regional organization lies in it's providing an institutional framework for the conduct of diplomacy between the beligerent factions. This is not an indication,however, that OAU diplomatic efforts have been successful. The second finding was that the OAU has not tried to enhance economic and social cooperation between Chad and Libya as a means towards the resolution of the conflict. The reason for this was attributed to the fact that Chad has not been able to develop her economic base because of the protracted nature of the conflict. Furthermore a substantial amount of her resources are used to prosecute the war and are thereby diverted away from the development of her economic base which would provide the basis for any meaningful relationship with another state.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Briefings "Libya and Chad" in Review of African Political Economy No. 21 May - September 1981 p. 85.

(2) Mansour O. EL - Kikhia "Chad: The same Old Story" in Journal of African Studies Vol. 10 No. 4 1983 - 84 p. 128

(3) Ibid pp. 128

(4) Briefings "Chad and Libya Op cit p. 86

(5) El - Kikhia Op cit p. 128

(6) Ibid p. 128

(7) Ibid p. 128

(8) Africa Today Op cit p. 410

(9) Briefings "Chad and Libya" Op cit p. 86

(10) Africa Today Op cit p. 411

(11) Ibid p. 411

(12) El - Kikhia Op cit p. 128

(13) Ibid p. 130. See also Herb Boyd "Chad: A Civil War without End?" in Journal of African Studies Vol. 10 No.4 1983 - 84 p. 120

(14) Africa Today Op cit pp. 411. See also S.C. Saxena "The Civil War in Chad: Causes and Dimensions" in African Quarterly Vol. 21 No. 1 1981 p. 82.

(15) For more on the impact of "Yondo" ritual on Tombalbaye's government see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff Conflict in Chad London: Ch. Hurst and Co 1981 p. 26

(16) El - Kikhia Op cit p. 130

(17) Ibid p. 130

(18) Thompson and Adloff Op cit p. 50

(19) Ibid p. 51

(20) Ibid p. 50

(21) Ibid p. 60

(22) Ibid p. 62

(23) Saxena Op Cit p. 82

(24) Thompson and Adolff Op Cit p. 85

(25) African Today Op Cit p. 411

(26) Ibid p. 412

(27) Ibid p. 412

(28) Ibid p. 412

(29) Ibid p. 412

(30) El - Kikhia Op Cit p. 130

(31) Thompson and Adloff Op Cit p. 119

(32) Quoted in Colin Legum (ed) African Contemporary Record 1971-72 p. C 56

(33) Thompson and Adloff Op Cit p. 65

(34) The French did in fact immediately approve of the new regime and French Major Camille Gourvenac was retarned as head of the intellegence services.

(35) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1975 - 76 p. B 460

(36) El - Kikhia Op Cit p. 130

(37) Colin Legum (ed) African Contemporary Record 1977-78 P B 541

(38) Ibid p. B 543

(39) Thompson and Adloff Op Cit p. 71

(40) Ibid p. 113

(41) Ibid p. 118

(42) Olu Adebayo "The Story of Chad" in New Nigerian 25th January 1982 p. 5.

(43) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1978-79 p. B 528

(44) El - Kikhia Op Cit p. 131

(45) Ibid p. 131

(46) Ibid p. 132

47 Thompson and Adloff Op Cit p. 6

(48) M.A. Vogt "Chad in Inter - State African Politics" in Sunday Herald 17 May 1981 p. 11

(49) Robin uckham "French Militarism in Africa" in Review of African Political Economy No. 24 May - August 1982 p.43

(50) Madan Sauldie "France's Military Intervention" in Africa No. 77 January 1978 p. 43.

(51) Luckham Op Cit p. 56

(52) Ibid p. 57

(53) Ibid p. 59

(54) Sauldie Op Cit p. 44

(55) Ibid p. 44

(56) Luckham Op Cit p. 60

(57) Vogt Op Cit p.11

(58) Ibid p. 11

(59) David S. Yost "French Policy in Chad and the Libya Challenge" Orbis Vol. 26 No. 4 1982 p. 968

(60) Africa Diary September 1968 Vol. 8 No. 39 p. 4109

(61) Africa Diary Vol. 8 No. 39 December 1969 p. 4745

(62) Ibid p. 4745.

(63) Africa Diary Vol. 9 No. 41 October 1969 p. 4677

(64) Ibid p. 4677.

(65) Ibid p. 4677

(66) Claude Wanthier "France's Year in Africa" in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1978 - 79 p. 109

(67) Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 20 No. 8 August 1 - 31 1983 p. 6946

(68) Ibid p. 6947

(69) Ibid p. 6947

(70) Ibid p1 6948

(71) Ibid p. 6948

(72) Thompson and Adloff Op Cit p. 121

(73) Briefings "Libya and Chad" Op Cit p. 95

(74) Colin Legum "The crisis Over Chad" in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1980 - 81 p. A 41

(75) Ibid p. A 41

(76) Quoted in John Howe "Libya's Gamble in Chad " in Africa No. 114 February 1981 p. 47.

(77) Colin Legum "The crisis over Chad" Op Cit p. A 41

(78) Ibid p. A 41

(79) Briefings "Libya and Chad" Op Cit p. 93

(80) John Howe "Gaddafi and Africa" in Africa No. 115 March 1981 p. 16

(81) Colin Legum "The crisis over Chad" Op Cit p. A 44

(82) "Chad: Americans Move In " in Africa No. 79 March 1978 p. 30.

(83) Ibid p. 31

(84) "Now The US Joins In" in West Africa 25 July 1983 p. 1701

(85) Ibid p. 1702

(86) "Chad: Libya Mediation Offer " in Africa Diary Vol. 10 No. 3. January 1970 p. 4787

(870 "Libya: Bid for Reconciliation with Chad Fails" in Africa Diary Vol. 11 No. 52 December 1971 p. 5778.

(88) "Chad: Meeting With Rebels Called Off" Africa Diary Vol. 17 No. 38 September 1977 p. 5689.

(89) Ibid p. 5690

(90) "Chad: Reconciliation With Libya" Africa Diary Vol. 18 No. 16 p. 8959

(91) Ibid p. 8959

(92) "Chad: peace in the Desert " in Africa No. 80 April 1978 p. 29.

(93) "Chad: Miscarriage at Sebla" in Africa No. 82 June 1978 p.43

(94) "Setback for Chad Liberation Front" in Africa No. 84 August 1978 p. 43.

(95) "Chad: Reconciliation Course" in Africa No. 86 October 1978 p. 71

(96) Ibid p. 72

(97) "Chad: Kano 1" in Africa Diary Vol. 19 No. 19 May 1979 p. 93

(98) Ibid p. 9493

(99) "Chad: Third Africa Conference in Lagos" in Africa Diary Vol. 19 No. 31 July - August 1979 p. 9618.

(100) "Chad: Kano 2" in Africa Diary Vol. 19 No. 28 July 1979 pp. 95 83

(191) "Chad: Third Africa Conference in Lagos" in West Africa 4 June 1979 p. 9583

(102) "Chad: Third Africa Conference in Lagos" in Africa Diary Op Cit p. 9618.

(103) Ibid p. 9619

(104) "At the OAU Summit" in West Africa 23 July 1979 p. 1297

(105) "Chad: Peace Propspects " in West Africa 27 August 1979 p. 1577.

(106) "Warring factions form Government of National Union" in West Africa 19 November 1979 p 2160

(107) "Chad Violence Erupts Again" in West Africa 31 March 1980 p. 565

(108) Ibid p. 566

(109) "Eyadema Intervenes With Very Little Result" in West Africa 14 April 1980 p. 679

(110) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1980 - 81 p. C 14

(111) "Chadian Leaders May Sign Another Accord" in New Nigerian 21 October 1980 p. 6

(112) "OAU Committee to make Another Attempt to Reach Chad" in New Nigeria 11 November 1980 p. 8

(113) "Weddeye's Forces Capture Ndjamena" in Nigerian Herald 17 December 1980 p. 8

(114) Yost Op Cit p. 971

(115) Ibid p. 971

(116) Ibid p. 972

(117) "General Elections in 1982" in West Africa 5 January 1981 p. 42

(118) Ibid p. 42

(119) John Howe "Libya's Gamble in Chad " in Africa No. 114 February 1981 p. 47

(120) Yost Op Cit p. 973

(121) Ibid p. 973

(122) Ibid p. 974

(123) "Chad Conference in Lagos" in West Africa 20 April 1981 p. 900.

(124) "Chad: Referendum Required " in West Africa 30 March 1981 p. 720.

(125) "Chaos Over Chad " in West Africa 1 June 1981 p. 1211. see also "OAU Resolves to Send Neutral Force to Chad" in New Nigerian 25 May 1981 p. 16.

(126) Yost Op Cit p. 976

(127) Ibid p. 977

(128) Ibid p. 977

(129) Ibid p. 978

(130) "Gaddafi's Diplomatic Coup" in West Africa 9 November 1981 p. 2620.

(131) Quoted in Yost Op Cit p. 980

(132) Ibid p. 980

(133) "Zone of Conflict" in Africa No. 124 December 1981 p. 19

(134) "Goukouni Wants OAU Troops to Fight Rebels" in Nigerian Standard 17 December 1981 Backpage.

(135) "OAU Must Act Now" in Daily Times 2 January 1982 p. 3

(136) "Chad: Peace Timetable Adopted" Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 19 No. 2 February 1 - 28 1982 p. 6335

(137) Yost Op Cit p. 981.

(138) "No Solution Yet in Chad" in Africa Now April 1982 p. 56 - 57

(139) Quoted in Yost Op Cit p. 981

(140) "OAU: The Quest for the Quorum" in West Africa 16 August 1982 p. 2089.

(141) Yost Op Cit p. 987

(142) "Tripoli's Time Bomb" in West Africa 29 November 1982 p. 3066.

(143) Zdenek Cerrenka and Colin Legum "The OAU in 1982" in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1482 - 83 p. A 53.

(144) "Tripolis Time Bomb" Op Cit p. 3061

(145) Quoted in Zdenek Cerrenka and Colin Legum "A Severe Setback for African Unity" in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1982 - 83 p. A 54

(146) Colin Legum "The OAU After Twenty years" in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1983 - 84 p. A 75

(147) "Chad: France and Libya Pulling Out" in Africa Now November 1984 p. 27

(148) Quoted in "Chad: Allegations of Continued Libya Involvement" in KeeSings Contemporary Archives Vol.31 September 1985 p. 33833.

(149) Colin Legum "The OAU After Twenty Years" Op Cit pp. A 76

(150) Ibid p. A 76

(151) "Diouf's Diplomacy" in Africa No. 174 February 1986 p. 26

(152) Quoted in "Chad: Allegations of Continued Libya Involvement" in Keesings Conteporary Archieves Vol. 31 September 1985 p. 33833.

(153) Colin Legum "The OAU. After Twenty years" Op Cit p. A 76

(154) Ibid p. A 76

(155) "Diouf's Diplomacy" in Africa No. 174 February 1986 p. 26

(156) Fanmbah Tayong "Another Failure" in Africa No. 177 May 1986 p. 23 - 24.

(157) Ibid p. 24

(158) "Irreconcilable Positions" in Africa No. 180 August 1986 p. 3.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter which focuses on the Western Sahara conflict will follow basically the same format as the previous chapter. The chapter will start with a brief narration of the background to the conflict in an attempt to identify the major causes of the conflict. After this will come a more detailed analysis of the growth and development of the conflict. This section will be divided into four main parts.

The first part will look at the rise of liberation movements. This will be followed by an analysis of the bases of the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the Western Sahara, and mediation efforts by the United Nations. The third part will focus on intervention by Libya, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the conflict. The fourth part will look at OAU mediation in the conflict. The fourth section of the chapter will assess the implications that the conflict holds for the effective functioning of the OAU as a regional organization, and for the theory of functionalism. The last section will be the conclusion.


4.2. BACKGROUND TO THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

As is the case with most African conflicts the principal cause of the Western Sahara conflict was the impact of colonialism

map 2

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WESTERN SAHARA



Source: Tony Hodges Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War

Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co. 1983 pp. 1

The region called the Western Sahara occupies an area of 105,448 square miles and was claimed by Spain as the Spanish Sahara in 1884. The Spanish had initially established fishing rights on the coast opposite the Canary Islands. The Berlin Conference of 1884 - 5, however, gave the spanish the opportunity to extend their control over the land. At the Berlin Conference it was stated that "every European power established on the coast has rights to the back country and can move back the frontiers of it's possessions until it meets the zone of a neighbouring influence or an organized state."[1] Thereafter, on 6th April 1887, the Spanish government issued a royal decree that placed the area between Cape Bojador and Cape Blanc, as well as 150 kilometers into the interior, under the authority of the Governor General of the Canary Islands, thereby establishing their authority over the present day Western Sahara.

In agreements made on 27th June 1900, 3rd October 1904, and 27th November 1912 the French and Spanish governments specifically delimited their spheres of influence in the Western Sahara region.[2] France recognized Spanish rights over vast portions of the desert including the Rio de Oro and Saquiet el Hamra. The French government also recognised Spanish rights over the land lying between 27° North Latitude and the Oued Draa. This latter portion of land was administered by Spain as a protectorate under the name of Southern Morocco. In 1956 Morocco became independent and in 1958 the protectorate of Southern Morocco was ceded to Morocco under the name of Fartaya.[3] The region of Riole Oro and Saquiet el Hamra remained as a Spanish colony under the name of Spanish Sahara.

In order to properly understand the background to the Western Sahara conflict it is essential to talk about the natural resources that the Western Sahara possesses because it is a central factor in the whole conflict. The most important natural resource in the Western Sahara is phosphate. Spain first discovered Phosphate deposits at Bu Craa in 1963. After subsequent tests and explorations the Spanish government announced that the Phosphate deposits contained nearly 10 billion tons of high grade phosphate rocks in the form of guelbs (rocky hills). These phosphate deposits, which are superficial and lie just below the surface, cover an area of 1,200 square kilometres thereby making it one of the largest phosphate deposits in the world .[3]

In order to explore this resource the Spanish government formed a mineral minin company called Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara (ENMINSA). Because of financial and technological difficulties however, mining did not start until 1972. Another difficulty was that of transportation. Although the phosphate rocks were superficial, making excavation and treatment easy, the company had the problem of transporting the rocks from the desert. To overcome this problem they had to construct a 96 kilometre conveyor belt from Bu Craa to the terminal near El - Aioun. In order to attract public investment, ENMINSA was opened to foreign participation and renamed Fostados de Bu Craa (FOBUCRAA) in 1979 [4].

Altogether the Spanish government controlled miningactivities in Bu Craa for only three years; from 1972 when production started

till 1975 when the Spanish government ceded the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco took over the northern section of the Wester Sahara which had the phosphate deposites, and concomittantly took 65% control of the industry, leaving Spain with a 35% share and the right to appropriate 35% of the output of the mines. A critical factor in the Moroccan desire to take over the Western Sahara therefore, was the Phosphate deposits. This reason is given greater credence when it is considered that Morocco has for long been the world's third largest producer of phosphate. She produced 20 million tons in 1975 behind the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. who produced 51 million tons and 25 million tons respectively in 1975 .[5]

With the outset of the war, however, production of Phosphate in the Western Sahara has been a virtual impossibility. Mining ceased in 1975 because the open cast mines, and the conveyor belt have proved to be easy targets of attack by the polisario fighters. Mining resumed in 1977 but lasted for only a few days because of resumed guerilla activities. (see table 4.1)

The second most important natural resource in the Western Sahara is fish . The territory has 1,025 kilometres of coastal waters that is one of the richest in the world. The waters are especially rich in Tuna and Losbters. When the territory was under Spanish rule, Spain declared the water a "free fishing zone". This policy attracted exploitation by mostly Soviet, Japanese, South Korean, South African, Portuguese, and Spanish fishermen. It has been estimated that during Spanish occupation an average of 1.5 million

TABLE 4. 1

The Fall in Phosphate Exports, 1975 - 79

	(tons
1975	2,638,000
1976	277,000
1977	25,000
1978	441,000
1979	139,000

Source: "Mining Annual Review, 1980" in Tony Hodges
Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War
Westport, Connecticut: Lawrrence Hill and Co., 1983
pp. 284.

tons of fish were caught each year.[6]

Since Morocco took over, she has signed several fishing agreements with different countries covering the waters of the Western Sahara. In response to this the Polisario formed a small marine commando unit which patrols the coastal waters of th Sahara. The objective behind this was to stop all off shore operations, and what the Polisario define as illegal fishing with: it's territorial waters. This has led to the capture of several Spanish and Portugues fishermen who were released after negotiatio with their home governments.

Other mineral resources that have been found in the Western Sahara include deposits of high grade iron ore near Dakhla, whose reserves have been estimated at 70 million tons. There have also been discoveries of potassium and copper deposits. There have bee rumours of oil and uranium deposits in the Western Sahara but these have not been verified. There was active oil exploration between 1960 and 1964 by mainly American oil companies, but these were not successful. Prospecting was stopped because of the war but in 1973 the Moroccan government gave Phillips petroleum of the U.S. and British Petroleum seven off shore oil exploration permits betwee El - Aioun and Bojador.[7]

Regardless of the seeming unviability of the Western Sahara desert, it is obvious that there is the undelying Moroccan desire to control the mineral and natural resources of the region. Moroccan control over phosphate production in the Western Sahara

would undoubtedly increase her share of the world Phosphate Market and enhance her economic position.

4.3. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

(i) RISE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Shortly after the independence of Morocco there were anti-Spanish demonstrations in different towns in the Spanish Sahara agitating for an end to Spanish colonial domination. Alongside the demonstrations there was the proliferation of various anti - Spanish liberation movements. On 18th June 1970, the Spanish government organized a pro - Spanish demonstration in the town of El - Aiouni, in the Spanish Sahara. The demonstration was meant to display the native Saharawi support for continued Spanish colonial rule. What eventually happened was that about 2000 people demonstrated against Spanish rule, and in favour of King Hassan of Morocco. In retaliation Spanish troops opened fire killing 12 people, arrested several leading individuals, and destroyed many villages. The Spanish administration stated that the demonstration had been organized and staged by an underground group. However, four demonstrators who fled to Mauritania claimed that it was staged by the Mauritania based Front de liberation du Sahara Sous Domination Coloniale Espagnole (F.C.S). 2.

The FCS was formed in 1956 with the backing of Mauritania. The movement was initially anti Moroccan because Mauritania, at that time, did not trust Moroccan intensions in the Sahara.

However, in late 1966 the position of the FCS changed. It's delegates attended a UN conference in December 1966 where they voted for the independence of the Spanish Sahara. However, the delegates passed through Morocco on their way back where they concluded a secret pact that brought the FCS movement under Moroccan control.[9] The FCS was dissolved with two years. It's significance lay in the fact that it was the first organized liberation movement in the Spanish Sahara.

On 14th September 1970, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, king Hassan of Morocco, and Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, met in Nouadhibou, on Cape Blanc, in order to intensify their efforts and arrive at a common strategy for liberating the Spanish Sahara. Nothing of much substance came out of the summit but two new liberation movements developed afterwards. The first movement was called Organization de liberation de saquia el - Hamra et Wadi el - Dahb. It was founded in Algeria in January 1971 but was short lived. The second movement was called movement de Resistance des Hommes Blouez (Morehob).[10] This movement was found in Rabat in January 1972 by Edward Moha. The main goal of the Movement was the attainment of the Sahara's independence from Spain. Although this movement was recognized by the OAU, Edward Moha's strong insistence on the Sahara's independence did not appeal to Morocco, so the movement had to change bases from Rabat to Algiers. Algiers later became suspicious of Moha's activities and he was labelled a persona non grata. By 1973

Morehob was almost non existent as a movement. Consequently Moha returned to Morocco in 1975 and declared his allegiance to king Hassan after which he dissolved the movement.

The most popular liberation movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquiet el - Hamara and Rio de Oro, Polisario movement, was founded by a group of university students in Rabat in the late 1960's, and it's main aim was the liberation of the Sahara from Spanish rule. Among the leaders of the movement was a law student called El - Ouali Mustapha Siyed. Initially they were patronized by the Istiglal party of Morocco, whose leaders wanted the students to seek liberation from Spain as junior members of the party. This condition was rejected by El - Ouali and his group who later gravitated toward other more radical, muslim students. (see ts 1a 4.2)

They advocated direct armed struggle against Spain. The students established contacts among the Sahara refugees living in Tindouf, Fautan and Zourerate in the early 1970's. After successfully coopting a number of followers in these areas, they went in search of aid from different countries, but only Libya and Algeria offered them anything substantial. The leaders of the movement thereafter established their base in Mauritania because of it's proximity to the Spanish Sahara. and the ethnic and cultural affinities

TABLE 4.2

Executive Committee of the POLISARIO Front

(elected by the 5th General People's Congress.

October 12 - 16, 1982)

Mohammed Abdelaziz, Secretary - General

Mohammed Lamine Ould Ahmed

Mohfoud Ali Beiba

Ibrahim Ghali Oul Mustapha

Bashir Mustapha Sayed

Ayoub Ould Lahbib

Mohammed Lamine Oul Bouhali

Source: Tony Hodgds Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War

Westport, Connecticut: Lawrrence Hill and Co., 1983

pp. 339

of the local population in addition to the support offered by workers at Zouerate. On 10th May 1973, the Polisario was formally constituted at Zouerate with it's stated objective being the independence of the Spanish Sahara through armed struggle.[11] Because Algeria offered the movement more aid and better facilities than Mauritania, the Polisario headquarters moved to Tindouf in 1975.

ii. THE BASES OF MOROCCAN AND MAURITANIAN CLAIMS TO THE WESTERN SAHARA AND U.N. MEDIATION EFFORTS

At this point it is necessary to take a look at the basis of the claims by Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara.

The basis of Morocco's claims lies in it's concept of a "Greater Morocco", According to the Moroccans all the territory from Morocco down to the Senegal river had been part of Morocco before the colonial era. Their claims rested on the argument that prior to colonial rule, the Saharwis had recognized the spiritual authority of the Sultan in Morocco. Furthermore the Sultan had representatives in the region who collected taxes from the natives. Spanish colonialism in the region therefore meant the occupation of a territory whose people once paid allegience to the sultan. Accordingly, once the Spanish withdraw, the territory should become part of Morocco.[9] (See Map 3)

Encl 3

GREATER MOROCCO



Source: Tony Hodges Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co. 1983 pp. 87

It is interesting to note, in addition, that Morocco opposed the creation of the State of Mauritania on the grounds that Mauritania was also part of "Greater Morocco". June 1956, Alla el - Fassi, the leader of Morocco's Istiglal party, declared that:

> "If Morocco is independent it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier, the Sahara from Tridoug to colom - Bechar, Touat, Kenadza are unified. Our independence will only be complete with the Sahara! The frontiers of Morocco end in the South at Saint Louis - du - Senegal" 12.

The Mauritania claim to the Spanish Sahara was also based on the concept of a "Greater Mauritania". This concept, however, had at it's core the ethnic, cultural, and religious affinity that existed between the tribes of Mauritania and those of the Spanish Sahara. The indegenous population of the Northern part of Mauritania are o the same ethnic stock as the Saharawis of Spanish Sahara. This situation led president Mouktar Ould Daddah to proclaim in July 1957, that:

> "I cannot help evoking the innumerable ties which unite us: we bear the same names, we observe the same noble traditions, we honour the same religious leaders, graze our herds on the same p stures, give water to them at the same wells. In word we are reffering to that same desert civilization of which we are so justly proud . So I invite my brothers of Spanish Sahara to dream of this great economic and spiritual Mauritania" 13

On 20th August 1974, the Spanish government announced that she would hold a referendum in early 1975, which was in response

to the Djemaa's request for an acceleration of the process leading to autonomy in accordance with UN resolutions. King Hassan opposed this plan, fearing complete independence for the Spanish Sahara. It was at this point that Morocco, in September, decided to carry it's case to the World Court.[14] This move was approved by Spain, Mauritania, and Algeria.

In October 1974, a secret deal was made between King Hassan and President Ould Daddah. In the deal the two leaders agreed that Mauritania would be alloted Rio de Oro and a share in the output of the Bou Craa Phosphate mines if Mauritania would relinquish it's claims to Saquiet el Hamra after the Spanish withdrawal from the Sahara. This deal was concluded without the knowledge of Algeria.[15]

In December 1974 the UN passed resolution 3292 which stated that Spain should desist fron holding a referendum. Instead the World Courts advise should be sought, and the UN would send a fact finding commission to the Spanish Sahara.[16] Subsequently, the UN Secretary - General, Kurt Waldheim, appointed Ambassador Simeon Ake, of Ivory Coast, as the leader of a three - man commission to ascertain the state of affairs in the Spanish Sahara. The mission visited Madrid, Rabat, Nouakchott, Algiers and refugee camps in Southern Morocco and the Tindouf region of Algeria. The visit was marked by demonstrations in El - Aioun, Asmara and Villa Cisneros which had been organized by the Polisario.

Meanwhile, the World Court started hearings on the Spanish Sahara issue in January 1975. Four principal questions were

addressed by the Court. Firstly, was the Spanish Sahara ownerless before the Spanish occupation? Secondly, what bond existed between it and Mauritania, and it and Morocco? Thirdly, if there were any bonds, would it justify modifying the UN demand that the Saharwis be consulted about their future? Fourthly, if there were no bonds, what were the judicial ties between the Spanish Sahara, the Kingdom of Morocco, and Mauritania.[17]

At the hearings Morocco based her case primarily on the historical evidence of the Sultan's sovereignty over the Spanish Sahara, and to a lesser degree on the cultural and ethnic affinities between the Moroccans and the Saharawis. Morocco argued that Saharawi Chiefs engaged in many acts of allegiance to the Moroccan Sultan. They cited the examples of tax being collected from the Saharawi Chiefs, and military expeditions that were sent out by the Sultan to defend the Saharawis against French and Spanish encroachment. The Moroccans further argued that the Act of Algeciras of 7th April 1906, which was signed by 13 countries, recognized the Sovereignty of the Sultan over his Kingdom and, they felt, had greater international validity than later Franco - Spanish agreements which divided the region. Morocco rounded up with the contention that "Spain in recognizing Moroccan independence in 1956, had formally acknowledged the unity of the Moroccan Kingdom/, the proof of which lay in the retrocession of Tarfaya and IFNI to Morocco."[18]

Mauritania stressed the cultural unity that existed between her population and the Saharawis, arguing that the desert imposed

a common way of life on it's inhabitants, thereby giving rise to the development of similar customs and institutions. Mauritania contended that by virture of this fact they were united as one people; and only the advent of European colonialism prevented the people from forming one nation. [19]

Algeria, on her part, maintained that the Alawite dynasty in Morocco had never firmly and conclusively established it's authority over the tribes in the Spanish Sahara. They argued that the Sultan was engaged in intermittent warfare with the Saharawis whom he never conclusively conquered. The Algerians accused Morocco of having "expansionist and annexationist designs" which she pursued through the establishment of bogus liberation movements like the Front de Liberation et de liunite (FLU). The Algerians stressed that their main concern was to make sure that the Saharawis could establish an independent nation state. [20]

Spain held the view that the World Court was not competent to adjudicate in the affair. She,however, argued that as at the time Spain conquered the region, the people there were neither subject to the authority of Morocco or Mauritania. Instead, the area was inhabited by politically independent tribes. Spain further submitted that because of the violence that was being perpetrated by both the Saharawi guerillas and the Moroccan army, she would soon relinquish control over the area. [21]

On 16th October 1975 the World Court issued it's advisory opinion on the Spanish Sahara case. The Court decided that before

the Spaniards came, the territory had juridical ties with Morocco. The Court also decided that the people of the territory had ties of a tribal and not a territorial nature with the Moors of Mauritania. Moreover, the Court stated that:

> "... The materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereigntytbetween the Territory of Spanish Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco, or the Mauritania entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 in the decolonization of SpanishSahara and in particular, of the principle of Self - determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory."22.

This in effect meant that there was no evidence that would justify the annexation of the area by Morocco or Mauritania, or a delay in carrying out the UN resolutions on the rights of the Saharawi to self determination.

The Moroccan government, in an extreme display of propaganda, twisted the decision of the Court by announcing that the Court's decision vindicated Morocco's claim to the Spanish Sahara, under Islamic Law". In order to symbolically display this, the King organized a peaceful "Green March" into the Spanish Sahara. On 6th November, 1975, about 350,000 Moroccans marched from Tarfaya to the Spanish Sahara border area, and were ordered back by king Hassan on 9th November.

On 14th November Spain signed an agreement with the governments of Morocco and Mauritania. According to the Agreement Spain would decolonized the Spanish Sahara and leave the territory before 28th February 1976. In the interim the territory would be

governed by the Spanish Governor - General who would be assisted by two Moroccan and Mauritanian Deputy Governor Generals. Upon vacating the territory, it would be partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania. Furthermore, Spain would retain 35% of the shares in the Fosbucraa phosphate company, leaving the remaining 65% for Morocco.[23] On 19th November the Agreement was ratified by the Cortez in Spain, and King Hassan announced that the problem of the Spanish Sahara had been solved. The Algerian response to the Madrid Accord was to embark on acts of economic retaliation against Morocco.

Spain started it's gradual withdrawal almost immediately. Against strong and growing military opposition from the Polisario, Morocco occupied Smara on 27th November. On 11th November about 4,000 Moroccan soldiers and several hundred civil servants took over El - Aioun and started operating flights to Morocco. Coming from the South, the Mauritanians occupied the town of La Guera with the help of Moroccan troops who had been fighting Polisario guerillas. On 12th January 1976, the Spanish relinquished control of Villa Cisneros which the Mauritanians promptly took over and renamed Dakhla.[24]

The response of the UN to this trend of events was passive considering the fact that two contrary proposals were tabled at the General Assembly on 10th December 1975 and both were accepted. The first proposal was tabled by Tunisia, Senegal and Zaire. It took note of the Madrid Accords and asked the

three governments to respect the wishes of the Saharawi whose freedom of expression would be ascertained by a UN observer. The proposal recieved 88 affirmative votes and 4, abstentions . The second proposal which was tabled by Algeria, ignored the Madrid pact and suggested that the Spanish administration should be replaced by a supervisory council comprising Spain, Morocco, Mauritainia, and Algeria. This council would hold a referendum to determine the future status of the Saharawi people. This proposal was also endorsed with 56 supporting votes, 42 opposing votes, and 24 abstentions.[25] For reasons of this ambivalence and inability to take any clear stand on this issue, the UN lost a lot of the effectiveness and prestige which it had in the handling of the conflict.

iii. FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Foreign intervention in the Western Sahara conflict has not been as open as that of the Chad conflict, in the sense that the conflict has not attracted the directed and prolonged involvement of external powers outside the main combatants; Morocco and Mauritania on one hand and the Polisario on the other. The nature of foreign intervention in the Western Sahara has tended more towards the provision of arms, and other forms of aid to certain sides. There was a very brief exception to this when France engaged in fighting in Mauritania to protect her nationals. Nevertheless the support provided by external powers have been motivated by either economic,

strategic or political interests, and does constitute a form of intervention, although of an indirect nature. The states that will be discussed in this section are Libya, France , the United states, and the Soviet Union.

(a) LIBYAN INTERVENTION

An African Country that has pursued active interests in the Western Sahara conflict is Libya. Libya has been an active supporter of Polisario and has remained in consistent opposition to Morocco ever since the conflict started. Libya's interests in the conflict are primarily political and strategic. The political aspect envisages the emergence of a Muslim, Pro - Libya SADR. The strategic aspect envisages strong Libyan influence in the Western part of the Sahara which is strategically placed below Morocco and next to the Atlantic. Furthermore, as was the case in Chad, Libya forsees an independent SADR, as constituting part of the long term strategy of establishing an Arab - Islamic empire.

Ever since Spain withdrew in 1976, Libya has provided financial, military and diplomatic support for the Polisario. Col. Gaddafi, allowed the Polisario to establish an office in Tripoli, and he provides weapons and military training for Polisario fighters. The amount of financial aid that Libya gives the Polisario is not known but the widely shared assumption is that between 1976 and 1981 the greater portion of Polisario's finances came from Libya. [26]

The important role played by Libya in this regard has two potential Political implications for the Polisario movement. Firstly, there is the increased probability of Libya gaining a strong leverage over the movement, thereby increasing the likelihood of the development of a pro - Libya faction within th movement. The second implication is that Libyan aid has increas the Polisario's freedom to manoeuvre in relation to countries like Algeria, which is a strong supporter of Polisario. In mid 1979, for example, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria expressed concer over increasing Libyan aid to the Polisario [27], which enabled the movement to attack parts of Southern Morocco. It is in Algeria's interest to maintain a restraining influence over the Polisario, in order to prevent the movement from provoking a war between Algeria and Morocco. Another attendant Political implication is that if Algeria is able to arrive at a compromise agreement with Morocco, Libya would be in the position to encourage the Polisario to fight on regardless of Algerian support.

Paradoxically, Libya has also been supportive of Mauritania. Her support has been due largely to the fact that Mauritania is an Islamic state. Prior to the Mauritanian involvement in the Western Sahara conflict, Libya financed several economic and cultural projects in Mauritania, [28] However, the escalation of the conflict exposed contradictions in Libya's policy of supporting both Mauritania and the Polisario while they were both at war with each other. Col. Gaddafi was not supportive of Polisario's use of

arms supplied by Libya, against Mauritania, and specifically to attack certain installations whose construction Gaddafi had helped finance.

It is assumed that, prior to 1978, Libya did not publicize her support for the Polisario because of Mauritania's involvement in the war. Libya's increasing involvement in the war became more Publicized after the July 1978 coup in Nouakchott which led to a ceasefire between Mauritania and the polisario. This ceasefire also saw the beginning of intensive and more direct attacks by the Polisario against Morocco.[29]

The Libyan government has completely opposed the Moroccan regime and it's designs in the Western Sahara. This has it's roots in the fact that Col. Gaddafi views the Moroccan regime as a feudal, pro - Western Monarchy. The manifestation of Libyan opposition to Morocco has been in the form of Military support for the Polisario, and diplomatic support for the SADR. Militarily, the Libyans have provided weapons which they want the Polisario to use exclusively against Morocco. In the diplomatic realm Libya has helped to lobby for the recognition of the SADR within the OAU.

In the long run however Libya would prefer to see the SADR merge with another Arab Islamic country rather than becoming a small independent Sahara state. This is in keeping with Gaddafi's ultimate vision of an Arab Islamic Empire. From 1977 to 1979 Gaddafi kept on persuading Mauritania to engage in a full

merger with the Polisario. Also in April 1981, after a failed coup attempt in Mauritania, Gaddafi called for a Mauritania - Western Sahara Merger with full unity.[30] Although these calls for merger are in keeping with Gaddafi's desire for Arab unity, the possibility of an independent SADR merging with another state, after having fought for independence, is very remote.

(b) FRENCH INTERVENTION

France professes a policy of diplomatic neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict. It has chosen not to recognize Moroccan or Mauritanian Sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and it has not recognized the Polisario or the SADR. Regardless of it's nominal neutrality, France does have political, strategic and economic interests in Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania.

Politically France has been the dominant external power in Northwestern Africa for the better part of this century. Furthermore, as the former colonial ruler of Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, France has a vested interest in maintaining and enhancing it's economic, political, and cultural relations with it's former colonies.

Mauritania is one of the West African countries with which France signed a Defence Agreement before it became independent. The Agreement gives France the right to intervene in Mauritania if she is attacked by an external power. Mauritania therefore

constitutes a link in France's overall military defense strategy in West Africa.

France has considerable economic interests in both Morocco and Algeria as the economies of both countries are closely linked to that of France. Between 1965 and 1974 Algeria's trade with France fell from about 70% to 25% of Algeria's overall trade. However, in real terms traling between the two countries is strong. Algeria and Morocco together constitute an important market for French products because both countries import more than $ 3 billion worth of French goods every year, with the trend increasing in France's favour. Before 1965, French investments in Algeria were substantial, but after the 1965 nationalization of many foreign companies by the Algerian government, French investments have been reduced to more modest levels.[31]

On the other hand French investments in Morocco are estimated to be between $500 - $600 million. In order to protect it's investments in Morocco France offers extensive financial and technical aid. From 1976 to 1977 French financial aid to Morocco increased from $48 million to $49 million. Other forms of French economic assistance to Morocco have taken the form of liberal import quotas, customs reductions, the acceptance of Moroccan labourers in France, and benefits extended to Morocco under the European Economic Community agreements. In January 1981, the French Prime Minister, Raymond Barre signed a series of

Franco - Moroccan economic agreements during a vist to Morocco, which centered around France's participation in the development of Morocco's industry and energy resources. France agreed to play a leading role in financing $ 1. 5 billion for Morocco's nuclear power program, and $ 3 billion for twelve phosphoric plants as part of a $ 6 billion expansion of Morocco's phosphate industry. [32]

Such heavy French economic interests in Morocco has made France in effect, pro - Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict. This has been manifested in the role that France has played as the principal supplier of weapons to Morocco. Since her independence in 1956, the Moroccan armed forces have been principally supplied with French weapons due to long term military agreements between the two countries. Between 1974 and 1981 France had supplied 60 Mirage jet interception aircrafts, 26 Fouga strike planes , 24 Alpha jet tactical support aircraft, 40 Puma troop - carrying helicopters, and 400 VAB armoured personnel carriers. Within this period the total value of French arms sales to Morocco, excluding credits, has been established to be between 1.5 and $ 2 billion. [33] In 1979 France reached an agreement with Morocco to deliver 50 Mirage jets. Also, in 1980 France agreed to sell Morocco 100 AMX armoured personnel carriers. [34]

In addition to French arms sales to Morocco, France has had to intervene militarily in the Western Sahara conflict itself. In May 1977, the Polisario attacked a Mauritanian

mining complex at Zouerate killing two French civilians, and taking six French employees of the mining company as prisoners. The French government complained to the Algerian government asking President Boumedienne to use his influence with the Polisario to secure the release of the French hostages. The Algerian government managed to arrange discussions between the Polisario and the French government, during which the Polisario tried to prevail on the French government to influence Mauritania to open up a dialogue with the Front.

However, in October 1979 Polisario guerillas took two railway technicians as prisoners, bringing the total number of French captives to eight. After this incident the French government decided to intervene militarily with the dual purpose of preventing the further capture of French citizens, and to protect Mauritania against threats of destabilization. Consequently, in December, France engaged in "Opération Lamartin". Air strikes were launched against Polisario colums by Jaguar fighters which were stationed in the French air base at Ouakam, Senegal. After sustaining heavy losses the Polisario released the 8 French prisoners in late December 1977. [36]

The French military intervention was strongly condemned by the Algerian government who decided that there was some sort of co-operation between Paris - Rabat and Nouakchott. As a retaliatory measure the Algerian government decided to reduce it's purchases from France. In November 1977, the Algerian

Ministry of Commerce placed an embargo on the importation of French goods by Algerian industrialists. In January 1978, the Ministry for Energy and petrochemicals placed a similar ban on Algerian companies under it's jurisdiction from buying French products. Thereafter, the French government took steps to restore and improve French relations with Algeria.

Ever since the election of Francois Mitterand's socialist party in 1981, France has moved towards a position of greater neutrality in the conflict. Although the French Socialist Party has ties with the Polisario, and calls for it's recognition, France has pursued a more balanced policy between Algeria and Morocco, and has openly advocated an OAU sponsored resolution to the conflict.

(c) UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

The United states also maintains a policy of nominal neutrality in the conflict which she bases on three main tenets. These are (1) The U.S. does not recognize Morocco's claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but recognizes Morocco's Administrative control over the territory based on the tripartite agreement between Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania reached in November 1975; (2) The U.S. does not recognize the Polisario or the SADR, (3) The U.S. supports the principle of self - determination in the Western Sahara but maintains that independence is not the only outcome of self determination.[36] The U.S. holds that her regional interests in Northwest Africa would not be

served by the emergence of a weak Sahara state which is likely to be dominated by Algeria. Considering the fact that Libya supports the Polisario, the U.S. also holds the view that an independent Sahara state would serve as a base for Libya - Soviet interventionist activities in North and West Africa.

Regardless of this stated neutrality, the strategic and political importance that Morocco has for the U.S. has made the U.S. openly align with Morocco in the conflict.

The Alawite Monarchy in Morocco has been a strong Western ally. This is coupled with the fact that Morocco occupies a strategic geographical position at the Southern part of the strait of Gibralter which is the entrance of the Mediterranean sea. It is very important for the U.S. to maintain this strategic foothold in Northern Africa considering it's ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union. Thus, after the U.S. strategic Air Command bases in Morocco were closed in 1963, the U.S. Navy still retained communications facilities in Morocco which were used until 1978. Thereafter, king Hassan's Administration always allowed U.S. warships to utilize Morocco's deep water ports. King Hassan's Administration has also provided political help for the U.S. because it has always played a moderating role in middle. - East affairs. As a result of this, since she attained independence, Morocco has recieved over $ 1 billion in U.S. aid. [37]

The strategic and political importance of Morocco to the U.S was underscored by Morris Draper, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State

for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs when he told the African Subcommittee of the House of Representatives on 25th March 1981 that:

> "Morocco is important to broad American interests and occupies a privotal strategic area. We intend to maintain and reinforce our historically close relationship with teliability and consistency as our watchwards. Morocco has shared and has agreed with many of our foreign policy priorities and objectives. Like the U.S. Morocco has been concerned over the challenges posed by the Soviets and their surrogates and client states." 38

Thus U.S. interests in Morocco goes beyond the Western Sahara issue to diplomacy and geo - Politics in the Middle - East and Northwest Africa. Since the central motivating factor of U.S. foreign policy has been her ideological rivalry with the Soviet bloc, a major U.S. concern, as regards the Western Sahara conflict, has been the strategic necesity to preserve the balance of power in North Africa, and to prevent the extension of the Western Sahara conflict into a full scale war between Algeria and Morocco. It is feared that such a war would destabilize the entire North-Western region of Africa and also attract Soviet and Cuban intervention, which the U.S. wants to avoid.

This view was underscored by the breakdown of the Magreb Association on 7th March 1976 when diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco were severed. This breakdown led to the question of the future of the Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. and NATO countries were seriously concerned about the implications of a victory by Polisario and King Hassan's fall from power.

If that should occur the balance of power in Northwest Africa would be tipped in favour of the more radical states which would not be in the interest of the West. This is because U.S. and NATO strategy is based on the striking power of the U.S. sixth fleet which is stationed in the Medterranean. The U.S. sixth fleet can operate effectively only if it can enjoy a free passage through the strait of Gibralter which is flanked on both sides by Morocco and Spain. The Suez Canal would not do despite Egypt's friendly relations with the U.S. because radical South Yemen and Somalia control the other entrance to the Red Sea. It is therefore crucial to both U.S. and NATO to have and maintain a friendly regime in Morocco. Thus, Harold Saunders, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State under President Carter, explained to the House of Representatives Sub Committee on Africa that:

> "For policy reasons, we believe an outright military victory over Morocco by Morocco's adversaries would constitute a serious setback to major U.S interests in the region. First and foremost such a development would destabilize the region in general, and the political equilibrium in Morocco in particular"43.

The implementation of the U.S. policy of supporting Morocco has been made concrete by arms sales to Morocco. Before the start of the Western Sahara conflict the U.S had been a major arms supplier to Morocco. An agreement was arrived at in 1960 under which the U.S agreed to provide arms to Morocco for defensive purposes. A stipulation in the agreement restricted the use of the arms to the defense of Moroccds internationally

recognized frontiers. Foreign military sales (FMS) agreements between the U.S. and Morocco rose from $ 8.2 million in Fiscal year (FY) 1974 to $ 242 million in F Y 1975. When King Hassan discovered, after the Madrid Accords, that the conflict might be protracted he sent a former premier, Karim Camrani, to Washington on 29th January 1976, to hold talks with the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Two weeks later the U.S. decided to sell 24 Northrop F 5E combat aircraft for $ 120 million, along with $36 million worth of armoured vehicles.[39] Also between November 1975 and November 1976, the U.S. had authorized the transfer of 36 106mm recoiless guns, 20 F 5 planes, 6 F 5 A planes, and 16 155mm mortars from Jordan to Morocco.[40] (See table 4.3).

However, because the U.S only recognized Morocco's administrative powers, and not sovereignty, over the Western Sahara, the arms were technically being used in violation of the U.S. Arms Export control Act and the U.S. - Morocco Military agreement of 1960 which prohibits the use of U.S. arms for non - defensive purposes beyond Morocco's recognized borders. Because of this violation President Carter placed a brief embargo on arms sales to Morocco in February 1978.

But regardless of this embargo, arms sales to Morocco still went ahead. Westinghouse was allowed to install a $200 million air defense system in Morocco and the Northern part of the Western Sahara. In February 1979 the State Department approved the sale of 6 Chinook CH - 47 helcopters. In March of the same

year the state department also approved the sale of $ 3 million worth of ammunition for F - 53 and $ 2.4 million worth of spare parts for F - 53 and C - 130 transport planes which had earlier been shipped to Morocco.[41]

Towards the end of 1979 President Carter's arms sales policy to Morocco underwent a change because of developments both within Morocco and internationally. The Polisario carried the war into Morocco's internationally recognized territory thereby changing, in the eyes of the U.S. the legal nature of the war. Furthermore because of the war economic and social conditions within Morocco had worsened thereby posing the risk of a potential insurrection against King Hassan's regime. Saudi Arabia also exerted considerable diplomatic pressure on the U.S. to reconsider and approve Morocco's requests for arms. The Saudi Arabia government even offered to provide financing for the purchase of the arms.

On the international scene, important U.S. allies like the Shah of Iran, and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua had fallen. Couplad with this was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In consideration of all these events the Carter Administration felt the need to reasses it's arms policy to valued allies in the Third world, and specifically Morocco. Thus, in October 1979, at the request of the National Security Council, President Carter lifted the official ban on the sale of arms to Morocco.

In January 1980, the U.S government announced plans to sell a total of $ 232.5 million worth of aircraft to Morocco.

TABLE 4.3

U.S ARMS SALES AND MILITARY AID TO MOROCCO (IN $ MILLION FOR FISCAL YEAR)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)											
Agreements	8.2	242.0	105.4	37.2	7.7	3.6	274.4	48.0	14.0	14.0	100.0
Deliveries	4.0	2.4	15.8	33.7	87.5	133.5	61.7	135.5	na	na	na
Credits	3.0	14.0	30.0	30.0	43.0	45.0	25.0	33.4	30.0	75.0	60.0
Grants (MAP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	30.0
International Military Education Programme(IMET)	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.7
Licensed Commercial Arms Exports	0.04	1.0	4.1	21.6	12.0	8.9	17.4	3.1	5.0	5.0	25.0

Source: " Congressional presentation, Security Assistance Program; FY 1983 and FY 1984" in Tony Hodges Western Shara: The Roots of a Desert War Westport, Cnnecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1983 pp. 357.

The inventory included 20 F 5E jets, 6 OV - 10 Broncos, and 34 Hughes 500 MD helicopter gunships. In March 1980 also, the Carter Administration announced that it would sell a further 125 air-to-ground missiless costing $ 7 million for Moroccos F - 5E fighters. Thus in 1980 alone FMS to Morocco nose to a total of $ 274.4 million. [42]

Upon assuming the Presidency in 1980 Ronald Reagan pledged to strengthen his support for Morocco in an attempt to support his view that strategically placed U.S allies should expect more reliable support than the Carter Administration had shown. Thus, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Morris Draper, explained that "it is the prevailing view of this (Reagan) Administration that America's allies and close associates should expect understanding and reliable support." [43] Only two days after taking office the Regan Administration approved a major arms sale to Morocco involving the sale of 108 Chrysler Manufactured M - 60 tanks worth $ 182 million. [44]

The strategic importance of Morocco to the U.S. became evident after the U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, paid a visit to King Hassan on 11th February 1982. After holding talks King Hassan agreed to grant fransit facilities at Moroccan air bases to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDR) which was being prepared by the Reagan Administration for possible intervention in the Middle East. In return Haig promised a substantial increase i U.S. Military aid to Morocco, and a joint military comission was

set up to coordinate the growing military cooperation between the two countries.

The facilities were formally made ready to the RDF when Mohammed Boucetta, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, signed a military agreement with Alexander Haig in Washington on 27th May 1982, following a visit to Washington by King Hassan on 18th May. The secret agreement, which is valid for six years, reportedly gave the RDF access to Casablanca's Mohammed V airport, and later, after a $ 20 million investment to improve the facilities, access to the airbase at Sidi Slimane. [45] The strategic importance of these bases in Morocco can be seen in the fact that they complemente facilities which had already been negotiated for the RDF in Egypt, Somalia, and Oman.

In keeping with Alexander Haig's promise to king Hassan, the State Department announced on 20th April 1982, that FMS credits to Morocco would be increased from $ 30 million in F Y 1982 to $ 100 million in F Y 1983. It was also announced that aid to Moroc o under the newly established International Military Education and Training (IMET) program would be increased from $ 1.1 million in FY 1982 to $ 1.6 million in FY 1983, and that the number of Moroccan military personnel to recieve training in the U.S would increase from 163 to 514. [46]

Meanwhile in July 1982 news was released that the U.S had sold anti - personnel cluster bombs to Morocco in two shipments which took place in late 1981 and early 1982. The first shipment

involved the sale of 100 CBU - 58 cluster bombs at the cost of $200,000. The second shipment involved the sale of $2.7 million worth of CBU - 59 and CBU - 71 cluster bombs. The scale to which U.S. Moroccan military cooperation had grown, and the strategic importance of Morocco to the U.S. were evidenced by the fact that 80 U.S. officials, including 8 Generals, and Assistant Secretary of State, and 2 Assistant Secretaries of Defense, took part in the first session of the U.S. - Morocco Military Commission which held in Fez on 26th April 1982.[47] In addition to this the U.S. government, within the same month, announced that it was selling 381 Maverick missles to Morocco for $ 28 million, and that it had authorized the delivery of 18 more Bell helicopters which were manufactured under license in Italy.[48] In November 1982, 1,000 soldiers of the U.S. 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit held joint exercises with Moroccan forces.

While both the Carter and Reagan Administrations kept on increasing arms sales, they recognized that Morocco could not win and outright military victory over the Polisario. Nevertheless, according to Harold Saunders "the President's (Carter) policy is based on the conviction that neither Morocco nor it's adversaries can win an outright military victory and impose a solution on the other side. Thus the comprehensive purpose of the President's decision on arms sales to Morocco is to help that country's efforts to defend itself while at the same time nurturing and encouraging a psychological climate in the region conducive to negotiations.

Our efforts to strengthen Morocco Military go hand in hand with our efforts to encourage both sides to come to the negotiating table."[49]

Under the Reagon administration, however, U.S. hopes are that increased military sales to Morocco would help restore the military equilibrium in Northwest Africa and as such, help Morocco to sustain the war. This is based on the Administration's view that a protracted war of attrition will persuade Algeria and Libya that they are engaged in an unwinnable war and, consequently, remove their backing for the Polisario. This situation would in turn prompt the Polisario to negotiate a peace settlement with Morocco on terms that would be acceptable to King Hassan.

(d) SOVIET INTERVENTION

Like the U.S. and Libya, the Soviet Union has never directly intervened in the Western Sahara conflict, nevertheless Soviet arms, which she supplies to Algeria, have found their way to the Polisario guerillas. Also like the U.S. the Soviet Union pursued an official policy of neutrality towards the Western Sahara conflict. Although the USSR voted in favour of self- determination for the Saharawis when the issue was put to vote at the U.N. in 1975, the Soviet Union has neither recognized the Polisario or invited any of the movement's representatives to Moscow.

The Soviet Union's interests in the region has been primarily economic. The Soviet Union has always desired access to Morocco's phosphates. Although the Soviet Union is the world's second largest producer of phosphates, she still has to meet the import needs of her East bloc purchasers. Thus, over the years the USSR has become Morocco's second largest supplier of crude oil and Morocco's largest purchaser of phosphates.

In December 1974 Morocco and the Soviet Union signed a $5 billion agreement for the supply of 5 million tons of Moroccan phosphate starting in 1980, which would double to 10 million tons from 1990 to 2005. In return the Soviet Union would help Morocco exploit her phosphate deposits, and supply timber, oil, and medical products. The Soviet Union took the agreement a step further in July 1977 when she agreed to provide $ 250 million as a loan to develop an open cast mine.[50]

On 10th March 1978 the Soviet Union reached an agreement with Morocco which was described as "the contract of the century" by Moroccan officials. It was the largest economic agreement ever signed between the USSR and a Third World country. Under the agreement the Soviet Union would export oil, timber, chemicals, and ore carrier ships to Morocco in return for phosphates and phosphoric acid over a period of 30 years. Furthermore the Soviet Union would finance an estimated $ 2 billion investment in the development of a new phosphate mine at Meskala, where there are deposits of 8 to

10 billion tons of high grade ore, to produce 10 million tons a year. [51]

This huge economic deal had advantages for both sides. For the Soviets, acquiring phosphates from Morocoo would be Cheaper because the location of her own phosphate Mines were remote in the Khola Peninsula, and the Kara Tau area of Kazakhstan. Secondly, the Soviet Union became assured of a steady supply of phosphates for her agriculture and also for export to her East bloc economic partners. For Morocco the agreement guaranteed a "Captive market" for her phosphate and phosphate by - products until the year 2005. Secondly, the whole agreement constituted a huge investment which was acquired on long - term credit. Lastly the agreement gave Morocco a propaganda advantage over Algeria which had closer diplomatic and military ties with the Soviet Union. [52]

On the other side of the coin the Soviet Union has had a substantial degree of military and ideological committment to Algeria, although not as substantial as it's economic links with Morocco. It has been estimated that between 1954 and 1976 Algeria has recieved economic assistance from the Soviet Union valued at $ 708 million. Militarily, Algeria has traditionally equipped it's armed forces with Soviet weapons. There are about 1,700 Soviet advisers in the Algerian armed forces. [53]

Although neither the Soviet Union or any of her Eastern bloc allies has supplied arms directly to the polisario, Algeria, which relies on the Soviet bloc for about 90% of it's arms, simply passed the equipment on to the Polisario.

Given the Soviet Unions strong economic interests in Morocco it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union would want to be drawn into a deep military involvement in the Western Sahara conflict. This view is buttressed by the caution that the Soviets have developed in their relations toward Arab countries in view of their failures in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia.

iv. OAU MEDIATION

The annexation of the Western Sahara by Mauritania and Morocco constituted an infringement of two of the OAU's enshrined principles. Those are the OAU's dedication to the total emancipation of the African terrritories that are still under colonial domination and respect for the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for it's inalienable right to independent existence.

Prior to 1975 the OAU had treated the Western Sahara issue as a case of decolonization and it was supportive of the UN attempts to bring to an end Spanish rule. The first time the OAU recognized the conflict in the Western Sahara was at the council of Ministers summit in Rabat in 1972. There the Council expressed it's solidarity with the Saharawi people and called on Spain to create a free and democratic atmosphere in which the Saharawis could exercise their right to self determination and independence.

Secretary General to submit a report to the next Ministerial Council meeting about the implementation of the resolution; (f) to call all parties to the Western Sahara dispute to take the necessary measures to find a solution acceptable to all. [57]

Mauritania and Morocco walked out of the conference in protest and the resolution was adopted by 29 votes to 2. Only Senegal and Gabon opposed the resolution while Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Malawi, Tunisia, and Zaire abstained. Before walking out of the conference, both Morocco and Mauritania threatened to leave the OAU entirely if the resolution was ratified at the subsequent summit meeting of African Heads of State. [58] With this threat Morocco boycotted the summit meeting which held from July 2nd to 5th in Mauritius. Both countries further reiterated their threat to leave the OAU if the resolution was adopted. No agreement on the issue could be reached at the summit so it was decided that discussions on the issue would be postponed to a special summit meeting.

After the summit however, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania stated that his country would not permit the presence of representatives of the SADR to attend the special summit. His argument was that the text of the OAU resolution on the Sahara which was tabled by Nigeria at the previous summit meeting made no mention of a Saharan Government and that it's references to the population of the area were references to the inhabitants and not to the nationals of the Western Sahara.

Furthermore, he stated that the Saharawis were to be found in Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, and that the Mauritanian delegation to the conference would contain representatives of this group that had been reunited with the "motherland."[59] The OAU special summit was, however, postponed until 1977.

At the OAU Liberation Committee meeting at Lusaka in January 1977, the Polisario was recognised as the sole representatives of the Saharawi people. As a result they were admitted to the council of Ministers meeting which held in Lome in February. The representatives of the Polisario turned up at the meeting and, despite Moroccan and Mauritanian Protests, they were allowed to stay. In retaliation Morocco and Mauritania walked out of the meeting and made a declaration that they would boycott all activities of the OAU. The effect of this move was to further isolate Morocco and Mauritania because the Polisario had been recognized and accepted by a growing number of African and Arab countries. This boycott also led to the cancellation of the special summit on the Sahara which had been scheduled for April.

After the Ministerial summit, Ahmed Hicke, the member of the Polisario council in charge of foreign relations, described the importance which the Polisario attached to the stand that was adopted by the OAU. He stated that "for the OAU the recognition of the legitimacy of the plight of the Polisario constitutes a severe test of it's committment to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Afric

as pronounced in the *purposes of the OAU Charter*, and of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for it's inalienable right to independence."[60]

A Mini - summit conference was organized in Niamey at the end of March. The conference was attended by representatives from Libya, Mali, Chad, and Algeria. Although no substantive resolution was arrived at, the countries did give the impression that they were all in support of the Polisario. This further underlined the changing attitudes of African governments towards the conflict.

In July 1977, the OAU Heads of State summit took place in Libreville, Gabon. President Omar Bongo had prevented the Polisario from attending the summit in order to ensure the attendance of both Morocco and Mauritania. On this occasion it was decided that the OAU special summit would take place at Lusaka in October. However, in September the Zambian government called off the summit because it claimed that only two states had agreed to help meet it's costs, and at the same time the war on the Zimbabwean border would threaten the safety of the visiting delegations.

President Omar Bongo, the current Chairman of the OAU, then offered to host the summit at Libreville in March. He also later called off the conference because, observers felt, he considered the fact that he was a close ally of both King Hassan and President Giscard d ' Estaing of France (whose air force was strafing Polisario guerillas in Mauritania at that time), and he had

no wish to embarass them. However, the ostensible reason he gave was that only 7 African Heads of state had agreed to participate in the meeting; and that the financial backing had not been secured. Earlier, both Morocco and Mauritania had agreed to send representatives to the conference if at least half of the leaders of all member states were personally present.[61]

The OAU Heads of State Summit took place in Khartoum two days after President Ould Daddah was overthrownand the Polisario declared a ceasefire with Mauritania. After lengthy debates on the Western Sahara issue the Heads of State decided to "set up an ad hoc committee composed of at least five Heads of State of the OAU including the current Chairman of the Organization, and entrust it with the consideration of all the data on the question of Western Sahara, among which is the exercise of the right of the people of this territory to self determination."[62] Based on this the committee was expected to reach a solution that would be acceptable to all the parties.

The OAU Chairman, President Nimeiri, proposed that Tanzania, Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea,and Nigeria should comprise the committee mainly because none of the five countries had come out openly in favour of either side.Algeria and the Polisario later expressed their disapproval of the countries. However, only two days later Tanzania declared that it had recognized the Polisario and would therefore leave the committee.

The "Committee of Wise Men", as it came to be known, held it's first meeting in November at Khartoum. The meeting was attended by Presidents Nimeiri, Traore of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea and General Obasanjo. Tanzania was represented by it's Minister for information while Cote de'Ivore was not represented at all. At the end of the meeting the committee delegated it's responsibilities to a sub - committee consisting of the Heads of State of Nigeria and Mali, and the OAU Secretary - General, Edem Kodjo. The sub-committee was charged with the task of "contacting all the parties concerned in the Western Sahara dispute including the Saharan people, and to take all procedures necessary to restore the peace and security of this area."[63]

Between May 1st to 5th 1978 the sub-committee met with Polisario leaders in Algiers, which was followed by talks between Edem Kodjo and the Spanish Premier, Adolfo Suarez, on 2nd June. General Obasanjo, President Traore, and Edem Kodjo reported back to the committee at it's second session which was held in Khartoum on 23rd June. The committee adopted a resolution which recommended an immediate ceasefire, the exercise by the Saharawis of their right to self - determination through a referendum which would enable them to opt for either total independence or maintenance of the status - quo; a meeting of all concerned parties to obtain their cooperation in implementing the ceasefire and referendum; and the creation of a special ad hoc committee of five African states to supervise the organization of the referendum in cooperation with the UN.[64]

In the meantime the new President of Mauritania, Moustapha Ould Salek, had intimated in a New year speech that Mauritania was prepared to withraw from the Western Sahara conflict if necessary in order to open the way to peace. He stated that his country supported "the right of self - determination of all peoples and will continue to speak of peace with an open mind, ready to listen to any proposals which would end this fratricidal conflict."[65] After the speech Moroccodecided to withdraw 6,000 of it's forces from Mauritania before the end of March.[66] The Mauritanian government was encouraged by the news of the Moroccan troop withdrawal. It's officials had feared that Morocco might use the presence of her troops on Mauritanian soil as an opportunity to realize Morocco's historic claim to much of Mauritania as constituting part of "Greater Morocco".

Meanwhile, Col. Salek announced that he would be prepared to allow the Saharawi people that were inhabiting the Mauritanian portion of the Western Sahara to determine their own future by a referendum, adding that he envisaged the future role of Mauritania as that of an arbiter between Morocco and Algeria.[67] The Mauritanian position was underscored by her Prime Minister, Colonel Ould Bouceif while on a visit to Paris. He stated that his government was ready to begin immediate negotiations with the Polisario Front over the Western Sahara independently of Morocco.[68]

At the OAU summit held in Monrovia from July 17th to 20th 1979 the proposals which had earlier been formulated by the

"committee of Wise Men" were endorsed by 33 votes to 2. King Hassan had changed his mind about attending the conference on the grounds that President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, whom he had offered to meet, would not be attending the conference either. During the debates the Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, led a walkout that was supported by Senegal and Gabon. He claimed that the debate had been rigged by a clique of countries that were supporting the opponents of Morocco. He charged that no legal points had been raised in the debate but that propaganda had been used instead, to cause confusion. At the summit Mauritania voted in favour of the proposals of the "Wise Men" All these events were proof of the extent to which Morocco was becoming diplomatically isolated from other African countries on the Western Sahara issue.

On 5th August 1979 after three days of negotiations, Mauritania and the Polisario Front signed a peace agreement with the Mauritanian government formally committing itself to withdraw from the war, and renounced it's claims on the Southern part of the Western Sahara. The agreement held that Mauritania would no longer lay any territorial claims to the Western Sahara, and that she would withdraw completely from the"unjust war". In the agreement the Polisario also declared that it had no claims on any part of Mauritania.[69]

Throughout the negotations which led to the agreement the Moroccan government and it's press issued warnings to Mauritania,

and when the agreement was signed Mauritania was condemned in Morocco for it's "capitulation". In an effort to prevent the agreement from taking place, King Hassan reminded the Mauritanian government that it was bound to Morocco by an economic agreement signed in 1976, a mutual assistance convention signed in 1977, and by the creation of a Supreme Defence Council which effectively brought the armies of the two countries under a single command (which was predominantly Moroccan) to fight the Polisario. King Hassan warned that if Mauritania should withdraw it's committments he would be obliged to assume his responsibilities in the area, by which he meant taking up the conflict alone.[70]

In early December 1979 a meeting of the Committee of Wise Men was called by the OAU Chairman, President William Tolbert, to discuss the implementation of a ceasefire and a referendum. King Hassan sent a letter to President Tolbert stating that he would not attend the meeting because certain members of the Committee were not impartial. He specifically cited President Traore whom he said "deliberately sided with our adversaries, thus spurning the most elementary rules of fair play and impartiality which should characterize the role of arbiter."[71] King Hassan also objected to the attendance of President Nyerere on the grounds that the Tanzanian government had recognized the S.A.D.R.

The meeting brought together President Shagari, Nyerere, Traore, and Nimeiri. Mohammed Abdelaziz attended for the Polisario, Mauritania sent it's Foreign Minister and President Chadi Benjedid of

Algeria was in attendance. At the end of the conference the Committe agreed to ask Morocco to vacate the Southern part of the Western Sahara which was formerly under the control of Mauritania. This, the committee said, was necessary because the area was handed over to the Polisario based on an agreement with Mauritania. The committee also agreed to appeal to all parties involved in the conflict to effect a ceasefire in order to give the OAU's proposed plans a chance to work. Lastly, the committee proposed the establishment of an OAU peace-keeping force to ensure the observance of the cease-fire. [72]

In June 1980 the Polisario submitted an application to the OAU for membership and recognition of the SADR. This was in accordance with the OAU Charter which stipulates that a government needs a simple majority among the OAU member states in it's support in order to be admitted. As at that time the SADR had already been recognized by 23 states. [73] Mauritania, without legally recognizing the SADR, made it clear that it would favour admission by the OAU. On the other hand Mohammed Boucetta of Morocco, said that his country and other states would pull out of the OAU if the SADR were admitted. He argued that the conditions for the admission of a new member state, namely that the country be sovereign and independent, was not fulfilled by the Republic which was declared by the Polisario because, he said, it had neither territory nor population. [74]

At the OAU Ministerial summit held in Freetown at the end of June, 24 member states recognized the SADR, but during the debates

a distinction was made between recognition and admission by the OAU. Out of the 24 countries which recognized the SADR, only 17 argued in favour of it's admission."[75]

However, at the Heads of State Summit which took place from July 1st to 4th 1980, 26 out of the 50 OAU member states voted in recognition of the SADR and it's admission into the OAU as a full member state under Article 29 of the OAU Charter which requires only a simple majority for such an action to be taken. The debate produced a clash between Morocco and Mozambique. President Samora Machel accused Morocco of expansionism and called it "an act of intolerable challenge for our organization and flagrant violation of the OAU". He added that "a parasite is always a parasite" and "we have a member of OAU which practices genocide".[76] In response the Moroccan Prime Minister Matti Bouabid, accused Mozambique of maintaining cultural, economic, and technological ties with racist South Africa.

Morocco challenged the eligibility of the SADR on the grounds that it did not constitute an independent sovereign state, and then reiterated it's threat to leave the OAU along with some other conservative African states if the SDAR was admitted. At this point Nigeria proposed a compromise which postponed consideration of the SADR's admission, and asked the Committee of Wise Men to continue it's efforts towards finding a solution.

The failure of the OAU to resolve the issue of the SADR's admission could be attributed to two main reasons. First there was the influence of Morocco among conservative Francophone countries. It was Morocco that established the nucleus of an African expeditionary force to Zaire in 1977, and since then most Francophone countries, especially those suffering from internal dissent, felt gratitude to Morocco for shoring up Mobutu's regime. Secondly there was the factor of U.S. pressure on behalf of Morocco. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of state for African Affairs, Mr. Richard Moise, had visited a number of African countries and it was believed that one of the things he did was to argue against the admission of the SADR on behalf of Morocco.

A meeting of the Committee of Wise Men took place in Freetown from September, 9th to 11th 1980. Fourteen parties that were involved in the dispute were represented at the meeting. They were Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, the Polisario, and ten other Pro-Moroccan organisations that were based in the Western Sahara. These organizations argued that they, and not the Polisario, represented the people of the Western Sahara. They said that the Polisario was an invention of Algeria which did not represent anyone in the Sahara. The officials said that their organizations had existed before the Polisario, and that they had fought spanish colonial rule not to make the Western Sahara independent but to return it to Morocco.[77] Moroccan officials protested to the Sierra Leone government because the Polisario had received an invitation to appear before the committee.

They argued that the Polisario should not have recieved an invitation since it had not been formally recognized by the OAU.

During the committee's session, Matti Bouabid and Mohammed Boucetta, who represented Morocco, refused to compromise on matters of substance. The committee noted in it's report on the meeting that:

> "Morocco's views were that the Polisario did not exist and was a creation of Algeria; that the conflict was between Morocco and Algeria which was committing aggression against her, that there would be an automatic cease-fire once Algeria ceased her aggresion and that there was no need to hold a referendum since the people of the Western Sahara had already expressed their wish to be integrated with Morocco in the traditional manner." 78

At the end of the meeting the committe made a six - point proposal which included (1) a fair and general referendum in the Western Sahara, (2) a cease-fire by December 1980; (3) the parties would leave their forces in their bases and barracks during the cease-fire; (4) UN peace - keeping troops would be entrusted with ensuring the effectiveness of the cease-fire, (5) the OAU with assistance from the UN would organize a referendum; (6) the Secretary - General of the OAU would inform the parties involved of the decisions taken.[79] However, in relation to the two major recommendations of a cease - fire and a referendum Morocco remained officially intransigent arguing that such

recommendations had to be adopted by at least a two - third majority of all OAU member states.

In early March 1981 delegation leaders from Mozambique, Madagascar, Seychelles, Burundi, and Sao Tome and Principe presented letters from the 26 African states that had recognized the SADR to the OAU Secretary - General, Mr. Edem Kodjo, requesting to know why the SADR had not been admitted to the OAU. Mr. Kodjo responded by explaining that the issue had been deferred to the next OAU summit in Nairobi when the committee of "Wise Men" would make a report on it.[30]

At the Heads of State Summit in Nairobi King Hassan declared that "we have decided to envisage a procedure of controlled referendum of which the procedure would simultaneously respect the objectives of the latest recommendations of the ad hoc committee and the conviction which Morocco has of it's legitimate rights."[31] Although this ostensibly constituted a concession on the part of Morocco, it was observed that King Hassan left out certain points. He did not talk about the authority that would control the referendum, and he also failed to mention the ad hoc committee's other recommendations for a cease - fire and the return of troops to their bases.

The Polisario and Algeria doubted King Hassan's sincerity. They believed that by conceding to a referendum, he was stalling for time in order to keep the SADR out of the OAU. They also believed that he would not allow a genuine referendum to take place because of his fear that a majority of the Saharawi would opt for independence. The Polisario summed up King Hassan's decision as a move to legitimize Morocco's illegal occupation of the Western Sahara.

The conference finally resolved to set up an implementation committee to ensure the implementation of the ad hoc committee's recomendations. The implementation committee was to consist of members of the ad - hoc committee (Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sudan) plus Sierra Leone, with Kenya at the Chair. The implementation committee would meet before the end of August 1981, and it's task was "to draw up the modalities and all other details concerning a cease-fire as well as the organizing and holding of a referendum with the cooperation of the warring factions."[32] The resolution also asked the UN, in collaboration with the OAU to furnish a peace-keeping force.

Immediately after the Nairobi conference the Polisario reiterated that King Hassan's pledge to accept a referendum was only a stalling device to keep the SADR out of the OAU. Thus on 25th July 1981 Mohammed Abdelaziz, the Secretary - General for

the Polisario, issued a communique to the UN Secretary - General. The communique set out nine conditions which had to be fulfilled in order for an effective referendum on the Western Sahara to take place. They were direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario; withdrawal of the Moroccan forces from the whole of Western Sahara; total withdrawal of the Moroccan administration; removal of Moroccan forces to at least 150 kilometres inside Morocco's pre - 1975 borders; the return of all Saharawi refugees; the installation of a provisional UN - OAU international administration a three month period in which the international administration would work with the SADR administration to create the climate for a free vote; the release of all Saharawi detainees from Moroccan jails; and the stationing of UN peace - keeping forces along the Moroccan border until the completion of the referendum.[83]

The implementation committee met for it's first session in Nairobi from August 24th to 26th during which it interviewed King Hassan, President Chadli Benjedid, Mohammed Abdelaziz, and Mohammed Ould Heydalla of the Polisario. At the end of the meeting the committee adopted a compromise resolution which satisfied neither Morocco, Algeria or the Polisario. It was decided that a cease - fire would be negotiated through the committee, and after that all troops would be confined to their bases. An interim administration assisted by an adequate number of OAU and/or UN peace - keeping forces

would then work with existing Moroccan authorities in the region to create the conditions for a referendum. On the crucial question of the number of voters the committee had compromised by adopting the population figure of 230,000, which was arrived at by the UN High commission on Refugees and had been adjusted to take account of population growth. King Hassan put forward the proposal that the question to be asked at the referendum should not include the option of independence but should be put in terms of the traditional "Bayaa" which was a tribal act of allegiance to the Alawite dynasty in Morocco. The committee rejected the proposal stating that the option which would be given to the people would be (a) independence or (b) integration with Morocco.[84]

Although the committee's plan could be described as a compromise it could also be said that King Hassan gained advantages on two issues. Firstly he had gained tacit approval for keeping his troops and administration in the area, which were two points which the Polisario insisted must be changed before voting could take place. Secondly, Morocco had refused to engage in direct talks with the Polisario, while the Polisario had insisted that direct negotiations would be the only fruitful means. However, the committee had proposed that negotiations be done through the committee itself.

In the following weeks the Polisario pressed Morocco to accept direct negotiations. King Hassan, however, continued to reject the idea, and instead insisted on talks with the Algerians.

President Chadli Benjedid, on the other hand, was adamant that he would not negotiate in place of the Saharauris. It was in such a manner that the OAU peace plan was slowly being frustrated.

The foreign Ministers of the 7 States comprising the OAU implementation committee tried to break the deadlock at a meeting in Nairobi on 6th February, 1982. They named the sole parties to the conflict as Morocco and the Polisario. They also recommended that the UN should take complete responsibility for the proposed peace - keeping force. The latter recommendation was in view of the fact that the OAU had been unable to persuade the member states to pay for the peace - keeping force in Chad.

King Hassan, in a show of disapproval, refused to attend the meeting of the implementation committee's Heads of state on 8th February, 1982. Instead he sent his Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, who rejected the proposals earlier arrived at by the Foreign Ministers. He said that Morocco will only negotiate a cease-fire with Algeria and Mauritania. After the conference he further stated that "there will be no withdrawal of Moroccan troops from the territory. There will be no retreat of the Moroccan Administration from the territory. There is no recognition of Polisario by Morocco."[85]

For fear of loosing the cooperation of Morocco the Committee decided not to name the parties to the conflict although they were known. This decision gave Morocco a diplomatic victory because if the committee could not name the parties to the conflict then it could not get them to negotiate a cease-fire, or to set a target date for the referendum. The contradiction, however, was that King Hassan had in fact accepted that there would be a referendum. By so reacting he was shifting the tide of opinion to Polisario's advantage because it was no longer a question of wether there should be a referendum but how one should be conducted. Most African governments had therefore come to expect that Morocco would honour her pledge by ensuring the conditions for a referendum.

Nevertheless, the SADR had won it's own diplomatic victory a shortwhile earlier when it was admitted as a full member of the OAU. On 31st August 1981, Eden Kodjo had written to the SADR to inform them of their admission into the OAU. He did this after the SADR had acquired the support of 26 African states in accordance with Article 28 of the OAU Charter which states that:

> "Any independent Sovereign African state may at any time inform the Administrative Secretary - General of it's intention to ad here or to accede to this Charter.
>
> (2) The Administrative Secretary-General shall on reciept of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member - states. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member - States. The decision of each Member - State shall be transmitted to the Administrative Secretary - General, who shall, upon reciept of the requirednumber of votes, communicate the decision to the state concerned."[86]

Thus, the SADR took it's seat as a full - fledged OAU member - State when the Council of Ministers opened it's session in Addis Ababa on 22nd February 1982. The whole affair was a calculated risk because, although it was known that Morocco would organize a boycott, the expectation was that it would be limited and not many states would follow. Morocco would thereafter take considerat of it's diplomatic isolation and negotiate with the Polisario. In response, however, Morocco boycotted the conference and King Hassan sent a message to President Moi accusing Mr. Edom Kodjo of abusing power and stating that "we expect you (President Moi) to take all adequate or necessary measures to restore the OAU legality and that the illegal measure tending to recognize the SADR as a possible member of the OAU be revoked. [87]

Between February 22nd and 28th, 1982 18 more delegations representing Sudan, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Zaire, Cameroon, Contral African Republic, Djibouti, Niger, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Gabon, Somalia, Gambia, Comoro Islands, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Liberia decided to boycott the Council of Ministers meeting. [88] Nevertheless, there remained 31 OAU member - states that actively supported or passively followed the Secretariat's decision to accept SADR membership.

Although the opponents of the SADR's admission were in the minority, they were still sufficiently numerous to prevent the formation of a two - thirds quorum in order for the conference to continue. Thereafter two OAU sponsored conferences on information,

media, and labour affairs were also disrupted by boycotts in March and April 1982, overthe issue of the admission of the SADR.

Meanwhile Mr. Edem Kodjo sent a circular to member states which explained that by admitting the Polisario he was acting in legal and legitimate manner, as was laid down in the OAU Charter, specifically Article 28. Mr. Kodjo said that he had first circulated to all member - states a formal request from the SADR in June 1981, asking for it to be admitted into the OAU. He said that 26 member - states, out of the total of 51, responded favourably. Under Article 10 of the Charter, which states that "questions of procedure shall require a simple majority" This was all that was needed. This fact notwithstanding, he said that he had initially refused to act, and that it was only when the 26 member - states that had officially recognized the SADR insisted that he should admit the SADR under Article 10 that he finally gave way. [89]

On his own part President Moi tried to take a neutral position by declaring that it was not a time for "quarrels and bickering". He, however, maintained that the Council of Ministers did not have the power to override the ad hoc committee consisting of Heads of State.

On 23rd March Mohammed Boucetta, of Morocco, delivered a message to President Moi asking for an emergency meeting of the OAU in order to revoke the SADR's admission. Unfortunately for him there was little response from member - states in favour of a special

meeting, Nevertheless, President Siaka Stevens, who had been in support of a special summit, put forward a proposal to exclude the SADR delegation from the next OAU summit, which was to be held in Tripoli, Libya, while preserving it's membership.

On 24th April, 1982 the OAU Secretariat appealed to all African governments to attend the OAU summit which was to be held in Tripoli from August 5th to 8th 1982. But Prior to this summit the U.S. had decided to capitalize on the SADR dispute and the Chad conflict to try to deprive Col. Gaddafi of the opportunity to hold the OAU summit. On 30th June, 1981 the U.S. State Department circulated a letter to certain African countries. The contents of the letter read that:

> "We note that it is traditional for the OAU to select the host Head of State or Government as it's next Chairman. If that traditiona were followed in 1982, we would look upon it with deep regret, since we believe Libya to be a most inappropriate spokesman for the principles of peace and regional stability for which the OAU stands and which we wholeheartedly support. Libya's support for international terrorism, it's intervention in the affairs of neighbouring countries, it's incursions into Chad and it's assasination campaign against Libyan dissidents abroad hardly qualify it to be the spokesperson of Africa to the World." 90

Thus, at the end of July a boycott by some member - states prevented the Council of Ministers meeting from opening in Tripoli. The boycott was staged as a result of the admission of the SADR into the OAU. On 26th July, when the meeting was supposed to have started, only 28 states had sent delegations. Nigeria proposed that the SADR should take it's seat at the Council of Ministers

session and then promise not to return to attend the Heads of states summit, but the proposal was rejected by the SADR delegates. On July 28th and 29th two further attempts were made to secure a quorum which failed. Thus on 30th July the decision was made to postpone the Ministerial Council meeting indefinitely, and to go ahead with the Heads of State Summit.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments conference, which was supposed to take place from August 5th to 8th, could not hold because it also failed to achieve a quorum. By 6th August about 30 Heads of State had arrived in Tripoli but it was short of the required two - thirds. The Heads of state that were present issued two appeals on August 6th and 7th in an attempt to persuade other African leaders to attend, but they were unsuccessful.

On August 7th Mr. Abdullah Obeidi, the Secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison, formally admitted that Libya's attempts to convene the summit had failed.[91] Nevertheless, the So - called radical states (comprising countries that had sent delegates to Libya) agreed to hold their own conference on 8th August in order to work out a formula that would allow the OAU to be reconvened properly at the end of the year. The meeting was attended by Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

TABLE 4.4

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SADR (OCTOBER 31, 1982

Prime Minister and Minister of Information and Culture	Mafoud Ali Beiba
Ministers	
Defense	Ibrahim Gali Ould Mustapha
Education	Mohammed Lamine Ould Ahmed
Interior	Abdelkader Taleb Omar
Foreign Affairs	Ibrahim Hakim
Justice	M'hammed Ould Ziou
Secretaries of State	
Trade	El -Kenti Ould Jouda
Health	Nema Ould el - Joumani
Secretary - General of the Prime Minister's Office	Mohammed Ould Sidati

Source: Tony Hodges Western Sahara: The Roots of A Desert War Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1983 pp. 340.

Among seven declarations that these countries arrived at they "affirmed their support for the SADR and called on the SADR and Morocco to consider ways and means to end their conflict."[92] In addition they sent a committee of five African leaders from Congo, Mali, Libya, Zambia, and Tanzania to reorganize the summit within three months and persuade the boycotters to attend. In order to aid them in their tasks the SADR announced on 29th October that, while it would not renounce it's OAU membership, it would voluntarily abstain from the reconvened summit.

Libya tried to reconvene another summit in November but the attempt failed due to the issue of Chad representation at the summit. Fourteen states walked out of the meeting in protest against the refusal of the majority of memberstates to admit a delegation from Hissen Habre's government in Ndjamena. The walkout removed the chances of having a quorum because the SADR, Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, and Upper Volta were also absent from the meeting. (See table 4.5)

On 20th December 1982, however, the SADR announced that it would henceforth attend all OAU meetings, and on 18th February 1983 the committee that had been set up to reconvene another OAU summit met in Nairobi and resolved to reorganize a summit for the third time in Addis Ababa. The committee thereafter sent appeals to all member - states to attend without pre-conditions.

TABLE 4.5

OAU TRIPOLI MEETINGS: RECORD OF MEMBER STATES

	THE ISSUES		
Algeria	x	x	supported seating SADR
Angola	x	x	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Benin	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Botswana	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Burundi	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Cameroon			Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Cape Verde	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Central Africa	x		Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1, attended Tripoli 2; walked out after compromise
Chad	x		Both supported seating SADR; both delegations arrived for summit, Habre did not accept to compromise, was not seated.
Comoros			Opposed seating SADR, declined to join Tripoli 2 after compromise

Congo	x	x	Supported seating SADR, member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt
Djiboouti			Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 1 until 5th August; attended Tripoli 2; walked out after compromise
Egypt			Refused to attend summit in Tropoli
Equatorial Guinea			Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Ethiopia	x	x	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt
Gabon			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2 walked out after compromise
Gambia			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2 walked out after compromise
Ghana	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Guinea			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Guinea-Bissau	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Cote D'Ivoire			Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise

Kenya	x	x	Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; Daniel Arap Moi, the outgoing Chairman, opposed the Chad compromise but called upon all African states to attend the summit; member of liais committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Lesotho	x	x	Supported seating SADR; did not atten final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange thi attempt.
Liberia			Opposed seating SADR
Libya	x	x	President Gaddafi, slated to become the new OAU Chairman, insisted upon Chad compromise, supporting Goukouni Weddei's GUNT regime; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Madagascar	x	x	Supported seating SADR

Malawi	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Mali	x	x	Supported seating SADR, member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Mauritania	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Mauritius	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Morocco			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Mozambique	x	x	Opposed seating SADR; member of liaison committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Niger			Attended Tripoli 1 through July, opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walk out after compromise
Nigeria	x	x	Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt
Rwanda	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Sao Tome et Principe	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Senegal			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise

Seychelles	x	x	Supported seating SADR
Sierra Leone		x	Opposed seating SADR
Somalia			Refused to attend summit in Tripoli
Sudan			Opposed seating SADR; on October 24 President Nimeiri stated that Sudan and Egypt would welcome an African summit provided it was not held in Tripoli
Swaziland	x	x	Supported seating SADR, did not attend final session of Tripoli 1
Tanzania	x	x	Supported seating SADR; appointed on liaison committee to arrange third attempt
Togo	x		Supported seating SADR; did not attend final session of Tripoli; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Tunisia	x	x	Opposed seating SADR
Uganda	x	x	Arrived in Tripoli in August, attended final session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt.
Burkina Faso	x	x	Opposed seating SADR; unable to send delegation to Tripoli 2 because of coup in October
Western Sahara	x		Seated as member of OAU at Tripoli 1; agreed to pullout of OAU temporarily 30th October

Zaire			Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out after compromise
Zambia	x	x	Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison committee to arrange third attempt
Zimbabwe	x	x	Supported seating SADR

FOOTNOTES:

1. Tripoli 1: countries that attended several days of informal talks in Tripolic after the summit failed to convene for lack of a quorum on 5th August.

2. Tripoli 2: countries that remained in Tripolis and attended informal talks until efforts to convene the summit were abandoned the morning of 26th November.

3. The compromise: In exchange for recognition by most OAU states, Habre was to stay away from the summit. Neither Habre or Col. Gaddafi accepted the compromise.

Source: Africa News, Durham, U.S., 13th December 1982 in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1982 - 83 London: Africana Publishers 1984, pp. C 10 - C 11

The reconvened summit which was scheduled to start on 6th June 1983, failed to do so. By 6th June all 51 Member - states (including the SADR) had arrived in Addis Ababa with 28 states represented by their leaders. Before the start of the summit Morocco had stated that it would stage a walkout along with about 23 other supportive states if the SADR were allowed to take it's seat. The opening of the conference was therefore postponed in order to allow a Bureau Committee of 20 member - states to attempt to establish a compromise.

The committee, which consisted of members from the two opposing sides, included Kenya, Angola, Gambia, Tanzania, Upper Volta, Congo, Libya, Uganda, Lesotho, Cameroon, Comoros, Niger, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia and Tunisia. After a preliminary meeting of the committee, an informal meeting of Heads of state was proposed for the evening of 6th June but Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, and Cameroon stayed away because it became known that Mohammed Abdelaziz, the SADR's designated President, would attend. President Moi then adjourned the meeting and proposed that the committee should discuss the problem formally instead. At the meeting Coli Gaddafi was adamant about the SADR taking it's seat, and after a heated debate Col. Gaddafi left Addis Ababa and did not turn up for any further meetings at the summit. [93]

On 7th June President Sekou Toure hosted 22 leaders who were in support of Morocco's stand. This pro - Morocco group

included Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gabon, Morocco, Tunisia, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Chad, Comoros, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, Djibouti, Tunisia, Egypt, Sierra Leone and Togo. It must be mentioned that although Sierra Leone and Togo had earlier on recognized the SADR, they were nonetheless opposed to it's being seated at the summit.

In opposition to this group, a second caucus of 12 member - states had formed around President Samora Machel, and they also met on the same day. They included Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome, Seychelles Zimbabwe and Mozambique.[94]

On 7th June President Moi appointed another committee comprising Kenya, Ethipia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Zambia to try to bring about a reconciliation. Later on, however, Ibrahim Hakeem, the SADR's Foreign Minister, announced that the SADR would "temporarily and voluntarily withdraw" in the interest of African Unity. The real reason behind the SADR's decision to withdraw was an agreement reached between Ethiopia, Senegal and Algeria whereby the friends of the SADR would urge it to withdraw, while Morocco's friends would urge King Hassan to implement the Nairobi summit resolution which called for direct negotiations between Morocco and Polisario and the guarantee of referendum.[95]

The final resolution that was adopted at the Addis Ababa summit urged Morocco and the Polisario, in conjuction with the

TABLE 4. 6

RECOGNITION OF THE SADR AS OF 1983

Algeria - 1976
Angola - 1976
Benin - 1976
Botswana - 1980
Burundi - 1976
Cape Verde - 1979
Chad - 1980
Congo - 1978
Ethiopia - 1979
Ghana - 1979
Guinea Bissau - 1976
Lesotho - 1979
Libya - 1980
Madagascar - 1976
Mali - 1980
Mauritius - 1982
Mozambique - 1976
Rwanda - 1976
Sao Tome - 1978
Seyechelles - 1977
Sierra Leone - 1980
Swaziland - 1980
Tanzania - 1980
Togo - 1976
Uganda - 1979
Zambia - 1979
Zimbabwe - 1980

Source: Tony Hodges Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War
Westport Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co. 1983 pp. 308

OAU implementation committee, "to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."[96]

In July 1983 the OAU Implementation Committee led by Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Goushu Walde, paid a visit to King Hassan to see how the resolutions could be implemented. King Hassan told the Committee that while he accepted the proposal for a referendum he would not give the territory to the Polisario even if the vote was in favour of independence. He also rejected having direct negotiations with the Polisario. Thereafter, the OAU Chairman, Col. Mengistu Hailo Mariam, summoned a meeting between the members of the Implementation Committee ,Morocco,and the Polisario. The meeting which was convened in Addis Ababa on 21st September 1983 collapsed on the second day because Morocco, which was represented by King Hassan's Son, Prince Mohammed, rejected Mengistu's appeal for direct negotiations with the SADR President Mohammed Abdelaziz. Instead the Moroccan delegation walked out.[97] The refusal of Morocco to negotiate direct with the SADR showed that Morocco did not have the sincere political will to resolve the Western Sahara crisis through the implementation of the OAU resolutions despite it's promises.

In February 1984 the Polisario issued a release stating that it would not take part in the Council of Ministers conference that February, but that it would attend the OAU summit which was initially scheduled to take place in Guinea in May but was later changed to Addis Ababa. In June Ibrahim Hakeem, the Foreign Minister of the SADR, announced that at least 40 members of the OAU were in support of the participation of the SADR at the next OAU summit. He also stated that an additional number of unspecified states had indicated their readiness to recognize the SADR as a full OAU member - state. [98]

On 22nd September 1984 Nigeria announced it's withdrawal from the OAU Implementation Committee stating that the Committee was unable to discharge the mandate that was entrusted to it. Nevertheless the OAU summit of Heads of state opened in Addis Ababa on 12th November 1984 and it was attended by all the member states including the SADR which was represented by it's President, Mohammed Abdelaziz. The decision to admit the SADR delegation had been taken the day before the summit, after Nigeria had declared it's support for the Polisario, Major General Mohammed Buhari said that Nigeria had decided to recognize the SADR because Morocco had failed to fulfill it's promises to hold a referendum on the independence of the territory, or to hold talks with the Polisario. The Nigerian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, also stated that the OAU had in past years been paralysed by the "intractable" problem of the Western Sahara to the neglect of other

pressing African issues.[99]

In response to the SADR's admission both Morocco and Zaire left the conference after petitions. King Hassan's personnal adviser, Redi Ghedira, stated that the pressence of the SADR was unacceptable to Morocco, and constituted "an irreversible process of illegality". Therefore Morocco was left with no choice but to resign from the Organization. The Foreign Minister of Zaire, Mr. Umeba Di Lutete, stressed that in Zaire's view the seating of the SADR was illegal. He stated that "the Western Sahara is a ghost state, and does not fulfill the conditions of a Sovereign state". He argued that by admitting such a state it created a precedent, and he questioned why, on this basis, liberation movements such as SWAPO had not been seated. He then announced that Zaire was suspending it's membership.[100] After having renounce Membership of the OAU, Morocco's efforts at acquiring diplomatic support have been geared towards the UN, while it tries to remove the OAU from the conflict resolution process, although unsuccessfull. On it's part the OAU has not been able to make any headway since Morocco's withdrawal.

4. IMPACT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT ON THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE OAU AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

In this section the three assumptions on international organizations and functionalism that were used in the previous chapter on the Chadian conflict will be similarly employed here.

The first assumption posits that if the responses of the OAU as a regional organization predominates over the responses of external powers or individual African states then it would be said that the OAU functions effectively as a regional organization. If the converse is the case then it could be said that the Organization functions ineffectively.

With respect to this assumption it could be said that the effectiveness of OAU mediation in the Western Sahara dispute counter balanced external responses to the conflict. An analysis of the role of external powers vis a vis the OAU shows that over time a kind of equilibrium was achieved. This is because the nature of foreign involvement in the conflict was mainly by way of arms supplies, with the U.S. and France supplying Morocco with large quantities of arms. No direct military intervention by any of the external powers in order to influence the course of the war in a certain direction was recorded.

On the other hand, however, the OAU, with it's support for the self - determination and independence of the Saharawis, eventually mastered the weight of diplomatic support behind it. Although the issue of the recognition and admission of the SADR into the OAU caused a lot of dissension among the member states, it was gradually solved as more states, within and outside Africa, gave recognition to the SADR. The eventual admission of the SADR into the organization caused Morocco to withdraw in protest .

In the absence of any means of enforcing it's decisions, the diplomatic support that was mustered by the OAU could be seen as a counterbalancing force against the huge supplies of foreign arms that are supplied to Morocco. In this respect the OAU could be said to have functioned effectively at the diplomatic level.

The second assumption holds that the international organization provides a more adequate framework for the conduct of diplomacy and negotiations. In this respect the OAU's effectiveness could be asessed to be two - sided. In the first instance the OAU espouses the principles of self - determination and decolonization. To this end the Organization has succeeded diplomatically in gaining the recognition of numerous states for the SADR and their support for an end to Moroccan irredentism. On the other hand, however, one party to the conflict, Morocco, has consistently refused to engage in any negotiations with the Polisario through the framework of the OAU. Although this represents a setback for the OAU, it cannot be said to be a deficiency of the Organization since it has consistently tried to bring the two parties together.

The third assumption is that functionalism posits that the promotion of economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for the solution of war. As in the Chadian conflict the OAU has not employed this strategy as a means for resolving the Western Sahara war. A reason for this is the fact that the Western Sahara conflict involves the struggle for the emergence of an independent state. Since states are the main actors in international politics,

this functionalist assumption involves promoting economic and social relationships between belligerent states through an international organization. In the Western Sahara war the SADR is struggling to attain the status of a fully independent state while Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory and it's resources. The situation is thus one in which Morocco does not recognize the SADR as a state: It would therefore be impossibile to promote any form of economic or social relations between the two entities.

4.5 .CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a brief description of the background to the Western Sahara conflict. It was found that the causes of the conflict is traceable to Spanish colonial rule and Moroccan and Mauritanian claims over the territory. In opposition to these irredentist claims are the Saharawis who are fighting for complete independence.

The next section dwelt on the growth and the development of the conflict. Apart from the discussion of the main liberation movements that opposed Spain and consequently Morocco, and the bases for Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, certain findings were made. Firstly, prior to OAU involvment in resolving the conflict, the U.N in conjuntion with the World Court had supported the right of the Saharawis to self determination. The OAU became involved along the lines of U.N

resolutions in support of Saharawi independence. In the area of foreign intervention there has not been any direct military intervention by any foreign powor. Rather the involvement of outside powers has been by way of arms supplies to the belligerents.

The OAU proved to be an effective framework for the conduct of diplomacy. The diplomatic efforts of the OAU were successful to the extent that it resulted in the reconition of the SADR by several member states and her admission into the Organization. Nevertheless, the diplomatic process that led to this was full of vacillations by the Organization and the member states. Firstly, the OAU was unable to stick rigidly to her position by granting formal admission to the SADR much earlier in accordapce with the recognition of the rights of the Saharawis to independence. Secondly, there were splits among the rember states of the OAU in regard to the issue of admitting the SADR. Even after it had gained the recognition of a majority of member states.

In spite of it's diplomatic successes the OAU was unable for to act as an effective framework for direct negotiations between the belligerents. This, however, was due to Morocco's constant refusal. Finally it was observed that the OAU had not employed the promotion of economic and social cooperation as a means of resolving the conflict. This was attributed to the nature of the conflict which involved Moroccan claims over the territory of the SADR itself.

FOOTNOTES

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(58) "What Happened to OAU ?" in West Africa 12 July 1976 p. 977

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(60) " Polisario's Diplomatic Victories" in Africa No. 69 May 1977 p. 75

(61) "Western Sahara" in Africa No. 80 April 1978 p. 34

(62) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1978 - 79 p . C 35

(63) Ibid p . C 36

(64) Hodges Western Sahara: The Roots of Desert War Op Cit p . 310

(65) "President Hints at Mauritanian Withdrawal From Sahara" in Africa Diary Vol. 19 No. 10 March 1979 p . 9410

(66) The Moroccan troops had been present in Mauritania Since 1977 when they were sent to help Mauritania prosecute it's war against the Polisario. They were mainly concentrated in key economic towns and the Southern part of the Western Shhara which was under Mauritanian Control.

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(72) "Shagari, 4 Ledders Meet to Solve Western Sahara crisis" in Nigerian Standard 5 December 1979 Frontpage. See also "Morocco Told to withdraw from Western Sahara" in New Nigerian 7 December 1979 p. 9.

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(83) Tony Hodges "Wither Western Sahara" in Africa Research Bulletin February 1 - 28 1982 p. 6355.

(84) "Compromise Plan for Referendum" in West Africa 31 August, 1981 p. 1972

(85) Quoted in Tony Hodes Western Sahara: Roots of A Desert War Op Cit p. 314

(86) Article 28 Charter of the Organization of African Unity

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA CONFLICT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter on the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict will once again follow the same format as the previous two case studies. There will be a brief narration on the background to the conflict This will be followed by a section on the growth and development of the conflict. Discussions under this section will consist of a brief overview in the development of the crisis, the geo - strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, the role played by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba in the conflict, and Mediation efforts by the OAU. The next section will look at the impact the conflict has had on the effective functioning of the OAU as a regional organization, and on the theory of functionalism. The last section will take a look at the major findings of each section.

5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA CONFLICT

As with the previous conflicts, the Ethiopia - Somalia dispute has it's genesis in the European colonization of Africa. The Somalis argue that they are the victims of 19th and 20th century boundary adjustments by Britain, France, Italy, and Ethiopia. These adjustments have resulted in large portions


of land being inhabited by ethnic Somalis in different parts of the Horn of Africa.

In the latter part of the 19th Century the Egyptians were forced to withdraw from the region around the Red Sea as a result of the Mahdi rebellions in Sudan. This situation resulted in a power vacuum in the region. The British then entered into agreements with several Somali sheikhs which led to an extension of British influence along the Somali coast. The British subsequently established a protectorate over the various Somali groups whose leaders they had earlier negotiated with primarily to ensure a supply of fresh meat to the British garrison at Aden. The British therefore tried to make the Haud (a fertile piece of grazing land in the Ogaden) a protectorate but was prevented from doing so by King Menelik of Ethiopia who had a garrison in the Ogaden.[1]

In 1882 the Italians promulgated the "project Law" which provided for the establishment of an Italian Civil administration on the Eritrean Coast. The French also managed to consolidate their hold on Djibouti through a number of Chartered companies. By 1885, however, the Berlin conference had given "legitimacy" to the territorial possessions of these colonial powers.[2]

In 1888 an agreement between Britain and France delimited the boundary between the French Colony of Djibouti and the British

map 4



Source: James E. Dougherty The Horn of Africa:
A Map of Political Strategic Conflict
Washington D.C.: Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982 pp. xvi

protectorate in Somaliland. In 1897 the British entered a similar agreement with Ethiopia which delimited the boundary between British Somaliland and Ethiopia. This agreement followed Menelik's victory over Italy at the battle of Adowa after which Menelik embarked upon an aggressive expansionist policy. Ethiopia's enhanced military reputation made Britain develop fears about the possibility of Ethiopia occupying her protectorate in Somaliland. In the face of agressive Ethiopian expansionism Britain was faced with the options of either standing firm to defend her protectorates or adopting a conciliatory attitude by compromising with Menelik. Britain opted to negotiate with Menelik.

In 1897 the two countries reached an agreement in which Britain ceded to Ethiopia some 67,000 square miles of British Somaliland territory.[3] It is this border agreement between Britain and Ethiopia that has provided the basis of the Ethiopia - Somalia dispute. The terms of the treaty called for the "good treatment" an "orderly government" of the Somalis. It also called for guaranteed nomad pasturage on both sides of the border. However, since the treaty's contents were not made public, the native Somalis were not aware of it's contents until 1934 when the Ethiopians demarcated the border. The Italians and the Ethiopians later made boundary revisions on copies of a German

Map which were lost and never found. Furthermore, in 1915 Britain and France signed a postwar treaty which added some more land to Italian Somaliland while leaving a portion of Somali occupied land in British East Africa which would later become Kenya.[4] (See Map 4)

In 1935, in an attempt to offset her economic losses, and also to revenge for her defeat a Adowa, Italy invaded and overran Ethiopia. By so doing Italy managed to rejoin Italian Somaliland with the Houd which had, prior to 1935, been Separated by an earlier boundary agreement. With the outbreak of world war II Italy invaded and occupied British Somaliland in August 1940. By May 1941 however, the tide had begun to turn against Italy and the British East Africa colonial troops had retaken all of Ethiopia, and both British and Italian Somali territories. Thus, for the first time all of the Somalis, except the small population in French Somaliland, were unified under a single colonial government.[5]

The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, returned and regained his throne and the Haud remained under British administration for a while under the name "Reserved Area".[6] The British, thereafter, appeared to be divided as to what course of action to take on the future of the Reserved Area.

The issue, however, had already become a serious problem at the UN, and Ethiopia was pressing for the complete return of the Reserved

Area. Ethiopia's efforts provoked counter protests from the Somalis who wanted an independent Somali state. It must be noted at this point that the unity which the Somalis experienced under British administration helped to strengthen Somali nationalist sentiments. The British administration helped to speed up the rate of political and social change by encouraging the formation of the somali Youth Club (later the Somali Youth league) in 1943.[7] This organization called for the unification of all Somalis and opposed the re-imposition of Italian or Ethiopian control.

On 31st January 1942, an agreement between Britain and Ethiopia was signed in which Britain recognized Ethiopian Sovereignty over the Ogaden However the agreement gave the British administration control over the city of Jijiga, the Haud, and the railway line from Dire Dawa to the border of Somaliland. The continued possession of these strategic areas by Britain is thought to have been motivated by her need to continue prosecuting the war that was still raging in North Africa and Europe.[8]

In 1946 the Somali aspirations for the emergence of an independent Somali state incorporating "Greater Somalia" were given fresh hopes by what came to be called the "Bevin Plan". Ernest Bevin, the foreign Secretary for the British Labour Government, stated on 4th June 1946 that:

> "In the latter part of the last century the Horn of Africa was divided between Great Britain, France and Italy. At about the same time we occupied our part, the Ethiopians

> occupied an inland area which is a grazing ground for six months of the year. Similarly the nomads of Italian Somaliland must cross the existing frontiers in Search of grass. In all innocence, therefore, we proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agree, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should have their frugal existence with the least possible hinderance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life as understand in that territory." 9

In effect Ernest Bevin was advocating the formation of a single Somali state. However, although the Bevin Plan was welcomed by the Somalis in the Horn of Africa and abroad, it was denounced by Ethiopia and the British government of Kenya. The Soviet Union and the U.S. also accused Britain of using the "Greater Somali" movement as a means of expanding her own imperial interests in the Horn. Thereafter the British completely withdrew from the Reserved Area in 1948, and also withdrew her support for the Somali Youth league. The British withdrawal was immediately followed by a strengthening of Ethiopian garissons and the establishment of an Ethiopian administration in the area.

In the meantime the UN formed a commission consisting of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. The commission was given the duty of visiting Somaliland with a view to determining the wishes of the Somali people regarding whether they wanted to be placed under Italian trusteeship or not. While the commission was making arrangements to go to Mogadishu; the Italian community

had organized a pro-Italy group which advocated the return of the former Italian Somaliland colony back to Italy as a trust territory. Consequently, when the commission arrived demonstrations and counter demonstrations eventually led to a riot in which 51 Italians were killed.[10]

The commission reported back to the General Assembly and in spite of the open opposition to a return to Italian trusteeship, the commission still decided in favour of trusteeship under Italy. This decision was endorsed by the UN at the end of 1949. In 1950 Italy resumed administration of the territory with a target of giving the territory independence after 10 years.

During the period of trusteeship there was an intensification of political activity because the territory had to be prepared for independence within the time period prescribed by the UN. On the other hand, because the British protectorate was not given any time table, the political atmosphere was more relaxed with emphasis placed on development. However, with the return of the Reserved Area to Ethiopia there was an increase in political activity. The net effect was an increase in contact between Somali politicians in the Italian and British territories, and the growth of a strong militant following for the Somali Youth League. The return of the "Reserved Area" thereafter became a central issue in Somali politics.

The effect of the pressure generated by the Somalis was that in 1956 the Italian government set up a legislative Council and a Somali dominated government. In 1957 Britain also set up a Legislative Council with heavy Somali representation in the government. At the end of 1959 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution granting the Italian trust territory independence on 1st July 1960. The effect of this was that Somali political parties began pressing Britain to set a date for it's protectorate's independence, and in addition they demanded unification with the Italian trust territory. In June 1960 the British protectorate's legislative Assembly voted in favour of the Union of the two territories. In July 1960, British Somaliland and the Italian trust territory were merged to form an independent Somali Republic.[11]

5.3 THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA CONFLICT

From the view of the Somalis, the independence which they attained was only regarded as a partial victory. To them the ultimate goal was the unification of all the Somali inhabited territories that surrounded the Republic of Somalia. This was expressed by the new Prime Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Shermarke, on the eve of independence when he announced that:

> "Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth ..... No I

> Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries with whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are Somali Kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements. .... They occupy the same terrain, and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language, we share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions." 12

In order to symbolize her irredentis claims, a five - pointed star was placed on the national flag to represent the components of Greater Somalia. The first two points of the star stand for British and Italian Somaliland which became united to form the independent Republic of Somalia. The other three points represent the Ethiopian Ogaden which encompasses about a third of Ethiopian territory, the northeastern section of Kenya which is occupied by Somalis, and Djibouti. Although the Republic of Somalia is 246,000 square miles in area, the total area inhabited by ethnic Somalis in that region covers 370,000 square miles. Somalia's irredentist claims therefore covers about 124,000 square miles with the Ogaden taking up 67,000 square miles. [13]

Almost immediately after Somalia attained her independence, hostilities increased with Ethiopia over the Ogaden. An armed clash between the two countries took place in early 1961, and in 1964 there was open warfare between the two countries. These events led to the enlargement of the armed forces of both countries, with Ethiopia aided by the U.S. and Somalia by the Soviet Union.

By the mid - 1960's it was clear that Somalia's expansionist policies would end in failure. This led to acute political crisis within the country. There was a split within the ruling Somali Youth league, and in 1964 Abdirazak Hussein was appointed the new Prime Minister. In 1965 fresh elections were held and the newly elected government of Ibrahim Egal promised to downplay Somalia's irredentist foreign policy and to pursue a policy of detente with her neighbours. This policy, however, caused discontent and political instability which resulted in the elections of March 1969 in which 65 parties and over 1000 candidates contested for 123 seats in the National Assembly. The Somali Youth league won again and Ibrahim Egal was re-appointed Prime Minister.[14]

Public discontent with the administration continued to increase and on 15th October 1969, President Shermarke was assassinated. Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal, who was on an overseas trip, rushed back to Mogadishu in order to make arrangements for the election of a new president. On the eve of the election, however, there was a military coup which toppled the civilian administration. The Prime Minister and other top politicians were arrested, the National Assembly was dissolved, and a new ruling supreme Revolutionary council was formed. Major General Siad Barre became the new President, the country was renamed the Somali Democratic Republic, and scientific socialism was introduced as the country's national ideology.[15]

Regardless of her socialist leanings, the new administration still continued the country's irredentist claims. In 1974 President Siad Barre became the Chairman of the OAU by virtue of the Summit being held in Mogadishu. He therefore faced the embarrassing problem of trying to reconcile his country's irredentist claims with the charter of the OAU which upholds the inviolability of African boundaries. Coincidentally it was also in 1974 that Siad Barre's administration helped in the formation of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) into a strong fighting force in the Ogaden.

The WSLF was created immediately after the independence of Somali, and it established it's headquarters in Mogadishu. The movement immediately directed it's efforts towards the recruitment of Somali Youth, who were living in the Ogaden, for military training after which it immediately began engaging in skirmishes with the Ethiopian army. The WSLF did not recieve much support from the Somali, government until the 1974 drought when President Barre felt that guerilla activities should be stepped up against Ethiopia since Haile Selassie's rule was rapidly loosing legitimacy. Nevertheless Haile Selassie was toppled and replaced by the revolutionary regime of the Dergue which affirmed the inviolability and indivisibility of Ethiopia. It was not until March 1977 that a restructured WSLF began to recieve open military

support from the Somali government.[16]

The Ogaden war began in mid - 1977 when the Somali government supported the WSLF in battle against Ethiopian forces. Soon after that the Somali regular army invaded the Ogaden to wage a full scale war against Ethiopia. This led to the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in september 1977. Initially Somali forces made rapid advances into Ethiopian territory and for a brief period the Ogaden was under Somali.rule. But with the decisive intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba on the side of Ethiopia, the tide of the war was rapidly reversed and it culminated in the withdrawal of Somali forces from the Ogaden in March 1978 after a major defeat at the strategic town of Jijiga.[17]

The defeat of Somalia was accompained by fears of an Ethiopian invasion which did not take place. The Dergue put forward a peace plan which the Somali government refused to accept. Instead Somalia put forward it's own plan which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from "Western Somalia", the establishment of a neutral force there and the recognition of the region's right to independence.[18]

After the war the WSLF stated that it would continue with it's guerilla warfare. On it's own part the Somali government stopped making reference to territorial claims in it's official pronouncements, but the government nevertheless has continued it's support for the WSLF believing that a long drawn guerilla war would be the only effective alternative.[19]

(i) FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Because of the geo - strategic importance of the Horn of Africa to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this section will not delve directly into the interventionary role played by foreign powers in the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict. The first part of this section will be devoted to an overview of the geo-strategic position of the Horn and it's importance in international politics .

The area that is called the Horn of Africa comprises Ethiopia, the Republic of Somalia, and Djibouti. The strategic importance of this region in world politics does not stem from it's economic resources. In fact the region as a whole is quite poor in economic resources and minerals. Instead the strategic importance of the Horn derives from it's geographical location. The region is adjacent to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean which are important transist routes for oil and other forms of ocean going commerce. In addition the Horn is very close to the Middle East oil wells. All the ocean going commerce that is bound for the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, and those that are bound for the persian Gulf and East Africa must pass through the narrow waterway at Bab el Mandeb which the Horn overlooks.[20] Thus, it is the strategic significance of the Horn in terms of it's situation next to an important ocean

passageway that makes the Horn of Central importance to both super powers.

The significance of this area to both the NATO and the Warsaw pact countries derive from very similar reasons. It has been estimated that more than 60% of the oil that is bound for western Europe passes through this area. In addition Japan gets about 85% of it's oil from the Middle East.[27] This accounts for the strong desire on the part of the West to maintain a foothold in this region. Similarly, most East European countries get their oil from the Middle East, and there are forecasts that in the 1970's the Soviet Union will start importing oil. This accounts for the competing desire on the part of the East bloc countries to have a strong foothold in the region.

Prior to 1979 the U.S. had relied on the Shah of Iran to act as a "Policeman" in the persian Gulf thereby guaranteeing the security of the oil Sea lanes. However, the Shah was toppled in 1979 and this was followed by a massive Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. With these events most Western states, espcially the U.S. felt that the Soviet Union had gained a foothold close to vital oil interests around the persian Gulf. They cited the fact that the Persian Gulf was barely 350 miles from Afghanistan, and that the U.S in order to forestall the spread of Soviet influence, also had to acquire military facilities around the persian Gulf.

It took the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to jolt the U.S. into an awareness of this need, regardless of the fact that prior to the intervention the Soviets already had facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Thus it was in full view of the strategic importance of this region that President Jimmy Carter stated in January 1980 that "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United states. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force."[22]

Thus, it is for the reason of obtaining influence over this strategically important region that the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia attracted the involvement of external powers. This section will investigate the causes and process of involvement of the U.S. Soviet Union, and Cuba.

(a) UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

The role of the U.S. in the Ogaden conflict, although having strategic roots, has to be seen against the backdrop of overall U.S. committments to her allies around the Middle East and Sub - Saharan Africa for two major reasons. The first reason relates to the position that was adopted toward the conflict by the major conservative Arab states in the region which was an overt opposition toward the spread of Soviet influence in that region.

The second reason involves the position adopted by the OAU concerning the inviolable nature of African boundaries.[23]

In the period immediately after Somalia's independence, U.S involvement in the area lay mainly in her attempts to train and equip Somalia's police force. Somalia, however, Soon rejected this form of aid from the U.S. on the grounds that the U.S. failed to give her any substantial aid or support for her "Greater Somalia" quest. Therefore Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for aid. Consequently the U.S. diverted most of her Military and economic aid to Ethiopia which was then under Emperor Haile Seleassie's rule. This is not to suggest, however, that U.S involvement in Ethiopia started immediately after her shift from Somalia. In fact U.S. Ethiopia relations dates back to the 1940's when the U.S took over a communications relay center at Kagnew near Asmara that was formerly run by the British.[24] This facility was crucial to the U.S. for naval communications between the Meditteranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

As part of an overall package the U.S. signed a Military assistance agreement with Ethiopia in 1953 in which the U.S. reaffirmed it's continuing interest in the Security of Ethiopia and it's opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.[25] In addition to this, as a form of rent, between 1949 and 1974 the U.S. gave Ethiopia over $ 450

million in economic and military aid. In 1974 alone the figure amounted to $22.3 million. Between 1953 and 1975 over 2000 members of the Ethiopian armed forces had been trained in the U.S.[26] Thus, the interests of the U.S. in the Horn in particular, and the Middle East in general, were served and enhanced by Emperor Haile Selassie who was a moderate and respected leader both within Africa and the Arab world. (See table 5.1)

It was in the period immediately after Somalia's independence that there was some push and pull between the two superpowers in the area. When Somalia became independent in 1960 Ethiopia appealed to both superpowers for military aid in order to stop Somalia's irredentist campaigns against her. The U.S, in order to forestall any Soviet encroachment into Ethiopia, agreed to supply Ethiopia with enough arms to expand her armed forces from 32,000 to 40,000 men, as opposed to Somalia's 20,000 strong force. In 1962 Somalia made requests to the U.S for arms in order to equip and enlarge her own armed forces. Although the U.S. refused to comply with these requests, due mainly to pressure from Ethiopia, she nevertheless urged Western European nations to come to Somalia's aid. At the same time the U.S. pressurized Ethiopia into refusing Soviet offers of Military aid.[27] The escalation of tensions resulted in the 1964 war between Ethiopia and Somalia which Somalia lost.

In 1973 Haile Selassie, during a trip to the U.S. requested for Military aid. The U.S. turned down the request, arguing that it

TABLE 5.1

U.S MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA 1970 - 1976

	Grants (in thousands U.S.S)	Sales	Personnel trained in U.S.
1970	10,494	6	-
1971	11,763	7	140
1972	10,654	10	159
1973	9,439	-	158
1974	11,719	7,440	147
1975	12,999	22,127	130
1976	7,277	135,339	192

Source: "United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Area" in Bereket Habte Selassie Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980 PP. 138

would upset the military balance between Somalia and Ethiopia thereby provoking another war. This decision by the U.S was a result of the Nixon administrations policy to reorder her overseas military priorities which led to a relegation of Ethiopia's Military needs in it's scale of overseas priorities. Another reason for this was the fact that the naval communications centre at Kagnew was becoming less useful to the U.S due partly to improvements in technology and partly to the acquisition of new facilities in Iran. In view of these factors the U.S had decided to phase out it's activities at Kagnew by early 1974,[28] by which time opposition against Haile Selassie had begun to gather momentum.

Thus, by 1975, after Haile Selassie had been toppled, the U.S found itself in the position of supplying arms to an increasingly Marxist leaning regime. United States officials had hoped that by continuing Military assistance to Ethiopia it could prevail on the new regime to pursue non - leftist Policies, but this failed to happen. Indeed, as events unfolded, the contrary happened. In February 1977, Ethiopia's ruling council the Dergue, announced that it would seek it's supply of arms from socialist states, thereby suggesting that the Soviet Union would replace the U.S as Ethiopia's main arms supplier. This decision by Ethiopia, and the subsequent change of administration in the US led to a policy reappraisal on the part of the U.S.

Firstly the new U.S administration under President Jimmy Carter decided to reconsider it's military ties with Ethiopia in view of the primacy given to Human Rights in the administrations foreign policy. Because of the gross violations of human rights as a result of the Dergue's political purges and her increasing leftist orientation, the U.S. decided to cut off all military aid to Ethiopia in February 1977. Secondly, by mid - 1975 the balance of power between Somalia and Ethiopia was strongly in Somalia's favour. This was coupled with the fact that Ethiopias military capabilities were being drained in the Eritrean war. These disadvantages cast the viability and stability of the ruling Dergue in doubt. Lastly, the Dergue's anti - American position culminated in the expulsion of all U.S. Military officials except her embassy staff on 13th April, 1977.[29]

All these factors led to the U.S. decision to stop military aid to Ethiopia in 1977. Up to this point the military assistance that the U.S had provided to Ethiopia represented about one half of all U.S Military aid to sub - sahara Africa from 1953.[30]

Because this period coincided with the infusion of Military aid into Ethiopia by the Soviet Union, the U.S. shifted to the provision of financial and economic aid through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Agency for International

Development. The reason for this was based on the desire of the U.S to retain some sort of leverage over Ethiopia. Thus when the the Ogaden war flared up the U.S maintained a low profile policy throughout. They refused to become militarily engaged in the war as rivals of the USSR, while at the same time cautiously maintaining economic links with Ethiopia.

In spite of this fact the Ogaden conflict could be said to have elicited an inactive sort of policy response from the U.S. This policy was basically the Carter Administration's committment to the idea that Africa's problems should be left to Africans to handle through the OAU. President Carter stated on 12th January 1978 that "we have taken a position concerning Africa that we would use our influence to bring about peace without our injecting ourselves into disputes that could best be resolved by Africans themselves.[31]" Despite this statement the problem which the Carter administration faced was that it could not remain an idle watcher while the Soviets were becoming militarily entrenched in Ethiopia and altering the regional balance of power to it's advantage. Thus, the Carter Administration was faced with the problem of how to respond without becoming militarily involved.

The Carter Administration therefore decided to embark on a diplomatic initiative to persuade the Somalis to withdraw their forces, thereby removing the prime reason for Soviet and Cuban

intervention. The U.S government, in collaboration with other Western States, persuaded the Somali government to withdraw her regular forces from the Ogaden in return for a pledge by Ethiopia not to invade Somalia. The committment was made on 22nd February 1978, and on 10th March the Somalis began their withdrawal. This U.S. endeavour, however, did not produce the ultimately-desired effect because the Soviet Union did not withdraw it's troops, but turned them instead to the Eritrean conflict. It was not until July 1978 that a contigent of about 3000 Cuban troops pulled out of Ethiopia.[32]

(b) SOVIET INTERVENTION

The intervention of the Soviet Union on the side of Ethiopia can be seen to have occurred primarily because of her strategic interests in the region. The Soviet Union was initially involved with Somalia, and this involvement dates back to the period immediately after 1963. In order to pursue her irredentist ambitions Somalia initially looked to the West for military assistance. The Western countries, however, were aware of the importance of Ethiopia as an ally in the region and as such they were unwilling to provide any substantial military support for Somalia. In 1962 the U.S. Italy, and West Germany offered Somalia a £ 10 million military aid package with the conditions that the military aid would be used purely for internal security, and that Somalia would not seek military aid elsewhere.

The Somali government rejected this offer and turned instead to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave Somalia an offer of £ 32 million which was later raised to £ 55 million.[33]

Although Soviet Military aid continued thereafter, it was not until Siad Barre came to power in 1969 that the Soviet military presence in Somalia increased. Under President Barre's leadership Somalia moved toward greater Economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union and other East European states. The relationship became so strong that in early 1974 Somalia became the first Black African state to sign a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1975 the size of the Somali army increased from 12,000 to 23,000 men who were being trained by Soviet military supervisors.[34]

It has been estimated that between 1970 and 1975 the number of Soviet military advisers attached to the Somali armed forces at all levels increased from 1000 to 4000. Similarly the number of Somali military personnel who were sent to the Soviet Union to recieve military training increased from 1,000 to 2,000. Simultaneously the supply of Soviet built F - 34 and T - 54 tanks increased from 100 to 300, and more than 100 aircraft which included MiG 15, - 17 , and - 21 fighters, transporters, bombers, and helicopters were supplied.[35] Thus, by virtue of this large scale military aid from the Soviet Union, Somalia attained military

superiority over Ethiopia, in terms of the quantity and quality of both it's equipment and personnel.

In addition, the strong military support which the Soviet Union extended to Somalia gave the Soviet Union a double advantage in the region. Firstly, by strengthening Somalia's military capabilities, the balance of power in the Horn was altered in favour of Somalia, thereby neutralizing the dominance that the West had enjoyed in the region. Secondly, the Soviet Union siezed the opportunity to gain the use of strategic military facilities for it's navy at the Somali ports of Berbera and Mogadishu. There was controversy raised by the U.S government over the exact nature of the facilities. Both the Soviets and the Somalis, however, continued to deny the existence of a Soviet Naval base or a missile storage facility at Berbera or Mogadishu. The Somali Foreign Minister, Omar Arteh, denied the U.S reports as zionist propaganda which was designed to justify the establishment of a major U.S base on the British Island of Diego Garcia in the India Ocean. Mr. Omar Arteh's accusation was given credence when the former U.S Secretary of State, Mr. James Schlesinger, appeared before the U.S Senate Armed Services Committee in order to defend the Carter administration's plan to construct a $ 108 million air and naval base on the Island of Diego Garcia. The irony was that much of his testimony failed to concentrate on the planned military base. Rather, he dwelt

on Soviet facilities in Somalia and how they were designed to support Soviet naval and air operations in the Indian Ocean and the persian Gulf.

Mr. Schlesinger emphasised that the expansion of the military facilities in Berbera meant that the Soviet Union wanted to establish a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In support of this contention General George Brown, the Chairman of the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed that the Soviet facility was an indication of increasing Soviet interest in the area, and the capability to support such an interest with a military force.[36] The uproar that was generated by the Soviet facility at Berbera is a strong indication of the strategic importance that both super powers attach to the Horn, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Nevertheless it must be emphasized that the Somalis were never totally in the Soviet camp or under Soviet domination. The Somalis, who are very independent minded, maintained their alliance with the Soviet Union only to the extent that it served Somali interests. The Soviets later on saw the Ethiopian revolution as an opportunity to establish a foothold in another East African Country. Thus, the Soviets courted the Dergue and in July 1976 the Dergue sent a high level delegation to Moscow. The joint communique which was released at the end of talks stated that:

> "the sides noted with satisfaction that, at the present time, new favourable conditions are coming into being for broadening relations between the Soviet Union

> and Ethiopia, and for the development of all - round cooperation. Certain questions of extending links in the economic, cultural and other spheres were discussed. During the talks the coincidence or proximity of the positions of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia on many international problems was noted." 37

In December 1976, the Soviet Union indicated that it was willing to supply Ethiopia with arms. With this assurance of military backing from Moscow the Dergue repudiated the U.S for not supplying enough aid, and announced in February 1977 that Ethiopia would obtain arms from socialist states instead. [38] The shift by Ethiopia to the Soviet Union held certain implications. By obtaining arms from the Soviet Union the Dergue hoped to undercut Soviet support for both Somalia and the Eritrean secessionists. On the other hand, the Soviets tried to allay Somali fears with the argument that by becoming the sole supplier of arms to Ethiopia they would be in a better position to extract concessions from Ethiopia in Somalia's favour. The Soviets were in effect hoping to extend their influence into Ethiopia while maintaining a foothold in Somalia.

Nevertheless by early 1977 the Somali government had assessed the relative military balance between herself and Ethiopia. They saw that Ethiopia was bogged down in a war against secessionists in Eritrea. The Somalis also correctly assessed that they had margins of superiority over Ethiopia in terms of combat aircraft, tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Furthermore, although the Ethiopians enjoyed a two to one advantage in terms of troop manpower, most of them were engaged in the Eritrean war. [39]

> "The Somali government has taken it's action unilaterally and in the conditions of the actual war which it has unleashed against neighbouring Ethiopia. In essence what lies behind this action is dissatisfaction because the Soviet Union has not supported Somalia's territorial claims on a neghbouring state and refused to facilitate the stirring up of a fratricidal war in the Horn of Africa. Judging by the present steps, chauvinist expansionist moods have prevailed over common sense inside the Somali government." 42

With these two official declarations from the Soviet Union and Somalia a political and Military switch was immediately effected. Thereafter the Soviet Union provided full military support for Ethiopia which was in excess of the amount that the May 1977 military agreement between the two countries provided for. 43

Between November 26th and 28th the Soviet Union started a massive military airlift which augmented the sealift that started after the military agreement in May.

In addition to the armaments that were delivered, by November 1977 the estimates of Russian and Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia were put at about 100 and 400 respectively. By January 1978, U.S intelligence sources estimated that the number of Russian and Cubanmilitary personnel who were involved in combat were 1,000 and 11,000 respectively. 44 In an attempt to explain the receipt of such heavy military assistance from the Soviet Union, the Ethiopian leader, Col. Mengistu, stated that:

> "An all - round aggression is being committed against Socialist Ethiopia by Somalia and reactionary regimes, assisted and abetted by international imperialism. In face of all these it is Ethiopia's legitimate and

> unquestionable right to ask the assistance of countries of her own choice." 45

With the strengths of her armed forces thereby vastly increased the Ethiopian troops mounted a huge counter - offensive between February and March, and repelled the occupying Somali forces from the Ogaden. In the end both the regular Somali army and the WSLF announced their withdrawal from the Ogaden. On 9th March the Somali Acting Information Minister, Abdisalam Sheikh Hussein announced that "the big powers have suggested that the problem of the Horn of Africa be solved peacefully and that all foreign troops withdraw, and that Somalia withdraw her units, at the same time promising that the rights of Western Somalia be safeguarded, the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party has decided that the Somali units be withdrawn."[46] In Spite of her decision to withdraw the Somali government declined to renounce completely her claims to the Ogaden.

On 20th November 1978, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia sealed the relationship that had developed between them by entering into a Treaty of Friendship and cooperation[47] with each other. The treaty pledged both countries to collaborate in political, economic, and military fields, and to consult each other on important international issues directly involving the interests of the two countries for twenty years from the time the treaty was established. In this light three Salient aspects of the treaty can be identified.

Firstly, in Article III the Soviet Union recognizes Ethiopia's non-aligned status. The Articles states that "The USSR respects

policy pursued by socialist Ethiopia based on the purposes and the principles of the OAU and the non-aligned movement which constitutes an important factor in the development of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence".

Secondly both sides undertook to cooperate militarily. Thus Article X states that: "In the interest of ensuring the defence capability of the high contracting parties, they shall continue to cooperate in the military field".

Lastly, Article IV recognises the right of all nations "to defend themselves, individually or collectively against aggression in accordance with the Charter of the UN".

From the preceding analysis one can deduce three strategic and one political interest that the Soviet Union has in the Horn of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. Firstly, by gaining a foothold in Ethiopia the Soviets can adequately maintain a strong naval pressence in the Red Sea. Secondly, by virtue of her influence in Ethiopia and South Yemen, the Soviet Union is placed in a more strategic position to influence the flow of oil through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The fears of Western countries and conservative Arab States is that any Soviet military presence in the region is indicative of a potential discruption of the Ocean - going commerce in that region.[48] Thirdly, the Soviet presence in Ethiopia serves as part of an overall counter - balancing strategy against U.S influence in the Middle East. Lastly, as a corollary to her strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union has displayed an ideological committment

in supporting Mengistu's regime. The Soviets regarded Mengistu's regime as being much more committed to the Marxist ideology, than that of Siad Barre. In addition the Soviets saw Ethiopia as a potentially more powerful ally than Somalia.

(c) CUBAN INTERVENTION

The involvement of Cuba in the conflict can best be understood in terms of the role that they have played in support of the positic of the Soviet Union, because no direct Cuban interest in the Horn is discernible. This assessment takes into cognizance the fact that the Cuban leaders have denied the allegation that they are surrogates of the Soviet Union. Instead they have advanced the political reason that they are an international revolutionary force that assist and defend progressive, revolutionary movements. Nevertheless the Cuban position in the Ogaden conflict has been in consonance with that of the Soviet Union.

Before the conflict, Cuba's involvement came in 1974 when Cuban military advisers trained and advised the Somali armed forces in the use and maintenance of Soviet arms. When the Ethiopian revolution started in 1974 Cuba also sent advisers to aid the Ethiopian military. Nevertheless, when the conflict broke out the Cubans changed sides to support Ethiopia along with the Soviets. The reason given by the Cubans was that "the Ethiopian revolution was more authentic than the Somali one, and Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden constituted a threat to the Ethiopian revolution."[49]

At the height of the Ogaden conflict, Cuban intervention on the side of Ethiopia was decisively heavy. Between 15,000 and 18,000 Cubans took part in the fighting by providing logistical support, driving Soviet made tanks, and flying Soviet MiG fighter planes under the command of the Cuban General Arnaldo Ochoa who had been engaged in the Angolan civil war in 1976.[50] Thus, it could be concluded that although Cuban intervention supported Soviet aims and objectives the Cubans themselves put forward political reasons for intervening on the side of Ethiopia.

ii. OAU MEDIATION

From 1961 up to the time that the OAU was established in 1963 there had been growing hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia which culminated in OAU mediation attempts. In September 1961 the Somali government sent a note to the Ethiopian government alleging that there had been increasing represesive treatment of Somali nomads in the Ogaden, violations of Somali territory by Ethiopian troops, and the infringement of Somali airspace by Ethiopian planes. Furthermore, on 23rd September the Somali government claimed that five men, who were arrested after an alleged attempt on the life of Somali President, Aden Usman with the aim of setting up a secessionist state in the Northern part of Somalia, were Ethiopian agents.[51] These accusations from Somalia generated hostile counter - accusations from Ethiopia which continued unabated.

Essentially the Somali claims against Ethiopia violates the OAU principle of "respect for the Sovereignty and territorial

integrity of each state and for it's inalienable right to indpendent existence. Yet, in an open challenge to this principle, President Aden Usman, at the inaugural conference of the OAU in May 1963 contended that:

> "It has been suggested that any attempt to adjust existing boundary arrangements would aggravate rather than ease the situation, and for that reason matters should remain as they are. We do not subscribe to that view"

In a strongly worded response to this speech the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. Aklilou Hasbe - Wolde, emphasized that:

> "Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation, for more than 3,000 years. That is a fact, second fact; the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretch from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. Third fact; there is no record in history either of a Somali state or a Somali nation. That too is a fact."[52]

It was on such an acrimonious note that the Ethiopia - Somalia dispute was introduced to the OAU. After the announcement of Soviet military aid which would enable Somalia to establish an army of 20,000, the Ethiopian government sent out a communique on 14th November 1963 expressing concern that "the creation of an army of this magnitude, which so obviously surpasses Somalia's reasonable requirements for internal security forces, is conclusive proof of Somalia's determination to pursue by force the Greater Somalia policy to which she has adhered in the past".[53]

Prior to this statement in July 1965, Ethiopia and Kenya had signed an agreement of cooperation and Mutual Defence Assistance which the Somali government promptly claimed was directed against the

Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. However, in a joint statement submitted to the OAU on 19th January 1964, Ethiopia and Kenya argued that the agreement was purely defensive and that it has provisions for the inclusion of other neighbouring states. They also emphasized that the agreement was in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the OAU Charter. [54]

In the months of January and February 1964 clashes occured between Somalia and Ethiopia at various points along their border. These incidents prompted Emperor Haile Solassie to send messages on 8th February 1964, to all African Heads of States informing them of the border clashes and announcing that it had become necessary to declare a state of emergency in the border region. In addition the Ethiopian government called for an immediate meeting of the OAU council of ministers to consider the dispute. On the other hand, the Somali government accused Ethiopia of having sent troops into Somali territory, and in addition she notified all the OAU member - states of the conflict. On 10th February the Somali government sent a request to the Chairman of the UN Security Council to call a meeting of that body if the OAU failed to resolve the border dispute. Finally the Somali government called for the inclusion of the dispute in the agenda of the OAU Council of Ministers which was to start in Dar-es-Salaam on 12th February 1964. [55]

The Council of Ministers Conference in Dar es Salaam discussed the conflict on 14th February and arrived at a five - point

resolution which called on the government of Ethiopia and Somalia t- (1) order an immediate ceasefire an to refrain from all hostile actions; (2) take measures to put an end to all campaigns of provocative or insutling nature, by all media of communications (3) act in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the Charter by entering into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute; (4) call upon all African states with diplomatic or consular missions in Ethiopia and Somalia to do their best to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire; (5) decide to place this border dispute on the agenda of the second Extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers which will meet in Lagos on 24th Februrary 1964, with a view to arriving at a peaceful and lasting solution. [56]

At Lagos the OAU Council of Ministers requested the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to maintain a ceasefire which they had started immediately after the Dar es Salaam conference. The body also urged the two governments to open direct negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful solution to the dispute, and to report the result of the negotiations to the next OAU conference of Heads of states to be held in Cairo in July 1964. The council also announced that the dispute had been referred to a sub-committee comprising Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Upper Volta. [57]

After the Lagos conference, President Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan offered to mediate in the conflict. At his invitation a conference

the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.[59]

In April 1965 Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to reopen negotiations but disagreed over the venue for the talks. The propaganda warfare between the two countries intensified and this led to some border clashes. But at the OAU summit in Accra in October 1965, the two countries entered an agreement to desist from the dissemination of hostile propaganda against each other in accordance with the Khartoum agreement of 1964.[60] But on 2nd June 1966, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry sent a note to the Secretary General of the OAU Complaining that the Somali radio and press had continued their propaganda against Ethiopia in contravention of the Khartoum agreements. However, just before the note was written Sudan had offered to mediate in the dispute once more. On 24th June 1966 the Sudanese Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Ahgoub, announced that the Ethiopian government had agreed to his mediation offer. In spite of this, President Aden Osman of Somalia announced in the following month that Somalia would continue to fight for reunification.[61]

However, in June 1967, Somalia held a Presidential election in which Dr. Abdirashid Shermarke was victorious over Aden Osman, and Mohammed Ibrahim Egal was appointed as the new Prime Minister. On 11th August the new Prime Minister announced that "we do not wish to annex the territory of any state, nor to expand into such territory. We do intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign domination, in order that they may attain sovereign independent status through the process of self - determination.[62]

For the better part of Mr. Egal's tenure of office, this policy of reconcilliation between the two countries made progress.

A turnabout started in 1969 when President Shermarke was assassinated and Major - General Siad Barre came to power. President Barre provided support for the WSLF and tensions once again started to increase with Ethiopia. From the middle of 1972 onwards a number of clashes had occured in the Ogaden after it was reported that an American oil company had found traces of oil near the Ethiopian border with Somalia. Therefore, when the council of Ministers meeting opened in Addis Ababa on 17th May 1973, Somalia requested for OAU intervention in the dispute. The Council however, adopted a resolution rejecting Somalia's claims against Ethiopia as being "Contrary to the OAU Charter".[66]

President Siad Barre failed to turn up at the Heads of States summit which followed immediately afterward on 25th May. The Somali Vice President, Ismail Ali Abubakar, explained that President Barre stayed away from the summit because Ethiopia was, allegedly, mobilizing troops along the Somali border in preparation for war. He therefore asked the OAU to urge Ethiopia to desist from aggression. On the initiative of General Gowon a five member commission comprising representatives from Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, was set up to seek concilliation in the dispute, but they failed to find a solution. Thereafter General Gowon and President Tolbert of Liberia sent Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, and Mr. Rocheford Weeks, the Liberian Foreign Minister, to Mogadishu

in order to persuade President Siad Barre to attend the summit. The Somali President acceded and he arrived at the summit on 28th May. [67]

Emperor Haile Selassie and President Barre subsequently agreed to the formation of an eight - member Good Offices Committee which was chaired by GeneralGowon.The Committee included the Heads of states of Cameroon, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanzania, and it was charged with the task of seeking ways to establish normal relations between the two countries. The task of the Committee was made more difficult by Ethiopia's strict insitence that there was no border dispute between itself and Somalia, and that existing borders should remain unchanged. On the other hand Somalia continued to press the case that a long standing border dispute was in existence.

With such totally irreconcilable positions, the committee ended up making the proposal that the two countries should reduce the tension along their border by moving back their troops an equal distance from the border, which was the basis of the 1964 Khartoum agreement when the OAU first attempted to mediate in the dispute. [68]

When the OAU summit was held in Mogadishu from June 12th to 16th 1974, the Assembly made no progress toward a resolution of the dispute, despite a private meeting between the Ethiopian and Somali leaders on 13th June. In his opening speech to the Assembly President Barre referred to the existence of a "territorial problem" between his country and Ethiopia. In his own speech

Emperor Haile Selassie emphasized that the terms of reference of the Good Offices Committee were restricted to arriving at a clear demarcation of the frontier. Another factor that added to this lack of progress was the fact that a report which had been prepared by the committee contained no recommendations and as such failed to bring about negotiations between the two sides.[69]

After the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, tensions c continued unabated between the two countries. In early 1976 The Ethiopian government sent out a 39 - page memorandum entitled "War Crouds on the Horn of Africa" to a number of African governments. In it they accused the Somali government of having infiltrated agents and guerillas into Sothern and Eastern Ethiopia in preparation for a full - scale war. The memorandum went on to list a number of incidents in which at least 9 Ethiopian Policemen were said to have been killed and 20 other people seriously injured between 14th December 1975 / an 4th January 1976 In addition it claimed that there had been a mobilization of Somali troops along the border.[70]

In a speech on 1st July, President Barre added to the already tense relationship between the two countries by declaring that "the worst enemy of the Somali people is the one who opposes it's unification, which is it's legitimate desire. Even before the colonial era the Somali people were one nation, and they therefore have every right to unification and liberation from her colonial domination."[71]

In response to this the Ethiopian government on 2nd August, unsuccessfully called for an emergency session of the OAU. The OAU would have met but it failed to master the consent of at least two - thirds of the member - states. Nevertheless the OAU, on the same day, called into session the good Offices Committee. The Committee accordingly met in Libreville, Gabon, on 5th August under the Chairmanship of President Omar Bongo who was the current Chairman of the OAU. Col. Feleke Golde - Gworgis and Mr. Abdurahman Juma Barre, the Ethiopian and Somalian Foreign Ministers respectively, were also in attendance. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister argued that Somalia was using the WSLF as an "artificial liberation movement" to expand it's own territory. After the committee had refused to admit the WSLF to it's meeting, and Col. Feleke had described the WSLF as "farce" and as "Financed, controlled and staffed by the regular Somali army", the Somali Foreign Minister left the meeting on 8th August.

At it's closing session on 9th August the Committee approved, in the absence of the Somali and Ethiopian delegations a recommendation which reaffirmed the inviolability of frontiers inherited from the colonial era. It also made mention of the Charter's condemnation of "subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states on other states". Furthermore it invited President Omar Bongo to make contact with the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia with a view to "halting hostilities". The Ethiopian government welcomed the resolution as "victory for the Ethiopian cause".

On the other hand the Somali Foreign Minister said in Geneva on 10th August, that the OAU's principle of the inviolability of frontiers did not apply to "Somali territory colonized by Ethiopia". He claimed that Ethiopia was "a colonial state" which had taken part in the Partition of Africa at the 1884 Berlin Conference, and that the population of the Ogaden had the right to self - determination.[72]

On 18th August President Bongo stated that unless there was an immediate end to the fighting, he would ask the UN security Council to send peace - keeping troops to Ethiopia. In the following month on 7th September Ethiopia severed diplomatic relations with Somalia asking her embassy staff to leave Addis Ababa within 48 hours. The government of Somalia retaliated by expelling the Ethiopian charge d'Affairs on 8th September.[73] On 12th February 1978 Somalia officially committed troops to the war in the Ogaden, after which the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on the side of Ethiopia.

At the OAU Council of Ministers meeting which was held in Khartoum in July 1978 after Somali forces had withdrawn from the Ogaden, Guinea tabled a proposal calling for a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Somalia, the withdrawal of the two sides to a distance of three miles inside their respective borders, and the creation of a mediation commission. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister rejected the recommendations on the grounds that President Barre's undertaking to continue fighting against 'Ethiopian colonization' constituted a declaration of war.[74]

At the end of it's session the Council of Ministers made two resolutions conterning military interventions in Africa. They state that (1) The peace and Security of African states are contigent upon strict adherence to the principles of people's right to self - determination and independence and of non - interference, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, non - recourse to the use of force and non - recoguition of territorial acquisition by use of force, and that differences should be settled by peaceful means within an African context (2) The OAU draws member states' attention to the dangers to the peace and security of the whole continent by pacts that encourage interference and military intervention and hamper the liberation process of peoples'.[75]

Thus the resolutions were framed in such a way as to apportion equal blame to both Somalia and Ethiopia without mentioning them by name.

At the Assembly of Heads of States summit which followed immediately afterward from July 18th to 21st, there were attempts to find a permanent resolution to the conflict. On 21st July Guinea and Nigeria put forward a plan which called for a 10 Kilometer wide demilitarized zone to be established along the border between the two countries, an end to Ethiopian air attacks on Somalia and negotiations supervised by the OAU. Although the plan was acceptable to the Somalis, Ethiopia rejected it with the argument that the proposals took no account of the guerilla war being waged by Somali troops disguised as nomads.[76]

The Assembly ended up with a five point resolution which were no different from all of it's previous resolutions in substance. They called for "an immediate end to all hostilities and any war like act; the immediate withdrawal of the troops of each of the parties from the borders; the Chairman of the Mediation Committee to take and enforce all measures that will enable it to ensure on the spot, the correct and full implementation of the present measures"[77]

In 1979, partly in response to it's defeat in the Ogaden war and partly as a result of it's diplomatic isolation among OAU member - states, the Somali government decided to restrict it's level of support and degree of involvement with the WSLF in pursuit of it's irredentist claims. The Somali government adopted a new constitution in 1979, the relevant clause of which states that: " The Somali Democratic Republic, adopting peaceful and legal means, shall support the liberation of Somali territories under colonial rule and shall encourage the unity of the Somali people through their own free will."[79] This meant; in effect, that the Somali Government had abdicated any direct military role in the attainment of it's "Greater Somalia" goal.

In August 1980 the Mediation Committee held a meeting in Lagos where it reaffirmed that the Ogaden region is an integral part of Ethiopia.[80] However, in June 1981, the Somali government sent a protest letter to the President Daniel Arap Moi, the current Chairman of the OAU, after the Assembly had endorsed

the recommendations of the Good offices mediation committee. The Somali government maintained that any resolution which purports to endorse the committee's proposals would be unacceptable to her. The petition stated that the Somali government objected to the decision because it claimed that the committee did not conduct it's findings in accordance with the international norms governing mediation procedures. What the committee did, it said, was only to try and bring the parties together, and on that basis the committee functioned in excess of it's jurisdiction therefore rendering it's decisions "null and void". The Somali government further argued that in recommending that the parties to the dispute should respect the colonial boundaries at the time of independence, the committee should have ascertained wether or not the departing colonial powers had in fact bequeathed Somalia with a legal boundary upon her attainment of independence.

The relationship between the two countries took a turn for the better in January 1986, when President Siad Barre and Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam actually shook hands at the inaugural summit meeting of the Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Development. The meeting took place under the auspices of the OAU and in the presence of President Abdou Diouf, the current Chairman of the OAU.[81] Although the conference had an economic aim, it's political significance was very evident because the six drought affected countries that it brought together - Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda - have all

had frictions in their relationships with each other.

The Ethiopian and Somali leaders held direct and extensive talks after which a joint communique was issued. The communique stated that the talks had been "constructive and were aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the normalization of relations and the establishment of lasting peace between the two countries". It also added that Ethiopia and Somalia had agreed to set up a joint ad hoc committee to examine and identify the areas of basic differences and recommend ways and means of resolving them."[82]

To conclude therefore, one could say that although the OAU was unsuccessful in preventing a major war between the two countries, the Organization did encourage the establishment of an economic organization that has brought the two states together along functional lines.

5.4. THE IMPACT OF THE ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA CONFLICT ON THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE OAU AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

With reference to the effective functioning of the OAU we would like to know wether the response of the OAU to the conflict predominated over external responses or not, like the other two case studies the efforts of the OAU have been primarily at the level of Diplomacy.

Both Ethiopia and Somalia felt that they had authentic cases to put before the OAU in order to gain redress. The Organization, however, proved over time to be incapable of bringing about any change in the attitudes of the belligerents.

Although the Chater clearly states the immutability of colonially inherited boundaries, thereby putting Somalia in the wrong the OAU only came out with resolutions that never identified any aggressor but only exhorted both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

It was the percieved incapacity of the OAU to stop Somali aggression, and the opportunity of the Soviet Union to gain greater influence in the region, that led to the Soviet and Cuban intervention on side of Ethiopia. The diplomatic efforts engaged in by the OAU to change Somalia's position before the war, however, was not entirely ineffective. This can be seen in the fact that Somalia's diplomatic isolation among OAU member states after the war made her reduce her support for the WSLF. Her isolation was the result of her obvious violation of the principle of the inviolability of colonially inherited boundaries, and her refusal to reach any diplomactic settlement.

In the long run, however, the decisive response to the conflict came from an external power. This can be seen as a reduction in the effectiveness of the OAU since the belligerents themselves gradually lost confidence in the ability of the Organisation to resolve the conflict.

The next assumption states that the international organization provides a more adequate framework for the conduct of diplomacy. With respect to this case study the OAU has provided the organizational framework for the conduct of diplomacy. The dispute has been a

constant feature of the Organization's agenda since 1964. In that year a sub-committee was established to look into the dispute. Similarly in 1973 an eight - member good offices committee was established to seek ways of reconciling the two countries. Side by side with the formation of these committees were the constant attempts by the Organization to bring the leaders of the two countries together. In as much as the Organization succeeded in bringing the leaders or their representatives together on some occasions, no permanent agreements were arrived at.

However, one distinguishing feature of OAU mediation in this conflict as compared with the previous ones has been the relative absence of splits between members states due to the conflict. There was general unanimity over the fact that Somalia was contravening an OAU principle.

By and large, however, the OAU did constitute an effective framework for diplomacy and negotiations. This is due mainly to the fact that both countries saw the OAU as the proper institution within which to resolve the conflict. Because of this they tabled the dispute before the Organization as early as 1964, and on many occasions have actually heeded resolutions exhorting both sides to cease-fires or negotiations. In that regard the belligerents displayed respect for the resolutions of the Organization. It was only the intransigence of Somalia over her claims that led both countries to war.

The last functionalist assumption holds that the promotion of economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for the ultimate

resolution of war. Unlike the other two case studies, it is only in this conflict that the OAU has pursued this strategy to resolve a dispute, although it was after the fait accompli of Somalia's defeat.

The case in point was the formation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development under the auspices of the OAU. The significance of the establishment of this body can be seen in two major respects. Firstly, the organization brought together six drought affected countries that have all had conflicts with each other - Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. Secondly, inasmuch as the formation of this body was not the immediate cause of the end of these conflicts, the fact that they are being brought together economically and socially can have the effect of forestalling any future conflict that might arise between the two nations. In this sense, the OAU's activities have given credence to this core functionalist assumption.

5.5 *CONCLUSION*

The main cause of the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict was traced to Somalia's irredentist claims which she vowed to pursue by any means including war. This contravened the OAU principle of the inviolability of colonially inherited boundaries. It was found that one of the key reasons for the involvement of foreign powers in the conflict lay in the geo-strategic importance of the region to both the East and West. This reason accounts for the heavy involvement of the Soviet Union on the side of Ethiopia whom

they saw as a potentially more powerful and dependable ally. On the other hand the U.S did not get deeply involved because of the view that prevailed in the Carter Administration that African conflicts should be resolved through the institution of the OAU.

As with the other two case studies, it was found that the mediatory role played by the OAU was largely diplomatic. It was characterized by the passing of resolutions. Although the OAU did consistently carry out diplomatic efforts to solve the dispute, which resulted in most African states not supporting Somalia, it was the decisive intervention of the Soviet Union that brought the war to it's logical conclusion. In this respect it could be said that extra - systemic responses prevailed over those of the OAU, thereby reducing it's effectiveness as a regional organization. Indeed it was the percieved ineffectiveness of the OAU in resolving the dispute that led Ethiopia to seek Soviet help.

Another important finding of this chapter lay in the use by the OAU of a sub-regional, functional organization to reduce any bellicose feelings after the war, and also to forestall the likelihood of war breaking out again. This is a vindication of the functionalist thesis that the promotion of economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite to the solution of conflicts.

FOOTNOTES

(1) Bereket Habte Selassie Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980 p. 101

(2) Ibid pp. 100 - 101 - See also Musfin Wolde Mariam "The Background of the Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary Dispute" in Journal of Modern Africa Studies Vol. 2 No. 2 1964 pp. 196

(3) Ibid p. 198

(4) James E. Dougherty The Horn of Africa: A Map of Political - strategic conflict Cambridge, Massachusetts; Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982 p. 20

(5) Ibid p. 21

(6) Ibid p. 21

(7) For more on the Somali Youth league see Saadia Touval Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa Cambridge; Massachusetts: Havard University Press, 1963 pp.140 - 146

(8) Habte Selassie Op Cit p. 102

(9) Ibid p. 103

10) Wolde Mariam Op Cit p. 209

11) Dougherty Op Cit p. 22

12) Quoted in Africa Today London Africa Journal Ltd, 1981 p. 1152

13) Dougherty Op Cit p. 22

14) Tom J. Farar War Clouds on the Horn of Africa New York: carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979 pp. 97-107

15) Ibid p. 108

16) Habte Selassie Op Cit pp. 105 - 111

17) Ibid pp. 117 - 122

18) Africa Today Op Cit p. 1155

19) Habte Selassie Op Cit pp. 122 - 123

20) Dougherty Op Cit p. 2

(21) Samuel M. Makinda "Conflict and the Super Powers in the Horn of Africa" in Third World Quarterly Vol. 4 No. 1 1982 p. 101

(22) Ibid p. 101

(23) Habte Selassie Op Cit p. 136

(24) Bimbo Osifeso "Superpower Rivalry in the Horn of Africa" in Nigerian Forum Vol. 4 No. 10 1984 p. 256

(25) Ibid p. 256

(26) Ibid pp. 256 - 257

(27) Colin Legum and Bill Lee Conflict in the Horn of Africa New York: African Publishing Company 1977 p. 10

(28) Ibid pp. 10. See also J. Bowyer Bell The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies New York: Crane, Russak and Co. Ltd. 1973 pp. 39 - 40

(29) Osifeso Op Cit p. 251

(30) Ibid p. 251

(31) Quoted in Colin Legum and Bill Lee "Crisis in the Horn of Africa: International Dimensions of the Somali - Ethiopia Conflict in Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1977 - 78 A 41

(32) Ibid p. A 41

(33) Dougherty Op Cit p. 24. See also Bell Op Cit pp. 41 - 42

(34) Dougherty Ibid p. 25

(35) Ibid p. 25

(36) "Somalia: U.S. Charge of Soviet Missile Base Denied" in Africa Diary Vol. 15 No. 31 July - August 1975 pp. 7537 - 7538

(37) Quoted in Legum and Lee Conflict in the Horn of Africa Op Cit p. 12

(38) Dougherty Op Cit p. 29

(39) Ibid p. 30

(40) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78 pp. B 226 - 227

(41) Ibid p. B 228

(42) Ibid p. C 83

(43) In May 1977 the Soviet Union and Ethiopia negotiated a secret Military agreement of which no details were published, but it was estimated that the Soviet Union would provide military aid worth about $ 400 million. See Legum and Lee Crisis in the Horn of Africa Op Cit p . A 43

(44) Ibid p. A 44

(45) "Interview: Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam talks to Raph Uwechue" in Africa No. 79 March 1978 p . 12

(46) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1977 - 78 p. B 229

(47) "Ethiopia : Friendship Treaty with USSR" in Africa Diary Vol. 19 No. 7 February 1974 P. 9384 - 9385

(48) For more on Western conceptions of Soviet designs in the Horn of Africa see Raman G. Bhardwaj The Dilemma of the Horn of Africa New Delhi; Sterling Publishers 1979, p. 136 - 142

(49) Habte Selasie Op Cit p . 142

(50) "Note on Somali Relations with Ethiopiaand Dispute over Frontier" in Keesings Contemporary Archieves May 25th June 1st 1963 p.19432

(51) Quoted in Catherine Hoskyns (ed) Case studies in African Diplomacy Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969 p . 32

(52) Ibid p . 34

(53) Ibid p . 42

(54) "Ethiopia - Somalia Peace Proposals by U Than and the Organization of African Unity" in Keesings Contemporary Archives July 11 - 18 1964 p. 20176

(55) Ibid p. 20176

(56) Hoskyns (ed) Op Cit p. 60

(57) A.O. Chukwura "The Organization of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems 1963 - 1973" in Nigerian Journal of International Studies Vol. 1 No. 1 July 1975 p . 71

(58) Hoskyns (ed) Op Cit p . 65

(59) "Ethiopia and Somalia Peace Appeals by U Thant and the Organization of African Unity" in Keesings Contemporary Archives July 11 - 18, 1964 p . 20177

(60) Hoskyns (ed) Op Cit p. 71 - 72

(61) Chukwura Op Cit p. 72

(62) Quoted in Hoskyns (ed) Op Cit p. 80

(63) "Somali - Ethiopia Agreement" in Keesings Contemporary Archives November 25 to December 2 1967 pp. 22386

(64) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1968 - 69 p. 624

(65) Ibid p. 624

(66) "OAU Efforts to Settle Disputes Between Member States" in Keesings Contemporary Archives June 18 - 24 1973 p. 25955

(67) Ibid p. 25956

(68) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1973 - 74 p. A 32

(69) "Twelth Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Governments" in Keesings Contemporary Archives July 8 - 14 1974 p. 24845

(70) "Ethiopia Dispute with Somalia" in Keesings Contemporary Archives April 2 1976 p. 27654

(71) "The Ethiopia - Somalia Conflict" in keesings Contemporary Archives October 28 1977 p. 28633

(72) "Inconclusive Meeting of the OAU Mediation Commission "in Keesings Contemporary Archives October 28 1977 pp. 28634

(73) Ibid p. 28634

(4) "Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Khartoum" in Keesings Contemporary Archives October 13 1978 p. 29260

(75) Colin Legum (ed) Africa Contemporary Record 1978 - 79 p. C 19

(76) Ibid p. B. 220

(77) Ibid p. C 35

(78) Harry Ododa "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations Since the Ogaden war of 1977 - 78" in Middle Eastern Vol. 21 No. 3 July 1986 p. 284. See also James Mayall "The National Question in the Horn of Africa" in The World Today September 1983 p. 339 - 340

(79) "Ogaden is in Ethiopia" in West Africa 1st September 1980 p. 1680

(80) "Somalia Sends Protest Letter to the OAU Chairman" in Nigerian Herald 1 July 1981 p. 8

(81) Pramila Bennett "Burying the Hatchet" in Africa No. 175 March 1986 p .36

(82) Ibid p. 36.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This study has focused on the factors that affect the conflict resolving capabilities of the OAU as a regional organization. Three conflict situations were used as case studies, and there were two criteria that governed the selection of these case studies. Firstly, these are conflicts that defied resolution by the OAU, and secondly they are conflicts that had at one time or the other attracted foreign intervention.

The theoretical framework that was employed in this study is the functionalist theory of international organization. This theoretical framework was selected for two main reasons. Firstly, because the level of analysis of this study is that of the international organization, functionalism with it's emphasis on the formation and role of international organizations provides and adequate theoretical framework. Secondly, functionalism, because of it's philosophical underpinnings, diverts attention away from the power politics and conflict emphasis of realism towards the conflict resolving and peace promoting roles of international organizations.

This final chapter will consist of a review of the major findings of each of the case studies with respect to the theory of functionalism and the effective functioning of the OAU as a

regional organization. This will be followed by a testing of the hypotheses that were developed in the first chapter across the three case studies. After this a look will be taken at the implications that the study holds for the theory of functionalism. Finally, recommendations will be made that could possibly help the OAU in it's conflict resolving functions.

In looking at the effectiveness of the OAU as a regional organization and the impact of each case study for the theory of functionalism three assumptions were used in each case study The first assumption stated that the affectiveness of the OAU could be determined by looking at the predominance or not of the OAU's responses relative to the responses of extra-systemic actors to the conflict. The second assumption stated that international organizations provide improved frameworks for the conduct of diplomacy. Thirdly, there is the functionalist assumption that the promotion of economic and social cooperation between states can lead to the resolution of conflicts.

With respect to the first assumption the case studies have shown that where extra-systemic actors have responded to conflicts directly through military intervention, the OAU becomes almost completely ineffective in her conflict resolving functions, such interventions by foreign powers have been directed at either preserving or enhancing their interests.

The cases of the Chadian and the Ethiopia' - Somalia conflicts support this. It is in the Chadian conflict that France has deployed her troops most extensively in Africa. In the Ethiopia Somalia conflict the intervention of Soviet and Cuban forces was decisive in the defeat of Somalia. These are instances where foreign intervention have prevailed over attempts by the OAU to resolve the conflict. The Western Sahara dispute has not involved any direct military intervention by an external power. This has resulted in the OAU having more room to engage in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. The support that Morocco recieves from external powers in the form of arms supplies has enabled her to continue the war, thereby counterbalancing the diplomatic efforts of the OAU.

With respect to the second assumption the OAU has provided an improved framework for diplomatic negotiations. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that the OAU is the organizational representation of the African state system and it's major instrument for the resolution of conflicts is diplomacy. The fact that diplomacy can be conducted within the framework of the OAU, however, does not imply that the organization's effort's are always successful. Certain factors do impede it's success. The Chadian civil war provides a case in which the OAU has provided an effective framework for negotiations between the belligerents. However, the factors of foreign intervention, differences and splits between member states over which faction to support have impeded the effectiveness of the organization.

Similarly, the Western Sahara conflict is a case in which the OAU has engaged in a lot of diplomacy. However, this has been impeded by Morocco's constant refusal to negotiate with the Polisario through the framework of the OAU. Indeed after Morocco withdrew from the OAU her government argued that the OAU was not the proper channel through which negotiations over the Western Sahara could continue. Morocco's repudiation of the OAU should nevertheless, be seen in light of the Organization's refusal to recognize Morocco's claims.

In contrast to the Western Sahara dispute, the Ethiopia - Somalia conflict is a case in which the two disputants saw the OAU as the proper framework within which to conduct negotiations. Thus the dispute was tabled before the OAU as early as 1964 and negotiations were carried on within the framework of the OAU until the time of Soviet and Cuban intervention in 1978. Besides these impeding factors, however, the OAU provides a good organizational framework within which African diplomacy can be conducted. The utilization of organizational committees and sub-committees, as well as the individual initiatives of member states attest to this fact. Furthermore, through the OAU the weight of the collective opinion of African states can effectively be brought to bear on the disputants.

With respect to the third assumption, there has been a lot of talk by the OAU about fostering economic and social cooperation

between African states. Unfortunately this has been followed up with very little action. This state of affairs can be attributed largely to the paucity of resources (mainly financial) at the disposal of the OAU and most of the belligerent states. The Ethiopia - Somalia case study provided the only example of the use of this method (although after the defeat of Somalia) to achieve a lasting solution. The formation of the intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development brought together six East African countries that had, at one time or the other, been in conflict with each other.

In the first chapter of this study three hypotheses were developed. They were premised on the axiom that the OAU, as the institutional representation of the African regional system, has it's functions regionally defined in that it's locus of operation lies within the African regional system. Furthermore, this system is itself acted upon by forces within the international global system.

The hypotheses that were developed are:-

(1) The ineffectiveness of the OAU at conflict resolution is partially a consequence of an institutional characteristic in which there is a low level of discretionary powers below the level of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments.

(2) The diffuse nature of power at the strategic decision making level of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government increases the

likelihood of a politicized decision making process. This derives from the fact that states enter international organizations with a view to enhancing their national interests or at a minimum, to promote them.

(3) A conflict resolution process that is augmented by the manifestation of power by the international organization e.g a multinational force, will lead to a greater restraint towards (a) the intensification of the conflict by both disputants, and (b) the propensity of either disputant to seek foreign intervention.

By and large the case studies support the first hypothesis which states that the ineffectiveness of the OAU at conflict resolution is partially the result of a low level of discretionary powers below the level of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. This fact is made clear in the OAU Charter where it is stated that "The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments shall be the Supreme organ of the Organization".

The constrictive role that the distribution of power plays in the OAU's attempts to resolve conflicts lies in the fact that the institutions below the level of the Assembly are not given a free hand to take independent initiatives towards resolving conflicts. Both the council of Ministers and the Administrative Secretary General are subordinate to the Assembly and recieve instructions from it. A number of examples from the case studies indicate that

the A organs below the Assembly are not allowed to take initiatives in resolving conflicts, rather, such roles have been usurped by the Heads of States.

The OAU mediation committee that was set up by Gabon, the then current Chairman of the OAU; in August 1977 comprised the Heads of states of Algeria, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique, and Cameroon. The ad hoc committee (Committee of "wise men") which was set up at the Khartoum summit in August 1978 to look into the Western Sahara dispute similarly consisted of Heads of states from Mali Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria and the then-current OAU Chairman. After it's first meeting this ad hoc committee delegated it's responsibilities to a sub-committee which consisted of the Heads of states of Nigeria and Mali along with the OAU Secretary General. The role of the Secretary General was more in the capacity of an assistant to the sub-committee than an active member at par with the two Heads of States. A similar situation can be found in the case of the Ethiopia - Somalia dispute. In an attempt to improve relations between the two countries the OAU, during the Addis Ababa summit in May 1973, established an eight - member good offices committee which comprised Heads of states from Nigeria, Lesotho, Cameroon, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania.

In none of the above cases was any of the institutions below the level of the Assembly allowed the discretion of initiating

conflict resolving measures that might augment the moves that were already being made by the Heads of States. Outside the institution of the Assembly, attempts at resolving conflicts have been carried out largely by individual Heads of states acting in third party roles that have been legitimized and assisted by the OAU. A case in point was the role played by Nigeria in organizing conferences between the rival Chadian factions in Kano and Lagos. Such activities have not been conducted within the Framework of the OAU, but they have recieved it's endorsement.

One incident that brings to light the constricted nature of power below the Assembly was the act by Edem Kodjo, the current Secretary General, of granting the SADR admission into the OAU in August 1981. While his action was carried out within the legal limits of the Charter he recieved severe reprimands from member states for allegedly having acted beyond his powers. Although this act was not in the direction of conflict resolution the implication it held was that an OAU functionary below the level of the Assebly was "illegally" committing the Organization along a specific path (which the OAU did eventually follow).

The case studies also give support to the second hypothesis which attributes the politicized decision making process at the level of the Assembly to the diffuseness of power distribution i.e one vote to each member state, and the fact that member states try to enhance or protect their national interests.

The Charter states that "each member state shall have one vote" and that "all resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority

of members of the Organization". Given such a distribution of power the political process within the Assembly will involve a lot of bargaining, giving and taking of concessions, and the formation of coalitions, cliques and factions.

The case studies suggest that such politics within the Assembly has reached extents whereby resolutions cannot be arrived at. At the Council of Ministers summit (which precedes the Heads of States summit) held in Monrovia in July 1979, there was controversy over whether the Chad delegation representing the Transitional Government of National Unity in Ndjamena should be seated. Nigeria and Libya opposed the seating of the delegation, while the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister expressed doubts as to wether the conference had the power to determine the authority of the only Chad delegation. Because of this impasse the decision was made not to seat the delegation.

Another case in point were the two abortive summits that Col. Gaddafi tried to hold in August and November 1982. The first summit collapsed mainly because of opposition towards the seating of the SADR and Gaddafi's attempts to press for the recognition of Goukouni Wedde, as the legitimate Chadian representative. The second summit from which the SADR voluntarily stayed away, collapsed because of attempts by Gadaffi to seat Goukouni Weddei's delegation instead of Hissen Habre's delegation to which the OAU had sent an invitation. In an attempt to resolve the dispute a three point "compromise" was announced which stated that (1) the Ndjamena delegation which was sent an invitation by the OAU was awarded the Chad seat but (2) the present government of Chad should be asked to stay voluntarily

away from the summit and should announce this publicly, and (3) no attempt should be made to seat any other delegation. This "compromise" effectively swept under the carpet a problem that the OAU was trying to solve.

When an attempt is made to link these two failed summits to the axiom that member states try to enhance their national interests within the organization, it could be argued that most of the OAU member states did not percieve it to be in their national interests to attend a summit that was being hosted by Gaddafi. Indeed they did not see it to be in the interest of the OAU for which the annual Heads of states summit is institutionalized. It could also be argued that by boycotting the summit, these states were not only acting on their own conception of their national interests but were to some extent projecting external interests into the OAU. This is because on 30 June, 1981, the U.S. government circulated letters to certain African leaders dissuading them from allowing Libya to host the summit. To the extent that these leaders boycotted the summit because of foreign pressure, to that extent they were representing foreign interests within the organization.

No information was found to support the third hypothesis which states that a multinational peace-keeping force will curb the intensification of a conflict by the disputants and hence their propensity to seek foreign intervention. The only situation in which the OAU used a multinational force was the Chad conflict, and the evidence obtained from there disproves these two claims.

The circumstances under which the peace-keeping force was deployed was actually decisive in allowing Hissen Habre's FAN to recapture Ndjamena. Before the OAU force was deployed Gaddafi's troops were asked to leave by Goukouni Weddei thereby creating a power vacuum in Ndjamena. Secondly the functions of the peace-keeping force were ill-defined such that it was not clear wether they were supposed to play an active, or a passive and neutral peace-keeping role.

These two factors heightened Goukouni Weddei's fears for the security of his government and he stated categorically that if the OAU forces would not maintain his government he would feel free to call back the Libyans which he eventually did not get the chance to do. The power vacuum that was created by the departure of the Libyan forces combined with the passive role of the OAU force gave Hissen Habre the opportunity to strike and recapture power, an act which necessitated the intensification of the conflict. One of the reasons that have been put forward for Libya's withdrawal from Chad was that the return of Hissen Habre would justify further Libyan intervention.

Overall, the paucity of financial and material resources, coupled with the absence of a clearly defined role rendered the OAU force ineffective in curbing the conflict and preventing foreign intervention.

The testing of these hypotheses in light of the information that have been gathered ushers in the next part of this chapter which will focus on the implications that this study holds for the

the theory of functionalism. In the first chapter it was stated that James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff identified an important assumption which underpins the theory of functionalism. It states that "Political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system"[1]. The factors that form the bases of the cohesiveness of such systems include "procedural consensus" or general agreements as regards the processes whereby resolutions are made, and "substantive consensus" or general agreement concerning the resolutions or outputs of the system.

With reference to this study it is quite clear that although an appreciable measure of procedural consensus does exist among the OAU member states it outstrips whatever substantive consensus there is. This assessment is exhibited in the fact that although the member states agree on the working of the OAU as an institution they are still quite averse to submitting themselves to the dictates of the outputs of the OAU i.e the resolutions, in the organizations attempts to resolve conflicts. This fact can be seen in the way that Morocco has consistently refused to observe OAU resolutions aimed at resolving her war with the Polisario.

Even the procedural consensus of the OAU itself has been thrown into question as the study displays. The general opprobrium that attended the admission of the SADR by Edem Kodjo, the OAU Secretary General, can be looked at not only in the light of practical politics and the potentially divisive impact of such an act, but also in light of

the fact that an act which followed the legal dictates of the Charter was being questioned. In effect there was a breakdown in procedural consensus.

While we can attribute the periodic breakdown in procedural consensus within the OAU to practical politics, the more enduring absence of substantive consensus can be attributed to the reluctance of the member states to vest the OAU with any more real powers than it already possesses i.e a reluctance to transfer a greater "slice of sovereignty" to the Organization. Thus Evan Luard cites that one of the serious handicaps that international organizations face is "the resistances to changes that involve a transfer of authority from the national state to a higher level."[2]

The theory of functionalism itself has been described by Inis Claule as "essentially an absertion and defence of the propositior that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war."[3] The OAU, which is a functional organization by virtue of it's multi-purpose nature, has not been able to institutionalize it's earlier successes in the field of conflict resolution, due primarily to the factor of power politics and the primacy that it's member states put on their national interests over the goals of the Organization.

Also as a result of it's lack of financial and material resources the OAU has not been able to intensify it's involvement in the economic sphere of inter-African relations so that member states can gain more economically by cooperating with the Organization and

subjecting themselves to it's dictates rather than opposing it. Nevertheless, the OAU has actively supported the development of sub-regional functional organizations. The extent to which the sub-regional organizations may act to check inter-state conflict by emphasizing economic cooperation constitutes fertile ground for furture research.

In conclusion therefore, although functionalism prescribes peace through cooperation, the study of the conflict resolving capability of any functional organization has to be done within it's political context. This does not in any way, however, detract from the thesis that functional cooperation among nations is a powerful vehicle for the promotion of peace.

The assessments that have been made so far brings us to the final part of this chapter which consists of some recommendations that may help to strengthen the conflict resolving capabilities of the OAU. The practicability or applicability of these recommendations might be altogether debatable, nevertheless it is important to make these recommendations after some of the shortcoming of the Organization have been identified.

The OAU was founded as a multi-purpose regional organization with the capacity to deal with conflicts that arise between member states. Among the advantages that the OAU has enjoyed is that it includes all the independent African states as members. The OAU thereby provides a forum where African leaders can meet on a periodic basis. Under such circumstances African leaders can meet with each other and discuss, negotiate and bargain with each other.

Such meetings facilitate diplomacy at the highest level. Not only the fact that a fraternal atmosphere engulfs the participants at any summit, but also the fact that there is the presence of third leaders who can help in bringing belligerent leaders together helps this process of diplomacy.

Despite the advantages of summit level diplomacy, however, a factor that has served to undermine the benefits of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is the lack of attendance on the part of the leaders themselves. The Organization could play an active role in curbing such absenteeism by embarking an a campaign directed at the Heads of States themselves, calculated at making them more aware of the real detriments caused by their absence and the potential benefits to be derived from their presence. For those purposes the services of the Secretary General could be employed.

This brings as to a second but related recommendation which dwells on the power of the Organization to implement it's resolutions. As is stated in the Charter of the OAU the Organization is vested with very limited authority, and as such resolutions have no real binding force. The Organization depends on voluntary compliance and cooperation on the part of it's members. In view of this fact thought could be given towards the creation of a small permanent organ of the OAU which would be similar to the Security Council of the United Nations.[4] Such an organ would consist of a few member states that would be empowered by the OAU to take initiatives on certain issues, and take decisions that would commit the organization as a whole. Such an organ could also meet more frequently than the Assembly thereby giving more time to certain issues.

Another advantage would be that the fratricidal politics that usually attends and stifles the Heads of states summits could be averted or reduced to a bare minimum. It would also have the benefit of giving the Organization some more authority because such an organ would require that the member states give up a greater degree of sovereignty to the OAU.

As an alternative to this the office of the Secretary General could be vested with greater powers so that he can play a greater role in African diplomacy than he does at present. In order to play such a role his powers could be expanded beyond merely implementing the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. His powers could be expanded to include the initiating of political moves on behalf of the OAU, and the conduct of negotiations between member states on behalf of the OAU. In this respect he could also be made to take active part in negotiating teams and committees that are established by the OAU.

A fourth and final recommendation which is in keeping with the functionalist thesis lies in the promotion of regional and sub-regional economic integration among African states. Presumably, when the economies of African states become sufficiently interlinked and interdependent the possibility of conflicts generating between the member states will reduce. In April 1980 the OAU held an economic summit in Lagos,[5] which was aimed at the formulation of a plan of action intended to lead to greater economic integration in Africa at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels. This is expected to pave the way for the establishment of

an African common Market and the eventual formation of an African Economic Community.

According to the plan African nations are expected to strengthen the existing regional economic communities and establish other economic groupings in other sub-regions in order to cover the continent as a whole. This, in addition to increased sectoral integration, is expected to lead to the creation of a continent-wide economic community by the year 2000. The potential for such sectoral integration to facilitate the resolution of conflicts can not be under estimated because it was the formation of such an organization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), that heralded the beginning of a peaceful and cooperative relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia. The major significance of the formation of this sub-regional functional organization is the fact that the six countries that comprise it's membership have all had frictions in their relationships with one another over the years. Thus through the formation of such organizations member states realize that they stand to gain more through peaceful social and economic cooperation, which is a major postulate of the theory of functionalism.

FOOTNOTES

(1) James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgratt Contending Theories of International Relations New York. Harper and Row, 1971 pp. 417

(2) Evan Luard "The Process of Change in International Organization" in Evan Luard (ed) The Evolution of International Organizations London: Thames and Hudson 1966 pp. 11

(3) Inis Claude Swords Into Plowshares London: University of London Press 1970 pp. 345.

(4) See "Interview with William Eteki Mboumoun, OAU Administrative Secretary General" in Africa No. 83 July 1978 pp. 21
See also "Libreville Summit: Reforming the OAU" in Africa No. 71 July 1977 pp. 66.

(5) "OAU leaders Agree to Have Common Market" in New Nigerian 1 May 1980 pp. 2.

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