

THE ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE OF ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT
TERRORISM IN SELECTED NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER (2014 – 2016)

BY

OMEBIJE, Theophilus
P13SSMM8005

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES,
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE IN
MASS COMMUNICATION

JANUARY, 2018

DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation entitled “The Analysis of the Coverage of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Terrorism in Selected Nigerian Newspapers(2014 – 2016)”, has been carried out by me in the Department of Mass Communication, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other institution.

OMEBIJE, Theophilus

Date

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled “The Analysis of the Coverage of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Terrorism in Selected Nigerian Newspapers(2014 – 2016)” by Omebije Theophilus meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Masters of Science in Mass Communication of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Yakubu Ozohu-Suleiman, Ph.D.
Chairman, Supervisory Committee

Signature

Date

Maryam Ibrahim, Ph.D.
Member, Supervisory Committee

Signature

Date

Shamsuddeen Mohammed, Ph.D.
Head of Department

Signature

Date

Prof. Sadiq Z Abubakar
Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies

Signature

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to God Almighty for His undeserved Grace; to my parent and siblings for their encouragement and I also dedicate this work to all the victims of terrorism worldwide.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most thankful to Almighty God, for enabling me to accomplish this work. May all the glory, honour and blessing be unto Him. Also, my special thanks go to my supervisors Dr. Yakubu Ozohu-Suleiman and Dr Maryam Ibrahim for their assiduous support, advice and overall supervision during my research. Furthermore, my appreciation goes to all my Lecturers and staff of Mass Communication Department who in one way or the other contributed to the success of this program. Also, I am thankful to Prof Farouk, my external examiner as well as Dr. Adama Adamu and Dr. Tijjani Haliru for their thorough contribution in making this work better.

I thank the friends- Chiazor Offia and Timothy Usue- who, without charge, assisted me in the content coding for this study, may God bless you abundantly. Furthermore, my heart felt appreciation goes to the Leaders and members of Charismatic Renewal Ministry (CRM), Maiduguri, Borno State especially the Ushering unit for tarrying with me in the place of prayer all through this work. Similarly, the support of Gospel Faith International (GOFAMINT) is fondly appreciated.

The encouragement of my parents and siblings is well appreciated, including the great sacrifices of my elder brother, Victor, in running errands. I must acknowledge George, Benjamin, Paul, Emmanuel, Elizabeth and Cecilia for their unwavering prayer and support. My gratitude goes out to my peaceful neighbours: Maryam, Martha and Rhoda, for the enabling environment accorded me.

I must acknowledge my good friends, confidants and colleagues, Yakubu Daniel and Emmanuel Onuchi for their high level of maturity and advice. Finally, my gratitude goes to the entire management and staff of Yola Electricity Distribution Company (YEDC) Bulumkutu Business

Unit, especially the Head of Human Resources, Hajjia Aisha for granting me permission, even at short notices, for journeys during the period of this research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION:-----	i
CERTIFICATION:-----	ii
DEDICATION:-----	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:-----	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS:-----	v
LIST OF TABLES:-----	viii
LISTS OF FIGURES:-----	ix
ABSTRACT:-----	x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION -----	1
1.1 Background to the Research:-----	1
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem:-----	5
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives:-----	7
1.4 Research Questions:-----	7
1.5 Scope of the Research:-----	8
1.6 Limitation of the Study:-----	9
1.7 Significance of the Study:-----	9
1.8 Justification for the Choice of <i>Daily Trust, The Guardian and Punch</i> Newspapers--	12
1.9 Definition of Key Terms:-----	14
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK --	15

2.1 Introduction:-----	15
2.2 Conceptual Review of Terrorism:-----	15

2.2.1	International Community’s Conceptualisation of Terrorism: -----	19
2.2.2	Government and Security Agencies’ Description of Terrorism: -----	22
2.2.3	Academia’s Definition of Terrorism: -----	24
2.3	Causes of Terrorism: -----	28
2.3.1	Liberal School of Thought: -----	29
2.3.2	Conservative School of Thought: -----	30
2.3.3	Radical School of Thought: -----	31
2.3.3.1	Liberal School of Thought: as Modified: -----	32
2.4	Marginalisation as a cause to ISIL formation: -----	33
2.4.1	Foreign Influence as a cause to ISIL formation: -----	33
2.4.2	Arab Spring as a Cause to ISIL Formation: -----	34
2.5	Motives of Terrorists: -----	35
2.5.1	Political Ideology: -----	35
2.5.2	Ethno-Nationalism: -----	36
2.5.3	Religious Extremism: -----	37
2.6	Victims of Terrorism: -----	38
2.7	Security Landscape in Nigeria: An Overview: -----	39
2.8	Terrorism and Media: -----	40
2.9	Terrorists Using the Media: -----	42
2.10	Objectives of Terrorists’ Use of the Media: -----	47
2.11	Framing Patterns Used by Nigerian Newspapers in Crises Situations: -----	48
2.12	Extant Empirical Literature: -----	50
2.13	Theoretical Framework: -----	56

2.13.1 Framing Theory: -----	56
2.13.2 Assumptions of Framing Theory: -----	57
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY -----	61
3.1. Introduction: -----	61
3.2. Research Method: -----	61
3.3. Data Description and Sources: -----	62
3.4. Content Analysis: -----	63
3.5. Content Population: -----	64
3.6. Sample Frame: -----	64
3.7. Unit of Analysis: -----	65
3.8. Content Categories: -----	66
3.8.1. Content Categories and Sub-Categories: -----	66
3.9. Content Coding Instrument and Procedure: -----	68
3.10. Research Methodological Gap in Previous Studies: -----	69
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ---	70

4.1. Introduction: -----	70
4.2. Data Presentation: -----	70
4.3. Discussion of Findings: -----	78
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --	90
5.1 Summary: -----	90
5.2 Conclusion: -----	90
5.3 Recommendations: -----	91

5.4	Suggestions for Further Studies: -----	92
	REFERENCES -----	94
	APPENDICES -----	99
LIST OF TABLES:		
Table 2:1:	Distinct Features of Definitions of Terrorism: -----	18
Table 4.1:	Cross Tabulation of Newspapers Showing Causes of ISIL Terrorism: ----	70
Table 4.2:	Cross-Tabulation Showing Victims of ISIL Terrorism: -----	71
Table 4.3:	Cross-tabulation of coverage of motives of ISIL: -----	72
Table 4.4:	Framing of Solution to ISIL Terrorism: -----	73
Table 4.5:	Prominence of ISIL Coverage in the Sampled Newspapers: -----	75
Table 4.6:	Sources of News on ISIL Terrorism in Nigerian Newspapers: -----	76
LIST OF FIGURES		
Figure 1:	The Borders of ISIL’s Planned Caliphate: -----	2
Figure 2:	An Integrated Process of Framing: -----	58

ABSTRACT

This study examines how some of Nigerian newspapers (*DailyTrust*, *Punch* and *TheGuardian*) presented the Islamic State of Iraq of the Levant (ISIL) terrorism to local audiences in the period of March 2014 to March 2016. Through content analysis, an aggregate of 732 content population was coded into definitive categories of Causes, Motives and Victims of the ISIL terrorists' formation. The study is anchored on the Framing Theory. The study found that the three Nigerian newspapers studied situate the causes of the ISIL terrorism on sectarian marginalization in Middle East that operates within the larger framework of the Euro-American global power play, and to a lesser extent, the Arab Spring. The intent/motives of ISIL are presented as ethno-nationalistic, and an advancement of the group's ideology interfaced with religious extremism. The ISIL victims are largely unspecified in the newspapers' presentations. Furthermore, the findings revealed that the two Southern Nigerian newspapers studied had more articles on ISIL than the Northern newspaper. Also, majority of the sources of ISIL news articles in the selected Nigerian newspapers were from the international media. The study concludes that there was uniformity in the three Nigerian newspapers' framing of the causes and motives of ISIL terrorism except for differences in the level of prominence attached to the ISIL conflict. Also, *Punch* and *The Guardian* newspapers' framing of victims of ISIL terrorism were unspecified whereas *Daily Trust* framed most of the victims to be Shiites. The study, among other things, recommends that the Nigerian newspapers make more concerted effort to report international terrorism such as ISIL terrorism from a firsthand stand point.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.8 Background to the Research

There is consensus among scholars alluding to the fact terrorism has become democratized across the globe especially after September 11, 2001 (Watts, 2015; Gersten, 2015). The scale, causes, motives and target-victims may differ from group to group; however, groups with violent extremism have rapidly emerged world over in the 21st century (Allen, 2015; Rudd, 2015). From the suicide bombing in the Holy city of Jeddah to Boko Haram attacks in North-Eastern Nigeria, and from attacks on Turkish airline to attacks of synagogues in France, almost all parts of the world are facing one form of violent insurrection or the other. The reason for this increase is complex and intertwined however, Welsh (2010: 1) say:

Some use terrorism to convince opponents to concede to their demands. Other terrorist groups seek to provoke authorities into engaging in indiscriminate repression, which will undermine support for the government and justify the use of terrorist violence. Some use violence to demonstrate to current and potential supporters a capacity to deliver powerful blows against their opponents.

Thus, violent extremism is not a problem restricted to one part of the globe whereas other parts are in placidity; instead it is a global phenomenon. More so, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has revolutionised the idea of extremism. ISIL has gone beyond just an extremist fighting force; it has also grown into an ideology- an ideology complex enough to entice others-across cultures and national boundaries- to join their campaign (Stohl, 2014; Lister, 2014). As Watts (2015:2) noted “ISIL recruits often have limited understanding of their religion. They instead find motivation to fight in Syria and Iraq because of social and psychological reasons rather than simply ideological justifications.”

ISIL rose from Al-Qaeda and espoused an ideology of creating a caliphate or an Islamic state with its ruler called a caliph. This state is to be ruled according to Islam and is to be established in the Levant region which cut across present day Iraq, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon (Global Terrorism index, 2014). This idea is reflective of their name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). On June 29, 2014 ISIL had declared the establishment of a caliphate stretching across 423 miles of Iraq and Syria (Lister, 2014). Its use of force to achieve this goal has drawn global attention including from Nigeria.




Figure I: the borders of ISIL’s planned caliphate (source: <http://www.aun-tv.com>)

In mid- December, 2014, a BBC report said 5000 people were killed in the month of November alone across nations like Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria. It also said ISIL was responsible for 44% of the deaths and placed alongside ISIL Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Taliban as the most deadly groups responsible for the actions in these countries (Cited in Stohl, 2014). Also in 2015, Boko Haram-Nigeria’s most feared extremist group- pledged allegiance to ISIL (*Daily Trust*, March 8, 2015)

ISIL's 'feats' are possible because of its financial base of 2 billion dollars gotten from its sales of crude oil and its large number of active members which are drawn from all parts of the world making it both the richest and largest terrorist formation globally (PressTV, 28 November, 2014). Denselow (2015: 4) in describing ISIL says "Hordes of black clad fighters overrunning historic Middle Eastern cities, brutal Hollywood-style executions and thousands of recruits flocking from across the globe has made the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) a priority enemy as its shift from contagion to pandemic gathers momentum."

ISIL's recruiting strength is a result of its initiative of using the media, specifically the internet as a propaganda tool to appeal to all class of people, across national boundaries and cultural divides. Grestan (2015:2) admitted:

Violent extremist groups – such as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – are leveraging online tools to propagate messages of violence, identify and groom potential recruits, and supplement real-world recruitment efforts. ISIL's public messaging and social media is exceedingly slick and dangerously effective.

The scale of use and slickness of ISIL's content on the internet is that ingredient that has made ISIL different from past and even present existing extremists groups (Watts, 2015). Also, the internet factor has complicated counter-terrorism actions against ISIL even from technologically advanced nations in the West. Watts (2015: 2) explaining this complexity says

Engagement in the online space has proven a struggle for the West as well. The Internet and social media, by design, allow users to access highly desired content and block out undesirable content. Those attracted to ISIL's online narratives can simply avoid or disengage from Western messages that positively promote an alternative to jihadist extremism. Additionally, Western online engagement remains highly constrained by bureaucratic approval processes and slow development timelines. Jihadi social media moves in seconds and minutes, but Western responses occur over days, weeks and months. Lower quality, slow developing, lackluster counter

narrative content will never match the proclivity of ISIL's online media campaign.

With this across-the-board galvanising capacity the internet provides ISIL, it has forced the international community to come up with a response to ISIL's ideology and methods. More so, Nigeria, being part of the international community and a nation not new to conflicts and terrorisms, it is necessary to study the way the Nigerian media framed an international extremist group such as ISIL which has domestic implication.

In the matrix of terrorists and the terrorised, the media plays an indispensable role. Both the terrorists and terrorised seek the media howbeit for different purposes. Whereas the terrorists use the media to amplify fear in an audience beyond the microcosm of those directly affected in a threat or actual attack, the terrorised use the media to understand the identity, ideology, motivations and target victims of the terrorists (Nacos, 2007; Hoffman, 2006; Lumbaca, & Gray, 2011; Stannard, 2006). The European Union security agency, Transnational Terrorism, Security and Rule of Law (TTSRL), (2008: 3) says

In most cases, terrorist attacks are very localized, and affect only a few people. The goal, however, is to spread the message to more people than just those who were directly hit in the attack. The media play an important role in achieving this by spreading the news of the attacks or even by directly transferring the message of terrorist organizations.

By satisfying these two publics (terrorists and terrorised), the media do not only fulfil their traditional obligations but also increase their advertising revenue through increased viewership, listenership, or readership- as the case may be (Rivera, 2016). Thus, the aggregate audience attention to the content of the media creates the much needed market for the media. This is because terrorism in the media keeps the audience glued to the media over a longer period of time. Spencer (2012: 9) avers that

It has become widely accepted that there is an almost symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media as terrorism provides for exciting and violent stories which help sell the news product and the media provides terrorist groups with a means of spreading their message and creating fear among the general public.

There is, therefore no gainsaying that the framing of terrorism is very important and deserves to be studied because the media gives the audience the frame in which the activities of the extremist group can be understood (Hoffman, 2006; Jenkins, 1975 Nacos, 2007). In the study of the framing of terrorism, scholars have agreed that the media report terrorists' activities along five frames namely: who, causes, victims, motives and solution frames. (Cunningham, 2003; Allan and Zelizer, 2002; Chigozi, nd). The explanation given for this categorisation of framing terrorism is that immediately a terror attack happens, the media ask the following questions: what is the identity of the group (who frame), what led to their rise (cause frame), who are their target victims (target frame), what do the group intend to achieve (motive/reasons frame) and what is the government doing to confront the terrorist activities (solution frame). In studying Nigerian newspapers framing of ISIL terrorism, this study adopts four of the five frames exempting 'who frame' as the identity of the group in this study is already ascertained.

1.9 Statement of the Research Problem

Framing in essence is what the media does. What matters is not only what is said in the media but how it is said; it is the way a story is told that is important. This is because the way a story is told can potentially skew the perception of a person or group of persons in a certain direction in relation to the issue framed in the media (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013; Cohen-Almagor, 2006; Entman, 1993). Pate (2015: 3) explains that "the media is strategically important in helping the majority of our people to form their opinions about their immediate and distant environments". Extremists Violent Groups (EVGs) are well aware of this potential in the media and

consequently carry out distinct horrible violence with novelty that attracts media attention because they know the media parlance “if it bleeds, it leads”. Welsh (2010: 1) explains “Media attention is an important vehicle by which terrorists communicate with their audiences, and thus a central goal of many terrorist groups is to influence *the scale and tone* of media attention to their attacks” [emphasis added]. The reference to the scale and tone makes us understand that EVGs are not satisfied with just being in the media, they are really after how they appear in the media-the framing of them in the media.

Studies have been carried out on the etymology of terrorism, the effects of terrorist incidents on affected populations, and the impact of terrorist threats. The same is true for the news about governmental terror alerts, warnings, and assessments (Spencer, 2012, Nacos, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, 2006; TTSRL, 2008; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Hoffman 2006; Lumbaka&Gray, 2011). Similarly, many more studies have been conducted on media framing of terrorist elements and reaction of audience to such frames (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013; Stannard, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Nacos& Torres- Reyne, 2002; Cohen-Almagor, 2006; TTRLS, 2008; Welsh, 2010). In one of such studies, it was concluded that mere threat, heavily mass mediated achieves at least part of what actual terrorism achieves (Nacos, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, 2006). Similarly, Ozohu-Suleiman (2013) correlated the coverage of Israel-Palestine conflict in the international media with the perception of the conflict in the third world (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013). In same vein, studies have been conducted on Nigerian newspaper framing of foreign news. Uche and Ngumoba (1996) compared Nigerian and British media coverage of the botched kidnap of UmaruDikko. Also, Cherry (1985) studied the sources of foreign news in Nigerian newspaper. In a study, Dare (1973) looked at Nigeria’s newspaper coverage of the Yom Kippur war between Israel and Arab in 1973 and Nwuneli (1971) examined the logistical and

professional capacity of the Nigerian press to conduct on-the-spot reports of conflicts in foreign countries.

While researchers have dealt with all these angles of terrorism which include the terrorists, the terrorised and the media, and have examined the presence of foreign news in the Nigerian media, this study examines the framing of an international terrorist group in a local media for the local population. This study also relates the findings to the prevailing security situation in the country. Therefore, this study closes this gap by studying the frames in which *Daily Trust*, *Punch* and *The Guardian* newspapers in Nigeria cover ISIL terrorism.

1.10 Research Aim and Objectives

The main aim of this research is to examine the frames in which major Nigerian newspapers (*Daily Trust*, *Guardian*, and *Punch*) covered ISIL terrorism. The objectives of the study are:

1. To find out what the three newspapers framed as the causes of the rise of ISIL terrorism.
2. To identify the victims of ISIL terrorism from the coverage in the selected Nigerian newspapers.
3. To analyse the Nigerian newspaper framing of the motives/reasons behind ISIL terrorism.
4. To find out the level of prominence given to the coverage of ISIL terrorism stories in the three newspapers under study.
5. To identify the major sources of news on ISIL terrorism in the selected Nigerian newspapers.

1.4 Research Questions

The research is guided by the following questions:

1. How has the three selected Nigerian newspapers framed the causes of ISIL terrorism?

2. Who have the selected Nigeria newspapers portrayed as the victims of ISIL terrorism?
3. From the Nigeria newspapers' perspective, what are the motives/reasons behind ISIL terrorism?
4. What is the level of prominence of coverage on ISIL in the three newspapers under study during the period under review?
5. What are the major sources of news on ISIL terrorism in the three newspapers under study?

1.5 Scope of the Research

The scope of the study falls within the period of March, 2014 – March, 2016. The reason is ISIL began and escalated their operations around March, 2014 to the point of declaring a caliphate that stretched across 423 miles of Iraq and Syria. Also, it was within this period many international military coalitions were formed to combat ISIL. This include the Western led Coalition to Counter ISIL in which some Arab countries are part of; Russia and Iran separately got involved to also combat ISIL formation. Also many other non-states militarised groups like Hezbollah, Pershmega forces and Iran Quds Force got involved. Thus the period under review saw numerous ISIL and counter ISIL activities and the Nigerian media is expected to have covered these developments.

The content was sought from news texts and articles available on the web archive of *Daily Trust*, *The Guardian and Punch* newspapers within the period under study excluding advertisements.

The analysis focused on news and articles (features, briefings, opinions) and key words as may fit into certain established categories in relation to the research objectives. A thematic analysis as described in the content analysis was used in the study. However the study excludes adverts, pictures and videos. Similarly, the study also excluded corroborating articles linked to the article

via hyperlinks which do not belong to any of the sample in this study but the hyperlinked word itself was part of the study. This is to avoid ambiguity of content population. Space and time measurement of units are also excluded, however, the frequency of news stories and articles on ISIL was considered.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

There were areas this study is limited and it must be clearly identified:

- a. Odd number of newspapers is used- in this case three- so that if two newspapers agree with a framing then such frame is taken as the dominant frame although even the minor frame is still discussed.
- b. Only manifest content is analysed from the selected newspapers: this means that it is only the text present that was content analysed. There were no latent meaning that was attributed to any of the text.
- c. There were only three (3) newspapers studied: even though these papers are national newspapers in Nigeria, it must be stated that the result may not be generalizable on the whole of the Nigerian newspaper.
- d. The study is limited to the study of only ISIL reportage in the three selected newspapers.
- e. There was the use of a single theoretical framework which was sufficient for the research objectives

1.7. Significance of the Study

In the past, the Nigerian media has reported events that were on-going in other countries and as a result of the reportage Nigeria is plunged into chaos which resulted in the loss of lives and

properties. Instances such as Denmark's Jllands-Posten Mohammed Cartoons controversy in 2005; the Egyptian satirical drama about Prophet Mohammed in 2012; the coverage of Israel-Palestine wars and the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015 have had dramatic effects in Nigeria. The reason for such reactions from the Nigerian audience can be diverse and complex however one simple explanation is that the world has shrunk into a global community which share ideological and psychological proximity to one another. People are more integrated in their beliefs and readily share homogenous ideological sympathy irrespective of geographical boundaries. (Jan, 2009).

As the globe shrinks into a community and Nigeria being part of that global community, Nigeria is not insulated from the happenings around the globe. Therefore, this sense of proximity added to the framing of the media of such incidences make for sympathy and eventual violent reaction from Nigerians often against fellow Nigerians who are innocent. Pate (2015: 3) says "the media and other means of information dissemination and exchange occupy a central position in the *process of decision making, opinion formation and behaviour manifestation*" [emphasis added].

Today, the world has further integrated into a global village. This is also the case with ideas, extremist groups and allegiances. The media is central to this global integration on various fronts. Pate (2015: 3) says "the media can conveniently convey an individual's mind without moving him physically from one part of the country [or the world] to another". This proximity is amplified when the activities of ISIL are reported via popular opinion-shaping newspapers. Allen, (2015) says "ISIL is not simply a Syria problem or an Iraq problem... ISIL and other extremists present a global danger which requires a global, coordinated, and enduring response." Thus the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria and the activities of the terrorist formation can have effect on Nigerians. This is so because Nigeria just as Syria and Iraq is a multicultural, pluralistic and

heterogeneous country. The three countries share a number of religious and socio-political similarities. For instance, the three countries are made of significant number of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians. And socio-politically, there is some level of tension among these groups in all three countries especially during political transitions and elections.

Furthermore, despite the present administration's focus of fighting corruption, defeating insurgency and attaining economic development, Pate (2015: 3) describes Nigeria as a setting "where the points of shocks and conflict are manifold and widespread." Nigeria is faced with numerous intractable pockets of violent groups and general state of insecurity and fear across the six geo-political regions: In the North-East embattled Boko Haram still poses substantial threat; the North-West has cattle rustling and elements of religious fundamentalism. In the South-West Kidnapping is on the rise; while the problems in the North-central are ethnic tension and the marauding bands of suspected herdsmen. The South-South is faced with Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and similar groups' vandalism of oil infrastructure; whereas in the South-East, the rise of the secessionist group, Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) poses its own threat (Pate, 2015). All these groups and situations are rudimentary when compared with the conquest of ISIL however, it is important to know that any of these can escalate to that same level of extremism by drawing inspiration from the media framing of ISIL. In fact NDA, in some media is already, framed as economic terrorists (*Vanguard* 29, 2016; *Daily Trust*, 28, 2016) and since the position and content of the media cannot be taken for granted in shaping the behaviour and attitude of the citizens and even foreigners (Pate, 2015), it is therefore important to study the frames in which leading opinion-shaping newspapers in Nigeria such as- *Daily Trust*, *The Guardian* and *Punch* categorise ISIL terrorism to the local audience.

1.8. Justification for the Choice of *Daily Trust*, *The Guardian* and *Punch* Newspapers

This study makes use of three Nigerian national dailies which include: *Daily Trust*, *The Guardian* and *Punch* newspapers. They are all privately-owned newspapers with *The Guardian* and *Punch* published in Lagos whereas *Daily Trust* is published in Abuja. Three newspapers- which is an odd number- were selected in order to be able to arrive that the popular frame used by Nigerian newspapers in the coverage of ISIL terrorism. This means that if two out of the three newspapers report ISIL in a particular frame then that frame is taken as the dominant frame of reportage of ISIL terrorism in the Nigerian press.

Four factors influenced the choice of the newspapers for this study: ownership pattern, circulation of the newspapers; concentration of the audience; and the ideology of writing style.

i. Ownership Pattern: *Daily Trust*, although owned and funded by 19 shareholders of Media Trust Limited, was established by a northerner from Kano state, Kabiru Yusuf. *The Guardian* was established by Alex Ibru and Stanley Macebuh from the South-South and South East respectively of Nigeria. Lastly, *Punch* published by AjibolaOgunsola, had an ownership pattern of the south West. Studies (Cohen-Almagor, 2006; Adeyanju, 2015; Nacos, 2006; Boyode, 2014; Omu, 2001) have made it clear that ownership pattern of the media influences the content of that media. Therefore it is expected that just as the ownership pattern of *The Guardian*, *Punch* and *Daily Trust* newspapers varies so also will their coverage of ISIL.

ii. The Circulation of the Newspapers: the aggregate circulation of the three newspapers makes up nearly half of the total newspaper circulation in the country. (Alozie, 2003; Alhassan, 2015). The three newspapers are among the most popular newspapers in their regions. This therefore qualifies the newspapers as opinion shaping newspapers. *Daily Trust* has the highest circulation

within many Northern states and it is widely described as a northern newspaper (Bayode, 2014: 12; Ngwu, Ekwe and Chiaha, 2015; Alhassan, 2015).

iii. The Concentration of Audience: as stated above, *DailyTrust* is described as a northern newspaper. In fact, Bayode (2014: 12) puts the readership level between the northern and southern part of Nigeria at ratio 70:30. Evidently, the concentration of *Daily Trust*'s audience is in the north of Nigeria. *The Guardian* newspaper published by Alex Ibru family is described to resonate more among the south-east and south-south axis of the country (Omu, 2001). This is the region where *The Guardian* makes the most sells of its publications. Conversely, it makes the least sales in the northern part of the country. *Punch* is a popular newspaper in the West and one of the highest selling newspapers. Therefore, these newspapers appeal to different parts of the country in a manner that each newspaper has distinct comparative advantage over the other in that region. For instance *Daily Trust* has a comparative advantage over *The Guardian* and *Punch* in the North whereas *The Guardian* has similar advantage over *Daily Trust* in the south.

iv. The Ideology of Writing Style: the three newspapers have distinct writing styles which is probably the reason they appeal to different audience. *The Guardian* is described as an elite newspaper because of the high standard grammar it uses in writing. This writing style appeals more to the educational upper class of the society. (Adeyanju, 2015). *Daily Trust*'s writing style resonates more with the less educated class otherwise known as the common man. (Haruna, 2012; Bayode, 2014). *Punch* writing style is in between that of the elite and common man. The writing of *Punch* is for the middle class. Therefore, this makes it possible to evaluate the coverage of ISIL from different perspectives as contained in *Daily Trust*, *Punch* and *The Guardian*.

1.9 Definition of Key Terms

The following terms were used in this study that requires definition as used in the research:

ISIL: This is an acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This is a group widely believed to be a terrorist group operating mainly in Iraq and Syria with affiliated groups across the world including in Nigeria

Motives: This refers to what ISIL seeks to achieve by carrying out their violent actions.

Causes of ISIL terrorism: This refers to factors that led to the rise or formation of ISIL as contained in the newspapers under review.

Ethno-Nationalism- means ISIL motive is to setup a different autonomous geographical region with its own system of leadership structure.

Sectarian Marginalisation- This refers to sectarian tensions among the various sects within Iraq and Syria. This is one of the factors that led to the rise of ISIL

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This section gives an overview of relevant literature on broadly three aspects: one is the terminology and typology of the concept terrorism; secondly, the symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism and thirdly, the theories on which the study is anchored.

2.2. Conceptual Review of Terrorism

Any reader on terrorism will understand that finding a suitable definition or description for the concept is difficult. This is because most of the definitions are not only subject to perception but they are also parochially ascribed. Therefore, the modern definition of terrorism is inherently controversial. (Cunningham, 2003: 6). Even the UN Member States do not have an agreed-upon definition of terrorism. A deficiency which experts maintain has retarded the fight against terrorism. Instead, member states in the UN are guided by 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The difficulty in defining “terrorism” is in agreeing on a basis for determining when the use of violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is legitimate (Gerges, 2005; Hoffman, 1998; Cunningham, 2003). In this wise, it is common for Palestinian militants to call Israel terrorist, Kurdish militants calling Turkey terrorist, Tamil militants to call Indonesia terrorist, ISIL calls Iraq and Syria terrorist, Hezbollah calls ISIL terrorist-and vice versa; and, of course, the nation-states call the militants who oppose their regimes “terrorists”. Like “beauty”, “terrorism” is in the eye of the beholder. One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.

Hoffman (1998: 31) explains “If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in

a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism.” Expounding on the multiplicity of definitions of terrorism, Spencer (2012: 7) says “while some definitions focus on the physical act of violence others stress the centrality of the innocent or civilian target, the political nature of the act or the sub-state status of the terrorist actor.”

However, no matter the plurality of definitions and descriptions, it is of great importance to have a workable definition or description of terrorism in this study. In the search for a definition, the first thing to understand is this: neither are all violence nor all conflicts terrorism but all terrorist acts are violent and result in conflict. Secondly, terrorism can be carried out by anyone- individual, group or state- the actor or perpetrator is less important in defining terrorism. The act is what constitutes terrorism. (TTRSL, 2008; Cunningham; 2003; Crenshaw, 1981). Majority of definitions in use have been written by agencies directly associated with government and is systematically biased to exclude governments from the definition. The contemporary label of "terrorist" is highly pejorative- it denotes a lack of legitimacy and morality. As a practical matter, so-called acts of “terrorist” or terrorism are often a tactic committed by the actors as part of a larger military or geo-political agenda (Hoffman, 2001; Hersey and Hauss, 2003; Dickinson, 2008).

Highlighting what terrorism is not and the difference between terrorism and other violent crimes Jenkins in Kegley, (1990) says “terrorism differs from ordinary crime in its political purpose and in its primary objective. ... Likewise, not all politically motivated violence is terrorism. ... Terrorism is not synonymous with guerilla war or any other kind of war and it is not reserved exclusively for those trying to overthrow governments”. Miller (1990: 1) further expounds saying “warfare is about taking political power through force of arms. Terrorism is about seizing

political power through force of propaganda. Terrorist violence is a façade behind which is concealed political and military impotency”.

Furthermore, some studies (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 1987) have maintained that there is an irreconcilable world of difference between revolutionaries or freedom fighters with terrorists. And some scholars (Cohen, 2005; Miller, 1990; Muller, Spaaij, Rittenberg, 2003) are of the opinion that any attempt to draw parallelism between terrorists and revolutionists only, in the words of Cohen-Almagor, (2005: 2), “serves the interests of terrorists who wish to blur issues and to gain legitimacy and public support.” Sometimes, comments are made saying one state's "terrorist" is another state's "freedom fighter". However, Senator Henry Jackson rebutted this notion saying:

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school-children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracy would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with the acts of terrorists. (Quoted in Shultz, 1986 cited in Cohen, 2005)

Many definitions have been offered for terrorism. There is the academia or intellectual angle, the human rights or rational viewpoint, the security or pragmatic perspective, and the national and international non-governmental organisations' (INGOs) standpoint. Unfortunately, some of these definitions of terrorism are distinct and, in many cases, mutually exclusive. For instance Cunningham (2003) explaining the typology of terrorism avers that:

People view it from their own institutional perspective, disciplinary framework or personal experiences. We examine it through our parochial lenses, whether academic, governmental or experiential. We focus on different aspects of the problem

—legal, operational, theoretical and experiential—and we exalt the importance of different issues and concerns.

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongmann (1988) are famous for compiling one of the most diverse definitions on terrorism. They put together 109 definitions highlighting distinct features of violence that qualifies as terrorism.

Table 2:1 : Distinct features of definitions of terrorism

Elements	Frequency (%)
1. Violence, force	83.5
2. Political	65
3. Fear, terror emphasised	51
4. Threat	47
5. (psych,)effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organised crime	32
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9. Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11. Publicity asset	21.5
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
13. Civilians, non-combatant, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14. Intimidation	17

15. Innocence of victims emphasised	15.5
16. Group, movement, organisation as perpetrator	14
17. Symbolic aspects, demonstration to others	13.5
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9
20. Repetitiveness; serial, or campaign character violence	7
21. Criminal	6
22. Demand made on third parties	4

Source: Schmid and Jongman (1988:5) cited in Spencer (2012: 10)

Five threads running through all these hundreds- if not thousands- of definitions on terrorism are: first terrorism is violence-passive or active, secondly, it is a symbolic act; also, it is a highly localised engagement; fourthly, the primary purpose of the attacks is to create fear lastly, there is communicational element to propagate this fear to a larger public (Spencer, 2012; Nacos, 2002; Cunningham 2003; Paletz, and Vinson, 1999; Laqueur, 1999; Miller, 1990).

To gain deeper understanding on the concept of terrorism, definitions postulated by the academia, experts and civil society as well as different international regional blocs like the United Nations (UN), Arab league and European Union are stated and analysed below and then a suitable definition is formulated. Beginning with the regional blocs:

2.2.1. International Community's Conceptualisation of Terrorism

On December 9, 1994 the UN General Assembly resolution adopted Article 49/60 which attempted to describe terrorism by stating that terrorism is any:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

Updating this description, the UN Security Council in 2004 adopted resolution 1566 to include terrorism as:

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

In an attempt to be more specific on the targeted-victims of terrorism, a UN panel in 2005 refined the description of terrorism as follows:

Intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to **civilians or non-combatants** with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. [Emphasis added]

The three descriptions of terrorism by various organs within the UN show that terrorism is recognised as violence- which is adjudged to be criminal- against a segment of people in order to create fear or achieve some vested interests. These descriptions see terrorism as an act which tends to be active physical force against targeted victims. However, studies reveal that terrorists are more concerned about spreading fear and if this can be achieved without an act of violence they will prefer that way to the act of violence (Nacos, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, 2006). Therefore limiting terrorism to acts of violence neglects the purpose behind the violence and that purpose is as well terrorism. By limiting terrorism to act of violence, the various UN organs and agencies focused more on the victims of a terror act than the perpetrators.

Thirdly, the descriptions implicitly exclude the range of actors capable of committing terrorism. Another key element clearly absent in these descriptions of terrorism is the communicational element of terrorism. A study concluded that “mere threat, heavily mass mediated, achieves at least part of what actual terrorism achieves” (Nacos, Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, 2006). Usually terrorists intend to spread their message beyond the microcosm of the targeted victims and they can achieve this through the media. The media element is not mentioned in UN’s description of terrorism.

In 1988, the Arab League in a convention in Egypt defines terrorism as:

Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources.

The Arab League’s definition is broader to include threats as well as acts. Furthermore, it includes another dimension to terrorism which is environmental terrorism. The definition above mentioned the psychological dimension of terrorism. But just as the UN definitions, the Arab league failed to address the communicational element of terrorism as well as the distinction between immediate (primary) and extended (secondary) targeted victims.

In a framework on combating terrorism, the European Union in 2002, Article 1 describes terrorism saying:

...terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious offences against persons and property which: given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international

organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

2.2.2. Government and Security Agencies' Description of Terrorism

Definitions of terrorism from governmental and security agencies' perspectives are usually more concise but remain too broad for objective application (Cunningham, 2003). The following are definitions of terrorism from government and security establishments:

a. US Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The US Department of State and CIA use Title 22 of the US code-section 2656f which says terrorism is "Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."

b. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):

FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

c. Department of Defence (D of D):

According to the D of D "terrorism is the unlawful use of—or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives."

d. United Kingdom:

The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism to include an act "designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system". An act of violence is not even necessary under this definition."

In a review on these definitions, Cunningham, maintains that while the State Department definition addresses premeditation and the non-combatant status of victims, it does not address state actors or the psychological effects of the acts. It also fails to mention the illegal or illegitimate nature of such acts. The FBI definition addresses the illegal nature of the acts, but it does not address the actors. It does suggest that there are political or social objectives that add a little depth to the definition. The Department of Defence definition adds religious and ideological objectives and eliminates general social ones. It mentions the unlawful nature but it also fails to address the issue of actors. More so, it excludes state actors (White, 1991; Cunningham, 2003).

e. Nigeria's Description of Terrorism

In 2009, Nigeria began to experience the activities of Boko Haram and by 2011; The Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted by the National Assembly. This Act does not provide a clear definition or conceptualisation of terrorism however; it gave numerous descriptions of contexts which could be interpreted as terrorism. According to Section 1(2) of the Act, an act of terrorism means; "an act which is deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which:

- a. May seriously harm or damage a country or an international organisation;
- b. Is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to-

- i. Unduly compel a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;
- ii. Seriously intimidate a population,
- iii. Seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation
or
- iv. Otherwise influence such government or international organisation by intimidation or coercion.

2.2.3. Academia's Definition of Terrorism

The definitions of terrorism in the academia are usually lengthy, comprehensive and attempt to delineate every aspect of the term. Therefore, it is more probable to get a suitable definition of terrorism from the academic definitions. The following are definitions of terrorism from the academic point of view:

Seeing democracy as the global standard for governance and any threat to it an infection, Cohen-Almagor (2005: 2) defines terrorism as:

The threat or employment of violence against citizens for political, religious and ideological purposes by individuals or groups who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. The underlying assumption is that a zero sum game exists between terrorism and democracy, i.e., a win for the one constitutes a loss for the other

Welsh (2010:1) drew from Fromkins (1975) idea saying “Political movements that engage in terrorism typically have too few material resources—personnel, funds, or territory under their control—to achieve their goals through legitimate political action or large-scale organized violence.”

Fair enough, the definitions highlight threat and actual usage of violence against citizens to achieve some pre-defined purpose as terrorist acts. The problem is the definitions are too broad with many grey spots even in symmetric war whether intra or inter country, or in petty crimes, threats and employment of violence are used yet that cannot be defined as terrorism. Secondly, the definitions neglect the fact that terrorism could be state and non-state sponsored. Thirdly, attributing terrorism to be violence which threatens democracy neglect the reality that there are other countries which do not practice the democratic system yet could be very guilty of terrorism even state-orchestrated against its own citizens for instance Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Argentina and Myanmar during the days of the military juntas.

Fourthly, Cohen-Almagor's definition leaves out the relevant ideas of fear creation and the fact that terrorism has an implicit communication strategy. Terrorists' acts are symbolic and intend to spread fear beyond the microcosm of those directly affected. Spencer (2012:10) says "if one considers terrorism to involve more than simple violence against civilians by sub-state groups [as well as state] for political purposes and includes some sort of communicational element in order to spread a message, then the media are central to the understanding of what makes violence terrorism". On these aforementioned grounds, Cohen's definition is deficient in defining terrorism.

Hoffman, (1998: 43-44) incorporates more specific elements into his definition below.

Terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national

government or political party or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

Hoffman's definition goes a long way in addressing the different dimensions of terrorism. There is the victim-both immediate and distant, psychological aspect, the communication dimension. In reacting to Hoffman's description of terrorism, Cunningham (2003) explains that:

The issues of power and publicity (mass media and communication) should not be overlooked. Most of the power of terrorism is derived from the responses to the act and not the act of terrorism itself. This power is the power to terrorize and cause fear. This fear is spread by the media and by our individual and collective responses to the terrorist acts. Ignoring or minimizing the psychological and communicative aspects of terrorism is to treat it as other, more legitimate forms of political violence.

In this regard, two dimensions make Hoffman's description of terrorism incomplete. They are: the absence of the illegal nature of the violence and the actors involved.

In a more detailed definition, Schultz in Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) says:

Political terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or use of extra normal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of achieving certain political objectives/goals. Such goals constitute the long range and short-term objectives that the group or movement seek to obtain. These will differ from group to group. Such action generally is intended to influence the behavior and attitudes of certain targeted groups much wider than its immediate victims. However, influencing behavior is not the only aim of terrorist acts. The ramifications of political terrorism may or may not extend beyond national boundaries

In this definition violence has been qualified with the phrase "extra-normal forms", giving an idea that the forms of violence in terrorism appear to be illegitimate. Secondly, the fear factor has been introduced as well as the publicity (mass media and communication) - an intention to

influence beyond the immediate victims. Schmid and Jongman in Cunningham (2003) went a step further in defining terrorism saying:

Terrorism is an anxiety—inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought

Schmid and Jongman focuses on the anxiety inspiring (fear or terror) and repeated violent action of terrorism. He also acknowledges that the actors are individuals, groups or states and that they use terrorism for idiosyncratic, criminal or political purposes. This contends with those who believe in terrorism's inherent political nature and with those who believe that states do not commit terrorism, but rather *terror*. He also highlights the distinction between direct targets and main targets and that the targets (random or symbolic) are message generators for communication process intended to change behaviour of main audience—for intimidation, coercion or propaganda purposes. Schmid and Hoffman both address many of the qualities that define terrorism as a distinct form of political violence—indirect targeting and communication to a wider audience. Most instrumental acts of violence do not share these qualities (Cunningham, 2003). These definitions (Schmid and Hoffman's) touch on the four media-dependent objectives of terrorism as propounded by Brigitte Nacos which are: attention, recognition, sympathy and legitimacy (Nacos, 2007).

In view of the reviews of the various definitions and descriptions of terrorism, it is clear that it is difficult for one definition to capture all the aspects of terrorism and remain operationally applicable. However, this study adopts the definition of William G. Cunningham, Jr. because of its encompassing scope and depth, avoiding the trap of being too broad or simple to be operational and too complex to be useful. The definition is as follows:

Terrorism is defined as the illegitimate use or threat of violence to further political objectives. It is illegitimate in that it targets civilians and/or non-combatants and it is perpetrated by clandestine agents of state and non-state actors in contravention of the laws of war and criminal statutes. It is symbolic and premeditated violence whose purpose is to communicate a message to a wider population than the immediate victims of violence. It is designed to affect this audience by creating psychological states of fear in order to influence decision-makers to change policies, practices or systems that are related to the perpetrators' political objectives. These objectives can be either systemic or sub-systemic and may be motivated by complex social forces including, but not limited to, ideology, ethno-nationalism or religious extremism (Cunningham, 2003: 24)

This description of terrorism when applied to the ISIL group clearly makes ISIL to be called a terrorist organisation. This is because, the definition, although postulated years before the emergence of ISIL, captures the causes, motives and victims of ISIL group and by so doing ISIL falls, according to the tenants of Cunningham's definition, into the category of terrorist formation.

As explained earlier in the previous chapter, ISIL has specific objectives for conducting its nature of violence. These objectives are ideological, ethno-nationalistic and religious in nature. As part of the objectives, this study seeks to find out the categories of framing the Nigerian press covers ISIL activities along the causes, motives and target victims as stated in Cunningham's description of terrorism.

2.3. Causes of Terrorism

Discussions on the causes of terrorism are diverse. Some analysis label attribution of terrorism to particular causes as an attempt to legitimise such use of violence. Other analyses maintain that the use of violence on the scale of terrorism is not vacuous but caused by complex socio-economic, political and cultural interplay. To arrive at the causes of terrorism, there are three schools of thought that offer explanations. These schools include: liberal, the conservative and the radical schools of thought. The first two are seen as mainstream while the last as a contending school of thought. The mainstream schools are divided over the question of whether there are root causes of terrorism. It is important to note that the individual schools in themselves may not give us satisfactory understanding to the causes of terrorism but when the three schools are studied in addendum then a more elaborate understanding can be drawn. Each of these schools will be briefly discussed.

2.3.1. Liberal School of Thought:

According to this school of thought terrorism is caused and does not occur in a vacuum. This school of thought believes that terrorism and violent behaviours do not just emerge, there are logical reasonable deep-rooted causes which the so called terrorists seek to ‘honestly’ resolve. The only problem is the method chosen to achieve such resolution (Friedman, 2003). Just as individuals chose different methods to react to the same issue, so also some people choose the path of violence, which turns out to be illegitimate, to resolve certain perceived social injustices. The liberalists believe that what make people to become terrorists are factors which affect them (Gerges, 2005). Cunningham (2003: 18) explains:

Those who believe that there are root causes of terrorism base their assumptions on the hypothesis that there are necessary conditions that give rise to terrorism. These conditions are

experiences such as a history of colonialism, ethnic, minority, cultural or religious persecution, political repression and economic deprivation.

Therefore, those who are termed terrorists are just reacting to the circumstances around them. They posit that if those factors are removed or resolved, partially or totally, then there will be no need for individuals or groups to engage in violence which qualifies as terrorism. Adherents to this school believe that elimination of the root causes of terrorism such as political and economic marginalisation is the first stage to resolving terrorism. To this end, Atteree, Saferworld and Keen (2014:69) says:

If conflicts defined as stemming from ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ or ‘terrorism’ are driven in part by moral objections to policies and actions which are unjust or unlawful, part of the strategy for achieving sustainable peace should be to reconsider those policies and actions.”

Those who support the liberal approach tend to be scholars and researchers.

2.3.2. Conservative School of Thought:

Adherents to this school’s view maintain that there are no excuses that can be offered to justify the use of the degree of violence extremists and terrorist use. They argue that the inherent laws and constitutions in any nation are suitable to offer fair degree of resolutions to matters, and that ignoring the laws and constitution of the land cannot be justifiable, therefore any talk of causes of terrorism only seeks to give legitimacy to terrorism and terrorists. supporters of the conservative school of thought just like the liberal believe there are mal-conditions in every society that calls for discontentment among segments of the populace however, the conservative school of thought maintains that there are constitutional procedures laid out, that if followed, can lead to the resolution of these discontenting conditions in the society without necessarily embarking on the scale of violence and threats that qualifies to be called terrorism. Subscribers to

the conservative school tend to be security analysts, police and military officials and government representatives. Scholars of this school of thoughts, according to Cunningham (2003: 18), believe that:

The search for root causes only acts to justify the terrorist's unjustifiable acts. For them, terrorism is not rooted in conditions but caused by extremists and fanatics who choose to ignore conventional norms in order to influence the political environment.

Those of this school propose, as a measure of resolving terrorism, annihilation of terrorists through the instrument of the security apparatus in the country within the ambit of the law. The conservative school suggests that the only solution is to crush the dissenters with force using the police and the military. They assume that those groups using terror will only respond to power and they are not really interested in political solutions (Cunningham, 2003: 17). Shedding more light on the arguments of terrorism in the two mainstream schools, Laquer (1999: 36) says "history shows it [terrorism] has little to do with the severity of the oppression measured by any acceptable standard; terrorism is largely a matter of perception, of historical, social and cultural traditions and of political calculus." Laquer's assertion touches the arguments of the two schools but does not go deep enough to dislodge their claims to the presence or lack of sources for terrorists' actions (Cunningham, 2003).

2.3.3. Radical School of Thought:

Scholars of this school of thought believe that it is not the question of whether terrorism has root causes or not but that such question is only a smokescreen to the more profound question- who practices terrorism. Therefore, they aver that the mainstream approaches are two sides of same coin-that is they are pro-western and anti-eastern biased. The radicalists view the mainstream as Western thinkers which see terrorism as being carried out by enemies of the west whereas the

West and her allies cannot engage in terrorism. The key arguments of the radicalists is that the root causes of terrorism stem from Western colonialism, capitalism, imperialist hegemony and globalisation and therefore the West must change in order to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism. (Moore, 2003; Laqueur, 2002; Cunningham, 2003) It is important to add that the radical thinkers, by the pre-supposition that terrorism is only caused by the West, are inevitably guilty of the same fallacy they accuse the mainstream of, just that in her case the terrorists are pro- eastern and anti-western.

Following the succinct overview of the three schools of thought, this study adopts the liberal school of thought with some slight modification. The choice of the liberal school of thought is no surprise as it is the school that most academicians adopt; the conservative is adopted usually by the security apparatus and government. The slight modification is to address:

1. The resolution to terrorism in some instances involve the use of stick and carrot that is, use of force as well as dialogue as some extremists groups will only respond to force and not just political measures.
2. Liberal school of thought will neither be considered pro-western nor anti-eastern but will cut across the bi-polar world of West and East including event non-state actors.

2.3.3.1.Liberal School of Thought:As Modified

Since this school of thought has established that terrorism is caused and does not hang from nothing, it is therefore imperative to understand the possible causes. It should however be stated that although this study agrees that terrorism is caused, it does not justify the use of such violence no matter the cause. This study therefore analyses the causes of ISIL terrorism under the following definite categories: marginalisation, foreign influence and the Arab Spring.

2.4. Marginalisation as a Cause to ISIL Formation

Most societies in the world are not homogeneous but heterogeneous. Thus, the heterogeneity of a society means that most societies are sectioned along ethnic and religious lines or sectioned by some other forms of social demarcation. A situation whereby one group perceives that it is been side-lined, economically, politically or in some other forms by those in authority, breeds the tendency of the side-lined group to protest such perceived marginalisation. Such protest can be in different forms: from peaceful to violent to even the point of taking the dimension of terrorism. In Iraq, some scholars have attributed the formation of ISIL to the partisan politics of the former and present Prime Ministers Nouri Al-Maliki and Al-Hadi respectively which marginalised the minority Sunni and favoured the majority Shiites. Global Terrorism Index Report 2014 says:

Of all the factors and conditions that can explain the rise of ISIL and its major military and modest state-building successes since the summer of 2014, the more specific and directly relevant ones are internal to the countries and the region in question. They include the genuine discontent by very diverse groups of Iraqi Sunnis – from the former Baathists to tribal groups to radical Islamists – with their growing political and socio-economic marginalization and repression. This rising discontent had earlier helped feed the anti-U.S. insurgency, but continued to accumulate during the rule of the increasingly sectarian al-Maliki government. That was coupled with the general limited functionality and low legitimacy of the unpopular, but increasingly authoritarian Iraqi regime inherited from the times of the foreign security presence.

2.4.1. Foreign Influence as a Cause to ISIL Formation

Scholars (FATF, 2015; El Fadl, 2015; Hagan, 2015) have stated that the factors that led to the formation of ISIL terrorism were mainly internal to Iraq and Syria. However, it was not long before some analysts began pointing fingers at possible foreign influence which supported the ISIL group. The categories of these foreign influences have been divided into Western foreign influence and Non-Western foreign influence. The Western foreign influence blames the West

led by the United States and her allies of forming and supporting ISIL. Whereas the non-Western blames other countries which may not belong to the Western bloc for stoking ISIL terrorism in order to achieve their vested interests (FATF, 2015; El Fadl, 2015; Hagan, 2015). Edward Snowden, a former US intelligence officer turned whistle blower revealed that the programme to create ISIL was called Hornet's nest and it involved "the British and American intelligence agencies as well as Israel's Mossad [who] worked together to create...the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)." He further said the purpose for creating ISIL is "to attract all extremists of the world to one place, using a strategy called "the hornet's nest."(Global Research reports cited in *DailyTrust*, November 14, 2015). Furthermore, Cartallucci (2015) reveals that:

ISIS supply lines run precisely where Syrian and Iraqi air power cannot go. To the north and into NATO-member Turkey, and to the southwest into US allies Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Beyond these borders exists a logistical network that spans a region including both Eastern Europe and North Africa.

2.4.2. Arab Spring as a Cause to ISIL Formation

In the spring of 17 December, 2010, the self-immolation of a Tunisian vegetable seller, MuhamedBouazizi as a result of police brutality sparked a wave of violent and non-violent protest across the Arab region beginning with Tunisia. These grass root protests which became known as the Arab spring, led to the ousting of many of the leaders in the affected countries. They include Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia; Hosni Mubarak of Egypt; MammarrGhaddafi of Libya; Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. The Arab spring placed many other leaders in embattled situation which has degenerated into civil war in countries like Yemen, Libya and Syria. The protests in some of these countries were totally peaceful and civil oriented such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. However, it was violent and militarised in countries like Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

The political vacuum occasioned by the Arab spring resulted into chaos, anarchy and in some countries civil war. These situations became fertile ground for terrorists groups to thrive. One of such groups that sprang up in the days of the Arab Spring is ISIL. According to Lister (2014:1) “Intense turmoil in Syria and Iraq in recent years has created socio-political vacuums in which jihadi groups have been able to thrive. Most notable in this respect has been the rise to prominence of the Islamic State (IS)”. Also, Hagan (2015) concluded thus “The rise of ISIS was in direct response to the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war- a fruit of the Arab spring- and the contemporaneous withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in December 2011.”

2.5. Motives of Terrorists:

The motives of terrorists differ mainly based on the cause(s) of terrorism. Therefore, the motives are the agenda of the extremist groups. Motivation is the key variable in understanding how to resolve the underlying issues that give rise to such groups. (Cunningham, 2003:25). Among plethora of motives classified by scholars, the study adopts the classification by Cunningham which divides the motives into: advancement of political ideology, ethno-nationalism and religious extremism.

2.5.1. Political Ideology:

The motives of extremist groups based political ideology is an abject rejection to the political system of governance within their context of operation. They propose a different system of governance which is oppose to the status quo and at the same time not mainstream. Cunningham (2003: 32) explains that:

The common thread of ideologically motivated terrorist groups is that they all espouse extremist views that fail to motivate large audiences of followers. They remain isolated from the political mainstream. This may be one of the answers of why political extremists turn to violence rather than pursue their

goals through non-violent political mechanisms such as mobilizing political parties and participation in elections. They understand that their views are not widely embraced and will therefore not succeed in elections or popular referendums.

Therefore, groups that desire to radically change the prevailing political system like a monarchical system to democratic (in Bahrain) or from communism to democracy (in Vietnam) and employed methods fitting to prescribed attributes of terrorism is motivated by political ideology.

2.5.2. Ethno-Nationalism:

The combination of the words 'ethno' meaning ethnic and 'nationalism' meaning patriotism explains that ethno-nationalistic groups are usually defined by: first, ethnicity and secondly their strong desire to have her own country based on its ethnic or cultural identity. Therefore, ultimate objectives of an ethno-nationalistically motivated extremist group are: one, to gain a degree of autonomy from the central government which usually is predominantly different from that of the seceding group and secondly, to gain political and economic independence through seceding from the host country. It must be stated that these objectives in themselves are not terrorism however, the methods such groups use to achieve these objectives could. Usually these groups have political ideology but the main objective is succession. Examples of such groups are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka (LTTE) and Hamas of Israel/Palestine (Cunningham, 2003; Friedman, 2003). Distinguish between political ideological group and ethno-nationalistic group, Cunningham, (2003: 32) explains:

One of the characteristics that distinguish ethno-national terrorist groups from ideological ones is that the nationalist groups usually have a higher degree of public support which is derived from a sympathetic national or ethnic group from which they emerge. The ideological groups are usually isolated

from the masses by espousing non-popular or fringe political views—either from the far left or the far right. Ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, while usually representing a minority, nevertheless can have populist appeal within their ethnic populations.

In Nigeria, ethno-nationalistic are many. In fact it is obvious that most of the groups which have at certain times had violent confrontation with the security apparatus have ethnic connotation. Ethnic groups such as NDA, MEND, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) are advocating, in some fragmented forms for independence from Nigeria.

2.5.3. Religious Extremism:

Even though most mainstream religions of the world preach peace and respect for human life, studies have shown that many groups and individuals have committed heinous acts in the name of religion just as suicide bombers and extremists have portions of scriptures on their lips during their operation (Friedman, 2003; Hoffman, n.d; Moore, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2001; Cunningham, 2003). Thus, academic studies have moved from asking if religion is a catalyst of violence and terrorism to finding out why and how individuals and groups have exploited religion for violence. Rapoport, citing Juergensmeyer (1988: 181) states that “A reason often given to explain why religious symbols are associated with acts of real violence is that religion is exploited by violent people” (cited in Cunningham, 2003). Thus, religion is not violent but violent people exploit grey areas in religious texts and holy books to not only justify their violent acts but to see these violent acts as divine assignments. Hoffman (2001) explains that:

For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred by political, moral or practical constraints.

With this in mind, scholars have said extremists groups with religion as a motivation are the most difficult to deal with. This is because unlike groups motivated by ideology and ethno-nationalism, religious extremists seek the destruction of all those that do not subscribe to their version of God (Jeurgensmeyer, 2000). With such hard-line stance, negotiation is not part of the options for resolution, force is imperative. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been labelled a group that espoused this motive.

2.6. Victims of Terrorism

As earlier stated, terrorism is symbolic and their attacks are a microcosm of their full intent. Therefore, in order to understand the philosophy of an extremist group, looking at the catalogue of its victims can be a good start. Referring to terrorist attacks, Cunningham (2003) says “their targets will help to identify their objectives and the sources of their motivation. As the targets are usually of symbolic importance, understanding them will help to uncover hidden motivators and anticipate where subsequent attacks may be likely.” However, it must be stated that sometimes, attacks of extremist groups are indiscriminate that it becomes difficult to understand their motives. For example Boko Haram’s attacks have affected both Christians and Muslims; by some count more Muslims have been affected. Many scholars have explained that when victims which belong to the same espoused ideology, ethnicity, or religion as the extremist group are affected in an attack, then it is either such victims are seen by the extremist groups as collateral damage-a necessary sacrifice or traitors who are also legitimate targets for refusing to support the cause of the extremists group. (Gabriel, 2006; Gerges, 2006; FATF, 2015). In this study, the victims of ISIL extremism are sectioned as follows: Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and Unspecified. The unspecified are those victims who were not given religious or sectarian qualification but just mention in numerical terms.

2.7. Security Landscape in Nigeria: An Overview

The minor amalgamations of communities and enclaves into protectorates in the North and South of pre-Nigeria and the eventual major amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate into Nigeria was an artificial union with many fault lines. As these fault lines began emerging especially in post-independence when the nation was firmly in the hands of Nigerians and not colonial masters the result was catastrophic; Nigeria suffered a gruesome 30 months civil war, ethnic violence surfaced, political chaos became rampant and religious crisis was not in short-supply. If one is to look from date retrospectively to independence in 1960, it can be said that violence and extremism did not punctuate Nigerian history it was a recurring decimal which became a common norm.

In recent years, Nigeria is witnessing political and economic terrorism on a scale never seen before. As Boko Haram terrorism is phasing out in the North-East, Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is emerging in the South-South. The group is responsible for almost daily vandalism of oil pipelines, oil companies are threatened and in fact recently, some multi-national oil companies filed a force majeure indicating they will not be able to honour their contractual agreement with the nation due to the worsening security situation in the Niger-Delta. As a result of pipeline vandalism, the nation is facing a near black-out situation as power generation dropped to 1697.00 megawatts on 26-June-2016 from 4387 megawatts in March, 2016. (TCN, 2016) Also, export of crude oil has substantially dwindled to 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) (Kachikwu, 2016).

The nation is as well facing secessionist groups in the east which are clamouring for the creation of Republic of Biafra, the intractable Fulani and farmers conflict is raging at different parts of the country, kidnapping has assume a frightening dimension. These are the major security realities confronting Nigeria today. Even though the present administration has given priority to crushing

insurgency, it is obvious that many more security challenges confront the nation subsumed to the Boko Haram insurgency, the biggest of all is the rise of NDA.

2.8. Terrorism and Media

The intractability of terrorism across various countries has force the media to become a cardinal instrument used by terrorists and for counter-terrorism (Pruitt, 2007; Sunstein, 2003). From early times, the media have been drawn into terrorism and counter-terrorism campaigns; however since Pearl Harbour attack in the days of the Second World War, the media has taken on a new dimension in its reportage of terrorism campaigns (Al-Salhy, 2015; Weimann and Winn, 1994). Another defining moment in the media and its coverage of terrorism was the event of 11th September, 2001- popularly called 9/11. Al Qaeda hijacked planes and used them to attack the United States' World Trader Centres, the US ministry of Defence also called Pentagon and one of the planes crashed in an open field. These attacks resulted in the death of over 3000 people and the world media covered these attacks extensively (Lumbaka and Gray, 2011). However, this coverage was could not be compared to the media coverage received ever since former US President George W Bush declared the so-called War-against-Terrorism (Nacos, and Torres-Reyna, 2002).

The increase in the media coverage of terrorism did not just come from the organised society alone. In the days after 9/11, studies show that the terrorist groups also began giving increase access and exclusive interviews to international journalists. In an elaborate study titled "Terrorists use of our media", Muller, Spaaij, and Ruitenberg (2003) explains that terrorist groups especially Al Qaeda granted interviews and released statements to the media 17 times more frequently than they did since its establishment as a terrorist group in the 70s. However,

even though the primary aim of the media is to disseminate truthful information, some scholars believe that the media should not be detached from the reportage. Cohen-Almagor (2005:2) says:

acts of terror are newsworthy, but when the media report on terrorists, journalists do not have to view themselves as detached observers; they should not only transit a truthful account of “what’s out there”. Instead they may feel free to make moral judgements. It is an objective matter that terrorism is wrong. That is another way of emphasizing that terrorism is plainly wicked, not wicked only because people think it is (Dworking, 1996; Reese 1990)

First, the objectivity of the wrongness of terrorism is relative to the perpetrator, the victim and the inclinations of the spectators. That’s the reason for the cliché one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Second and more profoundly, if Cohen-Almagor believes that journalists can make subjective statement about terrorism and yet not lost their objectivity because the journalists statement should lambast terrorists then what will happen when the media and the journalists are sympathetic to the perceived terrorists and their sponsors such that they do not see the act in the light of others who think it was terrorism? Will it still be alright for such journalists to make subjective statements which may rationalise the actions of the perceived terrorists? For instance the so-called moderates elements which are supported by the West in its proxy war against Bashir Al Assad in Syria, the media in the West do not report the actions of such groups as terrorism- even though many of their actions fit Cunningham’s definition of terrorism- whereas the media of Iran and Syria do see and report them as terrorists. Same also is the case with Israel and Hamas or Israel and Hezbollah. The media outlets take sides and in so doing some refer to Israel as the terrorists and Hamas or Hezbollah as victims whereas other media reverse who the suppose victims and terrorists are. Hoffman (1998: 31) says “if one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies

with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism”

If the subjective comments of journalists are encouraged when covering terrorism, then it is just a matter of time before journalists define terrorism merely on perception and not objectivity because the point of reference to what terrorism is would be lost in their subjectivity. Therefore, advocating that the media should make subjective statements against complex events such as terrorism is akin to giving fuel and water to a fire-fighter and an arsonist to face an inferno; the fire-fighter will use the water to extinguish the blaze whereas the arsonist will use the fuel to exacerbate the blaze.

Thus the 21st century has seen a two dimensional and divergent use of the media. One form is from the organised society in which the governments and private media are instrumental in sustaining (Cragin, Daly, Sara, 2004). The other is from the terrorists which the combination of competition and curiosity of the private media and the leverage of the internet has given the terrorists the platform to reaching the world (Bender, 2014).

This situation is mostly common in democratic settings. After all, democracy prides itself in ubiquitous freedom, safety and civil rights and liberties of which a free press is the cornerstone. However, TTSRL (2008: 2) ask the pointed question “What happens, however, if the content the media offer the audience is delivered or influenced by an organization that has the objective to disturb that safety?” This is the case with terrorism; in order to spread fear and thus advance its political goals, a terrorist organization needs the media.

2.9. Terrorists Using the Media

On the various fronts in the global war against terrorism, the media play a pivotal role mainly for two reasons: One, the media provides information for audience's perception and secondly, it provides information for audience's reaction. In the former, the media has a great potential to shape peoples' perception toward many events in the world especially during conflict. In the latter, the media, in times of extremism, is imbued with the capacity to define to the audience who the extremists are, their motives, their target victims, their grievances and government's policies towards extremism and by so doing, the media potentially determine the audience reaction (White, 1991: 5; Pillar, 2001: 9).

Armed with such great potentials, the mass media have shared a silent but salient intricate link with extremism. This unholy marriage is arguably due to the overall goal of both the media and extremists organisations: to exercise maximum influence over the largest number of people at the lowest cost per-capita (Muller, et al. 2003, 56; Vieira 1991, 82; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2002, 9). To this end, the terrorists, on one hand, carry out despicable acts which are gore and horrendous enough to evoke public outcry. The media, on the other hand, give coverage to these acts by representing the actions of the terrorists to a wider audience. In doing so, the media inadvertently becomes an instrument of propaganda for the terrorist groups. By their coverage, the media propagate the popularity of the terrorists beyond the microcosm of those affected to a wider audience resulting into what President Buhari calls "small fires causing large fires [of fear]" (Buhari, 2015). The European Union security agency, Transnational Terrorism, Security and Rule of Law (TTSRL), in a study on media and terrorism TTSRL, (2008: 3) explains that:

In most cases, terrorist attacks are very localized, and affect only a few people. The goal, however, is to spread the message to more people than just those who were directly hit in the

attack. The media play an important role in achieving this by spreading the news of the attacks or even by directly transferring the message of terrorist organizations.

Thus, when the media serve as information instrument to generate publicity and draw attention to the activities of terrorists, these coverage serve as an enabler for acts of terrorism. Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of Britain, says “media publicity is the oxygen of terrorism” (cited in Vieira, 1991: 74). Therefore, whether it is television, radio, newspaper or the internet, terrorists realize that these media are valuable resources in instilling fear within a community or winning the hearts and minds of sympathisers (Lumbaka and Gray, 2011).

Consequently, in order to spread fear and advance its political goals, terrorist organisations need the media. And for business, ratings and fulfilment of their traditional role to the society, the media covers the activities of terrorists. When the media carries statements of extremists, this attracts the attention of the public to the media. The aggregate audience accumulated attention to the content of the media creates the much-needed market for the media. This is because more people remain glued to the media over a longer period of time. This creates the necessary atmosphere for revenue generation through advertising. Spencer (2012:9) avers:

It has become widely accepted that there is an almost symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media as terrorism provides for exciting and violent stories which help sell the news product and the media provides terrorist groups with a means of spreading their message and creating fear among the general public.

Extremisms are important news which interests the media because they entail contentions, dissensions, disagreements and tensions. They are ‘attractive’ societal events that the media cannot simply ignore because of their traditional responsibility of informing, educating and mobilizing the society for sustainable development (Pate, 2015). Therefore, the media are bound to bring to light everything that can possibly impede societal development. This is a surveillance

function of the media. The media, according to Howard (2002) cited in Ozohu-Suleiman (2013), are a “double-edged sword that can serve as frightful weapon of violence, when they propagate messages of intolerance, or as instrument of conflict resolution, when the information they present is reliable, respects human rights and represent diverse views”

Today, the internet is bringing these divergent views onto one platform shrinking the world into a global village. This has benefited extremism across the globe in a way that extremist groups in one part of the world not only pledge allegiance to other groups thousands of miles away but also carry out coordinated attacks across borders. This fusion of terrorists has great implication for not just the globe but the media as well. The international community-Nigeria inclusive- must devise means to respond.

This function is much more reflective when the media cover activities of extremist groups. In times like this, the media carries out basically one function: the media shape the people’s reaction and perception towards the extremist group by defining who the extremists are, what their motives are, the target victims of the extremists and the factors that led to the rise of the extremist group. And this is only possible through framing. To this end, the media becomes important to both the terrorists and the public. To the terrorists, the media gives them the platform to reach a vast number of people beyond their immediate target and by reaching this ‘external target’ they can permeate fear into a large number of people by just a single act. Welsh (2010: 1) explains “Media attention is an important vehicle by which terrorists communicate with their audiences, and thus a central goal of many terrorist groups is to influence the scale and tone of media attention to their attacks”. Furthermore, Hoffman in Rivera (2016) says “Only by spreading the terror and outrage to a much larger audience can the terrorists gain the maximum

potential leverage." To the public, the media gives them the frame in which the activities of the extremist group can be understood. (Hoffman, 2006; Jenkins, 1975 Nacos, 2007)

However, it must be understood that the media-terrorist relationship is not always smooth. In fact it can be seen, in some media coverage, that messages of extremist groups are not framed in the way extremist groups anticipate nor does the messages have the terrorists' desired effect on the audience. In fact, sometimes the media coverage does not create fear, panic and sympathy in the audience as desired by terrorists. Instead it creates opposition, resentment and even popular uprising against such terrorist groups. For instance, experts have noticed that it was only after the grotesques footages released by the Islamic State- of slighting of throats and beheadings of captured prisoners, the images of widespread massacre of religious, ethnic minority groups like the Yazidis, including the execution of two American journalists- Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff- that public perception against the group turned from that of despair and fear to anger and a global clamour for international intervention to crush the group. It was this public demand for intervention that led to the creation of a broad international military coalition with a single mandate "to downgrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL (White House Press Briefing, 2014).

Also, it was noticed that ISIL's footage of live-cremation of the captured Jordanian pilot galvanised the people of Jordan behind their government to increase its air strike against ISIL. It can therefore be hypothesized that if ISIL had not sought to gain popularity through its slick videos of beheadings and live cremation, it might have operated for a longer period without galvanising the international community against itself. Therefore, instead of the fear ISIL wanted to permeate the world, they got a concerted global military response. Thus, while it can be said that the media has been an enabler for terrorist groups, it has also, in many instances, worked against their efforts. (Robinson, nd; Nacos& Torres-Reyna, 2002; Gowing, 1997)

2.10. Objectives of Terrorists' Use of the Media

In order to put this study into perspective, it is imperative to review literatures from experts on why terrorists will so much want to be in the media. Yonah Alexander argues that terrorist groups have three purposes to interact with the media, namely attention, recognition and legitimacy (Alexander et al. 1979, 162). Robin Gerrits focuses more on the psychological interaction between terrorists and the media. According to him, “demoralizing enemies such as governments, demonstrating strength, gaining sympathy and creating fear and chaos are the main interests of terrorists for which they can utilize the media.” (Cited in Paletz and Vinson 1992, 2). Furthermore, Marighella, (n.d.:103) asserts “the war the insurgent wages is based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communications and news transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government”. As for Bandura, (1998, 172), he notes that the media is used for moral justification, arousal of sympathy and intimidation of the public.

BrigettNacos, the international relations experts, tied all these points together. She states that terrorists have four general media-dependent objectives when they strike or threaten to commit violence. The first is to gain attention and awareness of the audience, and thus to condition the target population (and government) for intimidation: create fear. The second goal is recognition of the organization's motives. They want people to think about why they are carrying out attacks. The third objective is to gain the respect and sympathy of those in whose name they claim to attack. The last objective is to gain a quasi-legitimate status and a media treatment similar to that of legitimate political actors (Nacos 2007, 20).

For each terrorist organization the objectives in using the media may be different. In some cases, one objective is more important than the other. For some organizations, one of the objectives

may not be an issue at all, or another objective should be added. An added caveat is that the first objective is not necessarily the most important one. Nevertheless, most of the perceived important objectives fall under Nacos' division. Therefore it is a very useful framework, and will be explained elaborately (TTSRL, 2008: 6).

2.11. Framing Patterns Used by Nigerian Newspapers in Crises Situations

The Nigerian media cover violent crises occurring in the country and across the world. In their coverage, the media lay emphasis on particular aspects of the conflict. The dominant angle a particular media report the crisis is known as frame. Through content analysis, researchers have studied media contents to find out frames used in their coverage of crises. For instance, in a study titled the "Nigerian and British media coverage of the botched kidnap of UmaruDikko" Uche and Ngumoba, (1996) realised that frames such as kidnap frame, rescue frame and diplomatic frame were used. Also, Okoro and Oddemelum, (2014) cited in Muobike, (2017) in a study titled "Print Media Framing of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria" categorised the Nigerian media coverage of Boko Haram conflict into nine frames namely: policy-response frame, political frame, human interest frame, conspiracy frame, attribution of responsibility frame, ethnicity frame, economic frame, labelling frame, ethnic and religious frame. The researchers found out that *The Guardian*, *ThisDay* and *Vanguard* newspapers reported Boko Haram insurgency in a predominantly policy response frame, while the *Daily Sun* focused more on ethnic and religious frames.

Similarly, a research on "The Mass Media Coverage of the Kidnap of the Chibok Schoolgirls" (Amannah, Mba-Nwigoh and Nwigoh, 2014), the following framing categories were used: neutrally objective frame, cause-promotion frame, conflict frame and peace-oriented frame. The

researchers discovered that there was a predominant use of conflict approach and lesser use of peace-oriented journalism by the mass media in reporting the Chibok girls kidnap. In the media framing of the rescue or release of the Chibok girls in two Southern and Northern-based newspapers, Ngwu and Ekwe (2015), used rescue efforts frame, powerlessness frame, hopelessness frame, political frame, religious frame, ethnic frame, conspiracy frame and economic frame. Result showed that the hopelessness frame was used more in news reports. Muobike (2017) studied “Newspapers Framing of the Abduction of Chibok Girls” from the angle of the constructive way the media frame the abduction. She made use of four broad frames in which each frame had its unit of analysis namely: problem definition frame (unit of analysis: government, politics, insecurity, Boko Haram), cause frame (unit of analysis: poverty, wealth, bad government, good government, tribalism, disunity, unity, terrorism), remedy frame (unit of analysis: street protest, improve education, security and training, none). The result revealed that the newspapers studied framed the abduction of girls in a constructive manner, to a small extent. From the results above, it shows the Nigerian media frame crisis situations in a way that is not constructive.

A study by Owolabi and O’neill (2014), in an analysis of the content of Nigerian Press arrived at similar conclusion. The study revealed that the press has not performed creditably well in the coverage of poverty, rural communities, and lacked developmental contents. The result further showed that contents were mostly tragic occurrences like religious crisis, communal clashes and inter-tribal disputes (Owolabi and O’neill, 2014). In a content analysis on the coverage of crisis in West Africa sub-region Edeani (1994) studied three elites Nigerian national dailies and three leading magazines found out that despite the high coverage of conflict in the newspapers and magazines studied, news stories which contained constructive suggestions accounted for just 26

percent of all the contents of the newspapers and magazines. Those that contained no suggestions represented 27 percent of the total content, while stories which were adjudged to be irrelevant to both constructiveness and non-constructiveness constituted the remaining 47 percent (Edeani, 1994 cited in Muobike, 2017).

This review shows that the Nigerian media have covered many crises situations extensively however the frames in which these crises were covered differ from one media house to the other. The media lay emphasis on the frames they consider most important. This study looks into the framing of ISIL terrorism in three Nigerian newspapers in line with the Entman frames as well as sub-categorised unit of analysis.

2.12. Extant Empirical Literature

When it comes to terrorism, various studies have been conducted on different aspects. Even more popular, are studies linking the media and terrorism. There are studies that focused on the dialectic arguments of the criteria of labeling a violent act as terrorism. This is important because relativist tradition of conflict states that “what might be considered conflict in one culture might not be recognized as such in a culture that holds different set of values” (Saxberg, 1995: 3 in Ozoh-Suleiman, 2012: 13) For example, same nature of violence might be perpetrated by different individuals or groups however, the media will label one as terrorist attack and the other retaliatory. This is the norm of media coverage in one of the most intractable cultural conflict of modern times- the Israel-Palestine conflict (Ishak and Ozohu-Suleiman, 2012).

In this regard, Ibrahim (2016) compared the frames of coverage of the Niger Delta Avengers and Boko Haram insurgents in some selected Nigerian newspapers. The study findings indicate that all the three reviewed newspapers (*Daily Trust*, *Vanguard* and *The Guardian*) framed Boko

Haram as terrorists, while the Niger Delta Avengers were framed as militants or freedom fighters. Also all three newspapers condemned the activities of Boko Haram insurgents but rarely condemned the activities of the Niger Delta Avengers.

Similarly, in an attempt to check for media shift from war journalism to peace journalism in the Israel-Palestine conflict, Ozohu-Suleiman (2012) analyzed the major providers of world news- the BBC World, CNN International, Al-Jazeera English and Press TV and how their coverage relate to cross-national understanding of the conflict in Nigeria and Malaysia. Overall findings show a significant support for war journalism compared to peace journalism. Specifically, Press TV, BBC World and CNN International were more inclined to war journalism in their reportage of the Israel-Palestine conflict; whereas Al-Jazeera English produced a significantly higher amount of peace journalism than war journalism contents within the period investigated.

In October 2014, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) embarked on a four-month project to understand the financing of the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The study identified how funds are raised, moved and ultimately used by ISIL. The study found out that ISIL obtains the vast majority of its revenues through local criminal and extortion activities in the territory where it operates, which present unique challenges for the international community but also presents a declining revenue base if it is unable to find alternative sources of revenue or take additional territory (FATF, 2014).

In a study on the framing of messages on ISIL by users of social media, the think-tank organization, *voices from the blog*, analysed online posts written in Arabic between the periods of 1st July-22nd October, 2014. Data source for news online (public available) total: 90, 443 posts; social media (public profiles) total: 2,195,444 posts, of which 93% from Twitter, 4% from

Forum, 1% from Facebook, 1% from Blogs. Findings of the study is as follows: 1) the negative sentiment toward ISIS always increases after the diffusion on-line of videos showing the beheading of Western citizens, but in one case (the killing of the Israeli-American journalist Steven Sotloff); 2) exactly as it happens for the news, also in the social media case the discussion about ISIS grows considerably after the killing of James Foley. Furthermore, It is interesting to note that only after the killing of David Haines (and soon after the killing of Alan Henning) (i.e., two British humanitarian aid workers) the sentiment toward ISIS is more negative on social media than on news on-line (voices from the blog, 2014).

Scholars have made attempts to come to grasp to what made ISIL a formidable terrorist group as the media frame its messages and what exactly did ISIL do differently that other so-called terrorists groups did not do to earn ISIL the extent of media coverage and global coalition against it.

To achieve this, the victims of the ISIL terrorism, the motives of ISIL and the causes of its actions became the point of measurement of whether ISIL could be tagged an international terrorist group. One of such study is that conducted by Arne L. Kalleberg. Kalleberg concluded that the “combination of sudden success, territorial control, and markers of terrorism that bring attention to the Islamic State.” One of such acts include the classic “terrorist” behavior—beheadings of captives and attacks on civilians.

But these in themselves may not be sufficient explanations. For instance, compare ISIS to the recent reports about the Khorasan militant group located in Syria; in the media and even government accounts it takes on a secondary importance even though it has been suggested that Khorasan was planning direct attacks against Euro-American targets. And other Syrian Islamist

groups, like al-Nusra Front, control territory but have not expanded their area so dramatically populations.

In pushing the argument further, Muhammad, (2014) maintains that even before the video-taped beheadings, the attacks on Yezidis and other religious minorities seemed to signify international terrorism to the American public. There's a seemingly odd confusion here in public opinion. While the Taliban in Afghanistan never carried out international terrorism, they were the target of the American response to September 11th just as much as Al-Qaeda was. Similarly, in Iraq, various militant groups were seen as international terrorists even without action beyond the context of the Iraqi Insurgency (TTRSL, 2008). Many have thus learned to think of any militant Islamic group as terrorists; all the group needs to do is reveal its *Islamicness*. Attacks on religious minorities certainly do that. In this environment, beheading hostages is just another marker, especially as it echoes the acts of previously militants defined as terrorists—Al Qaeda's beheading of Daniel Pearl in 2002 or the frequent beheadings of captives by Al Qaeda in Iraq during the Insurgency

In an analysis, Colin Beck cited in Kalleberg, (2014: 3) juxtaposed the victims of ISIL and the motives that could have led to such murder thus:

I wonder if the beheadings are actually more a product of cross-militant competition than a message to the outside world. The Islamic State's leadership is not imprudent, so they must have known that attacking the citizens of western countries would create a response... So why do it? The Islamic State could believe that the response will not actually imperil their organization and its gains. Or, possibly, that beheadings would encourage other governments to pay for hostages which have been a lucrative source of funding in recent years. "More importantly", he went on saying "I think it is also likely that the Islamic State was trying to prove its bonafides. ISIS has been fighting with other Islamist groups among the Syrian rebels, and, in 2013, struggled with Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda over

who best represents Islamist interests in the Syrian conflict. This sort of cross-Islamist conflict is quite typical. So, perhaps, beheading hostages is a way to establish their credibility with other militants.

Back in Nigeria, many scholars have studied the Nigerian newspaper coverage of contentious issues happening in other countries. For instance, Okunna and Omenugha (2006) studied the Northern and Southern newspaper coverage of the Denmark Cartoon and its attendant crisis in Nigeria. The study concluded that there were differences in the frame the Northern and Southern newspapers reported the Cartoon and the crisis that followed thereafter. Furthermore, Opkoko (2001) studied the presence of foreign news in some selected Nigerian newspapers to find out the Nigerian newspaper sources of the foreign news as well as the direction of tone of such foreign news. His research found out that national diplomatic news were gotten from press releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs however for events occurring outside the country, the Nigerian newspapers relied almost entirely on news agencies for their source of news. In a comparative study conducted by Uche and Ngumoha (1996), on the Nigerian and British press coverage of the botched kidnap attempt on UmaruDikko in 1984 in the United Kingdom (UK), they found out, among other things, that the Nigerian newspapers obtained most of their reports of the events from Western news sources. In a similar study on the nature of foreign news in the Third World media, Stevenson and Gaddy (1982) revealed that there are significantly more conflict stories in the Third World media than all other framing combine. They argue that Third World editors are to blame for their over-selection of conflicts news events from the Western wire services. Cherry (1985), in a study to ascertain the NWICO debate and its effect on the Third World media found that for most press in the developing world news is still defined in Western terms and from Western perspectives. The study found that 51% of the foreign news item in the sampled Anglophone newspapers originated from the West; at the same time, the newspapers

failed to identify about 59% of the sources of their foreign news items. Furthermore, the study condemned the developing world media for not patronizing non-Western news agencies.

Generally, most literature shows that the Nigerian newspapers have not performed well- in terms of the volume and sources of news -in their coverage of foreign events. For instance, Nwuneli (1971), in a study of the Nigerian press coverage of the mercenary invasion of Guinea, found that though the news of the invasion reached Nigeria one hour after it had begun, the Nigerian national press did not report it until the third day, due to lack of personnel and facilities to make such coverage possible. A similar study on the coverage of the 1973 Yom Kippur war between Israel and the Arab countries, showed that none of the four newspapers that were sampled in Nigeria present on-the-spot coverage of the war; yet most of their news report and editorial comments were grossly anti-Israel (Dare, 1973 cited in Uche and Ngumoh, 1998).

In studies which looked at the coverage of the developed world media's coverage of Third World countries, there are findings that show the developed media frame the third world in conflict, crisis and disaster frames. Hunt (1996), in a study examined the news coverage of Africa by three American elite press over a year period. He found that 56.9% of the coverage was negatively framed against Africa, there were much more stories about places and nations than stories about people. In fact the study maintained that roughly only 10% of the stories described people in any great detail. Similarly, Haule (1984) studies reveal that most times Africa is framed in negative light and the positive frames are reported in context which gives some level of credit to the developed countries. However, Stevenson and Gaddy (1982) maintains that the accusation against developed media bias against the Third World is not peculiar to the Third World alone but a general media problem where bad events tend to make good news.

Therefore, this review has shown different perspective of terrorism and the media coverage of terrorism. From comparative analysis of Nigerian press and the British press to analysis of coverage of the developed media of events in the Third World. The review of literature has also shown the sources of news for most Nigerian newspapers' coverage of foreign events. More so, it has reviewed the works of scholars which have looked into the framing of foreign events in local media and framing of local events in the third world in the developed media. The gap that remains is how do the coverage of Nigerian newspaper of foreign conflicts relate to the events on-going within Nigeria?

2.13. Theoretical Framework

The media are very well suited for the purposes of terrorists (Nacos, 2005). Several theories concerning characteristics – or capabilities – of the media explain part of this phenomenon. In the context of this study, the Framing Theory was used.

2.13.1. Framing Theory

Framing evaluates the manner in which the media cover events which can influence the construct of meaning the audience give the story. (De Vreese, 2005). The media frame events by emphasizing particular aspects of an event and de-emphasizing others. Framing, according to Entman (1993: 52), “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.” Thus, it is obvious that the media does not just ‘report’ events — they ‘mediatise’ them (Rudd, 2015). According to Ibrahim (2016:1) “framing refers to the inclusion or exclusion categories, concepts and contexts in the news. The way the stories are framed can indicate the editorial direction and ideology of the

writer or media organisation”. For framing to be achieved, there are multiple layers the constructs must pass through. Entman (1993) says that “frames have several locations, including the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.” Gitlin (1980: 7) defines frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse.’ DeVreese (2005) citing Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 47) says frames activate knowledge, stimulate ‘stocks of cultural morals and values, and create contexts.’

2.13.2. Assumptions of Framing Theory

The following are the assumptions of the framing theory:

1. The theory assumes that framing is an integrated process. There are frame building processes. These processes are internal and external factors that border around the journalists, the news organisation and the journalists interaction with elites and social movements. The outcomes of the frame-building process are the frames manifest in the text. (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; De Vreese, 2005; Cooper, 2002).
2. The media frames exist within a context and are not vacuous. (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). This context is called the frame-setting. De Vreese (2005) defines frame-setting as “the interaction between media frames and individuals’ prior knowledge and predispositions.”
3. The media frames have effects on the audience which are measurable. This is called the *consequence* of framing. This consequence can be conceived on the individual and the societal level. An individual level consequence may be altered attitudes about an issue based on exposure to certain frames. On the societal level, frames may contribute to

shaping social level processes such as political socialization, decision-making, and collective actions. (De Vreese, 2005; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978).

The diagram from De Vreese (2005) below explains the three assumptions of framing theory




Figure II: An integrated process of framing

The assumptions show that there is a media framing of events which is meant to interact with the predisposition of the audience and this media frame-audience interaction result in a measurable perception change or reinforcement in the audience.

However, it should be understood that framing is not spontaneous nor is it static, instead it is a gradual building process. De Vreese (2005) noted that “the potential of the framing concept lies in the focus on communicative *processes*. Communication is not static, but rather a dynamic process that involves frame-building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience predispositions).”

The framing theory emerged from the Agenda Setting Theory. However, the latter is more concerned with *quantity* of coverage of an event, the latter focuses on *how* that event is reported. De Vreese (2005) says “while Agenda-Setting Theory deals with the salience of issues, framing is concerned with the presentation of issues.”

In times of conflict, the media is instrumental in defining the conflict to the audience and it does this through framing. In fact, anytime there is a terrorist attack, there are four questions the audience expects the media to answer through its framing. They are: who are the perpetrators, what are the causes, what are the motives and who are their target victims? Rudd (2015: 2) explains the importance of framing:

How the media report international conflicts and crises has a number of important consequences. First, it defines whether there *is* a crisis or conflict (global warming, an impending financial crisis, a terrorist bombing...). Second, i[t] identifies the causes of the crisis or conflict (Islamic extremists, rogue bankers...). The media can then identify a remedy to the problem (military invasion, government regulation of banking, carbon credits...). And underlying all this, the media can convey a moral judgment about the event (terrorism is evil, democracies are the best form of government, environmental protection is best left to the free market...).

Similarly, Entman (1993: 2) says:

Frames ... *define problems-determine* what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; *diagnose* causes-identify the forces creating the problem; *make moral judgments-evaluate* causal agents and their effects; and suggest *remedies-offer* and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions.

There are two ways for conducting a study using the theory of framing: one is the inductive and second the deductive. In the inductive approach, there is no prior knowledge of the possible frames in which the event is reported. In such studies, the frames are not defined before the study but it is the study that defines the frames (Gamson, 1992; De Vreese, 2005). In the deductive approach however, the frames are defined before the study is conducted. This definition is done through operationalizing particular words as they fit into certain codes in a content analysis.

Many scholars are of the opinion that the latter approach is better when conducting a content analysis (De Vreese, 2005). This study makes use of the deductive approach. In using this approach, Cappella and Jamieson, (1997) advised that, first, a news frame must have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics. Second, it should be commonly observed in journalistic practice. Third, it must be possible to distinguish the frame reliably from other frames. Fourth, a frame must have representational validity (i.e. be recognized by others) and not be merely a figment of a researcher's imagination (Cited in De Vreese, 2005).

Therefore noting the assumptions of the theory and the discussions by many scholars among which are Rudd and Entman, the theory is appropriately used to investigate the frames the selected Nigerian newspapers reported the ISIL formation and its activities. It is expected that the theory will lend insightful explanations to the frames the Nigerian newspaper reported ISIL activities.

CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.11. Introduction

The research methodology contains the procedure used to carry out the study. The viability of a study is dependent on how scientific the methods are. Thus, if the methodology is significantly scientific then the study will not just be academically sound but scientifically verifiable. To this end, this chapter contains the research design- which is the blueprint of research-, the population, sampling technique, instrument of data collection and coding rules.

3.12. Research Method

In the study of terrorism in the media, many scholars have used different methodology. Two methods most used are the content analysis and survey methods. This is because studies have shown that there is a correlation between the level of prominence of terrorism in the media and its prominence in public discuss. Also, research has shown that news frames affect the perceptions and reactions of viewers, listeners and readers. (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002; Iyengar, 1991) Spencer (2012: 9) says

Methodologically, the salience of phenomena such as terrorism to general publics can be measured either by public opinion polls or by media content analyses. With regard to media content analyses, assessing the amount of an issue's coverage in the media offers indirect insights into that issue's public salience, which can be expected to rise with the amount of media reporting on it (epstein and Segal 2000: 66-67): there is a strong correlation between the prominence of an issue in media coverage and the importance attached to it by general publics (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Miller and Krosnick 2000).

The study therefore, made use of content analysis to empirically understand the framing of ISIL terrorism in three leading opinion shaping Nigerian newspapers namely: *Guardian*, *Punch* and

Daily Trust. The analyses of ISIL in the Nigerian press give an insight to informed discussion on the present security situation in Nigeria. Rubin, Alan, Haridakis and Piale (2010: 215) explain that “Content analysis is a procedure that helps researchers identify themes and relevant issues often contained in media messages.” This methodological approach is consistent with many similar researches. Ozohu-Suleiman (2013), for instance, carried out content analysis of the major international broadcast stations- Press TV, CNN, Aljazeera English and BBC-of their reportage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Similarly, Nacos and Torres-Reyne content analysed the framing of Arab-Muslim minorities in the American leading newspapers before and after the 9-11 attack. Many studies have also focused on analysing ISIL in the media. An academic body called “voices from the blog” content analysed social media posts and comments on ISIL terrorism. The study analysed the framing of each post to determine the level of negative sentiment against, and positive sentiments in favour, of ISIL (Voices from the blog, 2014). They found out that the negative sentiment toward ISIS always increases after the diffusion on-line of videos showing the beheading of Western citizens, but in one case (the killing of the Israeli-American journalist Steven Sotloff) (Voices from the blog, 2014).

Similarly, Lister chronicles the emergence of ISIL and its communication strategy in the US, UK and the Canadian (Lister, 2014). Therefore, content analysis is a method widely used and is also used in this study.

3.13. Data Description and Sources

The study uses content data. The purpose of content analysis is to scientifically establish how the ISIL terrorism is framed in the *Guardian*, *Daily Trust* and *Punch* newspapers from the period of March, 2014 and March, 2016.

Content data were obtained from articles and news reports on the websites of the three newspapers under study and within the period under study. This study excludes pictures, adverts and videos on the websites.

In this research, the internet is used only as a means to gain access to news archives of the selected media outfits.

3.14. Content Analysis

Content analysis is the systematic examination of the structure and content of messages, particularly those in the media (Rubin, Rubin, Haridakis and Piele, 2010). In essence, content analysis is a scientific procedure that helps researchers identify themes and relevant issues often contained in media messages. (Hunt: 2003). Content analysis according to Berelson (1952) in Wimmer and Dominic, (2013:79) “is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.” The central objective of content analysis is in the ability to replicate the study. This therefore entails a need for a solid way to make sure that such study is reliable and valid. In this view, Prasad (2008) says content analysis “is essentially about making valid, replicable and objective and generalizable inferences about the messages on the basis of explicit rules.” There are two approaches in content analysis of media messages: the qualitative and the quantitative analysis approaches. Qualitative content analysis refers to textual analysis of content whereas quantitative content analysis refers to numerical categorisation of textual occurrences in the content. This study makes use of quantitative approach. In this study, content analysis of the *Daily Trust*, *Guardian* and *Punch* newspapers serves the methodological requirements for the research objectives. Therefore, content analysis is employed for:

1. Finding out what the Nigerian Newspapers framed as the causes of ISIL terrorism.
2. Ascertaining the victims of ISIL terrorism from the coverage in Nigerian press.
3. Understanding the motives of ISIL terrorism from the coverage in Nigerian newspapers.

3.5 Content Population

In research, universe is the same as population. It constitutes the total number of news, articles and any other item for measurement in a study. The population of this study is all the reports of ISIL in *Daily Trust*, *Guardian* and *Punch* newspapers within two years- March, 2014 through March, 2016.

The reason behind the newspaper selection is both based on the ownership pattern of the three newspapers and the concentration of their audience. This choice is meant to represent the diversity of Nigerian newspapers cutting across various regions. *Daily Trust* has Kabiru Yusuf as its chairman and it is considered one of the most vibrant northern newspaper; *Guardian* owned by Alex Ibru, is considered an elite newspaper of both the East and South and *Punch*, published by Ajibola Ogunsola has a high concentration of audience in the Western part of Nigeria (Omu, 2004). The selection is intended to represent the leading newspapers in Nigeria.

Articles are chosen from the websites of the selected papers for ease of accessibility and precise selection of the articles that contain stories on ISIL as they fit into defined categories. This will aid replication of study.

3.6 Sample Frame

Ozohu-Suleiman (2013: 81) says “sample frame is the complete list of all the population elements of a target universe.” The study covers the articles and news reports on ISIL in the period of March, 2015 through March, 2016. This was the period ISIL terrorism was at its

highest point. Upon identifying the exact population of content for this analysis, a total coverage study was conducted. This means that all reports on ISIL that fall within the study period were considered and analysed. The cumulative population of ISIL reports in the selected newspapers is 732 editions. *Daily Trust* had 214 editions; *Punch* had 279 editions and *Guardian* had 239 editions on ISIL terrorism.

3.7 Units of Analysis

Unit of analysis is simply the variable by which the content of the media outfit is analysed. In a study, unit of analysis is the level of abstraction at which the researcher looks for variability. It varies according to the data and purpose of research and might be a single word, a letter, a symbol, a theme (a single assertion about one subject), a news story, a character, an entire article or an entire film or a piece of programme (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013). In this study, the unit of analysis in relation to the stated research objectives are as follows:

1. Item (i.e. articles, news reports, editorials relating to ISIL, IS, ISIS, Daesh, Dawlah or Islamic state as may fit into identified categories)
2. Themes relating to “causes of ISIL terrorism”, “victims of ISIL terrorism” and motives of ISIL terrorism”

The units of analysis are coded as they occur within the news reports and articles in relation to content categories. Key Word in Context (KWIC) analysis is done to ascertain that coded word units were used in relation to the ISIL terrorism and to determine the direction of usage of the words.

3.8 Content Categories

Developing content categories is of great importance in content analysis. In fact, the extent to which the content categories are accurately developed in line with the research objectives is the extent to which the study may be termed successful or even scientific.

The relationship between content category and unit of analysis is that the categories represent the subject of inference into which the analytical units are organised (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013). By their choices and positioning, content units are given their eventual meaning and intention by the category into which they are fitted. Content categories are usually dealing with “what is said” or “how it is said”. There are basically three criteria for developing content categories, they include:

- i. Content categories must be operationally defined.
- ii. Secondly, it must be exhaustive so that all units to be examined can fit into appropriate categories and
- iii. It must be mutually exclusive. This means that categories must be unambiguously coded in such that they are independent of another. The reason is to ensure that a unit of analysis is coded into one and only one category (See Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013: 84).

3.8.1. Content Categories and Sub-Categories

In this study on the three Nigerian newspapers’ framing of ISIL terrorism, the content categories are defined as thus:

Causes Frame of ISIL Terrorism: this refers to factors that led to the rise or formation of ISIL as contained in the newspapers under review. The following sub-categories under this frame are defined thus: Sectarian Marginalisation- the factor that led to the rise of ISIL was as the result of

the sectarian tensions among the various sects within Iraq and Syria. Foreign nation influence – means that ISIL in Iraq and Syria was formed as a result of external influence from other nations and intelligence agencies. This frame was further divided into two unit of analysis which are: Western nations- this means the countries that belong to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the allies of those nations as foreign influence that led to the rise of ISIL. Non-western nations- mean nations which do not have good relationship with the West but are framed in the newspapers to be responsible for the formation of ISIL. Arab Spring- means that the wave of spontaneous protests occurring in North Africa and the Middle East known as Arab Spring was what led to the formation of the formation of ISIL, as well as Syrian civil wars and Israel/Palestine conflict.

Victim Frame is who the newspapers frame as the victims of ISIL terrorism or the category of people that mostly targeted in ISIL attacks. The following are sub-categories under the frame and are defined thus: Sunnis- means that victims of ISIL attacks belonged to the Sunni Muslim sect. Shiite - means that victims of ISIL attacks belonged to the Shiite Muslim sect. Christians - means that victims of ISIL attacks were Christians, Jews, and Yazidis. Military – means ISIL victims that were framed to be the military, para-military and other armed forces. Unspecified: means that the newspapers did not specify the victims according to religious/ethnic identity or any of the previous categories but mentioned

Motive/Reason Frame is formulated anytime what ISIL seeks to achieve through its violence is reported in the newspapers. The following sub-categories under this frame are defined thus: Advancement of political Ideology means – ISIL objective is to advance a lifestyle that is according to the socio-cultures and political ideologies of the group. Ethno-Nationalism means- ISIL motive is to setup a different autonomous geographical region with its own system of

leadership structure. Religious Extremism means- ISIL espoused an extreme version of Islam and forceful sought to impose the version on people.

Sources of ISIL Reports in the three newspapers are divided into three: Foreign source means- news stories and articles in the studied newspapers that are not written by staff reporters, an identifiable columnist, and it is not culled from a Nigerian news agency. National Source means- news stories and articles that are written by staff reporters or identifiable columnists. Unidentifiable Source means – news stories or articles on ISIL which are not attributed to any source or which the source is neither foreign nor national.

Solution Frame means – what measures were proffered as means of solving the ISIL terrorism by the newspapers. The following sub-categories were formulated. They include: use of force means- the solution to ending ISIL terrorism is the use of lethal military force. The Use of Diplomacy means – attempting to end ISIL terrorism through dialogue and negotiations and not the use of force. The use of force and Diplomacy means – solutions to ISIL terrorism based on the use of both diplomacy and force.

3.9 Content Coding Instrument and Procedure:

The instrument for content analysis is the code sheet. However, this study because it is essentially using internet materials, it relied on the search for key words and themes to search for related and relevant media content on ISIL terrorism as contained in the sampled newspapers. According to Chong & Druckman (2007), “articles or stories are identified via searches (such as key word searches on electronic data bases) and typically serve as unit of analysis...coders then analyse a sample, identifying the presence or absence of the predefined frames in the story or article” (cited in Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013:88).

Furthermore, the procedure for content coding included Key Word in Context (KWIC) coding. This can be carried out through the use of concordance software to check the presence and context in which a word relating to the ISIL terrorism is used.

3.10 Research Methodological Gap in Previous Studies

As shown in the statement of the problem, there are many studies on media and terrorism, as well as the presence of foreign news in Nigerian newspapers and the Nigerian newspapers sources of foreign news. Most of these studies used the same research methodology which although scientific, had limitations which are worth considering. First, the coding of the tone in most studies was divided into, positive, negative and neutral (see Dare, 1973; Stevenson and Gaddy, 1982), secondly, until recently previous studies did not have the privilege of an internet archive nor a web-database such as *factiva* therefore these studies depended on manual skimming of newspapers which was cumbersome (see, Uche and Ngumoh, 1998; Cherry, 1985; Haule, 1984). However recent studies have employed the use of web-archives and databases which has proved reliable and scientific (see Ozohu-Suleiman, 2013; Nacos, 2010)

This study closes these two methodological gaps observed in most previous studies in the following ways: one, the study went beyond categorisation of tone into negative, positive and neutral but this study sub-categorise the frames to find the causes and motives of ISIL formation as well as the framing of the victims of ISIL activities. Also, the method of data gathering and the duration of this study is an improvement from previous studies. This study uses internet archive and accessed database websites to search for relevant ISIL stories in the sampled Nigeria newspapers unlike the analogue process used in previous studies listed above.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION

4.4.Introduction

This chapter presents, interprets, analyses the gathered data and discusses findings of the study. Analyses are made using tables, percentage frequency and interpretations are given to the data in the tables. Following the interpretations, the findings are discussed in accordance to the research questions. The coding rule must be restated here: if at least two newspapers agree on a frame then that frame is taken as the dominant frame.

4.5. Data Presentation

This section presents and interprets the data generated. In this study, *Daily Trust*, *Punch* and *The Guardian* newspapers' reports of ISIL terrorism were content analysed. The number of reports was 732. The data is presented below:

Table 4.1.: Cross Tabulation of Newspapers Showing Causes of ISIL Terrorism

Nigerian Newspapers	Tone of the Causes of ISIL formation					Total
	Marginalisation	Arab Spring	Foreign nation's influence		Unclassifiable articles	
			Western influence	Non-Western influence		
<i>Dailytrust</i>	26.6 (n=57)	13.6 (n=29)	35.5 (n=76)	4.2 (n=9)	20.1 (n=43)	100 (n=214)
<i>Punch</i>	10 (n=28)	16.8 (n=47)	15.4 (n=43)	6.5 (n=18)	51.2 (n=143)	100 (n=279)
<i>Guardian</i>	20.9 (n=50)	11.3 (n=27)	18 (n=43)	4.6 (n=11)	45.1 (n=108)	100 (n=239)
Total	18.4 (n=135)	14 (n=103)	22.1 (n=162)	5.2 (n=38)	40.2 (n=294)	100 (n=732)

The table above shows the causes of the formation of ISIL terrorist group. All three newspapers blame foreign nations and their Intelligence agencies as the greatest cause for the formation of ISIL. In reporting the cause of the formation of ISIL, *Daily Trust* had the highest volume of reports on foreign influence with 85 (40%) articles. *Punch* and *Guardian* respectively had 61 (22%) and 54 (23%) reports blaming foreign nations for ISIL's formation. Also, *Guardian* and *Daily Trust* respectively identified internal sectarian marginalisation, 50 (21%) and 57 (27%), in Iraq and Syria as the next cause of ISIL's rise. The Arab Spring was the least aggregate cause 103 (14%) of ISIL's rise. *Punch* newspaper maintains that besides foreign causes 61 (22%), the Arab spring is the next cause 47 (17%) and sectarian marginalisation 28 (10%) the least cause. Therefore, foreign nations' interference is therefore considered the greatest cause to the rise of ISIL, followed by sectarian marginalisation within Iraq and Syria and lastly, the Arab spring are the sequence the Nigerian newspaper framed the causes of the rise of ISIL.

Table 4.2.: Cross-Tabulation Showing Victims of ISIL Terrorism

Nigerian Newspapers	Victims of ISIL terrorism					
	Sunni	Shiites	Christians	Unspecified	Military	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Daily trust</i>	18.7 (n=40)	34.1 (n=73)	19.2 (n=42)	26.6 (n=57)	1 (n=2)	100 (n=214)
<i>Punch</i>	3.6 (n=10)	27.2 (n=76)	26.2 (n=73)	39.8 (n=111)	3.2 (n=9)	100 (n=279)
<i>Guardian</i>	3.8 (n=9)	9.6 (n=23)	7.9 (n=19)	56.5 (n=135)	22.2 (n=53)	100 (n=239)
Total	8.1 (n=59)	24.5 (n=172)	18.3 (n=134)	49.6 (n=363)	8.7 (n=64)	100 (n=732)

The victims of ISIL terrorism as reported by all reviewed newspapers, with the exception of *Daily trust*, showed that most of the victims were 'unspecified'-*Punch* 111(40%) and *Guardian*

135(57%). The ‘unspecified’ are victims the newspapers’ reports did not identify based on religious or ethnic affiliations. *Daily Trust* identified Shiites as the most affected victim with 73 (34%) of its articles. Unspecified victims, Christians and Sunnis in prominence progression had 57(27%), 42(19%) and 40(19%) respectively in *Daily Trust*. Both *Punch* and *Guardian* frame the victims in the same prominence sequence howbeit with difference in frequency. On the one hand, the former had Shiites 76(27%), Christians 73(26%) and Sunni 10(4%) whereas the latter framed Shiites 23(10%), Christians 19(8%) and Sunni 9(4%). For the military victims, *Guardian* had the highest articles that framed military casualties with 53(22%) articles, *Punch* had 9(3%) and *Daily trust* 2(1%) articles. In accordance with the coding rule, it can be stated that the majority of the victims in the Nigerian newspapers were framed unspecified.

Table 4.3.: Showing Cross-Tabulation of Nigerian Newspapers’ Coverage of Motives/reasons/intents of ISIL

Nigerian Newspapers	Motives of ISIL terrorism				Total %
	Advancement of Ideology %	ethno-nationalism %	religious extremism %	Unclassifiable articles %	
<i>Daily trust</i>	25.7 (n=55)	22 (n=47)	8.4 (n=18)	42 (n=94)	100 (n=214)
<i>Punch</i>	20 (n=81)	33 (n=92)	16.1 (n=45)	21.8 (n=61)	100 (n=279)
<i>Guardian</i>	28.5 (n=68)	35.1 (n=84)	23 (n=55)	13.4 (n=32)	100 (n=239)
Total	27.9 (n=204)	30.5 (n=223)	16.1 (n=118)	25.6 (n=187)	100 (n=732)

The table above shows the reasons for ISIL’s violence as framed by the reviewed newspapers. Articles in *Punch* 92 (33%) and *Guardian* 84 (35%) show that the foremost motive of ISIL was based on ethno-nationalistic grounds. This means that ISIL’s goal to gain some level of autonomy. However, *Daily Trust* framed the advancement of ISIL’s ideology as the highest motive with 55(26%). Also, *Punch* had 81(20%) and *Guardian* 68(29%) articles which framed ISIL’s ideological advancement as the second most prominent goal of ISIL. Religious extremism was framed as the least motive in all newspapers.

Table 4.4.: Framing of Solution to ISIL Terrorism

Nigerian newspaper	Solution to ISIL terrorism				
	Support for foreign military intervention		Support for the use of Diplomacy	Unclassifiable articles	Total
	Western-led coalition	Non-Western military			
	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Daily Trust</i>	10.7 (n=23)	21 (n=44)	9.8 (n=21)	58.9 (n=126)	100 (n=214)
<i>Punch</i>	19 (n=53)	9.7 (n=27)	6.8 (n=19)	64.5 (n=180)	100 (n=279)
<i>The Guardian</i>	30.1 (n=72)	14.6 (n=35)	11.7 (n=28)	43.5 (n=104)	100 (n=239)
Total	20.2 (n=148)	14.4 (n=106)	9.3 (n=68)	56 (n=410)	100 (n=732)

In the coverage of the selected publications on how the ISIL conflict can be resolved, all newspapers supported the use of force through foreign military intervention albeit with different degree of frequency. One noticeable difference, however, is that *Daily Trust* was the only newspaper that supported the non-Western military intervention above the Western-led military coalition against ISIL (table 4.4). The non-Western military intervention includes: Russian air support, Iranian ground troops, Hezbollah fighters which join the fight on the side of the Syrian government against *Daesh*. The other two newspapers supported the Western-led coalition against ISIL over the non-Western (see table 4.4).

It can be suggested that the region of coverage of the newspapers can lend more understanding for the framing of resolution of ISIL terrorism by the three newspapers. *Punch* and *The Guardian* resonate more with the Southern part of Nigeria, *Daily Trust* is popular in the Northern part of Nigeria. *Daily Trust* framing could represent a framing of deep suspicion for the Western-led military coalition against ISIL in Iraq and Syria believing the intervention has ulterior motives; suggestively, the frame indicate that the West might want to achieve regime change in Syria or possibly unbridle access to the oil deposits in Iraq and thereby use the intervention as a smokescreen to their actual agenda. This suspicion is legitimated as the coverage of *Daily Trust*, January, 28, 2016 show that 28 NATO-member countries as well as a host of countries in the Middle East are involved in the fight against ISIL and the war is still not over.

On the framing of *Punch* and *The Guardian*, the frame implicitly portray the West as the purveyor of democracy and advocates of human rights and in this regard, has the moral responsibility to confront ISIL and oppose the Assad regime in Syria on grounds of human rights violations in its civil war. Therefore, countries such as Russia and Iran as well as non-state actors

such as Hezbollah which support Assad in Syria and fight against ISIL in Iraq are framed to have the ulterior motive of helping keep the Assad regime in power and not really confronting ISIL.

Table 4.5.: Prominence of ISIL Coverage in the Sampled Newspapers

Nigeria's Newspapers	Frequency of articles on ISIL terrorism
<i>Daily Trust</i>	(n=214)
Percent of coverage	29.2
Average number of stories	3.4
<i>Punch</i>	(n=279)
Percent of coverage	38.1
Average number of stories	2.6
<i>The Guardian</i>	(n=239)
Percent of coverage	32.7
Average number of stories	3.1
Total	(n=732)

In this study, prominence is measured by the number of individual news stories and articles on ISIL terrorism in the three selected newspapers.

The *Punch* newspaper has more news stories and articles in terms of quantity of coverage devoted to ISIL. During the two years period, 279 news stories and articles about ISIL appeared in *Punch* newspaper leading to 38.1 Percent of the total coverage the three newspapers devoted to

ISIL terrorism. *The Guardian* published a total number of 239 news stories and articles on ISIL, making it the newspaper with the second highest publication. *Daily Trust* published the least number of articles on ISIL with a total of 214 news stories and articles.

De Vreese (2005) makes us understand that the salience of events in the media show the importance attached to that event. In line with that thought, *ThePunch* gave the highest salience to the ISIL terrorism when compared with *The Guardian*, and *Daily Trust*. This therefore means ISIL terrorism was more prominent in *The Punch* newspaper.

Table 4.6.: Sources of News on ISIL Terrorism in Nigerian Newspapers

Nigerian Newspaper	Source			Total
	Foreign	National	Unidentified	
	%	%	%	%
<i>Daily Trust</i>	59.3 (n=127)	31.8 (n=68)	8.9 (n=19)	100 (n=214)
<i>Punch</i>	64.9 (n=181)	21.9 (n=61)	13.3 (n=37)	100 (n=279)
<i>Guardian</i>	66.1 (n=158)	17.6 (n=42)	16.3 (n=39)	100 (n=239)
Total	63.7 (n=466)	23.3 (n=171)	13 (n=95)	100 (n=732)

What were the sources of ISIL news and articles in the three selected newspapers? To answer this question, the research relied on the data generated in Table 4.4. It was discovered that *Punch*

had a total of 279 news and article reports on ISIL. Some of the sources of these articles were identified whereas others were not. Of those identified, the staff and guest writers of *The Punch* were responsible for generating 61 (22%) of the published articles. *The Guardian* had a total of 239 articles with identified and unidentified sources, out of which its own staff and guests-writers were responsible for writing 42 (18%). The *Daily Trust* on its part, was responsible for generating 68 (32%) out of a total of 214 news stories and 127(59%) news stories were gotten from foreign sources; 19(9%) of the sources of her reports on ISIL were not identified. The other two Nigerian newspapers, the *Punch* and *Guardian*, respectively carried 181 (65%) and 158 (66%) of identified news stories from foreign sources, while the remaining of 61 (22%) and 42 (18%) articles were from unidentified sources respectively.

4.6. Discussion of Findings

4.3.1 Research Question 1: Framing of the Causes of ISIL Terrorism

The reviewed Nigerian newspapers blamed the rise of ISIL formation on: One, power play of the Western foreign nations and her allies in Iraq and Syria. Two, sectarian marginalisation prevalent in the Middle-East and three, political vacuum created by the Arab Spring (see table 4.2.1).

The study showed that foreign nations were blamed for the formation of ISIL terrorist. Most reports blamed the intelligence services of various Western countries and their allies for the creation of ISIL. According to the reviewed newspapers, the programme to create ISIL was called the Hornet's nest which created a conglomerate of extremist groups. A former agent at the US National Security Agency (NSA) who became a whistle-blower, Edward Snowden, reveals that "British and American intelligence agencies as well as Israel's MOSSAD worked together to create...the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)." This terrorist organisation, he

further said, “is able to attract all extremists of the world to one place, using a strategy called “the hornet’s nest” (Quoted in Global Research reports in *DailyTrust*, November 14, 2015). The possible aim of creating ISIL, according to Denselow (2015), is to “come up with a "perfect enemy", which allows a variety of political actors to pursue their own agendas under the guise of fighting them”. Credence might be given to such assertions if one considers the number of countries combating ISIL and yet have not defeated the group. The countries currently fighting ISIL include: all countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Turkey, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirate (UAE), Morocco, and Hezbollah, with a host of many other countries giving military aid to the fight against ISIL. (Cited in *Guardian*, October, 12, 2015)

Furthermore, qualitative analyses show that ISIL campaign is sustained by tactical support from these same countries. Cartallucci (2015) explained that ““ISIS’ supply lines run precisely where Syrian and Iraqi air power cannot go. To the north and into NATO-member Turkey, and to the southwest into US allies Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Beyond these borders exists a logistical network that spans a region including both Eastern Europe and North Africa.” (Cited in Punch, November 27, 2015)

Headlines such as: “How America helped create the Islamic State” (Punch, November 27, 2015); “The brains behind ISIS and ISIL” (Daily Trust, November 14, 2014); “Where does ISIS get its guns?”(Daily Trust, August 15, 2015) show the framing of the cause of ISIL formation.

This Euro-American and her allies’ global power play which created ISIL worked within the frame of marginalization along minority Sunnis and majority Shiites already existing in Iraq and the Middle East in general. These two sects in 2006-07 plunged Iraq into civil war. In recent

years rifts began to resurface as the Sunnis accused the Shiite led government of marginalisation.

Global Terrorism Index Report 2014 came to this conclusion on the cause of the rise of ISIL:

Of all the factors and conditions that can explain the rise of ISIL and its major military and modest state-building successes since the summer of 2014, the more specific and directly relevant ones are internal to the countries and the region in question. They include the genuine discontent by very diverse groups of Iraqi Sunnis – from the former Baathists to tribal groups to radical Islamists – with their growing political and socio-economic marginalization and repression. This rising discontent had earlier helped feed the anti-U.S. insurgency, but continued to accumulate during the rule of the increasingly sectarian al-Maliki government. That was coupled with the general limited functionality and low legitimacy of the unpopular, but increasingly authoritarian Iraqi regime inherited from the times of the foreign security presence.

Regarding Syria, Nougayrede (2014) explains "ISIL has been able to cast itself as the sole protector of Sunni civilians as they continue to be massacred by the barrel bombs and air power of the Syrian regime"(cited in Denselow, 2015).

These findings show that inasmuch as ISIL is the product of Euro- American power play in the Middle East, they could only succeed because there was internal tension and rivalry already existing within the country.

However, Lister (2014) argues against the school of thought that claims ISIL is the brain-child of the West and her allies. He maintains that ISIL had access to the quantity of weapons -though American-made- when it overran sensitive military bases in Iraq and captured their weapons. All other links and accusations lack empiricism and are merely products of conspiracy theories. ISIL is a product of internal rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites.

As the Euro-American power play coalesced with sectarian marginalisation in Iraq and Syria, the Arab Spring in 2010 created the enabling environment for the rise of ISIL. Arab spring created

chaos and made governance nearly impossible for affected countries. Some presidents were arbitrarily deposed or killed creating vacuum which thrive extremism. As Lister (2014:1) noted, “Intense turmoil in Syria and Iraq in recent years has created socio-political vacuums in which jihadi groups have been able to thrive. Most notable in this respect has been the rise to prominence of the Islamic State (IS)”. Also, Hagan (2015) concluded thus “The rise of ISIS was in direct response to the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war- a fruit of the Arab spring- and the contemporaneous withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in December 2011.”

Although Lister absolves the US and its allies from the formation of ISIL, this study, as well as many others, finds the Euro-American power play in the Middle East to be the greatest cause. And although this study shows that Arab Spring was the least cause for ISIL formation, Hagan and Lister see it as a major factor. And even though El Fadl’s studies placed marginalisation as the greatest cause to the rise of ISIL terrorism and this study shows marginalisation to be the second greatest cause, it all goes to show that scholars agree that marginalisation along sectarian divide in Iraq contributed to the rise of ISIL.

4.4 Research Question 2: Framing of the Victims of ISIL Terrorism?

The study categorises the victims into five groups namely: Sunnis, Shiite, Christian, Military and unspecified. *Punch* and *Guardian* reports show that most victims were unspecified whereas *Daily Trust*, second highest victims were unspecified- only second to Shiite victims. Unspecified in this study connotes that the reports did not identify the victims based on religious/ethnic affiliations. For instance headlines such as: At least 14 Killed in bomb blasts in Syria’s Homs: state media (*Guardian*, 28 December, 2015); At least 22 killed in IS-claimed Baghdad bombings (*Guardian* 28 February, 2016); Islamic State militants ‘burn to death 45 in Iraq’ (*Guardian*, 17 February, 2016) does give any indication of the victims’ faith or sect. However, headlines that

read: ISIL kills dozens of Iraqi soldiers near Ramadi (*Guardian*, 28 January, 2016); ISIL kills 44 in Shiite neighbourhood in Beirut (*Daily Trust*); Yazidi massacre, ISIL guilty of ethnic-cleansing- Cameron (*Punch*); ISIL beheads scores of Ethiopian Christians in Libya (*Guardian*) – are all specific to the religious or military identity of the affected victims.

Journalists and the media generally are faced with a sensitive task when reporting terrorists' attacks. This sensitivity heightens when reporting the victims of such attacks. Thus, the framing of the victims of terrorist attacks in the media sends a message to the wider public on the target-victims of the terrorists. In this regard, the media is saddle with the responsibility of maintaining social decorum when frame the victims of terrorists' attacks. Where the media fail in such responsibility, then fear and suspicion is bound to permeate the society. This is even truer in a country like Nigeria which is divided along religious and ethnic lines.

Therefore for the selected newspapers to have framed the victims of ISIL as 'unidentified' by not associating religious or ethnic affiliations to the victims, this result is in tandem with the notion of the Social Responsibility theory as advanced by Miller, (1990) which states that "the media is free but such freedom must be tempered with responsibility. It is the responsibility of the media therefore, to remain accountable to the safety of the audience and society."

4.5 Research Question 3: Framing of the Motives/reasons/intents behind ISIL Terrorism?

Many literatures have given detailed account of who, what, when and how terrorists groups are operating all around the world. These literatures, including this study, has described the social, political and economic conditions that are helping create these groups, but most of these studies fall short of understanding the group's motives. In other words, many literatures have described what ISIL is doing but this section will discuss why they are doing it. Understanding the motives

is one of the most important variables in counter-terrorism and it points towards solutions (Cunningham, 2003).

In order to get the motives of ISIL as covered by leading Nigerian newspaper, the motives were divided into three categories namely: advancement of political ideology, ethno-nationalism, and religious extremism. Although each of these concepts is elaborately discussed in chapter two, for clearer understanding it is necessary to briefly restate them here: Cunningham (2003) explains that terrorist organisations which are “motivated by [political] ideology the final ends are a new socio-economic-political structure. For those motivated by ethno-nationalism, the ends are some level of autonomy or independence. For the religious extremists it is the destruction of their enemies.”

Although studies have shown that there is no single or simple-explainable motivation of terrorism, this analysis explains each of the motives not in isolation but in relation to one another, in order of the prominence the newspapers framed the motivations.

From the study, ethno-nationalism was the greatest motivation of ISIL. This means the intention of ISIL is to gain some degree of autonomy or to create an independent state in the region of the Levant which is present day Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel (see map on page 3). One of ISIL’s press release states this clearly “our main goal is to establish the Islamic state and bring the caliph system back to life in the Islamic world after destroying all the images of the infidel political systems” In June 29, 2014, ISIL achieved this goal- to a limited extent- with the declaration of the independent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in parts of Syria and Iraq.

The second most prominent motivation of ISIL, according to the findings, was advancement of its ideology. This gives the indication that ISIL also struggled to advance its own ideologies in

Iraq and Syria which was based on its version of socio-political and economic Islam. Global Terrorism Index 2014 says ISIL “is opposed to the Alawite Assad regime and the Shia Iraqi Government of both former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his successor Haider al-Abadi. *It seeks to change their governance for ideological allies.*” [Emphasis added]

The third motivation was religious extremism. As ISIL pursued its ethno-nationalistic ambitions and advanced its ideologies, its actions became extreme. It lacks tolerance for those who did not subscribed to its ideology and the penalty of such non-adherents was death. Explaining this connection, Ranstrop (n.d) says

To identify the link between the roles of religious dogma and political ideologies; they both offer forms of order to counteract the effects of chaos. On the one hand, ideological or ethno-national terrorist knows he must answer to his fellow man for his actions, the religiously motivated, on the other hand, believe that they receive their marching orders from God. This knowledge emboldens the religiously motivated terrorist. For them the struggle is not one of political parties or systems or even of competing ethnic groups, but one of good versus evil.

It should be understood that the fact that the study has shown that the ambition of ISIL is to secede and create a caliphate ruled by a caliph in itself did not connote religious extremism however, as ISIL pursued policies and her caliph released what was called fatwas to the press and public, it began to reveal an Islamic ideology with interpretations that were extreme to the generality of Muslims. Cunningham (2003: 37) argues that

The religiously motivated exhibit traits of both the ideological and the ethno-national. Extreme or fundamental religious dogma is the spiritual equivalent of extreme forms of political ideology. Further, one’s religion is most often a key part of their ethnic or cultural identity. Therefore, we make the case that what can be said of victimized ethno-national groups can also be valid for those perceiving similar threats to their religious identity. Also, as religious extremism plays a similar

role to political ideology, combining both these factors together into a single terrorist organization makes for an extremely volatile mix.

4.6 Research Question 4: Sources of News on ISIL in the Nigerian Press

Majority of the reports on ISIL terrorism in the Nigerian press were gotten from foreign sources. This means that the newspapers under study relied on foreign media such as CNN, Al-Jazeera, BBC and wired services such as AFP, Reuters, AP for stories on ISIL (see table 4.6). As such, it is common to come across an article in one of the dailies and some days later, see that same article in a different newspaper. Sometimes, whereas the first newspaper which publishes the ISIL story may carry an identified source, the subsequent dailies may not give credit or attribution to the original source. It is therefore significant to point out that 466 (64%) stories the three Nigerian newspapers carried in their coverage of ISIL activities depended on foreign news sources.

This finding validates an earlier result carried out by Cherry (1985) which concluded that the sources of most (59%) major foreign news in four Anglophone African daily newspapers (as indicated in the literature review) were not identified. Similarly, Uche and Ngumoh's (1996) study shows that 57% of reports in the Nigeria media about events in other countries depended on foreign media sources. This study finding of 64% dependency on foreign media sources is almost the same with the 59% of Cherry and 57% Uche and Ngumoh previously found in their separate but related studies.

This study also shows that in all three sampled newspapers there was no single on-the-spot-coverage of ISIL war. This finding shows that the state of the Nigerian newspapers, in this respect, has not improved over many decades because in a study conducted by Dare (1973) on the Nigerian newspaper coverage of the 1973 Yom Kippur war between Israel and the Arab

countries, found that “none of the four newspapers that were sampled in Nigeria presented on-the-spot coverage of the war yet most of their news reports and editorial comments were grossly anti-Israel”. Just like in this study, most of the stories were from Western news wired services and staff or guest writers which presented opinions. The inability of the Nigerian newspapers to send reporters to spots where events are unfolding abroad could be due to financial constraints, lack of competent personalities and logistical incapacity.

4.7 Research Question 5: Prominence of ISIL Reports in the Nigerian Press

The aggregate of the quantity of ISIL coverage in the three newspapers is 732. Of the three newspapers, *Daily Trust* has the least amount of reports with 214 separate reports whereas *Punch* had the highest with 279; followed by *The Guardian* with 239 separate articles on ISIL (see Table 4.5). The agenda setting theory makes us understand that the differences in the quantity of coverage in the publications are indicative of the level of prominence each of the newspapers attached to the ISIL terrorism. The data in table 4.5 shows that whereas *Punch* and *The Guardian* which have strong audience base in Southern Nigeria attached more prominence to ISIL terrorism, *Daily Trust*-commonly called a northern newspaper-did not attach similar level of importance.

This finding shows that the newspapers in the South are likely to attach importance to the ISIL terrorism and deemed it fit to enlighten their audience on the activities of ISIL. The effort to enlighten the audience came on the back heels of the Boko Haram terrorism the country and army-Shiite clash in Zaria which was made headlines within the period under study. The southern press used the ISIL terrorism to further educate their audience on the nature of terrorism at both home and abroad. The southern press coverage of ISIL terrorism could be analysed as part of a broader coverage of conflicts and terrorism which Nigeria has being experiencing

within the same period under study. The fact that the two southern newspapers' coverage of Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance to ISIL was remarkably higher than *Daily Trust* and subsequently, there was an increase in the quantity of ISIL reports in both *Punch* and *The Guardian* newspapers showed that the Southern press reported ISIL terrorism as part of the broader violence facing Nigeria. They reported ISIL terrorism within the context of the Boko Haram terrorism as well as the military-Shiite clash.

On the other hand, *Daily Trust*, probably overburdened with coverage of conflicts such as the Boko Haram terrorism and the military-Shiite clash in Zaria, deemed it unwise to further heat up the polity in the north with reports on ISIL. The newspaper probably believed that the ISIL terrorism might resonate strongly with those in the North due to perceived religious similarity and this might negatively affect the northern community. This position is best understood using the social responsibility theory. Thus it can be postulated that in order to avoid offensive content triggering crime, violence, or civil disorder or harm, *Daily Trust* became self-regulating and thus focused less attention to ISIL terrorism in the interest of the society.

4.8 Other Findings

The study also analysed the way the newspapers framed the solution to the ISIL terrorism. The frames were divided into 'use of force frame' and 'dialogue frame'. From the study, the finding shows that all newspapers under review framed the solution to ISIL terrorism using the 'use of force frame'. They supported the use of foreign military force to counter the rise of ISIL formation mainly in Iraq, Syria and across the world. They however differed on the nature or composition of such force. While *Punch* and *The Guardian* support the Western-led coalition force, *Daily Trust* was oppose to the Western-led military intervention but instead supported the non-Western force which is made of Russian, Iran and Hezbollah. Unlike the Western-led

coalition military force against ISIL, the non-western force is not fighting together under any organised anti-ISIL coalition umbrella. They are all fighting separately against ISIL on the invitation of Iraqi and Syrian government.

4.9 Application of the Finding to Nigeria Security Situation

This sub-section relates the findings of the study to the prevailing security situation in Nigeria.

The relevance of these findings in relation to the prevailing security situation in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. The ethno-religious tension facing Nigeria is a cause for concern. The situation in which one segment of the country seeks succession because it perceives it is marginalised by the centre government and the other region gives quit-notice ultimatum based on tribal affiliations are indications of deep divisions in the country. In the time past, such tensions have degenerated into violent clashes to the point of civil war. As the findings of this study have shown, albeit in Iraq and Syria, the prevailing ethnic and religious tension in Nigeria can also be an avenue for external powers to instigate the rise of an extremist group within Nigeria to increase the tension. The presence of various violent splinter groups in the country can become ready tools for instigating violence in the country. Groups such as Materialisation for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), the herdsmen crisis and even Boko Haram terrorism can be used to destabilize the country even further.

The main goal of these groups is ethno-nationalistic, that is to obtain some degree of autonomy or to totally secede from Nigeria in order to create their own country. The finding shows that there are links connecting ISIL's ethno-nationalistic goals to the advancement of its ideologies and to its resort to extreme violence on the basis of religion. The various violent groups across Nigeria can also end up in similar way. In Nigeria, most groups are motivated by advancement of ideologies and ethno-nationalism. For instance, the strongest motive of groups such as MASSOB

and IPOB in the East is ethno-nationalistic; whereas the strongest motive for MEND and NDA in the Niger Delta is advancement of ideology; Boko Haram in the North East is the only group that has explicitly weaved ethno-nationalism, advancement of ideology and religious extremism as its motives. The negotiable solutions for groups motivated by ethno-nationalism and advancement of ideologies are to grant the groups some degree of autonomy and a new socio-political and economic structure respectively (Pillar, 2001).

The media framing of the conflicts can either douse or aggravate the tensions. When the media carry headlines which show clear ethnic or religious affiliations of victims or perpetrators, such headlines may act as triggers for reprisal attacks in other parts of the country. For instance headlines such as the following can lead to more violence when placed in the Nigerian context: “ISIS targets Shia neighbourhood in Lebanon as scores feared dead” (*Punch*, November 12, 2015), “Lebanon mourns 44 killed in Beirut double bomb attack- here the reports states that the blasts occurred in “a neighbourhood where the Shiite Hezbollah movement is popular.” (*Daily Trust*, 13 November, 2016), Libya condemns killing of Ethiopian Christians by ISIL (*Guardian* 21 April, 2015); Islamic State ‘abducts 90 Christians in Syria’ (*Guardian*, 24 February, 2015); Iraqi soldiers die in attack on army base (*Guardian*, 02 June, 2015); ISIL kills dozens of Iraqi soldiers near Ramadi (*Guardian*, 28 January, 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.5 Summary

The study focused on the framing of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist group in three Nigerian newspapers namely: *Daily Trust*, *The Punch* and *The Guardian* within two years from March, 2014 – March, 2016. Three content categories were formulated according to Entman's theory of framing to study these newspapers framing of ISIL. These frames include: causes frame, victims frame and motives frame of ISIL terrorism. The research objectives and questions were formulated based on these frames. Content analysis research method was used to analyse 732 news stories and articles gotten from the three newspapers. The study found out that the greatest cause of ISIL formation was interplay of Euro-American and her allies power play in Iraq and Syria which took advantage of the prevailing sectarian marginalisation in Iraq and Syria and lastly, the Arab Spring created the vacuum which gave ISIL the opportunity to operate. The leading motive of ISIL is ethno-nationalism. The victims of ISIL's violence were unspecified. This means that no religious or ethnic affiliation was given to majority of ISIL victims.

5.6 Conclusion

If you pick an article on ISIL terrorism in *Daily Trust*, *Punch* and *The Guardian* newspapers, the chances are that it will be- either entirely or in some fragmented fashion- on the causes, the motives, and the victims of ISIL activities. And among these three categories, all three newspapers had more reports on the victims than on the causes and motives of ISIL. This gives credence to the media manta "if it bleeds, it leads". This also goes to show that the Nigerian press did not make enough effort to finding out the causes and motives of ISIL formation but instead was quick to report the thrills of the deadly attacks of and counter-attacks against ISIL.

The result of the study's content analyses demonstrates ISIL was created and is supported by the geo-politics of the West and its regional allies in the Middle East. Beside the three newspapers highlighting the existing socio-political and economic marginalisation based on sectarianism in the Middle East as a factor that contributed to ISIL's formation, the framing of these reports also showed that the Arab revolution in 2011 popularly called the Arab Spring, to a lesser extent, contributed to the formation of ISIL.

Equally important is the goal or motives of ISIL, the study showed that by far, the strongest goal of ISIL is to establish an independent state which it called a caliphate, in the Levantine region. To probably achieve this, the study showed that ISIL sort to advance or propagate its ideology across Iraq and Syria. ISIL released press statements and lectures called *fatwas* in which it clearly spelt out the advantages of living under a revived caliphate system of governance. The utopianism of the caliphate system drew mainly people who were disenfranchised and marginalized in their countries to join ISIL in order to bring about the caliphate system. Lastly in the framing of motives, ISIL discovered that the utopian ideology could not be realised, resulting into cognitive dissonance and as a result, they resort to extreme forms of violence. This violence is perpetrated in the name of religion. Therefore, religious extremism was the least prominent goal of ISIL as framed in two of the three Nigerian newspapers.

Furthermore, the sub-categories in which victims were framed showed that the three Nigerian newspapers were sensitive in how they reported the victims. Most victims were reported as 'unspecified'. Unspecified in the study means the victims were not identified based on religious or sectarian affiliation. When victims of ISIL are reported this way in the Nigerian press, ethno-religious tensions in Nigeria are not aggravated as further explained by the social responsibility theory.

More so, as the findings are related to the prevailing security situations in Nigeria, the study concluded that the factors which led to the formation of ISIL in Iraq and Syria are present in Nigeria. Today, the sense of marginalisation and economic hardship facing Nigeria is fuelling NDA and IPOB. Marginalisation, whether perceived or real, creates resentment which can be taken advantage of. When people are poor and feel marginalised, they easily fall prey to the manipulations of dubious politicians and other agitators with flawed ideologies and dangerous tactics. Using all means available, these agitators instigate the people. This result to ethnic and religious fundamentalism and extremism (Pate, 2015). These agitators include rogue external powers which can further exploit the situation and aggravate the scale of the activities of these violent groups. Furthermore, any uprising in any part of the country as a result of the economic hardship Nigerians are experiencing can give NDA, Boko Haram, MASSOB and IPOB or any other violent group the impetus they need to exacerbate their activities to achieve their most pressing motive.

5.7 Recommendations

From the findings and conclusion of this study, the recommendations of the study are as follows:

1. The Nigerian press need to increase their coverage on the causes and motives of ISIL formation instead of focusing most of their reportage on the casualties as evident in the number of reports on victims of ISIL. This will educate the public on the underlying causes and the goals of ISIL instead of just feeding the audience with reports of the bloodbath of ISIL activities.
2. Most of the reports on ISIL in the reviewed newspapers were gotten from either wired services or the global media. Also, there was no single on-the-spot report of ISIL

terrorism in any of the three newspapers under the study period. Therefore, it is important that the Nigerian press frame reports from first hand coverage and not just second-hand or sometimes even third-hand reports.

3. The press need to proffer more diplomatic solutions to end violent crises and terrorism through peace journalism as against the use of force frames to combat violence. The study showed that the three newspapers supported the use of force to solve ISIL terrorism more than the use of diplomacy.

5.8 Suggestions for Further Studies

The following are other areas in which studies can be conducted in this area

1. Behavioural studies: an attitude of Nigerians to the framing of ISIL in the Nigerian media
2. A study on the Nigerian newspapers' sources of news on ISIL terrorism
3. Analysis of foreign nations' policies toward combating ISIL.

REFERENCES

- Aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko-haram-pledge-allegiancep150312201038733html
- Allan, S. & Zelizer, B. (eds.) (2002) *Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War in Reporting War: Journalism in War Time*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Al-Salhy, S. (2015). *The full story behind ISIL's takeover of Mosul Museum*. Retrieved August 12, 2015, from <http://www.aljazeera.com>
- Alexander, Y., Carlton, D., and Wilkinson, P., Eds. (1979), *Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bandura, A. (1998), "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," In: Reich, W., (Ed.), *Origins of Terrorism; Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 161-191.
- Blanchard, C. M, Humud, C. E, Nikitin, M. B, (2014). *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U. S. Response*. Congressional Research Service.
- Bender, J. (2014), "As Isis Routs the Iraqi Army, here's a look at what the Jihadists have in their Arsenal," *Business Insider*, www.businessinsider.com/isis-military-equipment-breakdown-2014-7, accessed 10 February 2015.
- Chams E., and Pieter, V. O., "Overblown Fears of Foreign Fighters," *The New York Times*, 29 July 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/dont-fear-jihadists-returning-from-syria.html?_r=0>.
- Cherry, D. L., (1985). 'Foreign News in Africa's Anglophone Press: The Effects of the Debate for a New World Information Order', Paper presented at the annual conference of the international communication Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, May.
- Chigozi, I. E. *Objectivity and Balance in Conflict Reporting: Imperatives for the Niger Delta Press*. [www.google.com/Objectivity and Balance in Conflict Reporting](http://www.google.com/Objectivity%20and%20Balance%20in%20Conflict%20Reporting); retrieved on 6th February, 2012 9:30pm.
- Cunningham W. (2003). *Terrorism Definitions and Typologies*. In A. S. Office, *Terrorism: Concept, Causes and Conflict Resolution*. Virginia: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
- Cragin, K, Daly, Sara A., (2004), *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1782.pdf, p. 28, 37.
- Denselow, J. (2015, August 24). *How evil is ISIL?* Retrieved December 12, 2015, from Aljazeera web site: <http://www.aljazeera.com>

- Docherty, Jayne S., and Lisa S., (2001). *A Long-Term Strategy for American Security*. Harrisonburg, VA: Eastern Mennonite University.
<http://www.emu.edu/ctp/bse/longterm.html>
- Dickinson, T. (2008). "Truth or terrorism? The real story behind five years of high alerts." *Rolling Stone*. Retrieved March 21, 2015 from:
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/18056504/truth_or_terrorism_the_real_story_behind_five_years_of_high_alerts
- Economist (2007), "A world wide web of terror," *Economist*, Volume 384, Issue 8537, July 14,2007. See:
http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9472498.
- Edeani, D. O., (1994). Nigerian Mass Media Handling of Conflict Situations in the West AfricanSub-region. *African Media Review*. Retrieved fromarchive.li.msu.edu/.../africa%20media%20review/.../jam008001003.pdf
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: towards clarification of a structured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4)
- ElFadl, K. A., (2015). "The End of the Arab Spring, the Rise of ISIS and the Future of Political Islam" Retrieved on 21/5/2016
<http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2015/04/23/4221874.htm>
- FATF (2015), *Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(ISIL),FATF*,www.fatf.gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation_isil.html
- Fakude, T. (2014). *Aljazeera scholar*. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from Aljazeera english:
www.aljazeera.com/scholar
- Gabriel, A. M., (2006) "Journey into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist". Florida: Frontline
- Ganor, B. (2002), *Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare*, April 15, 2015.See:<http://www.ict.org.il/var/119/40015Terror%20as%20a%20Strategy%20of%20Psychological%20Warfare.pdf>.
- Gerges, F.A. (2005), *The Far Enemy, Why Jihad Went Global*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gitlin, T. &Hallin, D. (1994) 'The Gulf War as Popular Culture and Television Drama', in Bennett, Lance &Paletz, David (eds.) *Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Global Security (2009) *Worldwide military expenditures*. Retrieved March 9, 2015 from:
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm>

- Gowing, N. (1997). *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance In Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission
- Hall, S. (2005). *Representation & the Media*. Northampton: Media Education Foundation
- Hagan, B., (2015). The Fall of the Arab Spring and the Rise of the Islamic State. Retrieved on 22/05/2016
<http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/blog/the-fall-of-the-arab-spring-and-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-by-barney-hagan/>
- Haule, J., J., (1984). 'International Press coverage of African events: the dilemma and the future', *Gazette* (33)
- Hersey, M and Hauss, C., (2003). *Terrorism and Conflict Resolution In A. S. Office, Terrorism: Concept, Causes and Conflict Resolution*. Virginia: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
- Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism (Revised and Expanded Edition)*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press
- (2001). *Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica
- Ibrahim, M., (2016). "Comparative Analysis of News Framing of Boko Haram Insurgents and Niger Delta Avengers in some Selected Nigerian Newspapers (2011-2016)." Being a paper presented at the International Conference on Corruption, Security and National Development.
- Jan, M., (2009). Globalization of Media: Key Issues and Dimensions. *European Journal of Scientific Research* 39(1) retrieved from <http://www.eurojournals.com/ejsr.htm> on 19th February, 2015, 5:57pm
- Jakobsen, V. P. (2000). Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2). Pp. 131-143
- Jenkins, B., and Brian M., (2001). *Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats*. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, November 15, 2001, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
- Kalleberg, A (2014) (<http://blog.oup.com/authors/arne-l-kalleberg/>) retrieved on July 28th 2015

- Kegley, C. W. (Ed.). (1990). *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New York: St. Martin's Press
- Kerlinger, F. N. (2000). *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (4th ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Laqueur, W., (1987). *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987. --
(1999). *The New Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Lumbaca, S. & Gray, H. D. (2011). "The Media as an Enabler for Acts of Terrorism." *Global Security Studies* 2 (1)
- Marighella, C. (not dated), *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Havana: Tricontinental.
- Miller, A. H. (1990). *Terrorism and the Media: Lessons from the British Experience*. *The Heritage Foundation*, 1-9.
- Muhammad, F., "Hazem Commander: 'We Are Not U.S. Agents,'" *Zaman al-Wasl* (Doha), September 2, 2014.
- Muller, E.R., Spaaij, R.F.J., and Ruitenber, A.G.W. (2003), *Trends in Terrorism*, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer.
- Muobike, O. I., (2017). Newspaper Framing of the Abduction of Chibok Girls. *International Journal of Communication* 22 (1) 1-11
- Nacos, B.L. (2000), "Accomplice or Witness? The Media's Role in Terrorism," *Current History*, Volume 99, No. 636, April 2000, p. 174-178.
- Nacos, L. B. & Torres-Reyna, O. (2002). Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11. *Harvard Symposium Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism*
- Nohrstedt, S. A. (2009). "New War Journalism: Trends and Challenges." *Nordicom Review* 30 (1). Pp. 95-112
- Owolabi, T. O., and O'neill, E., (2014). Mass Media, Governance and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Nigeria: a Role Evaluation. *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, 17 (1) 62-74
- Ozohu-Suleiman, Y., (2013). "*Media and Peace Building in Israel/Palestine: an empirical study*". Kaduna: Richvalues
- Paletz, D.L., and Vinson, C.D. (1992), "Introduction," in: David L. Paletz and Alex Schmid (1992), *Terrorism and the Media*, London: Sage, p. 1-5.
- Pate, UA (2015). *Issues in Media and National Integration in Nigeria*. Lagos: Lagos state school of Communication.

- Pillar, P. R. (2001). *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press
- Paracha, A. S., Shahzad, M., Ali, S., & Nazir, J (2013). To Analyze the News Contents of Electronic and Print Media in Pakistan, Whether Media is Terrorizing or Informing the Community. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 59-67.
- Prasad, B. D. (2008). Content Analysis: A method in Social Science Research. In D.K. Lal Das & Bhaskaran (Eds), *Research Method for Social Work*. New Delhi: Rawat Publishers.
- PressTV (Director). (2014). *The Genealogy of ISIL* [Motion Picture].
- Pruitt, D.G. (2007). Social Conflict: Some Basic Principles. *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, 27(1)
- Puddephatt, A. (2006). *Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media*. International Media Support.
- Ranstorp, M., (n.d.). 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', Columbia International Affairs, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ram01/>.
- Robinson, M. (nd). Media Coverage of Terrorism and the War on Terror: Media as an Arm of the Government. *The Media: Crime and Criminal Justice in the News and Entertainment*.
- Rubin, B. R, Alan, M. R, Haridakis, P. and Piale (2010) *Communication Research: Strategies and Sources* (7th Ed.). Boston: Wadsworth
- Scheufele, D.A., and Tewksbury, D. (2007), "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models," *Journal of Communication*, Volume 57, p. 9-20.
- Schmid, Alex P. and Albert J. Jongman. (1988). *Political Terrorism*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company
- Slone, M. (2000). Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 44(4). Pp: 508-522
- Spencer, A. (2012). *Lessons Learnt: Terrorism and the Media*. Wiltshire: Arts and Humanities Research Council
- Stevenson, R., L and Gaddy, G. D., (1982). 'Bad news and the Third World', Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Communication Association, Boston, MA, USA.
- Stohl, M. (2014). *On the Horns of the US Counterterrorism Dilemma: Confronting ISIL and the Consequences of the War on Terror*. California: TRENDS Research & Advisory.

- Sunstein, C. R. (2003) 'Terrorism and the Probability Neglect', *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 26 (2-3): 121-136.
- Sweetman, D., (2001). Peace and Conflict Resolution in the Face of Terrorism. The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. 4.1, Summer 2001, <http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/terror.htm>
- Taylor, M., (1988). "The Terrorist." London: Brassey's Defence Publishers
- TTSRL. (2008). *Terrorism and the Media*. Prague: European Commission
- Uche, U. L. and Ngumoha, N, U (1996). Anglo-Nigerian Press Coverage of a Diplomatic Scandal: the UmaruDikko affair. In U. L. Uche, *North-South Information Culture* (pp. 210-29). Lagos: Longman.
- U.S. Department of State. (1999). Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000. Washington, DC: Department of State Publication
- Vieira, J.D. (1991), "Terrorism at the BBC: The IRA on British Television," In: Alali, A.O., and Eke, K.K., Eds. (1991), *Media Coverage of Terrorism, Methods of Diffusion*, London: Sage Publications, p. 73-85.
- Voices from the blog (2014). *ISIS*. Retrieved from: [www.voicesfromtheblogs.com/doc20%/isison 23/3/2015](http://www.voicesfromtheblogs.com/doc20%/isison%2023/3/2015)
- Watts, C. (2015). Countering ISIL's Ideology: Keep It Limited, Focused, and in Tune with Lessons Learned. *Taking the Fight to ISIL: Operationalizing CT Lines of Effort Against the Islamic State Group*. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Weimann, G., and Winn, C., (1994) *The Theatre of Terror. Mass Media and International Terrorism*, New York: Longman.
- White, J. R. (1991). *Terrorism, An Introduction*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole Publishing Co. [www.cicentre.com/?ISIS_aligned_map\(English.alarabiyan.net/en/perspective/profiles/215/01/8/paris-attacks-what-do-we-know-about-the-kouachi-brothers-.html](http://www.cicentre.com/?ISIS_aligned_map(English.alarabiyan.net/en/perspective/profiles/215/01/8/paris-attacks-what-do-we-know-about-the-kouachi-brothers-.html)
www.history.com/topic/9-11-attacks

Appendix 1

Code Sheet for the category for the causes of ISIL Terrorism

Sub-categories	Description of Frame		Frequency	Percentage
Marginalisation	Segregation or sectarianism with Iraq or Syria			
Arab Spring	The spontaneous uprising in the countries of the Arab League			
Foreign instigations	Western	Non-Western		
Unclassifiable	All articles that do not fit into the above mentioned categories			

Appendix 2

Code sheet for the category of the Motives of ISIL

Sub-categories	Description of Frame	Frequency	Percentage
Political ideology	Advance their own system of operating a state		
Ethno-nationalism	Creation of autonomous Islamic state		
Religious Extremism	Enforce fundamentalist Islam		
Unclassifiable	All articles that do not fit into the above mentioned categories		

Appendix 3

Code sheet for the category of the Victims of ISIL terrorism

Sub-categories	Description of Frame	Frequency	Percentage
Sunni Muslims	Victims who are categorically mentioned to be Sunnis or from a Sunni dominant area		
Shite Muslims	Victims who are categorically mentioned to be Shite or from a Shite dominant area		
Christians	Victims who are categorically mentioned to belong to the Judeo-Christian faith or from such region		
Unspecified	Victims which are plainly mentioned without been qualified by any ethnic or religious adjective beyond name of the location where attack occurs		

Appendix 4

Code sheet for the category of the response to ISIL terrorism

Sub-categories	Description of Frame	Direction of frame	Frequency	Percentage
Western-led military coalition against ISIL	Military intervention against ISIL by countries in the West and her allies including armed militia groups	Support		
		Against		
		Neutral		
Non-Western military intervention against ISIL	Military intervention against ISIL by other countries which are not in the Western coalition and armed militia sub-groups not sanctioned by the West and her allies	Support		
		Against		
		Neutral		
Dialogue	Reports suggesting resolving ISIL terrorism using non-lethal means	Support		
		Against		
		Neutral		
Unclassifiable	Articles whose framing does not fall into any of the mentioned frames			

Appendix 5

Code sheet for the Source of ISIL reports

Sub-categories	Description of Frame	Frequency	Percentage
Foreign media source	Reports whose by-lines indicate that the ISIL's report is culled from a media source from outside Nigeria		
National source	Reports whose by-lines shows that it is from in-house reporters or columns of analysts from within the media house or within the country		



Appendix 6

Code sheet for the prominence of ISIL reports

All Articles which are partially or fully on the ISIL terrorism	

Appendix 7


Some selected editions for *Punch* newspapers



10010

Al Jazeera

Russian President Vladimir Putin has accused Ankara of shooting down a Russian warplane to protect supplies of oil from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group to Turkey. On the sidelines of a global climate change conference near Paris on Monday, Putin said the downing of the plane was a "huge mistake". "We have every reason to think that the decision to shoot down our plane was dictated by the desire to protect the oil supply lines to Turkish territory," the Russian president said.



file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/punch full/How America helped create the Islamic State - Punch Newspapers.htm

Wednesday, March 2, 2016 Sign in / Join Home News Business Sports Metro Plus Editorial Entertainment Columnist Opinion News Feed

PUNCH NEW WEMA CARD CONTROL NOW LIVE! WEMA BANK

HOME NEWS BUSINESS SPORTS METRO PLUS EDITORIAL ENTERTAINMENT COLUMNIST OPINION

NEWS FEED

Home Opinion How America helped create the Islamic State

Custom

How America helped create the Islamic State

November 27, 2015

Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter

MOST READ POSTS

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/punch full/Germany throws weight behind anti-ISIL fight in Syria - Punch Newspapers.htm

Friday, March 4, 2016 Sign in / Join Home News Business Sports Metro Plus Editorial Entertainment Columnist Opinion News Feed

PUNCH NEW WEMA CARD CONTROL NOW LIVE! WEMA BANK

HOME NEWS BUSINESS SPORTS METRO PLUS EDITORIAL ENTERTAINMENT COLUMNIST OPINION

NEWS FEED

Home News Germany throws weight behind anti-ISIL fight in Syria

News

Germany throws weight behind anti-ISIL fight in Syria

December 4, 2015

Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/punch full/Deadly 'Russian airstrike' hits market in Syria - Punch Newspapers.htm

OPINION NEWS FEED

PUNCH HOME NEWS BUSINESS SPORTS METRO PLUS EDITORIAL ENTERTAINMENT COLUMNIST

News

Deadly 'Russian airstrike' hits market in Syria

November 23, 2015

Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter

MOST READ POSTS

- Exclusive! Ese speaks: I am not fine
- Gang leader, Adigun Oryomi, to die by...
- 2015 gov bid plunged me into debt...
- Bullion van escort opens fire on...
- PDP faction sets up new party

12457

Al Jazeera

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/punch full/Britain should join Syria air strikes - Cameron - Punch Newspapers.htm

Home News Britain should join Syria air strikes - Cameron

News

Britain should join Syria air strikes – Cameron

November 26, 2015



Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter

MOST READ POSTS

- Exclusive! Ese speaks: I am not fine
- Gang leader, Adigun Oryomi, to die by...
- 2015 gov bid plunged me into debt...
- Bullion van escort opens fire on...
- PDP faction sets up new party

354

AFP



Appendix 8

Sample editions for *Guardian* newspapers

The image displays three sequential screenshots of the The Guardian newspaper's website, each showing a different news article. The website layout is consistent across all three, featuring a search bar at the top left, the Guardian logo, a navigation menu with categories like News, Opinion, Business, Technology, Sport, Arts, and Features, and a 'MORE SECTIONS' button. The main article on each page includes a headline, byline, date, and time, followed by a short introductory paragraph and a social media sharing bar. A large image is featured below the text, and a 'Latest' sidebar on the right lists other recent news items.

First Screenshot: The headline is "'Your son has left Nigeria to join ISIS in Syria'". The byline is "By Afe A. Olatokun | 07 August 2015 | 10:25 am". The article text begins with "BRETHREN, he is of sound parental background. The young boy who recently joined the ISIS would not and could not have wanted a better parent. His father is one of us - a professional and man of impeccable moral chemistry." The image shows a man in a white cap speaking into a microphone.

Second Screenshot: The headline is "And The Middle East Breaks Along Sectarian Lines". The byline is "By Kamal Tayy Omgag | 30 January 2016 | 2:52 am". The article text begins with "Traditional long-standing friend and ally, the United States of America, was seemingly horrified when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia decided to execute popular Shiite preacher, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, alongside 46 others, which included Sunni terrorists, leaving the world groping with the implications of escalated Riyadh-Tehran hostility on the Middle East, particularly the Syrian crisis, and war against terror group, Islamic State in Iraq". The image shows a portrait of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

Third Screenshot: The headline is "Arab nations to create joint military". The byline is "By Editor | 30 March 2015 | 3:20 pm". The article text begins with "EGYPT'S president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, says Arab leaders have agreed to form a united military force to combat the 'challenges' the region is facing at a conference dominated by a Saudi-led offensive on Houthi fighters in Yemen." The image shows a large explosion with fire and smoke.

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Egypt seeks UN mandate for Libya Islamic State intervention - The Guard

Egypt seeks UN...

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Egypt seeks UN mandate for Libya Islamic State intervention

By BBC | 17 February 2015 | 10:36 am

EGYPT'S President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has called for a United Nations resolution allowing international forces to intervene in Libya.

Latest

Auchi records first rain in 2016
22 mins ago

Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras
23 mins ago

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/At least 22 killed in IS-claimed Baghdad bombings - The Guardian Niger

At least 22 killed in IS-claimed...

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

At least 22 killed in IS-claimed Baghdad bombings

By AFP | 20 February 2016 | 3:43 pm

Two bombings claimed by the Islamic State group struck a Shiite area of northern Baghdad on Sunday, killing at least 22 people, security and medical officials said.

The blasts near a market in the Sadr City area, at least one of which was a suicide bombing, also wounded at least 50 people, the officials said.

The bombings were the deadliest attacks to hit Iraq's capital this year.

IS, which overran swathes of territory north and west of Baghdad in 2014, claimed the attacks in a statement posted online that said

PHOTO: www.deccanchronicle.com

Latest

British business boss suspended over Brexit support
3 mins ago

Rudisha begins Rio buildup with win in Australia
10 mins ago

Libya's future threatened by "terrifying" IS
32 mins ago

Boko Haram cattle rustling prompts market shut-down in Nigeria
35 mins ago

NDDC disowns college renovation contract in Akwa Ibom

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Cameron urges action online to stop young Europeans joining IS - The G



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Cameron urges action online to stop young Europeans joining IS

By AFP | 19 June 2015 | 12:44 pm

British Prime Minister David Cameron on Friday urged action focused on the Internet to stop a mounting number of young Europeans leaving the continent to join the Islamic State group.

Speaking at the GLOBSEC security conference in the Slovak capital Bratislava, Cameron said Europe should focus on the Internet, used by the Islamic State "as the main tool to spread its warped worldview."

On July 1, the European Union's law enforcement agency, Europol, is due to launch its Internet Referral Unit to tackle the issue.

The Unit will "coordinate and share the identification tasks (flagging) of terrorist and violent extremist online content with relevant partners" and



Latest

- FRSC mobile court convicts 340 traffic offenders in Anambra
- Taliban reject peace talks with Afghan government
- Laos reports local transmission of Zika virus
- Catholic Bishop commends Army on insurgency, as Britain reinstates commitment
- British business boss suspended over Brexit support

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Iraq launches offensive to take back Tikrit from ISL - The Guardian Niger



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Iraq launches offensive to take back Tikrit from ISIL

By EDITOR | 02 March 2015 | 8:37 pm

GOVERNMENT forces backed by allied Shia and Sunni fighters have begun a large-scale military operation to recapture Saddam Hussein's hometown from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group.

Latest

- Jigawa LG immunises 65, 061 children against polio
- 13,000 refugees at Greek border ahead of launch of Turkey migration summit

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/At UN, Obama marches on with coalition against Islamic State - The Gua



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

At UN, Obama marches on with coalition against Islamic State

By AFP | 29 September 2015 | 7:55 am

President Barack Obama sits down with more than 100 leaders at the United Nations on Tuesday to push ahead with the US-led campaign against the Islamic State group despite Russia's rival plan.

Russia has been invited to the counter-terrorism summit held a day before Moscow hosts a special UN Security Council meeting on the same issue, two events bound to highlight sharp differences in approach.

The meeting comes a day after Obama clashed with President Vladimir Putin over the crisis in Syria during duelling UN speeches, but said the United States was willing to work with




US President, Barack Obama

Latest

- Array Of Music Stars For Gidi Fest 2016
- P-Square Remains Glo Ambassador
- BHM Celebrates Davido's Sony Deal
- A Party For Veteran Filmmaker, Tunde Kelani, At 68
- Allahbura's Life In Reverse

Get Our Daily Newsletter

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Iraq moves against Islamic State in Tikrit - The Guardian Nigeria.htm



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Iraq moves against Islamic State in Tikrit

By BBC | 02 March 2015 | 10:39 am

IRAQ has launched a military operation to recapture Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit from Islamic State (IS), Iraqi TV says.

Local media reported that forces were attacking the city, backed by airstrikes from Iraqi fighter jets.

Latest

- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras
- Anti-Erdogan newspaper defiant after domestic return

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEIE/Desktop/ISL/guardian/full/IS shelling kills nine students at Syria school - state media - The Guardian

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

IS shelling kills nine students at Syria school: state media

By AFP | 22 December 2015 | 3:00 pm

Islamic State group jihadists killed nine Syrian students when they shelled a school in the eastern city of Deir Ezzor on Tuesday, state news agency SANA reported.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said nine girls were killed and another 20 wounded, mostly students from the regime-held district of Hrabesh.

"The toll is likely to worsen as some of the injured are in serious condition," the Observatory's Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

The Islamic State group has controlled nearly all of oil-rich Deir Ezzor province since 2013, but half of the regional capital remains



Map of Syria. Image source: ianelpinart

Latest

- Libya's future threatened by "terrifying" IS
- Boko Haram cattle rustling prompts market shut-down in Nigeria
- NDDC disowns college renovation contract in Akwa Ibom
- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEIE/Desktop/ISL/guardian/full/Iraq, Russia, others unite against ISIL - The Guardian Nigeria.htm

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS


Iraq, Russia, others unite against ISIL

By Editor | 27 September 2015 | 10:03 pm

THE Iraqi military has officially announced it is to begin sharing "security and intelligence" information with Russia, Syria and Iran to help combat the advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group.

A statement issued by the Iraqi Joint Operations Command said the countries would "help and cooperate in collecting information about the terrorist Daesh group (using the Arabic acronym for ISIL)."

"It's a committee coordinating between the four countries, with representatives of each country, in the field of military intelligence and aimed at sharing and analysing information," Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for Prime Minister Haider



IS

Latest

- Taliban reject peace talks with Afghan government
- Laos reports local transmission of Zika virus
- Catholic Bishop commends Army on insurgency, as Britain reinstates commitment
- British business boss suspended over Brexit support
- Rudisha begins Rio buildup with win in Australia

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEIE/Desktop/ISL/guardian/full/Islamic State 'abducts 90 Christians in Syria' - The Guardian Nigeria.htm

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Islamic State 'abducts 90 Christians in Syria'

By BBC | 24 February 2015 | 10:21 am

ISLAMIC STATE (IS) has abducted dozens of people from Assyrian Christian villages in north-eastern Syria, a monitoring group says.

Latest

- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEIE/Desktop/ISL/guardian/full/Islamic State 'brand' spreading worldwide - experts - The Guardian Nigeria.htm

The Guardian

Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Islamic State 'brand' spreading worldwide: experts

By AFP | 17 January 2016 | 3:40 pm

The Islamic State group may be losing ground in its strongholds of Iraq and Syria but as the attack in Indonesia this month showed, the jihadists are rallying other groups under their banner, analysts say.

In most cases, these groups have no direct contact with the leadership of IS's self-proclaimed caliphate, but the group is happy to claim responsibility for the blood spilled in its name, the experts say.

"From the start, Islamic State has vowed to take its fight globally, but until recently it has been focused on managing its caliphate in Iraq and Syria," said Michael Kuegelman, of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.



Latest

- Array Of Music Stars For Gidi Fest 2016
- P-Square Remains Glo Ambassador
- BHM Celebrates Davido's Sony Deal
- A Party For Veteran Filmmaker, Tunde Kelani, At 68
- Allahbura's Life In Reverse

Get Our Daily Newsletter

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/islamic state claims responsibility for deadly Tunisia attacks - The Guardi



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Islamic State claims responsibility for deadly Tunisia attacks

By Editor | 26 March 2015 | 4:51 am

THE Islamic State group issued a statement yesterday claiming responsibility for the deadly attack on Tunisia's national museum that killed 23 people, mostly tourists.

The statement described Wednesday's attack in Tunisia as a "blessed invasion of one of the dens of infidels and vice in Mtalim Tunisia," and appeared on a forum that carries messages from the group.

The statement said there were two attackers and they weren't killed until they ran out of ammunition and it promised further attacks. "Wait for the glad tidings of what will harm you, impure ones, for what you have seen today is the first drop of the rain," the statement, which was also announced by IS's based SITEF.



Police officers guard the entrance of the National Bardo Museum a day after gunmen opened fire killing scores of people in Tunis.

Latest

- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras
- Anti-Erdogan newspaper defiant after dramatic seizure
- Iran and Turkey aim to triple trade to \$30 billion
- FG to meet 2017 digitisation target - Lai Mohammed

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/islamic state militants 'burn to death 45 in Iraq' - The Guardian Nigeria.h



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Islamic State militants 'burn to death 45 in Iraq'


By BBC | 17 February 2015 | 2:40 pm

JIHADIST militants from Islamic State (IS) have burned to death 45 people in the western Iraqi town of al-Baghdadi, the local police chief says.

Latest

- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Last US Islamic State hostage Kayla Mueller confirmed dead - The Guardi



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Last US Islamic State hostage Kayla Mueller confirmed dead

By BBC | 11 February 2015 | 3:37 am

THE US has confirmed the death of aid worker Kayla Mueller, the last American hostage known to be held by Islamic State (IS) militants in Syria.

Latest

- Auchi records first rain in 2016
- Sydney shines for annual gay Mardi Gras

file:///C:/Users/PATRICIA OMBEJE/Desktop/ISL/guardian full/Lebanon mourns 44 killed in Beirut double bomb attack - The Guardi



Saturday 5 March 2016

News Opinion Business Technology Sport Arts Features MORE SECTIONS

Lebanon mourns 44 killed in Beirut double bomb attack

By AFP | 12 November 2015 | 1:33 pm

Lebanon on Friday mourned 44 people killed in south Beirut in a twin bombing claimed by the Islamic State group, the bloodiest such attack in years.

The Red Cross said at least 239 people were also wounded, several in critical condition, in the blasts that hit a busy shopping street in Burj al-Barajneh, a neighbourhood where the Shiite Hezbollah movement is popular.

The attack harked back to a campaign against Hezbollah between 2013 and 2014, ostensibly in revenge for its military support of regime forces in neighbouring Syria's civil war.

But it was the largest attack ever claimed by IS in Lebanon, and among the deadliest bombings to hit the country since the



Latest

- FRSC mobile court convicts 340 traffic offenders in Anambra
- Taliban reject peace talks with Afghan government
- Laos reports local transmission of Zika virus
- Catholic Bishop commends Army on insurgency, as Britain reinstates commitment
- British business boss suspended over Brexit support

Libya condemns killing of Ethiopian Christians by ISIL

By | 21 April 2015 | 9:37 am

THE FOREIGN minister of the UN-recognised government of Libya has condemned the purported killing of 29 Ethiopian Christians shown in a video released by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) Libyan arm.

Muhammad Dayri called the killings "barbaric" at a meeting of African and Asian leaders in Indonesia's capital, Jakarta, yesterday.

"This is not the first time that these hordes of ISIL operate with tragic and horrible actions in Libya," Dayri said, referring to the earlier mass murder of 20 Egyptian Christians and a Ghanaian by the group in February 2015.



ISIL

Latest

- FRSC mobile court convicts 340 traffic offenders in Anambra
- Taliban reject peace talks with Afghan government
- Laos reports local transmission of Zika virus
- Catholic Bishop commends Army on insurgency, as Britain reinstates commitment
- British business boss suspended over Brexit support

Security Council condemns murder of over 30 Ethiopian Christians

By Editorial board | 23 April 2015 | 4:58 am

MEMBERS of the Security Council strongly condemned the heinous and cowardly apparent murder in Libya of over 30 Ethiopian Christians by an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh).

This crime once again demonstrates the brutality of ISIL, which is responsible for thousands of crimes and abuses against people from all faiths, ethnicities and nationalities, and without regard to any basic value of humanity.

The members of the Security Council expressed their deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, to the



This undated image made from a video released by Islamic State

Latest

- FRSC mobile court convicts 340 traffic offenders in Anambra
- Taliban reject peace talks with Afghan government
- Laos reports local transmission of Zika virus
- Catholic Bishop commends Army on insurgency, as Britain reinstates commitment
- British business boss suspended over Brexit support