COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB REGION: A CASE STUDY OF THE SIERRA LEONEAN CRISIS

BY

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ABSTRACT

This research project on: collective security and crisis management in the West African sub-region with a case study of the Sierra Leonean crisis.

This project is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introductory chapter. Chapter two is the literature review. Chapter three is the formation and performance of ECOWAS the principles of non interference and collective security in the ECOWAS chapter and ECOWAS machineries for conflict management. Chapter four is the Sierra Leonean crisis and intervention of ECOWAS, brief history of Sierra Leonean, the genesis and intensification of the crisis, intervention of ECOWAS, and major findings. While chapter five is the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis was carried out by me and has not been submitted for the award of a higher degree before at any other institution of higher learning.

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Iliyasu Shafi'i Darda'u Date

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled **COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUBREGION: A CASE STUDY OF THE SIERRA LEONEAN CRISIS**, by Iliyasu Shafi'I Darda'u meets the regulation governing the award of the degree of Master in international Affairs and Diplomacy (MIAD) Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and Literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents and children-Magaji, Abubakar, Mohammed, Asma'u and Aisha.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My special thanks to my supervisor Mallam Garba Aminu and the entire lecturers in the social Faculty, specifically those who participated directly in the MIAD programme. Abdulmumin too, being a colleague in the course with whose effort and support the work reached completion deserve commendation, I really thank him very much for his tireless assistance when consulted. I also than Dr. A.G. Wurma of the Faculty Arts N.A.L department for his assistance and cooperation.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The African continent has been characterized as an underdeveloped nation in the world, that almost nothing positive is expected to come forth either in terms of political and /or economic development. Of course, the potential for Africa either as a region or at its sub-regional levels to develop and operate machinery for conflict resolution has been ruled out. This negative impression ascribed to the continent as a whole, and the fact that several African countries have suffered exploitation during the colonial era, inspired some early nationalists of African origin to challenge both the activities and tendencies of imperialist and Western propaganda. Some of these nationalists leaders include Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana who advocated for African political unity. Others include Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria both of whom advocated for regional organizations and technical co-operation between African countries.

Take for instance, for formation of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), what apparently was uppermost to the founding fathers were patriotic and nationalistic feeling. It was very certain that several problems existed, which militated economic, political and social development of individual member nations. Much more there was an earnest need to liberate these young nations from neo-colonial domination

through the promotion of economic and social relations among their peoples. Significantly there was the need to remove the “artificial” barriers/boundaries created by various colonial masters in the name distinctive nationhood in contrast to cub-regional organization.

It is on this background that leaders of some countries in the sub-region, namely; Nigeria, Togo, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Coast Ivory and Gambia voluntarily ratified a treaty in Lagos establishing the community.

Following its establishment, ECOWAS has experienced some problems which at times threatened the survival and function sustenance of the organization. Typical examples of conflicts experienced include the Liberian civil War, Sierra Leone conflict and that of Guinea Bissau.

It is therefore, the intention of this research to discuss of these problems and examine the various approaches employed by ECOWAS to resolve particularly that of Sierra Leone. The study would also attempt to examine the circumstances in Sierra Leone that led to the conflict and the various means used in resolving the conflict by the government of Sierra Leone. The data available would be reviewed using a comparative approach of strategies adopted and results obtained with emphasis on Sierra Leone.

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

In considering the establishment of ECOWAS and the role has played especially in conflict management within the sub-region, several questions are bound to rise. For instance, it would be of interest to know how and why the problem erupted in Sierra Leone? What are some of its implication on the sub-region? Why did the sub-regional organization intervene despite the fact that it is an internal conflict in Sierra Leone.? What are the strategies used by ECOWAS to resolve the conflict? Here also, mention will be made of the various negotiations and various adhoc committees set to look into the problem, and the defense pact and the final use of force (collective security) through the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Also to be addressed by the study is the issue of how the monitoring group intervened and the aftermath of the “ECOMOG” interventions, other areas to be reviewed are the position of the monitoring group itself on the general security of the sub-regional organization. Its implication and relation to other international organizations such as organization of African unity now AU), Common Wealth of Nations and the United Nations Organization (UNO).

1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVE OF THE RESERCH

The aims and objectives of the study include the following:

1. To critically examine through analysis of data, the ECOWAS peace pact, vis-à-vis the provision as contained in the charter the non-intervention in another nations internal problems.

2. To objectively asses the different approaches and circumstances in handling the Sierra Leone. Crisis with emphasis on the role of the Monitoring group of ECOWAS.
3. It is intended to consider whether the aims and objectives of setting the monitoring group have been achieved or not.
4. The research intends to find out the relevance of negotiations or the use of force resolving conflicts between the member States.

1.4 HYPOTHESIS

-marginalization of some groups by Tejan Kabbah led to crisis in Sierra Leone

5. –the assassination of 39 soldiers by Tejan Kabbah led to the crisis in Sierra Leone.

6. –the intervention of the ECOWAS security led to the reinstalment of Tejan Kabbah.

1.5 SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This research is highly affected by finance but analytically the research will greatly focus on the conflict in Sierra Leone and its effect on Sierra Leone. The researcher will discuss the ECOWAS conflict management initiation, establishment of ECOWAS and criticisms of ECOMOG.

The significance are;

- it will add to the body of literature that are available in the field.
- It is hoped to constitute the new idea of conflict management.

- It will also serve as a point of reference for future.
- researchers.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory of decision-making will be of relevance to this study. The theory is also very vital in the understanding of the ECOWAS group itself, especially when one considered the reasons proffered by the sub-regional Heads of State for forming the community, in the opening paragraph of this research. Since therefore, the idea of forming the sub-regional group was conceived by the leaders, who are the policy makers, it is the same Heads of State who will decide on how to resolve the conflict tha engulf the sub-regional organization. This the Sierra Leone, conflict characterized by a military take-over of democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah by Major Jommy Koromah, the leader of the Military Junta. This problem or rather issue involved decision making and also decision taking by the Heads of States of the community.

Julius Emeka Okolo defined decision making as “the act of choosing among available alternatives on which uncertainty exists”. In present day international relations, some theorist seem to challenge the position of decisions making in international politics. Whether it is a theory or an approach, decision making is generally accepted as an important aspect of international politics and foreign policy.

This further explains its relevance to the subject of study, as the study concerns as sub-regional group comprising of different countries with different ethnic background, tradition institutions and different colonial experiences. Some of the theorists who belong to this theory of decision making area the early Greek historian, Thucydides, who in his book “The Pole Ponesian War” examined the factors that led the city-State o Athens and Spartan to decide the issue of war and peace as well as alliance among empires which has great precessions as they did under the circumstances confronting them. This is relevant to the subject matter of this research, based on the conflicts that confronted the sub-regional groups Heads of States.

The researcher also focused not only on the consensus reasons for statement choices and their perceptions of the systematic environment both of which are reflected in the speeches attributed to them, but also on the deeper psycho empires logical forces of fear, honour and interests which in varying combination motivated them as individuals and set the prevailing tone of their particular societies.

Apart from the works of the early Greek historian, other theorist attempted to develop a systematic decision making approach to the study to the study of international politics in the early 1950s by Richard C. Snyder. In his book, Snyder Stated that the focus of international relations research should be on the actives, reactions and interaction of State. For Snyder and co; “ the State

is especially its own decision-maker and State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the State".

In the framework of Snyder, the theory also draws attention to domestic politics and public opinion which they intended are potentially important elements in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Other important factors includes non-governmental factors and relations between countries in the form of trade, family ties, shared values mass media and other forms of communication, migration and cultural exchanges.

It is important to note here that this theory is of great relevance especially with some of the above mentioned factors by Snyder for the basis of understanding international politics and when this is applied to the problem under study with special emphasis or rather attention to the objectives of the group in the continent.

Decision Makers of the States that are not super powers or great powers (of which West African States fall within this category), must usually consider their position within a subordinate system s well as dominant bilateral relation. This is important in an attempt to understand the conflict management strategy applied by the ECOWAS member States in trying to handle their crisis.

Two crucially important variables in the internal setting are of course the States of military and economic capabilities, which sets the limits to what the government can do. In this regard, this can be applied to the situation in the

ECOWAS group, especially the military capability of the group in Handling the military sector-especially ECOMOG. The internal setting however extends to the ECOWAS group itself, by which is meant the position of the decision-makers Head of Government of the various States, in the political system such as how they relate to leadership within th3e group, leadership within the military organization itself, their various home and domestic problems, with regards to issues and policies pursued by the various Head of States and their domestic reactions as the pressure groups and the competitive elite.

Other issues worthy of note in the decision making theory is the character of the decision-makers, Richard Snyder has emphasized this aspect in this decision-making theory. Snyder heightened interest in such personality characteristics of decision-makers as propensity to a high risk, tolerance, ambguiy, and dominance, submissiveness, need for power, need for achievement, and affiliation (all these were some of the qualities of late General Abacha Nigerian Head of State, when he was the ECOWAS Chairman).

It is also hoped that the shortcoming of the decision-making theory in handling the conflict management strategy by the member nations would be considered, especially decisions reached by either the Heads of government or their various foreign affairs Ministers in trying to resolve the crisis within the member Nations.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

The research is primarily based on library materials, which involves archival research and other documented literature on the problems under study as contained in books, newspapers magazines and academic journals. The data collected was subjected to content analysis, with the intent of ascertaining the way and manner ECOWAS Heads of States who are decisions makers have succeeded in handling the conflicts that bedeviled the sub-regional group.

1.8 DEFINITION OF CONCEPT/TERMS

In an attempt to understand conflict management in the ECOWAS sub-region and essentially the role of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as the problem under study, it is important to define some key concepts and words used in the cause of this research. This is with the view of giving those outside this research a better understanding of the words used in this thesis.

"CONFLICT"

Gani joses Yoroms defines conflict as a multifaceted concept, which cannot be captured or comprehended in a "straight-jacket" definition. It may arise as Howard's put it from "inflicting" claims or interest or ideologies or perceptions, and these perceptions may indeed be fuelled by social or psychological drives" . Nicholson also says "a conflict exists when two people wish to carryout acts which are mutually inconsistent. Conflict is not a mere difference or disagreement between two poles, it is the manifestation of the opposite claims or the unity and the struggle of both.

“**MANAGEMENT”**

according to quite a number of definitions by management experts, management is the act or art of managing, the conducting or supervising of something. It can also mean judicious use of the means to the accomplish an end. It also means capacity for managing executive skills. For the purpose of this research, the word management here means”the ability to handle or take care of”.

“ECOWAS”

the word ECOWAS is the abbreviation of Economic Community of West African State. Which was formed in May 1975, and made up of 16 member countries within the West African sub-region.

“ECOMOG”

The term “ECOMOG” means ECOWAS Cease-Fire and Monitoring Group.

“PEACE”

The word peace means freedom from war, strife, dissension and civil commotion. It is also taken to mean a State of tranquility and quietness. Peace in the face of conflict requires the elimination of the restoration of justice. This is what is referred to as conflict resolution or conflict but it is the presence of justice.

“PEACE-KEEPING”

The term peace-keeping means the preserving of peace especially international enforcement or supervision of a truce between hostile States or communities.

‘PEACE-ENFORCEMENT”

peace-enforcement means the use of force to restore peace as distinct from peacekeeping.

“PEACE-BUILDING”

Boutrous Ghali defines peace building as “a chain to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in oder to avoid a relapse of conflicts.

“CRISIS MANAGEMENT”

It is the simply an act of curtailing or eradicating conflict or war amongst one or two people in same or different societies.

“COLLECTIVE SECURITY”

It is a group of countries that come together under a particular organization with guiding rules and regulations vested with the authority to maintain peace and order.

1.9 CHAPTER ARRANGEMENT

This research is divided into five chapters as below:

Chapter one is the introduction, statement of research problem, aims and objectives of research, hypothesis, scope and limitation of the study, methodology, definition of terms and concepts, chapterization.

Chapter two is the literature review.

Chapter three is the ECOWAS and the principle of collective security: formation and performance of ECOWAS the principles of non interfence and collective security in the ECOWAS charter, ECOWAS machineries for conflict management.

Chapter iv is the brief history of Sierra Leone, the genesis and intensification of the crisis, intervention of ECOWAS, major findings.

Chapter v which is the final chapter is the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Here, the researcher will attempt to review literature on ECOWAS, EOMOG as contained in documented materials.

In his attempt to explain or rather justify the community itself, A Bolaji Ajinyemi said, “ECOWAS is a manifestation of the desire for cooperation among the people of West Africa. It is a collective attack against the enduring problems of underdevelopment in tropical Africa. The language may be different, and the cultures may be diverse, but beyond it is the longing for ecomic emancipations through co-operation which transcends all boundaries.”

E. Benjamin in an attempt to explain the essence of peace in the sub-region said in his article “peace a pre-requisites”, stresses that the task before ECOWAS is no, more or less than to will all the challenges now facing West Africa, that the challenge of peace is the first that must be won. That is we fail to achieve peace, we can not face up to the economic, social and political challenges which unavoidably on our path- the primary aim of West Africa is to achieve effective economic integration, undertake social reforms in order to revive the commitment of our peoples to the development idea, to press on in our vital pursuit of democracy guided by our values and to fight the battle to the end. This observation by Benjamin

is very relevant for a sub-regional organization such as the ECOWAS which has a lot of economic undertones in its aims and objectives.

In his contribution in explaining the effects of the end of the “cold war” in the international politics of which West African is not an exception, Jimni Adisa in his article “problems of peace-making and peace-building for African post-conflicts States”, found in the Africa peace review, said” the international Community today is faced with a broad array of problems relating to peace making and peace-building”. The current difficultes are associated with the end of the cold War. The end of the cold war did not generate a haven of good will and stability. The concepts of the States has come under severe stress as demands of nationality, ethnicity and Micronationalisms are tearing Stages apart. The process has triggered wave of internal conflicts in which ethnic identity is a prominent source of political reference and the number of wars involving secession and State formation has increased significantly”.

In their article, G.j.Yorons and E.K.Aring “from Economic to political integration, towards an analysis of ECOWAS of ECOWAS transformation”. The writer tried to justify the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia through the ECOMOG- “that ECOWAS strategy represents a response to a fundamental transformation or in other words that it represents a response to global systematic changes in international politics.

The writers went further to say that indeed, the ability of ECOWAS-ECOMOG to survive is related to the hegemonic tendency exhibited by Nigeria. As noted, " without Nigeria's involvement, there would have been no ECOMOG".

Prof. J.E. Okolo in his article-" The Mutual defence Pact", found in the journal titled The World Today of May 1983, States that a commentary was made by radio Nigeria on 8th June 1981 "the significance of the defense pact protocol cannot be over-emphasized particularly at a time when almost every African country is becoming more and more vulnerable to external aggression. Okolo went further to say "the issue of national security at the sub-regional level or continental level has been a matter of rhetoric by most of the leaders, but ECOWAS is the first major grouping in African States to take a concrete step towards the creation of a defence organization".

Writing in a journal titled Africa peace review vol. 1, No.1, O.B.C. Nwolise in his article titled "ECOMOG peace-keeping in Liberia: Effects on political stability in the West African sub-region". Said "the civil War, with its trappings, was as unfortunate as it was tragic in Liberia, West Africa and the continent". As emphasized and lamented by Dr. Abbas Bundi (the then ECOWAS secretary)--- "it is a tragedy, first because it is happening in our sub-region and posing a threat to the peace and stability of the entire sub-region. Secondly, it is simply not for revolution or civil War in this

crucial stage of the development of the community, consolidation, co-operation and integration are the new imperatives which should underpin all community actions in the decade of the nineties".

Boutons says "conflict like sex is an essential creative element in human relationships. It is the means to change, the means which our social values of welfare, security, justice, and opportunities for personal development can be achieved. If repressed as often the case in traditional societies, where conflict is settled according to traditionally accepted norms, society becomes static---indeed conflict like sex is to be enjoyed".

e. John inegbedum States in his article "ECOWAS in Comparative perspective", ECOMOG is more than just a case itself. It constitutes a microcosm of the dialectics of economic development, regional security, democratization, and conflict management in Africa as whole. In other Words, insights from ECOMOG are relevant to how common threats affecting the basic livelihood of pepoples and the stability of governments are defined and analyzed in past cold War Africa", as Julius Emeka Okolo and Stephen Wright States- in spites of set backs, "ECOWAS offers one of the strongest and most respected examples of co-operation and serves as a model for the rest of Africa".

It is important to note at this juncture, that the above quotation by the said scholars, helps to debunk the views held by the Western scholars on Africa, especially the Continents inability to handle or resolve its internal

problems. But this has really indicated nationalists earlier mentioned, who sought of having regional organization with both economic and political aims.

Conclusively, the researcher will like to submit that, while trying to give reasons as to how conflicts are resolved “some policy makers use peace-keeping mechanism as a means to training their soldiers and keeping the soldiers busy especially at peace-time. While in some cases, it is a source of foreign revenue for participating nations, while governments lacking legitimacy at home use peace-keeping to acquire international respect and recognition.

2.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ECOWAS

The aims and objectives of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the field of industry, transport, telecommunication, energy, agriculture natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its 900 million peoples. To increase and maintain economic stability fostering close relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

Scheme for joint African development of transport communication, provides for the harmonization of the economic and industrial policies of the members States and the elimination of the disparities in the level of

development of member States. Top this end, “a fund for co-operation compensation and development is established. In addition, all citizens of the member States are to be regarded as “community citizens” and all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the community are abolished. Of particular importance is the detailed provision made in the treaty for institutions to give effect to the community aims and objectives.

The sub-regional organizations objectives of promoting co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity among member States is in keeping with the programmes of action in the establishment of a new international economic order which recognizes that” collective self reliance and growing co-operation among developing countries will further strengthen their role in the international economic order”.

It is important to critically look at the above Stated objectives of the sub-regional organization especially as it concerns the conflicts or rather the crisis within some member nations and the organization itself. The birth of this sub-regional organization on May 29,1975, can also be said to be the harbinger of regional integration in Africa.

The Lagos treaty did not expressly make for the political co-operation or the question of peace and security of the region. The member States did not at the time consider the fact that economic and political integration cannot be taken separately. Another major lapse of the Lagos treaty was

that it lacked clauses that would make the decisions of the conference of Heads of States and Council of Ministers binding members States. These decisions are only implemented vis-à-vis the institutions of the community. They are not binding on the member States themselves, and what is more they do not enjoy an immediate and direct applicability at the level of the jurisdiction of the member State of the community.

Another observation of the Lagos treaty, unlike the European Union treaty, lacks institutions, which evenly madly resembles the (EC) in terms of power and authority. There is also no ECOWAS parliament which like at European parliament exercises consultative and supervisory powers over the organs of the European Union (EU).

Following the problems that engulfed the sub-regional organization and also following the discussion of some of the shortfalls or rather lapses of the initial aims and the community of 1975, some reforms and modification were introduced into the organization. This research hoped to consider some of the problems that faced the organization later.

In April 1991, a committee of Eminent persons to review the ECOWAS treaty were drawn up from within and outside governmental circles in the region who have distinguished themselves in the various fileds, such as Law, Economics, Diplomacy and Customs, was constituted under the chairmanship of General Yakubu Gawon (Rtd) who fortunately happened to be of the founding fathers of the community in 1975. observers were

also drawn from some relevant inter-governmental organizations within and outside Africa including ADD, ECA, and UNCTAD. The committee was able to identify some of weaknesses of the 1975 treaty of Lagos.

Some of the weaknesses and omissions identified by the committee includes the absence of supranationality, the decision-making procedures of the community, the absence of provisions dealing with cooperation in political and defence matters, mobilization of resources to finance the regional integration effort,to mention a few.

Having discussed the aims and objectives of the community, it is important to note that they are economically centered, and therefore if they are to be really achieved, there has to be a peaceful atmosphere for any economic activity to take place. No meaningful economic activity can take place in a “Hobbesian” situation in any society or country. Talk less of a sub-regional organization. This recognition might be one of the main reasons why the committee of eminent persons was formed to review the Economic Community treaty and thereby make some reforms or rather include the omissions of the 1975 Lagos Treaty. The committee suggested the inclusion of some of the following into the treaty, a provision designating ECOWAS as the sole Economic Community for regional integration in West Africa and defining relations between the Executives secretariat and the specialized institutions of the community, another provision was the introduction of the principles of supra-nationality into

ECOWAS and making the decisions of the authority binding on both the institutions of the community and member States. Such decisions shall automatically enter into force in the territory of the all member States 90 days after their signature by the chairman of the Authority.

Others include provisions for the establishment and strengthening of appropriate mechanism for the timely prevention and resolution of States and inter-State conflicts. Such mechanism should include regional peace and security observation system and where necessary, observer groups for democratic elections, to mention a few of the committee's provisions.

2.2 PROBLEMS FACING ECOWAS

The-regional organization is a manifestation of the desire for co-operation among the peoples of West Africa. It is the structural embodiment of the people's belief in a collective attack against the enduring problems of underdevelopment in tropical Africa.

The languages may be different, and the cultures may be diverse, but beyond all, the longing for economic emancipation through co-operation transcends all barriers, as Akinyemi pointed out. "The mainstay of the economies of the West African States Traditionally is agriculture. For most of the States in West Africa, if not all,,, agriculture provides the bulk of the governments revenue as well as the foreign exchange earnings. All the ECOWAS member nations are dependent on foreign trade. The bulk of exports of the ECOWAS countries are primary commodities and most

exports to only or two major markets, mostly to the industrial countries of Europe and North America. The paucity of intra-West African trade is a cause for concern. This is because the colonial rule did not open up the West African trade is a cause for concern. This is because the colonial rule did not open up the West African region for much intra-West African trade.

The infrastructural facilities of the pre-independence era were developed to promote West African European trade. The roads and railways connected only the seaport and the producing areas. As part of the colonial legacies in West Africa, the countries belonged traditionally to either of the two currency zones the sterling area and the Franc zone. The Anglophone are protected under the commonwealth preference system, while the Francophone nations were associated with EEC under the Yaounde convention.

Since the signing of the treaty in 1975, some set backs tend to appear which affects the achievements of the desired objectives of the sub-regional group, for example, the desire of Togo-Benin border late in 1975, make a mockery of West African Unity and is in conflict with the ECOWAS spirit. The obstructive role Senegal appeared to have played in the vital arena of West Africa co-operation has been a subject of concern.

The Francophone Community of six (CEWO) made up of Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Mauritania and Upper Volta, had held a summit in

Dakar and formally Launched a development fund designed to benefit the less favoured States of the grouping. People like Houghovet-Boigny and Lepold Sengor, consistently had the view that unity among Francophone States would be the first major step towards a wider West African Unity.

As observed by Adedeji, some of the problems are lack of adequate infrastructure, road, rail, telecommunications and other links for the free movement of goods and services, linguistic complexity and multiplicity of constitutions such as those of the Francophone. The persistence of colonial ties, different administrative systems and the persistence of both local and foreign interests in the preservations of the status-quo.

Other problems are existence of different tariff arrangement with differing rate of customs duties and the over-dependence on revenue from import duties by many West African countries.

Also associated with this is the presence of different currencies some of which are not easily convertible, therefore creating problems for payment arrangements with consequent difficulties for inter-State commercial transactions. Another problem is lack of basic statistical data, which crates difficulties for reliable assessment of the probable repercussions of the integration purposes. Preparedness by the countries involved giving up part of their sovereignty over their economic affairs.

There is also the problem of wide disparity in the strength of the economies of member countries, reflecting their level of development and

natural resources endowment. Every aspect of economic integration involves political decision and value judgments in areas of varying degrees.

In view of the past experiences, in terms of crisis, it seems that security arrangements of the organization were too cumbersome to be involved in terms of tense crisis. Abbas Bundu, the then ECOWAS secretary had this to say in light of the organizations, security arrangements, ”The harsh reality is that West Africa is experiencing a crisis of unprecedented proportions and the only viable solutions lies in the revitalization and intensification of sub-regional co-operation and integration. Any further temporizing to recognize and confront----issues---head on, will condemn us all to a period of unimaginable--- and anguish. After this Statement by Bundu, the community was faced with political and security issues. The region was affected by the Liberian crisis.

Another problem confronting the ECOWAS is the irreconcilable position of the Francophone States which tends to support the allegation that is a manipulation strategy by France against the background of her inability to withstand an economic regional organization in West Africa under Nigeria’s power and influence.

On the leadership issue within the sub-regional group, the contention for who should lead and who should follow in ECOWAS is still between just two of the big four: Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Cote d’Voire has the

political status and policy objectives that continued to rival those of Nigeria. However, while Cote d' Voire contends Nigeria's leadership, Houghout Boigny hardly questions the spread of the economic burden of ECOWAS Nigeria pays 32.8% of the ECOWAS budget, Cote d'Voire contributes only 13%

Other issues are the traditional values and historical legancies, which still impinge, from language and region to stereo types and migrations. Thus, the new international division of labour and power constitute a new context for African States and the ECOWAS in particular. The States of ECOWAS have distinctive histories and cultures, which inform their response to adjustment reform and non-alignment revisions.

2.3 SOLUTIONS TO SOME PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONTED THE SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATION:

Since the inception of the organization, it has been faced with same problems as discussed somewhere in this chapter. In the same vain, having identified some of the current crisis in Guinea-Bissau, the sub-regional organization has made series of attempts to solve the problems, both economic and political, especially those that concerns

Conflict and unrest's within the member nations. It is also important to note that much will be discussed in details on the issues of conflict management itself as it concerns the different countries and the strategies used on each.

First and fore most, the treaty itself of 1975 that established the community experienced some reforms, especially the omissions identified by the member nations, all with aim of “plugging the loopholes”. For examples, in April 1991, the committee of eminent was formed to review the ECOWAS treaty. Membership of this committee was drawn up from within and outside governmental circles in the region, who have distinguished themselves in the various fields. It was constituted under the chairmanship of General Yakubu Gowan (RTD).

Among the weaknesses and omissions identified by the Eminent persons, was the absence of supra-nationality. This the group solved by introducing the principle of supra-nationality into ECOWAS and making the decision of the authority binding on both the institutions of the community and member States. Such decisions shall automatically enter into force in the territory of all member States 90 days after their signature by the chairman of authority. But is this really done?

Provisions were also made which gave power to the Council of Ministers to pass regulations, which shall have the same force as the decisions of the authority and to make them equally enforceable under the same conditions.

Addressing himself to the worrisome debt situation, President Babangida of Nigeria stressed the urgent need for ECOWAS to undertake intensive campaigns at various international fora, especially the United

Nations General Assembly, to remind the international Community of its moral obligation to fulfill its commitment to Africa, especially in view of the pledge made and adopted at the UN Assembly in 1986 to assist Africa under the UN programme of action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD).

The ECOWAS leaders at the 15th summit agreed that there was need for immediate actions to accelerate the pace of regional integration. The default in member States contribution was also given special attention and emerged as one of the Council issues on the agenda of the summit. An appeal was therefore made to those who were behind in their contributions to Liquidate their debts.

Indeed, to the message from the sub-regional organization Heads of State was very clear, coup d'etats are no longer acceptable and will no more be tolerated in the sub-region. The community vowed to support only democratically elected governments and the community will spare no effect to restore constitutional order in such cases.

Another serious problem that ECOMOG helped in solving is the Sierra Leonian crisis, where the democratically elected President Ahmed Tijan Kabbah was overthrown in a coup 'detat by the military under the leadership of Major Koramah. This sparked off civil war in the country, but for the intervention of ECOWAS group through its force. The ECOMOG, Tijan Kabbah was returned to power.

It is important to State here that right from the inception of the organization, it had some problems and shortcomings and in the same vein the sub-regional organization provided some solutions to both its economic and political problems. It is also important to mention here that different approaches to the specific crisis were applied, but the solutions discussed above are broad based.

ECOWAS according to Mallam Adamu Ciroma, while addressing commissioners and participants at the international conference on the Economic Community of West African States had this to say; "For some time now there has been much talk and commentary on ECOWAS. From all indication, ECOWAS seems to mean different things to different people. To some, it is yet another talking-shop for high-level government officials. Others see it as a cry for Utopia in the light of our past failings and the recent experience of the East Africa Commmunity".[41]

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 ECOWAS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

3.1 FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE OF ECOWAS

The emergence of independent African States brought into focus the significance of national boundaries, which introduced discontinuities in trade, inflows of production and in general economic policies. There was also the awareness that most of the African countries are too small to be able to create modern viable industrial structures within their national framework. The problem of enhancing the rate of economic progress and combating poverty, ignorance and disease which become the major preoccupation of the African people, soon led to the realization that the individual efforts of African countries could not sufficiently induce the rapid rates development necessary to achieve this noble objective. It is therefore generally recognized that the appropriate strategy for rapid economic development in developing countries is through regional economic integration.[1]

the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since its inception has always emphasized the need for trade expansion and economic co-operation among themselves (developing countries) which will not only foster their economic growth, but also strengthen their overall position in relation to the developed countries. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) regards economic co-operation as a must for African countries. It argues that the

harmonization of industrial development within each sub-region or within a group of countries is the answer to Africa's development problems.[2]

the pan-Afrca congress held at Machester in 1945, after noting the systematic exploitation of the economic resources of West African by the imperial powers, recommended, among other things the establishment of a West African economic Universe. [3]

in May 1973, the 10th summit conference of the Organization of Africa unity (OAU) at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted an "African declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence ", which among other things urged African countries to set-up inter-African co-operation, particularly in the monetary and communication fields.[4]

according to Adedeji Adebayo, while addressing a conference had this to say, "if the countries of Africa are to achieve self-sustained growth co-operation in the production and distribution of strategic goods and services, on a multi-national basis in Africa, must be seen by each and everyone of the governments of Africa as a necessary condition for the successful achievement of their respective national socio-economic goals".[5]

To Adedeji, co-operation goes far beyond treaty making the negotiation of protocols and the establishment of institutions and machinery. It is important to briefly look at the antecedents of ECOWAS. This must be seen to include organs and institutions, established in the period of European colonial rule, which worked towards the purpose of regional integration, such as the post-

independence inter-State associations of the former French Tropical African possessions, e.g Union Africaine at Malagache and the Organization of Africaine et Malagache de co-operation Economique.[6]

French West Africa was integrated not only demonstratively, but also in the economic and cultural sense. Apart from the common currency, there was the tremendous uniformity of the impact of the French Language and culture which enables this sector of the West African sub-region to bang together as a distinct cultural. If not political zone. [7]

In the British West Africa, the approach to administration was decentralization, although even here, efforts at inter-State integration were not complete by absent. Institutions and organs of integration were included, the establishment of common West African court of Appeal, Common currency board, and more spectacularly, a West African Conference of governor of British territories. All these institution help to provide a common forum and services, which helped to bring together territories, which were otherwise governed as separate Union. [8]

Of Relevance To The Ecowas, However, Were Series Of Inter-Colonial State Relationship That Were Encouraged Between The French And The British Which Make Up The Bulk Of The Independent States In The West African Sub-Region And Therefore The Dominant Element In Ecowas- Such As Anglo French Entity Of 1904 And The Anglo-French Consultative Commission Later. [9]

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in resolution 142 (vii) and 145 (vii) passed at its seventh session held in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1965, recommended that member States of the commission should establish as soon as possible sub-regional inter-governmental machinery for harmonizing their economic and social development. [10]

R.O. Olaniyan argued that the shared and economic difficulties by African countries served as the platform for the call for African Unity by black nationalists. This found expression in the idea of pan-Africanism, as advocated by early nationalist such as Kwame Nkruma of Ghana. That there is no doubt that African political leaders are aware of their political and economic predicament and realized that their future depended on some forms of regionalism or integration. Therefore, political unity is constrained by inter-State conflicts, political instabilities and disparities in ideological orientation. [11]

A delegation consisting of top officials from Nigeria and Togo toured fourteen (14) States in West Africa August 1973. consequently, a ministerial meeting was held in Lome, Togo on 1444 December 1973, which was attended by representatives of 14 West African countries. It was agreed in principle that an Economic Community of West African States be established. Nigeria and West African States be established. Nigerian and Togo were mandated to work out the details of the proposed organization. Eventually, on

28th May 1975, the Heads of State and government of all the 16 members States assembled in Lagos, Nigeria and signed the treaty of ECOWAS.

The treaty of the ECOWAS was signed in Lagos on 28th May, 1975 by 16 countries, namely Benin republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'voire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. It is also important to mention that on June 23, 1975, seven State of ECOWAS had ratified the treaty and this brought it into effect. The seven States were Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Upper Volta,ivory coast and Guinea.

3.2THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE ECOWAS CHAPTER

In April 1978, when the sub-regional group was only three years old, member countries signed and adopted the protocol on non-aggression. Under the protocol, member States "resolved not to use force as a measures setting disputes amongst themselves." Three years later, in May 1981, the community went further, signed and adopted the protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence. Under it, member States resolved that "any armed threat of aggression directed aginst any member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community, and the community shall therefore give mutual aid and assistance". [12]

This was one of the first initiations by the sub-regional organization with the view of solving problems or rather conflicts within the sub-region

since its inception in 1975. it is also important to note here that despite this bold and concrete initiative by the sub-regional group, that " agreements were signed between countries and their former colonial master for example France and her former colonies had a defence agreement. This is not in the interest of the sub-regional organization. For example, the Statement by the chairman is a clear indication of what the sub-regional group has- been doing to ensure peace , that is to resolve the crisis in the member nations.

For ECOWAS to operate effectively there was the need to guarantee security in the sub-region. President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, during the 13th summit of the ECOWAS authority of Heads of States and Governments held in Banjul from May 28th- June 2nd, 1990, re-echoing the concerns of his colleagues, proposed the setting up of the standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of four members headed by the country that holds the chairmanship of the authority".[3] The Nigerian leader recalled the basic principles on which ECOWAS was founded and observed "the noble ideas of ECOWAS were anchored on solidarity, unity, mutual trust and good neighborliness". [13]

3.3 ECOWAS MACHINERIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Salim Ahmed Salim, the then Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), said "We have paid a high price to build our nations, and to ensure their unity, these are assets we should strive to preserve". He went further to say " society that is governed by self-discipline resulting from a system of political controls and balance. Equal

access to resources and political participation is likely to enjoy long lasting peace". [14]

It is intended in this chapter that some of the mechanisms for conflict resolution used in restoring peace in the conflict areas would be looked into, for example, the non-aggressive treaty of 1979/80, the various ad-hoc committee set up at various occasions to resolve the problems the ECOMOG defence pact, the use of force through ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group), as initially requested by Sergeant Samuel Doe of Liberia, later by Kabbah in Sierra Leone and the assistance requested by Viera of Guinea Bissau, all with the intent of quelling their "internal" crisis. During the 21st ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, the then chairman of the group, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Nigeria Head of State said"------ ECOWAS has performed expectations------ amalgamated our region into one community acting with one voice and one objective. But unfortunately, we have spent so much time bringing peace and not putting enough emphasis on economic isues". [15] this conflict in 1989, the organization had to make a choice. It could adopt a strictly legalistic approach and sit on the fence, believing that it was an internal conflict and therefore, beyond the scope of the protocol on non-aggression and mutual assistance on defence matters. Alternatively, it could intervene in primarily humanitarian grounds, since the State in the real sense of the world had ceased to exist and had become a regional security issue.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 THE SIRREA LEONIAN CRISIS AND INTERVENTION OF ECOWAS

4.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE.

Sierra Leone was under Britain in 1787 as a colony for freed slave which followed the abolition of the slave trade. As efforts were then geared towards the abolition of the obnoxious slave trade to pave the way for 'legitimate' trade. The anti slave trade campaign caused a demographic revolution in Sierra Leone.. in 1805, the colony had about 2,000 inhabitants. By 1811, the flux of people freed from the slave ships, had more than double the population. The liberated Africans" as they are officially styled or "re-captives" as they more conveniently be called had to be maintained in the colony. They were brought from different parts of the coast. A few came from the East even as far as Lake Malawi. [1]

Most of the British officials saw the re-captives as a problem. Sir Carles Mac-Cathy, who governed Sierra Leone from 1814-1824 saw them as an opportunity to be exploited. He proposed to transformed tem into a Christian population, spread new ways to the unelightelened, especially along the Christian faith. [2]

Missionaries were put in charge of the captive villages as government officers, they could use secular as well as religious authority to impact their messages. Lacking a common language, they were ready to learn English to

communicate with one another. Abandoned their traditional religion and language s, they adopted European lifestyle and even names. [3]

Within a decade or two of Mac-Carthy's death, his dream had come true. The re-captive population had been transformed in the way he indended. Though about 5% five percent remained Muslims, and other still clung to the religions of their distant homelands, most became churchgoing Christians. Despite disapproval, some indigenous practices (like communicating with the family dead) were unobtrusively incorporated into Christian worship. 4

Historically, the indigenous people of Sierra Leone are the Femme and Mende before the coming of the Creoles or rather the re-captives. Following the suppression of the slave trade. It is therefore, important to note that contact between these different peoples with different cultures, and religious background would really play a significant role in explaining the crisis the country experienced as will be shown later in the cause of the chapter.

4.2 THE GENESIS AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE CRISIS

The educational imbalance and other disadvantages such as religious and economic imbalance arising out of colonial experience between those in the southern part of the country and those to the Northen areas created prejudices and fears which politicians and the Military exploited for selfish reason. This imbalance for a long time created a period of struggle for

political power between the two rival ethnic-based political parties on the other hand and the weakened, fractionalized and politicized 16, 000 men strong army on the other hand[5]. The Sierra Leonian peoples party (SLPP) and the All Peoples congress (APC) have for a long time been arch-rivals. The SLPP led the country to independence and formed the first post-colonial government under Sir Milton Morgan. [6] it was a party dominated by elite of the Southern and South eastern ethnic groups which produced most of the nations educated citizens, bureaucrats and business men. On the other hand, elite of northern and north-Western ethnic group dominated the APC[7].

The SLPP ruled the country until 1962 when a political crisis erupted. Politicians that were unable to resolve the crisis, resorted to using the army either to win or retain power or deny their opponents of it. This unhealthy relations and political maneuver led to series of coups and counter-coups which later led to the coming to power of the APC as the ruling party.[8]

APC remained in power for 24 years with some political stability but not without using security agents to intimidate and haras political opponents. The other opposing political parties were thus forced to resort to underground subversive activities manifesting in the form of political actism by intellectuals and their students as well as labour strikes and media attacks. This culminated into the formation of the Revolutionary United Fron (RUF) by some lecturer and student of Fourah Bay college in 1982.[9]. The APC went

into negative activities that had many effects which led to military mutiny of 25th May, 1997. the outbreak of the civil war in neighbouring Liberia helped to ignite the already smoldering crisis in sierra Leone.. the intellectual founders of the RUF trained with the leadership of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). [10] it is important to State here that due to the problems in Sierra Leone. And the desire for a change, an intellectual revolutionary group, has metamorphosed into a military force, with even a force commander, in person of Foday Sankoh.[11]

Foday Sankoh, having participated actively in the Liberian War, commenced armed rebellion against the government of Sierra Leone. On 23rd March, 1991. The rebellion led to the collapse of two governments, hulled all economic activities in the rich eastern part of the country, imposed heavy stain on the nation's economy, brought tremendous social dislocation and ruined the armed forces. [12]

On the 29th April, 1992, there was a coup masterminded by junior officers who deserted their posts at the war front. They overthrew the APC government of President Saidu Momoh. This coup had a catastrophic consequence on the command structure of the Sierra Leone. Army, it formed the background of the 25 May, 1997 coup.[13] the officers who took over the government formed a National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) headed by Captain Valentine Strasse, who was also overthrown by Captain Ma'ada Bio in a Palace coup. [14] The election. Thus, the beginning of the rejection of a

democratically formed government in Sierra Leone. By the RUF the new regime was forced to organize parliamentary and parliamentary and Presidential election. These election were won by the SLPP led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 1986. [15]

The leadership of kabbah inherited a lot of dissatisfaction among power groups who felt threatened over their loss of grip on power and economic resources. They felt that their interests would not be protected by the return of SLPP. Also dissatisfied were some APC leaders who had been in power for almost 24 years during which they abolished the SLPP and other opposition parties. They had equally accumulated wealth and privileges.

Another dissatisfied power group was the junior military officers and soldiers who had tested power, privileges and influence under the regime of Valentine Strasser.[16]

The government OF SLPP having realized the fears of these groups, it embarked on a policy of national reconciliation. But its economic policies, aimed at putting the nation back on a sound economic footing, was hurting the vital interests, of these grouped' interest. The various measures led to job losses, price-incensement and general decline in the standard of living of many people in the lower strata of the society whose income declined in real terms.

The government was vilified by opponents and businessmen and the media over these policies. The military also have their grouse with the government, particularly over the issue of the Kamajoor, local militia men who are mainly hunters, from the Presidents ethnic tribe. Many soldiers also became aggrieved that their officers were embezzling their pay and allowances and diverting their rice allocation for personal use. [17]

It was in the midst of this unfortunate political-military charged atmosphere that the SLPP government took a decision to reduce the troops rice allocation. To many aggrieved soldiers, this was the last "act of wickedness" they could take all they needed at the time was a leader to start a revolt against the new regime. They found the leader in Sergeant Abu, Sankoh (Zagallo) who led the mutiny of 25th May, 1997 which brought to power the Armed Forces Rulling Council (AFRC) whose leader was Major Johnny Paul Koramah, while Foday sankoh, the RUF leader later became the deputy. [18]

The regime of the AFRC further plunged the nation into an abyss of bloody crisis. This. the sub-regional organization, had to intervene under a military force – ECOMOG.

It is important to note that joint commissions and committees set by the sub-regional organization went into action in Sierra Leone in the early stages of the peace implementation process which had just began when suddenly, on 25/5/97, the RUF exposed its bad faith for which it is known as earlier

mentioned. Discarding the peace agreement as a scrap of paper, and with the disloyal section of the Sierra Leone army, they destroyed the fragile structures of Kabbah regime, forcing the President and his close associate to flee to neighboring Guinea – Bissau. About one million citizens including technocrats and the intelligential followed their elcted leader, preferring to a live as a refugees in other countries than living under the tyranny of a military junta characterized by bloody horror, killing of innocents citizens, arson, looting, torture, and many other crimes against humanity in Sierra. [19]

Those left behind resorted to civil disobedience, Sierra Leone like Liberia, came to a stand still and became a nuisance in terms of value to the progress of the sub-regional group. Such shameless crimes against humanity perpetuated by the military junta sent shocking waves throughout the international Community. According to Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the deposed President of Sierra Leone, the take over by the junta was because of "collaboration" between RUF rebels and the national army who were not loyal, and also "their sole interest is and has always been to fleece the country economically and in the process inflict untold, havoc and suffering on the population, --- the centre of all this is the diamond and gold business. Military Junta have been no more than desperate attempts to check the nudity of their treason which they had long since contemplated"[20] he added. He said the coup "stopped the forward march of my people, in place of peace and development, the coup substituted a future of strife and violence, the

coup makers knew nothing of national reconciliation and they care even less for fundamental freedom and basic human decency. In so far as it is a revolution.

4.3 THE INTERVENTION OF ECOWAS

Nicephore Soglo, the then Republic of Benin President said in 1992 “without a minimal level of Unity, consensus and democracy, the efforts of ECOWAS would indeed be in vain”. The elimination of all aspects of tension in the region was according to him “a prerequisite for the establishment of then extended common market we are yearning for”. This also requires the restoration of a climate of peace, security and regional stability.[22]

The emerging world which followed to end of cold war, stresses the need to rethink the doctrinal foundations for international security, responses by given greater emphasis to “action designed to bring hostile parties to settlement” (peace keeping) and a “negotiated revolution” of comprehensive reports designed to face the factors that initially prompted the conflict (peace building). This helps to explain the reasons that prompted the ECOWAS Heads of States in their summit in Banjul, the Gambia, to think of solving the Liberian crisis and the final establishment of peace keeping force known as “ECOMOG”,[24] Michael Brown argues that “ECOWAS has significantly moved into the political sphere through establishing its joint peace keeping force in Liberia in 1990”[24] The decision by ECOWAS to intervene in the internal

ethnic conflict of a member State has generated widespread discussions of the role of regional organizations in a civil conflicts.[25]

The emergence of and spread of Liberian crisis like any other previous crisis resulted from the failure of ECOWAS to effectively practicalised the security arrangements established under the protocol of mutual assistance on non-aggression and defence endorse in 1978 and 1981 respectively.[26]

It is important to note that since the signing of the treaties on ECOWAS security, military and political insecurity, the level of inter-governmental relationship deteriorated in the area of social, military and political insecurity. ECOWAS leaders lack the foresight on how to put into practice the institutions establishing the protocols. This is due to lack of economic where with and wrong sense of patronization".[21] To the extent that in 1985, the "Accord on non-Aggression et d'Assistance on matiere de defence" (ANAD) intervened in the 1985 crisis between Mali and Burkina Faso instead of ECOWAS. The border dispute between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau and that between Senegal and Mauritania skirmishes over the water rights. As much as the authority of ECOWAS was incapacitated by lack of both political will and economic strength, less support from member States rendered its executive responsibilities ineffective.[27]

Following the Liberian crisis, new security arrangement were built around the authority and the committee system for the implementation of the peace process as follows:

a. Establishment of Standing Mediation Committee (SMC)
b. Committee of Five (CF) and
c. Committee of Nine (CN).

These are all unconventional approaches fashioned outside ECOWAS institutional framework to attend to exigent crisis in Liberia. This has greatly helped in the transformation of the sub-regional organization.[28]. The ability to implement the SMC decisions for the establishment of ECOMOG to intervene and restore peace in Liberia almost broke ECOWAS apart. This was because, Babangida, the then Nigerian leader, was known to be friendly with Samuel Doe of Liberia. Thus, any initiative by Babangida for regional intervention in Liberia was seen as defending Doe's interest.[29] The SMC threw up ECOMOG as a collective defence forces to address an uncontrollable threat to regional security, which under normal regional security arrangement it would have been impossible to achieve. The mechanism for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace keeping has been established by the sub-regional organization. The mechanisms drew from the experiences gathered in the field by sub-regional organization. The mechanisms drew from the experiences gathered in the field by sub-regional peace keepers (ECOMOG) owing to its "excellent" performance in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Tom Ikimi, remarked that "it should be noted that despite ECOMOG successes, we could not claim that it is a totally perfect mechanism".[30] with no peace to keep, Nigerian leaders took the decision on

14/9/90 to bring it, rather than wait for it to happen. They concluded that it was urgent that ECOMOG halt the human slaughter, secure Monrovia and create conditions necessary for emergency relief to begin. In what ECOMOG source have described as “defensive-offensive” this meant imposing a cease fire on the warring factions if necessary.[31]

The ECOMOG military push against Taylor triggered tow significant events:

a. It brought the political decision within ECOWAS fully into open.

b. The military push was instrumental in forcing a cease fire.

Following the elections of 1997, the seven years of civil war characterized by wanton destruction of lives and properties, formally came to an end on 8/2/97 as the country joined the league of democratic nations. Mr. Taylor won the presidential election, was sworn in as the President of the post-war democratic Liberia.[32]

President Obasanjo also said “the economic and social needs of the people in the sub-region have to be tackled collectively by the leaders of the sub-region”. That in spite of the dire need for economic and social development in the sub-region, attention is now focused on resolving conflicts.[33]

Charles Taylor also said, the crisis then in Sierra Leone was affecting Liberia negatively, pointed out that the relationship between the two countries is that of the “two nose” and “the eye”, when you hit the “nose” the “eyes” run

water. He promised to destroy all the arms collected from the rebels during the Liberian crisis, President Olusegun Obasanjo thus welcomed the move to destroy the arms, that it is a good decision, that the destruction will mark the final disengagement of ECOMOG from Liberia.[34] But to Charles Taylor who fails to realized that “he who fight band run away, live to fight another day”, what si the situation of Liberia today and the conditions of Charles Taylor in particular politically.

4.4 MAJOR FINDINGS

As stressed in this chapter, the military Junta in characterized by bloody horror, killing of innocents citizens, arson, looting, torture and many other crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone, all these are uncivilized ways of resolving problems, rather they have succeeded in compounding the problems of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone at a time came to a standstill and became a nuisance value to the progress in the ECOWAS sub-region, especially when considers the aims and objectives of the sub-regional group as spelt out in article 2 of the organization.

Despite the restoration of the democratically elected President Kabbah in March, 1998, the rebels regrouped and the attacked the capital Freetown in January, 1999, about 6,350 bodies were buried in mass graves.[35]

On casualties, it was reported that many houses were destroyed in the process, including the Nigerian Embassy in Freetown which the rebels burned down when invaded the place.[36]

Other effects include the killing of some journalists by the rebels, eleven Indian businessmen were kidnapped. Also abducted was the Honorary Consul for Japan in Sierra Leone by the rebels. They stole large sums of money from the company's office and burnt down the premises.[33]

The most devastating effect of the crisis in Sierra Leone is the escalation of the problem into Guinea. The military source in guinea-Bissau said, southern Guinea was threatened by the new armed faction of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone Peoles Army).[37]

Some 20 people including five Guinean soldiers were killed in the raids by the rebels which have devastated an area already destabilized by presence of 60,000 of the 350,000 Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea. The authority therefore deployed a sizeable security force around Fore Carriah.[38]

Many villagers include Malifor were destroyed in subsequent raids, during which the rebels reportedly looted and burnt houses as they advanced. The most hit was the village of Malifor, whose 400 inhabitants fled. The village on the bank of the Kolante river which forms the border between the two countries were been gutted. All these causalities were within Guinea.[39]. These casualties were as a result of the Sierra Leone crisis. Finally, no amount of peace-keeping force or intervention could actually sustain democratic everlasting in Sierra Leone talk more of returning the country to its pre-independence days. The solution to the problems in Sierra Leone remains with the Sierra Leone just as the problems emanated within

themselves. Therefore, Kabbah in pursuance of this lasting peace for which ECOWAS has sank a lot of money and human lives to ensure, should not see himself as the "victor", rather he must adopt the policy of no victor" "no vanquish".

4.6 REACTION OF THE SUB-REGIONAL GROUT TO THE MILITARY COUP IN SIERRA LEONE

By some strange coincidence, the military coup le by Major Koromah occurred just two days before the opening session of the Annual Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Harare-Zimbabwe. The ECOWAS 16 members among 51 leaders spread no efforts at ensuring that the agenda, unanimously and unequivocally condemned the illegal seizure of power by the Junta, called for immediate restoration of the constitutional order and most importantly appealed to the leader of ECOWAS o assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order in the country and for the International Community at large to lend their support. This resolution can best be described as joint ECOWAS, OAU decision on Sierra Leone ande this had far reaching effects:- The Common Wealth and reinforcing the decision. All these institutions took decision to impose a variety of sanctions on the junta in Sierra Leone. The continued contacts by representatives of these institutions OAU, ECOWAS, UN and Common Wealth of Nations brought the junta face to face with the reality that it was a non-entity in the International Community with a high degree of nuisance value.[40]

For days to the 20th ECOWAS meeting in Abuja, the then Nigeria Head of State, General Sani Abacha, embarked on some trips to Mali, Cote d'Ivoire because of the Sierra Leone crisis. After the meeting, the Chairman dispatched To Ikimi, the then Foreign Affairs Minister to South Africa on the Sierra Leone crisis. These diplomatic shuttles were said to have the way to the success recorded at the end of the meeting.[41]

The sub-regional organization gave the junta a two-week deadline within which to handover power to Kabbah peacefully or face military action by ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The deadline expired and the coupist clung to power and the collective will of ECOWAS to forcefully eject them had shown a crack as some countries still continued preferred dialogue not mindful of the fact people were suffering from junta's maltreatment of innocent souls. The crack in the regional body about a collective way forward in dealing with the Koromah regime, present ECOWAS with a dilemma anda challenge. [42]

Chief Emeka Anyaokwu, the then Common Wealth Secretary General, in condemning the coup generally, describe the coup as a "retrogressive step". Also in condemning the coup, the Unite States called on "those claiming power in Freetown to return power promptly to the country's elected leadership and parliament".

President Robert Mugabe, then the OAU Chairman warned that military take over of government was getting out of fashion in Africa and urge the

coup leaders to respect the world opinion and return power to the legitimate government under Kabbah. [43] The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan also disapproved the coup and expressed support for whatever measures to restore the ousted legitimately elected government. [44]

At the end of the 20th ECOWAS Summit in Abuja, a communiqué was adopted by the Heads of States and Governments of the Regional Organization. They approved a package of sanctions and blockade as a further measures to ensure the restoration of the legitimate governance of Kabbah. Nut it is important to note that the imposition of sanction is one thing, and the enforcement of sanctions another thing. It is therefore in keeping with the UN, OAU and Common Wealth decisions, that ECOWAS finally decided to extend ECOMOG operations from Liberia into the neighbouring Sierra Leone to ensure the compliance and observance of the sanctions. It is also important to state here that it was at the end of the Summit in Abuja that a document was signed agreed by members legitimizing ECOMOG authority and backing to extend its operation into Sierra Leone from Liberia. [45] This gave ECOMOG a legal backing for its presence in Sierra Leone. This was how ECOWAS (ECOMOG) became directly involved in the Sierra Leone conflict.

In early February 1998, the Nigerian led ECOMOG stormed Freetown, chasing rebels of Koromah's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council AFRC) out of Freetown. Setting the ground for the eventual return of Kabbah back to

office as the democratically elected President of Siera Leone. Therefore, the clinical routine of the junta under Johny Paul Koromah by the ECOMOG marks as important landmark towards the restoration of democratic rule in Sierra Leone. [46]

For the first time in history, a Head of State regain his seat with the assistance and support of ECOWAS. On 10th March, 1998, Sierra Leone was agog with joy and festivity as the President was reinstalled back to power after 8 months of forced exile in Guinea. The reunion of kabbah with his people was witnessed by some Heads of States, Lansana Conte of Guinea, Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali, Sani Abacha (late) of Nigeria and the the ECOWAS Chairman, Ahmed Salim, the then OAU Secretary General, Ibrahim Fall, who represented the UN Secretary General. [47]

The crucial argument or question to ask is, how were the rebels getting their supply of arms? Did the British government know about and gave approval for the activities of Sand hive International in important arms to Sierra Leone in defiance of the United nations arms embargo? This really helps to give an insight as to the involvement of an outside body in the Sierra Leone conflict especially the prolongation of the restoration of power or rather the refusal by the junta to handover peacefully, but rather prefer to do it through the use of force. The supply of arms to the rebels by an outside body helps to explain external interference in the conflict.

ECOMOG had evidence of several arms importation into the country by the government , some of these arms are destined for the rebels in Sierra Leone, confirmed Major General Timothy Shelpidi, the then ECOMOG Commander in Sierra Leone. The ECOMOG Commander went further to say "if nothing is done to stop this ugly trend, the rebel situation may be protracted for a long time and can even destabilize other neighbouring countries". [48]

4.6 THE ECOWAS STANDING MEDIATION COMMITTEE (SMC)

It was established at the end of the summit and immediately to concern itself with the civil war in Liberia. This followed the decision that ECOWAS should mediate between the warring factions and bring peace and harmony to the people of Sierra Leone. Abacha appealed to his colleagues to exercise great restraints and allow wise council to prevail as the community cannot afford at that time to dissipate vital energy or inter-states squabbles. [49]

The sub-regional group was first confronted with a major article 2. [7] Although, this pact initially has a positive intention for the sub-regional group, it was not without any problem. The issue of the community forces, vis-à-vis their funding also the problem of fear, that is how best to guarantee that the bigger countries such as Nigeria and Senegal did not completely dominate the organization. These issues thus kept dominating the problem that faced the sub-regional organization from its inception, anytime an attempt is made at resolving conflicts within the organization. Also associated to this problem

is the colonial allegiance as stated earlier to their colonial masters as stated earlier. [50]

The then ECOWAS Secretary, Dr. Abubakar Outtara in June 1981 had this to say “that the document was a very complex instrument”----- meant to be financially very light structure, yet operationally efficient” [51]

Under the protocol the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) and Units of National Armed Forces of member states that are assigned for such duties. For the AAFC to be called out, an aggrieved country has to write to the community for assistance which shall then hold an emergency meeting of the authority to consider the request in all its ramifications”. [52]

On the issue of the pact therefore, it is only when the necessary socialization has taken place in terms of changing attitudes and orientation that the community can begin to think of its defence protocol. French involvement in the ECOWAS region has been inimical to the regions unity and stability, its influence in its former colonies ensures that it can play an important role on the traditional hostility between Anglophone and Francophone countries of the region. It has used its military might not onlt to remove governments, but also to support “friendly” government. [53]

It therefore becomes important to mention here that in the cause of resolving the crisis in the organization countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso were not really ready to assist in the resolution of conflict in Sierra Leone, rather their countries became the training grounds for the

rebels, and for the importation of fire arms. This has greatly affected the efforts of the sub-regional organizations at resolving the crisis in Sierra Leone. [17] But thanks for the commitments of Nigeria's financial and military efforts to the crisis.

The sub-regional organization therefore through its mutual defence agreements has shown a desire to solve the twin but complementary problems of economic and military security, especially as indicated by the Francophone members. The pact is seen as a way of maintaining the relative stability that may occur within the region pact is seen as a way of maintaining the relative stability that may occur within the region and relation to other parts of the continent, so that available amounts of scarce resources can be spent for meaningful economic development. Te region is in a much better position to achieve regional integration as envisaged by the ECOWAS Treaty in as an effective instrument for assuring regional peace and stability. ECOWAS defense pact should however be seen as representing much more than a military alliance. It is also a political alliance which allows members. The defense pact must also be able to discuss issues that are likely to endanger security of the region, as a whole or one of its member State, either directly or indirectly. [54]

With the problem that engulfed the ECOWAS in the 80s, apart from the pact of 1978, as discussed above, as an attempt of how to solve the region's conflicts, another effort was made. The extra-ordinating summit of ECOWAs

leaders and government held in Lome Tofo for conflict prevention, on 17th December 1997, approved the establishment of mechanism management resolution and peace keeping for regional security. In line with these directives, ECOWAS Ministers of foreign affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs held their first meeting in Yamoussoukro on 11-12 March, 1998. [55]

Article 6 of the protocol on non-aggression, ember State pledge to resort to peaceful means in the settlement of disputes. The protocol, however, does not specify what those peaceful means are. Conflict management will be facilitated if they are specify. In the absence of clearly defined peaceful means of settlement of disputes, it will be difficult to determine the stage at which all peaceful means of settlement of a mechanisms could be enshrined in the protocol; direct negotiations, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. [56]. For more efficient management of conflict, the composition, mandate and modus operandi of the committee could be spelt out. That is the committee which to be established on protocol provided with types of disputes, and those that cannot be settled peacefully by it and who it should refer the issue to especially those it cannoy resolve by itself. [57]

4.7 CRITICISMS OF ECOMOG:

a. some members of ECOWAS saw ECOMOG as an instrument of orchestrated attempt to impose a government of those who fled the

country in the face of persecution by Samuel Doe (Late), especially the academics, and those who did not participate in the fighting.

a. Another criticism is its intervention role, which was seen as a gross violation of Article 3 section 2 of the charter of the OAU. This section stipulates that members should not interfere in the internal affairs of members sate. Further more, the UN through its General Assembly Resolution 21311(1965) and (1970) clearly enumerated the principle on non-intervention. This principles follows from the liberty and independence of nations, that each has the right to govern itself as it thinks proper, and that no one of them has the right to interfere in the government of another. Going by the international law, the ECOMOG had no business Liberia. [59]

It has also been criticized as a mismone in concepts and nomenclatures. For example, a force composed of soldiers from west African countries is grossly misrepresentative of the ECOWAS 16 member countries and did not deserve to go under a tag suggesting a mandate from the regional group. Also, the massive mobilization by the ECOMOG gave the impression not of a pacifist initiative, but of the belligerent interventionism. [60]

The activities of ECOMOG soldiers went beyond peace keeping. Many soldiers were accused of looting stores inLiberia and Sierra Leone, raping girls and harassing people, and producing ‘children without proper parental care. Due to this ECOMOG rather than simply keeping the peace, helped in

killing the peace and compounding more problems especially with the emergence of “ECOMOG” children among the Liberian people. [61]

Despite the negative criticisms brought against the monitoring group of the sub-regional organization of the ECOMOG group has made same positive contribution. The principal motive of ECOWAS did not go to Liberia and Sierra Leone on humanitarian ground, but also to put an end to a foreseen dangerous political crisis which may degenerated could have degenerate into another neighboring West Africa State (but it really did, especially with Bssaiu) and this will mean absence of peace and peace is a must for any kind of integration. Hence EcOWAS economic goals canot be achieved without peace within the sub-region. As observed by a political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes,” No meaningful development can take place in a state of chaos and anarchy,” that is in Hobbesian state of nature. Thus, the need for the sub-regional organization to ensure that peace prevails within its members and the entire sub-region. [62]

In conclusion, it is worth nothing that the formation, deployed immensely to the stabilization of government and operations of ECOMOG in Siera Leone, contributed immensely to the stabilization of governments and political economy of the countries in the sub-region. Some may see it in the negative. ECOMOG success has shown clearly that regional peace keeping can work well, even among poor and weak nations. There is therefore a great need for

sub-regional organization in its treaty to incorporate ECOMOG as a force for the sub-region. [63]

Finally, in the face future conflicts effective security institutional framework should be put in place or crises would continue to rock the region. For ECOWAS to function, there is need for hegemonic leadership that is benevolent, consensual and adaptable to negotiations as means for conflict resolution. ECOMOG has clearly therefore raised the heightened sense of awareness among political leaders in Africa. Unlike in the past, they now recognized that sovereignty provides less immunity against atrocities on ones own population than it once did. African leaders cannot ignore the signs of the hard in the post-cold war global political economy. More importantly is for the sub-regional members to embrace the wind of democratization that is now blowing the world over, apart from addressing the crucial problem of poverty, leaders should always use dialogues as the best means to resolve conflicts. Leaders must learn to accept and accommodate the views of others. As suggested by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in one of the inaugural lecture that ushered in the civilian administration delivered on 28th May, 1999 in Abuja, Nigeria. He suggested that “any regime that comes to power through force should be rejected by all other African Leaders”. [64]

This method of rejection and ultimate isolation will help in resolving conflicts rather than the use of force. But is it tenable.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Chapter as stated above, will concern itself with the summary of findings of the entire research, and finally make recommendations on some collective sensitive issues, especially the position of economic in the sub-regional organization.

5.1 SUMMARY

The main concern of this project is to discuss the management of Sierra Leone conflict by ECOWAS collective security.

For property understanding and articulation of this problem, the decision-making theory is used as the base of the explanation so as to critically investigate and analyse the ECOWAS machineries for conflict management. The research is designed to discuss ECOWAS and the principle of collective security, formation and performance of ECOWAS, the principle of non-interference and collective security in the ECOWAS charter, the Sierra Leone crisis and intervention of ECOWAS.

Furthermore, in treating this problem, various hypotheses were formulated centered on the following factors: intervention, conflict and collective security. To test these hypotheses, relevant literature and related documents were reviewed. In order to ascertain the validity, reliability and to achieve the purpose of study, the data were critically analysed and the result

shows that, the intervention of ECOWAS/ECOMOG led to the reinstalment of Ahmed Kabbah of Sierra Leone.

5.2 CONCLUSION

The wind of democracy, the political climate for the advancement of capitalism has become the order of the day. Late Garuba A. Chris said “It is not possible for one part of a system to be insecure and others secure. The insecurity of one is insecurity of all.” The security of the ruler and the ruled, privilege and unprivileged, the elite and the masses are all tied together, It is an exercise in futility for one social class to seek to improve its security, at the expense of the other. Security, like development, is a linkage affair “. [8] He continued, the rulers that coerce and terrorize their citizenry weaken the state, create insecurity, and become prisoners in their own homes”. Security concerns must move from the domain of just protecting governments and regimes to the protection of the citizenry. A much higher level of confidence needs to be built between the government and governed for the security of the system” [9].

In conclusion, the ECOWAS peace effort is a result of which many West African countries paid for in blood and many, analysts warned that sacrifices are still to be made particularly by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean in the post-war reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation period. “Kudos” to Ahmed Tejan Kabbah’s initiative that gave four seats in the government to be formed to the RUF rebels, all in an effort to get a lasting

peace in the country, despite his restoration to power by the ECOMOG forces on 10th March, 1998.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The research here intends to makes some recommendations on the sub-regional organization in its efforts to resolving conflicts within its members. The research would also make some recommendations on the peace monitoring group (ECOMOG) on peace initiatives in the sub-region. Peter Wallesten has noted that "the concept of solution, or more specifically conflict resolution, is associated with a purposeful search for ways to accommodating the explicit interests of the parties in conflict. Thus, is does not mean the same as termination of conflicts through victory, nor does it refer to transformation of conflict. Victory means that one party dominates the other and is able to impose its order on the other. [10]

Justice should be done in the distribution of national resources – funds, citing of national structures, sharing of political positions etc. Government within the region must be responsible and accountable and responsible to the people, must respect the rule of law, human rights and public opinion. Ethnic and religious manipulations must be ended as well. Co-operation, justice and good government are required for conflicts to be limited in any country. Institutions are also needed to maximize political participation of the citizens.[11]

The fundamental causes of the violence or crisis must be traced and done away with appropriately in order to ensure a sustainable and comprehensive peace. The causes of war should not be treated like the causes of the Nigerian civil war which were swept under the carpet and never traced for proper solution, only to come back to hunt the nation in the 1990s. As earlier mentioned, justice is relevant to lasting peace to reign in a country.[12]

As regards conflicts prevention, management and resolution, some appropriate proposals have been advanced by some regional group regarding the establishment of an observation and monitoring system which will provide in advance of full-scale conflict, early warning information on the root causes of conflicts to break out between or within States without prior indication of a deteriorations in relations or signs of political, economic and social malaise in any country. [13]

The observation system would consist especially in the establishment of a regional network within which States would be grouped into four (4) zones, each with a zonal capital. A regional observation and monitoring centre should be established within the execution secretariats to give warning of impending crisis. Reports prepared by Lonal Bureau will be transmitted to the centre. The centre will record and analyse all such data and take appropriate actions. [14]

The leaders of the sub-regional organizations should also display a stronger politically will to effectively implement the various agreements of the organization there is this lack of "political will" – the marginalization of the political aspect of integration in the West African region. The need, therefore, for the authority to provide the political will for integration, thus creating an environment that would enable individual citizens to move freely across the sub-regional organization, in its quest to operate effectively must have to guarantee security in the area. Babangida recalled the basic principles on which ECOWAS was founded and observed "the noble ideals of ECOWAS were anchored on solidarity, unity, mutual trust and good neighbourliness" [16]

On ECOMOG, though it faced a set-back when on September 9, 1990, President Samuel Doe on a visit to the Headquarters was captured by forces loyal to Prince Yomie Johnson, and executed him the following day in brutal circumstances. ECOWAS from the ruins of Liberia, has emerged as the most virile of sub-regional groups in Africa and ECOMOG. A case study in regional peacekeeping. Africa indeed the sub-region have demonstrated its capacity for self reliance and self innovation". President Sani Abacha (late) of Nigeria on May 21, 1997, during the ECOMOG has opened new fields of co-operation and laid a foundation for what could evolve as a permanent framework for greater security co-operation within our sub-region" [18] I might add that after the Liberian war, this force could be transformed into the nucleus of a regional permanent peacekeeping force" [19] declared Abacha. On

the future of ECOMOG, Victor Malu, the then ECOWAS summit Commander in Liberia, had this to say “with the uniqueness of ECOMOG, and the success we have achieved here. It will be a mistake for the ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization to let the expenses of all what we have gained here not to be harnessed. I believe there should be an outfit called ECOMOG, it does not matter how small, it should be maintained. It would be called upon for this type of duties. If and where they come up within the sub-region. It is quite a good advice, a good suggestion that ECOMOG as a peacekeeping outfit should be maintained after the Liberian situation. [20] Building a strong community united and its complete solidarity represent a major challenge, requiring sacrifice. For the regional organization to meet this challenge face-on, member States must be ready to make Liberian situation. [20]

Building a strong community united and in complete solidarity, represents a major challenge, requiring sacrifice. For the regional organization to meet this challenge face-on, member States must be ready to make sacrifices in part by setting aside national pride in certain areas in pursuit of the collective goal. This is necessary when talks of ECOMOG. Member countries should resolve to provide troops in order to maintain the tempo and continued existence of the sub-regional monitoring group. [21] Finally, it is important to note that, if the sub-regional organization canot afford to maintaining the ECOMOG peacekeeping force due to some financial and logistic problems, especially positioning of their headquarters and the

issue of the force Commander. The sub-regional organization may disband them, but that each of the member states should maintain a unit within its armed forces only to be called upon when the need arises, while the issue of the force Commander may be nationally just like that of the chairman of the organization. No matter the methods used the whole idea centres on the “will power” of the States to resolve their problems. [22]

On the problems and possible solutions, J. Sorie Conteh said “while the institutionalization of the rule of law by itself may not absolutely guarantee democratic culture, it does minimize the abuse of power that exists in its absence. Consequently the needs to put in place the principle of the rule of law as an important instrument for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and thereby enhanced the promotion of a culture of peace. Tolerance and respects of human rights, sustain democracy, freedom and the guarantee of pacific co-existence between and among diverse ethnicity and people of different religious beliefs.” [23]

Therefore, if the rule of law is in place, machinery for conflict prevention, management and resolution would address the issue as indeed is the case in modern democracies. It is partly the failure to adhere to the rule of law, lack of press freedom, tolerance of dissenting opinions and opposite groups etc. that have generated some of the conflicts that have been plaguing the sub-regional organization and indeed, the African continent at large. [24]

The researcher will like to add that, we need to readjust out thinking and accept that socio-economic development cannot be sustainable in an environment riddled with violence, instability and insecurity. We need to accept the view that human dignity cannot be rebellion and conflict. Thus, the best solution to problems is always dialogue on the conference table over a “cup of tea” rather than the “barrel of the gun”.

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