IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM ON NIGERIA-CAMEROON RELATIONS (2009 - 2016)

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this dissertation entitled, "Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon Relations (2009 – 2016)" by Ugwuigba Michael Chukwuma was carried out by me in the Department of Political Science/International Studies. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at this or any other Institution

_____ _____

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CERTIFICATION

This dissertation titled "Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon Relations (2009 – 2016) by Ugwuigba Michael Chukwuma meets the regulations governing the award of Master's of Philosophy (M.Phil) degree in International Relations of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to God first then to my wife Mrs. Grace O. Ugwuigba and Ozo Philip Ugwuigba the Head of Ugwu Nwa Ugwuigba's family. To my late parents Onyishi, Onuoha (Dr.) Ugwu Nwa Ugwuigba and Mrs. Obukogwo Ugwuigba and all the fallen souls in the family as I pray that they rest in perfect peace, Amen.

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ABSTRACT

This research is an investigation of the "Impact of Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations (2009-2016)". Nigeria-Cameroon relations shortly after independence in 1960 has been described as 'unfriendly', 'love and hate', prompted by some variables such as border crisis, Bakassi Pennisula crisis and colonial influence. The emergence of terrorism at the borders of the two countries provoked this research which investigated on whether their relations had improved, worsened or remained the same. This led to the review of related literature using conceptual, thematic and theoretical approaches. Linkage theory was employed to explain and guide the study. Data were generated from respondents with basic and sound knowledge/experience on the study area through survey method facilitated by in-depth interview techniques. The study revealed that Nigeria-Cameroon relations before the period studied was not cordial at diplomatic level but flourished socio-culturally and economically. The study established that the unfriendly diplomatic relations greatly improved during the terrorist regime and the level of improvement can translate into better relations in future. The study revealed that while diplomatic relations greatly had a boost during the period of terrorism the socio-cultural and economic circle were on the downturn hence consciousness were on security and safety of lives but, that these areas will normalise as soon as terrorism is degraded. The study finally recommended strategies towards handling terrorism at the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon such as; establishing functional Joint Border Commission, recognition and understanding terrorism as a local and international threat. Establishment of Joint Academy (University) whose responsibility is to research and establish causes of terrorism, and border criminalities and ways to fight terrorism. Joint resource-pull and cooperation should act of terrorism manifest in one country or at the borders, good leadership and governance and also exploration of legal means for repatriation and total economic, social and political independence for Africa. The study also recommended that both countries should explore other areas to boost their socio-cultural and economic ties, colonial heritages and linkages should be sacrificed for good neighbor relations, introduction of National Identification Cards (NIC) for both citizens of each country and introduction of standard exchange of diplomatic relations among the two countries as this will bring more innovations, closeness and peace between them than their daily visits to America, Britain, France and Germany. The best way to handle and fight terrorism is not with gun but improving the quality of lives of the people and good neighbor relations of countries.

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ACRONYMS

CAR	=	Central African Republic
CMS	=	Christian Missionary Service.
ECCAS	=	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	=	West African Peace Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	=	Economic Community of West African States
EDCs	=	Economically Developed Countries.
FLNA	=	National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
ICJ	=	International Court of Justice.
IDI	=	In-depth Interview
IMF	=	International Monetary Fund.
INYM	=	Isoko National Youth Movement
IYC	=	Ijaw Youth Council
LDC	=	Less Developed Countries.
MASOB	=	Movement for the Actualization of the State of Biafra
MEND	=	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNJTF	=	Multinational Joint Task Force
MPLA	=	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
NBS	=	National Bureau of Statistics
NDLF	=	Niger Delta Liberation Force
NDR	=	Niger Delta Vigilante
NPFL	=	National Patriotic Front of Liberia.
OAU (AU)	=	Organization of African Unity or African Union.

OPC	=	Odua People's Congress
SDPF	=	Social Democratic Party Front
UC	=	Union Cameroonaise (A party founded by Amadi Ahijo - The only Political party in eastern Cameroon before Cameroon officially became a single party state in 1966.
UN	=	United Nations
UNITA	=	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
UPC	=	Union des Populations Camerounaises

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction

The concept "terrorism" and the activities of the terrorists today have taken a frontal stage in world politics. Be it as it may, the effect on domestic and international politics cannot be overemphasized evident in the foreign behaviours of nation states in pursuit of their national interests which of course, security and territorial integrity are among the core.

Nigeria's perception of the strategic necessity of mutual and friendly relations with her immediate neighbours has played a major role in the formulation of good neighborliness policy. The principle of respect for the sovereign equality of all nations is clearly exhibited in Nigeria's external relations and prominent in her external relations with her immediate neighbours. More conspicuous is the mutual acceptance of OAU (AU) declaration in July 1964 of respect for the existing border on the achievement of independence in Article 3 paragraph 3 of the OAU Charter. This in itself, has not prevented in totality, the occasional outburst of boundary disputes, threats to security as well as other provocative activities.

Violence across the borders might and might not be a calculated action of the state actors but could be actions of other actors in the international arena which include individuals and groups. This could be evident in the words of Bamigbose (2006:127), events such as domestic policies and actions of sovereign governments, routine exercise of power on matters which border on day-to-day governance, can snowball into foreign policy controversies that are likely to attract global attention. The operation of Boko Haram has moved from the sphere of domestic or internal politics to international domain. Such issues (like the case of Boko Haram) may provoke favourable or negative reactions from other nations that are touched by policies

emanating there from and this can invariably lead to the enhancement or deterioration of bilateral or multilateral relations.

The contiguous nature of Nigeria and Cameroun coupled with the activities of terrorism in and across the borders mount security threats which might either bring the two countries closer or worsen their relationship.

If terrorism has no respect for the borders of countries, and cooperation is needed, maturity is also needed among nation states as to close ranks which can only result from mutual understanding to counter the activities of terrorism and curb or eliminate threat to security and foster good neighborhood relations.

This research inquires into the impact of Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroun relations, whether the emergence of terrorism in and across their borders has succeeded in bringing them more closer or worsened their relationship, cognizance of the fact that the two countries have been relating under mutual suspicion, love and hate fraternity.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study examines the extent to which Boko Haram terrorism has impacted on Nigeria–Cameroon relations between 2009 – 2016. Nigeria and Cameroon are contiguous nations in the continent of Africa. Nigeria has largely maintained friendly relations with its immediate neighbours as embedded in her constitution. Despite this, there have been a number of crises between Nigeria and her neighbours especially Cameroon. Some of these crises, majorly, have been border problems exacerbated by the discovery of oil in the Bakassi Peninsula region which has negatively affected the relations of the two countries. Contemporarily, the crisis at the borders of the two countries is caused by other actors like terrorist groups which needed the

cooperation of the two countries to counter and secure peace, safety of lives and properties in the region.

1.3 Research Questions

The research questions are:

i. What was the nature of the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon before the advent and activities of Boko Haram?
ii. What factors defined the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon?
iii. How did terrorism become an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon and how has it affected relations between the two countries?
iv. What measures did the two countries adopt to tackle Boko Haram terrorism?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are to:

i. Establish the nature of Nigeria-Cameroon relations before the advent of Boko Haram activities.
ii. Investigate the factors that defined Nigeria-Cameroon relations before the mergence of Boko Haram and how terrorism became an issue of interest for the two countries.
iii. Assess the nature and extent to which Nigeria and Cameroon have cooperated in fighting Boko Haram Terrorism.
iv. Examine the effect of Boko Haram Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations.

1.5 Assumptions of the Study

The assumptions of the study are:

i. Nigeria and Cameroon relations before the advent of Boko Haram has occasionally not been cordial.

ii. Boko Haram insurgency, a domestic issue, snowballed into international arena.

iii. Activities of Boko Haram have impacted positively on Nigeria-Cameroon relations.

1.6 Significance/Justification

The significance of this study cannot be over emphasized. Corroborating the literature reviewed, it is evident that this study is a unique one, hence it explored a new ground in the relationship of Nigeria and Cameroon. There are limited literature on terrorism in the region of Lake Chad Commission. There is also highly limited literature on terrorism in the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. The literature are implicit on how Boko Haram has affected the Nigeria-Cameroon relations even from 2009 - 2016. Consequently, the study has increased the literature available on terrorism in the Lake Chad and Gulf of Guinea regions especially connecting contiguous third world countries constrained by limited resources, managerial deficiencies and colonial linkages and attachments.

1.7 Scope of Study

This study focused on the impact the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism has had on Nigeria-Cameroun relations. Time frame of this study is 2009 - 2016; a period in which terrorism took a frontal seat in the affairs of these two countries and even attracted multilateral attention. The effect of terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations was investigated by looking at their socio - cultural, economic and political dimensions.

Nigeria and Cameroon as areas of study is prompted by the contiguous nature of the two countries and as well, the similarities between them, for example, the role the two countries play in their immediate regions of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) which, if their relations improve, will boost human and material development in the Gulf of Guinea region. The time space, 2009-2016

is prompted by the fact that this was the time terrorism became more violent, tense and a burning issue in the region that attracted the international community. The choice of terrorism as a dependent subject of study is because it contemporarily has taken a frontal stage in international politics which impact on bilateral and multilateral relations of nations.

The limitations of the study are; first, in the course of the field work, Banki in Borno State was among the sample designated area but the researcher was strictly warned at Mubi, Adamawa State not to venture cross to Banki due to tense the situation and tight security there. As a result of this, data was not generated from Banki. Secondly, the offices visited went into bureaucracy with exception of the Immigration office, Mubi and the Emir's Palace, Mubi. Red-tapism was much that inspite of the Introductory letter from the Department, most of them demanded for letter seeking for interviewing the respondents. These were written and in some cases re-written after several calling and re-visits, the security at gates and countless hours of waiting in offices were rather frustrating. Thank God at the end, all slated for interview were met and interviews carried out as designed and in very conducive and relaxed atmosphere because the booking of appointment in most cases offered, or prompted dedication of specific time for the interview interaction.

1.8 Organization of Chapters

This study is divided into chapters and each chapter is also divided into units for better understanding of the work. The first chapter will embodies the introduciton to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, assumptions, signifcance/justification, scope of the study and organization of chapters.

Chapter two focuses on literature review, limitations of the literature review and the theoretical framework.

Chapter three focuses on research methodology while chapter four is the analysis of data generated. Chapter five embodies summary, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Here captures the review of different literature in search of definition of the term 'terrorism'. Theoretical perspective of terrorism, Rising of Global Terrorism, Impact of Terrorism in Africa, impact of terrorism on Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, terrorism and Nigeria-Cameroon relations, terrorism in Nigeria, terrorism in Cameroon, Nigeria African Foreign Policy, similarities between Nigeria and Cameroon and finally the theoretical framework.

2.2 What is Terrorism

It would be an understatement to say that terrorism is the only social or political concept that has posed a definitional problem; yet, it is empirical that the concept 'terrorism' due to its nature, operations, time, and space has been more difficult to define. This is affirmed by Carlile (2007.4) that there is no universal acceptable definition of terrorism. That hitherto, it remains a subject of debate in international bodies. Yoroms in Okumu and Botha, ed. (2006.8) states that it remains difficult because the meaning of terrorism is becoming highly pejorative. It is a badge which denotes a lack of legitimacy and morality. The appellation 'terrorist'; is therefore always disputed, and attempts to define the concept always arose debate because rival definitions may be employed to include the actions of certain parties, and exclude others, the proponents of each of which will subjectively claim a legitimate basis for employing violence in pursuit of their own political or religious cause or aim.

In the affirmation of space and time, the League of Nations in 1937 defined terrorism thus, "Criminal acts directed against state and intended to or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or group of persons or the general public. This definition does

not stress the effect on the victims of terrorism as it merely used the concepts, 'intended' 'calculated' and 'fear', such was expanded by the International Law Commission thus:

> *Any act that causes death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to a head of state, his representative, relative, or any person holding public office. Secondly when act calculated to destroy or damage public property or property devoted to a public purpose. Thirdly, any act likely to imperial human lives through the creation of public danger directed against persons who enjoy international protection or manufacture, obtaining, possession or supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substance with a view to the communism of a terrorist act.*

The UN (1992) defines terrorism as, an anxiety – inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandastine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.

The above definitions of terrorism abhor the tenet of terrorism before the First World War, except UN definition especially during the French revolution of 1793 – 94, Merari declared the 'rule of terror' that it is the act of state against the citizens. In this case state is dominant in the definition of terrorism and individual or group abhorred.

After the second World War in 1945, diverse phases of perception of terrorism emerged where Cold War, colonialism and globalization aftermath breaded terrorism and has served the vacuum which the above definitions and even many subsequent definitions abhor in conceptualizing terrorism and that is, "the cause of terrorism'. At this stage, different concepts of terrorism were introduced.

Africa's perception of terrorism is conceptualized, Umaru (2004.9); "such acts perpetrated on the African continent – slave trade; the colonization of the continent; white

minority apartheid rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe; assassinations of genuine African leaders in countries like the Congo, Nigeria and Liberia; the undermining and force of governments committed to providing good environment, installing and propping up corruption leaders, the subversion of the economies of African countries through the instrumentality of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, establishment and arming of rebel groups to fight civil wars; the use of the African continent for the purpose of conducting germ warfare experimentation and testing of viruses such as AIDs and Ebola viruses were acts of terrorism".

The above is encompassing, act that depicts terrorism especially in African perspective. Inspite this view, all conventions on prevention and combating terrorism after the bombing of cities in Kenya and Tanzania defined terrorism and terrorist acts in article 1(a) (i), Yoroms (2006.7);

> *intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institutions, the general public or any segment therefore, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles: or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent or to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) (ii)*

The September 11, 2001 terrorist act in America that saw the bombing of the twin towers rather complicated and compounded the more, the understanding of terrorism worldwide. From this time, US National Security Strategy defined terrorism as the

> *calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fears intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.*

The US National Counter Terrorism Centre also defined terrorism as

> *premeditated act perpetuated by a subnational or Clandestine agent, politically motivated, potentially including religious, philosophical or culturally symbolic motivations, violent and perpetrated against non combatant targets.*

European Union in her document on the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in 2002 conceptualized terrorism as

> *criminal offences which given their nature or context may seriously damage a country or an international organization, with the aim of seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure of a country or an international organization.*

Looking at the definitions alluded by US and that of the EU, they are merely the same in context but what is clear is the change in the definition after September 2001 as well as looking at terrorism as external act. The later also reflect in the definition of UN for instance UN Security Council Resolution 15666 (2004) which says;

> *… any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions …intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such acts, by its nature or text, is to intimidate a population, or compel a government to do or to abstain from doing any act.*

Even in US alone, working framework on terrorism faces variance in definitions. The above definitions stem from the magnitude of terrorism threat after 2001 which has imputed value and interest. All the above definitions have expanded the scope of terrorism to include religion and culture, ideology as well as the other actor in international politics referred to as "organizations".

Attempt has been made again by the above definitions to abhor state as an actor in defining terrorism which triggers more actions and reactions.

The OIC definition tends to technically and mechanically reflect the views of the third world countries. Diplomatically, it tends to x-ray the activities of the power countries in the violation of the sovereignty of the less powerful countries but the truth is that terrorism can also threaten the political unity and sovereignty of a country for instance the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria whose aim was to carve out a country of its own from Nigeria and it was religiously and externally motivated. In operationalisation of OIC definition of terrorism, the article 2 of the convention on Terrorism become more explicit; that its idea of terrorism does not include "peoples struggle such as armed struggle against foreign occupation, external aggression, colonial exploitation and the struggle for self-determination".

Scholars in their diverse ways have also made their contributions. According to Greenshaw (2011.2);

> *Terrorism is a form of violence that is primarily designed to influence an audience, its execution depends on concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy, and deception. Terrorism is not a spontaneous, or does it involve mass participation. The act of terrorism communicates a future threat to people who identifies with the victims.*

The above definition narrows "influence" which is one target of terrorists instead of constituted authority like government and it identifies the fact that terrorism is not a mass movement. Laqueur (1987) simply defines terrorism as a "shifting behavior by frightening via political or criminal violence. The concept "shifting behavior" applied by Laqueur is ambiguous and could mean so many things but we see it from the perception of deviating from the normal norms, conventions and rules governing violence.

In his perception, Schemid (1998), defined terrorism as "anxiety inspiring method of repeated violence action, employed by semiclandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons.

The above definition reflects many definitions already cited such as UN. He counts states actor and as well opines that there must be repeated act before it could be established as terrorist act. Repeated as many opinions project, it is subject to situational occurrence for e.g. Dele Giwa was killed in a parcel bomb in Nigeria in 1986 during President Babangida Military regime and similar case never happened again inspite other incidences during the regime. This issue of when, 'how', 'time', 'number', "act", 'any', 'other' in defining terrorism increases the confusion about terrorism. The Federal Republic of Germany, Schmid and Jongman (1988.34) defined terrorism as;

> *the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals which is intended to be achieved by means of assault on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes such as murder, homicide, extortionist, kidnapping, arson, setting off a blast by explosives, or by means of other acts of violence which serve as preparation of such criminal act.*

In the above definition which is very explicit, the concept 'severe crime' is explained but "other" acts which serve as "preparation of such criminal act" looks ambiguous. It could mean that the other preparations could be the totality of revolutionary, gorilla or warfare act before what some classify as the real 'act of terrorism'. Some states e.g. in their definitions expressingly state, "manufacturing" and "distributing arms" "explosives" etc which could also be deemed as "preparation" for the actual act of terrorism.

The inability to clearly demarcate terrorism from conventional warfare, gorilla or other socio-political, economic and cultural insurgent activities culminate into division of the globe

both domestically and internationally. What tend to be more acceptable today is that terrorism can occur in the cause of conventional warfare, political struggle, gorilla activities etc. The Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence (1987.54) states that "the word terrorism is often used with qualifying terms such as 'often', 'mainly', 'general' and 'usually', 'obviously' to determine when a struggle encroaches into terrorism in itself is a value judgement. Substantiating this argument, how can one prove whether or not, the whole lot of crises in Africa is or is not caused by underdevelopment which prompted poverty, poor governance and denial of justice? Or, how did America come to a conclusion that what happened in Viena and Rome are acts of terrorism.

To the US President George W. Bush, Chacha (2006) "there is no link between poverty and terrorism". Yet research abound proving that poverty is a breeding ground for insecurity including terrorism. Within this domain of bias, Hoffman (1998.2) states that;

> *The decision to call someone or label some organization "terrorist" becomes almost unavoidably subjective depending largely on whether on sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concern.*

This definitional problem which has been age long but becomes more complicated in the contemporary age led Laqueur (1977) to conceptualize terrorism thus:

> *Terrorists have found achievers and publicity agents in all ages. No words of praise are fulsome enough for these later-day saints and martyrs. The terrorist (we are told) is the only one who really cares; he is a totally committed fighter for freedom and justice, a gentle human being forced by cruel circumstance and an indifferent majority to play Good Samaritan distributing poison.*

Precise enough the above affirms that terrorism is a prompted action and it is an evil that is justified or out of sinqa none.

While the definitional bias raged, Makinde in Botha and Okuma (2006.15) reflect on this thus;

> *Many people use the word 'terrorism' frequently, but they do not all refer to the same thing; ...In simple terms, one can say terrorism is a technique of warfare that is as old as human society. Over the years, the word 'terrorism' has been used and abused by policy-makers and analysts. Those who seek to delegitimize the goals or tactics of their opponents often label them 'terrorist'. Hence the claim that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.*

The above opinion in conceptualizing terrorism has been one of the confusion underlying universal definition of the term before 2001, yet, the attack on US World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon has compounded today's understanding of terrorism, act of terrorism and who is a terrorist.

Generally, synthesizing perceptions above on what terrorism is, it is a fact that there is definitional problem; another man's food is another's' poison. The UN definition of terrorism tend to be more versed than the states definition nevertheless all the definitions have certain things in common such as fear, intimidation, force, civilian/noncombatant, influence, victim not the targeted, destruction, etc. Some states and some organizational definitions tend to be parochial by officially excluding state as actor or agent of terrorism. Some of the states and organizational definitions of terrorism also see it as an international phenomena alone while some definitions reflect both domestic and international terrorism. US Department of Defence and in France cum Britain in their wider definitions ended up in categorizing terrorism as individuals and groups yet going by the definition of, and perception of terrorism in France, it quakes the heart to assume that any international act of violence and everything related to it is terrorism. Yet states are exonerated from such acts. Even in the academic circle the western academias tend to represent the official stand of the west in perception of the concept of

terrorism. The former colonies of the West in Africa and the third world countries in general and OIC and Latin America perceive terrorism even from the act of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Mamdani (2004.4), Umaru (2004.9) argue that the present day terrorism was constructed by the West against Africa and that September 2001 was just a reap of what America sowed. The third world therefore have their peculiar perception of terrorism so also some of the individuals and countries plagued with terrorist activities especially the one the western powers perpetuate under the cover of "national interest".

The whole logic of Africa's perception of terrorism as product of the west is also ethically biased, it is awesome for Africa to believe that all the woes about security in the region is about the western plots. After all, terrorism existed in pre-colonial Africa only that time, space and age have played on the development and complications of the term and act of terrorism and the west is on the opportune side.

Based on this variance in understanding and formulating a general definition of the concept 'terrorism' which affects the approach towards solving it as a societal problem, for the purpose of this study, the working definition of terrorism is, 'act of violence in any struggle that is unlawful/out of social rules/engagement perpetrated by individual, group or organized institution meant to intimidate, insteal fear in people or organized institution for purpose of achieving any intended goal'. On why there is no universal definition of 'terrorism', it is this confusion in understanding the term terrorism that has led to non-universal approach even in countering it.

Yoroms in Okumu and Botha, ed. (200612) assert, the specific definition of the concept in various countries has yet to be accepted because the contradictions in these countries are counter-balanced by clashes in their world view or the triple heritage that they have found

themselves with. Emphasizing on the implications of non-universally accepted definition, Schemid (1993.8) ended up in enquiry; "The definition of what constitute 'terrorism' varies from society to society, from government to government and, to a lesser degree, even from academic authors. Such diversity of definition is problematic when one strives to develop a common policy against 'terrorism'. If one country has a broad definition and the other a narrow one, a clear and consistent consensual policy will be an elusive goal. How can we escape from this definitional quagmire?"

2.3 Theoretical Perspective of Terrorism

Trying to examine how international political theories have explained the phenomenon of terrorism is basically and majorly the thesis and synthesis of the orthodox and the critical stands. A theory of terrorism according to Yoroms (2006.5) is difficult to capture scientifically. It has been suggested that the gap could be filled by establishing a typology of terrorism than in search for theory. He suggests typology in theorizing terrorism due to its complexity, after a long time and terrorism has no definite academic and intellectual direction. Typology has been applied by many scholars in discussing terrorism. Example Adeniran (2006), but they only end up in categorizing or classification of terrorism into revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, state terrorism, national, transnational or global terrorism. This cannot represent theory of terrorism because they just don't exhibit the features of theoretical framework. Typology lacks procedural, empirical and systematic coherence through which data are collected, facts verified and corroborated, established and generalization is made. Bunyavejchewin (2010.1 and 2) in his work titled "The Orthodox and the Critical Approach toward Terrorism argued thus:

> *Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to political scientists, since terrorists have become transitional actors since the late 1960s, but during the cold war era terrorism was deemed more as a local issue and source of conflict since*

> *the main issue of that time was the conflict between the great powers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, terrorism has gradually come more explicitly to the forefront, although it had previously been neglected by both academics and practitioners in the 1990s which seemed to be a decade of relative peace and cooperation not surprisingly, the incident of 11 September 2001 created a drastic shock for greater powers especially US.*

It was the above incident that prompted a search for how and why the incident happened for future prevention. According to Buyavejchewin (2010), much studies have been done since this time, "most of these studies, however, have tended to reach conclusions, which answer the questions of 'how' terrorism occurs, rather than 'why'. He declared these studies can be said to follow the orthodox approach. However, there is a smaller group of academic who criticize orthodox explanation as being essentially inadequate for forming an understanding of the nature of the terrorist phenomenon. Their approach can be called the critical approach, and in general, they adopted the concepts developed by the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies".

In theorizing terrorism these two camps have been relevant grounds. The orthodox approach entered into the study of international relations in 1950s while the critical approach is a post September 11, 2001 with its entomological critique on the orthodox epistemological approach to the study of terrorism without methodological procedures that give empirical result.

To examine the difference between the orthodox and critical approaches, three categories are necessary which are, Bunyavejchewin (2010.2) entomology, epistemology, and methodology. He states that most of the studies of terrorism which follow orthodox approach have been influenced by mainstream social science, which assert that social phenomenon as well as their meanings have an independent existence. Thus a contextual consideration is not essential since the object in question is not related to socio-political actors and contexts. By conceptualization and entomological position here is objectivism. Thus the orthodox approach

tends to neglect the importance of time and place as well as socio-political context since it appeared to believe that terrorism will exist 'out there', no matter what the historical context may be, as such, its ontological position determine its epistemology as well as its methodology.

Opposed to this position of the orthodox, critical approach does not believe that the object exists autonomously, rather object and subject shape each other in a dialectical, never – ceasing dynamics. Thus in this sense, their entomological position is based on socio-political; interaction and focuses on both actors and contexts. In essence therefore, critical theorists on terrorism defines their ontomology as "a minimal foundationalism, since the approach does not totally deny the distinction between object and subject. They believe that terrorism is fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact, that its nature is not inherent to the violent act itself, but is dependent upon context, circumstance, intention and critically, social, cultural, legal and political processes of interpretation, categorization and labeling. That this entomological approach can be conceptualized as social construction. It holds that "a difference in ways of being leads to different ways of seeing and ideas about how aims will be achieved".

As it is the nature of ontomology to describe what it is out there to know, that the next question is how it can be known. That orthodox adopt the main stream tradition of social science, which has made strong effort to make social science an objective science. Therefore, its way of seeing an epistemological position cannot differ from its matrix, hence positivism result. That to understand the epistemological position of the critical approach, it is necessary to comprehend its positive premise, that as 'objectivism is the root of positivist epistemology, positivism stresses the existence of an existing object. In other words, social reality can be understood in the form of data and fact by using the methods of natural science, which claims to be value-free, such as data collection, theoretical deduction, and statistical analysis. The object must be observable unless

the instruments of natural science cannot be applied. That on the other hand, the orthodox approach tends to focus only on "what can be empirically verified. Physical violence for instance, is deemed as main object to be observed since it occurs explicitly and had been paid attention to by the government. An example to buttress this was a RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incident. This project, led by the RAND Corporation, one of the prominent American think tanks, has collected data related to terrorist incidents for over 30 years and this data has been used in its research".

The argument raged that "the positivist epistemology of the orthodox approach is not as neutral as its believers claim it to be. That it could be described as a problem solving theory, a term first introduced by Robert Cox", in that it takes world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationship and the institutions into which they organized as a given framework for action. From this perspective, the orthodox approach is in channel to presuppose that terrorism must be conducted by non – state actors. And divide the world into the legitimate state and the illegitimate terrorists, since it does not question the existing social and power relations because of its epistemological presumptions. In sence, the orthodox approach rejects the concept of state terrorism, since the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The argument and insistence that including state terror in the study of terrorism would have made the study of terrorism impossible, for it would have included not only US foreign policy, but also Hitler and stalin". This gave in the approach argument that orthodox approach 'uses actor-based analysis, focusing entirely on non-state actors, with an exception made for state sponsored terrorism which is often defined as such by major powers such as US. The increase in the research study of terrorism from 19% before to 26% after September 9/11 is evident in the research paper published in terrorism journals, Bunyavejchewin (2010.5) used descriptive and

inferential methods, he imputes that it is evident that the increase in orthodox – style research into terrorism derives from a specific place and time as well as context; namely the American experience of what the US has defined as an age of terror. Then the orthodox approach can be seen to be a state – centric explanation and invariably the approach can also be deemed to be a legitimization of elements of US government policy, such as War on Terrorism since the epistemology of this concept determined that the bulk of research will be conducted within this government framework.

The critical approach as an objection to the above, aims to take into account context, history, specificity and nuance. Critical approach also rejects notions of "universalism, essentialism and exceptionism". This stance proves that the epistemological position of believers in critical approach are not static and monolithic. It is also believed that the epistemology of critical approach is "hard to conceptualize because it adopts various elements from different forms of epistemology, from positivisms to ethnography through to post-structuralism. Nevertheless it can be conceptualized roughly as critical positivism and post-positivism".

The position of critical approach on the idea of positivism is, either not a total rejection because it does not 'completely reject a belief in timeless law and monolithic categories, it still preserve the usefulness of positivist epistemology for examination of some specific contexts. Yet, the approach stresses that the context needs to be reviewed in or to 'inquire about its meaning since the episteme is not only for someone and some purpose but also must come from somewhere'. This position therefore affirms the stand of critical approach that the 'origin of any use of knowledge must be scrutinized, for otherwise it would not be possible to understand the meanings that terrorists attach to their actions; suicide bombing, for instance is regarded generally as irrationality or psychological abnormality according to the western episteme, with

its roots in philosophical notions about the fear of painful death. However, if such acts are considered in the context of ethnographical epistemology, they may not seem so irrational". They also argue that the believers of orthodox approach full grasp the fact that narrative and knowledge of orthodox terrorism studies seem incompatible of understanding outside discourse, which prompt, to reveal clearly what the discourse of orthodox terrorism studies actually consist of. They support their argument with the present discourse around terrorism which they said is to "legitimize US foreign policy on the 'War on Terror', which uses military intervention and regime change as well as extending assistance programmes to authoritarian regimes".

Critical approach accepts that based on this view, 'post-structuralism is one of the epistemology of the critical approach. Nevertheless those who follow the critical approach do not adopt post-structural epistemology entirely, in that they do not deny the specific category of terrorist violence as a whole because of the epistemologies it uses. The orthodox presupposition that the act of terrorism cannot be perpetuated by state is rejected by critical approach since it sees terrorism as political and social construction. They posit critical approach as an 'action-based' analysis and its belief is that act of terrorism can be perpetuated by anyone given the existence of a particular context.

From the epistemological position of critical approach, it greatly emphasis, on the essence, importance, and the notion of "emancipation, which is the "realization of greater human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social actualization and well being". As such, the critical approach opens space for silent and marginalized voices, yet in contrast to the orthodox approach, the epistemologies of the critical approach lead to critiques of the methodologies which drives from its episteme".

On a general note, Bunyavejchewin (2010.8) justifies these different approaches;

> *The methodologies of both the orthodox and the critical approach are based on their dissimilar uses of epistemology, and thus they are very different from each other. In the orthodox approach, the applications of scientific methods such as empirical data collection and statistical analysis are employed for the purposes of research. In this sense, the root causes of terrorism can be concluded from empirical evidence and analysis. As a consequence, the orthodox approach is frequently used for policy recommendations, since it can provide verifiable information which appears to provide a credible input into the policy process. The results of its analytical processes are deductions from its research. Thus, the explanations and conclusion of orthodox approach tend to be narrowly focused due to the methodology it uses.*

Yet he further argued in contrast to the orthodox approach that "the critical approach casts doubt on the inherent trustworthiness of a statistical language since statistic can easily be manipulated to serve a particular purpose. As a result of epistemological position it uses, the critical approach aims to utilize its interdisciplinary methodologies to produce more conclusive explanations". Citing an example of critical interdisciplinary methodologies he states that "Foucauldia geneaology has been adopted by critical approach; in order to reflect in existing understanding of terrorism, since this method analyse(s) the conditions under which we might consider certain utterance or propositions to be agreed to be true… [and] the condition under which we, as individuals, exist and what causes us to exist in the way that we do". That from this point of view, "self-reflexivity is a vital methodological notion in the methodologies of the critical approach. That it is not only the orthodox approach that can be revised by self-reflexivitive methodologies, the critical approach can also benefit by carefully examining itself.

On a final note, the two approaches were considered relevant and indisputable in the study and analysis of terrorism. Critical and orthodox approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. That these came from "the main differences between the approaches namely "their

ontology, epistemology and methodology from this perspective, it is not necessary to conclude which approach is better or more appropriate, since their foundations are so different. Both have contributed greatly to the field of terrorism studies. Nevertheless, in order to apply which approach to be used in research, the conditions and limitations of each approach need to be understood in depth".

It is overwhelming to conclude therefore that the theoretical approach studying and understanding of terrorism is quite a recent development and it has displayed two ways through which terrorism can be studied. Two camps have been established in theorizing terrorism, either through scientific empirical method where the root cause, the actor in question, the victim of terrorism can be objectively studied and concluded through the critical theory approach which combine positivism and objectivism – yes, terrorism as a social phenomenon, but how did it exist, in what context, and how does it function? Than the perspective of the orthodox that – terrorism exist, out there, is independent, and must exist. In the epistemology of critical perspective, it is obvious that, terrorism does not exist alone, it is not an island, it was a product of something and it exist and operate in the midst of a sociological and political environment which in turn/itself produces interaction and friction, competition and domination. This I believe prompted their ontomological assertion that "object and subject shape each other in a dialectical, never – ceasing dynamic". This is the minimal situational context and as such they focus on the actor and the environment. They believe though in part, the distinction between the actor and the context hence they conceptualized the term 'ontology' as a minimal foundationalism.

The bone of contention of critical approach against orthodox in addition to the narratives above has to do with procedural way of establishment of facts in the post September 11, 2001, value judgement application in selective and nomenclatural usage of the term terrorism and anti-

terrorism for reasons of mere political power. Filled with enthusiasm on the new call for critical theoretical chart on terrorism. Javis (2009.19) in his work "The Space and Faces of Critical Terrorism stressed;

> *These demands the researchers participate in the broadening of terrorism studies function as a powerful call for critical distance in scholarship. By drawing our attention to the possible intrusion of political and institutional contexts into academic inquiry. They remind us that analytical framework and constructs are themselves embedded in historical, discursive and ultimately social problematic. ...we be wary of constructing a dubious ethical binary between the noble academic and the murky world of raison d'etat.*

He further cited in his work, (Herman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Burnett & Whyte, 2005; Horgan and Boyle 2008. 59 – 60) that "it is, of course, desirable that academia resist the temptation of becoming an ideological state apparatus passively internalising the threats occupying political elites.

The above is to justify the entomology and epistemology of the critical approach that their central belief is the "emancipation" which is the realization of greater human freedom and human potentials and improvement in individual and social actualization and well-being". This in the other hand, the mainstream approach is static and believes therefore, in the epistemology of the old paradigm that the state is a monopoly of power but this study believes that there is indeed limitation to state use of power within its possession against the citizens and other sovereign entities in the globe.

Finally, this theoretical perspective on terrorism has epitomized the divergent opinions in the literature reviewed in this study in an attempt to define terrorism, hence some were critical and followed critical theoretical approach to the study of terrorism while some were subjective following the orthodox mainstream entomology.

In all, Javis (2010.25) posit that;

> *A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumption, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practice that we accept rest. ...criticism is matter of flushing out that though and trying to change it to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticisms is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.*

2.4 Rising Global Terrorism

Globalization according to Ogwu (2005.11), has been attended by the growth and spread of international terrorism which has threatened to undermine the defense and security system of some sovereign states. According to Oche and Dokubo in Ogwu ed. (2005.279), The 11th September, 2001 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York has again raised questions about international terrorism, its networks and the threat they pose to international security. Ayadike (2013) declared, in all places and countries, security has been considered as a first order value.

Embedded in history Fearery in Livingston, Kress and Wanek, ed. (1976.20) assert that the first use of international terrorism is hard to pinpoint. However, historians will recall the Moroccan rebel Raisuli's kidnapping of an American and an Englishman in 1904 in a successful attempt to force the United State and British governments to pressure France into compelling the Sultan of Morocco to comply with Raisuli's ransom, prisoner release and other demands. Perhaps the opening phase of the international terrorist threat we face today, though itself a reaction to oppression and terror, was the hijackings by freedom-seeking escapes from the East European communist countries in the middle and late forties. In the early sixties the stream of hijackings from the United States to Cuba commenced ...Beginning about 1968, Palestinian and

other violence oriented political groups in several parts of the world began extending their terrorist activities to countries - or to diplomats of countries not directly involved in the dispute giving rise to the violence. From these opinions, we can see the relationship between the past and present.

Charting into the origin of terrorism, Shaw (1829.523) emerged in the distinction of terror and terrorism. The concept terror denotes fear, Terror refers to government actions to crush resistance. It originated as a description of the reign of Terror (1793 - 1794) during the French revolution. The difference between terrorism and terror is not always clear and in late 19th century, terrorism was turned against the state e.g. in the actions of French revolutionaries, European anarchists and Irish nationalists. Wilkinson (1985:24) argues that terrorism dates back to first century. The Middle East has always been the brewing pot of terrorism. The Jewish Sicarris and the Zealot movements used terrorism as weapon against the Romans in the first century. The same weapon was employed by the Asian Sect to eliminate its enemies, among Muslims, though the then Muslim world in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Agreeing with Wilkinson, Stern (2006.4) argues that Middle East has always been the centre and the origin of terrorism and she rooted the rising of global terrorism to Christendom. In the first century Judea, a violent group called the Zealots pushed for Jewish independence from Rome. Some of their most advent adherents become known as Sicarri, or dagger men, a name that comes from the short swords they hid under their garments, mingling in Jerusalem's festival crowds, the Sicarii slit the throats of their enemies or stabbed them in the back. She further argues, in 66 C.E., a group of Zealots seized the fortress of Masada near the Dead Sea. They butchered the Roman garrison and made the mountain top fastness their base of operations. For years they sotied from there and harassed the imperial authorities. In 73 C.E., the Roman Tenth

Legion led by Governor Flavius Silva retook Masuda but they did not conquer the Zealots ... Rather than give in to Rome, 960 of them - everyone up there except for two women and five children - committed suicide. Some view the Zealot revolt as the start of terrorism as we know it. True or not, since then terrorism has left deep tracks on, in the history's path. William of Tyre in Stern (2006.6) agree with Stern and Wilkinson but gives further insight on the rising of global terrorism, a 12th century Clergy man - Beginning in 1095 and continuing from two centuries, crusader armies repeatedly crossed between Europe and the middle East. Opposing them were Muslim Forces from Asia and North America. The issue was the control of Jerusalem, and each tried to gain the advantage. In their many battles those "holy warriors'" hacked one another to pieces. They also used their sword and battle - axes on mere bystanders. All then that meet they slew, and smote right down, men, women, and children sparing none.

The above scholars have tried to trace the rising of global terrorism hinging it on religion but Abbas (2013.1) posits it differently. It may be wrong to think that the current trend of terrorism around the world is all about religion. When the first act of terrorism was perpetrated by a Jewish Zealot group, about 2000 years ago, neither Christianity nor Islam had taken any firm root. Though Prophet Isa (Jesus) had come and gone by then, his divine mission had not reached the gentile. And that time, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) had not been born. If violence alone is what constitutes terrorism as many people wrongly tend to believe, then, it never emanated from religion though religion has sometimes been used as a cover up and blamed for it.

Abbas (2013.1) does not disagree with other scholars on the rising of global terrorism rather he opines that terrorism preceded religion citing only Christianity and Islam but forgotten that even paganism and other forms of religion exist and some even existed before the two he regards as religion and even unto the time he was speculating. Yet he makes a point when he

said, ... the engendered terrorism by the Zealots in 06 C.E. was rather a violent expression of resentment for the domination of the Jews by Roman gentile than a fight between two religions (Luke 6:15, Acts 1:13 and Mathew 10:4 for confirmation). By connotation that resistance was to the domination of a culture by another culture. He became more explicit when he further said, what should be understood about terrorists method of operation is that any evil doer will look for a justifying reason, whether tenable or untenable, to indulge in evil deed. And the reason often given is one which appeals to people of like minds at least in the neighborhood. This is to elicit their sympathy and support. The common denominator among all terrorists is the theory of "using what you have to get what you want".

Terror dates back to history Laqueur, (1977.70) agrees and brings us link to the contemporary terrorism. Acts of violence and terror dates back to history but act of terrorism belong to the modern ages. The term "terrorism" was a coinage of French origin which first used to refer to the organized response to unpopular repressive government in France popularly referred to as "regime la terreur" between March 1793 and July 1794. Later terrorism became instrument of suppression and oppression in the hands of dictators. The Italian Facist leader, Mussolini, justified this when he declared, "terror? Never, it simply is social hygiene, taking those individuals out of circulation like a doctor would take out a bacillus".

Beyond this is the classification of the rising of terrorism into time frame, like Bassiouni (2002.178), in the 1930s the dictators Adolf Hitler of Germany, Benito Mussolini of Italy, and Joseph Stalin of Soviet Union used terrorism to discourage opposition to their governments. Another wave of terrorism.

Steping into constructionism, Mamdani (2004.4) in his perception of rising global terrorism, states that terrorism is not a cultural residue in modern politics. Rather terrorism is a

modern construction. Following the defeat of America in Indochina and the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa, both in 1975, the centre of gravity of the cold war shifted from South East Asia to Southern Africa. And that as the centre of gravity of the cold war shifted from East Asia to Southern Africa there was also a shift in U.S. strategy.

Mamdani (2004) sees rising of global terrorism in almost all ramifications in life. Far more than restricted to the strategies of guerrilla and even conventional warfare and pockets of group or individual violence to time and space, acts and actions of the powerful state actors, Umaru (2004.9) agrees with Mamdani and argues thus, Acts of terrorism include all acts against African region such as slave trade, the colonization of the continent; while minority apartheid rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe, assassination of genuine African leaders in countries like the Congo, Nigeria and Liberia; the undermining of force of governments committed to provide good environments installing and propping up of corrupt leaders; the subversion of the economics of African countries through the instrumentality of the World Bank and the International Monetary fund; the imposition of economic sanctions; establishment and arming of rebel groups to fight civil wars; the use of the African continent for purpose of conducting germ warfare experimentation and testing of viruses such as AIDS and Ebola viruses - were acts of terrorism.

Umaru (2004) and Mamdani (2004) perception of terrorism is rather wholistic and inclusive. They believe that every misuse of state power politically, economically, abuse of fundamental rights etc. is a terrorist act as such, the society is now faced with wars, Umaru (2004.9), America's perspective of terrorism and all terrorism related issues are tied down to the happening of one event. The September 11, 2001 mass attack on America. He further posits, the attack, as claimed by America, has changed the world and the world is now at ‘war’. And "this

'war' declared by America is against what it calls "international terrorism" which has no rules, and Iraq is currently the main battle front of the 'war'. The other battle front includes Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Chechnya, and a number of African countries. Umaru depicts the outrage of a foreign policy and foreign relations of dictator hegemony and foresees enemity and expansion of new face of terrorism round the world in a short time.

In agreement with the above opinions, Adeniran (2007.249), depicting the rising of global terrorism and the state of Africa today ravaged by insecurity in societies that are in a state of underdevelopment or decay, states that terror is a political weapon, used to establish authority and compel obedience; while in territories or societies seeking freedom, terrorism is used to secure that goal. In this regard, it is a product of frustration and disenchantment since guerrilla warfare is no longer an attractive choice and conventional military option offers very little promise. In all cases, the element of tension is constant. The cause for which a disgruntled or dedicated and determined individual or group resort to executive kidnapping, bombing (of airports, city centres, leisure facilities, transport system), hijacking etc usually stems from a sense of deprivation of very basic needs or conditions of life. In the opinions of many authors today, terrorism looks like a wild fire that could or could not be put off. Yet it is a consensus by scholars that cooperation is the only therapy that will quench the fire.

Concerned on the gains or effects of terrorism with an expansion, the New Encyclopedia Britannica (1998.651), the purpose of terrorism is not the single act of warton destruction, but the reaction it seeks to provoke, economic collapse, backlash, hatred, division, elimination of tolerance, chaos, until societies cease to reconcile differences and become defined by them. This is a justification of the notion that terrorism also seeks the brake down of law and order. In other words it seeks to overthrow government or regime as Goodluck Jonathan referring to terrorist

activities in the North East of Nigeria, Agbese (2014.3), Boko Haram in Nigeria seeks to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Modern terrorism is depicted by Stern (2006.6) when she states that June 28, 1914 is viewed by historians as a turning point in European history. A young man, regarded by some as a hero shot the Australian crown Prince, Archiduke Francis Ferdiland. That event brought mankind into World War 1. Twenty million deaths later the Great War ended. The New Encyclopedia Britannica vol. 11 (1998. 650) depicts the transformation of terrorism into modern state "Although terrorism in this usage implied an act of violence by state against its citizen, since 20th century, the term has been applied most frequently to violence aimed at, either directly or indirectly at governments in an effort to influence policy or topple an existing regime.

On the modus operandum of modern terrorism, New Book of Knowledge Vol. 8 (1992.116) makes a historic comparism of terrorist operations

> *Modern terrorism use the method of historical terrorism equally well. The most dramatic example of this came in 1981 when President Anwar el Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by the religious and political extremists.*

Further posits that modern terrorism retains elements of historical terrorism but at the same time, it differs from it in its far wider extent, in many of its methods and the threat this pose to innocent people and in danger it presents to democratic system of government. The opinion has also acknowledged that terrorism has a characteristic that key into its operation "one of the characteristics of the modern terrorism is their practice of taking hostages in order to force the granting of their demands from a particular government. If the demands are not met, the hostages face the threat of death. Hijacking commercial airliners and holding their passengers and crews hostage has become one of the most common methods of operation of present - day terrorists".

Bombing, according to Bassioni (2002:175), Alexander (1992.117), makes up about half of all terrorist acts. "Generally, terrorist attack people who oppose their cause or object that symbolizes such opposition" common victims of terrorist's kidnappings and assassinations include diplomats, business executives, and police. Terrorist also attack churches, synagogues and other places of worship, oil refineries, and government offices. At other times, terrorists simply choose any other target certain to attract newspaper or TV coverage.

Fearey in Livingston and Wanek, ed. (1978) in trying to locate domestic and international terrorism assert that, international terrorism only manifest when the activities go across the borders. He has also established the fact that international terrorism originates from domestic terrorism. Contrary to this, Adeniran, (2007.248) declared, the type of terrorism that is manifest within a country has sources that are different, or could be different, from the type perpetuated at international levels. In otherwards, territorial terrorism and extra territorial terrorism have different targets or goal and their sources could also be different but he also allude that some times, factors responsible for internal domestic terrorist coincide with those which encourage terrorism at international level. He dabbles into what causes domestic terrorism when he said, at the national level for instance, relative deprivation with regard to allocation of some fundamental necessities of life, poverty and political frustration can fuel terrorist activities. Religious intolerance or fanaticism are also potential terrorist incendiaries. Whatever the cause the result is always instrumental (or goal-directed) violence resulting and from the terrorist's conviction that he must impose some fear or inflict some damage on certain individuals or group of individuals.

Adeniran's opinion is rather relevant and reflects Bamgbose quoting Albert Tanimu Sam Tsokwa, the chairman of the House of Representatives on Rules and Business Bamgbose (2013. 127) posits that the Boko Haram issue is beyond mere legislation by parliament. The issue has

outgrown council boundaries, and has now become an international problem. The security agencies claim that they have evidence that these people are linked with Al-Qaeda, and if they are truly linked with Al-Qaeda, it is not something we can resolve through legislation in National Assembly. They will be dealt with in the same manner Al-Qaeda is being tackled. In this way internal issue has attracted international actors.

Boko Haram has developed the characteristics of international terrorism hence the cross-boarder activities. Adeniran, (2007.255) in describing the initial transformation of domestic terrorism into international terrorism posits the regular tactic commonly used by terrorists is that very often they enter host countries legally and at other times they enter surreptiously with questionable passports and visas. In most cases, they set up a fairly complex intelligence network through which recruitment, induction and operation are carried out.

Adeniran, (2007.254) categorized international terrorism into two i.e. conventional and nuclear. He declared that both could be perpetrated by different group of people - especially the youth, including even women. A fifteen year old youth was among the group, alleged to have been inspired by Pakistan, that attacked the Indian High Commission in London on 20 February, 1973, while the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union in West Germany, was staged in February 1975 by a group which includes a 31 year old German woman.

Scholars have propounded series of solutions to countering terrorism but Kittrie in Livingston, Kris & Wane, ed. (1976.15) assert that “a pragmatic step – by step approach”, continued exploration on national and international levels, and exploring potentials for greater consensus regarding the extradiction of political offenders, including terrorists. A balance must be maintained “between human rights and world order”.

There is varied opinions in dialoguing with terrorist, Livingstone, Kress & Wanek (1976.28,29) posits the America stand thus, ... if terrorist group get the impression that they can force a negotiation with United States and in acquiescence in their demands, then we may save lives in one place at the risk of hundreds of lives everywhere else. Therefore it is our policy ... that American Ambassadors and American officials not participate in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists and that terrorists know that the United States will not participate in the payment of ransom and in the negotiation for it. For these reasons, the United States government has not and will not pay ransom, release prisoners, or otherwise yield to terrorist black mail ... We urge the same policy on other governments, private companies, and individuals. We rely for the safe return of American hostages on the responsibility under traditional international law of a host government to protect all persons within its territories, including the safe release of hostages. We consider it the host government's sovereign right to decide during an incident how it will fulfill this responsibility. America's stand seems ambiguous. America does not pose a posture of non-negotiation with terrorists rather its stand, therefore, is none interference with sovereignty of nations but all of these are today null and void. According to, Abbas (2013), ... it will be wiser to quench the fire than to chase the smoke around. Dispelling the smoke can never have any effect on the burning fire ... dialogue with the terrorists will better solve Nigeria's problem of insecurity than engaging any group of terrorists in very costly war of attrition. Yet, Samal (2014.61) represent the opinions of some scholars who do not agree that terrorists should be handled with kid glove when he argued that dialoguing with Boko Haram is like pouring tankers of hot water on Zuma Rock in order to melt it. The degree of responsiveness will be almost zero. We are dealing with terrorists whose achievement of their allies in Iraq has

emboldened, coupled with the shield they have gained through the kidnapping of Chibok girls and other Nigerians in the north-east.

Looking at the upsurge of terrorism in the world, UNESCO, Social and Human Sciences section (2005.27), allude "...nobody in the present age, is safe from the violence that threatens the security of people."

Synthesizing the above opinions, rising of global terrorism dates back to existence of man and gradually developed to the stage it is today posing global security threat in all ramifications. It is also clear that in the development of terrorism, it is hard to limit the targets of attack of terrorists hence, time, space and technology change their activities, operations and techniques.

2.5 Impact of Terrorism on Africa

The effect of terrorism on Africa especially the North Africa, East Africa and West Africa are glaring. The truth is that the entire Africa runs the risk of perpetual underdevelopment hence the reality in the saying, “no society develops amidst of violence”. Terrorism is a mass killer, who knows, whether it is one of the policies of the west to reduce the African population – this too affects the farming/agricultural industry which the international theory of specialization has subjected Africa to which directly means shortage of food, hunger and more death.

The greatest effect of terrorism in Africa is not only that it reduces population but the intention to cripple future leadership materials in the continent. There are evidences of recruitment of youths and children in insurgency activities in East Africa, North Africa and West Africa. In West Africa, Engels, Omach, Peter, Ikelegbe and Okumu in Ikumu and Ikelegbe, ed. (2010.38);

> *Taylor’s NPFL recruited young fighters from Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire while Cote d’Ivoire assisted the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) with recruiting youths and children fighters from refugee camps in the region of Cote d’Ivoire*

> *further benefitted from youth recruitment into the Forces de Liberation du Grand Ouest (Forces for the Liberation of the Great West, FLGO), which fought alongside government forces.*

This same applied to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and Cameroon where children and youths (male and female) are recruited and used for suicide bombing. In East Africa, the LRA is also known to have forcefully recruited and conscripted children from Sudan, the CAR and DCR.

The activities of insurgencies have lead to the collapse of states (state failure) in Africa. Makinde in Okumu and Botha (2006.18), Ikelegbe in Okumu and Ikelegbe, ed. (2010.128) subscribe to this. Though Makinde posits that state failure has no clinical definition, Ikelegbe states that; apart from Bostwana and Mauritius which have had sustained democracies and semblance of stability and prosperity, African states have generally been weak or in decline, fragile or collapsing. In fact, Osugahe's observation that many states in Africa are fragile and distressed was reiterated in the World Bank report of 2006 that listed 26 fragile states, of which 14 were in sub-sahara Africa. Sub-sahara African countries also dominated the lowest rungs to the United Nations Human Development Index in 2006. Foreign Policy's Failed State Index of 2008 listed 11 African States (Chad, Cote d'Ivore, the CA, the DRC, Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) among the 20 states it designated as weak and failing. The determinants of the above are numerous but for clear understanding here, the measuring scale used are, Makinde in Okumu and Botha, (2006.18);

> *...the state of instability, security and legitimization, the levels of group grievances, factionalisaiton of the elite and evenness of development, the state of the economy, public services and human right observances, and the levels of external intervention and displacement of persons are means.*

In northern Africa the effect of terrorism is evident in the statement of Shady in Okumu and Botha, ed. (2006.45) that terrorism eroded all possibilities for the development of national – legal leadership in Africa. "In North Africa, rational models of leadership have been increasingly challenged. Rational leader's ability to convince their citizens that the war on terrorism is fair and just have been constrained. Terrorist organizations and groups accused rational leaders of violating religious codes of legitimacy. According to these terrorists ideological blue prints, these leaders are infidels and may destroy the purity of religious beliefs. So, terrorist organizations and their leaders have been using religious discourse to delegitimize the existing rational models.

The other negative trend of terrorism in all these regions of Africa is this divisiveness and creation of hatred among African states. This show its ugly face in state terror and state sponsor of terrorism against the other which at the end sow seed of discord and disunity in Africa. Typical example of this is in West Africa and East Africa, Ikelegbe and Okumu in Ikelegbe and Okumu, ed. (2010.38);

> *In the Mano River conflict complex, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire supported rebels in Liberia, which in turn supported rebels in Sierra Leone and government forces in Cote d'Ivoire. In Ruwanda, Uganda supported the Ruwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, Front Patriotique Ruwandais), and later faught with it to oust Zaire's Mobutu from power for backing Ruwanda rebels. Interestingly, Ruwanda and Uganda turned against Laurent Kabila, whom they had installed in power and supported rebellion against his government that was then propped up in Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwean government, Uganda and Rwanda later turned against each other and used rebels as proxy to enhance their interest in the DRC. …Sudan also supported rebels in Chad and the CAR which inturn supported rebels in Dafor.*

To say that the lion share of African countries budget/income in the recent time are spent on security issue that are prompted by insurgency terrorist activities at the expense of every other

thing governments in Africa owe to the citizens is not an over statement. As earlier stated, this has led to impoverishment of the people of Africa and their environment, untimely death, illiteracy and exposure to all manners of diseases and hardship. This gives concern and terror to the hearts of on lookers and sympathizers for the question is, is there hope for Africa, when will these insecurity in the continent end? when everyday, new ones are emerging and the old ones are not yet resolved. Cilliers (2015.16);

> *Mali continues to remain unstable and violent as fighting continues between pro-government and secessionist forces. A 10,000 member UN peace keeping mission and a peace deal brokered by Algeria and signed in June 2015 have not been able to end the conflict as rivalries between Tuareg clans resurface. In Mali's Central regions, of the Islamist militants from Ansar Dine displaced by French have regrouped (as the Massina Liberation Front) to exploit the marginalization of the Fulani ethnic minority who extend from Senegal in the minority who extend from Senegal in the West to Sudan in the east. Since the border with Algeria is still largely uncontrolled, fighters travel freely from one country to another. It is evident therefore that violence is just a norm and precept through which survival is assured in Africa, yes, because the insurgents do not represent the interest of those they claim they fight for.*

2.6 The Impact of Terrorism on Nigeria and her Immediate Neighbours

Nigeria and its immediate neighbours through natural creation found themselves neighbours and within a geographical entity and region which places certain demands on them. Garba, (1987.39), Chad and the Republic of Cameroon were technically outside West Africa but they were immediate neighbours whom we had to handle with care. Yakubu (2011.111), the civil war experience had re-emphasized the need for closer cooperation among African states. The support given by some of the neighbours like Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Togo clearly revealed to the Nigerian Government that the security of the country depends on the security, stability and

freedom of its neighbours: Adeniran (1983.47), The United Nations Declaration of 1970 contains certain principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states. In accordance with the charter of the organization, this declaration which is usually called the "Declaration of Friendly Relations of 1970", is based on the tradition of cooperative interactions. He further posits, in the political domain, there has been some commitment to co-operation among states. Co-operating politically is regarded as a legal obligation ... while it is true that there are basis for competition, confrontation and conflicts, some of the bases for conflicts also constitute basis for collaboration.

The above opinions show that co-operation among states are but tradition in international arena and contiguous states like Nigeria and her neighbours cannot help but to co-operate hence the security of each other lies in the hands of one another. This led to so many areas of cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours in the past such as the creation of the Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Yakubu, (2011), Balewa, saw economic cooperation as the necessary step towards African unity. Therefore, Nigeria under his leadership developed close ties with its immediate neighbours ... on October 26, 1963, Nigeria together with Cameroon, Chad, Dahomev (Benin), Guinea, Ivory Coast (Cote devoir), Mali, Niger and Upper Volter (now Burkinafaso) teamed up to establish the River Niger Commission which was designed to encourage cooperative efforts in the development of the Niger River.

The above opinion also shows that there exist cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours in many different spheres. As Yakubu (2011 - 117) further put it, it is the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution of Bakassi crisis, "this partly explained the Gowon's willingness to sign the Marua accord ceding the Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon in 1975.

It is clear that the negative effect of terrorism is devastating in addition to escalating political instability, Ojukwu (2011.2) terrorism has a large effect on socio-economic activities, the capital stock (human and physical) of a country is often reduced as a result of terrorist attacks, it promote increases in counter terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for-use in security, it has an adverse effect on specific industries such as tourism and it reduces the expected return to investment, that is, changes in the intensity of terrorism have an ambiguous effect on the over-all investment position of the world such as investment over wealth. This is evident in the hindrances in the flow of human and material goods between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours.

According to Onuoha (2014.8), referring to the number of refugees, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 60,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in neighboring countries since 2013. For instance, there are about 40,000 Nigerian refuges in Niger Republic and about 28,000 in Cameroon ... many of the refugees, fled without any food or water, thereby intensifying the strain on scarce resources and social services of the host communities. Boko Haram violence has led to the destruction of health facilities in North East States of Nigeria, forcing health workers to either flee or shot down clinics. This in turn has compelled residents to seek medical attention in Cameroon, Chad and Niger thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in host communities. He posits the implications of terrorism on Nigeria and her neighbours looking at the insignificant resources available to the countries. He further laments "Worsening of food insecurity caused by the destruction of livelihood and social support system, bomb of infrastructures (bridges), displacement of farmers and pillaging of livestock and foodstuff. Cross-border abductions by Boko Haram for instance scare off potential tourists in the far North region of Cameroon, leading to a sharp drop in

customs revenues for the Central African countries ... the violence has severely impacted the local economy of the region, as well as for the wellbeing of the economies of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin amongst other countries, which are tied to the Nigerian economy. Around three million people live in the affected area in northern Cameroon. In addition to that, 30,000 people have fled across the border from Nigeria to Cameroon since the terror began. The economies of these two countries no doubt have been badly affected.

Before he was sworn in as president on 29 May 2015 Buhari, (Daily Trust, Tuesday 12, 2015) on the visit of the president of Chad, Idriss Deby, said, "We know how Chad, Niger and Cameroon have been helping Nigeria to secure our borders and you know how this helps in commerce and industry. Due to insurgency attacks, some of the bridges were blown up while infrastructures were destroyed.

The above opinions are expression of effect of terrorism on Nigeria and her immediate neighbours as affecting all the aspects of human and material endeavors. Onuoha (2014.9) further said, "These negative impacts on the economy add to the diplomatic unease in the Nigeria-neighbor relations. Nigerian authorities have criticized Cameroon for not doing enough to secure its borders, noting that Boko Haram has been using Cameroon territory as a transit route for weapons and as a base to lunch attacks in North East Nigeria. Cameroon Officials have rejected such accusations. The Chadian President, Idris Deby (Daily Trust May 12, 2015 p.56) posit the lack of coordination between Nigerian and Chadian Armies in the ongoing anti-terror war is not creating the desire impact. This accounted for the difficulty in arresting the leader of the Boko Haram. The two Armies are separately prosecuting the antiterrorism war.

The Nigerian view of her immediate neighbours Luke (2011) The Nigerian government has identified the foot soldiers of terrorism that has engulfed the northern parts of the country as

many foreign nationals from neighboring politically-unstable countries of Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroon that accommodate radical and fundamentalist Islamic groups. Identifying the close ties with her neighbours, Ali (2011), Afrev Ijah, Vol. 2 February 2015), the three critical immediate neighbours of Nigeria have predominantly itinerant Fulani Islamic population that share common borders with Nigeria's eight states in the northern region, namely, Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba, and Gombe. The cross-border activities are defined in certain push and pull variables, Ali (2011) presents, the push factor as consisting of domestic conditions in Chad, Niger and Cameroon which include the severe socio-economic dislocation that stalls sustainable development, perennial drought, famine, political instability, social and ethnic conflicts and near collapse of state control of resources and institutions as well as the survival pressure on immediate and extended family members. The pull factors to Nigeria are critically socio-economic prospects, food security, religious and cultural affinity with Nigeria and political freedom.

The tense insecurity prompted certain actions of Nigeria on her immediate neighbours, British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences (2012.70). Touched by the degree of insecurity that overwhelmed the country, the Federal government had recently deported 7000 illegal immigrants from Chad and Niger Republics. Against ECOWAS protocol of free movement of persons signed in May 1979. Ekpomera and Omoyibo (2013. 94), Boko Haram Islamic terrorist attacks have claimed over 3,000 lives including foreigners, prompting the Nigerian government to effect the deportation of 4,000 foreign nationals from Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the immediate neighbours on the north-east axis who are giving soft landing to radical Islamic sect utilizing terrorism as a modus operandum in pursuit of their political and religious beliefs.

2.7 Terrorism in Nigeria

In the sub-region of Nigeria and Cameroon, security challenges are historic. In Nigeria, Ohiole (2014.165) enumerates about 14 names he refers to as militant groups in Nigeria: Ansaru, Arewa People's Congress, Bakassi Boys, Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination, Boko Haram, Civilian Joint Task Force, Egbesu Boys; Igbos People's Congress, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Niger Delta Liberation Front, Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, Niger Delta Vigilantee, Oodua People's Congress, and Yan Tatsine.

In Nigeria, Akintala, Akinbade and Kammer (2014.120) posit, we have had several of such struggles against the state. The Aba Women's Riot of 1929, the nationalists' agitations, the Eastern minorities agitations, the agitation by the Yoruba of Western Nigeria against the imposition of the late Chief S. L. Akintola as the leader of the Yoruba and the Middle-Belt riots against the "perceived neglect and oppressive policies of the ruling Northern People's Congress (NPC). All these agitations were for the common good and executed without arms.

The above opinions present sectarian crisis in Nigeria as historic and posit the periods as violent era without arms. According to Akpa, Ekanem and Olofu-Adeoye (2014.151), apart from the challenges of poverty, sectarian, economic and political crisis and Niger Delta Militancy, Nigeria is currently facing a deeper and profound challenge of terrorism, especially in the North-Eastern region of the country. Akifala, Akinbode and Kammer (2014.120) ... it is obvious that many Nigerians see cases of terrorism and abductions every day in many parts of the country today. The Boko Haram sect and the Niger Delta militants have killed countless number of people and destroyed properties belonging to individuals and the authority. Oyeniyi (2010.12) ... in all 7,000 men and women from different terrorist groups all over Ondo, Delta, Edo, Cross

River, Rivers, Bayelsa, and the entire Niger-Delta region accepted the Amnesty and laid down their arms.

There are, Ajayi and Olanrewaju (2014.8), about 150 groups that claim to be voicing the desires of the people. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is the most dreaded of the militant groups. The Niger Delta and the North- East Regions become more troublesome spots. Following the Niger Delta militancy Folarina, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2014.8) posit, there has been the increasing torent of terrorism in Nigeria and the dangerous dimensions this has taken. The advent of Boko Haram group changed the content, context and texture of national security. While the militants in Niger Delta operated mostly within the region, the Boko Haram has embarked the whole of the country as their terrain. Akpan, Ekanem and Adeoye (2014.4) agreed with Olarewaju, when they said, list of disheartling phenomena includes, but is not limited to the bombing of several churches, Mosque, public stations, schools and prisons in Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Other parts of the country were not spared... The emergence of Boko Haram and Islamist terrorism is age long.

The surge of Islamist terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria from 1999 has copious negative implications..." According to Alozieuwa (2015.1), The apparent confusion generated by the plethora of theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram challenge also characterizes the origin of the sect, the confusion not only reflects in the narratives about the exact date, and who the actual founder was but also as to the true source of these expositions. For instance, Adibe (2012), has observed that while the popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002. Olojo (2013.2) posits that most authors generally agree that the Naka'atu Ahlis sunna Lidda'awati Wai-Jihad, more widely known as Boko Haram, first appeared in 2002, yet, other views trace it back to 1995 when it existed as a little-known Muslim Youth organization

called Shabaab … under the leadership of Lawal Abubakar who situated the headquarters in Maiduguri Borno State in north-eastern part of Nigeria ... Lawal left for University of Medina, "the group's leadership was transferred to the late Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. Another account agrees that "Boko Haram's origin was a group of Muslim Students from the University of Maiduguri who were led by Aminu Tashen Ilimi who dropped out of school in response to a preaching of an Islamic scholar who convinced them that western education was haram (unlawful) in Islam. This account argues that this band of students came in contact with Mohammed Yusuf who with his new ideology altered the message of the religious sermons to the extent that he was prevented from preaching at the Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri around the year 2000.

Islamic radicalism in the northern part of Nigeria Olojo (2013), Agbiboa and Maiangwa (2015.69-70), Ekpomera and Omoyibo (2013) agree dates back to 1980s during the regime of the first democratically-elected civilian government of Alh. Shehu Shagari. The Ya Tatsine (followers of Maitatsine). A sect founded by Muhammedu Marwa Maitatsine who hails from Marwa town in Northern Cameroon. The violence of this sect was equated to that of Nigerian civil war. Ekpemora and Omoyibo (2013.697) argue that Nigeria is not a stranger to Islamic radicalism, having experienced the activities of the extremist maitatisne sect movement that became violent in early 1980s. Anthony (2009) state that the directive by the federal government to the police force to crush the movement which had a large followership of the unemployed youths, led to clashes with police in Kano which claimed 4,177 lives in a space of 10 days in May 1980 … it took another dimension in Zaria as Muslims attacked Christians and their properties. Many scholars argue that 2009 marked the beginning of the current Boko Haram terrorist mayhem in Nigeria following the killing of their leader Abubakar Yusuf by government

forces and the subsequent transfer of leadership to Abubakar Mohammed Shekau who led the sect into violent activities ... and after Yusuf was killed in 2009 in police custody, all restrain was lifted, and Boko Haram morphed into the brutal organization it is today.

In the early 2000s, The Africa Report Magazine No. 216 (2014:9) argued that a similar group (Maitatsine) appeared in the North East. Initially referred to as the Yusuffiyya or Nigerian Taliban and later as Boko Haram. It rejected all secular authority. While it is comparable to the Maitatsine group, Boko Haram draws ideas and inspiration from newer radical Muslem entities. Importantly it has concrete links with not only al-Qaeda but number of radical African Muslem jihad groups as well. The skills they have imported have made Boko Haram a much more significant threat than Maitatsine.

The terrorist act in Niger Delta region dates back to1960s the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011.204-205) posits;

> *The struggle for resource control can be significantly traced back to the formation of Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an Ijaw group formed by Isaac Adoka Boro and which he declared a Republic in 1966. This was followed by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) by Ken Saro Wiwa that raised the issue of Environmental pollution caused by oil companies and highlighted the lack of representation of Niger Delta people especially the Ogonis and published an Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990; and also the 'Mujahid' Dokubo-Asari movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).*

It further argued that the recent phase of the crisis in the Niger Delta crisis emerged from a piecemeal discontent of the local peoples with the federal government's age-long neglect of the region and ignited by local ethnic crisis in 1996 between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri. The Niger Delta crisis which gave rise to militancy in the region has for almost two decades now impacted serious reverses on the political economy of the nation. Even criminal gangs have capitalized on

the general tension and fear imposed by these militant activities to unleash further terror on the people. “It has become very difficult to decipher genuine protests from criminal activities in the region especially in metropolises of Port Harcourt, Warri, Yenagoa and Asaba (where several bomb explosions have occurred in recent time)”.

The act o f terrorism in the country Abimbola and Adesote (2012.15) assert was mainly carried out by the militants in the Niger Delta area and the Boko Haram in the Northern part. For example, before 1998, the Niger Delta people has adopted series of strategies as means of getting themselves out of socio-political marginalization, lack of infrastructural facilities, environmental degradation and lack of corporate social responsibilities. Among these strategies are, petition, litigation, protest, and violence and mass mobilization. The latest phase of Niger Delta agitation which began in 1998 to the present was marked with the emergence of terror strategies which included outright confrontation, violent, pipeline vandalization, bombing of oil installation, armed resistance against the agents of the Nigerian State and the transnational oil companies operating in the region, kidnapping and hostages taking. Ogbogbo (2004). Abimbola and Adesote (2012.15), the adoption of this act of terrorism in the region was necessitated by the emergence of various youth militias. Among these militias in the region are, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Egbesu Boys, the Niger Delta peoples Volunteer, Force led by Alhaji Asari Tokubo, the Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, Niger Delta Vigilante (NDR) led by Ateke Tom, Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF) among others. He further states, the activities of the youth restiveness in the Niger Delta area against the Nigerian state on one hand and the transnational oil companies operating in the region on the other have constituted a major threat to national security. Adesole (2010), in fact, before the adoption of Amnesty programme by the late

president, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar' adua in 2010, as a positive measure to put an end to domestic terrorism in the region the region has remained the most dangerous zone to live in the country.

Synthesizing the above opinions, it is clear that Nigeria has been prone to terrorism even before independence every part of the country has a historic record of terrorism yet the most violent ones which have served threat to the security and unity of the country are the activities of Islamic militancy in the north east region and the Niger Delta militancy in the south-south region.

On the mission or goals of these major militants in the North east and South-South, Audu (2011.2), Abimbola and Adesole (2012.16), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011.192,211), Okumu and Ikelegbe ed. (pp. 135 & 317), Agbiboa and Maiangwa (p.64), Ohiwerei (2014.164), Guitta and Simcox "(2014.9) and others agree that the aim of other terrorist groups in Nigeria especially the major groups, in the Niger Delta Region" agitate for attention, inclusion in the political system and realization of Nigeria as one nation state "The Nigerian military struggled to contain the insurgency in the Niger Delta until a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme was accepted by the militias in October 2009". In the other hand Boko Haram is an extension of international Islamic ideology of exclusive Islamic state, Kabir in Okumu and Ikelegbe ed (1914.317) representing the opinions of many scholars state "contemporary militant Islamic movement in Northern Nigeria can be identified by the manner in which they pursue the principles of Islam. They seek to achieve their goals by violently confronting the symbols and institutions of state power, authority and legitimacy with the ultimacy aim of taking over state power. Further, they seek the strict application of Islamic law, the transformation of Muslim society and the abandonment of European/Western cultural

influences and innovations: Agbese (2014.3) President Goodluck Jonathan posits Boko Haram mission thus,

> *Terrorism is a global problem and Nigeria is having unfair share of this global problem and Nigerian situation is beyond terror. When terrorists are gaining grounds, attempting to install even leadership, it is no longer terrorism, it is clearly the idea of secession, and no government will accept it*

Guitta and Simcox (2014.9), since July, assert that Boko Haram has been a prescribed terrorist organization in UK and since November 2013, a designated terrorist organ in the US. In May 2014, the UN Security Council added the group to its al - Qaeda section list.

2.8 Terrorism in Cameroon

Cameroon like some other African countries had colonial experience entangled with terrorist activities. According to Fearon and Laitin (2005.6), there is some disagreement about what happened between June 1955 and December 1956, when UPC boycotted (and attempted to sabotage) the 1956 elections to territorial Assembly. On some accounts rebel activities was ongoing in the period. Levine (1963.20) as an example, in describing post-May 1955 situation as a "continuing rebellion inspired by the UPC - initially among the Bassa in the Sanga- Maritime region, later spreading to the Bamileke areas and to the western sectors and recurring with sporadic violence in the principal towns.

It is a popular opinion that terrorist activities in Cameroon were a product of liberation movement which started 1950s into the early independent periods. Fearon and Laitin (2005.7), the official estimate of the total number of rebels over the whole late mandate period is 500 but this is probably wrong because evidence from one camp in Bassa insurgency alone had about 500 soldiers. Alangana (1997, 102), UN reports state that 2,078 rebels surrendered in 1958 alone and 371 rebels were killed between January and October 1958. Over the course of the late

mandate and early independence period, the insurgency in Cameroon met the 1,000 death threshold so qualify as a civil war. Johnson (1970.392), Fearon and Laitin (2005); in these insurgencies rebel and government forces killed 6,000 and 15,000) and this figure include non - battle deaths... in the later phases counter - insurgency effects claimed as many lives as the rebellion... enough deaths to justify in coding of at least two civil wars taking place in Cameroon against the French.

The proto-insurgency in Cameroon was short leaved. Fearon and Latin (2005.8), the insurgency took two separate parts. In the Bassa areas, the insurgency lasted until 1958 with the murder of the UPC leader Reuben Um Nyobe. The Bamileke, who were fragmented into roughly 90 chieftaincies never developed a coordinated organization. According to Atangana (1997.120), it was at the point of Bassa accommodation that UPC split into a legal and illegal factions, the "illegals" took the struggle against the French to the Bamileke areas Joseph (1977.346) posit that the second and bloodier phase of the insurgency, as conventionally recounted, took place in the Bamileke areas from around 1956 to 1971 and was only suppressed with French assistance. The French increased their military presence in December 1957 and adopted extremely brutal measures to suppress the rebellion. Fearon and Laitin (2005.9) upon independence with the insurgency, Ahidjo asked for more French assistance.... The 1960 campaign resulted in the deaths of 3,000 rebels and 30 French soldiers. This may be an underestimate of the total number of victims as many died in the forest of disease and exhaustion. Delancy and Delancey (2000.269 and 169) agree with some other scholars that the insurgency ended 1971 "when the prominent UPC figures were arrested and executed".

Cameroon Time Line traces violence to 1955 when differences ensued in the ideologies of emerging political parties seeking independence. While some parties wanted the two parts of

the country (British Cameroon and French Cameroon) to be united, some wanted (English speaking) to join Nigeria. In 1955, "A revolt start" in the major towns of French Cameroon. The uprising is organized by Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC) Paul Biya's take over government in 1982 and his political arrest and Human Right abuses prompted the former and first president Amadou Ahidjo who was in exile in France accused him of "making Cameroon a police state". This led to coup attempt that failed in 1984 but brought terror to Yaounde. "A military coup is attempted but fails after three days of fighting in the streets of Yaounde". Fearon and Laitin (2005.12), the attempted coup drastically changed the nature of the Biya regime. It followed by a major cabinet reshuffle and the replacement of parastatal heads, he was careful to retain a few northerners not closely associated with Ahidjo's. He also created new administrative units in order to separate non- Muslim northerners from Ahidjo's fulbe powerbase. In May 26 1990 a political party called Social Democratic Party Front was formed without permission from a government that had only Biya as a candidate in election of April 24, 1988 "Around 30,000 attended a peaceful founding rally in Bamenda. Police tries to get people away from the streets. Riot breaks out and shots are fired into the crowed killing 6 and injuring several others".

On Oct. 11 1992 USA observers declared fraudulent by Biya who scored 39.9% votes against his rival John Fru Ndi with 35.9%, this lead to a mass demonstration, "so a state of emergency was declared in the western province. Thousands were arrested and many people died in the riots. Also journalists are arrested and tortured. John Fru Ndi and other opposition members were put to house arrests.

On resource mismanagement, Transparency International (1998 and 1999) classified Cameroon as "the most corrupt country in the world". The Catholic Church in Cameroon in 2000 criticised the high level of corruption all over the country. Cameroon 'Time Line posits, "The

state of Cameroon remains with a relative healthy) economy, but the rate of violent crimes increases as the population faces huge economic and social problems".

Synthesizing the above opinions, crisis and violence in Cameroon have largely been political from struggle for independence to early 2000. According to The Bradt Guide to Cameroon, The CIA Face book, "domestic political tension has pervaded Cameroon through the last decade". It further states, reference to Biya at odd with Anglophone, in 2002 this in the west dissatisfactions manifested itself in widespread protest throughout the northern Muslem community. Unrest continued to erupt through the presidential elections in 2004 as well as parliamentary elections in 2007. In February 2008, unrest swept the major towns of Cameroon ... government suppression of the riots resulted in the deaths of over 1000 Cameroonian citizens. The genesis of recent and modern phase of violent activities in Cameroon has two origins, Zenn (2014), asserts that the conflict in the CAR started in December 2012, when a coalition of rebel groups from the eastern CAR called Séléka, attempted to overthrow the government of President Francois Bozize in the CAR's capital of Bangui. Spill over from the conflict to Cameroon began surfacing about six months after Boko Haram's first kidnapping in Northern Cameroon and the Séléka rebels advanced on Bangui in March, 2013.

Synthesizing the above opinion, it is clear that the Séléka terrorism was transported from CAR into Cameroon. This same view apply to terrorism from Nigeria to Cameroon for instance, the Boko Haram, Forest (2012.1), ... it is very much a locally- oriented movement. Members of Boko Haram are drawn primarily from Kanuri tribe (roughly 4 percent of the population) who are concentrated in the North eastern states of Nigeria like Bauchi and Bornu, and the Hausa Fulani (29 percent of the population) spread more generally throughout the northern states. From the period of struggle for freedom to post independence era and up to late 2000s Cameroon can

be said to be stable (in spite the diverse in religion, 250 different ethnic groups etc) relative to other countries within the region. This stability is attributed to Bayart (1976), Fearon and Latin (2005.11), an important theme in the country literature for why Cameroon was so stable is the distinctive personal style of Ahidjo. In contrast to Biya, Ahidjo managed tensions within Cameroon by recycling elites and by maintaining good relations with a variety of ethnic groups (e.g. Van de Walle 2001; Kofele- Kale 1986; Krieger and Takougang 1998 etc.) in addition, he is credited with reducing the salience of ethnicity in Cameroonian politics by introducing regime ideology intolerant of the discussion of ethnicity. For example, he banned all ethnic associations in 1967. Bayart (1973.160) refers to his approach to ethnic politics as "Jacobin", but notes that the "ethic of unity" only strengthened the most favoured groups Fearon and Laitn (2005.10) state the reason for stability in Cameroon as emanating from French creation.

"It is likely that the UPC rebellion and the way in which it was suppressed reduced the likelihood that Cameroon would have another insurgency in two ways. First it created a strong military completely loyal to Ahidjo. The French trained the Cameroonian army and helped to construct the service des Etudes et de la Documentation (SBDOC) which, according to Krieger and Takougang (1998.39) was "one of the most effective intelligence service in sub - Sahara Africa. Second, the rebellion allowed Ahidjo to - assume Emergency powers in 1959 and he used this power to postpone elections due 1960. This move allowed him to draft the constitution of independence of Cameroon and to create an extremely powerful presidency and Electoral rules. Designed to ensure the dominance of his Union Camerooaise (UC) ... Ahidjo's UC was effectively the only political party in East Cameroon well before Cameroon officially became a single-party state in 1966".

2.9 Terrorism and Nigeria-Cameron Relations

The gunmen (Daily Trust of January 20, 2015, p. 6) now control about 20,000 square miles of Nigeria. From this secure base they appear to have decided to conquer Northern Cameroon. Most of Boko Haram's leaders including Abubakar Shekau are from the Kanuri ethnic-group whose home land spans the border between Nigeria and Cameroon.

The above opinion stresses the contiguous nature of Nigeria-Cameroon which to some extent has facilitated tension in the relationship between the two countries. Garba (1987.39), as earlier quoted in parts, Chad and Republic of Cameroon were technically outside West Africa but they are our immediate neighbours whom we have to handle with care. Incessant border problems with Cameroon were extremely delicate although there were moments when we wondered whether the Cameroonian authorities were deliberately trying to provoke a crisis between us. Brimah (2014.4), Cameroon has a history of harboring criminals who use its territory to destabilize Nigeria. You may wish to recall that the leader of the Maitatsine Islamic sect operated from Marwa, a Cameroonian border with Nigeria ... Mallam Muhammadu Madu Marwa, better known as "Maitatsine" a Fulani native of Marwa, in Northern Cameroon was driven from northern commercial city of Kano back to Cameroon by the Emir of Kano in 1962.

While the Southern Nigeria and Southern Cameroon source of mutual suspicion in the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon dates back to colonial era, same with the northern parts which are the contemporary origin of terrorism in the sub-region. Brimah, (2014) posits, Federal Government was aware of Cameroon's unexplainable indifference to Nigeria ... as early as 1906, northern Nigeria suffered from violence orchestrated by religious leaders whose roots were in Northern Cameroon. He further quoted commenting specifically on the Boko Haram insurgency, "From all indications, there appears to be an unwritten understanding between the

sect members and Cameroonian security forces that they can operate from bases within their borders as long as they don't lunch attacks within Cameroon.

With their scant regard for national borders (France 24 blogs Fri, 05/23/2014) in their quest to form a dream caliphate, jihadist groups are also able to attract foreign fighters. Nigerian officials believe Boko Haram, which began as a local Islamist group more than a decade ago now has foreign fighters, including Chadians and Cameroon. The Governor of the Cameroon's Far North Region, Fonka Awa posits, "until now, (they) could not get involved in an Issue happening in another country, because they are trying to get into our territory." ... The number of attacks are mounting and Nigeria is responsible... suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked Chinese workers stationed in the Northern Cameroon, at least one person was killed and 10 more kidnapped. The Army no longer has the situation under control. Nigerian soldiers are running away from the militia and crossing the border into Cameroon. ... They are exporting their problems into our territory and the Far North Region in particular. In affirmation same source, France 24 blogs Fri 05/23/2014, French officials have also voiced that the Cameroonian government in the capital of Yaounde has viewed the threat as Nigerian issues and refused to acknowledge the extent of the destabilization in the Far North Region. The opinions shared above, show the attitude of close neighbours, even at the epoch of terrorist threat. Experience has shown that due to contiguous nature of the two countries chances of snowballing of insurgent activities from one country to the other is evident.

The Cameroon Forces (Daily Trust, Tuesday 20, 2015 p. 6) have been quite proactive in tackling Boko Haram and the Cameroon government has been critical of the Nigerian government for not doing enough. The same source posits Boko Haram campaign of abduction and terror has spread beyond Nigeria to become a regional threat. … The gunmen struck across

Nigeria's eastern border into Cameroon rading two villages and taking about 80 people captive. The national Army claimed to have rescued about 20 of the captives... but Cameroon Army has only 12,500 soldiers to protect a country almost twice the size of Britain.

Days after May 17 2014 (Daily Trust May 12, 2015 p.56) Paris summits on Nigeria's security, Cameroon Foreign Minister Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo declared, "It's not necessary to have joint patrols. The most important is that information flows between our two countries so that each country respects the territorial integrity of the other. The reaction, source, France 24 blogs Fri 05/23/2014, posit, "Despite the commitment to "information flows", security experts note that the lack of bilateral trust poses several intelligence-sharing challenges.

The above opinions show the typical relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon when the source above further stressed, "the intense focus on Biya's presence in the lead-up to the Paris Summit highlighted Cameroon's key role in tackling the regional threat as well as the thorny state of Nigeria-Cameroonian relation and what that spells for the fight against Boko Haram. Nigeria has already reached an agreement with Niger to allow its troop s to cross the border in pursuit of Boko Haram, and is discussing similar agreement with Chad. Cameroon however has been reluctant to allow Nigerian troops with a track record of human rights violations to conduct operations on Cameroonian soil. Porsche Classul September 23, 2014 (http://porsheclassy.com/17447/cameroon-vs-nigeria-controversy-alleged-killing-boko-haram-commander-abubakar-hekau#sthash.KcHlll^g/t.dpuf). quotes, "There was no raid whatsoever by Cameroon or any foreign forces in part of Nigeria's territory in pursuit of terrorist as claimed in reports allegedly quoting Cameroon authorities. This is the reaction of Nigerian force towards the claim by Cameroon troops that they killed the Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau in Nigeria.

The ransom paid by Cameroonian official presented her as enemy of Nigeria, Guitta and Simcox (2014.15) "in the light of this, Cameroon has been viewed as the 'weakest link' with Nigeria's head of counter-terrorism complaining on 30 May 2014 that its neighbor was not doing enough to fight off Boko Haram. ”He further said, despite having a mutual enemy in Boko Haram, Abuja and Yaounde has a cold relationship, something which is exacerbated by disputes over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.

2.10 Nigeria Africa Foreign Policy Dimension

Nigeria is one of the African territories affected by colonial creation rising from Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Through colonial experience, Nigeria emerged having gained independence on a plater of gold on October 1, 1960. Coincidentally too not of her making or choice; she became the largest country in Africa in terms of land mark, population, natural and human resources, Saliu in Saliu, ed (1999.127), informed by the factors of population, size and resources the principle of African centerpiece of policy was adopted after the attainment of independence. This gave her a remarkable position, Osuntokun in Ogwu, ed (2005.29), Fawole (2003.1), “the most populous black nation on earth”. Nigeria emerging from independence, wielded influence and glory as it became the “richest African country and by extension the most influential in African affairs.”

All of the above factors, Osuntokun in Ogwu, ed (2005.29), compel her to shoulder the leadership of the black world assuming responsibilities for beyond her borders. On the other hand, therefore, it is this background that led to the foundation of Nigerian Foreign Policy in 1958 which became a reality, in the speech of Tafawa Balewa to the Federal House of Representatives and the United Nations General Assembly on 20, August, 1960 and 7 October, 1960. It is interesting that Tafawa Balewa carefully thought of the colonial experience of Africa

and decided that Nigerian Foreign Policy (considering her position as already enumerated) will be such that will focus on attempt to salvage the plight of the continent. This he formally declared shall be built on the following principles, Yakubu (2011.93):

1. Sovereign equality of all African States,
2. Respect for the independence, sovereignty; and territorial integrity of every African States,
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African States;
4. Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity;
5. Total eradication of racialism and colonialism from Africa
6. Non-alignment; and
7. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration.

The five out of the seven enumerated above makes Africa the centerpiece of Nigerian Foreign Policy which in the realm of action objective translate into Ukeje (2003.91), fostering of African Unity, the promotion and enhancement of peace, stability, and security in Africa; the creation of the necessary economic, political, social and cultural conditions to secure the independence of Nigeria and other African countries; and the promotion of the rights of all blacks and others under colonial domination. Within Nigeria Africa Policy, Nigeria has a passion for her immediate neighbours depicting Achebe's perception that the sun shines on those standing before those kneeling.

Nigeria has lived up to her Foreign Policy principles inspite all odds beginning from her resolve to total eradication of racialism and colonialism. Matching words with action Ukeje (2003.94-95);

> *after attaining independence in 1960 Nigeria linked its fullness to the eradication of all the vestiges of colonialism*

> *and foreign domination from Africa. She consequently set herself the goal of eliminating colonialism on the continent as well as enhancing the dignity of Africans. Barely a year of independence Nigeria succeeded in mobilizing forces against South Africa and striped the country of her membership in both Common Wealth and International Labour Organization in 1961 as well as breaking diplomatic relations with France same 1961.*

The establishment of OAU in 1963 was the handwork of Tafawa Balewa who had the premonition that collectively under an umbrella of a continental body, Nigeria's dream for Africa will become a reality. The establishment of ECOWAS on 28 May, 1975, the formation of Lake Chad Basin Commission collating Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria in 1964 were among the structures Nigeria faught to put in place to wield Africa together and help Nigeria in achieving her dream for the continent. Through these institutions, Nigeria believed that Africa will speak with one voice, foster socio-economic co-operation and development in Africa aimed at averting foreign dependence and underdevelopment. Nigeria has been bearing the financial burden of these organizations, Ukeje (2003.94), "she has remained an active participant and bears the bulk of their financial burden."

Radically, in Nigerian Foreign Policy, it is affirmed, Fawole (2003.72), that the regime of General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi was the first to take any radical stance against Portugal and South Africa. Well, this of course is evident in the July, 1966 ban on the use of Nigeria's airport, airspace and seaport facilities by the aircraft and ships of Portugal and South Africa vis-à-vis other countries ship and aircraft enrout to the two countries. This radicality could also be seen in the 1976 boycott of the Montreal Olympic Games and the same action in 1978 and 1986 against the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and Edinburgh respectively. The seizure of British Financial Institution in Nigeria (Barclays Bank of Nigeria Limited) in 1978 and the nationalization of British assets (British Petroleum) branded African Petroleum in 1979 cum

moral, material and financial support to various liberation movements in Africa branded Nigeria "a frontline state in the Vanguard of Liberation of Africa."

A more radical approach to Nigerian Foreign Policy manifested during Murtala/Obasanjo regime having gained additional legal tool, Yakubu (2011.132), Nigeria utilized skillfully the OAU forum on Angola. Nigeria indeed threw her weight in thwarting the manipulations and confusion America and the allied were creating in Angola accepting intervention and assistance from South Africa proved to Nigeria that out of three Liberation Movements (FLNA, UNITA and MPLA) that MPLA was the true Liberation Movement. Spending everything within her power, for example mobilizing OAU, ₦13.5 million as aid to MPLA and military supplies. To OAU Liberation Committee, Aluko, ed. (1977.170), £100,000 in 1963/64, £74,000 in 1964/65 and £84,000 in 1965/66. Nigeria like a pregnant woman who forgets the pregnant/labour experience emerged happy, Yakubu (2011.134), Nigeria took the lead which eventually left the United States, the Western Powers, South Africa and their allies-FNLA and UNITA unsuccessful and utterly defeated. Nigeria saw Angola to a successful independence in 1960 and South Africa in 1994 as well as viable support to other liberation movements in Africa.

To further socio-economic development in Africa, Nigeria established a Trust Fund at the Development Bank (ADB) mounting to a sum of $88 million in 1976. This was intended for development of projects in other African countries. Progressively, this good intention multiplied and as at 1995, Ukeje (2003.96), the Nigeria Trust Fund had $450 million and Nigeria was not allowed to benefit from it so that African countries will reap the fullness of it. Nigeria signed co-operative venture for intra-trade agreements with neighbours and hosted the summits at which the Lagos Plan of Action was adopted and the African Economic Community Treaty was signed in 1980 and 1991. This in turn justifies Nigeria's motion in the Economic Community of Africa

held in Accra in March 1973, which was adopted for the establishment of Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations. In presenting this motion which Adebayo Adedeji, leader of Nigeria delegation, Aluko in Aluko, ed. (1977. 169), said:

> *such organizations were needed to boost intra-African trade. Nigeria believes that the future of Africa lies in the active and virile economic cooperation of African governments. This is the only way in which we can hope to complete our liberation by adding economic independence to our political freedom.*

To see a viable economic robust in Africa Nigeria through direct bilateral contacts has conscientised African countries not to enter into any economic agreements with EEC and she had the backing of all Commonwealth African countries at a meeting held in Lagos in 1973 that Africa should negotiate collectively with EEC. Same resolution was passed by African Ministers concerned with trade and monetary matters in a four-days conference held in Abidjan in May, 1973. As at 1973, Aluko, ed. (1977.169), Nigeria already had a good record in terms of integrating African countries in economic area:

> *Up to early 1966 Nigeria had trade pacts with only two African countries – Egypt and the Congo (Kinshasa now Zaire) – outside West Africa. By early 1973, Nigeria had struck bilateral trade agreements with over 16 African countries outside West Africa. Joint Economic Commissions have also been set up between Nigeria and most of them.*

The FESTAC of 1977 was a show of a good picture to the entire world of Nigeria's dream to integrate Africa socio-culturally and economically.

In the security sector, the troop sent to Congo now Zaire by UN Peace Keeping Operation Ukeje (2003.97) was headed by Nigeria's Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi. Tanzania's call to Nigeria in 1962 made Nigeria to send troops to Tanganyika to contain an army mutiny and maintain peace in the country. OAU and ECOWAS being the wheel through which Nigeria

operate enabled her to lead the Peace Keeping force in Chad whose first commander was General Geoffrey Ejiga with an expenses that amounted to a sum of $100 million. Nigeria, Ukeje (2003.98) states:

> *single handedly sponsored ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group and did successfully through the instrumentality of ECOMOG brought peace in Liberia after seven years of war that nearly destroyed that country. This was the invasion of the country by National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in 1989. Nigeria similarly brought peace in Sierra-Leone and restored democracy, a major success of the Abacha regime. When in 1997 Major Paul Koromah took over civilian government of Tejan Kabbah. ECOMOG in itself was a brain child of Nigeria which began with the resolving of the Liberian crisis.*

Without Nigeria, Yakubu (2011.222) argues, ECOMOG, the West African Peace Monitoring Force of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), would be toothless and African-led peacekeeping missions in Guinea – Bissau, Liberia and Sierra-Leone would not have been possible.

In the spirit of Africa, Nigeria has treated her neighbours friendly even in the face of provocation, example of this was in 1981 when Cameroonian gendarms attacked and killed some Nigerian soldiers in Nigeria territory. The show of love has guided Nigeria relations in Africa, Zabadi in Best, ed. (no date p.74),

> *Nigeria has been generous and friendly to her neighbours. She has always resisted the temptation to use her superior might against her weak neighbours even after they have carried out acts of aggression against her.*

It is to demonstrate to Africa the commitment of Nigeria's belief in Africa as the centerpiece of her foreign policy that led her to accept the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Hague in Oct., 2002 over the dispute between her and Cameroon regards the oil

rich Bakassi Peninsula. The handing over of the place in August, 2008 and total disengagement on Aug., 2013 was a commitment that there may be peace in Africa.

In the same direction of peaceful settlement of disputes, Nigeria demonstrates that she does not have expantionist mission. With this spirit, Aluko in Aluko, ed. (1977.173), General Gowon in his address to African Heads of State on 6th September, 1969 in Addis Ababa appealed that "African countries can never survive, they can never make it if we adopt the attitude of an eye for eye and tooth for a tooth." This is seen in Nigeria's foreign attitude when she quickly reconciled in 1970 with four African countries that sabotaged her effort in the Nigerian civil war by recognizing Biafra.

Continuity has been the watchdog of regimes in Nigeria from 1960 to date. What has changed is in style – Transformation and radicality in the actualization of her Foreign Policy missions, Yakubu (2011.132),

> *A radical departure of style (not of principle) was brought under the regime of Mohammed/Obasanjo. During this time, there was an accelerated priority assigned to African Affairs.*

A major re-thinking in Nigerian Foreign Policy which could be viewed as a change in the principle but we look at it as a strategy to solidification for a greater outing and role of Nigeria in Africa surfaced in Yaradua's administration 2007-2010. This was the looking inward and introduction of "Citizen Diplomacy. This resulted from the decay of the home front which in the other hand affect the Nigeria's leadership role in Africa. Saliu (1999.137),

> *given the infuriate relationship that exists between domestic and international politics, the lingering political crisis should be taken a second look at to again empower the Foreign Policy. For now, it serves as a major constraints. The situation back home attracts critical arguments "that Nigeria gets nothing in return to her role in Africa rather is at the expense of the citizens.*

In his observation, Yakubu (2011.230) states that Maduekwe saw the need for "diplomacy of consequences which in ordinary diplomatic parlance was called reciprocity." The logic in this diplomacy he presented the postulation of the Minister thus "if a country was nice to us as Nigerians, we would also be nice to that country as well, but if a country was hostile to us, we would also be hostile to the country, while making things difficult for that country's nationals in our shores. In other wards, Nigeria would no longer turn the other cheek as it had done in the past." This is a complete departure from the principles of Nigerian Foreign Policy laid down in 1958 and consistently followed by regimes that have lasted in Nigeria with exception of the fact that some of them were radical about it and some lukewarm.

Even then, this dimension of Nigerian Foreign Policy under Yar'adua has not in practical terms manifested. The subsequent regimes of Goodluck and Buhari have not toed that line either, rather they continued in the line of the established principles of Nigerian Foreign Policy. For instance inspite the hostilities across the borders of Nigeria and her neighbours, (Cameroon, Niger and Chad), Nigeria has been up and doing to see that the region is rid of terrorism. This could be seen in the state visit of Goodluck to Chad and Niger Republic in 2014 and consequently the visit of Buhari to Niger and Chad on 3rd and 4th June immediately after he was sworn in on 29th May, 2015. His visit to Cameroon in 2015 and the reciprocal visit by Paul Biya in 3 days state visit 3rd to 5th May, 2016 where the two presidents jointly mapped out new dimensions of better relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon. Among other agreements Wakili (2016.3), Both Leaders expressed commitment to the upcoming second session of regional security session in Abuja. Both pledged to fully participate in the processes of and implement the outcome of the meeting to ensure peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin, and that a tripartite meeting of both nations and United Nations High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR) be convened by July, 2016 to agree on framework to ensure the safe return of Nigerian refugees currently hosted by Cameroon. Both countries also agreed to build a bridge over the Nile Tier River that would link Belel in Nigeria and Damsan in Cameroon and related infrastructure along the Jabi Lamba Garuwa Corridor. The two leaders rose with the emphasis that their "ministers of economy to convene the Nigeria-Cameroon forum in Abuja as soon as possible. This is a country that the leaders hardly meet and Cameroon has always reciprocated Nigeria's neighbor friendly with hostility just like many other neighbours around her.

Despite her friendly foreign policy posture towards Africa, there are some odd times, such as her expelling of over two million illegal aliens in 1983 by Shehu Shagari, Yakubu (2011.148), the Daily, a London Newspaper, described Nigeria's action as "unworthy of a country which has real claim to be the natural leader of a continent against racism in South Africa. In 1985 the military approach in some African crisis Saliu in Saliu ed (1999.126), the incursions into Liberia and Sierra Leone which appear to rest on a shaky legal ground, may be considered as not only interferences but also interventions. The closure of her borders against her neighbours in April, 25 and May, 6 1984, sounded extreme as Yakubu (2011.165) assert that the economies of the countries in the West African sub-region depend on Nigeria. Among others is Omede (2006.13) in the expulsion of about 700,000 Chadians affected by the Nigerian deportation order of January 17, 1983 and the deportation of 4,000 nationals from Niger, Chad and Cameroon, Ekpomera and Omoyibo (2013.94) as a result of Boko Haram attacks which claimed up to 3,000 lives.

Despite some of these odds that tend to portray Nigeria as contravening some aspects of her foreign policy principles, and ECOWAS protocol of free movement of persons, Nigeria has remained steadfast to these principles despite the attitudes of most of the African countries

especially her immediate neighbours. Her effort in her role in Africa is impeded by so many factors which include internal and external factors. In external factor, we can see the attitudes of African countries exemplified, Saliu in Saliu ed. (199. 129), any foreign policy that radiates too much confidence stands the high risk of attracting the envy of other states or even antagonizes them. Indeed, some countries in Africa had independence before Nigeria and emerging, Nigeria, pose as a leader with King's crown. Garba (1987.37),

> *Indeed Nigeria's Foreign relations in the first decade of independence were almost dominated by mutual rivalry, and antagonism with the Republic of Ghana, whose vocal Pan-African and socialist rhetoric always seemed to make Nigeria's leaders very uncomfortable. President Nkurumah had obvious ambitions to lead Africa but he lacked the size and economic resources to impose his leadership on Africa.*

Even among African countries contiguous to Nigeria saw her as a threat to them, Garba (1987.37), but any aspirations we may have had with regard to assuming a leadership role in West Africa or all of Africa were usually frustrated by our West African neighbours.

In an effort to save Liberia from the crisis that befell her, the Senegal President states, Nwosu in Saliu ed. (1999.115) that Nigeria might use ECOMOG to complete an ambitious design in the sub-region. As Cameroon gendarms killed Nigerian 5 soldiers so also Chad in 1983 killed nine Nigerian soldiers and captured nineteen others as prisoners of war as a result of Chad's interest in Lake Chad Basin area. All these are in a bid to provoke Nigeria and drag her into war but Nigeria has been very careful and conscious of her foreign policy principles, Garba (1987.40), …we resisted temptation to use force. I was convinced that Nigeria's African policies would be seriously damaged if we took any retaliatory action against border violations by either Cameroon border or Chad.

Finally, this is the foreign policy of a country packaged by colonialism. She tries to meet up with these responsibilities of leadership in the continent yet some internal and external factors created by same colonialism pose confusion and mountainous challenges. Nigeria by colonial creation is surrounded by Francophone countries whom their umbilical cords are still tied to France and as such every step taken by Nigeria in the region is greeted with suspicion. She is economically, politically and even socially dependent on the advanced countries even to take decisions, act on internal matters, Agabi (2016.12) Abdulaziz Yari reported that the chairman of Nigeria Governors Forum speaking on behalf of governors was reported, "commended Buhari in his efforts to consult international communities to find a lasting solution to the situation in the Niger Delta, the North-East and the fight against corruption. She is faced with crisis both internally and across her borders and lacks the political will and the wherewithal to manage leadership role in her region and Africa at large. Even the effort she is putting in as a leader in her region due to home factors is today declining, Onuoha (2014.9);

> *Nigeria which had consistently ranked as the fourth larger contributor to UN peace operations behind India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and also as the largest contributor among African countries, has since December, 2011 lost that position to Ethiopia due to imperative of addressing internal security challenges. Moreover pressing demand for troops at home to help combat the Boko Haram insurgency and other internal security challenges contributed to Nigeria's withdrawal of some of her troops in July, 2013 from United Nations multidimensional integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)*

2.11 Similarities between Nigeria and Cameroon

This section attempts exhibiting some peculiarities that exist between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Nigeria and Cameroon shared in the colonial experience of same 19th century. Tordoff (1993. 1 and 2) in enumerating what Africa share in common said they were ex-colonial, that is, they have been subjected to rule by one or another of the colonial powers Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain. And these new states were also old societies, with a pre-colonial history of their own. Nigeria and Cameroon happen to be countries that experienced two different colonial masters they were ruled by British and French colonial powers, Fearon and Latin (2005.1), the British administered mandated territory (administered as part of Nigeria) had divided into two zones. As a result of a plebiscite in 1961, the northern zone united with Nigeria, while the southern zone was incorporated into Cameroon.

Nigeria and Cameroon were liberated from the colonial masters in the same year; Cameroon being older than Nigeria by 9 months – Cameroon's independence was January 1, 1960 and Nigeria's October 1, 1960. Nigeria and Cameroon are known for diverse ethnic groups with appropriately same Nigeria 300 and Cameroon 200 different ethnic groups even though, difference in population is an immeasurable gap (Nigeria 170 million and Cameroon 20 million). The central language in the two countries are colonial languages. In terms of religion, Islam and Christianity dominate in the two countries. Sharing the same feature, Fearon and Latin (2005.3), more Muslims are found in the North and more Christians in the south. Joseph (1997.10) presents Bamileke ethnic group originally from the Western highlands bordering former British Cameroon, as the predominant economic source of Cameroon economy so also the south-south of Nigeria hence the oil. Joseph argues that ethnic diversity and the management in Cameroon appears to have prevented political instability but in Nigeria this cannot be said to be shared feature hence it is the opposite. Nigeria and Cameroon share same people and culture at the frontiers as Njoku (202.197) states that many ethnic groups and people in Cameroon are ethno-

culturally connected to populations in Nigeria. It is difficult for the locals along the border area to understand border demarcations and delimitations as they see their kith and kin as part and parcel of their everyday life. Funte (2015.32) and Kane (1976.23-24) state:

> *… like the Ejagham and Borki groups of Manyu Division divided between Nigeria and Cameroon into Ejagham – Nigeria and Ejagham-Cameroon. The Kanem Bornu Empire, the presence and connectivity of these Cameroon-Nigeria and Kanuri of Cameroon) made them to consistently see themselves as brothers inspite colonial influences. They depend on one another's political, economic and social activities.*

This is why Njoku (2012.199) sees the interconnectivity of these cross-border communities as a serious issue for the respect of the international boundaries since some of these groups share dieties and totems, ancestral shrines and major rites (birth, manhood, maidhood, womanhood, marriage, child-bearing and death), annual festivals and rituals that all members of each group across the frontiers are traditionally obliged to take part in.

As a contigous nations, this is a gift of nature which makes them share geographical and historical immediacy. Nigeria and Cameroon share the feature of finding themselves in the African continent and within the region of Gulf of Guinea but belonged each to the (Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central Africa (ECCAS). Nigeria plays a dominant political, economic and security role in ECOWAS so also Cameroon in ECCAS both countries are rich in natural endowment (human and natural resources). Nigeria and Cameroon who play significant role in the Gulf of Guinea are also members of OAU (AU) and UN, and OPEC. Both countries are members of one of the oldest African regional institution Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) founded in 1964. Nigeria and Cameroon though are dominant political and economic figures within their regions fall within the internationally classified poor countries, Rourke and Buyer (2002.291), … whether or not

you subscribe to economic nationalist, internationalist or structuralist theory, it cannot be denied that the world is generally divided into two economic spheres; a wealthy north and a less wealthy south. Most EDCs lie to the north in North America and Europe and most LDCs are further to the south in Africa, Asia Central and South America. As such, Nigeria and Cameroon economically belong to the south. Both countries are not industrialised nations. They rely on agriculture and produce and export raw materials to the industrialised world. Both have vast land, more than fifty percent of their lands are virgin yet citizens of both countries suffer hunger and malnutrition. According to the Economist, 2014, Nigeria has both the largest population in West Africa and also in Africa as a whole. Nigeria's economy worth about 510 Billion USD. Cameroon has the largest economy within the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) with a GDP of 50.8 Billion USD and a population of 21.5 million (the Heritage Foundation, 2014), arguably, it is one of the main contributors within ECCAS.

Nigeria and Cameroon share common experience of federal structure and unitary system at different times. Nigeria in 1966 experimented unitary system under Gen. Ironsi but replaced with presidentialism, hence an existing federal structure. Fearon and Latin (2005.3), what little autonomy Anglophones retained in 1961 was gradually eroded by Ahidjo. Cameroon saw another political transformation in 1972, when the nation voted by referendum to replace the federal government with a unitary system under the united republic of Cameroon.

There are evidences of poor governance in Nigeria and Cameroon which has a broker effect on economic and human index development, Ejiofor in Eleazu, ed. (1988.158) depicting Nigeria-Cameroon situation, states that the economic crisis in which Nigeria is engulfed in is externally induced as it is internally generated, as politically precipitated as it is administratively nurtured and fed by a warped value system of the society. Nigeria and Cameroon share in the

characteristic of leadership corruption and mismanagement of national resources against the service to the citizens of both countries... No economy can be effectively managed by corrupt public officers.

Poverty and inequality IMF (2014) and NBS (2012), is most visible in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon. Consequently, from this point of view, promote reasons behind protest or violence in Nigeria and Cameroon can be attributed to government lack of meeting the socio-economic needs of its people. It is alleged that both governments do not publish real figures of poverty and unemployment in order to avoid much criticism both domestically and internationally.

Nigeria and Cameroon are classified as weak states. Transparency International (2014) asserts that, Corruption, weak institutions, bad governance, Nigeria and Cameroon were ranked both 144 out of 177 countries. It is true that poverty rates, are somehow high in both countries with Nigeria 61 percent (living in less than one Dollar a day) in 2010 according to NBS (2012) while Cameroon had around 39.9 percent in 2010 according to IMF (2014), Tuschi and Ngang (2007.13) assert that in 1986, the Cameroonian President declared that the country was undergoing an economic crisis from which it has not recovered until today. Consequently, the unemployed youth within these regions are not only lured by financial rewards but also embark on terrorism as a sign of frustration and thereby become aggressive.

Both countries have been battling with economic managerial problems and subsequently in different times do not have good record of human rights, Tuschi and Ngang (2007.13).

> *All Nigerian Governments ever since independence have had very negative human rights records. Political killings … the murder of minority human rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa in November 1995 and the brutal murder of the wife of Presidential candidates, Moshood Abiola. Abiola's own sudden and untimely death while in custody still remains*

> *unresolved. In Cameroon they assert that as many as 25,000 people were killed alone during the UPC insurrection in 1960s, another 5,000 were tortured to death and close to 20,000 were severely maltreated while serving prison terms, under President Biya who has now been in power since 1982 the major problem has been the economy.*

Cameroon has suffered major economic setback since the mid-80s and the recent emergence of civil unrest in the Western Cameroon (English speaking) as a result of marginalization, government has shown brutality and degrading of human dignity which at short or long run may degenerate into terrorist activities.

Therefore, when citizens find themselves with dire socio-economic difficulties and corrupt elites, they often turn to religious or radical extremist groups as is the case in Syria where the IS has become a national, regional and even international threat. Nigeria and Cameroon being contiguous nations share common boundary. They share common joys, frowns and sad moments, Funte (2015:31) sums it up,

> *Cameroon and Nigeria are neighboring nations that share a common border, people and history. Both nations relied on the propinquity to create opportunities that benefited them in the economic, social and the political domains. But considering the ethnic character of the stakes involved in controlling the natural resources of conflict and hostility typified by the Bakassi Territorial dispute, pirates' actions and the transitional insecurity orchestrated by Boko Haram and, hence placing the relationship on the balance of paradox.*

Finally, both countries, share natural wealth that come from the Atlantic Ocean and the natural wealth provided by the forest of the South zone to the wealth of Lake Chad basin and the hazards of the desert and dry land in the north that do not encourage agricultural production except with aid.

2.12 Summary of Literature Review

The literature reviewed, while they have scholarly articulated on the issue of terrorism, they have not been able to address certain important aspects of it. These areas include: the fact that there is no consensus on the definition of the concept 'terrorism', who is a terrorist?' 'operations of terrorist', distinction between terrorist and other forms of insurgencies' such as freedom/liberation fighters, and 'the distinction between warfare and gorilla wars', 'when does terrorist act begins and where does it end? Finally, there is no agreement or coherent solution to terrorist insecurity, destruction and mayhem it poses on man both domestically and trans-nationally. Rather, it is another terror as literature reviewed express fear on the rapid pace of terrorism and its impact on the global politics where the old order has been threatened.

Finally, the literature reviewed have not been able, to specifically identify the impact of terrorism (Boko Haram) on Nigeria Cameroon relations. Reviewed literature have rather helped to reveal/discover the fact that terrorism at the border of Nigeria and Cameroon especially at this magnitude is a new phenomenon in the relations of the two countries since 1960 and there are highly limited literature in this area, yet there abound literature in some other linkages between the two countries such as, border crisis, Bakassi Peninsula crisis, trade and commerce.

Generally in addressing global, trans-national down to intra-national terrorist issues, different people, regions and groups take different postures and stands, depending on perception, feeling, background, sympathy and interest, therefore, the value attachment and subjectivity in understanding of terrorism are all embedded in bias and this has snowballed into, 'looking for universal solution.'

Inter-facing the theoretical framework (linkage theory) of this study to the literature reviewed, it is obvious that the theory's postulations are justified. First the fact that there is

connectivity in terrorist activities in one country and another country. Secondly, the linkage of nation states with issues hence inter-woveness. This exhibit itself in the transition of modern terrorism from Middle East to Africa, the movement of terrorism activities across the borders of one geo-polity to another and the consequent effect of terrorism in the global politics which has polarized the world into two camps – 'friend' and 'enemy'. Consequently most of the terrorist activities are response to certain stimuli. This is why critical theory of terrorism insist that terrorism should not be studied in isolation of the context or environment evident in the fact that terrorism in itself does not exist somewhere rather it snowballed or manifest from societal ills and social interaction. Example, the invasion of Africa and colonial experience to Africans is evil and to many, US policies of hatred and unequitable distribution of world resources are other evils that pre-occupy some peoples heart and at times move them to extreme.

2.13 Theoretical Framework

2.13.1 The Linkage Theory and its Key Proponents

Linkage theory has been selected as a mirror through which this study is viewed. Linkage theory was propounded by J. N. Rosenau in 1969 in his article titled "Linkage Politics".. It is regarded as one of the latest additions to the stock of theories and corollaries on system analysis.

Linkage theory is considered because of the nature of this study which has to do with Nigeria and Cameroon relations. The Linkage theory has its central belief in the fact that states exist with boundaries yet they are interwoven through issues and what happens in one affects the other and as well generates reaction. Surprised at the way some scholars study national issues in isolation, Mayer, Fry and Gubert (1982.425) states, that there can be no question of the significance of linkage politics in its various forms and manifestations, and in the late 1960s James Rosenau perhaps more than anyone else, brought" to the attention of political scientists the

need for systematic study of national/international linkages. Too many students of International Affairs seemed to study the International system as if it were detached from events taking place in individual polities, while decision making theorists studied foreign policy processes with scant attention to how the parameters of decision making were influenced by systematic factors. Mayer, Fry, and Gubert (1982.426), argued that Students of Comparative Politics tend to take the international environment for granted as if national systems were immuned to external influences and had full control over their own destinies. Similarly, students of International Politics tend to make a series of simplifying assumptions about the international behavior of national systems, as if all such system react in the same stimuli. The complaint that Rosenau made in the introduction to Linkage politics was timely.

The term linkage donates, Johari (1985), any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in system and is reacted to in another. It thus peeps into the perennial problems relating to the connection between domestic and foreign policy by taking the spheres of national and international politics as interacting system. The theory holds that "the initial and the terminal stages of 'linkage' are described as 'inputs' and 'outputs' and differentiated according to their origin within the state or within the existing environment. If the patterns of behavior are deliberately designed, the inputs and the outputs are 'direct' if these patterns are unanticipated, the inputs and the outputs are indirect. It is therefore the relationship between input and output that is referred to as linkage. The linkage here as postulated by Rosenau has three forms which include Penetrative linkage, Reactive linkage and Emulative linkage. These forms further explain the nature and types of relationship that exist between states for instance:

- **Penetrative linkage:** exhibits that form of linkage where one polity serves as participant in the political process of another as well shares the authority to allocate values within the

penetrated unit. This includes political, military and economic penetration e.g. is the domination of industries and economics by massive foreign investors.

- **Reactive linkage:** being a category of linkage caused by the boundary- crossing reactions without direct foreign participation in the decision made within the unit. Those responsible for the input do not penetrate the other unit but nevertheless those responsible for outputs with the unit do react, e.g. in a relationship of perceived hostility, an increase in the offensive capacity on one side clearly leads to the increase in the defence effort of the other.
- **Emulative linkage:** this is a noticeable situation of diffusion or demonstration effect whereby political activities in one country are perceived and emulated in another, as non-nuclear states emulating the ways of the nuclear states, or claims of dependent and semi-dependent units for full independence from colonial holds. Under this form, linkage is seen to be emulative when a state tries to match the 'initiating state; it becomes 'imitative' when a state copies the initiating state without any expectation of 'matching'. An example was French decision to develop nuclear weapon which is imitative in relation to the then super powers but emulative in relation to a major power like Britain.

Rosenau also argued that 'adaptive' behavior is an interesting offshoot of linkage approach that seeks to cover the elusive nature of change. This he posits that the basic premise of adaptive perspective is "that nations can be viewed as adapting entities with similar problems that arise out of the need to cope with environment. That adaptive perspective seeks understanding not in unique factors, but in common factors; not through the case study, but through the comparative assessment; not through the applied inquiry that solves immediate

problems, but through the theoretical formulation that rests hypotheses and establishes general principles.

Based on the above affirmation, any foreign policy behavior undertaken by the government is seen to be adaptive, or maladaptive. Adaptive when it copes with or stimulates changes in the external environment that contributes to keeping the essential structures of the society within acceptable limits while maladaptive behavior is that, that contributes to changes in the essential structures that are out of acceptable limits. Coping with the constant flow of trans-boundary transactions, a government embarks some times on adaptive and sometime on maladaptive policies. He argues further that the relation between the two, as well as the relative importance of the issues dealt with determines the position of the state in terms of adaptation. While Rosenau believes that extremes in these cases are very rare, he states that a complete maladaptation can be found in states losing a war and forfeiting independence and complete adaptation will mean maintenance of essential structures fully static. He encourages adaptive capacity of societies due to the rapid changing nature and growth of the society and under this circumstance a greater check is placed on extremism hence fluctuation between adaption and maladaption shall be the result.

The main assumptions and arguments of this theory can be located in the fact that there is a link between domestic and international politics and that countries have boundaries but they are linked by issues, what happens in one polity also affects the other. That such scholars Comparative Politics, International Politics and decision makers should not be parochial in their study of international politics. The theory asserts that there must be issues always between states and states should be diplomatic and toe peaceful line in other that the international community might be stable. The theory, a corollary of system analysis emphasize that the interaction

between input and output is the "Linkage" in itself designating that issues must originate from somewhere and also reacted to. For instance, Zinne (1970.346) pointed out against the arguments of some of the contributors, "what is new here is not so much the study of linkage politics but rather the cooperative nature of the present enterprises". In essence, the theory has a central belief in international order and peace therefore, it ensue for more collaboration and co-operations among the actors in international system through systematic and empirical approach.

2.13.2 Relevance of the Theory to the Study

This theory is justified by its strength. Linkage theory is just suitable in the analysis of inter-state relations. The reality therein being the fact that, it has critically and empirically linked domestic politics with international politics. It has empirically established the fact that international politics did not originate from the air and does not operate in a vacuum either. If we may ask, where is the international domain. It is simply, the nation states and the crossing of their geo-boundaries.

The suitability of this theory in analyzing Nigeria-Cameroon relations cannot be overemphasized hence it states that domestic activities and actions often snowball into international arena: Reference to the literature reviewed in this study corroborated with respondents opinion, it is obvious that terrorism, example the Boko Haram terrorism originated in Nigeria as a domestic issue and not only snowballed into Cameroon but has also attracted the attention of the international community which has also provoked some other actions and reactions.

X-raying the typology of relations, linkages between states encapsulated in the penetrative linkage, reactive linkage and emulative linkage as posited by Rosenau, makes the suitability of this theory to this study become even more evident. The boundary crossing of

Nigeria-Cameroon by the terrorists was not a direct policy of any of the countries yet there is reaction(s) by the government of the countries. Consequently, there is impact of this in political, economic and socio-cultural relations of the two countries.

Imitative linkage as expressed by the theory reveals the activities of terrorism in Nigeria and Cameroon as a linkage between the two countries which is also copied from other countries. It is a replica and a reproduce of what is happening in some other geo-polities like Iraq, Syria, Mali, Somalia Algeria, Middle East, Iraq, etc. Finally, Rosenau stresses "adaptive behavior of states against "maladaptive behaviours" in order to maintain peace between states and also avoid re-colonization. This fits into the principles of Nigerian foreign policy/external relations with her immediate neighbours and African countries. She is ready to within her limits, change the economic and political status of African countries without interfering with the internal structure of any of the counties. This is one of the national interests of Nigeria premised on good-neighbourniless and her assumed leadership role in Africa. In the same manner, Cameroon is also adherent to non-territorial violation, the theory therefore epitomizes the need for co-operation and mutual understanding among states in dealing with issues, cognizance of the fact that issues will always occur between states so that the entire international system will be peaceful. The theory therefore in this direction has x-rayed the crisis ridden Nigeria-Cameroon relations since independence and why they are still friends today translating in to better tomorrow. The theory has empirically articulated the fact that many variables play in Nigeria-Cameroon relations and crowned it all with the contemporary Boko Haram terrorism which seeks collaboration and understanding of the two countries.

2.14 Limitations of the Theory

This theory has some of the following weaknesses;

i. There is over simplified generalization as it peeps into any behavior that originates in one geo-entity and it is reacted to in another.

ii. The theory categorizes actors into two and emphasis was on states ignoring the fact that there are other vibrant actors in the international system that also dictate and influence the relations and behaviours of nation states. Affirming this is the fact that has become an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon is not a deliberate policy of either of the countries.

iii. The theory tends to assume that all states behaviours are in a continuum or regular and must always obey principles not remembering that every country has a national interest that it pursues in its external relationship and any impediment to its achievement is ignored or crushed as such states continue to obey rules only when such serves their national interests.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the procedure through which this study was conducted. The steps starting from the background, research design, population sample and sampling techniques, instrument of data collection, reliability of research instrument and method of data presentation and analysis.

3.2 Impact of Historical Source of Crises on Nigeria-Cameroon Relations

The impact of crises on Nigeria-Cameroon relations which has its origin in colonialism can not be substantiated enough. The root being that Africa's heritage to gradual development and perfection was truncated and fast tracked with already alien and advanced super-structure. Development is characterized by so many variables, Rodney (1972.16) identifying why different people develop at different rates when left alone states that:

> *Part of the answer lies in the environment in which human groups evolved and part of it lies in the super-structure of human society. That is to say, as human battled with the material environment, they created forms of social relations, forms of government, patterns of behavior and systems of belief which together constituted the super-structure-which was never exactly the same in and two societies. Each element in the super-structure interacted with other elements in the super-structure as well as with material base. For instance, the political and religious patterns affected each other and were often intertwined. …in the final analysis the breakthrough to a new stage of human development is dependent upon man's technical capacity to deal with the environment…. Peculiarities in the super-structure of any given society have a marked impact on the rate of development.*

The emergence of colonialism in Nigeria-Cameroon regions in particular and Africa at large was without permission and consent, otherwise, they would have sought for more time

when African development would have reached stage that it would encounter colonialism and capitalism and still forge ahead e.g. Russia, USA, China etc. It is no doubt therefore that when two societies of different sorts come into prolonged and effective contact, the rate and character of change taking place in both is seriously affected to the extent that entirely new patterns are created. The weaker of the two societies i.e. the one with less economic capacity is bound to be adversely affected and the bigger the gap between the two societies concerned the more detrimental are the consequences. Nigeria and Cameroon who happen to be contiguous falling into weaker societies group have inherited a pattern of crisis fashioned by strangulated development that has metamorphosed into dependency.

The imposition of already matured super-structure in term of political structure on Nigeria and Cameroon has created room for political dependency which is characterized by crisis. The structure and institutions of governance as well as the civil service structures are modeled. Consequently they become too advanced and complicated to be managed by the indigenous hands. In other words it breeds politicians and technocrats that are glued to the colonial masters becoming agents of neo-colonialism. This manifest in electoral malpractices, mismanagement of resources, embezzlement, corruption and abuse of office. Public fund meant for development and welfare of the citizens are looted and sent overseas. Even when we talk about democracy, it is merely on the existence of institutions. Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon for 34 years after Ahidjo ruled for 22 years from federalism to unitary system (1960 – 1982 and 1982 up to date) with some parts of the country not adequately represented in the government.

In Nigeria, political crisis resulting from balkalisation and joining of different ethnic groups together has made a mockery of democracy and constitution as a binding force, breeding crisis all over. Inability to govern (adherent to colonial legacies) in these two countries has been

described as responsible for crisis within and in relations between the two countries. Manifesting in Nigeria and Cameroon governments incapacity to implement in their policies, that which will enable sufficient employment creation, reduced poverty and inequality. Frustration of the youths manifest itself and the resultant consequences or show off is to submit to the recruitment of terrorist organizations. Unemployment, poverty and inequality coupled with injustice, corruption have been attributed responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram in the far North of Nigeria and Cameroon and down south, Niger Delta crisis as well as agitation for independence by the western Cameroon and movement for actualization of Biafara and many other border crimes between Nigeria and Cameroon and in Africa generally. The political will of pre-colonial Africa in subduing crimes has been subjugated by the encroached colonial system and culture of the west. The pre-colonial capacity and political will to control crisis was totally lost. None of the pre-colonial authorities could wield power again.

The negative impact of colonialism in political terms was quite dramatic, Rodney (1972.264);

> *overnight African political states lost their power, independence and meaning irrespective of whether they were big empires or small polities, certain traditional rulers were kept in office and the formal structure of some kingdoms was partially retained, but the substance of political life was quite different. Political power had passed into the hands of foreign overlords. Numerous African States in previous centuries had passed through the circle of growth and decline. But colonial rule was different so long as it lasted, not a single African State could flourish.*

In the cultural parlace, Africa is in a total aliehination. It is obvious that African culture is intertwined in religion and this is why the custodian of government in pre-colonial Africa is the head of both political, cultural and religious activities. From colonialism and in the colonial super-structure imposed on Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon, these are three distinct entities. Each

operating in its own sphere, the government only regulates. These three areas in Nigeria and Cameroon today as well, all parts of Africa is an unassessible chaos and inability of the states to function properly. It is disheartening how the religion of Africa suddenly lost its co-coordinative control and direction of man's activities and environment. Now, Africa has gone back to the pre-formation of order in the society, the era before "Liviatha" and in the representation of George Owell in Animal Farm. In this order, Giri in Walsh (2003.59-60), the Chairperson of Guild of Peace, India lamented that;

> *Religion originates in response to the direct experience of the sacred and spiritual, governments have a profound responsibility to set an example of religious tolerance. The world is beset with problems of terrorism, organized crime, poverty, social and economic discrimination, and a blatant disregard for human rights. Violence has gone to the core of the society, where religious intolerance wrecks havoc and trauma in people's and hearts.*

In furtherance to the kind of order in pre-colonialism and the contemporary crisis as a result of distortion, Ilogu (1974.63) using Igbo land as a case study lamented that

> *It could be deduced that before the arrival of Christianity, Igbo land was a place in which the traditional religion laid the basis of behavior, social and cultural identification, and the principles of socialization from the older to the younger generation were clearly understood. With the arrival of missionaries and traders from 1857 onwards the neat pattern became disturbed.*

Even though Islam came much earlier than colonialism and its own distortions, Christianity yet facilitated colonialism and both of them and any other religion other than paganism is alien to Africa. Both Islam and Christianity distorted the culture of Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon in particular. Though Islam was violent, it conformed with some of the African traditional culture such as marrying many wives and producing as many children as possible, making of charm for protection against enemies etc. Christianity that came with colonialism was

totally opposite and alienated all these. It restricted Africans from many wives (one man, one wife) which means reducing labour force for farming. It totally alienated its converts from all forms of traditional African culture such as worshipping any other gods, acquisition of unnecessary wealth, participation in traditional titles and other ceremonies that are fetish in nature. To sum it up is that a convert is expected to have only one straight recognized relationship i.e. God; any other is such that will facilitate your good work to God which will lead you to heaven. It forms its own community, disrupting African kinship like the principle of direct rule, it was the belief of Christianity that African Paganism would go into extinction. This is seen in the words of Ilogu (1974.63) where John Christopher Talor, the first missionary and pastor in Onitsha 1857-1869 had hoped very confidently that the Nwadibeas, (diviner-priest and healers of Igbo land), would soon disappear. In his Journal entry for 6th February 1863 he reported to the C.M.S Headquarters in London:

> *Already the Dibeas are ashamed in this district and they could not boldly show their nose, and are trying to rid themselves, as their craft is now in danger of being exposed before the pure light of Christianity and in the eyes of their Long-troden vassalage.*

Hence the effort to undermine the work of the Dibeas and now, it manifest because so many of them including shrines have gone into extinction. It is disheartening to note that colonial masters did not believe that Nigeria and Cameroon and Africa in general had a culture. Even hitherto, making reference to African culture is tied to "barbaric", "achaic", "backward" etc. This up till today has a diverstating psychological effect on Africans, Booth Jr. (1979.1) asserts that

> *An early Portuguese visitor to Southern Coast of Africa reported that, "The people are Hottentots and they have no religion. He was wrong on both counts, but at least on the latter point his mistake was understandable. After all, he*

> *was from Europe, where the presence of religion is manifested in church buildings, priests, and sacred scriptures. Perhaps he was on his way home from India where comparable phenomena would have been seen. In that part of Africa, however, he saw no distinctively religious functionaries, and certainly no scriptures. Therefore, they have no religion.*

Africa lost its culture and we stick to the culture of colonial masters both in dressing, eating, education, religion, lifestyle, respect and grooming that starts from childhood to adolescent, anti-crime system to conscience and sacredless. All these have resulted to loss of control, loss of image and identity. It is said that when "salt loses its taste," it is no more salt. Indeed the territory referred to today as Africa is no more what it used to be rather it is now "Africa", Rodney (1972.245) puts it this way "Africa ceased to set indigenous cultural goals and standards, and lost full command of training young members of the society. Those were undoubtedly major steps backwards." More disheartening effect is the crisis that result from displacement of kiths and kins, Bamigbose (2013:8), pre-colonial African families/ethnic groups and socio-cultural were distorted and divided, each finding themselves in the separated today different entities "the consequence today is that ethnic political features of African landscape elsewhere same ethnic groups found themselves under different political sovereignties".

In the spheres of economy, Nigeria-Cameroon crisis emanated from the point that the two countries have been designated into the poor category class in the world economic struggle. This is evident in the fact that the world is economically divided into 'south and north', 'have and the have not.' Had Africa which Nigeria and Cameroon are part was allowed to develop in the natural sense, it would emerge industrial continent. There were indices that many kingdoms/societies in pre-colonial Africa were already on the way to this claim, Rodney (1972.112-113).

> *It is particularly striking that in the early centuries of trade Europeans relied heavily on Indian cloths for resale in Africa, and they also purchased cloths on several parts of the West African Coast for resale elsewhere, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegambia, Ivory Coast, Benin, Yorubaland and Loango were all exporters to other parts of Africa – through European Middlemen. Yet, by the time that Africa entered the colonial era, it was concentrating almost entirely on the export of raw cotton and the import of manufactured cotton cloths. This remarkable reversal is tied to technological advance in Europe and to stagnation of technology in Africa owing to the very trade with Europe.*

It is a clear indication that the resultant effect of this is that African economic development was dislocated and conversely limited to the production of raw material alone to serve industries in Europe. They made Africa to sleep like a baby in the arms of their exploitative concept/theory of "comparative advantage".

In other hand the implication of integration of African economies to a developed capitalist economies coupled with dislocation of African culture have multiplier effect. One is that Africa has crisis of producing food to feed its populace thereby infesting the continent with hunger and famine. Secondly, there is brain drain hence some intelligent Africans are handpicked and given job abroad while some because of the backwardness of Africa find Africa not conducive and safe for them to stay and voluntarily go to advanced countries where there is security and comfort of life. Thirdly, this has divided Africa into different classes – the class of the poor i.e. abject poverty, the class of average and the rich class. The rich class are very few, in each African societies who run the state machineries as their private business, exploit and embezzle public fund. The class of the poor i.e. those who are in abject poverty are always high. These are the volurable class who express their feelings through violence.

Colonialism, neo-colonialism and globernization all embedded in imperialism are all strategic tools to further deepen stagnation and increase crises in Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon in particular. Globernization, is simply a new political socio-economic phenomena and strategy to strengthen the pillars of neo-colonialism. The effect results in perpetuating dependency hence the advanced societies continue to develop and the disadvantaged societies to underdevelope. This means that the backward societies will continue to look up to the developed for aid. In other wards, instead of giving them net to fish, they (advanced) pin Africa to only beg for fish so that struggle and violence become patterns of their lives.

Colonialism structurally (landmark, population, resource wise,) carved Nigeria out for leadership role in Africa yet the stumbling blocks have been put in place (even before she was named) so that this leadership role be not achieved so also to become a setback for her to forge ahead and develop. This is the reason why Tafawa Balewa in his wisdom and foresight decided to be pro-west at the birth of Nigeria as to strengthen the economic pillars of Nigeria for continental leadership role knowing fully well that much will not be benefited economically from the relations with African countries rather much is to be given out yet, many scholars saw this as a weakness; all the same little did he know that Nigeria and Africa have been fashioned to serve the metropolitan powers. The same apply to Cameroon who ought to play effective leadership role in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

Generally colonial system was hostile, exploitative and antagonistic and deceitful, Nigeria and Cameroon genetically inherited all these characters. This crowned with the strategic plans to serve the colonial masters perpetually groomed, hatched and nurtured crises in the region and continent. Neo-colonialism has been strengthened by “globalization.” Solution does not lie in the theory of ‘delink’ ‘detach’ as propounded by Samir and Rodley, but the question is,

can we go back to pre-colonial era and possibly continue with natural state of development? The answer is still no. probably, the answer may be appeal and negotiation for total liberation which still looks gloomy because it will mean backward for the already advanced countries who systematically suck the blood of Africa to sustain their own development and advancement. While crises continue to ravage Nigeria and Cameroon even Africa as a continent, may be, time will sort things out but repatriation might sound more achievable.

3.2.1 The Nature of Nigeria-Cameroon Bilateral Relations Before Terrorism

The relationship between Nigeria and Cameroun could be said to be as old as the existence of man within this geo - political area. It transcends the artificial and colonial division of the geo-political, socio - cultural and economic areas which gave them the names they bear today which also has created diplomatic divisions from colonial regime to the era of indigenous regimes. According to Omede (2006.7):

> *Nigeria's relationship with her mainly Franco-phone neighbours is predicated on the historically ill-defined and improperly delimitation of boundaries in the West African sub-region by the erstwhile European colonial masters. The highly porous and easily permeable nature of these boundaries, coupled with the lack of a coordinated and coherent boundary policy by Nigeria and the governments of contiguous states' accounts for the lukewarm and sometimes, frosty relations between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours.*

In the same manner, Akinterinwa and Ate (1992) affirm that the boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroun Republic arising from their long, but ill - defined borders (1680 Kilometers or 1050 miles) are of colonial origin. However, it has remained a source of conflict in direct bilateral relations of the two countries since independence.

Nigeria and Cameroun have been relating and co-existing, yet, they are not best of friends, depicting the international norm of no permanent friend, no permanent enemy. The

Nigerian-Cameroon relationship Omede (2006.15) is characterized by mutual distrust and friction emanating from the claims by both countries to the disputed Bakassi Peninsular. The boundary is the longest of all Nigeria's international boundaries and is the most complicated topography. The Bakassi Peninsular Njoku (2012) posits,

> *has made Nigeria-Cameroon relations to be characterized by mutual mistrust, suspicion and hostility. ... the boundaries between both counties happen to be the longest of all Nigeria's international boundaries and the most obscured geographically. The boundary disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon Republic (1680 Kilometres) are of colonial origin. However, it has remained a basis of variance in direct bilateral relations of the two countries since independence.*

Both Nigeria and Cameroon Omede, (2006.15), are claiming ownership of the Bakassi Penunsular and by so doing, both countries have engaged in series of verbal vituperation and military maneuvers which have serious political and security implications on the sub - region.

A more systematic analysis is the fact that the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon can be classified into segments. From 1960 when both countries gained independence there were cordial relations but the cordiality got interrupted in the mid 1960s. Buttressing this, Familugba and Ojo (2013.185) assert that

> *In the northern section of the two countries, grazing lands are commonly used in some areas, for example, around Adamawa and Mandara Hills, grazers gain from this cooperation, and government of both countries equally derive revenue from tax payer's money. The fishermen from both sides jointly use the local rivers for fishing and other domestic purposes. The trend of Nigeria – Cameroon relationship underwent some changes in the middle of 1960s. It was characterized by disharmony and inherently conflict prone. This was partly due to the influence exerted by France and leadership role of Nigeria in the sub-region, although, the rulers of these respective countries in the sub-region often attempted to portray an impression of cordiality in their official relations.*

From 1970 – 1980 scholars, Tushui and Ngang (2007.10), Funteh (2015.41), Familugba and Ojo (2004.185) agree that the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon continued to be un-cordial resulting to hostility. The first major use of direct violence in form of military conflict, Tushi and Ngang (2017.10) took place on May 16, 1981.

> *This day, Cameroon's National Radio Network Service announced that three Nigerian Military patrol boots had violated Cameroon's territorial sovereignty by intruding into Bakassi up to Rio-del- Rey River and opened fire on the Cameroonian Navy. In retaliation, Cameroonian soldiers also retaliated and in the battle that ensued, five Nigerian soldiers were killed.*

This hostility in the relations of the two countries continued hence there was always confrontation, retaliation and affront. Even when Cameroon sought to settle the differences regards Bakassi at the U.N. International Court of Justice in 1994 the affront continued unabated, Check (2011.5) assert that the entente between the two neighbours collapsed when in 1981 and again on Christmas Day 1993, Nigerian troops invaded the Pennisula. The armies of the two countries were holed-up on the Peninsula until 14 August, 2007 when the ICJ had ruled that the disputed territory belonged to Cameroon.

The dictates of the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon to a large extent also depended on the rhetorics of leadership, personality and political changes. This could be justified by the bilateral and multilateral outing of Cameroon during Amadou Ahidjo's time in office. Also, Cameroon's stand with Nigeria at the crucial period of the formation of OAU (AU) in 1963, inspite of the fact that Brazzaville group was dominated by Francophone Countries Cameroon opted for Monrovia group seeing reasons with Nigeria's opinions. Furthermore, according to Check (2011.7);

> *the then Cameroon federation strongly supported the Federal Government of Nigeria during the 1967 to 1970 Nigerian civil war. The Bakassi estuary, which was the only waterway into the secessionists Biafran territory, was blocked by the Cameroon Navy and stifled any Biafran attempt to secure supplies from the outside world.*

On the other hand, Triple Agent, Double Cross (2015) posits, "Infact, Boko Haram in North Cameroon and the system/ Biya regime are in symbiosis as they make each other relevant in a space where both are loathed by the vast majority of Cameroonians". Biya's rule in Cameroon could be associated with the intermittent military sojourning in Nigeria governance. The military intervention in Nigerian politics has had its own positive and negative bilateral effect on Nigeria-Cameroon relations for instance most of the clashes or violent periods between Nigeria and Cameroon could be traced to military regimes just as Check (2011.4) asserts "Cameroon diplomacy underwent ahiatus under the Biya regimes as the grandiose days of the Ahidjo era dissipated into the doldrums of diplomatic stagnation. Since that time she has had little presence at continental and global gathering". The civilian regimes in Nigeria have always to some extent parliated the Nigeria-Cameroon relations with diplomacy. During Shagari's regime, the apology by Cameroon in July 1981 was accepted for killing five Nigerian soldiers in Akpayafa river instead of Rio-de-Rey as claimed by Cameroon in Cameroon territory and Shagari was commended for averting violence.

As radical as it were, though the seal was by Military regime referred to as ceding Nigeria territory (Bakassi) to Cameroon during Nigerian Civil war 1967 – 1970 by Yakubu Gowon. Same was revoked by Military regime Tuschi and Ngang (2007.9) asserts that

> *Shortly after Gowon was over thrown in Coup in 1975, the new leader General Murtala Muhammed and the apparatus he put in place lulled the bulk of Nigerian citizens into believing that former President Gowon had given Bakassi proper to Cameroon as a gift in gratitude for role played*

> *by Cameroon in Nigerian Civil War. He questioned the validity of the 1971/1975 Maritime border agreements and repudiated the Maroua Declaration on the premise that it had not been ratified by the ruling military organ.*

In the same manner his predecessors General Obasanjo continued and this posture set stage of protracted border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Obviously, the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon have largely been punctuated and characterized by mistrust which I allie to differences in ideology and other colonial heritages. Cameroon on several occasions have alleged that Nigeria is selfish and works to exert her influence against the benefits of Cameroon. This assertion is echoed by Familugba and Ojo (2013.185) thus:

> *The situation of rivalry and disharmony had perhaps been more pronounced in Nigeria – Cameroon border more than any others. This was not unconnected with some actions and decision taken by Nigerian government which Cameroon regarded as out of place. Cameroon accused Nigerian government on the following grounds: that Nigeria used her influence through Lake Chad Basin Commission to get Niger and Chad on her side. Secondly, that Nigerian fishing boats plunder their waters with the support of Nigerian Navy using Cameroon as a dumping ground, whereas the trading activities should be on mutual consideration between the two countries.*

They further assert that on boundary dimension that the Cameroon regarded Nigeria as carving out an expansionist policy to grab more land from small and weak Cameroon and that Cameroonian authority is of the opinion that Nigerian government masterminded the result of the referendum in 1959 in the former Northern section of British controlled by Cameroon, that Nigerian government sent in thousands of Nigerians to vote against the idea of uniting with Cameroon. This notion as early as independence has kept Cameroon on alert, suspecting every movement and steps Nigeria ever made.

Whether the above assertions were true or false, it has led Cameroon to act in certain ways against Nigeria such as planning and embarking on the intermittent clashes with Nigerian forces at the borders and Bakassi in particular, maltreatment of Nigerians at different times which in turn prompted retaliatory measures. In the claims of Tuschi and Ngang (2007.16 & 17). It is therefore in line with this that during the military confrontations both countries advanced security reasons as excuses for resorting to direct military force. In 1981, Cameroon claimed that Nigeria had entered her sphere of influence and thus posing a threat to her national security and territorial sovereignty (state security). Nigeria on the other hand, justified the deployment of soldiers to Bakassi saying she did so to protect the security of Nigeria fishermen and traders who were subjected to harassment and unfair treatment in the hands of Cameroonian gendarmes (human security).

It is obvious that it was due to strained confidence Cameroon had on Nigeria that made her to boycott bilateral negotiations and settlement and registered the Bakassi issue at the UN court at Hague. Even when the case was at a court, Tuschi and Ngang (2007.11) assert that:

> *The last major incident broke out in February 1996 when deploying an additional 1000 troops, Nigeria invaded and occupied Bakassi. This time around, it seemed as if an extended and full-fledged military combat was imminent, in spite of the fact that the case was already before the ICJ. By May 1996, more than 50 Nigerian soldiers had lost their lives and several others taken prisoners according to diplomatic source.*

This affirms Omede (2006) that at putting up of the Green Tree Agreement in 2006 and withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Bakassi in 2008 and complete administrative takeover of Bakassi in 2013, Nigeria released about 150 Cameroonian prisoners of war 1998. It is, therefore, worth noting that Nigeria-Cameroon relations since independence has been characterized and punctuated by crisis yet the relationship has continued. As a matter of fact frictions at one time or

the other are common in international relations. Nigeria and Cameroon have always put these differences behind them and forged ahead. As already enumerated they have supported each other in times of needs and have had occasions of diplomatic exchanges, unabated flow of socio-cultural and economic interactions both formal and at informal levels hence there is tight and corresponding relations at the frontline communities fostered by relational ties which colonial divide has not succeeded in extinguishing even though many occasions it has been the cause of crises in Cameroon-Nigeria relations.

The resolve and peaceful settlement of Bakassi saga epitomizes assertion that inspite all odds, Nigeria and Cameroon have not and will never forget that they are brothers, once upon a time, without boundary and diplomatic divide. In describing Nigeria and Cameroon closeness Tuschi and Ngang (2007.28) remembering a suitable African adage said "the eye and the nose are too close to go to war. A war between Cameroon and Nigeria will have serious ramifications for both countries and the entire region as well. Nigeria would lose its status as a great advocate for the respect of the rule of law nationally and internationally and its credibility to settle disputes peacefully.

It cannot be argued that Nigeria-Cameroon relations has strains in some areas but furthering the strengthened relations between Nigeria and Cameroon is the human proportion and representation in each of the countries hence the interview held with HE Pierre Moukoko Mbonjo, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Republic of Cameroon on 2 September 2013 at Chathman House London where he asserts that "four million Nigerians are resident in Cameroon and one million Cameroonians live in Nigeria, so cooperation between the countries is essential". This was among his response when he thanked United Kingdom on behalf of Cameroon for provision of maps, legal experts and support during Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula case at

the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In affirmation of Nigeria-Cameroon good relations, Tuschi and Ngang (2007.19) still argued that:

> *Despite the long – standing border disputes between both countries, Cameroon and Nigeria continued to have a cordial and brotherly relationship with one another. However, Nigeria suspected that foreign powers like France, Britain and Germany mingled into the conflict in favour of Cameroon.*

In the other hand, Funke (2015) argued that it were events that prompted many scholars to class the relations between the two nations as "perpetual hostility" – the respective governments remained connected in an attempt to close these sad pages of their relationship. He further posits that historical analysis and strategic examination of Cameroon-Nigeria political and economic relationship revealed a considerable level of warmth, cordiality and mutuality of interest and purpose. Even at that, he warned that "they also need to reconsider the nature and effects of their foreign policies and profoundness of their shared opportunities. This will help them to minimize the tricks and profanes introduced by colonial and neocolonial legacies not often aimed at orienting the construction of African continent to an indigenous sustainable beneficial offer and Familugba and Ojo (2004.186), Nigeria and Cameroon need each other to survive.

It is evident from the above that border issues, Bakassi Peninsula, governance and leadership style all embedded in colonial legacies are the origin of crises in Nigeria-Cameroon relations.

3.3 Research Design

The study employed survey method with in-depth interview as the method of data gathering. This is because survey, according to Osuala (1982.253), studies both large and small populations by selecting and study samples chosen from the population to discover the relative

incidence, distribution and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables. Survey focuses on people, the vital facts of people and their beliefs, opinions, attitudes, motions and behaviours.

Small population is preferred in this study basically because of the nature of the study. Being a qualitative study, the sample population is determined using non-probability technique. According to Etikan, Musa and Alkassim (2015.2), data gathering is crucial in research, as the data are meant to contribute to a better understanding of a theoretical framework. It then becomes imperious that selecting the manner of obtaining data and from whom the data will be acquired be done with sound judgement, especially since no amount of analysis can make up for improperly collected data.

The non-probability sampling and survey methods are not without faults hence is based on a researcher's judgement and there might be possibility of bias in sample selection which can affect or distort the findings of the study. According to Osuala (1982) the problem of securing degree of involvement by respondents to a survey is more intractable. This is particularly so when it is carried out by post, but is also difficult when the survey is carried out face to face. If the sampling is faulty, this produces a generalizability or external validity problem such that we cannot generalize our findings. Nevertheless, survey is proven to be one of the best research methods."The survey is more realistic than experiment setting" and Osuala (1982) further asserts that notwithstanding all these caveats, a good, competently run survey is something all generalists real world researchers should be able to offer. Survey provide the type of data which are not difficult for an intelligent lay audience to understand, particularly an audience with scientifically literate. Choosing respondents for face to face interview in this study was done using purposive and convenience techniques. This is in line with the assertion of Etikan, Musa

and Alkassan (2015.2 and 3) that convenience sampling is a non-probability or non random sampling where members of the target population that meet certain practical criteria, such as easy accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time or the willingness to particulate are included for purpose of the study while purposive identification and selection of individual or groups that are proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of interest. The respondents therefore were selected based on the nature of the study which requires people with in-depth knowledge of the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon as well as the phenomena or dependent variable "terrorism" or "Boko Haram Terrorism". In the other hand those at the frontline border e.g. Mubi in Adamawa had practical experience of Boko Haram activities being at the border, witnessing movements in and across border and as well having been victims at different times.

The survey method applied here also include mail interview questions, Osuala (1982.268 and 273) states that "mail questionnaire is another type of survey and has been popular in education and in social sciences. It has serious draw back unless it is used in conjunction with other techniques. He posits its strength thus: "it affords not only wider coverage than any other technique, but it also reaches individual who are normally difficult to contact. In other hand, interview as a technique is a special conversation carried out with the definite aim of obtaining certain information. It is designed to gather valid and reliable information through the responses of the interviewees to a planned sequence of questions. Out of the four classifications of survey Osuala (1982.265) – personal interview, mail questionnaire, panel, telephone and controlled – observation, the study chose two of this, mail questionnaires with personal interview which he asserts "far overshadows the others as the most powerful and useful tool of social scientific survey research". Hoyos and Barnes (2012.23) assert that face - face interview are very labour

intensive, but can be the best way of collecting high quality data and Meho (2006) opines that e-mail interview cost less compare to face-face interview.

3.4 Population Sample and Sampling Technique

In choosing sample for this study, respondents were categorized into three – Government offices, traditional institutions and private individuals and they are stated thus:

i. Immigration and local chiefs at the frontiers (Mubi and Banki)
ii. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cameroon Embassy at Abuja.
iii. Ministry of Defence Headquarters at Abuja.
iv. Ministry of Commerce Trade and Investment and National Bureau of Statistics at Abuja.
v. Private Individuals (serving and retired) citizens of Nigeria and Cameroon

The sample size is seventeen (17): six government offices represented by their ministers, High Commissioner, the Officer-in-Charge Nigerian Immigration Office Mubi, one traditional ruler, the Emir of Mubi; four Nigerians, three at Mubi in Adamawa State Nigeria, one at Nigeria Military Police, Basawa, Zaria. Six citizens of Cameroon (private individuals) – two in Nigeria and four in Cameroon. All of the above were interviewed (face to face) with exception of four individuals in Cameroon that mail questionnaire was used to generate data from. In all, contacts were made with all of the designated respondents. Choice of this population is in line with the study's assumptions, questions and the nature of the study; they are characterized as experts or key informants as they have versed knowledge on the field of study (Boko Haram and inter-state relations), Anderson (2006.136), they were not chosen to be representatives of a population, but because they are the persons most likely to provide the information needed to answer the research questions.

The choice of the population is further strengthened, Teddlie (2007.77), the technique is used in selecting units (e.g. individual, groups of individuals, institutions). That it is a type of sampling in which "particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices". He described convenience sampling technique as "drawing samples that are both easily accessible and willing to participate in a study". The interest and enthusiasm the researcher witnessed in some of the respondents especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in Abuja, Immigration office at Mubi as well as the Emir's Palace at Mubi substantiates Teddlie's assertions. This could be justified by their willingness to answer questions, share their experiences. I was taken round the Emir's Palace where I saw some damages done by Boko Haram when they invaded Mubi and in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, little did we know that we had put in as much as over 3 hours in the interview session.

3.5 Instrument of Data Collection

Primary and secondary data collection were employed in this study. The primary data generation was done through survey method facilitated by the use of face to face interview with specific number of interviewees/respondents which include private individuals, government officials/organizations and traditional institutions. The choice of purposive and convenience technique in data generation made it much easier in location of the interviewees/respondents, premised on the fact that the study is a qualitative one than quantitative. Face to face interview chosen as an instrument of generating primary data from a target population in the study was inspired by Osuala (1982.253) who assert that interview helps to capture the "vital facts of people and their beliefs, opinions, attitudes, emotions and behaviours. This actually manifested during the field work hence the respondents reacted in different ways in trying to prove their

stand in the relations of Nigeria and Cameroon from 1960 to 2016, some of the respondents were emotional, some historic, some were sober and yet some were emotionally stable, while some were lamentative.

In a successive order the questions posed were designed, cognizance of each category's knowledge and experience as relevant to the study questions and assumptions. This is evident in the study's effort to identify the practical feelings of the frontline communities and even the government operatives therein, the actual official actions and reactions and attitudes from government agencies with specific related functions as well as ordinary citizens who are versed in the area of the study.

Secondary source are documents collected from people who did not witness the events to be reconstructed in history. In other words, secondary sources are information collected through a third party, "someone who was not an eye-witness". Relevant data to the study were generated from text books, journals, newspapers and magazines, internet and other published and unpublished materials. The major base used for the sources of secondary data were Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU, Political Science and International Studies Departmental and Faculty of Social Sciences Libraries, Public Library ABU, and useful documents gathered from individuals and government agencies visited in the course of field work.

Both sources, primary and secondary indeed complemented each other which added value to the study.

3.6 Reliability of the Research Instruments

Primary and secondary type of data were employed and the instrument used were survey method facilitated by in-depth interview technique (IDI) with structured interview questions and restructured mail questionnaires. All of these were meant to ascertain the validity or otherwise of

the research questions and clarify the assumptions posed by the study on Nigeria-Cameroon relations from independence to the contemporary period of study 2009 – 2016. The instruments of data collection were effectively deployed, data generated and the responses of the interviewees were adequately tested and they answered the research questions and assumptions, which proved some of them true and some negative.

The study in preparation for field work was already aware of some assertions, that reliability and validity of survey data depend on a considerable extent on the technical proficiency of those running the survey. If the questions are incomprehensible or ambiguous, the exercise is obviously a waste of time. This is a problem of internal validity, where we are not obtaining valid information about the respondents and what they are thinking, feeling, doing etc.

The primary knowledge of the deficiencies of survey method and the techniques employed was rather an input, a first step guarding against time wasted at the end of study, Etikan, Musa and Alkassim (2015.1) epitomizes it in the fact that "data gathering is crucial in research" hence data is aimed at contributing to a better understanding of a theoretical design. They assert that the researcher should be wise and be sound in his judgement warning that "no amount of analysis can make up for improperly collected data". The study as much as possible, removed every bias and obstacles that was to come between the interviewer and the respondents. The instruments were properly and adequately chosen and applied and the emotions, feelings in sharing experiences and enthusiasm to do so proved their willingness and objectiveness. When of course the right tools are matched with the right skills, the expectations will also be right, Hoyos and Barnes, (2012) "qualitative research should not be assessed based on criteria developed for quantitative methods", from the inception the direction of this study has been non-probability

and the tools tenured along this line even unto analysis, statistical inferences were not possible and statistical validity was not discussed hence the study is qualitative.

3.7 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

Data presentation and analysis in this study employed the qualitative descriptive method owed to the fact that quantitative data were not involved in the study and required no statistical analyses. Data generated were described, narrated in accordance with the responses of the interviewees depicting positive or negative as regards the research assumptions. The narrative technique provided or helped to expose the logical account of the events and issues which helped in describing and explaining the extent of agreement or disagreement or even departure of a set of opinions and feelings on an issue or phenomena. The data generated were basically described, interpreted in conjunction with the secondary data to prove the study's assumptions right or wrong. In other words, the use of qualitative descriptive analysis helped the study to simply or literally explain and interpret the result of the findings corroborating the information generated in primary and secondary sources which helped the researcher to draw conclusions on the findings which amounted to acceptance and rejection of any of the assumptions put up by the study earlier.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is a presentation of data generated from the field. Key points and valid opinions of respondents as well as related propositions to the study were appropriately cited and corroborated by some other secondary sources. This is done, collaborating the assumption and objectives of the study. The chapter therefore is divided into sub-sections for easy analysis and understanding of the objectives of the study.

4.2 Survey Field Work Analysis of the Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria-Cameroon Relations

4.2.1 Pre-Terrorist Relations of Nigeria and Cameroon

This section established the basis for comparison and identification of what the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon was and what it is during the period under investigation i.e. 2009 – 2016 and possibly forecast the future. This is analyzed based on investigation carried out which focused on socio-economic, cultural and political factors.

4.2.1.1 Socio Cultural Relations Before Terrorism

It is a common knowledge that contiguous nations like Nigeria and Cameroon are bound to relate socio-culturally because of the intertwindness of the people, Karim (2015) asserts the contiguous existence of Hausa and Fulanis in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Yoruba and Egun in Nigeria and Togo, Benin Republics and the existence of Efiks-Ibibio in Nigeria and the Cameroon Republic. The prevalent feeling among the interviewees shared this opinion and some of them highlighted their opinions in this order: The Emir's Palace Mubi (2016), Nigerian Immigration Office Mubi (2016).

> *You should first understand that before independence/colonial era, the whole territories called Nigeria and Cameroon today were one. After independence socio-cultural relations continued to flow for the following reasons.*

i. Mubi to Cameroon have one tribe called Gude tribe and another is Fani. In Michika Local Government there is a tribe called Kamuwe that is Higg because some people knew them and call them Higg.

ii. Borderlines just divided families and people who share common socio-economic and cultural values. There is common movement, there is inter-marriage, common worship including ancestral beliefs. They share one ruler; there is one traditional emirate that still exist e.g. Rulers in Cameroon come to Adamawa to pay homage to the Lamido of Adamawa. This is religion and tradition. They share same culture in Kwaja half of a building (house) is in Cameroon, half is in Nigeria.

The respondents opinion above is shared by many of the literature reviewed. The above opinion is corroborated by Njoku (2012.201) stating that in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, there are Efik/Ibibio groups that shared from the Calabar area into the neighboring Littoral areas. Just like the Fulani and Shuwa Arabs of Cameroon are common on both sides of Gongola and Borno States of Nigeria.

The above opinions could account for cordiality at the frontier communities between Nigeria and Cameroon. A respondent affirms this, Emir's Palace Mubi (2016) stressed the point that "we share everything you can think of in life together. We are just same people, is just by name we are divided." Yet, in some cases it is evident that this nearness to each other has been source of crisis, Njoku (2012), Omede (2015) ascribe the crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon to Bakassi Peninsula.

4.2.1.2 Socio-Economic Relations Before Terrorism

It is also a common knowledge that contiguous nations like Nigeria and Cameroon are bound to relate economically. The economic relations between Nigeria and Cameroon are both formal and informal. Consequently, it is more in the informal side than formal because of the closeness of the two countries. Corroborating this, Funte (2015.35) stated that owing to their geo-historic proximity, the people of Northern Cameroon and Nigeria carved out commercial opportunities. The most prominent and important trade routes were Garoua-Yola, Maroua – Mubi and Mora – Maiduguri. There exist another route from Ngoundere through Kontcha to Yola. Many respondents affirm this opinion, Kimeng (2016) asserts that

> *Cameroon is the gateway of Nigeria goods to Central African countries up to Libya and Sudan.*

Many respondents agree that before terrorism, trade and commerce between Nigeria and Cameroon was booming. The Emir's Palace Mubi (2016) empirically put it this way.

> *Mubi market is an international market. Different countries come to buy different things. if it were those days, I would have taken you to the market, you would have seen things for yourself – one lorry loads what three lorries suppose to carry, every part of the lorry is attached with one thing or the other.*

Corroborating the opinions of the above respondents the Nigerian Immigration Office Mubi (2016) laying emphasis and stressing the fact that there was good trade flow before terrorism said that "Trade then was booming, Nigeria gain. Cameroon comes here to buy everything including magi."

This opinion affirms the reality between economically more viable nation relating with less privilege one. The respondent opinion is not intended to ridicule Cameroon but to show the extent of economic relations hence another respondent lamented on how they have missed some

goods that come from Cameroon such as cow, rice etc. Yakubu (2001.223) affirm this referring to Bakassi crisis that "if not for the crisis Cameroon stands to benefit more from Nigeria more especially given the latter's policy of good neighborliness". The opinion of respondents are also corroborated by the table from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015 Appendix 1) which showed continued and uninterrupted economic flow. The table showed that bilateral trade relations between Nigeria and Cameroon 1999 – 2009 was normal and uninterrupted and this was the period before the emergence of terrorism at the borders (and in the) two countries. This official trade relations reflected the trade activities at the frontier borderline based on the opinions of respondents.

4.2.1.3 Political Relations before Terrorism

In the political circle, the good diplomatic relations of contiguous nations ought to galvanize cordial relations in other sectors of their relations yet contrary seem to be the case between Nigeria and Cameroon. This is also a product of contiguity hence Yakubu (2001:224) capturing Eminue (1994) views, pictured the political relations between Nigeria and Cameroon as resulting from violation of principles five of Cameroon; "Cameroon authorities have perpetrated numerous acts of aggression against Nigerian citizens, over time, including the Cameroonisation of some Nigerian fishing settlements at Bakassi Peninsula." Yakubu opined that "All these reveal that Cameroon has no respect for Nigeria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence." This characteristics of tension, suspicion, mutual distrust, Omede (2006:15), Ajayi and Oluruwaju (2014) exhibited strain and restriction in diplomatic relations of Nigeria and Cameroon. This was corroborated by majority of the respondents. A group of respondents assert that the political relationship after independence was, using these words "frosty", "cold", "tensed", "hostility", "forced". Buttressing this strains in the diplomatic relations of Nigeria and

Cameroon before the emergence of terrorism, some respondents to interview questions tried to justify their opinions by recounting the cause of this unfriendly relations thus:

> *Bakassi Peninsula issues, colonial legacies, immigration – issues of residency and National Identity Card (NID), Trade domination by Nigerians in Cameroon and boarder crisis.*

On the other hand, the responses of professionals, Nigeria Foreign Affairs Office (2016) and the Cameroon Embassy were rather a diplomatic approach. Both opined that:

> *Nigeria–Cameroon relations before terrorism was cordial, though there were moments of unpleasant events, that do not make it not to be cordial.*

Specifically, the Cameroon Embassy Official (2016) affirms his stand when he further said that Nigerian-Cameroon relations are cordial and will continue to be cordial. Mustapha (2016) expanded the term "cordial". Responding to interview she said,

> *Nigeria and Cameroon have not gone to war. In a bilateral relations, there are bound to be moments of hiccups. It is common in international relations and politics and that, in itself at times strengthens the bilateral relations.*

Corroborating the above opinion Umar (2016) responding to interview said;

> *Look, there is no total cordiality of relations among any nations" but shortly added, "oil politics is all about Bakassi which affected Nigeria–Cameroon good relations after independence but they pretended to be good neighbours.*

Analytically, it is obvious that the diplomatic relations of Nigeria and Cameroon relative to other sectors (socio-cultural and economic) was not friendly. Pretending to be friends is justified by Yakubu (2001) that if not for the Bakassi crisis, Cameroon stands to benefit more from Nigeria more especially given the latter's policy of good neighbourliness. This is further

justified when we say that Nigeria endures her neighbours excesses cognizance of her leadership role in the region which may give her up in the eyes of the international community.

4.3 How Terrorism Became an Issue Between Nigeria and Cameroon

This section addressed the objective two of this study which seeks to investigate how terrorism became an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon. This statement is based on the fact that contiguous nations are faced with some peculiar problems. Nigeria and Cameroon have history of existence as contiguous nations and this inturn is characterized by both positive and negative actions and reactions. Dating back to 1960s both countries have had accusations against one another especially in the security and border circles, Brimah (2014) assert that Nigerian government was "aware of Cameroon's unexplained indifference to Nigeria … as early as 1906 Northern Nigeria suffered from violence orchestrated by religious leaders whose roots were in Northern Cameroon. On the contemporary terrorist attacks he asserts that it was an agreement with the terrorist and Cameroon that they use Cameroon land against Nigeria but they should not lunch an attack in Cameroon. Many literature reviewed traced religious violence in Nigeria land from Cameroon. The birth of the present terrorism (Boko Haram), Olojo (2013), Ekpmoro and Omoyibo (2013:9697) among others assert that the intense terrorism in the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon started in 1980s "The Ya Tatsine (followers of Maitatsine), a sect founded by Mohammedu Marwa Maitatsine who hails from Marwa town in northern Cameroon. There is a general notion for instance, Brimah (2014) that Cameroon has a character of habouring criminals who use Cameroon land to destabilize Nigeria. Same notion and accusations on the Cameroonian side, France: 24 blogs Fri, 05/23/2014, the Governor of the Cameroon Far North Region asserting that "Boko Haram was Nigerian affair, an issue happening in another country but Nigeria is transporting it to our land". There were many accusations mounting on the emergence

of the intense terrorism in northern Nigeria and Cameroon, a scenario that interviewed respondents have consensus opinions that;

> *It started in Nigeria in Borno State but with time, it also affected Cameroon through the boarder.*

The Ministry of Defence Headquarters (2016) was different here that "there was no accusation. It was not Nigeria-Cameroon issue but other actors in international affairs. The two countries were only dragged into it". Majority opinion of respondents in interview were corroborated by some of the literature reviewed, Ekepe (2016:25) referring to Boko Haram asserts that the origin and history of Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad Basin has different versions. However, it is generally agreed by various scholars that Boko Haram terrorist group started in Borno State, Nigeria.

Critically, the altercations between the two countries mounted and stemmed from the historic past yet there are empirical evidences that the current and tense terrorist act across Nigeria-Cameroon borders started in Nigeria.

4.4 The Period of Terrorism

This section addressed objective two of the study that also sought to investigate Nigeria-Cameroon relations during the terrorist regime. Key factors such as: how they cooperated in the fight, socio-cultural, economic and political relations were focused at.

4.4.1 Nigeria-Cameroon Co-operation in the Fight against Terrorism

The relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon at this crucial time is a major reason for this study. The menace at the borders of the two countries need a joint collaboration and the history of the two countries have proved them to be unfriendly friends. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in America, Pattern of Global Terrorism (2002. xi) brought closer to America 136 countries who came together to join forces ranging from diplomatic, intelligence, law

enforcement, economic to military power to fight terrorism. There was attraction, reactions and enlisted responses, not only from the United States but from other parts of the world against the act of terrorism. Resulting from the fact that what is permanent is only change therefore respondents were put into task here and the opinions tend to be overwhelming. A consensus opinion of respondents was that there was no initial cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. But there was a consensus too that co-operation between them sparked off later. A group of respondents interviewed put it this way:

> *At initial time, many neighbouring countries including not only Cameroon saw it as Nigerian affairs but later when other countries were attacked, they started reacting. They joined hands together especially after the inauguration of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).*

At this time there was good co-operation and for a respondent who said he is deeply interested in the study (Anonymous, 2016) posited it this way;

> *They have co-operated with the Multinational Joint Task Force to some extent. In Cameroon it was business but in Nigeria it was politics i.e. Cameroon was focused on fighting Boko Haram but in Nigeria it was politicized.*

Corroborating the above opinions, a respondent, Njiforti (2016) "Fight is now united with the same goal and spirit".

The researcher believes that abstaining from acting or acting in the face of an issue in international affairs is equally 'action' or 'reaction'. Some respondents were of the opinion that "initially there was no cooperation. Cameroon saw it as a Nigerian issue that she had nothing to do with". This in the other hand, generated another question and that was, what could have prompted Cameroon not to cooperate initially.

The variance in opinion of respondents here is justified and substantiated. A respondent Jangur (2016) said:

> *Initially, Cameroon saw it as a Nigerian issue that she had nothing to do with but this was still due to the lukwarm relationship that exist between them because Niger and Chad cooperated from the beginning. Cameroon however joined in the Multinational Task Force (MNTF) and they started working together but this was after Cameroon has been attacked by the insurgency….*

The above opinion reflects the historical relations behaviour of the two countries since independence as already enumerated but close to it is an opinion of another respondent that it is a personality issue in leadership and politics, Mustapha (2016).

> *Paul Biya did not support that Cameroon should fight Boko Haram at the initial time. She equally said that it has colonial connotation because Cameroon has to clear with France first because of the umbilical cord linking them.*

This respondents feeling is corroborated by Check (2011.3) that "foreign policy-making in Cameroon are a highly personalized matter and have been dominated by the governing style and personality of President Amadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya respectively. Both have had far-reaching impact on Cameroon diplomacy and have been at the centre of whether Cameroon diplomacy is aggressive or passive on certain fundamental international issues that Cameroon holds dear.

The Ministry of Defense Headquarters (2016) assert that it is "respect for territorial integrity" is in the principles of Nigeria and Cameroon bilateral relations and Yakubu (2001) affirms it, Nigeria's 3rd principles and Cameroon's sixth principle are against interference in internal affairs of other countries. An anonymous respondent said:

> *Let me tell you, one of the reasons is that southern Cameroon has been threatening secession and Cameroon government feels that Nigeria may help them fight Cameroon as such she doesn't want to have anything to do with Nigeria.*

Empirically, it is evident that there was no initial co-operation, whatever might be responsible for hesitation in co-operation was overcome but with the notion of a respondent, who told me that if I want to know his name so that I will say he said, he was not going to give me much; he said,

> *The truth of the matter is that we owe thanks to foreign countries i.e. America, France and Britain if not for them the insurgency would have done more harm. There is no evidence that Cameroon or Nigeria was capable of handling the terrorist within their borders a tip of the eyes berg is the Chibok-Girls.*

A respondent corroborated the above opinion in allaying his initial fear and disappointment, Umar (2016) "I initially rated Nigeria very poor, after exodus, the second time in October 29, 2015 we ran out of Mubi with even military, they dropped their uniform and gun." Adherence to the principles in the international arena or in bilateral relations of contiguous nations if it was really applied by Cameroon therefore was risky and subsequently, Niger and Chad did not hesitate to rush to Nigeria and Cameroon as soon as they discovered it was beyond internal crisis and possible snowballing into their own territories.

Another respondent Takwa (2016) argued it thus;

> *Both sides under-estimated the magnitude of the crisis until it engulfed the two countries, with 14 LGAs under the control of Boko Haram in the Nigeria side. Cross-border raids into Cameroon and kidnap of officials, including the wife of the Vice Prime Minister magnified the issue and both countries soon realized that due to the vast and porous border, the war cannot be won without co-operation from both countries. Moreover, the Boko Haram sect is said to be largely dominated by the Kanuri speaking groups that stretches across the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. The threat of the Boko Haram completely overrunning the whole area in their so-called Islamic Caliphate of State suddenly frightened the two countries into co-operation in an alliance of conveniences.*

In the other hand, the colonial legacy opinion makes sense hence the cooperation in earnest started after the MNJTF found its root, Umar (2016) "cooperation ensued from the March 11, 2015 when Multinational Joint Task Force came into effect" which was an initiation of France - Paris Summit May 17 2014.

4.4.2 Economic and Trade Flow During Terrorism

The economic relations of contiguous nations like Nigeria and Cameroon have two major phases i.e. formal and informal. Consequently the informal trade counts greater than the formal trade due to contiguity and intertwindles of the people at the borderlines as earlier stated. All respondents at the frontier borderline assert that there was negative effect on the flow of trade and commerce between Nigeria and Cameroon during terrorist time. At the formal level, the table from the National Bureau of Statistic (NBS, 2015, see Appendix 1 attached) on the flow of formal trade between Nigeria and Cameroon 1999 – 2015 affirm the above opinion that trade flow piped low during terrorism period. From the table, it is glaring that 2010 and 2011 the trade flow was one sided hence there was no export from Cameroon to Nigeria at all. This was an interruption caused by terrorism as such trade flow was negatively affected which corroborates the frontier border activities asserted by the respondents. Respondents, Emir's Palace Mubi (2016), Immigration Office Mubi (2016) said emphatically;

> *No trade, no commerce. The concern of everybody was security. The terrorist came and took over town through Madagali which has border with Gwoza in Borno to Michika to Mubi North and Mubi South, Maiha then Hong to Gombi. It was at Gombi the Federal force drove them back they spent 21 days. No supply of food because Cameroon depend on Nigeria. Movement of people, everybody running for safety of life.*

In like manner, so passionate was the Emir's Palace depicting the scenario of war situation. Just as he was when he took the researcher and his team round the Palace showing us

parts of the Palace yet to be repaired, holes, damages on the walls made by Boko Haram guns. He on one of the occasions said

> *At this time security became paramount every other thing slowed down. Trade relations closed. We are suffering oil, rice, cow that used to come from Cameroon. Our own goods they don't come to buy. Cameroon is a gateway through which our goods are taken to other parts such as Central Africa up to Libya and Sudan.*

Corroborating the above, another respondent virtualized the past to prove that trade at the borders actually was affected by the emergence of terrorism. He showed his dismay thus:

> *Trade between Nigeria and Cameroon within the frontiers honestly dropped. An international market like Mubi market does not have patronage from outside Nigeria as it used to be. The lorries and the people from all walks of life that use to come to buy our goods during their attacks stopped coming.*

From the above opinions the emergence of terrorism affected economic relations negatively. Some respondents posited reasons for the drop in trade relations. The Cameroon Embassy (2016) said that

> *It is normal in a situation like this that trade flow will drop. Within a short time, it will pick up again.*

Corroborating the above opinions the Ministry of Commerce (2016), The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) agree that it is a common occurrence and that "even internally, movement of people and goods were also affected how much more across the border". The table generated from NBS (table attached) displays the official flow of trade between Nigeria and Cameroon 1999 – 2015 which also reflect the views of respondents. The table showed that there was a down turn in trade flow between the two countries from 2010 – 2015. Import and export between Nigeria-Cameroon reflected the feelings of many respondents that a time like this major concern was safety of life.

Analytically, it is evident that terrorism impacted on trade flow, Funteh (2015. 37 and 38) asserts that "Nigeria is first on the world trade partners with Cameroon. In a table generated from his work (Appendix 2 attached), he showed import representation of Cameroon in 2011 with Nigeria topping the list, France and China came second and third, but in 2013, Nigeria was shifted to number three in Cameroon's import list, France taking over Nigeria's position. This assertion is further supported by an interview held with the Chief Executive of African Trade Group with the world and author of "Unleashed: A New Paradigm of African Trade with the World" John Akhile Snr. by Premium Time (PT) culled from Triple Agent, Double Cross on 07/04/2015, that

> *Nigeria is the second largest exporter to Cameroon, after China, much remains to be done to amplify the opportunities available to both countries.*

PRESS KIT Dossier de Press (2015.1) also assert "Cameroon's first trading partner is Nigeria" but China and France took her position because of the emergence of terrorism. This is a reflection of the happening at this time impacting on Nigeria-Cameroon economic relations.

4.4.3 Cultural Relations

The tie between Nigeria and Cameroon has been historic, Njoku (2012.198) projects the cultural relations "The people of these ethnic groups continually insist on their right of interaction for historical and cultural reasons". It is premised on this that the respondents at the frontiers responded to this aspect of interview. The Emir's Palace Mubi (2016) put it this way;

> *Let me take it one by one holding his fingers*
> - *Worship across the borders, Churches and Mosques stopped even ancestral worships.*
> - *Inter-marriages still continue but reduced drastically and without the usual celebrations and ceremonies.*
> - *On meetings of local officials of both countries, can only be held if government calls at this terrorist time otherwise, there is no meetings even at the death of*

> *prominent ones either sides. Like I told you earlier, security is tight everybody is concerned about his/her life.*

Corroborating this, another respondent said that "social interactions has dropped drastically e.g. marriage, tourism. Many Cameroonians used to come on tourism in Nigeria but now it is zero."

All of the above opinions signaled that the cultural ties between Nigeria and Cameroon can only be temporarily obscured for a time like this. That it is the right of the frontiers to interact socio-culturally and economically as affirmed by Njoku (2012), it is a corroboration of some of the respondents that these relations will be restored as soon as the insurgency is overcomed. President Biya also corroborated this, PRESS KIT Dossier de Presse (2015.4), when he affirmed that "Bound by History and Geography to live together, and by numerous links rooted in common culture, the Nigeria and Cameroon peoples have every possible reason to promote mutual beneficial ties of friendship and cooperation.

4.4.4 Diplomatic/Political Relations of Nigeria and Cameroon during Terrorist Time

Linking the past political relations of Nigeria-Cameroon with the present terrorist period, a respondent in an interview assert that;

> *Before, interaction across the border was flowing but now economic activities are very low but in the diplomatic side, there is great improvement especially at this late time see the visit of Nigerian Head of State General Muhammad Buhari to Cameroon and President Paul Biya to Nigeria and other meetings as a result of the insurgency.*

All the respondents attach importance to the exchange of visit by the Heads of State stressing that in the history of the two countries, the exchange of visit of Nigeria and Cameroon though contiguous has been very poor, even at the beginning of this crisis that they ought to have met several times to fashion a way out against the insurgency. A respondent stressed that 'at the

beginning, I will say it was poor but with the recent visit by Paul Biya and his team to Nigeria there is serious improvement."

The above opinions are supported by France 24 blogs Fri 05/23/2014 who assert that Biya's presence in the lead-up to the Paris Summit highlighted Cameroon's key role in tackling the regional threat as well as thorny state of Nigeria-Cameroon relations and what that spells for the fight against Boko Haram. Conceptualizing "diplomatic relations, a respondent to an interview Mustapha (2016) speaking on political relations of the two countries at this time said

> *Their relations at a time depends on the issue at hand. I was representing Nigeria in Cameroon at this time of terrorism. The diplomatic relations at this time called for closer cooperation which the two countries did. There are different levels of diplomatic interactions ranging from letters, phone calls, representatives and exchange of visits. There has been series of meetings on how to better Nigeria Cameroon relations e.g., The Joint Commission on Cooperation has continued meeting from October 9 – 11 2008 to 9 – 11 April 2014. The Heads of State exchange visits too. During this terrorism, President Muhammad Buhari, visited Cameroon and President Biya visited Nigeria.*

Corroborating the above opinion, the Cameroon Embassy (2016) responding in an interview said:

> *As I earlier told you, Nigeria Cameroon relations have always been cordial. That there is today a more and regular visits of Heads of State, meetings and others is simply a demand of the current situation between the two countries otherwise such visits and meetings have always been on and part of bilateral relations.*

The opinions above which are contrary to the majority opinions stem from professional background. Majority opinions depict scenarios of mutual relationship of countries who have things in common and know what they stand to benefit from each other. History has shown, Press Kit Dossier de Press (2015.1) that visit of Heads of State between Nigeria and Cameroon

since 1960 is highly limited and majorly on ceremonies and other international gathering like summits. Comparing their visits across European countries on discussion of business and diplomatic ties, it is clear that their frequent meetings at finding solution to insurgency is well corroborated by many respondents and other source opinions.

Takwa (2016) with aroma of strength and confidence responded in affirmation;

> *The two countries have since intensified their relationship with high level visits by President Buhari and Paul Biya. The outcome has been positive on the diplomatic front. Both countries are also co-operating and exchanging intelligence and military co-operation in the frame of the Lake Chad Commission and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) fighting the Boko Haram insurgency/terrorism.*

4.4.5 On Whether the Emergence of Terrorism will Improve the Border Relations of Nigeria and Cameroon

All the interviewees in this direction were positive. The Mubi Office of the Nigeria Immigration Service (2016) responded this way:

> *Yes, it will, the Bakassi crisis brought about the review of borderlines between Nigeria and Cameroon. There is now new Borderline Commission, there were proper demarcation some towns in far northern Nigeria are now back to Nigeria e.g. Brawa Vango village, Bwira village. They were in Cameroon before but boundary adjustment brought them back to Nigeria. Darak village was in Nigeria before but now in Cameroon along with others.*

Another respondent said, "Yes because the tension between Nigeria and Cameroon has always been border, security and politics. If border conflict is handled well which I believe this incidence will bring about improvement in that area, I think they will relate well". In corroborating the above opinions, Mustapha (2016) added;

> *Events unfold in bilateral relations even some issues that were common, when they present themselves in another*

> *dimension that attracts attention especially beyond the borders of a two countries involved, it will definitely take another dimension of approach in solving it. Nigeria and Cameroon including other neighbours and beyond are interacting/putting heads together and border policing is among the issue involved. It will definitely improve.*

The opinions above are a consensus that border relations is one of the problems in Nigeria-Cameroon relations. But Defence Headquarters (2016) in an interview asserts that; "it is a government decision." This simply refers to the opinions that the emergence of terrorism will improve the border crisis. On the other hand the latter opinion affirms that its improvement is on the policy formulation and implementation which corroborates the opinion that states the government of both sides are putting heads together cognizance of what contemporary situation has dictated.

4.4.6 On What are the Impact of Large Refugees Flow from Nigeria to Cameroon and Vis-avis

A respondent assert that,

> *In a situation like this, it is expected and the truth is that it devastate almost all aspects of the economy of the country they ran to. One is that they were not expected. Two the government of the country they ran to did not plan for them especially we the third world countries with our inadequacies all round – they will eat, cloth, need shelter, medical care etc.*

Another respondent assert that "honestly majority people ran to their kins in Cameroon side when it happened. Cameroon government escorted them back later and Nigerian government received them at Mubi and sent them to IDP camps. In the opinions of many respondents,

> *This is the beginning of another diplomacy which if well handled will improve the relations of the two countries. To buttress that this relationship is already in operation a*

> *respondent affirmed that "it brings and opens another door of relations. Cameroon has been helpful in keeping Nigerians who ran to their place but now they are tired and wants Nigeria to collect her citizens. It is part of the bilateral relations and in this direction they have come closer and related well. There is a tripartite agreement on refugee that will be coming out very soon.*

4.4.7 On What Were the Relational Situation at the Border during the Period of Terrorism

The few respondents on this area were positive, Immigration Office, Mubi (2016) responded this way;

> *I will say with every sincerity that it has been cordial. We understand ourselves. Even though every other activities piped low at this time, there was still movement of people especially Nigerians who ran to their kins across the border for safety. Honestly, inspite all odds we border service men from Nigeria and Cameroon understand ourselves and the issue at stake.*

The above opinion shows cordiality among the servicemen at the border at this time of terrorism. In the other hand, it was this good rappour between the border servicemen of the two countries that enabled movement across the border for safety of lives.

4.5 The Impact of Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon Relations

This section fulfils the objective two which sought to establish how terrorism has impacted on Nigeria-Cameroon relations.

The views of respondents interviewed run thus: A respondent Jangur (2016) is of the opinion that:

> *It is in two ways, positive and negative. It impacted negatively on both countries and their collective securities. There were common security challenges. Initially both countries accused each other of security lapses. This is not a good report. The flow of goods and services between the two countries were badly affected. Future leaders, men and*

> *women who could have contributed positively to improve Nigeria-Cameroon relations were killed. It also brought us together. Both Heads of State visited and bilateral talks on improving Nigeria-Cameroon relations has sparked off with great expectations. Now, Nigeria and Cameroon work together more than ever before. There is conditional unity now to fight common enemy. Nigeria has committed $13 million (US Dollars) to Multinational Task Force to fight terrorism. It will help bind both countries together.*

Corroborating the above opinion, another respondent interviewed put it this way;

> *Of a truth, it has areas the relations has improved and areas it has hit very had e.g. in the diplomatic angle, everybody can see improvement, Nigeria and Cameroon are becoming more united. In the economic and social sector the relations dropped e.g. it has reduced the volume of trade, the collapse of the trade across Nigeria - Cameroon borders affected Naira exchange and therefore made it to crash. Before terrorism, ₦250.00 exchanged for one thousand Cameroon CFA Franc. This is because areas through the border that goods enter into the country and as well goods go out, all these borders are blocked and in the south, it is only one border post at Calabar. Naira crashed against Cameroon CFA Franc.*

The above opinion is corroborated by Njoku (2012.204) that Nigerians and Cameroonian at the border zone at all points freely exchange each other's currency as legal tender. The Nigerian Naira is acceptable in the neighbouring border-lands of Cameroon, just as the Cameroonian CFA Franc is in the Nigerian area. In like manner most respondents corroborate same idea in the dimension of tourism. A respondent said:

> *Many Cameroonians used to come on tourism, now it is zero. Border checks intensified especially for Nigerians and Cameroonians who live in Nigeria. There are up to twenty check points from Calabar to Bamenda. Borders are closed. At times it's difficult for you to stamp your ID down south. Commerce between the two countries badly affected. There is great downturn, cultural ties has drastically dropped. Before terrorism there used to be about 10 – 15*

> *lorries carrying grains from Kano to southern Cameroon on daily basis now it is zero.*

The opinions of respondents above have merit stemming from the fact that there are two sides of the coin. While diplomatic relations has improved, the economic and social interaction have been on the downturn. Improvement in the diplomatic sector is a reflection of Paul Biya's speech to Francophone Summit on 19th November, 2014 at Dakar, Press Kit Dossier de Press (2015.1) that faced with a common enemy who rebuffs every value we hold dear, solidarity must come fully into play. Recent history teaches us that there can be no compromise with such an opponent. We must pool efforts to stem its tide. This is a sign that the realities of terrorism has dawned on the two countries and there is no option to cooperation. This in turn affirms the opinion of another respondents who chose to be anonymous (2016).

> *Let me tell you the truth, the truth of the whole matter is that terrorism has brought Nigeria and Cameroon closer than ever before but the secret of the matter is that if this war was to be left for Nigeria and Cameroon alone, they would have continue to politicize the whole thing, pretending to be friends which they were not.*

In the same direction a respondent boldly told me that Boko Haram terrorism has served as a unifying factor and may be source of renewed friendly ties in Nigeria-Cameroon relations. Another respondent, agreed with the above opinion but told me that:

> *If you are interested in knowing my name so that you say that I said; I will not give you much".*"*Look, thanks to international community i.e. America, France and Britain, UN etc. Is not that I am ignorant of their own politics but this incidence has exposed Nigeria and Cameroon as failed states. Yet they claim giants in their regions and even Africa as a continent. Honestly more harm would have been done to the entire region. There was no indication that both of the countries could even handle the crisis in their domain how much more across the borders. A tip of the eyes berg is the Chibok-Girls which brought in the international community. Talk of a greater effect, it is a*

> *good lesson which I don't think both countries will forget again in their bilateral relations.*

The above opinion of respondents show effect in the exposing influences and in capabilities of countries that claim to be giants which indeed will bring about other countries looking down on them even, among each other. Of a truth, in the belief of some other countries, earlier, they thought that Nigeria was equal to the task. The diplomatic surgeoning abroad soliciting for support against terrorism by Nigerian Heads of State and the words of Biya in PRESS KIT Dossier (2015.2), "Personally, I still believe that the threat posed by Jihadists, Boko Haram and Shebabs may be defeated only through global mobilization. I would like to commend the multi-faceted support provided by United Nations Organization, but also some big powers, notably the United States of America, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia and Germany. We thank them for their firm determination to stand by us in this struggle", sounded like shock to the smaller African countries.

The above opinion confirms the feelings and views of most of the respondents that Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) ushered in the greater improvement in the relations of Nigeria and Cameroon. A respondent Major General Duru (2016) assert that;

> *The major impact is that it has brought about improved relations through MNJTF. The present Chief of Army Staff, General Brutai was the first Commander of the MNJTF. It has strengthened the relations between the two countries and a beginning of greater future.*

Generally participants felt that refugees that arose as a result of terrorist activities mounts positive and negative effect on Nigeria-Cameroon relations depending on the way it is handled. Immigration Office Mubi (2016).

> *Terrorism has created a big burden on Nigeria and Cameroon. From our discussion, you can see that there is no flow of trade and commerce. Borders are closed,*

> *security is tight. The only thing that flows across the border now is movement of people to their relatives for safety. On the other hand refugees management is big burden between the two countries both socially, economically and otherwise. About ten thousand refugees are in Adamawa-Futuri and Yola. There are two Internally Displaced Peoples Camp (IDPC) in Adamawa. There is also a temporary one in NYSC camp.*

The above opinion shows the impact stemming from internally displaced persons in the economic and social perspectives. These countries never planned or budgeted for this, even if it was anticipated, the lack of resources planning and other factors as third world countries syndrome would bring about diversion of money/fund meant for other sectors through linkages in infrastructures and other developmental plans; thereby faltering further, the good neighbor relations. Council for Peace and Security of Central Africa (COPAX) in affirmation of the above PRESS KIT Dossier Press (2015.1) laments the fact that the countries concerned are compelled to divert substantial resources that were previously earmarked for their economic and social development to fight against this insurgency groups.

On a general note, therefore, the impact synthesizing the opinions of most of the interviewees and other sources, the negative effects mounts in almost all the aspects of Nigeria – Cameroon relations, yet the diplomatic circle has received a boost. A time like this too, a war like situation, respondents feeling is that socio-economic and cultural relations definitely will be on the downturn. Meanwhile between 2009 – 2016 every other relations between Nigeria and Cameroon slowed down at the expense of combating terrorism even at the borderlines, formal or informal, safety of lives ran supreme.

4.6 Discussion of Findings

Results accruing from the data analysis are discussed here in line with the objectives of the study as earlier stated in chapter one of this study so as to establish findings.

Objective one of this study was to inquire and verify the kind of relationship that existed between Nigeria and Cameroon before the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism in the region in 2009. There is evidence in the data generated from the respondents interviewed, electronic interview questionnaire corroborated with the secondary source of data that the pre -terrorist relations between Nigeria and Cameroon was vibrant socio-culturally and socio-economically but politically/diplomatically, it was cold, suspicious and frosty. The analysis proved that Nigeria and Cameroon are contiguous nations who have built up experiences of each other since independence and that such issues like Bakassi Peninsula, border and security issues have always been the source of tension between the two countries earlier than the emergence of terrorism. Affirmation of this finding Njoku (2012), Omede (2006.15) assert that "The boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon is the longest of all international boundary (1680 kilometres) with its complications as well as Bakassi crisis that have characterized mutual mistrust and remain a basis of variance in direct bilateral relations of the two countries since independence".

Objective two (2) of the study aimed at investigating how terrorism became an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon and identify what impact Boko Haram terrorism has had on Nigeria-Cameroon relations since 2009 – 2016. The analysis of the data from the respondents proved that terrorism started in Nigeria as an internal issue and later encroached into Cameroon due to porous borders between the two countries. The assumption two of this study is affirmed which totally rhymed with the perceptions of respondents in the outcome of the analysis, against many opinions contesting from where the present insurgency started. Asserted by France: 24

blogs Fri., 05/23/2014, the army no longer has the situation under control, Nigeria soldiers are running away from the militia and crossing the border into Cameroon. They are exporting their problems into our territory and the Far North region in particular. Younde has viewed the threat as Nigerian issues and refused to acknowledge the extent of the destabilization in Far North region. On the other hand Brima (2014) representing the other side posit that "Cameroon has a history of harbouring criminals who use its territory to destabilize Nigeria". Specifically they point out that "From all indications, there appear to be an unwritten understanding between the sect members and Cameroon Security Forces that they can operate from bases within their borders as long as they don't lunch attacks within Cameroon.

From the analysis, it is clear that Boko Haram terrorism impacted on Nigeria-Cameroon relations both positively and negatively this is affirmation of objective three and assumption three of this study that the emergence of terrorism have impacted on Nigeria-Cameroon relations. On the aspect of socio-cultural and economics, respondents general views on the formal and informal trade proved that trade and commerce between Nigeria and Cameroon were negatively affected and has remained on the downturn, the only movement across the borders is but for safety of lives.

The data analysed have generally proved that the emergence of terrorism across the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon will turn a new leaf in the relations of the two countries. The proof, based on the evidence available from respondents on how Nigeria-Cameroon political/diplomatic relations has greatly improved within the later part of the terrorist regime. The analysis proved in response to objective three, though, there was hesitation in cooperation in fighting the terrorists from beginning which was part of the cold old relations, and as some argued was respect for principles of non-interference but from 2015 to 2016 there were

evidences of positive diplomatic development rising from joining hands, having one spirit and common goal against the terrorists to other diplomatic strategies such as exchange of military intelligence, sharing the same views and spirit, visitations and meetings for better and tighter future cooperation and relations between the two countries.

Based on the above, this study establishes that Nigeria Cameroon relations before 2009 was very cordial but was uncordial at the diplomatic level which the study shows has greatly improved during the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism at their borders especially from 2015 to 2016 and synthesing from the level of diplomatic relations within this time, there is high hope for better relationship between the two countries in the future. Worth emphasis is that the areas that were affected negatively in their relations i.e. socio-cultural and economic sectors were areas that were vibrant in their relations before 2009 and there abound proves from respondents that in a time like this, such areas are commonly affected negatively and to be restored as soon as such crisis was over.

The study also discovered the differences in many of the literature reviewed and the feelings of the respondents during field work do not agree as many analysts at academic circle tend to make conclusions on a bilateral and inter-state relations of contiguous nations like Nigeria and Cameroon without corroborating the events and activities happening at the frontier borderlines. The study discovered that of a truth there were moments of unpleasantries in the relations of the two countries as affirmed, shared by many opinions which in reality majority believe conducts the relationship at the diplomatic level, yet this study has discovered that relations at the borderlines flow unabated. Even when crisis occur, shortly, afterwards, they put it behind them and the socio-economic, cultural and other socio-political relations continue to flourish. Close to this for affirmation is in Njoku (2012.198) who stressed the interwindness of

the people at the frontier (Bakassi) asserting that the people of these ethnic groups continually insist on their right of interaction for historical and cultural reasons, and for socio-economic and commercial purposes against artificial and unfair impositions by the colonial and post colonial state and Funte (2015.34) assert that these new borders soon faded in their minds in favour of their familiar economic and socio-cultural interaction.

Majority relations between contiguous nations like Nigeria and Cameroon are informal even what is regarded today as illegal tend not to be illegal but for new developments in Africa created by colonialism, in Funte (2015.34) questioning the concept of illegality/smuggling and legality states that the illegal (that is, illegal in the eyes of the foreign authorities) transport of goods and persons across what now became official boundaries followed the institution of trade restrictions. Everything changed and what had been normal trade relations for the indigenous population suddenly became illegal.

This study, therefore is of the opinion that the study of relations between contiguous countries should not be in isolation of happenings at the frontiers. Even though the activities at the communities might be hard/cannot be coded or quantified, but it can be estimated; it forms the bulk of their relations. Nigeria and Cameroon have been having worthy moments of economic, cultural and social interactions since independence proved by respondents and the moments of sad events should not eclipse their good times and prompt a general statement. The fact that there is a diplomatic problem or crisis at a point in time does not generalize the whole relations of Nigeria and Cameroon as hostile, frosty, turbulent, forced etc. this hostility and unfriendly relations generalized as characterizing Nigeria-Cameroon relations do not reflect in economic flow both formal and informal as well as in the cultural ties and other social interactions such as job opportunities, schools and other social benefits. It is political and has

colonial undertone and should be addressed so than presenting Nigeria-Cameroon relations as if it is conducted only by one variable, Funte (2015.46) asserts that even when this cordial dealings was intermittently interrupted by some disheartling circumstances of victimization (masterminded by a few colonial politicians), and secessionists tendencies, territorial dispute and the terrorizing actions of pirates and the Boko Haram events that prompted many scholars to class the relations between the nations as "perpetual hostility" – the respective governments remained connected in an attempt to close these sad pages of their relationship. In fact, historical analysis and strategic examination of Cameroon-Nigeria socio-cultural and economic relationship revealed a considerable level of warmth, cordiality and mutuality of interest and purpose. There are so many variables that play in inter-state relations and the major cause of frown between Nigeria and Cameroon at diplomatic level is just but colonial instincts.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This segment is the presentation of the summary of the study and its conclusion was drawn from the investigation on "Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism" on Nigeria-Cameroon relations; 2009 – 2016. The recommendations made here were based on the outcome of the findings in the research investigation.

5.2 Summary

This study had a task of investigating the Impact of Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon Relations 2009 – 2016. To achieve the main objectives of this study, the study employed some specific steps such as: forming a basis for the investigation by attempting to know what the relations of Nigeria and Cameroon was before 2009; how independent variable i.e. terrorism connected the two countries, how they related in fighting the insurgency and how it has affected the relations between the two countries and as well the better way of handling terrorist activities in the future to sustain good neighbor relations. This led to the review of literature that are relevant to the study both published and unpublished. The theoretical base employed for the study is "Linkage Theory" due to its relevance to the study. Data generation included primary and secondary data and they were generated through the in-depth interview and structured interview questions as well as content analysis. All these sources obviously complemented each other and added value to the study.

The work in itself is divided into five chapters. Chapter one embodied the general introduction to the entire work starting from: the background to the study, statement of research problem, research questions, objectives, assumptions, significance/justification, scope of study

and limitations. Chapter two embodies the review of literature (both conceptual and empirical) which helped in identifying the gap that needed to be filled by the study as to make impact and contribution to the body of knowledge that already exist. It also accommodates the theoretical framework which was actually a road map to the study. The chapter three embodied the research methodology that enumerated the process and procedure the data were generated, and analyzed, the research design, population sample and sampling technique, method of data collection, reliability and method of data presentation and analysis. Chapter four embodied the presentation and qualitative analysis of the data generated consisting of both primary and secondary data while chapter five was the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

5.3 Conclusion

Here, the major findings of the investigation on the impact of Boko Haram Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations; 2009 – 2016 is presented, as follows:

The investigation discovered that Nigeria-Cameroon diplomatic relations before terrorism was not cordial but tensed by some variables which included border management, Bakassi Peninsula crisis and trade dominion by Nigerians within Cameroon. It also found out that relations within the frontline communities were cordial both socio-culturally and economically which to a large extent was attributed to biological and social linkages between the towns within the borders whose division was just colonial pronouncements. At the official level, relations on trade and commerce were also normal (see appendix 1 and 2).

The study has also proved that terrorist activities started in Nigeria and snowballed into Cameroon. The study has strategically and empirically shown that cooperation between the two countries in the fight against the insurgency initially was very poor and that socio-cultural and economic relations have piped very low but political relations has greatly improved from 2015

and will translate to a better relations between the two countries in the future. Even then, there is a great caution that the steps or measures the two countries have embarked upon to fashion out sustainable relations between the two countries should not be neglected or allowed to relapse at the degrading of terrorism in the region.

Finally, it can therefore be concluded that Nigeria-Cameroon relations especially in diplomatic circle was frosty before the emergence of terrorism and that terrorist activities that originated in Nigeria and snowballed into Cameroon has impacted positively and negatively on their relations.

5.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations are proffered:

i. A functional joint border security commission be formed whose responsibility will be to recruit, train and survenance of borders with view to tracking down every security threat and clamping down on them before it attracts a bilateral or multilateral attention.

ii. Recognition and understanding of terrorism as a local and international threat. This means that both political, traditional and religious leaders should cooperate with one another and the international community to overcome root causes and fight together should it occur. Therefore manifestation of terrorism, local, inter-state or regional relations should not be politicized because it has a characteristics of international linkages.

iii. Establishment of a joint academy (University) by both Nigeria and Cameroon whose responsibility will be to research on causes and effect of all manners of criminality and ways of averting, curtailing and stopping them from emanating, escalating and crossing the borders.

iv. Joint resource pull: Both countries should agree on annual budget allocation to handling such border criminal activities like piracy, terrorism, kidnapping etc.

v. Bad leadership and governance in the two countries are worse than the porous borders, security and Bakassi peninsula crisis. The leadership and governance in Nigeria and Cameroon create poverty, unemployment, class inequality which create and multiply criminality in each country and transported to the other. Fighting this is the beginning of grassroots/primary elimination of terrorism or overcoming it.

vi. Exploration of Legal means for repatriation and total economic, social and political liberation. Nigeria and Cameroon can use their positions as powers in their sub -regions to educate conscientise and convince even unto AU to negotiate for permanent solution through legal means hence most of the crisis in Africa boils down to poverty and bad governance created by colonialism. If total liberation is achieved, Africa will be able to have effective economic and political control of their resources and destiny.

vii. There should be other joint commissions on socio-cultural and economic relations. Such commissions will help the two countries have tighter cultural, economic and political relations. They should set up concrete projects and programmes geared at Closer Corporation of Nigeria and Cameroon. Hence Lake Chad Commission should be revived and de-politicized.

viii. Colonial heritages/linkages abhorred: Empirical analysis of the detriments of colonial attachment should be made by organizing joint programmes that will empirically analyse the origin and the effect of crisis on such contiguous nations. That they should understand themselves as contiguous nations whom their good relations is rather paramount and from this understanding good neighbor relations will result and flow unabated.

ix. Introduction of identification card (ID) Scheme for all Nigerians and all Cameroonians as well as non citizens within these countries.

x. Exchange of diplomatic visits and other associates of it should be frequent and mandatory. It cost much less for Nigerian or Cameroon head of state to visit each other four times in a year than one trip to America, Britain, France etc. true peace can only evolve from within and not from outside the region.

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APPENDIX 1

Bilateral Trade Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Naira)

Year	Export from Cameroon to Nigeria	Export from Nigeria to Cameroon	Balance
1999	52,077	20,457,491	20,405,414
2000	88,998,129	2,502,963,263	2,413,965,134
2001	387,084,775	13,904,866,119	13,517,781,344
2002	3,823,665,218	13,565,866,319	9,741,400,101
2003	104,449,565	40,436,966,467	40,332,516,902
2004	160,902,311	57,086,489,950	56,925,587,639
2005	292,796,241	71,858,159,685	71,565,363,444
2006	1,071,093,971	136,354,247,479	135,283,153,508
2007	502,522,664	662,837,393,988	662,334,871,324
2008	162,963,324	55,858,482,989	55,695,519,665
2009	286,972,625	73,084,710,531	72,797,737,906
2010	-	75,281,629,909	75,281,629,909
2011	-	62,502,080,982	62,502,080,982
2012	38,083,390	1,490,076,028	1,451,992,638
2013	2,134,819,831	2,339,949,354	205,129,523
2014	1,966,029,325	1,759,741,409	-206,287,916
2015	744,023,693	10,004,977,323	9,260,953,630

Source: Nigeria Foreign Trade Summary, National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja

The table above is to back the claims on pages 127, 134, 135 and 152 which attest that there was good flow of trade between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1999 – 2009 which was the period before the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism but it became interrupted from 2010 – 2015 which was the period of terrorism. The table shows that 2010 – 2011, Cameroon officially had no record of export to Nigeria but the record showed that Nigeria exported to Cameroon.

APPENDIX 2

Table 2: Cameroon Import Representation, 2011

Global Imports by Cameroon			
Import from	**Trade value (thousands)**	**Share (percent)**	**Growth (percent 5 yrs)**
Nigeria	2,205,873	23.99	NA
France	1,618,298	17.60	NA
China	599,363	6.52	NA
Belgium	382,933	4.17	NA
Equatorial Guinea	326,377	3.55	NA
Germany	326,602	2.52	NA
United States	270,983	2.95	NA
Japan	258,834	2.82	NA
Brazil	258,192	1.98	NA
Italy	249,961	2.81	NA
India	181,920	1.88	NA
Mauritania	131,728	1.43	NA
South Africa	127,327	1.39	NA
Netherlands	127,024	1.38	NA
United Kingdom	125,555	1.37	NA

Market value: 9,193 (million) Source: (*http://www.nyamnjoh.com, 2013*). Note: By 2013, Nigeria occupies the thirds position in the Cameroon import list as follows: China 16.8%, France 16.6%, Nigeria 12.3%, Belgium 5.3%, Italy 4.3%, US 4.2%.

The above table was culled from the work of Funteh (2015) published in International Journal, Peace and Development studies to back up the claims of respondents in page 136, 152 and data from National Bureau of Statistics that Boko Haram Terrorism affected trade flow between Nigeria and Cameroon negatively within the period of this study. From the above table, and commentary under it, in global imports by Cameroon as at 2011 Nigeria toped the first but as the terrorist activities progressed, Nigeria shifted from the first position to third position on official import of Cameroon on global import list in 2013 sec comments below the table. PRESS Dosier de KIT (2015.1) reported thast Cameroon first trading partner is Nigeria. In 2016, an African Trade Expert (The Chief Executive of African Trade Group with the world Chief John Akhile Snr affirmed this in an interview with PREMIUM TIMES from his house in Wisconsin, USA Triple Sgent, Double Cross (07-04-2016) the "Nigeria is the second largest exporter to Cameroon".

APPENDIX 3

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1.1 Immigration/Local Chiefs at the Frontiers (Mubi and Banki)

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

1. Based on your experience at the border post here how can you describe the economic/trade flow (formal and informal between Nigeria and Cameroon before and during this terrorist activities.
2. What was the state of social interactions across the border (before and during terrorism) in terms of movement of the people, inter-cultural relations such as worship in a common mosques/churches, owning and worship of common ancestral deities due to contiguity and unwarranted division of families by colonial borders.
3. How often do local officials of local governments and even the state government officials of both Nigeria and Cameroon exchange visits before the emergence of terrorism and even during the terrorist activities?
4. The traditional rulers help in wielding peoples/communities together, maintain peace and facilitate cordial social interactions across the borders, how often do these traditional rulers within the frontiers of Nigeria and Cameroon meet/exchange visits before and during terrorist regime to discuss issues concerning Cameroon and Nigeria?
5. What is the type of relationship between the immigration and other forces of both Nigeria and Cameroon at the border before and during the insurgency?
6. How did terrorism became an issue between Niger and Cameroon?
7. In your own view what are the effects of terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations.
8. Empirically, how can you describe the cooperation of Nigeria and Cameroon in fighting the terrorism?
9. Can you categorically say, whether there is improvement in their relations, worsened or it has remained the same science the emergence of terrorism at their borders?

APPENDIX 4
INTERVIEW GUIDE

1.2 Foreign Affairs Ministry/Embassy

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

1. Do you have an idea of any crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon since both gained independence in 1960?
2. In your view, how did terrorism became an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon.
3. How can you describe the relations (diplomatic, economic and social) between Nigeria and Cameroon before the emergence of terrorism in 2009 and during the terrorist period, 2009 - 2016.
4. Can you please categorically state whether is relationship has improved, remained the same or worsened as a result of the emergence of terrorism at their borders?
5. Empirically, can you please state the areas of improvement or draw-backs during the intense terrorism in Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
6. In your own opinion, what are the effects of terrorist activities on the Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
7. If manning of Nigeria-Cameroon longest but porous borders has not been effective in the past, do you think the emergence of terrorism will improve or worsen their border management and translate to good neighbor relations or worsen it.
8. How have bilateral and multilateral security agreements worked between Nigeria and Cameroon before and during this insurgency, has it improved or worsened?
9. Paul Biya, and the former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan only met in France in May 2014 at the instance of France president on tackling insurgency in the two countries but back home they never meet as contiguous nations fighting a common evil, in your own opinion how can you describe this in conjunction with Biya's three days visit (3-5 May, 2016), a reciprocation of President Buhari's visit to Cameroon on 29 June 2015 and what effect does this have on Nigeria-Cameroon relations especially during this insurgency.
10. What in your view are the effects of large flow of refugees from Nigeria to Cameroon and vis-à-vis; and what real effect this has on Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
11. Generally, can you say that even if terrorism is overcome that the relations between Nigeria - Cameroon will improve hence there has been no vibrancy in their good relations after resolution and disengagement by Nigeria from Bakassi Peninsula in 2006 and 2013 respectively.
12. Fighting terrorism need collaboration/cooperation how far can you describe the cooperation of Nigeria-Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism?

    Please: May I have any available documents that will back/substantiate this interview.

    Thanks.

APPENDIX 5

1.3 Ministry of Defence/Military Personnel

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

1. How did terrorism became an issue between Nigerian and Cameroon.
2. In your experience on the fight against terrorism in the region of Nigeria and Cameroon and being contiguous nations how can you describe their individual effort in fighting the insurgency?
3. The Joint Task Force (JTF) and the Multi-lateral Taskforce were set up so that Nigeria and Cameroon will join hands together and fight terrorism can you, based on your wide experience say what happened after the formation and what the situation is now whether they cooperated or not.
4. Based on your experience on Nigeria-Cameroon security relations before this insurgency, can you say that the relationship has improved, worsened or remained the same?
5. Specifically, can you state the areas of security improvement or worsened areas between Nigeria and Cameroon as a result of this insurgency?
6. What was the relationship at the borders between the Nigeria military and para-military and that of Cameroon before and during the insurgency?
7. If manning of the longest and porous borders between Nigeria and Cameroon was not effective before; do you think the emergence of terrorism at the borders of the two countries will improve this or worsen the management of their borders translating to either good neighbor relations or suspicious and volatile one?
8. Do you think the insurgency could harden some citizens of both countries as a result of the type of training they received thereby increasing violence in the region and what effect will this have on Nigeria-Cameroon relations.
9. Even if the insurgency is overcomed, there is always arms-race created by the insurgency already; what do you think will be the effect of this on Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
10. The resolution of Bakassi crisis and the handing over in 2006 has not manifested a significant improvement in Nigeria-Cameroon good relations. In your own view what will be their relational behaviour even after the insurgency has been degraded or decimated?

APPENDIX 6

1.4 Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry/National Bureau of Statistics

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

1. Do you have an idea of the relationship that exist between Nigeria and Cameroon before the emergence of terrorism and what is this relationship like since the regime of terrorism in 2009-2016.
2. Nigeria and Cameroon due to contiguous nature engage in commerce which might be formal and informal. In your own experience, what was the flow of this commerce between Nigeria and Cameroon before the emergence of terrorism in 2009 and during the terrorist period?
3. Specifically can you say that the insurgency has affected the commerce between the two countries positively, negatively or it is as consistent as it was before terrorism?
4. Were the two countries working together before to improve commerce between them; and if your answer is yes or no, what is the state of it during the insurgency, improved, worsened or remained the same?
5. What is the effect of huge number of refugees raised by terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
6. What are the effects of terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations?

APPENDIX 7

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS (SERVING AND RETIRED)

INTERVIEW GUIDE

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

1. In your own experience on Nigeria-Cameroon relations, how do you describe their relationship before 2009?
2. How did terrorism became an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon.
3. How can you describe Nigeria-Cameroon co-operation in the fight against the insurgency?
4. Specifically, what are the positive and negative effects of this insurgency on Nigeria-Cameroon relations?
5. Do you think in your own view that there is improvement in their relationship as a result of the insurgency or has it worsened their relations or the relationship has remained the same as before the insurgency?
6. Having good knowledge of this terrorist activities at the borders of Nigeria and Cameroon, how best do you think it can be handled to improve the relations between the two countries?

APPENDIX 8

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES/INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA.

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Ugwuigba, Michael Chukuwma, an M/ Phil student of Department of Political Science/International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Name: ……

Nationality: ……...

Occupation/Status: ……

QUESTIONNAIRE

The mission of this questionnaire is to achieve an academic study on the "Effect of Terrorism on Nigeria-Cameroon relations 2009-2016". I will be grateful if this is given urgent attention. Your views and opinions are held confidential and to be used only for this study.

Your acceptance to contribute to the success of this study is highly appreciated. Tick (√) where your opinion lies and equally write where need be.

1. Name Sex (a) Male (b) Female
2. Nationality …….
3. Occupation/status ……
4. What was the nature of Nigeria-Cameroon relations since 1960 when both had independence?
   (a) Cordial
   (b) Luckwarm and suspicious
   (c) Friendly
   (d) Unfriendly
5. Are you aware of any crisis between Nigeria-Cameroon since their independence? (a) Yes (b) No
6. If the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1960-2009 has been cordial, friendly or unfriendly, lukwarm and suspicious, please can you give reasons for which ever that represents your views?
7. How did Terrorism become an issue between Nigeria and Cameroon?
   (a) Started in Cameroon and crossed to Nigeria.
   (b) Started in Nigeria and crossed into Cameroon
   (c) Both countries accuse each other as the origin
   (d) Other ……..
8. Do you think Nigeria and Cameroon cooperated initially in fighting the terrorist (a) Yes (b) No
9. Do you think their cooperation in fighting the insurgency came at a later time (a) Yes (b) No
10. If they cooperated later can you state why not from the beginning, and how cordial and effective was the later cooperation ……
11. Do you think there is effect of this terrorist activities on Nigeria-Cameroon relations? (a) Yes (b) No
12. If yes or no, can you say how it has affected the relations between the two countries
13. Would you say that the relations between Nigeria - Cameroon has improved, worsened as a result of the emergence of terrorism or has it remained the same …….
14. There was no enthusiastic or viable change in Nigeria-Cameroon relations after the ICJ resolution 2002 and total disengagement of Nigeria from Bakassi peninsula. In your view do you think this situation will change after insurgency is subdued in the region?
15. If yes, can you please state how and what might lead to this change.
16. Please kindly express your personal opinion on Nigeria Cameroon relations before and during the intense terrorism ……..

    ……

    MY E-MAIL ADDRESS: adoyaks@gmail.com

APPENDIX 9

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

SN	Name of Respondent	Date of Interview	Place of Interview	Position
1.	Mr. Dahiru Mahmud Gella	12th July, 2016 10:40 – 12:30pm	Nigeria Immigration Office, Mubi	Officer-in-Charge
2.	Dr. S. P. Umar	12th July, 2016 3:15 – 4:20pm	Adamawa State University, Mubi	H.O.D. Sociology Dept.
3.	Dr. Umar D. Jangur	12th July, 2016 12:20 – 1:50pm	Adamawa State University, Mubi	H.O.D. Political Science and Administration
4.	Alh. Abubakar Isa Amadu	13th July, 2016 4:30 – 5:35pm	Emire's Palace, Mubi	Director of Protocol
5.	Dr. Njiforti Peter	24th August, 2016 11:35 – 12:20pm	ABU, Zaria	Senior Lecturer
6.	MWO James Emaikwo	28th August	Nigerian Military Police School, Zaria	Regiment Staff Major
7.	Dr. Kimeng	5th August, 2016 10:40 – 12:01pm	ABU, Zaria	Senior Lecturer
8.	H. E. Hadiza Mustapha	14th Sept., 2016 2:15 – 5:20pm	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Former High Commissioner to Cameroon
9.	Dr. Henry Eze-Ugo	13th July, 2016 10:00 – 10:45am	History Dept, Adamawa State University, Mubi	Senior Lecturer
10.	Yemi Kale	15th Sept., 2016 1:10 – 2:00pm	National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja	Nigerian Statistician
11.	Major Gen. R. C. I. Duru	10th October, 2016 2:30 – 3:40pm	Civil Military Relations, Defence HQs, Abuja	Director
12.	Salaheddine Abbas Ibrahim	15th Sept., 2016 10:00 – 10:55am	Cameroon Embassy, Abuja	High Commissioner
13.	Anonymous	16th Sept., 2016 10:29 – 10:40am	Federal Ministry of Industry Trade and Investment	Special Adviser
14.	Zebulon Suifon Takwa	September, 2016	Online e-mail	Peace and Development Advisor UN system
15.	Justice Mbuh	24th Sept., 2016	Cameroon	Great Politician Opposition Leader
16.	Anonymous	28th Sept., 2016	Cameroon	-
17.	Anonymous	30th Sept., 2016	Cameroon	-