AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TALBA YOUTH REHABILITATION AND REORIENTATION PROGRAMME IN GOMBE STATE (2011-2015)

BY

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Declaration

I humbly declare that this dissertation titled **"An assessment of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe State 2011-2015"** has been carried out by me in the Department of Political Science. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree at this or any other Institution.

_____	_____	_____
Name of Student	Signature	Date

Certification

This dissertation entitled "**An Assessment of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe State 2011-2015"** by Abdulkadir Ahmed, meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Masters of Science of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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Dedication

With deep sense of gratitude to almighty Allah, I dedicate this research wok to my wife Maryam Gimba Marafa, my late son Ahmed Abdulkadir Ahmed and to all the victims of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.

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Abstract

This study assesses the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe state 2011 to 2015. The choice of this topic was informed by the fact that Kalare thuggery in the state had appeared to have defied all efforts by government to stem it. Despite the huge investment of taxpayers' money in the efforts to get rid of the menace of political thuggery, yet relatively little was achieved as Kalare thuggery has continued unabated. This is evident, in view of the policies and strategies adopted by the state government such as the introduction of anti-Kalare squad to checkmate the activities of kalare thuggery throughout the state; engaging Kalare thugs as Special Assistants (SA's) and Personal Assistants (PA's) to the governor, as well as employment of Kalare members in the Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency (GOSEPA). Incremental theory was used as the theoretical framework for the study. Its adoption was informed by the fact that the programme was initiated as a result of the failure of the successive government strategies to tackle the growing trend of Kalare violence in the state. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used. Three survey instruments were used to gather data from the primary source, while the secondary sources were collected through review of related literature. The data was quantitatively and qualitatively presented and analysed using the triangulation method. The study found that, poverty, unemployment and economic disempowerment were the major factors responsible for youth involvement in kalare thuggery. The study also discovered that the introduction of the programme had not effectively ended Kalare thuggery in the state within the period under study. Similarly, the beneficiaries of the programme were only a fraction of kalare youths in Gombe state. In view of this, the study recommends that severe sanctions should be meted against anybody involved in kalare thuggery and their sponsors. More youths should be employed into the programme and an elaborate sensitization campaign involving parents, community and religious leaders should be embarked on immediately to discourage youths from getting involved in kalare related activities.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Youths are one of the greatest assets that any nation can have; they are usually embedded with untainted energy, robust ideas and virile potentials for charting a new path of social production. Anasi (2010) has observed that the youths are the foundation of a society and thus their strategic value makes them very critical in nation-building and leadership recruitment. The energies, inventiveness, character and orientation of the youths defined the pace of development and the security of a nation. Youths can also constitute a reservoir of energy and dynamism for any national struggle or campaign if they are correctly guided, mobilized, and fully integrated into the social fabrics of the nation.

Valuable as the youths may be to any nation, however, they could also constitute a threat to national survival and stability if allowed to be adrift, unemployed, indiscipline, morally bankrupt and engaged in restive activities. The phenomenon of youth restiveness has been a source of great concern in both developed and developing societies. But Youths in developing countries especially in Africa are faced with many challenges such as poverty and unemployment, illiteracy, lack of access to information and essential welfare services which are manifested in the young people's diminished hope for the future (Aiyede 2010:43).

Some of the highest rates of violence, political thuggery, crime, drug abuse and prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases are seen among the youths population, leading many to label them as a source of society's problem rather than its potentials (Nnachi 2013:19). Nigeria is not an exception from the menace of youth restiveness and political thuggery.

Existing scholarly opinions such as Samuel (2010:24), Agba (2011:58), Haruna and Jumba (2011:11) and Mbaya (2013:16) assert that youth restiveness, especially political thuggery over the years has been used to create and foster a climate of intimidation, uprising and violence in Nigeria especially in the Northern parts of the country, where selfish politicians are in the habit of recruiting and manipulating

unemployed youths, most of whom come from less privileged families, to serve as their fighting political dogs, used against opponents or anybody perceived as obstacle to realising their selfish interests.

Gombe State is one of the states in the North most affected by political thuggery. The bedevilling security challenges faced by the state were largely attributed to the activities of political thugs known as 'Kalare'. Kalare thugs wreaked serious havoc on many innocent citizens, leaving some with permanent injuries and quite a number of others lost their lives. Mahmoud (2011) and Umar (2014) have both observed that the phenomenon of Kalare thuggery in Gombe State is attributable to poverty, illiteracy and unemployment among the youths. Labaran (2014) has also found out that youths aged between 15 to 35 constitute about 65% of the Gombe State population and the educational profile of the state indicate that 53% never attended any school. This means that the state has a large army of uneducated and unemployed youths are vulnerable to various forms of restiveness such as political thuggery and drug related violence.

In order to tackle the menace of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state, the current governor of the state, Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo proscribed the group's activities and granted its members amnesty during his first inauguration as the executive governor of Gombe State on the 29th of May, 2011. He later followed by constituting eleven sector-based committees that came up with reports and recommendations. Part of the recommendations was the enactment of a law by the State House of Assembly for the establishment of the Gombe State Agency for Social Service (GSASS), a body mandated to coordinate and manage the youths for the provision of social services in the state. This is thus stipulated in Section 3 of the Act, "There is hereby established for the state a body to be known as the Gombe State Agency for Social Services (in this law referred to as ''the agency'') which shall consist of such number of uniformed members as may be determined from time to time by the agency with the approval of the governor" (Section 3, Gombe State Agency for Social Services Act 2012)

One of the first acts of the GSASS was to initiate the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme, designed for Kalare members and other restive youths who had abandoned violence. The programme was specifically aimed at reorienting and rehabilitating such youths. And after

undergoing a mandatory training period and medical examination, they were engaged as Road traffic agents, Environmental marshals or Ward and community agents respectively. As a policy analysis, this study is designed to assess the programme based on the objectives upon which it was conceived and set out to achieve.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The occurrence and recurrence of Kalare related violence in Gombe State since the return to democratic rule in 1999 and especially in the build-up to 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections has remained an issue of concern. This is because, politically motivated violence, killings, threats of killings, arson, intimidation, and harassment of perceived political opponents by thugs recruited by politicians has created an atmosphere of tension and perpetual fear, thereby constituting a serious challenge to peace, security, economic progress and political stability in Gombe State.

It is against this background, that this study assesses the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe state as a deliberate strategy to checkmate the growing menace of Kalare thuggery within the period of 2011-2015.

1.3 Research Questions

The main questions this study addresses are:

i. What is the relationship between youth's disempowerment and Kalare thuggery in Gombe state?
ii. To what extent, and how, has the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme empowered youths in Gombe state who were formerly involved in Kalare thuggery?
iii. To what extent has the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme enhanced political stability and transformed ex-Kalare thugs into agents of societal development in Gombe State in the period 2011-2015?

1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The main thrust of this study is to establish whether the policy tagged Talba Youth Reorientation and Rehabilitation Programme in Gombe State has empowered former Kalare thugs by making them gainfully employed youths in the period, 2011-2015 and how. In order to accomplish this, the study has the following specific objectives:

i. To examine the relationship between youths disempowerment and Kalare thuggery in Gombe State.
ii. To assess whether the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has empowered youths who were formerly involved in Kalare thuggery and to what extent.
iii. To evaluate whether the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has enhanced political stability and transformed ex-Kalare thugs into agents of societal development in Gombe State in the period, 2011-2015.

1.5 Propositions of the Study

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the study is guided by the following propositions:

i. The main factor responsible for youth's involvement in Kalare thuggery in Gombe State in recent times is the lack of empowerment by the state.
ii. Youth's empowerment in the form of jobs and skills acquisition will discourage Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.
iii. That Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has enhanced peace and political stability in Gombe state.

1.6 Justification of the Study

The menace of political thuggery in Nigeria and Gombe state to be specific has become an issue of concern among scholars and policy makers alike. Past studies on political thuggery in Gombe state, such as Lamido (2008), Mahmoud, (2011) and Umar (2014) basically focused on the evolution, trends of youth restiveness and political thuggery and how it affected socio-political relations in the state. The studies also suggest ways of curbing the challenges posed by the notorious Kalare groups and their restive activities.

The point of departure of this study is to assess the transformation of hitherto political thugs to agents of societal development in the study area.

Similarly, this study is justified on the ground that it will spark up interest in students and scholars who may want to conduct further research on the subject under study and it hopes to provide them with a basis for literature. It will therefore, also contribute to the existing body of literature hence expanding the frontiers of knowledge. Furthermore, the study will help the state government and other agencies to formulate policies that will engage the teaming youth in a more productive venture..

1.7 Scope and Limitations

. This study is confined to the assessment of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe State in the period 2011 to 2015. The choice of this time frame was based on the fact that 2011 was the year when the programme was introduced. Secondly, it will enable the study to cover the first four-year tenure of the administration of Alhaji Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo, the executive governor of Gombe state, who initiated the programme.

One of the limitations to this study is the difficulty in getting access to some of the informants that were selected for interview. Also part of the limitations of the study is the lack of access to materials, especially classified documents which made it difficult for the researcher to obtain the 2010 data on the record of victims of Kalare related violence in Gombe state.

1.8.0 Methodology

1.8.1 Sources of Data

Data for this study were gathered from two major sources. These were Primary and Secondary sources. The primary source were gathered through survey instruments and techniques in order to obtain first hand information from the respondents which included questionnaire administration to respondents; interviewing key personalities who are stake holders; focus group discussion with identified group members of kalare; and personal observation by the researcher.

The secondary source included the use of existing literature derived from relevant materials like theses written on the subject matter, text books, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, relevant government publications, internet materials related to the subject of study as well as other relevant unpublished materials.

These materials were sourced and collected from the Kashim Ibrahim Library (KIL) ABU Zaria, Postgraduate Library of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, ABU Zaria, Faculty of Social Sciences Library, and Federal University Kashere Library, Gombe State University Library, Post-graduate School Library of Gombe State University Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training, Zangon-Shanu, Samaru, Zaria and other sources of information. Information gathered from these sources was used to compliment the primary data generated. Accordingly, two research assistants were involved to help the researcher in the administration and retrieval of the questionnaires. Both of them are graduates of Political Science from Gombe State University.

1.8.2 Target Population and Research Sample

The first category of respondents were the ex-Kalare who were registered, enrolled, trained, and deployed into the various categories of the programme as either road traffic, environmental and ward community agents. These people are direct beneficiaries of the programme who were drawn from various parts of the state. Since the study is assessing the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme, it has become necessary for these youths to be surveyed as the target population thus, they constitute the first category of respondents in this study.

There were three thousand five hundred and sixty four (3,564) youths who were registered, trained, enrolled and deployed into various categories of the programme as Road Traffic Agents, Environmental Agents or Ward and Community Agents. Out of these, three thousand and eighty four (3,084) youths were confirmed to have been ex-members of Kalare groups and are enrolled in the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe State. The three thousand and eighty four (3,084) youths constituted the population of interest and therefore comprised the target population of this

research and the sampling frame within which the sample was drawn. To get the sample size from the population of interest, the researcher used Yamane (1973) formula to determine the sample size of the research studies. This enabled the researcher to statistically determine the sample size from the population of interest. Thus:

$n= N/ (1+Ne^2)$ where

n = Sample size

N= Population size

e= the level of precision (95% confidence level and 5% precision level is assumed)

Therefore, $n = 3084/ ([1] + 3084 [0.05]^2)$

n = 3084/ ([1] + 3084 (0.0025)

n= 3084/ ([1] + 7.71)

n= 3084/ (8.71)

n= 3084/8.71

n= 354.075

n= 354

Therefore, three hundred and fifty four (354) respondents were selected as a representative of the 3,084. This is equally in conformity to Morgan and Krejcie (1970) sample size classification

1.8.3 Sampling Procedure

Sampling is the scientific process of selecting a subset called sample of a population of interest for the purposes of making observations and statistical inferences about the population (Anol, 2012). Three hundred and fifty four (354) respondents were selected as a representative of 3,084; this was adopted from the classification presented by Yamane (1973) with the confidence level of 95% and margin error of 5%.

A systematic random sampling procedure was used in determining the selection where the lists of the target population were arranged. The researcher numbered the list from 1 to 3,084 in ascending order; he then numbered pieces of paper from 0 to 9. Afterwards, the researcher then put the numbers in a

box, shuffled and carried out raffle selection using simple random sampling in picking the N- term (the actual respondent) within the numbers 0-9. Zero represented the tenth term unit. He then divided 3,084 by 354, as presented below:

3084/354 = 8.711

Eight (8) was taken to represent the population of interest since, if it was taken as approximately 9, it would exceed the number of the sampling frame before 354 were selected.

Therefore, it was taken that after the first selection using simple random sampling; at every count of eight, one will be selected, that is the 8^{th} term. After the raffle, 7 was selected as the first case and the first respondent was registered as seven; thereafter at every count of 8, the researcher picked one, that is (7^{th}, 15^{th}, 23^{rd}, 31^{st}, 39^{th}, $47^{th,}$ 55^{th}, 63^{rd}, 79^{th}, 87^{th}, 95^{th} ...2832th) therefore, 354 beneficiaries were selected as respondents in this study.

1.8.4 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

Two Focus group discussions (FGD) were organized. The two groups were formed in different locations in the state, one in Tudun Wada in Gombe metropolis, Gombe Local Government Area and the other one in Kumo town, Akko Local Government Area. Each of the groups comprised eight respondents of unemployed youths who were still involved in the Kalare activities. The researcher tried to engage them in a focus group discussion to obtain information on why they were still part of Kalare thuggery while a programme was already designed to rehabilitate and empower them.

The reason for the selection of Gombe Metropolis and Kumo town are that, Gombe has remained the centre for Kalare activities being the seat of power coupled with its cosmopolitan nature. Similarly,

Kumo town doubles as the headquarters of Akko Local Government and Gombe Central Senatorial District and equally has its own fair share of the Kalare related violence. These two places are most affected by Kalare related violence.

1.8.5 Key Informants for Unstructured Interview

Fifteen key informants were selected for unstructured interviews. The first category of the respondents comprised the security agencies including the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The reason for the inclusion of security agencies was borne out of the need to obtain their views on the incidences of Kalare related violence before and after the introduction of the programme. This is to ascertain whether the programme has helped in reducing Kalare related violence in Gombe State within the period, 2011-2015. To this end, the Police Public Relations Officer of the Gombe State Command and the Officer in Charge of Operations (O.C Operations) of the Nigerian Civil Defence Corps of Gombe State Command were interviewed.

The second category of the interview respondents were government officials that included the Commissioner for Youths and Poverty Alleviation in Gombe state, the Director General Gombe State Agency for Social Services, Director Planning Research and Statistics, and the Director of Youth Development in the Ministry for Youths and Poverty Alleviation. They provided relevant information as to how the programme was initiated and gave their views on the success and challenges of the programme.

The third category of respondents was made up of community leaders comprising two district heads and two ward heads. The reason for their inclusion is the fact that, community leaders are closer to the people. Moreover, the marshals who are deployed as Road Traffic, Environmental and Ward Community Agents interact with the community through the Community leaders thus they constitute the informants within this category.

Furthermore, Civil Society Organisations were included to make the fourth category of the interview respondents. The reason for their inclusion is that, civil society organisation were at the forefront to mount pressure on government to take decisive actions on the phenomenon of Kalare thuggery in the state therefore, their views as to how the programme fared in its effort to stem the Kalare thuggery was considered as very important. Foundation for Youth Awakening and Empowerment (FOYAE), a civil society organisation was included and their director of programmes and administration was interviewed.

Similarly, two victims of Kalare thuggery and two Politicians were interviewed. One of the politicians is a house of representative member representing Gombe, Kwami and Funakaye Federal Constituency in the National Assembly; he is a member of the opposition party in the State. The other is the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) State Secretary.

Based on this therefore, the informants were selected from each of the strata, using stratified sampling method. More so, the breakdown of the informants is represented on the table below:

Table 1.1 **Informants Stratum**

Stratum	Number
Community leaders	4
Government officials	4
Civil Society Organization	1
Politicians	2
Security Personnel	2
Victims of *Kalare* violence	2
Total	15

Source: Field Work, 2015

1.8.6 Method of Data Analysis

Quantitative data are presented in tabular form, interpreted using statistical tools and analysed qualitatively. This is done through tabulation method, which is a method of transferring data from its gathering instruments to a tabular form. The data are analysed through the use of both quantitative and qualitative descriptive methods of analysis to summarize the results of the subjects under investigation. Through the quantitative method, the researcher made use of simple percentage and frequency distribution tables to sum the mass of the information that were generated during the field work. The interviews and FGDs were tape-recorded, transcribed and the data was triangulated and analysed through the use of the qualitative method of analysis.

1.9. Definition of Concepts

1.9.1 Youth

Suleiman (2012) observed that 'youth' lacks clear definition. He noted that in some situations its definition may be based on one's social circumstances rather than chronological age or cultural position. However, the National Youth Policy (2001) defines youth as all young persons of ages 18 to 35 years. It is important to note that this category of people constitute about 40 percent of more than 140 million people in Nigeria. Thus; the definition of National Youth Policy is adopted as the working definition for the study.

1.9.2 Kalare

. Kalare, as used throughout this study refers to a group of youth notoriously called as 'Yan-kalare' in Gombe Staten who have constituted themselves into political thugs and who have made themselves available largely to the political class to be used to scare political opponents or perceived political opponents before, during or after elections, and aimed at achieving an undue political result or advantage.

1.9.3 Empowerment

Empowerment has been defined by various scholars depending on the circumstance and the interest of the researcher. Wallerstine (1992) maintains that empowerment is a social-action process that

promotes participation of people, organisations and communities towards the goals of increased individual and community control, political efficacy, improved quality of community life, and social justice.

However we shall in the context of this research define empowerment as a way of encouraging the youth to acquire skills through training and knowledge which will allow them to effectively take charge and control their destiny and also enable them to contribute to the development of their community with dignity.

1.10. Organisation of Chapters

This study is structured into five chapters. Chapter one contains a general introduction which describes the research design. It basically highlights background to the study, statement of research problem, significance of the study, objectives of the study, research hypothesis, research methodology, chapter organisation and definition of concepts.

Chapter two delves into the review of the existing literature and theoretical framework. It gives a thematic and theoretical analysis of the theoretical framework used for the study. The third

Chapter dwells on the historical background of the study area. It covers the location, the people, the economic activities, politics and administration of the study area. It also deals with the historical evolution of Kalare thuggery in Gombe State and the various efforts put in-place to tackle the menace. The fourth Chapter covers the presentation of data collected from the field and proceeds to analyse them. Finally, chapter five encompasses the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations advanced from the research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The chapter reviews literature relevant to the subject and the theoretical framework on which the study is based. A thematic review of existing literature on the issues under study is attempted. The chapter reviews the concept of policy, public policy and public policy process. Similarly the chapter deals with youth restiveness, political thuggery and the historical overview of youth's involvement in political thuggery in Nigeria, causes and effects of political thuggery. It also deals with youth empowerment as well as strategies for youth empowerment. Incremental theory was examined and adopted as a theoretical guide for the study.

2.2 The Concept of Policy

Scholars have viewed the term policy differently and from various perspectives. Ekechukwu and Emma (2013) observed that the term policy is central to the operation and activities of both private organizations and public institutions. And while some emphasize policy as an action; others see it as a choice. Some see it in terms of scope of action. In other words, the way a given scholar conceptualizes a policy depends on the perspective from which the scholar is viewing it and this account for the varied definition of the concept. For instance, Ekpo (2014) defines policy as a long series of more or less related activities and their effects. Similarly, Hill and Hupe, (2002) contends that Policy involves behaviour as well as intention, and action as well as inaction. Policy arises from a process over time, which may involve both intra and inter-organisational relationships.

The concept of policy and public policy are not easily distinguishable as people often use them interchangeably. In trying to make a distinction between the concept of policy and public policy, Ekechukwu and Emma (2013) observed that Policy made by an individual or private institution is known as private policy while the one made by government or its institutions is called public policy. Similarly, Anderson (1997) observed that policy is a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors

in dealing with a problem or matter of concern while Public policies are those policies developed by governmental bodies and officials.

2.2.1 The Concept of Public Policy

There is no precise and universally acceptable definition of the term Public policy, Dlakwa (2008) observed that, public policy refers to the principles, guidelines or orientation adopted by a governmental body in guiding the affairs of people in a given polity (Dlakwa 2008:2). In similar vein, Ekpo (2014) observed that public policies are the purposive course of action followed by government or public institutions. To Egonmwan (2002), public policy is a government programme of action. He further asserts that, the raging debate over the parameter and the scope of what could constitute public policy is an issue of concern (Egonmwan, 2002). Some have raised the question as whether public policy should be posited at the level of decision making, intention or action of government Public policies are usually made to cover all areas of governmental interventions such as youth empowerment policies, health policies, housing policies and educational policies among others.

Dlakwa (2008) pointed that the various perspectives on public policy could be classified broadly into three: (a) policy seen as a statement of intention, (b) policy seen as a set of activities and (c) policy seen as a process of decision-making or choice. He also argued that, all the three perspectives on public poly are interlinked, as there cannot be any meaningful statement of intention without elements of decision making coming into play. Nor could there be any activity carried out to realize an objective without the objectives being specified in the first place. Neither could the carrying out of activities be effectively done without decisions made in the first place (Dlakwa 2008:7). This therefore, means that public policy is a legally sanctioned statement of intentions by government following a painstaking process of decision making, as well as the crafting of an institutional framework through which these intentions could be accomplished so as to meet the yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry.

Based on the perspectives of scholars such as Anderson (1997), Egonmwan (2002), Dlakwa (2008) and Ekpo (2014), Public policy possess several attributes, including, the decision which translates to policy is goal-oriented. This means that the policy must be targeted at solving a specific problem; a policy must involve series of actions. That means that a policy should have an identifiable action plan that needs to be followed in order to actualize set goals; Policy must be rooted in some institutional structures combining finance, human resources and even physical structures needed for its implementation and policy must be derived from duly constituted rules or laws. This makes a policy to be authoritative to promote certain values or agenda or allocate resources to promote the values of the government or organization.

2.2.2 Public Policy Process

The public policy process generally describes the processes through which a public policy occurs. Notwithstanding difference in the institutional and political settings, there is broad consensus in the views o scholars, such as Anderson (1997), Dlakwa (2008) and Ekpo (2014) that public policy process generally involves the following activities which may also be referred to stages as problem identification, agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimization, policy implementation and policy evaluation.

Problem Identification: This arises when members of the public, masses and elite alike, begin to make demand on the government over various problems and challenges requiring government actions and interventions. Dlakwa (2008) observed that need or problem identification is the process of noticing, articulating and aggregating the pressing needs or demands of the society so as to attract government's attention to them (Dlakwa 2008:25). This suggests that, problems such as unemployment among the youths, political thuggery, increased crime rate and drugs addiction and other pressing problems that are noticeable in the community will elicit the need for relieve for the community affected.

Agenda Setting: It is the second stage in public policy process. , Ekpo (2014) observed that, it is the stage where some of the demands emanating from the population have to be taken up and synthesized by formal and influential institutions, individuals and interest groups, such as think tanks, intellectuals, the media, politicians, political parties, government officials, civil society and others. Similarly, Dlakwa (2008) pointed that, at this stage, selected demands are transformed into important policy issues which will then be sold to the government and its institutions for consideration.

Policy Formulation Stage: This is the third stage in public policy process. Ekpo (2014) argued that policy formulation stage is the most important stage in the policy process. It involves careful considerations of several issues, including the problems requiring government interventions, individuals and institutions to be charged with different phases of implementation, and duration of the intervention.

Policy Legitimization: This is a necessary stage for any policy formulated. After policy formulation, policy legitimization becomes very important in order to provide legal backing and make the policy legitimate. Dlakwa (2008) argued that policy legitimization is meant to protect the civil servants that would be engaged in implementing such policy from litigation arising from performing their functions. Ekpo (2014) pointed that legitimization could take several forms, including approval by some of the highest organs of the state such as parliament, legislative statute or act, order-in-council among others. The legal backing provided the legitimization of the policy.

Policy Implementation: policy implementation is described as the most critical stage in policy cycle. Dlakwa (2008) observed that, any policy that is adopted and legitimized, but not properly implemented is not worth more than the paper its contained. Policy implementation stage involves bringing together all the necessary human and material resources necessary to achieve the goals of the policy. It should follow strictly the different stages of implementation outlined in the policy by the policy makers.

Policy Evaluation: policy evaluation is the final stage in public policy process. This essentially involves an assessment of the impact of the policy to be carried out either by the policy makers themselves or by any of the various interests group or independent expert. Dlakwa (2008) pointed that policy evaluation provide a basis to judge whether resources employed in executing projects have been utilized efficiently or effectively. Similarly, it is from evaluation that the cost-effectiveness of a project or programme could be determined. Furthermore, the performance ratio could be determined through evaluation with a view to adopting new management techniques that can improve the performance (Dlakwa 2008:31). In similar vein, Ekpo (2014), observed that Policy evaluators are usually interested in several issues when carrying out policy evaluation, including whether or not the policy has met its intended objectives and cost associated with implementing the policy relative to the benefits derived (Ekpo 2014:9).

2.3 Youth Restiveness

Youth restiveness, as observed by Chukuezi (2009), is a combination of any actions or conducts that are not only unwholesome but also socially unacceptable which are engaged in by the youths in any community. This means that it is a phenomenon that, amongst others, could result to breakdown of law and order, low productivity, increasing crime rate, intra ethnic hostilities and harassment of prospective developers, among other negative tendencies.

The phenomenon of youth restiveness all over the world, especially in Africa and Nigeria has become a pattern of behaviour increasingly prevalent among youths, and has correspondingly attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers who investigate the causes and attempt to devise a means through which the menace will be tackled. Happiness and Innocent (2009) assert that youth restiveness is a manifestation of man's negative side of social development. It is disturbing to both individuals and the society, because it has become one of the many security challenges facing man in the contemporary society leading to loss of lives and properties worth millions of naira vandalized by restive youths.

Chukwuemeka and Agbara (2010) argue that human society and in fact the entire universe, is simply and squarely a complex entity. In view of this, individuals and groups have their complexities,

needs, aspirations, hopes, goals, opinions, views and values which could be social, economic, religious, psychological or political. When these needs remain unmet for a prolonged period of time, there is bound to be restiveness among different groups of people, especially youths who are at their prime age. In the same vein, Kursim (2007:11) and Suleiman (2012:24) opined that the existence of gross reservoir of unemployed youths have led to easy recruitment into ethnic militias. Also, limitless supply of hungry willing able bodied young Africans into the schemes of destabilization set up by the elites is facilitated. Youth restiveness has also been a device used by the youths to get what they want from the relevant authority. As noted by Osasai (2009:4), conflicts in human history are centred on the scramble for control of natural resources and the attendant struggle for political power for the domination of human societies.

Youth restiveness, as a global phenomenon has created problems in both developed and developing countries. For instance, Bell (2010) in his study, *Criminal Responsibility and Young People in France and the United Kingdom* argues that young people are increasingly perceived as being a threat to society due to their anti-social behaviours such as gangsterism, rape cases, petty crimes, hooliganism, among other anti-social behaviours. This led to the labelling of restive youths in the United Kingdom as 'thugs' and 'yobs' because of the preponderance of anti-social behaviours which is prevalent among youths. In the same vein, Abubakar (2015) provides instances from the research conducted by Harrof-Tavel in 2010 where youths were involve in violent activities. He pointed-out few cases of such violent behaviours which started from the 2005 experience of the wave of violent disturbances that plagued Paris and its environs and spread to over 200 cities in France, to the 2008 experience of armed violence involving different gangs in Cape Town, South Africa, and also the Rio de Janero conflict in 2010 in Brazil where drug-peddling gangs engaged the police in a violent manner leading to loss of lives and valuable properties. Similarly in Nigeria, the activities of restive youths have constantly posed a serious challenge to the socio-economic and political wellbeing of the country. As noted by Tenuche (2009), the activities of militants in the Niger-Delta, the area boys in the South West and the Arewa People's

Congress in the North have constantly created problems and in fact have retarded development in various sectors of Nigeria's economy.

Historically, youth restiveness has become transactional mechanisms through which most of them bargain and get what they want from relevant authorities. However, Abdullahi (2010:60) has traced the historical evolution of violence involving youths in Northern Nigeria to religious, ethnic and socio-political matters. She argued that the Northern part of Nigeria has dealt with religious, ethnic, and socio-political conflicts since the pre-colonial era and that youth have remained at the fore front of these conflicts. They are seen at the battle front carrying out the most despicable of all offences, eliminating lives and destroying properties worth millions of naira. She went further to explain that some of the conflicts that have ensued in the region have remote origins in the patterns of pre-colonial migration, conquest, and control.

However, Abdullahi's (2010) argument is not consistent with the scholarly views of Chika and Onyene (2013) who assert that youth resistance to conditions, issues and unwelcome leadership regimes dated back to 1934 when Herbert Macaulay floated a political party to kick against dependency with fellow elite youths that had contact with the West. In addition, political parties like the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Northern People's Congress (NPC), and the Action Group (AG) had their youth wings which were as vibrant as the other party constituents. This position was further corroborated by Chukuezi (2009) who argues that youths serve as the vanguard for nationalist movement. As students, they were the militant wing of the anti-colonial struggle. Youths played pivotal roles in the Nigerian Youths Movement, the Zikist Movement, and the West African Student Union (WASU) through which they popularized the anti-imperialist consciousness theorized by the elder nationalists. Chukuezi (2010) also noted that these youths were thrown out of school, often detained and jailed by the colonialists who regarded them as a dangerous nuisance; but they persisted.

Even in the economy, youths as workers in the coal mines of Iva Valley, Enugu, were murdered by colonial police yet they remained undaunted in their sometimes militant agitations against economic

injustice. They even fought the slightest manifestation of colour barrier thereby arresting the introduction of any racialist schemes. However, Patrick (2013) argued that the use of students as militant wing of nationalist movement led to an uncontrollable spate of restive activities by youths in Nigeria today. He demonstrates that after participation in nationalist activities, students began to form cult groups, ethnic cliques and cleavages as well as clannish movements which seem to have legitimized restive reactions among the youths.

In their studies, Ubulom (2003), Akwara (2010), Chukuemeka and Aghara (2010), Chukuezi (2010) and Idowu (2012) express different views on the root causes of youth restiveness in Nigeria. They link it to youth unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, poor leadership and corruption. Akwara for example, attributed the phenomena of youth restiveness to poverty and unemployment and argues that poverty and unemployment as a social menace in Nigeria constitute a threat to national security. Evidently, unemployment creates poverty and poverty leads to insecurity. It therefore follows that both poverty and unemployment have implications on national security. This is because poor people and unemployed people, especially the youths could be manipulated to undermine national stability and cause violent disorders in the country at any point in time (Akwara 2013:8).

Chukuezi (2009) further observes that historical experience has shown that youths and students have rendered valuable contributions to the struggle for national liberation and development. He went further to argue that in Nigeria's political landscape, youths have assumed a transitory status determined by certain social forces of unemployment, poverty and corruption. Adegoju (2012) describes youths in Africa and particularly Nigeria as a 'social category in crisis.' Adegoju's position concurred with Chukuezi (2009) who describes youths as being characterised by exclusion, marginalisation, threat, victimisation, abuse, problem, frustration and violence. Their anger, frustration and bitterness resulting from the multifarious crises and the ensuing negative orientations, are compounded by the fact that they constitutes a large pool that is amenable to all sorts of manipulations by political leaders and other elites groups and the fact that they can easily transform their bitterness and frustration into violence.

2.3.1. Political Thuggery

Political thuggery, as a form of youth restiveness, has been interpreted by different scholars depending on their intellectual disposition. Samuel (2010) believes that ‘’political thuggery is any act of intimidation, violence, hooliganism, brutality, gangsterism, whether leading to death or not, calculated to pose a threat on perceived political opponents before, during and after elections and aimed at achieving an undue political results or advantage’’. His conception means that political thuggery involves the use of thuggery in the political process and it is clothed with criminal flavour. It is a violent behaviour in which people fight and attack others and it is consequently associated with all negative synonyms such as violence, brutal acts, hooliganism and gangsterism. This suggests that thuggery is the use of thugs, private armies and physical force to threaten and harm political opponents to rig elections. Haruna and Hamman (2013:20) cite example of thugs to include a former secret organization of robbers in India, who are worshipers of the goddess Kali who strangle their victims. Similarly, the thugs in Nigeria go by different appellations. For example, in Kano they are called ‘*Yan daba’*, ‘*Sara-suka*’ in Bauchi, ‘*ECOMOG*’ in Borno and Kalare in Gombe State. They move in groups and are always seen during elections attacking the perceived opponents of their pay masters and most often even when elections are over; they usually commit crimes such as stealing, raping and assault of innocent people.

Furthermore Howell (2004), observed that political thuggery involved a tireless repetition of misleading ‘facts’ designed to depict an opponent as personally despicable with regard to governance which is dangerous to the physical and political life of the nation. Therefore, political thuggery is simply the criminalization of politics. When politics is criminalized, it is left in the hands of ruffians, assassins, thugs and hooligans, for this reason, the good people are afraid to participate. In fact, contemporary events across the country have undoubtedly confirmed that Nigerian politics has been hijacked by political thugs (Asiegbu, 2011:11). Asiegbu also notes that politicians recruit youths comprising mostly males as their thugs and touts. These thugs intimidate and coerce people to do their bidding especially during elections. Even party agents and INEC officials at the polling booths are threatened and made to

compromise. Therefore, it has become a reality that thugs are dangerous and they are seen freely disobeying laws. But one surprising thing is the fact that no political party agrees to have thugs rather, whenever trouble is caused by one of them and the culprits are netted by the police, then politicians always set them free.

2.3.2 Youth and Political Thuggery in Nigeria: A Historical Overview

Political thuggery in Nigeria dates back to pre-independence period, and one defining characteristics of the Nigerian political system has been the use of youths as political thugs to perpetrate violence. Before the attainment of independence, there were myriad of political violence that preceded the general elections of 1952, 1954, and 1959. Samuel (2013) Observed that political thuggery has been a common feature in Nigerian history since independence but it is quite difficult to ascertain the exact time it became an indispensable part of the Nigerian polity. The political tussle between Akintola and Awolowo during the first republic (1960-1966) which witnessed an unprecedented violence is one of the earliest crises recorded in post colonial era (Samuel et al 2013:91). It has become recurring phenomenon that claimed Nigerian political scene during the past two republics 1960-1966 and 1979-1983 as aptly captured by Lamido (2008); that the electoral process and party system were little more than armies organized for fighting election based on regions. Winning elections became a life and death struggle which justified all means fair and foul. So vile the abuse of the electoral process that it almost raised the question of the need for election at all (Lamido 2008:40).

Bala (2002), traced the phenomenon of youth involvement in political violence to 1952 when the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) supporters engaged policemen in what could have been a disastrous clash in Kano 1952 and the use of thugs by the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) for the Eastern Regional Elections of 1957 (Bala 2002:3). The Tiv riot of 1964 is also a case in point where as observed by Samuel (2013) that, there were serious outbreaks of violence in Tiv land in 1960 and 1964 where it was estimated that 337 people died. Tiv people often refer to the

brutal attack as 'Atemtyo' literally meaning killing of political opponents by smashing their heads (Samuel etal 2013:93). This trend continues and became more pronounced immediately after independence especially with the quest and the struggle to control power at the center and one very prominent character of contemporary politics in Nigeria is the emergence and proliferation of dozens of militia groups across the country (Banwo 2003:142).

During the first republic it was known that political thugs were used by the Northern People's Congress (NPC) to check the winning streak of NEPU. The problem of thuggery during the first Republic is not limited to any region, it was a common phenomenon in several parts of Nigeria and since then, the use of thugs by politicians to gain political advantage became widespread.

Recently, political thuggery appears to be the only means of gaining political power without consideration for meritocracy and popular opinion of the masses. Bala (2002) highlighted some of the politically motivated violence to include the violent political disturbances in Gusau where two people were killed on 5th October 2001, the violent intra-AD conflict in Osun State where one person lost his life on 19th January, 2002 and the political violence at the PDP National Secretariat on 26th January, 2002 where thugs believed to be working for PDP chieftain in Anambara State who is strongly opposed to the governor attempted to prevent the governor from entering the premises of the secretariat for a meeting of the party's National executive committee (NEC) meeting. Adebanwi (2004) attempt to provide instances where youth were employed to perpetrate political violence since return to democratic rule in 1999 to include the March 10th and 11th clash between supporters of the PDP and Alliance for Democracy in Lagos, the attack on the convoy of the presidential candidate for National Conscience Party (NCP) on March 14th, 2003. Similarly, between November 1, 2006 and March 10, 2007 four assassinations attempt were reported and several assassinations of Nigerian politicians, party officials and other individuals which were directly linked to various electoral campaigns were reported and mostly carried out by youth (Adebanwi 2004:336). One alarming problem is that memberships of the thugs are predominantly youth.

If youths who are the leaders of tomorrow are deeply entrenched in violence and intimidation by unpopular and selfish politicians to gain access into power, political insecurity and instability may become the order of the day.

2.3.3. Causes of Political Thuggery

Several factors abound to explain the occurrence of political thuggery as well as political violence. These include illiteracy and poverty, weaknesses in the institutions and absence of checks and balances (Agba 2011, Haruna & Hamman 2013). However, these cannot adequately explain the causes of political thuggery which range from micro to macro level. Other causes include the phenomenon of godfatherism, lack of internal party democracy and the negative impact of money politics.

a) Unemployment; Unemployment has been identified as a major cause of socio-economic and political problems in Nigeria. According to the National Bureau of Statistics in its 2014 report, unemployment in Nigeria increased to 23.9 percent in 2014, from 20.6 percent in 2013 and it seems it will continue in 2015. It described this situation as 'potentially dangerous'. More than 60 percent of millions of unemployed Nigerians are said to be between the ages of 15 and 44, thus, youth unemployment is said to be near 50 percent mark.

Unemployment exposes many youths to certain criminal activities like political thuggery, kidnapping, robbery and hired assassinations. Agreeing to this, Nnachi (2013) observes that some of the highest rates of violence, political thuggery and crime, drug abuse and high risk sexual diseases is prevalent among the youth population than any other age group leading many to label the youths as a source of society's problem rather than solutions. This suggests that unemployment and its associated economic deprivation and helplessness lures many youths into political thuggery which is not only a criminal act but also a dangerous misadventure. Similarly, Theophilus (2013) observes that politicians recruit, train and empower local secret sects who are mostly unemployed to harass, intimidate and victimize perceived political opponents with opposing views against their political ambition. These gangs

are comprised primarily of unemployed young men who are mobilized to attack their sponsors' rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections and protect their patrons from similar attacks (Human Rights Watch 2007).

b) Poverty and Illiteracy; High level of unemployment accounted for poverty in Nigeria as indicated by NBS 2013. Most thuggery-prone youths come from humble families which cannot fulfil their obligations and needs; and since poverty provides the fertile ground for easy manipulation of these youths, little efforts is needed to join any group of militia/thugs to meet their daily needs. Illiteracy is another cause of political thuggery. Studies such as Mahmoud (2011), Njoku (2012) and Mbaya (2013) reveal that most of those engaged by politicians in their shoddy deals are either illiterate or received low level of education as such they become prey to overzealous politicians. Agreeing to their views, Umar (2014) further observes that poverty and illiteracy are among the major factors that encourage youths to be easily manipulated by the self-seeking politician. This explains how politicians in Nigeria especially Gombe State easily recruit young people mostly from poor background as their political hunting dogs to attack their perceived opponents.

c) Weaknesses in the Political System and Lack of Checks and Balances; There are prevalent weaknesses in the institutions responsible for carrying out electoral processes in Nigeria. The inability of institutions of government such as Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the police, the judiciary and the executive resulting from abuse of office and fraud often emasculate the electoral process (Odivwri, 2003:3). Furthermore Njoku (2012) explains the weakness in the institutions to include undue favour to some group or individuals and power of incumbency which in effect result to disaffection by other groups. There is also the lack of checks and balances on part of the three arms of government to ensure smooth electoral processes, this often leads to fraudulent acts and behaviours, rigging, cheating among others (Haruna & Hamman 2013).

d) The Phenomenon of Godfatherism; The phenomenon of godfatherism has been largely responsible for the prevalence of political thuggery and the subversion of the electoral integrity of the country. In the

context of Nigeria's politics, a god father is the man or woman who enjoys enormous goodwill and respect from the people, so much that his belief system represents those of his people (Odivwri, 2003:47). Odivwri (2003) further observes that, the godfather also has considerable wealth as well as social and political connections with which he tilts situations and opportunities in his favour and that of his followers. In addition, in contemporary Nigerian politics, many godfathers maintain an army of thugs who intimidate political opponents, snatch ballot boxes during elections and play other key roles in manipulating election results in accordance to the wishes of the god father.

Similarly, Okohue (2011:1) states that since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, the god fathers have remained a force to be reckoned with. He notes that no contestant of political office could achieve his ambition without the blessing of the godfather. He concludes that the roles of the godfathers in the country's political environment were as important, if not more important, than that of the electorate. This is especially in the manipulation of the electoral process in favour of their chosen candidates. Lamido (2008) observes that in Gombe state, the godfathers always recruit, finance and empower political thugs known as Kalare who engage in political violence and manipulation of the electoral process to satisfy the wishes of their sponsors.

e) Lack of Internal Party Democracy: This is one of the major problems that have encouraged political thuggery in Nigeria's political environment. Problems of internal party democracy within a political party entails that a powerful clique within the party may hijack the party's leadership and structure, and arbitrarily take party decisions and actions in its favour to the detriment of the popular will of the larger membership (Osehobo, 2011:17). In the same vein, Omeje (2010:33) observes that internal party democracy is one issue that has consistently eluded Nigerian democracy in virtually all the four republics the country has had since independence. He further maintained that political parties have always been hijacked, at all levels, by powerful potentates who impose loyal clients, sycophants and bootlickers as candidates for elections. This suggests that the absence of internal party democracy encourages utter

disregard to the popular will of the majority of party members which in the long run lead to chaos and conflict in the polity (Aminu, 2008:9).

Even in the build-up to the 2015 general elections, there were cases of imposition of candidates as some of the political parties did not conduct primary elections. Thus, lack of internal party democracy accentuates the problem of thuggery in Nigerian politics. Many politicians often resort to "self help" when they are convinced that party rules and regulations guiding primary elections and other vital issues would be subverted by the clique that has hijacked the party. The politics of exclusion and hijacking of political parties by a clique often results in the use of thugs to unleash mayhem on the party members and possible destruction of party properties (Anucha, 2011:13).

f). The Negative Impact of Money Politics: The enthronement of money politics in Nigeria's political arena is one of the major causes of political thuggery in the country. As politicians spend a lot of money to secure political offices, they employ the services of thugs to ensure the realization of their political ambitions either by fair or foul means (Ogunaike, 2010:9).

The former INEC Chairman, Professor Maurice Iwu has faulted the character of Nigerian politics which he stated lacked ideology and principle. He also stated that the perception of political office as easy access to wealth was the prevailing expression of the character of democracy and elections in the country. This has encouraged the prevailing act of thuggery which enables politicians to manipulate elections and assume or retain political offices at the detriment of the society. (Edike, 2008:7)

For Anifowose (2003:76) violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Indeed, politics appears to be the most 'lucrative business' in contemporary Nigerian society. In view of this, some persons who occupy political offices make extensive use of thugs to sustain their political power irrespective of the wishes of the majority of the people.

2.3.4 Effects of Political Thuggery

The effects of political thuggery are numerable depending on the perspective from which one looks at it (Samuel 2010). Samuel (2010), Haruna and Hamman (2011) and Mbaya (2013) observe that the effects of political thuggery include constituting a major threat to national security; instilling fear resulting in low turnout or participation by eligible voters during elections, and allowing for serious doubt of the credibility of the purported elected leaders before the eyes of the local and international community. Similarly, it could affect respect from the governed and this could further affect the general acceptability or the popularity of the government, amounting to stealing of genuine mandate from the voters. Good governance is also compromised as people's hopes and expectations are dashed continuously by imposed leaders. Finally, it hinders or does away with public accountability of elected officers since re-election and continuity is guaranteed by the support of godfathers who are able to deploy political thugs in the service of their godsons

Although Samuel (2010) emphasizes political thuggery affects electoral processes and diminishes the hope of the electorate in the process, he did not look at how political thuggery affects other aspects of human life. Mbaya (2013:12) argues that the effects of political thuggery are in three dimensions which are; the political, socioeconomic and security and these three are interrelated. Agreeing with Mbaya's view, Umar (2014:56) in discussing the effects of political thuggery in Gombe State observes that the excessive attacks and killings of innocent people, disruption of socioeconomic activities and instilling fear in the minds of the people as they go about their day-to-day activities also contribute to some of the effects of political thuggery. This suggests that political thuggery as a phenomenon has over the years affected socio-political and economic development of most of the political systems especially in the developing countries where politicians recruit youths as their political dogs to harass and intimidate their opponents.

2.4.1 Youths Empowerment

Youth empowerment constitutes a major role of governments in contemporary societies. Webster (1998) observes that to empower means to give official authority or legal power, or to promote self

actualization or influence. The strategy prescribed by the first definition can be quite effective provided that the party is being empowered that is, the "empoweree" already has the competencies needed to achieve the desired outcome. The strategy does not work well when it is plugged into a framework of youth development in which empowerment itself is being used as a strategy for developing competencies in youth. For youth development, the third definition seems to be more suitable (Huebner, 1998:7).

Similarly, Whitmore (1988) sees empowerment as an interactive process through which people experience personal and social change, enabling them to take action to achieve influence over the organisations and institutions which affect their lives and communities in which they live. Wallestine (1992) also notes that empowerment is a social-action or process that promotes participation of people, organisations, and communities towards the goals of increased individual and community control, political efficacy, improved quality of community life, and social justice. Simply put, empowerment has to do with a process whereby individuals achieve increasing control of various aspects of their lives and participate in the community with dignity. It is a process whereby people gain the ability and authority to make decision and implement change in their own lives. It is a way of encouraging the youth to acquire skills through training and knowledge which will allow them to effectively take charge and control their destiny and contribute to the development of their community with dignity (Lord and Hutchison 1993:78). Too often, youths workers assume that "empowering" is a synonym for relinquishing all guidance, control, and responsibility for a project to the young people with whom they work. Typically, this approach is met with failure on the part of the youth, frustration on the part of the youth development professional, and more evidence that the notion of "empowerment" is a concept that looks good on paper but does not work in the real world of youth work.

Hutchison (1993) observed that empowerment has to do with personal control, how people control their own lives. He did not look at empowerment as being a multidimensional approach because he narrowed the concept of empowerment and limited it to only personal control. However,

empowerment has to go beyond just personal control and it has to be pursued via a multidimensional approach if it is to be durable.

Rapparport (1987:121) expatiates further that it conveys both a psychological sense of personal control or influence and a concern with actual social influence, political power and legal rights. His conception did not also look at empowerment holistically as his definition focuses on psychological control and political influence. Tope (2011) in his study *The Challenges Facing the Implementation of Youth Empowerment Programmes/Economic and Development Strategy (NEEDS) in Northern Nigeria* maintains that youth empowerment does the following for African youths; it gives them the ability to make decisions about personal/collective circumstances; the ability to access information and resources for decision making; ability to consider a range of options from which to choose; ability to exercise assertiveness in collective decision making; having positive-thinking about the ability to make change; ability to learn and access skills for improving personal collective circumstance; ability to inform other's perceptions through exchange, education and engagement; involvement in the growth process and changes that is never ending and self-initiated; increasing one's positive self-image and overcoming stigma; and increasing one's ability in discreet thinking to sort out right and wrong (Tope 2011). This suggests that youth empowerment has to do with creating enabling environment for the youths within the age bracket of 18 to 35 years to take full charge of their life situation while at the same time achieving psychological sense of personal control or influence.

Youth empowerment means involving young people in decision-making processes on issues that affect them, as well as entrusting them with the knowledge and skills necessary for them to effectively and meaningfully participate in decision making especially as its affects their lives (Reiss, 1988). This implied that youth empowerment is a wide-range of activities and has become an imperative not only for national development but also because the transitional period from childhood to adulthood is unquestionably a challenge for many youths.

In recent years, the governments of most countries have sought new approaches to harness the potential of young people and address the problems facing them. The concept of youth empowerment has gained increasing attention. For example, the 2012 report of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) observed that Africa has a youthful population made up of enthusiastic and energetic young people which, if sufficient supportive policies and programmes are put in place, could drive the social and economic prosperity of the continent. It also suggests that there must be sustained, determined, and concerted action by a wide range of actors. This implies that all stakeholders in youth empowerment and development, including governments, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, parents, guardians, and elders have the responsibility to empower youths around them in order to jointly realize the national objective of socio-economic transformation of communities (Yemisi 2010).

Finally, there seems to be a consensus as to what youth empowerment entails. Youth empowerment should be a cross-cutting and a high-priority issue that needs to be addressed within the framework of an interdisciplinary, multi-sectoral, and multi-stakeholder approach. Emeh (2012) observes that there is a wide-held view that productive employment and decent work for young people's empowerment cannot be achieved through fragmented and isolated interventions. Studies such as Lord and Hutchison (1993), Perkins and Zimmerman (1995) and Webster and Perkins (2007) all believed that empowerment has to be a multilevel construct. They also argue that empowerment is a multilevel construct because it affects the individual family, organization, the community, and even the society at large. Hence, the four levels are interconnected in that psychological empowerment (including a sense of personal responsibility and collective efficacy) may be a necessary condition for community and organizational empowerment which is the basis for societal empowerment (Perkins and Zimmerman 1995:43).

Individual and Family Level Empowerment: At the personal level, empowerment focuses on acquiring access to resources and increasing control. A goal for the poverty-stricken segments of the population is to begin to meet their material needs by obtaining housing, health care, education, and

employment (Webster and Perkins 2007). However, while meeting material goals is necessary, it is not sufficient for empowerment as it does not necessarily lead to an increase in feelings of value, self-efficacy, and control. Just as Rapparport (1987) states, empowerment has to convey both a psychological sense of personal control and legal rights. This suggests that individuals are assumed to understand their own needs better than anyone and therefore should have the power to define and act upon them, and to take actions and achieve influence over the organizations and institutions which affect their lives and communities in which they live.

Organizational-level Empowerment: At the organizational level, empowerment focuses on changing belief systems, roles and power relationships, support systems and leadership styles of a group in order to increase its efficacy, self-sufficiency and the legitimacy of its members in the organization of society. The training of hitherto Kalare thugs too was to help in discouraging them from their unholy venture and enhance their capacity as individuals, and to contribute in developing their community. Kera (2014) posits that the initiation of any programme is borne out of the need to take youths off the streets, engage their minds positively and then broaden and brighten their horizon, stimulate the maximisation of their potentials, polish or reshape their philosophy and psyche, while reducing their tendency to become hooligans.

Similarly, Harter (1993) observes that empowering youths is important because it leads to competence, and competence is linked to self-esteem. Accordingly, youths with increased competence can become a great resource for developing their communities because they will assume increasing responsibility in the day to day activities and in running the overall programme. DiBenedetto (1992), and Huebner (1998) identified factors influencing youth's feelings toward empowerment as including being able to experience and exercise power, receiving education and training, participating in critical analysis of issues, experiencing an environment of safety, closeness and appreciation, being able to honestly

express opinions and emotions, accepting diversity, developing a voice and being able to take action applied to other situations.

Community-level Empowerment: Tremendous variations exist among communities in their levels of structural violence and therefore, it makes sense that there are a wide variety of community-level empowerment strategies to address social violence where youths are involved with restiveness, crime, and other problems Wandersman (1998). This is accomplished by forming coalitions in communities and gathering large number of individuals to work together on a common purpose. Perkins (1995) observed that community level empowerment has to do with community coalition approach the public health and primary prevention literature, certain empowerment principles, and an effort to comprehensively engage multiple social systems such as families, schools, workplaces, media and civic organisations in solving seemingly intractable social, psychological and health problems

Societal-level Empowerment: Societal empowerment targets larger social structures and institutions that keep people in positions of powerlessness and poverty; it may also be targeted at an effort to sustain the other levels of empowerment and resolve problems associated with poverty. Perkins (1995), however, finds a clear pattern of co-optation of empowerment ideology, or at least language, at the societal level of national and international policy-making, with little or no specificity regarding the meaning of empowerment and little or no impact on empowerment at other levels. For instance, Perkins (1995) also identified the Nicaraguan cooperative movement as a model organization that grew out of the principles of empowerment. In the 1980s, severely disadvantaged peasants organized themselves into more than 3,000 voluntary agricultural cooperatives, which were later nationally encouraged by the government. The members typically shared a land deed, its work, responsibilities, and rewards. In turn, the cooperative provides various benefits including education, housing, and land for personal farming in addition to occasional supplies such as wood, fruit, milk, or meat. The Contra War weakened many cooperatives, but

they remained an integral and necessary component of the national economy. This suggests that cooperatives fostered empowerment on the personal, organizational, and societal levels.

2.4.2 Strategies for Youths Empowerment in Nigeria

Scholars such as Ijere (1990), Nwankwo (2007) and Anachi (2013) identified the following as strategy for empowering youth in Nigeria: education, promoting private enterprises, improving agriculture, creating affordable houses, jobs accessibility, promoting peace and security, promoting industries and strengthening skill base as the major ways through which youths can be empowered. Furthermore, these were equally encapsulated in the National youth development policy (2001) and National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (2004).

a) Education: Education is the key to human empowerment. The knowledge, appropriate skills, self-confidence and patriotism, that is necessary for participation in development activities, are received through education. Education helps one to develop mentally, physically, morally, politically and socially so as to be equipped for proper functioning within a given environment where individuals find themselves. The annual report of National Policy on Education (2004:4) states that education in Nigeria is an instrument (for-excellence) for effective national development. However, Nigeria's education system is not structured in such a way that meets up with needed development. It is as a result of this that most graduates of Nigerian tertiary institutions are ill-equipped to contribute to national development.

b) Promoting Private Enterprises and Improving Agriculture: The private sector is the engine room for economic growth. It is therefore important that government should make some fundamental changes in the economic sector so as to create an enabling environment in which established businesses could thrive (Nwankwo 2007:102). If government creates micro economic frameworks that will facilitate true deregulation and liberalization, foreign investment would be attracted and youths would be empowered through employment. Agriculture is the largest source of wealth after mineral resources, though it is not fully exploited. The promotion of agricultural

activities is the major route through which youths are empowered. Provision of improved high yielding crop varieties, animals, training and other inputs will help in making the sector more viable for the employment of youths. Credit facilities, storage facilities and increased capacity for food reserve programmes should be made available.

c) Creating Affordable Houses and Jobs Accessibility: One of the strategies for empowering the youths is by providing adequate housing. The youths need more houses so as to take them out of the streets and from under the bridge. The government should remove all administrative bottlenecks that hinder private developers from acquiring land and building on them. The use of local building materials should be encouraged and youths should be trained in new architectural designing. By this means, youths would be employed and empowered. In Nigeria, the rate of urbanization is so high and manufacturing sector is stagnant. Therefore, there is an imbalance between the demand for labour and its supply. Government should therefore make policies that will open up rural areas thereby creating new jobs driven by the private sector with local government (NEEDS, 2004).

d) Promoting Peace and Security: To promote peace and security among youths, the state action plan will include among other things, reforming the security sector, reorientating Police officers so as to offer more youths friendly service (like establishing an early warning and response system that will detect conflicts), providing fair allocation of revenues and responsibilities between state and local government and mainstreaming conflicts prevention by establishing structures and processes that promote peaceful culture (NEEDS, 2004). There is no gainsaying that there must be existence of peace for any country to flourish. There are many crises in some countries today because the youths are not empowered. A notable example of this in Africa is Nigeria where many youths are not empowered through employment further compounding the problem of urban slums and insecurity. When jobs are created for them, there will be peace and the life of the citizens will be spared.

e) Promoting Industries and Strengthening the Skill Base: One of the strategies for youth empowerment is the development of the industrial sector, by relying more on local resources and less on imports. These industries would be guided by local research and development strategies that seek to promote science and technology based on small and medium scale enterprises (Ijere1990). The major thrust of the policy is that the state should stop selling the natural resources in crude form. The crude should be processed within the state so that more jobs would be created for the teaming population of youths and there will be more export earnings for this generation. The future of the Nigerian society depends on the youths who are well prepared and are ready to take their place in the scheme of things in the nearest future. The government should implement the Universal Basic Education Law and increase teachers and trainees. The government must, as a matter of urgency fund courses that build vocational and entrepreneurial skills and improve training technology at all levels of the education system in Nigeria (Nwankwo, 2007:102).

2.4.3 Youth Rehabilitation in Africa

According to Mac-Ikemenjima(2008:2) youths in Africa and especially in West Africa, are an endangered species. Amongst the many ills that have shackled their immense potentials are illiteracy and poor school enrolment, inadequate opportunities for tertiary education, poverty, unemployment, and high prevalence of diseases like HIV, amongst others. On the basis of this, Mac-ikemenjima argued that the urgent needs of young people in West Africa are rehabilitation, reintegration, resettlement, healthcare, education, leisure, employment and participation. Obviously, the above highlighted challenges form formidable challenges that demand systematic concerted remediation actions. While Gombe state, the setting of this study, is not without policies and programmes that attempt to tackle these assorted problems, the issue of whether and to what extent the above listed needs of young people have been addressed in Gombe have been addressed in the next chapter.

Writing in respect of one of the causative factors of youth involvement in gang behaviour and other socially inappropriate behaviours, Olutola (2012:2) explicates that while there has been some semblance of concordance of opinions on the role of drugs in the process of degeneration of youths into violent behaviours (For instance as buttressed by Umar 2014 and Mahmoud 2011), there has been less than convincing correct diagnosis of the causes and consequences of drug abuse in Nigeria. Amongst others, Olutola (2012:2) points to preoccupation with punishment as a treatment of drug abuse as a wrong approach that has not helped the cause of rehabilitation, a point that is borne out by the fact that the inauguration of the Anti Kalare Squad in Gombe in 2006-a contingent of soldiers and police men whose short hand for correction is physical assault-went together with the involvement of violent youths in the Gombe State Environmental Protection of Agency. Moreover, even the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme appeared to have been informed by this narrow thinking which reduces rehabilitation to forceful flushing of violent tendencies and influence through coercive means. This is because the Gombe State Agency for Social Services, the agency charged with managing rehabilitation of repentant Kalare members was made up of uniformed officers who constituted the board. What this suggests is that the thinking behind the programme is predominantly militaristic, a form of thinking that Olutola (2012) argues is inappropriate to bring about rehabilitation.

Having examined the strategies of youth rehabilitation and empowerment identified by scholars, namely, education, promoting private enterprises, improving agriculture, creating affordable houses, jobs accessibility, promoting peace and security, promoting industries and strengthening skill base, this study seeks to assess whether and how successful the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has been since it inheres in some of the assumptions and values that underlie the strategy. In other words, in the specific instance of Gombe with a baggage of youth restiveness, have these strategies been able to rehabilitate, transform and empower the beneficiaries?

2.5: Gap in the Literature

From all the discussion thus far, it is obvious that while in the literature some level of agreement exists on the factors that predispose youths to violent behaviours, what has remained unsettled is the issue of the route to complete rehabilitation. For instance in respect of the general causes of violent behaviours, Njoku (2012) and Mbaya (2013) point to illiteracy as a predisposing factor, a view shared by Nnachi (2013) and Haruna and Hamman (2013). In the specific case of Gombe State, Lamido (2008), Mahmoud (2011) and Umar (2014), all pointed out in separate studies that in addition to poverty and illiteracy, politics and drug abuse were important factors in the escalation of violent behaviours on the part of youths in Gombe state. However, despite the institution of both the Antikalare Squad and GOSEPA, violent behaviours have remained a menace in Gombe state necessitating yet other interventions like the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme.

Aside from the point addressed above, the literature reviewed (for instance Ijere 1990, the National Youth Development Policy 2001, NEEDS 2004, Nwanko 2007, Mac-Ikemenjima, 2008, amongst others) have identified education, promoting private enterprises, improving agriculture, creating affordable houses, jobs accessibility, promoting peace and security, promoting industries and strengthening skill base as the means of rehabilitation and empowerment. Thus, given the fact that the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme does not inheres in some of the methods of rehabilitation (education and skills acquisition, to mention two (2)), this study attempts to assess the policy to see how far the policy has gone in rehabilitating the youths in Gombe that have been brought under the programme. More over the policy is very recent and since there has not been any assessment of it, this study attempts to fill this gap and possibly contribute to the burgeoning literature in the field of youth rehabilitation by showing how well the policy has succeeded in achieving its aim(s).

2.6 Theoretical Framework

According to Anol (2010:28), a theory is a set of logically related ideas that try to explain reality. As the author further explains, a theory is a system of constructs and propositions that collectively presents a

logical, systematic, and coherent explanation of a phenomenon of interest within some assumptions and boundary conditions (Anol 2010:28).

Similarly, Izah (2012) has observed that, theoretical framework is an important aspect of scientific inquiry, because it provides logical basis for expectations about the world. This means that a theory should provide explanations of why things happen and should go beyond describing or predicting correlations between variables. It also suggests that a scientific theory has to offer explanations which require causations, or understanding of cause-effect relationships between dependent and independent variables. Accordingly, the theoretical framework adopted for this study is incremental theory.

2.6.1 Incremental Theory

Incremental theory or science of muddling through was propounded by Charles E. Lindblom in 1959; other proponents of the theory include Martin Landau (1962) Robert Dahl (1967) and David Braybrook (1968). Lindblom (1959) wanted to provide an alternative to the scientific school, the rational comprehensive theory which is rooted in scientific thinking, thoroughness, rationality or power of proper reasoning, objectivity and empirical claim of proof of claims in dealing with societal problems.

Incremental theory is one of the empirically based theories of decision making and started from a recognition that human problems are extraordinarily complex, while our analytic capacities and resources are quite limited among other obstacles, we lack sufficient knowledge of cause-and-action effect to understand complex social problems, and there is not enough time and recourses even to conduct most of the partial studies that are feasible (Lindblom 1959).

Braybrook and Lindblom (1963) claimed that people do not know all their goals or the tradeoffs they are willing to make among them. They further argued that, humans disagree about almost everything, and have no satisfactory analytic method for resolving disparate perceptions and priorities into collective choices. Due to the constraints in time needed for rational decision, Lindblom proposes what he calls

‘’disjoinetd incrementalism or the ’’science of muddling through’’. In line with this philosophy Lindblom proposes five distinct characteristics of policy decision making, which the analyst has to recognise (Dlakwa 2008:141).

Stillman (1980) further explained that, it is incremental in the sense that only small steps are taken at a time in order to achieve objectives and not broad ‘’leaps and bound’’. Second, it is non-comprehensive because of the limitation imposed on policy makers by lack of resources to go into sufficient details of problems before taking remedial measures. Third, policy decision involves “successive comparison because policy is never made once and for all but made and remade endlessly by small chains of comparison between narrow choices.’’ Fourth, in practice decision making ‘’suffices rather than maximizes from among the available options.’’ The fifth characteristic of the incremental theory is plurality in choice. This is based on the fact that government decision making rest on a ‘pluralist’ conception of the public sector in which many contending interest groups compete for influence over policy issues, continually forcing the administrator, as a person in the middle, to secure agreement from among the competing parties’’ (Stillman,1980:201, cited in Dlakwa 2008). Based on the outlined characteristics of the incremental theory, the following assumptions are discernible:

i. That public policy is a continuation of previous policy with minimum changes
ii. That existing programmes, policies expenditures are considered as a base, and
iii. That policy maker accepts the legitimacy of previous policies because of uncertainty about the consequences of new policies.

2.6.2. Weaknesses of the theory

Some scholars have criticized incremental model as a descriptive model of policy choice on methodological and empirical grounds. For example Dlakwa (2008) claimed that incremental theory is being unfocussed because it subscribes to the principles of riding with the tide, by moving in a disjointed

incremental pattern. If this principle is adhered to by policy makers, the scares resources meant to solve human problems would be wasted in the process of trial-and-error.

Similarly, Paggett (1980) observed that incremental theory is associated with problems in the measures used, in the conceptual clarity of terms and in the nature of the underlying decision-making model (Paggett 1980:65). Others have complained of problems in capturing the complexities with simple theories of budgeting, particularly the incremental model. While the incremental model was discredited by these critiques, it was never replaced by a viable alternative.

2.6.3. Relevance of the Theory

Despite the limitations of the incremental theory as highlighted by Paggett (1980) and Dlakwa (2008), the theory provides the study with adequate framework for analysis.

Since policy is a purposive course of action based on currently acceptable societal values followed in dealing with a problem or matter of concern, predicting the state of affairs which would prevail when that purpose has been achieved. The introduction of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation as a policy made to address a societal problem of Kalare thuggery on incremental basis inheres in it the basic characteristics of the incremental theory. Incremental theory suggests that Public policy is a continuation of previous policy with minimum changes and the initiation of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme was an increment on the successive government strategies such as the Anti-Kalare squad and Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency as a deliberate strategy to effectively stem the menace of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND OF THE AREA UNDER STUDY AND YOUTHS ORIENTED PROGRAMMES IN GOMBE STATE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the background to the area under study. It includes brief information on the location, the people, major economic activities, politics and administration. The chapter also addresses Kalare thuggery in Gombe State, the efforts made by the State Government in addressing the menace of Kalare thuggery and discusses various Youth Empowerment Programmes in Gombe State as well as the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme.

3.2 The Background and Location of Gombe State

Gombe state is located on latitude 9^0 and 12^0, 30 N and longitude 8^0 451 and 11^0 45 E in the centre of the north-east region of Nigeria. It has a land area of 20,265 sq km. It shares boundaries with all the others states in the zone namely: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Taraba and Yobe. Gombe state has eleven local government areas, which include Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, and Nafada. The climate around Gombe State is the same with most parts of the Sudan Savannah. It enjoys a subtropical climate. It also has two distinctive seasons which are the wet and the dry seasons. As in other parts of the Nigerian Savannah this precipitation distribution is mainly triggered by a seasonal shift in the Inter -Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ).

The average annual rainfall is concentrated between May and October and much of the rainfall especially in July and August is associated with storms of high intensity. The mean maximum monthly temperature is 34^{o} occurring in March to May, while the mean minimum monthly temperature is 18^{o} occurring between December and February. For the annual precipitation, its mean stands as 835 mm while the mean annual temperature is about 26°C. Relative humidity has the same pattern being 95% in August, although it drops to less than 10% during the December/January, the hammattan period (Udo 1970). The topography of the Gombe State is mountainously undulating and hilly to the South but flatly open to the North and Eastern part of it before drawing into the river Benue at Numan. In addition to this, the Dadin-Kowa, Balanga and Cham dams in the state also provide water for irrigation farming thereby supporting agro-allied industries in the state.

3.2.2: The People

Gombe State is endowed with diverse languages and it is peopled by over twenty six (26) diverse ethnic groups (Gombe State Vision 20:20:20 Report) with twenty one (21) languages spoken as first language. This diversity owes much to centuries of migration and intermingling exemplified by intermarriages and other forms of intercourse. Some of the major ethnic groups in the state include Tera, Tangale, Waja, Fulani, Bolewa, Jukun, Jara, Pero, Tula, Chamawa, Longuda, Dadiya, Kumo, Awak, Kanuri, Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. Most of these groups claim Middle Eastern origin, given that a common feature in their oral traditions suggest that they migrated from the East, especially Yemen. As observed by Umar (2014), in terms of linguistic classification, the dominant linguistic group that exists in the area of Gombe State belonged to the Afro-Asiatic and Niger-Congo family of languages. The groups such as Igbo and Yoruba are said to have migrated into Gombe in the 1940s and 1950s as traders and artisans.

3.2.3: Economic Activities

Gombe state is strategically located at the centre of the North East Geopolitical Zone and is equally seen as a commercial hub of the North Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Taraba and Yobe states. This is because the people of Gombe State are entrepreneurs and actively engaged in trade

and commerce in both local and international markets, just as they travel to Kano, Lagos United Arab Emirate (Dubai) and India for trade. However, one of the major economic activities in Gombe State apart from trade is agricultural activities.

Agriculture has been the major source of livelihood for most of the people in the state because majority of the population live in the rural areas and engage in both subsistence and commercial farming. Gombe State is known for the cultivation of food crops like maize, millet, sorghum, cotton, cowpea, groundnut, tiger nut, beniseed, sweet potatoes, and tobacco. While tobacco is only cultivated by the Terawa, other fruits and vegetables cultivated in the state include guava, mango, orange okra, spinach, and sorrel etc. These fruits are grown in various parts of Gombe State both for local consumption and for commercial purposes.

Gombe State is also home to Ashaka Cement Factory, a cement company located in Bajoga, the headquarters of Funakaye Local Government; it is also home to other construction companies. Furthermore, there are also a number of small and medium scale businesses across the state such as block making industries, hotels, sachet water making factories, bread baking factories among other businesses that provide jobs to the people especially the youth. These industries facilitate economic growth. Gombe State is equally endowed with solid minerals which are of commercial quantity and some of these mineral resources include coal, copper, limestone, gypsum, kaolin, granite, silica, and iron ore among others.

3.2.4: Politics and Administration

Gombe State was created on 1st October, 1996 by the military regime of Gen. Sani Abacha alongside five other states including Nasarawa, Zamfara, Ebonyi, Ekiti and Bayelsa states. Prior to 1996, Gombe State had been under the defunct North-Eastern State and the defunct Bauchi State between 1967 and 1976. From the North Eastern State to the old Bauchi State, Gombe area has been a key part of the land mass now delineated the North East geopolitical zone. As a subordinate unit in the old Bauchi state it comprised two administrative units: the Gombe Native Authority and Tangale-Waja Native Authority. Gombe Metropolis, which became the capital of the new state when it was created in 1996, was also the

capital of the defunct Gombe Division. This came after the initial transfer of the capital of Gombe emirate from Gombe Abba to Nafada and then to Gombe Doma (the present state capital). The state has eleven (11) local government areas, some of which have been in existence since 1976, while the rest were created in 1989. These include Yamaltu/Deba, Balanga, and Nafada/Bajoga local government areas. Kaltungo and Billiri local government areas were created in 1992, while Nafada, Kwami and Shongom local government areas were created in 1996 (Mohammed 2013).

The state has experienced both military and democratic governance; two military administrators and three civilian governors have governed the state since its creation on 1st October, 1996. Captain Joe I. Orji was the first military administrator of Gombe state and he ruled from 1st October 1996 to June 1998 while the second military administrator, Col. Mohammed Inuwa Bawa held sway in the state from June 1998 to 29th May, 1999. The three civilian governors were Alh. Abubakar Habu Hasidu who governed from 29th May 1999 to 29th May, 2003, Alh. Mohammed Danjuma Goje, from 29th May, 2003 to 29th May, 2011 and Alh. Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo has been in office from 29th May, 2011 to date.

3.3 Kalare Thuggery in Gombe State

The term Kalare has become a household name in Gombe State, and for those living outside Gombe state, Kalare is always synonymous with Gombe State. Although there are many folklore explanations on the emergence of Kalare groups in Gombe state, Kalare was originally the name of a hunter from Guddiri in Azare, Katagum Local Government Area of Bauchi state. He was said to have retired and become a musician singing for hunters during naming ceremonies, Sallah celebrations or celebrations of hunting victories over rival groups. Hunters came upstage one-by-one chanting and showering on themselves slogans of bravery while Kalare played his music. He also captivated the hunters with magical and daring performances that included the use of charms to play with knives, broken bottles, fire, swords and razor blades. These groups of hunters were then named after the musician, '*Yan-Kalare*'. They are not biological sons of Kalare, in the real sense, but they share a common antecedent (Baba 2008).

Subsequently, groups of hunters that comprised both indigenous hunters and hunters from neighbouring states formed the habit of coming to Gombe for hunting purposes even before the creation of Gombe State. With the creation of Gombe State in 1996, however, their profession became a victim of rapid urbanization, deforestation and extinction of wild animals from the nearby bushes, leaving behind, within the cities, remnants of jobless, locally charmed ex-hunters. These ex-hunters engaged in nothing but petty stealing, street fighting, drug abuse and other forms of youth restiveness.

Lamido (2008) and Mahmoud (2011) observed that several youths who were formerly hunters and who were impressed by Kalare began to emulate his daring exploits. They usually organized themselves into groups mostly based on their neighbourhoods and streets and went round the town thrilling people who often offered them money and other materials as gift. The term 'Yan Kalare' therefore denotes those groups of youth who were in the practice of emulating *Kalare*, by using local charms to play with fire, knives and other dangerous weapons. As time went on, the rivalry among various Kalare groups began to turn violent and fighting among various factions of '*Yan* Kalare often occurred on daily basis. It is worthy of mention here that Kalare is not only made up of the ex-hunters who lost their jobs, but also other categories of young people such as irate youths (who have fallen out with families), school drop-outs and those who have never attended school. It also includes those who are from less privileged families and have become victims of poverty, therefore becoming vulnerable to join the Kalare membership. The objects used by the Kalare thugs in carrying out their ugly activities are items like: guns, knives, woods, sticks, cutlasses, swords and axes. Others includes bronze knives, antelope horns, shoulder blades of camel, sharpened bones, bronze needles, machetes, hockey sticks, triangular rings, bows and arrows and charms (Isa, 2008).

With the creation of Gombe State in 1996 and with the return to democracy in 1999, these youths whose profession became a victim of rapid urbanization, deforestation and extinction of wild animals from the nearby bushes became lucrative raw-materials available to ill-willed politicians for utilization in

perpetuating nihilistic supremacy (Baba 2008 and Umar 2014). Consequently, the numbers of Kalare youths who were initiated kept increasing at every election season i.e. 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 respectively. Although there were cases of Kalare thuggery in the 2015 general elections, the incidences of violence perpetrated by the Kalare thugs were said to be higher in the previous elections especially the 2003 and 2007 general elections. In fact, it was the 2003 gubernatorial election that ushered in a new chapter of Kalare related violence into the electoral campaign process in the state (Lamido 2008; Baba 2008; Mahmoud 2011 and Umar 2014).

During the 2003 election which was fiercely contested by two leading contestants, namely Abubakar Habu Hashidu (the then incumbent governor who contested on the platform of All Peoples Party, APP) and Alh. Muhammed Danjuma Goje (who contested on the platform of Peoples Democratic Party, PDP), one Kabiru Bappah Jauro, the then Special Assistant to the Governor of the state Alh Danjuma Goje and the PDP youth leader, Alh Habu Mu'azu were responsible for the initiation of the first contingents of yan Kalare for the purpose of the 2003 election in favour of their party, the PDP (Baba 2008). It was also revealed that Kabiru Bappah Jauro who is currently the PDP youth leader in Gombe state confessed to have actively taken part in mobilizing and arming some youths numbering about 280 to unleash terror on anybody who dared to oppose their moves. Baffa Jauro further argued that it was done in order to protect their votes because they were afraid that the incumbent governor Alh. Abubakar Habu Hashidu would use the Police at his disposal to his advantage.

According to Human Rights Watch Report (2007), ahead of the 2003 general election in Gombe state, thugs were mobilized by the PDP in their numbers ostensibly to protect their votes from attempts of rigging by rival parties. Community leaders, civil society activists and other residents of the state interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that those youths were used to help the PDP in winning the election by stealing and stuffing ballot boxes, chasing away voters and intimidating INEC officials. The report also indicated that since 2003, Gombe's Kalare boys have committed not only politically related

crimes but also other forms of violent abuses with complete impunity. From politically motivated attacks in 2003 their activities have degenerated into assault, rape, harassment, extortion and scaring ordinary civilians from continuing their political roles. These acts were notable during the election period of 2007. As observed by Mahmoud (2011), the violence perpetuated by Kalare members has not been confined to election periods. Gombe state residents have been caught between political violence and the epidemic of violent crimes; therefore, they have been trapped in a state of persistent insecurity. For example, between 2003 and 2009, so many people were affected by Kalare related violence as victims of killing, rape or injury.

The Gombe Elders Forum, an association of respected former ministers, commissioners, doctors, religious leaders, civil servants and other stake holders, commissioned a research by local doctors regarding the spate and the scale of the human right violations of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state between 2003 and 2009. The findings revealed that Kalare thuggery wreaked serious havoc on the people of Gombe state especially Gombe Metropolis.

The *Leadership* Newspaper of 6th January, 2014 published a report of the International Human Rights Commission (IHRC) on a petition to its office on the alleged extra-judicial killings in Gombe state between 2003 and 2009. The report revealed the uncovering of over 70 cases of politically inspired extra-judicial murders, mostly of perceived opponents of the former administration in the state. The report further stated that Yan Kalare thugs harassed, intimidated, assaulted, tortured and brutally murdered many innocent citizens of the state. The report also cited some of the victims of murder to include renowned politician and businessman, Hon. Isah Magaji Bangus a former Special Assistant to Governor Danjuma Goje who later decamp from PDP to an opposition party ACN in the state and one Nasiru Keke.

Studies such as Lamido (2008), Baba (2008), Mahmoud (2011) and Umar (2014) all revealed that the spate of Kalare related violence has drastically reduced in the subsequent elections, going by the records of Kalare related violence in the state. However the events that preceded the 2015 general election

in Gombe state suggests that Kalare thugs still have not reneged in the business of wreaking havoc and distorting social relations in the state. For example, Weekly Trust Newspaper of 25th October, 2014 published a report titled *Deadly Return of Political Thugs* where it was observed that as the 2015 general elections drew nearer, the Kalare appeared to have resurrected with more fierceness. According to the newspaper, Kalare thugs moved freely with all sorts of weapons, ready to descend on targets. Others alleged that they sometimes indulged in other crimes, like burglary, assault and even murder. The paper reported that the Chief of Staff of the Gombe State government, Alh. Ahmed Yayari, decried the violent activities of the group. He was quoted to have said, ''three days ago, behind the Emir's palace close to one Ali Jijji's house along Bello Sabon Kudi Road, two people were killed by the members of Kalare group''. Similarly, in January 2014, one Adamu Yusuf, nicknamed 'Cooler', a political youth leader and a close associate of the governor and one Umar Makama were reportedly killed by suspected Yan Kalare at Chechnya Quarters in Gombe Metropolis.

In the same vein, *Thisday* Live, an online Newspaper published a report titled '*In Gombe, Comes Kalare's Disquieting Threat'* on 3rd October, 2014. The Newspaper reported that the threat by the dreaded Kalare group, an outlawed association which undermined the peace of Gombe State in the past has raised fresh concern in the state. The paper also observed that the Administration of Governor Dankwambo on assumption of office in 2011 decimated the Kalare group, but the turn of events lately has shown that cells of this group have not died completely. Except they are revisited, the lifeline of the group allegedly linked to the former administration of Senator Danjuma Goje will threaten heavy showdown in the countdown to the 2015 general election.

Consequently, during the 2015 elections, and even after the elections, there were cases of Kalare related violence. For instance, according to the police, Kalare gangs murdered one Mohammed Bunu a photographer living at Idi Quarters in Gombe Metropolis in cold blood. Although the Gombe state Police Command has paraded nine suspects in connection to the killing, Kalare thuggery has continued to create problems in Gombe state especially within the Gombe Metropolis.

Similarly, an online newspaper, *Universal Reporters*, published a report on 21st April 2015 stating that the police in Gombe had arrested 67 political thugs. According to the report, the police said it has arrested 67 suspects in connection with political thuggery in the just concluded general elections in the state. The newspaper further explains that the Police Public Relations Officer, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Fwaje Attajiri stated that the police have arrested the suspects on charges of political criminal offences. According to him, the police had recovered dangerous weapons from the suspects including cutlasses, knives, long sticks and charms. He said over 20 cases were recorded in connection with election violence in the state, and that investigations on the matter were currently on going after which the suspects would be charged to court to face the full wrath of the law. This shows that even as the state government was not relenting in its quest to tame the menace of political thuggery, there were still cases of Kalare related violence in Gombe state.

3.4 Efforts by the State Government to Tackle the Kalare Thuggery

In its effort to tamed the menace of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state, which has become a hydra headed phenomenon since its creation in 1996, and especially after the return to democracy in 1999, Gombe State government under different administrations has been making concerted efforts to discourage the youths from engaging in Kalare related violence. For instance, from 1999 to 2015, government introduced different strategies that were specifically targeted at reducing Kalare thuggery in the state by introducing the Anti-Kalare squad, and giving the youths employment in the Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency. Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme was introduced as a result of the failure of the various strategies established to effectively stem the menace of Kalare thuggery in the state.

3.4.1: The Anti-Kalare Squad

In an effort to rid Gombe state of Kalare thuggery which has become a recurring phenomenon and creating security problems and increase crime in the state, government of Governor Mohammed Danjuma Goje established a special security squad called ANTI-KALARE operation which was launched on 1st May, 2006. The Anti-Kalare squad is a joint operation of the military, the police, the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agents (NDLEA) and the Department of State Services (DSS).

The squad is headed by operation commandant and has several units under him to effectively cover the entire state, although the of Anti-Kalare squad is more visible within the Gombe metropolis being the capital city and the most volatile in terms of kalare activities, the operations of the Anti-Kalare squad were not limited to the Gombe metropolis, it was extended to other towns and places considered to be strategic within the state. Each unit of the squad comprises of nine military personnel, six mobile police, one conventional police, one DSS personnel and one NDLEA personnel. Similarly, each unit is attached with a Hilux pick-up van, operational rifles, cans of teargas and other operational equipments to discharge their mandate.

However, despite the establishment of the Anti-Kalare squad in 2006, the spate of politically motivated violence continued and Gombe degenerated into a ghost town that was haunted by the Kalare thugs. The Anti-Kalare recorded little or no success owing to lack of genuine intention on the part of the State government to tamed the menace and politician's relentless efforts, especially those in government to continue using the Kalare thugs in achieving their interests. Lamido (2008) and Mahmoud (2011) Argued that the police in Gombe during this period, was reduced to powerlessness and became onlookers in the face of all the atrocities committed by the Kalare thugs. Mahmoud (2011) further observed that, the Anti-Kalare squad was established by executive fiat as there is no legislative backing and that, it is the state government in collaboration with the security agencies involved that came up with the idea of establishing the squad. He went further to observe that lack of legislative backing partly accounted for the ineffectiveness of the Anti-Kalare squad.

3.4.2: The Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency (GOSEPA)

Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency was introduced in 1996 following the creation of Gombe state and it has the mandate to enforce environmental laws and ensure environmental sanitation. However, with the growing number of Kalare youths in the state, in 2004, the state government decided to give them some kind of employment in the state. The State Environmental Protection Agency was mandated to engage the youths and assign them the responsibility of cleaning Gombe town on daily basis. All the eleven local government areas were also directed to employ youths and put them on a monthly salary scale of between seven thousand five hundred naira (7,500) and ten thousand five hundred naira (10,500).

This was meant to integrate them into governance and give them a sense of belonging in their own government. This has not worked because those who were employed at GOSEPA rarely did their jobs of cleaning the town due to its derogatory nature and those at the local governments only reported to work on pay days (Mahmoud 2011:93). Similarly, Lamido (2008) observed that it was within that period, the *Kalare* gangs evolved a new concept of 'KJK' i.e. 'Kafan ka Jarin ka' which literarily means your legs are your assets or capital. While they were engaged by GOSEPA for environmental sanitation, they always abandoned their work and operated like an army of mercenaries who hang around public offices and official residences of mostly political appointees to collect their shares of the dividend of democracy.

3.4.3: The Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) in Gombe State

This was an interim measure introduced in the early 2000 to address the problems of rising unemployment and crime wave, particularly among youths. The primary objectives of PAP are three-fold: to reduce the problem of unemployment and hence raise effective demand in the economy, to increase the productiveness of the economy; and to drastically reduce the embarrassing crime wave in the society.

The orientation of PAP was holistic and emphasis was placed on the creation of jobs with the target being the employment of 200,000 idle hands with an allocation of 5,000 per state. To actualise the

programme, the Federal Government earmarked N10 billion, which was later raised to N17 billion by the Senate. This pointed to commitment by government to genuinely reduce the unemployment rate especially among the youths and to effectively channel their energies towards developing their communities rather than engaging in counter-productive ventures such as Kalare thuggery and other forms of crimes. PAP was initiated by the federal government and states governments were encouraged to participate and to partner with the federal government in its implementation. In Gombe state, the PAP recorded limited success due partly to its inability to reduce the menace of Kalare thuggery as indicated by the continued involvement of youths in political thuggery due to rising level of unemployment and its abrupt discontinuation.

3.4.4: National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP)

NAPEP was introduced in 2001, and the programme focused on the provision of strategies for the eradication of absolute poverty in Nigeria (FRN, 2001:3). NAPEP is complemented by NAPEC which coordinates poverty reduction related activities of all the relevant ministries, parastatals and agencies. The poverty reduction related activities of the relevant institutions under NAPEP have been classified into four, namely: youth Empowerment Scheme (YES; which deals with capacity acquisition, productivity, credit delivery and enterprise promotion) rural Infrastructure Development Scheme (RIDS; which deals with the provision of portable water for irrigation, rural and urban transportation, rural energy and power support); Social Welfare Service Scheme (SOWESS; which deals with special education, primary health care, food security, micro and macro credit facilities, rural telecommunication) and; Natural Resource Development and Conservation Scheme (NRDCS which deal with the conservation of land and space, agricultural, water and solid minerals, CBN 2004).

It can be said that NAPEP attempted to provide integrated schemes for youth empowerment, development of infrastructure, provision of social welfare services and exploitation of natural resources and capacity building (Aliu, 2001: 12). The NAPEP programme just like the PAP was initiated by the federal government but state governments were also involved in its implementation. In Gombe state, the

implementation of NAPEP yielded limited or no results because it was politicised and youths who were supposed to benefit from the programme were denied the opportunity to participate. There are also allegations that politicians converted NAPEP to a tool for political patronage by allowing only their cronies to participate in the programme.

3.4.5: The Subsidy Reinvestment Programme (Sure-P)

This programme was introduced in January 2012 when the federal government withdrew subsidy on petroleum products. It is aimed at accelerating economic transformation through investments in critical infrastructure projects, so as to drive economic growth and achieve vision 20: 20: 20, and to lay a foundation for successful development of a national safety-net programme that is better targeted at the poor and the most vulnerable on a continuous basis (Sure-P Draft Implementation Manual, 2012). The programme was also to provide jobs to the teeming youths in the country and it has many strands with focus on social safety-net programmes and infrastructure projects. The scheme is aimed at empowering young Nigerians with specialized skills to take up existing job vacancies in both private and public sectors, and notable among the programmes are the Graduate Internship Programme (GIP) and Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET).

According to the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme Progress Report (2013), the Graduate Internship Programme is aimed at providing mentorship and upgrading the skills of Nigerian graduates. It will also provide them with apprenticeship opportunities that will expose them to skills and experiences relevant to the current labour market and enhance their employability. The GIP was set to employ 50,000 youths across the country to ensure that their skills are being developed towards empowering them to be employable in the short/medium/long term. They will be attached as apprentices in reputable firms for a period of one year where the skill of such individuals will be sharpened. The Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) on the other hand, are to engage youths in skills training. State governments were also partnering with the federal government in the implementation of the SURE-P programme nation-wide.

The state implementation unit is manned by a state coordinator and other supporting staff that are responsible for policy guidance and oversight. Gombe state has benefited immensely from the Sure-P programme because jobless youths were empowered through its various programmes. It has complimented the state government's efforts in reducing unemployment and poverty especially among Youths in the state.

3.4.6: Skill Acquisition Programme

Skills acquisition is one of the programmes designed to complement the efforts of government in mitigating the menace of Kalare thuggery. The thrust of the programme is to create employability through life vocational and entrepreneurship skills development in the key sectors of the economy (Labaran 2014). The essence of this program according to the Ministry of Youth Status Report on Youth Transformation Agenda is to produce a pool of skilled youth that will service the states industrialization drive and also produce youths that will establish their own businesses and employ others. These goals were pursued through both formal and informal skill acquisition.

The formal skill training focuses on the youths with formal education; these youth are admitted and given some training in skills of their choice for a given period of time in any of the four designated skills acquisition centres in Lubo, Ture-Mai, Tongo and Kashere. The state government is also into partnership with other training institutions in the state such as Federal College of Horticulture, Dadinkowa, Ashaka Cement Training School, Federal College of Education (FCE) Gombe and National Directorate for Employment, to train youths in various skills acquisition programme.

The informal skill acquisition or the open apprenticeship scheme is also designed to train the uneducated youth who are in the majority. They are recruited and attached to a master trainer of their choice for a period of time lasting for not less than three months depending on the skill being learned. The youths engaged in both formal and informal entrepreneurship training were paid six thousand Naira

(6,000), as monthly stipend or for the duration of their training. Upon completion of their training, they are given the full compliments of the equipments for the trade or skilled learnt as resettlement kits. They are also eligible for an interest free loan of two hundred thousand Naira (200,000) as start up capital through the state Micro credit scheme. According to Governor Dankwambo's Report Card for May 2011-May 2013, about one thousand four hundred and eighty four (1,484) youths were trained under the formal and informal skill acquisition programme in Gombe State.

3.4.7: Conditional Cash Transfer

Conditional cash transfer is one of the strategies adopted by the state government for poverty alleviation in the state. Poverty has been identified as the major factor which provided a fertile ground for youths to be easily manipulated by the political elites in achieving their selfish ends. The state government therefore made concerted efforts towards alleviating poverty through Conditional Cash Transfer Programme. According to Mijinyawa Sani Labaran, the Honourable Commissioner for Youth and Poverty Alleviation, the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme is adopted by government to assist the youth from poor families. The programme is predicated on giving incentives to the poor, with the sole aim of improving human capital development and increasing long term employability of the youths. Labaran further argued that, about three thousand (3,000) Families have benefited from the scheme. All these programmes were specifically designed as part of deliberate efforts by the state government to stem the menace of political thuggery in the state.

3.5 The Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme

The Gombe State Ministry of Youth Empowerment and Poverty Alleviation in its status report (2013) indicated that out of the two million three hundred and sixty six thousand and four (2,366,04) population of Gombe state based on 2006 census, 53 percent are males and 47 percent are females. Youths aged 15-35 years constitute 65 percent of the total population of the state. The report showed that 53 percent did not attend any school, while only 7 percent attended or are attending tertiary institutions; it

also showed that 17 percent of the population attended school in the past. Consequently, the report confirmed that Gombe state has a large reservoir of uneducated and unskilled workforce which means that there is a tendency of high dependency ratio, increased social vices and political thuggery among other forms of youth restiveness because of increasing poverty rate to about 70 percent in the state (Labaran, 2014).

Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme was initiated as a deliberate effort by the state government to tackle the menace of Kalare thuggery and at the same time empower the youths who were hitherto engaged in Kalare and other forms of youth restiveness. Kera (2014) argues that the initiation of the programme was borne out of the need to take youths off the streets, engage their minds positively and then broaden and brighten their horizon, stimulate the maximisation of their potential, polish or reshape their philosophy and psyche while reducing their tendency to become hooligans.

In his inaugural speech on 29th May, 2011, the current executive governor of Gombe state Alh. Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo declared that Youths are the most sensitive and mobile part of the society, and, depending on how they are handled, they could either be an advantage or a disaster. He went further to explain that the problem of Kalare thuggery can only be solved through non-violent and persuasive discussions; objective engagement and sustainable diplomacy (Labaran 2014).

Consequently, the state introduced a programme where youths are trained under the Gombe State Agency for Social Services. The agency has about three thousand five hundred and sixty four (3,564) youths who were trained in two batches. The first batch of the youths who were trained under the public works scheme in 2012 was about one thousand five hundred and thirty (1,530). These youths were divided into two categories: the first categories were the gang leaders who were leaders in their various groups and they were about 330 and the second category were other members of the Kalare groups drawn from different communities, but mostly from within Gombe metropolis having been the place mostly hit by the Kalare activities, they were about two thousand and thirty four (2,034).The second batch of the

youths were enrolled into the programme in 2013 and they were about one thousand, five hundred and fifty four (1,554).

The first category of the youths who were three hundred and thirty (330) in number were trained at the Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre, Shere hills in Jos, Plateau State and they are trained as supervisors whose duties were to supervise a certain number of the youths who would be assigned under them. The second categories of the youths were trained at the Gombe state NYSC orientation camp in Malam-sidi, the headquarters of Kwami Local Government for three weeks. A coordinated series of activities were organized for them in the camp, they were given paramilitary training, citizenship education, emergency response, and enlightenment on the dangers of drugs and substance abuse before they were deployed as environmental, traffic and ward agents.

There are three major objectives which the programme was designed to achieve. These include:

1. To tackle the trend of Kalare menace in Gombe State.
2. To reduced youth's unemployment by providing them with the opportunity to participate in the development of the state.
3. To enhance peace and political stability through persuasive engagement of Kalare youths in the state.

Table 3.1: Budgetary Allocation for the Programme

Year	Recurrent	Capital	Recurrent and Capital
2012	22,000,000	300,000,000	322,000,000
2013	45,000,000	----------	45,000,000
2014	40,000,000	494,000,000	534,000,000
2015	12,700,000	400,000,000	412,700,000
Total	119,700,000	1,194,000,000	1,313,700,000

Source: Gombe State Ministry of Finance 2016

As indicated in table 3.1 above, in 2012, Twenty two million naira (22,000,000) was spent on recurrent expenditure while Three hundred million naira (300,000,000) is spent on capital expenditure. Similarly, in 2013, Forty five million (45,000,000) was spend on recurrent expenditure with no allocation for capital expenditure in 2013. In 2014, Forty million naira (40,000,000) was spent on recurrent while Four hundred and ninety four million naira (494,000,000) was budgeted for capital expenditure. Similarly, in 2015, Twelve million seven hundred thousand naira (12,700,000) was spend on recurrent and four hundred million naira (400,000,000) was spend on capital expenditure (See Appendix 8 and 9).

The agents (or Marshals as they are popularly known in Gombe State) were initially given a stipend of ten thousand Naira (10,000) fifteen thousand five hundred Naira (15,000,500), twenty thousand Naira (20,000) and thirty thousand Naira (30,000) per month respectively as their allowances, but the state governor in April, 2015 converted their appointment from temporary to permanent and pensionable appointment.


The environmental agents were deployed to streets, markets places, motor parks, and other public places to help in enforcing environmental laws and ensure environmental sanitation especially within Gombe metropolis while the road traffic agents were deployed to control traffic and enforce traffic laws across the state and ensure free flow of traffic especially in Gombe metropolis. On their part, the ward and community agents were deployed to monitor Youths behaviour; report any action that is capable of disrupting peace and security of the community; ensure peaceful and cordial community relations; provide security for Ministries, Departments and Agencies; guard and protect government buildings in order to prevent vandalisation of government properties.

The Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme is being implemented by the Gombe State Agency for Social service, established by the Gombe state government with the mandate to coordinate and manage youths for the provision of social services in the state. It is backed by law, and this is stipulated in Part one (1) sec (3) of the act thus:

There is hereby established for the State a body to be known as the Gombe State Agency for Social Services (in this law referred to as ‘’the Agency) which shall consist of such number of uniform members as may be determined from time to time by the Agency with the approval of the Governor (GSASS Act 2012).

The agency is headed by a General Manager as a chief executive with a governing Board as stated in the Act. Similarly structure of the Agency includes the Staff officer of the Agency, Commandant General, Civil defence attaché, NDLEA attaché, Provosts for Environmental, Traffic and Ward community Agents, as well as Commandants for various wards under the agency.

Fig. 3.1: Gombe State Agency for Social Services Organogram.



Source: Gombe State Agency for Social Services (2015).

The researcher made several efforts to obtain a comprehensive policy document on the Programme through the Gombe State Ministry of Youth and Poverty Alleviation and the Gombe State Agency for Social Services, only the law establishing the Gombe State Agency for Social Services; a body established to coordinate the programme was readily available as there was no official policy document for the programme (See Appendix 7)

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the presentation and the analysis of data gathered through both primary and secondary sources. It is based upon deductions and findings drawn and verified from the data, based on the propositions posed in chapter one. The analysis of field data was carried out using triangulation method, where data collected through questionnaire, interviews and focus group discussions were collectively presented and analysed. Data obtained from Gombe State Bureau o f Statistics on the record of victims of Kalare related violence in Gombe State in 2003-2015 was then used to support our findings.

Table 4.1: Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaire

Questionnaire Administered	Questionnaire retrieved	Valid questionnaire
354	341	338

100%	96.3%	95.4%

Source: Field Work, 2015

As table 4.1 above indicates, a total of 354 copies of the questionnaire were administered, based on Taro Yamane formula for determining sample size as calculated in chapter one. Out of the 354 administered, 341, representing 96.3% were retrieved and 338 representing 95.4% of total questionnaire administered were properly filled and therefore, were considered to be valid for data analysis. The retrieval of the 341 copies was made possible with the aid of research assistants who guided the respondents on how to fill it.

Table 4.2: Categories of Rehabilitated Kalare Members as Marshals

Categories	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Road Traffic Marshals	62	18.4
Environmental Marshals	109	32.2
Ward and Community Marshals	167	49.4
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.2 above indicates that out of the 338 respondents, 62, representing 18.4%, were Road Traffic Marshals while 109, representing 32.2%, were Environmental Marshals and 167, representing 49.4%, were Ward and Community Marshals. This implies that there were more ward and community marshals category than the remaining two categories of environmental and road traffic marshals respectively. This situation as explained by an interview respondent, the Commissioner for youths, who asserted that "…yes we deliberately trained and deployed more youths in the category of ward and community agents in order for them to work with Civil Defence Corps and the Police to help get rid of the Kalare menace throughout the state and thank God they are working hand-in-hand with Civil Defence in the state" (Interview 2015).

Similarly, another interview respondent, a community leader, observed that the intention of government was to tackle Kalare head long and it could only be achieved if as many youth as possible were engaged and deployed as ward and community agents

4.2 Demographic Distribution of Respondents

Table 4.3 below is a compound table containing the demographic characteristics of respondents. It covers the age distribution, sex, marital status and literacy level information of the respondents. All the information were summarized and presented in a single and simplified in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Demographic Characteristics of the Beneficiaries of the Programme

Age	**Frequency**	**Percent**
18-29	241	71.3
30-39	83	24.6
40-49	14	4.1
50 and above	0	0.0
Total	338	100
Gender	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Male	329	97.3
Female	9	2.7
Total	338	100
Marital Status	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Married	102	30.2
Single	229	67.7
Divorce/Widow	7	2.1
Total	338	100
Literacy level	**Frequency**	**Percent**
No formal western education	135	39.9
Primary	130	38.5
O/level	62	18.3
Tertiary	0	0.0
Arabic Education	11	3.3

Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Age Distribution: As table 4.3 above shows, 241 of the respondents, representing 71.3 %, were between 18-29 years of age; 83, representing 24.6%, were within the age bracket of 30-39, while 14, representing 4.1%, were between 40 and 49 years. None of the respondents fell within the bracket of 50 years and above. This implies that the majority of the beneficiaries of the programme were youths aged 18 to 39 years. In other words, it can be argued that most Kalare thugs in Gombe State were Youth aged 18 – 39 years.

Gender Distribution: As the table 4.3 shows, 329 respondents representing 97.3%, were males, while only 9, representing 2.7%, were females. This suggests that, most of the beneficiaries of the programme were males and it also shows that males were more involved in Kalare and other restive activities in Gombe State than their female counterpart. It can therefore be inferred that there were more male as beneficiaries of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme than females.

Marital Status: In terms of marital status, table 4.3 indicates that 102 of the respondents, representing 30.2%, were married men and women while 229, representing 67.7%, were singles. Only 7, represent 2.1%, indicated that they were either widowed or divorced. This implies that most of the ex-Kalare youths were not married.

Literacy Level: The literacy level of the respondents indicates that 135, representing 39.9%, did not attend any formal western education while 130, representing 38.5%, attended only primary school. The table also indicates that only 62 of the respondents, representing 18.3%, had attended secondary school and none had attained post secondary school education, although 11, representing 3.3%, indicated they had Arabic education. It can therefore be deduced that the vast majority of the ex-Kalare youth had very little or no formal western education.

4.3 Analysis on Ex-Kalare Rehabilitation and Reorientation

This section reveals the level of involvement of the Ex-Kalare youths in Kalare thuggery before joining the programme as beneficiaries. It covers variables such as their employment (status before joining the programme), why they joined Kalare thuggery and their sponsors while they were actively involved in Kalare thuggery. These are presented in tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.

Table 4.4: Employment Status of the Beneficiaries before Joining the Programme

Category	Frequency	Percent
Government	4	1.2
Private organization	11	3.3
Self employed	37	10.9
Not employed	286	84.6
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.4 above shows the employment status of the respondents. The table reveals that only 4 of the respondents, representing 1.2%, had worked with the government before joining the programme. Eleven (11) of the respondents, representing 3.3%, had worked in private organizations, while 37, representing 10.9%, were self employed. 286 of the respondents, representing about 84.6%, were however jobless.

It is deducible from the data on table 4.4 above that most of our respondents were previously unemployed. The implication of this was clearly brought out by an interview respondent, who observed that; "an idle mind is the devil's workshop; for those people were not working before joining this programme, how do you expect them not to have been manipulated by being given money? Let me tell you, lack of jobs made them join the Kalare thuggery'' (interview 2015). Similarly one of the FGD respondents confessed that he was a member of Kalare simply because there was nothing for him to do. In his words, ''some of these marshals you see are my friends, but they are now lucky to have joined the programme. I have nothing against the programme, but there is nothing I can do. I have no certificate, no sponsor if I go back to school and as such I have to look for money from the politicians during elections and after elections I have to follow them to their houses doing '*kjk'* ''(FGD respondent, 2015).

Correspondingly, an official of the Gombe State Agency for Social Services informed the researcher that unless the government did something about the level of poverty and unemployment in the state, "we will be wasting our time because we don't have the capacity as an Agency to engage all the youths on the streets. Sadly, if these youths continued to move around doing nothing, Kalare will not end that is the reality" (interview 2015).

Interestingly, Akwara (2013) reached the same conclusion in his own study, where he made the observation that unemployment creates poverty and poverty leads to insecurity, therefore both poverty and unemployment have implications on national security. This is because poor people and unemployed people, especially the youths could be manipulated to undermine national stability and cause violent disorder in the country at any point in time (Akwara 2013: 8)

Table 4.5: Why Respondents Joined Kalare Thuggery

Category	Frequency	Percent
Economic Disempowerment	175	51.8
Heavy financial inducement by politicians	115	34.0
Adventure	44	13.0
Undecided	4	1.2
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

In table 4.5 above, effort was made to obtain respondents views on why they joined Kalare thuggery. The table shows that 175 of them, representing 51.8%, argued that economic disempowerment was responsible for their joining Kalare thuggery, while 115, representing 34.0%, were of the opinion that heavy financial inducement by the politicians was the main reason why they joined Kalare thuggery. However, and 44 of the respondents representing 13.0%, reported they joined Kalare thuggery just for the sake of adventure while 4, representing 1.2%, were undecided. Deducing from the above table, it is clear that economic disempowerment was the major factor responsible for Kalare thuggery in Gombe State.

Similarly, an interview respondent who was one of the community leaders in Billiri observed that it was economic disempowerment that provided a fertile ground for politicians to take advantage of youths by providing them with financial inducement and recruiting them to fight for their interests. He argued:…"If our youths are economically empowered, when there is job, when they are educated and when they are adequately engaged in small scale businesses, I tell you no self seeking politician will approach them with any kind of inducement to go out there and fight for him'' (Interview 2015).

In the same vein, the general manager of the Gombe State Agency for Social Services observed that most of the beneficiaries of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme were not in any way engaged in any productive venture. He also noted that youthful exuberance coupled with the desire for money, could easily lure the youth into perpetrating crime in the name of protecting the interests of their political masters (Interview 2015).

Table 4.6: Respondents' Views on the Sponsorship of Kalare Thuggery

Category	Frequency	Percent
Politicians	177	52.4
Self sponsored	50	14.8
Moneybags/godfathers	104	30.8
Undecided	7	2.0
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

The above table 4.6 presents the respondents' views on the sponsorship of Kalare thuggery in Gombe State. The table shows that 177, representing 52.4%, believed that politicians were the major sponsors of Kalare thuggery, while 50, making up 14.8%, were of the opinion that they were self sponsored. However, 104, representing 30.8%, believed that moneybags/godfathers were the sponsors of Kalare thuggery in Gombe State, while 7, making up 2.0%, were undecided. This data further confirm our findings that politicians were the major sponsors of Kalare thuggery in the State. This finding is further corroborated by an interview respondent, a politician and a member of the House of Representatives who observed that politicians were the major financiers of Kalare thuggery.

These are his words "…yes, it is true. Self seeking politicians who lost hope in the conventional process always resort to manipulating youths to achieve their ends. As politicians, we are the principal culprit and of course major beneficiaries of Kalare violence in Gombe state, but you know as politicians we are never the same and politicians are like every other Nigerian. There are the good ones and there are the bad ones'' (Interview 2015).

Similarly, respondents in a Focus Group Discussion observed that the Kalare thuggery major financiers are the politicians. According to him, politicians always paid them huge amount of money to carry out assignments, and they do not waste time in giving them money whenever they approached them for assistance. Thus they remained loyal and always waited for directives from them (FGD respondent, 2015).

Table 4.7: Whether Respondents have abandoned the habit of drugs taking

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	290	85.8
No	31	9.1
Undecided	17	5.1
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.7 above 290 of the respondents with 85.8% indicated that they have abandoned drugs and other substance while 31 of the respondents with 9.1% reported that they are still taking intoxicants substance and about 17 with 5.1% were undecided.

Deducing from their responses as presented in table 4.7, majority of the respondents have abandoned their usual habit of taking drugs as Kalare members. They are no longer involved taking substance.

Similarly, an interview respondent confided that most of them have abandoned their old habit and went further to add that …..''It has not been easy to stop them from something, which has become part of their life. We are still trying our best, but some of them are still taking drugs'' (interview respondent 2015).

Table 4.8: Whether Respondents are still members of Kalare

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	42	12.4
No	276	81.7
Undecided	20	5.9
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

As indicated in table 4.8 above, an attempt was made to ascertain whether respondents are still members of the Kalare thuggery, in their responses, 42 with 12.4%, indicated that they still taking part in Kalare activities, 276 of the respondents, with 81.7% reported that they have abandoned Kalare thuggery and 20, with 5.9% were undecided.

Deducing from above, majority of the respondents have abandoned Kalare thuggery owing to the fact that they are positively engaged and as such, they could not go back to political thuggery.

Similarly, a focused group respondent reported that most of his former friends who were actively involved in Kalare thuggery have since abandoned the enterprise and went further to add that, he is willing to denounce Kalare if he can find his way into the programme (FGD respondent 2015).

Furthermore, an interview respondent observed that the boys are closely monitored and in his words; ...the boys are closely monitored and anybody found to be involved in Kalare thuggery will be dealt with. We always admonish them on the dangers in involving themselves in to any form of restive activities (Interview respondent 2015). As an indigene of the state, the researcher observed that most of the beneficiaries of the programme have since abandoned Kalare thuggery.

4.4 Impact Assessment of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme on the Beneficiaries.

This section presents the respondents' views on the assessment of the impact of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme on their lives. Divergent views were expressed by the respondents and the analysis was made from tables 4.9 to 4.12 below.

Table 4.9: Source of Livelihood of the Respondents as Beneficiaries of the Programme

Category	Frequency	Percent
Independent/ Monthly salary	201	59.5
Depending on politicians/godfathers	98	29.0
Depending on parents/ guardians	32	9.5
Undecided	7	2.0
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

As presented in table 4.9 above, 201, representing about 59.5%, opined that they are now independent while 98, representing 29.0%, reported that they still depend on politicians and godfathers. 32 of the respondents, constituting about 9.5%, reported that they are still depending on their parents and guardians while 7, representing 2.0%, were undecided. This implies that the beneficiaries of the programme are empowered to take charge of their lives as stated by one of the respondents in an interview thus "…You see, most of them have their families and majority of them got married after joining this programme. They save money to buy motor cycle and give it out for commercial use; some of them invest their money so they no longer rely on politicians or their parents to cater for their needs. In fact, most of them support their parents. They are employed; they are responsible and have since become useful to the society (Interview 2015).

Similarly, a respondent in a Focused Group Discussion observed that beneficiaries of the programme are no longer depending on politicians. But for somebody like him, he has no choice but to continue depending on politicians (FGD Respondent 2015). In the same vein, the researcher observed that most of the beneficiaries of the programme have become self reliant and depend on their allowances for their daily needs.

Table 4.10: Respondents Views on the Payment of their Monthly Stipend

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	287	84.9

No	39	11.5
Undecided	12	3.6
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

The table 4.10 above presents views of the respondents on their monthly allowances. It revealed that 287, of the respondents constituting about 84.9%, reported that their monthly allowances are being paid regularly while 39 of the respondents, representing 11.5%, believed that their monthly allowances are not being paid regularly. 12 of the respondents, making up 3.6%, were undecided. This suggests that prompt payment of their monthly allowances has been maintained and it is as a result of this that they able to save money and support their parents.

An interview respondent, a management staff of the Agency stated that

"…we don't delay their allowances, we are very much aware that they use their allowances to support their families. Although there was a time we deliberately delayed their allowances for three months, but it was done to test their endurance and most of them behaved very well'' (Interview, 2015).

Table 4.11: Respondents Views on the Comfortability of their Job

Category	Frequency	Percent
Very comfortable	269	79.6
Fairly comfortable	51	15.1
Not comfortable	15	4.4
Undecided	3	0.9
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

In table 4.11 above, an effort was made to ascertain the respondents' view on how comfortable they are with their job as Marshals. 269 of the respondents, representing about 79.2%, reported that they are very comfortable with their job. 51 respondents, making up15.1%, believed that they are fairly comfortable. 15 of the respondents, representing 4.4%, argued that they are not comfortable with their job and therefore need to change if the opportunity avail itself. Three (3) of the respondents, representing

0.9%, were undecided. This means that most of the beneficiaries of the programme are comfortable with their work.

Similarly, most of the interview respondents from the Agency and the Ministry of Youth believe that the beneficiaries of the programme are quite comfortable and they have not received any complain form them. The Director of Youth of the Gombe State Ministry of Youth observed that "…To the best of my knowledge, these boys are comfortable with what they are doing because we have not received any complain about their assignments and they are always looking very happy and ready to work'' (Interview, 2015)

Furthermore, one of the respondents from a civil society organization, Foundation for Youth Awakening and Empowerment (FOYAE) observed that the beneficiaries of the programme seem to be ok with it. He stated;

"We often interact with them, we monitor most of the government interventions especially as it affects youths and we are pleased with the way these boys are being treated" (Interview 2015)

Table 4.12: Changes Experienced by the Respondents after Joining the Programme

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	326	96.5
No	4	1.1
Undecided	8	2.4
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

As pointed out by table 4.12 above, an attempt was made to get an in-depth knowledge on whether the programme has improved the lives of the beneficiaries. About 326 of the respondents, representing 96%, were of the view that, their lives have improved compared to before joining the programme as beneficiaries. Four (4) of the respondents, making up 1.1%, of the respondents reported that they have not seen changes in their lives, and 8, representing 2.4%, were undecided.

Therefore it can infer that the beneficiaries of the programme are well taken care of and they have seen changes in their lives. This finding has been corroborated by the interview respondents. A respondent of the interview opined that there are changes in the lives of the beneficiaries of the programme and he went further to argue that "… They are our children and we know them. Some of them used to come to me while they were still part of Kalare and I always admonished them to be of good behaviour. Luckily, this programme was introduced and those that joined the programme are now looking responsible and they confirmed to me that they even regretted joining the Kalare thuggery (Interview 2015).

4.5 Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme and Socio-Political Stability in Gombe State

Table 4.13: Whether the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme had Enhanced Political Stability in Gombe State

Category	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	203	60.1
Agree	88	26.0
Disagree	28	8.3
Strongly disagree	16	4.7
Undecided	3	0.9
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

In Table 4.13 above, an effort was made to ascertain the respondents' view on whether their employment as marshals has helped to enhance political stability in the state. It is clearly shown that 203 of the respondents, representing 60.1%, strongly agreed that their employment has enhanced political stability in the state, and 88 of the respondents, representing 26.0%, agreed that their employment enhanced political stability in the state. However, 28 of the respondents representing 8.3% disagree to the notion that their employment has helped achieved political stability in Gombe State while 16,

representing 4.7%, strongly disagree and are of the view that their employment has nothing to do with political stability of the state and 3 of the respondents, representing 0.9% were undecided.

The implication of the results presented on the table above is that, there is positive relation between youth empowerment and political stability. Similarly, an interview respondent, the co-Coordinator of FOYAE observed that, "…those who were deployed to ensure sanitation in market places and the ones controlling traffic are trying their best. In fact, all the marshals are trying only that they see themselves as being employed by the state governor and not the state government and therefore support his political party during elections'' (Interview 2015).

Table 4.14: Respondents Punctuality to Duty-post

Category	Frequency	Percent
Regularly	247	73.1
Sometimes	77	22.8
Once in a while	10	2.9
Completely not reporting	0	0.0
Undecided	4	1.2
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.14 above shows the respondents views on how they report to their working place. It revealed that 247 of the respondents, making up 73.1%, report to their duty-posts regularly, 77 of the respondents, representing about 22.8%, are not regular in reporting to their duty-post, 10 of the respondents, representing 2.9%, report to their duty-post once in a while but none of the respondents stay away from their duty-posts completely. Four of the respondents, with 1.2%, were however undecided**.** This implies that most of them report to work and contribute in their little way.

An interview respondent observed that the marshals are always on their duty-post in his words; "… you always see them on the street trying to control traffic; you will see them neatly dressed and control traffic along major roads especially within the metropolis'' (Interview 2015).

Table 4.15: Respondents Views on the Nature of their official Relationship with the General Public

Category	Frequency	Percent
Very cordial	108	31.9
Fairly good	151	44.7
Poor	71	21.0
Undecided	8	2.4
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.15 above shows the relationship of the respondents with the general public at their places of work. 108 of the respondents, representing 31.9%, believe that their relationship with the general public is very cordial, 151 of them who representing 44.7% believe that their relationship with the general public is fairly good while. 71 of the respondents representing 21.0% reported that they have poor relations with the general public. 8 respondents, making up 2.4%, were not decided. From this analysis, it can be deduced that their relationship with the general public remains intact and does not in any way affect their work.

4.6 Constraints of the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme

An attempt was made to identify the challenges of the programme and those of the respondents. Those interviewed bared their feelings and enumerated factors considered which they considered as challenges facing the programme.

Table 4.16: The Challenges of the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme According to Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percent
Poor working relations with security agencies	123	36.4
Inadequate working facilities	103	30.5
Poor condition of service	84	24.8
Others	28	8.3
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

Table 4.16 shows an effort to obtain respondents' views on what they think are the challenges facing the programme. It was revealed that 123 of the respondents, representing 36.4%, reported that poor working relations with other security agencies such as the Police, the Civil Defence, and the Federal Road Safety Corps are the major problems confronting them. 103 of the respondents, representing 30.5%, identified lack of sufficient working equipment as the major constraint of the programme. Similarly, 84 of the respondents, representing 24.8%, observed that poor working condition is the major challenge and 28 of the respondents, representing 8.3%, were of the opinion that other factors are responsible for the challenges facing the programme. It can be inferred that, the major challenge confronting the programme as presented on the table above is the lack of synergy between the marshals and other security agencies.

Furthermore, one of the interview respondents, a management staff of the Gombe State Agency for Social Service observed that there is the problem of inadequate working facilities for the marshals and there is no way one can function effectively without adequate working facilities. He stated;

"For us to effectively fight Kalare, we need to be supported because Kalare thuggery seems to be on the increase. He went further to add that; "…the recruitment chains of Kalare has not been broken, as government tries to rehabilitate the ones in the programme, more youths are being recruited on daily basis due to the rising unemployment rate, selfishness of the political class and the get-rich-quick syndrome among the youths'' (Interview 2015).

Another respondent with the Ministry of Youth argues that inadequate funding; poor logistics and lack of rehabilitation facilities are the major challenges of the programme. He observed that:

"there is no way we can achieve our objective of ending Kalare in Gombe state without adequate funding and rehabilitation facilities…You know we can only train the number we can handle and if you compare the number of Kalare youths out there with the ones rehabilitated, it is as if we have not started'' (Interview 2015).

Similarly, the director of Planning, Research and Statistics observed that part of the teething problems hampering the effective performance of the programme is political interference. He further asserts that;

> …politicization of the programme and unnecessary interference are part of our major challenges. Look at the recruitment, the initial recruitment was lopsided and there was no spread of the beneficiaries across the state. The governor ordered that 1,000 youths be employed and I can tell you that all of them are from Gombe metropolis. How can you employ all the 1,000 from one Local Government? It was when people began to ask questions that the governor agreed to approve 20 each from the remaining 10 local government areas to make the number 1,200. I agree that Gombe metropolis is the most affected by the Kalare phenomena, but you can't operate like that (Interview, 2015).

The researcher observed that even the name given to the programme 'Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme' will have a long time implication on the success of

the programme. This is because the governor appeared to have personalized the programme to bear his name which will ultimately affect the programme should the programme survived beyond the governor's tenure in office.

Table 4.17: Whether Respondents Were Affiliated to Political Party

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	106	31.4
No	120	35.5
Sometimes	84	24.8
Undecided	28	8.3
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

The above table 4.17 presents the respondents' responses on whether they are affiliated to political parties. It revealed that 106, representing 31.4%, belongs to political parties while 120, representing 35.5%, reported that they are not affiliated to any political party. 28 of the respondents, representing 8.3%, were undecided. This implies that some of the beneficiaries of the programme are affiliated to political parties.

However, in an interview with one of the Directors in the Ministry of Youth, the respondents openly admitted that most of the beneficiaries of the programme are still actively participating in partisan politics and function most at times as 'corporate thugs. He continues:

> You see, this programme ought to be a model for other states, but along the way, the noble objectives of the programme were eroded by selfishness and self-centeredness of the politicians especially those in government. These youths were trained to help their communities, they are supposed to be neutral, but often times they are being engaged in political rallies to help the person in power. This thing has to stop for us to make any meaningful progress as a state (Interview 2015).

In same vein, security personnel with the state command of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) observed that during the just concluded 2015 general elections, those marshals participated in harassing voters. He went further to argue that; "…I am a living witness; we were at the

polling station when they came in their Hilux van numbering about 15 and they went straight to charter away election material and nobody dared them'' (Interview 2015).

This was also reported by Umar (2014) in his work titled *Democracy and Social Violence in Gombe State,* has also found out that uniformed youths who were supposed to protect the voters were the ones involved in election malpractice during the 2013 Local Government Elections in Gombe state (Umar 2014).

Table 4.18: How Respondents Joined the Programme.

Category	Frequency	Percent
Through community leaders	91	26.9
Through politicians/godfathers	198	58.6
Invitation by security agents	27	8.0
Through officials of the agency	18	5.3
Undecided	4	1.2
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

As table 4.18 above shows, 91 respondents, making up 26.9%, joined the programme as beneficiaries through community leaders. 198, representing 58.6%, indicated that they joined the programme as beneficiaries through politicians/godfathers, 27 making 8.0%, joined the programme through invitation by security agents and 18 respondents with 5.3%, join the programme through officials of the Gombe State Agency for Social Services while 4 of the respondents making up 1.2%, were undecided.

It can therefore be deduced that, majority of the recruitment were done through politicians and godfathers. Similarly, one of the interviewed respondent stated that, due process was not followed during the recruitment exercise and that politicians abused the process. He further stated that:

"...The right thing was not done from the beginning, therefore wondered what the expectation would be. The recruitment ought to have emanated from the communities because every community

knows its problems, they know the boys better than anybody, but politicians hijacked the process so that they can continue manipulating them" (interview 2015).

Another respondent in a Focused Group Discussion reported that, the recruitment into the programme was not transparent and that, one has to have somebody who will stand for you in order to be selected. He further explained that... '' We wanted to join the programme, but there is no way because our godfathers' are not in government'' (FGD respondent 2015).

Table 4.19: Whether Expanding the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme Would Help Reduce Kalare Thuggery

Category	Frequency	Percent
Yes	291	86.1
No	41	12.1
Undecided	6	1.8
Total	338	100

Source: Field Work, 2015

In table 4.19 above, an attempt was made to obtain the respondents' views on whether employing more youths to join the programme will help reduce Kalare violence in Gombe state. 291 of the respondents, representing 86.1%, believe that giving more youths the opportunity to participate in the programme will help reduce the problem of Kalare in the state. 41 of the respondents, representing 12.1%, reported that engaging more youths would not solve the menace of Kalare thuggery in the state and 6 respondents making up 1.8% were undecided.

This means that majority of the beneficiaries of the programme believed that engaging more youths as marshals will help to stem the scourge of Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.

Similarly, an interview respondent who is the director of Planning Research and Statistics in the Ministry of Youth and Empowerment observed that for government to effectively stem the menace of Kalare

thuggery, efforts should be made to enrol more youths into the programme because the number of employed youths is inadequate. He further argued that:

"...they are trying their best, but you know the issue of Kalare in Gombe state is a very serious one and it will require continuous training and re-training of the youths in the programme''(Interview 2015).

In the same vein, a respondent in a Focus Group Discussion further maintained that;

> … If this programme will be redesigned, sustained and be devoid of politics, it will go a long way in providing jobs for people like us. We want to be part of it, but we are not connected. One has to have somebody for you to get a job (FGD Respondent).

These positions were in line with scholarly the views of Kera (2014). Kera observed that the initiation of youth empowerment programme is borne out of the need to take the youths off the streets, engage their minds positively and then broaden and brighten their horizon, stimulate the maximisation of their potentials, polish or reshape their philosophy and psyche, while reducing their tendency to become hooligans (Kera 2014:23).

4.7 Kalare Violence and Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme

Despite the introduction of the youth rehabilitation and reorientation programme in Gombe state, cases of Kalare related violence are still being recorded on daily basis. In an effort to assess the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme, a record of Kalare related violence in Gombe State from 2003-2015 was sourced, presented and analysed to reinforced our findings.

Table 4.20: Recorded Victims of Kalare Violence 2003-2015

Year	Death	Percent	Injured	Percent
2003	17	19.3	0	0.0
2004	5	5.7	2	0.9
2005	14	15.9	13	5.5
2006	4	4.5	4	1.7
2007	16	18.2	14	5.9
2008	6	6.9	5	2.1
2009	7	7.9	5	2.1

2010	0	0.0	0	0.0
2011	5	5.7	25	10.7
2012	1	1.2	23	9.8
2013	0	0.0	53	22.6
2014	4	4.5	51	21.7
2015	9	10.2	40	17.0
Total	88	100	235	100

Source: Gombe State Bureau of statistics 2015.




Figure 4.1: Trend of Kalare Related Violence in Gombe State 2003-2015
Source: Gombe state Bureau of statistics 2015

Table 4.20 and Figure 4.1 above show the rise and fall in the recorded cases of Kalare related violence, in Gombe state. In 2003, the numbers of recorded death were 17, representing 19.3%, of the recorded death cases. Although record has shown that there were no cases of injuries, the period between 2003 and 2007 was characterized by intense political rivalry and violence. In 2004 about 5 deaths and 2 cases of injury were recorded, representing 5.7%, and 0.9%, respectively. In 2005, 14 deaths and 13 injury cases were recorded, representing 15.9%, and 5.5% respectively, 2006 had 4 deaths and 4 injury

cases, representing 4.5%, and 1.7% respectively, while 2007 recorded 16 deaths and 14 injury cases which represent 18.2%, and 5.9% respectively. These periods recorded the highest number of casualty involving the Kalare rival groups and innocent citizens due to the fact that the 2003 and 2007 were elections years and the two elections were keenly contested where political parties and politicians in a heated contest for political power engaged jobless youth that fought to ensure the victory of their candidates at the polls. This clearly indicates that there is strong relationship between Kalare activities and intense partisan political activities.

Similarly, there were cases of Kalare violence within the period, 2008 and 2010, as shown in table 4.20 and figure 4.1. Although there was no record of 2010, 2008 recorded 8 deaths and 5 injury cases, representing 6.9% and 2.1% respectively while 2009 recorded 7 deaths and 5 injury cases which represent 7.9% and 2.1% respectively. The slight drop of Kalare related violence within that period will not be unconnected with the introduction of a carrot and stick approach by the state government in its exertion to stem the menace of Kalare thuggery.

It was within the period that government introduced the Anti-Kalare Squad, a special squad comprising the military and the police with special training and equipment to checkmate the growing trend of Kalare thuggery in the state. The Gombe State Environmental Protection Agency (GOSEPA) was also introduced to employ some of the Kalare youths as cleaners, but soon after its introduction, the thugs abandoned their jobs of cleaning the streets and went back to their Kalare activities. All these have not completely ended the Kalare thuggery in the state but it has helped to reduce the spate of Kalare violence for sometimes. Initially, Anti-Kalare squad recorded tremendous success, but it was accused of eventually derailing from its noble objectives by aligning with the loyalists of the ruling party to provide cover for thugs loyal to them and harassed only those from the opposition parties.

Furthermore, the period between 2011 and 2015 as shown in table 4.1and figure 4.1, witnessed yet another phase of Kalare related violence because within that period, the recorded cases of Kalare related

violence reached an unprecedented high despite the introduction of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme. Although the numbers of death cases were reduced, the record shows that within that period, the injured victims surpassed the ones recorded between 2003 and 2010. In 2011 there were 5 deaths, and 25 injury cases representing 5.7% and 10.7% respectively. As an election year, there were no high records of Kalare violence in 2011. In 2012, there was one death and 23 injury cases, representing 1.2% and 9.8% respectively, 2013 did not record any death, but it recorded the highest number of injured victims. In 2013 alone, 53 cases of injured victims representing 22.6% were recorded, while 2014 recorded 4 deaths and 51 cases injured victims representing 4.5% and 21.7% respectively, and in 2015 the number of death cases were 5 and 40 cases injury representing 10.2% and 17.0% respectively. However, the reason for the increase in the number of injured victims especially in the period 2011 to 2015 is probably because the Kalare youths have evolved a new concept call *flashing* which in their local parlance means to injure and not to kill. One of the interview respondents who is with the Nigerian Police Force revealed that most of the Kalare suspects arrested and interrogated will tell you that they only 'flashed' and not killed … "We arrest detain and interrogate the Kalare youths, but they will tell you they just flash and did not kill anybody" (Interview 2015)

Similarly, Daily Trust newspaper reported with a caption 'Dankwambo says Kalare are terrorizing Gombe' the newspaper quoted the governor saying that, "Kalare members who are mostly between the ages of 16 and 20 have recently resurfaced in Gombe terrorizing, killing, snatching people's bags and breaking houses both in the day time and at night" (Daily Trust 2nd July, 2015 p 29).


Table 4.21: Monetary Value of Properties Lost to Kalare Related Violence 20011-2015

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015

0.00	91,350	52,000	782,000	1,569,640

Source: Gombe State Bureau of Statistics 2015

Figure 4.2: Trend of Monetary Value of Properties Lost to Kalare Related Violence 20011-2015



Source: Gombe State Bureau of Statistics 2015

Table 4.21 and Figure 4.2 above present the monetary value of properties lost to Kalare related violence within the period of 2011-2015. Although there was no record of the properties lost in 2011, but the record shows that there is sharp increase in terms of monetary value lost to Kalare violence from 2012 to 2015. In 2012 properties worth 91,350 were lost to Kalare related violence, in 2013 it was about 52,000 worth of property lost to Kalare related violence. In 2014 properties worth 782,000 were lost as a result of Kalare related violence, while in 2015 properties worth 1,569,640 were lost to Kalare related violence in Gombe State. This implies that the Kalare violence has consistently become a challenge to socio-political stability of the state.

One of the interview respondents observes that:

‘’… the issue of Kalare is not restricted to the loss of lives; it also involves lost of properties. Properties are being lost, for example, they break shops snatch mobile phones from their victims and even break

homes to steal and in the process they injure their victims. So you see, it is a serious matter'' (Interview 2015).

Similarly a respondent in Focus Group Discussion argued that... "To me these marshals are not adequately trained to help and get rid of the scourge of Kalare thuggery. If you look at the way they are, you know they cannot effectively fight the Kalare menace. I agree that those of who were formerly Kalare members are no longer part of it now, but I doubt their capacity to fight it" (FGD Respondent 2015).

4.8 Discussions of Major Findings and Verification of the Research Propositions

From the relevant data presented, analysed and reinforced by the data generated from the Gombe State Bureau of Statistics on the record of victims of Kalare related violence, the following deductions or findings can be drawn:

1. Youth Unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, economic disempowerment and sponsorship by politicians are the major factors responsible for youth involvement in Kalare thuggery. Based on the information presented in tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively and also corroborated with interviews and scholarly positions, it was identified that unemployment, poverty and economic disempowerment are the major factors responsible for youth restiveness in Gombe state. In the data presented, table 4.3 indicated that the majority of the respondents are illiterate with about 135 making up 39.9% having no western formal education. Table 4.4 also shows the employment status of the respondents with about 286 of them representing about 84.6% of them not employed before joining the programme as beneficiaries. Similarly, table 4.5 indicated that economic disempowerment is the major factor responsible for youth involvement in Kalare thuggery. The finding is in line with the findings of Mahmoud (2011) and Umar (2014) who both found that the phenomenon of Kalare thuggery in Gombe State is attributable to poverty, illiteracy and unemployment among the youths

This finding conform to proposition number one (1) of this study as stated in chapter one, that the main factor responsible for Kalare thuggery in Gombe state in recent times is the lack of empowerment by the state.

2. The beneficiaries of the programme are being rehabilitated, empowered and have since abandoned Kalare thuggery, but they are few and constitutes only a fraction of the Kalare youth in Gombe state as majority of the kalare youths were left out of the programme. Deducing from the data obtained through interviews, Focus Group Discussion and the researcher's observation, the bulk of Kalare youth were left out of the programme because the Agency does not have the capacity to employ all the Kalare youths in the state. Although there is no exact figures as to the number of youth who are still actively involved in Kalare activities, the researcher observed that many youth are still in the Kalare thuggery, always

move freely and engage their rival groups in a free for all fight and in most cases, people are injured and properties lost.

This also conform to proposition number two (2) of the study as stated in chapter one that Youth's empowerment in the form of jobs and skills acquisition will discourage Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.

3. The introduction of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has not effectively stemmed the menace of Kalare thuggery in the state. This is against the backdrop of the trend of Kalare related violence within the period 2011-2015 as presented in table 4.18, table 4.19, figure 4.1 and figure 4.2. The record of Kalare related violence involving loss of lives and valuable properties worth millions of naira especially in 2013 and in 2015 is indeed worrisome and alarming. It raised questions on the determination of government to genuinely confront the menace of Kalare thuggery headlong. Similarly the huge investment of money made by Gombe state government on the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme outweighed the benefit derived from the programme. The expenditure for the programme is not worth while given results.

This finding disproves the number three (3) proposition as stated in chapter one, that the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has enhanced peace political stability in Gombe state.

4. Based on the data presented in tables 4.7 and 4.15, corroborated with interviews, Focus Group Discussion and the researcher's personal observation as an indigene of the state it has become clear that, recruitment into the programme has been lopsided and there are inadequate funds and lack of training facilities for the programme. The selection of the beneficiaries were not done transparently because thugs loyal to the ruling party in the state were given preferential treatment thereby making it difficult for others who have no godfathers in the ruling party to be employed. In table 4.7, 91 respondents, making up

26.9%, reported that they joined the programme as beneficiaries through community leaders. 198, representing 58.6%, indicated that they joined the programme as beneficiaries through politicians/godfathers, 27 making up 8.0%, joined the programme through invitation by security agents and 18 respondents with 5.3%, joined the programme through officials of the Gombe State Agency for Social Services while 4 of the respondents representing 1.2%, were undecided. This implies that, majority of the recruitment were done through politicians and godfathers.

5. The beneficiaries of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme now rely on their monthly allowances and do not rely on politicians and godfathers for their daily needs. The results obtained from the interviews, FGDs and the views of the respondents presented in table 4.7, where about 201 respondents representing 59.5% of the respondents, reported that they now rely on their monthly allowances and no longer depend on politicians, godfathers or their parents for their needs. Furthermore, since unemployment and poverty are identified as two major factors responsible for political thuggery, the data presented suggests that the beneficiaries of the programme now do not rely on politicians for their upkeep and hence no longer participate in Kalare activities. Similarly, tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 indicated that there is prompt payment of their monthly salary; the tables also show that the respondents are comfortable with their jobs as seen in table 4.11 and they have seen positive changes in their lives compared to their lives before joining the programme as marshals.

This equally conform to proposition number two (2) of the study posed in chapter one that Youth's empowerment in the form of jobs and skills acquisition will discourage Kalare thuggery in Gombe state.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1: Introduction

This chapter summarises the report of this study, draw a conclusion and offers a set of recommendations on the assessment of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe state.

5.2 Summary

The study was conducted mainly, to assess the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe State 2011-2015. The variables investigated in the study include relationship between youth disempowerment and Kalare thuggery. It also assesses whether the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has empowered youths who were formerly involved in Kalare thuggery in Gombe State and to what extent. The study examined whether the Talba Youths Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme have enhanced peace and transform Ex-Kalare thugs into agents of societal development within the period studied.

Furthermore, using the documentary method of analysis of some of the existing materials relevant to the study, In-depth Interview (IDI), FGD and questionnaire, the study has come up with some major findings that the introduction of Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme does not

effectively stem the menace of Kalare thuggery in the state. And although the beneficiaries of the programme are being rehabilitated, transformed and empowered, they only constitute a fraction of the Kalare youth in Gombe state. Similarly, youth unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and economic disempowerment are the major factors responsible for youth involvement in Kalare thuggery. In the same vein selfish politicians always take advantage of the disempowered youth in Gombe state and recruit them into their services for their interest. Similarly, the programme is faced with many challenges that make it impossible for the programme to function effectively.

5.3 Conclusion

Based on the data presented, analysed and corroborated with literature reviewed, it is safe to conclude that the introduction of the Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme has not completely succeeded. The concept empowerment has been narrowly conceived based on the content of the programme. This is because given employment to beneficiaries does not constitute empowerment, though it is one of the critical component, but it has to go beyond that to include the ability to make decisions about personal/collective circumstances; the ability to access information and resources for decision making; ability to consider a range of options from which to choose; ability to exercise assertiveness in collective decision making; having positive-thinking about the ability to make change; ability to learn and access skills for improving personal collective circumstance; ability to inform other's perceptions through exchange, education and engagement; involvement in the growth process and changes that is never ending and self-initiated; increasing one's positive self-image and overcoming stigma; and increasing one's ability in discreet thinking to sort out right and wrong.

The agency is handicapped by inadequate rehabilitation facilities which would have enabled the agency to engage more youths train and deploy them to help tackle the Kalare menace. Similarly, lack of funds arising from competing demands on the state government has also contributed to operational

difficulties and ineffectiveness of the programme. Employment of the beneficiaries was also politicised, it was done based on purely political considerations because preference was given to the youths loyal to the political party in power and those considered being loyal to the opposition political parties were rarely considered. This has eroded the noble objective with which the programme was set to achieve.

Therefore, Kalare thuggery has remained a threat to social stability and a source of immense concern in Gombe State. Though government has tried to absorb some of the Kalare youths in its determination to get rid of the scourge, the menace of Kalare violence appears to have defied its efforts and persisted against the background of continuous loss of lives and valuable properties as revealed by this study.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are presented:

1. Stiffer sanctions should be meted out against youths engaged in Kalare related violence and their sponsors, to serve as a deterrent to others who may be contemplating to join the group. Similarly, the capacity of security agencies, the Police, Civil Defence, and including the Marshals need to be enhanced by providing them with necessary equipment and support to effectively carry out their duty of ensuring security of lives and properties throughout the state.
2. More youths should be engaged in the programme especially those identified to have joined Kalare thuggery. Besides, apart from Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme, other skill acquisition programmes which will make them productive to themselves, their community and society in general can be organised. This becomes necessary in view of the alarming trends of Kalare related violence especially within the period investigated.
3. The programme should be devoid of politics, and unnecessary interference by highly placed individuals in the state. The Gombe State Agency for Social Services should be provided with

necessary rehabilitation facilities, adequate funding and other logistics so that they can function optimally.

4. The beneficiaries of the programme need to be encouraged to remain neutral; they should be given proper training and re-training to objectively and professionally perform their official duties. This will go a long way in making their job easier; it will earn them respect and restore confidence in the community on their ability to serve diligently.
5. Government should pay more attention to the overall human development that can reduce poverty and hunger especially among the youths to break the recruitment chain of Kalare in Gombe State. In addition to this, government should also come-up with a sound education policy that will ensure that all school-age children regardless of their background attend school and have opportunity to be educated.
6. Communities need to be encouraged to be vigilant and, guard their neighbourhood. Parents and religious leaders should get involved in that enlightenment and sensitisation of youths on the dangers of indulging in restive activities.
7. There is need for partnership between Government and Non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, families, traditional and religious leaders towards enlightenment and reorientation of the youths to shun manipulation by selfish politicians.
8. Finally, there is need for politicians to imbibe the culture of politics without bitterness based on true democratic ethos. They need to observe the rule of the game and not see politics as a do-or-die affair; as such they will not sponsor Kalare in perpetrating violence.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1 Questionnaire

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
Ahmadu Bello University
Zaria – Nigeria.

Dear respondent,

The bearer of this research instrument is undergoing Msc. Political Science programme in Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (ABU); I am conducting a research on the topic; **an assessment of the Talba youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme in Gombe state 2011-2015**

I am soliciting for your cooperation and assistance to respond on some questions that will ensure success in this research and the information supplied will be purely used for academic purpose.

Abdulkadir Ahmed

M.Sc/Soc-Sci/32295/2012-2013

SECTION (A). DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

Note: **Respondents are to select only one option from question 1-23 in all the sections**.

1) **Age Distribution:**
   (a) 18-28 (b) 29-39 (C) 40-49 (d) 50 and above
2) **Gender:**
   Male (b) Female
3) **Marital Status**:
   (a) Married (b) Single (c) Divorced
4) **Higher level of education attained**:
   (a) No formal western education (b) Primary (c) Secondary (d) Tertiary (e) Others

SECTION (B). The Relationship between Youth Disempowerment and Kalare Thuggery

5) **Did you belong to any *Kalare* group before joining this programme as marshal?**

a) Yes (b)No (c)Undecided

6) **Why do you joined *Kalare* thuggery**

a) Economic disempowerment (b)Heavy financial inducement by politicians

(c)Adventure (d) undecided

7) **I f your answer in 5 above is no, then what do you do for a living before joining this programme as marshal?**

_____

8) **Who are your sponsors as Kalare thugs?**

a) Politicians (b) Self sponsored (c) Moneybags/godfathers (d) undecided

9) **Now that you are employed as marshal, are you still taking drugs substance?**

a) Yes b) No c) Undecided

10) **How did you join this programme as marshal?**

_____

SECTION (C). How has Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme Empowered Youths who were formerly involve in Kalare Thuggery

11) **Now that you are employed as marshal are you still part of *Kalare* group?**

a) Yes (b) No (c) Undecided

12) **Are you being paid your monthly stipend regularly?**

a) Always on time (b) Sometimes is delayed (c) Most at times delayed

(d)They don't pay the allowance at all

13) **Has your monthly allowance providing for your needs every month?**

a) Yes (b) No (c) Sometimes Yes (d) Sometimes No

14) **Now that you are working as marshal, are you independent or you are depending on your parents/guardian.**

a) Am now independent (b) Am still dependent on parents/guardian

(c)Am depending on politicians (d) Undecided

15) Are you comfortable with the job you are doing now as marshal?

a) very comfortable (b) fairly comfortable (c) not comfortable

(d) Completely not comfortable (e) Undecided

16) What is your approximate earning monthly?

_____

17) Is your life better now compared to your life before joining this programme as Marshal?

a) Yes (b) No (c) Undecided

18) If your answer in 16 above is NO, tell us what do you think is the problem

_____

SECTION (D. How has Talba Youth Rehabilitation and Reorientation Programme enhanced political stability and transformed Ex-Kalare Thugs in to Agents of societal development

19) Do you now as a marshal support any political party?

a) Yes (b) No (c) Undecided

20) What is the nature of your job as marshal?

a) Road traffic Marshal (b) Environmental Marshal (c) Ward and community Marshal

21) How often do you report to work?

a) Regularly (b) Sometimes (c) once in a while (d) completely not reporting

(e) Undecided

22) How do you relate with general public in your duty post as marshal?

a) very cordial (b) cordial (c) fairly cordial (d) poorly (e) Undecided

23) Do you agree that your employment as marshal helped Gombe state and enhanced socio-political development?

a) Strongly agree (b) Agree (c) Disagree (d) Strongly disagree (e) Undecided

24) Has your employment helped reduced the problem of Kalare thuggery?

a) Yes (b) No (c) Undecided

Appendix 2

List of Interview Personnel

S/N	Names	Designation	Venue	Date
1	Alh. Buba Shanu	PDP Secretary Gombe State	Gombe State PDP Secretariat	2nd 07, 2015
2	Mr. Adamu Kala	Director Planning Research and Stat	Ministry of Youth and Empowerment	25th 08, 2015

			Gombe State	
3	**Mr Sunday Jika**	**Staff Officer GSASS**	**Gombe State Agency for Social Services**	**15th 06, 2015**
4	**Mijinyawa Sani Labaran**	**Commissioner for Youth Gombe State**	**Ministry of Youth and Empowerment Gombe State**	**20th 05, 2015**
5	**Alh. Abdulkadir Abubakar**	**Senior District Head, Gombe Emirate Council.**	**Alh. Abdulkadir Abubakar's Palace.**	**24th 09,2015**
6	**Moh'd Kwairanga Sa'idu Abubakar**	**District Head, Malam Inna Kagarawal**	**District Head Palace, T/wada Gombe**	**26th 08, 2015**
7	**Cleobas N. B. James**	**Director of Programmes and Admin. (FOYAE)**	**FOYAE Office, Fed Lcst Gombe**	**6th 10, 2015**
8	**Wakaya Maxwel**	**Director Youth Development Gombe State**	**Ministry of Youth and Empowerment Gombe State**	**7th 10, 2015**
9	**Hon Khamisu Mailantarki**	**Member House of Reps. Gombe, Kwami and Funakaye Fed. Const.**	**Residence of Hon Khamisu Mailantarki**	**27th 08,2015**
10	**DSP Fwaje Attajiri**	**Force Public Relations Officer Gombe State Police Command**		**10th 09,2015**
11	**Alh. Usman Mohammed Bage**	**Community leader, Bajoga, Funakaye L.G.A**	**Alh. Usman Mohammed Residence, Bajoga**	**17th 09, 2015**
12	**Mr. Maxwell Simon Tudu**	**Community leader Tudu ward, Billiri L.G.A**	**Mr. Maxwell Simon Tudu's Residence Tudu Kwaya, Billiri.**	**14th 07 2015**
13	**DSP Salisu Usman**	**Head of Operations, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) Gombe Command**	**NSCDC Gombe Command Office**	**2nd 08, 2015**
14	**Maikudi Abdulhamid**	**Victim of Kalare violence**		**10th 08, 2015**
15	**Bello Mohammed**	**Victim of Kalare violence**		**13th 08, 2015**

Appendix 3 Map of Gombe state




Figure 3.1 Map of Gombe State Showing the Entire Study Area
Source: Adopted from the Administrative Map of Gombe State