SUB REGIONAL HEGEMONY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S POSITION IN WEST AFRICA

BY

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CERTIFICATION

This project entitled "Sub Regional Hegemony: A Critical Assessment of Nigeria's Position in West Africa " by Zakaria Habila Dunku, meets the regulations governing the award of Masters Degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy (MIAD) and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research was conducted by me in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Dr. Shehu Ismail. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree or diploma at any university.

Name of Student	Signature	Date
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DEDICATION

This research paper is dedicated to GOD Almighty for giving me life and making all things possible. I also dedicate this research paper to my wife Helen and children, Mitong and Nitong Joy for their understanding throughout the academic session.

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ABSTRACT

In international relations nations are said to interact due to the fact that not all countries are equally endowed. Due to the principle of comparative advantage, it is not in the best interest of individual countries to pursue an isolationist policy. For this reason, countries in Africa and West Africa in particular have come to see themselves as members of one family. Nigeria as a dominant power in West Africa has since its political independence in 1960 been playing a lot of supportive roles in assistance towards other West African countries. These roles vary from military, political, financial/economic. This work is an assessment of Nigeria's position in the West African sub region.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Nigerian state is located in the West African Sub region, occupying a landmass of 923,770 square kilometers (Alkali, 2003:154). In terms of population, Nigeria is estimated to be 140 million in 2006 (Vanguard, January 12 2007:16). Nigeria is neighboured by Niger and Benin Republics to the Northwest, Chad and Cameroon to the Northeast, while to the South East Nigeria is bordered by Cameroon and Benin Republic to the South West.

These countries were mainly French speaking nations whose friendliness with Nigerian could not be guaranteed due to antecedent of their colonial experience especially language barrier which made them more bound to one another rather than with Nigeria an English speaking nation. However the spirit of West African brotherhood among countries through the Economic Community of West African States to some extent foster harmonious relationship between Nigeria, her immediate neighbours and other African countries.

The West African countries consist of ten Francophone, five Anglo phone and one Portuguese countries. The boundaries of these countries were artificial creation of colonial governments to suit their purposes only.

These states were created before a strong sense of nationalism had developed among them. Consequently, individuals loyalties extend primarily to the tribe, clan or region or other significant reference group and often only secondarily if at all to the states that have been created in their names (Holsti, 1967). This explains why West African states are lowly or poorly integrated.

There is also politico-cultural polarization along colonial lines e.g. Francophone, Anglophone blocs depending on whether it was France, Britain or Portugal respectively that colonized the countries. In addition to these, West African States are characterized by intense ethnic and elite conflicts, instability, centralization of power, arbitrary use of power for political repression etc. west African states can be said to be prone to incessant conflicts and crisis thereby necessitating peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, ECOWAS and African Union. Furthermore West African states are characterized by poverty which makes West African states underdeveloped, backward and dependent.

An outgrowth of poverty is the formation of groups and classes with conflicting material interests. These tend to polarize West African societies into hostile camp of people, quite often armed with strong ideological convictions of how society should best be organized for the purpose of overcoming or at least minimizing the condition of poverty. These conflicts

and interests usually manifest randomly at the level of the individual, or structure themselves through organized institutions like political parties, workers' trade Unions and employers' associations or informally through a combination of ethnic and religious sentiments (Ake, 1981)

Due to all these features of the West African sub region, they are dependent and in need of assistance. Therefore Nigeria being the most endowed among them has historically seen herself as giant. It is often said that countries choose their friends but never their neighbours. Nigeria's neighbours are a matter of colonial heritage and making friends out of her neighbours has been and a major preoccupation of Nigeria's foreign relations (Garba, 1987:36) Nigeria has also exhibited profound interest in the development and well being of her neighbours (Ogwu, 1986:93). This is because, apart from the poverty of the West African states, Nigeria stands at above all the West African states in terms of natural endowments. Going by the tapped and untapped resources of Nigeria, which are enormous, Nigeria has no rival in Africa (Saliu, 1999; 116).

The implication of this and the physical size of the country is that being the most endowed nation and given the far flung nature of the country's borders with African countries, which occasionally create envy among them Nigeria adopted the policy of good neighbourliness to

reassure the neighbours of Nigeria's good intentions towards them and its commitment to the spirit of African brotherhood.

Furthermore, in spite of her geo-political and economic position, Nigeria has always sought to propel its West African neighbour through cooperative strategies into recognizing the great need for economic cooperation among them. More than any other West African country, Nigeria has been promoting gradual integration of West African. Indeed since independence, the main tenets that have been guiding Nigeria's relations with her neighbours are the country's aspirations for collective African economic, social and stability (Ogwu, 1986:93).

As a result of this objective, successive Nigerian governments have placed high priority on economic and development matters relevant to her neighbours in her diplomatic endeavours. At a narrower level, Nigeria has also demonstrated the conviction that her economic, security and political interests might be better served if neighbourly cooperation at the macro (West African) level is complemented by cooperation at the micro (immediate neighbours) level. Thus, the four countries it shares land borders with namely Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon have been objects of special cooperative attention, this could be seen in such efforts as; the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Nigeria/Niger Joint Commission, the Lagos Irons-Mombassa highway e.t.c.

Similarly, Nigeria's bilateral economic relationship with her immediate neighbours is in line with her policy of increased cooperation to reduce her neighbour's vulnerability to external economic influence, thereby also ensuring her aim security. For example, Nigeria's economic relationship with Benin Republic was a useful mechanism for promoting the idea of self-reliance in small industries. The sugar and cement joint ventures with the Republics of Benin and Togo were sources of foreign exchange savings for the particular countries.

Furthermore, Nigeria does not only share the Kainji dam facilities for power generation with Niger, she also has assisted in the construction of the Birn Nkan, Bridge in Niger and also infused enormous aid in the country especially during the Sahelian drought in 1974 (Ogwu, 1986:94)

In the military sphere, in the dutiful spirit of support for troubled and war ravaged neighbours, Nigeria has always given a special attention to countries in crises. An example of this peace move was during the Liberian crisis when Nigeria in collaboration with four other West African states i.e. Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, set up and contributed troops to form the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) whose mandate was primarily to restore peace to war ravaged Liberia. Nigerian contributions in both men and material constituted more than half

of the troops that made up the ECOMOG (Nwosu, 1999:110). Nigeria similarly extended this gesture to Sierra Leone and recently Sudan.

The foregoing indicates that Nigeria has proven herself to be the giant of Africa, and a hegemon in the west African sub region. The veracity of this assertion forms the focus of this research.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This research is an attempt to assess Nigeria's perceived and acquired hegemonic position in West Africa, with a view to identifying and discussing the possible reasons why the policymakers are being pragmatic about being drawn into the Ivorian crisis. In the light of the above this research examines the following questions:

i. What is the nature of Nigeria's leadership position in West Africa?

ii. What are the implications of Nigeria's leadership roles on her national security?

iii. Why is Nigeria being pragmatic about interfering into the leadership crisis in Cote d'Ivoire?

1.3 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS

The following are the assumptions of this research:

i. That Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy stems from her desire to lead the African continent.

ii. That due to Nigeria's resources, its neighbours are suspicious of her good neighbourliness policy.

iii. That the adoption and implementation of Nigeria's good neighourliness policy have not yielded any benefits but rather impacted negatively on her national security.

1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this work is to critically assess Nigeria's position in West Africa. Specifically the following are to be realized at the end of the research:

i. To assess Nigeria's position in West Africa generally.

ii. To examine the impacts of Nigeria's commitment to the African cause on her national security.

iii. To identify and discuss the possible reasons why Nigeria was not drawn into the leadership crisis in Cote d'Ivoire

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE/JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH

The significant of this study is multidimensional. First is that, Nigerian leaders and policy makers will benefit form it. Secondly it would be of immense benefit to African leaders, future policy makers, scholars as well as all parties interested in good neighbourliness in Africa generally. It

is also expected that the findings of this study would stimulate further studies by scholars who may be interested in advancing the course of good neighbourliness in Africa as a whole.

Specifically, this work is significant in the following regards:

i. It is a modest contribution to knowledge.

ii. Its findings will be a ready blueprint for government/policy makers on the need to know how best to relate with our neighbours

iii. Its findings will serve as a veritable reference material for other researchers who might be interested in carrying out a similar research in future.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

This research covers Nigeria's relations with her West African neighbours in political, economic, social, cultural, technical fields in the period 1990-2008. The impact are also restricted to issues which borders on Nigeria's national security

1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Problems to be encountered would include time constraints, bureaucracy, call to duty, imminent posting and heavy workload/tight

schedule and travel distance. However, efforts will be made to ensure that these do not negatively impact on the research quality.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

Research methodology provides rules of evidence which helps to establish credibility of claims to knowledge made by scholars. The methodology of this research hinges on information sourced from secondary sources, which include textbooks, journals, newspapers, magazines, seminar papers and the internet.

The data obtained from secondary sources were then critically analyzed using qualitative content analysis and logical conclusion were drawn from the analysis. The reliance on secondary sources of data was informed by previous efforts of authors of relevant literature.

1.8 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS

Relation

No state however big or small can survive in isolation of the international environment. This is so because global resources which all nations need, are scarce and their distribution unequal over the earth. Therefore, it has become imperative for each member state to actively participate in the sharing and resharing of these resources, hence

international relations. Therefore, relations have to do with having connections or affairs. It may also refer to interactions with regards to nations, relations therefore, means nations having connections, affairs or interactions among themselves.

Neighbour

This is seen as one or two people that are near one another. Neighbours are groups of people and their homes forming a small area within a larger space such as a town. In this context, neighbours are group of nations sharing certain things in common within the West African sub-region.

National Security

This can be seen in relation to internal security. Although they are often used inter-changeably, internal security is said to cover the whole spectrum of freedom from danger and anxiety to that of sovereignty which is the ability of a nation to protect its values from external and internal threats.

1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE

This work is structured into five chapters. Chapter one which is the general background to the study introduces the work which comprises of

statement of the problem, aim, objectives and significance of the study. The chapter also sets out the theoretical framework and assumptions, scope and limitations and method of data collection and analysis. Chapter two embarks on a review of relevant literature and elaborate theoretical framework.

Chapter three will examine Nigeria's relations with her neighbours from independence i.e. Nigeria's foreign policy towards her neighbours and what forms or relationship Nigeria has gone into with her West African neighbours.

Chapter four looks at the leadership crisis in Cote d'Ivoire and also assesses Nigeria's response to the crisis. Chapter five concludes the research and offers useful recommendations on the way forward.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

As it is customary in every research work, this chapter thematically examines in summary the views and opinions of authors in the field of commitment, Nigeria's relations with her neighbours and national security. It is hoped that a review of exiting literature will enhance a better comprehension of the study. Thereafter, the gap in literature will be identified.

2.2 NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS

Over the years, a number of studies have been conducted in relation to the concept of commitment, ranging from the studies that are concerned with looking at commitment from the perspective of professionals or individual's by employing organizations, while others view commitment from the perspective of an individuals commitment to other persons, family, communities or to a particular line of action.

With regards to the first category most of the available literature on the concept is from the management school. Earlier works on individual commitment have been conducted by a lot of writers. In other studies of individual commitment to the pursuit of the goal and objectives of the

organization, the concept has been viewed in terms of exchange and cost-benefit approaches. Emphasis has been on the bargaining or exchange relationship between individuals and their organization. To this end, the more abundant the perceived rewards in relation to cost, the greater the commitment of the individual to organization's goals.

However, it has been found out by Becker (1990) that this exchange paradigm is not sufficient in explaining commitments, since the behaviour of individuals is not as simplified as the paradigm puts it. Becker pointed out the inadequacies of this approach. He tried to present a more refined approach, by introducing the idea of 'side-bets' or investment quality of organizational participation. To Becker, commitment is "primarily a structural phenomenon which occur as a result of individuals' organizational transactions and alterations in 'side-bets' or investment over time. But even 'side bets' theory shows its own inadequacies. Ritzer and Trice (1969) in their study of Becker's 'side bets' theory tried to point this out. To test the utility of the 'side bets' concept they asked their respondents if they would definitely change employing organization or occupation if given certain incentives. They claim that using the 'side bets' theory there were difficulties in predicting commitment level.

Although this research does not totally negate the importance of the 'side-bet' theory in explaining an individual's commitment to organizational

goals, it is nevertheless pertinent to note that this paradigm is problematic. The most formidable problem related to that of the level of analysis i.e there is the problem of transferability from the individual level to the national level, since nation is much more complex than the individual. The second problem with the 'side-bets' theory is that investment cannot singularly determine commitment. There are other important factors that must be considered.

While the above group of writers form the backbone of the first perspective, the other group looks at the concepts in a slightly different light. The group sees commitment in terms of individual responsibility to persons, family, community or a particular line of action. For instance Hinde (1979) uses the term in general perception to refer to "situation which one or two parties either accept their relationship as continuing indefinitely or direct their behaviour toward optimizing its properties".

From the above brief review, it is evident that most writers on the concept look at it as involving some form of psychological bond between people and organization or between an individual and a group of a particular line of action, it has to do with a certain degree of involvement, investment, loyalty, attachment, interest, and there are some perceived penalties if the commitment act is pursued. However, there are a number of general methodological problems with the available literature on the

concept of commitment. Prominent among the problems is that of the level of analysis. This is because the bulk of the literature is concerned with commitment of the individual level. There have been very few studies, which explicitly view a nation's commitment to pursuing a particular course of action, hence there is the problem of transferability of the concept from the individual level to the general or national level.

However, Ojo (1980) who traces Nigeria's commitment to the formation of ECOWAS in the initial period has undertaken one important work on Nigeria's commitment to the establishment of ECOWAS. Specifically, he is concerned with the diplomatic bargaining and coalitions that took place before ECOWAS was formed. Ojo makes one important conclusion about Nigeria's commitment to the ECOWAS, he contends that 'whether Nigeria will be able to fulfill this promise will depend as much on domestic, economic and political situation (an oil squeeze on resurgence of anti-integrationist forces could be disastrous in this respect) as upon extra regional forces.

Unfortunately, Ojo's writings stopped at period when Nigeria's commitment to the development of ECOWAS cannot be comprehensively assessed. He did not speculate the possible reason why Nigeria has been committed to the development of an intra-West African regional grouping. The present research therefore intends to build ahead by examining both

the diplomatic haggling's that went behind scenes in the formation and subsequent measures taken by Nigeria to ensure that the ECOWAS survives and develops.

For Ojo, when the national interest of Nigeria is examined, one finds that the West African sub-region (consisting mainly of ECOWAS countries) can be seen as the core in her foreign policy pursuits. A number of scholars of Nigerian foreign policy have agued that the Nigerian interest in ECOWAS is closely linked to considerations of national security, economic and national self-perception. Each of these considerations can be said to be closely linked with element of status. For instance the issue of national security, has to do with maintenance of Nigeria's territorial integrity which are the protection of lives of its population, the continued economic prosperity of the country, that any threat to these issues is also a threat to Nigeria's status within the West African Sub-region.

He contended that in order to stabilize and control her external environment which is mainly made of weak Francophone nations, Nigeria has to pursue friendly policies that will ensure the stability and prosperity of her neighbour, after all a more stable and economically prosperous nieghbour is less likely to be or be used by powerful external aggressors to destabilize the region of which Nigeria is a part. Therefore, Nigeria is ensuring that the sub-region is stable and prosperous by pursuing certain

measures though the ECOWAS, which in the long run is expected to bring improvement to the economies of the sub-region.

The next consideration is that of economic development. This is also linked to status 'preservation' and 'projective'. In that, through the ECOWAS, Nigeria can attain economic prosperity, which can help raise the welfare and standard of its citizens and even that of the sub-region. This, Nigeria can attain through the ECOWAS, since she will have expanded market opportunities for her goods and better access to raw materials from the ECOWAS countries. In this way, Nigeria can continue to preserve and project her status in the sub-region as a dominant power.

The last consideration, which is particularly related to Nigeria's status 'projection', is that of national self-perception. Nigeria being a dominant power in the sub-region perceives her self as the 'big brother' and through the ECOWAS scheme she has tried to preserve and project this position which tend to give her prestige in the eyes of countries both within Africa and outside. She does this by granting concessions in form of soft loans, aids in cash and kind, financing certain projects in other ECOWAS countries, and also by tolerating and forgiving in terms of crisis between her and her neighbours and also by mediating between conflicting parties within the West African Sub-region.

2.3 MANIFESTATION OF COMMITMENT

In order to fully comprehend the level of Nigeria's commitment to her nieghbours, this study has, for analytical convenience adopted the method of considering acts of the country's involvements in, attachment to and taking active interest in respect towards the affairs of the West African states. The punctuality of fulfilling financial obligations, assistance (in cash and kind) to other West African countries, and ratification and implementation of protocols, are referred here to mean some act of commitment. All the above will be used to assess the level of Nigeria's commitment to the ECOWAS integration scheme.

2.4 EMPIRICAL MANIFESTATION OF COMMITMENT

This section deals with financial obligations which mainly consist of funds devoted to conflict resolution in West Africa. Conflicts have become prevalent in West Africa and the need to resolve these conflicts have called for initiatives like the ECOMOG, a project which has cost Nigeria over 10 billion dollars (Best, 2005).

In his view, Gambari (1999), with regards to the obligatory contribution, Nigeria is expected to always contribute 32.8% of total, which is based on the calculation of coefficient "as one half of the ratio of the GDP of all member states to the total per capital income of each

member state. The important fact however to him, is that Nigeria since the inception of ECOWAS has paid her dues regularly.

Best argued that the amount Nigeria has so for spent on ECOWAS projects amount to over 23 billion dollars between 1990 to 2005, as contributions to the development of ECOWAS including part of the activities of the ECOMOG. It is significant to note that this constituted a substantial amount for one country to have contributed. For Nigeria to have done that, she must in fact be committed to the integration scheme, especially when one considers the fact that there have been fluctuations in the Nigerian economy. There has never been an instance whereby Nigeria failed to pay her dues for the running of the Secretariat.

2.5 VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE TO THE ECOWAS

This section considers voluntary assistance to the ECOWAS integration scheme by Nigeria. It must be noted that the willingness of a member country to make extra contributions to an organization is a very strong indicator of the extent to which that country is committed to the development of that organization. Nigeria, has since rendered a number of assistances to ensure the peace in West Africa. In 1976, Nigeria accepted to host the ECOWAS headquarters. Similarly in 1978, she hosted the first ECOWAS games. Also in 1986, she provided land for the

construction of a new ECOWAS secretariat at Abuja and donated the sum of N 5m towards the construction.

According to Kuna (2005) Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy is no longer new in intra African politics. To him, Nigeria's relations with her neighbours must necessarily be situated historically and within the context of her foreign policy objectives, whose thrust is peace building, conflict resolution and peace keeping within and outside Africa.

He added further that the promotion of peace both within and outside Africa is based on a policy of non interference, respect for inherited borders, commitment to African unity, economic integration and to decolonization. To him even the 1979 and 1989 constitutions in Nigeria backed Nigeria's commitment to good neighbourliness in West Africa as they encouraged the promotion of African Unity, the political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa, the domination of racial discrimination and the promotion of cooperation across the commitment.

While making an assessment of Nigeria's role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in West Africa and Africa in general, Barrett (1997) asserted that the objective of peace in West Africa that is the thrust of Nigerian foreign policy has evolved overtime and that an independent pan African and anti-colonial foreign policy became increasingly evident in the course of and after the civil war. He noted that this dominant approach

can be located in the nation of the four "concentric circles" of national interest, the core of which is a concern with Nigeria's own security predicated on the cultivation of good neighborly relations especially with Nigeria's immediate neighbours.

This in his view is in recognition that Nigeria's security is inextricably tied to the security of West Africa and it is for this reason that the second circle expands to include the whole West African sub-region, continental Africa constitutes the third circle and like the two previous ones, the major focus is on the promotion of peace, economic integration, development of the fight against all forms of colonial domination. His fourth circle focuses on Nigeria's relations with bodies and countries outside Africa.

For Garba (1987) Nigeria's good neighborliness policy in West Africa is a matter of incumbency. He put it that countries choose their friends but never their neighbours. To him Nigeria's neighbours are a matter of colonial heritage and that thus, the making of friends out of her neighbours has been and will continue to be a major preoccupation of her foreign policy.

He noted further that the task facing Nigeria in generally ensuring peaceful coexistence in Africa has always been difficult not only because of the obvious differences resulting form different colonial traditions, but also

because of the disproportionate size of Nigeria when compared with her immediate neighbours in particular.

He pointed out that in spite of Nigeria's policy towards her neighbours which has been largely accommodating, some people have criticized Nigeria as being in inconsistent in her policy towards her neighbours and insensitive to their feelings.

For Okoro (2002), Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy is to be commended because in spite of serious economic problems, Nigeria has managed to find the wherewithal to sustain security operations beyond her borders. He argued further that Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy is a way of guaranteeing peace at home i.e. if Nigeria's neighbours are engulfed in domestic crisis, such may have implications in Nigeria therefore the maintenance of peaceful coexistence in the sub-region translates to ensuring domestic peace and tranquility.

2.6 NATIONAL SECURITY

According to Ogoshi (2003), security is first of all, the right of every citizen and that one of the major functions of the state is to protect the lives and property of the citizens from both internal and external aggression. In his opinion insecurity is normally a direct result and outcome of a missing link between the rulers and the ruled; which occurs

when those in authority fail to provide the basic requirement of life to the ruled. He again views insecurity as a transfer of long subdued frustration, aggression and anguish on the society, usually by highly oppressed, dominated and subjugated members of the society.

Ogoshi maintained that giving the enabling environment and a relative provision of the basic needs of life of the citizens and indeed, a good act of governance, translates to guaranteeing national security. To him threats to national security could manifest in a form of coup d'etat, kidnapping, assassination, murder, rape, war, armed robbery etc. These to him are associated with violence and are mostly politically motivated and sponsored to settle an old score. On the other hand, it is seen to be carried out by dejected and frustrated members of the society to desperately meet up some basic needs of life.

For Nwakanma (2005) National Security should not be misconceived to mean security of the leaders but of the state. The security of the state or nation is far more important than the security of the government. To him, a state is like a trusteeship established in perpetuity for as long as the critical interests that glue the trusteeship together still abide by the principles that established it. He opined that political leaders are more or less, executors of the sovereign trust and in a democracy, they derive their legitimacy from the people, their mandates are guaranteed and protection

offered by about all the people. It is on this note that Nwakanma posited that national security concerns ought to flow from a higher imperative: the security of her people and their material culture, the security of her space and environment, the security of her food culture, the security of her literal and sovereign boundaries, the security of her species and of course, the security of its legitimate means of public action. Nwakanma submits that a nation is constituted upon these paradigms.

The opinions of Ogoshi and Nwakanma seem to corroborate one another as each focuses or places more emphasis on the wellbeing of citizens as the major issue to consider when talking about national security.

Furthermore, Shehu (2005), opines that one of the biggest challenges facing many growing societies world over is that of security of lives and property through coordinated efforts, proper and timely allocation of resources and of course periodic reviews and update of all security variables and situations. In his view, for the government, the issue of national security is not a matter of choice or chance but rather that of discharging a clearly defined constitutional duty and burden whose discharge gives credence to those in governance.

Shehu posits further that national security is everybody's business. That for the individual it is both a civil, civic and constitutional

responsibility and duty which if positively achieved helps and allows the individual to plan and achieve his set objective as with minimal fear, risk and interference. The argument put forward by Shehu indicates that his idea of national security translates to a situation in which both government and the governed, carry out their duties to the letter.

Gee (2006) maintains that security is the first condition of humanity and that for any whichever; a secure place (in terms of the provision of safe fluid water, of atmosphere and its elements, of edible flora and fauna and good ground for their thriving) had to be ensured before human life itself got logdement and promise upon the planet earth. To him, it was the need for the initial security that helped to establish the cradle of humanity.

Attah (2006) notes that in a democratic society, national security emphasizes the non military, non-strategic perspective focusing on the following development, fundamental human rights and freedoms (which entail tolerance of dissenting views and opinions) general welfare and happiness. To him, this conforms with the notion that security is a development and that without development there can be no security.

Attah further argues that national security goes beyond territorial defence and should therefore also focus on the physical, social, economic and psychological quality of a society and its members, both in the

domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system. He added that whereas defence against military aggression obviously remains vital component of national security, the concept of national security must be expanded to include protection against all major threats to human survival and well being, including threats posed by severe environmental degradation, gross injustices and massive human suffering, social disinheritance etc.

Attah (2006:42) quoted the former President Obasanjo who said:

> "... the primary objective of national security shall be to strengthen the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to advance her interests and objectives; to contain instability; control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth; improve the welfare and well being and quality of life of the citizenry".

The foregoing means that the security of individuals first of all translates to national security. This must therefore start from the level of meeting individuals' basic human needs before efforts are made to provide security against physical violations. This also implies that the primary consideration in the security calculation of any society must be the overall welfare and well being of the individuals that constitute such a society.

This further suggests that for security to have any real meaning, the basic social and economic needs of the people must be adequately provided for. The provision of social amenities such as shelter, education, health and other infrastructural facilities and the elimination of economic inequality and part and parcel of this.

According to Hubert (1999), national security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. He argued that national security is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people ad its part of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments.

In his view, like other security concepts, national security, is about protection. This to him entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimizing risk and taking remedial action where preventive action fails. National security also calls for the creation of a strong and self reliant economy which guarantees full employment, economic development and equitable allocation of resources such that discontent, disgruntlement and marginalization on the part of some sections of the populace could effectively be eliminated.

It is the foregoing notion of national security that largely underpinned Dr. Robert McNamara's (2001) conception of security as economic development as according to him, the security of stakes lies not solely or even primarily on military force, but equally in developing stable patterns of economic and political growth both at home and abroad. He further posited that the root of a nation's security does not lie in its weaponry; but in the mind of its component units i.e. citizenry.

With particular reference to third world states, McNamara argues that in modernizing society, security means development. To him security is not military force though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is development and without development security can never be realized.

According to Touray (2006) national security involves working on the basis of a definition which encompasses both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict.

The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and

economic imperatives as well. This newer, multi-dimensional notion of national security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation.

At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic, political and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental level, the principle would be underscored that the "security of each country is inseparably linked to that of other countries and the continent as a whole."

In Touray's opinion, security threats may be deemed to pose a danger to the security interests of a nation, as defined above, when such threats confront all, some, or one of the aspects of a country. Such common security threats which thus undermine the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, may be internal or external.

This review shows that there are scholars who view Nigeria's relations with her neighbours from a positive point of view, this is not to

indicate that there re no negative views. To be noted here is that these views have failed to look t the security implications of Nigeria's relations with her neghbours. This gap is what this research seeks to fill in the subsequent chapters.

2.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical foundation of this research rests on the systems theory. System theory is an inter-disciplinary field, which studies system as a whole. It was propagated by Ludwig Von Bertalanfy, William Rose Ashby etc, between the 1940s and 1970s on the principles borrowed from physics, biology and engineering and later grouped into numerous fields including philosophy, sociology, management, economics, international relations e.t.c.

System theory became popular with scholars in the field of international relations on the following reasons:

- The inter-disciplinary character of the study of international relations
- It enables these scholars to look at the entire international system rather than on its parts or nation states as their major objective of study and research.
- It enables them to understand the view that the study of international politics presented the study of phenomenon containing

a great deal of organized complexly and the self-regulating and adaptive character of the international system and;

- The terminology of the systems approach, which these scholars thought would be equally suitable for international relations (Varma, 1975).

System theory in analyzing international politics takes a holistic view of inter-states relations. It views the international system as a unit of analysis consisting of components parts of states having common characteristics such as boundary, sovereignty, government and population. These components part are engaged in constant interaction within the world system and the behaviour of one state or unit affects the others and vice versa.

The behaviour of the component parts of the state is said to be complex, but organized along certain basic structure and processes that shape the relationship. In other words, the relationship between and among the component parts presents a pattern of interaction in systemic form in which the parts in spite of space of distance affect each other. And also, depending on the nature of the relationship of the components parts, the whole system may be stable or unstable.

The system is said to be stable when there is harmonious relationship among the component units and it will be unstable when there

is crisis. Crisis and instability may lead to adjustment in the system. This adjustment is seen in terms of adaptation in an organism to external stress.

In the realm of international politics, states having different definite boundaries within the international system may pursue certain specific objectives. When these objectives tally, they cooperate to achieve their common goals. This strengthens the international system as a form of interdependence is introduced that make the "federating units" of the international system feel indispensable to one another.

On the other hand, when states' interest' conflict, it may generate into conflicts thereby threatening the system by causing stress which may ultimately result in shifting inter-state relation to an asymmetrical power structure reflecting the balance of power. This adjustment in the system ensures continuity and survival of the international system as a unit composed of components parts in constant relation to one another. Based on this, the pattern of relations can assume different dimensions; it may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, dependent or interdependent and so on.

Systems theory can be seen to have practical expression in world politics within the context of balance of power. The significance of states in the international system is measured by their ability to influence the system. And in that wise, states may be categorized into three, those that

act by taking bold decisions in the international system, those that react by being powerful and equal to those that act, and those who adjust to external influence from their counterparts on account of weakness in the equation of the system, based on that, the balance of power represents a state of equilibrium in the ability of powerful components parts of the international system to take bold decisions and actions in relation to others in the system.

The foregoing postulations of the system theory help this research to see the African continent as a whole comprising of component units, which affect one another since the West African sub-region is a system of states whose interactions affect one another. Therefore the relevance of the systems theory to this work.

CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS SINCE 1960

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter examined key concepts that are central to this study by way of literature review. To enhance an understanding of this topic, this chapter in a historical perspective, looks at Nigeria's relations with her West African neighbours. However it is necessary to first look into Nigeria's policy towards her neighbours.

3.2 NIGERIA'S POLICY TOWARDS HER NEIGHBOURS

Nigeria is surrounded on all sides by Francophone states (Omede, 2006). Typically, her foreign policy goals and leadership aspirations in West Africa receive perhaps the greatest challenges from these states (Ede, 1986). Nigeria's policy toward her neighbours had since independence been based largely on the following four principles (Ogpu, 1967).

i. The sovereign equality of all African states

ii. Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state

iii. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries

iv. Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity

Based on these principles, Nigeria has been totally indifferent to the internal political power struggle in other states around her. The lukewarm attitude of Nigeria towards her neighbours can also be attributed to feelings of phobia, real or imagined, of French response in case of an overtly aggressive policy against any of those states that have close colonial ties and cultural affinities with France. In addition to the French connection, the following major reasons impact greatly on the non-interference attitude of Nigeria in her neighbours' affairs (Alack, 1977).

a. Nigeria's respect for the principles of sovereign equality of all states and respect for African states.

b. Nigeria's apprehension of threatening the security of her weaker neighbours who might be frightened into the arms of some powerful extra-African forces that could pose a direct threat to the survival and national security of Nigeria. Moreover, active interference in her neighbours affairs could also lead to arms race which Nigeria could not seriously contemplate. An arms race would entail the diversion from economic and social welfare needs to defence matters.

3.3 PROFILE OF NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS SINCE 1960

(a). The Balewa Administration 1960 - 1966

From the outlined five foreign policy objectives of the Balewa administration, the issues of devotion to African-oriented policies and the pursuit of continental unity as well as the campaign against total decolonization of Africa and the fight against white minority rule (Apartheid), were considered most important and were therefore pursued with vigor. Nigeria demonstrated this Afro-centric foreign policy posture in a number of ways within the first republic.

For instance, Nigeria actively participated in the establishment of the organization of African Unity OAU, which served as platform for promoting the course of Africa within the international system. Nigeria also under the Balewa Administration demonstrated commitments towards promoting peace in the continent, thereby promoting an enabling environment for development. Nigeria contributed to the United Nations Peace forces in the Congo in 1963 under Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi. Nigeria's interest in Africa also manifested in 1961 when the Balewa Administration severed diplomatic relations with France following France's testing of an atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert.

(b) General Gowon Administration (1966 – 1975)

The general Gowon Administration did not make any discernible departure from the Balewa Administration. The key objectives of the Balewa Administration still featured prominently. For instance, Nigeria continued financing and giving moral assistance to the Liberation movement in Southern Africa, payment of dues to the Liberation committee of the OAU; campaign against the Anglo-African states, and the establishment of ECOWAS.

(c) Murtala/Obasanjo's Administration (1975 – 1979)

The Murtala/Obasanjo administration followed suit with the foreign policy objectives of their predecessors. The administration further gave impetus to the Afro-centric foreign objectives by according Africa and African problems a central position in the administration's foreign policy.

The administration continued financing and making material contributions to Liberation movements within Africa. The Obasanjo Administration in particular added another foreign policy objective to Nigeria's foreign policy. The creation of necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world, which facilitated the defense of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development (daily Sketch, editorial, July 3, 1996:3).

(d) Shehu Shagari Administration (1976 – 1983)

Nigeria foreign policy under Shagari was dictated by the 1979constitution, which emphasized "dismantling of colonialism and apartheid, as key foreign policy objectives and interest. In pursuit of this, the administration expressed commitment to strengthen and consolidate the OAU and it make it more effective forum for solving the continent's problems, Liberation of Africa from colonialism and promotion of socio-political and economic emancipation of African States through bilateral and multilateral cooperation; among others.

(e) The Buhari Administration (1984 – 1985)

Generally, according to James Okoro (2002:37), Buhari's administration foreign policy was characterized by hostility to Nigeria's neighbours (i.e expulsion of illegal aliens like the "Ghana must go" episode), undefined objectives, confrontational diplomacy. This implies that the administration did not pursue any specific foreign policy objective or interest rather it considered domestic problems more important than foreign problems.

(f) Babangida Administration (1985-1993)

Babangida continued the Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policies. Babangida expressed commitment to solving Africa's problems and finding solutions to them, in addition to showing commitment to ECOWAS and

practically and meaningfully pursuing the objectives and aims of the UN. Babangida also demonstrated Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy towards her neighbour when she spearheaded the formation of the ECOWAS contingency group popularly known as ECOMOG in response to the crisis which broke out in Liberia and later Sierra Leone.

Abacha adopted the policy of no permanent friends in international relations but interests. He did this with a measure of success which worried our traditional friends in Africa and Abubakar Abdulsalami Administration (1998-1999) did not achieve much foreign policy objectives which Nigeria pursued in relation to Africa. The Abubakar Administration was only concerned about normalizing relations with Nigeria's traditional friends and assuring the international community of Nigeria's resolve to return to democratic rule. The Shonekan administration were characterized by "Areaboy" diplomacy which lead to Nigeria degeneration to a Pariah state Status.

(g) Obasanjo's Administration (1999 – 2007)

Conscious of the negative perception with which the international community viewed Nigeria, Obasanjo introduced a new vision for Africa – a vision for continental free trade, drawing African States closer in business commercial standards, conflict resolution and education. This was intended to promote Nigeria's interest, particularly economic development

through establishing mutually beneficial economy relations. The Obasanjo Administration support to the transformation of OAU to AU and Obasanjo chairing of the NEPAD implementation committee are all manifestation of Nigeria's commitment to solving the numerous problems of the continent. From the foregoing, it is evident that Nigeria's foreign policy had been focused on achieving certain basic objectives and interests. Besides the quest for power and prestige in the West African sub-region, the continent and the world, Nigeria's foreign policy has been targeted at promoting, and protecting the country's interest for the benefits of its citizenry.

The African-centered foreign policy, efforts at decolonization, promoting Africa's development, ensuring the end of minority rule in parts of Africa, promoting African unity, and promoting peace in the African continent are major policy innovations of the Obasanjo administration towards its African neighbours.

(h) Yar'adua/Jonathan Administration

On assumption of the leadership position of the country, president Umaru Musa Yar'adua concerned himself with efforts geared towards salvaging the ailing Nigerian economy. In his various foreign tours the president unequivocally sated that his priority was the economy which was in a bad shape. To this end the government initiated the seven (7) point agenda which revolved around including Nigeria among the top 20 world

industrialized nations come year 2020. Therefore the key sectors of the economy i.e power, agriculture, oil etc, were given top priority. In addition to this, the Niger Delta region which had long been embroiled in crisis was also given attention. It would be recalled that the crisis in that region had negatively impacted on oil production in the country and also assumed an international dimension as nationals of other countries were frequently harassed and kidnapped. The government thus came up with the amnesty programme for militants of the Niger Delta region.

3.4 NATURE OF NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS SINCE 1960

The policy of non-interference as well as the non-challant attitude of Nigeria's decision makers was later reviewed due to series of events that unfolded within the sub-region. The events, it is imperative to note, resulted among other factors from the role of neighbouring countries in rendering military and humanitarian assistance to the Biafran rebel group during the civil war (1966 - 69) in Nigeria. Also, threats posed by the establishment of a Franco-phone economic organization - The Exclusive Communaute Economique D'Afrique Occidentale (CEAO), in May 1973 is noteworthy. The creation of the CEAO was perceived by Nigeria as an attempt by France not only to perpetuate colonial divisions and privileges

in Africa, but also to use the CEAO as a counterpoise to the "big brother" status enjoyed by Nigeria within the sub-region.

Significantly however, it was at the inception of the Babangida administration in 1985 that serious efforts were made to rectify the frosty relations between Nigeria and her neighbours. The strained relationship between Nigeria and her neighbours prior to 1985, was described by officials of the administration thus (Shagaya, 1990).

"Virtually all our neighbours enjoyed what can best be described as frosty relations with us. There was a tense situation between Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Nigeria. Occupation of lands belonging to Nigeria by armed brigades of neighbouring countries had become a norm. These tense situations were created out of the misconceived suspicion that Nigeria might succumb to the temptation to dominate her neighbours".

In ensuring a continued cordial relations and reaffirming the good intentions she contemplates toward her neighbours, Nigeria, in her "presentation to the UN Goodwill Mission", emphasized that border conflict between the country and her neighbours have been largely avoided through the Federal Government of Nigeria. .

The principle of good neighbourliness, policy of cooperative security and preventive diplomacy which Nigeria cherishes and upholds even at the

expense of its own national interest through established means of diplomacy, the process of boundary demarcation, has been initiated with her neighbours (except Cameroon). This offers a valuable opportunity to all the parties to discover and resolve anomalies and ambiguities that if left unattended could cause conflict

In spite of Nigeria's affirmation to maintain cordial relations with her neighbours, the reality of the situation is that the neighbouring countries, in particular Cameroon, continue to embark on actions detrimental to Nigeria's national interest and security. In fact, the threats engendered by the contention between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula and the accompanying deployment of troops and military capabilities to the area under dispute, are worthy of note. Accordingly, an analysis of the threats posed to Nigeria and the implications inherent in the relationships will enhance our understanding of the volatile nature and the precarious condition of Nigeria's relationship with countries in the West African sub-region.

In its numerous policy pronouncements, Nigeria has not only committed itself to the total political liberation and independence of the black people in Africa; but has also exhibited profound interest in the economic development and social well being of African states, especially its closest neighbours of the West African sub-region. In the West African

sub-region, Nigeria's foreign policy goals are closely linked to considerations of national security and development and its national perception. Indeed, to keep Nigeria's role in ECOWAS and its national perception. Indeed, to keep Nigeria's role in ECOWAS and its bilateral relations with its immediate neighbours in proper perspective, one must be guided by a variety of economic, cultural, strategic, external and geopolitical considerations that have a crucial impact on its foreign policy.

The pre-eminent factor is that Nigeria looms large in any consideration of regional African relations, especially at the sub-regional level. In sub-regional proportions Nigeria occupies 35 percent of the land area of West Africa, its 140 million inhabitants is about 56 percent of ECOWAS countries population is greater than the combined total for the 14 Francophone states (Omede,2006). In addition, Nigerian citizens are scattered in great numbers all over West Africa (nearly 1 million in Ivory Coast and Liberia alone) actively engaged in trade.

Yet, in spite of its pivotal geopolitical and economic position, Nigeria has sought to propel its West African neighbours through cooperative strategies into recognizing the great need for economic cooperation among them. More than any other West African or indeed, African country, Nigeria can unequivocally claim consistent interest in promoting the gradual integration of West African economies.

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Indeed, since independence, the main tenets guiding Nigeria's relations with its neighbours are its aspirations for collective African economic, social and technological development that would ensure unity and stability. Nigeria's special interest in forgoing good relations with its neighbours is a continuing reaffirmation of Prime Minister Balewa's resolution at independence to promote African unity.

The Nigerian drive to establish a lasting framework for trade and economic cooperation with its neighbours was corroborated by the former commissioner for external affairs, Joe Garba, when he stated that the maintenance of good relations with her immediate neighbours was one of the cornerstones of Nigeria's foreign policy.(Ogwu, 2006)

In tune with this objective, successive Nigerian governments have placed high priority on economic and development matters relevant to its neighbours in its diplomatic hierarchy. Therefore, Nigeria's orientation toward future economic self-reliance and integration in the West African sub region was initiated primarily with its immediate neighbours. Nigeria borders on four other African nations-Benin, Niger, Chad and the Cameroon. The Lake Chad Basin Commission, Nigeria/Niger Commission, the Lagos-Trans-Mombassa highway represent Nigeria's early initiatives to develop close links with its neighbours.

In addition, Nigeria's bilateral economic relationship with its immediate neighbours was in tune with its policy of heightened cooperation to reduce their vulnerability to extenral economic influence, perhaps thereby remotely ensuring its own security Nigeria's economic relationship with the Republic of Benin, for example, appears to be a useful mechanism for promoting the idea of self-reliance in small industries. The sugar and cement joint ventures with the Republics of Benin and Togo have been sources of foreign exchange savings for the participating countries.

Nigeria not only shares the facilities of the Kainji Dam for power generation with Niger, it also operates a joint Uranium venture in which it has 16 percent interests. Nigeria has assisted in the construction of the Birni N'Konni Bridge in Niger, and also infused substantial aid in the country during the Sahelian drought in 1974.

In the dutiful spirit of support for a troubled and war-ravaged neighbour as Chad, Nigeria intervened and gave a special attention that was designed to secure peace. In spite of Nigeria's initial setbacks in its mediatory efforts in the Chadian conflict, the Flurry of diplomatic activity which characterised Nigeria's role in Chad is significant.

Nigeria's strategy has sought to lead its neighbours through cooperative means in economic development, self-reliance (where

possible) and political stability. Yet its neighbours as illustrated by Chad, Benin and Cameroon, have posed a concern for Nigeria's security and a potential threat to peace and stability in the region.

The conflict in Chad and its concomitant refuge problems, the alleged occupation of a Nigerian village in Sokoto state by Benin forces and the killing of five Nigerian soldiers across the Nigerian border by Camerounian gendarmes have precipitated heightened tension in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. Tension management could in fact become part of diplomatic activities with its neighbours in the future.

It also raises a number of crucial questions: why has Nigeria sought to make closer relations with its immediate neighbours a main tenet of its foreign policy? What are Nigeria's ultimate goals in its relations with its neighbours? What impediments will Nigeria confront as it attempts to forge closer relations with its neighbours in the future?

The answers to these questions may be found in the pronouncements of successive Nigerian leaders and the actions of Nigeria towards its west African neighbours. In addition, the futures that Nigeria will confront will serve to weaken or consolidate its position in its relations with its neighbours and in the long term in the region.

It is worthy of note to point out that since 1960 when Nigeria got her flag independence to date, Nigeria has resiliently and purposefully

been engaged in conflict resolution in virtually all African countries troubled by conflicts. Nigeria has since 1990 when the ECOMOG operation began in Liberia to date, spent over 10 billion dollars as noted in the previous chapter. Apart from financial commitments to peace keeping missions, Nigeria has contributed both men and materials.

On the multilateral front, Nigeria's pre-eminence can be recognised in its unrelenting drive to help create a sub-regional economic community (ECOWAS). It appeared that the remarkable success of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association provided additional stimulus for revitalising Nigeria's aspirations for economic cooperation in West Africa.

Thus championed by Nigeria in collaboration with Togo, the move to urge and enlist the participation of other West African states began intensively following the end of the civil war in Nigeria. Because of the traditional, almost umbilical, cultural economic and political links between France and the Francophone states, the initial attitudes of those states toward the creation of ECOWAS were lukewarm and wary.

By April 1972, however, Nigeria and Togo, (the prime movers) had set the tone by signing a treaty establishing the nucleus of ECOWAS itself in Lagos on 27 May. By 1975, 15 West African nation states, had signed

the treaty with two of Nigeria's closest neighbours, Chad and Cameroon conspicuously absent.

By the terms of the treaty, a common tariff would be adopted and, most importantly, a common fund for cooperation, compensation and development would be established to serve the interests of member states who suffer losses from the liberalisation of trade. Indeed, the principal objective of the treaty was to provide a favourable atmosphere for the increase of both multilateral and bilateral cooperation among member states.

Although the basic purposes of ECOWAS serve to promote collective self-reliance within the community, the real significance of Nigeria's relations with West African nation states must be understood in the broader context of Nigeria's security interests and unacknowledged competition with France for influence in the sub-region. Nigeria's relationship with ECOWAS member states, and especially its neighbours are rendered more consequential by the fact that, the four states that border Nigeria are former French colonies.

As long as France continues to maintain an economic and military presence on bordering states, Nigeria's national security will be seriously threatened; and political stability, cultural interaction and economic growth in West Africa will be greatly impeded. The stationing of French troops

and French controlled military bases is an entrenched part of French diplomacy in the sub-region. Tension management in the areas of French influence has been subjected to French intervention. In neighbouring areas of Benin, Chad, Cameroun, Togo and Niger, French penetration of their economic, cultural and political life is a given.

Unquestionably, the French leverage in West Africa is very pronounced. Undoubtedly too, the absence of the overbearing influence of France is crucially important to a durable regional economic arrangement. Policy makers and observers of Nigeria's foreign policy have pointed to the importance of Nigeria in the West African community. In emphasizing the role of Nigeria, Ishaya Audu stated that;

Our position in the organization of African Unity and in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is crucial. We see things objectively (Ogwu,op cit).

Even if Nigeria were sure and confident of its leverage and the outward and gross national product) the French counter leverage and influence would tend to diffuse Nigeria's efforts in the region and most probably perpetuate under-development. The problem posed for Nigeria by France was put more starkly by Mazrui when he declared that, the natural rival of Nigeria is France. Unless Nigeria reconciles itself to the

status of a competitor with France in its own backyard, it will have to reassess its policies to counterbalance the numerous problems and dilemma that it would inevitably confront in the future.

In spite of the quest for regional collective self-reliance and security, a Nigerian preference for bilateral diplomacy with its immediate neighbours should be stressed. On the bilateral level, Nigeria's avowed commitment to a good neighbour policy may require it to yield more to the demands and whims of its neighbours. The challenge for Nigeria then would be to work out how to keep its neighbours friendly without sacrificing its national interests on the altar of good neighbourliness and regional solidarity.

Acceptance of Nigeria by its neighbours, or at least the absence of hostilities, is vitally important to Nigeria's continued pre-eminent role and its security in the sub region. Furthermore, the exasperating French presence in and around Nigeria, means that, for Nigeria, bilateral relations should be pursued skillfully in order not to accentuate Anglo-French rivalry. So Nigeria's policy would foster greater economic development and political stability.

As the millennium progresses, it seems likely that Nigeria will in general terms be involved in three separate sets of relationships in its sub-regional diplomacy: an intensified cooperative relationship with its neighbours that would not engender fears of Nigerian sub-imperialism'.

The second feature that of establishing a security 'perimeter' or a sphere of influence that would depend entirely on the level of the Nigerian threat perception and the limits of its national interests or regional ambitions.

Thirdly a competitive relationship that could fuel conflict. The last probable scenario - that of conspicuously isolating itself from sub-regional politics to avoid over exposure, would at best be an anathema to historic Nigerian aspiration to its 'preordained' role in the region. An isolationist role for Nigeria would have no future in any analysis of Nigeria's diplomacy. Among the alternatives available are:

i. Intensified political, economic cooperation and flexibility with neighbours: This course involves achievement of a balanced relationship in which paternalism is almost absent.
ii. Aid to neighbours on very generous terms
iii. Intensified joint development programs, especially investments and exploitation of natural resources; and
iv. Engaging in personal diplomacy at top official levels

Friendship and partnership especially with its immediate neighbours based essentially on the principle of sovereign equality of countries is based essentially on the principle of sovereign equality of countries is the

keystone of this alternative. The nations that share boundaries with Nigeria are more keenly aware of, and sensitive to the intensive activities of their gigantic neighbour. Given its preponderant size, Nigeria should avoid the appearance of paternalism. The assumption is that interaction between nations are theoretically and sometimes practically come between more or less equals where reciprocity is expected.

Nigeria would therefore allay the fears of imperialism by stressing partnership and strive to promote a more favourable environment for exercising some positive influence even if remotely. But Nigeria's commitment to a 'good neighbour' policy may require it to engage in more intensified strategies to encourage economic growth, and increased participation of its neighbours in ECOWAS. The assumption is that this policy will through cooperative ventures and mutually beneficial relations with Nigeria, infuse some measure of progress and opportunities into their economies.

More significantly, Nigeria's greater stake in its neighbours' economic development is best explained into Nigeria to participate in a relatively more prosperous economy. The major challenge to Nigeria is to adopt a preference for bilateral economic and political diplomacy that would help its neighbours while simultaneously diminishing their impact

and pressure on Nigeria's domestic resources by the illegal immigration of their citizens into Nigeria.

It seems perhaps inevitable that Nigeria should play a major but less domineering role in not only assisting but also encouraging the socio-economic and political development of its less developed neighbours and to itself as well. Stable, prosperous neighbours are perhaps less likely to become antagonistic toward Nigeria. More significantly, the region would in the long term provide a natural market for Nigeria's exports as its industrial base expands.

CHAPTER FOUR
POST ELECTION CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE

4.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF COTE D'IVOIRE

The Republic of Cote d'Ivoire known in English as Ivory Coast is a country in West Africa. It has an area of 322,462 km^2, and borders the countries of Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana; its southern boundary is along the Gulf of Guinea. The country's population was 15,366,672 in 1998 and was estimated to be 20,617,068 in 2009.

Cote d'Ivoire became independent on 7 August 1960. From 1960 to 1993, the country was led by Felix Houphouet-Boigny. It maintained close political and economic association with its West African neighbours, while at the same time maintaining close ties to the West, especially to France. Since the end of Houphouet-Boigny's rule, Cote d'Ivoire has experienced one coup d'etat, in 1999, and a civil war, which broke out in 2002. A political agreement between the government and the rebels brought a return to peace. Cote d'Ivoire is a republic with a strong executive power invested in the President. Its de jure capital is Yamoussoukro and the biggest city is the port city of Abidjan. The country is divided into 19 regions and 81 departments. It is a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, African Union, La Francophonie, Latin Union, Economic

Community of West African States and South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

4.2 POLITICAL CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE

The presidential elections that should have been organized in 2005 were postponed until November 2010. The preliminary results announced by the Electoral Commission showed a loss for Gbagbo in favour of his rival, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. The ruling FPI contested the results before the Constitutional Council, charging massive fraud in the northern departments controlled by the rebels of the Forces Nouvelles de Cote d'Ivoire (FNCI). These charges were contradicted by international observers. The report of the results led to severe tension and violent incidents.

The Constitutional Council, which consists of Gbagbo supporters, declared the results of seven northern departments unlawful and that Gbagbo had won the elections with 51% of the vote (instead of Ouattara winning with 54%, as reported by the Electoral Commission). After the inauguration of Gbagbo, Ouattara, recognized as the winner by most countries and the United Nations, organized an alternative inauguration. These events raised fears of a resurgence of the civil war; thousands of refugees have fled the country. The African Union sent Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, to mediate the conflict. The U.N. Security

Council adopted a common resolution recognising Alassane Ouattara as winner of the elections, based on the position of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States). ECOWAS suspended Cote d'Ivoire from all its decision-making bodies while the African Union also suspended the country's membership.

Cote d'Ivoire entered a renewed period of extreme political instability, accompanied by significant political violence, following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying Cote d'Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002.

This instability directly threatens long-standing international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Cote d'Ivoire. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable state capacity-building and economic growth in West Africa, along with billions of dollars of U.S. foreign aid to achieve these ends. The United States has supported the Ivoirian peace process since the 2002 war, both diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. The

United States supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI); funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Cote d'Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. Congress may be asked to consider further Cote d'Ivoire-related assistance if UNOCI is expanded or if ECOWAS mounts a new military intervention force; or to fund emergency humanitarian interventions if the political-military situation significantly deteriorates, as is likely under a range of potential scenarios.

On November 23, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two candidates who had won the most votes in a first-round October 31, 2010 poll. Both candidates claim to have won the runoff vote and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by Cote d'Ivoire's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, has endorsed the IEC-announced poll results as accurate and authoritative and demanded that Gbagbo accept them and cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, however,

appealed the IEC decision to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which reviewed and annulled it, proclaiming Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.

The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in political tension and violence, resulting in many deaths and human rights abuses, and provoked attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo's electoral victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president, and is using diplomatic and financial efforts, personal sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. Top U.S officials have attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down, and an existing U.S. ban on bilateral aid has been augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo Administration. As of early 2011, Ouattara and Gbagbo were each rigidly adhering to their positions, and regional mediation had produced no tangible results. Continued political volatility is likely if either Ouattara or Gbagbo prevails, and the country is likely to remain bisected in the latter case. A war, whether civil or due to external intervention, is also possible. A unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root causes of the crisis. If the crisis is resolved, Cote d'Ivoire is well-placed to recover politically and economically.

4.3 NIGERIA'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

In reaction to the crisis in the republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the ECOWAS, AU and the global community were swift to intervene in the crisis. It was expected that Nigeria which has a track record of intervening in such situations would react. This was in view of the fact that Cote d'Ivoire is not just a fellow African country but a West African country. It is to be borne in mind that Nigeria is dedicated to protecting her West African neghbours. It was however surprising that the Nigerian leadership under Goodluck Jonathan did not respond to the situation despite pressures from within and outside Nigeria. Nigeria's leadership only made statements to the fact that the incumbent leader is only fueling the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire. Nigeria the giant of Africa claimant was seen to be making utterance that Gbagbo is fueling crisis in the state.

The ongoing crisis in Cote d'Ivoire is a growing cause of concern not just because of the decision of the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo to hold on to power against the wishes of the electorate, but because of the resolution of ECOWAS Heads of State 'to use legitimate force' to get Gbagbo to step down for challenger and former Prime Minister Alssane Quattara the declared winner of the second round of the November 28 Presidential election (having secured 54.1 percent of the vote). Should ECOWAS leaders follow through with the threat then it would no doubt

lead to the dispatch of a contingent of her troops under the auspices of the ECOWAS authorized intervention force known as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).But this is exactly where the problem lies.

Nigeria has once again found herself in a very uncomfortable spot, not only because President Goodluck Jonathan is the ECOWAS Chairman, but also because ECOMOG has always been accepted by many as more of a Nigerian initiative. But worrisome however is the cost previous operations have had on the county's resources both financial and material (most of which could have been avoided if adequate preparations were made).Though the circumstances in Cote d'Ivoire are much different, it is still yet to be seen if Nigeria has truly learnt from the mistakes of the past ECOMOG operations in Liberia (Operation Liberty) in 1990 and Sierra Leone (Operation Sandstorm) in 1997. A look at these two operations should raise some questions.

To recall, Nigeria paid a bitter price for her involvement in both the Liberian and Sierra Leone crises. The image of Nigeria loomed large in terms of military and civilian personnel, materials and funding for the operations. Opposition to the military adventure domestically grew more intense after news of mounting casualties on the part of Nigeria started coming in. They asked for a recall of Nigerian troops, many had already

perished by their hundreds in unspecified instances. Nigeria lost more troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone than in any other peace-keeping operation she had engaged in. In Liberia, it is estimated that Nigeria lost 500 peacekeeping troops most under unspecified circumstances, considering the fact that the number of deaths, the causes of deaths and the figures were often hidden from even the victim's families. Other sources have however put the figure a bit higher. The Nigerian Armed Forces also lost hundreds of its troops during the Sierra Leone operation.

During the 6 January, 1999 rebel invasion of Freetown Sierra Leone It is estimated that about 100 Nigerian soldiers died while another 100 were missing in action, and 170 killed in road accidents and other non combat-related incidents (e.g. illness mysterious deaths etc). Another 200 were also reported injured due to land mines. Unexploded shells were also responsible for a lot of injuries and even deaths suffered by Nigerian troops. The then British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, said in the aftermath of the 1999 rebel invasion that 700 Nigerian soldiers had been killed trying to maintain the legitimate government in Sierra Leone. All this becomes painful when one considers the fact that a large number of troops died because they lacked sufficient body armour while fighting. Also, some of the troops were exposed to health hazards without being adequately catered for by the government. Some were killed rendering

their poor families hopeless and without adequate compensation, while some were maimed and incapacitated for life without adequate compensation or any form of insurance for them and their families.

Nigeria continued to bear over 70% of the financial cost for sustaining ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. A BBC news source had put the cost of Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone at almost 12 billion dollars (approximately 8 billion for Liberia and 4 billion for Sierra Leone). Nigeria had spent a lot on welfare, allowances, food, medical and other essential needs alongside the equipment, logistics and weapons.

Presently the United States and other Western Powers have supported the resolve of ECOWAS to use force to remove Gbagbo if necessary but it is hoped that Nigerian leaders will push for significant financial commitments from the West if the use of military force becomes inevitable. At least the West can no longer hide under the excuse that she had refused to support Nigerian led ECOMOG operations in the past because it would have given Nigeria's military regimes at the time some credibility especially following the placement of international sanctions and arms embargo on Nigeria between 1993-1999. But we shouldn't forget that even following the restoration of democracy to Nigeria, the United States Government pegged assistance to Liberian peace-keeping operations was put at only 10 million dollars in 2003, even though 110

million dollars was needed just to cover troop transport cost to Liberia. Nigeria contributed a lot of money to make sure the troops were kept there and found herself in a situation where she literally had to shoulder the additional burden of maintaining the contingents of cash strapped contributing countries. This she did by paying the salaries and allowances of their troops (e.g. Niger Republic and Sierra Leone).

4.3 LESSONS FROM THE COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Various lessons from the combat experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone should be taking into consideration in the event of a ECOMOG deployment to Cote d'Ivoire. The Nigerian Armed Forces had intervened in these two crises ill-prepared much to the advantage of various rebels operations and advances. In Liberia, the first field commander, General Quainoo of Ghana had indicated at a time that of the 3,000 men who participated in the landing in Monrovia in Liberia, only about half of them were battle ready while the rest were mainly 'drivers, cooks clerks, mechanics etc. The troops were hastily brought under commanding officers who did not have enough knowledge of the soldiers under their command and with whom they had not trained. This no doubt affected command and control in the mission areas. Various Nigerian Battalions (NIBATTS) became victims of guerrilla style attacks.

This can be seen in the high number of Nigerian deaths recorded as a result of ambushes and hit and run tactics easily employed by the rebels against ECOMOG troops and these occurred more in the Sierra Leone mission. The fact is that the Nigerian Armed Forces were not skilled in this area of combat. This deficiency was even made worse by the inadequate exposure of Nigerian troops to diverse terrains during combat training exercises. Cote d'Ivoire is characterised by lagoons, dense tropical forest, an extensive savannah, and mountains capable of giving any potential rebels an ideal cover to launch attacks on the government and peacekeepers. In the event of a rebel uprising, one cannot say for sure how prepared we are. This will largely depend on how much the government has been allocating over the years to military training with emphasis on Special Forces and counter-insurgency.

The troops should also be paid when due and all due. It is sad that when one remembers cases of Nigerian troops just back from peacekeeping missions protesting the non payment of their full allowances even when provisions for it has been made only for the troops to be court marshalled at the end. The new Army Chief, General Azubuike Iherjirka has proven himself once again a truly professional soldier in part by pardoning 27 soldiers last year who were jailed by a military court Marshall for demanding their allowance for a foreign service. All round the world

unnecessary delays and shortages in remuneration are known to affect the morale of troops and tempt them into engaging in looting and shabby deals. Previous missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone exposed the inadequacies of basic battle craft expedients like maps, intelligence and communication equipments.

Closely related to the problem of troop movement and deployment was the problem of troop rotation and its non implementation. The policy was that troops serving in mission areas should be rotated every six months. In Liberia and Sierra Leone this did not happen as it was common to find troops serving in the same operational area for one to four years. This was caused by lapses in administration and logistics.

4.4 WEAPONS SUPPLY AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

The experience with arms supply during the Liberian and Sierra Leone operation was not in any way pleasant to members of the Nigerian Armed Forces. For example, in Liberia, it had become quite disturbing discovering that some of the arms and ammunition meant for use during the operations were not inspected before they were delivered to the operation areas. In Sierra Leone, most of the weapons were obsolete and were already worn out from their use in Liberia. The basic rifle was still the FN rifle that had been in the Army's inventory since the 1960s. The rifle was no match to the AK-47s used by the rebels which not only fired more

rounds per second but could operate effectively under the harshest conditions Therefore a high level of weapon failure and breakdown (especially in the heat of battle) was recorded. This must have badly affected the performance of the troops. It also meant more casualties in both dead and wounded.

In spite of noticeable concentration of efforts on getting ships ready for ECOMOG sealift operations, considerable long periods of non-availability of ships were observed. The Nigerian Navy's participation in Liberian operations exposed more than ever the inadequacies in its sealift capabilities. As for the Nigerian Air Force, there was an imbalance in its tactical air power structure. NAF lacked both attack and transport / evacuation helicopters. It lacked sufficient C-130 aircraft too which would have proved invaluable to NIGCON for the purpose of medical evacuation (Medevac), re-supply and insertion of troops to critical areas. The army's armour and artillery units on the ground also lacked sufficient rocket propelled grenades as well as adequate trailers and lifts for the movement of heavy guns and armaments to operation areas.

President Jonathan being our dear Commander in Chief should ask for an extensive audit of our defence capability as was carried out during the previous Olusegun Obasanjo government which can be giving credit for setting in motion a modernization process. One of such audits took

place in 2000 and the findings were staggering. The audit of Nigeria's military conducted by the Military Professional Resources Initiative (M.P.R.I.) founded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), discovered in the year 2000 that 75 percent of the army's equipment was not operational, The air force's pride, its 22 MIG-21 and 15 Jaguar fighter jets were grounded as were all but two of the eight C-130 transport planes and that the navy had 19 Admirals but only nine seaworthy ships. The Ministry of Defence, which had been one of the biggest spending ministries, had one of the highest numbers of abandoned projects. Most of the infrastructure of the armed forces was in a deplorable condition. Corruption as existed in other ministries was rampant and there were few processes to ensure accountability.

The Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire would most likely never get to the point requiring a full scale military intervention as happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But our policy makers should never take chances and wait until a need arises before trying to assess or upgrade our defence capabilities. Members of the Nigerian Armed Forces deserve better for being used as instruments for the implementation of our foreign policies abroad. The least we can do in trying to undo the mistakes of the past is by giving them adequate and continuous funding, training and remuneration as they remain on standby to sacrifice their lives for their fatherland. The drive

towards military modernization and the issue is, does Nigeria has the moral in face and begin to think of how to handle her domestic political crises which she is pretending not to have before the comity of nations. Going by Nigerian political antecedent as regards her political crises and dissensions, one wonders what Nigerian state and her delegates will be telling Gbagbo trying to make him see reasons why he should give power to Outtara.

Let us not detain ourselves on the political impasse and dissensions Nigeria state has had that were similar to that of Cote D'Ivoire but bore different out come, but a cursory look of them are inevitable if the claim of this write up is to be substantiated. In June 12,1993, the ever accepted most peaceful election in Nigeria won by Abiola was annuied by Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (IBB). He wanted remaining in the office, but pressures from both national and international and crisis of legitimacy forced him out of the office. He in turn gave Nigerians Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest Shonekan. Thousand of Nigerians lost their lives and properties as those from the East who live in the North were seen traveling down to East their home town in palpitation that crisis will soon erupt the nation because of June 12 annulment.

In 2007, Olusegun Obasanjo the former Nigerian president wanted to amend the constitution to keep his stay in office after the expiration of

his tenure in 2007, but this was condemned nationally and internationally and he was unable to succeed. The contemporary Nigeria president, Good Luck Ebele Jonathan has refused to obey his party (PDF) constitution as addressed by zoning arrangement. This goes to show that Nigerian leaders just as other African leaders only obey the Law when the Law does not contradict their interest.

The question that has been left unanswered is does Nigerian leaders leave office because they want to? or they were being forced out of office. If they do because they want to, then, why did Obasanjo wanted amending the constitution in 2007?, why did IBB refuse to hand over Power to Abiola?, and why has Good Luck Jonathan the Nigerian president refused to obey his party (PDP) constitution?

What Gbagbo has done is unacceptable in the modern world of governance where everybody is embracing democracy, and that act should be condemned in all ramifications. For that is a political genocide which all African states and the entire globe should put hands together to stem. This is because this kind of crises always come with pogrom and immolate as have been witnessed over time.

However, Nigeria as a nation should ask her self the question do I have the moral right to wade into Cote D'I voire crises or do I just keep quiet considering my past political annals. Nigeria must reconsider her political

retrospects before making comments concerning Cote D'Ivoire political impasse and dissensions.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the development of West Africa since her independence in 1960. The country's focus on West Africa could be explained in part as a conscious resolve by her leadership to shoulder the border of the continent based on the perception that the country is of the size and potential of providing strong leadership for the total transformation of the entire continent.

However, inspite of the quest for regional collective self reliance and security, a Nigerian preference for bilateral diplomacy with its immediate neighbours should be stressed. Acceptance of Nigeria by its neighbours or at least the presence of hostilities, is virtually important to Nigeria's continued pre-eminent role and its security in the sub-region. The challenge for Nigeria is how to work out how to keep its neighbours friendly without sacrificing its national interest and security on the exalter of good neighboursliness and regional solidarity.

This study has examined Nigeria's relationship with her immediate neighbouring countries. These countries like Nigeria are vestiges of colonial creation. Nigeria is an English speaking country while her other neighbours with the exception of Equatorial Guinea (which is a former

Portuguese territory), are historically French colonial territories hence their political, cultural, military and economic affinities with France. These varying backgrounds account for the series of crises experienced in the sub-region within the past three decades.

Strategically, this study has posited that neighbouring countries had over the years been engaged in series of exploitation of Nigeria's natural and economic resources and the encroachment on her territorial frontiers. This is why various Nigerian governments have perceived these infringements as threats posed by the activities of her neighbours, this study observed that in spite of its policy of restraints and caution which has resulted in the lack of finances and of definitive tactics in stemming the tide of violations of her sovereignty, the Nigerian government had over the past couple of years continued to make attempts at fostering better relationships with her next door neighbours.

5.2 CONCLUSION

The analysis on the relations between Nigeria and her neighbours has revealed that Nigeria is seriously threatened by the various activities of her immediate neighbours who are mostly Francophone countries. The bilateral military, political and economic agreements between France and

her erstwhile colonial state are largely attributed to the frequency with which these countries infringe on the sovereignty of Nigeria.

In addition to the French factor, other security problem arising from Nigeria's relationship with her neighbours are the various incidences of armed banditry, refugee problems, the fear expressed over the potential of spill over effect of the conflicts in some West African countries etc. Inspite of these threats, historical analysis and strategic examination of Nigeria's relationship with contiguous states revealed a high level of warmth, cordiality and mutuality of interest and purpose between Nigeria and majority of her immediate neighbours

The threats to national security manifest themselves in various forms. The internal threats include local strikes and demonstrations, religious tensions and inter-communal conflicts, threats of coup d'etat etc. The external threats manifest themselves in forms of hostile propaganda, threat of use of force by unfriendly nations, sabotage of sensitive military, economic, and strategic installations.

In the case of Nigeria, threats to national security may manifest themselves in such forms as direct military aggressions by hostile forces, sabotage of economic and strategic installations such as oil, water, electricity ad sensitive military targets, there by affecting the safety, health and general well being of the Nigerian public.

Invariably, Nigeria's relations with her West African neighbours have direct implications for Nigeria's national security since Nigeria's commitment to its goods neighbourliness policy may prevent the state from meeting its obligations to citizens.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the forgoing, it is recommended that:

i. The conduct of Nigeria's good neighbourliness policy should be done in such a way that it does not negatively impact on the ability of the state to carry out its commitment to the welfare of citizens.

2. Government should endeavour to carry the people along in terms of the conduct of Nigeria's good neighborliness policy. In other words, the people should be given a say in the conduct of Nigeria's afro centric foreign policy.

3. More attention should be paid to meeting domestic needs and quelling internal conflicts before doing same outside our borders.

4. Government needs to intensify security at Nigeria's various borders to check the increasing tide of armed banditry in the country and the inflow of illegal aliens into Nigeria.

5. Efforts need to be made to ensure that Nigeria does not suffer spill over effects of conflicts from neighbouring countries. To this end,

the refugee problem in Nigeria should be looked into as a matter of urgency.

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