

**The *ECOWAS* and the Management
of Integration in the West African
Sub-Region : 1985 - 2005.**

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June, 2011

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**BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POST GRADUATE
SCHOOL, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

June, 2011

DECLARATION

I declare that the work in the dissertation entitled – “The *ECOWAS* and the Management of Regional Integration in the West African Sub-Region: 1985 – 2005”, has been performed by me in the Department of Public Administration under the supervision of Prof. A.A.Anyebe, Dr. Kola Obaitan and Dr Yarima. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and the list of references provided. No part of this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma at any university.

Umar, Mohammed Bello

Date

DEDICATION

This dissertation is firstly dedicated to my two parents: my dad, Alhaji Umar Al-Bashir and my dearest mother, Safeeya Umar. They have always supported me with their unending prayers and blessings. To share this piece of dedication are also late Mallam Muhammad Jallo, Former Director Dornier Aviation, Kaduna, my great mentor and guardian and late Dr. Hamza Zayyad Rafindadi, Former Chairman TCPC/Bureau for Public Enterprises, my teacher and corporate idol.

CERTIFICATION

This dissertation entitled “THE ECOWAS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTEGRATION IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION - 1985 – 2005”, meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I will remain forever thankful to Allah [SWT] for sparing me in good health and for making this work a reality. Once again, Alhamdulillah. Also deserving of my utmost thanks are my humble parents, Alhaji Umar Al-Bashir and Safeeya Umar, for their ceaseless prayers and support. May Allah [SWT] bless them with *Jannatul-firdausi*.

My intimate intellectual mentors, my first and second supervisors, Professor A.A. Anyebe and Dr [Prince] Kola Obaitan have been consistently exemplary in supporting this project. Their articulate and thought provoking inputs have been most rewarding. I will always remember how each one of them painstakingly went through this work at all its critical stages. My third supervisor, Dr Haruna Yarima, closely supported the duo especially with his radical approach to issues. I will always appreciate his kind inputs.

Dr. Suraj Abdulkareem, the current Head of Department, has been a veritable source of inspiration for me and as an experienced administrator and scholar, I benefited from his huge reservoir of knowledge and experience. Dr Sylva Ngu, the immediate past HOD Public Administration has consistently remained personally encouraging. I indeed owe him and Dr Suraj Abdulkareem a huge debt of gratitude for their kind support.

In addition, I will like to thank Professor Ibrahim Abdulsalami, now with Abuja University. As my initial first supervisor, prior to his retirement, he effectively gave me the 'first aid', which consequently saw me through the rigors of this work. As a scholar with unparalleled national and international exposure, he actually gave this dissertation the desired focus when he definably encouraged me to put my thoughts together especially at the initial stage. Professor Halidu Abubakar, a distinguished scholar and a thorough academic contributed very significantly in making my entire 'PhD' experience a positively memorable one. I will always remember his fatherly advice especially when he said to me that 'PhD is about patience' Professor Adejo Odoh, also an intellectual colossus has been imminently receptive; I therefore owe him a huge debt of gratitude for helping me to cultivate the right attitude to scholarship.

I also appreciate the personal cooperation and assistance I received from my Ph D course mates such as Dr Hamza Yusuf, Dr John Ndan, Dr. Andrew Suku, Dr.Habibu and Alhaji Sani Maradun. My good friend, Mr. Parker and his colleagues in the Departmental Library have been most helpful. May God bless them with additional wisdom.

My very special thanks also to my brother Professor Tijjani of the Library and

Information Studies, ABU Zaria, Professor I. Kolo, VC IBB University, Dr Baba Alfa, DVC IBB University, Professor Danfulani S. Ahmed, NIPSS, Kuru, Professor Victor Are Kolawole, IBB University, Professor Bayo Lawal, University of Ilorin, Dr Noah Yusuf, Unilorin, Dr A. Adeoye, Unilorin, Professor Funsho Oluleye, KWASU, Professor O. Ogunlana [*Baba Agba*], IBB University, Dr Victor Egwemi, Dean, Management and Social Sciences, and Dr Boniface Onoja, Mal Abdulkadir, Business Admin. IBB University, Dr Abdulmajid Alkali, UDUS, Dr Ibrahim Jawondo, Unilorin, Alh Hamid Bawa, Ex MD DANA, Kaduna, Mr. Klaus Gloege, my former CEO at DANA Kaduna, Alhaji Kabiru K. Ayuba, Alh. Baffa Ahmed for their numerous words of support and encouragement. I am hugely indebted to you all.

My gratitude also goes to the top management of the ECOWAS Commission for allowing me access to a number of their documents and all the materials in their Library, in addition to freely discussing all issues relevant to my research. The staffers in the Library were most helpful, I must express. Thanks a million! I also appreciate the assistance of the officers of the Nigerian Customs and the Nigerian Immigration Service, and the Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, for appreciating the value of my research and for assisting me, as appropriate at all times.

I am also greatly indebted to Alh. Abdullahi Wali [Head of Service, Sokoto State]. His gentle profile and impeccable conduct strongly influenced me. He was and with utmost dignity too, always around for me at all times. I also wish to thank very deeply Kuluwa H. Adamu for her unalloyed support, loyalty and kind dedication. Her role as another research assistant will always be appreciated. Thanks a lot!

To my dear friends, Arc. Abdullahi Saidu Bello, Hon Jibrin Adamu [Ex-Member, NASS, Abuja], Alh. Muhammadu Umaru [Afro], Lt-Gen AB Danbazau, Alh. Muhammad D. Inua, Mallam Shehu Muhammad Usman Makarfi, Provost School of Health Technology, Makarfi, Mal. Yakubu Abdullahi, CST KADPOLY Kaduna, Professor Sani Abba [ABU], Dr Ahmed K. Babajo, Dr AB Ahmed [both of KASU], Capt J. Hassan, Arc. Nasiru Aboki [Deenarc Ltd.], Air Cdr. Ali Abarshi, Hon. A.A. Sayaya, Mallam Usman Tafida, Mallam Hadi, Mallam Maidamma Ja'oje, Mallam Surajo Bari, and Little Yusuf Bari. I thank you all for your untiring support and kindness. May Allah [SWA] reward you bountifully.

Very special thanks to my loving brothers, sisters and cousins Garba Umar Basheer, Binta Umar, Engr. Mustafa Umar, Engr. Aliu Umar, Musa Umar, Bashir Umar, Sulieman Umar, Kulu Mamman [Stiles], and Bello Abubakar Guiwa, Perm. Sec., Ministry for Local Government, Sokoto.

At all times, I received a lot of help and emotional support from my beloved

wives who have turned into my good friends and confidants, Hajia Hauwa Bello-Shariff; Malama Murjanatu Bello-Rabiu. I cannot figure out the best words that could qualify their moral and material support especially during some trying times of my life. May Allah [SWA] reward you both with Aljanna-Firdausi, amen. My lovely kids - Najeem, Nabila, Naja, Zayyad, Farooq, Nabil, Mohd Ramadhan, Fatima, and Sultan, I must thank you all for your emotional support and prayers also. I must also specially thank my first daughter Ummi and my son-in-law, Lukman Usman Jibrin, for their continued interest. I can't also forget their lovely children who always kept me on my toes anytime they come visiting me while working. May Allah [SWT] bless them abundantly, and grant them good health and wisdom.

I also appreciate the cooperation of my Research Assistants Alhaji Bala Sakkwato, Mallam Yakubu Muhammed Isah, Barrister Mouktar Aliu, Adamu Isa Mohammed Jibia, Madame Hajara Maradi, and Mallam Muhammadu Babba.

ABSTRACT

The founding fathers of the ECOWAS were very fundamentally clear as to the primary objectives of the over 40-year old regional body, yet despite this mission clarity, and the ‘numerous efforts’ and strategies put in place, the ECOWAS is replete with several examples of failures or ‘mere near successes’ in the integration process. The lofty dreams of creating an ECOWAS of people against an ECOWAS of states have over the last three or four decades remained largely elusive. This study titled - An Evaluative Study of the ECOWAS Coalition and the Management of Regional Integration in West Africa – 1985 - 2005, represents a modest attempt at appraising the difficulties faced by the integration process, more so, in terms of the creation of one unified economic entity, with the soul objective of improving the life of West Africans. Salient issues such as those bordering on regional security, governance crises, and institutional incompetence have been noted as fundamental impediments in the process of West African regional integration. The study has also extensively deployed varied techniques and methodologies such as questionnaire administration on a sampled population amongst borderland communities in Nigeria and Niger Republic. Questionnaires were also administered on other more informed citizens of the Community. In addition, notably recognized individuals vital to some aspects of the integration processes were also sampled for interview. Empirical observations coupled with other sources of secondary data were also extensively utilized in the effort to more closely appreciate other ECOWAS integration dynamics, factors such as those of neo-colonization and challenges of regional insecurity amongst others. In terms analysis of data, frequencies and simple percentages were portrayed in tabulated forms and from these, the study was able to draw its own conclusions and in some cases the study was able to positively reinforce other scholarly opinions. In concluding our study, we noted that the process of ECOWAS integration especially in the economic sphere has just began, adding that Nigeria being the leading regional economy by way of recommendation ought to re-establish its leadership position in all aspects of ECOWAS unification and for ECOWAS to achieve its lofty objectives the study further recommended an elaborate involvement of the general citizenry, the informal sector of the economy and very importantly the organized private sector. The study found it strongly expedient to recommend the facilitation and promotion of a second monetary zone in order to ease negotiation with the CFA Zone as a step towards the emergence of one single currency.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background:

Fundamental to this study is the issue of integration amongst and between nations and its imperativeness as a force for human development, especially with reference to emerging independent states of Africa. From the framework of the UN [United Nations], regional organizations are viewed as a major feature of contemporary global economic system. One of the basic purposes of such regional bodies is to make use of deliberate governmental and private sector efforts to strengthen south-south trade and economic links more rapidly than would be the case if such links were to be determined only by market forces [UNCTAD, 1986]

In this introductory segment of the study attempts to examine integration and the forces shaping the process amongst and within the disparate and independent nations of a geographical area so described and referred to as “West Africa” would be made. Very importantly too, the researcher’s approach to this study has also been viewed and governed by notable global integrative activities and pursuits well known and acknowledged, and which also culminated into a string of international integration efforts, processes and which in turn created world’s first generation international bodies such as the United Nations [UN], European Union [EU], Organization of African Union [now African Union - AU], World Bank [WB], International Monetary Fund [IMF], South African Development Cooperation [SADC], Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] etc. It is therefore not surprising that the Economic Community of West African States otherwise known

as ECOWAS and similar such bodies like the Southern African Development Community otherwise referred to as SADC are widely seen as “representing the globalization phenomenon” [CDD W/Paper, June 2002].

The most dramatic evidence of globalization is the increase in trade and movement of capital. From 1950-2001 the quantum of world exports rose over 20 times and by 2001 world trade amounted to a quarter of all the goods and services produced globally. In the early parts of the 1970s, only \$10 billion to \$20- billion in national currencies were exchanged daily. By the beginning of the 21st century more than \$1.5 trillion worth of Japanese Yen, Euros, Pound Sterling, Dollars and other currencies were effectively traded daily in order to support the expanded levels of global trade and investment [Goldstein: 1992, Robert: 2001, Eichen: 1998].

Globalization denotes a comprehensive term for the emergence of a global society in which economic, political, environmental and cultural actions in one part of the world quickly come to have implication for people in other parts of the world. Globalization is therefore the result of a multifaceted advancement in communication, transportation, and information technologies and it also describes the growing economic, political, technological, and cultural linkages that connect individuals, communities, businesses, and governments around the world. The growth of MNCs [Multinational Corporations] or TNCs [Trans-National Corporations], as organizations with operations or investments in many countries, functioning in a global market place is an integral part of the globalization phenomenon. As citizens of disparate nations we are culturally, materially, and psychologically engaged with the lives of people in other countries as never before, thus distant events often have an immediate and above all significant impact, blurring the boundaries of our personal world [Eichen: 1998, Robert, 2001].

The idea of the West African community, according to history, goes back to the times of late William Tubman of Liberia who initially made the call in 1964. An agreement was signed between Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in 1965, February, but this came to nothing. In April 1972, General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Togo's General Eyadema "re-launched the idea, drew up proposals, and toured 12 countries, soliciting their plan from July to August 1973" [www.ecowas.int]. Like a number of similar bodies, the founding fathers of the ECOWAS were not without a dream. The founding fathers of the ECOWAS body were motivated by global developments that emphasized coming together to boost the capacity of diverse nations for economic development and growth.

The successes and failures of regional organizations such as the ECOWAS need be closely focused, hence it is imperative to look at other integration experiences, as most of them are not showing signs of continued viability. Scholars have equally observed that despite the seeming differences between these categories of Regional Integration Arrangements [RIA] in terms of their motive forces, political settings and development path, an objective assessment of the experiences of the organizations would provide useful insights and perspectives for other organizations in deciding on their respective courses of development.

This study has deliberately sought to amply assess and evaluate the ECOWAS as an integrative body within the West African sub-region and from diverse spectacles like national policies, competence of institutions, leadership of member-states and as a development option or strategy. This coalition is composed of former colonies of some of the world's most formidable imperial powers and nations; Britain, Portugal and France. The coalition is also composed of

communities and societies of diverse cultures and histories.

Issues and matters such as pre-colonial history of the West Africans, in addition to the varied neo-colonial postures of the constituent nations would also be telescoped in this study. The study is also to overview the global trends in the processes of international integration, which are essentially propelled by forces of ‘cultural globalism’ and the ever-changing technological discoveries that have characterized human existence today and very importantly the transformation of the global economy.

In further attempting to understand ‘INTEGRATION’ as a process, we are to similarly make efforts at viewing it from the context of the forces of globalization, liberalization, economic growth, global security and stability, and more so in the light of the emergence of these forces as critical and fundamental issues that have helped in not only shaping but propelling contemporary global events.

After looking at the reactions of diverse segments of the population so far, in addition to the several illustrations, in various works and literatures, it has also been irrefutably confirmed that Nigeria as a regional giant has immensely contributed and invested heavily in building the ECOWAS coalition. It is important to observe here that by 2001, ECOWAS regional Gross Domestic Product [GDP] totaled \$ 75.1 Billion and Nigeria’s GDP, the region’s largest, was \$ 39.5 Billion, more than half that of other members combined i.e. about 52.3%. Current GDP for Nigeria according to NESG [Nigerian Economic Summit Group] sources is in the region of \$170 Billion [*Leadership* Newspaper, Oct 27th. 2008]. A corresponding GDP increase is envisaged in other West African states. In the case of Nigeria, this is perhaps explainable by the global rise in oil prices especially in the last two years.

Further to the above, an authoritative publication of the ECOWAS Commission titled *Annual Report 2008 – Forging Regional Response to Global Economic and Financial Crises* also held that ECOWAS is a ‘good integration model’ in view of its ability to facilitate the co-existence of the strong with the weak. Nigeria as the dominant regional economy at 2007 accounted for 62% of the total regional GDP in 2007. Nigerian economy the publication claimed was seven times the size of Cote d’Ivoire and eleven times the Ghanaian economy. Guinea-Bissau was the smallest economy in the region in 2007 with a real GPD of only \$217.25 million, which was 0.27% of the Nigerian economy and 0.17% of the regional economy. The four largest economies in the region were Nigeria [62%], Cote d’Ivoire [9.35%], Ghana [5.64%] and Senegal [4.82%]. Put together, the four economies accounted for 81.70% of the total regional economy. Four other economies described as the smallest in the region accounted for only 1.7% of the total regional economy. In this group were Cape Verde [0.58%], Liberia [0.56%], The Gambia [0.39%], and Guinea-Bissau [0.17%] [ECOWAS Commission, 2008].

Total regional export, including intra-regional exports was \$ 26.1 billion in 2001. The region’s major export commodities were energy products [crude oil and refined petroleum products], minerals [gold, diamond and bauxite] and agricultural products [cocoa, coffee, groundnut, and cotton]. Nigeria is West Africa’s only net energy exporter and the size of its export alone makes the region a net energy exporter. In 2001, the countries of West Africa collectively consumed 1.48 quadrillion British Thermal Units [Btu] of commercial energy [0.4 % of total world production]. Nigeria accounted for 61.9 % of energy consumption, 96.3 % of energy production, and 74.2 % of the region’s carbon emissions [*ECOWAS Fact Sheet*, June 2003].

In West Africa, electricity is essentially generated through thermal [58.8% of installed capacity] or hydroelectric [41.2%] resources. Installed generating capacity was 9.4 gigawatts [GW] at the beginning of 2001. The West African Power Pool [WAPP] was initiated to develop energy production facilities and to interconnect the respective electricity grids in the sub-region. In terms of electricity consumption, total regional output was 31.8 billion kilo watt-hour [bkwh] and Nigeria accounted for as much as 14.6 bkwh, which translates, to 48.8 % of the total regional profile [*ECOWAS Fact Sheet*, June 2003].

Again, in a broader sense, the study also reinforced the view that integration efforts of governments, as often revealed, was more of a state-cum-bureaucracy led activity, inferring that it is more limited to the restricted circles of top government functionaries and diplomats. This further implies that the integration process did not fully encompass the general citizenry who actually make up the dominant population of the sub-region, thus inhibiting genuine integration of the broad peoples and institutions of West African states. This situation as a result earned ECOWAS the label of an “elitist organization”, again further underscoring the need for a more participatory approach to West African integration as in the case of similar bodies the World over.

It is also very importantly posited by preliminary findings that institutions of government bestowed with the responsibility for domestic integration, inter-country or regional integration amongst nations of West Africa, such as Nigeria’s public orientation agencies or public communication organizations are believed to have been ineffectively positioned in the integrative objectives or pursuits of the sub-regional body and perhaps a negation of the foreign policy objectives of quiet a number of member-states as a core components of the ECOWAS. Often this is

also in direct reflection of their respective legal or Constitutional provisions relating to issues of foreign policy.

In the course of this study, it has been further noted that integration in West Africa should have related to the experiences of other parts of the World, in the sense that it should have been more encompassing and all involving, as in the case of the EU for instance. When one looks at the formation of similar bodies, especially the EU or ASEAN, the participation of the general citizenry of respective member countries has always been of paramount significance. We are witnesses to series of referendums that have taken place in European countries on EU related matters, ranging from decision on membership and specific economic matters, thereby ensuring ‘democratized involvement’ of the citizenry. Even though the literacy level between Europe and West Africa may not be in anyway comparable, ECOWAS citizens ought to have been more actively targeted and involved in the various processes of integration, as individuals and as groups especially from the region’s rich socio-cultural bounties and from various perspectives too. Incontestably, and going by the experience of the named regional groupings, this “participatory approach” has the positive effect of generating genuine interest and commitment towards the works, operations and functioning of these Sub-Regional bodies in different parts of the world. Abbas Bundu, one time Executive-Secretary of the ECOWAS coalition had while assessing ECOWAS in an ECOWAS report a decade ago, described the body as “elitist” in view of its top down agenda, adding that “a culture of integration is yet to be conspicuous in the region in spite of political noises” [Executive Secretariat Report].

Indeed, bringing diverse communities and sovereign nations under one integrated body is an enormous challenge that requires not only strategy but also commitment

and dedication of amongst others participating governments and their institutions. Also relevant in the process are the entire citizenry of the federating units of these self-governing nations.

Within the confines of international relations, many actors are vital in positively facilitating or negatively inhibiting the diverse efforts towards integration; the nations, the leadership in these nations [and their individual level of commitment]; sub-state actors exemplified by diverse groups/organizations; trans-national actors exemplified by organizations operating in more than one country, and international organizations.

Nations are the most critical elements in global or regional integration. A nation can be viewed as a territory with well-defined boundaries and a government that is not accountable to any higher authority other than its own. The population of a nation also has a group identity, which is often based on a combination of common ancestry, language or culture. According to history, by 1997 there were 186 recognized nations in the world, in addition to other entities thought of as nations e.g. Taiwan, officially considered a province of China. There are few others like Martinique and the Vatican City, the later does not even fit into any of these categories.

Nations differ in size and power - from the United States [US] with over \$14 trillion strong economy [according 2008 estimates], China with a human population of over a billion, to nations with less than 100,000 people such as Greenland in the Arctic region. Indeed, size, economic power as well strategic location are obviously vital variables in determining relationships between nations and their influence on international affairs. The position of Nigeria in West Africa, as a dominant nation state and economy backed by its population and size in

addition to its strategic location in geographic terms is clearly illustrative of her regional significance. Nations like Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, China, Japan and once again the USA, are powers that will continue to play a dominant role not only in their regional or sub-regional politics but in global politics too.

Leaderships of nations are also vital to international relations and more especially the topmost leader who usually is most profoundly vested with power and authority for decision-making. The role of the Nigerian state and its leadership at various points and times as exemplified by Gowon, Shehu Shagari, Late Abacha, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Olusegun Obasanjo and Late Umaru Musa Yar'adua are clearly illustrative.

The Sub-state actors are also vital in influencing international relations. These may emanate from industries/entities with distinct interest or constituencies with ties to foreign countries, a ready example could be found in the so-called "Friends of Nigeria" group, headed by US's Andrew Young, once in charge of African affairs in the US.

Transnational actors do also play strategic roles in the conduct of foreign relations. They include Multinational Corporations [MNCs] and Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs] such as Planned Parenthood Federation, which promote their interest across borders. Other transnational actors are International Governmental Organizations [IGOs].

In examining the roles of each of these actors, especially in terms of the quantum of influence or role each has generated or played, four categorizations have been erected as part of the basis for analyses - [a] individual political actors [b] interstate influences [c] domestic influences, and very importantly [d] global or 'sub-global'

influences.

As noted earlier, the creation of the ECOWAS coalition, following the signing of treaty I on 25 May 1975, was an imaginative as well as a strategic response to vital global forces that were at play and that required the attention of any responsible leadership. The founding fathers of the ECOWAS coalition by their foresight, many observers have concluded, must be viewed as having demonstrated vision and quality leadership that were then most desirable.

Despite these visionary efforts, the ECOWAS as a regional coalition has little to show in terms of genuine integration of the 15 nations that make up the body unlike other experiments such as the EU, ASEAN or even the SADC for instance. The ECOWAS coalition has in past several years devoted greater efforts in resolving crises in Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Guinea-BISSAU, Cote d'Voire, Guinea without much economic integration being achieved. The decision to emphasize the coalition's change of focus was informed by the realization that peace and regional security are necessary in the socio-economic development of member states. Thus, as reported in an ECOWAS website, the Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted a non-aggression protocol in 1978, a defense assistance protocol in 1981 and a declaration of political principles in 1991.

One of the principal objectives of the ECOWAS coalition as observed earlier was to create a single economic block with a single market organized as an economic and monetary union. This was borne out of the realization that the domestic markets of the member states taken individually were, because of their smallness, far from being competitive in a world environment marked by the existence of large and perhaps more efficient trade blocks. Very importantly too, manufacturing is viewed as the fastest expanding opportunity for developing countries especially

as the US, Japan and Europe are advancing into the post industrial high-tech economy but most sadly, this is the sector of the ECOWAS economy which is the least developed.

In addition, more importantly the problem of low intra-ECOWAS trade and investment is again further worsened by relative inconvertibility of the diverse currencies within the sub-region; scarcity of foreign exchange and the astronomical cost of imported capital goods from Europe and the USA.

Integration on an effective basis is therefore hinged on sound economic and political preparations and requirements, and these do not come overnight. Trade liberalization for instance, involves broadly industrial complementation and opening up of the individual domestic markets, which, although primarily an economic issue, require bold and substantive political decisions and efforts. Viewed from this perspective, once again integration in West Africa has never been easily attainable more so in view of its challenge as a **third system politics** that tended to replace what in some literature is labeled as ‘a retreating state’ [Hetne, 1990] or another form of development put in place in order to promote the abandonment of ‘nation-state framework’.

In the context of West Africa as in other sub-regional, or regional cases, integration has the objective of raising the economic wellbeing of the general citizenry, the promotion of the goals of security, democracy and development, and therefore the promotion of what is often referred to as regional stability. At this point, it is vital to pore over what constitute a region. Scholars of regional dynamics explained that a region is a political-spatial identity consisting of a group of states, which are proximate, interdependent, and generally characterized by geographical relatedness and other affinities. Similarly, a region is further viewed as “a set of contiguous

states with a level of interaction between them, such that a lack of security within or between individual states in the region affects the security of the set of states as a whole” [Buzan, 1991]. This is typically descriptive of the situation in the ECOWAS Coalition.

Asiwaju et al, in addition to the above have recognized that there exist certain ethno-cultural and economic similarities within each region, which are far more remarkable than the differences. These are enhanced, they added, by ‘traditional’ cross-border trading and free movement of people, which in West Africa predate the ECOWAS. This does not however preclude the members of the organization from having areas of conflicts - for example over artificial borders inherited from the colonial powers, and the rivalry over the relative weight and influence of member states, especially Cote d’Ivoire, the most prosperous of the West African Francophone states, and Nigeria as the most populated and perhaps the most affluent of all and vitally too an “Anglophone nation”. The Francophone – Anglophone divide is also demonstrative of the apparent intensification of vertical ties with western colonial masters and the tragic limitation of horizontal cohesion between ECOWAS members.

From the above background, the most vital features of a regional configuration are the relative degree of balance, complementarity, and extent to which the component states are oriented to integrative behavior [Feld W.J., et al, 1980]. It is also widely argued that a relatively balanced distribution of economic capabilities ensures genuine equalities and breeds mutual confidence while on the other hand unequal capabilities cause apprehensions real or perceived-among the weaker states because of their disadvantaged position economically and politically. Feld et al, further denoted that in regions where there is a high degree of balance and

complimentarity, as in Western Europe, usually there are a number of economic power levels and a regional unanimity that protects the interest of the smaller and therefore disadvantaged members. Similarly, marked contrast in economic power levels, degrees of complimentarity and extent of integrative orientation to the region are observed in regions like Latin America, South Asia, and Southern Africa as several studies have indicated. In each of these regions, there is typically one strong core member - Brazil in Latin America, India in South Asia, South Africa in Southern Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. Within nations of the ECOWAS, very importantly the degree of complimentarity is very low.

Apart from issues of balance and complimentarity, level of domestic political development and foreign policy orientation of individual members are core determinants of integrative and cooperative behavior in a region. It is in the light of these realities, that we have further identified several problems associated with the present state of affairs and more importantly the performance of integration relevant institutions within ECOWAS member states e.g. the Customs, Police, and Immigration in the public sector and bodies like the Chambers of Commerce/Industry in the private sector.

The 15-member body is made up of nations who in the past thirty years remained strongly glued to their colonial past, meaning the creation of neo-colonial structures that have remained with them, some for over five decades, now. Tying themselves to the apron strings of their past colonial masters is generally identified as one of the major obstacles to the socio-economic-cum-political integration of West Africa, even after thirty years of operating within the same scenario, as “independent” nations. This intense primordial attachment, for example, to France, Britain, or Portugal some observers have noted is a key factor in debarring the

attainment of a sound breakthrough in West African integration especially in the economic sector and chiefly the aspect of trade and trade development.

Again, all these years after the signing of TREATY I, establishing the ECOWAS as a regional body, the overall objective of promoting cooperation and integration, in order to create an economic and monetary union for the purpose of stimulating economic growth and development remains consistently elusive. Rightly, the ECOWAS coalition was expected to lead into the formation of a body that would raise the living standards of its people; enhance economic stability and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent [ECOWAS Secretariat Abuja, 1990].

For the transformation of the regional economy to be achieved through integration, four key strategies were identified as follows:

- The suppression of custom duties, and equivalent taxes.
- The establishment of common external tariff.
- The harmonization of economic and financial policies.

AND

- The creation of a monetary zone.

These broad based objectives, according to ECOWAS official documents have not yet being attained, over forty years after the inauguration of the sub- regional body. Again while reviewing an ECOWAS official web site on January 18, 2006, the document in focus expressed that, it was in view of apparent slowness in the achievement of the aforementioned objectives that the 1975 treaty had to be

revised. Indeed, the revision in 1993 marked an important change in both the structure and character of West African cooperation. Some have posited that this also was a shift to a more “people-centered organization” and as opposed to the “overly bureaucratic inter-governmental agency of the past” [Aryeetey, 2001:16]. The revised treaty additionally contains the following critical subjects:

- The introduction of the principle of SUPRA-NATIONALITY in the application of decisions.
- The introduction of autonomous funding of the budgets of its institutions.
- The creation of supra-national institutions of control and arbitration in the application of decisions: the ECOWAS Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Council [ECOWAS Treaty II, 1993].

A comparison between the two generations of ECOWAS treaties clearly demonstrates a change of tact. Many new areas of focus were introduced e.g. issues of employment, which recognizes workers as strategic participants in the integration process as well as beneficiaries of economic integration. In fact in 1995, in Abuja, the same spirit of regional renewal engulfed African leaders leading to the creation of the African Economic Community [AEC]. The key focus here was that integration must go beyond narrow trade agreement whose emphasis must be placed on long-term development strategy based on the principles of collective self-reliance and self-sustenance. “The Abuja concept of integration was a holistic approach which aimed to integrate economic and non-economic sectors, build new institutions consistent with a self reliant development process, uphold democratic principles and foster new social and cultural values” [ADB 2000:116]

It is the observation of quite a number of scholars of international integration and

coalitions to note that the ECOWAS as a supranational body, “has chalked up remarkable progress”, despite all odds, especially in the areas of free movement of persons, regional roads construction, and the development of inter-state communications, West African power and gas projects, in addition to regional peace and security.

As also noted by this study, ECOWAS has sadly attained very insignificant success, in the promotion of integration within the sub-region’s market, a prominent negation of article 3 of the treaty establishing the organization. The article states as follows:

“The aims of the community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic coalition in West Africa, in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent” [ECOWAS Treaty I, 1975].

The coalition shall by stages also ensure:-the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programs/projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture, and natural resources, industry, transport and communication, energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, and legal matters.

The ECOWAS union according to the document is also to seek for the establishment of a COMMON MARKET through the under mentioned ways:

- The liberalization of trade by the abolition of customs duties levied on imports/exports and the abolition of non tariff barrier in order to establish a

free trade area at the community level.

- The adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-à-vis non-members.
- The removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, service and capital and to the rights of residence.

The three issues above are the factors that determined the choice of a series of public [and private sector] organizations and institutions for assessment and evaluation in Nigeria most especially and to a little extent in Niger Republic. The discrepancy in terms of emphasis between Niger Republic and Nigeria were dictated by obvious reasons such as limited access and linguistic barriers amongst others. These organizations and a number of other trade relevant bodies focused for study are also viewed as directly responsible for the three key responsibilities of promoting various aspects of regional integration especially in relation to trade liberalization, adoption of appropriate external tariff within the coalition and a common trade policy as it affects non-members of the Community. Very importantly too and as cited above, these organizations are to serve as facilitators in the process of effectively removing all obstacles to free movement of persons, goods, services and capital in addition to providing for the protection of the Citizens' rights of residence.

Others are the establishment of an economic union, through adoption of common policies in economic, financial, social and cultural sectors and the creation of a single monetary union; promotion of joint venture enterprises especially by the private sector to be achieved by the adoption of a regional agreement on cross border investments; private sector integration, especially in the creation of an

enabling environment for the promotion of small scale/medium enterprises; the establishment of an enabling legal environment; harmonization of national investment codes leading to the adoption of a single Community investment code; harmonization of standards and measures; promotion of balanced development, paying special attention to special problems of landlocked countries and small island member states; encouragement of information flow especially among various groups - women, business, media, workers and trade unions; adoption of a population policy that would ensure balance between demographic factors and socio-economic development; creation of a fund for cooperation, compensation, and development.

Despite ECOWAS poor display in the area of trade and business promotion, some limited “paper successes” have however been recorded in other salient areas, some of which will continue to be relevant to trade, business and investment promotion and these includes the creation of a broad range of strategies through which inter-state trade could be efficiently promoted. For instance, the IMP [Industrial Master Plan] adopted by the ECOWAS coalition at the 17th session of the Authority in 1994, provided for ways of optimizing ECOWAS industrial integration and by extension trade integration, in addition to creating a more elaborate forum for business people and professionals to not only communicate but to interact as a congregation. It is however significant to also note that despite its loftiness or superciliousness, IMP implementation has been largely difficult mainly because of paucity of funding, apathy of member states, insufficient information, and failure to ‘unlearn’ the taste and luxuries of the colonizers, which has encouraged the dumping of western luxury goods in many ECOWAS member nations.

It is vital to also restate that ECOWAS has spent the last ten to twenty years

resolving political and social conflicts. Other challenges to West African integration, which are of great implication to trade and trade promotion were corruption, mismanagement, debt problems, mono-cultured/primary product based economies of the dominant majority of member states and the dwindling prices of primary products and the burden of economic restructuring and reforms as determined by the Bretton-woods institutions.

It is in the light of these general assessments, that the study strongly envision, that a selection of authorities, within the union and its institutions coupled with the coalition's collection of strategies must be effectively and efficiently re-aligned and redefined in order for the organization to fully realize not only its potential but its objectives, as spelt out in Article 3 of the ECOWAS revised treaty, establishing the Community, and in consonance with [1] decision A/DEC of 30th May 1990, [2] the Lagos Plan of Action and [3] the Final Act of Lagos, of April, 1980.

1. 2 Problem Statement:

The key objectives of the ECOWAS are among others to promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of member states. In addition, it also aims to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the West African Sub-region.

Poverty in all its dimensions is one of the major challenges confronting the ECOWAS region and this is reflected by the general low levels of income and sky-scraping levels of human deprivation. From available data, over 80% of the entire

regional populations live below poverty line of US\$2 per day. Recent statistical data provided by the World Bank and the African Development Bank also designate that over 70% of the ECOWAS member-states have their population living in what has been described as “extreme poverty”. The greatest deprivation being faced by populations in the ECOWAS region is principally in the area of low access to portable drinking water and malnutrition particularly amongst children. The problem of poverty as reflected in poor access to water and malnutrition in West Africa has been lately most aggravated by the drought situation that had hit the region in the past few years. In a more general sense, poverty in the West African sub-region is a consequence of economic, social, political, technical, environmental and other exogenous factors.

The West African sub-region is furthermore characterized by low and unsustainable rates of economic growth, which has also arisen within the context of higher rates of population growth – resulting in aggravated low incomes. This state of affairs as a result has promoted the profound absence of adequate capital assets - human, physical, financial, natural and social. The social capital of the poor are basically low in view of the fact that they are physically less productive and when they are able to provide services or goods, such services or goods are under-priced. Furthermore, the situation of poverty as explicated above is in itself a by-product of the following:

- Inefficient utilization and deployment of scarce capital assets as exemplified above;
- Huge gaps existing between the rich and the poor in terms of their economic power. This further accentuates the poverty of the dominant majority who also have minimal power or capacity to determine or control prices of their

goods and services;

- Extremely limited economic opportunities

Desertification and destructive climate change, soil erosion and environmental degradation, water pollution and scarcity, depletion of forest and other natural resources.

It is historically irrefutable that the ECOWAS as an international integration body was created over three and a half decades ago. It is also factual that the ECOWAS coalition had as its initial objective the economic transformation of the West African sub-region achievable through a process of economic unification of member states. It is also true that these objectives have remained persistent and were at no time in the history of the union modified or even remodeled. It is also true that the effectiveness or otherwise of the ECOWAS coalition like any similar organization the world over is a function of many salient factors – internal and external. It is in the light of these observations and the historical and empirical narrative as spelt out above that we established the expediency and essence of this study. The expediency of this research has further been more broadly clarified within the context of the following problems and questions:

1. Why has the ECOWAS coalition for the past several years remained unable to achieve its initial objective of creating a unified economy for the improvement of its citizens' quality of life through poverty reduction and the fight against illiteracy and diseases?
2. Why has it been impossible for West Africans to achieve political unity especially within the framework or principle of 'supra-nationality' since its creation in 1975? It is substantially evident that member-nations of the

ECOWAS coalition with very limited exceptions have emphatically remained glued to the minutest aspect of their sovereignty in addition to being subservient to forces of neo-colonialism. Perhaps, it may then be expedient to further, ask, if it has to do with the architectural make up of these emerging nations/states.

3. Why has also has the ECOWAS body that failed to evolve into an economically productive, politically and socially secured organization more so in the sense of assured peace and harmony amongst it's diverse peoples and communities? Concisely, and more specifically why has the union failed in attaining genuine peace and stability as a major requisite for political and economic unification? Can this state of insecurity be related to the nature and character of post-colonial West African states?

4. Very importantly too, why has this body of 'independent' nations remained incapable of creating 'one big single economy' provided with an effective exchange mechanism as a key requirement for more functional intra-community trading activities? Similarly, is the current exchange mechanism that operates within the present global financial framework capable of extricating itself from being sub-merged or from being subservient to the forces emanating from the dominant metropolis economies of the world?

1. 3 Objectives of the Study:

1. Primarily, one of the fundamental purposes of this study is to evaluate the contribution of the ECOWAS Coalition in the promotion of the union's integration dreams within the "West African Community", especially with reference to cognate issues of trade, trade facilitation and development. It is vital to note that

this study has placed emphasis on trade promotion, as trade represents the most significant propelling force in the stimulation of growth and development amongst similar groupings of nations, the world over.

2. Similarly, the ‘global’ objective as expressed above is to examine the role of the ECOWAS and the respective agents/agencies of state in obliterating obstacles to regional integration or otherwise and especially with reference to trade promotion and development.

3. This study will also explore best global practices, in the promotion of economic unification of disparate nations, within the continent of Africa, in particular, and the third world in general, whose long-term vision is, facilitating proper economic growth and development, with the aim of enhancing their citizens’ standard of life.

4. Again, in a definable sense, the study will fittingly seek to examine the practical value of some trade and trade facilitation efforts of the ECOWAS and more importantly also assess the performance of trade relevant organizations such as the Customs, Immigration, Monetary System organizations and as public organizations. This would be done in the context of their roles in trade facilitation and development within the ECOWAS.

In a nutshell, therefore, this Study is about the integrative effectiveness or otherwise of public programs, strategies, policies, institutions and how they singly and jointly constitute both cogent and coherent forces of action and development within the 15 member-states in the ECOWAS coalition.

1. 4 Research Hypotheses Tested:

Hypotheses are viewed as value-free positive statements that often express relationship between two variables or empirical events. This means they are suggestive devices aimed at getting at some solution to identified problems. Hypotheses, which are usually stated in negative terms, are referred to as null hypotheses [Ola Aluko, 1999]. All sound hypotheses must also have a quality of testability.

FOUR major hypotheses guiding this study are presented as follows:

Hypothesis No 1: *That*, the non-involvement of citizens/citizens- based groups have resulted in the continued creation of an elitist ECOWAS and therefore thwarting the emergence of a people centered coalition.

Hypothesis No 2: *That*, the pervasiveness of insecurity in all parts of the Sub-region has strongly impeded the emergence of an environment conducive for intra-community trade.

Hypothesis No 3: *That*, state agencies serve as obstacles rather than facilitators to ECOWAS economic unification.

Hypothesis No 4: *That*, the profound absence of a single regional currency as an acceptable means of exchange serves as a major impediment to trade facilitation and development in West Africa.

1. 5 Scope and Limitations of Study:

The research focused on issues such as citizens' mobilization, security, political stability, efficacy of institutions/agencies of member states – public and private, means of exchange/common currency within the coalition and between individual members and borderland communities that are strategic to trade and trade development and politics.

Furthermore, the research has equally noted that an extensive survey and study of an international organization like ECOWAS or an international process like the integration of the ECOWAS, which in terms of research jurisdiction may encompass the whole of West African sub-region, would also mean extensive travels by road and air. With limited resources, this was indeed a difficult task, consequently, the 'study team' limited its travels to a few border towns such as Illela, Gudu-Balle, [Sokoto State-Nigeria], Jibia [Katsina State-Nigeria], Idi-Iroko-Seme border [Lagos and Ogun States - Nigeria/ Benin Border]. In addition, on the Southern borders of Niger Republic the study sampled communities in Birnin-Konni and Maradi, both of which are generally considered as important commercial centers whose "local economies" have over the years remained critically impacted by the ECOWAS coalition. A heavy human and animal traffic is a common feature especially of Niger's southern borders.

Birnin-Konni, one of the key border towns in Niger has been described as "an important market center in the south of Niger. It is also very close the border with Nigeria". The town is "located on the cross-roads emanating from Agadez and leading to Sokoto in Northern Nigeria. It is a good place to buy a few things that may be harder to find in the desert...petrol is readily available...smuggled across the border from Nigeria and prices here are among the lowest in Niger"[<http://www.world66.com/africa/niger/economy>, 2007].

Maradi, also, an important commercial town with many affinities with some neighboring Nigerian towns in Katsina state of Nigeria is “the third largest city in Niger with over 50,000 inhabitants...mainly an agricultural centre”. It’s “market is the closest thing to a real tourist attraction...a good place for buying cheap Nigerian stuff smuggled in” [Ibid. 2007].

Niger Republic in which these two notable trading centers are located “is a poor landlocked sub-Saharan state whose economy centers on subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry re-export trade and increasingly less on uranium, its major export since 1970”. Nigeria is Niger’s largest trading partner. Terms of trade with Nigeria, Niger’s largest regional trading partner has improved dramatically since the 50% devaluation of the West African franc [CFA] in January 1994. This devaluation strongly boosted exports of livestock, cowpeas, onions and the products of Niger’s small cotton industry. Niger Republic relies on bilateral and multilateral aid for operating expenses and public investment and is strongly induced to adhere to the IMF/World Bank -initiated and designed structural adjustment programs. The discovery of uranium and oil is “turning Niger into a nation of good fortunes fastly” opined a Nigerian business executive. It is also turning the country into another bastion of elite and political conflict, especially when one takes into consideration the political crisis that had in the recent past engulfed the country, following President Tanja’s failed tenure elongation activities which also culminated in the dissolution of the Nigerien parliament and which also earned it suspension from the ECOWAS.

A study of this scale and magnitude would certainly mean involving the entire sub-region in terms of assessing the impact of the body, its institutions and its activities. Similarly, the study would also involve an examination of nations’

leadership, their institutions, attitudes and mind-sets towards integrative and also ‘non-integration related activities’ These are impossible within the context of limited financial resources, thus as a consequence, we focused our attention on a few border settlements with long history of close association to themselves and as identified above.

Calculatingly therefore, we narrowed our study’s emphasis on the most salient issues posited by the central dream and objective of the ECOWAS - the promotion of political INTEGRATION and the facilitation of TRADE as a key aspect of the economic integration of the sub-region. These are in addition to the effects of these objectives on the region’s unification, growth and development.

Taking cognizance of the specialized nature of the subject of study, in addition to the above, the research extended its efforts towards collecting data from the following groups of people who are largely viewed as generally informed about the subject matter: - Experts, Diplomats in Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, Abuja, staffers and personnel in selected ECOWAS member states’ missions in Abuja, the Management and Personnel of the central governing Commission of the ECOWAS. Others are students and academics in various Nigerian universities currently engaged in postgraduate programs on Diplomacy and International Relations, Business and Public Administration. The decision to seek for information from these groups is predicated on the assumption that they constitute an informed and enlightened segment of the research population.

In order to obtain what we consider as more vibrant and authoritative data, on the subject, we also interacted with not only illustrious and eminent personalities, who were one way, or the other associated with the integration project, in West Africa. These include a former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS and two other top

serving officials, who reside in Abuja, and a former Nigerian president.

The activities of the ECOWAS coalition and its institutions are highly dispersed and consequently not easily amenable to empirical evaluation e.g. the recently commissioned West African Gas Pipeline. It is therefore expedient, that the study was essentially limited to secondary data made available by ECOWAS secretariat, and other key institutions such as the World Bank, UNCTAD, World Trade Organization [WTO], International Labor Organization [ILO], African Economic Community, Central Bank of Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics and other accessible web sources on some major integration issues.

In the course of gathering data, we were also confronted by the challenge of ‘strong barricades’ because of the unique security requirements of most diplomatic areas or missions, including the ECOWAS Secretariat itself; therefore, gaining access to the secretariat was a huge task, and so has been the atmosphere in most diplomatic missions. The researcher believes that this may be attributable to the violent experience of September 11 in the US.

One other constraint the study faced was language barrier, a problem that even the sub-regional body continuously grapples with in many ways. This is because of the sub-region’s multi-lingual landscape. The researchers’ inability to fluently speak and write French or Portuguese resulted in employing the services of a few assistants with reasonable knowledge of these languages. Interaction with some personalities in diplomatic missions and the ECOWAS Headquarters, Abuja, proved to be most valuable, however, in very few situations the privilege of asking follow-up questions were not available, and this meant the necessity for exploring other means of getting the required information, which would have been best obtained from primary sources. It is interesting to note that a sizeable portion of the

research respondents is French speaking. Very limited were Portuguese speaking. Even though a good number of the respondents especially in the foreign missions are largely fluent in English, we were sometimes confronted by problem of what one could describe as ‘limited interactive communications’ due to experiential/cultural exposure differential. These experiences are a reminder that West African sub-region is made of English, French and Portuguese speaking peoples, having undergone colonization of the colonizing forces of Great Britain, France and Portugal.

Obtaining clearance to carry out surveys and interviews was necessary especially in view of the authorities’ idea and requirement for security. More surprisingly in the Niger Republic mission based in Abuja, the challenge was surprisingly enormous even though rewarding. Along the borders, the formalities were even more strenuous and corruption-ridden. The Niger-Nigeria border formalities were exemplary in this context. On the two sides the border formalities the formalities were disappointingly most herculean or to say the least-extensively “bureaucratic” and in the case of other francophone borders the problem could be described as most devastating.

In furtherance to the above, and taking cognizance of the huge number of public institutions that are vital to trade facilitation and development within the countries in focus, we are forced to limit the search for data to mainly the Customs, Immigration and other allied security services such as the State Security Service and the Police, in addition to other vital public and private organizations such as the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria [MAN], Trade Groups and Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Central Bank, EKO Bank e.t.c.

The emphasis placed on these organizations is predicated on the realization that the

named organizations especially the Customs and Immigration are not only evident but also vital in all the ECOWAS member-states we visited. In terms of responsibilities, they are by all means charged with salient and in most cases core trade related issues and processes such as those affecting common external tariff / tariff unification, trade laws harmonization and free movements of goods and persons / border documentations and payment processes e.t.c. It is also vital to add that there exist a multiplicity of public institutions that are trade relevant and it is therefore expedient that only a few were realistically selected and cited in this study.

Determining the scope of this study in terms of determining where to place the **epochal pegs** was itself a very challenging task. The task became even more expedient after a pilot survey was carried out. The pilot survey very significantly helped us in determining the final coordinates upon which we were to draw the fundamental boundaries of this research. The study ultimately determined to limit its search on TWENTY years of the coalition's existence i.e. 1985 – 2005. This decision was essentially based on the observation that studying the entire life span of the ECOWAS, which began in 1975, would be most herculean if not impossible to realistically undertake. Other justifications for the selection of this period [1985-2005] are as follows:

It was within this epoch that one of the greatest security challenges, i.e. the Liberian Crisis emerged. This crisis was also followed by similar others such as that of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau all together underscoring the essence of security in the positive transformation of any coalition arrangement. The later case of Cote d'Voire considered and viewed as Africa's "oasis of peace and prosperity" is also depictive of the colossal security challenge that affected the operations of

the ECOWAS and its institutions; It was also within this period that the revised treaty of the ECOWAS was signed in 1993. This gave the organization not only a new look but totally changed its approach to many of its problems. This development indeed marked an important change not only in the structure but also in the character of the ECOWAS; the change of government in Nigeria as the union's most dominant state also occurred within this period and the new government of President Babangida emerged with a different and a more committed approach to West African integration. The Babangida administration in addition supported the construction of the ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja, re-opened the borders closed by the deposed administration and attended to the series of security/refugee challenges brought about by the conflicts that dotted the sub-region. Key members of the coalition also within this period pursued democratization programs, thus further changing the character of states and governance within the region; the creation of the African Economic Community [AEC] in 1995 also re-energized Africa's regional groupings more so as the spirit of regional renewal became more prominently intensified.

Other than all the above, it is generally assumed that 20 years in the life of any organization is long enough to practically and intellectually appreciate its successes or failures.

In view of the 'holistic' or all-encompassing nature of our study, more so, in terms of its multi-disciplinary dimension, theoretical and conceptual framework, our 'global' approach to the subject of study was aimed at establishing a reasonable level of theoretical clarity on the various processes of integration at regional pedestals. It is in the light of this consideration, that this study first established the processes and dynamics of international integration from a global perspective as

well as historical perspective. In-roads into over-viewing international integration, from historical to contemporary perspectives, starting with the earlier forms of integration and integration bodies, within the context of historical realities and relevance were therefore attempted. The study further graduated into economic cooperation bodies or coalitions established between contemporary nations, and then finally and more specifically, the regional groupings of the ECOWAS. It is from the framework of this “globalized” approach, that the study was able to erect a broader theoretical-cum-conceptual foundation for comprehending the complex contours of regional integration especially in the light of an emerging West Africa as a strategic economic bloc on the African continent.

This approach, coupled with the established relevance, and necessity of the study, have jointly constituted an amalgam of factors and series of activities which metamorphosed, into an exercise that resulted in producing a sharper, and perhaps a more incisive understanding of the phenomena of regional integration and its diverse implications. These efforts were further backed, and supported by empirical discoveries of the study, which in conjunction with the aforementioned, have not only combined to re-alert us on the essence and benefit of integration, its dynamics and challenges, in all practical sense, but further stimulated and aroused our intellectual impulses towards the complex processes of integration in West Africa. It again created a convenient launch pad for future academic works, on the subject in general, covering a significant portion of the coalition’s entire existence as a regional body. This work is therefore, and for us, academically most pulsating. The most precise delimitation of this study, however, as earlier stipulated has to do with the main issues upon which the ECOWAS dream was based and which precisely aimed at the attainment of collective self-sufficiency through the integration of West African countries into an economic bloc with a single market

organized around an economic and monetary union. Furthermore, the study became more directed and therefore concentrated on specific issues of trade facilitation and development within the sub-region. ALL together, these have determined our ultimate study coordinates and therefore the boundaries of our inquiry.

Pertinent questions that affected or still affects trade and trade promotion within the ECOWAS group and more especially against the backdrop of the numerous Protocols that entailed specific and general obligations and which spiraled beyond the confines of the treaty commitments - thereby stimulating a significant re-definition of goals among national political or even institutional actors were specifically asked or investigated.

From evidential and therefore authoritative proofs available, intra-Community trading is abysmally low, sometimes as little as only 5 - 6 %, and as noted by observers and analyst, most of it was centered on the informal, the unofficial, and the unregistered. Significantly, therefore, in the area of regional trade especially as it affects market integration, the efforts of the community has been described as most frustrating. An official ECOWAS web site report confirmed that intra-regional trade is "...only 11% as compared to trade with third countries" adding that "common ECOWAS external tariff [CET] has still not seen the light of day and the economic and financial policies have not been harmonized" even though an appropriate launch pad for its take-off is believed to have been established since [ECOWAS Official Web Site, monitored on 18th Jan 2006]

1. 6 Significance of Study:

The significance for this study is primarily explicated below:

As an evaluative study, this research would be of immense value to prospective scholars interested in searching into regional integration in general and the ECOWAS in particular. In more specific terms the following are a reinforcement of the above:

1. The apparent realization that more than three decades into its existence, the ECOWAS, whose aims were to establish and promote economic growth and development, is yet to effectively succeed, due to problems such as political instability, insecurity and the absence of good quality governance in many member-states. Others are insufficient diversification of national economies of member states; the absence of an extensive and reliable infrastructure; the existence of multiplicity of organizations for regional integration and cooperation, with the same objective. **Again, this underscores the imperativeness for re-establishing the desirability for a more incisive study on the effectiveness or otherwise of regional and sub-regional integration and cooperation arrangements more so, as it will aid researchers and other scholars of policy and development in more clearly comprehending the dynamics of integration processes from a more globalised and even specific contexts.**

Several ECOWAS member countries are currently part of the West African Monetary Union, UEMOA, and a regional economic and monetary union, which shares a common currency, the *CFA Franc*. The francophone countries of Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, with Guinea-Bissau otherwise referred to as Lusophone, comprise the membership of UEMOA; and internal strife within some member nations; non-complimentarity of their respective economies; general regional instability; diverse configuration of

member states in terms of their unequal capabilities, W.Feld et al [1980] similarly noted.

2. The study has further provided an effective springboard upon which students could dig more deeply into salient aspects of West African diversity more as a strength than as a weakness from both historical and contemporary perspectives, and thus be able to use and apply them more creditably, for the region's growth and development. Most notable of these diversities, which are a necessary part of the sub-region, are natural-such as climatic differences, and differences in terms of ethnology, linguistics and neo-colonial linkages as evinced by the texture and nature of the region's historical experiences. Rather than consider these diversities as weaknesses, the study noted that they should be stimulants to the region's socio-economic and political transformation, and furthermore ornament the beauty/essence and benefits of regional integration in West Africa. The significance of this study is again underscored by its apparent ability in **revealing the inadequacies of contemporary literature on integration especially within developing nations as well as some of the Eurocentric views on issues of integration within the third world.**

3. It is strongly believed that this study has evaluated closely the role, effectiveness and efficiency of national governments and their leaderships, the efficiency or effectiveness of regional institutions in charge of various integration functions, especially those relating to promotion of trade, business and investment such as the Customs, Immigration authorities, Civil Society Organizations – [NGOs, NGAs], labor and other private sector organizations like the Africa Business Round-Table, the ECOBANK, Manufacturers Association, the Employers Consultative Assembly and numerous other Chambers of Commerce &

Industry that have speckled trade and business landscapes.

4. It is also aided in bridging some of the huge gaps in the comprehension of integration bodies, the institutions for international integration, and the dynamics of the integrative processes, all with a view to creating greater awareness, on the essence of the processes of integration, and more specifically the value and potential of West African integration as a driving force for effective development. Therefore, in the course of this academic “intrusion” into the workings or dynamics of integration, an inroad into a more insightful understanding of the contemporary international political economy has been largely achieved. This has indeed catapulted the study into assuming a multi-disciplinary approach to the understanding of one of the biggest contemporary issues of our time and it is therefore a very clear departure from a number studies conducted on ECOWAS integration.

5. For policymaking and policy re-engineering purposes, especially within the confines of politico-administrative scenarios and associated areas, this study has also refocused on aiding governments in LDCs redefine and redesign not only their foreign but domestic economic policies and development strategies within the context of one integrated community. This policy shift would hopefully be in line with contemporary realities and therefore supportive in facilitating better goal achievement, which will in turn lead to the ultimate realization of superior and more qualitative life for the citizenry, under a more effective integration model. Looking at the unearthed issues such as the role of the people within border communities, the role of the informal sector, civil society and other organized groups like labor, youth and women, we have been able to re-emerge with better alternatives and strategies for integration amongst and between nations of the third

world.

6. With greater reference to the goals of integration therefore and as relayed above, this study justifiably enabled us **appreciate that for the overriding goals of West African integration, such as economic development; regional stability; and regional security to be achieved effectively, efforts must be made towards facilitating greater involvement of the generality of the citizens and therefore the grassroots, thereby promoting effective regional peace, genuine democracy and good governance** as it is with similar processes and institutions.

7. In addition to understanding the historical forces shaping regional integration in West Africa, this study has **enhanced our capability as students of international integration in better appreciating more closely the essence of promoting and maintaining regional peace and stability and by implication would enable researchers and scholars view issues beyond the limited borders of our countries and nations.** In relation to this, Ukeje [2001] similarly noted that the outbreaks of wars within the sub-region in the recent past had grave implications, which have generally reinforced the concern that “the ideals of economic integration might prove impossible to realize without tackling the myriad politico-security problems threatening the members individually and collectively”.

8. This study is an attempt at viewing issues of integration from a multi-disciplinary point, therefore **for scholars of Policy and Development Administration, Diplomacy & International Relations and even ‘ordinary’ citizens within ECOWAS it is a veritable tool that can used generally refining and re-sharpening our understanding of the broad goals and objectives of international and more specifically West African integration and the institutions responsible for diverse and strategic functions.**

1.7 Operational Definitions of Key Terms:

It is indeed very expedient to define or adequately explain within the confines of this study some of the terms that have been most frequently used in this research. Sociological definitions, classifications and conceptualizations are to be seen in their fruitfulness in not only theorizing about a social phenomena but explaining it. Spiro [1966:53] noted that two types of definitions are distinguishable – the abstract and the operationalised definitions. The former are essentially nominal formulated in reference to empirical phenomena while the later represent attempts to explain and grapple with the diversity and uniqueness of those phenomena in special context such as ours. It is in the light of these outstanding postulates and positions that we present below the definitions of the various terms and concepts we have used in the course of this research.

1.7.1 Regionalism

In the context of this study, Regionalism may be defined as representing efforts by neighboring nation states, reinforced by a sense of common purpose or predicament within a definite region or defined area, to foster economic or political cooperation among contiguous nations in order to lessen their dependence on others outside the region.

1.7.2 Region

A Region is a political-spatial identity consisting of a group of states, which are proximate and interdependent. A region is therefore characterized by what is described as geographical relatedness and other affinities, thus a region may be defined as a set of contiguous states with a certain level of interaction between them, such that a lack of security within or between individual states in the region

affects the security of the set of states as a whole. Barry Buzan's definition is considered as adequate in the present context [1991].

1.7.3 Integration

Integration refers to the fusion of two or more independent states on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis with the aim of attaining mutually agreed goals and objectives. It also makes inference to a situation in which frontiers between states are largely eliminated. It also in addition denotes the elimination of national discrimination.

1.7.4 Economic Integration

This is indicative of a situation in which national components of a larger economic community or entity are no longer separated by economic frontiers but function together as an entity or one single entity.

1.7.5 ECOWAS

ECOWAS represent a body of 16 and later 15 independent West African States [with the exit of Mauritania] who signed the Treaty of Lagos on the 28th of May, 1975 aimed at promoting cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activities, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of member states. ECOWAS is generally designated one of the five regional pillars of the African Economic Community [AEC]

1.7.6 ECOWAS Treaty

ECOWAS treaty connotes an agreement or a pact signed and agreed to by

ECOWAS heads of States/Governments in Lagos, Nigeria. The treaty was signed on 28 May 1975 and is often referred to as the Treaty of Lagos.

1.7.7 Revised ECOWAS Treaty

ECOWAS Heads of States/Government similarly signed the revised treaty in July 1993. The Revised Treaty was principally designed to accelerate economic integration and political cooperation of member states. The achievement of a common market and a single currency are the principal economic objectives of the revised treaty. Politically the revised treaty aimed at establishing the West African parliament, an Economic and Social Council, an ECOWAS Court of Justice that was to enforce community decisions. This treaty was signed in Cotonou, Republic of Benin on 24th July 1993.

1.7.8 Executive Secretariat of the ECOWAS

This makes inference to the executive secretariat of the ECOWAS provided for the Executive Secretary who is also appointed under articles 17 and 18. The Secretariat]was originally located in Lagos and was shifted to Abuja, Federal Capital Territory [FCT] of Nigeria following the completion of a permanent office structure. The Executive Secretariat has now been transformed into the ECOWAS Commission and is headed by a “President”.

1.7.9 Citizen

In its universal sense, it refers to an individual member of a given political society, state or a collection of states; by extension, one who owes allegiance to and may lawfully demand protection from the government or governments of that state or a collection of states. Thus, in a more specific sense ‘citizen’ refers to a legitimate

national of a member-state of the ECOWAS.

1.7.10 Development

As established by the *Proposal for Action* of the first UN Development Decade [1960-1970], development is growth plus change. Change in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic. Change in this context may be qualitative as well quantitative. The key issue the concept denotes is that there must be a marked improvement in the quality of people's life.

1.7.11 Political Stability

This implies stability of the polity where all agreements and disputes are arrived at in accordance with laid down procedures in the interest of all parties involved. This also refers to the effective functioning of all institutions of state within the confines of democratic principles and ideals.

1.7.12 Function

This refers to an activity or body of activities of one or many parts of a structural setting defined clearly as part of an organizational make up or design. This is cognate to all organizations that are properly structured and is more in relation to functional efficiency and effectiveness in the task of service delivery.

1.7.13 Supra-nationality

Denotes a willing submission of some degree of a nation's authority to another body usually made of two or more nation-states.

1.7.14 Security

Security in the context of this study implies a situation of peace and tranquility that can effectively facilitate smooth interaction amongst citizens, institutions and members of the coalition

1.7.15 Public Agencies and Institutions

Agencies that are established by decrees or acts of parliament and are mandated to carry out public functions in line with the broad public interest and these for example includes Customs Service, Immigration Service, Police, State Security Service, and the Central Bank.

1.7.16 Means of Exchange

This denotes accepted ways of exchange which facilitates business or trade interaction involving the use of accepted currency or legal tender within a given economy or a coalition of economies.

1.7.17 Common Currency

This makes inference to a legal tender that is commonly accepted as a means of exchange in and between nations such as the EURO under the European Union or the CFA Franc being utilized by the francophone states of West Africa.

1.7.18 Effectiveness

Viewed from the context of competence and performance of public agencies and institutions, this denotes a situation in which the organizations in question are achieving their fundamental objectives through an economical utilization and deployment of both human and material resources at their disposal. Thus, 'ineffectiveness' makes inference to a reversed situation exhibitiv of

organizational incompetence.

17.1.19 Elitist/Elitism

Elites and elitism restrict powers and privileges in a society to members of one small, favoured group. Often members of this group have the belief that this arrangement is justified by their superiority.

1.7.20 Trade

This denotes the exchange of goods and services between people or nations. Goods can be defined as finished products, as intermediate goods used in producing other goods, or as agricultural products and foodstuffs. International trade enables a nation to specialize in those goods it can produce most cheaply and efficiently. Trade very importantly enables a country to consume more than it would be able to produce if it depended only on its own resources. Finally, trade enlarges the potential market for the goods of a particular economy. Trade has always been the major force behind the economic relations among nations.

1.7.21 Intra-Community trade

This implies the process of exchanging goods and services within the framework of a regional economy. Regional Community makes inference to member countries of the ECOWAS.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

2.1 Introduction:

The growth and evolution of international regional integration globally has been most dramatic especially in the last three to five decades. The most critical of such developments were more noticeable in Western Europe, especially with the rise of the European Union [EU] in the 1950s, with six countries forming the “pioneer class” of the economic bloc. By the middle of 1990s the EU had 15 members, with a long list of would be members. The organization closely coordinates several aspects of the economic policies of its members more especially in the areas of trade, immigration, labor and agriculture.

Outside Europe, the process of regional integration has been generally adjudged as very sluggish. Other examples of international economic and political cooperation on a non-regional but diverse basis could be sighted in the Commonwealth of Nations, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, International Monetary Fund [IMF], United Nations [UN]. Others are the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], the Southern African Development Community [SADC], are probably the most notable sub-regional bodies. In Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] is most outstanding. In 1975, the ECOWAS was fundamentally established to promote economic cooperation between member nations in West Africa.

In this segment, it is imperative to reflect that apart from the efforts made in

enunciating the emergence of relevant international integration bodies, the world over, this research would be telescoping the global phenomena from what we presuppose are diverse perspectives, which also infers that integration would be screened from the viewpoint of a number of erudite works. All these are to facilitate the augmentation of our horizons on the phenomena, thus assisting scholars and researchers identify some of the ideas behind them, in addition to sighting the challenges facing such processes, which sometimes are considered and viewed as major inhibitions to the process of integration especially in the developing world.

The experiences of these bodies especially those relevant to this dissertation have also been highlighted, all with a bid to enlarging and grinding our views and understanding of the major theme of this study.

2. 2 International Integration Efforts - A Broad Perspective:

Regional international integration efforts globally, were pivoted upon the fundamental pillars of commerce, trade and foreign exchange, and they are located in the annals of the advancing phenomenon of global communications, fundamentally motivated by changes in technology and other key political considerations.

An International Organization refers to a group that is membership - based, and that operates across national borders for explicitly defined purposes. No doubt, scholars of politics and international studies, consider international organizations, as bodies, whose global significance has always been on the increase, especially as they affect intensely, world politics. As noted earlier, examples of international organizations are copious and varied and these include the United Nations [UN],

the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross, The Green PEACE e.t.c.

International organizations are mostly known to operate, as part of one or more international regimes. An international *regime* according to Goldstein [in his treatise titled “Historical Development of International organizations”] is a set of rules, standards and procedures that govern national behavior in a particular area. In further discussing other aspects of international organizations, Goldstein, added that examples of international *regimes* include arms control, foreign trade, and Antarctic exploration. He further reported, that international organizations are often central to the functioning of an international *regime*, giving structure and procedures to the ‘rules of the game’, by which nations must comply. Key examples of organizations that define and determine the rules in the area of trade for instance are the European Union, World Trade Organization, and North American Free Trade Association, Southern African Development Community, Association of South East Asian Nations, Economic Community of West African States etc.

Two main categorizations of international organizations exist as follows:

Inter-governmental organizations [IGOs] that have national governments as members and these members have created these organizations to serve purposes considered most useful to the group. Membership of IGOs can range from as few as two member nations to virtually all nations. The UN and its various agencies are IGOs, so are most of the world’s economic coordinating institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF].

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] also seeks to

coordinate the production and pricing policies of its 12 member states. The International Atomic Energy Agency [AIEA] seeks to regulate the flow of nuclear technology to developing nations. The WTO helps to negotiate and monitor agreements among 128 nations and to lower trade barriers. Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the South East Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO], and political groupings such as the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity now AU [African Union] are also IGOs. In general, many scholars are of the belief that regional IGOs have experienced more success than global ones, and as similarly echoed Goldstein, those with specific purposes have worked better than those with broad aims.

Non-Governmental Organizations [NGOs] some of which operate internationally are recognized as important political institutions e.g. Green-peace, the International Olympic Committee, International Committee of the Red Cross. In the case of Multinational Corporations [MNCs], they are viewed as sharing many things in common with NGOs, but they are limited by the fact that they do not co-ordinate the action of their members for mutual gain or benefit.

Historically, IGOs and regimes have strongly reflected the interest of the world's most powerful nations. Many of them were established during periods of global hegemony-that is when one nation was viewed as having dominated the others in the international power game. Most of these periods often followed a major war among the great powers. Today's United Nations [UN], the Organization of American States[OAS], and the World Bank - were created after World War II ended in 1945, and that was when the US was a potent power big enough to create rules and institutions that other countries must necessarily follow.

International organizations and *regimes* serve the interests of most participating

nations and usually endure even after the “fading of hegemony” in whatever form. Most countries share mutual interests, yet find it difficult to coordinate their action for mutual benefit because of a lack of central authority. It is the consensus of many scholars that, the coordination of efforts to write new rules and monitor them requires an international organization. For instance, the UN’s Environment Program aided member countries negotiate a treaty to stop producing chemicals that destroys the ozone layer. Therefore; nations find it most useful to give international organizations some power to enforce rules and interestingly, most nations are significantly compliant.

The most outstanding outline of the concept of global federation emerged from the works of two major philosophers of the 18th century - Emanuel Kant of Germany and Jean Jacques Rousseau of France. Their broad outline of global federation resulted, one could say, in the least- “minimally in the conceptualization of today’s UN”. Organizations like the UN are generally seen as “practical bodies”, through which nations managed essential issues and problems, like the control on global nuclear proliferation [Loyd: 2000, Howard: 2009, Paul: 1992, Friedrich: 1963].

The upward expansion of the scope of activities of the earlier international bodies, culminated in the emergence of the League of Nations in 1920 and the rise of European International Organizations that proliferated in the 20th century covering an extensive range of issues. The European Coal and Steel community, which metamorphosed into the European Union [EU], some years later, Coordinated Coal and Steel Production. From the 1990s onwards, the European Commission, the Executive Agency of the EU, enforced regulations pertaining to labor, environment and several other matters affecting the daily life of virtually every citizen in Europe.

Further into the 20th century, NGOs similarly sprang up coordinating intently defined activities across national borders, and most of these bodies were made up of professional and scientific groups. Other specialized NGOs also emerged in areas of investment, tourism, sports and communications. Between 1945 and 1995, International Governmental Organizations [IGOs] multiplied fivefold in terms of their number, reaching incredible 500, while NGOs increased to about 5000. This trend we feel is reflective of the mounting significance of international coordination for both governmental and private institutions in a world that is largely mutually supportive.

In the post cold war epoch, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, International Organizations tended to assume greater roles and importance in global politics. One would have thought for instance, the NATO military alliance would fizzle out, but it did not. At the same time, the creation of WTO [World Trade Organization] did not cause smaller free trade associations such as NAFTA [North American Free Trade Association] to end. Indeed, “the mosaic of International Organizations continued to expand, particularly as new communications and information-processing technologies make the workings of international groups more practical and above all more effective”. The interdependent structure of world’s nations also resulted in the realization that no single nation no matter how advanced or powerful can dictate the outcome of international conflicts, nor can private groups and individuals rely on national governments to solve major global problems. On this premise therefore, most scholars are ordained to conclude that, in today’s contemporary world, both governments and national citizens will continue to turn to international organizations as an important way to address these problems and to protect their own interests [Howard Peter: 2009, R. Longworth: 1968].

The **UNITED NATIONS [UN]** is an international organization of countries created to promote world peace and cooperation, it essentially emerged as a political reaction aimed at ensuring global peace. Founded in 1945, the UN's mission has been maintaining world peace, developing good relations between countries and promoting cooperation in solving other world's problems, and respect for human rights.

As an alliance of countries in agreement, brought together rich and poor nations, large and small nations with diverse socio-political systems. The UN functions within the parameters of cooperative existence and support for all member nations. As at 2003, the UN had 191 members, nearly every country of the world. In the 1990s, the UN emerged as a more outstanding and prominent global body and it was awarded a Nobel Prize for World peace in 2001.

Owing to the ever-growing challenges of existence within the community of nations, the UN continuously works towards promoting cooperation between and among member states. Additionally, the UN has always found it difficult operating within the context of limited power and authority, more so as member-nations have always been unwilling to defer the slightest quantity of their power and authority to the international body.

The promotion of world peace as one of the key objectives of the UN has as a result helped in promoting and encouraging business and international trade. In addition, the UN serves its members in several other ways e.g. settlement of disputes without violence; attacking problems of global poverty, diseases and environmental degradation; coordinating and promoting economic and social progress in developing countries. The UN also coordinates the works of many agencies and programs within and outside its organization, in addition to collecting

and publishing global, sectoral, regional, subject data [*Microsoft [R] Encarta [R]* 2009].

In writing about the UN, reference would always be made to the thoughts of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, on whose thoughts the formation of the UN, out of the League of Nations, was predicated. As an organization that precedes the UN, Kant posited that members of the league should be able to unite and punish any nation that committed an act of aggression. With its 63 member states, the League existed effectively from 1920 to 1946. In 1941, US's Franklin Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of the United Kingdom, signed the **Atlantic Charter**, which pledged to evolve a more efficient system to promote international peace and cooperation. The name UN first emerged out of this charter following Roosevelt's coinage. It was in 1945, following the YALTA Conference, that the UN was first given birth to. In attendance at the conference were the USA, Britain, USSR, and China [Paul Guyer: 1992, Friedrich Paulsen: 1963].

In order to sustain the interest of the US, the Headquarters of the UN was located in New York City and to preserve the sovereignty of the big four and France, a VETO power was given to each. This has been a subject that till today remains an aspect of the UN that has been vehemently subjected to serious criticism by scholars of international integration.

The charter of the UN established six distinct bodies serving diverse functions; General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council.

Over the years, the influence of the UN has varied especially with its success in peace promotion and with its impressive record on issues of **security**; the body

directed its focus on serious problems of its third world members that are development related.

With its **peacekeeping force**, the UN played prominent role, in different regions calming regional conflicts in different ways - from participating as observers, to ensuring that conflicting parties follow agreements. It also provided a buffer zone between warring parties, opening lines of communication in addition to negotiating with military officers of the warring parties. The UN Peace Keeping Force also monitors cease-fires, supervise elections, and in some cases provide humanitarian aids. The idea of peacekeeping first arose during the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, when Israel attacked Egypt. Lester Pearson, a Canadian diplomat, has been generally credited with the origination of the idea of peacekeeping force [UN Peacekeeping Force, [Howard Peter: 2009, *Microsoft(R) Encarta(R)*, 2009].

The use of peace keepers by the UN were also visible during the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988, in South Africa to oversee the independence of Namibia and also supervise its first elections. The UN kept about 44,000 troops and it participated in 15 separate peacekeeping missions in South Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa.

The promotion of economic and social development is fundamental in establishing global peace, thus this has remained one of the most vital principles of the international body. The need to restructure international relations is also recognized by the body as a strategy aimed at helping developing nations reduce the existing gaps between them and the advanced world. Towards this end, the UN established subsidiary bodies like the UNDP, UNIDO, and IMF etc.

Other areas of interest of which the UN acted vociferously were environment,

human rights, and very importantly arms control and disarmament. On arms control and disarmament, the UN, through the well-known International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], under the leadership of Mohammed El-Baradei, has even more recently assumed a leading role in stemming the tide in global nuclear arms build-up.

In addition, like most international integration bodies, the UN is confronted by a crisis of funding. By 1997, the UN was owed \$3 billion, being unpaid dues and contributions due to it, more than half of which was owed by the US. The US and other industrialized members of the body are the greatest contributors to the UN fund and for political reasons, they were unhappy with how some UN programs were managed and executed, including peace keeping missions [*Microsoft (R) Encarta(R)*, 2008].

2.3 Other International Integration Bodies:

2.3.1 The International Monetary Fund [IMF]

For one to demonstrate other global developments at integration more so in relation to trade and economy, one must necessarily note the significance of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] which also played a critical role in the promotion of growth and development in Less Developed Countries of the world.

The IMF as an international organization operated as a specialized agency of the UN, and was purposely set up to facilitate the expansion of international trade, through the promotion of international monetary cooperation. Today it operates as a permanent forum for consideration of issues relating to international payments and it encourages member nations to maintain what international economists refer to as an “orderly pattern of exchange rates” and to avoid “restrictive exchange

practices”. Having been created in 1944, at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire, the IMF began operation in 1947, along with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]. By 2001, the IMF has 183 countries as members. Upon joining the fund, each member is assigned a quota in special drawing rights [SDRs], the fund’s unit of account, whose value is based on the weighted average value of five foremost currencies. The SDRs value by October 2001 was about \$1.29, and each member’s quota is an amount analogous to its relative position in the world economy. The US, as the leading global economy had up to SDR 37.1 Billion, while the least economy, the Republic of Palau had a paltry 3.1 Million SDR. A nation’s quota subscription determines how large a vote a member will have in IMF deliberations, how much foreign exchange it may withdraw from the fund and the amount of SDRs it may receive in episodic allocations [Barry: 1998, Gilpin, 2001].

The IMF receives applications for foreign exchange from countries with balance of payment problems, These countries that apply for foreign exchange do so in order to extricate themselves from their balance of payment problems and could use these resources for as long as five years. A borrower-country, by IMF rules, pays below market rate of interest.

In terms of organization, the IMF is managed by a 24-member executive board, which represent member nations individually [for larger countries] or in groups. The Managing Director of the Bank chairs the board. The headquarters of the bank is located in Washington, D.C. The IMF leadership has of recent been immersed in scandals involving the immediate past and the current Managing Director. Recently too, the IMF was heavily criticized by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Gordon Brown, describing it as “ill-equipped” and incapable of addressing the

problems caused by the current global financial melt-down [Barry: 1998, Gilpin R. and Gilpin J.M.:2001, Microsoft(R) Encarta(R): 2009].

2.3.2 The International Bank For Reconstruction And Development [IBRD]:

This bank was created along with the IMF, following the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 with the following as its chief objectives:

- To assist the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes.
- To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participation in loans.
- To supplement private investment by providing, under “suitable conditions”, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital.

IBRD grants loans, for financing specific projects. Borrowers must be properly appraised in terms of their repayment capability and as per spelt out conditions as stipulated by the bank. Issues such as the economic feasibility and soundness of a project are the most crucial conditions for granting loans. The inability of a potential borrower to obtain financing from other sources is also another vital consideration in determining a nation’s qualification for a loan from IBRD.

Unlike in its initial years of existence, developing countries of the world interested in financing projects that could enhance their productive base are IBRDs most formidable area of interest. Others are facilitating the borrowers’ access to such necessities like safe water, family planning, nutrition, health care, education,

housing and environment.

Apart from directly involving the poorest people in economic activity, through the provision of loans for agriculture, rural development, and small-scale enterprises, the bank is also expanding its assistance to areas of ecological concerns and energy development.

Capital shares of the bank are worth SDR 100,000 [about \$120,000] each. The minimum number of shares a member must purchase varies according to relative strengths of its national economy and not all funds subscribed are immediately available to the bank; only about 8.5 % of the capital subscription of each member nation is actually paid to the bank. The remainder is to be deposited only if, and to the extent that, the bank calls for the money in order to pay its own obligation to creditors. So far, there has not arisen the need to call in capital. The bank's working funds are principally derived from the sales of its interest bearing bonds and notes in capital markets of the world, from loan repayments, and from profits on its operations. Since 1947, the bank has consistently earned profits.

In terms of structure and governance, the bank is made up of governors, appointed by each member nation. The board of governors meets once in a year, and it delegates its power to a body of 24 executive directors, who meet regularly at the central headquarters of the bank in Washington DC. The first five largest shareholders of the bank appoint five of the executive directors, while the governors elect the remaining nineteen from the other member nations. The President of the World Bank is elected for a five-year term. The bank currently has 183 members, and the President heads the Executive Directors, in addition to heading the bank's two affiliates - the International Finance Corporation [IFC] and the International Development Association [IDA]. The latter is the bank's

concessionary lending affiliate, designed to provide development financing for countries that do not qualify for loans at market-based interest rates. The IDA only demands for 0.75 % service charge on its loans, it also sources for funds from its most prosperous members and from transfers of income from the bank.

All the three institutions are legally and financially separate, but the bank and the IDA share the same staff. The IFC, however, has its own operating and legal staff, but uses administrative and other services of the bank. Membership of the IMF is a prerequisite for membership in the World Bank or its affiliates.

2.3.3 The European Union [EU]:

One of the most stupendous inter-country cooperation bodies is the European Union [EU]. The EU is similar in objective and even structure when compared to other regional bodies in other parts of the world. It is however, not comparable when it comes to issues of relative efficiency and effectiveness, in addition to the records attained by the body, so far. This union emerged as an entity of 12-member states after the signing of what is referred to as the **Maastricht Treaty**. The body was loaded with both political and economic motives. Primarily, the EU had the belief that as a supranational body, it is most relevant in ensuring that the threat of war between member-states is essentially eliminated. Derek W. Urwin, in his account on the EU, reported that for Europeans to continue to play a dominant role in world affairs, they had to speak with one voice and that should be through the EU.

Until after World War II, the creation of cooperative organizations fared very little. Hitherto, nations opposed all attempts to infringe on their powers and were unwilling to yield control over their policies. These supra-national organizations

we must note require members to surrender at least a portion of their control over some policy areas and compel compliance with their mandates, thus after the second world war, proposals for some kind of supra-national organizations in Europe became increasingly more pronounced and frequent.

The EU, as an organization of European countries is prominently dedicated to increasing economic integration and the strengthening of cooperation among its members. Headquartered in Brussels, the EU was formally established on November 1, 1993. It originated from the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] in 1951, which became the European Community [EC] in 1967. The members of the EC were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Spain. The EU is now the most famous trading power, with an increasing political influence. Keohane in his article titled “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in the International Economic Regimes” [Holsti, Siverson & George; 1980] interestingly noted that similar bodies found in Africa and Latin America lagged behind the others such as the EU.

The EU has the following two broad objectives:

- The promotion and expansion of cooperation, among members- in economics and trade. Others are social issues, foreign policy, security, defense and judicial matters.
- The implementation of economic and monetary union, leading to the establishment of a single currency for EU members, the EURO.

With the exception of EMU [European Monetary Union], which came into effect in 1999, progress towards the attainment of these goals has been erratic and

various factors have limited the ability of EU to succeed in achieving its goals, including sharp disagreements among member-states, external political and economic problems and pressure for membership from the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. This brought to the fore Hetne's postulations which expressed that International Regional Relations must be based on the principle of symmetry, rather than based on the principle of comparative advantage; further displaying that regional relation must be to a larger extent political [Hetne :1990]

The economic motive of the EU rested on the belief that larger markets would promote competition, and therefore leading to greater productivity and higher standards of living. Very importantly, economic and political viewpoints merged in the assumptions that economic strength was the basis of political and military power and that a fully integrated European economy would reduce conflict among European nations.

The first free trade area within EU history started with the emergence of the Benelux Customs Union. This supranational organization, which was composed of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, was formed in 1948 and its formation was predicated on the logic that the economies of separate states, were individually too small to be competitive in the global market. The coal and steel community therefore provided an appropriate monitoring mechanism, more so as coal and steel products are central to many industries especially in the armaments industry and as spelt out in the SCHUMAN PLAN, which created out of ECSC, an agency that oversee production levels and prices.

More than ever before, the EU represents a classical order of security, shaped by European balance of power politics, which generally indicates that it was in no state's interest to allow any other state to achieve a dominant position in Europe

[O'Neill, 1990].

The Maastricht Treaty was a product of lengthy negotiations, accepted by the European council in Maastricht, the Netherlands, December 1991 and it committed the EU to a monetary union [EMU] that was meant to unify the economies of member nations, in addition to adopting a single currency by 1999. It further set strict criteria that member states have to meet before joining EMU in addition to creating new structures, designed to promote a more integrated foreign and security policy, and to encourage greater cooperation on judicial and police matters. Member - states granted the EU governing bodies more authority in several policy areas such as health and education, environment and consumer protection.

To make the body more attractive and relevant to the average person, the **Amsterdam Treaty** was introduced, thus revising the Maastricht treaty. This meant the creation of more jobs; consumer rights safeguard, and improved health within the union.

EU expansion issues were contained in the 2001 treaty of Nice, which clearly outlined series of reforms that were to prepare the EU for enlargement and more especially to keep the size of the union manageable. Even at the EU, the issue of a single European currency was fundamentally controversial. Countries like UK resisted the attempt, as they viewed it as threatening their national identity and governmental authority. Members also disagreed on additional matters, such as fiscal issues in trade relations, subsidies to the industrial sector etc.

Many EU states tried to meet the EMU's stringent requirements, relating to pegging of rates of inflation; limited level of budget deficit; national debt

limitation to below 60% of GDP; keeping interest rate at 2% maximum, than the average in three countries with the lowest rates etc. In May 1998, eleven out of fifteen members adopted the EURO. This also created the European Central Bank [ECB], destined to take charge of EU's monetary policies. The **Euro** established itself as a viable currency in international money market after some initial teething problems.

It is the consensus opinion of many observers of EU activities, and scholars of international integration, that the introduction of the Euro led to what has been described as an “unprecedented integration and cooperation among EU members”. Also fundamental to greater European integration were the two pillars based on intergovernmental cooperation - Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] and Justice and Home Affairs, [JHA]. The CFSP is a forum for foreign policy discussions, common declarations, and common actions that work towards developing a security and defense policy. There is, however, not a single common policy actions ever developed by the forum. The JHA largely succeeded in combating crimes like trafficking in drugs and in setting immigration and asylum policies.

Major bodies of the EU are as follows:

- European Commission
- Council of European Union
- European Parliament
- European Court of Justice
- Court of Auditors.

- The European Commission is the highest administrative body in the EU, responsible for policy initiation, implementation and supervision, in addition to the Union's financial management. The Commission is indeed the engine of European integration. Historically, it spearheaded preparations for the single European Market, and the moves towards establishing the Euro in addition to addressing the following major policy related issues:
- Establishing a single European market in which the economies of members are all unified. This is to be achieved by defining a common commercial policy, reducing economic difference amongst its richer and poorer members, and by stabilizing the currencies of its members.
- Addressing regional economic policies through agencies like the Euro Social Fund, Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the Euro investment Bank. All are meant to promote development in economically disadvantaged areas of the EU.
- Establishment of a Common agricultural policy based on the need to effectively, feed its population, through market stabilization, improved productivity, and ensuring fair deal for both farmers and consumers.
- ETC.

Urwin [2004], in further commenting on the EU noted that the EU, will for decades to come, remain a veritable force on European unity, more so, as it has succeeded in putting the diverse economies of European countries together, in a host of cooperative practices, adding that, the EU has recorded the best success, so far, in developing a viable culture of international collaboration.

2.3.4 Pan-Africanism & The Organization Of African Unity [OAU]:

Pan-Africanism surfaced as a strategy for addressing the problems of the African continent, notably in the form of regional cooperative groups. Most recently, at the AU Heads of State and Government Extraordinary Summit on Employment and Poverty Alleviation, African leaders again acknowledged the role of the RECs in contributing to the socio-economic development of the continent and accordingly gave them shared responsibility, along with Member States, to follow up on the assembly's Plan of Action. To bring about stronger cooperation between the RECs and to promote economic opportunity, the plan specifically recommends harmonizing community labor legislation as well as establishing mutual recognition of training and skills across borders. Coordinating employment policy is clearly part of the design to introduce a more uniform, or at least compatible, regulatory environment between African countries to encourage investment and cross-border business activity as well as set the stage for broader continental integration. Nevertheless, the Summit's Declaration and Plan of Action go much further in recognizing that regional economic development is contingent on things like greater democratic participation through social dialogue, the empowerment of women and integrating employment issues into regional programs – all of which confirm that social policies appear to be gaining prominence on the African RI agenda. Ready examples could be found in regional bodies such as the South African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS. Fundamentally, these bodies were therefore a response to the increasing competition from international economic blocks in North America, Europe and Asia. These efforts were also directed at creating better future for the present and the generations yet un-born.

The **OAU** as an organization of African nations was one of the first of such organizations to be created following the decolonization of the continent. Stephen Burgess, in his contribution to the study of international organizations, identified that its creation was vitally to promote continental peace, unity and cooperation. As a continental organization, it works to resolve conflict between nations and to coordinate political, economic, cultural, scientific, medical and defense policies. The OAU has 53 members, and has its headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where it was initially founded on May 25, 1963 and it has helped to strengthen intra-African ties and settle disputes between African nations. Like most international bodies, it also faced many **problems** that undermined its ability to achieve its goals. Throughout its history, the body had been troubled by series of disputes among its member nations. In 1975, it was divided over the Angolan civil war, because of the intrusion of the rival world powers, into the Angolan conflicts. This type of split also became manifest in 1977 and 1978, when Angolan-backed forces attacked Zaire's Katanga Province. Again, another conflict emerged as a consequence of Somali's invasion of Ethiopia in 1978. The body experienced several other divisive moments. In 1981, the continental body became polarized because of its recognition and admission of Western Sahara. This also led to Morocco's temporary withdrawal.

These divisions within the continental body, was further accentuated by the perceptible turn down in the economies of most African countries particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Notwithstanding its problems, the organization has recorded some **successes** in its several years of existence. It mediated a border dispute between Morocco and Algeria in 1964 and 1965. Similarly, it mediated between Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya from 1968 to 1970. It formed the African Liberation Committee in 1963 to channel financial support to movements that

fought to unseat Portuguese colonization in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. It also worked diligently to unseat apartheid in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The organization coordinated collective action among African nations at the United Nations; in addition, it also promoted the decision to bar South Africa from participating in UN activities through its policy of racial segregation. It vehemently supported the admission of China into the UN.

In terms of **structure**, the continental body has three major bodies - the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat. The Assembly meets once in a year, to consider recommendations of Ministerial Council and discuss issues of policy. The Ministerial Council is composed of Foreign Ministers of member nations and it meets at least twice a year to recommend actions and policies to the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. The General Secretariat runs the day-to-day operations of the organization, also assists in building consensus between member states. It is headed by a Secretary General and later renamed African Union [AU].

Under the leadership of Salim Ahmed Salim, the AU secretariat had established a 'conflict resolution mechanism' and a PEACE FUND. Both were set up in 1992 to deal with the growing number of conflicts. The AU participated in aiding to re-establish peace in Liberia by sending peacekeeping troops there. In addition, when South Africa became a member in 1994, following the collapse of apartheid, the AU received a major boost. These developments coupled with a sound leadership in the secretariat made the AU a stronger and probably more effective. With the factor of a sound leadership in the Secretariat and South Africa's membership, the AU is now a stronger organization, and may consequently be more effective.

2.3.5 The Economic Community Of West African States [ECOWAS]

More than half of the populations in ECOWAS member-states (some 115 million people) live on less than one US dollar per day with 12 of its 15 Members identified among the world's least developed countries (UNCTAD, 2004). It is irrefutable that such desperate circumstances inevitably mould and set limits on the Regional Integration process in West Africa. Some observers of West African integration have also authoritatively articulated that a large uneducated and subsistence-based population is clearly not poised to take advantage of an expanded regional market or the opportunities that might result from a freer flow of goods and capital within the region. These same difficulties of economic isolation and limited opportunity have driven many countries especially in the sub-region to adopt regional strategies as a way to overcome domestic weaknesses such as small size, landlocked economies or limited communication and transportation links with the outside world. There is in fact today a general acceptance that regional and sub-regional integration efforts offer a promising avenue for addressing the political, economic and social challenges facing African countries in this new age of globalization (ILO 2003c: 8). In keeping with the character of African RI, ECOWAS is therefore fundamentally a strategy for socio-economic development in West Africa.

The ECOWAS as a regional organization was therefore rightly established to encourage economic, social and cultural development of the West African sub-region. As earlier noted it was founded in 1975, and it derived its legitimacy from the treaty of Lagos signed by its 16 member pioneer member-states: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Voire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo [See **table 1 B** for details on member-countries in terms of area and population].

In further justifying and elucidating the basis for formation of ECOWAS three fundamental reasons were presented as follows:

1. Intrusive and negative impact of global political and economic policies external to Africa but affecting the continent in fundamentally disruptive ways.
2. The success of similar regional groupings in more developed regions of the world, coupled with the remarkable progress attained in Western Europe since 1957.
3. The glaring reluctance of developed and powerful nations in the western hemisphere to assist African countries during periods of economic recession and turmoil [Fawole & Ukeje: 2005].

Reflecting on the above, the ECOWAS treaty thus mandated the body to provide for the following:

- [1] Eliminate between member-states custom duties, and other charges of equivalent effects on imports and exports;
- [2] Eliminate quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among members;
- [3] Establish a common tariff structure and commercial policy towards non-member countries;
- [4] Eliminate obstacles restricting the free movement of persons, services and capital between member states;
- [5] Harmonize agricultural policies and promote common projects in marketing, research and agro-industrial enterprises;

[6] Evolve common policy and jointly develop facilities in transport, communication, energy and infrastructure;

[7] Harmonize economic, industrial and monetary policies of member states, as well as eliminate disparities in their level of development and

[8] Establish a fund for cooperation, compensation and development.

It is vital to note all the above as deliberate efforts towards - establishment of a free trade area [a & b], a custom union [c], a common market [d], an economic union [e-g].

ECOWAS was initially administered from its secretariat in Lagos, but with the shift of Nigeria's seat of government to Abuja and the construction of its permanent secretariat in Abuja, spearheaded and largely financed by Nigeria under the leadership of President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, the entire management of the organization moved to Abuja, the new capital.

Following its inauguration in 1975 and the full commencement of its operation in 1977, the West African body made several moves to facilitate trade liberalization by gradual reduction of restrictions on the movement of goods, services and people between member states. The body also worked towards improving transport and communications throughout the length and breadth of the region, however on the effectiveness of the body in these areas, there are more questions than answers.

Fawole and Ukeje posited that ECOWAS is a mixed grill of expectations, challenges and misfortunes, adding that several of its decisions and protocols were more "breached than complied with, thus short circuiting the qualitative attainment of this pioneering nationalist dream"

The ECA reports in addition, stated that most RECs (ECOWAS and WAEMU included) have largely analogous or parallel economic integration aspirations. But where there is a plurality of initiatives pursuing indistinguishable goals within the same region, this will likely result in wasteful duplication, a dissipation of effort, confusion about the goals of integration, and counterproductive contest between countries and institutions (ECA 2004: 41). For its part, the World Bank considers that to achieve profound integration, consolidation of bi-polar institutional structures is crucial (World Bank 2001).

Also, notwithstanding the inability of some member states to settle their dues and monetary obligations to the union, and the failure of a sizeable number of members to implement policies agreed upon at their respective national levels, the ECOWAS has played a significant role in the region particularly in the 90s.

It was in 1990 that the organization set up the machinery to mediate between members in dispute, all of whom have in conformity with the ECOWAS treaty acceded and pledged to a policy of mutual non-aggression. Therefore, in terms of mapping out the parameters for politico-security relations within the sub-region, perhaps even to the envy of other sub-regions in Africa and beyond, the ECOWAS must of necessity be scored highly. The outbreaks of wars and conflict have grave security implications and consequently, the body's ideals of economic integration were becoming unfeasible to achieve. Without tackling these politico-security problems intimidating members individually and collectively, the goals of the ECOWAS especially in terms of economic unification and socio-political integration may be impossible to achieve.

2.3.6 The ECOWAS Monitoring Group [ECOMOG]

The ECOWAS protocol of 1999 in response to the emerging political and security challenges eminent in the sub-region, “called for the establishment of a standby force of brigade size consisting of specially trained and equipped units of national armies ready to be deployed at short notice” [A. Adebayo, 2002]. The ECOMOG peacekeeping force was to be multinational in composition and was first deployed to Liberia in 1990, to mediate the one-year-old civil war in the country. Despite colossal difficulties, ECOWAS, at the end, helped to oversee the negotiation of a peace treaty between the warring factions and the setting up of an intermediary government, which took control in 1994. Again, when war broke out between the factions, in early 1996, ECOMOG forces occupied Monrovia, the capital city.

The ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, despite its various constraints and derisive criticisms, such as its branding as another diabolical attempt by Nigeria to construct and impose a *Pax-Nigeriana* project on an unwilling sub-region, many observers favored its sustenance and the expansion of its operational functions. In contrast with the above position however, a Kenyan political scientist, Professor Ali Mazrui earlier had in his book *Towards a Pax Africana*, described this sort of effort as essentially *Pax Africana*, adding that it is an indigenous system for managing conflict in West Africa [Ali Mazrui, 1967], further emphasizing the dream and vision of earlier leaders and indeed the founding fathers of the ECOWAS.

Despite the high profile outlook of the ECOMOG organization, the initiative almost destroyed the fragile consensus that up till 1990 held the ECOWAS together as a unified body, thus as expressed Kofi [1993], the need for extreme caution any time ECOMOG was called for peace broking became most expedient. At a certain level for instance, the ECOMOG initiative dented if not shattered the

kind of neutrality an organization like ECOWAS should be seen to represent. ECOMOG brought to the fore the irritating Anglophone-Francophone suspicions and rivalries that have traditionally slowed or subverted progress towards economic cooperation and integration. According to Klaus van, [1999], the ECOMOG was specifically viewed as a ‘backdoor ploy’ by Abuja to push forward Pax Nigeriana in the sub-region. A number of Nigerians on the other hand have often questioned the government on this military partnership in view of its huge cost on the lives of its soldiers and the economy of the nation, thus the need for greater institutional partnership in terms of role and cost sharing, with international bodies such as the UN and AU became most imperatively advocated in many circles of observers. Nigeria is known to have borne over two-thirds of the ECOMOG costs [Adibe, 1997].

Notwithstanding the criticisms against the ECOMOG, it is undeniable that it has played a crucial role in stabilizing and fundamentally reversing the hitherto deteriorating situations in some member states-especially Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its significance in terms of delivery and distribution of humanitarian and relief materials during situations of crisis cannot also be underscored.

2.3.7 The South African Development Community [SADC]:

The SADC otherwise known as the South African Development Community started as a South African Development Coordination Conference or the SADCC. The SADCC owes its origin to historical, economic, political, social and cultural factors that have created strong bonds of solidarity and unity amongst the people of Southern Africa. These factors paved the way for the formation of what observers of African regional integration have described as a “distinct Southern African personality and identity that underpins political and economic cooperation”

Very importantly too, the SADCC reflected the spirit of Pan-Africanism which sought for the establishment of regional integration bodies and regional integration as a veritable means of promoting African continental unity as well as the recovery of African dignity and status in world affairs. These principles were explicitly enshrined in both the OAU Treaty of 1963 and Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos.

More recently, the African Union [AU], the successor to the OAU, reaffirmed its commitment to the African Economic Community [AEC], which also principally viewed Regional Economic Communities [RECs] as the building blocks for continental community. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa's Development [NEPAD] has also designated RECs as implementing agencies for its program.

Similar to the ECOWAS organization, one of the main SADC institutions was the Summit of Heads of State or Government which was responsible for policy direction and control of conference functions. The Council of Ministers which reported to the Summit was also in place to oversee the work and development of the SADCC. The Council also approved SADCC policies. The Standing Committee of Officials, a technical advisory committee was responsible for advising the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat is based in Botswana and from this point SADCC programs are synchronized and managed.

For the coordination of SPA, a decentralized formation was adopted under which different sectors were allocated to each member-state. The rationale here was to “build collective self-reliance, mutual trust and confidence” and as members increased the number of areas also multiplied.

The official establishment of structures to facilitate regional cooperation and

integration commenced as an initiative of the ‘Frontline States’ – originally made up of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The original purpose of the frontline states was the political liberation of the region through a coordinated endeavor at fighting colonialism, racism and white minority rule using the national Liberation Movements of Southern Africa. This struggle undeniably was the major factor that strengthened the bonds of unity in today’s Southern Africa and further encouraged the group to act collectively against colonial and neo-colonial domination.

This initiative was later extended to address military attacks and destabilization of majority-ruled states by Apartheid South Africa, which also added some strength to the solidarity between the Frontline States of Southern Africa.

Having observed the intensity of poverty and economic backwardness pervading most of the newly independent states, coupled with the factor of a hostile minority-ruled neighbors, it became tactically expedient to organize a cooperative and integrative framework for the promotion of economic and social development. As a consequence, the nine majority-ruled states made up of the original five SADCC members and Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe as new members, agreed on a strategy in April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted what was popularly referred to as ‘the Lusaka Declaration’ again further titled ‘Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation’ as well as a coordinated Programme of Action called the SPA The SPA focused on creating functional cooperation in key sectors of the economies of member-states.

The SADCC Summit at their meeting in Windhoek, August 1992, the Heads of State/Government signed a Treaty transforming the “SADCC” from a coordination conference into SADC the Community. The Treaty redefined the basis for

cooperation among members from a loose association into a legally binding arrangement and with the aim of promoting deeper economic cooperation and integration.[<http://www.sadc.int/English/documents/risdp/chapter1.php>, 2007]. The SADC mission called upon all member-states and people of Southern Africa to develop a vision of a shared future, a future within a regional community whose main focal points are ensuring economic wellbeing of Southern Africans as well as improving their quality of life, promoting freedom, social justice, and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. An SADC Website as noted above further expressed that this shared vision is anchored on the “common values and principles in addition to the historical affinities that exist between the peoples of Southern African”.

The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan [RISDP] is underpinned by the SADC mission statement. According to the agreement amending the SADC Treaty, RISDP is designed to provide strategic direction with respect to SADC programs, projects and activities. Even though RISDP is not a prescriptive or command type of plan, it sets targets that can be monitored and measured over a period. Towards this end therefore RISDP as a strategic tool sets up a logical and coherent implementation programmed of the main activities necessary for the attainment of the region’s broader goals with a reasonable, feasible, and agreeable time frame that closely takes into account resource constraints. Thus, RISDP recognizes the need for a flexible approach towards deeper integration.

Most of the policies, strategies and programs of SADC were independently designed by Individual Sector Coordinating Units before they were grouped into clusters and managed through Directorates. Critics of this arrangement have noted that the various policies, programs, and strategies were very weakly coordinated

leading to poor inter-sectoral linkages. RISDP therefore was introduced in order to identify and strengthen inter-sectoral linkages, programs, and policies of the various sectors with a view to improving efficiency and delivery of the SADC Program of Action [SPA]. It is projected that in the next 15 years, RISDP would provide members-states with a “coherent and comprehensive development agenda on social and economic policies”. It is also estimated to provide the Secretariat and other SADC institutions with clear guidelines on all agreed social and economic priorities and policies and therefore enhance their efficacy in discharging their facilitating and coordinating role. In addition, RISDP is expected to take stock of the current regional political, social and economic situation with a view to providing a way forward for SADC to attain its objectives.

The SADC mission statement specifically stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty that the organization is “...to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and valuable player in international relations and the world economy” [SADC Treaty Document]. The pursuit of this mission is guided by the following key principles, which are adequately stated in Article 4 of the SADC Treaty:

- sovereign equality of all member-states;
- solidarity, peace and security;
- human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- equity, balance, and mutual benefit;

- and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Broadly, the SADC according to its treaty was to adopt the following as strategies towards the attainment of its goals of socio-economic and political transformation of the Southern African region:

- Harmonization of political and socio-economic policies and plans of member-states.
- Encouragement of people and institutions to initiate and develop economic and socio-cultural ties and to fully participate in the implementation of SADC programs and projects.
- Mobilization of requisite resources for the implementation of SADC programs using appropriate institutions and mechanisms.
- The development of policies that could aid in removing all obstacles to free movement of capital and labor, goods and services.
- Promoting the development, transfer and mastery of technology.
- The improvement of economic management and performance through regional cooperation.
- Promoting the coordination and harmonization of the international relations of member-states; and
- Lastly to secure international understanding, cooperation and support and mobilize the inflow of both public and private resources into the region [SADC Review, 2008].

2. 4 Diverse Theoretical Perspectives to Integration:

In pre-eminently appreciating integration from a theoretical context, on an introductory basis this study would be focusing on two broad categorizations of theory of integration, from whose contexts several individual theories, explaining integration have emerged.

2.4.1 The Pluralist Approach

This approach involves crosscutting affiliations among the diverse cultural groups or national groups. This angle pre-supposes plurality as major feature of one whole. The tenets emphasized in this approach to integration between nations or societies are here rooted in the ‘separatedness’ and individuality of all entities involved in building the coalition, and this may be in terms of the sustenance of each other’s political or socio-cultural identity. Indeed, this is essentially depictive of a coalition’s character of heterogeneity.

2.4.2 The Assimilationist Approach

The Assimilationist approach is based on the assumption that primordial ties are mutually exclusive and integration assume the profile of a zero-sum game, consequently, giving rise to a “homogenized entity”, a fused nation or region, in which primordial or other micro forms of loyalties disappear and are emphatically replaced by loyalty to a larger entity, even with its assorted constituents.

2.5 Other Integration Theories:

2.5.1 The Structural-Functionalist Theory

The increase and the encompassing stimulation for modernization and

development have triggered the utmost need for an increased socio-political interdependence between independent nations. This is a major prerequisite for genuine integration and is fundamentally predicated, on the structural-functionalist model. The positional leaning of this theory, has been amply demonstrated by contemporary developments observable in the European Union. The presentations of Coleman [1955], Lerner [1958] and Cohen were equally illustrative of this theoretical postulation.

2.5.2 Social Communication Transactional Theory

The emphasis of this theory is placed on transaction and other forms of social communications in the study and analyses of integrating political communities [Deutch, 1964]. The key hypothesis in this theoretical construct is rooted in the realization that political cohesion from the levels of individuals, groups and communities or nations can best be assessed, measured or promoted by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction between them. Deutsch is further of the opinion that, if an integrated community, is the end- result desirable, it is then most essential, to formulate ways and means of facilitating the flow of transactional exchanges and interaction between and amongst the sub-groups making up the whole.

Huntington, however, in a variant position, is of the opinion that an improved communication between elites is only capable of creating and stimulating political disintegration [Huntington, 1967]. One may see some probable examples in elitist activities that are divisive in a number of developing countries. This position has however been punctured by many students of integration, who noted that transactional communications could take any form. It is therefore not only exclusive to the elites. Interestingly, it is this elitist approach to issues of

integration that has made integration process not only limited and difficult to effectively implement, but confined to a small group or groups. This is especially typified, by the experiences in developing countries, and perhaps is responsible for the “insignificant success recorded” in this part of the World, where contemporary integration activities are dismissed as mere jamborees.

2.5.3 The Free Market Model

This theoretical construct is attributable to Hass and Schmitter [1971] who in their judgment expressed that the political actors concerned with or in the process of political integration behave within the precincts of rationality. For Hass and Schmitter, rational behavior is that action that seeks to enhance or maximize the pay-offs to individual participants in the integration process. The underlying assumption here is that political actors perform rationally, and that the collective welfare, like that of the individual, will be elaborately maximized, more so, as the gains and losses will annul each other, leaving the “cooperative whole” most improved.

2. 6 Operational Conditions and Ingredients of Integration:

The term ‘integration’, for many observers and scholars alike denotes a “process” or “condition”. Operationally, and as posited by Deutsch, integration means - to make a whole, out of parts; signifying that, previously separate units are deliberately brought into one coherent structure, a single territorial unit. The establishment of a distinct identity; national, regional or universal further supports integration.

This conception of integration presupposes an existence of a society that is principally characterized by all ingredients of plurality; a distinct history, language,

and political system. Broadly viewing the above, integration therefore makes inference to creating a sense of “territorial similarity”, by groups considered distinct, and the sub-ordination of “parochial” or sub-national loyalties. In close liaison with the aforementioned also, is the establishment of a centralized authority and its consequential overriding control over the “federating” units, which make one integrated body.

Deutsch, [1964: 61] in his submission furthermore inferred that integration denotes a “sense of community”, accompanied by both “formal and informal institutions and practices that are sufficiently strong and widespread”.

In his contribution towards the definition of integration, Morrison [1972] described it as a process by which members of a given social system develop linkages and cohesion leading to the super-eminence of broader boundaries above the boundaries of the sub-systems, bringing us once again to the concept of ‘supra-nationality’.

The imperative connection between the government and the governed is also noteworthy in facilitating a blend or otherwise, in any “federated” territory, of whatever scale, thus, bridging the gaps and reducing areas of conflicts and misunderstanding are of high-flying value in “stemming the tide of disintegration”. The creation of a reasonable quantity of a value system crucial to the promotion of justice, equity and equality in addition to effecting a reasonable distribution of political and economic resources are also of terrific value in helping to give an integrated polity its required quality of legitimacy.

Creating a sense of communality amongst inhabitants of integrated society through the development and inculcation of reciprocally evolved behaviors and attitudes

are also decisive in ensuring integration. With these conceptual clarifications, it is now appropriate to declare that **international integration encompasses a cosmic range of human relationships and attitudes, the fusion of diverse and very distinct socio-cultural loyalties, and the development of a sense of nationality.** Other vital components are the **integration of the “federating” political units into one territorial framework, and with a governmental or institutional body that is effectively capable of exercising authority.** The process of integration, also involves **a synthesis of the ruled with the rulership, thereby merging the citizens into one political cluster, which at the end would translate into an interconnected society, built with the sole purpose of promoting the finest living standards for the general citizenry.** Integration therefore, is a “multi-dimensional process” and it displays an effort at looking for “commonalities”. These experiences are crucial and observable amid most of the integrating groups.

In almost all the conceptual landscapes we visited, all in the efforts to sufficiently, comprehend international integration, three foremost themes are identifiable in all of them:-

2. The subsistence of an identifiable territory, an exclusive political entity, a nation or a region.
3. The pre-eminent existence of a central authority, or a government within an identifiable political system.
4. Detectable loyalties of the various groups of inhabitants to an established central authority, or government against loyalties to their parochial, blinkered or narrow-minded enclaves.

Notwithstanding the common themes noted above, there is an apparent **tenacity or**

resilience of national identities. Even the EU, with its apparent success, had to grapple with resilient and hardwearing national identities of its respective member nations at a time, example like that of the British, the French or Germans, who are viewed as sociological majorities in the European coalition. Ones in a while, this problem is manifested as one of the contemporary challenges of international or regional integration. In West Africa, the Nigerian and Ivorian attitudes may be viewed as ready examples of the promotion and resilience of national identities.

The plurality of the societies are also defiant, thus in many cases, it may be catastrophic to vigorously work towards eliminating them, consequently observers have noted that emphasis may most desirably be placed on regulatory activities, consensus and concession. Indeed, it is agreeable to note that there is **viability in plurality!** This is again even truer when we note that no society can survive in seclusion!

In studying “integration” as a process, it is important that we also look at the matter from some standpoint of details as exhibited in other scholarly works. An assortment of more or less comparable definitions and theoretical approaches on Regional Integration [RI] also exist, reported Hass [1970].

Hettne [1988], a Gothenburg University Professor of Development Research in his article on “European Integration and World Development”, confirmed that there are indiscriminately used related terms, such as regional organization, referring to actors, intentions or activities that may or may not end in regional integration. This plurality of concepts is really a pointer to an emerging phenomenon, about which there is apparent dearth of theoretical consensus, and perhaps, one may say there is insignificant empirical knowledge too. **Thus, the emergence of the concept of “New Regionalism” became expedient, connoting political cooperation on a**

regional base aimed at promoting a given collection of entities as one viable economic, cultural and ecological territorial unit. This territorial unit is also viewed, as essentially different from a common market, which only produced hierarchical division of labor on a regional spectrum.

2.7 Other Vital Conditions for Integration:

Etzioni [1965], in his scholarly treatment of the subject, considered a number of questions, conditionalities, and strategies as follows under which integration as a process is achievable and these principally includes the existence of States or societal units to be a part of the integrating union or an identifiable territory; aggregate or collective nature of the fusing units; the environmental configuration of the integrating units and the feasibility of the environment towards the drive for integration; degree and extent of interdependence and integration in existence before the initiation of the new process of integration.

OTHER vital pre-conditions to integration processes are also the following:

2.7.1 Territorial and Geographical Proximity

Daniels [1995], in his analysis of integration, posited that the more geographically proximate a set of disparate territories are, the more likely they are to develop relationships that are integrative amongst themselves. Philip and Tuscano, rationally reconfirmed this position when they further divulged that the closer the communities are, the greater the prospect for political integration. This is especially telescoped through the spectacles or variables of homogeneity, transaction, interaction, and mutual knowledge within the integrated whole.

2.7.2 Depth and Extent of Homogeneity

It has also been elaborately re-affirmed, that the more heterogeneous a society, the more difficult to integrate [Peter Holmes: 1999, 127].

2.7.3 Mutual Knowledge & Cognitive Proximity

Philip and Tuscano, further stated the essence of mutual knowledge and understanding, as a key factor that facilitate people effectively working together, and more as a political community. For them, these constitute the foundational base for the construction of a solid socio-political partnership

2.7.4 Public Policy/Public Sector Effectiveness

Public sector and governmental policy/ development program efficacy, which are generally satisfactory, and in consistency with the aspirations/expectations of the dissimilar lots, are vital in any integrative endeavor. Integrating states must demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency in their respective conduct and administration of their internal policies and programs.

2.7.5 Practical and Functional Interest

In most integration processes, the dominant functional interest should be shared as per the dictates of the treaty defining the needs and aspirations of the integrated community. This position is however questioned by the realization that the endurance competence of these functional interests, may not be everlasting because of a possibility of relational paradigm shift, which may arise, as an upshot or outcome of many change factors.

2.7.6 Structural Setting

This is the frame upon which the body is literally embedded with the required “flesh and blood” that would facilitate a smoother functioning of the structure. Where in a structural setting, a form of an ideology is rooted, and there is an ideologically propelled synthesis between diverse groups, the cultivation of a solid communal and therefore integration affinity is made more possible, achievable and most realistic.

2.7.7 Past Experience[s] on Integration

It is the consensus of many observers of the international scenario of integration, such as Hass [1968] in his study of European integration, to note that, the process is profoundly easier to conduct and implement where one had existed before. Dorland Scott [2000, 54] in his *Faces and Phases of Global Integration*, re-affirmed the essence of past experiences in facilitating integration.

In the context of the ECOWAS how are the positions of these preconditions?

Daniels [1995] Philip and Tuscano posited that the more geographically proximate a set of disparate territories are, the more likely they are to develop relationships that are integrative. In the case of the ECOWAS, there indeed exist an elaborate level of contiguity amongst member states as huge geographical barriers such as impassable mountains and seas are non-existent. So, geographically ECOWAS is at an advantaged position to integrate.

Holmes [1999] presented the arguments on depth and extent of homogeneity as a major determinant of integration. In looking at the ECOWAS within this

framework, it is easy to note that integration may pose great difficulty because the sub-region is composed of federating units that are intensely diverse in many ways and examples could be cited in the colonial experiences of the various member-states; linguistic and tribal configurations; diversity of currencies and economic profiles of members with one or two being very rich while the dominant majority being very poor.

Mutual knowledge and understanding of each other again Philip and Tuscano argued are fundamental to integration. From the ECOWAS experience, this is also evident in the sense that naturally because of some degree of cultural similarity integration between some members like Niger and Nigeria are cognitively easier as understanding each other from historical and cultural perspectives very easily attainable. The same issue has also caused disaffection and distrust amongst members as in the case of francophone Cote d'Voire and Nigeria on the ECOMOG platform.

Public Sector and Policy effectiveness in relation to conduct of state and efficacy of state policies and institutions are vital issues in the facilitation of integration in the West African sub-region also. With regards to these, we are making inference to issues of the efficiency of public institutions and extent of policy harmonization amongst member-nations of the ECOWAS. In the ECOWAS these have not been effectively achieved and as a consequence, the integration process is likely to be in jeopardy.

In terms of functional interests, one can further argue that this may not be everlasting because of a possibility of relational paradigm shift as earlier observed and this may arise as an upshot of many change factors and conversely too it is commonly expressed that 'there are no permanent friends but permanent interest!'

In terms of structural setting many factors are vital here and that principally includes things like governance infrastructure, economic structure and other related issues. And as noted Hass [1968], the process is profoundly easier to conduct and implement where one had existed before. Scott [2000, 54] , re-affirmed the essence of past experiences in facilitating integration. West African integration has been relatively easy in some scenarios because of common historical experiences amongst communities that were hitherto together prior to the creation of artificial borders by forces of colonization.

2.8 International Political Economy and Global Integration:

In international political economy, the emphasis is in understanding the interaction of politics and economics amongst the nations of the world. Of all these interactions, the most important concerns trade. Others are related to understanding the politics of international financial relations, regional economic and political cooperation, international environmental management, international investment patterns of MNCs, foreign aids, and relations between the rich and poor regions of the world [Goldstein J.S., 1993]

Goldstein further posited that the subject in addition has helped us, as scholars in more perfectly comprehending the imperatives of defense and the military, especially with the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, at the point of which we saw a shift of emphasis to the cold war conflict, between the US and the defunct USSR. Following the end of the cold war in 1991, attention was re-directed to the study of other areas of international relations. A new generation of Students and scholars, now place more emphasis in understanding government policies and economic trends, in addition to more importantly focusing on grasping the foundations of global and/or regional integration within the contours of global

economic cooperation.

International trade, international currency, international integration, the multinational corporations and the apparent shift of global economic attention to Asia Pacific, are key issues and trends that are vital to attaining a deeper perception of Political Economy. With the termination of World War II, the pace of economic transactions globally, multiplied many folds, and diverse regions of the world have witnessed uneven patterns of economic growth and change, necessitating the emergence of new-fangled or innovative international institutions coordinating policy strategies and efforts in addition to resolving international disputes, that have emerged as outstanding parts and aspects of contemporary global economy [Kuttner R., Dicken P]

International trade grew progressively, to nearly 20% in the 90s with goods and services valued far above \$4Billion, and created within a year. This development saw with it, the rise of new institutions with the sole purpose of promoting and managing world's trade. The world witnessed further dialogue and treaties, on lowering of trade tariffs, through the General Agreements on Trade and Taxes [GATT], which also transformed into the notorious World Trade Organization [World Trade Organization].

It must be however, observed, that most of these activities, were more concerted or intensive in industrialized countries of Western Europe, North America, and East Asia, accounting for over 75% of all international trade. This is of enormous implication to the economies of Less Developed Countries [LDCs], especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In terms of international currency, the world witnessed an explosive growth in the

exchange of foreign currencies. Technological advancement also aided in providing an effective link between major global financial centers of New York, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Zurich.

International investment has transformed its nature dramatically too, especially at the aftermath of world war two. For instance, unlike what obtained in the past, today's MNCs [Multi-National Corporations], regularly seek for cheaper manufacturing locations outside their countries of origin, thus taking advantage of low labor cost, natural resources, friendly weather conditions, trained and skilled workforce, favorable tax and trade regulations, standardization of brand name products worldwide etc. The growing influence of MNCs also raises a number of difficult issues for national governments, which are often compelled to weight the need and attraction for foreign trade and investment against the utmost desire to preserve national cultures, autonomy and security [Dicken P, Tabb W.K.].

The swing in the center of economic activities from North America to East Asia Pacific region and more expressly to places like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Taiwan, and Korea also provided a theatrical change in global trade and investment. These areas have registered remarkable prosperity and growth effectively elicited by their strategy of export growth promotion. In the late 80s, China recorded a spectacular growth of up to 10% on its economy and using similar model and strategy, its economy grew significantly more. In order to stimulate further growth of their respective economies, other countries within the region emulated China. India has also joined the mainstream of emerging economies with an impressive growth rate of nothing less than 8% annually in the last five years.

While all these developments were taking place in other parts of the world,

especially in countries that were similar to Africa in terms of position vis-à-vis developmental stage and history of colonization, most of the continent of Africa and more especially sub-Saharan Africa were left sprawling behind. This status was further worsened by depreciating living standards and as a result, global attention was shifting to the economically more attractive parts of the world, further leading to the abandoning of the African continent. These developments consequently, also stimulated some responses from countries of the African continent, more so with the apparent influence of globalization and liberalization, forcing a number of developing nations, to look inwardly within their “zones” for solutions to tribulations and evils of poverty and underdevelopment, and as closely viewed and confirmed by Hettne [1990, 1998] the promotion of regionalization became necessary amongst Africans in view of the realization that Europeans care more about their poor cousins in the east and are more worried about crises in the internal peripheries of Europe.

2.9 Theoretical Framework:

Varied theories can be employed to evaluate performance and output of international integration organizations and programmes. As Cole clearly pointed out, the works of Fredrick Taylor of the Scientific Management School, Max Weber and his concept of bureaucracy and the motivation, leadership and group at work studies pioneered predominantly by Elton Mayo or Harold Leavit’s Power Equalization Models (PEMs) can be used successfully to analyze organizational output and performance. While the classic theorists are concerned with the formal structure and relationships as sole determinant of organization performance, the Humanists or Motivational and group work theorists have laid more emphasis on the informal structure and relationships (structural and human) in formal

organization, which have a lot of influence on organization performance as well. The systems theory of organization for instance may analyze the factors affecting the performance of the various integration efforts and institutions over a period. This approach also provides one of the bases for understanding the achievements and failures of various integration programmes using the **OPEN SYSTEM layout**. The systems approach also apart helping us to see success or failures of government led integration efforts and the sum total of all its units. The approach further reveals the inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of the various units and structures at different levels – from community to top-most government level, and how a failure of any one unit can affect the operations of other units and the performance of the organization as a whole. Through this approach, the actual performance of an organization can be established and more using the inputs – outputs device. The approach is finally indicative of how an organization can subsist by generating more outputs as results. The Systems theory as an analytical as well as a theoretical formulation has defined organizations as sets of interrelated and interdependent components surrounded by a boundary, which absorbs inputs from other systems and transform them into outputs (products and services) that are needed by other systems in the environment.

The approach further argues that since organizations are Open-Systems, they of necessity draw resources from their environment, which they mobilize and employ to produce goods and services that are in turn exported back to the environment. As these input-output activities occur in cyclic manner, the performance (success or failure) of an organization or programmes/a set of or program can be measured by the ratio of inputs to outputs. If the outputs are higher, the organization is viewed as efficient. The organization will be viewed as fundamentally defective, and inefficient when the inputs are higher and the output less.

This also further implies that integration efforts within the ECOWAS for example and series of its programmes are not insulated from the happenings and forces in the immediate global environment – political, economic technological etc. For instance, the endemic socio-economic and political instability in the sub-region has had its negative consequences on its agencies, member-government agencies, and programmes and therefore performance. Frequent changes in policy that usually go along with frequent change of governments amongst member-states, have also made continuity of plans and plan implementation difficult to achieve. The daily increase and sophistication of corruption especially in the conduct of government business of member-nations, have also made the coalition's programmes or organizational successes unachievable - thus any attempt to analyze the situation must take these factors into account in order to get to the root of the problems or factors affecting the performance of the more than numerous ECOWAS led activities in the last few decades.

Again, within the framework of this discourse, another question is – is it possible to establish the true performance of the coalition and its diverse projects and programmes using the inputs-outputs model? It is affirmatively possible. For instance, it is amply cited that ECOWAS program inputs have been consistently higher than their outputs, and that the coalition has not essentially succeeded over the years notwithstanding the huge level of investment made into it; and why successive managements of the union and member-governments continued to sustain the main body and its various agencies notwithstanding the demonstrated high cost profile and the fact that little is seen as empirical achievements or successes in terms of erecting a more unified economy and a politically cohesive ECOWAS.

Indeed, the development of scientific knowledge through the research process has

been significantly aided by the use of appropriate concepts, constructs and theories in order to elucidate and classify relationships amid the observed phenomena. For the purpose of this research, we have adopted a theoretical framework that is envisaged to provide our study with an effective guideline through which a series of sound hypotheses are formulated. In the same context, one has also emerged with an appropriate research design, through which the acceptability of findings is probably more enhanced.

In the context of this research, as is the case with many similar research oriented endeavors, the aim here is to postulate an appropriate theoretical viewpoint on integration in West Africa and with specific reference to the ECOWAS coalition, and more in relation to development and well being of the sub-region. Again, this theoretical framework would aid the researcher in analyzing with a reasonable degree of assertiveness and confidence, how the phenomena in focus could relate with other key variables, and issues that have been raised by the research on integration in the West African sub-region. It is with this notion in mind, that the **Structural-Functionalist theoretical Model** becomes most appropriate for adoption.

The aim here furthermore is to attain and establish a credible correlation between the central theme of the study and other essential variables fundamental to West African integration. Ones again, and for these factors elucidated above, the **Structural-Functionalist Model** presents itself as the most ideal in this circumstance.

Going by the ordinary dictionary meaning, the word **STRUCTURE** denotes the way in which the parts of something are linked with each other to form a whole. **STRUCTURALISM** therefore connotes a method of studying society, in which

we examine the different parts or ideas...to find a common pattern. A notable American anthropologist, Sahlins Marshal David, known for his theoretical contribution to anthropology has asserted that the Structuralist School, seeks to understand the relationship among all of the elements in a system, at a given time. Structuralism therefore as an analytical tool views society as a closed set of interdependent parts.

Sahlins was largely influenced by another notable French anthropologist such as Claude Levi-Strauss, who also worked extensively on society and culture. Levi-Strauss was believed to have developed the analytic method known as **structuralism** and he wrote extensively on the universal tendency of the human mind to sort things into sets of opposing concepts, such as day and night, black and white, or male and female.

In Social Science circles, **FUNCTIONALISM** views society as a system made up of interrelated parts, all interacting based on a common value system or consensus about basic values and common goals. Every social custom and institution is seen as having a function in ensuring that society works efficiently.

Looking at the two simultaneously, **STRUCTURE** refers to an orderly arrangement of diverse constituents or traits of a social system, while **FUNCTION** connotes the interconnection process of a continuum of social life, the part, the structure plays in accounting for the fusion and persistence of one social whole. [Berker, 1967]

Berker, in one of the most incisive delineation of the **structuralist-functionalist** model, demonstrates that **societies are self-contained lots, consisting of**

integrated and independent components - portrayed further in the form of disparate cultures; family organization; political and legal institutions; political and technological organizations.

Berker again viewed society as a system composing of divergent sub-systems, functioning “symbiotically”, in order to meet the needs of all its members, and finally the broader system. He added that sub-systems in this context are seen as cohesive elements of the whole and not as isolated units. Moreover, for the sub-system to effectively subsist and survive, these sub-systems, as part of a whole, must work dedicatedly towards attaining the goals for which they are formed or established.

Emile Durkhiem, one of the earlier fathers of Sociology, used the functionalist approach in the study of society and social groups. He notably observed that individuals should be considered within the context of the society in which they live. Durkhiem’s ideas were expanded by British scholars Radcliff-Brown and Malinowski, who wrote more prominently in the 1920s and 1930s. Their approach to understanding the interaction between society and culture was known as **Structural Functionalism** or simply functionalism. In the context of these broad views, therefore societies or nations are seen as systems with an elaborately defined structure of organization.

Again, from a functionalist framework, all societies are seen as exercising what is viewed as normative control, specifying behavior, which is considered as appropriate, in addition to erecting role structures and functions for members, to closely adhere to. Members are accordingly rewarded for compliance and sanctioned for deviance from the standard norms or rules. These rules and norms are set as parameters upon which responsibilities and roles are a defined or even

ascribed and limits of behavior are stated, all with a bid to goal attainment. These standards, and features serve as behavioral coordinates for members, and it is from these coordinates, that order and social relations are definably determined. However, this viewpoint has upon further interrogation tended to represent a neo-classical notion of integrating societies or even nations.

Within the context of an international organization, [as viewed from the spectacle of structural functionalism] such as the ECOWAS, we can then situate these behavioral standards and requirements in addition to noting how member-nations and their leaderships react, in the event of compliance or deviation from what is referred to as the accepted rules. This further explicates the behavior of most international integration bodies, which is fundamentally tilted towards the neo-classical pattern.

The Liberian and Sierra-Leonean crises, perpetrated by elites and warlords of the said nations, clearly typify the cost of deviance and perhaps the benefit of compliance to rules. Compliance with rules or protocols pertaining to the establishment of Common External Tariffs [CET], the rules in respect of free movement or residency of Community citizens within the sub-region, inter-state control on cross-border crimes and movement of small arms are perfect areas and examples where some standards in terms of compliance are expected from members of the ECOWAS coalition also.

2.9.1 Structural-Functionalist Model of the ECOWAS as an International Integration Body

The international integrative functions of the ECOWAS, as a regional body, are the most decisive aspect of its existence and legality as a body. More distinctively, the

facilitation of economic cooperation between member-nations is the core objective for which the organization was set up in 1975.

The relational activities of the 15-member regional group, facilitated by the authority establishing it and its institutions, coupled with the integrative activities of the coalition such as the treaties guiding the coalitions operations, the Summit, the Council of Ministers, trade promotion programs and a series of ECOWAS protocols e.t.c. are vital and critical parts or units of the ECOWAS organization. These parts are structurally and functionally part of a holistic continuum, and from a theoretical position, they make up the parts and units of a WHOLE.

2.9. 2 Key Assumptions of the Structural-Functionalist Model

a] This study essentially assumes that the ECOWAS as an integration body in the West African sub-region is the only credible body known that encompasses 15 West African states, and is designed to be principally involved in the process of building economic and political cooperation within and among its member states. Thus, it is important that one additionally identify and present other alternate integrative roles open to the ECOWAS, such as harmonization of some existing institutions common to all or most ECOWAS states, in addition to making predictive, prognostic or extrapolative deductions on its capabilities on these alternate functions.

b] As may be rightly seen, international integration is an all-encompassing process. It is therefore envisaged to also be an all-embracing activity in terms of the participation of the general citizenry. Furthermore, it is pre-eminently imperative for a researcher to at this stage effectively define or inquire on the following:

How would the ECOWAS, as an inter-country cooperation body direct, implement and monitor its integrative efforts, and in a fashion that is essentially democratic?

In doing these, it is also worthwhile to in relation also inquire on how the various institutions of the coalition would affect the union's efficacy in achieving an array of wide-ranging goals of economic integration within member nations.

c]. It must also be assumed that for the ECOWAS coalition to succeed, in a world where competitiveness, is the basis of endurance and survival, an energetic pursuits of its objective is fundamental within the structures and institutions that are intrinsic and central to the organization. It is vital therefore, to strive towards looking at the body from the context of its organization and institutions, such as the ECOWAS Secretariat/Commission, and other allied institutions such as the ECOWAS Central Bank, the ECOWAS Court, the Customs and Immigrations of the respective member-states e.t.c.

In the light of the assumptions [a], [b], [c] above, the questions and the postulates raised therein, which are also predicated on the structural - functionalist theory, and in view of its appropriateness as a chosen platform of analysis, and for a better understanding of the ECOWAS, its institutions, membership and processes, it is pertinent to generate additional interpretations of the precept or issues below:

International Integration

In the context of the above, International Integration denotes the efforts and abilities of the ECOWAS in specific conformity with the treaty establishing the organization, to closely and effectively coordinate all member nations, that make up the parts of the sub-regional body, in order to collectively achieve regional economic cohesion and to properly compete as an economic bloc, with other

notable regional economic blocs in the most efficient ways possible.

Articulation and Control of Economic Development Schemes/Programs

The ECOWAS and its institutional structures should be able to work as a body or collection of bodies in such a way as to effectively promote the growth of the general regional economy, through the development of appropriate programs and schemes especially in the area of trade and trade promotion. ECOWAS is therefore expected to serve as a medium for the articulation and development of programs, that are initiated for the sole aspiration of stimulating regional economic growth and development.

Facilitation for the Attainment of Goals of Economic Change and Cohesion

In addition to using its institutions to attain developmental goals as defined in its treaty, the ECOWAS is to aspire towards uplifting the living standards of its West African population, through diverse strategies as one of the body's most crucial goals. By this, the ECOWAS would be effectively considered as an ideal springboard for the management of regional economic integration and development programs, especially in areas vital to trade and trade development such as the effective provision of relevant infrastructure on a regional scale; regional security and stability; border crime control and prevention; effective finance and banking facilities and practices; effective public bureaucracy; harmonization of investment and trade rules affecting trade/investment protection and guarantees; human rights and immigration practices etc.

Viewing broadly, the various segmentation of the process of integration, as well as the diverse theories and definitional variations noted on the term- "integration", and the unique challenges, it poses as a process, in West Africa, a reasonable

number of inhibiting factors standing against regional cohesion, economic and political are amply recognized below:

1] Inability to adequately and very effectively define and coordinate the goals of economic integration as spelt out in the *Revised Treaty of Lagos* that established the body, by the visibly notable diversion, which inevitably placed greater premium on issues of politics and security. West Africa had over the past decade, been rocked by a string of disastrous conflicts in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. These have unavoidably made the issue of security a recurring and largely an inveterate and perhaps incorrigible problem affecting West African integration. For many scholars, this has indeed heralded a new security order and therefore a new security imperative in the West African sub-region.

2] Inability of ECOWAS body and its institutions to clearly articulate a body of standard and coherent policies in addition to defining responsibilities of its several integration promotion institutions. Related closely to this, is the apparent failure of these institutions to create sound schemes, projects and programs meant to promote regional cooperation and development. It would be interesting to further more restate that several years after the establishment of some of these institutions like the ECOWAS Central Bank, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, many of these institutions are still unable to make noticeable marks in the sub-region. The ECOWAS Parliament is yet to be effective despite so much “window talk” about democracy and democratization in the sub-region. In addition to the above, ECOWAS has set up several commissions without developing corresponding financial capacity to maintain them or even make them meaningful in the discharge of their specialized functions and

responsibilities. Perhaps, one can assume that this is a typical case of an institutional over bloat, leading to further exacerbating the community's financial burden.

3] Primordial loyalties and the concomitant existence of similar integration bodies, within the Sub-region, is one of the factors inhibitive of regional integration in West Africa. Several scholarly literatures dismissed the ECOWAS as a body that is groomed into serving as an extension or an accessory of post-colonial state formation with their notorious pathologies as postulated by Charles Ukeje [2005]. To demonstrate this more, it is vital to state that even the ECOMOG was at a point viewed by Cote d'Voire, Burkina Faso, and Senegal [all francophone], as a diabolical attempt by Nigeria to construct and impose a *Pax-Nigeriana* project [Cleaver: 1998, 225-226].

Again, most of the times, Britain and France determined the tempo and degree of cooperation among their respective ex-colonies especially by creating harmonized structures and institutions for the delivery of common services as further noted Onwuka and Sesay. This again infers that, African states engage in the intensification of **vertical ties** with the Western World and to the detriment of West African integration.

4] The existence of minimal citizens' participation, accentuated by the absence of an articulate program of political and economic information, is in addition, vital in inhibiting the success of West African socio-cultural, economic and political integration. This information, and mobilization lacuna, has resulted in the absence of sufficient trade and investment data, which may be useful to an average investor, chiefly, with respect to investment and business decisions. The situation is most unsettling when we view the "elitist top-down approach"

and the horrific absence of a “culture of integration” as tersely observed Abbas Bundu, former Executive Secretary of the [ECOWAS Website: “Executive Secretary’s Report”] . Onwuka and Sesay [1988:206-223] once again asserted that, the ECOWAS was not following a “people oriented path towards integration”.

5] The absence of genuine commitment on the part of the leadership, as key actors within the system, especially with regards to addressing core economic issues such as tariffs and customs related matters; exchange rates; cross-border crimes; personal dangers to persons due to banditry; constrained movement of goods and persons, ineffective banking services, varied languages [local and foreign], poor transport/communication infrastructure, snail slow bureaucracy etc. are constitutive of a huge set of inhibitive factors colossally debarring effective integration in West Africa. Very importantly, TRADE which is suppose to be main economic driving force in the sub-region is abysmally low and where it exists, it is centered on informal, unofficial, unrecorded and illicit transactions. Even the so-called trade liberalization scheme meant to kick-off in 1977 was stalled until 1990. This halfhearted response was only a reaction to contemporary global trends, under the neo-liberal economic reform agenda, of the Bretton Wood institutions.

6] Inability of the body to go beyond the circle of the Regional leadership, career and/or non-career diplomats in terms of involving the appropriate relevant non-governmental organizations - such as mass movements like labor, professional groups & associations, the private sector, civil society groups etc. in the integration project.

7] Failure to carry out reforms in terms of improving the efficiency of their

respective public bureaucracies and institutions, with a view to reducing or totally removing “red-tapism” in policy/decision-making and implementation.

8] Failure to introduce adequately relevant laws and legislations, which could protect traders, investors and their investments, by way of providing protective measures like “trade and investment guarantees” when and where necessary, for West African businessmen and women, as practiced in several cases involving foreign investors from advanced nations, and more especially in strategic areas of the regional economy, in addition to the inability of members to closely adhere to the organization’s leading protocols, such as the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence & Establishment adopted in May 1979. This is indicative of the coalition’s failure to effectively construct what is in general viewed as “community citizenship”.

A number of paradigms and positions have been earlier on articulated and discussed, in the efforts to appreciate and understand international integration as a global phenomenon. Notwithstanding these efforts, like several other academic dialogues, the subject will continue to remain consistently knotty, and vibrant. The subject will thus in addition continue to offer more challenges with respect to research and further studies. This realization is again reinforced, by the multi-disciplinary nature of the area and the multiplicity of paradigm shifts, which over the years affected several aspects of global integration developments.

In addition to all the above, the complexity of this field of study, and the phenomena of integration , owing to salient factors such as - the dearth of interest in the general populace, created by the incapability of ECOWAS to successfully mobilize, galvanize or activate people for integration and the coalitionist’s inability

to identify and make the best use of the socio-cultural, commercial, and historical affinities, existing solidly in and along ‘traditional’ border towns/settlements in several West African states, becomes even more visible and above all most challenging. It is certain that without any meaningful participation on a massive scale, limited benefits, if any, could be accruable to the citizens, more so as the coalition can not muster grassroots support for its activities. While making a presentation at the National Workshop on Cross-Border Security, Cooperation and Integration –North West Zone - in Sokoto, Nigeria, on the 27th of June 2000, former Executive Governor of Sokoto State, Attahiru Bafarawa noted that there has been a history of an age long relationship between border communities of the two countries adding that, in quite a number of cases, the relationship had even assumed familial or ancestral posture for several decades.

In many countries within West Africa, people only know of ECOWAS vaguely, most especially during major summits of the organization. It is most interesting to note and observe that these salient affinities in terms of common history, dates back to 1000 AD. History had it that between 1000 AD and 1500 AD, three successive West African States-the Kingdom of Ghana, the Mali Empire, and the Songhai Empire attained the pinnacle of their influence. These states effectively controlled trans-Saharan trade, taxing the caravans carrying gold and slaves from sub-Saharan West Africa and those carrying weapons and textiles from North Africa. The Kingdom of Ghana emerged by the fifth century, reached its climax around 1000 AD., and broke apart in the early part of the 13th century. The great Mali Empire incorporated Ghana’s territory and expanded it in the 13th century. It was within this epoch that the city of Timbuktu emerged as a world-renowned center of trade and scholarship. Mali Empire declined in the 14th century and was

succeeded by Songhai Empire, which even grew far larger than the previous. Adu A. Boahen, Basil Davidson]

Notwithstanding the enormous quantum of data international integration studies have generated, and the various theoretical dissertations, on the subject based on contemporary experiences, more efforts, theoretical and empirical, need be put into studying the process of integration, more so, after observing the minimal success the process has so far recorded in the developing world, and very importantly too because of the contemporary character, relevance and challenges of this area of study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction:

The examination and evaluation of the ECOWAS as a coalition of member-states and as a sub-regional organization especially as it relate to issues of sub-regional socio-economic, political integration and development is the main purpose of this study. This chapter would be discussing the ways and methods adopted in collecting the study data, sources of data as well as how the analysis of the data envisaged to be collected would be pursued.

Furthermore, in order for this study to succeed in accomplishing its desired objective as amply expressed, the research design, which encompasses the typologies of data, collected, the methods of data collection have been more deeply elucidated in this chapter, and more specifically under the mentioned sub-headings below:

[1] Research Population, [2] Sample, [3] Sampling Procedure, and [4] Research Instrument. Other vital sub-headings are – [5] Methods of Data Collection and [6] Analysis of Data.

Researchers have used different methodologies from laboratory and field experiments to survey studies and formal theory to effectively, generate laws and theories that could stand the test of time; Skinner [1953] , developed the famous

Stimulus-Response Theory, in the field of Psychology, through a series of laboratory experiments, that extensively used rats; Fredrick Taylor [1911] developed the famous scientific management approach, which was derived from a chain of field experiments on the floor of a factory. These celebrated works were inimitable in several ways, and their uniqueness was a function of many factors, and that includes the subject being studied, the audience or target structure, the research population, and the central intention of each study i.e. the problem in focus, in addition to the state of knowledge on the matter and very importantly as Runkel and McGrath [1972] concluded, the amounts and kinds of resources, both human and material, at the disposal of the study team etc.

In order to sufficiently, conduct this study, a wide range of activities or programs and institutions of the coalition or a given member-state should be the focal point. This study is indeed primarily an EVALUATIVE RESEARCH; therefore, it must conform or adhere as closely as possible to currently accepted standards of Research Methodology. In this study, therefore the researcher's job is to prove the effectiveness of these organizations, their programs and activities such as those that relate directly or indirectly to the coalitionists' dream of sub-regional integration especially through the spectacle of intra-community trade facilitation. All these are to be attained in the context of state structures and their numerous institutions. In the light of this, it must be further noted that evaluation as a study or research technique goes to prove that both effectiveness and efficiency have a vital place in public service. Herzog, Elizabeth [1959] similarly observed so in her presentation on evaluative study.

This study is additionally penciled on testing a number of hypotheses using data collected from specialized 'clusters' of samples delineated as follows:

[1] Samples from borderland-communities living along or within border towns of Nigeria, the neighboring Niger and Benin Republics and who are also deemed as ‘direct’ participants in the ECOWAS coalition processes.

[2] Samples from an established crop of diplomatic elites, in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, members of the Customs and Immigration Services and allied security operations.

[3] Samples from Students, Scholars and Teachers in Administrative and Social Sciences in the Ahmadu Bello University, one of the premier centers of learning in Nigeria in addition to scholars, teachers in other Nigerian universities and polytechnics like the Kaduna State University, Kaduna Polytechnic, and the IBB University.

[4] Samples from senior employees of the Secretariat of the ECOWAS located in Asokoro District, 60 Yakubu Gowon Crescent, Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal Capital.

[5] Samples from Reputable Nigerian and if possible Niger Republic personalities that are or were related to the development and growth of the ECOWAS coalition and more importantly too from the following:

- Other vital secretariat staff in the ECOWAS regional Secretariat in FCT Abuja, Nigeria and Nigerian ECOMOG field commanders.

This deliberate classification has afforded the study access to a huge variety of respondents inclusive of highly positioned military personnel, diplomats, top government officials in national institutions, inter-country bodies, scholars, the business/trading communities and the general citizens of the Community living along or around border settlements between traditional neighbors – Nigeria, Niger

and Benin Republics.

In making this study simpler and statistically evaluative, the entire volumes of data collected was analyzed using simple tabular presentations of figures and percentages from where the relevant deductions and inferences were drawn.

3.2 Research Design:

From a general perspective, a research design is a plan created by a researcher that principally takes cognizance of the special challenge presented by the fundamental requirements of the study, which specifies rationally and coherently how data relating to problem under investigation should be collected and subjected to an objective analysis. It is also here that a detailed procedural outline for the conduct of the study is clearly elucidated.

One of the fundamental utility values of a research design includes majorly the provision of a solid framework for tackling a particular research problem - social, economic or political. At the commencement of this study, its international nature has been closely noted, therefore, the challenge it poses in terms of “researchability” has been more closely appreciated. Notwithstanding this, and other allied challenges, an amalgam of styles that could aid the study achieve its key objectives have been adopted.

In arriving at a decision, the study has viewed diverse aspects of its target population and what portion of the population would form the research sample. This is in addition to focusing on the type of statistical tests or systems of measurement that may be of great value to the research. It is also within the confines of the **research design** that the vital coordinates of the research study were not only fixed but also established in terms of both purposes and scope.

This study on ECOWAS, like many similar research works, has therefore employed the use of a **SIMPLE SURVEY METHOD**. This approach as highlighted by many scholars, study both larger and smaller groups of population by selecting and studying samples chosen from the population to discover cases of relative incidence, distribution and interrelation of the dependent and independent variables. This sampling method or style has therefore been considered as most suitable more so as the data collected is unlikely to influence the outcome, which is usually guaranteed by confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents.

Further to the strengths of the chosen survey method, the study has also noted that it is not possible to survey the entire ECOWAS population in West Africa; therefore, it is definably imperative to limit investigation to a defined sampled population.

The determination of research sample is vital in influencing reliability, validity and “testability” of data collected. Therefore, the study has to ensure proper selection of respondents using appropriate procedures, in addition to noting key argumentations as indicated below:

1. Quality and extent of “representativeness” in relation to the universal population is of significant value, as it forms the basis, upon which we can enhance the credibility of research results, and the ability to generalize across comparable situations. It is in the light of these key factors, that we have to use this particular sampling mechanism.
2. Humanly as earlier observed, it is impossible to study an entire population for reasons, some of which are too many to mention, but more importantly - reasons of research circumstances and resources. This again, emphasizes the

essence of sampling as research strategy. Conclusively, sampling is indeed the mechanism a study adopts in deliberately choosing designated quantities or proportions of what is often referred to as **universal population**.

Therefore, the study on ECOWAS and specifically with reference to its function on regional integration, trade facilitation, and development, and investment promotion on a regional scale e.t.c. has tried to ensure that a sample that was meaningful in terms of its “representativeness” of the general populations is created, thus, the inclusion of a variety of respondents, within the Nigerian population, and other accessible members of the regional “Community”.

In her expose on the subject of sampling, Margarate Peil [1982], has asserted that sampling as a vital part of research design, is fundamental in the selection of field respondents and ultimately in the isolation of data that are directly relevant for the preparation of a research report. Peil further reported that sampling from a population is predicated on the realization that it is not humanly possible to cover whole populations as in the case of a national census.

In determining my study samples due consideration was also taken of the nature of data envisaged because of which also other relevant sampling methods were used. Furthermore, systematic sampling method was used to enable the researcher administer questionnaire on a variety of respondents especially those with distinct features, as noted earlier in this presentation. Of particular relevance is the sampling of population of border settlements with commercial configurations between Nigeria and Niger Republic and these included principally Birnin-Konni and Maradi in Niger Republic, Illela and Jibia in Nigeria in addition to a some others in Mellavil and Seme [both in the Republic of Benin] . Others are Post-Graduate Students of administration and social sciences of the Ahmadu Bello

University, Zaria as well as members of the diplomatic community in Nigeria and the relevant foreign missions within Abuja FCT. Moreover, it is because of the perceived variables of the research, that the final research sample was selected from groups of persons that are of defined interest to the study, therefore the emphasis on major commercial locations found in the border towns, which also represented the “clusters” from which a sizeable portion of the study samples were drawn.

In terms of size i.e. the total number of population elements that are selected or sampled are considered as relatively large, believing that the larger the size the more it is representative of the total population and therefore the more reliable may be the consequent generalizations about the total population. It must also be noted that the larger the samples the more the possibility for limiting error of measurement as implied Leedy [1974]. In a large sample also, the attributes of a normally distributed population are assumed in the measurements that involve such a sample Johnson [1980] added.

An effective management of sample selection is an essential component of any social research; therefore, a carefully selected sample ultimately and more clearly opens up a research population more clearly for empirical observation.

While sampling respondents from within the academia and other professional groupings, the research was triggered by forces of “**purposiveness**”, and significantly propelled by the simple assumption on the level of reasonable ‘expertise’ of respondents on the subject matter in focus. Warwick and Lininger [1975:74] were similarly clear on such issues. In a more specific sense, this sampling method points to a systematic selection method or procedure in which the choice of a particular element into that sample does not in any way jeopardize the

chance of other elements of being selected into the same sample.

In terms of data gathering instruments, the Likert Scale type of questionnaire has been primarily utilized. The questionnaire method has been globally affirmed as the most popular instrument used by researchers, more especially when a large population is involved and resources are limited.

In arriving finally at the decision to use the **questionnaire** instrument, the research was again guided by the understanding that the bulk of information required cannot be obtained in generalized or even specialized statistical publications, or any “Who is Who” publications etc. The instrument of questionnaire could also give respondents enough time to think of suitable responses, especially when aided by good quality and interesting questions.

Very importantly, the research tried to ask questions that were straight, simple and unambiguous. The questions asked were also close ended, and were deliberately made so in order not to ask for too much from respondents. To each questions - five model answers for selection by respondents were provided, and as indicated above every answer was allotted a value or strength, based on its position on the scale of responses. However, considering that the respondents might express opinions that are not contained in the scaled responses, allowances were provided in order to allow respondents an option of a more “independent” response in a very few cases:-

This is represented by – “Others..... [Please, specify in the space provided]”.

This provision proved useful in the sense that it enabled the research to obtain some information that were vital to the study mainly on matters directly vital to the analysis of data.

For the purpose of **comparative analysis** of data generated by the diversity of respondents, the use of illustrative tables and percentages were adopted. The use of these statistical techniques was further justified by the **ordinal profile** of the study data, in addition to its **segmentation** into diverse but essentially exclusive categories.

A number of diverse works on integration in general, and international integration efforts at different levels and epochal periods have been subjected to a closer examination as a result of which this study was aided in gaining a reasonable measure of understanding on this all-encompassing and all-important subject of international integration and whose contemporary significance is coherently irrefutable.

A forceful effort was also made in the process of further appreciating integration in the context of Less Developed Countries [LDCs], especially in Sub-Saharan Africa hence the intense utilization of existing literature to facilitate a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of international integration especially in the context of global developments, the ECOWAS and West Africa. Again, as a consequence, the study examined several other publications obtained from the Abuja based headquarters of the ECOWAS, the ECOWAS official web site, the National Bureau of Statistics, the Central Bank of Nigeria, selected Missions of West African States and other private sources available in Nigeria like the Kaduna, Sokoto and Katsina States Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

In order to elicit responses capable of generating relevant information on this study, especially in relation to the **efficacy of ECOWAS [states and institutions]** as an economic integration body, and more so on the issue of general economic/political unification, economic development and **trade facilitation**,

relevant **hypotheses** were initiated. In addition, the ECOWAS was reviewed from the theoretical standpoint of **Structural-Functionalism**.

3. 3 Population of the study:

Robert Johnson, in his work titled *Elementary Statistics*, described population as a collection or set of individuals, objects or measurements whose properties are subjected to analysis. Margarate Peil's definition is however more relevant to this study having described population as "all the cases or individual that fit a certain specification" [1982]

Owing to the dearth of a formidable population statistics or data in many developing nations, and which consequently made it difficult, if not impossible to identify the elemental composition of a population, this study was compelled to proceed further without determining an appropriate sampling frame. This is a typical feature of population data in developing countries. It was in the light of the above, that the study deliberately identified and grouped its population into two broad categories.

3.3.1. The General Research Population

This is composed of people that make up the entire population in the West African sub-region. This means the total population of the citizens of the 15-member/nation states belonging to the ECOWAS organization or Community.

The Target Population

A target population is made up of persons that have been variously or specially selected or targeted for interview or questionnaire administration. For the purpose of this study, the population was been grouped as follows:

[A] Group One [Borderland Communities/Businessmen & Women in Niger, and Nigeria]

50 Residents/businessmen and women noted to be conducting business/trading activities of varying types in the town of Birnin-Konni [Niger Republic].

50 Residents/businessmen & women noted to be conducting business/trading activities of various types in the town of Maradi [Niger Republic].

100 Residents/businessmen & women noted to be conducting business/trading activities of various types in the towns of Illela and Jibia [100 each]

Sub-Total =200

[B] Group Two [Career diplomats/Banking & CBN/ECOBANK Mngt./KADCIMMA & KATCIMMA/Academics & Students of Intl. Rels. & Diplomacy]

10 senior staff of the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja [Nigeria].

20 Senior Staff of Missions of Selected ECOWAS member states [5 for each] - Ghana, Niger Republic, Sierra Leone and Benin Republic [two Anglophone, two francophone].

5 Top Executive Members of the ECOWAS Secretariat.

Sub-Total 35.

10 Senior Staff of Federal Ministry of Integration in Africa.

10 Senior Staff of the Foreign Ministry in Abuja.

10 Central Bank of Nigeria [CBN] Management Personnel.

10 Senior/Management Staff of ECOBANK Kaduna Branch, Nigeria.

10 Officials of the Kaduna and Katsina States Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture [five each].

Sub-Total 50.

20 Post-Graduate Students of ABU Zaria.

5 Academic Staff of International Relations Department, ABU Zaria.

Sub-Total 25.

[C] Group Three - Thirty Five Specially Recognized Individuals for Interview

Notable figures and past leaders, in addition to the following:

A Permanent Secretary, Federal Secretariat, Abuja.

Four Federal Directors and Deputy Directors, Abuja.

A member of the Sultanate Council, Sokoto.

A member of the Katsina Emirate Council.

A member of the Daura Emirate Council and the District Head of Jibia.

Two SSGs, from 2 northern states.

1 Permanent Secretary, Political, Cabinet Office.

The Director Security, Govt. House.

The Permanent Secretaries, Commerce from two States.

2 Comptrollers of Immigration.

2 Comptrollers of Customs.

Chairmen and Secretaries of SIX selected LGAs:

Sub-Total 35.

Summary of Total SAMPLE:

A. : 1. Group 1 = 200

2. Group 2 = 110

Sub-total.....310

B. : 1. Group 3 = 35

Grand total..... 345.

Some of the respondents mentioned above are considered vital to this study in view of the role they have played in the formation of the ECOWAS at different times, while others have been selected because of the strategic position they now occupy, which places them on a vantage point to discuss issues relating to the ECOWAS. A

number of others have fallen into the study sample as a result as their location in specific settlements or in view of their position as business personalities.

3.4 Study Sample and Sampling Procedure:

In most Social Science, related research activities, studying an entire population, say for example a population of an ECOWAS member nation is indeed not realistic or practically achievable. It is in the light of this realization that most if not all Social Science research works are constrained to operate within a “restrictive” size, out of the total population which is referred to as the “universe”. This is the core of the research strategy called SAMPLING - which denotes a selection of a population that has all the elements or characteristic features of the UNIVERSAL POPULATION. Concisely, sampling is therefore “a mechanism of choosing designated quantities or proportions as representations of whole population”. As noted above and in the case of this study, some of the characteristics that are readily notable include the following:

- All those sampled/respondents are citizens of the Community called or designated ECOWAS.
- All are viewed as experienced or knowledgeable enough, thus, are capable of expressing independent judgments and personal views and opinions of their own on the subject under study.
- Most [if not all] are also reasonably within the access of the research team.
- A good number of the sampled respondents were either retired notables, including past Heads of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, who were part of the ECOWAS process or the running/administration of the sub-

regional body, serving Civil Servants and Political leaders at Federal, State and LGAs. Others are Diplomats, or Residents of cities, commercial centers, traders and businessmen/women, scholars/students or ‘ordinary’ citizens residing or adjudged as doing business within the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderland communities or towns.

Indeed, the management of sample selection is a very critical and essential component of any social science or administrative research. Therefore, it is important to infuse a reasonable dose of expertise and professionalism in the process as noted Imoisili [1996] when he observed that the quality of the research data a researcher collects is often a product of the efficiency of a battery of instruments employed and very importantly these includes the selection of respondents.

3.5 Instrumentation:

Executing a research project such as an evaluative study on the ECOWAS, would require the use of a number of strategic techniques and instruments. One of the most notable techniques of obtaining data especially at the primary level of a Social Science research is the use of a **QUESTIONNAIRE method**. The questionnaire is an acceptable device or instrument used in collecting in a written form, the feelings, opinions, beliefs of a respondent, in addition to identifying some useful data regarding issues of age, professions, experiences etc. These are usually obtained through responses expressed as answers to a sequence of questions.

As earlier identified, the researcher adopted the use of the **LIKERT TYPE Model** of Questionnaire, very importantly in view of its ordinal feature, which is also

noteworthy in the assessment – valuation, scaling, and ranking of obtained responses. The ordinal scale is also used to measure essential attributes of the respondents and very importantly, it defines the relative position of objects or individuals with respect to a characteristic.

Respondents reacted by ticking appropriate boxes that were beside answers that were closer to their feelings.

As a veritable instrument for Social Science data collection, the instrument of Questionnaire remains most popular in terms of data gathering. Its key characteristics such as the value of anonymity granted respondents, uniformity in terms of outfit, consistency and standardization are also vital factors that led to its adoption as a data collection strategy for this evaluative study on the ECOWAS as an international integration body and more specifically its role as a tool for economic growth and development on a regional scale.

Notwithstanding the enormity of data obtained through the questionnaire device, this research has very importantly too made use of other methods of field data collection as follows:

- **Interview Method:** This is a vital tool for data collection in this research as the method was substantially used in this study especially in view of the caliber and profile of the personalities that make up the list of interviewees and more specifically this became most relevant in unearthing information from key players such as former Chairmen and ECOMOG field commanders.
- **Empirical Observation:** In this study, the researchers have also obtained substantial information from simple empirical observations. The researchers

took notes from informal discussions, in addition to observing vital conducts of officials on duty along border posts and roads leading to target settlements from Nigeria and within the ECOWAS regional secretariat and the foreign missions visited. Similarly, the researchers did observe the reaction of diverse nationalities with a view to noting their attitudes and mindsets on issues imperative to the coalition and with special reference to integration and intra-community trade.

The researchers have also monitored some radio and television programs in Kaduna, Katsina and Sokoto States. In Sokoto state, it was interestingly noted that there were exchanges of cultural programs between the State Television [*Rima* TV] and that of the State of Tawa in the Southern portion of Niger Republic. “The Program exchange was officially initiated”, a discussion with the Transmission Engineer of Isah 10- KW *Rima* TV Transmission Station, in Sokoto State, Nigeria, confirmed.

Goode et al [1952: 133] opined that most knowledge is derived from uncontrolled observation – participant and non-participant. Reflecting on this it must re-state that observation method as one of the major tools for primary data collection was also used. In the course of doing this, the study cautiously avoided biases and prejudices by carefully documenting and directly observing all that were meant to be observed.

In addition to the methods mentioned above, and in order to enhance the quality of data collected, the study further ensured that the questionnaire had additional qualities, as earlier noted, that best fit a standard research questionnaire and these are as follows:

- Utilitarian value or quality.
- Task directed relevance in relation to research objective.
- Consistency of flow.
- Clarity and legibility of presentation and outlook
- and Quantifiability in line with the most basic requirement for statistical data analysis and presentation.

3.6 Validation and Revalidation of Instruments:

Every questionnaire that desires to collect information that conforms to the objective of a standard research, indicating that it is eliciting the correct value in terms of respondents' reaction in view of its organization and presentation is considered valid for achieving its purpose. Added to the above also, is the observation that the questionnaire enables the study to draw conclusions that are not only valid but also most appropriate. For the purpose of this research, "validity" denotes the extent to which the data being collected are consistently relevant to the problem of the research.

In order to achieve all the above, the questionnaire instrument was passed through an evaluation process with the supervisors of the research taking the lead. The advice of other notable scholars of public administration and management sciences were sought for and their reactions were essentially very frank and had proved to be highly productive. This furthermore facilitated the adoption of a number of changes on the instrument. This process of validation and re-validation, which considered issues such as clarity of language/expressions, and clarity of instructions, clarity of variables and their relational links have jointly enhanced the

quality of the questionnaire instrument, thus making it a more reliable tool for data collection.

3.6.1. Pilot Study

Conducting a Social Science research in this part of the world where the dearth of properly organized data especially on a large scale, is prominently visible require that in collecting even the most basic social science data, a researcher has to pass through the rigors of a pilot study. This is even more necessary in view of the subject matter. The idea behind the strategy of ‘pilot study’ is to provide a more effective basis for testing the reliability of instruments adopted for a research, which again is best demonstrated by consistency and repeatability of results. Another factor that necessitated this type of ‘trial runs’ or *pilot study* is the fact that the sample size is relatively large in addition to being fundamentally diverse in outlook.

It is in the light of the above, and the desire for attaining an acceptable level of internal consistency, that it became expedient to subject the study questionnaire and other instruments to pilot and reliability tests. Randomly, fifty questionnaires were presented to members of the Community who were essentially in Kaduna and its environs. These members were viewed as competent to respond to the questionnaire especially in view of their multi-faceted characteristics. The result elicited, confirmed the reliability of the study instruments and their appropriateness.

These tests also enabled the identification of a few ambiguities for correction. Subsequent to this was the emergence of the final questionnaire for the study. In addition, the pilot studies equally aided in the final determination of the most

appropriate methodology for data analysis.

3.7 Administration of Questionnaire Instrument:

After taking note of the incompetence of the Nigerian postal system, the idea of mailing the study questionnaires was dropped. They were therefore delivered directly and personally to individual respondents, using a few Research Assistants. Even though this method of delivery was practically more “tasky”, and very expensive in most cases, the research is fundamentally of the opinion that this delivery method was the most assuring delivery system, and in terms of response, it helped to augment the questionnaire return rate, as past social science research works have indicated. By questionnaire return rate, we are making inference to the volume or number of questionnaires returned and filled vis-à-vis the total number sent or given to respondents. At the end, we were further convinced to conclude that it was more effective in terms of cost even though time consuming.

3. 8 Secondary Data:

In the course of this research, a very extensive use of secondary sources in order to collect relevant data of both quantitative and non-quantitative nature was made. Key amongst data collected through secondary sources included data on essential variables of the four hypotheses postulated - such as regional integration, regionalism, regional security, relevant agencies of states in Nigeria and Niger Republic, profiles on trade and tariffs, intra-community trade, population data of member states, economic profile and trade data of member-states, sub-regional communication infrastructure, ECOWAS decisions and protocols. Others are information on borderland communities, checkpoints, pre-colonial and post-colonial structure of West Africa, and the structure of the ECOWAS organization.

These secondary data in addition to the others not pointed above were obtained from diverse sources such as journals, reports, bulletins, and principally too, much was obtained from UNCTAD, EU, CBN, ECOWAS Commission, ECOBANK, Federal Bureau of Statistics, World Bank, SADC, ILO, ECA.

Textbooks, Newspapers, and Magazines also formed a sizeable chunk of secondary data used in this research.

3.9 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis:

Within the context of this research, as Kerlinger [1979:12] noted analysis of research data makes direct inference to categorizing, ordering, manipulating, and summarizing data collected.

As a prelude to the process of data presentation and analysis, it was necessary to commence by closely re-examining the returned questionnaires, in addition to collating the responses of all the questionnaires returned. The collation of information was purposely done to provide for effective computer data entry and analysis.

The techniques of data analysis adopted were dominantly descriptive and inferential statistics. These techniques made possible for the study to adopt the methodical techniques or approach that have been amply offered by Simple Percentages, most of which were presented in tabular forms. The selection of this statistical technique was informed by the Survey character of this research, coupled with the need to analyze the hypotheses presented and the general data collected on a comparative basis. Another vital consideration was the “grouped” structure of the study data collected, in addition to the need for bringing out data comparisons between and within groups. These two popular techniques were of enormous value

in helping the study to profile meaningfully its data in descriptive and even organizational terms.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ECOWAS COALITION, INTEGRATION, TRADE FACILITATION & THE NIGERIAN STATE.

4.1 Introduction to the Background of the ECOWAS:

In this segment of our fourth chapter in our study on the ECOWAS coalition, an effort would be made at closely telescoping the diversity of ECOWAS as an historical entity as well as its geo-political landscape. From an appreciation of West Africa in its geographical form, we would be examining the rise and fall of the great empires of pre-colonial West Africa, the intrusion of colonialism and the consequent collapse of the great empires. The effects of these essential historical developments would also be focused in this section of our study. We shall also trail through the contours of significant challenges such as those of neo-colonization, sub-regional security and the inevitable rise of the ECOMOG option and very importantly, how the Nigerian state performed within the coalition. A brief and expeditious survey of the political landscape of Cote d’Ivoire, one of key francophone, also believed to be the strongest economically and therefore one of the group’s leading voices would also be core segment of the study. This in particular is with a view to demonstrating some of the critical challenges of instability that bedeviled a number of ECOWAS countries.

4.1.1 West Africa: A Physical and Geographical Sketch:

Geographically and physically, West Africa is very diverse. It has desert landscapes as well as tropical rain forest. The rain forests of West Africa covered most of the sub-region's coastlines. This rain forest also grows some of the world's best-prized hardwood trees such as Mahogany and *Iroko*. The invading "traders" and colonizers of Western European descent overwhelmingly exploited this enormous geographical layout.

Most West Africans are farmers and are heavily reliant on seasonal rainfall for their livelihood. Sometimes, especially along the Sahel, drought and poor harvests are experienced. In the Sudano-Sahelian belt, animal herding is a major economic activity. In terms of climatic conditions, it is wetter down and most especially towards the coastline. In the northern parts of the Sub-region, it tends to be drier.

One of the most outstanding physical features of West Africa is its several rivers and more especially the River Niger, which runs for over 4181 kilometers. These rivers, especially the Niger are hugely supportive of rich fish stocks in addition to being a source for hydro-electric energy, serving the hugely populated Nigeria and to a lesser extent Niger Republic, under a special supply agreement.

A UN definition of West Africa has expressed that it is the Western most region of the Africa continent encompassing 15 or 16 countries. The region is distributed over an area of 6,140,000 km² i.e. equivalent to 1/5 of the African continent. As earlier noted, the vast majority of West Africa is mainly plains, lying less than 300 meters above sea level. Some isolated high points also exist especially along the southern shores, [United Nations, 1999].

Historically, West Africa has had an experience of Slave trade and was

significantly noted for being a key participant in the famous trans-Saharan trade, which pervaded through most of North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The existence of several languages and cultures are also a major feature of the old West Africa as well as contemporary West Africa. Its history of colonization is also of great socio-economic and political impact and connotation - thus cannot be disregarded when assembling whatever type of document with reference to most aspects of its development.

Several member states of the ECOWAS were part of the process for creating a variety of African and sometimes non-African bodies and organizations aimed at facilitating and promoting their collective and individual interests. These include organizations like the West African Monetary Union or *Union Economique et Monetaire oust-Africaine* [UEMOA], Liptako-Gourma Authority etc. The former is made up of 8 members, mostly French speaking and was principally established as a common currency organization employing the use of the *CFA Franc*. The later was established to essentially facilitate development of the contiguous areas of its three-member states of Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso. [http://www.africanculturalcenter.org/1_3_west.html].

Further to the profile displayed above, one of the main objectives in this chapter is to elaborate and discuss the pivotal basis upon which the ECOWAS as an organization of West African states was created. In addition, the study would also be closely examining salient issues such as the composite setting of the sub-region in terms of its peoples and their histories; characterization of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial West Africa; the making of the union of West African states; the crises of instability and insecurity and the rise of the ECOMOG as a home-grown security and defense initiative of the ECOWAS coalition.

Another vital sub-topic discussed under this segment of our study in a slightly more detailed form is the Nigerian State and its diplomatic or relational link to the ECOWAS especially between the reign of the IBB presidency and 2005, a period of twenty years.

In the course of addressing the key subjects raised in this chapter, the research would be delving further into unearthing the experiential-cum-pragmatic issues and forces that have in the past several decades fashioned and directed the evolution of the states and nations that make up the sub-regional body. Also to be examined is how these configurations, observable in the past and now have influenced the formation and the consequent outlook or even the efficacy of the ECOWAS coalition.

4. 1. 2 Pre-colonial West Africa:

Understanding West Africa from the perspective of history is vital therefore a study like this must begin by noting that the West African sub region was made up of distinct societies and cultures prior to the intrusive influence of the forces of colonization. In the earlier parts of this presentation, the great empires and kingdoms of **Ghana, Mali and Songhai** and their predominant influences, which affected the molding of pre-colonial societies in this part of the world, were distinctly identified. These pervasive influences were in a variety of areas such as **technology, trade, commerce, arts, scholarship, religion, administration and governance.**

The Great West African empires existed between 1000 AD and 1500 AD and **they were known to have effectively controlled trans-Saharan trade, taxing the caravans carrying gold, slaves from sub-Saharan West Africa and those**

carrying weapons and textiles from North Africa as exhibited in the works of Diop [1990].

The **Kanem-Bornu Empire** and Uthman Bin-Fodio's led **Sokoto Caliphate**, were also great empires that were vital in scripting the history of pre-colonial West Africa. Kanem-Bornu was a spectacular African state in the Lake Chad region and it lasted for about 1000 years - from the ninth to the nineteenth century. The *Kanuri's* who founded the Kanem-Bornu Empire were a mixed Negroid and Berber people living east of Lake Chad. The **Trans-Saharan trade** brought tremendous prosperity to the empire in addition to the influence of **Islamic religion**.

In the Kanem-Bornu Empire, the 16th century was one of improved expansion and power especially under Idris Alooma, who had acquired firearms from **North African Turks**. In the 18th century, the empire inescapably declined with the apparent rise of the Sokoto Caliphate. Other factors also influenced the decline of the great Kanem-Bornu Empire.

The pronouncement of Jihad or holy war by Uthman Bin-Fodio [1754-1817] in 1804 marked the unassailable beginning of the Sokoto Caliphate and its subsequent imperious influence, which transcended into present day Niger Republic in the north, and to the Oyo Kingdom in the South. The caliphate went beyond Adamawa highlands, and into the present day Cameroon. The great Gobir, a Hausa Kingdom had collapsed and the Jihadists had killed its *Habe* King by 1808. Following the disintegration of Gobir Kingdom, Uthman Bin-Fodio had to shift his attention to **Kanem-Bornu**, located on the eastern flank of the caliphate, which he considered as “practicing an unacceptable brand of Islam”, in view of its adulteration with traditional and customary practices. Bin-Fodio's advancement towards Bornu was

however check-mated by the Bornu forces and partly too by the diplomatic exchanges between Bin-Fodio and the leadership of the Bornu Empire on the state of Islam in Bornu. This outline has been more adequately catalogued in Y.B. Usman's *Studies in the History of Sokoto Caliphate* [1979]

With the demise of Uthman Bin-Fodio, his Son Muhammad Bello, himself an erudite scholar, took over the mantle of leadership and expanded the caliphate southwards into *Yoruba* land, thus challenging the then famous Yoruba state of Oyo. One of the vital effects of the *Fulani* invasion of Yoruba **Kingdom of Oyo** was the breaking away of the **Kingdom of Dahomey**, in what is now referred to as Benin Republic.

The Kingdom of Dahomey was prior to colonization a powerful and **centralized state** with an efficient **system of taxation** and it had an **organized army**, which played a key role in liberating itself from the imperial dominance of the Oyo kingdom. In addition, with the suppression of **slave trade**, the Kingdom derived its resources from the exploitation of its copiously laid **palm plantations**, which though not under direct state control, were proficiently taxed. When the **French** finally suppressed the kingdom, it was estimated that Dahomey had over 40 million **palm trees**.

Many students of History view the **Ashanti Kingdom**, as the most powerful and geographically most extensive forest state. It was positioned in what is now Ghana, prior to colonization. From Lynne Rienner's [1998] account of the socio-economic development of Africa through the colonial period to independence, it became clearly possible to note that - economically, the kingdom derived its wealth from the production of **Gold dust**, which it traded with the **British, Danish and Dutch** traders on the coast, consequently the region became known to **Europeans** as the

Gold Coast. The kingdom finally fell to **British forces** in 1896, following series of battles.

At the mouth of the Senegal River were also a lot of trading activities especially in **Groundnuts and Gum Arabic**. The inland Wolof **State of Futa-Toro** influenced this trade. Moreover, in response to the growing influence of Futa-Toro, the **French forces** attacked, sacked the state, following which they [the French] established a protectorate over the region. Over the course of the 19th.century, **Sierra Leone** grew extensively with the settlement of **freed African slaves** there and by the beginning of the 1820s, a group of freed African-Americans began settling to the East of Sierra-Leone in a region that later earned the name **Liberia**. Liberia was established as an independent nation in the 1870s [Adu A.Boahen, 1964, 1966].

4.1. 3 Colonial West Africa:

In line with Crawford's position [1997], Colonialism denotes one country's domination of another country or people - usually achieved through aggressive, often military, action-and the territory acquired in this manner. There have been diverse types of colonies in the past 500 years. The most notable were colonies of exploitation [e.g. Nigeria and Ghana], colonies of settlement [e.g. New Zealand and Australia] and colonies of contested settlement [e.g. Algeria and Southern Rhodesia]. Evidence had indicated that many colonizers established more than one type of colonies. This study would be looking at West Africa's colonies of exploitation. To this colony type, belonged most of British, French and Portuguese colonies that today constitute what we refer to as member-states of the ECOWAS.

Colonies of exploitation also referred to as tropical dependencies, did not attract

large European settlers. Europeans were in these colonies primarily as planters, administrators, merchants, or military officers. In these colonies, political control and where necessary “force” was employed to contain any resistance by the native populations as enunciated by Lewis’s [1987] description of pivotal events in the drive towards colonization of Africa. Furthermore, colonies of exploitation essentially had their economies based on the products produced by the local population in own land or plantations. These colonies primarily produced crops that served as raw materials to the growing industries of Western Europe, especially the colonizing powers.

In order to further understand colonialism, it is essential it is reviewed from the confines of its salient motives. Firstly, most colonization efforts were propelled by the national self-interest of the colonizing nation. Concisely, three key motives were noted as reasons for establishing colonies the world over and these were “Gold, God and Glory”, but the greatest incentives for colonization were fundamentally economic [Davidson: 1995, Chamberlain: 1999]. Some scholars further added religious and strategic motives.

4.1.4 British West Africa

Britain began establishing trading posts on the West African coast in the 18th.century. By the early part of the 20th century the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, British Togoland, Nigeria, and the British Cameroons had all been established as British Colonies. British Togo land and Gold Coast, which were administered together, became the independent state of Ghana in 1957. Nigeria became independent in 1960 and in 1961; the Northern part of British Cameroons became part of Nigeria, while the South merged with the newly independent Cameroon, formerly under the administration of the French. Sierra Leone became

independent in 1961 and the Gambia in 1965. [Chamberlain, 1999]

4.1.5 French and Portuguese West Africa

French West Africa was one of the largest colonial possessions of a colonizing force in Africa. This “possession” was made up of eight independent nations: Senegal, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Between 1854 and 1865, the French journeyed up the Senegal River and into the interior of present day Senegal and Southern Mauritania. In 1860s, France began to establish trade and military posts on the coast of Dahomey and in 1883; they succeeded in establishing a protectorate over Porto-Novo, adjoining Dahomey.

By early 1890s, France formally established Cote d’Ivoire and French Guinea as colonies, conquered the Kingdom of Dahomey and subdued its northern portion where the present-day Burkina Faso is located, and by the end of the 19th century, the French had established control over most of West Africa [Wesseling, 1996].

During the Second World War [1939-1945], French West Africa was initially loyal to the German-dominated Vichy government of France. Nevertheless, in 1942, following the US invasion of North Africa and the occupation of Dakar, Senegal by allied forces, French West Africa became free French territory under General Charles de Gaulle. After the war, these colonies were made overseas territories, making their inhabitants French citizens in addition to securing the right to representation in the French legislature, and the right to form political parties as a result. By 1958, these countries were given the option of complete political independence or that of being self-governing entities of the newly created French community. This community had been designed to provide for cooperation on common issues such as foreign affairs, defense and higher education. It was only

French Guinea that opted not to join the French community, becoming formally independent in 1958 [Royle, 1996]. All the French West African states, at the end, opted for independence, thus quitting from the so-called French community.

In an elaborate treatise on Guinea-Bissau, the only Portuguese colony on West Africa mainland, Bigman [1993], noted that the little West African nation had a history that was largely incomprehensible or obscure. She added that records have however indicated that the former Portuguese colony had the *Balante* and *Pepel* tribes fully established since the 12th. Century and it rose to be an important slave trade centre with the visit in 1446 by a notable Portuguese slave trader known as Nuno Tristao. By 1687, the Portuguese had fully established its post at Bissau. This drew Portugal into a dispute with the French and British colonizers, which was later settled with the signing of a treaty in 1886. Effective control of this territory by the Portuguese was however achieved only in 1915.

Guinea-Bissau was granted independence following a protracted struggle and battle led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde [PAIGC], under the legendary Amilca Cabral, who became its President on September 10, 1974. Cabral moved towards establishing socialism in Guinea Bissau by nationalizing all landholdings and state monopoly over international trade as Joshua Forrest articulated [1992] in his post colonization study of Guinea-Bissau. In 1980, Amilca Cabral was however, deposed following a military coup.

4.1.6 West Africa and Neo-Colonialism:

The growing weakness of colonizing forces coupled with the agitations of Africans in addition to emerging global changes, made the introduction of “reforms” in the newly independent states necessary. Across French West Africa, elections of local

government officials were allowed in return for agreement to maintain close economic ties with France. This was also succinctly displayed in Robert's *History of the African People* [1997].

In 1946, the CFA franc, a common West African currency was established, and it exchanged at a fixed rate with the French franc. In addition, assured also, was that all France's decolonizing African territories would continue to bank, invest and trade with France.

The decolonizing processes in British colonies were essentially more haphazard. It was however, more African driven in its initiative, with Gold Coast providing the initial lead in 1957. Thereafter, other independent processes were fashioned by factors such as agreement on leadership and forms of government, a fact equally confirmed by Low in his - *The Eclipse of the Empire* [1991]. In between 1960 and 1964, most sub-Saharan British colonies became independent.

In order to keep a tab on their colonies, the British Empire created what was formally known as the **British Commonwealth**, similar to what the French did. The difference however, was that, what later turned out to be the Commonwealth of Nations is a worldwide association of nations and their dependencies, whose members share a common commitment to promoting human rights, democracy and economic development. All members accept the British monarch, the queen as the symbolic head of the Commonwealth.

Members of the Commonwealth share many customs and traditions because of their association with Britain. Many have their governmental, judicial and educational institutions modeled after that of the British. English is the official language of most former British colonies. This was best illustrated in Trevor's

Wind of Change [1996] in which a graphic narration of Africa in the final days of the British Empire is visibly illustrated.

More importantly, members of the Commonwealth have for the past several decades, maintained major economic links between themselves. In some cases, economic ties were preserved under a system of **mutual tariff preferences** as sufficiently noticed Palmer [1996]. Set up in 1932, the mutual tariff preferences sought to eliminate British duties on certain exports, thus “benefiting” the less developed members of the Commonwealth group. In return, these countries favored Britain in their imports of certain manufactured goods. However, the importance of this tariff regime became significantly eroded and challenged with the increase of British trade with other industrialized countries, especially in Europe, and more with the growing significance of the European Union. Similarly, a number of notable scholars such as Mansergh [1969] observed that most commonwealth nations diversified their economies and found new trading partners outside the ambit of the Commonwealth.

4. 1.7 The Making of the ECOWAS Union – The Key Factors:

The ECOWAS was set up in 1975 as a reaction to vital developments that had dotted the global terrain and very importantly for the following elemental reasons:

[1] The body was to provide an appropriate institutional framework to compliment the numerous development initiatives of member West African states directed towards accelerated growth and development on a sustainable basis.

[2] The invasive and essentially negative effects of global economic and political policies, which were affecting the African continent and particularly West Africa in various ways and they were fundamentally disruptive. The Middle East crisis

that precipitated the Arab-Israeli war and the consequent effect on oil prices was a case in point. The development adversely affected the weak economies of most West African countries, because of the constraints it posed to their national budgets.

[3] The success of economic regionalism in other parts of the world, especially Europe from 1957, when the treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was adopted, also triggered the formal establishment of structures to facilitate regional integration as an initiative of the West African states.

[4] The apparent reluctance of the world richest and most industrialized nations to assist the Less Developed Countries [LDCs] during challenging periods of economic turmoil and decline.

Analysts and scholars have noted the rise of the ECOWAS and other regional bodies such as the SADCC, as reflecting effectively the spirit of **Pan Africanism**. Pan Africanism was pre-occupied with the need for regional integration as the means towards African continental unity, and the recovery of African dignity and status in global affairs. These principles were profoundly enshrined in both the OAU Treaty of 1963 and the Lagos plan of action of 1980 and the Final Act of Lagos.

With all the above factors, which were both internal and external, the desirability for a sub-regional/cooperative approach to issues of development in West Africa became more significantly expedient in the minds of leaderships in the diverse nations of West Africa. As pronounced in the earlier part of this study, on May 28 1975, the Heads of States and Governments of the fifteen independent countries in the sub-region signed the treaty establishing the ECOWAS in Lagos, Nigeria.

Sesay [1985] in one of his erudite works on ECOWAS further identified three major reasons that stimulated the formation of the body as follows:

[1] Markets in individual West African nations were too small and therefore incapable of promoting accelerated development in most countries within the sub-region. The creation of the ECOWAS was therefore to facilitate the emergence of a larger market that could invigorate the regional economy.

[2] That by their integrative pursuits, members of ECOWAS could effectively consolidate and strengthen their newly won independence.

[3] That, as severally mentioned, ECOWAS member nations believed that a lot could be learned from successful integration efforts of Western Europe.

As pertinently defined earlier, the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] was established in 1975 with the central aim of promoting cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activity within the West African sub-region, leading also to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of member states. ECOWAS integration policies and programs are influenced by the prevailing economic conditions in member-countries, the need to take the principal provisions of the AEC treaty into account, and relevant developments on the international scene.

The **revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993**, which was to extend economic and political cooperation among member states, designated the **achievement of the common market and a single currency** as economic objectives, while in the political sphere it provided for a **West African parliament, an economic and social council and an ECOWAS Court of Justice**. The treaty formally also

assigned the Community with the responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts.

4.1.8 Structure of the “ECOWAS Organization”

The Community consists of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Community Tribunal, the ECOWAS Parliament, the Executive Secretariat and 6 specialized Commissions.

The Authority of Heads of State/Government of member states is the supreme institution of the Community and is composed of Heads of states and/ or Government of member states and it is responsible for the general direction and control of the Community and take all measures to ensure its progressive development and the realization of its objectives. This body in addition to several other strategic functions principally determines the general policy and vital guidelines of the Community. The ‘Authority’ gives directives as well as harmonizes and coordinates the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social policies of member states.

The **Council of Ministers** comprises of Ministers in charge of ECOWAS affairs and any other minister of each member state responsible for the functioning and development of the Community. In addition to several other vital duties, the Council makes recommendation to the Authority on any action aimed at attaining the objectives of the Community in addition to serving as appointing authority to all statutory appointees other than the Executive Secretary [whose appointment is determined by the Authority of Heads of State] and by the powers delegated to it by the Authority, the Council also issues directives on matters concerning coordination and harmonization of economic integration policies.

The ECOWAS treaty provides for a **Community Tribunal**, whose composition and competence are determined by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. It is responsible for interpreting the provisions of the treaty and settles disputes between member states that are referred to it.

The **Executive Secretary** operates the **Executive Secretariat** of the Community. At the Summit of 1999, a restructuring of the Secretariat was approved and two positions of Deputy Executive Secretaries in charge of Economic Cooperation and Policy Harmonization were created. The ECOWAS Commission currently replaces this.

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security emerged out of an agreed protocol following the ECOWAS Summit of December 1999. It also has a Council of Elders and a Security Mediation Council, whose members are drawn from Benin, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Togo.

In order to facilitate the attainment of the broad objectives of the Community eight **Specialized Commissions** were established as follows:

1. Food and Agriculture;
2. Industry, Science, Technology and Energy;
3. Environment and Natural Resources;
4. Transport, Communication and Tourism;
5. Trade, Customs, Taxation, Statistics, Money and Payments;

6. Political, Judicial and Legal affairs, Regional Security and Immigration;
7. Human Resources, Information, Social and Cultural Affairs; and
8. Administration and Finance.

Each Commission comprises of representatives of each member state and if it deems fit, may establish or set up a subsidiary to assist in carrying out its work. In recent years however, the ECOWAS assumed a different structure with the conversion of its Secretariat to a **COMMISSION**. This was achieved under the leadership Dr Mohammed Ibn-Chambas.

October 1999, saw the birth of the **ECOWAS Court of Justice** in Abuja, Nigeria. The Court's major functions include addressing complaints from member states and institutions of the ECOWAS, as well as issues relating to defaulting nations. The Court has a President, Chief Registrar and seven judges.

In May 2002, the **ECOWAS Parliament** was convened with 115 members in attendance from all member states except Cote d'Voire. Membership is constituted from the membership of the national parliaments of member nations. The ECOWAS parliament is situated in Abuja, Nigeria. Presently it acts in an advisory and consultative capacity only. A Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria [FRCN] report in May 2007 quoted the then ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas, in a press conference, saying that, apart from having a parliament with proper legislative powers, all ECOWAS parliamentarians would in the nearest future be directly elected.

4.1.9 The Strategic Imperative of ECOWAS Peace and Security

Peace and Security related activities have been a major area of great concern to the

ECOWAS owing to the prevalence of events that were highly distressing in several member states. The ECOWAS therefore considered it imperative to get directly involved in conflict resolution processes within the sub-region. **Member states have predicated their direct involvement in West African conflicts following the realization that for economic development to be attained regional peace and stability must be properly established in the sub-region.** To this end, member states realized the imperativeness for taking the following strategic steps:

[1] The adoption of a **Protocol Relating to Non-Aggression [PNA]** on 22nd April 1978, which enjoined members to “refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression” against one another.

[2] The signing of another **Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance and Defense [PMAD]** in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May 1981 was effected. By this, members were committed to a collective defense treaty, noting vitally that armed aggression against one constituted an aggression or threat against the Community. The coalition also resolved to give mutual aid and assistance for defense.

The ECOWAS **Regional Mechanism for Conflict Resolution** provides a framework for regional intervention in political crises in member states with **ECOMOG** as the adopted regional intervention force.

Subsequent security related agreements include the ECOWAS Conventions on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and on Extradition signed in Dakar 29th July 1992 and on 6th August 1994, the Declaration on the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, was adopted by the Authority of the ECOWAS. Equally adopted were a number of supplementary

protocols e.g. the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and as part of efforts to combat cross-border criminal activities, ECOWAS Police Chiefs and Interior Ministers have over the years been working on establishing the region's Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau. In addition, there exist a number of multi-lateral arrangements within the confines of the ECOWAS. For example, between Nigeria and Niger and between Benin Republic and Nigeria outstanding efforts have been jointly put towards cross border crime control.

4.1.10 Structural and Cognitive Challenges facing the ECOWAS

The most precarious challenge facing the Coalition has since its inauguration been how it could best transform the commitment of member nations into “concrete and viable action plans” that are sustainable. For the purpose of this study, we shall be reflecting on the problems that stand against the success of the group as follows:

- Pronounced existence of parallel and vehemently parochial divisive allegiances. This is being further accentuated by the overbearing pressures put on weaker nations, because of their over dependence on foreign aids.
- Poor economic structures, worsened by weak domestic currencies coupled by the mono-product nature of their economies. These have combined to make their economies generally uncomplimentary and internally less competitive.
- Inability to create an original integrative scheme that is indigenously unique in content, objective and strategy. Most of the coalition's activities are believed to be imitative of other successful bodies in other parts of the world whose economic foundations have been soundly erected. To many observers, this is only indicative of the leaderships' inability to appreciate

the uniqueness, diversities and enormity of challenges that normally confront this scale of integration efforts - socio-economic, political and technical.

- The question of “environmental unsuitability” as drawn by Ravenhill [1985], in a study on regionalism in Africa identified critical features of Africa that have made the environmental terrain difficult for integrative action or pursuits. Those readily noted are a confirmation of Sesay’s earlier observations; low level of contemporary intra-African trade, non-complimentarity of African economies, poor infrastructural facilities, language diversity, persistent colonial links, huge debt overhang and its detrimental consequences on adjustment and investment efforts [Kornai,1980], poor domestic currencies and the apparent lack of properly trained work force.
- Failure of the initial treaty establishing the body and by implication indicating “vision failure”, on the part of the founding fathers - to effectively encompass or include possibilities of violent conflicts that may arise as a result of the colonial and neo-colonial structure of the sub-region, in addition to the inability to formulate appropriate containment strategies. A body like ECOWAS should have envisaged these possibilities and thus incorporated best ways, practices and methods of strategic containment, more so, in view of identity related conflict scenarios that have characterized the newly “independent” that had been ravaged by colonization and imperialism. This situation negatively affected the security landscape of the Sub-region, thus making it impossible for effective economic integration.

4.1.11 The Crises of Identity, Instability in Post-Colonial West Africa:

In this segment of the study, efforts towards explicating the foundational roots of the highly visible crises that over the decades have become an integral part of post-colonial West Africa in general were made. It is therefore imperative to present a coherent profile of the crises that have bedeviled these burgeoning states of the sub-region.

As a step towards illustrating the nature and configuration of nation-states in contemporary West Africa, the study closely focused on Nigeria, vividly identifying the challenges posed by these readily identifiable crises and how they affected or undermined the process of West African integration. In addition, the study located the Nigerian state within the overall integration process as a strategic partner and more closely telescoping her roles on issues of refugees, ECOMOG, regional economy etc.

The ECOMOG as a “homegrown” response to the profuse crises in West Africa as can be seen has been intimately elucidated in all sections of this portion of the study. Colonial antecedents coupled with the direction of state policy have been identified as the most critical factors that have coalesced to configure the outlook of post-colonial West Africa. This view is generally held by the positions of Davidson [1995] and very importantly Mazrui [1986]. Even with the rise of independent states in West Africa, very diminutive transformation had taken place, most of which were only reflected in personnel changes as sufficiently reported Ake [1980].

There are several features many scholars of post-colonization have noted that are significantly conspicuous in most African states, and these discernible features

were noticeable irrespective of the systemic profile of these states - unitary or federal. Attenuating diversities in terms of ethnicity or institutional setting was never part of the re-organization of the post-colonial states of West Africa, not even symbolically.

It is most interesting to note that the split of citizenship as local and state governments remained largely exclusionary in normative and practical terms. These splits were in terms of rights and privileges conferment, usually reflecting a given label - “natives”, “indigenes”, “settlers” or “immigrants”, all in the same country. In most countries belonging to this neo-colonial framework, issues of access to jobs, scholarship/grants, education, appointments and even access to micro-credit schemes/facilities are determined using some arithmetical formula. In some countries, this is enshrined in the constitution, while in others, the issues raised are conventionally determined.

The counter-productive consequence of this policy in most scenarios is not in dispute, having placed ethnic identity over and above any salient national factor as a basis for granting social rights and state entitlements. An all encompassing result of this practice is that the central state becomes an arena of ethnically based contest, where in several cases, the most dominant and powerful ethnic groups submerge and to a larger extent exclude the lesser ones, in addition to denying them the benefits of citizenship. The repercussion of this situation further undermines the integrity and cohesive potentials of state, which already was based on a fragile foundation, more so as the principle of greater national territorial loyalty and citizenship is supplanted by a profoundly more micro principle of loyalty to ethnically based community.

4.1.12 Post Colonial Nigeria as a ‘SUB-SET’ of ECOWAS West Africa.

It is interesting to note and commence with a discussion on the position of pioneer leaders of Nigeria on the issue of Nigerian unity for example. Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first Prime Minister had declared in parliament that “since the amalgamation of southern and northern protectorates in 1914, Nigeria had existed as one country only on paper...still far from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country”. Similarly, Obafemi Awolowo, one of Nigeria’s most formidable leaders during the same period, wrote in the *Path to Nigerian Freedom* [1947] that “Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’; the word “Nigeria” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within Nigeria and those who do not.” Perhaps it is possible to note that very little difference exist between the views of this earlier generation of leaders and the views of several scholars and observers in contemporary Nigeria.

Under colonialism, state structures and institutions were instrument of repression and domination and are today effectively adapted and utilized for the purpose or exigency of post-colonial politics. These structures such as the police, military and intelligence corps are persistent and in addition constitute the bedrock of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes not only in Nigeria at various times but in most African states. This produced “command structure” experience especially in post-colonial West Africa, which later and in most of these states resulted in the erection of “Centralized Presidentialism” in addition to vehemently inhibiting the construction of genuine state structures based on true democratic ideals. Again, the backlash effect of this setting is pertinently evident with the apparent weakening of the capacity of state to deliver and be ordinarily trusted by the general public. Even

when efforts are made towards democratization, such efforts end up appallingly failing.

O'Connell [1967], tersely noted in his article - "The Inevitability of Instability" in the *Journal of African Studies*, that it is impossible to genuinely democratize in British-Africa because of the defective foundation on which British colonizers built, more so, in view of the realization that; the new "ruling elites" created did not receive any training in democratic principles and practices, and had to use an inherited colonially-oriented bureaucracy that was chiefly mischievously dictatorial in function and activities; so also were the Armed Forces and the Police, which functionally operated and continued to operate like a colonial force, to the utmost detriment of the generality of the citizenry. This orientation sadly gave birth to the practice of combining powers of the executive, legislature and the judiciaries in the hands of the new African political elites, enabling them behave like their colonial predecessors, O'Connell [1967] further asserted. At the end, this gave Africa and West Africans in particular a **governance infrastructure** constructed on an authoritarian foundation and which relied heavily on governance by draconian laws and decrees that were largely "anti-people".

In addition, as civil and political liberties and rights were gradually more and more withdrawn or even foreclosed, the gulf between the state and citizens turn out to be more enhanced. This development without any doubt, generated what Adejumobi [2001] described as "hidden spaces of solidarity and resistance by groups - ethnic, religious, civic etc, whose identity formation, mobilization and activities became contradictory and conflictual to the state in the political process" adding that the state in post colonial context has failed to provide a strong and a dependable "trans-ethnic or secular national identity" for its citizens, nor has it been able to

effectively safeguard the true and sacred values of citizenship. Adejumbi, further posited that, the state is “submerged in a cesspool of sectarian struggles - ethnic, racial, religious”, as its internal processes and constitutive rules are essentially determined by those social elements. A Nigerian newspaper publication once declared on its front page that “South Roars, Says - its either presidency or confederacy” following a sectarian meeting of leaders comprising of Governors, Ministers, Traditional Rulers and socio-political leaders of Southern Nigerian extraction, which at the end also resolved that the “presidency post-2007 must be zoned to either the South-South which has never tested the plum job or the South-East which merely sniffed it for six months” said the *Daily Sun*, a Nigerian newspaper. Another newspaper carried an advertorial depictive of a typical elite conflict scenario, signed by a leader of a Kano based Youth Network Forum [YNF], apparently a “pro-establishment” organization. Its content essentially “chastised” the former governor of the state, and one time Federal Defense Minister, for allegedly making efforts to “destabilize” the state by deploying all antics and missiles at his disposal not to help in developing the State but in undermining it”, the advert maintained [*Daily Trust*]. The former Governor was accused of using a large chunk of the state’s youth population ‘loyal’ to him, to intimidate, assault and insult members of the public. According to the publication, the former governor trained the youth to specialize in acts of treachery, in addition to saying that the Federal Minister was working towards influencing the appointment of the State Commissioner of Police, may likely facilitate the intimidation of Kano people, against the exercise of their franchise rights in 2007, the advert continued. Further careful review of Newspapers in Nigeria, portrays that in the recent past, the Nigerian state has witnessed a gale of impeachments of state governors, leading to the removal of governors of Anambra, Ekiti and Plateau States. Most interesting was the realization that these impeachment processes have

been viewed as a flagrant abuse of legislative, judicial and executive powers, under the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Another demonstration of elite conflict was the apparent feud between the then President of Nigeria Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and his deputy Atiku Abubakar. This was especially triggered by Atiku Abubakar's opposing posture on Obasanjo's bid for what had been popularly referred to as the "third term agenda" or 'tenure elongation'. According authoritative sources, these conflicts have brought to the fore the reality of 'elite fragmentation' in Nigeria particularly and in Africa generally. The Obasanjo-Atiku conflict as a result had undermined the cohesiveness of the Nigerian presidency, which also as a result negatively impacted on governance and political stability in Nigeria and the entire West African sub-region by implication.

Another issue closely associated with the above observations was that of the reliability or preparedness of the nation's chief electoral body INEC [Independent National Electoral Commission], which conducted the April 2007 elections adjudged by international observers as most widely rigged. Nigerians in general had earlier on according to tracked media reports questioned the credibility of the voter registration exercise. Other tracked reports also confirmed the absence of a sound internal democracy within the major parties in Nigeria.

In addition, it was also noted that the major parties were grossly intolerant of the opposition further displaying the failure of the political class to demonstrate commitment to the core values of democracy. The partisan use of security agencies, the EFCC [Economic and Financial Crimes Commission], ICPC [Independent Corrupt Practices Commission] and the Judiciary as viewed by several observers was apparently seen as posing a great danger to the survival of Nigerian democracy and the rule of law. The general consequences of these "state-

led activities” have eroded the confidence of many citizens in these institutions.

With this type of setting, as evinced by past and on-going developments in ECOWAS member States, it is then convenient for one to conclude that the West African states have not been able to develop from the organic roots of their own society, therefore, they are lacking in the required basic pre-requisite of a state. This situation has grossly as a consequence undermined the ECOWAS coalition in several ways.

Mafeje [1999], in his contribution to the discourse on the state in post colonial Africa, further emphasized this when he noted that for an African state to establish firmly, “it must organically out of society, construct hegemony and legitimacy for itself”.

These struggles have assumed varying dimensions in West African states. In a number of situations, they have assumed an armed expression in which ethnic groups take up arms against each other, while in others they have taken the shape of “a low intensity war” amongst groups and communities capable of undermining a nation’s project. In a number of cases, additionally, these struggles have led to more intense agitations for greater democratization, as we earlier observed with anti-third term or tenure elongation struggle in Nigeria. Several similar examples are empirically observable within the West African landscape.

It is irrefutable that many African states especially those within the ECOWAS are bedeviled by series of crises between ethnic groups, religious groups and between state institutions and various citizens’ groups. These conflict situations are seen in Nigeria, in Cote d’Ivoire, in Togo, in Guinea-Bissau, in Liberia, Sierra Leone, in Guinea, and in Niger. All these have combined to make West Africa the breeding

ground of conflicts and controversies in Africa in the past and even presently.

Added to the political crises above, is the crisis of production in sub-Saharan Africa, which emerged as a result of the underdevelopment of the productive forces in West Africa. Problems such as huge debt overhang, weak national economies, downscaling of food production - resulting in poor investment flow into the sector, poorer foreign cooperation, limited entrepreneurship and overall national poverty best demonstrates this situation. Also of great significance in understanding the West African setting, is the crisis of democracy, which is best manifested by the tilt towards one party state and the problem of poor governance and leadership. Of note was how Charles Taylor and those before him glued themselves to the “throne” in Liberia and in Niger in spite of the conspicuous opposition led by their citizens.

4.1.13 The Nigerian State and the ECOWAS Organization

Nigeria with a population of over 140 million is easily described as the main propeller shaft driving the ECOWAS project. It is also the view of many Nigerians, even though from another perspective that the country was making far too many commitments and sacrifices at its own expenses. This negative display became more pronounced with the expression of support for the expulsion of mostly ECOWAS citizens in 1983 and the closure of its borders to checkmate smuggling activities in 1984.

The military coup of August 1985 interestingly started the re-enactment of Nigeria’s gesture of renewed commitment to the ECOWAS and its ideals. Some of the steps taken by the new government were first to re-open the land borders in 1986 and to, fully implement the second phase of the *Protocol on Free Movement*

of Persons and Rights of Residence.

Very importantly too, it the new regime that donated a large expanse of land in the new Federal Capital Territory Abuja, for the sitting and building of a new ECOWAS headquarters, which was earlier on located in Lagos. The government also donated \$4.5 Million to the Secretariat project [Okolo, 2002] in Abuja. No doubt, the location of the ECOWAS headquarters in Nigeria's capital Abuja was deliberately facilitated by the IBB led government in order to maintain Nigeria's leading position within the coalition. Other sources have indicated that Nigeria's contribution represented 32% of the total project cost. The Federal Government [FGN] similarly donated land in addition for residential accommodation in both Lagos and Abuja.

In the year 2001, the combined Gross Domestic Product [GDP] for the entire ECOWAS region was estimated at \$75.1 Billion. Out of this figure, Nigeria's economy accounted for more than half. As at 2001, Nigeria had an estimated \$39.5 Billion as its Gross Domestic Product and by 2008/2009, according to an ECOWAS Commission publication the sub-region's estimated GDP in nominal terms was \$309.04 and \$374.49 respectively. In 2007, Nigeria was adjudged as 'the dominant economy' in the sub-region, accounting for 62% of the total regional GDP.

With the conflicts that extensively pervaded Liberia and other parts of Africa, Nigeria became a Refugee Host nation and to, further legitimize this status, in addition to acceding to the UN's dictation on issues of refugees, the Federal Government enacted a decree establishing the Nigerian Refugee Commission [NRC]. Further to all that were achieved, in 1999, the Federal Government of Nigeria also established the Oru Refugee Camp, located in Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State,

in the South Western part of Nigeria and by August 2003 over 5500 refugees were in camp. Thus, with these efforts Nigeria was effectively in a functional collaboration with the UNHCR- United Nation High Commission on Refugees [Sesay, 1992]. Because of the carnage and devastation Liberians faced, especially the non-combatant rural population, the “big-brother” Nigeria had to host over 141,000 Liberian refugees [Vogt, 1992]. This devastation led to the displacement of several thousands of Liberians who trooped to neighboring Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea.

A. Adebajo, of the International Peace Academy of New York [Africa Program] while presenting a paper at a CODESRIA Assembly, in Kampala, 2002 reported that the three ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau demonstrated the importance of Nigeria to peace keeping mission in West Africa, adding that Nigeria is “an indispensable presence to the success of any future sub-regional peace initiatives. Again, Late General Cheikh Diarra, ECOWAS Malian Deputy Executive Secretary [who died in a Bellview air crash outside Nigeria’s Lagos] had once expressed that “Nigeria is the problem and the solution to the problem”. General Diarra noted the successes of Nigeria - led ECOMOG in protecting both Monrovia and Freetown from being overrun by rebels in 1992 and 1999 respectively.

The Nigerian-led ECOMOG also repelled the NPFL from Monrovia in 1990, also equally restored the Kabbah government to power in Freetown later in 1998. Adebajo, thus, concluded the indispensability of Nigeria especially from the context of her financial and military muscle and the strategic relevance of these two elements in sub-regional peace efforts. Adebajo further contended that Nigeria has an interest in stabilizing its sub-region in order to promote its economic and

political goals in West Africa notwithstanding its domestic political and economic problems. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's President and Commander-In-Chief, in September 1999, while addressing the UN General Assembly, expressed that "for too long the burden of preserving international peace and security has been left almost entirely to a few.." adding that Nigeria's continued burden in Sierra-Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take-off, this bleeding has to stop".

According to Adebajo [2002], Nigerian casualties in Sierra-Leone were estimated at one thousand. However, inspite of all these observations, and the balancing problem created by the existence of a smaller, independent economic and political [including military] groups of Francophone West Africa, Jinmi Adisa in his "National interest and Values" [Ekoko & Vogt: 1990], like many other defense analysts expressed the view that "Nigeria must place value on what happens in the West African neighborhood because threat to the country's home territory and capabilities would materialize from these adjacent territories". This same school also observed that a regional collective defense arrangement is most desirable in several ways and more especially as follows; "it should prevent our neighbors from allowing their territories to be used as a base for pre-emptive attack on Nigeria; give her the leverage and legal protection and sanction in defending her investments in countries like Benin, Cote D'Voire, Liberia and Guinea" [Ekoko 1990]. The totality of this is what has over the last few decades given rise to the ECOMOG as an imperative aspect of West Africa's security and defense scenario.

4.1.14 The ECOMOG as a Sub-Regional Response to Regional Crises

Following the huge display of conflicts in West Africa, it is expedient that a collection of strategic responses have to be devised. It also vital to restate in this

portion of the study that it might have been possible that the ECOWAS founding fathers did anticipate the kind of contemporary conflict scenarios we have in West Africa today. The founding fathers did not demonstrate this understanding in the basic provisions of the treaty especially as a strategy for providing for a peaceful environment necessary for any kind of human development. Some would argue that with the profile of leadership that constitutes the body of founding fathers, especially in the mid seventies, it is not surprising that they were not able to read the handwriting on the wall!

On the variety of conflict scenarios that have dotted the West African sub-region, and the consequences of these conflicts on West African integration and for the purpose of achieving a clearer picture and understanding of the multifaceted nature of the sub-regional problems, it is vital that we summarize some of the key conflicts as follows:

Liberian Civil War broke out in 1989, four years into the IBB administration. Propelled by ethnic rivalries, this war unleashed unparalleled terror on the local population thereby leading to the emergence of one of the world's worst refugee crisis in West Africa. Historically, LIBERIA has over 17 tribal groups and thrice more tribes. Of these groups, two to three stand as distinct tribal groups; among them are the Kpelle and Bassa. Another dominant group is the Americo-Liberians [freed American slaves], who also dominated Liberian economy and politics until the emergence of Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, in a military coup of 1980. The rise of Samuel Doe to power paved way for the emergence of the Khrans as one of the dominant tribal groups in Liberia. Samuel Doe appointed several of his tribal men to strategic positions in government, leading to deepening of ethnic conflicts in the country. As Margaret Vogt concluded, the Liberian crisis was, and perhaps

still, a complex host of conflictual relationship between settlers [of freed-slaves] and diverse lots of indigenous natives whose configurations were dominantly characterized by high level of illiteracy, poverty and who largely lived outside the city of Monrovia, the capital [Vogt,1993].

Sierra-Leonean Civil War was also one of the most disturbing crises that affected the sub-region in several ways. Apart from producing another diversion with regards conformity to regional integration objectives, the war also produced its own magnitude of humanitarian crisis, socio-political and economic devastation within and outside the boundaries of Sierra Leone.

The conflict in Sierra Leone was largely similar to that of Liberia in many ways, its humanitarian complication and the resultant creation of a huge refugee population, and its attendant consequences such as extensive damage to key infrastructure and the general economy of Sierra-Leone and by extension that of the West African sub-region.

The authority of state was as in several African cases was equally challenged in Sierra-Leone and it took the support of the UN Peace Keeping force to restore sanity to Freetown as the city had transformed into a beehive of war and anarchy largely as a result of an invasive political conflict that engulfed the Country. When Major J P Koroma of the Sierra-Leonean armed forces, overthrew the democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabba, ECOWAS under the leadership of Nigeria, mounted a military operation in Freetown that flushed him and his supporters out of power.

The entire West African sub-region had for an extended period had been doted by very serious conflicts that were fundamentally similar in terms of causal factors.

Sometimes, these conflicts even created similar devastating consequences.

More interestingly, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group otherwise referred to as ECOMOG had attracted the most attention as a regional institution globally, in view of the success it seemed to have recorded in the discharge of its responsibilities. In another scheme of reaction and assessment, however, the ECOMOG is viewed rather differently. Mitchel [1990] observed that at a point, “the ECOMOG almost destroyed the fragile consensus that held the ECOWAS together up till 1990”. Once again, Nigeria was in particular accused of using ECOMOG to pursue what has been described as “*pax-Nigeriana* project”. Such positions has often created responses that called upon the ECOMOG and its mother organization - the ECOWAS to view the set up as a spring board upon which credible lessons on peace keeping can be learned.

Kofi Anan also noted was that ECOMOG should provide the role of an honest peacekeeper [Kofi, 1993]. As expected by many, ECOWAS indeed rose to its responsibilities when it creditably and in a manner unprecedented, embraced the challenges of conflict management and peace keeping in West Africa, especially at a time when the so-called great powers of the world had clearly shifted emphasis to the conflict flashpoints of Europe. Since the beginning of the 90s, the ECOMOG has attained the highest level of media attention and has therefore ignited the interest of the academia.

Article 16 of the treaty of ECOWAS stimulated most interest and perhaps greater controversies, especially as some prominent members like Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, who inadvertently were staunch supporters of Charles Taylor, vehemently challenged the legitimacy of ECOMOG to the extent of boycotting all efforts made towards peace by the organization. The article unequivocally states as

follows:

“When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a member state of the Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of States”. Regional security in West Africa remains therefore the single most important fact to aid economic growth, development and integration, thus, the continuous focus on the issue by leaders of the ECOWAS as similarly observed Abimbola [2006]. Security cuts across all borders, political inclinations and ethnic affiliations notwithstanding, thus, it cannot be ignored or swept under the carpet.

4.2 Intra-Community Trade in the ECOWAS Coalition:

4.2.1 Introduction to ECOWAS Intra-Community Trade Facilitation:

Having over-viewed the picture of the sub-region from a more holistic sense as above, and considering the essence of trade to sub-regional integration in any part of the world, it is furthermore appropriate to identify and re-state other salient factors that have militated against the economic integration of the ECOWAS coalition and more especially intra-community trade.

Apart from the institutional setting of the ECOWAS, several other factors have equally been identified as primarily prohibitive of trade facilitation and development in the Sub-Region. For all these issues to be properly comprehended, it is vitally of the essence that we make an in-road into the global profile of trade development and its impact on West Africa.

In addition, this study will also focus closely on other major facets of intra-ECOWAS trading relations by beginning with an enunciation of ECOWAS initiated trade promotion programs.

4.2.2 Short and Medium Term ECOWAS Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Programs:

In the light of the utmost desirability for an effective trade link within the ECOWAS Coalition and in conformity with the provision of article 6 of the ECOWAS Treaty establishing the ECOWAS Council of Ministers and which was also definitive of its function and composition, the body of Ministers on the recommendation of the **Trade, Customs, Immigration, Money and Payments Commission** decided on the adoption of **Decision C/DEC.4/12/92**. This decision

defined a series of Short and Medium term trade promotion programs within an ECOWAS institutional framework to be adopted and implemented by the Executive Secretariat.

This Trade Promotion Program [TPP] was aimed at opening domestic markets by creating the necessary conducive regional environment for the business community to exploit. On a short-term basis, therefore the ECOWAS coalition is to strengthen and increase intra-community trade by **creating awareness of market opportunities** in the region to the business community. An example of the effort towards awareness creation is best exhibited by the coalition's introduction of the "SIGOA TOPS" – a TRADE OPPORTUNITIES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM aimed at promoting trade contacts between companies of the region and at boosting ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme [ETLS]. The system is to facilitate a network of information exchange between the various trade promotion structures within the ECOWAS including official TPOs [Trade Promotion Organizations] and private sector organizations. Interestingly, this software development is funded by the EU and entrusted in the hands of the International Trade Organization. The ECOWAS Community Computer Centre [CCC] operates and manages the system.

Also Again, in terms of activity details, the coalition mapped out an eight- point strategy towards effective trade facilitation in the sub-region. And these included [1] the conduct of supply and demand surveys on a periodical basis on some priority products such as Canned Tuna, Vegetable oils, Jute Sacks, Ceramic Tiles, Agricultural Chemicals, Medicaments for human and veterinary uses, [2] conducting of Buyer/Seller meetings on a product by product basis and also in varied stages [3] organization of workshops between 1993-1995 on varying themes

which included - “Training: A Foundation of Trade Promotion”, “Project Financing”, “Legal Aspects of Trade and Marketing Policies” e.t.c. [4] organization of seminars in collaboration with national trade promotion institutions in order to enlighten the business community on issues of available trade opportunities in the region and measures in support of ECOWAS business expansion, [5] the preparation of an ECOWAS Handbook on legal, financial and economic framework of member states which is also to be updated after every two years, [6] assistance to the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce to organize special action groups among enterprises, financial institutions and other trade related organizations interested in promoting specific projects, thus facilitating the involvement of the private sector in planning and implementation of ECOWAS policies, [7] setting up of the region’s Trade Information Network aimed at providing data on raw materials, intermediate inputs, annual supply and demand situation as well as pattern of consumption, [8] completion of ECOWAS Trade Directory in collaboration with the International Trade Center with a view to codifying information on company profiles engaged in both exports and imports and as obtained from the surveys and buyers/sellers meetings.

On a medium term basis the following strategies were most paramount: [1] harmonization of packaging, labeling, and marking rules on goods, [2] development of a unit within the Secretariat/Commission that would undertake the development of standardization, quality control, certification, and meteorology activities, [3] upgrading of manpower resources through the establishment of a regional center for handicraft activities with the sole objective of promoting the improvement of production methods, adoption of modern marketing methods, and coordinating the sectoral handicraft development. Other strategies were [4] the expansion of the scope of existing trade information networks through the

establishment of contact and facilitation of information flows among trading organizations such as commercial enterprises, export and marketing bodies to link up with other sub-regional institutions in Africa, [5] preparation of inventory on trade documentation process in each member state with a view to simplifying and harmonizing documentation procedures and aligning same to meet international standards, [6] organization of training programs to improve the skills of national trade promotion officials by utilizing existing educational institutions available in the region and [7] organization of trade fairs every four years with all member states participating [Community Computer Center, 2006].

4.2.3 Other ECOWAS Related Trading Arrangements:

Viewing closely the trade relationship between the “vibrant” EU bloc and ECOWAS states, one could evidently notice the presence of “non-reciprocity” in the sense that the EU did not demand for reciprocal treatment even when it offered what Alaba [2006] has described as “preferential market access to West African exports” as contained in a paper presented to a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Despite the gloomy picture as similarly captured by many contemporary trade literatures, an improved trade relationship is envisaged with the implementation of a new arrangement titled “Economic Partnership Agreement” otherwise referred to as EPA, in 2008. The Economic Partnership Agreement [EPA] seeks to establish a new framework on which the relationship between ACP Countries and the EU shall be based. This agreement is envisaged to be a dramatic departure from the previous non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements enjoyed by African Caribbean and Pacific nations in the past. The EPA is predicated on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement [CPA], also an outflow of the Lome IV. It is vital to note

that one other key feature of the CPA is the emphasis it placed on development and poverty reduction. In addition, it further involved a reciprocal relationship between the EU and ACP countries and the institutionalization-crystallization of these relationships into a series of Economic Partnership Agreements [EPA].

Oyejide [2004] further noted that these agreements are expected to crystallize into FTAs [Free Trade Agreements], with every region negotiating independently. The negotiating structure, Oyejide added, provides West African States a greater opportunity to further deepen and perfect their integrative agenda. These developments further underscores that **the main thrust of all trade negotiations of whatever scale – bilateral or multilateral, is fundamentally to create trade structure and policy frameworks that ensures the emergence of mutually beneficial market access.** Trade coalition building is therefore a paramount aspect of the process and it is a strategic basis for creating the necessary influence for advancing vital common interest, a position implicitly shared by Moonhawk [2005], in his study on regional trade integration and market coalitions.

Again, an overview of these trends tend to strongly motivate West Africa's need to re-consolidate regional integration and trade facilitation within the sub-region in addition to further justifying the vital need for ECOWAS to adopt a revised strategy and therefore be more pro-active on taking appropriate steps on issues relating to trade development, and trade capacity building in close liaison with major global trading blocs.

In this segment of the study, attempt would be made to motivate the need for the reconsolidation of regional integration and trade promotion in West Africa, in addition to further justifying the need for the regional body [ECOWAS] to seize the opportunity for broader coalition and cooperation with other strategic trading

blocs especially in respect of building capacity for mutually beneficial trading activities with other parts of the world. The relevant World Trade Organization's provision, the EPA has mandated, are to be closely adhered to, thus changing the traditional pattern of trade relationship between the EU and other ACP countries.

Apart from maintaining the achievements of the **Lome Convention** which provided a framework of cooperation between the European Community, the predecessor to the EU and former British, Dutch and French colonies more especially in the area of granting compensatory finance to ACP states aimed at checkmating adverse fluctuations in global prices of key minerals and agricultural products and the **Cotonou Conventions** which was largely to more widely promote partnership between ACP states in terms of facilitating economic, social, and cultural development, the EPA sought to be most compatible with WTO provisions. The WTO is an international body promoting and enforcing the provisions of trade laws and regulations and has the authority to administer new and existing free trade agreements among others.

Furthermore, the new EPA arrangements was also to encompass a unilateral elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions which existed under the GSP [General System of Preference] in Lome and which were to be replaced with reciprocal free trading arrangement for all trading activities between the ECOWAS and the EU in particular. Alaba [2005], in further discussing these changes, opined that the core mandate of the CPA included working out modalities to ensure the following:

[1] Gradual liberalization of ECOWAS trade in relation to EU and in conformity with the WTO guidelines. This implies that ECOWAS states would be required to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of

tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalations on a comprehensive group of products.

[2] Developing and least-developed countries obtain further reductions of tariff escalation in EU markets.

[3] Dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade and a substantial lowering of trade distorting policies in return for preference erosion.

[4] Take fully into account the special developmental requirements and interests of the ECOWAS sub-region, including special differential treatment to be agreed upon.

Alaba, [2005] again in discussing the provisions of the EPA, noted that in principle it should be flexible in addition to working within the confines of the WTO guidelines in establishing key issues like:

- 1] The extent or life span of transitional periods.
- 2] Product range and most importantly as in relation to product coverage.
- 3] The determination of the degree of asymmetry in the timetable for dismantling various access market barriers.

Unlike in the WTO, however, the precise extent to which products can be excluded from liberalization is yet indistinct but forms part of the negotiations. There is also little doubt, however, that not all products will be involved in the reciprocal liberalization proposal. The term “substantially all”, although not properly defined, has been clarified by EU in WTO committees. The EU tended to view its interpretation in relation to the proportion of trade covered rather than qualitative

interpretations as proffered by some WTO members [Stevens et al, 2005]. Interpretations of the phrase under article XXIV of the WTO states 80-90% of all trades between parties.

4.2.4 The ECOWAS-EU Trade Relations:

The emphasis placed on examining the ECOWAS-EU trade relations is predicated on the realization that the EU consistently remained the most important trading partner to the ECOWAS bloc. Other blocs are however ascending to position of prominence in the last few years. **Table 2 A** - titled “**ECOWAS Trade Structure 1996-2001**” is clearly indicative of the dominance of the EU in respect of ECOWAS export to the rest of the world between 1996-2001.

Similarly, the structure of ECOWAS import equally displays the significance of the EU to West African trade position. Forty percent of ECOWAS import is also from the EU as portrayed in **Table 3 A** – “**ECOWAS Trade Structure 1996-2001**”. **Tables “2 A” and “3 A”** also revealed that the hike in trading activities might not be unconnected with the various trade preferences being enjoyed by ECOWAS under Lome I-IV and the EPA initiatives of the EU under the CPA.

The rising relevance of the North America made up of the **US and Canada** may be explained by the introduction of the African Growth Initiative Act [AGOA] by the US. Some African countries have benefited from this initiative.

Alaba [2005], re-declared that the degree of intra-ECOWAS trade compared with the rest of the world suggested that regional integration process is still far from the ideal in West Africa, adding that over 70% of EU’s total trade occurs within the community [EU]. In the case of West Africa, intra-community trade remains far less than 15%, implying the frantic requirement for an urgent reform. This reform

would involve the dismantling of existing barrier to intra-regional trade as a launch pad for stimulating and sustaining diverse forms of trade facilitation processes.

4.2.5 The Development of South-South trade:

Over the last forty years, enhanced economic cooperation has been a key development strategy for many developing countries. With the creation of the G77 and the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964, developing countries of the world were generally viewed to have set a more solid base for the institutionalization of cooperation among them. The G77 membership rose from an initial 77 to over 130 states at present. Central to the formation of the G77 was the need to breed cooperation and solidarity among developing countries in bringing about profound changes in international trade, finance and monetary systems.

The G77 provided a forum under which various forms of economic and trade cooperation among developing countries emanated. The G77 reaffirmed the group's central interest that bind them together including – maintaining a common platform to voice their concern and press forward their economic interests; striving for justice and equity in international economic relations; establishing an equitable international trade regime [UNCTAD: 2004]. The vision and goals of the group have equally found expression in the Millennium Development Goals. UNCTAD secretariat reports on “New Geography of International Trade: South-South Cooperation in an Increasingly Interdependent World” [TD 404] and “Follow-up to UNCTAD XI: New Developments in International Economic Relations - The New Geography of International Economic Relations” [TD/B/51/6] are clearly exhibitivive of the emergence of a new geography in global trade. The emerging contours are principally determined by the increasing role and importance of developing countries to drive trade and growth; South-South trade and economic

cooperation; the changing context of North-South interdependence.

Aided by major developments in relation to trade and trade related economic reforms and growing complementarities, growth in South-South export trade have generally exceeded that of the World trade in the past ten years. Between 1990 and 2000, South-South trade has been growing at the rate of 10% per annum as against 6% for world trade [UNCTAD Statistics, 2003]. Similar UNCTAD sources also displayed that with its strong growth, the share of South-South trade in total global trade climbed from 8% to 12% over the same period [1999-2000]. In terms of the export of both manufactured and agricultural goods, forty percent is conducted with other developing nations. Fifty-Seven percent of export trade from South-South States is conducted with developed countries while three percent are with transition economies [UNCTAD, 2003].

4.2.6 Implication of Coalition Arrangements on Trade Performance:

The benefit derivable from any integration arrangement is the key stimulating factor leading to the promotion of such arrangements worldwide. The growth effects of integration have been found to be clearly pronounced in several countries involved. International evidence portrays that regional integration is capable of providing mutual benefits to all countries involved. Herenkson [1996] remarked that belonging to the EU is growth enhancing through what he described as “efficiency effect”. Similarly and even more specifically, Coe et al, [1993], narrated that about 0.3% of the growth experienced in France in the 80s could be attributable to its membership of the EU. Between 2.5% and 6.5%, increase in the incomes of EU countries could be explained by the 1992 internal market arrangement.

Oyejide, Ogunkola, Adenikinju, Bankole and Alaba, [2003], once again, in their incisive submission to the World Bank on Nigeria’s trade and the impediments to her integration into the global trade, assertively noted that regionalism is a formidable factor for the rapid integration of nation-states into an ever-expanding global economy.

It is therefore imperative to examine closely global insights and experiences as they affect the ECOWAS states especially in relation to integration and economic performance. Unlike the ECOWAS model, where all countries merged following the Treaty of Lagos in 1975, six nations created the EU while other member-countries joined at different times and which they individually considered as convenient and in their economic interest.

While looking at the EU’s example of Regional Integration [RI], it is most convenient to assert that it has evolved into what we can readily describe as the most competent model of Regional Integration Arrangement [RIA] the world over, with its members demonstrating the highest level of commitment to the core tenets and ideals of the union. In terms of trade, individual EU economies have experienced noteworthy growth and expansion after each of its member state ascended to the union’s membership. The table below [marked as table 4] is clearly expressive of this assertion:

Table 4 : Exports of Goods and Services [% of GDP]of Some Selected EU Member-States /1960-2003]

EU Members	Austria	Denmark	Finland	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	U.K.
Year of Ascension	1995	1973	1995	1981	1986	1986	1995	1973

1960	23.6	30.7	2.4	8.8	15.5	8.4	22.4	20.2
1965	24.4	28.5	19.3	8.6	23.7	8.3	21.3	18.5
1970	30.2	27.2	24.5	9.6	21.6	12.6	23.5	22.3
1975	30.9	29.3	22.7	17.3	18.0	12.8	27.5	25.4
1980	36.0	32.2	31.6	23.6	24.2	14.8	29.1	27.1
1985	39.8	36.4	28.8	19.7	33.0	21.6	34.9	28.8
1990	39.6	35.8	22.7	18.1	32.9	16.3	29.7	24.0
1995	36.8	35.5	36.7	17.6	30.2	22.6	39.3	28.3
2000	50.3	44.1	43.0	25.6	31.5	30.1	46.1	28.1
2003	51.8	43.5	37.0	19.8	-	27.9	43.7	25.1

Source: World Development Indicator, WDI, 2005

According to the World Development Indicators [World Bank, 2005], exports of goods and services by EU members have witnessed tremendous growth since 1975. The UK and Denmark for example ascended to the EU in 1973 and as a result, their exports as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product [GDP] witnessed progressive expansion afterwards. In specific, Export as a proportion of GDP in the UK multiplied from 18.5 % and 22.3% respectively in 1965 and 1970 to 25% in 1975. It further stabilized above 28% in 1995 and 2000.

Austria, Spain, and Sweden, upon ascension to the EU witnessed notable increases in their export sector. Austria's export as a proportion of GDP dramatically increased from a trend between 30 % and less than 40% in 1970 – 1995 to over

50% after joining the EU in 1995. In the case of the other 1995 entrants – Finland and Sweden, some stupendous positive transformation in terms of their export profile were also evident. According to WDI reports, respective Greek, Spanish and Portuguese national outputs have been generally mixed. They were however, bigger than the pre-1975 trends.

It can well be asserted that the ascension of members into the EU community may have opened an array of opportunities for members to easily access larger import markets. **Table 2 A** is clearly descriptive of the increases recorded by EU membership relating to imports after ascending into the regional organization.

Table 4 A: Imports of Goods/Services as % of GDP.

Members & Year of Ascension	Austria 1995	Denmark 1973	Finland 1995	Greece 1981	Portugal 1986	Spain 1986	Sweden 1995	UNITED Kingdom 1973
1960	24.5	31.8	22.6	15.2	20.3	7.0	22.8	21.6
1965	25.1	29.9	21.4	18.5	27.0	13.4	21.9	19.4
1970	29.4	30.1	26.2	16.7	26.5	13.6	23.9	21.5
1975	30.5	30.1	28.9	23.3	28.1	16.6	27.4	27.1
1980	38.1	33.3	33.0	27.8	36.0	17.2	30.7	24.9
1985	39.6	36.1	28.1	26.7	35.5	19.9	33.1	27.8
1990	38.4	30.8	24.3	27.9	39.5	19.7	29.1	26.6
1995	37.6	31.4	28.8	24.9	36.4	22.8	32.5	28.8

2000	50.9	38.1	33.7	34.1	42.8	32.4	40.3	30.1
2003	50.3	36.9	30.0	28.0	--	29.7	37.1	28.1

Source: World Development Indicator, WDI 2005.

Austria, from the profile above, depicts clearly a classical case in respect of relationship between export trend and import considered as a vital component of GDP. Austria's import in GDP increased from less than 40% before joining the EU in 1996 to over 50% from the year 2000. Similarly, countries like Denmark, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom recorded impressive growth in imports. From theoretical construct, expansion in imports as a percentage of GDP is viewed as a positive development. It implies that consumers within the affected economies are now having greater opportunities to access resources from other economies. In addition, an expansion of market opportunities in respect of exports tends to indicate an increase in the capacity of member countries to import.

4.2.7 Regional Coalition and Broader ECOWAS Trade Performance:

The key mission of the ECOWAS coalition as spelt out in the treaty of 1975, signed on May 28, defined the imperativeness of promoting collaboration and integration within the 15-member regional body. Part of what the ECOWAS set to do was to achieve the removal of customs duties and taxes that were of equivalent effects; establish a common external tariff; harmonize economic and financial policies; and create a single monetary zone within the West African sub-region. Unlike the arrangement in the EU, the ECOWAS level of commitment to the various "functional" protocols meant to facilitate the attainment of the vision of the sub-regional body as envisaged by its founding fathers has been very low. Perhaps, this explains the dismal profile in the

community's intra-ECOWAS trade. Again, unlike in the case of the EU, member countries who have recorded outstanding expansion in their respective economies, the ECOWAS membership export contents [in relation to GDP] have not displayed any impressive trend.

Between 1975 and 2003, a larger proportion of ECOWAS members rather recorded a decline in their GDP export component. Most prominent of such declines were recorded by Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In the same context and within the same period, the economy of Benin Republic literally stagnated. A few countries in the group of those referred to as “developing category” recorded a relatively significant growth in their export market. In terms of import records, similarly delineated on **Table 4B**, the position is also not in anyway impressive. According to the said records, imports as proportion of GDP dropped for many countries in the ECOWAS between 1975 and 2003 and more especially Benin, Burkina-Faso, Niger, Cote D’Voire and Togo. Export as GDP ratio records have indicated a profound stagnation in Senegal, while in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria the figures have shown significant increases.

A comparative analysis of the trend in the export component of GDP clearly suggests that export earnings from many ECOWAS states fell very short of the budget required to pay for their imports. Again, this has been strongly confirmed by the index of export as capacity to import

4.2.8 Unified Monetary Zone for West Africa:

The process for adopting a single currency has been set in motion in West Africa, but whether the appropriate conditions for a unified currency bloc are

achievable remains to be seen. After a detailed analysis and study of the necessary conditions in relation to the diverse economies of West Africa, the following major points prominently re-emerged:

1] The West African Currency Board which operated among the British colony of Gambia, Ghana Nigeria and Sierra Leon was abandoned after independence while the Francophone states largely retained their institutional structures together with their neighbors and with France on a multilateral framework.

2] Since its inception in 1975, ECOWAS adopted a number of schemes for monetary cooperation; these included the West African Clearing House (WACH), the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Program (EMCP) and the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA).

3] In 1999, the ECOWAS coalition decided to form a second monetary zone for the non-CFA countries with the aim of ultimately merging the two zones into a single currency by 2003. The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was set up as an institutional vehicle to establish the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), but because the states in the new zone failed to meet the convergence criteria, WAMZ failed to emerge and the date for a single currency was shifted twice from 2003 to 2005 and then to 2009.

4] Scholarly views have attributed this to a series of economic factors and these includes the coalition's record with regards to factor mobility, degree of openness and asymmetry of their respective economies and differential rates of inflation. While the above economic factors were essential, the emergence of a single currency for West Africa would depend on **political will and**

commitment and the will to implement the necessary measures as defined by the relevant protocols and the willingness of member-states to **surrender their individual monetary policies to one single institution** and in the spirit of supranationality. Some schools of thought are however of the view that this may be near impossible to achieve in the context of the present global financial architecture where the dominance core economies of Europe and America may not be easily disputable.

4.2.9 The CFA Experience & TRADE Facilitation in West Africa

One of the most powerful driving forces for **economic policy coordination** is the creation of the **CFA Zone** within the West African Coalition [Quattara, 1999]. Notwithstanding the vehement criticisms labeled against it by some scholars and its consequent dismissal as “a neo-colonial creation of the francophone” that was meant to serve French neo-colonial interest in developing or least developed West African countries, the CFA currency remains till today a veritable force within the UEMOA enclave. For long time to come, the CFA will continue to play a vital role in the economy of the West African sub-region.

Oyejide [2003] has additionally reported that the CFA Zone’s integrating experience has clearly demonstrated the importance of regionalism for rapid integration into the mainstream of the global economy. The apparent success recorded by UEMOA in francophone West Africa is most probably attributable to the willingness of its members to yield their economic policy matters to a strong, independent regional organization, again, driving us to the principles and utility value of ‘supra-nationality’ as a cogent part of regionalism and regional integration.

4.2.10 Obstacles to Integration, Trade Flows and Export Growth within the ECOWAS:

Trade has always been the pivot of West African integration. Thus, anything that impedes trade and development in this context is directly and indirectly inhibitive of the all-encompassing process of regional integration. As emerging and strategic development phenomena, Regional Integration [RI] process is a great topic of concern in and beyond West Africa. It is also evident that despite all efforts injected into the process of West African integration, the result on intra-regional trade remains very stumpy. An outline of intra-ECOWAS trade, with specific allusion to imports and exports figures of 1996 and 2001, and as generally displayed in tables **4B, and 4C [below]** are explicit of the poor trading outlook in West Africa.

TABLE 4. B: ECOWAS INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE

IMPORTS [MILLIONS \$] EXPORTS [MILLIONS \$]

COUNTRY	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
BENIN	21	22	55	73	73	9	25	10	13	10
BURKINA-FASO	127	101	127	132	122	28	31	46	52	33
CAPE-VERDE	6	5	6	5	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/N	N/A
COTE D'VOIRE	446	335	432	597	478	571	596	685	817	838
THE GAMBIA	39	40	24	26	28	14	8	5	7	6
GHANA	273	277	298	312	346	215	234	246	254	268
GUINEA	112	101	96	121	50	2	1	1	6	12
GUINEA-BISSAU	14	12	11	12	14	6	5	5	6	7

LIBERIA	7	10	14	16	18	11	10	12	14	16
MALI	186	138	184	263	268	223	104	100	262	405
MAURITANIA	3	5	6	7	6	40	28	50	54	37
NIGER	87	58	39	34	78	55	46	24	40	55
NIGERIA	97	102	75	98	120	304	235	370	618	698
SENEGAL	115	47	111	112	120	91	81	137	151	13
SIERRA-LEONE	8	9	9	11	10	2	1	2	3	5
TOGO	31	39	65	63	76	19	19	22	19	19
TOTAL	1572	1301	1552	1882	1813	1600	1424	1715	2316	2539

Source: ECOWAS Handbook on International Trade, 2003.

TABLE 4. C: ECOWAS Trade Structure 1996-2001

(As a % Total ECOWAS Export Value)

Countries/Years	1986	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Intra-ECOWAS	10.86	12.66	14.59	10.08	8.40	9.25
Other African Countries	14.69	16.20	18.53	13.59	9.59	8.70
European Union	14.80	38.47	42.51	31.54	28.81	31.44
Northern America	23.06	25.81	19.47	26.11	36.69	31.00
Asia	8.79	11.16	7.52	19.02	17.12	14.68

Source: ECOWAS Handbook of International Trade 2003.

TABLE 4.D : ECOWAS TRADE STRUCTURE 1996-2001

[AS a % Total ECOWAS Import Value]

COUNTRIES/YEARS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
INTRA-ECOWAS	11.25	10.93	10.54	12.44	16.79	13.61
OTHER AFRICAN STATES	13.94	13.02	13.01	15.29	19.60	N/A
EUROPEAN UNION	47.73	46.30	50.09	51.68	48.31	45.50
N.AMERICA	12.46	11.77	10.98	11.26	8.73	9.56
ASIA	16.23	19.15	17.88	19.19	21.89	20.89

Source: ECOWAS Handbook of International Trade 2003

These tables are particularly explicative [*ECOWAS Handbook*, 2003] of the region's depressing trading performance. In addition, WTO reports [2005] have equally expressed and confirmed that Intra-Regional trade within the ECOWAS coalition is only about 11%, a little lower than other statistical presentations.

In the year 2000, it has been portrayed that only about 6% of Nigeria's export, comprising mainly of oil, were traded with ECOWAS member states of Ghana and Cote D'Voire. In terms of imports, it was tragically noticed that only 2% of commodities/items of ECOWAS origin came into Nigeria and they were mainly from Republic of Benin, Cote D'Voire [both francophone] and Ghana.

From the experience of the EU, commitment to the tenets and ideals of regional integration stimulates and enhances both intra-regional and inter-regional trade flow. Trade facilitation in itself is vital to advancing strong regional integration arrangement. From available evidence, the ECOWAS sub-region undisputedly possesses large enough a market for members not only to dominate but also to

equally launch out as a veritable competitive force to other regions of the world.

In assessing trade and its success or otherwise in the developing world and especially within ECOWAS, it would be worthwhile to examine the identifiable sets of barriers or obstacles to trade facilitation and trade development. The first set is composed of barriers associated with **tariff policies** while the second comprised of several **Non-Tariff Barriers** [NTBs]. Both groups of trade barriers are further discussed below:

4.2.10.1 Tariff Policies Related Barriers:

In looking at tariff-associated barriers to trade flows in many LDC countries, it is pertinent for one to view the issue from the point of view of revenue generation. Additionally, and in West Africa in particular, tariff policies are essentially anchored on two key objectives. The first is hinged on revenue generation by government and its institutions, as earlier enunciated, and the second is predicated on the need to protect domestic industries and producers. In some peculiar cases, the idea has been found to be protective of some “choice monopoly businesses” that in addition to enjoying the patronage of state and vice-versa are partly or fully owned by public appointees or politicians whose business interests in such enterprises are usually veiled. These may seem to give explanations to the “exponential” tariff regimes in some of the countries within the sub-region, more especially in the past few years. Since the early 80s however, trade regimes in most of West Africa have undergone some degree of reasonable liberalization, more on the average and especially as they affected agricultural and non-agricultural goods. The tariff rates, which were initially high, have declined very sharply over a long period. The tariff reduction rate between the year 2000 and 2004 was very high in a number of ECOWAS countries including Guinea [91%], and Benin [75%].

In a draft submission to the ILEAP, Canada titled “Negotiation and Aid for Trade: West African Perspectives and Priorities” Oyejide, [2005], articulated that the average in both 1980-84 and 2000-2004 periods have concealed a huge intra-country and inter-country variations, even though both have significantly declined over time. The average tariff rate, he continued ranged from 18% [Senegal] to 76% [Guinea] during 1980-1984; this range also shrank to between 6.5% [Guinea] and 29.1% [Nigeria] during 2000-2004. The failure of governments in the sub-region, the submission further stated, to enhance their revenue generation capacity by “exploring other veritable alternatives to tariff revenue has continued to impose serious constraints on both intra and extra-community flow of trade”. Records have further indicated that nearly a quarter of government revenue of ECOWAS countries is dependent on import duties. Gambia and Cape Verde attribute over one third and a quarter of their respective revenues to import duties. Import duties share in total government revenue are 18% and 17.8% for Benin and Senegal respectively. Nigeria and Cote D’Voire have the least shares of 4.7% and 8.2% respectively. In general, the situation has been worsened by the generally common fiscal deficit that has characterized most of the economies of West African states.

In 2001, most of the West African states, with the exception of Cote D’Voire had fiscal deficit [Adenikinju and Alaba, 2004]. In many of these countries, it is strongly feared that the loss of fiscal revenue because of import liberalization, might further compound the already precarious financial situation. Mainstream capitalist theoretical postulates as contained in liberal Economics literature, however, have suggested the positive effects of trade and import liberalization. According to this school of thought, import and general trade liberalization could have positive influence if countries rightly respond to market opportunities made possible by reciprocal free trade opportunities across the globe adding that loss of

revenue would be compensated by efficiency gain and an increase in market share expected.

The ECOWAS made efforts to establish a Common External Tariff [CET of 0%, 5%, 10% and 20%], similar to those put in place by the UEMOA States of West Africa. The CET did not enjoy the support of most non-UEMOA countries. Somewhere in the mid 80s and the early part of the 90s, a substantial number of ECOWAS states effected the implementation of unilateral trade liberalization schemes. These were under various structural adjustment programs as backed and stipulated by the Bretton woods institutions of the IMF and World Bank. In terms of drop in tariffs, a noticeable change became visible.

Table 4 E : Final MFN Bound Tariff [%] West African Countries.

<Binding Coverage> <Maximum>

Country	All	Agric	Non-Agric	All	Agric	Non-Agric
Benin	39.4	100	30.1	100	100	60
Burkina Faso	39.2	100	29.9	100	100	100
Cote d'Voire	33.1	100	22.9	64	64	25
Gambia	13.7	100	0.5	110	110	110
Ghana	14.3	100	1.2	99	99	99
Guinea	38.9	100	29.6	75	75	40
Guinea-Bissau	97.7	100	97.4	50	40	50
Mali	40.6	100	31.6	75	75	60
Mauritania	39.3	100	30.1	75	75	75
Niger	96.8	100	96.3	200	200	200

Nigeria	19.3	100	6.9	150	150	150
Senegal	100	100	100	30	30	30
Sierra Leone	100	100	100	80	80	80
Togo	14.0	100	0.9	80	80	80

Source: WTO, World Trade Report, 2005.

The average tariff rates and the level of binding are two major elements that are influential in determining the flow of trade, which in turn ensures and provide for a consolidated regional integration arrangement as well as trade development in the sub-region. World trade reports of 2005 have indicated that binding coverage is deliberately low and devoid of harmony for most West African countries largely due to its potentials for an expanded revenue inflow from tariffs. On the average, only four countries [Sierra Leone, Niger and Guinea-Bissau], have binding coverage of about 100% out of the ECOWAS member states.

4.2.10.2 Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade Flows in West Africa:

Even though tariff related hindrances are horrifying obstacles in themselves, non-tariff barriers [NTBs] constitute the most significant hindrances to integration, trade, and more importantly export supply response capacity of the sub-region. Prominent among the NTBs includes government instruments, such as import prohibition and quota restrictions. NTBs can also be categorized into two broad classifications – official [operationalised by government] and unofficial.

Evidence available has indicated that government initiated NTBs have been maintained by over half of the members of the ECOWAS organization as instrument for state control of their respective economies. Import prohibitions and quota restrictions have regularly featured in the Sub-region's trade policy

processes. Students and observers of these processes in West Africa have alluded that the trend is a major contradiction to the principles upon which the ECOWAS body was established, especially when the said tools of state control are used in the process of intra-regional trade.

In terms of classification, the NTBs have further been segmented into two broad groups as follows:

- [a] **Institutional** and these includes also administrative and procedural barriers and
- [b] **Infrastructure related barriers** arising out of deficiency noted in the sub-region's roads, communications, port infrastructures etc.

Institutional Barriers

Several studies on trade and trade related issues are increasingly noting that state motivated tariffs, quotas and other trade policies constitute one major component of the larger continuum of intra or inter-regional trade barriers. It is also the contention of several scholars that efforts put into improving trade related institutional [including administrative and procedural] processes are most likely to have higher positive impact than mere reciprocal reductions in overt trade policy barriers. World Bank study has confirmed this conjecture and has therefore evidentially endorsed that logistical, institutional, and regulatory barriers are often more costly and generate no meaningful or offsetting revenue [World Bank, 2005].

The World Bank report further stipulated that a vital area that also impedes intra-regional West African trade relate to technical requirements such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures in addition to other technical regulations and standard often coordinated through domestic Customs Valuation Schemes [CVS] of each member-state. Even though these barriers are focused for review by international

trading organizations like the WTO, they still are a potent force standing in the face of trade development the world over.

According to UNCTAD, the approximated burden of trade certification and documentation requirements and compliance with official import/export regulations averages 10% of the value of world trade. This implies that the cost of compliance is an enormous burden on trade and very importantly, it is capable of exceeding the cost of tariff duties as a percentage of the total value of goods [Alaba, 2006, Ogunkola 2003].

Significant efforts, even though grossly unproductive, have been put in place over the years, in order to enhance and improve efficiency, transparency and accountability in customs processes. Despite these efforts, in addition to the huge volume of investments nothing meaningful in terms of positive results has been achieved. A good example of such investment in computer-based processes adopted in a number of West African states is the UNCTAD - based ASYCUDA program. ASYCUDA is a computerized customs documentation initiative meant to minimize human deficiencies that have bedeviled several customs processes in West African trading activities. The system uses, and or provides on-line information on customs import or export restrictions and prohibitions, national concessions, exemptions and customs procedures and controls. The system also provides advisory information to customs organizations as well as traders [[http://www.zra.org.zm/customs/pubs/introducing % 20ASYCUDA++](http://www.zra.org.zm/customs/pubs/introducing%20ASYCUDA++)]. Observers of these developments and efforts towards minimizing human induced problems have noted however, that not much is achievable through these initiatives because the systems are human operated and in addition, some customs and other allied personnel have a dauntless fixation on perpetrating corruption and corrupt

practices. Furthermore, it has been observed that the trade related organizations in question, and in most member-states of the ECOWAS have established the notoriety for being citadels of corruption themselves and are being used to promote the interest of a few political elites in these states, to the detriment of trade development and facilitation.

In addition to the observations above, it is pertinent to reiterate that human barriers are salient mechanisms for “instituting” illegal multiple fees and charges at various stages of discharging cargo and land borders. According to an Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] report in 2004, Customs delays in Africa are herculean. Averagely, overall delays at African customs remains longer than the rest of the world; 12 days in countries south of the Sahara compared to 7 days in Latin America, 5.5 days in Central and East Asia, and slightly above 4 days in Eastern and Central Europe. Overall, this unquestionably adds a tremendous cost to importers each passing day at a custom’s warehouse. On several occasions where this issue has been focused for discussion, the consensus opinion is that the customs delays experienced by importers considerably adds to the cost of doing business in Africa, and Nigeria most especially.

Illegal charges are a prominent feature of most border points and various other entry ports such as airports and seaports. Along the roads, several illegal checkpoints are a regular attribute. They are also operated as “revenue centers”. When all are together cumulated and assessed, one can then assert that they are a key addition to the cost of doing business in West Africa.

Table 4E below is self-explanatory and it goes further to indicate that the protocol on free movements of peoples and goods suffer most outstanding abuses by officials and agents or officials of governments of ECOWAS member states.

Rationally, one can then affirm from a collection of reports, that crossing a border in the West African sub-region is still a colossal task. World Bank [2005] assessment has indicated that crossing a West African border [in cost terms] could be equivalent to the cost of more than 1000 miles of inland transportation. This, the assessment further added, can also be compared to the equivalent of 100 miles in Western Europe.

The poor commitment of ECOWAS states towards integration through trade facilitation is again more clearly displayed by their mind-set to the numerous and uninhibited checkpoints that still pervade all parts of the sub-region. This is a sharp repudiation of a number of vital protocols that were designed to promote West African integration through trade development and facilitation. Thousands of traders and travelers along the community highways have reported dreadful experiences.

It is also astonishing to note that even between Badagry [in Nigeria] and Seme Town border posts in Benin Republic, there were over 21 checkpoints and all engaged in illegitimate and criminal acts of extortion. It is also interesting to note the existence of over 16 checkpoints between Birnin-Konni [in Niger Republic] and Illela in Sokoto [Nigeria], a distance of less than 120 kilometers. These checkpoints were mounted principally by the police, the State Security Service, Immigration Service, and the Customs. It is noteworthy to also observe that the numerous checkpoints were representing diverse formations within the individual services e.g. Local service, State Command operations Zonal operations and Federal Operations, all in the case of the Nigeria Custom Service. Even though this situation is best seen in Nigeria, it is however more interestingly visible in most member states as demonstrated in the table below [marked 4E].

Table 4 F : Checkpoints along Intra-ECOWAS Highways

High Ways	Distance	Checkpoints	Checkpoints/Security Post per 100 km.
Lagos – Abidjan	922 km	69	7
Cotonou – Niamey	1036 km	34	3
Lome – Ouagadougou	989 km	34	4
Accra – Ouagadougou	972 km	15	2
Abidjan – Ouagadougou	1122 km	37	3
Niamey – Ouagadougou	529 km	20	4

SOURCE:ECOWAS Official Web Site,2003

Infrastructure-Related Barriers

Infrastructural facilities are vital instruments for the promotion of all aspects of any human economy. In terms of trade relationship, an effective infrastructure indeed provides for a free or freer flow of both of intra-community and extra-community trade. Volumes of evidence have confirmed that there is indeed a direct relationship between quality of infrastructure and trade volume. In the EU, good roads and telecommunication links have contributed to an increase in intra-regional trade and growth. In West Africa, there exist disproportionate arrangements of existing roads and rail links, air and sea transport, in addition to poor communication and a colossally disappointing power supply systems. All these have combined to weigh down heavily on ECOWAS efforts at free flow of trade, ability to respond effectively to trade opportunities and economic integration.

The present status of infrastructure is reflected in higher direct transport costs and longer delivery period. The EU model in this respect has also confirmed that an

improved infrastructure can make a significant difference to the cost of production and trading. Huge investments in roads development and modest communication network in the EU is directly responsible for the reduction of the cost of doing business in the EU states. It is irrefutable that reducing cost in key areas such as transportation is one vital factor that makes producing firms and their nations to remain spiritedly competitive within international markets.

Basing its assessment on the theorization of Limoa and Venerables, the Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] has noted that “improvement in transport infrastructure such that a country moves from an average range among 64 countries considered, to being among the top 25 per cent of those countries would reduce transport costs by an amount equivalent to 481 kilometers of over land travel and 3,989 kilometers of travel by sea. It would also increase trade volume by 68% which is equivalent to being 2500 kilometers closer to other countries” [ECA, 2005].

In response to the requirements of global competitiveness, visible efforts have been made by ECOWAS member-states to achieve what has been described as an integrated transport and communication infrastructure within the West African coalition. Presently in progress are intra-community highways constructions. The community has developed a program of integrated regional network roads and railways in 1980, under which two major trans-national community highways were designed and implemented: - the **trans-coastal highway** linking Nigeria’s commercial capital Lagos with Nouakchott in Mauritania [4,676 km], over 80% completed and the **trans-Sahelian highway** linking Dakar, Senegal with N’Djamena, Chad [4,633 km], and so far over 87% completed [Community Computer Centre Website, 2005].

Similar efforts at improving the sub-region's telecommunication and power systems have also been embarked upon by ECOWAS under the framework of the **INTELCOM 1² and II³** and the much envisaged **West African Power Pool [WAPP]**. These efforts are however still at an infantile stage, thus greater practical efforts are obligatory for the ECOWAS coalition to go beyond rhetoric to practical integration.

Despite the experience of several global lessons especially those derivable from the EU bloc, the West African region still lags behind in investment towards the development of modern Information and Communication Technology [ICT]. The region has recorded very low performance in the harmonization of the ECOWAS regional communication systems. The consequences of this poor performance on domestic and international trade facilitation are therefore irrefutably enormous.

Table 4 G : Communication Infrastructure:

Telephone Mainlines Per 1000 persons for 5 Selected West African Countries.

West African states	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2002
Benin	2.5	2.7	3.2	5.2	8.1	9.2
Ghana	3.5	3.0	2.9	3.7	11.7	12.7
Niger	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.9	1.9
Nigeria	..	2.5	3.0	3.9	4.4	5.8
Senegal	3.3	3.5	6.0	9.8	21.6	22.3

Alaba, 2005

Telecommunication services are inadequate, inefficient and very expensive within the sub-region. Availability of mobile cellular phones is very inadequate, prohibitively expensive and in rural areas non-existent. Africa in general, has the lowest dispersion levels in terms of global internet deployment and utilization, this is necessitated by the glaring absence of the relevant infrastructure, and where available, they are dominantly inefficient.

4.3 The Nigerian Economy and the ECOWAS Coalition:

Under the Shagari regime in January 1983, the expulsion of illegal aliens, most of whom were citizens of Nigeria's ECOWAS neighbors took place. Thousands were forced out of Nigeria in what many observers noted as unfortunate conditions. For a number of Nigerians, businesses inclusive, it was emotionally sad. For others however, some justification for the expulsion was found in the assumption and belief that Nigeria and her citizens were making 'undue sacrifices' to the ECOWAS.

The emergence of the Buhari regime did not change matters significantly as the government was not particularly interested in the sub-regional organization. After four months of its emergence, the government proceeded to close all land borders, believing that the measure could aid in checkmating what the government described as 'incessant smuggling and currency trafficking'. The height of government's high handedness against other citizens of the ECOWAS, was further displayed with their subsequent expulsion some few months later.

In addition to these measures, the government of General Muhammad Buhari declined to host the ECOWAS heads of state summit in 1985. The government also postponed by one year the implementation of the second phase of the

ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of persons. This apparent display of lack of enthusiasm by government was again reinforced by its reluctance to accept the leadership [Chairmanship] of the sub-regional body. Because of these, the government succeeded in 'inducing' Nigerians, even though not deliberately, into developing a negative perception of the sub-regional body [Muhammad et al, 2002].

IBB got into the steering wheel of the country's most prestigious seat as President, Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces in 1985. He was able to introduce many programs linked to political, social and economic reforms paving way for emerging and possible good governance. He ruled Nigeria from 1985 to 1993 before handing over to a Civilian Transition Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan. Under the Babangida presidency, the objectives of economic relations are many as well as varied. Attracting foreign investment was the central focus of Nigeria's economic relations with the advanced countries, while South-South cooperation was the emphasis in relations with African and other developing countries. The West African sub-region was of paramount importance to successive Nigerian governments and this was because they have continued to value economic integration of the ECOWAS. Upon his rise to power, IBB worked assiduously in order to 'regenerate enthusiasm in the ECOWAS Community by re-affirming Nigeria's unflinching commitment to the aims, objectives and aspirations of the coalition [Nwachukwu, 1991]. Amongst IBBs most immediate and outstanding steps aimed at reversing the attitude of Nigerians and also re-engineering the ECOWAS were the re-opening of all land borders hitherto closed by his predecessor, Muhammad Buhari; commencement of the implementation of the second phase of the Protocol On Free Movement of Persons and Rights of Residence; undertaking the onerous task of mediating between Ghana and Togo

by very importantly, persuading Ghana's Jerry Rawlings to pay a visit to Togo. He also equally convinced Togo's Eyadema to welcome Jerry Rawlings in a gesture that significantly amounted to brotherly forgiveness for wrongs done to Togo [*West Africa*: 1988]; successfully led Nigeria into accepting the mandate in conjunction with Guinea to mediate in a dangerous dispute involving Liberia and Sierra Leone [Liberia was invaded by Sierra Leone]; successfully identified the role intra-community trade could play in the sub-region's economic recovery process and the need to put into effect the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme; removed strong barriers against agricultural and industrial trade, thus underscoring the need for a more effective intra-community trade. In addition, IBB served as the ECOWAS Chairman in 1986, 1987 and 1988.

These many observers concluded, "brought a sense of commitment and devotion to his work that ultimately gave direction to the ECOWAS. IBB and his regime [Okolo]. Again IBB "was unshaken in his conviction that the Community existed to improve the lives of its people and that one way to do it effectively is to promote its security". This explained the government's interest and commitment to the promotion of ECOMOG as key body "armed" for providing an intervention mechanism in conflict ridden member states within the coalition. The regime was and is still severally criticized and challenged for endangering the lives of Nigerian soldiers, especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia where huge casualties were recorded. In addition, an estimated 6 Billion US Dollars was expended in these operations.

Notwithstanding, these criticism, the Babangida years have been viewed by many observers as constitutive of an era of positive transformation for the ECOWAS. It was within this period, that IBB and his regime demonstrated a profound ability to direct the affairs of the coalition in the interest of members. Lt. Col Mustapha

Jumare et al, [1996], while writing on the Liberian crisis have also graphically demonstrated the competence of this Nigerian administration in managing peacekeeping and ECOMOG operations.

Prior to 1985, Nigerian economy was branded as ‘anemic’. Foreign Exchange reserve as Gabriel Umoden [1992] reported, shrunk to a mere N1 billion from N5 billion in 1981. A massive debt of over N10 Billion added to the incapacitation of the economy. Trade arrears of over N4 Billion were accumulated from its import dependent economy. The economy on the whole suffered negative GDP growth as it was heavily loaded by an ‘elephantine’ or a hugely enlarged public sector, with so many Public Enterprises constituting a massive drain on the economy. Other factors such as the global oil glut, resulting from the discovery of new oil fields in North Sea, Mexico and Alaska, all non-OPEC sources seriously impinged on Nigeria’s main income source.

Nigeria’s commitment under this government was indeed based on the recognition of West African countries as “Nigeria’s natural market”. The government underscored this when President Babangida asserted that “ECOWAS remains the most important sub-regional experiment at economic integration in the African continent, a fact which bestows on us a heavy responsibility to see it survive and grow as a part of our own contribution to the attainment of African Economic Community” Again, in his maiden broadcast to the nation, President Babangida reminded Nigerians that ‘the ECOWAS must be reborn’ with a view to achieving regional integration.

4.3.1 Nigerian Economic Crisis and the SAP Strategy:

The IBB administration inherited an economy that was in deep crisis since the

early eighties. The preceding government of Shehu Shagari packaged a rescue strategy often referred to as “Economic Stabilization Act” in 1982 and it incorporated measures meant to adjust problems of external deficits, which also entailed key issues like import restrictions, subsidy cuts, reduction in public spending etc. It was against the backdrop of these developments, that the government in 1986 introduced the Structural Adjustment Program [SAP] with the following key objectives:

- Restriction and the diversification of the productive base of the Nigerian economy
- Achievement of fiscal balance of payment and reduction of budget deficit
- Laying the foundation for a sustainable and non-inflationary growth
- Reduction of the strangulating response of administrative controls on the economic sector.

Further to the attainment of the above objectives, SAP was according government a general reform program that was to open up the economy to the effective interplay of market forces.

Establishing a Foreign Exchange Market in 1986 was one of the cardinal points of the program. The result of FOREX market was the consequent abolition of the notorious import licenses. From then on, manufacturers were able to purchase any amount of FOREX at market rates through the exchange. Similarly, genuine exporters established an Export Development Fund in order to provide financial assistance for carrying out certain promotional activities. In addition, Export Credit Guarantee and Insurance Scheme aimed at providing a cover against risk of non-

payment by foreign buyers.

Other schemes introduced were Duty Draw Back Scheme introduced to provide refund of import duties and local duty on raw materials used in the production of goods destined for exports, the Manufacturing under Bond Schemes. Other strategies include Interest Incomes on Loans by banks for export exempted from tax. Non-Oil Exporters were also able to utilize 100% of their proceeds in foreign currency domiciliary accounts and can similarly use the proceeds at Foreign Exchange markets for specified purposes.

Despite these glossy expressions, critics of the SAP strategy observed that it offered limited or no prospect for Africans and for Nigeria in particular believing that, it would only draw and drown the economy further into the capitalist system dominated by the prescriptions of Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and World Bank. Critics again noted that the weak disposition of most African states makes it fundamentally impossible for them to profit from the present international economic cooperation arrangement and simultaneously pursue an independent foreign policy. This criticism was best displayed in Joy Ogwu;s paper titled “Nigerian Economic Diplomacy: Some Contending Issues” [1991:13] quoted in *Nigeria’s Economic Diplomacy: The Ike Nwachukwu Years – 1988-1992* [Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1992].

4.3.2 Nigerian Economic Diplomacy Approach:

Under the Babangida presidency, government continued to provide the appropriate coordinates upon which bi-lateral relations with ECOWAS states were determined. The pattern and form these relations had taken were mostly in terms of Venture

Capital; Financial Assistance; Outright Grants or Technical Assistance. Under its Technical Assistance Scheme, the government engaged in the provision of personnel in specialized areas through the TAC [Technical Assistance Corp] programs, similar to the American Peace Corp Program. Others were the provision of training facilities in Nigerian higher institutions of learning, especially for citizens of West African states.

Very importantly also government economic diplomacy facilitated the generation of some off-shore investments by Nigerian entrepreneurs especially in Togo, Benin and Cote de Voire. Within this period, trade levels were abysmally low too and this was because of the informal nature it took. Trade was at this point also largely ‘unadministered’ and consequently posed serious problem of data collection, collation and planning. As a result, government redressed these deficiencies through the instrumentality of Joint Commissions, Trade Missions and massive public enlightenment.

In order to attain greater economic growth on a global scale, the regime thought it expedient to introduce other measures and strategies in re-building an economy that was already anemic. One of the efforts was the creation of the Industrial Development Coordinating Committee [IDCC]. The IDCC was a One Stop Project Approval Agency. This agency in addition to other measures such as the facilitation of capital import for new ventures; granting of fiscal concessions and technology transfer agreement, it also ensured the provision of approvals within 60 days, thus eliminating the need to go through various government agencies. Other measures were the establishment of the Nigerian Export Promotion Council [NEPC]. Key duties of the NEPC were to promote Nigeria’s non-oil export through the streamlining of the general regulatory environment; the promotion of

the export processing zones; liberalization of access to foreign exchange; introduction of a market - driven exchange rate for the naira; fiscal and financial assistance provision.

Under IBB, the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy introduced new dynamism with emphasis being placed on using limited resources to pursue Nigeria's external interests especially in the economic sphere. More clearly defined national economic objectives in the regime's foreign policy program were put in place by government with a bid to strongly pursuing its broad foreign policy program.

Nigeria was in the fore - front of the advocacy for dialogue between creditors and debtor nations on debt problem that affected all West African states. In 1991, General Babangida described Africa's debt crises as a "central element in Africa's critical economic situation". While speaking at the UN general assembly in October 1991, Gen. Babangida called for debt forgiveness on the basis of the following:

1. The introduction of a credible and a sustained Structural Adjustment Program
2. The pursuit of a credible environmental protection scheme
3. and the introduction of a credible democratization process.

Government program of economic diplomacy program was borne out of the utmost need to adjust Nigeria's foreign policy to the imperatives of the emerging new political and economic order. Several feats were achieved by the regime's economic diplomacy program. Most salient of these achievements included the enhancement of the role of the Organized Private Sector [OPS] in the conduct and management of Nigeria's external economic relations and that indeed included the

ECOWAS. Thereafter, OPS became more recognized by the government and was more involved in vital negotiations and through state official visits, trade missions.

In addition, the government further facilitated OPSs participation in formulating and executing policies and programs, resulting in a more functional and mutually beneficial partnership and more specifically in marketing Nigeria within and outside the sub-region. Admiral Augustus Aikhomu [August 18, 1992], while acknowledging government achievement, expressed that government policy as pursued tended to ‘instill greater confidence among foreign investors and entrepreneurs in the domestic investment arena especially among exporters’. According to government, the strategy of “Nigeria Incorporated” entails the development of the nation’s economic strength through an effective partnership of both the Public and Private sectors aimed at achieving a harmony of interest, elimination of mutual suspicion and recognizing the need for confidence building between the two sectors.

Major General I.O.S Nwachukwu [rtd.], while presenting a paper titled “The Dynamics of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, [30 June 1988], emphasized government support for West Africa’s economic integration when he noted that the government fully supported ECOWAS initiatives towards the abolition of obstacle to free movement of persons, services and capital. The Minister further added that ‘ECOWAS represented the highest expression of link between the government’s economic development efforts and foreign policy and the Foreign Affairs Ministry was working in close collaboration with other home economic ministries, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria [MAN], NACCIMA, and the Africa Business Round Table’.

4.3.3 International Economic Cooperation Directorate:

As one of the strategic starting points, in 1984 and subsequent years too, the International Economic Cooperation Directorate was divided into two – [1] Bilateral Economic Cooperation Department and [2] Multi-Lateral Economic Cooperation Department. The two represented the main link on economic and trade matters with the appropriate areas of government diplomatic missions accredited to Nigeria. Multi-lateral economic cooperation was essentially a tool for advancing national economic activities and was also aimed at completing efforts in the bi-lateral sphere as well as those that relate to sub-regional, continental and international organizations such as the ECOWAS, the OAU now AU and the UN.

4.3.4 Nigerian Governments and the ECOWAS coalition:

Governments from the IBB years accorded the ECOWAS a top-most priority. One time Foreign Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu captured it all when in the course of presenting a paper titled – “The Dynamism of Nigerian Foreign Policy”, stated that:

As we re-appraise the fundamental nexus between economics and politics in the international system, the importance and relevance of ECOWAS as a central feature of our foreign policy manifest itself. ECOWAS initiatives towards abolition of obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital need our unqualified support. Also ECOWAS projected goals of industrial and fiscal harmonization are useful for us...ECOWAS represents the greatest open manifestation of Nigeria’s commitment to African regional economic development and integration as well as the highest expression of our foreign policy

These remarks, which represented an elaborate government position, indeed, signaled the government’s enormous commitment towards the development and

economic integration of the West African sub-region. Further to these remarks, which displayed the establishment of the government policy direction, IBB's government undertook a state visit of France in March 1990. The visit was dominated by extensive bilateral discussions on economic matters and it interestingly offered the French an opportunity to express their support towards strengthening the ECOWAS. A Nigerian Foreign Affairs Ministry publication in 1990 perceived the relaxation of the French 'hold' on Francophone West Africa, adding that it was to be a 'bonus for the proper development of the ECOWAS'.

Between the 16th and 23rd February, 1989, a Sixteen member Nigeria trade delegation, the first since the inception of IBBs economic diplomacy, comprising mainly of private sector representatives, visited Ghana and Liberia, both ECOWAS member-states. These visits attained important milestones in Nigeria's trade and investment promotion activities. In specific terms, the trade mission to Ghana was significant in varied ways – firstly, Ghana was an ECOWAS state and a natural market for Nigeria and secondly, the mission was also aimed at formalizing trade in the Sub-region, which was strongly dominated by itinerant traders largely engaged in unrecorded trading activities.

It was also during one of these trade missions that the major constraints to the implementation of the protocols on free movement of persons, goods and services were telescoped and appropriate remedies proposed. The problems of bi-lateral payments were also examined and the delegation agreed to give precedence to the establishment of inter-bank correspondent relationship between banks in the sub-region. The overall success of the Ghana mission was the establishment of Nigeria-Ghana Trade Commission. Conclusively therefore, and as noted Bola Akinterinwa [1993], Nigerian economic diplomacy program was viewed as “a non-

confrontational policy, adopted to create an environment of mutual understanding between Nigeria and her economic partners in order to enhance domestic economic growth and development”

Notwithstanding the critics’ position on government economic diplomacy strategy, within the context of SAP, the administration had stimulated some additional positive effects. Some of such developments affected ECOWAS in different ways. One of such effects was the emergence of several bi-lateral chambers as clearly stated Nigeria’s Chief Akin George, one time President of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce and who also similarly described government’s economic strategy as ‘a sensible principle’. Chief Ernest Shonekan reinforced this position further when he emphasized at a presentation he made at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies [NIPSS], Kuru, in 1987, that IBBs economic diplomacy represented a credible ‘means of revitalizing Nigeria’s economic activities’, adding that the strategy had helped Nigeria in highlighting her priorities to the outside world [FMFA: 1992].

4.3.5 The “Good Neighbor” and the ‘Ring Countries’ Policies:

In close association with the above, the government further developed a consistent pattern and made relentless efforts at ensuring and encouraging peaceful co-existence with Nigeria’s immediate neighbors – the so-called “Ring Countries”. Within this period, Nigeria had least number of clashes with her immediate neighbors. Government in a statement noted also that “crisis in any of the ‘ring states’ would consequently affect on our peace and tranquility”. IBBs regime was therefore fundamental in not only effectively promoting but also enhancing what is often referred to as ‘Nigeria’s good neighbor policies’. Another pointer to this policy was also Nigeria’s efforts at peace restoration in Chad, a neighboring non-

ECOWAS state.

Upon emerging, the government of IBB flung Nigeria's borders, which had been closed by its predecessors to curb smuggling, currency trafficking and illegal bunkering. This was done in the interest of good neighborliness and in the spirit of the ECOWAS Community. To consolidate his strategy, IBB made his first foreign visit to our neighboring Niger Republic, further underscoring the value placed on relations with neighbors.

Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, Babangida's first Foreign Affairs Minister and one time Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, also helped in bouncing back Nigeria to play the role of a giant as shown by his peace initiatives between warring Mali and Burkina-Faso, both of them were ECOWAS states. "Peace was effectively restored fastly following Nigeria's 'pacifist' stance and Professor Akinyemi's shuttle diplomacy" [Federal Ministry of Information: 1986].

In order to facilitate free movement of persons and goods, Nigeria ratified the Brown Card Scheme and a Nigerian company, NICON was to play a major role in operating the scheme [FMI: 1986]. The exit of IBB, after 8 years, did not significantly change the approach of the succeeding administrations. It is interesting to note that key strategies adopted by IBB and his regime towards ECOWAS integration and socio-political and economic development of the sub-region subsisted for more than 2 or 3 decades after IBB. His collection of strategies for many years remained consistently formidable in determining the direction of state policies and attitudes towards the ECOWAS union.

4.3.6 “LIBERIA: A Mission of Peace” and the ECOWAS/ECOMOG Security Challenge:

The ECOWAS region completes the concentric circles governing Nigerian foreign and defense policies, and IBB had particularly observed that ‘one out of every four West Africans is a Nigerian’. It is therefore imperative he added, that ‘we strive towards the prevention and avoidance of the deterioration of every crisis that threatens or jeopardizes or even compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region’. Support for the ECOWAS government therefore concluded was a “national imperative”. Regardless of cost therefore, Nigeria intervened to stop the utterly senseless carnage in Liberia. IBB clear headedly stated and as quoted Professor S.E. Ogude in a scholarly documentation titled “LIBERIA: A Mission of Peace”, published by the Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, that -

In a changing World marching into the twenty-first century, while other peoples and regions are busy consolidating and skillfully planning for the welfare of their countries and people, we are energetically engaged in fratricidal carnage and wanton destruction. Our critics tend to ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in the sub-region...Liberia would not be a Nigerian Vietnam, our mission there is clear, precise and attainable

In further analyzing the ECOWAS initiative, led essentially by Nigeria, all the three ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau are historically viewed as having demonstrated the strategic importance of Nigeria to any peacekeeping mission in the sub-region. Despite the continuing fears expressed by several members of the ECOWAS coalition and numerous other commentators of a ‘bullying’ Nigeria clumsily rampaging through West Africa, Nigeria still appears to be a colossus and an indispensable presence to the success of any future sub-regional peace-keeping initiatives.

The Malian Deputy Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS General Cheikh Diarra was reported to have eloquently stated that "Nigeria is the problem and the solution to the problem", as similarly observed Dr Adekeye Adebajo [2002]. The absence of "the Nigeria Gulliver" from the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was critical to the impulsive and more especially premature termination of the peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau in 1999. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces had been able to triumph over their logistical shortcomings to protect Monrovia and Freetown from being overrun by rebels in 1992 and 1999 respectively.

Nigerian troops were also able to fend off the NPFL from Monrovia in 1990 and restored the Kabbah government to power in Freetown in 1998. This again is clearly suggestive of the indispensability of Nigeria's military and financial potency to the West African sub-regional peacekeeping efforts.

Notwithstanding, the imperativeness of the ECOWAS to the stability and development of Nigerian state, the behavior of Nigerian leadership first by way of coming to power and perpetuating themselves on the 'throne' did not display anything exemplary. Interestingly too, most regimes in West Africa have been characterized by crisis of legitimacy, the IBB regime and many others in Africa inclusive. These experiences on the rise of illegal governments have also resulted in the 'socio-psychological persecution' of Nigerians and the Nigerian state on grounds of illegitimacy. Often, many West Africans have questioned the moral justification of Nigerians and their leadership to query them on political activities within their boundaries. Recently, politicians behind Niger's Mamoudu Tanja's bid to perpetuate his 'rule', have as a reaction to criticism from Nigeria and other West African states demanded that their critics should concentrate on amending the

anomalies in their home countries as they considered the problems in Niger as fundamentally internal, and were strictly for its citizens to resolve internally.

Notwithstanding the strong criticism against the Babangida presidency, the history of the ECOWAS can not be told without making significant references to IBB's tenure as Nigeria's Commander-In-Chief and President. As reported J.E. Okolo, in his "The Babangida Regime and ECOWAS" [2002], Babangida was characteristically bold and resolute and was ready to tackle the challenges posed by the ECOWAS. His government therefore, remained determined to leave what Okolo referred to as "indelible footprints on the sands of ECOWAS' history". Despite all these efforts and commitment, the administration like many others after it did not succeed in bringing the ordinary Nigerian into a conscious process of West Africanization. The various administrations in Nigeria and other member-states therefore went by without fundamentally achieving a truly non-elitist West African coalition that would ensure the involvement of the mass of the citizenry.

Like IBB, the coming to power of Abacha on November 17, 1993, Guei's sacking of President Konan Bedie on December 24, 1999 and their self-succession bids are not new in Africa, especially in the West African sub-region. Gambia's Yaya Jahmey, Guinea's Lansana Conte, Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema are some of the African military leaders who have perfected the strategy to shed the uniform for the civilian regalia. Mamoudu Tanja before his deposition also dislodged a duly constituted parliament and organized an unlawful parliamentary election leading to the recent suspension of Niger Republic as a member of the ECOWAS, October 2009. All these are within the Coalition of West African states

Reflecting on history of the Nigerian state after IBB would no doubt aid us in illustrating the characteristic of leadership in the West African sub-region. Abacha,

a Nigerian army general that took over from Ernest Shonekan was to a larger extent the same with IBB, as he left no stone unturned even if it meant annihilating every opposition on his way. He was also a product of the same system. The casualties of Abacha's activities were, however, numerous. Key members of the opposition were detained, threatened or forced into exile. Abacha's constituency, the military, was not spared as officers and men opposing his mission had a rough deal with him. In spite of the various international sanctions and the pariah status given to the country, Abacha remained defiant and was bent on carrying out his horrendous mission. This became glaring when the defunct five parties, United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and Congress for National Consensus (CNC) partly described by the incumbent Minister of Justice Bola Ige as "four fingers of a leprous hand" all chose Abacha as consensus candidate. Not even the pro-democracy activists like National Democratic Coalition [NADECO], Eastern Mandate Union (EMU) Northern Youths for Democracy (NYD) and Joint Action Committee of Nigeria (JACON) and international isolation and sanctions could sway Abacha until his sudden death on June 8, 1998.

4.3.7 Other ECOWAS States – The Lesson of Cote d’Ivoire’s Instability:

Like Abacha, General Guei who was not swayed by the UN, U.S. and EU sanctions, he in his bid to succeed himself went all out against all opposition members even those he perceived among the army. Therefore, when gunshots were first heard on the streets of Abidjan on December 24, 1999, the world was jolted by the shockwaves that reverberated from a once peaceful country known for several decades as an "oasis of peace and prosperity", a scholar described Cote d’Ivoire as once "a beacon of hope in francophone West Africa". Francis Obinor, an international foreign affairs correspondent reported that from

the beginning General Guei's adventure, Cote d'Ivoire, a traditional haven of peace in West Africa, has continued to witness violence of an incomparable scale. The foiled troop mutiny in July at the residence of the former junta leader General Robert Guei and the backlash of the just - concluded presidential election of October 22 with reported shooting at the Aquado Barracks have shattered this great country and its impressive history of stability. This attracted world's attention. Attempts to restore a civilian regime have nonetheless 'orchestrated swirly orgy of violence' leading to a declaration of a state of emergency. Cote d'Ivoire's stability had always been built on one of the stronger economies in the West African sub-region, which led it to be regarded by several global powers as an important ally. As the world's largest exporter of cocoa beans, and a major palm oil and coffee exporter on a global scale, Cote d'Ivoire since gaining independence from France in 1960 had its first coup following months of tension between deposed President Henry Konan Bedie and would-be challenger Alhassane Quattara. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from agriculture is 31% and it has a per capita income of \$1,680 and a Six percent growth rate. A slump in the price of cocoa worldwide has caused serious economic difficulties.

This downturn in addition to the tragic emergence of Robert Guei, made soldiers to go on mutiny several times demanding more money. The first revolt in March claimed the life of a soldier when troops loyal to Guei violently suppressed the uprising. In July, another uprising witnessed hundreds of soldiers taking to the streets for two days in Abidjan and other cities in what looked like a successful attempt to oust Guei. Guei's downfall began when he expressed his intention to stand in the civilian election.

This move drew the ire and strong criticisms of France, the United States, Nigeria and South Africa, as well as those of Ivoirian politicians. Guei

who had already become the umpire and player postponed the elections initially scheduled for September until October. Having disqualified Quattara, the key challenger contesting the presidency with him on nationality grounds, Guei went ahead to alter the constitution and even nominated members of the (CNE) electoral commission led by Honore Guei to oversee the polls. Although Quattara, a former Prime Minister has consistently insisted that he is an Ivoirian, he was completely sidelined with other members of his rally of the Republicans and former ruling Democratic Party (PDCI-RDA). Guei, who overstretched the honor and trust reposed in him on September 18, said in a statement that he would not condone any form of “disorder”. These statements followed an attempted move to kill him by some dissident soldiers protesting his style of leadership. In what appeared to be a crack down on an invisible enemy, Guei decided to sack two of his powerful generals Lansana Palenfo and Abduolaye Coulibaly, accusing them of planning the attack. Both generals alongside others decided to seek haven at the Nigerian Embassy in Abidjan to safeguard their lives having perceived the inexorable quest by Guei to eliminate all oppositions. Apart from splitting the army to suit his interests, Guei, called the bluff of the U.S., EU, OAU and the ECOWAS and subsequently sent out his soldiers to the streets to look for money to prosecute the election. This move witnessed uncanny experiences from Ivoirian market women and men who recounted their ordeals in the hands of the Guei's soldiers. Guei's request to former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to have Palenfo and Coulibaly back for trial was rebuffed, as Obasanjo insisted that Guei must step down before a fair and transparent election could be held. Since the demise of Houphouet Boigny who led the country to its independence 40 years ago, the rising tensions

even after the dishonorable ousting of Guei have confirmed Cote d'Ivoire's transformation from a rare African state with narrow-minded and intolerant civilians, politics and a viable economy, into a country where military activities hold sway. Having barred Quattara and Bedie from the election, Guei was left to fight for the Presidency with five others with Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivoirian Popular Front as his main challenger. The sagging profile of Guei became apparent when Gbagbo took early lead in the October 22 presidential poll. Dejected, sad and unrelenting, Guei stopped further release of results, dissolved the electoral body and declared himself winner the following day. In order to perfect his game having failed to learn from history of what befell past African leaders like the late Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Emperor Bokassa of Central African Republic, Haile Mengistu of Ethiopia and a host of others, Guei also declared a state of emergency to forestall mass protest against his decision. The spiral of events that ensued astounded him having perceived his miscalculation of a possible back up by the army. The nightlong shooting at the various barracks alongside street protests which sent Guei underground.

With Guei out of the scene, supporters of both Quattara and Gbagbo are now at loggerhead, thus deepening the political crisis. Speaking on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Quattara said a fresh election to determine the best choice candidate by Ivoirians should be called. United Nations former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, supported this call. In an apparent move to forestall further clashes, Gbagbo who got 52 percent of the total vote, called for a government of National Unity, comprising Quattara and other party leaders in Cote d'Ivoire [Obinor,2009].

CHAPTER FIVE

5. PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, efforts would be made at presenting in a methodical and logical fashion the relational profile on the salient questions raised in this study and the findings of the research. Thus, the discussions of our results are closely interrelated to the series of hypotheses and the multiplicity of variables and questions that have emerged or arisen in the course of the study. In addition, we emphatically re-state at the same time that our presentation and analyses of data will be based on responses derived from diverse reactions and responses as presented by the various groups of respondents to our questionnaires or interviews.

5.2 Sample Population

The populations on whom questionnaires were administered and with whom interviews were conducted in the course of this survey were as previously noted wide-ranging. The make-up of the sampled population were a function of many vital factors but more importantly the type of information that were likely obtainable from them. Below are a broad outline of the sampled population, presented in tabular forms [Tables 5:1 & 5:2], and as indicated by the profile of the questionnaire return rate as well as specially recognized persons interview response as presented below:

5.2.1 Profile of Responses for all Three Sample Groupings:

TABLE 5.2.1:

QUESTIONNAIRE/INTERVIEW RESPONSE SUMMARY FOR ALL THREE SAMPLED GROUPINGS

Sample Groupings:	Total Sample Size	Number/% Group of Samples Returned	Percentage Out of total groups of samples [%]
1.Border Communities Group:			
Birnin-Konni	50	33 [66%]	57.6%
Maradi	50	29 [58%]	
Illela	50	35 [70%]	
Jibia	50	39 [78%]	
	200	136 [68/100%]	
2. Informed Community citizens:experts, military diplomacy etc.	132	88 [65.6/100%]	37.2%
3. Specially Recognized Persons.	35	12 [34.2/100%]	5.08
4. Others	0	0/0	0
TOTAL:	367	236 [64.3/100%]	100%
<i>Source: Research Survey, 2009</i>			

From the table 5.1 above, it is most convenient to conclude that the rate of

responses of the three broad classes of respondents as a whole and on the average were sufficiently satisfactory and consequently most agreeable for predictive analysis or for drawing valid generalizations. When viewed from the standpoint of an average, the three categories of respondents can be concluded as having reacted sufficiently and positively.

5.2.2 Analysis of Age and Gender Classification of all three groupings:

TABLE 5.2.2: AGE AND GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS OF ALL RESPONDENTS FROM THE THREE SAMPLED GROUPS

AGE GROUPS	Freq. Male	%	Freq. Female	%	Total	%
20-30 YEARS	28	11.86	8	3.38	36	15.24
31-40 „	46	19.49	20	8.47	66	27.96
41-50 „	52	22.03	20	8.47	72	30.5
51-60 „	37	15.67	16	5.77	53	22.44
61 and above	9	3.81	0	0	9	3.81
TOTAL	172	72	64	27.09	236	100

Source: Research Survey [2009].

From table 5.22 above, about 30.5% of our sampled respondents are within the age bracket of 41-50 and this age group is closely by those within the age group of 31-40, who constitute up to 27.96 of the total sampled groupings. In terms of gender distribution, 72% are found to be males while about 27.09% are females.

5.2.3 Analysis of the Educational Attainments of all three Groupings:

Realizing the value and essence of education in all human endeavors, the researchers deemed it appropriate to undertake a survey on the educational profile of all the three core groups of respondents. Below is a table depicting the level of

educational attainment of all respondents:

TABLE 5.2.3: EDUCATIONAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS FROM ALL THREE SAMPLED GROUPINGS:

Sample Groupings:	Primary Sch. Certificate	Secondary School Certificate	Polytechnic/University	Others [Special Courses/Programs]
Borderland Communities [136]:	54 [39.7%]	26 [19.1%]	10 [7.35%]	46 [33.82%]
Informed Community Citizens/Professionals [88]:	0 [0%]	6 [6.8%]	67 [76.13%]	15 [17.04%]
Specially Recognized Persons [12]:	0 [0%]	0 [0%]	9 [75%]	3 [25%]

Research Survey, 2009.

From table 5.2.3, as evidenced above, a good number of the borderland respondents have only primary education [39.7%]. In addition, out of the whole lot, only 7.35% have what is referred to as ‘polytechnic or university education’. This in essence means a limited number has higher education. Even those who are educated up to secondary level represent only 19.1% of the group sample have attained secondary education. However, there is no indication whether they have attained proper GCE Certifications, its equivalent or only passed through secondary school.

A sizeable proportion of the borderland respondents, up to 33.8% have

other types of education and this may mean Qur’anic education or other types of certifications. Moreover, amongst the informed citizens group, only 6.8% attained secondary education. Up to 76.2% have attained University or Polytechnic education, meaning that a sizeable chunk of this sample grouping is well or to say the least reasonably educated, having achieved diverse certifications or qualifications [degrees or diplomas] from universities or polytechnics. This further qualifies them to appreciate the subject matter in focus and from diverse perspectives too. The same type of profile is evident in the Informed Citizens Sample and the Specially Recognized Persons Group. As envisaged by the research, most of the ‘well-informed’ and perhaps authoritative comments on the ECOWAS and its integrative pursuits, challenges and difficulties emanated from this group of respondents. This is not however an under estimation of the value of the borderland group, who are considered as ‘real practitioners’ in the integration process.

5.2.4 Analysis of Language Proficiency of all three Sample Groupings:

Language plays an important role in determining the level and relative interaction between peoples of diverse linguistic roots. In Africa and particularly West Africa several local languages exist, principal amongst these languages are languages like Hausa, Yoruba, Fulfulde, Wolof, Ewe [which is more dominant between Ghana and a few of its neighboring states], and *Zabarmanchi*, also commonly spoken amongst the peoples of Nigeria, Niger and the northern flank of Benin Republic. Thus, for the most parts of its existence, West Africa was characterized by shared linguistic experiences and West Africans are thus affiliated to each other linguistically. However, notwithstanding this affiliation, the emergence of the forces of colonization has introduced about three new languages into the West African language or linguistic terrain. The question, at this point, to

once again ask, is, how many of the numerous indigenous languages, for example, should members of the coalition feature in education, the media, and other aspects of our socio-economic activities? Traditionally, language policies in the sub-region have tended to favor the European official languages for which a dominant majority of the people is unable to understand, more so within the educationally less-privileged citizens of the community. The following tables are more clearly illustrative of language status of respondents. Some selected major local languages that are commonly found between Niger and Nigeria were analyzed as well as the only three foreign languages that are found in all ECOWAS member-states – English, French and Portuguese. The later is only spoken and adopted as an official medium in Guinea-Bissau.

TABLE 5.2.4 A: FOREIGN LANGUAGES PROFICIENCY PROFILE FOR ALL THREE SAMPLED GROUPS IN ECOWAS.

LANGUAGES:										Total Sample Size.
Sample groups	ENGLISH:			FRENCH:			PORTUGUESE:			
	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor:	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor:	
Border Comms.	16 [11.7%]	38 [27.9%]	82 [60.2%]	13 [9.5%]	32 [23.5%]	91 [66.9%]	0 [0%]	0 [0%]	136 [100%]	
General Citizens	38 [43.1%]	30 [34%]	20 [22.7%]	12 [13.6]	6 [6.8%]	70 [79.5%]	5 [5.6%]	5 [5.6%]	78 [88.6%]	88

Specially										12
Recorg	10	2	0	0	2	10	0	0	12	
persons	[83.3%]	[16.6%]	[0%]	[0%]	[16.6%]	[83.3%]	[0%]	[0%]	[100%]	
Total										236

Source: Researcher [2009]

The table above shows that amongst the border communities only 11.7% of the total group sample are fluent in English. Similarly, only 9.5% are fluent in French language. This is perhaps indicative of the poor literacy level of the sampled border communities, thus further confirming the limited level of investment in public education as many observers have generally claimed. In contrast, however to the second group of respondents, the language proficiency level is relatively higher amongst this group, indicating a higher level of education amongst the sample respondents.

**TABLE 5.2.4 B:
LOCAL LANGUAGES PROFICIENCY PROFILE FOR ALL THREE SAMPLED GROUPINGS.**

Sample groups	LOCAL LANGUAGES:									Total Sample Size.
	HAUSA			FULFULDE			ZABARMANCHI			
	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor:	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor:	Fluent:	Fairly Fluent:	Poor:	
Border Comms.	112 82.3%	24 17.6%	0 0%	86 63.2%	33 24.3%	17 12.5%	47 34.5%	58 42.6%	31 22.7%	136

General									88
Citizens	58	19	11	21	26	41	2	5	81
	65.9%	21.6%	12.5%	23.8%	29.5%	46.6%	2.3%	5.7%	92.0%
Specially									
Recorg	6	3	3	1	1	10	0	0	0
persons	50%	25%	25%	8.3%	8.3%	83.3%	0%	0%	0%
Total									236

Source: Researcher, 2009.

The table, labeled 5.2.4. B above, has denoted that there is some level of popularity of Hausa and Fulfulde languages amongst the border communities and these languages are a common medium of expression especially in the conduct of social and business interactions. This underscores the need to for member-states in the ECOWAS region to develop and popularize these languages as a basis for the facilitation of a more ‘natural integration’ and more especially as Fulanis and Hausas are found in all parts of West Africa – from Senegal to Nigeria and from Mali to Ghana.

5.3 Sample Population of Border Towns/Communities:

It was in the light of the issue of trade development, trade facilitation and “locational” significance of this group that a vital sample of this research was created out of the diverse populations that are found in all the borders of the ECOWAS member states. As border populations, it is strongly assumed that several economic activities relevant to the ECOWAS coalition and implicitly this study are actively pursued here on a daily basis. Therefore, a lot of economic activities of various forms, legitimate and illicit are a major feature of these border

settlements. Simultaneously, and from this premise too, the location significance of these populations is again rooted, therefore making them of strategic intellectual and empirical relevance to our study. From this discourse, therefore it is important to note these communities as playing a vital role in trade and trade development not only in their respective “entities” but also by extension in the entire West African sub-region.

Very importantly, it is from these populations that the following vital features have been significantly noted:

1. An existing distinction between the “natural”, the “politically willed” and the formal integration processes which are informed by a set of causes such as technological, socio-cultural changes and changes in public policies [economic and political] can be observed. A professor of linguistics, A. Lawal, while expressing his views on the subject asserted that African countries should pursue a mixed language policy that will emphasize the use of more and more indigenous languages side by side English, French or Portuguese adding that these languages can be used to promote nationalism, ‘nationism’ and West African integration.
2. Cross-border trading as one of our key interviewees equally noted is conducted by “small scale quasi traders...which also makes available goods and services consumed by the general populace, especially the poor”. These populations are often of the belief that their economic fortunes are inseparably connected more so as they benefit considerably from cross-border trade.
3. It is visibly noticeable that most of these communities are known to be integrated into a “traditional system of weekly markets”, with traders

moving goods across the borders. In some of our discussions, these markets are described or often referred to as “rotating markets”.

4. During periods of inter-state crises and tensions, historical evidence have amply indicated that these border line communities are the ones that are mostly affected by the backlash and in most cases hostile effects of strained relations, more so when they are often targeted for raids and reprisals. On the Nigeria-Niger borders, we have not seen or observed any confirmatory evidence.
5. It has also been observed that the borderland communities are often neglected in terms of receiving the benefits of central government initiated or engineered programs of development, in addition to finding their livelihood intermittently interrupted by the decisions of their central governments such as those pertaining to border closures and increased military activities. Despite this apparent state of neglect, these communities remain targeted as veritable sources of revenue for the development of the hinterlands opined some of the residents of these communities.
6. In these border communities, the study has through informal discussions and other credible sources that it is irrefutable that their exist a very close kinship and marriage relations amongst borderland communities. In his presentation, which essentially catalogued on the “Paradox of West Africa’s integration”, Dr Steve Tonah, in a UNESCO organized seminar in Accra [November 2005], clearly re-affirmed this observation. Attahiru Dalhatu Bafarawa, former Executive Governor of the northern border state of Sokoto, in Northern Nigeria, similarly reinforced this observation while addressing a North West Zone’s National Workshop on Border

Security Cooperation and Integration meeting held in Sokoto on 27th of June 2000.

Two hundred questionnaires, divided in four equal parts of 50 each were administered through the use of local research assistants in all the four locations of Birnin-Konni, Maradi [in Niger Republic] and Illela [Sokoto State] and Jibia [Katsina State, Nigeria]. Out of these questionnaires and as earlier noted, 136 were returned, representing 68% of the total sample of 200.

In **Birnin-Konni**, a border town very close to Nigeria and with an outstanding and a busy border post because of its active commercial orientation, 50 questionnaires were distributed by the Researcher and two field assistants most familiar with the terrain. In **Maradi**, also a fairly populous settlement with enormous business profile, the questionnaires were administered by research assistants who were conversant with not only the physical terrain but with both French and the local languages such as *Hausa*, *Zabarmanchi*, *Buzanchi*, and *Fulfulde*, all of which are extensively spoken in the area. It is easily noted that a local variety of ‘Pidgin’ French as the similarly experienced ‘Pidgin’ English in Nigeria and Ghana is also spoken by the local residents.

In **Illela**, also a commercially oriented town and the headquarters of Illela Local Government Area [of Sokoto State] has in a relative sense a sizeable population and is no doubt a ‘ready market’ in which a variety of items ranging from textiles to food and an assortment of rubber products like kettles, buckets, jerry-cans, mats, etc. whose origin are traceable to Nigeria’s petro-chemical down-stream sub-sector, are openly on sale. “Okada” riders or commercial motorcycle riders are making brisk business here. Food and Agricultural products commonly displayed include grains like sorghum, millet, *gari* [a food product extracted from cassava, very common in West Africa] beans, maize, fish and

livestock. Also elaborately displayed are assortments of clothing materials, rubber products from Nigeria, such as rubber/plastic buckets and other processed products from Nigeria’s foods and beverages sub-sector.

In terms of our questionnaire distribution, this was done with relative ease, essentially because of our familiarity with the environment and our ability to communicate with relative ease. Hausa is most commonly spoken here. Other languages most evident were *Zabarmanchi* and Fulfulde. In terms of questionnaire return, about 70% sample response was recorded. Respondents in Jibia were more positively responsive in terms of returned questionnaire. Of the total 50 sent 39 were duly completed and returned. Thus, the recorded return rate is 78%, reasonably sizeable for effective empirical deduction.

The features of **Jibia** town, also a Local Government Headquarter in terms of market and product types are similar to that of Illela, dealing mostly in, textiles, rubber products, grains, fish etc. Other prominent products commonly found in these two border towns are a variety of livestock and this is especially so because of the Sahel - Sudano nature of the belt, favorable for the sustenance of livestock.

5.3.1 Analysis of Responses of Sampled Border Communities:

In terms of responses in key borderland settlements from which we drew our sample, the following table, tagged as table 5.3 is additionally illustrative:

Table 5.3.1 A: RESPONSE PROFILE OF SAMPLED BORDER COMMUNITIES IN NIGERIA AND NIGER REPUBLIC [Jibia, Illela, Maradi, & Birnin-Konni].

Border town	Country	Total no of Questionnaires Sent	Total no of Questionnaire Received	% received
Birnin-Konni [BKN]	Niger	50	33	66

Maradi [MRD]	Niger	50	29	58
Illela [ILA]	Nigeria	50	35	70
Jibia [JBA]	Nigeria	50 [200]	39 [136]	78
			[136/200x100= 68% total Sample Response]	68% for Total Sample.

Source: Research Survey [2009]

In addition to all the above, we also investigated on issues such the group's line of trade or business, educational attainments, in addition to other vital issues as diversely tabulated below:

TABLE 5.3.1 B: BORDER COMMUNITIES' SAMPLE BACKGROUND CHECKS IN RELATION TO GENDER CLASSIFICATION, TRADE/BUSINESS, AND EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS:

<i>ITEMS</i>	<i>R ESPONSE:</i>	<i>FREQUENCY</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>TOTALS</i>
1. Gender Classification	Male-	94	69.2	136/100%
	Female-	42	30.8	
2. Age Groupings	20-30 years	35	26	136/100%
	31-40 ,,	67	49	
	41-50 ,,	24	17.7	
	51-60 ,,	9	5.3	
	61 years / above	1	0.73	
3. Line of Business/ Trade	Food Processing	15	11.02	

	Transportation	20	14.7	
	Farming	38	27.9	
	Trading	34	25	
	Middleman	29	21.3	136/100%
4. Educational Achievements	Primary	54	39.7	
	Secondary	26	19.1	
	Poly/University	10	7.35	
	Others	46	33.8	136/100%

Source: Survey Research 2009.

Principally, it can once again be asserted that in this sample, the overriding majority are of the male sex. Female representation is only 30.8%, which one can say however, is also indicative of a rational role members of the female sex also play in cross border activities.

This tends to very importantly question the claim in some literature in which women-traders in West Africa, were portrayed as playing the most dominant role in real trading activities. A likely explanation for this may be seen in the cultural and religious practice in some of these areas where women undergo seclusion, thus they were not likely to come across our questionnaire.

In terms of the types of business activities found to be foremost in the areas sampled, trading with a count of 34 persons out of the total sample size of 136 i.e. 25%, is the most dominant after farming. This is followed by “middlemanship”, which is a dominant feature of most local markets and their adjoined settlements across West Africa. This group may in another sense be viewed as ‘traders’ also.

In terms of education, only 7.3% has attained higher educational

qualifications [University/Polytechnic] in this group of respondents. This again is also a portrayal of the poor level of ‘western-styled’ education around and within the border areas surveyed. The governing majority [39.7%] went to ‘western-styled’ Primary Schools, while 19.1% had the benefit of post-primary or secondary education. Captivatingly, a sizeable group out of this set of respondents has attained other forms of education and when asked to specify, 33.8% have identified Qur’anic schools. Again, this observation, which is depictive of the dearth of modern educational facilities in borderland communities, is furthermore conclusive of the neglect often suffered by members of these border communities as earlier illustrated and especially in the provision of social services.

Subsequent to our data analysis, we are also able to reasonably identify that the leading majority of our respondents are in more youthful age brackets especially between 20-30 years [26%] and between 31-40 years [49%]. Therefore, it can then be concluded that those actively participating in cross-border activities especially in the area of trading or what is alternatively referred to as “buying and selling” are youthful having made up 75% of our total sample [26% + 49% = 75%].

In order to make our study more encompassing as notably expressed above, and to furthermore create a stronger pedestal for effective generalizations, we have deliberately expanded our data source to also include two additional groups as noted in our table 5.1 above; the “Informed / General Members of the ECOWAS Community Sample” and that of the “Specially Recognized Persons Sample”. One of the strategic purposes for this “multi-source” approach is to essentially provide a sounder base for a confirmation or disputation of a position – expressed or observed.

5.4 Analysis of Sample of Informed Citizens Group [ICG] of the ECOWAS Community:

This group is composed of persons that are adjudged as well informed members of the public within the ECOWAS Community. This characteristic further confirms the “purposive” nature of this sample as earlier noted in our methodology presentation. Principal among this sample are persons consciously sampled in order to give the study a component of a more enlightened sample especially after taking cognizance of the international nature of the subject matter and its apparent complexity as a contemporary issue. In the light of these observations therefore, we sampled informed citizens from the academia, the international civil service and diplomatic community within the ECOWAS set up and other members of the diplomatic and business community. Moreover, others are officials of institutions and organizations that are in trade relevant organizations and institutions in both the private and public sectors of the ECOWAS coalition states and civil society groups. A specially designed questionnaire meant to elicit informed responses on vital issues on regional and trade related integration in the ECOWAS States was administered by the Researcher and specially employed research assistants. Only 88 [or 87.79] persons responded to our questionnaire, thus making over 66% of the group sample and up to 37.2 % of the research’s total sample population of 236.

An analysis of the educational background of this category of sample has indicated that 60.2 % have attained university education, while 32 % have achieved Polytechnic or Monotechnic education. Only 5.6 % are of post-primary educational status, and 2.2% have acquired other forms of training some of which have been explicitly specified, and these included special training courses especially those carried out overseas [UK and USA especially] and in higher

institutions of learning within the confines of the Community.

In terms of gender categorization, a predominance of the male sex was most noticeable. Precisely, the male population of this sample is 69%, while the female portion is only 31%. Even though 31% does not mean a really sizeable representation on comparative terms, it however denotes that claim by some scholars that women are still an integral part of the ECOWAS integration process and they will continue to play a strategic role in trade and integration processes now and in the future.

5.5 Analysis of Sample of Specially Recognized Persons[SRP]:

The 12 respondents obtained from 35 persons approached represents only 34.2% of the total. This also implies 5.08% of the total sample population of 236 [i.e. $12/236 \times 100 = 5.08\%$]. This group of respondents has been specially focused in view of the assumption that they possess some special characteristics and these include some of the following:

1. Positive disposition towards the subject of study, more so in view of their responsibility towards the ECOWAS coalition project, a few of them from inception.
2. Contribution and historical roles played as key players especially in the context of their paternal situation or responsibility as the coalition unfolded over the last few decades.
3. The quantum of experience possessed in trade, defense, security or diplomacy related matters in general and in the specific context of the ECOWAS coalition.
4. It is also possible for this category of respondents to authoritatively confirm or dispute what the other classes of respondents, in addition to our numerous

secondary data sources have said or indicated.

5.5.1 Interviews Successfully Conducted:

All the respondents comprising of specially recognized persons were specially interviewed by the Researcher on an individual basis and following their personal approvals. Out of the 35 SRPs [Specially Recognized Persons], only 12 responded positively, representing only 34.2% of the total sample of this category of respondents. In terms of the total research, sample this represent only 5.08%. Persons in this category includes career diplomats, ECOMOG-ECOWAS field commanders/Officers [Nigerians only] and other important personalities.

In sampling these respondents of specially recognized persons as in the case of our “purposive” sample group II, we adopted a judgmental criterion in identifying who should be in this group based on the factors presented above, and especially after telescoping on their remarkable contributions towards the ECOWAS organization and all that the process gave impetus to by way of concept, action or program. Thus, the “selection” was based on a criterion – fundamentally associated as earlier enunciated with the ECOWAS ‘processes’, and its institutions. The overriding majority here as earlier stated is therefore and more specifically top government officials, members of the Diplomatic Corp, retired or serving Nigerian military officers on ECOMOG contingents and political leaders.

The Interview Schedules [attached as an appendix] were personally and mostly presented to a majority of interviewees by the Researcher who was closely assisted by research assistants. Although the response rate can be described as low as noted above, it can be admitted for valid generalizations. In terms of Gender categorization of the 12 respondents recorded in this category of samples,

only two are females. To some analysts this may clearly be indicative of an apparent preponderance towards male dominance in this group.

5.6 Testing of Hypotheses:

Hypotheses are in general “value-free statements expressing a relationship between two variables” or empirical events. In carrying out our tests of hypotheses, a series of vital procedures are adopted ranging from the original act of hypotheses formulation itself; obtaining the relevant data; comparison of grouped data from the three varied samples with the aid of tabulated figures/percentages; and drawing of conclusions.

As we have noted under our Methodology discussion, our approach to data interpretation and analysis will essentially be pinned on the use of tabular/percentage presentations for statistical inferences.

Hypothesis No 1: *That*, the non-involvement of citizens/citizens- based groups have resulted in the creation and sustenance of an elitist ECOWAS and therefore thwarting the emergence of a people-centered coalition.

Hypothesis No 2: *That*, pervasive insecurity in most parts of the Sub-region has strongly impeded the creation of an environment that is most conducive for integration and intra-community trade in the ECOWAS region.

Hypothesis No 3: *That*, state agencies and institutions serve as obstacles rather than facilitators to ECOWAS economic unification.

Hypothesis No 4: *That*, the profound absence of a single regional currency as an acceptable means of exchange is a major impediment to trade facilitation and development in West Africa.

In the light of these four hypotheses as spelt out above, we have developed

appropriate questions in both our questionnaires and interview schedules specifically to elicit responses on issues raised by all the hypotheses generated. For all the three groups of respondents/samples, questions that relate broadly to the respondents' background checks were asked, in addition to those that are fundamentally hypotheses-related. In attempting to be more broad in our analyses of various integration issues, the study initially determined that questions and responses that deal with issues of mobilization and neo-colonialism as a prologue and as expressed below:

5.7 Analysis of Border Communities' Responses on Issues of Citizens' and Institutional Mobilization:

Integration processes in all its multifaceted settings the world over have been noted as complex occurrences that require the participation of several strata of society or community, thus the study consider it pertinent to sample views of border communities and all other groups of respondents on this vital issue. This observation indeed further underscores the need for a premeditated and purposeful program of mobilization within and in between all relevant groups. Based on this observation, we developed questions that stimulated responses on the apparent non-involvement of the general citizens, formal and informal groups and how the situation has also deterred the emergence of an effective West African coalition. The following are fundamentally vital in the introductory analyses of the mobilization thesis. About ten questions were asked this group of respondents all relating to the thesis of citizens' mobilization and the table below marked as Table 5.7.A is clearly illustrative:

Table 5.7.A: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON ECOWAS CITIZENS' MOBILIZATION PROGRAMS AIMED AT RE-AWAKENING CITIZENS' CONCIOUSNESS ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	8	5.8%
2	Barely strong	10	7.35%
3	Weak	70	51.4%
4	Very weak	40	29.4%
5	Undecided	8	5.8%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Responses on ECOWAS's programs of mobilization especially in direct relation to its responsibility towards raising consciousness of the citizens on integration elicited the following responses from this group of respondents further indicating that state directed mobilization programs are essentially weak, especially as over 51.4% have described government led efforts as "weak". Closely following are those who positioned that these efforts are very weak [29.4%]. Only 8 respondents representing 5.8% are undecided on this issue. In the light of these responses and as generally tabulated above, the general populace as collated is barely involved in the integration process.

Table 5.7.B: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON ECOWAS-LED MOBILIZATION PROGRAMS AIMED AT RE-AWAKENING CITIZENS' CONCIOUSNESS ON INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	8	5.8%
2	Barely strong	45	33.3%

3	Weak	63	45.1%
4	Very weak	20	15%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

As noted on Table 5.7.B above, borderland communities have indicated the apparent weakness of ECOWAS efforts towards promoting citizens' awareness and consciousness on intra-community trade. Out of the 136 respondents in this group, 45.1% have shown that ECOWAS's efforts are essentially 'weak'. About 15% have also reinforced this view when they closely expressed that the efforts of the ECOWAS in reawakening citizens' consciousness on intra-community trade is 'very weak'.

Table 5.7.C: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF the ORGANIZED PRIVATE SECTOR IN INTEGRATION AND INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE PROMOTION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	37	27%
2	Barely strong	43	31.8%
3	Weak	30	22.3%
4	Very weak	26	19%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In many countries, especially those with the laissez-faire approach to economic management, the role of the private sector in the management of

their economies is fundamental and cannot therefore be underestimated. Realizing the essence of the organized private sector [OPS] in the business of trade promotion and economic development in general, the study sampled views of its respondents on the involvement of the private sector in the act promoting intra-community trade and therefore West African integration. Table 5.7.C summarizes all the views of this group of respondents on the degree and involvement of the organized private sector [OPS]. An impressive 37% and 43% have respectively observed ‘very strong’ and ‘barely strong’ involvement of the organized private sector. In addition, 30 others representing 22.3% of the sample is however of the view that the participation of the organized private sector is ‘weak’ and 19% have described OPSs involvement as ‘poor’. This view may be more reasonable in the sense that respondents in this group may be having an enlarged view of what constitutes private sector or more precisely the ‘Organized Private Sector’.

Notwithstanding the critics of SAP as an economic strategy, it stimulated some additional effects, which also affected ECOWAS in different ways as official circles portrayed. One of such effects was the emergence of several bi-lateral chambers as clearly stated Nigeria’s Chief Akin George, one time President of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce. The responses of our respondents, as demonstrated above, seem to reinforce the participatory effectiveness of the organized private sector, especially through the bi-lateral chambers.

Table 5.7.D: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTEGRATION AND INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE PROMOTION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	10	7.6%
2	Barely strong	52	38.6%
3	Weak	44	32%
4	Very weak	30	22%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Non-governmental organizations [NGOs] the world over have been known to be formidable citizens' groups who are often key participants in the process of promoting various development initiatives and programs especially in less developed countries. For many donor organizations NGOs are better appreciated as they tend to demonstrate better management capability and are financially more accountable. It is in the light of these observations that this research deemed it appropriate to ask questions on the involvement of the NGOs in the process of promoting intra-community trade and integration in order to assess the involvement of citizens' based organizations in the process of promoting regional coalition. Out of 136 respondents from the border-communities, only 10 of them, representing 7.6% are of the view that the ECOWAS has 'very strongly' involved the NGOs in the process of promoting integration and intra-ECOWAS trade. This is certainly very un-impressive, in our view, and more so, in consideration of the growing significance of NGOs in recent times. In addition, 52 out of 136 respondents [38.6%] followed closely when they stated that ECOWAS involvement of the NGOs was 'barely

strong’, also an unimpressive outcome. In addition, 32% of the total respondents however are of the view that the involvement of NGOs was precisely ‘very weak’. Table 5.7.D above is clearly depictive of all the above positions.

Table 5.7.E: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES’ OPINIONS ON ECOWAS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION MOBILIZATION PROGRAMS

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	20	15%
2	Barely strong	26	19.1%
3	Weak	60	44.1%
4	Very weak	3	2%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In terms of assessing ECOWAS political and economic information and mobilization programs, 44.1% have indicated that these were apparently weak, while 19.1% were indicative that these programs of economic and political information are only ‘barely strong’.

Table 5.7.F below displays figures that are indicative of the existence of an innate culture of integration in West Africa. About 55.9% of this group of respondents have expressed the belief that there is an innate culture of integration amongst West African societies. Closely supportive of this position were 39.1% of our respondents in this group who inferred that West Africa is bestowed with a natural culture of integration. As similarly observed traditional African scholars of integration, there existed over the past several years an innate desire for African neighbors and communities to integrate

amongst themselves, thus details as portrayed on Table 5.7.F found below are equally supportive of this thesis.

Table 5.7.F: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE HISTORICAL EXISTENCE OF AN INNATE CULTURE OF INTEGRATION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	77	55.9%
2	Barely strong	53	39.1%
3	Weak	3	2%
4	Very weak	3	2%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

On whether the ECOWAS has as a body established noticeable public projects or programs in member-states, 36% clearly stated that these projects/programs were weakly noticeable. About 18% [Very strongly] and 29% [Barely strongly] have both expressed that ECOWAS projects/programs are noticeable in their countries. The figures on display in table 5.7.G below are clearly expressive of the general noticeability or presence of ECOWAS created or led projects in member-states.

**Table 5.7.G: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE NOTICEABILITY OF
ECOWAS PROJECTS/PROGRAMS**

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	25	18%
2	Barely strong	39	29%
3	Weak	49	36%
4	Very weak	23	17%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Having x-rayed the statistical displays on a number of tables as presented above, it is thus imminent to strongly re-assert that there exist an apparent **non-involvement of the general citizens**, formal and informal groups and as a result, this has strongly created a backlash effect on the various integrative pursuits of the coalition of West African states – the ECOWAS. In addition, when all these views are re-viewed and aggregated, it becomes convenient to assertively uphold the first hypothesis of the study, which has inquired on whether there is a correlation between the involvement/mobilization of the general citizens/their groups with effective West African integration.

5.8 Analysis of Border Communities' Responses on Issues of Regional Security and Stability:

Some questions were asked our respondents in this group and these questions were centered on our first hypothesis, which essentially sought to emphasize the essence and value of security and political stability as they relate

to regional trade and investment promotion. The first question was related to the essence of good governance and leadership as cogent facilitators of trade and development. 49% of this group of respondents was of the view that these factors were of very strong relevance in trade facilitation [See Table 5.8.A below for details].

Table 5.8.A: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE ON WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	67	49.3%
2	Barely strong	28	20.5%
3	Weak	18	13.2%
4	Very weak	23	17%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In addition, it is interesting for one to note that up to 100% of our specially recognized persons group was supportive of this view. On the issue of stability and security, 47% of border community citizens [a comparative majority] expressed very strongly that stability and security were of paramount importance. Nineteen percent [19%] of this group of respondents was equally supportive of this position, even though not on a more definable scale.

Table 5.8.B: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE EFFECT OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY ON WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	65	47.7%
2	Barely strong	25	19.8%
3	Weak	12	9%
4	Very weak	32	23%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In terms of the correlation between citizens - based crises and integration, about 44% of these respondents opined that there was a close link between the two issues, thus one directly affects the other. In addition, 25.4% followed with a view that is hugely similar when they observed that the effect of these citizens-based crises is barely strong. About 14% are however, of the opposite opinion when they portrayed that there is a weak relationship or link between state/citizens-based crises and effective ECOWAS integration [See Table 5.8.C below].

Table 5.8.C: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' VIEWS ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN STATE/CITIZENS-BASED CRISES AND EFFECTIVE WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	61	44.8%
2	Barely strong	36	25.4%
3	Weak	20	14.7%

4	Very weak	19	14%
5	Undecided	0	0%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

With this catalogue of responses as severally displayed and analyzed on tables 5.8.A, 5.8.B, 5.8.C, and 5.8.D, it is imperative to hereby re-state that, in general, reactions from this group of respondents seems to be positively and significantly inclined towards supporting or upholding our hypothesis, which sought to see the correlation between poor quality of governance, instability and insecurity in relation to the region’s inability to undertake effective political integration and economic cohesion. This point has equally been confirmed by the reaction of ‘informed community citizens’ and the ‘specially recognized persons’ groups whose position was very much similar. Over 90% of the Specially recognized persons group were in support of the postulation above.

As a response to the series of crises bedeviling the West African region, the Authority of the ECOWAS created the ECOWAS Monitoring Group – ECOMOG as a homegrown initiative with the aim of finding indigenous ways and methods out of the series of political crises that had engulfed West Africa. About four broad questions were administered on respondents and these bordered significantly on important motivational issues such as peace promotion, promotion of good governance, disarmament and credible elections.

Table 5.8.D below demonstrates the opinion of borderland respondents on the functional essence of the ECOMOG. The dominant majority of this group of respondents, numbering up to 60 out of 136 and which represent 44.1% are of the opinion that ECOMOG was established for the principal purposes of regional

peace promotion.

Perhaps, this segment of the borderland respondents have taken into consideration the historical roles of the ECOMOG in the region’s hotspots of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. It is also interesting to note that up to 31.6% of the respondents are of the belief that the promotion of good governance is ECOMOG’s key responsibility. From the display of responses on table 5.8.D below, 22% are of the belief that disarmament of ‘warring factions’ as in the case of Liberia, is the key responsibility of the ECOMOG. Interestingly however, the same percentage [22%] have indicated their ‘un-decidedness’ or indifference on the subject of disarmament as a key responsibility of the ECOMOG.

From the table below [5.8.D] it is convenient to conclude that this group of respondents has demonstrated a significant understanding on the broad and specific essence of the ECOMOG as a peace promoting initiative of the ECOWAS. Again, this more significantly underscores the value of security to the integration process. Understandably, 46% of this sample scored the ‘promotion of credible elections’ ‘weak’, implying that there are more significant responsibilities for the ECOMOG as expressed the variables of peace promotion, good governance, and disarmament.

Table 5.8.D: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES’ VIEWS ON THE FUNCTIONAL MOTIVATION BEHIND SETTING UP THE ECOWAS MONITORING GROUP [ECOMOG]

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	PEACE PROMOTION:	60	44.1%
2	PROMOTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE:	36	26.4%

3	DISARMAMENT:	26	19.1%
4	PROMOTION OF CREDIBLE ELECTIONS	12	8.8%
5	UNDECIDED	2	1.4%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

5.9 Analysis of Responses on Agencies of State / Institutions - Processes & Performance:

In the light of the need to on a strategic basis attain a certain level of global competitiveness, some efforts have been made by ECOWAS member-states to achieve what has been described as an integrated transport and communication infrastructure within the West African coalition. The level of infrastructural development especially in terms of transport and communication is noted in many trade and business literature is therefore of strategic relevance and value. It is in the light of this postulation that we deemed it appropriate to unearth the reaction of our respondents on these key issues. The table below [5.9.A] is expressive of varied reactions obtained. 63.2% of this group of respondents has clearly affirmed that transport and communication plays a very positive role in facilitating trade and economic cohesion in general. 38% and 35% of the group further noted the weak and poor status of communication and transport infrastructure respectively.

One of the most recognized strategies for facilitating the erection of a cohesive regional economy is through the pursuit of joint efforts in building infrastructure in such areas as transport and communication. Fifty-One percent [51%] of this group of respondents has however recognized the glaring absence of

such joint projects in the region. Only 4% of the group has noted any of such projects.

TABLE 5.9.A: RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ON INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES

Issues	Responses:					Total	Percentage
	Very strongly	Barely strong	Weak	Poor	Undecided		
OPINION OF RESPONDENTS ON THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE ON TRADE:	89 65.4	17 12.5	10 7.3	20 15	0 0	136	100%
VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE STRENGTH OF ECOWAS COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE:	16 11.7	47 34.5	53 38.9	20 14.2	0	136	100%
VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE STRENGTH OF ECOWAS TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE:	18 13.2	39 28.6	48 35.2	31 23	0 0	136	100%
RESPONDENTS' OPINION ON THE VALUE OF JOINT FACILITY/ INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT:	69 51	44 32	8 6	5 4	10 7	136	100%
RESPONDENTS' OPINION ON THE EXISTENCE OF JOINT	2 1.4	3 2	42 31	50 37	39 29	136	100%

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS:							
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Source: Field Survey, 2009.

Referring to the theorization of Limoa and Venerables, the Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] equally noted that improvement in transport infrastructure such that a country moves from an average range among 64 countries considered, to being among the top 25 per cent of those countries would reduce transport costs by an amount equivalent to 481 kilometers of over land travel and 3,989 kilometers of travel by sea. It would also increase trade volume by 68% which is equivalent to being 2500 kilometers closer to other countries. Empirical reactions from our primary respondents seem to indicate poor performance of the ECOWAS in promoting effective infrastructural development, thus one can say that the low level of infrastructural development within the coalition has negatively affected trade volume. Presently in progress however, are a few intra-community highways constructions and in addition, ECOWAS had in 1981 developed a program of integrated regional network roads and railways, under which two major trans-national community highways were designed and implemented: - the **trans-coastal highway** linking Nigeria's commercial capital Lagos with Nouakchott in Mauritania [4,676 km], over 80% completed and the **trans-Sahelian highway** linking Dakar, Senegal with N'Djamena, Chad. Additional efforts in these areas are perhaps not clearly observable especially in recent past, thus confirming the general impression displayed by our respondents.

Some efforts at improving the sub-region's telecommunication and power systems under the framework of the **INTELCOM 1² and II³** and the much envisaged **West African Power Pool** [WAPP] were made. They are however still at an infantile stage, thus greater practical efforts are obligatory for the ECOWAS coalition to go beyond rhetoric to practical and more meaningful integration.

Despite the experience of several global lessons especially those derivable from the EU bloc, it is apparent that the West African region still lags behind in

investment towards the development of modern Information and Communication Technology [ICT]. Practical indicators have shown that the performance in the harmonization of the ECOWAS regional communication systems is low. The consequences of this poor performance on domestic and international trade facilitation are therefore irrefutably enormous.

Looking at the presentation of Alaba [2005] on communication infrastructure in five selected ECOWAS states, one can conveniently see concurrence between his views and those of our respondents. Nigeria for instance he reported - by 1990-recorded only 3.0 telephone main lines per 1000 persons and by 1995, it rose to 3.9. As at 2000, the figure was only 4.4 and by 2002, it climbed to a paltry 5.8. The case of Ghana was not significantly different, more so as by the year 2000, it went beyond Nigeria with 11.7 mainlines per 1000 persons and by 2002, it shot to only 12.7 per 1000 persons. With all these, one can safely conclude that telecommunication services are inadequate, inefficient and very expensive within the sub-region. Availability of mobile cellular phones is very inadequate, prohibitively expensive and in rural areas non-existent. Some sources have also indicated that Africa in general, has the lowest dispersion levels in terms of global internet deployment and utilization, this is necessitated by the glaring absence of the relevant infrastructure, and where available, they are dominantly inefficient.

Trade documentation and payment processes are integral to any economic or trading transaction in addition to being a key feature of any organizational arrangement. Only 5% of this group of respondents scored the region's trade documentation processes as very adequate. 9% have also scored the region as being very poor in terms of trade documentation processes. This again confirms the claim in many ECOWAS trade literature, which expressed that most

of ECOWAS intra-regional trade, was not only 'illicit' but also 'unrecorded'. In addition, the informality of most trading activities in West Africa is by these reactions further portrayed. *ECOWAS Handbook*, [2003] is particularly explicatory of the region's depressing trading performance. WTO reports [2005] have also equally expressed and confirmed that Intra-Regional trade within the ECOWAS coalition is only about 11%, a little lower than other statistical presentations. In the year 2000, only about 6% of Nigeria's export, comprising mainly of oil, were traded with ECOWAS member states of Ghana and Cote D'Voire. In terms of imports, it was tragically noticed that only 2% of commodities/items of ECOWAS origin came into Nigeria and they were mainly from Republic of Benin, Cote D'Voire [both francophone] and Ghana. This dismal performance may be viewed as a function of many other factors and that includes the reported negative activities of border officials, which directly relates to border processes. To further illustrate and affirm this, a collection of reports have indicated that crossing a border in the West African sub-region is still a colossal task. According to a World Bank [2005] assessment crossing a West African border could be equivalent to the cost of more than 1000 miles of inland transportation. Similarly, it can also be compared to the equivalent of 100 miles in Western Europe. Another illustration is the existence of uninhibited checkpoints that pervade all parts of the sub-region. Many OBSERVERS are of the view that this sharply repudiates a number of vital protocols that were designed to promote West African integration through trade development and facilitation. Thousands of traders and travelers along the community highways have reported dreadful experiences on checkpoints. Between Badagry [in Nigeria] and Seme Town border posts in Benin Republic, there were over 21 checkpoints and all engaged in illegitimate and criminal acts of extortion. It is also interesting to note the existence of over 16 checkpoints between Birnin-

Konni [in Niger Republic] and Illela in Sokoto [Nigeria], a distance of less than 120 kilometers. Principally the police, the State Security Service, Immigration Service, and the Customs mounted these checkpoints.

The ease with which **banking and payment procedures** are carried out in any economy denotes not only its level of organization and sophistication but its level of competence. It is in the light of this key assumption that the study samples were at various levels required to evince their position and views on this issue. The sample on border communities and who in most cases are remotely connected to the mainstream elite class have displayed the following opinions, with only 2% of the sample describing banking processes as ‘very adequate’. Amongst this sample, up to 35% have described these processes as ‘very weak’. 13% are however undecided on the subject. Table 5.9.B below is clearly illustrative.

TABLE 5.9.B RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS AND OPINIONS ON TRADE DOCUMENTATION AND PAYMENT PROCESSES

ISSUES	OF	Very	Barely	Weak	Very	Undecided	Total	%
DOCUMENTATION		adequate	adequate		Weak			
& PAYMENT PROCESSES								
RESPONDENTS’	VIEWS	7	35	57	24	12	136	
ON		5%	26	42	18	9		100%
TRADE								
DOCUMENTATION								
PAYMENT PROCESSES		3	27	40	48	18	136	
		2%	20	30	35	13		100%

Source: Research Survey, 2009.

Vital to any region that seeks to achieve economic integration is the issue of **free movement of persons and goods**. Many analysts have noted the failure of many ECOWAS states to achieve the smelting of their respective boundaries. 38 out of this group of respondents [27.9%] as indicated on the table 5.9.C [below] have scored the ECOWAS regional coalition ‘very poorly free’ in terms of the effective implementation of the protocol on free movement of persons while 5 [3.6%] remained undecided, meaning they have no definite position on the subject. About 46.3% representing 63 out of this group opined that free movement of persons was however ‘fairly adequate’. Amongst the group, only 11 [8%] have agreed that there exist free movement of persons through the inter-state borders, while 19 persons [13.9%] of the sample are closely following on the issue as amply indicated on table 5.9.C below. These scores have in many ways demonstrated the position of many scholars on the poor state of **protocol implementation** within ECOWAS member-states. Again, this represents what Fawole et al described as ECOWAS’s mixed grill of expectations, challenges and misfortunes; more so as several of its decisions and protocols they added were more breached than complied with, thus effectively short-circuiting the qualitative attainment of the pioneering nationalist dream as envisioned by its founding fathers. One of the respondents interviewed within diplomatic circle expressed his utmost displeasure at the failure of the ECOWAS group in this direction, over forty years after its creation.

5.9.C: BORDER COMMUNITIES' RESPONDENTS VIEW ON FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN ECOWAS STATES.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very adequately free	11	8%
2	Barely free	19	13.9
3	Fairly free	63	46.3
4	Very Poorly Free	38	27.9
5	Undecided	5	3.6
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

5.10 Analysis of Responses on Common Currency and Associated Neo-Colonial Issues:

Many scholars of integration have telescoped on the implication of bi-polar organizations on ECOWAS integration. These organizations are known to have co-existed with similar bodies that sometimes have similar objectives especially with the ECOWAS organization.

TABLE 5.10.A: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES' RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF NEO-COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE COMMONWEALTH, CFA, etc ON CROSS-BORDER TRADE.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly	68	50
2	Barely strong	50	43.3
3	Weak	4	3

4	Very weak	5	3.8
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

As displayed above on table 5.10.A, the study respondents bared their minds on this subject when 50% out of their lot expressed that these bodies are of detrimental effect on ECOWAS integration likely because of their diversionary influences. 43.3% were closely supportive when they noted that such bodies were ‘barely strong’ in negatively affecting ECOWAS unity, especially in economic spheres. Additionally, only 3.8% said the effect of such neo-colonial bodies may be ‘very weak’ in terms of effect.

TABLE 5.10.B: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES’ RESPONDENTS’ OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF CFA ON ECOWAS TRADE.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly	56	41.1
2	Barely strong	27	19.8
3	Weak	18	13.3
4	Very weak	35	26
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

On the negative implication of neo-colonial financial arrangements such as the CFA, on trade facilitation table 5.10.B above has portrayed that about 41% of

this group of respondents were of the strong view that such neo-colonial arrangements adversely affect trading within the ECOWAS trading block. This view was closely toughened by about 19.8% of this sample who equally believed that such arrangements like the CFA, affected trade facilitation strongly, further underscoring not only the need for one single currency in West Africa but also the need to work outside the path of the forces of neo-colonization.

The creation of a single currency is critical to the success of any intra-regional trade arrangement. It was in recognition of this assertion that the study introduced questions on the subject with a view to obtaining a sample-based response. As displayed on table 5.10 C below, over 63% of this group of respondents as probably envisaged declared their agreement very strongly with the need for a single regional currency and another 23.5% closely supported when they opined that a single currency is strongly desired. Only 5.8% were in disagreement. Another 5% was similarly undecided.

TABLE 5.10.C: BORDER COMMUNITIES' GROUP'S OPINION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A SINGLE ECOWAS CURRENCY AS A TOOL FOR INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE PROMOTION.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly Agreed	86	63.2%
2	Strongly agreed	32	23.5
3	Disagreed	2	1.4
4	Strongly disagreed	8	5.8
5	Undecided	8	5.8
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Table 5.10.D: RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON
THE DIVERSIONARY EFFECTS OF OTHER BI-POLAR INSTITUTIONS ON
INTEGRATION/INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE IN ECOWAS

S/N	RESPONSES:	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	STRONGLY AGREED	71	52.2
2	BARELY AGREED	48	35.2
3	STRONGLY DISAGREED	10	7.3
4	BARELY DISAGREED	4	2.9
5	Undecided	3	2.2
6		136	100%

Source: Research Survey, 2009

Bi-polar organizations and institutions have often been identified in terms of their ability to divert less developed countries of the world from the attainment of regional unity or even south-south cooperation. In the light of this assumption, the study sought to unearth the opinion of this sample on the subject and an array of responses was obtained as displayed on table 5.10.C above. In analyzing the contents of responses as shown above, about 52.2% of the sample has strongly agreed that belonging to these bi-polar bodies is inimical to ECOWAS integration. This view was closely reinforced by 35.2% of the sample who also barely agreed that membership of such bi-polar bodies are essentially diversionary. Only 7.3% of the sample ‘strongly disagreed’ while 2.2% is

‘undecided’.

Some schools of thoughts have regularly expressed the link between language and commerce and more particularly trade, especially in the light of the contextual essence of communication. It is interesting to note that this sample of respondents does not believe that the colonially originated languages were of any meaningful impact on trading activities within the region. Perhaps, this is explainable by the fact that other credible, established and traditional means of communication profoundly exist within and between communities in the region. About 26% of the sample believe that the profound existence of foreign languages only ‘very weakly’ impact on intra-regional trade.

TABLE 5.10.E: BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES’ RESPONDENTS’ OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES ON INTRA COMMUNITY TRADE FACILITATION IN WEST AFRICA.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly	56	41.1
2	Barely strong	27	19.8
3	Weak	18	13.3
4	Very weak	35	26
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Other categories of reactions as the table [5.10.D] above displayed, were however, not remarkably different from each other, thus one can note that up to 23% of our respondents in this sample, expressed that there was a strong

correlation between these foreign languages and trade relations and it is perhaps more so in situations of formal trade within the ECOWAS region.

5.11 Analysis of Responses of Informed Citizens' Group [ICG] on Issues of Citizens' and Institutional Mobilization:

It is the consensus of many of our respondents in this sample as in the case of the borderland communities, that much of what is being expected in terms of promotional activities have not been effectively carried out by the ECOWAS coalition since its take-off in 1975. These promotional activities were envisaged in the form of cogent political and economic information/mobilization programs. It is vital to restate that this sample was largely assumed as being more informed about issues of ECOWAS integration than the sample derived from various strata of the populations of ECOWAS borderland communities in view of its level of education/participatory roles in diverse aspects of the ECOWAS organization. ECOWAS Commission literatures have often identified a limited level of NGO participation in the activities of the organization.

To toughen this position further, about 32.9% of the ICG sample observed that participation of the 'general citizenry' was 'very weak'. Again, this was supported by 37.5% of the sample who chose to describe 'general citizen's' participation as only 'weak' as displayed on table 5.11A below. Out of this sample 13% were however 'undecided' in their reaction.

TABLE 5.11A: INFORMED CITIZENS GROUP'S OPINION ON MOBILIZATION AND INVOLVEMENT OF GENERAL CITIZENS IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS PROMOTED BY THE ECOWAS/MEMBER-STATES.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	3	3.4
2	Barely strong	4	4.5
3	Weak	33	37.5
4	Very weak	29	32.9
5	Undecided	19	21.5
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In further evaluating the role of Non-State actors, this sample has reacted by indicating an abysmal performance of Non-State actors in the process of ECOWAS integration. Amongst this sample, 36% of them described NGO participation as ‘very weak’. Similarly, 50% of them scored NGO participation as only ‘fair’. About 7.9% of the ICG surprisingly differed when they described NGO involvement as ‘very high’. Similarly, 3% of the total ICG sample was ‘undecided’. The table below noted as 5.11.B. has presented a profile of reactions that makes it amply safe to concur with the claim of many authors of West African integration that ECOWAS has largely remained a ‘non-people’ and an ‘elite-inclined’ organization.

5.11.B: PROFILE OF ICG SAMPLE'S REACTIONS ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON- GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strong	7	7.9%
2	Barely strong	3	4%

3	Weak	44	50%
4	Very weak	32	36%
5	Undecided	2	3%
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

For this study to demonstrate tangibly how visible are ECOWAS activities in the region, questions were similarly asked this group on the ‘noticeability’ of ECOWAS projects or programs and as a reaction 52% of them interestingly opined that they have not seen any ECOWAS led or implemented project/programs in their respective states/countries. For many analysts, this again reinforces the general assumption that the ECOWAS has largely remained ‘an elite jamboree’. Only 3.52% have indicated observing or seeing an ECOWAS-led program or project as portrayed in table 5.11.C below.

TABLE 5.11.C:
THE NOTICEABILITY OF ECOWAS LED PROJECTS
AS SHOWN BY THE ICG SAMPLE.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	6	5.28
2	High	4	3.52
3	WEAK	43	37.84
4	VERY WEAK	32	28.16
5	Undecided	3	2.64
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

The strategic relevance of the private sector in the economic activities of most less developed countries of the world cannot be under-emphasized more so

with the rising wave of western-led structural reforms of these economies. It is with this understanding that this study deemed it of utmost importance to evaluate the reaction of the ICG on the subject. Table 5.11.D below keenly illustrates the view of the ICG:

About 37.84% of the informed citizen's sample scored the ECOWAS efforts in terms of projects and programs visibility as 'poor'. Only 5.28 and 3.52 scored the ECOWAS 'very high' and 'high' respectively. Slightly more than 2.6% of the sample were however 'undecided' as portrayed in table 5.11C, below. This only re-confirms that activities of the ECOWAS are not practically visible in different parts of the sub-region, especially in terms of tangible projects or programs and in diverse respect. Many observers have noted that this is indeed about one of the best ways that such an organization can touch the life of people.

**TABLE 5.11.D ICG SAMPLE'S VIEW ON
COMMON HISTORY AND ANCESTRY AS A FACTOR ON ECOWAS INTEGRATION**

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	60	68%
2	High	21	23.8
3	Very Fair	7	8.2
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Several factors have been identified as key to the process of integration, thus, the view of the study samples and more especially the informed citizens' Group has been sought on these issues, which principally include common history

and ancestry; common culture and inter-marriages. The table above [5.11.D] has given us an insight into the sample's view on 'common history and ancestry'. About 68% of the sample view the role of common history and ancestry as vital to integration and scored these same factors 'very high'. More than 23% followed closely when they scored the factor of history and common ancestry 'high'. These two scores are indeed a portrayal of the essence of history and ancestry in the process of integration. Interpretatively therefore, one can say that the West African sub-region was naturally poised for 'natural integration' but this coloration might have been changed or even destroyed or negatively affected by some contemporary forces such as neo-colonization e.t.c.

TABLE 5.11.E
ICG SAMPLE'S VIEW ON COMMON CULTURE AS A FACTOR ON ECOWAS
INTEGRATION.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	51	57.9%
2	High	24	27.2
3	Very Fair	0	0
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	13	14.7
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

As in the case of common history and ancestry, the factor of common culture as a vital integration factor was considered by this sample of respondents and the scores given to 'common culture' is largely similar to scores given to issues of 'common history and ancestry' possibly because of some slight differentials. As displayed on table 5.11.E [above] 57.9% of the sample are of the

opinion that common culture factor is to be ranked ‘very highly’. It is however interesting to note that up to 14.7% are ‘undecided’ on where to place the ‘common culture’ variable. As in the case of table 5.11.D, also above, 24% of the sample is closely supportive of those who scored the common culture variable as of very high significance.

When inquiries were made on the role of inter-marriages as a factor in integration, the scores obtained were also significantly indicative of the essence of cross-border marriages. As shown on table 5.11.F, below, the intermarriage factor did also make an impressive display as in the case of other factors. Even though it may be likened to issues of common ancestry, about 51% of the sample believed very highly in the essence of intermarriages in the overall process of integration. This further underscores the need to examine integration from varied sociological perspectives and more especially within the confines of borderland communities. Looking further into table 5.11.F below, it is evident that over 52.2% of the sample also view intermarriage as a factor that is also ‘very high’ on the list of factors.

TABLE 5.11.F ICG SAMPLE’S VIEW ON THE FACTOR OF INTERMARIAGES ON ECOWAS INTEGRATION.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	46	52.2%
2	High	28	31.8
3	Very Fair	13	14.7
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	1	1.1
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

In order to reinforce the view of many of our respondents on issues of history, culture and intermarriages, it is expedient to recall a presentation made by former Governor, Attahiru Bafarawa of Sokoto State at the National Workshop on Cross-Border Security, Cooperation and Integration –North West Zone, on the 27th of June 2000, where he declared that there has been a history of an age long relationship between border communities of Nigeria and Niger Republic. Furthermore, he added, that, in quite a number of cases, the relationship had even assumed familial or ancestral posture for several decades.

5.12 Analysis of Responses of Informed Citizens Group [ICG] on Issues of Security and Political Stability:

The variables directly raised or implied in our second hypothesis and which border on issues of security, good governance and consequent political stability are fundamental in the achievement of regional cohesion in any part of the world. In West Africa, as similarly observed several scholars, security remains the single most important factor in aiding regional economic growth, development and integration, thus, the continuous focus on the issue by leaders of the ECOWAS.

As a précis to this segment of the study analysis, questions that directly relate to issues of good governance and leadership were raised. As tabulated below [5.12.A], about 90% the sample of informed citizens observed that good governance is of the essence in promoting genuine regional integration. The holders of this viewpoint might have been influenced by the odd consequences of bad governance and how such experiences have stifled meaningful development in diverse parts of the third world nations especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the majority [90%] that implied that bad governance could stifle genuine

integration, an additional 7.9% supported closely when they also noted good governance is of ‘high’ implication on regional integration. Only 1.13% was undecided in their response. Table 5.12.A found below is graphically more illustrative.

TABLE 5.12.A
ICG SAMPLE’S VIEW
ON THE ROLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING
ECOWAS INTEGRATION.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	80	90.9
2	High	7	7.9
3	Very Fair	0	0
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	1	1.3
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Security cuts across all borders, political inclinations and ethnic affiliations notwithstanding, thus, the issue of security is very imperative and cannot therefore be ignored or swept under the carpet. Therefore, it is the likely reason why a significant percentage [up to 72%] of this sample noted the impeccable significance of regional security as a key factor in trade facilitation and development. Details of the reactions of the Informed Citizens group are as displayed below on table 5.12.B.

TABLE 5.12.B

**ICG'S OPINION ON THE STRATEGIC ESSENCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN
PROMOTING ECOWAS INTEGRATION AND TRADE.**

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	 Very high	64	72.7%
2	High	20	22.7
3	Very Fair	4	4.5
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Closely associated with the issues of security and good governance as explicated above, are the twin issues of political stability and incessant wars within the ECOWAS. About 75% of the respondents within this sample acknowledged that political stability is a necessary requirement for the promotion of cross-border trade in the ECOWAS. Another 23% closely followed when they similarly affirmed the value of political stability in trade promotion. In terms that are more precise, they scored political stability 'high'. Only 1.13 scored the value of political stability 'very fair'. The table below marked as table 5.12. C is sufficiently clear on the sample's reactions:

TABLE 5.12.C
ICG SAMPLE'S VIEW
ON THE VALUE OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN PROMOTING CROSS-BORDER
TRADE IN ECOWAS STATES.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	66	75%
2	High	21	23.8
3	Very Fair	1	1.13
4	Fair	0	0
5	Undecided	0	0
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

On a number of occasions, West Africa has often been described as Africa's hot bed of controversies. These controversies in most cases had political genesis and their effects could be most devastating on all aspects of life. Over 70% and 19% respectively also viewed the consequences of incessant wars and citizenship based conflicts on intra-regional trade and trade facilitation as 'very highly' and 'highly' negative . In table 5.12.D below detailed scores are accordingly presented:

TABLE 5.12.D
ICG'S OPINION ON
THE IMPLICATION OF INCESSANT WARS ON CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN ECOWAS
STATES.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	62	70.4
2	High	17	19.3
3	Very Fair	3	3.4
4	Fair	3	3.4
5	Undecided	3	3.4
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Several conflicts in West Africa have degenerated to an exponential proportion. Many such cases of conflicts are or were citizenship-based. As table 5.12.E explains below, about 68.1% have rated these conflicts very high in terms of their negative implication on intra-community trade. Surprisingly, up to 13.6% were undecided.

TABLE 5.12.E
ICG SAMPLE'S VIEW/RATING
ON THE IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP-BASED CONFLICTS ON IMPEDING INTRA-
REGIONAL TRADE IN ECOWAS STATES.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very high	60	68.1
2	High	10	11.36

3	Very Fair	4	4.54
4	Fair	2	2.27
5	Undecided	12	13.6
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Even though inter-border skirmishes are few in West Africa, they sometimes tend to degenerate into very serious and long-drawn conflicts between those countries involved. While expressing their views on the effect of inter-state border disputes in impeding proper trade facilitation, up to 87% have rated the effects of this type of dispute as ‘very high’. Another 12.5 also rated it ‘high’.

5.13 Analysis of Informed Citizens Group [ICG] on Agencies/Institutions of State - Performance and Processes:

By way of an introductory summary, the table marked 5.13.A below, has in general identified West African and Nigerian Banks as having attained some level of effectiveness in the task of service delivery. The CBN was noted as having performed ‘very highly’ by up to 52% of this group of respondents. Similarly, perhaps as an up-shot of the Banking Sector Reforms undertaken in the last few years. Nigerian Banks have fared very well when up to 49% and 43% respectively described their performance as ‘very highly’ and ‘highly’ impressive. In trying to find a credible explanation on this, one of our interviewees also asserted that the leading reforms that were in the past one decade carried out by the apex bank were responsible for making the difference in terms of banking performance.

Public Sector agencies such as the Customs, Police and Immigrations have

often been identified as the bane of most of our societies. Reactions from this sample have indicated another depressing profile for these bodies. About 62% of the sample described the performance of the Customs as only ‘fair’, while the Immigration Service was also adjudged ‘fair’ by up to 64% of the sample. The Police was equally scored ‘fair’ by up to 79% of the sample in focus. The State Security Service was however viewed as best performing body amongst them, thus it was scored excellent by up to 14% of the sample, the only one to be so judged. All these scores therefore clearly demonstrates the competence of these state organizations and the effectiveness of their processes in promoting ECOWAS integration, and more so from the spectacle of the general citizenry. It is also a pointer to the disposition that expressed a competence and coordination relationship between agencies and institutions more especially concerning integration and intra-community trade.

TABLE 5.13 :INFORMED CITIZENS
OPINIONS ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED
AGENCIES and INSTITUTIONS

	Excellent	Good	Very Fair	Fair	Undecided
CUSTOMS-	0%	14%	24%	62%	0
IMMIGRATION-	0%	9%	27%	64%	0
STATE SECURITY SERVICE-	14%	16%	20%	50%	0
POLICE	0%	5%	16%	79%	0



	Excellent	Good	VERY Fair	Fair	UD
Commercial Banks in Nigeria-	49%	43%	5%	3%	0
Known Commercial Banks in other West African states-	43%	39%	11%	7%	0
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA- [CBN]	52%	37%	11%	0%	0

Source: *Research Survey, 2009*

5.14 Analysis of Responses of ICG on Common Currency and Associated Neo-Colonial Issues and their Effects on ECOWAS Integration and Trade:

As reported in several scholarly works, we have equally noted that member-states of the ECOWAS were part and parcel of the process for creating a variety of African and sometimes non-African bodies and organizations aimed at ‘facilitating and promoting their collective and individual interests’, and these include organizations such as the West African Monetary Union or *Union*

Economique et Monetaire oust-Africaine [UEMOA], Liptako-Gourma Authority etc. For example, the former is made up of eight members, mostly French speaking and was principally established as a common currency organization employing the use of the *CFA Franc*. The later was established to essentially facilitate development of the contiguous areas of its three-member states of Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso. It is also the belief of a number of our respondents within this sample that these developments sometimes do negatively influence ECOWAS integration.

Scholars of integration have watched the implication of bi-polar organizations on ECOWAS integration and have equally noted that these organizations are known to have co-existed with similar bodies that sometimes have the same objectives especially with the ECOWAS organization. Thus, it has been considered vital at this point to commence with a discussion on neo-colonial institutions as follows, beginning with the impact of neo-colonial institutions and their processes especially in trading and integration terms:

TABLE 5.14.A: INFORMED CITIZENS GROUP'S OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF NEO-COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE COMMONWEALTH, UEMOA etc ON CROSS-BORDER TRADE.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very Negative	37	42%
2	Barely Negative	35	39.7
3	Positive	5	5.6
4	Fairly positive	7	7.9
5	Undecided	4	4.5%
6	TOTAL:	136	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

As portrayed above on table 5.14.A, the study respondents bared their minds on this subject when up to 42% out of the lot expressed that these bodies [such as the Commonwealth and UEMOA] are of detrimental effect on ECOWAS integration likely because of their diversionary influences, as asserted an interviewee. About 39.7% were closely supportive when they noted that such bodies were ‘barely strong’ in negatively affecting ECOWAS unity, especially in economic spheres. Additionally and interestingly too, 7.9% said the effect of such neo-colonial bodies is ‘fairly positive’. This view is closely supported by up to 5.6% who feel that neo-colonial institutions are definably ‘positive’ From the general profile above, one can see the similarity of reactions between the first study samples made up of borderland communities and the second sample made up of informed citizens of the ECOWAS community. Again, these views have reinforced the general assertion, which claims that the so-called colonial masters have always remained in the center stage in not only determining the direction but the depth of cooperation among their respective former colonies. Indeed, with these observations, the study has further acknowledged the profound need for the establishment of harmonized structures and institutions between coalition members. One of the key objectives behind this is to more formidably deter African states from intensifying their vertical ties with the Western world more especially.

TABLE 5.14.B:

INFORMED CITIZENS’ OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF CFA ON ECOWAS TRADE.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly Negative	51	57.9%
2	Barely negative	25	28.4
3	Weak	10	11.3

4	Very weak	0	0
5	Undecided	2	2.27
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

As a reaction to the inquiry on the negative implications of neo-colonial financial arrangements such as the CFA on trade facilitation, table 5.14.B above has portrayed that about 57.9% of this group of respondents were of the strong view that such neo-colonial arrangements adversely affect trading within the ECOWAS trading block. This view was closely reinforced by about 28.4% of this sample who equally believed that such arrangements like the CFA, negatively affected trade facilitation just ‘barely’, further underscoring not only the need for the introduction of one single currency – the EKO, similar to EUs Euro.

However, the views of some scholars differ significantly on this subject more so as the CFA is seen as one of the most powerful driving forces for **economic policy coordination** in West Africa [Quattara, 1999]. Thus for long time to come, some analysts are of the view that the CFA will continue to play a vital role in the economy of the West African sub-region. Oyejide [2003] has additionally reported that the CFA Zone’s integrating experience has clearly demonstrated the importance of regionalism for rapid integration into the mainstream of the global economy and that the apparent success recorded by UEMOA in francophone West Africa is most probably attributable to the willingness of its members to yield their economic policy matters to a strong, independent regional organization, again, driving us to the principles and utility value of ‘supra-nationality’.

Table 5.14.C:

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON THE DIVERSIONARY EFFECTS OF OTHER BI-POLAR INSTITUTIONS ON INTEGRATION/INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE IN ECOWAS

S/N	RESPONSES:	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	STRONGLY AGREED	53	60.2%
2	BARELY AGREED	16	18.1%
3	STRONGLY DISAGREED	19	21.5%
4	BARELY DISAGREED	0	0%
5	UNDECIDED	0	0%
6	TOTAL	88	100%

Source: Research Survey, 2009

Some international organizations and institutions have often been identified in terms of their ability to divert less developed countries of the world from the attainment of regional unity or even South-South cooperation. For this reason, the study sought the opinion of this sample on the subject and interestingly diverse responses were obtained as displayed on table 5.14.C above. In analyzing the contents of responses as shown above, about 60.2% of the sample has strongly agreed that these bi-polar bodies are largely inimical to ECOWAS integration. This view was slightly reinforced by 18.1% of the sample who also 'barely agreed' that membership of such bi-polar bodies may essentially be negative,

perhaps in a diversionary sense. About 21% of the sample however ‘strongly disagreed’ that bi-polar organizations could have diversionary implications.

TABLE 5.14.D:
INFORMED CITIZENS’ OPINION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A SINGLE ECOWAS CURRENCY AS A TOOL FOR INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE PROMOTION.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly Agreed	61	69.3%
2	Strongly agreed	20	22.7
3	Disagreed	3	3.4
4	Strongly disagreed	1	1.1
5	Undecided	3	3.4
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

Over 69% of the respondents within the Informed Citizens Group have expressed their support for a Single currency as a trade facilitator. Another 22.7% were closely supportive of this view when they expressed that they strongly agreed on the need for a single ECOWAS Currency. Only 1.1% was in disagreement, while 3.4% was undecided. TABLE 5.14.D clearly depicts the various positions taken by the respondents of informed persons.

Diverse thoughts have regularly expressed the link between **language** and commerce and more particularly trade. In the light of the contextual essence of communication, we noted that some part of this sample of respondents do not significantly believe that the colonially originated languages were of any meaningful bang on trading activities. This may be explainable by the fact that

for centuries, other credible and well established traditional means of communication profoundly existed within and between communities in the region. On table 5.10.D below, 40% of sample of informed citizens have opined that the existence of foreign languages that emanated from colonial experiences of member-nations of the ECOWAS are of very negative effect and rather than promote good interaction between members, they tend to be divisive, with each giving emphasis to the language of its colonial master. Supportive of this opinion closely was also 43% of the sample who believed that foreign languages do not effectively aid integration, thus, they could rather be obstacles to effective integration and trade interaction. Moreover, in the study's analysis of indigenous languages in the introductory segment of this chapter, it was observed that the local languages have always been the most effective means of communication between citizens of the ECOWAS community and in most commercial and trading contexts.

TABLE 5.14.E:

INFORMED CITIZENS GROUP'S OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES ON INTERACTION/INTRA COMMUNITY TRADE FACILITATION IN WEST AFRICA.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCIES	PERCENTAGE
1	Very strongly	35	39.7%
2	Barely strong	37	43
3	Weak	9	10
4	Very WEAK	5	6
5	Undecided	2	2.2
6	TOTAL:	88	100%

Source: Research Survey Analysis, 2009.

On the influence of language on trade and interaction, a sizeable proportion of the sample [39% + 43% = 82%] was of the view that these diverse foreign languages as variedly adopted in ECOWAS states have the effect of very negatively limiting interaction within the ECOWAS citizenry, whose population stands at over 200 million. Over 39% and 43% of the ICG were supportive of the assertion above having respectively ‘very strongly agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ that the multiplicity of foreign languages does negatively affect the interactive potential of ECOWAS citizens. Table 5.11.D above illustrates all other scores on the issue, in addition to those expressed and analyzed above. An experience narrated by one of our interviewees was depictive of some of the complications multi-lingual communication can create even in official transactions. With the narrations above, it is no doubt pertinent to support the view that there is the need for a proper re-definition of the various language policies within ECOWAS states.

5.15 Major Findings:

As we have earlier noted, in carrying out our tests of hypotheses, a series of vital procedures were adopted ranging from the original act of hypotheses formulation itself; obtaining the relevant data; comparison of observed statistical values from secondary sources with the tabulated figures drawn from data collected from primary sources and conclusions. Very importantly too, as we have amply demonstrated, under our methodology discussion, our approach to data interpretation and analysis were essentially pinned on the use of tabular/percentage presentations from whose premise we made all the statistical inferences.

Based on the aggregated reactions of our three groups of respondents – the

borderland group, the informed citizens group and the specially recognized persons group, the first hypothesis that states, **“...the apparent non-involvement of citizens/citizens-based groups has resulted in the creation and sustenance of an elitist ECOWAS, thus thwarting the emergence of a people-centered coalition”** stands up-held.

Secondly, statistical indices derived from all groups of our respondents as portrayed above have also clearly maintained and sustained that **“pervasive insecurity in most parts of the Sub-region has strongly impeded the emergence of an environment that is most conducive for integration and intra-community trade in the ECOWAS region”**.

Thirdly, hypothesis three which noted that **“state agencies and institutions serve as obstacles rather than facilitators to ECOWAS economic unification”**, also stands.

The fourth hypothesis which expressed that **“the profound absence of a single regional currency as an acceptable means of exchange is a major impediment to trade facilitation and development in West Africa”** also similarly stands upheld in view of the aggregated opinion of all samples of respondents.

5.16 General Study Conclusions:

In arriving at these notes, as spelt out above, the research, modestly developed appropriate questions in both our questionnaires and interview schedules specifically to elicit responses on issues raised by all the four hypotheses generated. For all the three groups of respondents/samples, questions

that relate broadly to the respondents' background checks were asked, in addition to those that are fundamentally hypotheses-related all with a bid to arriving at a concise conclusion on all vital questions raised by the study.

Fundamentally, it is again most expedient to note that from reactions of all three groups of our respondents – the border communities' citizens, informed citizens group and specially recognized persons group, the coalition of the ECOWAS remains generally viewed as an elitist organization. For most citizens of the ECOWAS interviewed, most of whom were high profile and experienced personalities, and even those that were contacted on a casual basis, their views have been found to be largely similar. Frontally, this confirms the position of our first hypothesis, which is essentially demonstrative of the inability of the ECOWAS/leadership of member-states to use effectively the ordinary citizens as a tool or launch pad for the integration of the ECOWAS in line with the original dreams and vision of the founding fathers of the regional body.

It is interesting to note that many contemporary literatures tend to be continuously supportive of this position.

In their series of responses to the study questions, on an aggregate basis too, the three groups have clearly expressed their tacit support for our second hypothesis, and from a catalogue of reactions, the study was able to articulate that there apparently exist pervasive insecurity in all parts of the sub-region and such feature could serve as huge impediments to the successful emergence of an environment that may be most conducive for intra-community trade.

The general view on an aggregate basis amongst all the three groups therefore confirms hugely that there is an apparent problem of insecurity in most parts of the sub-region considering the series of conflicts that even today remains essentially pervasive. It is undisputedly true also, that; there is a strong correlation

between security and the emergence of a politically cohesive coalition and therefore a conducive environment for trade. With this overview therefore, the second hypothesis equally stands upheld.

The ineffectiveness and clear mal-functioning of state agencies who are bestowed with critical responsibilities have been collectively identified as resulting in problems of institutional failure, consequently, in the context of a coalition like the ECOWAS. The situation has been significantly identified as having impeded hugely in the attainment of the ECOWAS dream of regional economic unification. An aggregation of the responses of all the three sampled groups therefore, were all pointing towards the confirmation of the third hypothesis.

Similarly, the research noted the absence of a single regional currency and its implication on trade facilitation and development in the ECOWAS and from the aggregation of reactions variously collected from all three sample groupings, the study is left with no doubt on the status of the fourth hypothesis. As in the case of the first three hypotheses and as earlier noted, aggregated reactions and scores of the three groups have confirmed that they also stand formidably upheld.

CHAPTER SIX

6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction:

The Research report was titled - “The *ECOWAS* and the Management of Integration in the West African Sub-Region: 1985 – 2005”. The report was presented in a total of six chapters and the investigation as titled above was focused on evaluating the ‘ECOWAS’ as an economic entity in the West African sub-region. The following were specifically selected for study:

- 1] Nation states / leadership and the challenge of regional integration. Some emphasis was for strategic inferential reasons placed on Nigeria more so in view of her status as the biggest economy in the sub0region.
- 2] Institutions of states and non-state institutions that may be directly or indirectly responsible for diverse aspects of integration or trade promotion in particular such as the Customs and Immigration.
- 3] Actions or activities meant to facilitate general West African integration and intra-regional trade.
- 4] Protocols, decisions or policies meant to promote the process of integration in all their ramifications, especially those with trade or general economic or political relevance.

5] The institution of the ECOWAS and how it helped to promote regional integration and intra-ECOWAS trade.

6] Selected Border Communities or Borderland Communities in Nigeria, Niger Republic and Benin who are adjudged as continuously playing significant roles in ‘promoting’ sub-regional integration especially in the area of intra-regional socio-cultural and trade interaction.

7] Informed individuals and groups that were in one way or the other related to the process of integration through trade, commerce, investment, culture, politics, security or defense or those with scholarly insight into various aspects of ECOWAS integration.

6.2 Summary of Research Findings:

In the introductory segment of the research, the study has established the imperativeness of international integration as a force for contemporary regional and thus global development of human societies and institutions in addition to viewing the development of international integration organizations as a major feature of contemporary economic system.

In order to appreciate this salient human development from more cogent perspectives, efforts were similarly made at discussing other international integration bodies especially from the days of the “pioneers” or the first generation of such bodies such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and more recently and relevantly the EU etc. All these were discussed in the second chapter of this study.

In relation to the above, the study also discussed in more specific terms the nature,

rise, aims and of objectives of contemporary Regional Integration Arrangements [RIAs]. Most prominently featured were sub-regional bodies like the SADC, ASEAN e.t.c. Some of them, especially SADC were studied in terms of their history, strategic driving force/vision, objectives, and institutional structure all with a bid to effectively and comparatively better understand the ECOWAS coalition in terms of its evolutionary existence, vision, philosophy, problems and challenges.

One of the most critical themes emphasized by this research especially in this phase was an examination of the role of nation **states in relation to challenges of West African integration in its diverse forms**. The research is thus, a rational and a coherent reminder on the over thirty years of the ECOWAS unification struggle and with special reference the period 1985 to 2005. All these have been examined within the context of the following notes and perspectives:

1. ECOWAS has had to modify its original mission of evolving into a **customs union** to include political, peace and security issues. This was especially given teeth by the Revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in July 1993.
2. Some degree of dynamism has also been additionally manifested in the creation of new institutions like the ECOWAS Parliament and Court of Justice to back new initiatives as well as the formulation and the implementation of new policies and protocols.

In addition, the study equally discussed the growth and evolution of international regional integration globally as one of the most dramatic global human experiences in the last five decades and beyond. Most critical of such developments as seen earlier were seen in Western Europe, especially with the rise of the European Union [EU] in the 1950s, with six countries forming the “pioneer class” of the

bloc, as earlier noted. The study noted, however, that outside Europe, the process of regional integration has been generally adjudged as very sluggish. Other examples of international economic and political cooperation on a non-regional but diverse basis were sighted in organizations such as the Commonwealth of Nations, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, European Free Trade Association, International Monetary Fund [IMF], North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Others are the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the North American Free Agreement [NAFTA]. In Africa, the Southern African Development Cooperation [SADC], and the ECOWAS are probably the most notable of such bodies, the research noted.

The study also imperatively considered the enunciation of the evolution of relevant international integration bodies, the world over, in addition to telescoping the phenomena of regional integration from diverse perspectives and more so as screened from the viewpoint of a number of erudite works. All these, the research maintained are to facilitate the augmentation of scholarly research on integration as a phenomenon.

The study in further identifying some of the ideas behind integration and the challenges facing such processes considered and reviewed the major inhibitions to the process of regional or sub-regional integration in the developing world. The experiences of some integration bodies especially those relevant to this dissertation were most highlighted, all with a bid to enlarging and grinding scholarly views and understanding of the major themes of this study.

As earlier noted the examination and evaluation of the ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization especially as it relates to issues of the region's socio-economic and political integration and development is one of the main purposes of this study,

consequentially, in chapter three of the study, the diverse ways and methods adopted in collecting data, sources of data as well as the analysis of the data collected were amply highlighted. Moreover, in order for the research to succeed in accomplishing one of its core objectives as duly expressed, the research design [which encompasses the ‘typologies’ of data collected, the method of data collection] was more intensely elucidated and more explicitly under the following headings - Research Population; Sample; Sampling Procedure; Research Instrument; Methods of Data Collection and Analysis of Data.

A number of celebrated works on methodology were unique or inimitable in several ways, and this feature was a function of many factors, and that includes the subject being studied, the audience structure, the research population, and the central intention of this study in this case i.e. the problem in focus, in addition to the state of the researcher’s knowledge on the matter. Very importantly too, as Runkel et al [1972] concluded, the amounts and kinds of resources at the disposal of the study team etc.

From a general perspective therefore, the research adopted a design which took into cognizance the special challenges presented by the requirements of the study on the ECOWAS coalition, which specifies rationally and coherently how data relating to problem under investigation should be collected and subjected to an objective analysis. Here also, a detailed procedural outline for the conduct of the study was clearly stated.

At the commencement of this research, the international nature of the research subject or problem was noted and having reviewed that closely, the research was best placed to appreciate the challenges posed in terms of “researchability”. Notwithstanding this and other allied constraints, the research chose to adopt an

amalgam of styles or methods that aided in achieving its desired objectives.

Very importantly too, the study reviewed the importance of the target or research population and what portion of the said population would shape the research sample, in addition to focusing on the type of statistical tests or systems of measurement that may be of essence to the research. It is also within this premise that the study decided on its vital coordinates especially with reference to both purposes and scope.

The study employed the use of a **SIMPLE SURVEY METHOD**. The approach as highlighted by many scholars, study both larger and smaller groups of population by selecting and studying samples chosen from the population or the ‘Community’ to discover the relative incidence, distribution and interrelation of the dependent and independent variables. Further to the identified strengths of the chosen survey method, the research also noted that it was not possible to study the entire ECOWAS population in West Africa; it therefore became definably imperative to limit the investigation to a deliberately sampled population within the Community.

To ensure proper selection of respondents, using appropriate procedures, some key argumentations such as quality and extent of “representativeness” in relation to the universal population; research circumstances and available resources were also noted. In promoting this value of “representativeness” in research data collection, the inclusion of an amorphous variety of respondents, within Nigerian, Nigerien and general ECOWAS community populations was found to be necessary.

Due consideration was also given to the nature of data likely to be generated because of which other relevant sampling methods were used, most notable of which was systematic sampling. Of particular relevance was the sampling of

population of border settlements/communities noted for their commercial and familial configurations between Nigeria, Niger Republic and Benin to some extent and these were principally Birnin-Konni and Maradi [Niger Republic] , Illela and Jibia [Nigeria], Mellaville and Seme [Benin]. Others were Graduate Students of Diplomacy and International Relations of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria/other Nigerian universities as well as members of the diplomatic community in Nigeria, relevant even though deliberately selected foreign missions within Abuja FCT, citizens in other cities like Kaduna, Abuja, Katsina and Sokoto.

In addition, it is because of the perceived variables of the research, that the final research sample was selected from groups of persons that are of defined interest to the study, thus the emphasis on major commercial locations found in the border towns, which also represented the “clusters” from which a sizeable portion of the study samples were drawn.

The bulk of data collected for analysis and hypotheses testing were considerably from sources describable as both primary and secondary. Questionnaires and interview schedules were deliberately scripted around each of the hypotheses raised. This survey was conducted with research assistants extensively deployed to play vital roles. The researcher was however personally and singly responsible for the conduct of ALL the interviews. The mechanism of observation was also used in gathering vital data especially in border posts visited, checkpoints passed through, and markets explored in the course of data collection.

Huge volumes of secondary data from sources like the ECOWAS Secretariat or ECOWAS Commission, the Bureau for Statistics, Member-States’ Embassies, Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Central Bank of Nigeria [CBN] and other web sources were sincerely explored by the study.

Data presentation was most significantly in tabular forms where percentages and other figurative information were displayed and in terms of hypotheses testing, the study was similarly limited to the techniques as expressed above.

The fourth chapter is divided into two distinct segments. Part one explicated West Africa in various ways and phases especially in terms of geographical and historical outlook. In the first portion of this chapter therefore, the study as earlier mentioned undertook a historical-cum-geographical survey of West Africa as a sub-region. Its geographical diversity was closely explored and it was the enormous endowments that was offered by this geographical layout that came to be overwhelmingly exploited by the invading “traders” and colonizers of Western Europe.

According to a UN definition - West Africa is the Western most region of the African continent. The region is distributed over an area of 6,140,000 km² i.e. equivalent to 1/5 of the African continent. And as earlier noted the vast majority of West Africa is mainly plains, lying less than 300 meters above sea level. Some isolated high points also exist especially along the southern shores. West Africa has had an experience of Slave trade and was significantly noted for effectively participating in the famous trans-Saharan trade, which “ran through” most of North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The existence of several languages and cultures are also a major feature of the old West Africa as well as contemporary West Africa. Its history of colonization this study further affirms is also of great socio-economic and political impact and connotation. This study therefore understood this fact and equally reflected this understanding while scripting some parts of the research report.

The study also discovered that several member states of the ECOWAS were part

and parcel of the process for creating a variety of African and sometimes non-African bodies and organizations aimed at facilitating and promoting their collective and individual interests. Examples of these include organizations like the West African Monetary Union or *Union Economique et Monetaire oust-Africaine* [UEMOA], Liptako-Gourma Authority etc. The former has 8 members, mostly French speaking and was principally established as a common currency organization employing the use of the *CFA Franc*. The later was established to essentially facilitate development of the contiguous areas of its three-member states of Mali, Niger and Burkina-Faso. These organizations had their effects on the growth and development of the ECOWAS coalition. They still do as reactions from respondents have confirmed and as indicated in many scholarly works.

Further to the profile that the study had presented in this chapter, one of the main objectives of this research was to elaborate and discuss the pivotal basis upon which the ECOWAS as an organization of West African states was created. In addition, salient issues such as the composite scenario or setting of the sub-region in terms of its peoples and their history; characterization of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial West Africa; the making of the union of West African states; the crises of instability and insecurity and the rise of the ECOMOG as a security and defense appendage of the coalition were closely examined. Another vital sub-topic discussed under this segment of the study in a slightly more detailed form is the Nigerian State and its diplomatic or relational link to the ECOWAS.

In this chapter also and as the introduction earlier noted, the research delved into unearthing the experiential-cum-pragmatic issues and forces that have in the past several decades directed the evolution of the states and nations that make up the West African coalition, and how these configurations, observable now and in the

past, have influenced the formation and the consequent outlook or even the efficacy of the ECOWAS as a regional integration body.

It should be also at this stage be pointed out that the ‘structural-functionalist’ approach in terms of the selected theoretical framework looks at the regional co-operation process as a transitional stage of regional integration, rather than an end in itself. However, some important deductions follow from these premises. In the first place, the approach appears to be an oversimplification in the sense that it ignores the primacy of politics in the co-operation process among member countries. It has been observed that even if cooperation starts in a few discrete and non-controversial areas, it soon gets over-politicized negating the validity of a gradual politicization process. The functionalist approach secondly also implies surrender of some elements of sovereignty to the regional body, which in turn, gradually attains some amount of autonomy and decision making role. Empirically, however, it has been found that the member states are unwilling to share even the most negligible degree of sovereignty with these regional or even sub-regional institutions excepting where the member states explicitly agree to do so within an integration framework. Concrete examples of these exceptions are hard to come by except in the case of the EU as noted a CDD working paper [2002] earlier cited. In effect, the real decision making power lay with the government representatives rather than the bureaucrats of these organizations. This amounts to inter-governmentalism and this effectively means government to government relations rather than what is known as ‘supra-nationalism’

This research has equally found it expedient like in many other cases to overview West Africa from the perspective of history. West African sub region the research has also discovered was made up of distinct societies and cultures prior to the

intrusive and imposing influence of the forces of colonization. In the earlier parts of this presentation, the great empires and kingdoms of **Ghana, Mali and Songhai** and their predominant influences, which affected the molding of pre-colonial societies in this part of the world, were distinctly identified for example. These pervasive influences were in a variety of areas such as technology, trade, commerce, arts, scholarship, religion, administration and governance. The Great West African empires existed between 1000 AD and 1500 AD and they were known to have effectively controlled trans-Saharan trade, taxing the caravans carrying gold, slaves from sub-Saharan West Africa and those carrying weapons and textiles from North Africa.

Other prominent pre-colonial states that dotted the pre-colonial landscape in West Africa were **Kanem-Bornu Empire** and Uthman Bin-Fodio's led **Sokoto Caliphate**. Kanem-Bornu was a spectacular African state in the Lake Chad region and it lasted for about 1000 years-from the ninth to the nineteenth century. The **Trans-Saharan trade** brought tremendous prosperity to the empire in addition to the influence of **Islamic religion**. In the 18th century, the empire inescapably declined with the apparent rise of the Sokoto Caliphate according to authoritative historical sources.

In 1804 began the Sokoto Caliphate and its subsequent imperious influence, which transcended into present day Niger republic in the north, and to the Oyo kingdom in the Southern part of today's modern Nigeria. The caliphate went beyond Adamawa highlands, and into the present day Republic of Cameroon. Noted also was that prior to colonization, the Kingdom of Dahomey was a powerful and **centralized state** with an efficient **system of taxation** and it had an **organized army**, which played a key role in liberating itself from the imperial dominance of

the Oyo kingdom. In addition, with the suppression of **slave trade**, the Kingdom derived its resources from the exploitation of its copious **palm plantations**, which though not under direct state control, were proficiently taxed in the same manner modern organizations are today handled. When the **French** finally suppressed the kingdom, it was estimated that Dahomey had over 40 million **palm trees**.

The **Ashanti Kingdom** the study has noted was the most powerful and geographically most extensive forest state. It was positioned in what is now Ghana, prior to colonization. The kingdom derived its wealth from the production of **Gold dust**, which it traded with the **British, Danish and Dutch** traders on the coast, consequently the region became known to **Europeans** as the **Gold Coast**.

By the mouth of the Senegal River were also a lot of trading activities especially in **Groundnuts and Gum Arabic**. The inland Wolof **State of Futa-Toro** influenced this trade.

This study also found that over the course of the 19th.century, **Sierra Leone** grew extensively with the settlement of **freed African slaves** and by the beginning of the 1820s,a group of freed African Americans began settling to the East of Sierra-Leone in a region that later earned the name **Liberia**. Liberia was established as an independent nation in the 1870s.

This research has made effort also at reviewing West African history of colonization. For the purpose of this study, colonies of exploitation were examined. Records reviewed that most were British, French and Portuguese colonies and they today constitute what is referred to as ECOWAS West Africa. Colonies of exploitation records have also confirmed had their economies based on the products from own land or plantations. These colonies primarily produced

crops meant to serve as raw materials to the growing industries of Western Europe, especially the colonizing powers.

Having over-viewed the picture of the sub-region from the context of both geography and history and considering the essence of trade to sub-regional integration in any part of the world, this research furthermore identified the salient factors that have militated against the economic integration of the ECOWAS. Apart from the institutional setting of the ECOWAS, several other factors have equally been identified as primarily inhibitive of trade facilitation and development in the Sub-Region. For all these issues to be properly comprehended, this research established that it is of the essence that an in-road into the global profile of trade development between other parts of the world and West Africa be made in the fourth chapter of this study. In addition, this study also refocused closely on other facets of intra-ECOWAS trading relations.

Through the spectacle of sampled respondents, this study also looked at ECOWAS Short and Medium Term Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Programs from the adoption of **Decision C/DEC.4/12/92** that defined a series of Short and Medium term trade promotion programs within an ECOWAS institutional framework to be adopted and implemented by the Executive Secretariat. The aim here the study noted, was aimed at opening domestic markets by creating the necessary conducive regional environment for the business community to exploit.

On a short-term basis and within the context of the union's strategic framework therefore, the ECOWAS coalition was to strengthen and increase intra-community trade by **creating awareness of market opportunities** in the region to the business community. Also on a medium term basis ECOWAS was to **develop trade channels, trade services and human resources**, in support of market

integration.

The presentation in a methodical and logical fashion the relational profile between the salient questions raised in this study, and the findings of the research were the key subjects discussed in the fifth chapter of this research. Here, the discussions of the research results were closely interrelated to the series of hypotheses and the multiplicity of variables that emerged in the course of the study. A broad outline of the sampled population, in tabular forms and as indicated by the profile of the questionnaire return rate as well as specially recognized persons interview response were also given in this portion of the study as a formidable basis for the reinforcement of views earlier expressed.

Similarly, in this same portion [fifth chapter] of this research report, data collected were presented and analyzed. Data presentation was essentially methodical and logical in outlook. The relational profiles between the salient questions asked in this study and the findings of the research were herein established. Discussions of the research results were therefore closely interrelated to the series of hypotheses and the multiplicity of variables that have emerged in the course of the study.

Questionnaires were administered and interviews were conducted in the course of this survey. The composition of the sampled population were a function of many vital factors but more importantly the type of information that were likely obtainable. The rate of responses of the three broad classes of respondents as a whole and on the average was sufficiently satisfactory and consequently most agreeable for predictive analysis or for drawing valid generalizations. Moreover, when viewed from the standpoint of an average, the three categories of respondents can be concluded as having reacted sufficiently and positively too on the multiplicity of issues raised.

It was in the light of the issue of trade development, trade facilitation and “locational-cum-strategic ” significance of the ‘**borderland communities’ group** was defined as a vital sample for this research and was therefore strategically created out of the diverse populations in the ECOWAS coalition. Within the populations of borderland communities, several economic activities relevant to the ECOWAS coalition and implicitly this study were actively pursued here on a daily basis - legitimate and illicit, therefore their significance and consequently their empirical relevance to this study cannot be underscored. It is important to note and restate that these communities play a vital role in trade and trade development not only in their respective “entities” but also in other areas around them and by implication West African sub-region as a whole.

In addition, from the demographic configuration of these populations, we have been able to establish the following key issues, part of which include delineating a distinction between the “natural”, the “politically willed” formal integration processes which are informed by a set of causative factors; Cross-border trading conducted by “small scale quasi traders” making available goods and services consumed by the general populace, especially the underprivileged majority; existence of integrated “traditional system of weekly markets” with traders moving goods across the borders in line with the practice that is often described or referred to as “rotating market schedules”; and during periods of inter-state crises and tensions border line communities are the ones that are frequently affected by the backlash and in most cases hostile effects of strained relations; forgotten borderland communities in terms of receiving the benefits of central government initiated or engineered programs of development; the sporadically interruption of their livelihood by the decisions of their central governments such as border closures and increased military activities during times of conflict.

In this segment, two hundred questionnaires, divided in four equal parts of 50 each, were administered with the use of research assistants in all the four locations of Birnin-Konni, Maradi [in Niger Republic] and Illela [Sokoto State, Nigeria] and Jibia [Katsina State, Nigeria]. In terms of questionnaire return, about 70% sample response was recorded. The most positive response in terms of returned questionnaire came from Jibia, Katsina State, Nigeria. A total 50 were sent and 39 were duly completed and returned making a return rate of 78%. This is considered reasonably sizeable for effective empirical deduction.

Expanded also was the data source of the study in order to include two additional groups as earlier noted the “**Informed Citizens**” Sample and that of the “**Specially Recognized Persons**” Sample for the purpose of effective generalizations. This “multi-source” approach indeed provided a sounder base for a confirmation or disputation of observed positions in the course of this study.

A specially designed questionnaire meant to elicit informed responses on contemporary issues on integration and trade related matters in the ECOWAS States was administered by the researcher and specially employed research assistants.

In the category of **Specially Recognized Persons**, 12 persons responded out of a total of 31 persons approached, representing only 34.2% of the total. This also implies 5.08% of the total sample population of 236 [i.e. $12/236 \times 100 = 5.08\%$]. This group of respondents and more especially those amongst them that positively and closely interacted, the research has confirmed, possess some special characteristics or attributes and these include positive disposition towards the subject of study; contribution and historical roles played as key players especially in the context of their paternal situation or responsibility as the ECOWAS coalition

unfolded from its formative days; the quantum of experience possessed in both trade and non-trade related matters.

A series of procedures were adopted ranging from the stage of hypotheses formulation, obtaining the relevant study data, comparison of observed data with the tabulated figures and drawing of the relevant conclusions and inferences. In this chapter on data analyses, the approach to data interpretation and analysis which was essentially pinned on the use of tabular/percentage presentations was also displayed. Four hypotheses were propounded and accordingly tested. Respondents to the research questionnaires were asked questions that relate broadly to their background, general integration matters in addition to those that were more specifically related to hypotheses postulated.

6.3 Conclusions on Findings:

One of the key propositions of this research is to amongst others assess Nigeria's challenges and contribution to the West African integration project, and to **determine an agenda of action for moving the integration project forward**. The broader context of the 'integration project' which initially involved only five ECOWAS states - Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana and Mali, has to be examined with a view to appreciating where the process seemed to have derailed. The following are the key considerations in this study:

1] More specifically, the study sought to look at integration within the coalition from the confines of **policies or programs that have improved or weakened implementation efforts at the national level, at the level of Nigeria's immediate neighbors and in some respect at the level of the general ECOWAS Community as a whole.**

2] One of the ultimate considerations is also to **unearth the experiences** of other countries, more especially those in other regions, as a way of appreciating better the process of integration within West Africa and more so as a veritable development initiative, option or strategy.

3] In the same vein, this study is further aimed at **establishing linkages between national policies and regional visions**. At the end, one of the hopes of the study would be that the conclusions and recommendations, facts and findings of the research would contribute to overall strategies towards integration not only in West Africa but Africa as a whole, having also indisputably observed that West African leadership have accepted that it is only through united efforts that their countries can firmly find solutions to the common problems that have over the past decades bedeviled their nations.

4] Again, and in close affiliation with the above, ECOWAS and its leadership has had to grapple with the **unwillingness of leaders to appreciate the underlying principle that full integration entails and this fundamentally includes the cessation of part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority, resulting as the research has understood in the “prevalence of non-enforceable protocols”** and as specifically noted some of the interviewees in many cases.

As a result of these key ‘snags’ or shortcomings, the attainment of 2005 as a landmark year for the realization of **many expectations of the ECOWAS in areas like the Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), full circulation of ECOWAS passports, the creation of a second monetary zone have not been sufficiently feasible**. Other unresolved matters are **cross border problems, which principally include the upsurge in the trafficking of narcotics, small arms, women and**

children and the menace of herdsmen and cross-border armed banditry.

The Research further identified as important missing links in the sub-region's integration agenda the **lack of deeper involvement of women as a strategic component of the community's population, the private sector and civil society, the prevalence of the 'language barrier' and the formidable absence of a common currency.**

The scale and depth of **women's involvement** to many observers relate more to religious and cultural forces especially in Muslim dominated northern part of Nigeria and in Southern part of Niger Republic. Border communities in these two countries especially the places noted above are largely similar in terms of cultural and religious configurations, thus the apparent minimal involvement of the female population. The situation is hugely different however in the border settlements of Western Nigeria and Eastern Benin Republic.

The **language** issue we however consider seems to be confined to the Eurocentric definition of language barrier especially as the barriers in question are more in relation to the imported languages of French English and Portuguese, and which in themselves are least pervasive within the region when compared with indigenous languages such as Hausa or Fulfulde found predominantly in Northern Nigeria and in Southern Niger or Yoruba within the southwardly Nigeria-Benin border.

On **common currency**, we strongly concur with the view of other scholars and observers that at present the coalition is only striving to attain the status of a common market, thus it is impossible to imagine at this stage the procurement of a common currency. This position is further reinforced by the opinion of many others who have largely posited that within the context of global financial

framework and considering the convergence criteria put in place and essentially defined by mainstream capitalism, the attainment of a common currency for West Africa may for a long time remain elusive.

The above constraints, challenges and problems notwithstanding, the research as is the case with other scholarly works cannot but adduce to ECOWAS some reverberating successes especially in area of conflict management, abolition of entry visas within the sub-region, the construction of the West African Gas Pipeline and trans-coastal highway from Lagos to Nouakchott. Others are the adoption perhaps more in paper terms of a regional railway master plan and the regional Convention on Diplomas and Certificates”, etc

An overview of the role of states as central forces for economic management and change – mediating the processes of development and organizing productive social groups is a vital part of this study. The state is in reality however, not a neutral force; among other things because it commands both the economic and political markets and the political-economic decision it makes affect the life chances of millions of people. Again, an average West African state is perceived by many as weak/soft, suspended in mid air above society and incapable of managing the reproduction of a given macro-economic system. On the specific ways by which **Nigeria** and other member states are, to say the least, modestly facilitating the integration process, the research interestingly further identified bilateral meetings between members in general on the implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement and the ETLS; sensitization workshops for security agencies and private sector operators to promote compliance with ECOWAS Protocols, more speedier clearance of goods and removal of several customs, immigration, police and other allied barriers which have succeeded but only in a few cases. In the

study's presentation about Nigeria's role, an elaborate analysis of the significance of regional integration before outlining the varying phases of Nigeria's involvement in the ECOWAS project was attempted. In chapter four, core efforts have been made in appreciating the role of the Nigerian state in promoting the integration process more so within diverse socio-political and economic frameworks. This has specially been approached more broadly considering the role of the Babangida presidency more especially in the process of facilitating diverse aspect of ECOWAS integration. General Babangida's personal vision and commitment as a leader of the region's strongest economy as well a three-time chair of the ECOWAS has been expressly x-rayed by the study in order to give a clearer picture of Nigeria's strategic role in the ECOWAS process.

Identified also in association with the above and to make the study more encompassing, were the critical or vital roles or positions of other selected member nations such as **Ghana**. Unlike Nigeria for instance, Ghana' role in ECOWAS was adjudged by a critical diplomatic source as "low-keyed from mid-1970s to the latter part of its PNDC era". This is partly "because of the general inertia that characterized the organization and also because of the overly concerns of the various governments within the sub-region on matters of internal security" the study source further expressed. Again, as an example, in delineating Ghana's participation in the ECOWAS process, mention must be made of its membership of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), production of the first ECOMOG commander, contribution to ECOMOG troops to Liberia, Sierra Leone and, Rawlings' two term chairmanship of ECOWAS and the in the eventual resolution of the first Liberian conflict.

Ghana's other contributions to the ECOWAS as earlier identified include Kufuor's

two-term chairmanship and involvement in peace processes in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire, troop contribution to ECOWAS/UN peacekeeping in the sub-region. The appointment of Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chamba's as the Executive Secretary to the ECOWAS Commission, perhaps one can assert represents the pinnacle of Ghana's participation in the ECOWAS integration process.

Again like Nigeria, Ghana's integrative efforts in the economic sphere, has been instrumental in the launching of the ECOWAS Fast Track and Single Currency initiatives asserted credible embassy sources in Abuja. Ghana and Nigeria have therefore both achieved the position of West Africa's "beacons of hope" for various reasons. Ghana is relatively more peaceful especially when compared to other West African states. Ghana had just concluded a civilian-to-civilian transition following the defeat of John Kufuor's governing party by the main opposition party led by Professor John Attah-Mills. Nigeria on the other hand even though not comparable to Ghana in terms of peace profile occupies a formidable position in view of her rising economic and political stability profile vis-à-vis other members of the economic community. This further confirms the position of this research that no integration process would mean much if violent conflicts within nations and across the sub-region do not effectively subside. Many observers and all the Specially Recognized Persons Group while commenting on international integration within the framework of West Africa similarly shared this position.

In further appreciating the roles of nation states in the general process of integration especially with the achievements on new ECOWAS investment codes, the research has equally noted some constraints to the integration process which includes problem of labor mobility, absence of a common procurement policy, non-existence of larger and more efficient firms and a single large market, the

absence of a number of joint industrial and agricultural projects. Other more challenging constraints that became apparent were the multiplicity of checkpoints and series of charges and levies imposed at certain borders within the sub-region, gross lack of adequate infrastructure in the sub-region, cumbersome clearance and payment procedures, political unrest or instability in quite a number of cases.

As noted earlier, the research further telescoped on the respective roles of governments of states, their Foreign Affairs and other associate agencies such as the Customs, Immigration, State Security Service, the Police and the armed forces. Others are the members of the diplomatic corps, private sector chieftains, the Civil Society Organizations and very importantly the “ordinary” community citizens.

In trying to appreciate the protocols as instrument of integration within the West African coalition, especially with regards their implementation, the study noted that the protocols provided a legal and institutional framework for sub-regional integration. It is noted emphatically that outstanding challenges exist in the implementation of such protocols at the national level of member-nations.

Even though most West African states have “dualist approach” to ratification of international agreements, this has impaired their commitment towards ratification of most ECOWAS Protocols. Nigeria has ratified most ECOWAS protocols with few exceptions. This is demonstrative of Nigeria’s level of commitment to the integration process, especially when compared with other member-states. Similarly, and as at 2008, Niger Republic had ratified 38 conventions as at December 2008. All indications above are as at December 2008.

Nigeria’s Ministry for Integration in Africa created by the Obasanjo administration in 1999 does not exist any more! Like Ghana’s Ministry for Regional Cooperation

and NEPAD, the Ministry for Africa's Integration under the Presidency, was to coordinate and oversee the implementation of ECOWAS protocols in addition to other allied African integration issues. Its first minister was of cabinet rank. In practice, many of these government ministries were confronted by several problems. Among the problems principally identified were their inability to achieve as mandated; weaknesses in their organizational and institutional structure; lack of effective program implementation strategies; inadequate program financing; the absence of a development and integration culture; the lack of proper functioning of inter-ministerial coordination; imperfect monitoring and implementation.

Critical information with regards the poor functioning of these institutions was obtained from top-level internal sources. In addition to observable deficiencies, other issues identified by the study include principally that of regional insecurity. Security is considered crucial to any process of integration. Indeed, in all spheres, security has been noted to be one of the most crucial factors in successful regional integration and that explains why it took so long for ECOWAS to make its presence felt regionally and globally especially with regards matters that are most relevant to integration and economic development. Pre-occupation with national security or more precisely regime security in most of member-states contributed to the marginalization of regional integration in the 1970s and 1980s. From evidence available, this study further asserts that without security, it is ultimately impossible to think of regional cooperation or integration in whatever form.

Most of the respondents in this study have affirmed that the sub-regional political leaderships have often engaged in political talk rather than real action; sometimes too verbal commitments are made without real documentary or practical backing.

It is the viewpoint of many discussants and interviewees to this research that not until democratic and responsible governance is consolidated in the sub-region; it would be difficult to achieve integration that would be of utmost benefit to the generality of West Africans.

The research has also noted and concluded that further to a number of other issues, conflicts surrounding the question and validity of ECOWAS passports and other travel documents remain largely unresolved and this tend to significantly inhibit free movement of persons within the region. Some of the reasons readily identifiable for this situation is the negative orientation of agency personnel responsible for these programs or projects. The 2005 deadline for the adoption of ECOWAS passport has passed by a number of member states.

The issue of the ‘menace of herdsmen’ which featured in a number of discussions with respondents and the problem of armed banditry especially around border communities is generally viewed as pervasive and goes beyond mere application of ECOWAS protocols. It is a complex problem that brings into clearer focus issues of survival, local complicity, lack of education and illiteracy to the forefront.

This research has also noted that from anthropological and sociological perspectives and sources, that it is very difficult to promote integration and intra-regional trade without better understanding of the cultural and social context of the people involved. There is therefore the apparent need to rediscover West Africa’s pre-colonial past where and when integration was not particularly a problem. It then was indeed considered as a natural process. It is therefore concluded that for an effective formal ECOWAS integration projects and programs to be successful, they should be based on a process of natural integration having noticed that genuine integration has existed in the sub-region long before colonial rule.

This underscores the pertinence for revisiting history in order to appreciate the lessons that could be learnt. Again, this brings to mind that given that integration goes on ‘successfully’ at the informal level; the state has apparently become obstacle rather than a facilitator.

The study further demonstrated the non involvement of ordinary West Africans in the ECOWAS process by drawing attention to the fact that, the organization’s key events daily passed virtually unnoticed. Abbas Bundu, one time Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS asserted that West African integration was essentially ‘elitist’! The main argument often presented to justify this position is that ECOWAS adopted an elitist and technocratic approach without the involvement of large sections of the population and the observation that ECOWAS integration process did not take cognizance of the necessary social and cultural contact among the citizenry. In addition, it ignored their experiences and perceptions.

The ECOWAS idea this research therefore concludes has therefore remained an elitist project designed and carried out by government leaders without much consultation with the mass of population making the integration process genuinely appearing as imposed from above with little or no popular participation. The experience within the EU for instance is a complete negation or contradiction of the ECOWAS experience.

Based on a series of field surveys of people in Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, Abuja, Zaria and the selected four border towns of Illela, Birnin-Konni, Jibia, Maradi, Seme, and Mellaville the study examined cross-border socio-economic relations, perceptions about cross border neighbors and experiences with border workforce.

In addition to the above, the study drew the following **salient conclusions:**

In general, the borderland communities in Nigeria, Niger and other West African states have social, economic and kinship ties with communities across borders in the neighboring countries. Scores of these communities that populate the borders consider themselves as one people who often speak a common language and share a common culture. Following these findings, the study noted that there are close kinship and marriage relations among members of these communities. However, there still remains some considerable degree of prejudices and stereotypical views about persons living on either side of the border. The roles and post-colonial orientation of states and their apparatuses, which were in most cases negative can be paused as possible explanations.

Evidence have abundantly indicated that vital experiences of traders in the **informal sector** of the West African sub-regional economy have neither been acknowledged nor supported as part of the integration process. Long-standing social, cultural and economic relations that exist among communities that straddle borders and the extensive network of informal cross-national trade have been tragically ignored. This further underscores the urgent need to acknowledge, facilitate, support and **build upon these informal experiences** to make integration beneficial to large sections of the populace in line with the dream of making the ECOWAS coalition a community that shares, as in the words of Mohammed Daramy, ECOWAS Chief of Free Movement, Trade, Customs and Tourism Commission, "...a common destiny of a borderless expression that promotes the welfare of the totality of the people"[*ECOWAS Newsletter*],

Border communities also believe that their economic fortunes are inseparably linked as they benefit considerably from cross-border trade and they are integrated

into a system of weekly markets with traders moving goods across the borders in line with what one of the respondents described as a “rotating market schedule”.

In addition to the above, the study through a field survey found out that most borderland communities often consider their interests to some extent different from those espoused by national governments. The borderland communities live mainly in remote communities with a very small number of infrastructural facilities and have few public officials apart from those deployed to maintain law and order or to collect revenue on behalf of the government.

The ‘peripheral’ and specifically the disadvantaged position of these communities with respect to the distribution of national resources often indicates that they have to survive without state support and frequently look across the border not only for support but security. For instance during periods of crisis such as acute food shortages and drought, residents on both sides of the border have regularly obtained moral and material support and solidarity from their relatives diagonally located across the border. At the same time, also these borderland communities take advantage of price differentials in their diverse countries when it comes to matters of trade asserted an economist that participated in a research on informal trade in West Africa.

Local residents were also noted as frequently involved in the movement of banned goods and products across the borders. Also, imported goods especially textile emanated from European sources, thus confirming the heavy economic linkage with Western economies. A number of rubber products are also noticeable in these borderland markets. According to many respondents from the sample of informed persons, these goods are traceable to Nigeria’s burgeoning petro-chemical sub-sector as well as her commercial sector. Mainstream economists view the heavy

trading in contraband generally as a formidable disservice to the economies of most member states.

At times of inter-state crisis and tensions, borderland communities are the ones that immediately feel the effects of the strained relations more especially as they are frequently targeted for raids and reprisals. Most times, borderland communities enjoy little benefit from central governments are very evidently observable. Conversely, their livelihood was frequently interrupted by critical decisions of government such as border closures and increased military activities along such borders, a one time Nigerian peacekeeping command personnel noted in a discussion.

This research has in addition to all the above revealed that without political vision, not much can be achieved and though Nigeria's **Protocol ratification rate** as well as that of a number of ECOWAS membership has been most impressive according to credible ECOWAS Commission sources. The Babangida presidency was viewed as most active in this regard. What however remains to be seen in the context of today's ECOWAS are the commitment to see that the institutions [national and international] for implementation are adequately resourced and therefore effectively positioned to work.

As earlier noted credit must be given to other member-states for their rate of protocol ratification. Delays in the ratification and implementation of ECOWAS protocols could be substantially condensed if ECOWAS move effectively towards the principle of supra-nationality, where Community decisions do not need ratification by member states.

This study has substantially noted with interest the existence of a huge volume of

cross-border trade in agricultural and manufactured commodities within the ECOWAS and drew implications and policy options as a result using the following as a theoretical basis of analysis:

1. Integration of economies is said to be led by two underlying set of causes - technological, social and cultural changes; and changes in government policies that traditionally inhibited cross border activities. This leads to the appreciation of the dissimilarity between 'natural' and 'politically-willed' or formal integration processes.

2. Geographic proximity (physical distance, common border, language and culture) and lower transportation operating cost are essential factors in natural integration and that it is **when formal integration projects are based on a process of natural integration can they be expected to be successful or fundamentally effective.**

3. Other fundamentals for an effective and successful official regional integration scheme include the pre-existence among members of high levels of intra-group transactions, complementarities among regional partners in goods and factors of production and potentials for product differential between regional partners derived from differences in income levels and consumption patterns, and the outstanding support of a strong private sector and the pressure in promoting prompt and effective execution of agreed obligations and programs within membership of the economic coalition.

The promotion of regional trade is an important objective of most regional integration schemes worldwide but such integration schemes in Africa have visibly failed to improve intra trade ratios. This is largely because of the homogeneity in

the regions exports, agricultural and manufacturing production. This weakness is largely addressed in the case of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] in several; ways.

For example, as a share of total export and import, Ghana's intra- ECOWAS trade accounts for less than 25%. Also between 1993 and 1997, a total of four years Ghana's total intra-ECOWAS imports was between \$273-\$346 million while her total intra-ECOWAS exports was in the region of \$215-268 million for the same period according to *ECOWAS Handbook on International Trade* [2003]. For Accra, expanding trade between Ghana and her ECOWAS neighbors is conceived as a long-term development strategy for the strengthening of political, social and economic relations and the fostering of a regional self-reliant development process that improves the livelihood of Ghanaian citizens. Other member-states are not hugely at variance with this position too.

Nigeria in her case stands as the strongest economy in the sub-region with its total GDP outstripping twice that of the entire region. By 2001, this research study has affirmed that ECOWAS total regional Gross Domestic Product [GDP] totaled \$ 75.1 Billion and Nigeria's GDP, considered as the region's largest, was \$ 39.5 Billion, more than half that of other members combined i.e. about 52.3%. Total regional export, including intra-regional exports was \$ 26.1 billion in 2001. Despite her economic standing, Nigeria's West African trading profile has not evinced any impressive outlook. An outline of her trading relations shown below remains clearly illustrative of the oddity of the situation. Statistical evidence has declared that between 1993-1997 Nigeria's Trade with other members of the coalition was in the region of \$97-120 million in terms of import while in terms of export for the same period was \$304-698 million only. This is graphically

illustrated in the 2003 edition of the *ECOWAS Handbook on International Trade*.

Evidence available has also indicated that **small-scale quasi traders** including **women** who are also engaged in small agricultural production usually conduct cross-border trade. In addition, this trade makes available commodities that are consumed by the poor and it is likely to hugely increase employment and wages within communities in the sub-region. Cross border trade within the coalition allows farmers and mostly women to participate in intra-regional trade. The notable participation of the later group makes it also expedient for the study to review the relevance of gender as a key component of regional integration in the West African sub-region.

This study has found out from several literatures on regional economic integration the strategic need significance of a unified monetary entity as in the case of Euro Zone of the EU. From discussions with important functionaries in the Nigerian Banking system, the study has further discovered even though not much has been achieved in the area, the process for adopting a single currency has been set in motion in West Africa. It was however not clear whether the conditions for attaining such a goal could be met in the very near future. The influence of colonization was closely brought into focus. At this point, it is necessary to recall how the West African Currency Board which operated among the British colony of Gambia, Ghana Nigeria and Sierra Leon was abandoned after independence while on the other hand the Francophone states largely retained their institutional structures along with their neighbors in maintaining allegiance to France within the context of a multilateral framework.

From available data, ECOWAS had since its inception in 1975 adopted a number of schemes for monetary cooperation, which had encountered some teething

problems. These included the West African Clearing House (WACH), the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Program (EMCP) and the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA). ECOWAS since 1999 decided to form a second monetary zone for the non-CFA countries with the aim of ultimately merging the two zones into a single currency by 2003. The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was set up as an institutional vehicle to establish the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) but because the states in the new zone failed to meet the convergence criteria the second zone has not been created and the date for a single currency was twice shifted from 2003 to 2005 and then to 2009. An ECOWAS Commission report in 2008 confirmed that it s commenced dialogue with West African Central Banks which resulted in the establishment of the Inter-institutional Working Group on ECOWAS Single Currency. This group has been mandated to identify by March 2009 a strategy for the attainment of the region's monetary unification by 2009.

Apart from the problem of limited resources, other economic factors discovered for this state of affairs are the coalition's mixed record with regard to factor mobility, degree of openness and asymmetry of the shocks buffeting, differential rates of inflation and very importantly limited political commitment on the part of members. Nigeria as an individual member of the coalition did not help matters more so when recently it's former Central Bank Governor, Professor Soludo, was quoted in a Nigerian newspaper, expressing the inappropriateness of the timing for a West African unified currency. In this case as in many others within the ECOWAS, it only means that the will to implement the necessary measures or protocol for a **nation's decision to surrender its monetary policy** to a supranational institution goes beyond economic considerations. For a number of scholars, this situation is further worsened by the fact that the coalition is still at

the stage of going or growing towards a single market, consequently, it is too early to imagine the attainment of a single currency in such a situation. The negative effect of this situation is no doubt of paramount significance in terms of inhibiting effective economic integration within the ECOWAS coalition. The single currency situation within the coalition may also be observed from the context of global financial architecture, and which largely does not seem to support any radical change in the financial contours of the sub-region. The West African framework having been part of the global financial structure cannot therefore in the present situation re-position towards any radical shift or reform.

Again, going by the nature of the economies within the coalition, the question that need be necessarily asked is who will subsidize the weaker members of the coalition? This question becomes even more apparent when one looks at the structure of all members in terms of their individual economic strength as well as their relationship with each other within the coalition [both as individual nations and as a group]

These broad conception and perspectives have therefore informed the following recommendations as key upshots of the study.

6.4 Recommendations:

The study further demonstrated the non involvement of ordinary West Africans in the ECOWAS process by drawing attention to the fact that, the organization's key events daily passed virtually unnoticed. Abbas Bundu, one time Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS asserted that West African integration was essentially 'elitist'! The main argument often presented to justify this position is that ECOWAS adopted an elitist and technocratic approach without the involvement of

large sections of the population and the observation that ECOWAS integration process did not take cognizance of the necessary social and cultural contact among the citizenry. It also ignored their experiences and perceptions. The need for **mass awareness and the incorporation of the general citizenry as civil society or gender entities** in the integration scheme cannot therefore be overemphasized. In addition, in close liaison with the above, citizens' participation should further be enhanced by providing for the **direct election** of ECOWAS parliamentarians in all member-states. This can be translated to mean a genuine effort towards democratization of vital ECOWAS institutions. When the parliament is fully democratized, the process will facilitate citizens' participation in the conduct of the ECOWAS in addition to enhancing the checks on the activities of the ECOWAS organization.

For the ECOWAS coalition to accelerate efficient economic integration of the West African sub-region there is an apparent need to increase political cooperation and in relation foster collective actions in order to address more closely **cross-border trade issues**. This has become imminent and necessary in view of the postulates of Simai and Garam on what really represents progressive economic integration, which is taken to mean a diminishing of key issues such as the price, wage, interest rates and bond yield differential between the countries within a coalition of states.

Nigeria as a strategic partner and the strongest economy in the ECOWAS coalition needs to more widely **open its overland borders** further in order to encourage intra-ECOWAS exports as a way of encouraging production competitiveness within and outside her borders. This requires a sizeable **investment especially in cross-border infrastructure** such as the establishment and financing of border

posts infrastructure, inter-country roads and communication networks. Facilitating trade along the borders of the country thus calls for the opening of more exit points. This is to be supported by further **relaxation of border controls**, which can strongly help foster the pace of sub-regional integration. In further discussing the issue of road and communication infrastructure, it is pertinent to restate the value of doing so by closely appreciating the EU model. The EU model in this respect has observed that an improved infrastructure can make a noteworthy difference to the cost of production and trading. Therefore, huge investments in roads development and modest communication network in the ECOWAS would directly influence the cost of doing business in the sub-region. Reducing cost in key areas such as transportation is one vital factor that makes producing firms and their nations to remain spiritedly competitive within global markets. ECA has also noted, “improvement in transport infrastructure such that a country moves from an average range among 64 countries considered, to being among the top 25 per cent of those countries would reduce transport costs by an amount equivalent to 481 kilometers of over land travel and 3,989 kilometers of travel by sea. It would also stimulate an increase in trade volume by 68%, which is equivalent to being 2500 kilometers closer to other countries. It is therefore most imperative that efforts must be put into improving infrastructure and more especially transport infrastructure.

Communities found or located along the borders of the member-states are integral to the economic and political integration of the West African coalition. The same communities the study discovered are a veritable source of revenue to most member-states. In spite of their strategic relevance it is evident that very little have been done to these communities. ECOWAS countries, and with Nigeria now in the lead, having established the Border Communities Development Agencies [BCDA]

in 2009, should do everything possible to invest in improving the **quality of life within border communities** in the sub-region. This would help in invigorating their local economies and would consequently trigger a more definable trade, and economic integration with their respective hinterland communities. Indeed, there is no way an effective integration can take place when the first contact points on the fringes are poor and economically disadvantaged in diverse respects.

Vital experiences of traders in the **informal sector** of the West African sub-regional economy have neither been acknowledged nor supported as part of the integration process. Long-standing social, cultural and economic relations that exist among communities that straddle borders and the extensive network of informal cross-national trade have been tragically ignored. This further underscores the urgent need to acknowledge, facilitate, support and **build upon these informal experiences** to make integration beneficial to large sections of the populace in line with the dream of making the ECOWAS coalition a community that shares a common destiny of a borderless expression that promotes the welfare of the totality of the people. It is therefore recommended that the informal sector and its activities should be more closely monitored with a view to appreciating its positive effects on the regional economy. Regional institutions and agencies should therefore endeavor to not only note but effectively create strategies for recording all trading activities in this vital sector of the individual economies of member-states, more so considering the fact that this sector of the economy is an integral part of the regional economy and ignoring it would result in the inability to adequately appreciate the regional economy in its holistic form. Once again, the informal sector should therefore be the starting point for an effective integration of West Africa.

Common currency was essential for the promotion of trade within the coalition of West African states as in the case of any such similar arrangement. It is therefore pertinent for West Africa to have a **second monetary zone among the non-CFA states to facilitate the negotiation to a single currency at the sub-regional level.** Undoubtedly, it would for example be easier to negotiate between two currency blocs than several national currencies. In 1999, the ECOWAS coalition decided to form a second monetary zone for the non-CFA countries with the aim of ultimately merging the two zones into a single currency by 2003 and as part of the several steps towards monetary unification, the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was set up as an institutional vehicle to establish the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) but because the states in the new zone failed to meet the convergence criteria, the WAMZ failed to emerge and the date for a single currency was shifted twice from 2003 to 2005 and then to 2009.

Records have indicated that progress towards micro-economic convergence in recent years has remained generally mixed, as there has been no significant improvement in the overall performance. None of any member states has been able to achieve all the primary and secondary criteria and most members have generally found it difficult to sustain their performance in respect of targets realized in preceding years. As at the end of 2007, none has yet been able to meet all the primary and secondary convergence criteria. The best performance of eight targets was recorded by Benin. Mali and Togo followed with seven targets each, while Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, The Gambia and Senegal attained six benchmarks each. All were francophone countries with the exception of The Gambia. Cape-Verde, Guinea, Niger, and Nigeria realized five targets each, whereas Liberia met only four targets. Ghana and Guinea-Bissau met three targets each. Sierra Leone met two targets [ECOWAS Commission, 2008]. In the light of these experiences,

and having noted the strategic value of common currency in the facilitation of trade and economic cohesion, it is pertinent for us to recommend that English speaking West African states, should emphasize and pursue vigorously the building of a **common monetary coalition** amongst themselves, as a first step towards setting up an all-encompassing monetary union. Waiting to attain the convergence criteria, which might have been determined or influenced by external forces, may make it literally impossible to achieve a common currency status for West Africa. Consequently, it will be impossible to achieve the desired economic cohesion within the coalition. Attention must therefore be given to the role of external players in the sub-region. Equally, recognition must be given to the development challenges that arise as a result. No doubt, the adoption of a single currency entails carefully balancing economic criteria with political commitment and in practical terms, it may become more useful to relax the economic criteria in order to make the political decision so long as there is the political will to get them implemented. The greatest challenge, however, has to do with the structure or architecture of the international monetary system in which [except for the emergence of China and India], the dominance of core capitalist economies of the world is continually maintained.

Language is a major factor in West Africa's Integration thus establishing a close link between language, national development and regional integration is most critical. After having noted that a nation's development may be measured in terms of the people's overall standard of living, among other things, depends of the human resources available, which is itself a product of education. In addition, since education and training are facilitated by communication, language becomes an important factor in national development. Thus, language plays a crucial role in education, which in turn is a major factor in national development. The national

language policy therefore should make it possible for the majority of the populace to be educated well enough to participate meaningfully in nation building and by extension the ECOWAS.

However, the difficulty is in determining the language policy that would ensure that as many people as possible in the sub-region would benefit from education that would in turn enable them enhance their performance in the socio-economic development of their respective countries and the sub-region as a whole. The question to ask therefore is how many of the numerous indigenous languages, for example, should feature in education, the media, and other aspects of the region's socio-economic activities? Traditionally, language policies in the sub-region have tended to favor the European official languages for which a dominant majority of the people could hardly access. After an analysis of the various ramifications of the link between language, development and integration, the following policy-related recommendations are being suggested –

[1] Cognizant of the integrative role local languages continue to play at the grassroots and across national borders, they should be encouraged side by side with the official languages and irrespective of the genesis of these official languages. It is crucial for Nigeria to introduce the study of French very early to children since they are better able to learn different languages than adults are. Conversely, the Francophone or Lusophone countries should do the same. Scientific research has confirmed that children under seven years are capable of learning three different languages at the same time. Thus, Language promoting NGOs and private sector organizations should be encouraged to play a leading role. 'Alliance France' an effort in Nigeria that helps to promote French language is doing fairly well in a number of Nigerian cities should be strengthened. Nigeria and other English-

speaking West African states should therefore make greater effort to study French, the way their Francophone counterparts have done in learning English. The role of embassies is also vital here especially in aiding to set up Language laboratories in member-states' institutions and the training of teachers

[2] The multilingual setting that West Africa finds itself calls for serious language planning to ensure the maximum use of human and material resources across the sub-region. In addition, to overcome the fear of selecting any one of the local languages as a national language, the formula adopted by South Africa, which promotes the adoption of several, will be strategically most useful. Language pluralism should therefore be the guiding principle of policy-makers not only the guiding principle of policy-makers not only in Nigeria but also the rest of the sub-region.

[3] Also given the close link between language and education and the crucial role they both play in national development and regional integration, it is a serious policy deficit that language has been taken for granted for so long in the integration process. Further to these, language should be seen as a right and each group should be allowed to use the one for which it is best fit. Efforts should therefore be made towards publishing children's books at the basic level in core courses like science and mathematics in the local languages. Thus, the Francophone-Anglophone dichotomy often been seen as a problem could be turned into an advantage through carefully planned language policies.

Education is a key factor in attaining success any integration process. This has in part helped in determining the success of EU integration. West African states should as a matter of priority redesign their strategies in terms of educating the general citizenry especially the **youth**. This underscores the need for the

establishment of the **ECOWAS University and the strengthening of regional professional institutes** such as the West African College of Surgeons, and the **creation of the ECOWAS University**. More collaborative activities such as international conferences organized by the Nigerian Institute of Management under the auspices of the African Management Associations should be sincerely encouraged in ECOWAS West Africa. The establishment of the ECOWAS Service Corp Scheme for West Africans would also facilitate further integration and cross-fertilization of ideas especially in diverse areas of scholarship – culture, anthropology, medicine, agriculture, mining, ICT e.t.c. Nigeria is expected to take the lead in promoting these collaborative activities, more so as some member states are likely to appreciate the inputs of young Nigerian professionals into their respective economies. This would quietly aid in re-establishing the hegemony of the Nigerian state within the confines of the West African coalition. This suggestion is predicated on the experiences of the National Service Corp in terms of handling of the huge number of Nigerian graduates that are churned out of home and foreign institutions. Owing to the success of the Nigerian initiated Technical Aid Corp Scheme, it would be appropriate if the scheme can be strengthened further and replicated to cover more beneficiary nations within the ECOWAS

Free movement of persons and goods has remained one of the most outstanding challenges facing the Coalition, especially with the multiple check points dotted all over the sub-region. Whereas ordinary citizens with voter identity cards can move easily across borders, those with passports and other formal documents often encounter major difficulties in the process. To facilitate effective integration of West Africa, it is imperative that free movement of goods and persons must be properly ensured. A deliberate **program of re-orientation** for all operatives and officers operating internal checkpoints and border posts must be vigorously

pursued and in line with the strategic policy framework of the coalition. It is interesting to note that quite a number of operatives in border post are not fully conversant with overall strategic policy framework of the ECOWAS; consequently, it would be difficult for such personnel to fit into the challenging task of promoting ECOWAS integration. This again, vehemently underscores the need for a huge program of re-orientation to be periodically undertaken by the ECOWAS in collaboration with the academia, professionals in the private sector, and other stakeholders.

Development corridors as strategized by SADC need be considered for adoption in West Africa. Apart from being approached from the angle of public-private sector partnership, the development corridors may be developed in areas of coastal transport and energy infrastructure, hinterland water transportation and tourism development. *The SADC Review 10th Anniversary: 1997-2006*, has best displayed the structure and focus of the various development corridors set up by SADC. In addition, the positive effects of the strategy have been amply demonstrated by the SADC when for example, the Maputo Development Corridor, the first to be implemented in 1995 was known to have effectively linked the Gauteng Province of South Africa and Maputo in Mozambique resulting in the creation of over 15,000 jobs. Since its inception, this development corridor was effectively supported by a vibrant private sector and it focused also on the rehabilitation and upgrading of traditional trade and transport links as a basis for broad economic development of the area. Therefore, ECOWAS should undertake a closer review of its traditional trade and transport links that had existed in the past centuries with a view to identifying aspects that need be harnessed and revitalized.

The ECOWAS needs to provide for better-conceptualized definitions of issues,

policies, plan of actions, in addition to establishing a sound framework for outstanding political commitment by the state and non-state actors on all matters of commerce, trade and integration. Therefore, **public policy dialogue** and an effective **agenda-setting forum** must be established by the ECOWAS, to facilitate better conceptualized definitions of issues, policies, plans of actions in addition to creating a better framework for not only obtaining but re-establishing commitments by state and non-state actors on various integration issues.

6.5 Recommendations for Further Research and Study:

Sources close to UNCTAD have identified that more than half of the population of the ECOWAS Sub-region (some 115 million people) live on less than one US dollar per day with 12 of its 15 Member States identified among the world's least developed countries. The situation today may even be worse! These desperate circumstances inevitably mould and set profound limits on the Regional Integration [RI] processes. Even though these statistics have often been criticized as office-based and imperialist motivated, it is undisputable that such a large uneducated and subsistence-based population may clearly not be poised to take advantage of an expanded regional market or the opportunities. It is therefore vital as scholars of integration to note the impact of the twin issues of poverty and illiteracy on regional integration in West Africa.

Perhaps, one of the most dramatic and publicized example of a deepening political cooperation in ECOWAS involved the activities of the Standing Mediation Committee and the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was set up in 1990 for conflict prevention and management in West Africa. The existence of ECOMOG offers testimony to how regional policies can and often must adapt to confront the political and social realities of a region. A retired Nigerian Army

general, who was once an ECOMOG commander restated this when he noted the inevitability of the ECOMOG forces as a “necessity and an historical innovation” of the ECOWAS. He further declared, “...the ECOMOG was a strategic imperative, that adequately reflected on the region’s political realities”. In the light of this reality, it is imperative that a much closer study need be carried out on the ECOMOG as a stabilization factor in West Africa.

Studying the political and social circumstances of a region is crucial in understanding not just the potential for RI but also its impact on the local working and non-working populations. The concept of regional integration may be recognizable for many of its standard components, with trade liberalization, macro-economic policy harmonization and political coordination as some of its most prominent features. However, the dynamics of integration can vary dramatically within the region particularly where the economic endowments of member-states are at markedly different levels of development, or, as in the case of the ECOWAS, where there is widespread underdevelopment, poverty and recurring civil unrest. Each member state should therefore be more closely analyzed with a view to unearthing or rediscovering the features that facilitate or de-facilitate integration between members. A sound study here should focus on the inter-state differentials and how they affect the process of regional integration. In studying the differentials, it is also imperative to closely focus on their similarities – sociological/anthropological, economic, political and environmental. To further illustrate this, a study can be undertaken on for instance the reaction of individual members to the various protocols and conventions of the coalition.

One element among others that is generally seen as an impediment to regional integration in Africa at large (ECOWAS being no exception) is the fact that

countries commonly belong to more than one regional arrangement – an overlap that may result in the duplication of responsibilities, potentially conflicting commitments and the waste of already scarce resources. The UN Economic Commission for Africa itself considers the rationalizing of the RECs as a crucial step if these communities are to coalesce into the more ambitious African Economic Community. This impediment is especially evident in West Africa, which is reported to have the largest number of intergovernmental cross-border organizations. It is thus very important that a study on the implication of these bipolar organizations be commissioned with a view to objectively ascertaining their roles and consequences on West African integration and development. Similarly, it is pertinent that some effort be devoted also in studying the rationalization of regional economic communities in Africa as well as the impact of these duplications on West African integration.

The noticeable unevenness between the progress of WAEMU and ECOWAS economic integration may not necessarily be a source of tension or rivalry between the two organizations – even though the Revised Treaty identifies ECOWAS as ultimately the sole economic community in the region. Many scholars in fact see “multiple-speed” integration as a stimulus rather than as a deterrent of regional integration in West Africa. This same idea appears, for instance, in the context of the African Union where deeper integration of multiple regional economic communities is seen as contributing to and one day fulfilling the objectives of continent wide integration. By the same reasoning, the sub-grouping of WAEMU countries in West Africa is thought of as promoting ECOWAS integration by moving the regional agenda ahead more swiftly, if for the time being unevenly. Difficulties within this scenario, however, may appear if the trajectories of WAEMU and ECOWAS integration do not lineup, with regard to not only the pace

of integration but also the actual integration policy choices. The ECA reports, however, that most RECs (ECOWAS and WAEMU included) have largely similar economic integration aspirations. But where there is a plurality of initiatives pursuing identical goals within the same region, this will likely result in wasteful duplication, a dissipation of effort, confusion about the goals of integration, and counterproductive competition between countries and institutions. For its part, the World Bank considers that to achieve deep integration, consolidation of bi-polar institutional structures is essential, thus a closer analysis of the impact of the bi-polar institutional structure need be carried in future studies. A study that would look at the ECOWAS and her relationship with these institutions is therefore of great essence.

The revision of the ECOWAS treaty in 1993 marked an important change both in the structure and the outlook of West African collaboration. As noted in Aryeetey's work, which has been earlier cited, a shift to a more "people-centered organization" as opposed to the "overly bureaucratic inter-governmental agency of the past", reflecting a new form of integration that was then taking shape in the African political consciousness became most discernible. In fact, two years earlier [1991], in Abuja and in the same spirit of regional rejuvenation, African leaders signed into being the African Economic Community, acknowledging that integration on the continent up to that point had been unable to deliver on its economic promises. It no longer was a narrow trade agreement designed at expanding trade flows within the continent arising from the liberalization of trade and exchange regimes. Primarily, it was conceived as a long-term development strategy based on a collective self-reliance leading to an autonomous and self-sustained development. The Abuja Concept of integration is generally viewed as a **'holistic approach' aimed at integrating economic and non-economic sectors,**

building new institutions consistent with a self-reliant development process, upholding democratic principles and fostering new social and cultural values.

Political commitment to integration should not be restricted therefore to the respective integration ministries, rather the process should be the responsibility of the entire government comprising of the national Cabinets, Parliaments and their judicial wings who must expectedly push the integration agenda forward. In the light of these observations, it is pertinent that a comparative study of the two generations of ECOWAS treaties in this context, be undertaken.

A major component of intra-regional trade is informal for which data are often lacking. In addition, traditional trade and transport links as a basis for broad economic development of the ECOWAS need be more deeply investigated. A closer review of West Africa's traditional trade and transport links, which had existed in the past centuries, would better aid the ECOWAS in appreciating the best features of West Africa's traditional trade and transport links.

Similarly, a study into the informal economy or what is otherwise referred to as 'close-circuit economy' of the sub-region need be vigorously undertaken with a view to appreciating its dynamics and implications on development of West African states as a group and as individual nations. As earlier noted, conducting this study even becomes more imperative in view of the colossal and all-encompassing relevance and nature of the sector to the economies of member-nations.

Having also noted that it is very difficult to promote integration and intra-regional trade without better understanding of the cultural and social context of the people involved, the study recommends that there is the apparent need to rediscover West Africa's pre-colonial past, where and when integration was not particularly a

problem. This can best be attained that from anthropological and sociological perspectives.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1:

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ECOWAS BORDER COMMUNITIES OF ILLELA, JIBIA [NIGERIA], BIRNIN-KONNI AND MARADI [NIGER REPUBLIC].

SECTION A:

PERSONAL DATA:

Q 1. Age as of last birthday? [Pls. tick the closest to your own]

[a] 20 - 30 years [b] 31 - 40 years [c] 41 - 50 years [d] 51 - 60 years [e] 61 years and above

Q 2. Sex? [a] Male [b] Female, tick as appropriate.

Q 3. What is your highest educational qualification/Certificate?

[a] Primary school certificate [b] Secondary school certificate [c] University/ Polytechnic [d]

Others.....[please, specify]

Q 4. Nationality :.....

Q 5. How fluent are you in any of the following foreign languages?

Tick as appropriate [X] Very Fluent. Fluent. Poor.

English: [] [] []

French [] [] []

Portuguese [] [] []

OTHER LOCAL LANGUAGES:

Hausa [] [] []

Fulfulde [] [] []

Zabarmanchi [] [] []

Q 6. Which of the following best describes your trade, line of business or occupation?

[a] Farming [b] Middleman [c] Civil Servant [d] Petty Trader [e] Businessman

SECTION B:

GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL & CITIZENS' MOBILIZATION ISSUES:

Q 1. How do you assess the promotional activities of ECOWAS/ Member-States institutions towards awakening the consciousness of their citizens towards sub-regional integration?

[a] Very strongly active [b] Barely active [c] Weak [d] Very weak

Q 2. How do you evaluate the efforts of other ECOWAS states in this process re-orientating their nationals towards regional integration?

[a] Very strongly pronounced [b] Barely noticeable [c] Weak [d] Very weak [e] Undecided

Q 3. In view of the above, how do you specifically view the activities of ECOWAS organization in the task of intra-community trade facilitation?

[a] Very strongly pronounced [b] Barely noticeable [c] Weak [d] Very weak [e] Undecided

Q4. How do you also view the activities of the ECOWAS organization towards the general improvement of the life of West Africans?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Poor [e] Undecided

Q 5. How do you assess the involvement of other non-governmental organizations such as the Civil Society groups, Business or Labor groups etc. in intra-ECOWAS Trade promotion or facilitation?

[a] Very Adequately involved [b] Barely involved [c] Poorly involved [d] Not involved at all [e] Undecided.

Q 6. How would you evaluate the involvement of your country's 'Organized Private Sector' in the promotion of intra-community trade in the sub-region?

[a] Very adequately involved [b] Barely involved [c] Poorly involved [d] Very poorly involved [e]Undecided

Q 7. How do you assess the involvement of the general citizenry?

[a] Significantly high [b] Significant [c] Poor [d] Very poor [e] Undecided

Q 8. Historically it is said that West Africans have HAD an innate culture of integration, Do you agree ?

[a] Very Strongly agreed [b] Strongly agreed [c] Disagreed [d] Very strongly disagreed [e] Undecided.

Q 9. What is your assessment of ECOWAS economic and political information /mobilization programs in your country?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Inadequate [e] Very inadequate [e] Undecided

Q 10. How noticeable are ECOWAS programs or projects in your country?

[a] Abundantly noticeable [b] Noticeable [c]Barely noticeable [d] Not noticeable at all [e] Undecided

SECTION C :

SECURITY, GOVERNANCE/LEADERSHIP ISSUES:

Q 1 How do you assess the role and significance of good governance and leadership in promoting regional economic cohesion in West Africa?

[a] Very Significant [b] Barely significant [c] Insignificant [d] Very insignificant [e] Undecided

Q 2. How do you evaluate the role of security in shaping the growth or otherwise of cross-border trading in West African states of the ECOWAS?

[a] Of great value [b] Valuable [c] Barely valuable [d] Of no value at all [e] Undecided

Q 3. How do you view the role of political stability in shaping the growth or otherwise of cross-border trading in West African states of the ECOWAS?

[a] Of great value [b] Valuable [c] Barely valuable [d] Of no value at all [e] Undecided

Q 4. Incessant wars within and between West African states have strongly impeded on trade and economic development of the West African sub-region. Do you agree?

[a] Very strongly [b] Barely agreed [c]Strongly disagreed [d] Barely disagreed [e]Undecided

Q 5. How do you view or assess the impact of state/citizenship based crises like ethno-religious conflicts and political crisis in inhibiting the facilitation and growth of cross-border trade in the West African sub-region?

[a] Very greatly [b] Only fairly [c] Of no significant effect [d] Of no effect at all [e] Undecided

Q 6. What is your view of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] in terms of the following?

Tick as appropriate: [X] Very impressive. Impressive. Unimpressive. Poor

Peace and Stability Promotion [] [] [] []

Promotion of Good governance [] [] [] []

Disarmament of the populace [] [] [] []

Promotion of credible electoral
processes..... [] [] [] []

SECTION D:

TRADE RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS/PROCESSES : FINANCE, COMMERCE & INFRA-STRUCTURE ISSUES:

Q 1. How much do you agree with the assertion that a country's level of infrastructural development determines the success or otherwise of its trade and development?

[a] Very strongly agreed [b] Barely agreed [c] Strongly disagreed [d] Barely disagreed [e] Undecided

Q 2. In view of your position above how would you rate the state of transport infrastructure in the sub-region?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Very Poor [e] Undecided

Q 3. What is your assessment of the communication infrastructure in ECOWAS States?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Very poor [e] Undecided

Q 4. Similarly, how do you assess the state of ECOWAS Transport infrastructure?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Very poor [e] Undecided

Q 5. How strongly do you view joint development of facilities/infrastructure in the areas of transport, communication, and energy as vital to trade facilitation and development?

[a] Very strongly [b] Strongly [c] Unnecessary and of limited importance [d] Totally unnecessary [e] Undecided

Q 6. How visible are these joint facilities in the sub-region?

[a] Very strongly visible [b] Strongly visible [c] Barely visible [d] Totally invisible [e] Undecided

Q 7. Based on your practical experience, how would you assess Trade Documentation and Payment processes?

[a] Excellent [b] Very Good [c] Fairly Good [d] Poor [e] Undecided

Q 8. How do you assess Bank processes and payments within and between ECOWAS states.

[a] Excellent [b] Very Good [c] Fairly Good [d] Poor [e] Undecided

Q 9. How free do you and other West Africans move through the borders you are familiar with

[a] Very Freely [b] Fairly Freely [c] Highly Restricted [d] Undecided

Q 10. If you consider the issue of free movements of persons yet to be attained, how would you rate the following as factors responsible for the heavy border crossing restrictions in West Africa.

MARK 'X' to indicate your position:..... Very High. High. Limited

1. Corruption and corrupt practices amongst border officials:

2. The need to check cross-border crimes:.....:

3. The need to check illegal movement of arms.....:

Q 11. Based on your experience, how would you RANK the source of goods being traded more heavily between and amongst West African countries?

Tick as appropriate [X]: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th.

[a] European made/produced goods.....: [] [] [] [] [] []

[b] Made in Nigeria Goods: [] [] [] [] [] []

[c] Goods from other ECOWAS states.....: [] [] [] [] [] []

SECTION E:

NEO-COLONIAL ISSUES:

Q 1 . The existence of neo-colonial institutions like the Commonwealth of Nations, the West African Monetary Union [UEOMU] has inhibited cohesive trade facilitation and development in the West African sub-region. Do you agree?

[a] Very strongly [b] Barely agreed [c]Strongly disagreed [d] Barely disagreed [e]Undecided

Q 2. How do you view the effect of colonially originated languages such as English French and Portuguese on trade interaction and development in ECOWAS member states?

[a] Very negative [b] Just negative [c] Slightly negative [d] Of no effect at all [e] Undecided

RESEARCHER.

Appendix 2:

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESIDENTS/CITIZENS OF ECOWAS MEMBER NATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, SCHOLARS & EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION, INDIVIDUALS IN SUB-REGIONAL/NATIONAL TRADE RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS/ORGANIZATIONS.

SECTION A:

PERSONAL DATA:

Please Mark [X] As Appropriate.

Q 1 A. Your age as of last birthday

[a] 20 – 30 years [b] 31 – 40 years [c] 41 – 50 years [d] 51 – 60 years [e] 61 years and above.

Q 2 A. Sex ? MALE [] or FEMALE []

Q 3 A. Highest Qualification

[a] Primary School Leaving Certificate [b] Secondary School Certificate [c] Polytechnic or Monotechnic Cert. [d] University Degree Cert.

[e] Others [Pls. Specify]

Q 4 A. Nationality:.....

Q 5 A How fluent are you in any of the following foreign languages that are spoken in West Africa?

Tick as appropriate [X] Very Fluent. Fluent. Poor.

English: [] [] []

French [] [] []

Portuguese [] [] []

Q 6 A. If you are in business, which of the following best describes your line of business?

[a] Large Scale import/export Business [b] Small Scale Business/ merchandising/commercial trading [c] Manufacturing

[d] Semi-industrial Processing [e] Consulting/Services

OR Q 7 A. If you are a working professional, which of the following best describes your occupation, work or your professional group?

[a] Diplomat [b] Public Servant [c] Business Executive [d] International Public Servant [e] Scholar or Academic

SECTION B:

GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL & CITIZENS' MOBILIZATION ISSUES:

Q 1. How do you assess the promotional activities of ECOWAS/ Member-States institutions towards awakening the consciousness of their citizens towards sub-regional integration.

[a] Very strongly active [b] Barely active [c] Weak [d] Very weak [e] Undecided

Q 2. How do you evaluate the efforts of other ECOWAS states in this process re-orientating their nationals towards regional integration?

[a] Very strongly pronounced [b] Barely noticeable [c] Weak [d] Very weak [e] Undecided

Q 3. How do you also view the activities of the ECOWAS organization towards the general improvement of the life of West Africans?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [d] Poor [e] Undecided

Q 4. How do you assess the involvement of other non-governmental organizations such as the Civil Society groups, Business or Labor groups etc. in intra-ECOWAS Trade promotion?

[a] Very Adequately involved [b] Barely involved [c] Poorly involved [d] Not involved at all [d] Undecided.

Q 5. How would you evaluate the involvement of your country's 'Organized Private Sector' in the promotion of intra-community trade in the ECOWAS region?

[a] Very adequately involved [b] Barely involved [c] Poorly involved [d] Very poorly involved [e]Undecided

Q 6. How do you assess the involvement of the general citizenry?

[a] Significantly high [b] Significant [c] Poor [d] Very poor [e] Undecided

Q 8. What is your assessment of ECOWAS economic and political information /mobilization programs in your country?

[a] Very adequate [b] Adequate [c] Barely adequate [c] Inadequate [d] Very inadequate [e] Undecided

[a]Very Strongly agreed[b]Strongly agreed[c]Disagreed[d]Very strongly disagreed

[e] Undecided.

Q 9. How would you rank the following in terms of promoting the integration of West African societies?

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Common History and Ancestry	[]	[]	[]
Common Culture	[]	[]	[]
Inter-marriages	[]	[]	[]

Q 10. How noticeable are ECOWAS programs or projects in your immediate community or Country?

[a] Abundantly noticeable [b] Noticeable [c] Barely noticeable [d] Not noticeable at all [e] Undecided

SECTION C:

SECURITY, GOVERNANCE/LEADERSHIP ISSUES:

Q 1 . How do you assess the role and significance of good governance and leadership in promoting regional economic cohesion?

[a] Very Significant [b] Barely significant [c] Insignificant [d] Very insignificant [e] Undecided

Q 2. How do you evaluate the role of security in shaping the growth or otherwise of cross-border trading in West African states of the ECOWAS?

[a] Of great value [b] Valuable [c] Barely valuable [d] Of no value at all [e] Undecided

3. How do you evaluate the role of political stability in shaping the growth or otherwise of cross-border trading in West African states of the ECOWAS?

[a] Of great value [b] Valuable [c] Barely valuable [d] Of no value at all [e] Undecided

Q 4. Incessant wars within and between West African states have strongly impeded on trade and economic development of the West African sub-region. Do you agree?

[a] Very strongly [b] Barely agreed [c] Strongly disagreed [d] Barely disagreed [e] Undecided

Q 5. How do you view or assess the impact of state/citizenship based crises like ethno-religious conflicts and political crisis in inhibiting the facilitation and growth of cross-border trade in the West African sub-region?

[a] Very greatly [b] Only fairly [c] Of no significant effect [d] Of no effect at all [e] Undecided

Q 6. How do you view or assess the effect of inter-state Border disputes in inhibiting the facilitation and growth of cross-border trade in the West African sub-region?

[a] Very greatly [b] Only fairly [c] Of no significant effect [d] Of no effect at all [e] Undecided

SECTION D:

TRADE RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS/PROCESSES : FINANCE, COMMERCE & INFRA-STRUCTURE ISSUES:

Q 1. As a Community Citizen or Resident in one of the ECOWAS member-nations, how desirable do you think is CROSS-BORDER trade between West African states?

[a] Most desirable [b] Barely desirable [c] Not desirable [d] Undecided

Q 2. If you feel that West African trade is desirable, how do you score the following as desirable reasons for West African trade integration? [Mark as appropriate in the box provided, Pls. e.g. = [×]

Very high high low

Economic advancement of the general Sub-region	[]	[]	[]
Economic advancement of an individual nation or state	[]	[]	[]
Economic growth of border towns or cities	[]	[]	[]
Economic growth of traders or businessman/woman / investor[s]	[]	[]	[]

Q 3. How do you view the performance of the following governmental organizations in the Facilitation of West African CROSS-BORDER trading activities ?

CUSTOMS Organizations	Excellent []	Good []	Fair []	Poor []
IMMIGRATION Services	[]	[]	[]	[]
State Security Service [SSS]	[]	[]	[]	[]
The POLICE	[]	[]	[]	[]

Q 4. How do you view the integrative efficiency/effectiveness of other quasi-state SECURITY organs where they exist?

Excellent [] Good [] Fair [] Poor []

Q 5. How do you rate or score the following financial institutions in individual West African nations you know in the process of promoting Cross-Border economic activities?

	Excellent []	Fairly Good []	Poor []
Central Bank			

Commercial/Merchan t BANKS ECOBANK of W. Africa.			
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Q 6. Based on your experience, how would you RANK the source of goods being traded more heavily between and amongst West African countries?

Tick as appropriate [X]: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th.

[a] European made/produced goods.....: [] [] [] [] [] []

[b] American goods: [] [] [] [] [] []

[c] Made in Nigeria Goods: [] [] [] [] [] []

[d] Goods from other ECOWAS states.....: [] [] [] [] [] []

[e] Goods from other African states.....: [] [] [] [] [] []

SECTION E

NEO-COLONIAL ISSUES:

Q 1. The existence of neo-colonial institutions like the Commonwealth of Nations, the West African Monetary Union [UEOMU] has inhibited cohesive trade facilitation and development in the West African sub-region. Do you agree?

[a] Strongly Agreed [b] Barely agreed [c] Strongly disagreed [d] Barely disagreed [e] Undecided

Q 2. How do you view the effect of colonially originated languages such as English French and Portuguese on Citizens' interaction and development in ECOWAS member states?

[a] Very negative [b] Just negative [c] Slightly negative [d] Of no effect at all [e] Undecided

RESEARCHER

Appendix 3:

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SPECIALLY RECORGNISED PERSONS

INTRODUCTION: You are adjudged as one of the major promoters of ECOWAS as enshrined in its treaty of 1975 and the subsequent revised treaty signed by the 15/16 member organization referred to as the “Treaty of Lagos”. It is in line with this consideration, that the researcher deems it appropriate to interview you on the subject and would therefore appreciate your response on the following questions spelt out below:

[1] What would you say is your view on the “ECOWAS dream”, more so in view of the contemporary challenges the process has faced in the last two or three decades?

You are a citizen of one of the most outstanding nations of the ECOWAS. Having been aware of

the PROTOCOLS on free movement of persons -

[2] What would you say is your view on ECOWAS Citizenship and how do you assess the Community's success towards implementing the Protocols on "Free Movement of Persons"?

[3] The bureaucracy of the ECOWAS has been viewed in many different ways. What is your objective assessment of the ECOWAS bureaucracy in terms of its efficiency, more so in the area of trade and economic development?

[4] How do you assess the present setting of the ECOWAS infrastructure in general and do you see it as impacting on trade and economic development of the sub-region and how?

[5] The stability and security configuration of the individual states in the ECOWAS are both viewed as vital to West African unity. What is your view on stability and security as an important factors in West African cohesion and most importantly in the facilitation of TRADE and Economic DEVELOPMENT of the sub-region?

[6] Trade Liberalization Scheme [TLS] is generally viewed as a mere response to foreign manipulation. Do you share the same view, If so, WHY?

[7] Governmental institutions such as the Customs and Immigration Services are vital in trade facilitation. How do you assess the competence of these institutions with regards trade promotion?

[8] "The structure of the individual economies of West African states coupled with 'the protectionist tendencies' of a number of ECOWAS member-states, especially the 'Francophones', collectively hinders effective trade interaction in ECOWAS". How do you react to this assertion?

[9] In your view, how do you think we can promote effective trade interaction between members of the ECOWAS?

Researcher.

Appendix 4:
Convergence Criteria Achievement in ECOWAS States [2000-2008].

PRIMARY	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
CRITERIA									
Budget	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6
Deficit/GDP									
Inflation	11	10	10	10	9	9	8	7	9
Central	10	12	12	11	14	15	13	14	15
Bank Budget									
Deficit financing									
Gross	9	10	9	8	9	9	9	9	9
External Reserves									
SECONDARY									
CRITERIA									

Tax	1	0	1	0	2	2	2	3	3
Revenue/GDP									
Salary Mass/	5	7	6	8	6	7	7	8	8
Tax Revenue									
Public	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	7	7
Investment/									
Tax Revenue									
Positive Real	11	6	9	10	10	8	8	9	12
Interest Rates									
Real	15	13	14	8	12	12	12	13	14
Exchange Rate									
Stability									

Source: West African Monetary Agency, 2008.

APPENDIX 5:

• ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

SIXTEEN MEMBER STATES	POPULATION	AREA (SQ. MILES)
BENIN	6,005,117	43,475
BURKINA FASO	11,664,687	108,880
CAPE VERDE	486,027	1,557
COTE D'IVOIRE	16,631,710	124,500
GAMBIA	1,289,290	4,000
GHANA	19,328,740	91,843
GUINEA	9,051,128	94,925
GUINEA BISSAU	1,558,703	15,505
LIBERIA	2,889,600	43,000
MALI	10,158,274	439,186
MAURITANIA	2,478,437	419,230
NIGER	10,026,659	458,500
NIGERIA	107,584,111	327,186
SENEGAL	9,323,644	76,124
SIERRA LEONE	5,263,380	27,925
TOGO	4,725,590	21,853
ECOWAS	218,464,833	2,297,69

SOURCE: ECOWAS SECRETARIAT, 2000

