GENDER IDEOLOGY IN THE MASS MEDIA IN KANO

BY

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me and that it is a record of my own research work. It has not been submitted in any previous application for a research degree. All quotations are indicated and the sources of information are suitably acknowledged by means of references.

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APPENDIX

CERTIFICATION OF AWARD BY SENATE

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA

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WAS ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF THIS UNIVERSITY.

THE DATE OF AWARD IS

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DEDICATED

TO

WOMEN IN NIGERIA

(WIN)

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Abstract

The study considers gender ideologies presented in the mass media. Chapter 1 argues that ideologies are conditioned by social relations within modes of production but are relatively autonomous of them rather than reflexive. The dominant ideology of the socio-economic formation is that which represents the class and gender interests of the ruling group and which attempts to hegemonize tne ideologies of subordinate groups. In this process the mass media play an important role in propagating dominant ideology and delegitimating others. Specifically the media have a marked tendency to legitimise women's subordination.

The Nigerian mass media are discussed in the light of this theoretical framework, arguing that through overt control, cultural imperialism and apparently neutral media practices the media in Nigeria take part in the reinforcement and recreation of dominant class and gender ideologies. An analysis of the situation of Hausa women is also given.

The radio and television programmes preferred by women were structurally analysed in terms of gender ideologies. These programmes were found to underrepresent women and present them as subordinates to men and with negative characteristics. By so doing the mass media reinforce the subordinate aspect of women's subjectivity while ignoring and delegimating the other aspects, hence militating against the potential mobilisation of women as a social force.

In the course of the study more empirical evidence is provided which rebuts the liberal-pluralist theory of the mass media reflecting a diversity of viewpoints.

The study concludes that while ideological struggle is not a sufficient condition to eradicate oppression and exploitation it is a necessary corollary. More research needs to be done on the determination of gender ideologies in the media in order to consider how the media might reinforce the progressive rather than conservative elements of women's consciousness.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

Every society has patterns of distinguishing between the male and female sexes and ascribing to each various roles and values. This gender differentiation does not necessarily imply gender hierarchy, but in most societies differentiation has also resulted in hierarchy - specifically in the subordination of women - loosely referred to as the patriarchal system. In class societies systems of gender hierarchy have been articulated with relations of class exploration. Thus while in some respects women can be seen as a group vis a vis men, in other respects there are distinct differences between women of various classes and common interests of women and men in the same class.

These gender and class relations are built into the structures or mode of production of society. But they are also legitimated and reinforced by ideologies which form part of consciousness and subjectivity, and, which are propagated by institutions like religious movements, schools and the mass media of communication.

The role of ideology and ideological institutions in maintaining status quos or influencing change has received relatively little attention in the sociological literature generally. And in the case of contemporary African societies this paucity is even more glaring - particuiarly where gender ideologies are concerned.

In this study therefore the concern is to examine gender ideologies in the Nigerian mass media, focussing concretely on representations of Hausa women. A number of radio and television programmes directed at women are analysed to identify the images of women and gender ideologies portrayed. This analysis is carried out within the context of Hausa culture as it exists within the contemporary capitalist dominated socio-economic formation. By so doing the study also considers the role of the mass media in reinforcing or changing the situation of women in Nigeria.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

1.2.1. The Basis of Ideology

The starting point is the premise, established by Marx, that ideology and consciousness have a material base

> the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence but their social existence which determines their consciousness (Marx 1977a:20)

Consciousness is not due to a transhistorical mind, a la Hegel, free floating and independent from the material world. Rather particular forms of consciousness correspond to particular conditions of contrete life. Marx goes on to stress that consciousness is not only materially but also historically specific, when he stated that

> the fact is..... that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into definite political and social relations. Empirical observation

> must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification, the connection of the social and political structure with production (Marx 1965:41)

It is, however, on the nature of this connection that debate occurs. In The German Ideology Marx appears to see ideology as straight forward reflecting material needs. Thus ideology changes as the 'Basis' for it changes in an unproblematic fashion. Society is therefore conceived of as an expressive totality with the political, legal and ideological super-structure homologous to the economic base.

This notion of identity between base and superstructure has, however, been criticized as simplistic. Althusser (1977b), for example, argues that this is the result of a simple inversion of the Hegelian dialectic and emphasises that the concept of the social whole as of economic base ('foundation') and political/ideological superstructure (upper 'floors') is merely a spatial metaphor. He goes on to argue that Marx did not simply invert the Hegelian dialectic but overhauled the terms and the relations between them. The relation is not that of base-superstructure identity but a conception of particular relations between determinate instances in a base-superstructure complex of which the two ends of the chain are, determination in the last instance by economic relations, and the relative autonomy of the superstructure with their own specific effectivity. That is to say that the base determines the superstructures,

but the superstructures also have some reciprocatory action upon the base and upon each other. He therefore constructs a theorization of society as an ever pregiven complexly structured whole consisting of economic, political and ideological levels; each level has its own specificity but is also affected by other levels, i.e. levels are over-determined by each other, but the ultimate determination is exerted by the economic.

For example, one might conceive of a specific gender division of labour in early (pre-class) society forming the basis of production and reproduction relations (as among !Kung foragers where men hunt and gather and women gather and produce children, although these divisions are extremely flexible). The social consciousness of the convenience of these gender roles might begin to solidify into notions of the necessity of these specific gender-roles. This development of ideology, together with (for example) developments in technology to produce a surplus (tools and development of agriculture) or to enforce physical control (weapons) could lead to a situation in which women are restricted to domestic roles and men dominant in public ones (as among sedentarised horticultural !Kung- cf Draper 1975). Further progression of these types with interactions of the retention of the notion of desireability and necessity of male/female divisions on the one hand, and developments of means of production on the other hand, could then increase the complexity of the relations ofproduction and reproduction until we reach capitalism where pre-existing gender

divisions of labour have been incorporated into capitalist relations of production.

To summarise, the conditions of material life (i.e. of the production of the means of subsistence and mode of human and biological reproduction) at particular times and in particular places set out the limits within which determinate forms of social consciousness exist. But these forms of consciousness (or ideology) cannot be directly inferred by specifying the economic relations of production (or even by including the relations of reproduction). To extend the spatial base-superstructure metaphor we might see the material of the 'house' (human society) as constructed of semi-rigid foundations and rather more plastic 'walls' and 'roof'. The foundations (mode of production and reproduction) are more rigid because they are fundamental, without them the walls and roof (politics and ideology) cannot be built. But at the same time the house must have some form of walls and roof and the interplay between walls and roof (to return to the building metaphor, the stresses, strains, compression and tension between the walls and roof) may also affect the base as well as vice versa.

1.2.2. Ideology and Women

There has long been a debate over the appropriate mode of analysis of women in society. There are four main positions in the debate. The naturalist or socio-biological approach holds that women's position is a result of the natural biological division of labour (cf

Ardrey 1963, Sahlins 1977). The second sees women as subordinated by men through some form of universal sex oppression (Firestone 1971, Millet 1972). The third, the classical or orthodox Marxist argues that women's position is due to and derivable from class relations (cf Engels 1977, Bello 1985). While the fourth views women's positions as determined by the inter-relationships of gender hierarchies and class relations (cf Barret 1980, Beneria 1979).

I have argued elsewhere (imam 1982, 1985) that the first three are theoretically and empirically inadequate. Socio-biology posites a non-existent isomorphism of biology and culture, ignoring cross-cultural variations. The universal sex oppresion theory is over-general and a-historical. While classical Marxism reflects the specificity of women's positions. What concerns us here however are the implications of each for the analysis of the role of ideology.

The socio-biological thesis by equating culture with biology denies the role of ideology altogether - ignoring the fact that divisions of labour are maintained by social practices like socialisation and not by biology. By contrast, while pointing out the importance of consciousness and socialisation, universal sexual oppression theorists ascribe an overwhelming importance to the ideological - cultural distinctions between male and female - arguing that it is male definitions of women

which are internalised in consciousness and thus made real. But this begs the question of where this male definition came from, and, how and why they were able to enforce it. Without a historical materialist conception of the basis of ideology (as outlined above) the universal sex oppression analysis lapses into voluntarism on this issue, or reduces itself back into biological determinsm.

The orthodox Marxist position sees women's subordination as a secondary contradiction of class relations, benefitting the exploiting ruling class rather than men in general. While accepting that ideologies about gender reinforce class relations these ideologies are simply part of the false consciousness for which there is need in class exploitative societies. But if men derive no material benefit from women's subordination the "lagging behind" of sexist ideologies in socialist societies (for seventy years in the USSR) cannot be explained without abandoning a fundamental premise of Marxism - i.e. that social existence determines consciousness.

In order to avoid contradicting its own analysis of ideology (as well as to take account of the historical fact, pointed out by universal sex oppression theorists, that female subordination preceded class societies) Marxism must abandon the notion of gender subordination as an epiphenomenon of class relations, and pay attention to the ways in which gender relations form part of the general relations of production and reproduction. This is what those working under the rubric of socialist-

Feminism have been doing. The argument that women's (and men's) positions are defined by the inter-relationships of gender and class is congruent with the general principles of historical materialism as well as with the specific analysis of ideology as materially and historically specific, interacting with (though conditioned by) economic relations, and constituting itself as part of the subjective consciousness of men and women.

For example, Mernissi's (1975) account of the regulation of women's sexuality in pre-Islamic to Islamic Morocco argues that during a period of rapid socio-economic changes in which "a thriving mercantile economy was corroding the traditional tribal communalism" (Mernissi 1975:35) the ideology of Islam reduced women's freedom and enhanced male authority while shaping the legal and ideological history of Muslim family structure - the institution of the family being used to create new allegiances which provided both for the transmission of privatised resources (an essential feature of class societies) and for tight control over women.

Similiarly, the classical Marxist analysis depends on the fundamental contradiction between the proletarian and bourgeois classes. The sex of the proletarian or bourgeois is irrelevant to this abstract analysis. It is the relationship between these classes which forms the economic base of the mode of production: the proletarian selling labour power for a wage, and the bourgeois receiving in labour power not only the value of the wage but also

surplus value from which profit is derived. But in concrete analysis of any capitalist socio-economic formation it is clear that women (and not men) perform unpaid labour in domestic work and childcare, and, that as members of the labour force women occupy a gender distinct and inferior position to men even within the same class (cf Eisenstein 1979, Mackintosh 1982). Social ideologies about gender roles (i.e. that women's "natural function" - for which no pay is required - is to look after men and children, and, that women should depend on men for their sustenance) have been built into the economic relationships of production which make up the base of the base of the capitalist mode of production. That is "a model of women's dependence has become entrenched in the relations of production of capitalism, in the divisions of labour in wage-work, and between wage work and domestic labour"(Barrett 1980:249).

Thus Barrett points out that "many of the categories we call economic are constituted historically in ideological terms".(Barrett 1984:126) - a point similiar to that Marx made when referring to the "historical and moral" element of the wage. Gender ideology has influenced the material structuring of capitalist production relations, which serve to reinforce and maintain the ideology itself.

1.2.3. Dominant Ideology and Hegemony

Marx states that,

> the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx 1965:60)

These ideas are the dominant ideologies and are those which provide a way of 'living' the real relations of society (in Althusser's phraseology) such that it contributes to the maintainance of those relations In patriarchal societies this obviously includes also the maintainance of gender hierarchical relations. Ideologies in class society have a masking and displacing effect. Under capitalism production is even more socialized, but this is masked by 'experiencing' life as market relations. The relations of production are displaced (i.e. pushed aside) in ideology by relations of exchange. The masking also has a fragmenting effect. Social classes are presented as individual buyers or sellers of commodities, whether of labour or capital. Bourgeois idology then re-unites the fragments into a unity that does not threaten class relations, such as "the nation." Similiarly the real differences between women of different classes are displaced in an ideology of "womanhood" which focusses on the physical biological reproductive functions of women, which at the same time masks (by taking for granted) their social, political and economic subordination. It is not that ideology is totally false. In the above examples the market and market relations, and physical differences between men and women do exist. Ideology does have a referent - but this referent is only a part of what exists. Thus ideology produces a mis-recognition of the part for the whole (cf Hall 1979).

As Laclau (1979) points out while not every ideology can be reduced to a class ideology, all ideologies are overdetermined by class struggle. Consequently ideological

discourses are transformed "through class struggle which operates through the construction of the subject and the dis/articulation of discourses" (Laclau 1979:109). Thus, for example, all strands of feminist thought share in common the following definition: "the opinions and principles of advocates of the extended recognition of the achievements and claims of women" (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). This, of itself, cannot be regarded as bourgeois or working class. The same is true of feminist political demands for parity with men in terms of taxation, property rights, access to education, voting rights and so on. Yet in the context of an unequal society in which no all men are able to exercise these rights either, those groups, like the nineteenth century white American feminists who opposed extending suffrage to blacks, or the contemporary Nigerian National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS) who call upon poor Nigerians to further "tighten their belts", can be seen as overdetermined by bourgeois ideology. In contradistinction feminists who articulate the same demands mentioned above with a discourse which requires a restructuring of society such that these rights can be actively exercised by all women and men can be regarded as overdetermined by working class ideology. Thus one would expect to find in dominant ideologies that the discourses relating to gender relations would be articulated with (or at least compatible with) ideologies which mask and maintain class relations.

Gramsci developed the concept of dominant ideology [illegible] theorization of hegemony (1978). By this he refers

to the process whereby dominant ideology functions to maintain class domination. The extended reproduction of class relations requires that the ruling class does not continually rule directly through physical force. The consent of the subordinate classes to their own domination must be won. Hegemony is that process whereby the 'historical bloc' (the alliance of ruling class fractions) directs the ideology of subaltern groups as well as their economic practices, without having to rely on physical co-ercion, although this is always held in reserve to be used when necessary. It is the establishment of hegemony which explains why slave revolts, agrarian revolts, women's or black liberation movements strikes and revolutions are not constantly engaged in - why there is so much apathy and resignation to the social order.

It is not simply that the ruling bloc controls the means of mental and material production. Thus oppositional ideologies must be negated or contained. The achievement of hegemony is neither given nor fixed - it is a constant process or work out, hence the need to hold physical force in reserve for use when people no longer acquiesce quietly. Ideology is not a monolithic bloc, but can be conceived of as sets or strands of ideas (ideological elements) which are woven together to form a composite picture (discourse) (see Barthes 1973).

Subordinate classes have their own lived reality, but dominant ideologies attempt to fill out these discourses so as to incorporate them within a hegemonic framework. Thus, for example, the evident disparity between the life

styles and opportunities of the peasantry and working class on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie on the other, are recognised certainly. But this recognition is taken usually into the framework of fate (ikon Allah - God's will or power) as opposed to articulated with a generalised desire for reform/revolution. It is only when there is a failure to establish the former as the hegemonic framework and there are demands for change that overt force is used - and even then there are attempts at ideological justification (appeals to the need for law and order, for example).

In periods of hegemony the contradictions of the socio-economic formation can be neutralized in its ideological discourses, through the resolution of the contradictions in ideological discourse tending to rest on the purely implicit mechanisms of its unity. Thus, for example, the interpellation of women as passive dependents relying on male bread winners may co-exist with women actually making active and substantial contributions to household maintenance without the social agents living them as incompatible. In periods of generalized crisis, however, the function of ideology in constituting subjects breaks down (e.g. the contradictions between expressed dependence and the necessity for women to make their own living come sharply to the fore). And this may be expressed as generalised 'identity crises' as in the case of women in Lesotho whose husbands work in South Africa (cf Gordon 1981).

In his attempt to explain the reproduction of social (especially ideological) relations, Althusser draws heavily on Gramsci's work. In his essay on "Ideological State

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Apparatuses" (ISAs) Althusser (1977a) sees ideology not simply as values and symbols. Ideologies are "lived" realities, they are "the representations of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence," i.e. ideologies are the ways in which people represent to themselves (imagine/experience) the real conditions in which they live. But they are material. They are inscribed in practices and in institutions, particularly the ISAs. The ISAs are the institutions through which hegemony is exercised and reproduced. In contradistinction to the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs) like the police or the army, the ISAs exist in a plurality of forms including schools, the family, religious institutions, the mass media, trades unions and so on. Their unity is in the role they play in the necessary reproduction of the social relations of production. Althusser sees the school system as the major ISA through which ideologies are reproduced and hegemony is exercised. In this study however we are concerned with the role of the mass media of communication in reproducing ideologies and establishing hegemony.

1.2.4. The Mass Media and Ideology

One theory of the media that has great influence are the liberal-pluralist theses. According to liberal-pluralists other than in the special cases of authoritarian regimes or countries with low levels of political and economic development (which will be dealt with later) the media simply provide a mirror to society and represent fairly the diversity of viewpoints in society, thereby enabling them to act as a watchdog for society against

government, (see for example Schramm 1955, Siebert 1976, Hachten 1971). These basic theses are both theoretically and empirically inadequate.

Since ideology has been defined as 'lived' relations, it follows that all representations are constructed in ideology - the question is which? For the second thesis since each socio-economic formation has a set of dominant ideological discourses logically these will be represented dominantly in the mass media.

Empirical rebuttals of these thesis are also easy to demonstrate. A mirror reflects each and every item before it alike - but even the most cursory inspection of the media goods shows that there is structuring and selection .... of the thousands of events that occur everyday, only a few will ever make the news. Similiarly in capitalist, patriarchal, racist USA, the views of (say) a black socialist feminist get very short shrift.

We can therefore turn to more adequate theorizations of the relationship between media, ideology and hegemony. The analyses discussed below all accept that the media portray dominant ideology, and thus contributes to hegemony. They differ, however, over the mode through which media products come to be constructed within dominant ideology and therefore also over whether the media simply reinforce the dominance of this ideology, or play a part also in the construction of hegemony.

For Murdock and Golding the obvious starting point for an analysis of the mass media is "the recognition that

the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organisations that produce and distribute commodities" (Murdock and Golding 1977:25). The primary task of mass media organisations is thus profit maximization. Media companies are integrated through reciprocal investments and shareholding with other commercial enterprises. The central role of advertising, both for funds for the media and in promoting the realisation of surplus value in general, is an index of the important linkage of the media and capitalist economy.

Thus they see the ideological role of the media as merely a secondary aspect of the media. They note that the media produce cultural goods which draw on a very limited ideological range and relate this to the conditions of their production. In other words, Murdock and Golding argue that the media only articulate already legitimated values - reinforcing but playing no part in the construction of hegemony.

Their position implies what Connel has referred to as a "tight and necessary correspondence between market forces and decisions on the one hand, and the nature of the media's ideological output on the other" (Connel 1979: 71). In a recent article Golding and Murdock have denied this accusation. However, in the same article in a discussion of the transformation of 'political' press to popular press, they state that

> the major change is in the economic base of the press ... advertising gradually replaces sales to a greater or lesser extent as a source of revenue .. The journalistic consequences of this process are important. The search for readers draws papers away from a strident factionalism and towards a central neutrality of comparative inoffensiveness (Golding and Murdock 1979:215).

Here they have clearly demonstrated that they see a tight relationship between market forces and ideological output. While this aspect is obviously a feature of ideological determinations in the media it is not the sole determinant. In this case they have assumed that advertisers are willing to use any press of whatever initial ideological leaning - which is not the case. Advertising can only replace sales to the extent that people (generally capitalists) are willing to advertise in a particular paper - that is are 'sympatico' with a particular paper - which is not frequent in the case of an overtly leftwing or feminist paper. They have also ignored the fact that with party-based press it may be that the ideological leanings of the paper determine the funding and not vice versa. Also, as Connel points out media products are not constructed only in terms of cost-profit, "but also, and moreover, in the first instance, with reference to the criteria of communicative efficacy" (Connel 1979:72).

Murdock and Golding's view that the ideological role of the media is a secondary factor is also incorrect. While they criticize Smythe for basing his analysis on private business media in the USA, and Hall for concentrating on state controlled media, they fail to take account

of the fact that ideological output (regardless of varieties of style) of these forms of organisation of media have a similiarity which goes beyond any similiarity in the conditions of production of each. As Ibrahim says the ideological role of the media is so important that "even when it is not profitable for firms to engage in media production, the state, in the interest of the ruling class, is obliged to take it up" (Ibrahim 1983:57).

The most fundamental objection to Murdock and Golding's account, must be directed at the notion of ideology and class struggle that is implicit in it. If the media almost inevitably portray dominant ideology and there is no space for oppositional ideologies, it means that dominant ideology is seen as being without contradictions, and that a total hegemony has been exercised, without any ideological labour having taken place.

The foregoing analysis of ideology has shown that "the values and assumptions which are most familiar and most widely legitimated" are not that way automatically: values and assumptions are not simply reflections of the economic base; the ideology which is dominant is not a seamless monolith but consists of different ideological elements articulated together in a 'teethgritting' harmony; hegemony is not given but requires great effort on the part of those in state power to attempt to establish it. But in stating that the values propagated by the media "almost inevitably tend to be those which flow authoritatively downward through the social structure" Murdock and Golding ignore these complex issues which are raised by

an analysis of ideology. Their analysis thus reverts to the simplistic reductionist notion of ideology which has already been criticised, that ideologies and thus the ideological content of the media can be deduced from the economic as class struggle exists only at that level. The ideological level, including the media, thus merely reflects class struggle and is not part of it. Hegemony is for them total, ignoring all the advances that Gramsci made.

A slightly different view of the relationship between ideology, media and hegemony is presented by Jibrin Ibrahim. In contrast to Althusser, Ibrahim sees not the school, but the media, as the dominant ideological state apparatus, if only in terms of the sheer number of hours of exposure. He refers to the media as "monopoly capital's ideology tutor." He therefore agrees that Murdock and Golding are incorrect to see the media's ideological role as secondary, as this would imply that capitalist relations can be maintained without ideology, "reproducing ideology is a necessary task for capitalism and the media is primary in this role (so) the ideological role of the media is primary" (Ibrahim 1983: 57). He also agrees that the ideological state apparatuses are areas of combat over the building of hegemony and the propagation of "counter-hegemony."

However an examination of his empirical analysis shows that despite the foregoing statements, his concepts of ideology, hegemony and class struggle are not totally adequate. His method of analysis is to specify the class or

class fractions in ownership or control of media organisations, and relate media representations to the interest of these classes at each economic period. Hence he states, for example, that Iwe Irohin represented

> the direct requirements of capitalism moving and transforming from its phase of primitive accumulation into competitive capital, in preparation for the concentration of capital, the merger of industrial and bank capital, and the territorial division of the world, characteristic of its monopoly phase (Ibrahim 1983: 70-71)

And that

> the mass media in Nigeria is understood to have emerged and grew to carry out the ideological propagation that imperialism in the various phases of its development in the country has required (Ibrahim 1980:29)

Furthermore not only does any difference in ideological content stem directly from the economic situations of the groups involved but this difference is more apparent than real. Hence,

> there are certain contradictions which revolve mainly on how well some are accumulating in relation to others. It is essentially the combination of these interests and contradictions which explain the dynamics of the Nigerian media. It must be noted however, that the identity of interests is more primary than the contradictions within them (Ibrahim 1982:12).

Ibrahim's concept of ideology thus emerges as a sophisticated economism, whereby ideological terrains are direct reflections of differentiations of class fractions at the economic level. Despite his formal insistence that the ideological field is an area of combat, in fact, for him, it merely reflects the conflicts at the economic level.

It is not in his analysis, the realm whereby people become conscious of conflict and fight it out.

A third, and more adequate theorisation of the relationships between mass media, ideology and hegemony, which utilises the insights developed in the earlier discussion of ideology and hegemony, can be found in the work of Stuart Hall (1979, 1980, 1981a, 1981b). Hall's brief is that the mass media contribute to the maintenance and reconstruction of ideological hegemony by providing interpretive frameworks within which to understand the world. These frameworks delegitimate and/or suppress other ways of seeing the world by setting out areas of concensus, toleration and dissensus. They are effected through apparently neutral mass media techniques, conventions and practices which however produce certain ideological effects, i.e. a one-sided accentuation of reality that functions to promote the existing order of society and away from radical change. Important features are the accepted objectives of "balance" and "objectivity" which, precisely because of the lack of overt control, gives media representations in general the appearance of freeness and fairness which is crucial to their effectiveness in hegemonizing their audience.

In the selection of events to be represented in the news for instance there are certain widely accepted criteria as to what makes news. This explains why worldwide the same types of events are likely to be taken up by journalists as significant and worth reporting upon. These criteria, listed by Galtung and Ruge (1981) include immediacy,

personification, actuality, elitism, conflicts, unexpectedness and consonance. These news values are considered to be neutral vis a vis any particular ideological position but are not.

The criteria of immediacy and actuality requires that events which take place where/when journalists are not present are less likely to be reported (all other factors being equal). And since journalists are concentrated in large cities and centres of power there is little reportage on rural events or those of the powerless. Furthermore processes and structures receive little attention. Industrial disputes, for example, are seldom covered unless a strike is in the offing (or more frequently actually taking place) - implying that workers are unreasonable and impatient. The process whereby capitalist production relations daily remove surplus value from workers and convert it into profit is not mentioned.

Personification gives rise to elite, male and superficial treatment of issues. The opinions and speeches of those defined as prominent are given greater space so that their viewpoint comes to define situations in the public's mind. (It is a marked feature of Nigerian news that so much of it consists of reporting - often verbatim - the speeches of those in power). Even in reporting events the media use the opinions of such people as the primary definers and gives their interpretations more weight in establishing the significance of events. Thus, for example, the media coverage of the 1981 Bakolori peasant

uprising gave far more consideration to the statements of the State Governor, the Head of State, the police and spokespeople for the Italian construction firm, than it did to the views of the farmers themselves or the issues at the base of the uprising. Another feature of personification is that social criticisms are rejected not so much through evaluations of the analyses but through criticisms of the persons or organisations presenting them, hence delegitimising and trivialising oppositional viewpoints. Similiarly the personification of reports on cocaine smuggling, by concentrating on incidental features of some of those caught (i.e. their gender), has far outweighed any consideration of why cocaine smuggling occurs and appears to be on the increase.

The criterion of the consequences of events is also not operated neutrally, but in terms of the interest of the dominant group. Violence in religious disputes poses a potential threat to those in state power, and is given media space accordingly. But the everyday use of religion to justify and effect women's subordination (see, for example, Kabir 1985, Imam 1986c) is featured very little in the mass media.

Unexpectedness and consonance are also criteria which govern the selection of news. The atypical events makes news. Nonetheless the completely unexpected would be incomprehensible - Galtung and Ruge point out that "news is olds". To be able to present events as both unexpected and consonant with what is already known, Hall argues that the media go through a process of selection, distortion

and replication. To take the coverage of cocaine smuggling as an example the process is like this. A phenomenon is selected (cocaine smuggling). Certain features of it are accentuated, hence distorting the overall situation - the gender factor is emphasised, and related to previously existing ideological themes like the increase of women in crime as a consequence of women's liberation struggles or the peculiar responsibility of women to be more chaste and virtuous than men, even though more men have been arrested and convicted for drug dealing than have women. (For example, one article on the phenomenon led off with the execution of three men for smuggling and did not mention women at all - but used as its illustration a photograph of an untried woman suspect larger than the text of the story itself - Sunday Triumph May 26, 1985). These reports are then replicated with similiar instances until interest in the phenomenon dies down.

A further feature of mass media convention which serves to lesson the weight of analyses which do focus on social criticism or process and structure is the distinction made between 'fact' and 'opinion'. Where this type of oppositional content occurs in mass media thay are clearly presented as opinion in editorial, opinion columns or discussion programmes, and as such not to be accepted in the same unquestioning way as news which is "authoritative objective fact". But this distinction is not valid. As shown above the criteria that define and select items for news are not "objective" and neutral either.

The mass media's contribution to the establishment of hegemony is not however only at the level of reflecting and reinforcing dominant ideology. Through the same mode of practice, and in particular by giving weight to selected prominent people, they also take part in ideological work the reworking and shifting of terrains in discourse. Thus since the early 1980s when official pronouncements about the buoyancy of the economy began to conflict more and more with actual experience the ideological terrain about the economy has been reworked several times. It has moved from accusations of scaremongering, to placing blame on the corruptness of the Shagari regime, then shifting blame to the 'indiscipline' of the Nigerian people, through a debate over whether to take a loan from the International Monetary Fund, to an optimistic unspecified future date of a strong economy to be achieved through the workings of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market. These shifts cannot be related in any direct way to changes in the economic relations of production. The workings of ideology can be seen here to be relatively autonomous from the economic base. The ideological terrains have had to shift in order to attempt to continue to interpellate the masses, to get them to continue to acquiesce to non-fundamental changes in society. These shifts are conducted not at the level of the economic but at the level of ideology and politics, mediated via mass communication.

So far the consideration of media content has focussed on the production and content of news, and to a lesser extent current affairs, rather than entertainment. Far less attent-

ion has been paid to the ideological content of entertainment by media analysts although this category forms the bulk of media products. This is a serious omission, and not only because of the sheer amount of exposure. Many people, and in particular children and adolescents (i.e. those still in their formative stages and most susceptible to media influence) tend not to be among news and current affairs audiences. In addition, much news content does not affect people's daily lives - but entertainment features far more characters in home and work situations who can be used as models to identify with.

Entertainment programmes, like news and current affairs, accept the basic structure of capitalist societies. Their drama resides in resolving conflicts within the assumptions provided by this framework (see Hall 1980, Cohen and Young 1981). Programmes like the British series The Professionals, for example, take for granted the maintenance of the present structures of law and order as a goal. They then go on to sanction the use of (a certain level of) violence by state agents, even in contravention of the state's civil rights regulations, in pursuance of this goal - often presenting this not merely as a fight against crime but against communist plots and agitators. The USA programmes Dallas and Dynasty or the British The Prince Foundation all focus on conflicts in the domestic and working lives of members of the bourgeoisie without questioning the social structures which have placed them at the top of the hierarchy, or the modes of exploitation through which they become rich and powerful. Programmes like Good Times, Mixed

Blessings (USA) or Love thy Neighbour (Britain) do not question racist structures in society, taking racism at the level of individual prejudices only. The British series Mind Your Language utilizes and treats derogatively sterectypes about other ethnic groups and incidentally British working class culture in favour of British middle class culture.

Thus both news and entertainment programmes in the mass media aid the maintenance of the status quo by presenting the present as a given, by accepting certain criticisms as legitimate, by closing off and delegitimating other types of criticism and options for future direction, and by not questioning the structures that produce the surface phenomena. Given that the status quo is capitalist dominated they do work towards the maintenance of capitalism. In addition it must be noted that certain of these ideological effects are particularly crucial for the existence of class exploitation and gender hierarchies in general. Accepting the present structures as given means accepting inequitable privileges and rewards (in a word, exploitation) as a necessary feature of societies. Not probing beyond the surface means that the workings of inequity are not exposed. It is through these features, as well as through overt control, and the economic conditions of production of media goods that one can refer to

> the tendency of the media - but it is a systematic tendency and not an incidental feature - to reproduce the ideological field of a society in such a way as to reproduce, also, its structure of dominance. (Hall 1979: 346 - his emphasis).

Cultural Imperialism: The necessity to import both hard and soft ware for mass communication brings into consideration another factor influencing communication and ideology in Nigeria - imperialism, and in particular cultural imperialism. In order to avoid confusion and debate over possible non-issues these terms will be defined as follows. Broadly speaking imperialism refers to the exploitation of its people. In the contemporary era of monopoly capitalism this exists in Nigeria through neo-colonialism - foreign exploitation indirectly through a local regime. Culture denotes the ways which are developed to fulfil the fundamental needs for survival, shelter and nourishment, (i.e. over time in fulfilling these needs peoples develop patterns of thought and behaviour which are passed on to succeeding generations, and which they modify to adapt to continuously changing circumstances). Culture thus is not static but its autonomous development depends on a people's ability to retain or develop their inherited culture and to reject, adopt or adapt elements of foreign culture. Clearly this depends then on a people's freedom to exercise these choices.

Cultural imperialism is the foreign penetration of a people's culture which facilitates exploitation by limiting the ideological and political options available to the dominated peoples to those favourable to the continued existence of imperialist relations. Cultural imperielism has two related components: the spread of an ideology and the promotion of the emulation of foreign cultural forms which substitute for and/or subvert indigenous forms.

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Nigeria as a colonial possession, and now a neo-colonial state has been and continues to be a prime target for cultural aggression, first by Britain and now increasingly from America (see Varis 1985). There is a wide range of vehicles through which cultural imperialism affects mass communication in Nigeria. One means already mentioned is through the importantion of the hard and soft ware necessary to operate mass communications system. As several media researchers have pointed out (see Garnham 1979, Mattelart 1979, Murdock and Golding 1979), because of the processes of concentration, and vertical and horizontal integration which are features of monopoly capitalism fewer and fewer large conglomerates have control of larger and larger sectors of cultural production.

The search for profit also leads to the standardisation of formulae for known commercial successes, like the American television series Dallas and Dynasty, both of which deal with the problems of a rich American family, and which invite role identification with them and thus an implicit acceptance of the unequal structures of capitalist societies, and of the gender roles portrayed therein. There may also be an aggressive marketing policy to sell such programmes (see Tunstal 1977) in order to ensure "exposure to the fundamental achievements of the US way of life" (Rockefeller quoted in Mattelart 1979:58). The dominance of foreign programmes in television is evident, particularly in the newer television stations. Egbon (1982) reports that the proportion of local programming in Nigeria (i.e. not

including news and current affairs) has risen from 20% to 45%. Put another way this means that after 26 years of television in Nigeria the majority of programmes are still foreign.

The picture worsens when the content of news in the Nigerian media is considered. According to Farounbi (reported in Ibadan 1983:95) "NTA relies on Visnews (a television news agency owned by Reuters, the British Broadcasting Corporation and United Press Incorporated) for 23.8% of its news bulletins." A large part of the news content in Nigeria is garnered by monitoring foreign radio stations like the BBC World Service, the Voice of America and Deutchewelle. This is not only for news of the West but also for the rest of Africa and the Third World, and sometimes even for news of Nigeria. Thus a large proportion of both programmes and news come directly from foreign sources.

In addition to actual imports of media products and reports, the question of what are the models and reference points for locally made media products must also be considered. The television serial Second Chance, for instance, is obviously modelled on the British serial Mind your Language. Similiarly the format for many Nigerian radio music shows are often (inferior) copies of Western music programmes and dominantly feature the commercially packaged Western "disco hits". Advertising particularly takes Western advertisements as the reference point, featuring Western middle and upper class life styles and values.

The Joygirl Soap advertisement is an extreme example, suggesting that success consists of shuttling between London, Paris and New York.

This latter point is effected largely through the training and socialisation of those who work in the media (see Golding 1979). Initially they were trained abroad. More recently training centres, like the Nigerian Institute of Journalism and the NTA training school in Jos, have been set up. These utilize foreign experts (or foreign trained experts) and training styles developed in the core capitalist countries.

After considering the scope of imperialist cultural penetration in Nigerian mass media the situation looks bleak indeed. However several points should not be forgotten in considering cultural imperialism. First, penetration is not uniform, as both Cabral (1973) and Mattelart (1979) point out, but occurs through privileged enclaves depending on place and time, and is most marked among the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Clearly in Nigeria, television with its predominantly elite audience is such an enclave.

Secondly, it is also important to note that the Third World are not simply passive recipients of cultural aggression. The role of "national culture" must also be considered, and the role of internal forces which ally with the imperialists. The local ruling elites can and do make choices which affect the attempts to penetrate. One could contrast the state policy in Tanzania where the decision was taken not to establish television until they can afford it and control

their production of programmes; with the March 1983 International Market for Television Programmes organised by the NTA in order to gain easier access to foreign products.

The Ideological Character of the Mass Media in Nigeria:
From the theoretical analysis presented earlier one would expect to find that, as a state governed by capitalism the Nigerian mass media would feature dominantly pro-capitalist ideology. Ibrahim's important study of political economy of mass media in Nigeria demonstrates convincingly that this is so. Concluding his content analysis of the press he states that

> the political and ideological character of Daily Times and New Nigerian are supportive of the ruling comprador bourgeoisie and consequently of imperialism. As part of this support, they also routinely attack all attempts by labouring people to fight for their rights. (Ibrahim 1983:207).

The large proportion of foreign sources of media content in Nigeria and the capitalist and sexist ideologies in them have already been mentioned. But even in terms of indigenous programming ideologicdl themes are worked into pro-capitalist discourses. The NTA (1970) decree aims (among other things) "to seek, identify and preserve Nigerian culture and to promote the study of Nigeria history and languages". In taking up this objective NTA largely screens songs and dances from various ethnic groups divorced from the socio-economic settings which gave them meaning (e.g.) harvest dances are shown without explaining that these were performed at redistributions of wealth within small communities, or the image of the "taking drum" is used although, as Ewu points out, "whereas

the audience ideally should have oeen actively involved in making the decisions on issues of public interest, the decisions are already made for them on Tambari" (Ewu 1936:89).

Further Cabral points out that

> culture, both as a cause and an effect of history, includes essential and secondary elements, strengths and weaknesses, merits and defects, positive and negative aspects, factors both for progress and stagnation or regressions, contradictions, conflicts (extract in Mattelart and Siegalub (eds) 1979:210)

and goes on to say it is necessary to analyse culture for what it is to retain the good and channel them. However very often when the media valorizes indigenous cultural traits it is those retrogressive elements which are com-patiole with the maintenance of exploitation and oppression, such as the ideal of the traditionally submissive women versus the independent women spoilt by western schooling, (see, for example, Tambari 'Ya 'yan Zamani episode - NTA Kaduna).

Ewu's analysis of television drama comes to a similiar conclusion about media content to that of Ibrahim's on the press i.e. that there is a strong pro-capitalist and pro-government stance to be found. Kasagi and Cockcrow at Dawn both extol 1 the virtues of the governments' "back-to-the-land" and Green Revolution policies - the former by port-raying the pitfalls of urban life for peasants and the latter by extolling the success of the retrenched urban worker who returns to his village to farm. Themes.£f

episodes of Tambari (a Hausa drama series) are those which are easily assimilable to capitalism, for example to respect the rich, father/husbands should strictly control their families while the poor cannot succeed in establishing their rights (in an episode on plot allocation). Similiarly Samanja, a programme on the army, extolls the virtues of a (sub) society in which each person knows their place in the hierarchy and sticks to it, and so on, Ewu concludes that

> the primary function of Nigerian television drama as a socialising agent is to reinforce, foster and disseminate the values of the ruling class. The plays 'universalise' the dominant institutions and ways of life by explaining, justifying and propping up the status quo (Ewu 1986b:152).

Despite Nigeria's claims to having the freest press in Africa there is a high level of overt control and manipulation in the media in Nigeria. There are a number of restrictive statutes and decrees (ranging from the 1903 Press Ordinance Act, the 1909 Seditious Offences Act, the 1964 Newspaper Amendment Act, Decree No. 56 of the 1960-66 military administration, the 1976 Newspaper Publishing Official Reporting Act, and the now repealed Decree no. 4 of 1984) which have been used to control and intimidate media workers (see Akinfeleye 1983). Uyo's (1977) study shows how the NBC suppressed many issues on its News in Full during the Gowon era and beyond. Ibrahim (1980) refers to the way in which the federally controlled NTA refused to report on the meetings of the "Twelve Governors" while their state owned television and radio stations took

every opportunity to attack the party in central state power. Ewu discusses the struggles over the content of television drama between the administration and producers on the one hand, and between producers and playwrights on the other hand, concluding that television

> is firmly under the control of the state which dictates and censors the type of plays produced. This is in addition to the self-censorship which most television drama producers bring to bear in the plays chosen for transmission (Ewu 1986b: 152).

Liberal-pluralists have argued that high levels of media control are due to the authoritarian nature of political authority, such as military regimes (cf Siebert et al: 1976, Wilcox 1975) but Akinfeleye (1983) shows that the enactment and use of restrictive decrees have shown similiar patterns under colonial, Nigerian civilian and Nigerian military governments. Liberal-pluralists have argued that it is due to Nigeria's low level of socio-economic development (cf Akinfeleye 1983), but the present author has argued elsewhere (Imam 1986a, 1986d) that rather state control is a characteristic feature in any socio-economic formations when the state of hegemony is precarious as, for example, in the USA over news relating to US involvement in Vietnam.

While not denying the control of media by pro-capitalist forces in Nigeria it must also be recognised that the signifying practices used in the media themselves play an important part in producing and frameworking conservative ideological disourses. For example, Idemili (1984) discussing the determinants of news reporting in Nigeria gives a

similiar list of news values to that of Galtung and Ruge consisting of timeliness, proximity of geography and interest, consequence of events in magnitude and significance, prominence of people and places, and human interest (including age, sex, conflict and so on). To reiterate briefly while these criteria are assumed to be neutral vis a vis any ideological or class position they are not, but are inflected in terms of reinforcing the status quo.

Ewu makes a similiar point about the forms of television drama. She points out that the narrative structure of the television drama with their parade of stock characters, each episode with its own moral, the melodramatic polarisation of extremes all conform to a conflict/resolution model which imply that all problems can be solved within the existing structure of society. Thus she agrees that it is not sufficient for

> the revolutionary dramatist to change the content and message of his (sic) drama while retaining its traditional form. The old bottles could not simply be filled with new wine, for the bottles themselves were defective (Etherton and Crow 1980 quoted in Ewu 1986b:154).

The ideological character of the mass media in Nigeria then is established by a combination of overt control by capitalist classes via state control and the mode of media practices themselves. In demonstrating that the media are dominantly conservative and capitalist, the basis has been laid to detail the presentation of images of women and gender ideologies in the mass media.

1.2.5. Gender Ideologies and the Mass Media

The subordination of women worldwide (economic, political and social) has been extensively documented (cf for a few examples, Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974, Reiter 1975, Young et al 1981, UN 1980, UNFPA 1983, New Internationalist 1985). This one would expect from the analysis above that the dominant ideologies regarding women would justify and hide women's subordination: seeing women's inferior position as a natural and desireable part of society - and that these ideologies would be dominant in the mass media. Analyses of the media studies worldwide confirm this - although most studies of women and the mass media are of North America and Europe, the few studies from Asia, Latin America and Africa show evidence of the same patterns (1).

These studies provide further empirical refutations of the liberal-pluralist thesis that the media simply reflect social reality - there is a distinct difference between media presentations of women and men, and objective demographic fact. For example, although women form at least 50% of the population, in both news and entertainment women are grossly under-represented. A few examples should suffice to prove this point; in primetime television drama in the USA in 1952 32% of characters wree female, by 1973 this had fallen to 26% (see Tuchman 1981); in Egyptian television drama women constituted 30% of characters (Abdel Kader 1983); in Botswana between 1983-84 only 3.5% of newspaper space was occupied by women in Lebanese newspapers between 1935-1975 (see Gallagher 1979).

As in other parts of the world women are under-represented in the Nigerian mass media. Akpan's (1979) analysis of men and women in the press found in a case-study of Daily Times and New Nigerian that in the former women receive just 10% of coverage, while in the latter the situation was even worse with 3%. Furthermore on analysing the role categories she revealed that 33% of women in Daily Times and 50% in New Nigerian appeared as wives of men in the news. Hence women represented in the press in their own right can be estimated at approximately 7% and 1.5% respectively.

The lack of coverage of women in the mass media, out of all proportion to women's actual existence, frameworks the message that women are not socially important. As Tuchman puts it

> we may say that 'representation in the fiction world', such as the 1950s ideal family, symbolises or 'signifies social existence'; that is representation in the mass media announces to audience members that this kind of family (or social characteristic) is valued and approved.
>
> Conversely, we may say that either condemnation, trivialisation or 'absence' means symbolic annihilation' (Tuchman 1981:169).

It is not only "absence" or under-representation that is significant in women's symbolic annihilation. When women and gender ideologies are represented in the media they are framed in such a way as to imply that these are the appropriate ways in which to understand women. Butcher points out that

> images of women are the end-product of media and social practices. But the contribution of media practices: to do with the techniques of camera and lighting, the representation of three dimensions in two, as well as the kind of programme or article - news, documentary, fiction, adverts - structures images in such a way that there is a preferred signification. There is a transparency in the media images which no individual, individuals who are primarily living out a history and only secondarily signifying what their actions are about, can ever have. The media image is complexly structured, but whether verbal or visual is still simpler than 'real life': we have to understand and read it in a particular way, (Butcher 1981:318, her emphasis).

These particular ways comprise a limited number of stereotypes, characteristics and ideologies about gender relations: women are shown primarily as domestic; they are defined in (subordinate) relation to men; presented as either sex objects or asexual beings; shown most often as incompetant, backward, deceitful, deferent and trivial. Again a few examples of each should serve to make the point.

The Domestic setting of Women: Women are almost always portrayed within the household as wives and/or mothers. Although in the USA in 1973 more than half the female population between the ages of 18-64 were in the labour force, 72% of women portrayed in advertisements were shown in domestic roles, compared to 46% for men. Furthermore the 28% of occupationally portrayed women were seldom actually shown at work (see Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979). Clearly women's gender specific roles of wife and mother are promoted as more important than any other women may have.

This is underscored by a study of television violence in the U.S.A. which revealed single women were more likely to be victims of television violence than married women, and working women were more likely to be portrayed as villains than housewives (Gerbner 1972 reported in Tuchman 1981). Again this signifies approval of married women and housewives and disapproval of single and working women.

Worldwide parenthood is more frequently associated in the media with women than with men (see Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979, Tuchman 1981). Women's marital statuses are more frequently defined than those of men and they are more often shown as married than are men. Thus twothirds of female characters in USA television are, were, are about to be married while the majority of male characters are, were and will continue to be single (Tuchman 1981). Even when women are reported in the news irrelevant details as to their marital status and number of children are reported but not so for men (Gallagher 1979). Hence the media define being a spouse and parent as important for women but not so for men - reinforcing gender ideologies about the centrality to women of the roles of wife and mother.

Sexuality: In terms of sexuality the media presents women as either sex-objects for men, or asexual beings. The presentation of women as a waiting sexual vessel available or potentially available to men and of the fragmentation of parts of women's bodies to signify sexuality in advertising especially has been extensively analysed (see Millum 1975, Butcher 1981). This phenomenon of using women and sexuality as 'bait' has been extensively documented in

places as diverse as Ghana, Norway, the U.S.A., India, the Philippines and the U.K. (see Gallagher 1979).

As dramatic characters women are portrayed on a dichotomy between the sexually active villain ('whore') or the asexual good woman ('virgin' or 'madonna'). The 'whore-madonna' dichotomy may be inflected in a number of different ways: the seductive mistress eventually abandoned by the man, the glamour girl who incites to crime, the 'light relief' in (e.g. James Bond) adventure and action drama; or, the abandoned wife who sacrifices herself for the children, the sister or daughter who looks after her brothers or parents and so on (see Gallagher 1979).

These media images of female sexuality reveal an inability to cope with women's real sexuality - the alluring and inviting sex object for men in advertising, the passive asexual "good" woman, and the active but bad whore in media ideologies about sexuality leave no room to portray strong, independent, conscious women with sexual desires. As one analysis of film puts it

> woman roles in American cinema are increasingly trivialised, and woman is progressively relegated to sex-object. Films focus primarily on clincial, emotionless, detached and alienated sex. Actually the idea of sexuality seems less and less related to woman. Instead eroticism is linked with violence and female sexuality is equated with psychopathy (rosen 1973:337-338, reported in Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979:28).

Psychological Characteristics: Overwhelmingly women are presented in the mass media as weak, passive, submissive, deceitful and incompetent. Gallagher, reporting on detailed studies from Asia, North America, Europe and Latin America

investigating the psychological characteristics attributed to women in the mass media states that "consistent findings are that passivity and emotional dependence are rewarded in women while in general, characteristics that are defined as 'good' in men - decisiveness, independence, forcefulness, tenacity - are defined as 'bad' in women (Gallagher 1979:11). In the mass media "women are actually rewarded for ineffectuality, rather than to actually controlling their own lives" (Gallagher 1979:12).

Considering several studies of television drama in the USA. Ceulemans and Fauconnier (1979) note that women are portrayed as more passive than are men, more likely to leave problem-solving to others, absent from adventure and action stories or characterised as helpless victims in need of male protection and rescue, and dependent on men for financial, economic and psychological support. It has also been pointed out that "those few working women included in television plots are symbolocally denigrated by being portrayed as incompetent or as inferior to male workers" (Tuchman 1981:172) - female police have to be rescued from dire situations by their male colleagues, women doctors write case files while male doctors operate, women lawyers prepare briefs while male lawyers argue in court, women need to ask advice which men give and so on.

These stereotyped negative characteristics of media images of women inflect yet another aspect of dominant gender ideology - that women are somehow simple and nearer to nature than are men who are civilised. The media signifies that women should be concerned with their looks, faces and bodies,

and leave pursuits requiring the development of skills or the use of reasoning to men who will guide them. As Gallagher concludes "the dizzy ultra-feminine bird-brain is an image to which women, men and children are continually exposed: better to be wide-eyed and pretty than a forceful bluestocking" (1979:15).

Trivialisation of Women: Some aspects of mass media trivialisation of women have already been touched upon. Women are rendered unimportant and insignificant through sheer under-representation. Women are made to seem inane and futile via the negative characteristics associated with them in the media. But perhaps trivialisation of women and gender issues can be most starkly shown in the treatment of women's movements and struggles for women's rights.

Analyses from all parts of the world agree that the increasing strength of movements for women's rights has resulted in increased coverage in the media of these issues (Gallagher 1979, Tuchman 1981) though to different degrees - more in the west than in the Third World (Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979). However they also agree that nonetheless coverage is still relatively sparse. Furthermore while the issues now have to be mentioned the mode of coverage is frequently derisory and frameworked so as to prefer particular interpretations of women's struggles and delegitimate others. Hence the International Women's Tribune Centre (IWTC) asks "why when women organise are our effirts seen as inane, ridiculous, nonsensical?" citing as examples the following newspaper headlines on international women's conferences....

Feminists Fight At Meeting (The Daily Telegraph Australia, June 17, 1975)

Feminists Scream Insults At Meeting (Canberra Times, Australia, June 30, 1975)

Mum's The Word As the Big Yak-yak Begins (Sydney Morning Herald, Australia, June 30, 1975)

Conference Women Scuffle With Police (New York Times, July 19, 1980)

UN Women's Meeting Snarled in Politics (Christian Science Monitor), August 1, 1980)

A Discordant Conclusion For Women's Conference (New York Times, August 1 1980)

(quoted from IWTC first quarter 1981:6)

The term 'women's liberation' is trivialised by applying it incorrectly to all spheres of women's activities other than homemaking or equating it with sexual promiscuity, (see Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979). As well as focussing on conflicts (as in the headlines cited above) the media helps to fuel conflict by creating movement and anti-movement 'stars'. Further the media's ambivalence towards the issue of gender rights is also reflected in the types of photographs it publishes: photographs of anti-movement people are generally gentle and flattering, and those of pro-movement women are strident and harsh - further reinforcing the ideology that women should be judged by their views and actions (Barr 1977). Thus the media's treatment of attempts to legitimate gender struggles and make women a significant force itself delegitimates the struggle by trivialising it.

Again as in other parts of the world female images in the mass media in Nigeria are presented within a narrow range of stereotypes, noted in a recent overview of images

of women in the media as follows: the mother of the nation - the guardian of the nation's morality bringing up her children well; the 'supporter' - behind every successful (sic) man is a woman"; the 'temptress' - to whom is attributed evil whether directly or as a source of corrupting men; and the 'exception' (WIN 1985 : 108-109). The 'mother of the nation' and 'supporter' images on the one hand, and the 'temptress' on the other are obviously analaguous to the 'madonna-whore' dichotomy. The 'exception' seems to be an image analysed only in the Nigerian mass media. The 'exception' is described as the woman who is not only a good wife and mother (hence fulfilling well her assigned gender-role) but who also must be recognised as having made some achievements in her own right as a person. However even recognition of such a woman is posited within terms of an ideology which takes male superiority as the norm for, as the study points out, not only is this "generally considered to have been only achieved with the encouragement of men (and never in the face of opposition)", but "such a woman is in fact considered to have achieved the status of man-hood" (WIN 1985:109).

This general overview of media images of women in Nigeria is supported by more specific studies. Iweriebor, analysing the image of women in NIgerian films, argues that "inspite of the diversity of Nigerian films, women as a group remain somewhat confined within certain stereotyping" (Iweriebor 1981:2). They are portrayed as generally passive, when active, they are unpleasant and undesireable (usually the "parasitic and adulterous wife"). But even

here they are directed by male agents (the wife in Dinner with the Devil, for example, is chosen by her lover as a tool to get even with her husband - she does not initiate it). Similiarly, analysing literature both Ogundipe-Leslie (1984) and Seymour (1983) agree that with the majority of Nigerian authors images of women are highly stereotyped - ranging from the silent backgrounder pounding yam to the destructive whore. All the stereotypes inflect the same gender ideology - that women should be wives and mothers, subordinate to men - whether as the 'mother', 'supporter' and 'exception' who fulfil the role, or as the 'temptress'/whore who violates it (and usually comes to a sticky end).

The dominant treatment of women in the Nigerian mass media is negative. Overwhelmingly female images are passive psychologically (cf Iweriebor 1982, Ogundipe-Leslie 1984, Seymour 1983), and as Iweriebor points out when women are active it is undesireable, castigating these portrayals as 'purposeless mischief-makers' and 'cowardly weaklings' (Iweriebor 1982). This negative treatment extends to "straight" news also.

> for instance, crime is not only seen as a societal ill, but as a direct result of women neglecting their homes, husbands, and children, is their 'inordinate' pursuit of wealth. Male criminals are actually pitied for having succumbed to pressure of greedy womenfolk, who demand ehat their men cannot afford to supply (WIN 1985:114)

here inflecting the 'temptress' syndrome. In the mass media women cannot win. There is a contraction between, on

the one hand, calling on women to be modern to aid the nations development and blaming them for adherence to traditional ways or ignorance, and on the other hand, castigating 'modern' women's freedom-linking this to crime and immorality, while valorising 'traditional' women's submissiveness to male authority.

In Nigeria also women's sexual attractiveness is used as 'bait' to sell goods in advertising, or to sell media products themselves via (for example) the perennial semi-nude of Punch or the photographs of women (almost never men) who "happened to catch our photographer's eye" (2). A most cursory survey of newspapers will show that such photographs, frequently unrelated to either news or features content are often the only occasions on which women's photographs appear in an issue.

The Nigerian mass media also trivialise both women and issues of importance to women. The WIN study cites the following example.

> the press is also reluctant to lend support to any attempts (superficial though they may be) to enhance the status of women. The first time Nigerian women were given a quota in executive positions at the State level, by the present [1984] military government, this received no headlines but was reported relatively inconspicuously when the NCWS [National Council of Women's Societies] in accepting the quota, ventured to wonder why it had not been extended to the Federal level, a national newspaper reported this with the chiding headlines, 'Like Oliver Twist, Women Ask For More' (WIN 1985 110-111 - insertions in square brackets mine).

The same study points out that captions attached to

photographs of women frequently belittle anything other than their looks and decorative value ...

> as witness pictures of female graduates: who are described as 'beautiful', 'elegant' and 'adorning the occasion' (their own graduation ceremony). Never are male graduates called 'handsome', 'stalwart', 'attractive', lending anything to the ceremony which is in their honour, an acknowledgement of their academic prowess (WIN 1985:117).

There is the constant implication that the wife/mother role is the appropriate role for women. As mentioned earlier Akpan found that being the wife of a man in the news was the most frequent mode in which women received media coverage. Thus it is when speaking on marriage and children that women are most likely to be reported. For example, when reporting on the launching of a book containing policy recommendations for Nigerian women the media focused on three recommendations, all concerned with marriage (see for example, FRCN Kaduna News March 30, 1987, or The Guardian, backpage, April 1, 1987). But the book's 161 Recommendations include such things as free and compulsory education for all children; access to land, training and credit for women, and, for women to take an active part in national policy-making and implementation. Similiarly the communique from a women's organisation (on the same occasion as this launching) which touched, among other things, on the nature of a political and socio-economic system for Nigeria's future, and SFEM, was not reported until over a week later; and tucked away inside on women's page (see Guardian April 8, 1987) - implying that women have nothing worth hearing on any topic of general concern. As Barr

found in Great Britain when reporting on women's organisations the media focus on conflict rather than agreement. (cf for example the NTA Network News of JUne 9, 1985 reporting on an alleged conflict between two women's organisations about to leave for the U.N. Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi).

It must be concluded then that from these studies it appears that, on the rare occasions when women appear in the Nigerian mass media, they are dominantly portrayed in a stereotyped and negative fashion, and that the gender ideology portrayed is that which validates women's subordination and sees their chief role as that of wife and mother.

In sum then the treatment of women and gender ideologies in the mass media in both the West and the Third World represents not simply a reflection of women's subordinate position in social reality, but a syetematic portrayal of women and gender issues within certain negative stereotypical limits. Gallagher concludes that

> a consistent picture emerges from those research studies which have investigated the media's portrayal of women. At the very best, that portrayal can be described as narrow. At worst, it is unrealistic, demeaning and damaging (Gallagher 1979:47).

Woman are symbolically annihilated through their absence, trivialisation and condemnation. The media legitimates dominant traditional gender ideology - "domesticity and subservience are presented as the essence of women's nature and role in society" (Ceulemans and Fauconnier

1979:47); the media "emphasize women's maternal and marital roles and their function as sex-objects for male perusal (Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979:38). In short as with media coverage of issues relating to class struggle, problems and failures (of for example women failing to find happiness in subservience and domesticity) are presented as individual failings and not attributed to shortcomings of social structures, social conditions are not examined as the cause.

In summary, this consideration of ideology, hegemony and the mass media has argued that ideologies are neither completely autonomous from the base, nor a mere reflection of the economic level; that in each socio-economic formation are sets of dominant ideology which support the interests of dominant groups; that non-class ideologies, such as gender ideologies, are always articulated with class ideologies; that there is a continual process of attempting to hegemonise subordinate groups; that the mass media produce a structured ideological field in which these ideological themes expressing capitalist class interests and female subordination are dominant; that rather than simply reflecting dominant ideology the media play a role in shifting the ground of ideological discourses and constructing hegemonic fields by offering preferred significations.

It is noticeable, that the very few studies of women and the mass media in Nigeria relate to the print media (i.e. newspapers, magazines and books) and to film. Given

that only 6% of Nigerian women are literate (Population Reference Bureau 1981) then print media is less important to the majority of women than the broadcast media. Film also reaches women less than men particularly in areas where women are subject to seclusion. In fact since the majority of women are not only illiterate but also poor, radio is for them the most widespread medium of communication. Another factor to be noted, given the average 10-16 hour working day of rural women, and not much less for urban working class women (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 1972, WIN 1985) is that listening to the radio allows women to continue with other activities unlike reading. For these reasons the empirical study of gender ideologies presented here is confined to the broadcast media of radio and television.

1.3. Methodology

Radio and television programmes known from another study to be listened to and watched by Hausa women (see Imam 1987) were analysed with reference to the images of women and gender ideologies portrayed. These were three Hausa radio advice programmes and five Hausa television dramas. The ideological elements isolated in the programmes were then analysed in relation to Hausa culture and socio-economic formation using the theoretical framework outlined above. Finally the implications for the use of the media in transforming consciousness were considered.

In order to be able to consider the contention that the mass media routinely produce a structured ideological field in which themes expressing female subordination are

dominant, two forms of time period were chosen. The first, and more conventional, takes selected programmes continuously over some weeks (from January 19, - March 9, 1985) - this was done for the radio programmes. In the second all the programmes in a particular category over a week were taken, as was done in Ibrahim's study of the Daily Times and New Nigerian (Ibrahim 1983). Thus all the Hausa drama programmes on Kano's two television stations City Television Kano (CTV) and Nigeria Television Authority Kano (NTA) were analysed over the period of a week each (from 16-22 May, and 23-29 May, 1985 respectively).

The methodology for analysis is structural analysis rather than the more frequently used content analysis. Content analysis can be defined as "a method for objectively, systematically and quantitatively describing the manifest content of communication" (Berelson 1952). As Ibrahim points out this approach is not very useful for the study of ideology where the major message might well be latent rather than manifest (Ibrahim 1983:173), nor is it useful where one is concerned with quality rather than quantity.

Content and structural analysis differ in three ways: first, the problem of quantifying the different elements of the content; second, that of taking account of the 'form' or 'style' of the communication; and, third, the problem of the latent content of the communication. Content analysis is essentially quantitative - it enumerates and itemizes, but is unable to take account of the structuring of a message. Frequency may be relevant but

not necessarily sufficient to ascertain emphasis. It could be that the importance of a message is in what it does not say or says only once as in Burgelin's example of a Western film in which the numerous bad acts of the protagonist are counterposed to his single good deed (cf Burgelin 1972) or as that of Sidney Webb in Charles Dicken's novel A Tale of Two Cities.

Similiarly content analysis cannot make connections between style and content, whereas structural analysis proposes that style or forms is the level of integration of content within the form. Again, content analysis has as its goal a description of the manifest content of communication which is sufficient. To quote Burgelin,

> If we talk about the latent content of communication, are we not implying that the manifest content is a sort of metaphor, the real meaning of which is the latent content? (Burgelin 1972:321)

Crichter et al point out that "the superficial form is less important than the deep structure.....Sampling should be a means of reading between the lines" (Crichter, Parker and Sondhi n.d.) This does not mean the abandonment of all enumeration, but does point to the need for a more open methodology.

Structural analysis thus consists first of an immanent analysis of the material concerned by looking at the "units" of the message and the way in which they relate to each other. It is very much concerned with the internal organisation of the message: a concern which derives from its links with structural linguistics and semiology.

Structural analysis also looks at the context and framework within which a message is put. This is followed by another stage in which findings are related to general culture, as it is seldom sufficient to explain a message without this.

An adaptation of the standard content analysis methodology used in Abdel-Kader's (1983) study of women's images in Egyptian television drama, was made in order to make it conform to the requirements of structural analysis and to consider gender ideologies rather than images per se. The themes of each episode are summarised before considering quantitative data in terms of respesentation, socio-economic traits and then personality traits. The format of programmes are also discussed. Then ideologies particularly relating to gender - embodied in action or verbally expressed were considered, before relating the whole to the objective situation and general social ideology.

1.4. Contribution of The Study

It has frequently been noted that there is a dearth of studies of the mass media in Africa, compared to other regions of the world. This is particularly so when discussing analysis of gender ideologies in the media. Furthermore the few studies of the media in Nigeria concentrate on the print media rather than electronic, on news and current affairs rather than entertainment, and on content in English rather than in indigenous languages. In focussing on gender ideologies in Hausa entertainment programmes

on radio and television. This study therefore contributes to filling the gaps in a number of areas in the analysis of media and ideology in Africa.

NOTES:

1. There is a divergence from this pattern of media images of women and gender ideologies found in analaysis of the media in socialist states. However it is capitalist socio-economic formations with which this work is concerned.

2. The photographs of Sunmi Smart-Cole in The Guardian are the single exception to this.

CHAPTER 2 THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF GENDER IDEOLOGY AND THE MASS MEDIA IN NIGERIA

2.1. The Nigerian Socio-Economic Formation

Prior to colonialism the geo-political unit that is now the Federal Repubic of Nigeria consisted of diverse social formations with different relations of production ranging from feudal-tributary relations (e.g. the Sokoto Caliphate, the Borno Kingdom, the Oyo and Benin Empires), to pastoral nomads (the Fulani) to communal, semi-communal or clan communities (e.g. the Igbo). With the imposition of colonial rule Nigeria was incorporated into the world capitalist market and the process of the disruption of pre-capitalist production relations and of capitalist class formations was started.

Nigeria was, and still is, primarily agrarian. The colonialists initially expropriated surplus (particularly through exacting taxes) and this led to the conversion of production for commodities rather than for use, but without altering existing forms of production. Presently however there has begun the extension of capitalist relations of production into the rural areas creating a landlord capitalist farmer class, some Kulaks, and increasingly a class of landless rural proletariat from the small peasant farmers. In the urban areas capitalist production relations developed much earlier and there exists a clearly defined bourgeoisie and a working class, a rather more amorphous petty bourgeoi-

sie (including, for example, junior lecturers, self-employed crafts-workers, and traders) and again increasingly a group of people who live from hand-to-mouth, being unable to gain employment and without the resources to start own-account occupations.

Thus since the late nineteenth century the dominant class in Nigeria has been under the sway of capitalism, directly under the British or through the Nigerians to whom power was handed when Nigeria became a neo-colony. However this political, economic and ideological dominance has not been without conflict and resistance, both between ruling groups and exploited groups (e.g. the 1929 Aba Women's War, the 1968 Peasant Revolt in Western Nigeria, and 1945 and 1981 national strikes), or between factions of the ruling classes (as viz the numerous changes of Government since 1959). In other words capitalist domination of Nigeria clearly exists but is not stable in all spheres.

There has not, in Nigeria's history, been a serious threat to the economic domination of the bourgeoisie as a class as it was neatly averted in the pre-Independence period by negotiating with members of the emergent indigenous bourgoeisie, thereby preventing the formation of more radical demands. Ideologically however the field is very much more open - with even the openly bourgeois National Party of Nigeria (NPN) regime of 1979-1983 finding it necessary to make rhetorical bows in the direction of radicalism.

The reaction to these threats to dominance has always been to devise ways of extending and deepening control: at the economic level via (for example) the Green revolution Strategy, wage freezes (and not forgetting embezzlement and oribery) and the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM); at the political level via (for example) banning strikes and democratic groups; and, at the ideological level via control of the Ideological State Apparatuses - particularly the school system and the mass communication systems.

2.2. The Case of Hausa Women

Hausaland falls within the northern guinea Sudan and Sahel savanna ecological zone. Vegetation cosists of open woodland and orchard bush. The climate is dry sub-humid with distinct wet and dry seasons, the wet season lasting roughly from late March to September/October.

The population of Hausaland can be divided into three major categories; the Muslim Hausa who live in nucleated villages and the urban areas; the Maguzawa (animist Hausa) who live in dispersed compounds in the bush; and the Fulani who are primarily nomadic pastoralists out who are increasingly settling and cultivating land also (a significant proportion of Fulani are permanently settled and intermarried with the Muslim Hausa and these are frequently treated as one group with them). In the urban areas and large villages are also Nigerians from other ethnic groups. The Muslim Hausa form roughly 75% of the total and are the subject of this section.

The predominant occupation is farming (even in the cities people farm - see, for example, Davies 1966) although most individuals have more than one occupation. Over forty different crops are grown, the main staples being millet, guineacorn, groundnuts and cotton. A variety of economic trees are also used including locust beans, baobab, sheanut and tamarind. Livestock are also kept - cattle, sheep, goats, chicken and donkeys. The Hausa are also artisans and traders.

The history of the Hausa states (or Habe) is usally traced from around 1000 AD, when the indigenous population was conquered and ruled by a peoples migrating westward, (represented in myths of origin by Dalla), and who settled, intermarried and ruled until the Fulani conquest in 1807, (The Kano Chronicle).

The early history of the Habe states mentions the political power of women, such as in Daura, Abuja, Tawa as the founder of Gobir and, the most famous, Amina of Zazzau known as a famous ruler to whom tribute was paid from as far a field as Nupeland. This was bound up with the indigenous religion (referred to today as bori) which gave ritual legitimacy to the state whose deity was Iya the earth mother (Usman 1974) and of which, unlike Islam, there were prominent and institutionalised female adepts (Pittin 1979).

The coming of Islam occurred around the latter half of the fourteenth century but was probably not significant for another cebtury (Palmer 1908), as Islam co-existed

with bori (to a certain extent bori still exists today). With decline of bori and particularly since the Jihad, women lost their ritual authority and with it secular authority, and women's titles were abandoned or passed to men, such as the title of Iya in Katsina (Pittin 1979).

The mode of production during the period of the Habe states until the imposition of colonialism was what Abdullahi refers to as the tribute paying, in which the talakawa (common people) paid tribute to the sarauta (nobility) in kind and/or gayya (communal labour) on their farms (Abdullahi 1983). Agricultural production was dominant but there was also internal trade of local crafts and textiles, and long-distance trade north and south in kola-nuts, leather goods, salt, iron and other goods.

Artisans, and craftsmen existed as hereditary occupations but were frequently also wet-season farmers, except for those occupations requiring fulltime specialisation such as long distance trading or butchers at major markets (M.G. Smith 1955).

With colonialism came money taxes, the forced growing of cash crops, restrictions on and taxation of local industries, like weaving, and iron mining and processing. Nigeria (including Hausaland) was incorporated into the world capitalist system as producers of agricultural commodities and a market for manufactured goods no longer produced locally.

2.2.1. The Mode of Production and Gender Division of Labour

Hausaland, like the rest of Nigeria, is not just in-

corporated into the world capitalist market as a neo-colony, but is dominated by capitalism and the search for profit. There are however variations, in particular between rural and urban areas.

In the rural areas a peasant farming system based on a simple commodity form of production subsidises the costs of production to capital by providing part of subsistence requirements for the producers and lowering the price of agricultural commodities (see Abdullahi 1983, Imam 1986b). Small farmers, owning small plots of land, (averaging 2.5 - 3.5 hectares) using both household and non-household labour, with tools that are an extension of human labour produce crops both for use and for sale (Hill 1972, Norman 1972, Matlon 1979).

Increasingly there is the penetration of capitalist relations of production into agricultural production, with the acquiring and control of land by the state (for Agricultural Development projects, River Basin Development Schemes and so on) and by capitalist farmers resulting in small farmers' loss of control of production, creating landless rural workers, and peasants too poor to farm their own land and who must hire themselves out as kwadago or jinga labour. (See Abalu et al 1985, Wallace 1978, Abdullahi 1983 for examples).

In the urban areas there exists a proletariat, dependent on the wage, working in industries, civil service, parastatals, capitalist trading and service enterprises

and so on. In contradistinction to the propertyless are the bourgeoisie, some of whom are independently rich proprietors of, or shareholders in factories and businesses. Many of these accumulate capital through the manipulation of positions or contracts in the state. In this group also come the senior state functionaries - for example, senior level bureaucrats, commissioners and (ex) ministers. Many of those whose privileged basis was derived from aristocratic positions in the pre-colonial mode of production, Emirs (sarakkuna), wardheads (masu unguwa) and so on, have used their wealth to become part of the bourgeoisie.

Then there is the amorphous group referred to as the middle class or petty bourgeoisie. Here two distinct groupings can be identified; small artisans and petty traders; generally owning the implements of their trade and/or small amounts of capital, self-employed or employing a few people (for example carpenters, mechanics, tailors or market holders); and, those who have some professional skills or training but work for a salary, like petty officials, clerks or classroom teachers.

A clear gender division of labour exists, as evidenced by the practice of seclusion (kulle: full seclusion and tsari: partial seclusion). Almost all on-field farmwork is carried out by men. Older women and young girls may however participate in planting and weeding of particular crops, but where women are employed as on farm labour they receive lower rates of pay than do men, even for the same tasks (see Jackson 1978, Longhurst 1982). The

present author has argued elsewhere (Imam 1986b) that female on-farm labour is frequently under-estimated due to social ideologies, and the concept of the "man" hour. Nonetheless it is accurate to say that the great majority of field work is done by males, though women do participate in the processing of crops before sale or use, from within the compound.

There is also a gender division of labour in non-agricultural occupations. The range of occupation for men is wide, including factory workers, blacksmiths, tailors, carpenters, spinners leather workers, calabash carvers, making pots, cigarettes, mats and sugar barbers, hunters, butchers, beggars, Qu'ranic teachers (mallamai), drivers, messengers, commission agents and traders.

Deriving from the pre-colonial period, some occupations are hereditary - what Smith described as an "occupational class" ranked in order of girma (prestige) from aristocracy down to butchers (M.G. Smith 1955). While contemporarily this is more flexible, according to Longhurst (1985) to a large extent expertise, implements and clientele are still passed on from fathers to sons, making it well nigh impossible for women to enter these occupations.

Even among those occupations which are not hereditary and/or which have developed in relatively recent past (for example factory workers, drivers, clerical and sales assistants) there are clear gender divisions. First taking Nigeria as a whole women form only 24.1% of the

economically active population (ILO estimate quoted in Fapohunda 1983). Although it should be pointed out here that official labour statistics frequently undercount the selfemployed, particularly if female and secluded (see Anker 1981, Pittin 1984) in terms of employees they are relatively accurate. Furthermore, Muslim Hausa women's labour participation rates are much lower than the national average. In Zaria, for instance, the rate declines from 8.9% in the 15-19 age group to a minimum of 3.9% in the 35-44 age category, and rises to a maximum of 11.3% in the 65 plus age group compared to a minimum of 35.3% in the under 15 and a maximum of 66.9% for the 15-19 to 65 plus categories nationally. (ILO estimates quoted in Fapohunda 1983:36 and 43). Second, in every field, except nursing and sales staff, women are far outnumbered by men.

Once employed women also face discrimination, in the private sector particularly on rates of pay (see Zack Williams 1985), in access to promotion and training (see Pittin 1984), and in access to fringe benefits (Ighodalo 1976) - very few women are unionised (or in jobs where unions exist) and at shopfloor level certainly unions have paid little attention to attempting to raise women's union consciousness or to issues that affect women (see Pittin 1984).

Speaking of Nigeria generally Ighodalo (1976) points out that several factors affect women's participation in the labour force: employer discrimination; lack of education and training (which will be discussed in more

detail later) and ideological notions as to appropriateness of work for women. To this must be added, for Hausa women, the prevalence of seclusion.

Despite this, the vast majority of Hausa women do have at least one income-earning occupation. (Simmons 1976b, Bashir 1972, M.F. Smith 1981, Konan 1975). Unable to inherit occupations, and inhibited by the factors mentioned above, the range of occupations of Hausa women is narrow. The four "acceptable" sana'a are: food processing, trading, crafts (mostly spinning and embroidery) and medicine. These occupations are usually carried out from within the compound, using no more labour than the woman herself and the use of children as intermediaries to buy and sell (Simmons 1976b, Schildkrout 1982). According to Matlon (1979) poor women are most likely to have sana'a.

One other alternative is prostitution or courtesanship (Karuwanci) which carried out by non-married women (i.e. those who have been married but are so no longer). This alternative though little mentioned in the literature (or socially) is an option which women may well take in preference to marriage (see Pittin 1979).

Domestic work, (food preparation, cooking, cleaning, washing, childcare) is always women's duty.

2.2.2. Household and Family

As a number of commentators have pointed out it is usually assumed that the family and the household are universal structures which coincide, and that this is a unit of production and consumption marked by intra-relations

of pooling, sharing and generosity, operating in the interests of all its members (See for example Harris 1981, Pittin 1985). However as Pittin puts it

> feminist analysis has demonstrated the opposite; that it is within the context of family and household that women's subordination is most effectively created and maintained, and that it is also within this context that conflicts of interest arise, most notably between husband and wife. Within the domestic unit, production by family members may be undertaken for non-coinciding purposes ... (Pittin 1985:2).

Because of this the term "household" will be broadly defined as a co-residential unit in which personnel are generally related through biological, affinal or fictive kinship ties in which there is collaboration around the fulfilling of physiological needs, the organisation of consumption for subsistence and human biological reproduction, without making any prior assumptions about the nature of intra or extra-household relations, or about the organisational structure of the unit. This section will begin by considering the ideologies relating to male and female obligations and roles in the domestic unit, then go on to look its actual organisation, and the practice within it.

A key feature of the dominant Hausa ideology is that the proper role of women is that of wife and mother. This is so much so that for women it is marriage that marks the transition of a female child to adulthood, but not so for males who achieve adulthood more via taking on economic

responsibilities (Pittin 1979, Schildkrout 1983, Coles 1983).

In the role of wife and mother women are expected to be dependent on men. Obligations are clearcut - men should provide food, shelter and clothing, while women provide labour for food preparation and other domestic chores, sexual services, and, bear and raise children (M.G. Smith 1955, Longhurst 1983). As a consequence children 'belong' to men - as one woman put it "ba mu da 'ya 'ya ko daya" (we women have no children, none at all)(quoted in Pittin 1979:163). Outside of these obligations both men and women follow their own activities and occupations and these are quite separate conceptually from the household (Longhurst 1983, Simmons 1976a, Schildkrout 1982).

Women are however expected to be deferent to their husbands, demonstrating self-effacement, respect, obedience and loyalty (ladabi da biyayya) and modesty (kunya), for example kneeling to greet him, and obtaining permission for proposed actions. Men's rights to control wives and children, in particular their physical movement and the marriages of daughters are accepted by both sexes (M.F. Smith 1981, Pittin 1979).

The ideal household is considered to consist of a man as the head with his secluded wives (up to a maximum of four) and their children. In the rural areas ideally agnatically related kin work together in a joint production unit referred to as gandu. The actual structure of household and practice within them may however differ quite

considerably from these ideals.

The Muslim Hausa live in both rural and urban areas within walled compounds. Within each compound there may be one or more households. Each household may consist of (typically) a husband, wife (or wives) with their children (iyali), but may also consist of a woman and their dependents (Pittin 1979). Where more than one household lives in a compound they usually have some kin relationship, most frequently agnatic, (for example the respective Iyalai of father and sons, or of brothers). But they may also simply be co-tenants or friends living in the same compound, (more often found in urban areas). Gandu forms only about 25% of farming production units and most researchers agree its incidence is declining (M.G. Smith 1955, Goddard 1973, Abdullahi 1983) although it has been pointed out that little consideration has been made of other forms of labour relationships (Wallace 1978).

In terms of intra-household obligations it is clear that women do provide all the services required of them (other than bearing children which is not totally under human will). In polygynous households frequently domestic chores are shared, in particular food preparation and sexual services to the husband on a two day rota. It is argued that it is the fact of seclusion and this sharing of domestic chores that gives women the time to engage in their own income-earning occupations (Simmons 1976a, Pittin 1979).

However, it is in terms of the financial provision

for the household that there may be a division between the ideal and the concrete. Despite the dominant ideal of women's dependence, women work extremely hard for a measure of financial autonomy (Simmons 1976b, Pittin 1979, Jackson 1978). Furthermore, although seclusion is based on the premise that men provide women's and children's material needs, women do contribute (quietly in most cases) to their own and their children's support both in terms of food and (particularly) clothing especially in poorer households (Abell 1962, Simmons 1976b, Matlon 1979.) Finally, the ideal of women's dependence is contravened by the women-centred households which though they can claim support from kin also provide substantially (in some cases wholly) for their own subsistence (Pittin 1979).

2.2.3. Seclusion

Seclusion is a major feature of women's lives. Although Longhurst (with many others) states that "obviously seclusion is a major determinant of the sexual division of labour" (1982:98), it is more illuminating to follow Beneria's argument (1979) that it is the control of women's reproductive roles which leads to two consequences affecting women's roles in production: that the focal point of women's activities becomes the domestic physical space where reproductive activities are carried out; and that restrictions on women's physical mobility helps to ensure this. Hence seclusion helps to maintain and reinforce the gender division of labour rather than determines it.

Considering the life cycle of females in relation to seclusion its link to reproductive activities can be seen clearly. Pre-pubertal, post-menopausal, and non-married women are not generally secluded. In addition the status of "old-woman" can be manipulated by women who ascribe themselves that status in order not to be secluded (see Pittin 1979, Coles 1983). Furthermore, its concern with reproduction can be seen also in the fact that women are generally free to visit with other women despite nominal seclusion (Pittin 1979, Konan 1975).

Seclusion is maintained by a number of interrelating factors - the ideology which implies that any women who moves around too freely is likely to be considered as a Karuwa (prostitute), backed up by various interpretations of Qu'ranic Surahs and Hadiths, and the difficulty (though not impossibility) for women in maintaining themselves independently - due to occupational specialisation (discussed above), women's work being less remunerative than men's (Longhurst 1985, Jackson 1979, Simmons 1976), inheritance patterns biased in favour of men (Perchonock 1985, Pittin 1979, Mahdi 1985), and lesser access for women to education and training that would enable women to move into other occupations.

2.2.4. Education

Two parallel formal educational systems exist in Hausaland. The first which virtually all children attend is Qu'ranic school or makarantar allo - which consists of

learning the Qu'ran (in Arabic) by rote, then learning to translate it into Hausa. Makarantar allo also teach the basics of Islamic philosophy and practice, as interpreted in Hausa custom (1). For females however this stops at puberty with their marriage and few women manage to sauka (learn the whole Qu'ran by heart) much less go further. One woman suggested that

> a woman's best way to an advanced Muslem education (is) to marry a scholar, and be careful (not to) argue with him too cleverly or he would stop teaching her (Trevor, quoted in Pittin 1979:439).

Presently there are some adult education Islamic Classes for secluded women but these are not only few and far between, but women also need their husbands' permission to attend (which is not always forthcoming despite the Qu'ranic injunction on the duty of all Muslems to acquire knowledge).

The second formal school system is the 'western' system (makarantar boko) which teach initially in Hausa and later in English with academic curricula similiar to that found in most parts of the world. In Hausaland generally this system is relatively recent being associated with Christianity. Female schooling in particular has been resisted for such reasons as the lack of schooling institutions for females (Adamu 1977 - it might be noted for example that in Kano state there are still no day secondary schools for girls), jealousy, purdah and selfishness among males (Hong 1971), spoiling

of girls, early marriage, child labour, fear of pregnancy and financial hardship (Alabi 1977), the lack of female teachers, and government's lukewarm attitude to education (Sabo 1973). Nonetheless, with the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) the number of girls in school rose, though still to a much lower extent than boys (see WIN 1985) (and there are indications that the rate is falling again now that UPE has been abandoned see WIN 1985).

When girls are fortunate enough to have access to school they are steered into gendertyped streams - in particular to take up courses in education, home economics and arts - less occassionally social science or law, but very few in any of the natural sciences. (See WIN 1985). This has obvious consequences for the types of occupations available to females after schooling.

Even so 'western' education has enabled some Hausa women to widen the range of opportunities open to them - from choice of spouse, to occupation and non-seclusion without the stigma of (ascribed) karuwanci (Pittin 1979). In the short run however it also has a deleterious effected on already adult secluded women by depriving them of the intermediaries necessary to engage in sana'a successfully (Schildkrout 1983).

2.2.5. Hausa Women and Class Relations

It has frequently been noted that as a group Hausa women are in a distinctly different category to Hausa men

and that within the group there is little stratification unlike the situation when considering men. The factors of seclusion, the ascription of domestic and reproductive responsibilities to women, and the gender ideologies subordinating females are applied to all women, for example, women have few patron-client relationships among themselves, normally relationships being based on reciprocity (kawaye relationships) or being between older and younger women (Jackson 1979). The egalitarianism of women's occupations has been commented upon - in that all women's sana'a are open to all women unlike the hereditary nature of some of men's occupations (Longhurst 1983, Simmons 1976). In addition, women are entitled to inherit only half the portion of their brothers and in the case of land in particular frequently do not inherit at all their share, this being appropriated formally or informally by male kin (Pittin 1979, Perchonock 1985, Longhurst 1983). Thus one important feature of class societies the transmission of unequal access to resources is more transmitted to all women as a category than to women differentially as members of different classes.

The common practice of ascribing to women the class positions of their husbands is fraught with difficulty in the Hausa case since as M.G. Smith points out

> under conditions of .....marital instability spouses cannot share the same social status. Indeed, the status differentiation of co-wives by reference to marriage order precludes their status identity with the common husband.... Moreover since divorce rates are high and spouses change frequently, marital careers are individual and variable; accordingly a man and his wife or wives are not treated as status equivalents, but sharply distinguished (M.G. Smith 1959:244 quoted in Pittin

1979:412).

These factors have led to suggestions that Hausa women have no class or that they form a class in themselves. Jackson, for example, argues that in some ways all rural Muslim Hausa women can be regarded as a class of rural landless labourers in that divisions between women are not based on different positions to the social relations of production, and since their statuses are independent of their husbands. She goes on to point out however that since the fact of marriage guarantees (at least a part of) subsistence women are not solely dependent on the wage and thus not like a proletariat either (Jackson 1979).

However, while the assigning of women to class positions is clearly difficult, this is not to say that women are outside class relations. First, as Pittin (1979) points out, while marriage may be variable a woman is married to only one man at a time and her husband's class position does affect her - for example, women married to ruling class men are most likely to be in complete seclusion (Pittin 1979, Longhurst 1983); wives of the bourgeois and ruling class men tend to have servants and a lifestyle of conspicuous leisure (Pittin 1979); and initial access to the capital required for the more remunerative of women's sana'a is made easier by marriage to a wealthy man (Simmons 1976b, Pittin 1979).

Second, although women may inherit less they do inherit so that there is unequal access to resources among

women as well as between women and men. In addition, access to what Bourdieu describes as cultural capital may also be easier for the daughters of certain classes of men - Pittin (1979) notes a high correlation between female education and wage earning fathers, it has generally been noted in Nigeria (though there has been no study of the specific Hausa case) that the daughters of the rich are more likely to go on to higher education than those of the poor - wealth being a function of class position.

Thus although the situation is considerably more complex than for men, Hausa women can also be considered to have class positions determined by a number of factors: class origin, class of (present) husband as well as their own occupantion and possessions.

2.2.6. Ideology

The ideal of women's deference to and control by males is also exemplified in the practice. Young girls are constrained to marry in accordance with the wishes of their kin, particularly in first marriages, and after marriage are kept strictly secluded. Child custody (after weaning) is in the hands of men after divorce. Men divorce by simple repudiation talaq but women must go to court and cite grounds for divorce. Though many men have only one wife at a time the threat of Polygymy is ever preent and frequently resorted to. (See for example Schildkrout 1983, Pittin 1979, M.F. Smith 1981).

The ideology concerning women's reproductive roles,

subordination to men, appropriate work and so forth are structured into relations of production and reproduction, and these maintain and reinforce each other. However, as several commentators have pointed out this is not to say that women have meekly acquiesced in their subordination (see Ardener 1975, Beneria 1979, Edholm et al 1977). Indeed Pittin suggests that in many ways Hausa women manipulate these ideologies for their own ends: though choice of marriage partner is constrained the practice of yaji (running home to their parents and necessitating that if their husband wants the marriage to continue he must approach the parents for a reconciliation) means women can influence their treatment and do not long remain in marriages that they do not want; the insistence by some women on seclusion as a "right" in order to escape tedious farm work and have time to engage in their own sana'a; the manipulation of husbands into pronouncing divorce because of the stigma of being "bewitched" by a mere woman instead of the women having to go to court and so on are some examples.

Hence Pittin states that

> through the use of symbolic behaviour and particularly through resort to verbalisation of the male ideology, women "mystify" the extent of their actual extensive options and independence, and thereby protect them from exposure and possible curtailment (Pittin 1979:21).

Nonetheless, although women are shown to be by no

means passive and to have more socio-economic control than is apparent it remains the fact that the very fact of the necessity to manipulate dominant ideologies, places limits on what can be done that do not fundamentally change the constraints of the subordinate positions in the structures of society and of social relations in which women have to live. But it does point to the possibilities of subversion of dominant ideology.

2.3. The Development of the Electronic Media of Mass Communication

The analysis will concentrate on the electronic mass media of communication, that is, radio and television. This is because, through radio particularly, the mass media have become the main propagators of ideology even in the Third World. The vast majority of people in Nigeria have never been to school, even the majority of today's children will not have access to schooling. But even if they did it has been calculated that the total number of hours a child spends in school is roughly equal to that spent receiving radio and television programmes (in countries, like Nigeria, where several hours of programming per day are available) and this not to mention the rest of his or her adult life (see Farilce 1971:67).

The 1975 UNESCO puts the ratio of television receivers to population at 1:1000, but this is based on the number of licences bought. Since most people are not even aware that they are supposed to buy licences for their televisions, and since there is no enforcement of this regulation the number

of television sets bears no relation to the number of licences. Even in poor rural areas the radio is much listened to as Ibrahim's Zarewa study shows,

> 45 per cent of the respondents indicated that they own radio sets and only 5 per cent said they never bother to listen. Out of those that listen 54 per cent indicated that they listen many times a day, 26 per cent daily, 3 per cent about weekly, and 17 per cent occasionally (Ibrahim 1977:41)

Of all the media in Nigeria radio is the most important with the most widespread coverage. Because it is aural it transcends the literacy boundary. It is cheaper than any other form of media and it does not necessarily require electricity. Furthermore since a good deal of the programmes are in indigenous languages it does not require a knowledge of English.

Television, because of the high cost of receivers and the need for electricity, does not reach nearly as wide an audience. Because like radio it does not require a literate audience, and because of its combination of visual and aural images it can be extremely effective, and so it will be considered here. As Ibrahim points out, most of the elite and a high proportion of the urban working class are reached by television. It might also be noted that even in the rural areas the television audience may be rather wider than is often supposed. This can be ascribed to the increasing prevalence of the adaptation of car batteries to supply power, rural electrification schemes and the use of small electricity generating engines whose owners may rent out to neighbours a power point at 10 kobo a night (thus often

providing a cheaper and more regular supply than that of the National Electric Power Authority, as well as the better known phenomenon of people (especially children) gathering in one place to use a single receiver. Radio is, nonetheless, far and away the most important source of mass communication in Nigeria.

The media in fact may even surpass religious institutions as religious ideology is transmitted via the media. This is not only through the television and radio broadcasting of actual religious services on Fridays and Sundays, but also the numerous and frequent religious question-and-answer or song programmes during the week. These reach many people who do not or cannot go to public places of worship (Muslim women in purdah for example), and they reach people far more frequently than the laity of either religion are likely to be in Mosque or Church.

Both radio and television in Nigeria have always been the monopoly of the state. Radio broadcasting was started by the British Colonial Government in 1933 as the British Broadcasting Corporation Rediffusion Service. In 1951 it became the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (NBS) and in 1957 was renamed the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). With its 1978 Decree the then Military Government renamed it yet again as the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) and centralized it. Following the inception of the second civilian regime in 1979 a number of the FRCN stations became the property of the various state governments. Fearing the loss of control over communication, the central

(i.e. federal) government then began building State stations for the FRCN. Contemporarily the situation is that there is the central government owned station FRCN with sub-stations in the states, and state owned radio houses such as Radio Rima in Sokoto, Radio O.Y.O. in Oyo, and the Kaduna State Broadcasting Corporation (KSBC).

Television was started in 1959 by the then Western Regional Government as the Western Nigeria Television Service (WNTS) in Ibadan. This was quickly followed by the Eastern Nigeria Television Service in Enugu, a federal station the National Television Service (NTS) in Lagos, and in Northern NIgeria Radio Television Kaduna in 1962. Several observers have commented dryly on the fact that well before 1975 Nigeria, an under-developed country lacking basic infrastructure like an adequate road system, potable water and reliable widespread power supply had already in operation four different (and highly expensive) television systems (see Egbon 1982). As with radio the then military administration felt the need for firmer control of television broadcasting and by Decree No. 24 of 1976 reorganised the television systems into a single Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) developing substations in each state whereby the central NTA based in Lagos controlled directly some 12½ hours weekly, and the local stations produced 35 hours of programme per week.

According to a recent report however the Committee on the Rationalisation of NTA services set up in 1985 by the then military administration has recommended that programmes produced by the sub-stations should be reduced to 9 hours a

week (reported in The Guardian June 9, 1985), which would considerably increase central state control of television programming in Nigeria. Nonetheless, the central control of television has been resisted via the setting up of local state television stations such as City Television (CTV) in Kano State, and Plateau Television (PTV) in Plateau State. Thus, with television there is a similiar pattern to that of radio broadcasting.

NOTE:

1. One woman at a workshop for women on Nigeria's political and socio-economic future (Women in Nigeria Kaduna State branch, May 1986) related that in makarantar allo she had been taught to kneel to the buta (kettle containing water for the ablutions before the daily prayers) in lieu of her husband if he was not present.

Table 1 : Themes in the Topics Relating to Women and Male/Female Relations by Programme

Themes	Programme			
	Uwargida (Housewives)	Don Matasa (Youth)	Maigida (Husband)	Total
1. Control of Wives				
a) Economic Dependence	2	-	4	6
b) Restriction of Movement	1	-	3	4
c) Injunctions to submissiveness and patience	2	-	3	5
d) Husband is judge in home	-	-	4	4
TOTAL	5	-	14	19
2. Control of Daughters				
a) Choice of husband by girls	1	1	3	5
b) Relationship of father and suitor	-	-	3	3
c) Early marriage	-	-	2	2
TOTAL	1	1	8	10
3 Maltreatment of women				
a) beating and harsh treatment	2	-	-	2
b) Withholding of maintenance	1	-	2	3
c) Male extra-marital relationships	-	-	3	3
TOTAL	3	-	5	8
4 Negative Characteristics of Women				
a) Greed	1	1	2	4
b) Fickleness	1	1	-	2
c) Sulkiness	-	-	3	3
d) Wish to flirt ("yawo" and indecent behaviour	1	2	3	6
TOTAL	3	4	8	15
5. Learning for Women				
a) Pro	1	-	-	1
b) Con	-	2	2	4
TOTAL	1	2	2	5

Table 2: Themes Relating to the Characteristics of Men by Programme

Themes	Programme			
	Uwargida (Housewives)	Don Matasa (Youth)	Maigida (Husbands)	Total
1. Positive Roles/ Characteristics				
a) Family Provider	2	-	6	8
b) Authority Figure	1	3	9	13
c) Fairness	-	-	8	8
TOTAL	3	3	23	29
2. Negative Roles/ Characteristics				
a) Harshness and injustice	2	-	-	2
b) Promiscuity	-	-	3	3
c) Irresponsibility	1	-	2	3
d) Partiality/Favouritism	1	-	2	3
e) Greed	-	-	3	3
TOTAL	3	-	9	12

wurin fita"). Clearly women are not viewed as human beings with wills and minds of their own.

Themes dealing with male control of females were by far the most preponderant. Women were seen as under male control by definition ("mace tena karkushinka"), women were not to be allowed to leave the compound, even to collect firewood or locust bean pods or to trade in the market. Men are seen as the judges and arbitors in all family matters. While men were exhorted not to beat their wives too much (sic) that they have a right to beat women was implicitly accepted and not an issue for discussion. Fathers (but not mothers) were frequently called upon to exercise their maturity and discretion in deciding upon their daughters' husbands, and so on. Even where the rectification of bad situations was discussed the issue of where control lies was clear. Men were pleaded with in terms of their own self-interest to correct their behaviour, for example, men who do not provide maintenance cannot go home and expect to eat a meal. Women, on the other hand, were to be stopped from doing the actions complained of, like moving outside the compound.

The importance of men as authorities was implicitly ratified also in the structure of programme presentation. Although Uwargida is aimed at women there was always one or more men among the panellists. By contrast, Maigida aimed at men, never had a single female panellist. Don Matasa, aimed at both parents and youth, never had more than one woman out of four or five panellists. Thus men advise women but women do not advise men, while male advice

on youth is given three or four times as much weight as women's.

In only two cases was the issue of women's decision-making raised, but even then in the context of ultimate male authority. In the first case mothers were blamed for not allowing their daughters to go to school, even where fathers are willing. (The reverse situation was not raised in any of the programmes in the sample.) In the second girls were to have some freedom in the choice of their husbands but the father (not mother) being wiser is to ratify (or not) their choices. This topic incidentally, was also the only area in which there was disagreement among the panellists. In discussing girls who change their mind over suitors, the only woman panellist in Don Matasa argued that this might be justified where, after acceptance (i.e. once he is sure of her), the suitor's behaviour changes for the worse. The other panellists (all male) simply condemned such behaviour, and one of them disagreed strongly with the woman panellist saying that if a girl has been given an element of choice she has no right to change her mind.

That women might be able to take decisions on factors affecting their lives was thus hedged with restrictions as in the case above, but more frequently trivialised or ignored altogether. The possibility that women could decide for themselves to pursue learning and development their minds was trivialised - being seen merely as an excuse to leave the compound. The possibility that women might have the right to decide not to live within polygynous marriages, even within Islamic law, (see Kabir 1985, Imam 1986c), was

not raised at all - rather women were urged to behave with patience and forbearance to co-wives. (In fact in Maigida the issue was presented as if men's sole aim in taking another wife was to benefit the existing wife(s) with companionship - why then should she be upset?). Finally the right of women to pursue independent income-generating activities was ignored, although numerous studies testify that it is a common feature of Hausa life (see Bashir 1972, Simmons 1976b, Pittin 1979).

The issue of the female pursuit of learning was dealt with several times. Only in the case described above from Uwargida was it given definite encouragement. Girls' schooling was linked unfavourably with indecent dressing in Don Matasa, and with immoral male/female relationships in Maigida (intergender platonic and innocent friendships, even among school children, being unacceptable and impossible). The desire of married women to be educated was specifically treated as an excuse for "yawo" (roughly strolling, flirting and enjoying oneself). Given that most Hausa women have been married by fifteen this severely limits the possibility of much education. Listening to the programmes in this sample a man who has refused to allow his wife or daughter access to education might well contratulate himself on his wisdom. This is desipe the specific injunction of Usman Dan Fodio, the (otherwise much revered) leader of the Jihad who enjoined men to educate women and castigated them for not doing so, saying

> Alas! How can they (men) shut their wives, their daughters and their captives, in the darkness of ignorance, while daily they inpart knowledge to their students? (quoted in Hodgekin (ed) 1955:255 - my insertion).

In general the programmes treated women's roles and contributions negatively. The work women do was seen as of little value. For instance, mothers should allow daughters to go to school because the work the daughters would otherwise do in helping their mothers to (e.g.) grow peppers or grind beans is not very important. Women's attempts to gain a measure of economic autonomy through petty trading was castigated, in Maigida particularly, as greedy attempts to gain "pin-money" ("kudin-kashewa") and selfish because the use of young girls to hawk, (i.e. masu talla) (necessary for women in seclusion), spoils them. At the same time, however, women's right to expect more than basic maintenance from their husbands (e.g. soap, jewellery and clothes) was treated rather ambivalently. (A male panellist on Uwargida stated that some husbands did provide these items but the wives did not use them. Also it was accepted in Maigida that it might be helpful where a wife can aid her husband with the loan of maintenance money.) But overall the discussions suggest that independent cash generation for women is not favourable.

So far this analysis has been considering all three programmes together. There are however differences in emphasis between them. In Uwargida the negative themes on men are equally balanced by the positive (3 each). But in the other two programmes positive themes on men are mentioned more often (no negative themes in Don Matasa and a rough ratio of 5:2 in Maigida. In Uwargida the negative characteristics of women and bad treatment of women are mentioned the same number of times. By contrast in the other program-

mes the themes of women's bad character are presented more often than the bad treatment of women - 4:0 in Don Matasa, and 8:5 in Maigida. However, as has already been mentioned, none of the programmes put forward any positive images or roles of women.

Overall then all three programmes put forward dominantly negative images of women and ideological themes sanctioning the control and subordination of women. But the programmes aimed at women did so less often than those aimed at men or both women and men. Since all three programmes explicitly advise people on how to behave, the conclusion must be drawn that these radio programmes broadcast significantly conservative ideological themes which tell women to acquiesce to, and men to continue and strengthen, relations of control and superordination over women.

Although the issues discussed are those problems felt by women, men and youth, as Hobson says (of British programmes)

> It is in the forms that the resolution are made within programmes that the ideological basis of consensual feminity are reproduced and reinforced for women ..., the very fact of recognition and seeming discussion or consideration by some 'outside' or 'independent' authority gives an impression that the problems have been aired. The outcome remains the same. The resolutions....are not revolutionary; what emerges is the reinforcement of the fatality or inevitability of the situation without the need for change (Hobson 1981:113 - 114, her emphases).

3.2. Television Programmes

Episodes of five Hausa drama serials were analysed. These were Zaman Duniya, Samanja, Dan Magori, Jauro and Tumbin Giwa. Zaman Duniya (living in the world) is a series frequently using the same actors, but not the same characters each week. The episode here concerns a man in debt to a number of different traders whose patience has been exhausted and who are pursuing him for their money. He makes and breaks appointments to pay them and finally is rescued by a rich man who pays his debts for him.

Samanja is a series about the army - taking its name from the Hausa corruption of the English Sergeant-Major, who is the principal character of the series. In this episode Samanja is instructed by his commanding officer to farm some land in pursuance of the Operation Feed the Nation scheme. He takes the soldiers under his command and hires a tractor to do the heavy labour. The crops are divided between the senior officers leaving none for the privates.

Dan Magori (Teaser's son) takes its title from its principal character also - a mischevious man (a character says of him "rigima ya yi yawa" - the tumult (he causes) is too much). Here he has married a second wife, a Yoruba woman who speaks no Hausa, while he and the first wife do not speak Yoruba. A friend offers to translate but is unable to do so and Dan Magori is left unable to tell her to cook him some food since he has divorced the first wife who was protesting at the situation.

Tumbin Giwa is similiar in format to Zaman-Duniya in taking up different characters and storyline each episode. This one concerns cleanliness, the need for which is expressed through ridicule and scorn of dirty people - a woman who is scolded for painting her face rather than cleaning the compound, and a couple whose compound during a dauren aure (betrothal ceremony) was littered with dirt. The wife of the man leaves him because of the ridicule and states she will not return unless he mends his ways.

Jauro is the Hausa term for bush (pastoral) Fulani and this episode focuses on the misunderstanding caused by their inadequate understanding of Hausa. The Fulani men think that they have been advised that guinea fowl faeces improves the taste of miya (stew or soup). When the miya turns out to taste bad they go and abuse the Hausa man.

Three aspects of representation were considered - abolute numbers of male and female characters, types of character by sex (i.e. principal characters, secondary characters and incidental or background characters), and appearances of characters (number of appearances, and scenes consisting of women only, men only, or both). The analysis revealed that:

1. Women were grossly under-represented in terms of total number of characters. Of a total of about 145 characters in all five programmes (it was not possible to count all the characters accurately in crowd scenes - all crowd scenes were male alone), only 18 were female,

constituting approximately 12.4%.

2. Considering types of character, women were only 4 out of 15 principal characters (26.7%) and 8 of 27 secondary characters (29.6%). Considering that all crowd scenes were all male (in each case a wedding ceremony) women were an even smaller percentage here (approximately 5.1%).

3. Women had limited screen visibility also as compared to men - appearing in 17 of 37 scenes (45.9%) while men appeared in every scene.

4. Twenty scenes (54.1%) consisted of interaction between male characters solely, while no scene consisted solely of interaction between female characters. In only four scenes did the action at any point occur only between female characters. Thus according to the representation in drama, significant interaction occurs between men and women, and among men, but rarely among women.

The socio-economic traits considered were: age, marital status (including polygyny), class, educational status, seclusion status (for women), occupation, parenthood, and rural or urban residence.

It was noticeable in the analysis of socio-economic and personality traits that very few of the characters (even principal characters) were well enough developed for all of these variables to be present for each character. This relates to the nature of Hausa drama in which are similiar to the 'morality plays' of early mediaeval Europe - in which rather than concentrate on charachers' development,

the dramatis personae are stock vehicles. As might be expected then only in Samanja where the same central characters appear each week was there much development of the characters.

All the women who appeared as principal or secondary characters were married, while only 9 of the 29 male principal or secondary characters were shown to be married. The age ranges for male and female characters were similiar, unlike in Abdel Kader's study (1983) where female characters were dominantly younger than male. Again unlike in Abdel Kader's study, almost all the characters were poor - one rich man was shown, and two ranking army officers (a male captain and a female lieutenant).

Of all the male characters only one woman featured, (the lieutenant in Samanja), who could be assumed to have had any 'western' schooling - in this case to secondary level at least. Furthermore, while a Hausa speaker, from her name (Buky - a common dimunitive for the Yoruba name Bukola), it could easily be assumed that she is not Hausa but from another (Christian) area - the majority of the Hausa are Muslim (see Chapter 2). Of the male characters, four would have had a minimum of secondary school education, three primary school education and two were mallamai who would have had relatively high levels of Islamic education.

In only one serial was polygyny evident (Dan Magori), and in this case the story line was built in part round it. In terms of seclusion status, three female characters were shown not to be in seclusion. Just two were shown clearly

to be in seclusion, but on the other hand, all but one of the adult female characters were shown within the confines of the domestic arena only. For only two women was any occupation shown (trader and soldier). Male characters, however, more often had occupations shown (22) and had a far wider range of occupations, (8 or11) if each job among the soldiers is counted separately, as clerk, accountant, officer and fighter).

Parenthood was explicit for two female characters only - a woman trader referring to her children and grand children, and a woman sending her son to school (in this case the woman's husband although he does not interact with the child can obviously also be assumed to be a parent). All but three of the characters were presented as urban dwellers and those three were the Fulani in Jauro.

As has been stated personality traits of characters were not in general well developed. Only three women were shown as initiating action in relation to men, with three others initiating criticisms or argument among women. In every other case (18) the action was initiated by male characters and affected men only twice, and both women and men all the other times.

Concerning the ideologies expressed in the programmes in no case was the overt message addressed to gender issues. Two programmes concerned Hausa versus other peoples (Fulani and Yoruba). At one level this might be seen as concerning language misunderstandings, but also (and in both cases) this was expressed in a derogatory manner to non-Hausa

peoples: in Jauro, despite the explanation of the misunderstanding, the two Fulani men started fighting the Hausa men: while Dan Magori expresses the view that the Yoruba language sounds like swearing (the women is saying O da bo - see you later). The Zaman Duniya episode concerns living within one's means. (duk abin da za ka yi, ka yi shi daidai da arzikinka - cut your coat according to your cloth). The desireability of environmental cleanliness is the theme of the Tumbin Giwa episode. While the Samanja programme refers to the subversion of authority - ordered to farm Samanja gets a tractor to do the work as "ba aikin soja ba ne" (it is not soldier's work), although he does get the task carried out it is not as expected.

However in many instances gender subordination is embodied in the programmes. Even when annoyed women keep quiet when men talk to them, when two women fight physically they stop when ordered to by a man but not by the other women. Women are scolded and given instructions by men but not vice-versa (except in the case of ranking officer in the army and even so this was backed by a more superior male officer). Women required male permission for certain actions. Women served men, and never sat in a chair while men sat on mats, though the situation was frequently the reverse.

Verbal statements expressing gender ideologies were also made frequently. In Jauro a male character described marrying two women as double happiness. Another (male) character states that married women should not express their opinions, ("bai kamata ba matan aure su bude baki su rinka

yin magana") and in the same programme something is dismissed as an example of women's thinking (Dan Magori). If something goes wrong in the home, it is the senior wife's fault (Dan Magori again). And these statements pass without challenge in the programmes.

In addition, women are portrayed as being more quarrelsome and lacking in self control than men. In 3 of the 4 occasions when only women are present they are either quarrelling or physically fighting (see Note 1), whereas in only 5 of 22 occasions when only men are present do they quarrel or fight physically. An implication of women being greedy and uncontrolled was also created by the use of camera angles in Tumbin Giwa. In one scene where women were eating the camera focused frequently on close-ups of the food, of hands raising food to mouths, of food dropping from the mouth while talking and eating at the same time and so on. This type of camera angle was not used where men were shown eating - for example in Jauro, the immediate cause of the dramatic conflict is a male character's desire to eat again a particularly tasty stew which in an earlier scene he describes as so delicious he felt it in his ears. But he does not rush to eat it and gobble it down - rather he approaches it with great deliberation, although in comic terms it might have been thought he would gobble down several mouthfuls before realising the taste was foul.

It is interesting to note also, bearing in mind Pittin's suggestion that women manipulate dominant ideologies for their own advantage that in one case where a woman tries

to do so it is decisively rejected - in Zaman Duniya the woman trader tries to use the ideology that women and men do not interact in order to have her debt settled first (i.e. that she should settle her business and leave the men's company). But another of the traders aggressively refuses to allow this and begins to quarrel with her over it.

Comparing these dramatic presentations to the objective situation, in several ways Hausa drama programmes seem to be more realistic than Abdel Kader (1983) found to be the case for Egyptian drama. The majority of characters are poor, the conflicts dealt with are within the scope of the majority of people, women are shown to have a narrower range of occupations than men, characters in general have little or no formal education. In other respects however Hausa drama is also unrealistic - particularly in that the vast majority of characters are urban dwellers. Furthermore, while in reality almost all Hausa women have some occupation, this is not represented in the programmes. Again although Hausa women are married at least once a high proportion of women are not in marriages at any particular moment - this also is not shown.

The ideologies in the programmes can be regarded as those which support the present socio-economic and ideological structure of society. In the two cases where the programmes may be regarded as exhorting a behavioural change (re debt and cleanliness) neither affect socio-economic structure. This point is particularly so if the "silences" are read as Macherey (1978, and Eagleton (1976),

suggest. Thus for example not only is the rich man in Zaman Duniya praised for being charitable, and then comes in to resue the debtor, but nowhere in that episode is expressed any consideration of or resentment against the social relations that make some rich and others poor - it is not questioned at all. Again, though Samanja subverts his commanding officer's authority he does not challenge it openly, and can be regarded also as re-inforcing the "monkey dey work, baboon dey chop" principle since in his division of the harvest the rank and file soldiers do not receive a share, and are unable to protest effectively - though they try to take some when he is not looking they are caught and have to return it. Similiarly at no point in the programmes are women's opinions of polygny raised (although one programme deals with a polygnous situation and it might be thought that it could logically be raised in accounting for some of the Hausa women's resentment of the Yoruba woman). Nor are men as a group anywhere castigated, (though women frequently are).

In general then this analysis of Hausa drama television programmes shows them to be more realistic than is generally assumed to be the case despite the urban bias. Nonetheless women are underrepresented in these dramas, and women's subordination is both embodied in the relations between male and female characters and expressed verbally by male characters. Although some female characters (Bariki in Samanja, the teacher in Zaman Duniya, and the wife in Tumbin Giwa) do show decisiveness in action, the majority

of female characters are portrayed negatively as passive in relation to men, but quarrelsome, uncontrolled and greedy among themselves. Furthermore women are shown preponderantly in terms of their domestic roles. Finally, the ideologies present in these programmes are those which will not upset the status quo.

3.3. Mass Media Ideologies and Hausa Culture

This section compares the ideologies expressed in the media with the actual situation in Hausa culture. The fact that marital status is more frequently defined for female characters than for male in the media, and that in each case they were shown to be within existing marriages concurs with the high premium placed on females being married in Hausa culture, and the obligatory nature of marriage for women. It does diverge however from the objective situation in which (young) women may never have been married and others may be bazawara (not presently married). The media here reinforces the ideology in Hausa culture that women ought to be married by disregarding any other marital status for women.

Radio and television programmes expressed only approval for the principle of polygyny. In fact it is significant that only male points of view were expressed in either radio or television. On radio the principle was approved but the problem was how men can have a peaceful atmosphere at home - with the onus being on the first wife to make the second feel at home (Maigida). On television having two wives were described double happiness (for the husband) and the

problem was again how to achieve a smooth running of the household, as in how to instruct the non-Hausa speaking wife to cook a meal for her husband (Dan Magori). And as noted before neither women in this programme was given space in which to express her opinion of polygyny. Here again media ideologies are sanctioning one aspect of Hausa culture by presenting it as a worthwhile ideal, and ignoring oppositional points of view.

Concerning women's work as noted earlier almost all Hausa women have some income-generating occupation - most frequently from within the household, although some women (particularly those with formal 'western' education) do work outside the home. However the radio programmes ideologies about women's work viewed this with disfavour; and in the television programmes role models were very few (11% of female characters). Considering location of women working the situation is slightly more complex. Radio programmes expressed disapproval in general of women's physical mobility outside the house. But the female characters shown to have occupations on television both worked outside. However this seeming approval can be qualified. Of these two characters, one was an "old woman" to whom norms of seclusion need not be applied. The other would be assumed to be non-Hausa because of her Yoruba name. In short there was no representation of an unambiguously Hausa woman within her reproductive years having an occupation other than (unremunerated) domestic household work, despite the actual case of Hausa women. Thus media ideologies in this respect appear to be even more conservative than Hausa culture.

Women's access to western education in Hausaland has been very low but increasing gradually (with a sudden leap during the period of Universal Primary Education when school places were guaranteed though it was not compulsory). However radio programmes treated female education negatively (except in one episode of Uwargida), and the television programmes showed only one western educated woman (who as stated earlier is unlikely to be Hausa). It should be noted however that only one programme showed children attending school at all (two boys and two girls), but while the form of schooling was not stated none of them wore school uniform and the action occurred in the afternoon - implying makarantan allo rather than primary school. Thus as with the issue of women's work media ideologies seem to be more conservative than the trend in Hausa culture. And certainly the media are presenting ideologies which contradict the government's formal policies on the importance of female education, although both are state owned.

Both radio and television programmes presented ideologies which sanctioned female subordination to male control in the vast majority of cases: on the radio programmes women were advised to do as they were told, and in the television programmes female characters either did obey or were punished if they did not. Dan Magori's first wife, for example, at no point expresses her views on the marriage to her husband, and when she refuses to co-operate with the second wife is summarily told to pack her bags and leave. The occasion in Tumbin Giwa where a woman takes the initiative to leave her husband is unrealistic since the cause

is that the compound was dirty - usually it would be the woman's responsibility to sweep it or see that the children did so. The media therefore are picking up and reinforcing dominant Hausa cultural ideals of women as deferent, obedient, loyal and self-effacing, by punishing female characters who do not demonstrate these qualities. Except in the one (unrealistic) case noted above the media nowhere shows women with autonamous views, capable of making, and carrying out or enforcing her own decisions.

Finally there are the implications of the under-representation of women in the media. That they are less often seen and heard obviously implies a lesser importance. But in addition since when females are present it is almost always in relation to males (but not vice versa) it also suggests that the male dominated sphere is more important and that women's interaction is significant only when it relates to males, reinforcing views about the non-importance of women and their viewpoints.

3.4. Implications of the Study

Ceulemans and Fauconnier's review of research on television programme in North America, Western Europe and Latin America concludes, somewhat tentatively that

> in so far as television affects the sex-role perceptions of its audience, it socialises children into accepting men's dominant and women's subordinate positions in society at large and the family micro-cosmos. It teaches adult women and men that the prevailing sex-role division is appropriate and ultimately fulfilling (Ceulemans and Fauconnier 1979:27).

Gallagher reviewing research in USA, Canada and Australia is more definite, pointing out that

> it has been fairly well established that sex-stereotyped content leads children to describe women's roles in traditional ways;... that the more television boys and girls watch, the more traditional are their attitudes and aspirations. It would appear from such studies that girls and boys - and by extension women and men - do model themselves along lines suggested by media imagery. (Gallagher 1979:17).

MacRobbie's (1978) study of working class girls in Britain showed that girls take for granted a "natural" order in their lives concerning femininity and gender-roles which coincides with that presented in the media. Hobson's (1981) study of working class women in Britain comes to a similiar conclusion. Working class housewives use radio programmes to structure their working day. But they make an active choice in television programmes - rejecting the 'men's world' of news and documentaries (except where the content is explicitly feminine), in favour of light entertainment (comedy series and soap operas, quiz shows, and USA television films). In the "realistic" programmes, like Coronation Street or phone-in discussion programmes, female characters confront problems which may arise for audiences in their 'everyday' lives. The airing of these problems and their negotiation or resolution within the drama provide the female audience with points of recognition and identification. Research in Brazil, Venezuela, the Netherlands and Japan also suggest that women are successfully interpellated by soap opera in particular, and may even apply media presented solutions to problems in their

own lives (see Gallagher 1979 for a more detailed review).

In this study it has been demonstrated that the Hausa entertainment programmes in the Nigerian mass media not only reflect and reinforce gender ideologies of subordination in Hausa culture, but in some respects propagate even more conservative ideologies. This suggests that, far from aiding the progressive development and improvement of women's situations in Nigeria, the mass media are playing a retrogressive role.

NOTE:

1. Interestingly enough while I was analysing one of these scenes a male colleague present (and who by no means would be described as "a male chauvinist pig") commented spontaneously "Ah that's typical of women".

CHAPTER 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

4.1. Summary

In the study ideology is considered as being conditioned by modes of production and social relations, but relatively autonomous rather than reflexive of them. Ideologies may also interact with and have effects on the development of material social relations. Thus in the course of historical development gender ideologies have become embodied in contemporary Hausa social relations - particularly in the division of labour by gender in which there is a division between women's and men's occupations, and between domestic and non-domestic work. These divisions result in a certain household dtructure in which women are dependent on men both because of the fact that in the occupational structure the range of women's occupation is narrow and less well remunerated than men's, and, that unremunerated domestic reproductive work is allocated to women. This division of labour is maintained by the concrete practices of seclusion, male bias in inheritance of resources and women's lower access to education and training. But it is also reinforced by (and reinforces) ideologies about the family and of women's nature and (natural) subordination to men. These ideologies both provide a rationalisation for social structure and are important in constituting the subjectivity of individuals - their conceptions of self and appropriate roles as men and women.

Nonetheless, although there is a dominant ideology

in every social formation which is that of the ruling group and which works to maintain their domination this is not automatic. Subordinate groups do have their own "lived realities" and world views. Hausa women struggle to acquire a measure of financial autonomy through their insistence on sana'a, and of personal autonomy through recourse to such practices as yaji and the manipulation of male ideologies (in order, for example, to gain uncontested divorces).

Ensuring the hegemony of dominant ideologies requires work in winning the consent of subordinate groups to their own subordination by negating or containing subordinate ideologies. Since the mass media are a major vehicle for ideologies then the nature of the production of ideologies in the media and their influence on social consciousness has to be assessed. This is a topic over which there has been considerable debate. In this study the position that ideologies in the mass media are determined by the constraints of economic production, picking up and reflecting already legitimated values in society is rejected majorly on the grounds that this will not account for the shifts and developments in the mapping of ideological terrains nor for the deliberate ideological use of media by the state in some countries. However neither can the media be seen simply as presenting ideologies which are reflections of economic or political struggles through the collusion of media workers. This position is simply a sophisticated economism somewhat contradictorily linked with a conspirary thesis.

Rather, in the consideration of the mass media in Nigeria, the position is taken that they produce a structured ideological field in which themes expressing capitalist class interests and gender subordination are dominant, and that they take part in both the reconstruction and the reinforcement of ideological fields in the process of establishing hegemony. This is effected through a combination of overt control and cultural imperialism, but also (and particularly for entertainment programmes) through apparently neutral media practices working through and within frameworks of dominant ideology.

Looking specifically at gender ideologies within the mass media studies both world wide and in Nigeria have demonstrated that the media generally produce sexist images of women, presenting negative stereotypes and under-representing women. The analysis of programmes in Kano made in this study confirms this general picture. Both television and radio programmes underrepresent female characters and women's viewpoints. They present dominantly negative images of women, and put forward ideological themes sanctioning women's control and subordination. The media's definition of women as wives under the control of their husbands reinforces this aspect of women's subjectivity. By outright rejection and by refusing to recognise other opinions, the media helps to ensure that women's aspirations for education or work are frameworked within the structure of male authority, and not autonomously. The media in short broadcast ideologies which carry the message that women should acqiesce to and men strengthen and maintain relations

of gender subordination, thus legitimating the subordinate aspect of women's consciousness about their gender role and delegitimating all others, playing a conservative, not to say reactionary role.

4.2. Recommendations for Further Research and Conclusions

In the analysis of Nigerian mass media it was noted that the consideration of ideological media content has largely focussed on news and current affairs rather than entertainment, and that this is a serious ommission. The study further confirms this point by demonstrating that entertainment programmes do embody class and gender ideologies. It is suggested that in terms of influemce on social consciousness these apparently innocuous programmes may be even more important. Ewu (1985) points out that the social functions of drama are useful to the class which appropriates it to further its ideological position. She states that

> Empathy, a powerful ingredient in any drama is used to mentally condition the audience. Thrrough empathy, the audience is lured into a complete identification with the characters and actions of the play, bringing about a cathartic response. By identifying with the characters and the situation, the audience accepts the unrealistic world of the play as real and its values and ideas as proven (Ewu 1986a:12).

Given that some groups of women do consciously identify with the television drama characters and, as has been noted, the dramatic conflicts are resolved in such a manner as to leave the existing structures intact this has serious implications for the continued acceptance of dominant ideologies. Certainly more attention needs to be paid to

the ideological content of entertainment programmes.

Another point that arises in relation to the programmes analysed is the role of indigenous cultures. While cultural imperialism exists it cannot be held responsible for all reactionary tendencies in media ideologies and gender ideologies are a case in point. While existing gender ideologies and the aspects of the social structure that embody them have been taken over and maintained in contemporary capitalist-dominated Nigeria many of them do not derive from capitalist but existed also in the pre-colonial tribute paying mode of production in Hausa-land. Neither capitalism nor cultural imperialism alone can be held to blame for ideologies relating to women's deference to men, nor for polygyny nor for male bias in inheritance patterns and land control. In Hausa-land these predated them.

Furthermore, under the pretext of the identification and preservation of Nigerian cultures, in respect of gender this study shows that it is those elements which are negative and retrogressive to women's liberation that are being valorised in the media, particularly with reference to certain Islamic Surahs or Hadith. But this is the most conservative interpretation of Islam. Other more liberal interpretations have also been argued for in NIgeria from the pre-independence period to the present (see for example Wali 1956, Kabir 1985, Imam 1986c). Similiarly women's earlier self-definition as including occupation is ignored in favour of a primary definition of women as wife. Cabral's prescription that movements for national liberation must

"recognize and define (culture's) contradictory aspects so as to retain the positive aspects and channel them in the direction of the struggle" (Cabral 1973:47) must be taken more seriously.

This relates to yet another point. In criticising standard content analysis of media it was pointed out that the text cannot stand on its own to explain itself. In fact a number of commentators (in particular Eagleton 1976) have pointed out that in the analysis of cultural production the text must be understood as the product of the "complex historical articulation" of various structures - general mode of production, general ideology, authorial ideology, aesthetic ideology, and finally text. In this study the general mode of production, general ideology and the text have been considered. However aesthetic ideology was hardly touched upon (except to note the structural similiarity of Hausa drama to European mediaeval 'morality' plays), nor was authorial ideology (although it should be pointed out that in none of the programmes analysed was the author, producer or director female). A schema was presented for mass media production but a study of the specific situation in Kano was not made. These three issues do need to be considered. The last is particularly important in order to find ways of seeing whether, how and where spaces might be opened within dominant mass media to revolutionise and radicalise cultural consciousness.

Some media critics suggest that the media can be made to reflect the changing role of women, the diversity of women's roles and the actual (and potential) contribution

of women to society within the existing system, through such strategies as employing more women in decision-making, professional and creative capacities (see Butler and Paisley 1980), making policy to guide portrayals of women (as in the Swedish broadcasting Corporation), or forming organisations to monitor and/or complain about media representations (see the United States Commission on Civil Rights or the U.K. Alliance for Fair Images and Representation in the Media). In some countries also the media has been used as a self conscious tool for development, like the UNESCO-sponsored project in Senegal which used television for the social education of women (Fougeyrollas 1967). Indeed in this context it is ironic to note that while the Nigerian government makes pronouncements about the importance of female education and the need to "integrate women into development", the programmes of the state owned radio and television propagate ideologies negating this as has just been demonstrated. On the other hand perhaps it is not so surprising that official rhetoric has been transformed neither into action nor into encouragement via media ideologies, given the IMF-influenced policies of the same government regarding worker retrenchment and unemployment.

Noting contradictions such as these other media critics argue that attempting to work within the established systems leads to the stifling of radical views and voices, or even worse their incorporation and transformation so as to provide what Barthes (1973) would call "the innoculation" effect. In this view only purposefully created independent radical

media will (over time) become effective. Thus magazines like Famille en Development in Senegal, and Manushi in India have been set up, and there are a sizeable number of films and video-tapes made by independent collectives or individuals. But such alternative media also have problems of finance to cover production and lack of distribution facilities. It requires both research and struggle to see which kinds of strategies would be most effective in Nigeria.

This brings me to my final point. "Cultural revolution" alone cannot lead to liberation on either class or gender terms. Ideological work cannot be divorced from its material conditions in a given historical period. Ideology is not in the head alone but embodied in social relations and structures and these are mutually reinforcing. Nonetheless ideology can also affect and influence material conditions. Therefore the ideological conflict, the struggle over cultural practice, is essential and crucial in raising consciousness and transforming subjectivity in order to wage more effectively the political and economic struggle against subordination and exploitation.

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APPENDIX

List of Topics raised in Radio Programmes

a) Topics Raised in Uwargida...

patience with daughters-in-law
patience with co-wives
Thrift
Daughters' education
Beating of women
Harsh/unjust treatment of women
Girls' short marriage
Women flirting ("yawo")
provision of soap/jewellery by husband

b) Topics Raised in Don Matasa

Indecent dress by school children, particularly girls
Non-respect for elders (twice)
Girls' fickleness
pride
In-family fighting
Refusal to follow Islamic norms (twice)
Maliciousness

c) Topics Raised in Maigidanta

Control of wives
Girls' hawking
Showing off in front of women
Husband/Wife disputes
Women going out of the compound (3 times)
Married men and 'outside' women (3 times)
Daughters' marriages (5 times)
Interaction between male/female youth

Treatment of half-siblings

Co-wives

Pre-harvest crop selling

Control of Children's movements

Wealth and charity.