TIE EFFECT DF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION ON THE ECONOMIES AND POLITICS OF AFRICAN LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON BETWEEN NIGER AND UGANDA REPUBLICS.

BY

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D E D I C A T I O N :

To my parents Mr. and Mrs. Zakayo Ito Kiguwa (deceased), my parents In-Law Mr. and Mrs. Yokana Naiiro my brother Eria Kayeyera, my wife Mary and our Children.

May God bless you all.

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D E C L A R A T I O N

I Samuel Nathan Wakabi Kiguwa declare that to the best of my knowledge the data contained in this thesis is from my original research and it has not been submitted to any other University for examination.

Student's Signature

Supervisor'Signature

Internal Examiner

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A B S T R A C T :

African landlocked countries have had extra problems in their economic and political development endeavours than their coastal weighbours. As a result their road to economic and political maturity is far more hazardous than that of the coastal countries surrounding them. The gravity of this problem has been deeply felt by the entire world community and the United Nations Organisation and its agencies have been trying to alleviate these problems for the last twenty five years. Indeed all these countries were classified by the United Nations to be among the hard core least developed countries (LDC) requiring special assistances.

It is the gravity of this problem which prompted me to do research in this area. The significance nf the study is to throw further light on these countries' problems and to attract scholars to turn to this area of study so that more useful data is collected which can them be used to find solutions to this intricate situation All landlocked countries on the African continent have been surveyed in chapter two. Two of them namely Niger and Uganda were selected for special study and comparison.

Two major aspects of landlockedness have been of special interest in this thesis. The first is the effect location has had and is atill having on the economics of these countries. The second aspect is thB affect location hae had and is still having on the politics of the same countries especially the

way they formulate and implement policies towards the coastal states which saurround them. The findings show that location inland has boon extremely detrimental to their economic progress* Consequently they are trailing behind their coastal neighbours. It has also boon found out that this disadvantageous location inland has made these countries less sovereign and dependant on their coastal neighbours for their trade overseas. This dependence and frustration is a constant cause of friction , between them and their neighbours as the case of Southern Africa has proved.

The main recommendation is that these countries should re orientate their economies to stop depending on an export import trade with overseas countries. Overseas trade creates problems of transit and use of foreign ports as well as increased expenditures in foreign currency. Aid by the international community can do nothing to alter this sad fact. As a matter of fact the political strings of foreign aid aggravate rather than reduce their predicament. A policy of self-reliance ought to be considered seriously.

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CHAPTER ONE

I N T R O D U C T I O N

This is a geopolitical study of African landlocked countries. Its central aim therefore is to asses the impact geographical location has on their economics and political relations with their neighbouring countries which give them transit passages to and from the sea. Accordingly the study has at least three propositions to investigate. The first one is the view that the inland location of these countries is one of the main factors responsible for the prevailing economic backwardness and subsequent lag behind their coastal neighbours. The second proposition to be investigated is the view that the economic hardships confronting landlocked countries can be aggravated or reduced depending on the kind of foreign policies they pursue towards coastal states around them to which they depend to export and import goods overseas. The third proposition to be investigated is that African landlocked countries are on the economic periphery of the developed industrialised western capitalist countries and as such they are being constantly under-developed and are in a state of dependency on the former which they cannot easily throw off. They cannot therefore operate independent economies which would enable them to achieve quick economic recovery.

The study covers all landlocked African countries generally but special emphasis is put on the republics of Niger and Uganda's experiences. To this extend it is a comparative study.

Uganda's experiences in East Africa are compared with those of Niger in West Africa. A comparative approach has been adopted to bring out and highlight on as many problems facing these countries as possible. The countries to be compared are located in different regions very far from each other, have different climatic conditions, as well as political history and neighbours. Both are non industrialised and have agriculture as the mainstay of their economies although Niger has in the last decade shown orientation to a mining economy after the discovery and large scale mining of uranium which started after 1970.

The term landlocked is used here to refer to those countries which have no direct sea coasts and ports of their own because they are separated from the high seas by other soverign countries. There are twenty-seven such countries in the world fourteen of them are in Africa. The African ones are Botswana, Burundi, Central Africa, Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Uganda, Upper Volta, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Africa has more than fifty per cent of all the landlocked countries in the world and all of them are developing countries which emerged from colonial rule barely two decades ago. Unlike the European landlocked countbies the African landlocked countries are surrounded by equally developing coastal states whose period of independent existence is just as long. Both sets of countries lack well developed transport infrastructures and industrial bases to cope with the problems facing them at a regional level.

The investigation of all the propositions listed above is to be conducted within the general framework of two fundamental concepts namely that of underdevelopment and dependance in Africa. Both these concepts have a long history dating back to the inception of colonial rule in Africa. Africa was partitioned into small spheres of influence of various West European powers for purposes of their economic and political exploitation. The partition was based on the agreement reached during the Berlin Conference of 1885. It was this partition which created the landlocked countries being investigated here and set in motion the processes of economic underdevelopment and a relationship of dependance under which Africa's present planning and development is based.

Some Scholars consider development in terms of evolutionary perspective consisting of a set of interdependant processes through which a traditional social structure is transformed into a modern social structure.[1] This approach has all along tended to ignore the colonial fact which seem to play such a dominant role in the present development of African and Latin American countries. The central theme in this thesis is that the colonial experience is of crucial significance in the analysis of underdevelopment and dependence under which these countries are operating. Colonialism is not only an experience which has had an impact on the minds of the people concerned but it is also one of the historical processes which created underdevelopment in these countries. African landlocked countries being studied here have been colonial societies whose economic and political

1. Robert, I. Rhodes, ed, Imperialism and Underdevelopment: Reader, N.Y: Monthly Review Pres , 1970, pp.1 - 12.

structures were shaped by years of colonial occupation. These structures which continue to link the developed metropolitian imperialist countries of Western Europe to these countries are therefore a source of crucial data to be analysed.

In one of his studies of underdevelopment in Latin America, for example, Andre Gundar Frank observes that the present underdevelopment of Latin America is the result of its centuries long participation in the process of world capitalist development.[2] He argues that Chile's conquest incorporated her fully into the expansion and development of world mercantilist and later industrial capitalist system. It also introduced the monopolistic satellite structure and development of capitalism into the Chilean domestic economy. Since that time Chile has become increasingly marked by the economic, social and political structure of satellite underdevelopment. This development, he asserts, continues today both in Chile's increasing satellisation by the world metropolis and through the ever more acute polarisation of Chile's domestic economy. The same thing developed in Brazil and other Latin American countries.[3]

Late Professor Walter Rodney observed that underdevelopment expresses different levels of development obtaining in different countries. It is thus a comparative term denoting differences between the rich developed nations and the poor developing or emergent nations exploited by the former. As a relationship of development it is tied to the fact that social and economic development has always been unevenly distributed in the world.[4]

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2. Andre, Gandre, Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? N.Y: Monthly Review Press, 1970. pp. 10-24.

3. Ibid p 7

4. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington DC Howard University Press, 1974 pp 3 - 15

Rodney asserts, underdevelopment carries with it a negative and very painful connotation which is that a country is exploited by another country or countries as a result of capitalist imperialism and colonial expansion which reconstructs its political and economic institutions in such a way that a relationship of underdevelopment and dependence on the part of the colonised country to its coloniser is established and maintained.

Underdevelopment in Rodney's terms is effected by deliberate intense economic and political pressure applied totally against the will of the exploited country. At the individual level it reduces the individual's ability to increase his skills and capacity, his freedom to be creative, his self-discipline, responsibility and material well being. In the economic sense underdevelopment reduces a nation's ability to maintain and improve on their capacities for dealing with the environment depending on the extent to which they put this understanding into practice by devising tools (technology) and the manner in which work is organised.[5]

Walter Rodney's conclusions are endorsed fully by Ian Roxborough in his book 'Theories of underdevelopment', Roxborough argues that change in 'Third World' countries is primarily the consequence of the externalisation of Western European capitalism through the formation of a world market and various forms of imperialism and colonialism. Like Gunder Frank, Roxborough addressed himself to the problems of underdevelopment and dependence in Latin America.[6]

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5. Ibid.

6. Ian, Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979, pp.42-53.

He noted that the concept of dependency can be used in a number of ways. First it can be used to describe a form of boundary interchange as the dependence of one system on another. This he calls external dependence. Secondly dependency can be seen as a conditioning factor which alters the internal functioning and articularion of the elements of the dependent social formation. The distinction between these two ways is that in the latter the internal dynamics of the dependent social formations are fundamentally different from the internal dynamics of the social formations of advanced capitalism.

At first dependency was expressed as a purely economic relationship between two national economies or aggregated groups of national economies in which the economic development of dependent nations was conditioned by the economic development of the metropolitan nations. In this case dependency just meant lack of autonomy and prominent among the mechanisms which kept it into being was the postulated long term tendency for the terms of trade to move in favour of the industrialised nations. This approach was not very useful because it just led to a round argument that dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous growth and they lack it because their structures are dependent ones. The nature of those dependent structures and the differences between them and the structures of advanced countries remained unstudied.[7]

The African experience being investigated here conforms to the general pattern described by the foregoing scholars.

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7. Ibid p 44

Western European powers moved into Africa and set up colonial regimes under which the exploitation of the continent took place. The long period of colonial rule had a devastating effect on the African peoples. It affected their capacities to be creative or innovative. Africa was progressively incorporated into a permanent relationship with the expanding capitalist European economy. The occupation of Africa was hastened by trade and investments in the gold, copper and other mining ventures which needed to be reinforced by direct rule so as to make possible the enforcement of contracts, protection of title to property, forced labour and other similar actions. Within a very short time therefore the balkanisation of the Continent was complete and thorough.

One major consequence of this was the conversion of Africa into a periphery zone to supply raw materials to and serve as a market for European goods. Since then all African countries have been on the periphery of European economies to which they were tied. By this arrangement Africa's raw materials were and are still being extracted for use in the metropolitan countries with very low returns to the former. At the same time the cost of imports from Europe to Africa have been going up all the time creating acute adverse terms of trade between them. New methods of production emerged in the African periphery countries based on their progressive exposure to and domination by Western capitalism. This placed Africa in a similar position as Latin America already noted. The problems of underdevelopment and dependency noted in Latin America therefore apply equally to Africa.

During the colonial era two forms of monopoly took shape corresponding to two stages of the development of underdevelopment. The first was the establishment and tight operation of monopoly in international commodity markets. The second was the operation of monopoly in industrial technology. Both of these were due to the past accumulation of capital in the metropolitan countries which, taken together, have conferred on the former a cumulative advantage in bargaining power. As far as commodity markets were concerned it takes the form of superior information and knowhow, a limited number of actual buyers who increasingly control the wholesale and retail outlets and a general ability to deploy capital in the manipulation of stocks. It also takes the form of technological capacity to find substitutes for products of tropical agriculture which keeps down prices of many of them inspite of growing demand.

In industrial technology monopoly is exercised in the form of knowhow embodied in machinery for mass production based on constant innovation in product lines and the ever accelerating technological change which this requires and makes possible. The existing pattern of demand is heavily influenced by the fact that local incomes distribution is skewed towards a small partly expatriate section of the population. In most African countries the expatriate population is so small within the national boundaries drawn up by rival imperial powers that even if it were wealthy it could not absorb enough of any sophisticated products to justify local production on an economic scale. Since incomes of local populations are so low the markets which

they can create are even smaller. The mass of the population is able to afford only very few of the cheapest product of modern industry.

The opportunities for profitable investment even with high levels of protection, tend to be very narrow. The new investments being made are largely undertaken by foreign capital usually of international corporations which represent the culmination of the processes of concentration in the advanced capitalist countries. The phase of industrialisation of the periphery of the capitalist system does not lead to an autonomous process of capitalist development.

The foregoing shows how African countries come to be underdeveloped by Western European capitalism and imperialism. It also shows that underdevelopment is very much alive today. As a matter of fact it is a continuous process since the economic and political environment in which all African countries are working were set up and conditioned by underdevelopment. Any further attempts to restructure the economics of these countries based on Western or any other aid has so far tended to promote rather than reduce effects of underdevelopment. Coastal countries have had their share of underdevelopment but the landlocked ones have had more of it due to the additional hardships bequeathed to them by the pre-independence underdevelopment ventures of their former rulers which will be explored in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

'Dependence' is another key concept to be treated in this thesis. It is closely related to underdevelopment.

Henry Bernstein defines dependence as a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of other countries.[8] To this extent it is similar to underdevelopment. According to this definition a relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development.

The economies of African countries can only expand if the world commodity market expands and prices of their commodities rise. But this kind of expansion as noted earlier, depends on the monopoly imposed by the developed countries due to their cumulative power and high technology. These countries are therefore in a permanent state of dependence and any aid they get is calculated to boost the production of commodities in which the donors' economies can benefit or production of light manufactured goods consumable in Africa only. This kind of situation causes these countries to be both backward and exploited.

Landlocked countries have two types of dependence. First they depend on the forces operating in world markets where, together with their coastal neighbours, they sell their produce.

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8. Henry, Bernstein, Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today, Harmondsworth New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1973 pp 76 - 79.

In this respect finding buyers and fixing of prices are matters beyond their control. Secondly they depend on the countries which surround them to export and import goods through their territories. Quite often they have to pay high transport costs, port fees, storage, insurance and many other charges incurred in foreign ports requiring payments to be made in foreign exchange which they do not have in sufficient supply. Their economies therefore tend to stagnate because they generate very little capital and attract little foreign investments.

The dominant countries are endowed with technological, commercial, capital and socio-political predominance over the dependent countries varying according to the particular historical moments. Because of this they exploit the latter and extract part of the locally produced surplus at will. Dependence is based on an international division of labour which allows industrial development to take place in some countries while restricting it in others whose growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centres of the world. The international division of labour between producers of primary agricultural products and producers of manufactured products is a typical consequence of capitalist development which necessarily assumes the form of combined inequality among countries.

The dependency perspective sometimes assumes that the development of a national or regional unit can only be understood and explained in connection with its historical insertion into the world-wide political-economic systems which emerged with the wave of European colonisation of the world. This world-wide

system is associated with the unequal but combined development of its component parts some of which constitute its centre and others its periphery[9]. The centre is viewed as capable of dynamic development responsive to internal needs and is the main beneficiary of the global links. The periphery on the other hand has a reflex type of development restrained by its incorporation into the global system and which results from its adaptation to requirements of the centre's expansion. Theotonio dos Santos definition of dependence runs counter to that of Bernsten thus.

> "Dependency is a situation in which a certain number of countries have their economies conditioned by the development and expansion of another - placing the dependent countties in a backward position exploited by the dominant countries."[10]

Theotonio dos Santos argues that dependency can best be understood only by reference to its historical dimension and by focussiong on the total network of social relations as they evolve in different contexts over time. For this reason dependence is charaterised as structural, historical and totalising. He traces the unequal development of the world from the sixteenth century with the formation of a capitalist world economy in which some countries in the centre specialised in

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9 See Jose, J. Villamsed Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence, Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1979 pp 44 - 47

10 Ibid p 44

industrial production of manufactured goods precisely because peripherial areas of the world provided them with the necessary primary goods both agricultural and mineral. The world system was interdependent but different units performed different functions. The international division of labour thus created did not lead to parallel development through comparative advantages. The centre states accumulated capital at the expense of the periphery and the type of specilisation created had a profound effect on the evolution of internal social and political structures of the periphery states.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the interdependent nature of the world capitalist system and the qualitative transformations in it over time make it impossible for any state at the periphery to replicate the evolutionary experience of the now developed nations. The dependency perspective tends to make the contextual variables to shape and guide the behaviour of groups and individuals. But it must be recognised that dependence is not a fully defined theoretical model. It is a conceptual framework, a set of concepts, hypothesized linkages and an optic that attempts to locate and clarify a wide range of problems. In short it is a way of framing many of the issues which relate to underdevelopment.[11]

Another aspect of dependence to be noted here is that obstacles to development are not only or primarily national but also extranational and there are important structural linkages between them. Modes of incorporation into the world economy have been emphasized in the treatment of underdevelopment of the

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11 Ibid pp 2 - 13

periphery which is a consequence of the development of capitalism at the centre. However, the process of development cannot be considered as a smooth evolutionary transition between traditional and modern stages where change is continuous, incremental and harmonious. Change involves conflict since it means transforming a society's structures and also severing the links with the capitalist economies. Naturally such moves would be resisted by those closely associated with the structures created at the centre.

Professor Dudley Seers in his article 'Patterns of Dependence' discusses two world classifications of dependence. The first is whether a country is or is not communist and the second is if it is not communist its per capital income.[12] This method follows political idealogical aspirations of the west and east. Its widespread use has so far depended on the parties concerned. Governments of developing countries use it as a means of pressure on the developed countries. Usually the developing countries by preparing periodic development plans which they address mainly to the metropolitan powers of the west tend to attract aid since the latter tries to help them to develop and thereby hope to avoid spread of communism. Developed Eastern countries are also attracted to the idea of centralised economic planning. The extent of dependence in this case depends on which of the two sets of developed countries shows more financial and material commitment.

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12 Dudley, Seers 'Patterns of Dependence' in Jose, J, Villamil, ed, Tranenational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence, Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd., 1979 pp - 109.

The second classification of dependence referred to by Dudley Seers is one based on the per capital income. It is argued that if a developing country manages to raise its income per capita to the level of the major developed countries it becomes a developed country. This could be achieved through the use of a systematic economic growth plan. If the economies do not grow quickly enough and poverty continues unabated there must be obstacles such as trade controls, religion, traditional customs, extended family systems, linguistic barriers, illiteracy and others which hinder the operations of the various factor and product markets. Marxists put the blame on property rights especially in land and the resultant concentration of economic and political power. Modernisation is expected to remove all the obstacles and create the necessary productive capacity. The task of international organisations such as UNCTAD is to arrange sufficient transfers of resources to make this possible. Targets for growth rates implied targets for transfers of aid and private capital. In the United Nations Development Decade for example resolutions were drafted about tarriff preferences, commodity prices and other similar items.

This was the old classification of dependence but Professor Seers makes other determinants of degree of dependence which are more applicable to the present situation. The first is to imagine a situation where a country has been cut off from the outside world so that normal supplies of imports and exports were cut. There are many economic imputs which would be painful for any economy to do without. Minerals and foodstuffs are some of them.

But Seers notes that a country is especially dependent if it relies on one or two foreign countries for foreign exchange to buy imports essential to its economic prosperity. It means that such a country depends ultimately on the goodwill of one or two governments.[13] This raises questions about the geographical distribution of its exports, commodity composition, whether its customers can buy the same elsewhere or obtain substitutes.

The second determinenat of dependence is the need for foreign exchange to service foreign debts to foreign governments, banks or international agencies. The very dependence on such agencies makes it impracticable to default on such obligations. If the country concerned is heavily integrated into the world economy the potential costs of retaliation may be too heavy. Possibilities of invasion exist and if its military strength is limited it remains with very little room to manoeuvre in policy including policy to reduce economic dependence. However, economic and military autonomy is established if a government can successfully appeal to patriotism to justify reductions in the level of consumption and if need be the sacrifice of life itself when confronting another government. This patriotic capacity depends on cultural factors such as ethnic homogeneity, idealogical teaching, religion and language which are rooted in the history of the people. In former African colonies which were artificially created such cultural unity is lacking in almost every country and the people are too exposed to foreign western influences.[14]

The third determinant of dependence noted by Seers is the extent to which a country's demand structure matches its supply

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13 Ibid pp 98 - 99

14 Ibid

structure particularly in energy and food, Economic power depends very much on whether a country is a substantial net importer or exporter of these key inputs. Finally there is technological dependence which is related to economic dependence. The level to which a country is technologically dependent determines its economic, military and political dependence on foreign countries.

African countries were deliberately made to produce raw materials needed for industrialised Western Europe. Their economies were therefore tied to those of Europe. But since they are on the periphery of the latter it is Europe which determines the commodities to be produced and sold in world markets. Prices for these commodities are set by forces outside African control. But African countries as producers are in a helpless position since they produce commodities they themselves do not consume in substantial quantities and whose economic value depends on being sold in overseas markets. So they can neither refuse selling nor stop producing because they have no alternative means of livelhood.

The conditioning situation in dependence determines the limits and possibilities of action and behaviour of the people. Faced by these they may either choose among the various alternatives internal to that situation or they may seek to change the conditioning situation itself. African countries have not found it easy to find alternatives within their borders. They have also not found it easy to offset the conditioning they were forced and still being forced to undergo. The choice of action is limited by scarcity of capital, absence of the required technology and the small size of their domestic markets. To change the conditioning

effect itself means to break away from their ties with Western Europe, and this requires a lot of their own capital, skills and search for new markets as well as time.

Although the landlocked countries are the ones which need to change this conditioning situation most, they are the least capable of doing anything about it. Their economies are the poorest and cannot therefore generate their own capital to start them off. They have also the poorest technological competence to make a switch worth considering. In a majority of cases these countries are also the smallest in Africa in terms of population and size. They are therefore not in a position to create large domestic markets to replace the overseas markets to which they are tied.

The developed capitalist and imperialist countries exploit the Third World and by deliberate policies make them dependent on them economically and politically. The unequal international specialisation is manifested in three ways of distortion in the direction taken by the distortion toward export activities which does not result from inadequacy of the 'home market' but from the superior productivity of the centre in all fields which compels the periphery to confine itself to the role of complementary supplier of products for the production of which it posesses a natural advantage like exotic agricultural produce and minerals. If wages in the periphery become lower for the same productivity than at the centre a limited development of industry focussed on the home market of the periphery becomes possible while at the same time exchange will have become unequal. That is goods

from the periphery would not fetch the same prices in the metropolitan countries as they had done previously and prices for imports from there go up.

African countries have been caught up in this kind of trap on a number of occasions. Prices of their agricultural products such as coffee, cotton, tea, sugar and uranium tend to decline in world markets as production increases. At the present time there are fluctuating prices for oil commonly known as the 'oil glut.' The falling prices for oil is explained in terms of over production which has saturated the world market. No African landlocked country produces oil but this is an example of what happens to the economies of all developing countries. If they show signs of improvement world market mechanisms of which they have no control are applied to crush them. The vicious circle of poverty, underdevelopment and dependence therefore continues unabated.

The second distortion is based on the international monopolistic corporations which operate in underdeveloped countries. Initially these corporations operate under the umbrella of economic development with the aim of enabling the developing economies to catch up with those which are already developed. But the analysis of their strategies shows that so long as the dogma of the periphery's integration in the world market is not challenged the periphery is without the economic means of action in relation to the monopolies to effect the required integration. This means that the monopolies operating in the periphery use it to make their own profits which they remit home and leave nothing to augment the economies of the

countries where they are based. Because of this syndrome of events the economies of African countries do not appear to have improved very much since political independence was attained over two decades ago.

The third distortion is manifested by the extreme unevenness that is typical of the distribution of productivities in the periphery and in the system of prices transmitted to it from the centre which results from the distinctive nature of the peripheral formations and largely dictates the structure of the distribution of income in the same due to the adjustments of orientation of production in the periphery to the needs of the centre which prevents the transmission of the benefits of economic progress from the poles of development to the economy as a whole ensures strong economic domination by the centre. Usually this is explained in terms of international specialisation, the general structure of world trade in which the centre shapes the periphery in accordance with its own needs and in the dependence of the structures whereby growth in the periphery is financed.

As it has already been pointed out earlier this type of extraversion has a long history in Africa transcending more than two centuries in parts like South and West Africa. In East Africa it covers a little over one century. It started with colonial trade which sprung up after the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions in Western Europe. The drive for raw

material and markets was the real cause of European expansion in Africa. The investments made in Africa set up conditions for unequal exchange of goods between Europe and Africa. The low levels of the reward of labour at one pôle that is the African periphery and the concentration of capital at the other encouraged foreign capital to establish modern sectors in the periphery producing for export. Thus huge investments were made in the South African gold mines, Copper mines in Zaire and Zambia and agricultural industries of Zimbabwe and Kenya.

Since then industrialisation in Africa conforms to a process that climbs up from the light consumer goods industries to the industries producing semifinished goods. From these industries producing some essential equipments such as tyres, steel and other products are built. This kind of gradual industrialisation process was not followed in Europe. There the process embraced all forms of industry at the same time. It is clear from this that there is no real intention by the centre which is Europe to carry out a fully fledged industrial revolution in Africa to change and upgrade the economies of African countries to a developed status. If such a step is to be taken it must be by Africa itself.

From the foregoing the economic and political plight of African landlocked countries can only be altered by these countries themslves assisted by their coastal neighbours. The metropolitan countries which made them landlocked benefit better from the retention of the existing status quo. They made it for thesselves. Any economic investments made there and all international agreements that may be negotiated cannot change the position.

These countries being on the periphery are only producers of basic products and do almost all their trade with the centre located thousands of miles away. The central economies on the other hand do most of their trade with themselves and only refer to the perphery for raw materials. Their economies can therefore survive and flourish without the periphery but the economies of the latter cannot under present circumstance.

In the periphery financing is foreign and that stops diversification. Most of these economies tend to operate huge deficit accounts in the external balance of payments. Usually these economies go through three stages to get to this absurd stage. The first is upon the inception of colonial rule when the colony has a surplus of balance of payments. This is changed as colonial rule gains momentum due to the initiation and development of underdevelopment. The surplus balance of payments begins to decline. Finally underderdevelopment is followed by a phase of chronic tendency to deficit corresponding to the crisis of this system the blocking of growth based upon external demand. This last stage is mainly of post independence economies. It is therefore the one being stressed in this thesis.

On the whole there is an asymetrical relationship between Africa and her major trading partners in the world economic system. This is due to the fact that initiative to begin trading together has always come from outside Africa. The outsiders impose upon the African periphery the particular forms of specialisation now characterising the various African economies. This is asymentry which reflects the commercial dependence of Africa is shown in the unequal exchange already referred to.

She exports agricultural low income commodities subjected to constant and sudden fluctuations in prices and easily substituted for by commodities supplied from elsewhere. In some cases she exports huge quantities of minerals whose demand and pricing is determined by the buyers. On the other hand she imports very expensive manufactured goods which have very high value and whose prices do not fluctuate easily. There is therefore no parity between what she exports and what she imports.

This lack of parity is aggravated by the great financial dependence. This is because foreign capital investments generate a reverse flow of profits transfers. The foreign investors want always to repatriate their profits to their countries. It is the latter and not the former therefore which benefits. Periphery monetary systems shape the resultant dependence because the external holdings of third world countries consist largely of foreign currency such as dollars, pound sterling and other currencies. All these countries have therefore to live under a tight foreign exchange standard system.[15]

To sum up then on this point of dependence, it is to be recorded that if dependence defines the internal situation and is structurally linked to it, a country cannot break out of it simply by isolating hereself from external influences. Such action would simply provoke chaos in a society which is of its essence dependent. The only solution appears to be the change in its

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15 See Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Periphery Capitalism, NY and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973 p 260

internal structure although, needles to say, this would lead to confrontations with the existing international structure. To this extent Africa generally and the landlocked countries particularly need to consider this approach seriously.

Presently there are three peripheral formations in Africa based on the colonial powers. The first is the traditional West Africa macro-region comprising of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Sudan. These countries constitute what is termed 'The Africa of the Old Colonial Economy' - Economic de traite. This macro-region is subdivided into three sub-regions namely the Coastal Zone, the hinterland and the Sudan. The Coastal Zone is easily accessible from the outside world and constitutes the richest area. The hinterland serves essentially as a pool of labour for the coast and a market for the industries established there. It is made up of the desert countries of Chad, Niger, Upper Volta and Mali, all of which are landlocked. The second Macro region is the Sudan consists of Zaire, Congo Brazaville, Gabon and Central African Republic. This is 'The Africa of Concession Owning Companies.' The economic exploitation of this region was usually based on independent companies which had secured permission or concessions to undertake mining and plantation agriculture or tapping of rubber using cheap African Labour. These companies combined both governmental and commercial duties. But later these territories were formally annexed by different European powers which continued to issue concessions to the same companies.

The third macro-region was constituted by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia, Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. This was styled 'Africa of the Labour reserves', because Africans in this vast area were expected to provide cheap labour in the gold and diamond mines of South Africa, Copper mines in Zambia and Agricultural plantations in Kenya and Zimbabwe. An African proletariat class was therefore created to supply the required cheap labour. Of the countries mentioned only Tanzania and Uganda did not supply direct labourers to work in other countries. There was therefore complete underdevelopment and dependence of all these countries to South Africa and Zambia's mines and Kenya and Zimbabwe settler controlled economies.

Until recently there were no large scale mining ventures in West Africa. Instead there were organised a dominant trade monopoly based on the colonial import and export houses and the pyramidal structuring of the trade network they dominated along with the Lebanese who occupied intermediate positions. The African were forced to occupy subordinate positions. The Colonial government also introduced a system of taxation which forced the Africans to produce whatever the monopolists wanted to buy. The Africans had to raise money to pay taxes levelled upon them and so they had to engage in gainful employment dictated by the colonialists.

The monopolists were given political support which enabled them to appropriate to themselves some of the tribal lands and to organise internal migrations from regions that were deliberately left poor so as to be used as labour reserves for the plantation

Zones. Traditional society was as a result distorted beyond recognition. It lost its independence and its main function was now to produce for the world market under conditions which, because they impoverished it, deprived it of any prospect of radical change. This traditional society was not therefore in transition to modernity. As a dependent peripheral society its progress was completely blocked. South Africa has also relentlessly tried to remain and expand the market for her products in Zambia whose external economic dependence has not altered despite the attainment of Independence. Geographically Zambia is a vast land mass. But the colonial division of Central and Southern Africa during the notorious scramble at the end of the 19th Century left her completely landlocked in the heart of the continent. By the time she attained her independence in 1964 her political economy had become firmly integrated with and dependent upon those of the white ruled nations to the South namely South Africa and Rhodesia.

The new Zambia government made major efforts to break its dependence on rail transport and other infrastructures tying her to South Africa. But it did not succeed. Up to now Zambia's economy is externally dependent on South Africa which together with her allies overseas subject her to numerous pressures. Zambia inherited institutional economic structures which make such dependence inevitable. She has a dual economy which is both industrial based on the copper belt producing a tenth of the world's copper and agriculture. This apart, no developmental infrastructures in the form of roads, schools and hospitals were laid.

Two giant companies namely Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust emerged to dominate the copper belt. They bought 50,000 square miles of mining concessions from the British South Africa (BSA) Company.[16] It is estimated that the total cost of profits, interests, freight and insurance paid annually to these two companies which dominate Zambia's export enclave was on the border of two-thirds of her total foreign exchange earnings. These funds could have been used to train Zambian labour, build roads, schools, hospitals and equip industries needed to uplift her economy. But this was not done. This case illustrates causes of Zambian underdevelopment and dependence. In 1974 the falling copper prices, rising import costs a heavy and costly international debt created a serious domestic financial crisis which forced her to accept South Afric's detente' approaches.[17]

Then there are the so called South Africa's captives namely Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. As in the case of Zambia the scramble of the 19th Century left them small political units totally landlocked and dependent on South Africa economically. As such the entire set of Institutional arrangements established during colonial rule continued to shape their economies into a typically neocolonial relationship with South Africa. The basic industries there are predominantly owned by South Africa or interlinked. This is especially so in case of American firms operating in Southern Africa. The major banks are Barclays and Standard owned by Britain and South Africa respectively.

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16 Ibid p. 223
17 Ibid p. 238

The handful of wholesale trading houses which import manufactured goods are almost wholly owned by South Africans. These three states remained for a longtime incorporated into South Africa's Customs Union whose terms were negotiated more than fifty years age in 1910 to be exact. Under the terms of this treaty South Africa collected customs on all goods shipped through its territory to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which then received baraly one percent of all South African duties. This arrangement benefitted South Africa more since incomes received by the three small parteners for their exports were governed by world commodity prices. The existence of the Customs Union led to relatively expensive South African goods.

Swaziland and Botswana have now left this customs Union and have their own currencies to reduce dependence on South Africa. Lesotho which is totally inside South Africa could not leave. But all the same the balkanisation of Africa left states too small to establish fully viable economies at high levels of productivity. They will need to unite with their neighbous into larger, self-sufficient and increasingly integrated units capable of restructuring the regional economy. In the case of Lesotho, which is an island in South Africa, this option is nonexistant.[18] Her plight is therefore total and seemingly permanent.

The Southern Africa case described above gives an incite into the type of problems to be tackled in this study. South Africa which is not a landlocked country controls the economic and political life of six landlocked countries namely Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It also controls

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18 Ibid pp 174-176

the coastal states of Mozambique and Namibia. Deliberate colonial designs created this situation and the landlocked countries there are too small to act independently of South Africa. Indeed this vast area had three main axis of development to which the rest of the countries in the region were attached. These were South Africa itself, its subcentre in Rhodesia and Kenya in East Africa.

Thus while Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Mozambique andNamibia were left undeveloped so that they xcan be markets for South African goods and source of cheap labour, Uganda, Ruanda, Burundi and Tanzania, Eastern Zaire and Southern Sudan were kept in abeyance so that they could be markets for Kenya goods and a resevior of cheap labour. It was a long these lines that Cecil Rhodes the founder of Rhodesia dreamt of a Cape to Cairo railway to cover all British possessions starting from Cape Town in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt. The economic stagnation of all landlocked countries in this and other regions of Africa followed deliberate colonial designs which having been set in motion cannot be easily reversed.

The perpectual economic dependence of the coastal states and constant encroachment on the political sovereignty of landlocked states by the former has been a great cause of conflict in the Southern and Eastern regions of Africa. The inland location imposes limitations on the freedom of the landlocked countries to act freely as required of all sovereign states. These states want to formulate and implement policies in accordance with their own interests and prevailing conditions in the world at large.

In short they want to establish their own identity, style of doing things and make irdependent contributions to the development of the human race. But to their dismay they find themselves unable to adhere to this fundamental requirement because the coastal states try to impose their own policies or to use their advantageous location to secure compliance of the former to their unacceptable domestic and foreign policies.

Obviously a lot of tension, friction and uncertainty are generated inside the landlocked states because no country would want to compromise her sovereignty. There are too many instances where compromises are just not possible due to the fundamental differences in the socio-economic and moral basis of the countries concerned. For example South Africa's neighbours will not come to terms with the former's racial policies. They did not also compromise on Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. When such stalements arise the economies of landlocked countries suffer tremendously and the political sovereignty they cherrish so much becomes extremely hard to uphold.

These are the wtwo crucial issues this thesis is out to investigate namely the effect of location on the economy of Africa's landlocked countries and the impact such location imposes on their political relations with the coastal countries which surround them. In examining these issues a number of approaches have to be adopted. The first examines the types of economies operated by the various landlocked countries placed in the three geographical regions of Africa namely West East and Southern Africa. In West Africa there are the desert or

Sahel countries of Chad, Niger, Mali, Upper Volta and to some extent the Central African Republic operating poor desert economies beside a very rich rainy**coastal** zone to which they depend for their economic survival.

Then there is the East Africa regions comprising of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi as landlocked countries lying astride the coastal states of Kenya and Tanzania on the East coast and Zaire on the West. These countries operate very rich agricultural economies similar to those of Kenya and Tanzania and except for Rwanda and Burundi have equally strong economies and markets. As such they could compete in world markets.except for the landlocked position of Uganda which gives both Kenya and Tanzania the edge.

Finally there is the Southern Africa region where Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are the landlocked countries depending on unacceptable South Africa. Zambia and Zimbabwe have affluent economies based on mining and agriculture. Botswana, Lostho and Swaziland are too closely tied to South Africa and too small to be viable economic units. Malawi has a poor agricultural economy. This has in the past baen a region of labour reserves for South Africa.

The second approach to be adopted in examining the stated issues is the facilities offered to each landlocked country in terms of alternatives for routes to reach the open sea. Some countries are landlocked by a number of countries which can give them altternative passage to the sea if they are placed on different sides. For instance when the Southern route became unavailable to Zambia in 1966 she turned to Tanzania on the Easterns side and exported her goods by road and later by rail through the

port of Dar es Salaam. Some countries are landlocked by more than one country on different sides but passage to the sea is available only on one side. The examples include Burundi and Uganda and all the landlocked countries of West Africa already named. Such countries have no viable alternatives to reach the sea.

There is also a case of a country being landlocked by more than one country on the side which gives it passage to the sea. The example is Rwanda landlocked by Uganda and Kenya. In such a case the situation is rendered more difficult and delicate. Finally a country may be landlocked by one country surrounding it so that she does every thing with that country. The example is Lesotho totally surrounded by South Africa. In such a case the political and economic relations between the two assumes a different dimension.

Finally there is also the political strategy to be adopted in examining the stated issues of the thesis which is the one of good neighbourliness. Some coastal countries like those in West Africa are very friendly and ready to help their disadvantaged neighbours so much so that the latter do not suffer due to closure of routes and ports to them or charge exorbitant tarriffs to make them unable to engage in foreign trade. They also do not impinge too much on their political sovereignty. The East African case has been full of upheavils over the last fifteen years. Uganda's relations with Kenya and Tanzania have had too many ups and downs culminating into a full scale war with

Tanzania between October, 1978 and April, 1979. Uganda lost this war. Uganda relations with Kenya had many upheavils during and after the disappearance of Idi Amin from the Uganda political scene.

The Southern Africa case has been one of extreme hostility, bitterness and suspicion between the black countries in the region and the white ruled regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the former Portuguese colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola. There were fundamental differences between the white regimes with their oppressive racial laws and the black states seeking justice for the African being oppressed by the former. Relations between black Africa and South Africa are completely irreconcilable because of the former's support for liberation movements.trying to overt the repressive regime in the latter.

KASHIM IBRAHIM DI

Plan of the Study

This study has seven chapters including the introduction. Each of these chepters has a specific objective to accomplish. Chapter one is the introduction. Its purpose is first to introduce the main hypotheses to be investigated and secondly to give background information about African landlocked countries. It considers how these countries came to be landlocked and why they are suffering so much from such location. It also explains the theoretical basis of the main hypotheses to be probed, These are the concept of underdevelopment and depsudence.

Chapter two's objective is to give an over view of the economic and political hardships confronting all African

landlocked countries, This chapter deals with these problems on a continental scale. The idea is to acquire a firm grip of the problems at a continental level before going a head to treat the case studies. This is necessary because the study concerns all African countries. The two principle propositions of the theses must therefore be traced in all landlocked countries of Africa so as to show that these propositions have a continental coverage.

Chapter three has one main objective. That is to treat the first case study of the theses. The aim is to examine in detail the economic situation in Niger Republic in relation to its import - export trade with overseas countries taking into consideration ~ costs and mode of transportation and other expenses traders in there have to pay to get goods to or from any overseas country. Chapter four does the same thing for the Republic of Uganda. The data obtained in Chapters three and four are then compared in chapter five. This is a comparative study and Uganda and Niger are the two case studies which must be compared. Data about the two countries is assembled separately then compared in the following chapter.

Perhaps it is worth while to point out why these two countries have been selected for comparison. Since the idea is to reveal as much information on African landlocked countries as possible a comparative approach is preferred. In that case the countries being compared must be as different and as further apart as possible. The Niger Republic is in West Africa and it is a desert country within the Sahel region.

region. The Republic of Uganda on the other hand is a tropical country lying astride the Equator and whose economy is based on tropical agricultural crops of coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and others. Niger's economy is based on mining agriculture being poorly developed due to poor climatic conditions. Finally, Uganda has always been apart of the East African economic system with all infrastruatures such as railways, roads, airways, posts and telecommunications and harbours laid up on an East African basis. Niger has no direct rail link to the sea. She uses a combination of rail and road transportation system which link her to the English Speaking Federal Republic of Nigeria to which she depends too much for her economic suvival. All these differences make the comparison worthwhile.

Chapter six aims to survey the work being done by various international agencies operating under the anspices of the United Nations. These include the United Nation's Seabed Committee dealing with regulations governing the use of the high seas United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the United Nation's Development Programme (UNDP) World Bank and many others. The work of these organisations represent the effort being made by the international community to help landlocked countries of Africa and other pacts of the world. It is therefore better to discuss their work separately.

Chapter seven is the summary and conclusion. All the findings of the previous chapters are summarised, conclusions and recommendations made based on the facts revealed about

these countries. The bibliography is appended at the end of chapter seven.

Research Methodology

The methods employed to collect data for this study have varied according to the type of data required and area being surveyed. Initially personal interviews and questionnaires have been used to collect data on the two case studies namely the republics of Niger and Uganda. For the Niger republic data has been obtained with the help of the First Secretary in the Niger Embassy in Lagos through personal interview with him in his office. A number of Nigerian corporations and associations were also interviewed because of their close link with Niger's trade overseas. These included The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA). The Nigerian Railways Corporation (NRC) and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs who keep files on the Nigerian- Niger political relations, Ecowas, and files of other landlocked countries such as Chad, Upper Volta and Mali.

Interviews were also conducted with the United Nation's Development Programme Economic Adviser for Norther Nigerian States based in Kaduna for Information on Nigeria/Niger border relations and general information on UNDP's programme in Niger. The Director of The Institute for Crop Research in Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) based at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria was also interviewed in connection with the state of agriculture in Niger. This Institute is responsible to develop agriculturally based industries in all countries of arid West Africa and it runs many projects in Niger.

With regard to the general survey of the problems of landlocked countries in Africa described in chapter two data has been based on official government policies, statements in international meetings organised to discuss these problems and personal observations. This method was adopted here because the survey covers the whole African Continent and its aim is to give a general impression of these problems on a continental scale. before taking up specific case studies. The same approach has been employed together data for chapter six. Publications of the various international agencies handling these problems in Africa plus personal interviews of some of their representatives in Nigeria have made up the data used in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF AFRICAN LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES

From the introduction this study has two stated propositions to investigate. The first one is the view that the inland location of Africa's landlocked countries is one of the main factors responsible for the prevailing economic backwardness and subsequent lag behind their coastal neighbours. The second proposition to be investigated is that the economic hardships confronting these countries can be aggravated or reduced depending on the kind of foreign policies they pursue towards the coastal countries around them and to which they depend to export and import goods overseas. It was also stated in the introduction that the theoretical framework of this study is in the context of underdevelopment and dependence started at the beginning of the colonial era in Africa.

At the time of independence the outgoing colonial rulers bequeathed to these new states a two dimensional problem. Internally they had to begin operating economies incapable of expansion, divasification and independent existence. Expansion seems to be impossible because of lack of capital, skills and markets in which to sell finished products. Foreign capital is required to carry out necessary expansions and this is, ofcourse, not forthcoming except in the disadvantageous context of Africa as the periphery for European goods. Diversification is not possible for the same

reason and the fact that the economies were constructed to supplement manufacturing industries of Europe. Thus there is very little trade between African countries or within the domestic markets of each one of them because they do not consume what they produce. Most of their products are sold overseas in world markets at low values and it is not possible to undertake too much diversification in such circumstances.

Both diversification and expansion can only take place in economies capable of operating independently of other economics. But with the economies of African countries under review this is not possible. They depend on foreign investments, foreign markets and secure independent existence they are not likely to expand and diversify or disengage themselves from strings imposed up them from outside.

The second problem bequeathed to these states by their former rulers was the fact that they operate essentially export import economies with overseas countries. Such an arrangement requires the acquisition and maintainence of good cheap routes to the sea, easy access to international ports and ability to own or him big ocean going vessels to carry their merchandise. It also requires them to offset any possible excesses in expenditure due to transport and other costs. Unfortunately most of the countries being studied here do not have good cheap routes to the sea by rail, road or air. They also do not have easy access to ports of coastal countries and capacity to ship their exports and imports at will.

Provision of transit rights to the sea use of ports

any state are highly contested controversies in international law and they re closely tied to the sovereign equality of states. Every state has full jurisdiction on all people and property on its territory. Transit through a state's territory and use of its ports can only be granted by that state at its discretion. No higher authority can be applied to enable such services to be provided on terms other than those set by it because this would be undue interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. The problem for landlocked countries is that they have no legall, binding rights of transit to and from the sea and use of ports in foreign territories. Every transaction in this regard must be negotiated bilaterally and such bilateral arrangements cannot be enforced internationally. Once the will of the coastal state is nolonger there they cease to exist.

In Africa this has caused a serious source of friction between the landlocked countries and their coastal neighbours. The former have found out that their political sovereignty is often impaired. They wish to assert themselves and act freely as equals to the latter. But the status of dependence to which they were reduced subjects them too much to the wills of their coastal neighbours which by implication appear to be more sovereign and can control or influence the economic and political destinies of the landlocked countries. They can deny them the right to import or export goods overseas by just withdrawing permission to pass through their territories to or from the sea.

Sometimes the coastal states may require the landlocked states to get special permission to import or export certain categories of cargo such as military hardware. In that case they may search all cargo destined to a landlocked country to make sure that there is no violation of the conditions set. That means that a landlocked country cannot act secretly even in matters where a strict secrecy is necessary such as defence. Sometimes a coastal country may hold up goods of the landlocked countries to frustrate their economies, defence capability and independence. This happens if the two sets of countries follow divergent and competitive foreign policies or if they have different social systems which breed hostility between them. South Africa offers an example of this.

This point is to be treated later in this chapter. Now it is appropriate to review briefly the legal position concerning transit trade of landlocked countries. During the last three hundred years consistent efforts have been made to establish the right of free and unrestricted transit to landlocked countries. Emphasis was mainly on freedom to sail on the high seas and expansion of international trade. The right of way under public law provided landlocked states with unquestionable right of passage over territories separating them from the sea without need of any treaty or, in theory, even of an international agreement. In Europe the recognition of the principle of freedom of transit started long before the question became a matter of importance for developing landlocked countries.[1]

1 Devendra Raj, Upadhya, Transit Trade of Landlocked States,

transport is a difficult one unless they too receive external assistance. This could be achieved more effectively if joint cooperative action were launched between the land-locked and the transit state. Unless transit routes and port facilities for the landlocked states are not improved in the transit states the economic growth of landlocked states the economic growth of landlocked states will continue to be adversely affected. The less efficient the transit routes and ports, the less capability of the landlocked states to absorb increased costs and the less physically secure the transit routes.[2]

The recognition of free and unrestricted transit is not only a matter of great importance for landlocked countries but also that of survival. Freedom of transit over the territories of adjacent states is a matter of convinience to a coastal state. This question of survival has led landlocked countries to raise it at Heads of states level at international conferences. In his analysis of the 'Conventionon Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, concluded in 1965 Dr. John H. E. Fried hinted th t the absence of solutions to transit trade problems might lead to a new source of international misunderstanding. Transit trade problems are getting more important as time goes on because unhampered, fast reliable and economical transit is becoming ever more essential for nations and individuals. He concluded that unless progress is made in this field, the world will be faced, because of

2 Anglin, D: The Politics of Alternative Routes in Landlocked Southern Africa, in Cervenka, Z, ed, Land-locked Countries of Africa, Uppsala: Scandinarian Institute of African Studies, 1973.

frustration of landlocked states with a new source of dissent and complications on an international scale.[3]

What Dr. Fried predicted has since become the reality of politics in Africa. An examination of the political relations of African landlocked countries and their coastal neighbours is a reflection of this sad fact. In Southern Africa for instance there are six landlocked countries whose passages to the sea is countrolled by South Africa. They are Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The latter became an independent state in April, 1980. For the greatest part of the period covered by this study Zimbabwe had no real problems of transit because South Africa was very friendly to her and readily gave her assistance.

The geography of all these countries has some conspicuous features to be noted. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are almost completely landlocked by one country the Republic of South Africa. Botswana and Swaziland have small strips of territory connecting them to the republics of Zambia and Mozambique respectively. That means that all matters to do with transit must be negotiated between them and South Africa on a bilateal basis. This also means that these states must recognise the government of South Africa and accept her social system so as to secure effective and convinient terms of transit. This, however, they are unable to do because of the moral and political conceptions to human justice which South Africa grossly violates. Malawi,

3 Fried, J,H,E, 'The 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States', in Indian Journal of International Law VI, 1966.

Zambia and Zimbabwe were once administered as one political region the defunct Central Africa Federation which broke up in 1964. As such all their transport routes and their economies as a whole were based in the white dominated Southern Rhodesia now Zimbabwe. Salisbury was the capital and headquater for every thing. Malawi and Zambia were placed on the periphery within the Federation which was in turn placed on the periphery of South Africa.

The sources of underdevelopment and dependence could thus be easily identified and analysed. This arrangement enabled and still enables the Republic of South Africa to control the economic and political destinies of six countries. The most acute consequences of this came to light between the years 1965 and 1980, which saw the beginning and end of Rhodesia's protracted illegal independence from Britain. African countries including the ones under scrutiny here could not recognise the illegal and obnoxious white regime in Salisbury under Ian Smith. Instead they supported the African Liberation Organisations which cropped up to topple the white regime. They gave these nationalists political asylum , helped in treining, arming their armies plus moral encouragement. As expected this resulted into bitter hostility between Rhodesia and the rest of Africa and the extreme fear of being toppled led Smith to seek and cultivate closer links with South Africa. The latter easily cooperated because she felt her own security and economic interests depended on Rhodesia remaining white.

A very precarious situation was built up. South African troops joined those of Rhodesia to fight the African Liberation forces and their allies in the rest of independent black Africa with particular emphasis on those states closest to them. The two white regimes used all resources in their power to subdue the countries depending on them economically. They thought that this would force them to stop supporting the Liberation fighter. Rhodesia closed her borders with Zambia and by so doing the latter could no longer use the Southern routes to the sea which go through Rhodesia and South Africa. For once economics and Location came to be used to influence the making and implementation of foreign policy in Zambia. They thought that if Zambia's copper could no longer reach international markets her economy would crumble and this would break her nerves of resistence to white rule. She would stop supporting the liberation fighers and close their camps and if every other country in the region did the same there would be no one to comfront or oppose the white regimes in the two states.

The calculations, however, misfired, Zambia found alternative routes by rail and road through Tanzania and began shipping her copper using the port of Dar es Salaam. A special railway 'The Tazara' railway was promptly construct with Chinese aid to link the two countries. But this case illustrated two things. The first is that if a landlocked country is not on good terms with her coastal neighbour which gives her transit facilities to the sea the latter can use her advantageous location to punish the former who,

suit the coastal st[illegible]. If Tanzania had not come to Zambia's rescue the latter would have had no choice but to submit to the forces of evil in the South. Secondly this case illustrates that the landlocked countries always live under conditions of economic and political uncertainty as unexpected events might crop up anytime to change the status quo. There is no way they can safe guard against this. Such uncertainties are obviously not good for the development of healthy economies.

Botswana on her part has categorizally stated that she has not only to contend with the harsh realities of geography but also with the political and racial tyrannies on her frontiers. She is enclosed between South Africa and Zimbabwe which under Ian Smith was hostile to her. According to her Chief Delegat to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Caracas, capital of Venezuala, Mr. Legwaila, Botswana had since her independence tried and succeeded in establishing democratic political institutions despite her geographical handicaps referred to. But due to her proximity to racist regimes she received large influx of political refugees whom because of her opposition to racism she had to accept and assist. This aroused the anger of these regimes particularly South Africa which gives her transit facilities to the sea.[4]

Mr. Legwaila expressed the view that as long as the political relations in Southern Africa remained as it is Botswana's right of access to the sea could not befully

4 UN, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea: Official Records Vol II, New York 1975 pp 245-246

guaranteed. He accordingly impressed on this conference to include in the convention on the Law of the Sea, expected to be rewritten, the right of free transit and access to and from the sea which would not be predicated to agreements with the neighbouring states. He further demanded that guarantees of the right of transit should be provided in the convention so that any country denied access to the sea could appeal to the United Nations for redress. According to Mr. Legwaila, Botswana also wanted to make charges for transit and use of port facilities to be commensulate to services rendered. Finally he argued that if a landlocked country used its own means of transport she should not pay any charges for transit through the territory of the transit country.

Mr. Legwaila's submission gives a deep incite in the kind of relationship his country has with South Africa. The first thing to note is the fact that events within South Africa's domestic environment spill into Botswana and a lot of friction is generated because the latter does not endorse the former's policies. The geographical proximity of the two countries is responsible for this. South Africa is quite often tempted to use her geographical location to punish Botswana with a view to making her change her policies and national aspirations to support apartheid. The second thing to note is that South Africa makes transit rights conditional to political support for her racial laws and failing to obtain such support she overcharges Botswana for transit services given. Both these measures destabilise

Botswana's economy and make formulation and pursuance of independent foreign policies very difficult indeed.

The excessive charges made on Botswana's transit goods reduce profits she earns from her exports and raise the prices of imports. Her economy therfore tends to stagnate and to accummulate deficits in the balance of payments since what she earns from her exports cannot pay for what she inports. It was in this light that her Chief Economic Planner Mr. H. C. L. Hermans made the following sad observation:

> To be landlocked is difficult enough.
> To be black and landlocked in Southern Africa
> is a lonely and expensive experience.[5]

The above observation highlights on the geographical location and political conflict resulting from it. Botswana is suffering economically because she is landlocked but the suffering she experiences is hightened by her foreign policies which do not support apartheid or racial discrimination inside South Africa. The two propositions of the study are thus easily illustrated in this case.

Having examined the case for Botswana it is time to see how Lesothno and Swaziland are faring. Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa whose domestic policies of apartheid she does not endorse and yet economically she cannot survive without the latter. Lesotho's experiences and resultant policy about the subject of foreign trade for land-locked countries were vividly put by her Chief delegate to the conference already referred to Mr. Molapo. Mr. Molapo

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5 Op cit p. 42

endorsed all his Botswana counterpart had stated earlier. He, however, compared his country to other landlocked countries in Europe namely the Vatican and San Marino both completely surrounded by a single state Italy.

He observed that in the case of these two European states they shared the same culture language and traditions and there is political goodwill on the part of Italy consequent upon that. But unlike them Lesotho is totally encircled by a very hostile neighbour whose cultural values, domestic and foreign policies are totally at variance with her own. This is the genises of her economic and political plight. Lesotho has to use South Africa's ports to export and import goods overseas and she is properly linked to South Africa's railway system. But because of her difficult topography which is highly mountaneous she is forced to transport most of her goods by air. So in addition to transit by land she needs to use South Africa's airports and airspace.

Unfortunately, Lesotho's existing transit rights were based on customery international law and the principle of necessity. Technically therefore she has no transit rights at all since the prevailing circumstances cannot be governed by such ancient and ambiguous claims. It is her wish therefore to make the rights of transit clearly recognised in a multilateral binding convention. As circumstances are now Lesotho has only one country with which she can negotiate on a bilateral basis for transit rights and this is South Africa which is unfriendly. She is therefore not in a position to negotiate at all. She just has to suffer whatever hardships

imposed on her economy and political system by South Africa.

Lesotho's policy objectives are accordingly to make legally binding laws to the effect that the right of free access to and from the sea is an integral part of the established principles of international law. The right of landlocked countries to free access to and from the sea derived from the application of the fundamental principles of freedom of the high seas strengthened by the principle of the area of the sea bed as a common heritage of mankind. Because of her special needs Lesotho wanted to include airtransport to this right and to the convention to declare that the transit states should not be able to unilaterally define their legitimate interests and by so doing deny or impede transit or access to the sea by landlocked states.

The Lesotho submission touched on a number of very fundamental issues which cannot be resolved internationally but which show her total disillusionment resulting from the fact that she is landlocked by one country and so has no alternative routes to cultivate in other countries. While it is true that the high seas and sea bed are the common heritage of mankind to be exploited or used equally by all states landlocked or not, it is not true that coastal states can or should surrender fundamental aspects of their soverdigty in their supply of transit services to landlocked countries. National interests are selected and applied at will by every nation. The international community cannot therefore enact laws preventing coastal countries from defining their national interests of the landlocked countries are impeded in the process.

In the Lesotho case one can see the painful effects of dependence and underdevelopment to which she and other Landlocked countries are subjected. South Africa Literally decides on who must trade with Lesotho in what goods and on what terms of transit. She also decides on what punishment to give her if she feels that she is misbehaving. In other words she uses her position to determine the pace of economic advancement Lesotho can make and the direction of her forign policy.[6]

In 1977 for example South Africa established a Bantustan homeland for some of her black population and proclaimed it as the independent state of Bophuthatswan. This was an area directly adjacent to Botswana and she claimed that she had transferred Botswana's right of transit to the new republic of Bophuthatswan. Botswana was accordingly directed to neg negotiate for her transit rights with the government of Bophuthatswan. In doing this South Africa knew pretty well that African countries, Botswana included, do not recognise the empty independence of the Bantustans she creates. Her intention was to put Botswana into a tight corner where she would be forced to recognise South Africa's abominable policies in return for the much needed transit rights. Naturally, Botswana refused to do this and so she has no transit rights.

In a similar fashion, she had earlier created the Transkei Bantustan adjacent to Lesotho. As in the case of Botswana South Africa transferred rights of transit for Lesotho to the government of Transkei and told her to negotiate with

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6 Op cit p 46

Transkei on all matters concerning transit. Lesotho could, of course, not accept this suggestion and so she, too, was denied rights of transit through South Africa. To sum up then it is to be noted that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have no transit rights at all. They depend on charity wherever this is available and are therefore economic hostages of South Africa. Neither the international community nor South Africa could give them guarentees for transit rights or specify any definite manner and charges to be made for use of South African territory.

In the circumstances described above it is small wonder that the economies of landlocked countries can hardly flourish. The competing interests of the transit countries cannot let them advance as much as they could otherwise wish. It is also evident here that if these three hostages of South Africa could endorse the latters apatheid system much of the hardships now operating against them would be eased by South Africa as she did against Malawi which, though she does not endorse apartheird, she does not support, train or house liberation tighters engaged in overthrowing the white oppressive regime in South Africa. She also has diplomatic relations with the latter.

This extreme relationship of dependence which South Africa operates against other countries in the region was made possible and is strenghtened by foreign West European and American Capital. To a great extent therefore the apartheid system is really not opposed by them because it protects their financial as well as military strategic interests.

To justify this these powers argue against an economic blockade of South Africa because such a move would bring greater suffering to the landlocked countries located in the region and dependent on South Africa for their economic survival. But in reality an economic blockade would hurt them more be because their own economies are the ones which expanded into South Africa. South Africa on her part is a ware of the unshakable support she receives from her allies and so she tightens her grip on her hostages daily.

The evidence gathered so far shows that geographical location has created special economic and political handicaps for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which other coastal countries in the region like Mozambique and Angola do not suffer. The landlocked position gives South Africa derived power to torture these states and to influence the way they formulate their foreign policy objectives. But she is not in a position to do the same to the coastal states which by virture of their location do not need South Africa to conduct business with the outside world. Their capacity to act freely as soverign states is consequently much greater than their land-locked neighbours discussed. Mozambique and Angola for instance follow very strong socialist economic and political ideologies. The latter has even Cuban troops to help her defend herself. The rates at which their economies are developing are also determined by their own designs and capability both of which are beyond the reach of South Africa. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland cannot adopte such policies because of their location vis-a vis - South Africa which is

bent on keeping socialism and communism out of the South African region altogether.

The case of Zambia has already been noted. The Zambian economy could not flourish because of the political changes introduced into Rhodesia by Ian Smith backed by South Africa. The economy contracted huge and immediate transport and other overhead costs on the new routes by land and rail through Tanzania. The Zambian foreign policy towards Rhodesia also changed abruptly. A new political relationship between her and Tanzania took off immediately to safeguard her economy and national integrity. It was her intricate landlocked position which fermented the new relationship with Tanzania and it was the same position which had induced Smith to put her in such a tight corner.

The Zambia case therefore illustrates how changes in policy and political style in Rhodesia forced Zambia to make simultaneous changes in her own policies to cope with the new situation. Being landlocked means inability to plan and follow independent economic and political paths. Instead, a landlocked country has to be on the lookout and be ready to respond to demands imposed on it by events occurring in the surrounding countries. This creates the uncertainty and anxiety which are detrimental to the growth of the economy and stability inside the landlocked country. Zambia's economy and political style were disorganised within a single day and she had to undergo huge costs to retrieve them.

Transportation to Dar es Salaam by road was terribly expensive and when the railway was built Zambia had the

added disadvantage of having to repay the loan and increased haulage costs through the new route and port. The Dar es Salaam port was not ready to handle such big traffic so delays and storage charges had to be incurred plus costs of enlarging the port to fit her s requirements. All these reduced Zambia's income on her exports and pushed up prices of imports.

This is yet another example where location played havoc to the economy and politics of a country in Southern Africa. Ian Smith's closure of the border between his country and Zambia was prompted by Zambia's landlocked position which gave Rhodesia, acting in concert with South Africa, ability to strangle the former's economy and through economic strings Smith hoped to subdue Zambia politically also. He succeeded in inflicting severe strains on her economy but tailed to subjugate her politically. The failure in this letter respect was due to the assistance given to Zambia by Tanzania. The latter is another coastal state adjacent and very friendly to Zambia. So when the southern route became impossible Zambia easily found an alternative to the east. Zambia's position is therefore better than those of Lesotho Swaziland and Botswana which offered them no alternatives.

As in the case of Botswana and Lesotho discussed earlier Zambia's response and policy was given by her Chief delegate to the same law of the sea conference Mr. Mhlanga Mr. Mhlanga told the conference that Zambia's right of access to and from the sea had been grossly violated by her Southern neighbours repeatedly despite condemnation by the international

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community. For that reason Zambia had decided to abandon the Southern route in order to give effect to the United Nations resolutions calling for economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Accordingly Zambia had declined to take up Smith's offer later on to re-open the border between the two countries to allow her resume the flow of traffic through South Africa and Rhodesia.[7]

Zambia's decisions were guided by political principles. She was fully committed to the liberation struggle and liquidation white racist regimes and she could not be blackmailed about it. But as it has been noted she paid and still pays heavily for this policy. Her capacity to withstand the pressure being put on her is due to the fact that she is landlocked by more than one country and only those to the South were unfriendly. Her friends to the north east and west giveher the necessary support and with that she is able to pursue the same foreign policies towards the unfriendly south.

However, the real Zambian plight was vividly put by her. President Dr. Kenneth Kaunda in June 1978. Dr. Kaunda observed that both Central and Southern Africa were passing through the worst crises in their history. There were too many liberation wars going on in the region. In Zimbabwe and Namibia these wars had reached a decisive stage and South Africa was sitting on a deadly time bomb which could explode any time. Zambia was also a neighbour of the much unpredictable Shaba Province of Zaire which since the days of

7 Ibid.

Moise Tshombe in the early 1960s has always been a rebellious part of Zaire.

Such events, Dr. Kaunda observed, had produced a new situation in the region which was far more critical and dangerous than it had ever been before. He explained that the future of Central and Southern Africa was bound up with the future of Zambia and therefore she could not afford to dismiss or ignore it. The responses she had to make to each of these crises had to be with vision, committment and courage of conviction. Zambia had to do what she considered right and in her interest as well as that of free Africa. He felt that the security and well being of Zambia depended upon her economic strength. Accordingly it was highly desirable to build a strong and prosperous Zambia which would have the capacity to maintain peace and stability. It was only through economic strength and self reliance which would promote national security and freedom of Zambia as a nation.[8]

It is obvious from the foregoing that Zambia is trying to cope with a set of interrelated crises at the national, regional and global levels. Her policies therefore have to produce sufficient results to permit her escape from her inherited dependence and underdeveloped positions. The increases in the crises confronting her were indicative of increasing rather than declining problems of national inequalities, regional conflict and global stratification. Her geographical location made her part and parcel of the economic

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8 International Labour Office, Narrowing the Gap; Planning for Basic Needs and Productive Employment in Zambia, Addis Ababa: ILO Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa 1977 p 1

and political conflicts in the Southern Africa region. It also made her highly vulnerable to economic and political strangulation in two ways. The first is the adverse effect it has on her overseas export and import trade. The second is the spillover effect of political and economic upheavils within the domestic politica. environments of the countries around her to which she has no control.

South Africa is politically unstable and any changes inside there which are likely to be violent have serious repercussions for all countries in the region. The fighting there can easily spread into all of them and thus cause serious and negative effect on the political economic stability of each one of them. The Namibia issue and the precarious political situation in Shaba Province pose additional threats to Zambia's security. The recent South African attack on Angola can easily be extended to her. The independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 eased part of the tension that had been built up by years of hostility. But still Zambia has much to be worried about.

All told it seems that the challenges produced by the current conditions are part of a continuing structural condition in her economy and political strategy rather then a transitory superficial difficulty. Zambia has reached a point when major changes in its basic strategy of economic and social development are required. The economic crisis has much deeper and externally oriented causes which make it inscapable for her/to make major changes in her future economic policy.

This, then, is the position of landlocked countries in central and Southern Africa. It has been noted that those countries which were vehemently opposed to white supremacy in South Africa and Rhodesia white minority rule suffered more than those which did not. Rhodesia and Malawi which are both landlocked but did not oppose apartheid in South Africa did not suffer at all while Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia which opposed and still oppose it suffered tremendously. This is a measure of the operative differences in their foreign policies towards South Africa.

In East Africa there are the landlocked countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Burundi is the smallest and poorest followed by Rwanda. Uganda is the biggest richest, has a big population on which a healthy domestic market can thrive and a better location inland which gives her many neighbours to trade with, acquire transit rights from and to which she gives transit rights inland. She has in addition a direct railway and road links to Mombasa port on the Indian Ocean which she uses to import and export goods through Kenya. She also has another railway connection to the port of Tango in Tanzania via Lake Victoria. Goods are carried first by steamers across Lake Victoria and railed to Tanga through Masoma. Uganda is also nearer to the sea than either Burundi or Rwanda. Her transport costs are therefore not as high as their are for the latter two countries.

However, since Uganda is one of the two landlocked countries selected for detailed examination she will be treated in a special chapter. As for Burundi and Rwanda it must be

noted that they have no railways for external and domestic transport. Transport of goods and people is by road alone. Burundi uses the Tanzanian poet of Dare es Saloam and goes through a distance of over one thousand miles to reach it. From Dar es Salam up to Kigowm on Lake Tanganyika at the border with Burundi there is a railway which is used. But from there road transport is used up to Bujumbura Ler Capital city. Similarly Rwanda uses the Uganda Kenya railway up to Kampala in Uganda and then goes by road up to Kigali the Capital which is approximately five hundred miles away from Kampala.

Transport to and from the sea for both these small countries is a lengthy and very laborious exercise indeed let alone being expensive. To begin with only a limited number of goods are brought in by train due to inadequate train services. Road transport has been the main method used by Rwanda since 1970 when the operations of railway transport was greatly interferred with. Rwanda has to traverse the territorier of Uganda and Kenya to reach the sea. A round journey is approximately one thousand five hundred miles. It is quite well known that road transport is far more expensive, less efficient and hazardous then railway transport. Both the Burundi and Rwandese economy must bare this which they can illafford.

In many cases trucks leave Rwanda empty to pick up cargo in Mombasa. This is because they import more goods than they export. It is also due to the kind of goods and trucks needed to carry them. For example all petrol trucks have to leave

Rwanda and Burundi empty because they cannot be used for anything else. After emptying the fuel the trucks are serviced and prepared to repeat the journey. On the average one truck can make only one journey in a month. This huge expenditure is accummulated partly because of driving empty trucks on the outward journey and this forces up the prices of imports and puts these countries into constant deficit in their international trade since exports cannot offset the costs of imports.

Rwanda is essentially a nonindustrialised country surviving on subsistence agriculture. So is Burundi. Their exports are made up of agricultural crops the most important of which is coffee. Since the price of coffee is fixed internationally and there are many bigger producers coffee does not give them sufficient income to enable their economies to flourish. As a result their economies have shown very little expansion since their independence over two decades ago. The adverse effect of location is quite conspicuous here. On the international scene Rwanda's policies and diplomatic style are a reflection of her landlocked geographical position. She has always endeavoured to remain on cordial relations with all her neighbours especially Uganda and Kenya to which she depends to reach the sea. She has ambassadors in both countries and always tries to remain neutral on matters of concern or conflict between the three East African Countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

But despite this attitude she has been greatly affected by deteriorating political relations between the three count-

ries referred to especially during the most difficult and turbulent rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. While she herself has always been careful to avoid danger to herself Uganda to which she depends so much has acted in the opposite direction. As a result the political wranglings and war which has characterised Uganda's relations with Kenya and Tanzania over the last ten years has hit Rwandese economy very badly. For instance the quarrel between Kenya and Uganda contracted by Idi Amin, then President of Uganda, led to the former imposing an oil embargo on the latter for two months beginning from July to September 1976. It was the first oil embargo to be imposed in the East African region.

Rwanda being on friendly terms with both Kenya and Uganda was not included in the embargo, But since her oil and all other exports have to go through Uganda Amin used that opportunity to seize Rwandese trucks carrying oil from the only oil refinery in East Africa at Rombasa. Rwanda had paid for this oil and she was never compensated by Uganda. Rwanda had to stop temporarily passing her goods in Uganda and turned to the very long and difficult route through Burundi and Tanzania up to the port of Dar es Salaam. This meant moving exports and imports through a distance of over two thousand miles. Because of the long distances the trucks had to traverse and the very high costs only very essential commodities and oil capable of running the basic government services could be imported.

This case was the first visible indication of what can happen to a landlocked country if the coastal country around

her becomes uncooperative. By this action Uganda's economy was grounded and technically she was militarily disarmed also since all the military vehicles and aircraft could not go on operating for long. It is not easy to assess the total loss Uganda underwent during the two months for all sectars of the economy were at a standstill. Government employees were reporting to work on foot arriving late in the morning and leaving early in the afternoon. Rwanda which was not included in the embargo found herself in the same position as Uganda. So Kenya was able to bring both Uganda and Rwanda to their knees without any physical confrontation. Geographical location alone gave Kenya this power and denied it to the two landlocked countries. Amin had to beg for mercy and apologised to Kenya.

Rwanda suffered again during the Tanzania - Uganda war beginning from October, 1978 to June, 1979. This war interrupted the flow of traffic between Rwanda and Kenya because Uganda became impassable. The fighting led to the closure of all routes linking Rwanda and Kenya and Uganda routes were closed to international traffic up to the end of June, 1979 after the overthrow of Amin. During all this time Rwanda could not export or import anything except by air which she could not afford to do. Her already ordered imports remained stranded in Mombasa while her exports were languishing at home for eight months.

The Rwandese case presents the most acute situations of landlocked countries. The dependence relationship in which she was placed by the colonial rulers forces one to

curse colonial rule in Africa in the most emphetic terms possible. The location is the most unattractive to foreign investment. So, not much capital is brought into Rwanda to help advance the economy and yet locally within the country little expansion is possible. With rising costs of transport and imports Rwanda has stagnated economically and politically. The point to be borne in mind here is that the Rwandese case is unique in Africa in that since she is landlocked by two different countries relations between them can hit and strangle Rwandese economy completely and there is nothing she can do about it. In the Kenya/Uganda and Tanzania/Uganda conflicts she could only look on.

On her own part she has to compromise her policies first with Uganda and then with Kenya. She has managed to keep on good terms with both of them since her independence in 1960. But this has not and cannot save her from trouble because of the way Uganda and Kenya interact with each other. If the two get on very well it is to Rwanda's advantage and this is what she desires. If they do not she has to suffer without redress because she has nothing to do with the political relations of the other two transit countries. Besides that when trouble flares up between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania Rwanda suffers quietly as international attention is concentrated on where there is trouble. Thus the Tanzania and Uganda war referred to the international community was interested in what was going on in the battle field and remained unaware of the plight this war had put Rwanda in. In circumstances like these she cannot even hope for assistance from

anybody because she is out of sight and out of hearing to all sources of possible aid.

With regard to West Africa there are five landlocked countries to be surveyed namely Central Africa Republic (CAR), Chad, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta. These countries have a number of common characteristics. The first is that they were all ruled by one colonial power France hence they are French speaking. Secondly they all lie within the dry Sahel region which has suffered severe droughts over the last one and half decades. This has made them to be heavily indebted to the international community for their bare subsistence. To some extent the Central African Republic has enjoyed better times because it is rather far from the Sahara desert which has played havoc with the others. Thirdly all these countries have no railways connecting them either to the coast directly or for internal transport.

France saw no purpose in constructing railways purely for domestic use and she felt these areas did not have much to offer the French economy which needed mainly agricultural raw materials. These territories were so dry that they could not support a lively agricultural industry. The little that was produced could be exported to France by air. The French colonial policies in these colonies show quite clearly that France did not come to develop Africa. She came to gain and so invested in fields which yielded big profits and were not too costly. She could therefore not invest in railway and road construction or start big manufacturing industries whose products would have no market. These territories were

therefore maintained as they were and reduced to a status of dependence to France for their economic existence.

The Republic of Niger being one of the case studies will be treated separately in the next chapter. Here discussion will be continued to the other four countries. Taking the Central African Republic first it must be noted that it is a poor desolate country whose economy depends heavily on loans from France. Geographically it is enclosed by the Republics of Chad and Sudan in the North, Cameron in the West and Congo and Zaire in the South. It has an area of over 242,000 square miles but with a very scanty population of less than three million according to the 1974 census figures. Her main natural resources consist of diamonds and uranium produced on a very small scale, timber and a few others. Agriculture is the main stay of the economy. But inadequate transport services have proved to be the main bottleneck to the development of a lively agricultural industry.

As it has already been noted there are no railways to link her to the Atlantic Coast the nearest Ocean. She has no good roads either. River transport is the main method of transport used but this too has suffered setbacks over the last ten years due to the Sahel dry weather noted earlier. Air transport has proved to be the most reliable but by its nature no country's economy can flourish, because of air-transport alone. Despite being gravely affected by problems caused by her landlocked geographical location the Central African Republic has not been very active in participating in international conferences where these problems are discussed.

This may be due to the negative attitude her former dictator Jean Bodell Bokassa had on this subject. It could also be due to too much dependence on France which seemed to be responsible for the survival of the former's economy. As matters are now her views on this subject remain very obscure.

What has been said above accounts also for the Republic of Chad. She too has no elaborated views regarding her difficulties as a landlocked country. Her position is, however, much worse than that of the Central African Republic because she lies in the Sahel dry region proper. The absence of a policy on this subject can be attributed to the great political instability which has put her in a state of Civil War since her independence in 1960. Chad is enclosed by the republic in the South, Niger and Nigeria to the West, Libya in the North and Sudan in the east. It is a vast land with an area of almost helf a million square miles. Most of this vast landmass is pure desert especially in the north. In the 1975 population census she had a small population of approximately five million.

Chad's economic problems have been the concern of the international community since 1971 due to the special hardships she, together with other Sahel countries, have been experiencing. All aid to these countries and future economic strategies are planned centrally because they make up one problematical region. Most of these will be disessed in connection with the republic of Niger which is the special case study in the area.

Urlike the two countries encountered above Mali and Upper Volta have been very seriously concerned about their positions. They have made concrete and detailed proposals to the law of the sea conferences which they have always attended. In the Third United Nations Conference referred to earlier Mali's Chief delegate, Mr. Maiga, argued that the question of right of access to the sea could be approached in two ways. First it can be treated as a covollary of the priciple of freedome of navigation which is the right of all to participate on an equal footing in the exploitation of the common heritage of mankind. The second approach could be to treat it as fundemental element for the expansion of international trade.

To Mali, Mr. Maiga explained, the right of transit was no longer to be considered as a special right of land-locked countries because it had instead become the particular manifestation of a more general right valid for all. It included freedom of transit, communication and trade.[9] In presenting this arguement the Mali Chief delegate sought to widen the sope of the subject and by so doing solicit support from the coastal states. The weakness in his presentetion was in his assumption that both the coastal and landlocked countries needed transit rights on an equal footing. This is, of course, not the case and the conference consequently appeared not to take his views very seriously.

The Upper Volta Chief delegate Mr. Kafando, made a better impact as he had real suggestions to make based on

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9 Op cit p.

situations which caused definite threats to his country's economic viability. According to Mr. Kafande Upper Volta believes that the sea was a factor in the development of peoples, an element of solidarity between nations and a zone of peace and security. Priority to landlocked states includes access to the sea, right of transit and participation by developing landlocked states in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the exclusive economic zones. Because of this Upper Volta holds the view that the right of free access to and from the sea should be without restriction whatsoever. The right of free access to the seabed area ought to be made into law as the sea should not be made the property of coastal states.

Mr. Kafando presented a detailed speech to show Upper Volta's particular and other landlocked states general concern about access and use of the high seas. He made it quite clear that landlocked countries were far more deprived than the coastal neighbours. This is reflected in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) among the least developed countries. He urged the conference to find a definitive solution to ease the economic plight of the land-locked countries resulting from heavy transport costs, lack of industry and high costs of imports all of which reduced their foreign exchange earnings. It was because of this that the landlocked countries were trying to ensure that transit traffic should not be subjects to any customs duties or taxes other than for services rendered. If transit was recognised as a right then the principle of reciprocity would

not exist.[10]

The above statement is of profound importance to this study because it makes it quite clear that landlockedness has been a formidable cause of underdevelopment and dependence in Africa. It also reflects on the fact that this has been a long standing cause of friction among African countries and therefore needs to be quickly and amicably rectified. Upper Volta is one of the least developed countries in Africa and her position is made worse by the fact that she is in the very difficult Sahel region. This explains the great frustration and anxiety with which she approaches this subject.

To summarise, then, the evidence assembled above shows beyond doubt that landlocked countries in Africa have suffered and are still suffering from problems resulting from their inland location. Their economics are developing under very difficult conditions which make them incapable of keeping pace with the coastal states next to them. It has also been shown that African landlocked countries have also found it difficult to preserve their political sovereignty because they have at times to compromise it for transit rights to the sea. Economies of these countries as well as as their political independence can be preserved only if there is political goodwill on the part of coastal states. The Southern African and Uganda's experiences have hinted to this. It is proposed here therefore to review briefly the reactions coastal states have made and are willing to make to meet the demands of their landlocked neighbours.

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10 Ibid pp 239 - 240

The case of South Africa is the most extreme on the noncooperative scale due to the unique political relations between her and all her neighbours. The other coastal states have tried in a limited way to come to the assistance of the landlocked states. But this assistance does not go far enough to completely eliminate the fears and uncertainties of the future of landlocked states. Such fears and uncertainties can only be fully resolved by internationally enacted laws and not mere bilatual agreements which never carry the force of law. If this were to be achieved they would be able to use territories and ports of coastal states to export and import all sorts of goods independent of the wishes or national interests of the latter. Such laws would free them from negotiating with governments of coastal states since this is egarded as an infringement on their political soveraignty. It would also give them liberty to quarrel or even go to war with them without fearing for their goods to be impounded.

As the case is the coastal states cannot accept such out-rageous demands which would mean surrendering their own political soveraignty. They would no longer be in a position to control and direct affairs of their states at all times and under any circumstances. Moreover, it would grossly conflict with their vital national interests especially security of their states. Landlocked countries would be in a position to import arms or deadly drugs which they could deploy against the same coastal countries which give them passage to the sea. In such a situation it is most unrealistic to

expect the coastal countries to agree to such laws being enacted.

In connection with the above it is appropriate to look at specific reactions by coastal states to this proposal. Taking the Republic of Kenya first it is to be noted that she gives transit rights to Uganda, Rwanda Burundi, Eastern Zaire and Southern Sudan. Kenya's policy was contained in a speech by her chief delegate to the law of the sea already referred to Mr. Njonga. Mr. Njonga told the conference that his country provides a national route to and from the sea for a number of landlocked countries in the region. As a matter of fact the initial motive to colonise Kenya was to provide a access to the sea for a landlocked country Uganda. Kenya, Mr. Njouga explained, has always been conscious of the difficulties experienced by the African landlocked countries. She has accordingly done everything in her power to ensure their access to the sea.

Kenya was determined to help the landlocked states overcome the problems created by the balkenisation of Africa. But at the same time she does not expect that her conduct towards landlocked countries imposes upon her on obligation to recognise that she had a servitude in respect of her territory outside the framework of bilatant, multilateral or regional agreements Kenya's view is that free transit should be accorded in reciprocity because Kenya has important trade links with countries in Central Africa and the easiest route to them is through Uganda.[11]

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11 Ibid pp 239 - 240

Kenya thus rejected the idea that passage of goods and people for landlocked countries to the sea should be made into law binding her. She also rejected the idea of free passage to the sea by landlocked countries. Instead she holds the view that this should be done on a reciprical basis so that coastal countries have free passage to the interior. This arguement by Kenya fell short of what the landlocked countries wanted. For them access to the sea is a matter of survival but for the coastal state to move inland is a matter of luxury arising from their desire to expand their trade. The two types of requirement are not therefore of the same weight and to do it on a reciprical basis cheats. the former more than the latter. Furthermore, it means that in times of conflict the landlocked countries' economies would suffer because of the national interests of the coastal states.

Nigeria is another coastal state which aired her views on her calculated policy to help the landlocked states which depend on her for transit rights. Chad and Niger are the two landlocked states served by Nigeria in this respect. Her chief delegate to this conference Mr. Ogundere made it quite clear that Nigeria was faithful to the principles embodied in the Organisation of African Unity declaration no A/conf.62/33 which acknowledged the right of landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states to access to the exclusive economic zones of neighbouring coastal states. Nigeria, he explained, always recognised that right and voluntarily granted the neighbouring states of Chad and Niger free transit to and from the sea without hindrance. He instanced the crop failures

in Chad and Niger which necessitated emergency importation of food. Nigeria did everything possible to expedite transportation of all materials needed by the two states.

Nigeria therefore supported the codification which is expected to be written. However, he felt that the mode of transit should be settled by bilateral or regional arrangements between the transit and landlocked states concerned. He made it quite clear that his country would not like to impose conditions on the right of landlocked countries to free transit of persons and goods to and from the sea and she is quite sympathetic with their desire to have their right of passage to the sea guaranteed. This would enable them to share in the living resources of the economic zones of neighbouring states and also to share in the revenues reverting to the international sea bed authority. He too agreed that landlocked states should not enjoy rights they are unwilling / willing to reciprocate.[12]

From the above submission Nigeria seems to offer more guarantees to the landlocked states than Kenya. She has also been more helpful in more than one way to the states which directly depend on her. But still she maintained the idea of reciprocity a condition not at all satisfactory to the landlocked states. Moreover, she saw no way these states could stop being dependent on the costal states. In other words she felt that a state of complete independence demanded by the landlocked states was most unrealistic and therefore unattainable.

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12 Ibid.

The third coastal state to express her views was Ghana which gives transit rights to Upper Volta and Mali The Ghanaian Chief delegate to the conference, Mr. Kumi, told members that as far his country was concerned they were two issues to consider. The first is the inconteatable rights of all states to the resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as a common heritage of mankind. The second issue concerns an agreement on appropriate measures to ensure that geographically disadvantaged states had access to resources under the sovereign jurisdiction of coastl states. In Mr. Kumi's view this issue leeads to controversy and disagreement.

The conference could not spell out details of regional or bilathal agreements conferring the right of transit through coastal states to the sea. The convention to be written should contain provisions which would make the conclusions of such agreements mandatory. Ghana, however, made it clear that she sympathised and shared the concerns of those who wished to see regional or subregional economic zones established as a solution to the problems if landlocked states which include regional economic integration measures. But despite this sympathy Ghana shared with the landlocked states, she was not prepared to compromise the security of coastal states. She reaffirmed instead, the underlying principle of bilateral or multilateral agreements. She accepted as legitimate demands by landlocked states to have access to the sea and the right to benefit from the living and non-living resources of the economic zone of neighbouring countries.[13]

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13. Ibid

Ghana's position did not reflect much difference between Kenya and Nigerian positions. As a matter of fact she did not commit herself to any substantial issues. The whole approach she adopted was too theoretical and of little help to the countries afflicted by problems of location. Equally noncommittal was the Republic of Senegal. Her Chief delegate, Mr. Diatta, stated that Senegal attached great importance to the rights and interests of landlocked states the majority of which were in Africa and caught up in the struggle for development.

Senegal, he said, supported without reservations the Organisation of African Unity's declaration by Heads of States in 1973 and 1974 to the effect that the landlocked countries should be entitled to access to the sea and a provision to the same effect should be included in the convention. Landlocked countries ought to have the right to exploit the living resources of neighbouring economic zones on an equal footing with coastal states. The economic and political importance of this would be to narrow the ever widening gap between developing countries and by so doing reduce the international tensions generated by feelings of disappointment on the part of the nations which felt that they had been wronged. Senegal was firm on this and she was ready to support such a law if it were included in the convention.[14]

The Tunisian approach to this problem was similar to that of Senegal. The Tunisian Chief delegate, Mr. Sehbani, informed the conference that his country recognised the right

of landlocked countries to access to the sea because it had been affirmed by the Heads of states of the Organisation of African Unity. Like Senegal's delegate, he noted that nearly one third of the African States are landlocked. It would consequently be unfair if their legitimate rights with regard to the use of the high seas were not respected. He observed with dismay that unfortunately a number of other geographically advantaged countries were trying to appropriate the resources of the sea to themselves. Such countries have long coastlines and islands situated in different regions of the world to enable them do this.

Tunisia basically sympathised with those coastal states whose economies depended on the sea. But still she felt that every effort ought to be made to help the large group of land-locked countries since they were mainly developing countries. Thinking along the same lines was Algeria whose Chief delegate, Mr. Mesloub, told the conference that it should try to satisfy the legitimate rights of the geographically disadvantaged states. The treatment such states ought to be given was one of the major problems to be solved. He stressed that the new law of the sea must meet specific requirements namely to foster the development and progress of all nations without exception. Therefore bold new measures including the establishment of a machinery which, while not divesting the rich countries of their surplus resources, would prevent the unbridled exploitation of resources belonging to the poor countries.

In conclusion, Mr. Mesloub, recommended that the future convention should ensure genuine cooperation between all

peoples and thereby pave the way for an era of peace, justice and well being of all. His view was that help for landlocked countries could be at regional levels. This is the most satisfatory way of doing it but it should be supplemented by manifestations of solidarity by all countries of the third world. A successful outcome of this depends on the international community endorsing unreservedly the principle of the common heritage of mankind and to accord equitable treatment in the international seabed area to the landlocked countries. Accordingly Algeria felt that the Organisation of African Unity should be the basis for solution to all these problems.

The submissions by both the landlocked and coastal states given in this chapter show that the former have many basic problems arising from their location to contend with in their quest for economic development. They also show that there is need for international assistance. However, it was all along emphasised that only bilateral arrangements and self reliance mechanisms can save landlocked countries from economic collapse. The position of dependence and under-development in which they were plunged by their former colonial rulers seem to be virtually irredeemable.

The effect of geographical location on the economies of landlocked countries was admitted by all landlocked countries surveyed. The most outstanding contributions on this being those of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in Southern Africa, Zambia in Central Africa, Rwanda in East Africa and Upper Volta in West Africa. The effect location has had on the foreign policies of these countries has equally been illustrated.

Foreign policy has a direct role to play in determining the economic destiny of a landlocked country. The cases surveyed have proved this beyond measure. Now these two propositions have to be re-examined in relations to the two case studies. which follow.

CHAPER THREE

NIGER REPUBLIC: THE DILEMMA OF LANDLOCKED DESERT COUNTRY

The Niger Republic is the first of the two case studies to be presented here for close examination. Niger is a typical landlocked, poverty striken desert country. It is a vast land mass covering an area of approximately 490,000 square miles found on the southern fringes of the Sahara desert. It is bordered in the north by Algeria and Libya, in the east by Chad, in the west by Mali and in the south by Nigeria and for a short distance by Benini. It is approximately 1200 miles from the Mediterranean coast and 1000 miles from the Atlantic Ocean. It has no railways to link her to any of the coasts mentioned or for domestic use.

Almost eighty per cent of Niger is arid desert and the remaining twenty per cent is savannah suitable mainly for live-stock raising and very limited agriculture. The rain season begins around June and ends towards the end of September. It varies in intensity between 4 to a maximum of 32 inches. The climate is prevailingly hot and dry particularly in April and May and the atmosphere is usually dusty due to the winds which blow from the sandy Sahara desert. River Niger which is the only river of any importance to her flows for about three hundred miles inside her territory before it enters Nigeria and goes on to the Atlantic Ocean. Rice and truck produce are cultivated along its banks using irrigation mechanisms.

The Republic of Niger has a very small population of just over five million people. The density per square mile is only

three persons. Most of the people live in the Southern part adjacent to the Nigerian border. The northern part is mountaneous and too dry to support normal human settlement. Niger's population growth rate, however, is relatively high at 2.7 per cent annually. Niamey, the capital city, has over 80,000 people. Three other towns namely Zinder, Maradi, and Tahana have over 20,000 people each. The Hausa speaking people account for over fifty per cent of the total population and live in the southern part neighbouring northern Nigeria which is also hausa speaking. This fact is of crucial importance since it has determined the relationship between the two countries to the benefit of Niger which is landlocked and dependent on Nigeria for her trade overseas.

The Djerma-Sougai forms the second largest group of the population. They make up 23 per cent of the total population. Both the Hausa and the Djerma-Sougai are sedentary farmers who live in the arabic southern tier. On the whole people in Niger live a nomadic or semi nomadic life. This is particularly true of the peul, tonareg and touboue who make up the remaining 27 per cent. The hash climatic conditions of the country are responsible for this. People have to search for their animals. Many of these people and their animals find refuge in northern Nigeria and the Nigerian government lifted restrictions regarding border crossing. This fact will be examined in detail later in this chapter.

The political history of Niger is that she was a French colony until the time of her independence in 1960. She is therefore a French speaking republic and works in close cooperation with France like all former French colonies in Africa. She also

works in very close cooperation with other French speaking countries i West Africa namely Benin, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Togo, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. Her other neighbour Nigeria on whom she depends so much in terms of trade and transit to the sea was a British colony and therefore English speaking. This fact is important because it explains why no transport and other economic infrastructures were built to link the two countries.

The different colonial policies followed by both France and Great Britain could not bring such cooperation about. Nigerian railways were built up to Katsina in Sokoto state and Maiduguri in Borno state both very close to the border with Niger but they could not be extended into Niger because of the rivalry between the two colocial powers. This is an easy example of the under-development brought about by competing colonial interests in the same region. Niger's exports via Nigerian ports on the Atlantic coast have to be carried first by road to any of these two ends and then railed to Lagos. Similarly her imports have to be picked up at the same points. It has already been pointed out that the French never bothered to develop transport infrastructures to link her to any country or for her domestic requirements. This was a general French policy not to waste funds on constructing expensive railways in landlocked colonies whose economies could not justify the construction costs. Accordingly Niger, Chad, Mali, and Upper Volta have had nothing to do with railways.

The economies of these colonies were considered to be too poor to warrant huge investments into transport infrastructures which would have meant the flow of capital from France without

much in return. The few agricultural products they produced such as millet, sorghum, peanuts, beans, and cotton were mainly for local consuption. The little that were sold to France could be carried away by air. This attitude, of course, led to divastating economic and social retardation which Niger and indeed all the other countries named are trying desperately to overcome. Importing and exporting goods by land became a problem after the first few years of independence. That was when Niger realised that she was after all a landlocked country bearing all the burden of high transport costs. To send a ton of goods from Niamey, the capital, to the coastal ports of Cotonon in Benin or Lagos in Nigeria costs her at least one hundred United States dollars. It costs the same amount to import one ton of goods from the same ports.

All this is due to Niger's landlocked position placing her too far from the sea, poor road transportation and absence of railroads. The southern routes referred to are the only praticable routes since using the Mediterranean ports not only makes the distances longer but it also means traversing the great Sahara desert on foot or camel because there are no railways or roads to make quick and more economical crossing possible. Industrial development is seriously inhibited by the high cost of electric power generation which averages around twelve cents per KWH. Niger buys electic power from the Kainji Dan in Nigeria. She herself has no rivers of any significance to make hydro electric power generation possible. River Niger which orignates in Niger is not strong enough due to the drought conditions there to allow for building of hydro electric

power stations.

Economic growth is further retarded by the primitive state of animal husbandry, lack of a well developed marketing system and the reluctance of some tribal groups particularly the peuls to part with their cattle which they regard as a symbol of wealth rather than a source of income. However, the real drawback in Niger's economic development is to be found in her export-import trade with overseas countries. There are two main points to note here. First the colossol transport costs to and from the sea characterised by prolonged delays in the delivery of goods to their destination, lack of transport vehicles to carry the goods, excessive storage charges and loss of goods in the ports or during transit. The second point to note is the very high prices which she pays for her imports which are not at all balanced by income on the few agricultural products she exports. Niger: external balance of payments therefore shows cumulative deficits.

With regard to the first point above it is to be noted that Niger has to transport her exports and imports to or from the sea by land. She uses transport companies of the transit states such as Nigeria, Benin and Ivory Coast. Niger has also no shipping agents or clearing houses to handle her goods in the ports or to inform her about the arrival of her goods or movements of ships. She depends again on the services offered by the same countries named. The ports which handle most of her goods are Lagos, Port Harcourt, Warri and Sapele in Nigeria, Cotonon in Benin and Abidjan.

In the Nigerian ports no special figures are kept for Niger and Chad which are landlocked. They appear together as re-exports. The goods are marked specifically for the two landlocked countries and are treated purely as transit goods to be collected by the consignees without paying any customs duty. However, they pay handling charges in foreign exchange. Handling charges present the first drain on the country's foreign exchange reserves for it means for anything imported or exported foreign exchange must be used to pay those who handle the goods. Since Niger's foreign reserves are not usually very substantial she cannot afford to import many things. Instead she concentrate on the goods items needed to offset the famine that has faced her for more than a decade due to the drought in the Sahel countries.[1]

The Nigeria Ports Authority is very anxious to prevent congestion in the ports. Accordingly they urge consignees to clear their goods as soon as possible and not later than three months of their arrival. A Congestion Committee was set up to deal with the problem of Congestion and it is empowered to dispose of the goods not cleared withing three months. Storage charges are also made per day of extra storage as means of forcing consignees to take away their goods. The first three days receive free storage facilities and with the agreement of the ports authorities this can be extended up to the very maximum of ten days. After these few days of grace rent is charged

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1. This information was obtained through personal interview with the Personal Assistant to the General Manager (Operations) Nigeria Ports Authority in his Office Lagos in September, 1982.

depending on whether or not the goods are stored in the shed or outside. The first category is styled shed cargos and it attracts a high rent because of the special treatment they must receive. The second category is styled starking cargos and rents for them are lower.

For the shed cargo the rate is one naira per ton per day for the first six days. For the next six days the rate goes up to two naira per day per ton. There after the rate is raised to three naira per ton per day up to three months when the Congestion Committee may dispose of the goods still uncleared. With regard to the starking cargos the rate is fifty kobo per ton per day for the first six days and then one naira for the next six days and finally one naira fifty kobo up to the end of three months when the goods are disposed of. For cosignees from Niger and other landlocked countries payments have to be in foreign exchange. The foreign exchange bill therefore mounts daily as the goods continue to stay in the ports.

In the case of Niger delays to clear her imports are very common indeed. This is because the consignees in Niger quite often do not have shipping documents ready at hand when goods arrive. The shipping documents are prepared by overseas suppliers of the goods ordered and either sent directly to the consiignees in Niger or to their bankers who in turn send them to them. Goods are dispatched by sea and the relevant documents are sent by post. There is therefore a problem of communication. Documents may arrive before the goods and the consignees travel the long journey to Lagos and other ports to find that there are no goods for them. So they return to Niger and goods may later

arrive to find that there is nobody to clear them. So they have to be stored indefinitely and by so doing accumulate huge storage costs. Some of these goods never get cleared at all because the owners are never advised of their arrival. So they have to be disposed of in Lagos.[2]

Both government and private dealers in Niger have no representatives in Lagos to inform them about the state of affairs in the ports. Any information concerning their goods which cannot be cleared immediately is sent to Niger through the Niger embassy in Lagos. Obviously this method is not good enough because the embassay has no addresses of the departments and individuals inside Niger. So theycompile everything and send it to the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the hope that the latter would reach the consignees, which they cannot do. In the end most of the consignees lose their goods and sometimes money as well in case of advance payments.

The exports are kept in warehouses owned by the ports authority and charges are made for this service in foreign exchange. In ideal times warehouses are usually empty because the goods are carried away as they arrive and this lessens the bills paid on storage. But in bad times goods have to be stored for long periods of time and thus accumulate heavy storage costs at rates already noted above. Ideal times occur if a lot of traffic is generated by increased export and import commodities. The transport systems by rail, road and shipping Lines operate very efficiently as a result. Good administrative arrangements by the consignees, customs, the ports authority and the shipping

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2. Ibid

companies as well as oversea correspondence of the consignees combine to bring about these ideal times. The various financial Institutions and insurance firms must also not experience any problems.

But unfortunately these ideal times very rarely occur in the case of Niger. This is because she generates very little traffic because she exports very limited quantities of goods and also imports very little. This is true of all landlocked countries in Africa and in West Africa in particular. Fortunately for her she has very little need for warehousing of exports and the bills for storage of exports are negligable. But what she pays for storage of imports is relatively high though no figures are available. The reason is simply that she imports more and it is more difficult to organise clearance of imports in the ports than it is the case with exports.

Added to this further delays are experienced due to the time taken to load and off load cargo on or from ships. An average ship carries between 10,000 and 15,000 tons and it takes up to fifteen days to offload such a ship. The exact time taken depends on levels of the productivity of labour, and preparedness of the consignees to receive their cargo. This is the case with ordinary conventional vessels. Containerised ships of the same tonnage can be offloaded within one week. The speed of offloading and loading vessels is considerably low in Lagos and Africa generally because of the equipment used. In advanced countries it takes up to five days to offload conventional vessels and two days for container ships.[3]

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3. Ibid.

As mentioned earlier information about the arrival of goods is obtained through the clearing and forwarding companies which send the bills of lading to the banks of the consignees or directly to them. In the case of landlocked countries this ignites another problem that of organising foreign exchange to pay for the services at the ports and or for the goods themselves. The embassies are involved in this exercise and the Niger embassy does much to assist those in need. Obviously this leads to further time losses. It must be emphasized here that Niger has not got enough foreign reserves to make it easy for her to pay for all these services and the little she has would be better used to pay for essential goods to nourish her economy. But her landlocked geographical position dictates the way she uses part of her foreign exchange reserves.

However, Nigeria has proved to be a very helpful neighbour and transit territory for Niger. The two countries have direct dealings in import and export matters. No Intermediaries are allowed. This arrangement goes as far back as the time of independence in 1960 but it was re-emphasized and reformulated into concrete arrangements in 1973. In January 1973 the Chairman of Nigeria. Railways Corporation in Kaduna Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki led a high powered Nigerian delegation to Niger to study transport problems facing the latter with a view to solving them. Included in the delegation were the Lagos ports Manager Alhaji M. Tukur, the General Manager of Nigeria Railways Corporation Mr. Theophilus Nzegwu and the Northern district Manager of the same corporation.

The delegation studied possibilities of extending the railways into Niger to strengthen relations between the two countries. No final conclusion was reached on this matter but investigations are still going on. It was noted that Nigeria supplies electricity to Niger as away to forster good relations but also to stop the latter from constructing its own dam on river Niger to generate its own electricity which would block Nigeria's source of water supply to Kainji dam.[4] As a result of these deliberations a Nigeria - Niger Joint Commission was formed with its permanent Secretariat in Niamey capital of Niger. A sum of two million naira was set aside for building the secretariat. A Joint Ministerial Council was also established in Lagos in 1970.

Nigeria constructed a 668,000 naira bridge to link the two countries. This bridge was officially handed over to Niger by the Federal Commissioner for Works Major General Muhammed Shuwa who described the two countries as inseparably linked by geography, history and culture.[5] A transport agreement was signed in Niamey on 20th December 1972. This agreement reviewed problems of transport and transit of goods imported and exported by Niger through Nigeria on new rates and tarrifs commensulate to the volume of traffic offered by Niger. It also included exploration of storage facilities and new strategy for security at the ports and rail routes. A port's Committee was also established to review and plan the quota implementation of the new security provision.

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4. See Press Release No. 1728 Federal Ministry of Information 28th November, 1978.

5. Ibid.

Furthermore, it was agreed to build a transcontinental road to give Niger three terminals at Sokoto, Kano and Maiduguri. This was disclosed by the Secretary General of Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation Mr. B.O. Awokoya in November 1977. The two countries pledged full support to the Lake Chad, as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). All the efforts elaborated on above go to show just how committed Nigeria is to help Niger. It is a kind of committment which has no parallel anywhere else in Africa. As a matter of fact General Olusegun Obasanjo then Military Head of State in Nigeria described Niger as having been Nigeria's ally and trusted friend sinc the two countries became independent. This was at a State banquet for President Seyni Kountche of Niger in Lagos in March, 1978[6].

But despite this unprecedented help extended to Niger by Nigeria the former still encounters numerous transport problems by road and rail. It has already been noted that Niger has no transport companies and railways of her own. She uses Nigerian companies and railways. As such problems ecountered by these organisations are directly reflected in Niger. They are therefore worth examination because of their role in the economic life of Niger. Since 1955 the Nigeria Railways have been going through a very difficult financial period. Prior to 1955 the railways were one government department with a Chairman who was the highest paid civil servant in colonial times. It was converted into a Corporation in 1955 known as Nigeria Railways Corporation. There was a Chairman and a Board of Directors to represent a number of interests such as the Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA)

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6. See Press Release on 314 Federal Ministry of Information 8th March, 1978.

The Board was a policy making one not technical.[7]

Currently Nigeria Railways Corporation is under the care of the Ministry of Transport whose Minister is responsible for its policy making. The administrative format runs from the Minister at the top to the Board of Directors, then General Manager or Director General followed by six directorates namely administration, operations, civil engineering, electrical/ mechanical engineering and finance. Plans are underway to set up the directorate for lines to be in charge of planning change from the 3½ to 4½ feet standard gauge. The change in gauge is necessary to link up with the rest of the world to make it easy to buy equipment in world markets. It will also give it better stability in running of trains. Besides there are too many curves in the present line which make distance longer and reduce speed. New gauge will use tunnels to reduce the distance and increase speed. Straight lines are expected to achieve this and the lines directorate is expected to take care of it.

New railway lines are to be built to connect all Federal capitals and Abuja. Under the Union of African Railways it is intended to extend the railways into Niger. But there must be political goodwill between Niger and Nigeria before any concrete measures are taken. Once resources become available it is not difficult to get such goodwill considering what Nigeria is already doing in this direction and Niger's foreign policy towards Nigeria. The railways provide security for people and goods under its care. Administratively the Nigeria Railway system is divided into five districts namely Lagos, Western at

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7. This information was made available through personal interview with the Director of Research Nigeria Railways Corporation in his Office in Lagos, in September, 1982.

Ibadan, Northern at Zaria Northeast at Bauchi and East at Enugu. Altogether 35,000 staff are employed and the Lagos and Zaria districts are the ones directly concerned with carrying Niger's goods.

Up to 1963 the railways corporation was in a sound financial state for running and developing railways. But after 1963 it started operating a deficit account and government was always consulted to pay for operating costs. The operating ratio is calculated by comparing income and expenditure and at one time it reached 200 percent deficit. This deficit persists to this day although the operating ratio has been coming down gradually. According to the Director of Research the Nigerian Railways have been a sick baby of the Federation.[8] The reasons for this constant deficit are to be found in the stated government policy regarding railway services which make it a non profit making corporation. It is meant to be only service giving and so charges very low fees for goods and passengers carried. It concentrates on carrying food items, fertilisers and other farm equipment needed by the farmers and people at larger and which must therefore be as cheap as possible.

Sometimes directives from the government require trains to be reserved for specific non income earning duties which serve govermment policy but ruin the corporation financially. For example during the Festac celebrations in 1977 all passenger wagons from the rest of the country were concentrated in Lagos for two weeks to carry participants in the festival but the

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8. Ibid.

corporation earned nothing from this exercise. As a result of the deficit, poor management, inability to repair or buy new locomotives and wagons the corporation could no longer maintain normal train services. There were too few trains running and these could not keep time or carry all the cargo which needed to be carried. Naturally Niger had to suffer from this drop in services. As a matter of fact the railway corporation was on the verge of collapse and government had to make imprompt arrangements with Rail India to provide managerial and technical expertise to revive the railways services in the country.

Accordingly in January 1979 a Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES) agreement was signed. Under this agreement over five hundred Indian experts in railways management and technical services arrived in the country and entrusted with the management and operations of the railways. Part of this agreement stipulated that a large sum of money should be put aside by the government every year to enable these experts to work and re-equip the railways. It is not known how much money was actually put aside for this purpose but money was deposited every year for the said purpose. Since the arrival of these experts normal train services have been restored there are no more concellation of trains and keep times for departures and arrivals and the frequency of trains has been increased. The deficit account has been reduced steadily but it is still very big and it cannot be done away with unless there is a charge in the laid down policy so

that they are allowed to operate commercial rates.

The frequency of trains depends on the availability of traffic that is people and goods in the first instance. It also depends on availability of facilities namely wagons and locomotives plus the line capacity system of running single lines. The Nigeria Railways use what is known as the Absolute Block Working System which allows one train at a time to use the line between any two stations. Trains running in the opposite direction must wait until the line is cleared before setting off. This causes delays and as a result it takes 28 to 30 hours for express trains to reach Kano from Lagos and vice-versa. Goods trains take between 35 to 40 hours. Trains are usually congested because there are only a few coaches used. The corporation cannot buy enough coaches due to shortage of funds. There are also peak times when too many people and goods need to be moved. Warehouses are available at the terminals but the people themselves make their own arrangements to take their goods.

To cope with this situation time tables are made every six months so that more trains are made available during the peak times. But still demand for freight and passengers cannot be met satisfactorily. Wagons go fully loaded to the north of the country carring goods for the northern states and Niger. Unfortunately most of them return empty because there are very few goods coming from Niger or northern Nigeria for overseas export or consumption within sourthern Nigeria. This is therefore another way in which the railways lose money. They earn money on the northward leg and earn nothing on the return

journey to the south. As a result the management is quite often reluctant to release too many trains to the north. But then Niger suffers from this slump because her exports in Lagos cannot be transported as quickly as they arrive. They have to wait until there is a train programmed for the north. Before the Sahel drought exported Niger goods which were mainly food items used to go through Nigerian ports but now nothing comes from there.

The rates of carriage per mile per ton of goods for Niger and northern Nigeria were the same. An agreement to carry and classification of goods is in operation. To this extent Niger is not discriminated or over charged. She pays the same tarrif rates as importers of goods in Nigeria. The Union of African Railways is a technical agency of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Nigerian Railways Corporation is a key member. It is under the auspices of this Union that this Nigeria - Niger tarrif arrangement was made. Moreover, a master plan was also made to interconnect African railways. Under this plan railways in Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan are to be connected. The existing proposal is to connect Nigeria to Niger through Sokoto. However, since the master plan was made there have been too many political wranglings in the countries concerned to allow for any purposeful moves to be made. Until the political climate is settled little will be done in this direction. This plan was sent to the various governments for approval in 1979 but by 1982 no such approval had been received at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Only Upper Volta and Ivory Coast are working on this interstate plan.

The account on Nigerian railways has been given in great detail because of the extremely and seemingly permanent importance it has on the economic life of the Niger republic. The difficulties that have been encountered have been directly reflected in Niger. The speed and prices at which the people inside Niger receive their imports and discharge exports depends directly on the way services of the Nigerian railways are provided. Security and warehousing of their goods is a responsibility of the railways both in Lagos and at the terminals in the north. Besides the possibilities of extending railways into Niger are being considered with great concern in Nigeria. It is therefore worthwhile to know more about the organisation, operations and future plans of the Nigerian Railways corporation to be able to determine the future destiny of Niger's transport services to and from the sea through Nigerian territory.

Besides this it is important to note the role being played by the Nigerian Ministry of Transport. This ministry's policy is to make it as cheap and convincient as possible for Niger and Chad to import and export goods overseas. It is not the Ministry's intention to make capital out of Niger or any other country by overpricing transport services offered them. That is why the railway terfifs for Niger goods is the same as those charged on Nigerian goods. The Ministry also used its influence to create a Road Haulage Association (RHA) of Nigeria and the Nigeria Shippers' Council in 1981. The former brings together all private transport companies engaged in carrying goods to Niger by road so that they charge the same fees and not to make exorbitant profits which would ruin the Nigerian

economy. The latter provided information about movements of ships, arrival of goods and any other information in the export-import world.

With the cooperation of the railways, road haulage association, and the shippers' council many of the problems hither to encountered by Niger will be lessenad. Transport to Niger has become relatively cheap by both road or rail and goods will no longer stay in the ports for too long without being cleared or at least locate the consignees. That means that the quantity of goods usually disposed of by the ports congestion committee will be reduced.

Since 1969 Niger has been changing from an agriculturally based economy to a mining one. This followed the discovery and commencement of large scale mining of uranium at Arlit north of Agadez which is one of the major cities in the country Mining began in 1971 and now Niger ranks fith in world uranium production. Although the mining sector remained modest up to 1974, it is a sector of growing importance and it is creating diversication in the economy filling up the gap created by the failure of the agricultural industry which was hardly hit by the drought of the last decade. Mining contributed two per cent of the gross domestic product in 1979. The mine at Arlit alone produced up to 1000 tons that year and it was programmed to expand up to 6000 tons in 1980.

Exports of uranium gave Niger 20 per cent of its foreign revenue earnings in 1975. Under agreements with France Niger's share in SOMAIR, the company undertaking the mining and marketing of uranium increased from 16.75 to 33 per cent. The state to

state system of marketing was dropped in favour of commercial negotiations between Niger and the companies involved. The total deposits of uranium are estimated at 100,000 tons which makes Niger the faith largest producer of this mineral in the world. More and systematically calculated measures to increase revenue from the sale of uranium have been taken since 1979. These included the setting up of a new bureau known as BUREMI to over see the state's interests. West Germany, Italy and Japan hold minority capital in SOMAIR. The majority is held by French firms. The government expects to have at least ten uranium mines operating by the year 1985 producing 10,000 tons of uranium concentrate annually.

Unfortunately the world Uranium market prices have dropped very drastically all over a sudden with a result that Niger is experiencing very hard times in implementing her economic development plans. In his address to the nation June 1981 President Kountche Seyni noted with dismay that Niger's five year development plan whose financing has been based on revenue accruing from the sale of uranium could not be implemented because the earnings from this mineral were too low to suffice. The five year plan covering the period 1979-1983 had been made to be very ambitious. It sought to increase mineral exploitation, make the country self-sufficient in food items and reduce her geographical isolation brought by her landlocked location and increase the numbers of qualified and highly skilled personnal.

All these targets could not be obtained and a thorough revision had to be made. This case illustrates the extreme underdevelopment and dependence of African countries brought

about by their colonial past. The world market for uranium is controlled by the industrialised capitalist countries of western Europe who therefore fix the prices for this mineral. Just as Niger seemed to be doing well they reduced the prices so the hopes people in Niger might have had suddenly vanished.

Although most of the Sahelian countries had sufficient rainfall in 1983, Niger was more fortunate in her cereal production namely millet and sorghum which is just enough to cover her needs. But all the same she had to import over 30,000 tons of rice to meet the needs of her population which is growing at a rate of 2.7 percent per annum. With this growth rate in view the plan aimed at modest and attainable growth targets for the main cereals to keep pace with the growing population.

The plan had also aimed at eliminating the rice deficit by more than doubling production from 23,000 tons in 1978-9 to 60,000 tons by the end of 1983. A number of small irrigation schemes were planned along River Niger to make this production possible. To Niger food crops are deemed to be by far the most important political and economic goal. The great drought which has put her agricultural industry in jeopady since 1971 has made it absolutely necessary. Cotton and groundnuts have never recovered to their pre-drought days. Accordingly efforts were to be made during the life of the plan to reinvigarate production. It intended to raise groundnuts from 80,000 to 120,000 tons and cotton from 4000 to between 12 and 15,000 tons.

As far as laying infrastructures were concerned there was one major railway project from Niamey, the Niger capital, to Parakon in Benin Republic.

Parakon is the present teruinus of the railline from Cotonou on the coast which is one of the ports on the Atlantic Coast used by Niger to import and export goods overseas. This projected railway would give Niger the first railway link from her capital to the Atlantic coast and by so doing reduce to a bare minimum some of the hazards facing her now as a landlocked country without a link to the sea. This railway has not been built for lack of capital. Similarly it has not been possible to complete the road to the north linking her to Algeria and construction of other roads linking Niger to Upper Volta, Togo and Benini. The plan had made an optimistic target of 5 percent per annum growth rate up to 1980 which could not be attained because of the low incomes from uranium.

Furthermore, it had been planned to usher in a new social structure to up-date the administrative machinery. Details of this structure are still being worked out by a national commission set up for this purpose. The intention is to create a hierachy of development councils down to the village level which will both mobilise the population for greater development work and at the same time allow people some participation in decision making. But again this has been delayed due to inadequate funding. Niger has other minerals the most important of which are iron, copper, phosphate and oil which are being exploited on a very small scale. New mines at Atasto west and Akouta to the south of Arlit are now operational. The Arabian Oil company was expected to begin big oil explorations as far back as 1970. The first oil strike between Termit and Agaden north of Lake Chad was announced in 1975. TEXACO-NIGER and

ESSO worked in this area and found oil and natural gas at 4500 feet.

From the foregoing it is quite clear that the Niger economy is very vulmerable to climatic and international pressures. Climatic factors choked her agricultural industry and operations of world market prices have had very divastating consequences on her mining industry. By 1980 both these industries had hit rock bottom and by so doing threw the country into economic chaos renderring her 1979-1983 Development Plan completely unenforceable. Niger has no control of both these forces. She needs help. Her landlocked position makes matters worse as she has not only to struggle against forces of nature and world economy but also to struggle to import and export goods overseas under very expensive and cumbersome conditions noted at the beginning of this chapter.

To understand and appreciate fully what she is doing it is necessary to study her foreign policies towards the states which surround and therefore give her transit to the sea. A study of this has to be made in historical perspective covering the years 1960 to 1980. By treating these problems in historical perspective it will be possible to see how successive governments in Niger have reacted to the strange geogrzphical location of their country and the kind of help their foreign policies want to achieve. The evidence available shows that since her independence in 1960 Niger has been very much alert about her precarious landlocked position and the fact that she is a poor desert country. She realised she could not do much on her own to overcome the numerous problems resulting

from these two situations she has all along sought the services of a number of international organisations within and outside Africa to help her.

Niger seeks to be assisted by both the western and eastern power blocks and so she maintains friendly relations with both of them. She is also a member of the United Nations Organisation and gets aid from it and its associated agencies. Niger is closely linked to France and the French speaking community in Africa because of her political and economic history. France is the main customer for Niger products and main supplier of manufactured goods. But Niger is also linked to Nigeria which is the second most important trading partner and a major transit state for Niger to and from the sea. Her foreign policies are therefore geared at maintaining and cultivating further friendship with these two groups of countries in particular and the entire world community at large.

In the early years of her independence, President Diori, her first Head of State, played a very effective role in promoting close regional cooperation in Africa generally and West Africa in particular. It was because of his concern with matters of regional cooperation that he was elected President of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) comprising of all former French colonies in West Africa namely Ivory Coast, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Togo, Benin, Central Africa, Upper Volta and Niger herself. Similarly he was also elected President of the Afro-Malagasy-Mauritanian Common Organisation (OCAM) and the Council of Entente which was also

French speaking African countries. These two bodies gave Niger a strong economic and political base in which she kept ties with all the neighbouring and distant french speaking countries with which she been in the past strongly associated.

President Diori was certainly a man of great influence and his position in the two organisations mentioned above meant that Niger was specially entrenched in the economic and political life of West Africa. Niger uses the ports of the Republic of Benin and Ivory Coast among others to import and export goods overseas. It was therefore important for her to seize on any opportunity which gave her chance to ensure cordial relations with these two states. In addition to this Niger is one of the founders of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and of the Franc West African Monetary Union (CFA). She is also a member of the Lake Chad and Niger River Basin Commissions in conjunction with Nigeria and Chad. Details of these organisations are to be given later on in this chapter. Here it would suffice to note that Niger's policy has all along been to develop closer relations with her neighbours especially Nigeria, Libya and Algeria as a necessary addition to the French speaking countries already noted.[9]

It is worthwhile at this point to mention Niger's past links with her former colonial master, France, which is the main customer for her uranium and other products. France provides her with very efficient and most needed air links to the outside world. Without railways for both internal and external transport there

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9 See UN, ECA, 'Comparative Analysis of Niger, Nigeria, and Dahomey, ECA Economic Bulletin for Africa 1975, p.17

has always been great reliance on air transport. During the rain season the few roads become impassible due to the soft sandy soils and many parts of the country cannot be reached in any other way apart from air links. France maintains scheduled air services to the most important towns of Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder and Agadez. There are also scheduled air services to capitals of neighbouring countries namely Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Upper Volta and Benin. The main air line used for this purpose in Air Afrique which is a jointly run co company by all former French colonies in West Africa, Sabena and Uta.

Air transport has been particularly important in distributing very essential food items raised by international agencies to the people who need them in rural areas. This meant that food had to be flown into Niger from donors scattered all over the world and again distributed by air inside Niger itself. The gravity of this situation was highlighted upon by Mr. Edouard Saouna, then Director General of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in the Sahel countries. Mr. Saouna was directly in charge of handling food distribution, contacting aid donors and undertaking long term policy planning to combat food shortage in all the Sahel region. In his report he noted food deficit, hunger and widespread malnutrition.[10]

Having visited and received by Heads of the States of Chad, the Gambia, Ghana and Upper Volta. Mr. Saouna became firmly convinced that the tragedy of all Sahel countries was

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10 Edouard Saouna, 'Grave Situation in the Sahel Region, 'Nigeria Bulletin of Foreign Affairs Vol 8 no.5 May 1978

threatening to become endemic unless and until a major recovery effort was made with tenacity at once and in the long term. Eight countries equal to a third of the area of the United States were affected with seven million people's lives at stake. This was particularly absurd because the countries affected are some of the world's poorest states most of which having per capital incomes of less than one hundred dollars. The report further observed that these countries some of which are landlocked like Niger, Chad, Mali and Upper Volta are being constantly attacked by the advancing desert. Many of their semi nomadic populations were isolated due to lack of communications especially in the rain season when tracks become impossible.

The situation had remained the same since 1973. FAO was seriously alarmed by the situation and this led to two visits of these countries by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme Mr. Vogel. Representatives of the donor countries assembled in Rome at the FAO headquarters. On the second visit Mr. Vogel was accompanied by Mr. A. Senghor, Senegal's Minister for Rural Development and Water Resources who was the coordinator of the Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (C.I.I.I.S), Mr. Ali Cisse Executive Secretary to the same Committee was also present. The Estimates they made showed that these countries needed 457,000 tons of food to be immediately distributed, 124,000 tons of reserve food to be established in remote areas before the rain seasons begin. A further 400,000 tons including 65,000 tons of world Food Programme emergency aid was also immeditately required.

At the time the report was made there was a total deficit of food items to the tune of 180,000 tons. But the report observed that food aid alone is not enough. The food has to be available in time and in places it was needed. It has therefore to be accompanied by logistic aid. By logistic aid they meant the cost of transporting food from the ports to the interior and its distribution to the remotest places. It was noted for example that at the time the report was being compiled 60,000 tons of food were lying in the port of Dakar because of lack of transport to the interior and yet people were starving inside each of the countries it was meant for. The need for quick transport was therefore emphasized and the subsequent importance of air transport without which people in the most desperately big areas of Niger and Upper Volta would have died.

It was also felt necessary to help these countries to subsidize food distribution to prevent their national budgets from collapsing. For some of these countries especially Niger and Upper Volta the costs of importing food and distributing it exceeded their budgeting estimates by far and the only salvation for them was external aid. These countries also needed help in food imputs such as fertilisers, seeds, pesticides and farm implements which were estimated at 14.5 million dollars as minimum requirements. In addition, to this it was recommended to launch a Save the Livestock plan since it was deemed to represent the very basic of subsistence. Under this item 20 million dollars were needed for Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. Niger being in such an intricate

position realised that she had to work closely with all the neighbouring countries which give her transit to the sea. Air transport is employed whenever possible but not everything can be brought in by air. Land routes are important.[11]

Besides, she has also to secure rights for planes bound for or leaving Niger to overfly the surrounding countries. Niger's membership in the African and Mauritian Common Organisation is a further example of ensuring that she did not get locked up and forgotten by the countries on which she depended so much in matters of general trade and also in connecting links to the rest of the world. This organisation was formed in 1966 comprising of thirteen countries namely Benin, Chad, Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Madagascar. Mauritians joined in 1971. Cameroun, Chad, Congo, Madagascar and Zaire later withdrew from it. The aim of the organisation was cooperation in the development of the major sectors of economic activities such as agriculture, industry, transport and communications giving greater emphasis on intra-African trade.[12]

The republics of Benin and Niger are members of Conseil L'Entente, which was established in 1959. The objectives of this organisation was to harmanise and strengthen the policies and economies of member states on the basis of brotherhood and solidarity. Other members included Ivory Coast, Togo, and Upper Volta. Conseil L'Entent has undertaken several studies to promote economic cooperation among member states including Ghana. Some investments have been made through the 'Mutual Aid

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11 Ibid.
12 Opcit p 33

Loan Guarantee Fund' which is especialised organ of the Conseil. This fund is used to conduct and commission the studies and guarantees loans for major economic development projects. It also promotes the establishment of joint undertaking concerns the most conspicuous of which is SORENTENTE which is a tourist development company.

Unider Conseil L'Entente a 'Cattle and Meat Economic Community' was established in 1970 to promote the production and marketing of meat within the member states as well as nonmember states. It thus includes Ghana, Malie and Nigeria as associate members. The main tasks of this body have been to take steps to improve facilities for movement of cattle across borders of the countries concerned, disease control and some investments in livestock production are channelled through it. There is in addition to this close cooperation for river and lake basin development. Benin, Niger and Nigeria are members of the River Niger Commission established in 1965 but could not become very active until recently due to serious attention now given to the development of river transport and by electricity. Niger and Nigeria are also members of the lake Chad Basin Commission which has been very active since its establishment in 1964. Besides handling programmes for development of the basin it has more recently started discussions on wider measures of economic cooperation including cooperation in livestock development.[13]

Niger also cooperate with Mali and Upper Volta in the Liptako-Gourma Regional Integrated Development Authority which

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13 Ibid.

is a vast agricultural complex designed with the help of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation. The purpose of this complex is to promote economic development between the three neighbouring Sahel countries by creating multinational cooperative ventures. The emphasis in this venture is to rebuild and boost the agricultural industry in the three countries which is in shambles because of the prolonged drought.

But Niger's relationship with Nigerian noted earlier seems to be of more profound importance than anyother arrangements she has been able to negotiate bilaterally within West Africa. There are several reasons for this. First of all the bulk of trade between the two countries is much higher than that between Niger and any other country in West Africa. It has already been noted that Nigeria is the second largest customer for Niger products after France and principle supplier of exports needed to nourish the Niger economy. These include oil and electricity from Kainji dam. Secondly the vast majority of the people in Niger are Hausa speaking and live astride hausa speaking people occupying northern Nigeria. The boundary between the two countries is very long land boundry easy to cross and many of these people cross into either country at will either for business, social or religions functions.

The third reason is that most of the goods going to or from Niger go through the Nigerian Ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt and then proceed by rail and road to Nigeri Nigeria railways carry the bulk of this traffic and Niger collects its

exports and send off imports at the terminus of the railways in Katsina in Sokoto State and Maiduguri in Borno State. Economically and socially therefore Niger has far more to do with Nigeria than any other country in Africa. It was for this reason that she opened up a consulate in Kano in addition to the Embassy in Lagos. The Kano Office handles the day to day business at the border and helps to keep relations between the two hausa speaking groups warm.

Trade between the two countries flows freely by road and rail. Customs fees are paid in a few points but this is very limited indeed. In 1971 Nigeria switched to driving on the right and by so doing helped to unify driving regulations between her and Niger which had been driving on the right from colonial time. Nigeria buys cattle from Niger which cross the border on hoof. In the dry seasons farmers in Niger occasionally move into Nigeria with their cattle and return to Niger when the dry spell subsides. Nigeria offered Niger this facility as part of her assistance to brothers in the Sahel region who needed special help for their survival. This was agreed on by the Organisation of African Unity Heads of States Summit Conference of May 1973. It is also part of the objective of Nigeria's foreign policy to play the leadership role in the advancement of African peoples. She is by far the biggest and most capable African country to take up such a role. In this particular case she is even better placed geographically and economically to help her landlocked and economically backward neighbour.

According to the estimates by the United Nations Development Programme experts Niger's exports and imports cost approximately fifteen percent higher due to additional expenses incurred to defray transport costs. This means that revenue from her exports are reduced by the same margin. This is obviously a big handicap to the development of her economy. If the loss of fifteen percent on exports is added to the same additional cost on imports it means a deficit of thirty per cent. The goods exported do not bring in much revenue since they are essentially agricultural commodities subject to constant and unexpected price fluctuations. Again the rise in the prices of imports makes it impossible for her to import as many commodities as her economy may require to thrive. She therefore experiences general stagnation in all the sectors of the economy.[14]

But for Niger the prolonged and serious drought has really played havoc to her economy and politics. In a United Nations report of 1973 it was noted that the persistent drought in the Sudan - Sahelinan Zone is seriously unbalncing the relationship between men, animals, and their natural envirnment. The United Nations specialised agencies were deeply worried about this alarming situation. Members of the Executive Committe of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) had to pay particular attention to this issue in their meeting in Addis Ababa held between 18th and 22nd June 1973. The same worry was also shared by all the Organisation of African Unity member

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14 Information obtained through personal interview with the UNDP Economic Advisor in the Kaduna Office which is responsible for Economic and Commercial activities in Northern Nigeria and Niger.

countries who observed that approximately twenty percent of the cattle was facing starvation. The total loss was estimated at 100 million dollars. In addition to this too many people were dying also and ways had to be found to stop this. The countries most affected were the landlocked ones namely Chad, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta which are listed among the least developed countries of the world and therefore totally incapable of bearing the burden. The other countries affected included Mauritania, Northern Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sengal. Out in the case of these, however, the situation was not too desperate because they all have outless to the sea and could and did receive direct the emergency rations arriving by sea from donor countries.

The solutions to this problem were envisaged to lie either in the framework of African Solidarity or the United Nations or both of them. Ar the African level the conference of Heads of States and Governments and Council of Ministers worked out realistic and specific ways to tadkle this problem. This was in meetings held in Addis Ababa in May 1973. It was agreed to express African Solidarity in the form of material contributions to the countries affected. Neighbouring countries agreed to grant affected peoples and animals in search of food, water and pasture temporary freedom of movement across their frontiers. It was because of this policy that Nigeria threw her borders open to Niger which has already been referred to.

At the United Nations level the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) established a machinery in Ouagadougon, capital of Upper Volta, to ensure that the provisions supplied to the disaster area reach the stricken people on time.

Dr. Kurt Waldheim, then United Nations Secretary General, designated Mr. Bradford Morse Under Secretary for General Assembly Affairs to coordinate operations in New York to solve drought problems in Africa. The Economic Commission for Africa ECA held the view that the emergency measures taken by the OAU Heads of State and the United Nations Secretary General were not enough to deal with this problem. Medium and long yerm operations were required. The ECA therefore offered to put its resources of the subregional offices and the Niamey based United Nations Development Advisory Team (UNDPAT) office under the aid coordinating agencies.

The ECA felt very strongly that the drought and its consequences pertained to basic structural defects in the process of agro-economic and agro-sociological development. Therefore medium and long term measures should concentrate on identifying the basic structural constraints to increased agricultural productivity. The influence of the basic structure varies according to natural resources endowments, their geographical distribution and their time balance vis-a-vis population dynamics and overall economic structures, strategies and other similar considerations. In view of this the ECA/FAO second phase studies on intra sub-regional cooperation and trade in agriculture were to be reoriented to take full consideration of the long term requirements of the Sahelian countries. The aim was to make the problem of aid zones the earliest concern of the International African Centre for Animal Production and Health. (IACAPH).[15]

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15 Source: UN, ECA, Drought' Africa Target Vol VI No. 1 June 1973

FAO and other donor agencies organised relief operations for the afflicted populations and together with the World Food Programme, is very active in food producing ventures. By June 1973 the total cost of emergency aid was more than fifty million dollars. The drought, as it has been so far, requires to check the loss of human lives due to shortage of food. It also requies to take measures to arrest the spread of the disaster and stop other African countries from being affected because in some cases what is involved is a phenomenon that has been talked of for several years namely the 'encroachment of the desert'. The countries afflicted by drought serve as examples of this phenomenon.

FAO also established an Interdepartmental working Group on Problems of the Sahelian Zone and placed there a task team of livestock, water development and transport experts. The teams' plan of action was to identify and undertake whatever immediate action required. There is a special representative to hold discussions with the Heads of the states engulfed by the drought and submit reports to FAO headquarters in Rome. To add to this a Lake Chad Polders Project was started. It is a measure of drought protection and high yields of food crop in addition to cotton. Niger being one of the Countries located in this region is affected by all these measures meant for the region.

In Niger itself President Kountcha has taken a lot of initiative to rehabilitate his country's economy and rationalising as well as increasing food supply. Drought had by 1975 become a terrible menace and over ninety percent of the people

who live in rural areas were hard hit. There was shortage of food up to 170 million tons which was made up by donations from international agencies. More food had to be acquired from outside every year beginning 1976. When Kountche came to power he immediately set to rationalise food distribution. Soon all the refuge camps which had been over crowded began emptying as people returned to their villages because food could reach them there.

The foregoing information is very important because it shows that Niger's position is that of rehabilitation and survival. She is therefore not in a position to indulge into dynamic domestic and foreign policy ventures outside the contest of acquiring means of bare subsistence. The poor status of her economy has renderred her impotent and so she has to depend on her neighbours and international agencies to survive. Although she is aware that she is a landlocked country which needs to restructure her transport and communications network, both internally and externally, she has neither the capacity nor the time to do so. The financial investments needed are far beyond what she can even hope to get in aid and her leaders have most of the time been busy daily looking for food to feed the people. Naturally the food item has tended to sap most of the financial resources available and she has had to borrow more and more money every year.

The effect location has had on her economy in the form of transport and other costs has been noted in this chapter. On the average it counts for as much as fifteen percent of the total export earnings and raised her import bill by the same

margin. It has also been shown that her foreign policies have always been directed at permanent friends with countries which give her passage to and from the sea and are also her main trading partners. She has never quarrelled with any of them and she has on a number of occasions acted ahead of them. The neighbouring states also have done their utmost to assist Niger. Nigeria has been at the forefront in this. There is therefore a close relationship between location and foreign policy in her economic development plans.

The location of Niger plus the dry desert conditions and small size of her domestic market make it impossible to attract substantial foreign capital. The same conditions make it difficult to generate capital internally. The conditions of underdevelopment and dependence therefore continue unabated, and this is to be contrasted with the account of Uganda which follows.

CHAPTER FOUR

UGANDA AND THE ECONOMICS OF LANDLOCKEDNESS

This chapter is intended to highlight on Uganda as the second comparative study for this thesis. The main objective is to study how Uganda has functioned economically and politically since she became independent in October 1962 and then determine whether or not her landlocked geographical position has had any significant impact on her performance. Uganda is landlocked by the republics of Kenya in the east, Tanzania in the south, Sudan in the north and Rwanda and Zaire in the west. She is in the centre of Africa placed astride the equator. So she has a hot wet climate tempered by the high altitude above sea level which averages between 3500 to 5000 feet.

The main physical features include two towering mountains one Mt. Elgon at the eastern border with Kenya and the other Mt Ruwenzori at the border with Zaire. Both of these are permanently snow capped and a number of rivers flow down from their tops. Mt. Elgon is a dormantvolcano with plenty of alluvial soils which are very rich for agriculture. The area around it is the home of Uganda's arabica coffee industry. Mt. Ruwenzori is a fold mountain with many peaks and descending valleys which are also highly fertile for agriculture. The other principle physical features include the great Lake Victoria which is the second largest fresh water lake in the world.

This lake is shared between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and plays a major role in the distribution of rainfall in the southern parts of Uganda namely Bukedi, Busoga and Buganda.

This part of the country receives a lot of convectional rainfall from Lake Victoria and this coupled with good black soils has made southern Uganda the backbone of her agricultural industry. Cotton, Coffee, Sugar, Tea, Bannanas and all kinds of cereals and vegetables are grown in huge quantities. Since the backbone of Uganda's economy is agriculture this area is of great economic and political importance. Needless to mention almost forty-five percent of Uganda's population lives in this region. River nile which is the longest river in Africa originates in Uganda at Jinja. It is one of the most majestic physical features in the world with plenty of potential for hydor-electric power development. The Owen Falls dam was built and opened by Britain's Queen Elizabeth in 1954. It is the most important source of power in East Africa. It supplies power to Kenya while it remains the basis of Uganda's industrial development designs.

The construction of the Owen Falls dam at Jinja made this town the most important industrial base in Uganda and currently it is the second largest city in the country. But this great river has more to offer than has been mentioned. It serves as the base of Uganda's tourst industry. People flock from all parts of the world to see the source of the Nile. Historically early European explorers penetrated into the interior of Africa in search of the source of this mighty river. It has remained an attraction since then. In north-western Uganda this river

has helped the formation of a gigantic national park, the Kaborega National Park, with a number of lodges to accommodate tourists. The Kabarega falls are a wonder in Africa. At this point the river runs through a very narrow gorge twenty feet wide and drops down through a height of four hundred feet. It is a fantastic sight to see such a big river narrowed down to such a small size and then go through a tremendous ditch down below.

These falls are without doubt a major tourist attraction and hold great potential for hydroelectric power development. Uganda has in addition to this a number of small fresh water lakes which serve as the basis for her fishing industry. Included among these are Lakes Kyoga, Albert and George. A big national ;park, the Ruwenzori National Park, was started around Lake George and it promoted Uganda's tourist industry further. Another national park was developed in the Kidepo valley in Karamoja for the same purpose. Among the wild game found in this park is the rare white rhino.

Uganda is also endowed with many other natural resources. Copper is the principle mineral being exploited commercially. The mine is at Kilembe at the foothills of Mount Ruwenzori. This Copper belt extends into Zaire and ranks among the top five commodities which earn foreign exchange for Uganda. However Copper production in Uganda is not anywhere near the levels reached by Zambia or Zaire. In short Uganda is not a major world copper producer. The other mineral of importance is salt. Lake Katwe located near the Ruwenzori Nstional Park in Kasese distric is a salt Lake. A plant to refine this salt and make

it a major Export Commodity is nearing completion. It is being built with the help of aid from the Federal Republic of West Germany. Tin, iron ore, and small deposits of oil have been known to exist in Ankole, Kigezi and Bunyoro districts. But difficulties in transport and the fact that the deposits are small which do not justify huge capital investments have delayed commercial exploitation of these minerals.

Uganda is a small fertile country with a densely settled population. It is just over 94,000 square miles 20,000 of which is under water. The total pupulation is 13.5 million people and the average density per square mile is nearing 50.[1] As it has already been noted the sourthern part is more densily populated thzn the north. From the slopes of mount Elgon to the border with Zaire and Rwanda there are over 60 percent of t the population. The northern part is relatively dry and more thinly populated than the south. Teso, Karamoja and Lango districts are famous for livestock farming as well as crop agriculture. Transport problems particularly in Karamoja have tended to hold back the expansion of this industry. There are no railways or tamarc rods in Karmoja. There are very few good murram roads either. Even moving trucks are very difficult to comeby. This has been particularly the case during Idi Amin's reign during which transport problems assumed crisis proportions.

West Nile and Acholi are famous for cotton and tobacco. Coffee is also produced and other food crops. In south-western Uganda there is the rich and heavily populated hilly

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1 Information obtained from the Uganda National Census of Jan. 1980.

district of Kigezi, over looking Rwanda. Because of its climate Kigezi is called the Switzerland of Uganda. It has similar to pographical conditions as Switzerland. Kigezi district has the highest population density per square mile in the country. It is over 270 people per square mile approximately. This area is the home of a lively vegetable industry. Cabbages, Carrots, Tomatoes and other vegetables are grown in plenty. But due to difficulties in transport only a small per centage of it reaches the market. Coffee is also grown and a number of cooperative Unions look after the production and marketing of these products within Uganda.

Ankole district is one of the most important areas for the livestock industry. Most of the people are cattle keepers but they also engage in other forms of agriculture. They produce bananas, tea, maize and many other cerals. Ankole is located between Buganda and Kigezi. Toro and Bunyoro are specialised in tea production. There are several big tea estates run by the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC). The UDC is the largest single corporation founded by the British colonical rulers in 1952 to be the main axis for industrial and agricultural development. The colonial rulers launched a major economic development programme for Uganda between the years 1952 and 1955.

This is the period which saw the construction and completion of the Owen Falls Hydro Electric dam on river Nile which has already been referred to. It also saw the birth of the UDC and the Coffee and Lint Marketing Boards to handle the marketing of coffee and cotton respectively. It also witnessed

the construction of the first textile mill in East Africa in Jinja to utilise part of the cotton grown locally. There was expansion in the sugar, tobacco and tea industries and several other commodities. Unlike Niger Uganda is self supporting in food products. It was only during the 1978 and 1979 period that production fell below level and there was famine throughout the country. The drop in production was caused by hitherto unprecedent long drought and the Tanzania-Uganda war of liberation which displaced many people from their homes and thereby made normal tilling of the land impossible.

It must be emphasized here that most of Uganda's major administrative and industrialised urban centres lie within the area around Lake Victoria. This includes Kampala, the capital city and main commercial centre. Jinja is the largest industrial city and home of the source of the Nile and the Owen Falls dam. It is the main commercial centre for the agriculturally rich Busoga Province. Mbale located at the foot hills of Mount Elgon is the third largest city and handles a lot of coffee processing works. Masaka is the fourth largest town and rich agricultural area of West Buganda. Coffee is the main crop handled here. Other big towns include Mbarara, Gulu, Arua, Soroti and Lira.

There are all weather roads linking Kampala to all major district capitals in the country. The main exceptions to this being the districts of Karamoja, Sebei and West Nile where tarmac has not yet reached. Masaka and Mbarara were virtually destroyed during the war and are being rebuilt. There is also Entebbe town which was the colonial administrative capital.

The Governor's residence and Chief Secretariat were located here together with the only international airport. Now most of the Government Ministries have been transferred to Kampla and others are in the process of being transferred. Only State House and the internarional airport are destined to remain there.

The importance of Entebbe now is in the field of airtransport. It offers the only gate way to the world by air. Prior to Amin's rise to power all major airlines of the world both from the East and West as well as asia used to call at Entebbe. Transport to the outside world was therefore remarkably simple. Most of these services became disconnected as Amin's reign advanced. After the Israeli raid in July 1976 the airport was very badly damaged and closed to international traffic. Services are being resumed now as the airport gets repaired and the country as a whole rejoins the international transport and communications system.

Kampala has a direct rail and road connection with Kenya up to Mombasa. This is Uganda's commercial lifeline. Uganda's great economic and political potential in East Africa forced the colonial rulers to construct the Kenya-Uganda Railway (KUR) which was extended to Kampala across river Nile in 1931. It was this railway which made and has up to now kept Uganda as a viable economic entity. From Tororo the northern section of this railway was built up to Gulu with the intention of pushing it up to West Nile. Another extension was made from Kampala to Kasese in western Uganda. The northern section helps to transport cotton, tobacco and cattle from the north to the south.

The western section was built to transport copper from Kasese to Jinja for smelting after which it is exported.

On the whole the transport infrastructures in Uganda were laid to serve the requirements of the colonial economic designs. They are therefore oriented towards transporting agricultural raw materials to the sea and thereafter to markets overseas. Because of this Uganda's internal transport system is in a adiplorable condition. It is not easy to move from one place to another within the country unless these places happen to be on the main trunk routes. This policy also led to unbalanced economic and political development of the country. Northern Uganda and Karamoja in particular are the least economically developed and lack many essential services such as hospitals, schools and big commercial centres. Kigezi, Sabai Bunyoro and north Busoga are other areas caught up in this ~~si~~ situation, yet they have great economic potential which needs to be developed.

Kigezi has the most suitable climate for producing vegetables but poor transportation greatly hampers industrial development. North Busoga is very important for agriculture especially with regard to citrus fruits such as oranges, dairy farming and fishing in Lake Kioga. But none of these can get to market due to lack of transport. Sebei is particularly good for wheat farming. But since it is hilly there are no good roads no railways to get the wheat crop out. During the rainy seasons some wheat is first taken to Kenya which shares the border with Sebei and then imported back into Uganda for

consumption. Naturally this costs a lot of money which could otherwise be saved if there had been means of moving directly to other parts of the country without having to go through Kenya.

Initially Uganda experiences both internal and external transport problems in marketing her agricultural products. Internally she has to buy and collect these products from farmers in rural areas and then transport them to towns where they are sold locally or exported overseas. Perishable food items cannot be exported overseas because Uganda lacks quick transport facilities by air or refrigerated trains to carry them to Mombasa for shipping. Such items therefore cannot earn money for Uganda because she cannot transport them to markets over seas. This therefore presents the first adverse effect on her landlocked geographical position. These food items are sold inside Uganda only.

But if quick transport services were available most of these products would find their way overseas as it is the case with similar products from Kenya. Kenya being a coastal country can get such item away to various destinations throughout the world. Uganda therefore loses very valuable foreign exchange which would accrue to her if she could sell these products. Unfortunately for her there are no airtransport facilities to enable her take these products by air. It is too expensive for her to hire foreign firms to airfreight her products.

Notable cash crops such as coffee, cotton, tea, and tabacco are produced essentially for the foreign overseas markets.

Only a very little percentage of each of them is consumed locally. Uganda experiences tremendous transport problems to convey thousands of tons of these products to her customers overseas. She suffers from acute shortages of vehicles and locomotives to carry all these products to the sea in times they are needed there. She also encounters a lot of transit problems including those which occur within the port of Mobasa.

These problems were highlighted upon and summarised by her Chief delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas Mr. Ochana who told the conference that a landlocked country's most evident disadvantages include, among others, the absence of a sea port. This is a problem which has a fundamental effect on the economy of any state since the sea offered the cheapest mode of transport and was often the only way to reach international markets. Uganda as a landlocked country is faced with this problem. She is also faced with the problem of gaining access to the main avenues of international transport. The sebsequent high costs are therefore a serious impediment to her foreign trade and economic development generally.

Mention has just been made of Ugand's inability to market her perishable food items and transporting her main cash crops. These are some of the problems Mr. Ochana was referreing to. Finally, Mr.Ochana talked about the legal, administrative and political problems which often arise during the course of transporting goods and people in foreign territories. He stressed that it has now become necessary for

the international community to strike a balance between strict adherence to the sovereignty of coastal states and the needs of landlocked states to further their international trade.[2]

This is a serious obstacle for Uganda and it has caused friction between her and Kenya on a number of occasions. As recorded in chapter two Kenya has always maintained that her sovereignty is not negotiable and that she allows transit facilities to landlocked countries as matter of kindness but there can be no force of law involved. Moreover, her Chief delegated to this same conference had insisted on receiprocity facilities for transit services renderred to landlocked countries. In matters of conflict he had maintained that the national interests of the coastal states must be paramount otherwise being landlocked would become an excessive advantage. The landlocked countries would become more soveraign than their coastal neighbours. The substance of Kenya's position has been given in chapter two and no more details need be repeated. But the whole approach works in detriment to the Ugandan aspirations. That is why she is so bitter about it.

To understand fully the kinds of problems Uganda encounters and the effect this has on her economy it is better to treat the main products she sells abroad. The focus is to be put on how much she sells of each commodity, mode of transport used, type of problems encountered and costs of transit and storage in Mombasa. It in necessary to know the percentage of the costs over total profits. This percentage will reflect on the price

2 UN, Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records Vol.II, New York, 1975.

she has to pay for being landlocked. First consideration is to be given to the problems she faces in the marketing of coffee since this is by far the principle commodity she exports.

The buying and exporting of the coffee crop is the work of the coffee Marketing Board which came into being by an act of Parliament in 1963. Before this board was established there had been a joint board coordinating the marketing of cotton and coffee instituted in 1953 by the British colonial government. The reason for setting up this board was that as from 1953 coffee increasingly became one of the main foreign exchange earners and government decided to keep a close supervision of the way it was marketed overseas. By 1962 coffee was the number one commodity exported by Uganda and for that reason Uganda joined the International Coffee Organisation (ICO)[3].

The Coffee Marketing Board was given the duty of collecting revenue for the government from coffee. An act passed in 1969 gave it the monopoly of buying and selling coffee outside East Africa. It was also empowered to do anything necessary for or in connection with the purchase, transport, packing, storage, grading, exporting and shipping of processed coffee. The Board was further charged with the responsibility of maintaining and stablilishing the prices of Uganda coffee by purchasing or subsidising coffee within or outside Uganda. Finally the Board was also given the duty to make arrangements at the direction of the Minister responsible for agriculture which may be necessary to enable the government to fulfill any obligation

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3. Information on Coffee Marketing in Uganda was supplied by the Chief Statistician of the Coffee Marketing Board through personal interview, held in his office at the Board's Headquarters in Kampala in September, 1980.

incurred by government under international agreements.

The coffee Marketing Board is financed by bank loans and profits accumulated from the sales of coffee. It is fully responsible to pay all transport charges on coffee outside Uganda. Within Uganda transport to the Board's central godowns in Kampala is met by the individual cooperative Unions which buy the coffee from the farmers. In the 1974-1975 period the Board bought 193,457 tons of coffee for which it paid 586,765,275 Uganda shillings. Transporting it to Mombasa cost it 10,765,492 Uganda shillings. The following period 1975-1976 was a slack one due to a general economic squeeze on the people by the Amin regime. Only 137.064 tons were bought at 487,500,732 Uganda shillings and transporting it to Mombasa took 11,436,058 shillings. The Board paid more in transport charges to transport less coffee than it did in 1974.

The reason for the Board buying less coffee during this period than it had done in the previous period was that the farmers and the rural primary societies could not get transport for their coffee. So they kept it unsold. Some of this coffee began to be smuggled out of the country for higher prices on the illegal markets in Kenya and Rwanda. Thus Uganda lost revenue from a reasonable percentage of the coffee produced that year and subsequent years of military rule.

At the national level the Board has continued to face more and more transport problems. The East African Railways which used to be the main transporter of Uganda coffee could not supply sufficient numbers of railway wagons to take the coffee to Mombasa. The Coffee Marketing Board requires up to

seventy wagons daily to take coffee to Mombasa. If such a number could be obtained there would be no coffee piling up in Kampala. But unfortunately the railways could supply only up to thirty wagons which is less than half the required number. Huge stocks of coffee are therefore left untransported. The Board is therefore plunged into a transport dilemma which it cannot solve. The customers at Mombasa come in time to pick up the coffee and find that there is none and yet the Boards funds reamin tied up in unsold coffee stored in its godowns in Kampala.

The impact on Uganda's landlocked geographical position becomes obvious here. Uganda cannot transport her coffee and earn money from it because of lack of transport facilities by train and she has no alternative transpost to revert to. The very long distance from the sea is totally responsible for this sad situation. Kenya which is coastal and also produces coffee can use road transport facilities since the distance to be covered and not as long as those Uganda would have to cover if she attempted to do the same.

This undesirable situation was aggravated by the break up of the East African Railways Corporation in 1976. The newly created Uganda Railways Corporation was desparately short of wagons and locomotives. Moreover, Kenya had not given Uganda permission to use the Kenya Railways Corporation services to rail her goods to or from the sea. This led to a complete halt in railway transport between the two countries for some months. The coffee Marketing Board had to resort / to the most expensive and inefficient road transport programme. So in the period 1976 to 1977 a transport contract was offered to Kenatco and Sullivan

companies based in Kenya to carry Uganda's coffee to Mombasa. Kenatco carried 407,035 and Sullivan 77,062 bags, The cost to the Board was 27/53 shillings per bag delivered in Mombasa each weighing sixty kilograms by rail. By road the cost rose to 47/40. The Board therefore incurred higher transport costs in 1976-1977 than it had ever done before and this dug deep in its profits.

When railway transport resumed 1,877,442 bags were transported by rail at a cost of 400 Uganda shillings per ton and 674,724 bags went by road at a cost of 550 shillings per ton. The bulk of Uganda's coffee is sold overseas. In the earlier period 1973/74 for instance between 150,000 and 200,000 tons were sold oversea and only 1000 tons were consumed locally. In the period 1975/76 the Board exported four grades of coffee namely 127,072 tons of unwashed robusta at a price of 74.3 cents per kilogram washed robusta 4,500 tons at 69.6 cents per kilogram. Other arabic 4.500 tons at 82.7 cents and Bugisu at 103.3 cents per kilogram.

The Board's godowns in Kampala can store a maximum of only 50,000 tons and godowns in Mombasa only 25,000 tons. The Board employs a total of 1,492 workers in Kampala and 110 in Mombasa. It costs up to three million shillings annually to maintain these godowns. Payments made to employees in Mobmasa must be in foreign exchange since these are employed in a foreign territory. This is another way in which Uganda's landlocked geographical position has proved to be a drain on her foreign exchange reserves. Each big cooperation keeps godowns in Kenya and therefore requires foreign exchange to pay workers salaries,

and to carry out general overhead costs.

The Board's godowns in Kampala and Mombasa are very small compared to the amount of coffee the Board has to handle. The reason for having such small godowns is that coffee is not meant to be stored. It should be sold off as soon as it is received. But inadequate transport facilities makes such quick transactions impossible. It is therefore common practice to keep lorries which bring in coffee from cooperative unions and other curing works unloaded for a number of days during which time they remain out of use at the places they come from so coffee begins to accumulate there also. Transport problems therefore create a vicious circle of coffee accumulation at every station at primary sodieties which cannot carry all their coffee to headquarters of cooperative unions and at the union headquarters which cannot carry all their coffee to the Coffee Marketing Board Headquarters in Kampala.

The cooperative societies have to pay overtime and night allowances to the crew of their lorries and in case of hired lorries waiting charges have to be paid per day. These payments increase their overhead charges tremendously. At the Coffee Marketing Board godowns, as it has been already noted, coffee accumulates beceuse transport to Mombasa is inadequate. There are times when the Board actually fails to deliver coffee to its customers in Mombasa at the stipulated times in the contracts. The Board is at times penalised for breach of contract. In 1974/75 for instance the Board paid out approximately 16,288,204. United States dollars as penalities.

In the following period 1976/77 a total of 126,618.13 dollars was paid out. Uganda coffee is sold through the Board's offices in Kampala, London and New York and it is sold free on board at Mombasa. This means that the great transport and storage costs as well as penalities and insurance charges cannot be made good of. World market forces dictate the prices for coffee.

From the above account it is easy to see the effect geographical location has on Uganda's economy. The profit from coffee is greatly reduced by problems resulting from her location. The Board has been greatly concerned about this loss and it has made several attempts to find alternative routes and ports to export its coffee. These attempts were intensified in 1976 following the demise of the East African Community and subsequent deterioration in political relations between Uganda and Kenya. Arrangements were made to use the ports of Gabon on the Atlantic coast, Djibouti on the Red Sea as well as the Sudanese port of Port Sudan. This was Amin's innovative way in dealing with the acute political situation in which he had planted Uganda.

But since Uganda has no surface routes connecting her to any of these countries it meant that her imports and exports going through the above mentioned ports have first to be air lifted to and from the same ports. The Coffee Marketing Board exported five million tons of coffee through Gabon at a cost of 765 United States dollars per ton. She also exported 2,415 million tons through Djibouti at a fantastic 2,500.00 dollars. Obviously these routes were too expensive for the

Board to maintain. They proved to be no alternative routes at all compared to the relatively much cheaper Kampala-Mombasa railway route.

This exercise made it quite clear that Uganda cannot adopt air transport as a viable alternative means of transport for her products. Agricultural products such as coffee and cotton cannot be exported by air. They are too bulky and weighty and fetch too little price in the world markets which cannot justify the colossol air transport costs. Any alternative route for Uganda must be a surface route through the neighnouring states. The huge costs incurred came about first because of geographical location but this was than worsened by poor foreign relations conducted by Uganda towards her traditional East African neighbours Kenya and Tanzania. The close link between geographical location, foreign policy and economic development was vividly demonstrated during this period.

In 1973/74 Uganda's earnings from coffee were 226,578,975 United States dollars and in 1974/75 her earnings fell to 175, 337,139 dollars. In the following period 1975/76 her earnings rose to a record of 245,558,674 United States dollars. The costs of transport for the same years were 2.4, 3.7 and 2.2 percent respectively. Most of the coffee was sold to the United State of America, United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Japan. After 1976 earnings from coffee went down at an alarming rate. This was due to the worsening political relations between Uganda and the rest of the world which culminated in a trade embargo imposed on her by the United States. This situation was a direct reflection on her foreign policy.

What has been noted about the marketing of coffee applies equally to the marketing of Uganda's second foreign exchange earner cotton. The setting up of the Lint Marketing Board was intended to give it monopoly of buying all cotton, cotton seed and running a large variety of oil mills scattered all over the country. This Board was instituted in November 1949 to handle the cotton crop which has for a long time been Uganda's major cash crop. The transport needed by this Board consists of transporting cotton to her buying centres which are usually ginneries or cooperative societies. Prior to 1972 this service used to be handled by individual asian firms which had built ginneries all over the country. Only a little was handled by cooperative societies.[4]

Transport was free to the farmers and readily available. People were very keen on the growing of cotton because it used them to earn money with which they bought all the essentials of life. After 1972 however, the situation became different. Free transport was no longer available and the cost of hiring transport services went up more than ten fold due to shortage of vehicles for hire and unavailability of spares. In Uganda cotton is produced by small scale farmers and the income they derive from the sale of cotton annually was too low to justify the costs they were required to undergo to take their harvests to buying centres.

The farmers therefore switched from producing cotton to growing food crops which required less labour, hardly any

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4 All information concerning the Lint Marketing Board and Marketing of Cotton was kindly supplied by the Marketing Manager of the Board through a questinnaire sent to him in his office at the Board's Headquarters in Kampala in September, 1980.

transport costs and fetched them more money. Besides food crops were used as subsistance food items. Due to the great inflation which characterished most of Amin and post Amin era many people could not afford to buy food on the open market. They therefore resorted to producing it themselves and that meant forsaking cotton. This move was a divastating blow to the national economy because whereas cotton was a foreign exchange earner the food crops which replaced it were and are mainly for subsistence purposes. The failure in the transport industry is largely responsible for this change.

On the international market Uganda sells her lint and cotton seed free on board at Mombasa. This is because she has to competa with other cotton producing countries in the world. Charging her customers transport costs from Kampala to Mombasa would make her lint and cotton seed too expensive for them to afford. They would consequently turn to cheaper supplies from other countries and Uganda would lose her market. Since she cannot afford to lose her position in the world market she has to forego the colossal transport costs she pays to the Uganda and Kenya railways which provide her with the required transport services to the sea. She has also to forget all about the port charges she has to pay once her cotton is in Mombasa. These include storage, clearing and forwarding charges.

Unlike the Coffee Marketing Board, the Lint Marketing Board is not up to date with its figures. It is therefore not possible to know how much she has to pay to transport lint and cotton seed to Mombasa annually. But it is quite considerable. The Board does not experience too many transport problems because

cotton is dispatched from any railway station. There are no central godowns in Kampala as there are in case of coffee. Furthermore cotton is a seasonal crop which needs transport for only part of the year. It is not like coffee or tea which are marketed throughout the year. But as in the case of coffee the Lint Marketing Board has godowns in Mombasa to maintain and employees whose salaries are paid in foreign exchange. The country's foreign reserves are therefore drained monthly even when there is no cotton being sent to Mombasa as it has been the case since 1977.

This means that the total earnings from cotton are reduced first by the high transport costs to the port. Then they are further reduced by the cost of maintaining godowns and payment of salaries for the employees stationed there and this has to be in foreign currency. Moreover, even the transport costs incurred in Kenya have to be settled in Kenya currency and this applies to every commodity Ugada imports and exports. As it happens about two-thirds of the journey to Mombasa is through the foreign territory of Kenya. So the foreign exchange component of the costs to import and export goods is quite considerable and this is a direct consequence of her landlocked tgeographical position.

Now it is time to discuss Uganda's landlocked geographical position as a formidable obstacle in the clearing and forwarding of goods at Mombasa port. Uganda has in the past ten years experienced tremendous delays due to lengthy clearing and forwarding procedures in getting her imports and exports out of Mombasa. These delays were more than trebled after the collapse

of the East African Community and Amin's increasing unpopularity. The whole exercise now involves too much paper work and administrative bottlenecks. For instance to get any of her imports out of Mombasa a transit bond security must be executed by filling a form together with a copy of the bill of lading and invoices for the goods. After receipt of these documents the goods are then entered on the form C38 for transit to Uganda.[5]

On reaching the Uganda-Kenya border a certificate of importation has to be passed on form C40. Clearance can be effected on payment of duty and sales tax using forms C16 and C17 respectively. If a bound of security has been already executed goods can be warehoused by filling form C18. From there the goods proceed to Kampala having been cleared on form 22. As regards forwarding goods customs entries have to be passed according to the nature of goods.

Obviously the procedures outlined above are quite lengthy and cumbersome. Too many forms have to be filled and processed with a result that some of them get lost or misplaced and it takes a lot of efforts to look for them. There are always too many goods to be cleared all the time and the officers who handle these routine tasks are usually not as many and their efficiency not always at its peak. Loss or misplacement .... of these papers means great delays since the process has to be restarted. All companies which are engaged in the clearing and forwarding of goods for Uganda are privately owned. They

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5 All information concerning the clearing and forwarding of goods at Mombasa and Malaba has been supplied by the General Manager of the Cargo Clearing and Forwarding Company at the Company's Head Office in Kampala.in September, 1980.

clear and forward goods for the government, parastatal bodies, private companies as well as individuals.

A number of problems arise from this mixture of responsibilities. Lack of shipping documents makes it impossible for these companies to know to whom the goods belong and until the owners are known no clearance or forwarding can be attempted. This is quite often the case and contacts have to be made in Kampala to find out who ordered which goods. There is also a shortage of offloading machines, storage facilities and transport facilities in Mombasa. Besides the companies have to pay for the various services renderred in the port in Kenya currency. Unfortunately the Bank of Uganda tends to delay too much in approving these companies applications for foreign exchange and without ready cash at hand little can be accomplished. Shipping documents are usually processed through commercial banks which give loans used to buy goods overseas. Quite often these banks also tend to sit on these documents rather too long and this increases the time taken to clear goods from Mombasa.[6]

Besides the difficulties enumerated above, there are other difficulties clearing and forwarding companies in Uganda have to face. First of all they need transporting lorries and supervising cars to make sure that any goods cleared are taken away immediately. Unfortunately such vehicles are in very short supply and inadequate funds make it impossible to buy enough of them. So some goods which may have been cleared may continue to lie in the port because there are no means to take them away. Secondly the companies require enough money in foreign exchange to maintain the available vehicles and pay drivers during the

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6 Ibid.

process of transporting goods. This essential requirment cannot be easily met due to restrictions on supply of foreign exchange imposed by the Bank of Uganda. Nobody is allowed to take more than 100 Uganda shillings. This makes the return journays extremely difficult as drivers do not have enough money to buy fuel from Tororo to Kampala.

To overcome some of the difficulties.emcountered in Mombasa a number of measures are taken. First of all periodic surveys are made in Mombasa port by each company for any Uganda cargo noting down importers names and their addresses. The importers are then contacted to find out whether or not they are clients of the clearing and forwarding company concerned and get shipping documents from them. If no shipping documents are available suppliers of the goods are contacted by telex to find out to whom they sent the goods. Once this is established normal procedures begin. Free warehousing to all clients are arranged in the port.

The cargo clearing and forwarding company which is one of the main clearing and forwarding companies for Uganda goods, hires fork lifts from Transocean Uganda limited to help it in storing goods. It also hires more lorries to move the goods out of the port. It had only two lorries of its own which are obviously too few for the job. It had also acquired credit facilities which enabled it to pay before the Bank of Uganda had approved its application for foreign exchange. But this was found later on to be unworkable and was stopped in 1975. Instead of this the company simply secures a bank backing for its payments. Importers are also encouraged to keep in touch with

their banks when and if they are expecting goods so that shipping documents are released in time.[7]

Documentation is done up to thetime of payment and then the clients are contacted to send a bank draft. It any client is unable to pay in this way the company pays on his behalf and then charges him according to a specimen invoice. Where the importers pays for himself without going through a bank customs taxes and disbursement fees are excluded. Taxes are worked out according to the value, weight and volume of the goods. Additional charges are made if goods remain uncleared for too long. This is worked out on the basis of time taken to clear, weight and volume of goods.

Because of the absence of good transport facilities in Mombasa and delay in obtaining shipping documents Uganda goods sometime take too long to be cleared. The importers have to pay these additional charges which ultimately make the imported goods very expensive in Uganda. The causes of the delay have already been spelt out above and unless a quick procedure is devised Ugandans will continue to pay the additional charges and suffer from the time lage in obtaining their imports some of which are very essential to life. There is also a break in the chain of reaction of the arrival of goods whereby when consignment arrives it is sold off before the next consignment arrives. A break in supply occurs during the period of delay.

If the owner of the goods and his address cannot be established the goods are moved from the port to customs warehouses after twenty one days. If they remain unclaimed for

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three months, having been gazetted, they are auctioned by the customs on behalf of the government. In such situations those goods never arrive in Uganda. All the transctions take place in Mombasa culminating into government getting the revenue but the consummers inside Ugandans have to do without these goals and this accounts for the shortage of essential imports ordered but are never received in the country.

Uganda goods are transported by rail and road. Payment in Kenya is made by the handling companies on behalf of the importer and then they invoice the latter. In order to reimburse their Mobasa offices which make these payments the invoices are presented to the Bank of Uganda for the necessary Kenya shillings. Ugandans have to pay handling, clearing, durmurrage charges and if the goods are later cleared customs warehouses fees. There are six main companies which clear goods for Uganda in Mombasa namely the Cargo Clearing and Forwarding Company, Transocean Uganda Limited, Freightlinks International Limited, Afro Gargo (U) Limited, Maritime Forwaders (U) Limited, Samtanus (U) Limited and African Clearing and Forwarding Company.

Apart from the various transport companies which carry Uganda's imports and exports by road, the Uganda Railways Corporation is by far the most important transport agency for Uganda. This corporation was formed in 1977 following the break up of the East African Railways Corporation in December, 1976. But being a new organisation it has faced and still faces many administration, financial and technical problems. To begin with it started from scratch as Kenya and Tanzania retained

most of the assets of the defunct East African Railways Corporation. These included locomotives, wagons, workshops and training schools which were based in their respective countries.[8]

Apart from this Uganda has a number of disadvantages which have made the efficient operation of railway transport difficult. She is a small landlocked country which must depend on her neighbours to reach the sea. Uganda has only 1,316 Kilometres of railway in her territory covering the main line from Tororo to Kasese and a branch to the north from Tororo to Packwach. There is also a small section of railway from Jusambatia to Jinja which serves the agriculturally rich areas of north Busoga. There are in addition a few road services operated by the Uganda Railways Coporation which are confined to the Kampala Masindi-Hoima Bitiaba area.

The bulk of the country has no rail links. The areas covered by railways are also too remote from the well settled farming areas of the country. For purposes of passenger transport therefore railways are not very important within Uganda. They were constructed to carry commercial products for export overseas and not as a means of boosting transport services in the rural areas. This is therefore the first real disadvantage which has hampered the growth of rail transport in the country.

Another serious disadvantage is that since she has no sea coast Uganda has to use the Kenya Railways Corporation to reach the sea. /Railway corporation has therefore to handover Her

8 All information about Uganda Railways Corporation was supplied by its General Manager through Personal Interview conducted in his office in Kampala in August, 1980.

its cargo and passangers to Kenya Railways at the border at Malaba. No charges of traffic takes place but the crew changes. Ugandan personnel cannot be permitted to operate in Kenya and Vice-versa. This procedural arrangement creates a lot of serious consequences for Uganda. First of all she has no administrative control over Kenyans who as a result obey commends issued by their own government. Most of Uganda's locomotives stop at Malaba and from there up to Mombasa Kenya uses her own and Uganda has to pay for this service. Uganda wagons loaded with goods and passengers have to continue operating in Kenya until they are returned with imports from Mombasa. Passangers have to rebook their seats in Kenya currency at Malaba. The tickets they purchase in Uganda are Uganda railways so they must buy new tickets to cover their journey in Kenya.

The whole exercise is very cumbersome and time consuming indeed. It is also very expensive to Uganda since she has to pay Kenya Railways for use of the latter's railways. The system of payment is that of the open ledger or deposit accounts at Malaba and Mombasa. According to this system payment is made periodically at agreed times. Up to 1979 Uganda had not yet made any payments to Kenya. But the fact is she has to pay any amount assessed by Kenya-which may very from time to time as economic changes inside Kenya may demand. Naturally such uncertainty has created instability in Uganda's economic and political system.

Uganda's anxiety to avoid future catastrophy to her economic well being has led her to very frustrating efforts to find alternative routes for her trade. These have already been noted

as unsatisfactory and it appears she is no longer pursuing them. Tariff rates are set by Kenya Railways on the basis of weight units. Uganda has no part to play in determining these rates whether or not such rates can be favourable to Uganda depends on the political atmosphere prevailing between the two countries. Inability to guarantee that cordial relations will always obtain is responsible for Uganda's plight.

The Uganda Railways Corporation has been since its inception desperately short of locomotives, wagons, repair and training facilities. By the end of December 1978 it had only 21 locomotives. In the estimation of the management the cooperation required a minimum of 70 locomotives to be able to function properly. In addition to this it had 1,360 general cargo wagons, 380 petrol wagons and 40 cattle wagons. Naturally efforts were being made to acquire more of each of these items. West Germany and France' agreed to supply them on terms agreed between Uganda and themselves. The former had already delivered 8 diesel locomotives to Uganda Railways Corporation.

The Minister of Finance, Transport and Communications in Uganda signed an agreement with a French Bank 'Societe Generate for a loan of 72 million Uganda shillings to enable her purchase 14 locomotives from 'Alsthon Atlantique' of France. This was in May 1978. These locomotives were expected to be delivered during 1979. But the first batch of 7 heavy diesel electric locomotives were delivered in July 1980. Another 7 was awaited. Also awaited are 20 medium locomotives from West Germany. Uganda also bought 380 goods wagons from India and Belgium in 1979. The locomotives from France are the class 8 meant for main lines from Mombasa

to Kampala. They are quite ideal for heavy cargo and passengers and each cost 1.7 million dorlars. The loan is repayable within a space of five years.

Before concluding the discussion on the problems of railway transport in Uganda it is better to give a brief summary of the situation since 1971. This is the year when Idi Amin seized power from Milton Obote and started his reign of terror and destruction. By 1971, 1.8 million tonnes of goods were being carried in and out of Uganda by trains. Of this approximately 200,000 tonnes were trucked to other neighbouring countries namely Rwanda, Southern Sudan and Eastern Zaire. As many as 30 goods trains used to traverse the 750 miles between Kampala and Mombasa weekly. By 1978/80 two trains with less than 2,000 tonnes of goods cross the Uganda-Kenya border each week.

In place of the high volume low cost rail freightage, goods are now carried into and out of Kenya by road trucks each journey carrying 30 tonnes at most and three times the cost in foreign exchange to the landlocked countries of Uganda and Rwanda. Obviously the burden they have to carry is too heavy for them. They are slowly being suffocated by Kenya's private haulage entrepreneurs in Nairobi, who, it seems have great influence on Kenya Railways Policy making machinary.

As it has earlier been noted the Uganda Railways had to go independent after the East African Community broke up in 1976. It has suffered from the lack of equipment, spares and maintenance. Uganda had expected 925 wagons as her share of the spoils of the East African Railways Corporation but instead

Kenya gave her only 200. Kenya falsely claimed that Uganda had seized the lion's share of the rolling stock and locomotives. This claim was totally without foundation as Uganda got only 48 inferior steam and diesel locomotives of which only 7 were still working at the time of liberation in 1979.

Uganda is making dedicated efforts to revive her railways which have been extensively damaged because of the liberation war. According to calculations worked out Uganda must spend 150 million dollars to under-take the repairs, renewing track, signalling and construction of workshops. The Uganda economy cannot afford this huge sum of money now. It follows that the money will have to be borrowed from outside and so far no one has come up to help. This is one way in which the effect of the war has worked hand in hand with the disadvantagous location to virtually strangle the national economy. Unless and until the railway is rehabilitated there is no way her economy can be revitalised.

But as matters are even if the railway is rehabilitated Uganda's transport problem will remain unsolved. Kenya's reluctance to allow Uganda, Rwanda and Southern Sudan to use their own lorries means that their fuel is painfully carried by road in privately owned tankers. Meanwhile more than 300 rail tank wagons lie idle in Kenya railway yards, Kenya has viewed political developments in Uganda with a jaundiced eye since the liberation war which ended Idi Amin's rule. Apparently she feared that the Tanzanian war effort against Amin and the subsequent return of Milton Obote to power may end up in the establishment of a socialist system in Uganda which is anathema

to the Kenyans whose relations with Tanzania are just as bad.

Puzzled Ugandans who have always considered Kenya their natural ally economically found that attitude had to understand. There has been no evidence of a move towards socialism in Uganda and they felt that the direct result of Kenyan recalcitrance would be to force them closer to Tanzania. This was demonstrated by the number of investigations into Tanzania transport alternatives as more amicable, more reliable though less efficient a way to the Indian Ocean. The European Economic Community has expressed willingness to finance improved transport facilities within Uganda to link up properly with the Tanzanian transport system by lake and road. This move is also designed to help Uganda's neighbours particularly Rwanda and Eastern Zaire. The European Economic Community has embarked on extensive studies to see how this link can be brought about.[9]

In the meantime, however, the cost of road haulage is soaring due to increased prices for fuel and spare parts for the trucks. The accident rate is also very high due to poor maintainance of vehicles and bad driving. Some road sections also need major rebuilding. Unless a sane, generous and forward looking policy for increased and fairer use of the region's railways can be devised and implemented, the future welfare of Uganda and other landlocked countries around her will remain in doubt.

Kenya's actions have great political significance to Uganda. She wants to block the possibility of Uganda becoming a socialist state and being too friendly to Tanzania. This is

9 This information was released through personal interviews with Officials in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Dept. at the Ministry's Headquarters in Kampala in May, 1982.

because her own economic and political system based on the democratic capitalist system of the West hates Socialism and Tanzani which originated it in East Africa. But she can not do anything to Tanzania which is a coastal state and does not depend on her for anything. But because of location which made Uganda - dependence of Kenya for transport to the outside world the latter is relentlessly trying to exert pressure on the former with the hope of making her drop her Tanzania connections. Geographical location gives her derived power to influence policy in Uganda.

This chapter cannot go into the details of the current political climate in East Africa. The fact is that Uganda as a sovereign state has a right to adopt any economic and political policies she wants. She has also a right to get friends as she pleases. But the relations which obtained between her and Kenya indicate that if a landlocked country follows or is suspected to admire policies the adjacent coastal country on which she depends in her transit to and from the sea does not like, the latter can use her advantageous location to dictate policy on the former. Kenya was trying to do precisely this. But Uganda has the capacity to resist because she is landlocked by more than one country and she has an alternative to resort to. The existence of Tanzania as a friend and ally weakens Kenya each time she tries to play the domineering role.

Now a few words ought to be said about Kenya's frustrating role in the operation of transport by road. In 1970 Uganda formed a road transport corporation known as 'Transocean Uganda Limited. The purpose was to supplement the railways in transporting

Uganda exports and imports to and from Mombasa by road. Once this corporation was formed it run into problems. Kenya puts stringent restrictions about the number of Uganda vehicles licenced to ply on Kenya roads and each licence issued covers only three months after which a fresh application is made for another licence to cover a further three months.

This tough restriction makes it impossible for Uganda to carry away all her goods as cheaply as possible using her own vehicles. Instead she has to hire Kenyan transporters to bring or take away goods to Mombasa. This is in Kenya's and not in Uganda's interests. The former wants to give business to her own transporters who use this open chance to make as much money as possible from the Uganda government, commercial firms and individuals. Uganda resents it because the charges fixed are too high and she has to pay them in foreign currency. The cost of exports rises beyond what she can easily afford and it is irredeemable since she sells free on board all her products at Mombasa. Similarly the prices of her imports rise up too high to make it extremely difficult for the people to enjoy or use as many imported goods as they would like.

Moreover, the idea of having to licence vehicles every three months instead of doing it annually was devised by the Kenya government to make money out of Uganda. The latter has to buy these licences at very high rate and this has to be in foreign exchange. Kenya refused to give licences to cover long periods of eight or twelve months which would be cheaper and more convinient to Uganda. This is indeed a sad situation because Uganda is diliberately milked by Kenya for no reason other than

the desire to make capital out of her. Uganda could afford to use her own vehicles and by so doing reduce to a bare minimu the amount of money she now pays to Kenya transporters. From the figures quoted earlier in this chapter which she paid to Kenatco and Sullivan to transport her coffee to Mombasa in 1976/77 it is obvious that the expenses involved are unbearably high.

But despite the high costs Uganda's position makes it obligatory to continue using the Kenya transporters and paying them whatever they may ask. It is also obligatory for her to continue licencing her vehicles every three months so that she can at least carry a few goods home and to Mombasa more cheaply. If she does not accept this her imports would stay in Mombasa indefinitely because there would be no other way to bring them to Kampala and her exports would remain inside Uganda for the same reason. In short her economy would be strangled because she would be in no position either to buy or sell anything in the world overseas market. Obviously she would not survive under such circumstances so she keeps up with whatever conditions the Kenyans put up.

CHAPTER FIVE

NIGER AND UGANDA COMPARED

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight on the similarities and differences between Niger and Uganda's problems as landlocked countries. It is pertinent to begin by looking at their transport problems from the interior to the coast and vice-versa. The first thing to be noted is that both these countries thrive on an export import economy with overseas countries. They export agricultural raw materials and mineral wealth to the industrialised countries overseas which in turn supply them with manufactured goods needed to nourish their economies. To that extent they lie on the periphery of their main trading patners, who during colonial rule, set them into a state of permanent dependence on the world market mechanisms to which they have no control and on their neighbours for transit to the sea. These two forms of dependence have continued to undermine their economies to this day.

It has been brought to light that both Niger and Uganda have to pay dearly to transport their exports and imports to and from the sea. The details of payments made have been given in the two previous chapters and they amount to approximately fifteen per cent of their export earnings. Similarly the prices of their imports are raised by the same percentage. Besides this they are additional charges they have to meet which include handling and storage charges which are very heavy indeed as indicated by the rates paid daily in the ports of Lagos and Mombasa. In the case of Uganda they are even costs incurred on

paying fines due to failure to deliver her exports to customers in time. Niger does not pay fines because most of her goods go to France which does not want to impose any fines on her. Worse still all these costs are incurred in foreign exchange and therefore create big reductions in the foreign exchange reserves.

But this is not all. Both Uganda and Niger lack adequate transport facilities by rail or road to move their goods anytime they want to move them. Niger depends heavily on Nigeria railways and road operators to get exports from the coast and imports from the nearest railway terminals inside Nigeria. She is therefore affected by the administrative and technical competence of these agencies plus the political goodwill of the Nigerian government. It was shown quite clearly that the degeneration in the performance of the Nigerian Railways Corporation had divastating consequences for Niger and these lasted until improvements were made in the management and technical competence of this corporation after hiring Indian experts. It was also shown that the streamlining of road transport which came after the creation of the Road Haulage Association helped to ease the problems for Niger. These were problems occurring in the external environments around to which she had no control and could do nothing and yet they did real havoc to her economy. The effect of location inland and past colonial policies which tied her economy to countries overseas were responsible for this.

Uganda too, is in a similar situation. Although she has a direct rail link to Mombasa, there are administrative

problems to surmount. The railway is owned by two independent countries namely Ugada and Kenya. Each country owns the railway mileage inside its territory and runs it as a separate corporation. Thus there is the Uganda Railways Corporation operating as a separate entity. But Uganda being landlocked needs to use Kenya Railways Corporation services to reach the sea and avail herself to port facilities at the coast. Her exports are railed only part of the distance to the border between the two countries and then change hands to Kenyan authorities. From there up to the coast she has to pay Kenya Railways per mile per ton of goods carried and passengers have to rebook their seats in Kenya currency. Details of how payments are made were given in the previous chapter. But they are quite colossol.

Actually the goods and passengers do not change coaches or wagons but the locomotives and the crew change. So a situation arises where Uganda coaches and wagons are driven into Kenya up to Mombasa by Kenya locomotives which also bring them back loaded with Uganda imports and handed over to Uganda locomotives at the boarder. This exercise causes anxiety in .. Uganda in a number of ways. First once the wagons and coaches are in Kenya there is no way Uganda can get them. They can only wait until they are brought back by the Kenyans at their own pace. Furthermore, some of these wagons and coaches are deployed for work in Kenya while waiting for Ugandan imports to be cleared and loaded on them. Kenya can do this without having to inform or pay Uganda for using them. Uganda is never in a position to prevent this. Kenya can therefore gain first by

charging Uganda for using her railways and also by using her wagons.

Apart from this Uganda pays Kenya road transporters who bring her imports to her and take away her exports. The rates are set by the transporters themselves without involving the Kenyan Government. The cases of Kenatco and Sullivan were noted and how much they charged. The Coffee and Lint Marketing Boards have also to be maintained at great cost settled in foreign exchange. But unlike Niger Uganda has clearing and forwarding companies of her own based in Kampala and Mombasa. These are responsible for clearing and forwarding goods on behalf of their consignees. But they are numerous difficulties experienced in this exercise as noted in the previous chapter. In the final analysis shortage of foreign exchange proves to be the main bottleneck.

The clearing and forwarding companies cannot afford to buy enough vehicles which would enable them do their work effectively, and cannot charge low fees because of the high costs they have to settle. Besides there is difficulty in licencing Ugandan vehicles in Kenya and in the end only short term licences are issued which are ultimately more costly and time consuming apart from causing uncertainty to the companies concerned since they cannot be sure whether or not their vehicles would remain on the road. The reason for restricting foreign vehicles is to give Kenyan transporters business. But by implication the same Kenyans monopolise in the carriage of Ugandan goods into Uganda. The latter cannot refuse them because she needs her goods. So in away Kenya makes capital out of Uganda and the latter is unable

to resist given her disadvantageous location inland.

However, on the whole Uganda is better off than Niger in this respect because the distance to the sea is shorter in her case. Uganda is only 800 miles by railway from the coast and she has direct rail and road links which are cheaper and more convinient than that of Niger which is at least 1000 miles from Lagos the nearest seaport and has to change the means of conveyance of her goods by rail and road. The changes made during the journey make it more laborious, time wasting and risky due to possible losses or damage. Moreover, the Ugandan economy is relatively stronger than the Niger economy. As such she can pay all the transport and other charges and still be able to bag substantial profits. Her economy can therefore absorb many more strains and be able to pull off with relative ease. But exporting huge quantities of agricultural produce makes her require a lot of locomotives and wagons and road trucks than the supply available. This factor frustrates and makes her pay more for the produce she cannot dispose of immediately.

Finally on the issue of transport both Niger and Uganda cannot afford to rely on air transport as a viable alternative to surface transport. The experiment made on the orders of Amin to transport Uganda Coffee to port Sudan or Gabon on the Atlantic coast proved arbotive. It was too expensive to be worthwhile and it was abandoned within a year. Niger too cannot rely on air transport for similar reasons. She has to find alternative ways of conducting international trade with oversee countries. Both these countries appear among the hard core least developed countries listed by the United Nations.

The reasons given for this classification included among others having the weakest growth rates and too much dependence on a very limited number of commodities for their export earnings.

From the evidence gathered in the previous chapters it io obvious that landlocked countries in Africa if compared with their transit neighbours lack a very important resource namely territorial access to the sea. The submissions by Upper l/olta noted in chapter two illustrate this point very vividly and the date gathered on Niger and Uganda do not -at all contradict this fact. If any thing it endorses it wholeheartedly.. The lack of this resourcecompounded by remoteness and isolation from uibrld markets has been shown to be one of the causes of t'leir relative poverty. Overall growth through import substitution, export expansion or utilisation of foreign capital resources gives rise to demands for international transport services. The great difficulties and costs of such services encountered in the previous two chapters constitute an extra burden to their development. Like other African, Asian and Latin American countries Niger and Uganda have been found to lack a wide range of productive activities, suffer from scarcity of skills required in production and administration and they have little scope for substitution either in production or consumption between domestic goods, export products and imports.

Furthermore both these countries lie within developing regions. Their neighbours are also developing countries of broadly similar economic structures and beset by similar

1 U.NCTAD, A T.cnspor*t Strategy for L-r;ilDcked CTevelttping Countries, TD/BA53/AddI (MY

scarcities of resources. These countries are therefore not in a position to offer transport systems of high technical and administrative standards to which Niger and Uganda could link themselves by the sole development of their own internal transport systems. Thus Niger cannot expect her problems to be solved in this way by Chad, Benin, Libya, Algeria or Nigeria. The inability to extend Nigeria railways into Niger and the problems confronting railways in Nigeria are a pointer to this. Similaly Sudan, Zaire and Tanzania cannot be of much help to Uganda in this respect. As a matter of fact Zaire a coastal country, imports and exports a great per centage of her goods through Uganda and Kenya. Similarly Sudan failed to come to Uganda's aid in 1976 after the collapse of the East African community and closure of the routes through Kenya. Some goods were imported through port Sudan and then by land to Uganda. But this proved to be too difficult to maintain and has since been abandoned. Currently Tanzania is trying to provide alternative transport facilities to Uganda but the cost is too great let alone hazardous.

It has also been discovered that frontiers and transit from one national transport system to another form institutional impediments to the flow of goods and persons in both Niger and Uganda. In the case of the former the Nigerian transport system stops within Nigeria and goods carried by rail have to reach Niger by road under the care of completely different handlers charging their own rates, with their own security arrangements and systems of work. There is delay, risk loss

of goods and accumulation of overhead costs which do not help the proper and rapid growth of the country's economy. In the latter case Uganda goods face similar bottlenecks. At the Uganda Kenya border some goods brought by rail have to be handed over to Kenya railways corporation for conveyance to the port. Some goods brought by road have also to be transferred to Kenya transporters because many of the Uganda vehicles have no permission to operate in Kenya. In both cases the rates charged are fixed by the Kenyans basing them on economic factors prevailing in Kenya. Economic depressions inside Kenya therefore determine how much Uganda pay's them for conveyance of goods to or from Uganda. Only a few Uganda trucks owned by the Uganda government through its only transport corporation known as Transocean Uganda Limited operate in Kenya under restricted conditions.

There is also a limitation of the amount of money carried by drivers of these trucks. They usually have enough money for fuel within Kenya and minor repairs or servicing of the vehicles. If any major breakdowns occur the drivers and their vehicles become completely stranded. They have to report home and wait until some money is granted by the central bank to purchase spares and pay the mechanics who repair them. Between Kampala and the Kenya border the driver are allowed to take only 100/- Uganda shillings in cash to be used for buying fuel on their return journey. This sum of money is totally inadequate and as a result drivers get a lot of problems on their way back. But this ruling was made by the government without proper calculations and it is enforced as such. All told, it has been shown that

this additional burden of frontier transiting cost to be reckoned in expenditures incurred and time lost indicates the particularly high value which landlocked countries generally must attach to improvements in transiting procedures. Niger and Uganda are therefore having to grapple with this seemingly insurmountable problem.

Dependence on transit through other countries has given rise to foreign exchange outlays to both Niger and Uganda which their coastal neighbours do not have. While to private importers or exporters there may be little difference between expenditure in local or foreign currency there is a big difference from the national point of view. But these countries find themselves totally dependent on their neighbours transport policies, transport enterprises, and transport facilities which are completely unknown to coastal countries. It is this factor which raises in principle the possibility of excess costs depending on either the pricing of transport services and their utilisation and in the limitation of access to such facilities or from inadvertently giving less attention to services to the landlocked countries than to nationals of the transit countries. Niger does not suffer too much from this because of the political goodwill existing between her and Nigeria particularly and the other French speaking countries generally. Uganda on the other hand finds this to be a serious problem because on many occasions the much needed goodwill has been lacking.

This is a point where the kind of political relations existing between a landlocked country and its transit neighbours

make a difference in the economic survival of the landlocked country. Niger which has managed to be on cordial relations with all her neighbours particularly those to which she depends to reach the sea has been able to stir clear of this problem and by so doing kept her economy moving. But Uganda on the other hand has followed a waivering and sometimes hostile policy towards her neighbours Kenya and Tanzania. It was mentioned in the previous chapter that in 1976 Kenya imposed the infamous oil embargo which renderred her economy impotent and from 1975 up to now constant frustrations have been handed to her at Mombasa port by the Kenya government. Amin had to apologise to Kenya in September to get the oil embargo lifted. He met with only partial success and the national economy continued to experience transport and many other problems.

With regard to Tanzania which had been Uganda's tradional ally against Kenya in the defunct East African Community Uganda failed to stick to its policy of friendship and cooperation. This was due to Idi Amin's seizure of power in Uganda in January 1971 and Tanzania's hand of friendship to Dr. Obote who had been overthrown and seettled in Tanzania. Amin and Nyerere could not get on well and the latter did not even recognise the former's regime nor was he prepared to work with him in the East African Community. Amin on his part maintained and promoted hostility between the two countries by carrying out consistent acts of military incursions inside Tanzania which eventually led to a full scale war between the two countries in the period October 1978 and April 1979. Idi Amin's regime was toppled and he himself fled the country. Uganda has since been on very good

terms with Tanzania and she is trying to repair damage done to her relations with Kenya. The change in policy has led to the flow of traffic and usual cooperation between all the three countries which was at a standstill during Amin's rule in Uganda.

It was also noted that the high transport costs faced by Niger and Uganda and, indeed, all other landlocked countries reflect additional costs due to such factors as the need to maintain higher levels of inventories, greater storage facilities, greater delays connected with the use of ports and the maintenance of alternative emergency routes. Uganda spent heavy sums of money in her efforts to open up new routes through Sudan and Gabon. Now she is spending huge sums of money to develop routes through Tanzania via Lake Victoria. The volume of paper work involved in clearing and forwarding of goods was also noted. Niger goes through similar amount of paper work which are time consuming and add greatly to the overall costs incurred.

Dependence on foreign owned transport infrastructures means that landlocked countries have no control over the development of the same infrastructures, transport management and policy. These are normally shaped by the transit countries according to their own economic and social priorities. In the case of Niger and Uganda it has not been possible to make any of the surrounding countries to adjust their development priorities to suit their transport requirements. For instance Uganda needs a rail link to the Red Sea through Sudan and she just could not secure Zaire's cooperation to construct either

a road or rail link to the Atlantic Ocean. So her efforts in this aspect proved fruitless. Given the natural differences between the priorities of landlocked countries and their neighbours, the development of infrastructures and the transit services of the transit countries in their own and landlocked neighbours interest typically pose special problems of financing cost and benefit sharing and accounting.

To bring about a suitable solution to the above problems all countries located in a region must have joint transport planning and financing policies as well as common management of transport services. The economic and political goals of all the countries affected must be the same or very similar so that transport problems within the region are seen as problems for all of them and to which therefore they need to give joint action. This may mean raising funds within or externally to finance joint services together. Niger has never had such an approach to her problems. The countries surrounding her are prepared to give transit facilities to the sea and to be good trading parters but they have never agreed or discussed possibilities of coming together by having a common planning and administrative machinery for what would be considered common services. The organisations Niger belongs to have only political and economic significance. They are not planning agencies for the region.

It is to be noted for instance that although Nigeria is the second largest trading partner for Niger and in which most of her import and export trade passes plus the view that

politically both countries are allies, they have remained distinct different. Thus Niger has preserved her identity as a French speaking republic whose economic and political aspirations are with France and other former French speaking West African countries and not with the English speaking Federal Republic of Nigeria. In matters of planning and financing of transport and other services the two countries act seperately and without the knowledge of each other. So when problems arise they are limited to each one of them. In Africa generally what would be considered joint planning for transport services is undertaken under the auspicies of the United Nations agencies notably the Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Bank and the United Nations Development programme. Activities of these agencies will be the subject of next chapter. Here it will suffice to say that some joint approaches to development in Africa is being considered by them.

But unlike Niger Uganda missed or threw away a golden opportunity. Since 1948 the British colonial rulers in East Africa sought to create one Federal State in this region by uniting Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zanzibar. In 1940 they formed the East African High Commission to plan, administer and finance joint transport services which included railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications and many financial institutions and industries such as banks and insurance companies were started and operated on a regional basis. Nairobi was the official headquarters and the East African

Currency Board issued the only currency used by all these territories as they then were. The intended federation did not materialies but the joint common services were established and efforts were made to create an East African Common Market.[2]

When Tanganyika became independent in 1961 the East African High Commission (EAHC) was renamed the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO) to cope with her independent status. In 1961 EACSO was renamed the East African Community (EAC) following a treaty negotiated by the three independent states of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Under this treaty the services named above continued to be administered, planned and financed on a 'regional and equal basis by the three countries. This meant that these services were not the property of any of the member countries but a property of them all on an equal basis regardless of where the services were provided. Thus Uganda without a sea coast had equal rights over the ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania as these two countries on whose soil the ports stand. She also had similar rights over the railways in Kenya and Tanzania as well as the operation of airtransport internally and externally. Vigorous efforts were also made to make the common market a reality.[3]

But the coming to ;power of Idi Amin was a sad blow to Uganda's aspirations. Things began to change for the worse from 1971 and the final blow struck in December 1976 when the EAC came to a sudden and most absurd end. Uganda which had owned and at the same time relieved of the burden to plan and finance her own transport system and had never known how to negotiate

2. See Donald Rothchild, ed, Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary Nairobi: EAPN LTD., 1967
3. This was provided for in the East African Treaty of Cooperation of July, 1967.

with any government for these services was now in economic and political doldrums. The ports had reverted to Kenya and Tanzania, the railways had broken into three independent transport systems and so had the airways and post offices. Uganda was without an airline and her railways led nowhere due to her landlocked position. For quite sometime her border with Kenya remained closed and Tanzania was already in bad mood against her. So for once she was totally isolated and could not trade with any outside country.

It was during this time that she awoke to the realities of her landlockedness. She made hasty steps to negotiate with Kenya for transit rights and launched her own airline, 'The Uganda Airlines' to fill the gap left by the East African Airways. But all these moves started from scratch. She had neither locomotives, road trucks or aeroplanes to start with because being landlocked she had all along been on the periphery of the East Africa Community. Kenya and Tanzania seized all the infrastructures within their territories. Uganda had virtually nothing. So she lost everything. This is the golden chance she missed or threw away. It was her own conduct under her military leaders which led to the collapse of the community and this meant loss of over thirty five years of uninterrupted service.[4]

Since the demise of the community Uganda has never been economically and politically stable. Her leaders since 1976 have been engaged on too many hot issues whose solution could

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4 The interview with the new General Manager of Uganda Railways Corporation conduct in 1977 and referred to in chapter four confirmed this to be true.

not be found within Uganda itself. Amin spent the last years of his reign trying to get alternative routes to the outside world. As it has already been noted he could not succeed. His first two successors Presidents Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa capitalised on the revitalised relations between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to re-open the routes that had been closed and to secure more reasonable transit and service conditions in the the ports. There was also relative goodwill by the international community to help Uganda repair her battered economy. So Uganda once more enjoyed some blitz which has continued to this day.

But Idi Amin's flamboyant behaviour highlighted on two very important points. The first . is that a landlocked country cannot and should not antagonise the neighbours to whom she depends for her economic and political survival. If she does so they can strike and choke her economically and militerily as indeed they did to her in the period 1976 to 1979. This means that the political relations between the landlocked and the coastal states must always be cordial if the former is to succeed in her economic endeavours. But this basically means that the landlocked country must always compromise her policies to suit the interests of the coastal neighbour. The former therefore are made to be less sovereign than the latter and naturally this low profile is highly resented by the countries affected. As a result a lot of friction is generated between them. The Uganda - Kenya relations is full of such incidents.

The real cause of friction is the desire by the landlocked country to be equal or even superior to the coastal neighbour

to which she depends for transit to the sea. This sets in a competitive atmosphere and a natural desire to act discretly which hoightens the conflict. Uganda has been caught up because she does not know how to act as an inferior to Kenya and the latter cannot place hereself in a relationship making her equal to Uganda given her positional advantage. Niger has been able to stave off this type of conflict because she does not follow competitive policies with all her neighbours. That means she accepts her inferior status but disguises it through making friends and alliances with all the states surrounding her particularly those to the south.

The second point Idi Amin's flamboyant style highlighted on is the strategic importance of location. Some landlocked countries like Uganda are in the centre of the continent and control almost all movements into the interior and coastal countries have to depend on them for their travel inland. Uganda is the principle customer for Kenya goods and control movements to southern Sudan, East Zaire, Rwanda and Central Tanzania up to Zambia and Zimbabwe. These are the countries to which Kenya sells most of her goods. The dispute referred to which led to the imposition on the oil embargo also dealt a hard blow to the Kenyan economy. It meant that Uganda was not buying any more from Kenya and the latter could no longer get to the other countries because to get to them she had to go through Uganda and she could not do so because the border between them was closed.

Although the border was later reopened normal traffic did not resume until the fall of Amin in April 1979. Even now

Even now traffic between the two countties is slack and the border between Kenya and Tanzania which was closed in 1976 is still closed. The result has been a very rapid decline in the performance of the Kenyan economy. She has no market and she has had to devalue her currency in 1981. This means that landlocked Uganda occupies a central position which she can use as a weapon against Kenya with a reasonable chance of success. Besides Uganda's location gives a lot of potential for industrialisation. She has many relatively rich neighbours who would be very glad to get their imports from her than having to trek the long journey to Mombasa to get them. If Uganda catches up in this field she would be less dependent on Kenya for routes but the latter would suffer for the loss of market.

This leads to a very important point in the study of problems facing landlocked countries in Africa. This is that they are suffering because they have so far been incapable of re-orientating their economies from an export-import arrangement with foreign overseas countries. If they can do this and direct their economic development efforts towards building up an intra African market they would do better than many of the coastal states which are now outcompeting them. Uganda has great promise in her location because it gives her so many countries to trade with if only she can produce commodities they need. But this presents her with a real difficulty to be over come. First she must begin systematic industrialisation programmes to produce the manufactured products now imported by these countries. Both these problems cannot be easily solved but a start must be made.

Niger's position is not as promising as Uganda's. First of all her own domestic market is not as big as Uganda's given her very small population. Secondly the harsh climatic conditions make it very difficulty for her agricultural industry to take off. Thirdly she is located much further inland than Uganda and she has no railway links to the coast. This has held back the development of her mining industry which requires a healthy transport system to serve it. The small size of the domestic market and the insurmountable difficulty of moving goods in or out also scares foreign investors from investing their money in Niger. All investors need to make profits as quickly as possible. They cannot therefore put their money in an environment that promises no return to their efforts. If the Ugandan environment is finally developed it can attract a lot of foreign investments because it is located in a very potentially rich interior. Her present suffering can and will be remedied in the near future but the Niger case is a desperate and more permanent one.

The crucial point creating the distinction between Niger and Uganda therefore is the amount and nature of resources available to each one of them and the existing capacity to utilise them. To Uganda's rich agricultural base is added her potential hydro electric power resources, rich tourist industry relatively developed technology brought about by many years of manpower training and planning plus possibilities of discovering rich minerals. At the moment copper and cobalt from Kilembe at the foothills of Mount Rwenzori at the border with Zaire is the most commercially mined minerals. Oil, tin, iron ore gold and manganese exist in small quantities but no large scale exploration

ventures have been undertaken. Uganda has also chance to develop the livestock and fishing industries using her rich savanna land and huge expanses of fresh water lakes which include Lake Victoria, Kioga, George, Albert and a few small ones.

River Nile is a major physical feature in Uganda. It was the search for the source of this river which led to the discovery of Lake Victoria and eventual colonisation of Uganda by the British who felt that their interests in Egypt and Sudan would be jeopadised if Germany which was then ruling Tanganyika moved into Uganda. The Nile is a major commercial enterprise to the country and a backbone to its industrialisation plans. A big hydro electric power dam was opened by Her Majesty the Queen Elizabeth II of Britain in 1954 at its source in Jinja. This dam supplies electricity to the whole of Uganda and some of it is exported to Kenya. When this dam was opened, Jinja the adjoining town was designated the 'Manchester' of Uganda in terms of Industrial development. Jinja now is the second largest city in Uganda and the most industrialised boasting of two big textile mills, a steel manufacturing plant, match making factory beer and tobacco factories, bicycle tyres food processing factories and many other industries. The two largest sugar producing estates Kakira and Lugazi are in its neighbourhood.

Sugar is yet another important economic product depending on power from the Nile dam. There are four big sugar estates at Kakira, Lugazi, Kinyara and Sango Bay making her the number one producer of sugar cane in East Africa. But due to inattention during the Idi Amin era all these estates stopped production

and are currently being reactivated. Temporarily Uganda now imports suger from neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya. Uganda has direct links to Sudan and Egypt because of the Nile and because of this she has a controlling hand in their future development plans because they depend almost entirely on water and power supplies from it. If Uganda does anything to divert the Course of the Nile or reduce the volume of the water flowing from it they suffer directly and they are most anxious to avoid such a thing happening. With careful planning Uganda can use this to establish concrete economic and political links with these two countries. Her economic hinterland therefore extends up to the Meddterranean sea in addition to countries mentioned earlier.

Further, Uganda's geographical features which include river Nile have made it possible to develop big national parks which serve as a basis for . her expanding tourist industry. The Ruenzori and Kabarega national parks located in the western side of the country are the most famous. But there is also the Kidepo Valley national park in Karamoja which is the home of the rare white rhino. The Kabarega national park includes the world renowned Murchison (Kabarega) Falls where the mighty river Nile is squeezed into a very narrow gorge just twenty feet wide and drops down more than four hundred feet. There are hotels and lodges all over the country to service the tourist industry. Uganda has both the potential and intention to develop as many industries as possible to earn foreign currency and the tourist industry is one of the most promising and does not suffer from the country's inland location.

Niger's physical features on the other hand cannot allow her to develop into a viable state with a strong economy. She has virtually none of the attractive features Uganda has which could be used for internal development. Her economic resources although vast due to large quantities of Uranium deposits cannot be properly exploited for reasons already noted. To revolutionise her economy she has to depend mainly on foreign overseas investments which as noted earlier is not forthcoming. Niger therefore derives no potential advantage from her inland location unlike Uganda. Uganda's weakness has been in the field of leadership especially during the barren military period of Idi Amin which suspended further development and threw the country many decades of years backwards by destroying even that which had been attained.

Turning now to the politics of these two republics attention has to be given to their foreign policies towards their neighbours. Since they have peculiar conditions of existence these must be reflected in their foreign policies. It is therefore possible to assess the extent to which their poor geographical locations have shaped their relations with their neighbours. Taking the Niger republic first it is to be noted that her foreign policy is influenced by two main factors. The first is the poor nature of her economy which has determined the kind of goals she wants and has to achieve from the entire world community. She wants to acquire means of submistence in terms of food aid, transport facilities to get the food and other commodities into Niger, manufactured agricultural machinery and fertilisers to nourish her economy and good prices for her mineral products. ...

The second factor relates directly to the first and that is that her geographical location has made her too cautious and alarmed by what she knows can happen to her if her neighbours become unfriendly and stopped cooperating with her in letting the flow of goods between her and the outside world. This would ruin her completely and immediately so obviously she cannot afford to alienate these countries.

Considering the two factors stated above Niger's position was expressed by her first Head of State President Hamani Diori who affirmed the main principles of Niger's foreign policy in a document on the Sahara published on 30th August 1961. Diori expressed his government's willingness and desire to cooperate with all the bordering states of the sahara in a large international organisation for technical and financial purposes to promote the economic and social welfare of the people. His main preoccupation was the determined and persistent endeavour to improve the economic and social condition of Niger. He felt that a regional approach would be the best because Niger could not go it alone for economic, skill and geographical reasons.[5]

As it was pointed out in chapter three President Diori was a highly respectable Head of State and a loyal French citizen. His country was one of the poorest among the French speaking African colonies dependent almost wholly on the federal expenditure of the French African Community. He could not afford to offend either France or his closet friend and guide Houphonet Boigny of the Ivory Coast from whom he expected future financial and other material aid. Because of this Niger has since maintained

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5. Source: African Contemporary Record Vol. 6 1973-74

closer links with Francephone African Countries. This is exemplified by the many economic and political regional organisations she joined and some of which had President Diori as their chairman.[6]

Although Niger is more of a beneficiary than initiator of the organisations she joined, membership in bodies like L'Entente noted in chapter three is a clear proof of her intentions to solidify her relations with Fracophone African countries. From the time of independence in 1960 up to 1974 the foreign policy of Niger was shaped and dominated by President Hamani Diori and it had basically two main aims namely to keep as close as possible to her neighbours in Africa and to France both of which play a dominant role in her regard to provision of transport services. When the army tookover power in April 1979 no significant departure in foreign policy was announced. Colonel Konutche who became President told the country that Niger would continue to belong to all African and international organisations as it had been arranged by Diori's regime and would respect all the pledges made to them provided they in turn recognised and respected his military regime.[7]

Niger has therefore remained an active member of all the organisations mentioned earlier and has continued to play a major role among francophene countries. This is evidenced by the appointment of Colonel Kountche together with President Eyadema of Togo as mediators in the little war between Mali and Upper Volta in 1975.[8] However the military regime made some changes

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6 This information was obtained through personal interview with a high ranking official of the Niger Embassay in Lagos who want to remain anonymous.

7. Ibid.

in the practice of Niger's foreign policy to suit the growing sensitivity about her political sovereignty. It reduced its dependence on France and repudiated the defence agreement made between the two countries and the French military personnel were asked to leave Niger. It is difficult to determine whether or not France's refusal to buy Niger's uranium at the agreed prices was in part a retaliation to Niger's action. But it appears it had something to do with it. French help has continued to come to Niger but signs of friction have been showing up here and there since Niger took this action. Moreover, Niger's foreign policy is no longer as personality oriented as it was during Hamani Diori's time.

Before concluding discussion on Niger's foreign policy and its relationship to her development mention must be made of her policies towards Nigeria. In many respects it is true that Nigeria is the one African country which has made it possible for Niger to exist in the form she is in today. She is regarded by Nigeria as her natural ally[9]. Nigeria's foreign policy towards other African countries is that of brotherly relations, mutual cooperation and giving assistance to those states in need of help such as Niger. Nigeria's help takes many forms. In the case of Niger she is the main transit country for the former's exports and imports. She is also the main customer for Niger products and sells electricity to her to make her economic development endeavours feasible.[10]

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9 This has been given in detail in chapter three

10 This information was extracted from the Nigeria Niger *Political Relations file in the Nigeria Institute of* International Affairs Lagos. in September, 1982.

Nigeria guaranteed freedom of movement to the citizens of Niger afflicted by drought. These people take refuges in Northern Nigeria together with their animals whenever it is necessary to do so. Nigeria further guarantees security to Niger by sticking very strictly to the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other African countries which are members of the Organisation of African Unity. It is also Nigeria's desire to use her great human and material resources to advance the cause of all black people in Africa. In short she wants and does play the leadership role for Africa in world affairs.[11] Foreign policy makers in Niger have since independence recognised Nigeria's desire to help them and have not lost any time to utilise the chances offered them. Details of this are given in what is going to follow below.

In 1961 for instance Nigeria spearheaded a campaign to arrange a conference in Monravia to discuss major issues concerning African Unity. She was opposed to the idea of political union of all African states put forward by Ghana. She was also opposed to the two groups in which independent African countries had divided themselves namely the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups. She wanted unity and cooperation of states in Africa as independent free actors. Niger belonged to the Brazzaville group but she quickly took up the Nigerian stand which subsequently became and remained her foreign policy to this day. In a follow up meeting in Lagos the Niger delegation was led by President Diori himself and it again endorsed without

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11 Ibid.

amendment all the principles advocated by Nigeria. This meeting adopted a charter of Inter-African and Malagasy states Organisation which stressed the principles of the sovereign equality of all African States and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. These are the two cardinal principles of Niger and Nigeria foreign policy. The Organisation of African Unity charter written in 1963 was based on this principle which therefore seemed to signify victory for both of them in the field of foreign affairs within Africa.[12]

The Republic of Niger, Like many other states, subscribed to the views held by Nigeria and by implication accepted the summit of Heads of States in Addis Ababa that she was in favour of an African charter which showed respect to the sovereignty of each state and outlined a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. On the question of African Unity the two countries held the same views and agreed to adopt a cautious and gradual approach towards achieving it. In pursuit of this policy both countries have taken many steps together. For instance they signed trade and customs agreements between them to improve economic cooperation. In 1962 the Chad Basin Commission was formed and in 1964 the River Niger Commission was established.[13]

Earlier on in 1960 Nigeria had broken off diplomatic relations with France after the latter had exploded a number of atomic bombs in the Sahara desert. An embargo was placed on French aircraft and shipping within Nigeria. One week after Nigeria had adopted these measures Niger and Benin sent -

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12 Ibid

13 Information obtained from Africa Diary Vol.1-7 June 1963 pp 1181

delegations to Nigeria urging the latter to reverse her decision so that goods moving to and from their countries and which were to be carried by French ships could be allowed to proceed. At that time over 90,000 tons of groundnuts from Niger were stranded on Lagos docks waiting to be offloaded into French ships. The Niger chief delegate to this special meeting declared thus

'We should not be punished for the sins of France'[14]

Nigeria felt sympathetic to her neighbours and granted special concessions to lift the ban on french ships. This action showed Niger's sensitiveness to her landlocked position which made her permanently dependent on Nigeria and the latter was equally willing to help.

Furthermore, Nigeria on her part has stuck strictly to the policy of nouinterference in the internal affairs of other states and her lack of desire to expand her territory. For this reason she declined to support 'The SAWABA' Opposition Party in Niger which was at the time engaged in a bitter struggle to overthrow President Hamani Diori's government. This party led by Djibo Bakary had pledged in the Nigerian assembly in 1958 that it would vote No in the ensuring referendum for the establishment of a French West African Community. The party wanted Niger to become independent and then join not the French Community but the association of free states without prejudice to a possible future federation with Nigeria.[15]

Having rejected all these persuasive approaches to inter-

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14 Ibid 21st January, 1961

15 Quoted in Edward Morthimer, France and the Africans 1944-60, A Political History, London Faber and Faber Ltd., 1969, p321

interfere into the Niger affairs the latter felt a great sense of committment to return the help extended to her. The opportunity came during the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. This war put two main principles of the Organisation of African Unity charter on trial namely the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states and the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state. Nigeria's position was that the civil war was an internal affair and therefore Nigeria's unity and sovereignty was not negotiable. Any intervention would therefore be a violation of the above principles. Nigeria had refrained from any acts which could cause embarrassments to the government of Niger in its policies towards the Sawaba dissidents Niger was therefore bound to do the same.[16]

President Hamani Diori had to think of his country's dependence on Nigeria railways as a vital link to the sea. He was also aware that the people of Niger have a natural affection and attachment to the people of the northern states of Nigeria since they claim the same ethnic affilation. It was there in Niger's interest to play an active role in the peace making efforts to bring an end to the tragic and serious situation in Nigeria. Remaining neutral or unconcerned would not have served her national interests. President Diori was selected as one of six Heads of States consultative Mission selected by the OAU Heads of states summit in Kinshasa in 1967 to talk with the Nigerian Federal Government as to how to bring about territorial integrity, unity and peace in Nigeria.

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16 Ibid.

The talks ended in vain but the mission's work was revived in 1968 in Niamey, the Niger capital. Both the Nigerian and Biafran representatives were invited to attend. Yakubu Gowon the Nigerian Head of state and Odumegwu Ojukwu the leader of Biafra attended. Diori was chairman of the meeting and took keen interest in the proceedings. Although Niger's former ruler France and close friend Ivory Coast supported the cause of Biafra Niger did not do so. Instead she solidly stood behind Nigeria and refused to recognise Biafra. Niger could not afford to do anything that would alienate Nigeria because of the strong economic ties with her. Haman Diori's efforts were highly appreciated in Nigeria as evidenced by a speech made by the Military Governor of Kaduna State at Ahmadu Bello University Publicly acknowledging the noble role played by the President of Niger in the Nigerian crisis.[17]

The above description has been given to show how Niger has strived and she is still striving to cope with the hard conditions of her geographical location. She has had to cultivate and maintain cordial relations with all her neighbours particularly those which are directly involved in handling her export-import trade with the outside world. She has been able not only to be friendly with Nigeria but to be recognised and respected by the latter as a dependable ally. It has been noted that she is particularly innovative and active in matters in which Nigeria has interests. This

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17 Quocit p. 177

It has already been stated in this chapter that Uganda political relations with her neighbours has been shaped by Presidents Milton Obote and Field Marshall Idi Ami who ruled the country between the years 1962 to 1971 and 1971 to 1979 respectively. The first four years 1962 to 1966 showed no change from the colonial arrangements which had been inherited. It was a period of consolidation of independence for all the three partner states restructuring of the East African community which was formerly launched in July 1967. Obote was able to secure Kenyan and Tanzanian cooperation without difficulty and this kept Ugandans unaware of the precarious position in which their country was geographically placed. Tanzania was a reliable ally to Uganda and this weakened Kenya to the advantage of Uganda and Tanzania.

The East African Community was decentralised to make the operations and administration of the common services more evenly distributed and give each partner state fair benefits. The head quarters of the community were moved to Arusha from Nairobi and its secretaries General used to rotate between the three countries every two years. The four corporations dealing with the basic transport services were distributed in such a way that the Railways Airways were left in Nairobi Kenya, the Harbours and General Secretariat went to Tanzania while the Posts and East African Development Bank were cited in Uganda. The chairmen of the airways and Harbours were Ugandans and between 1964 to 1966 the Secretary General of the Community was also a Ugandan. In addition to this there

were three East African Ministers and their deputies chosen from all the three partner states. The three Heads of States were the policymakers and the Ministers were the executors and there was a Central legislative assembly to make laws governing the community. The three countries had equal representation.

There were regional head offices of all the four corporations in each country controlled by the government of the same country to make sure that the services were properly run. With this kind of arrangement Uganda received transit rights and use of ports in Kenya and Tanzania as a matter of course without having to negotiate with the governments of Kenya and Tanzania. These services were jointly financed, planned and administered. Uganda had legal rights over installations in Kenya and Tanzania and by implication transit rights which were legally recognised.

These measures brought Uganda more power and influence outside her borders. Kenya was renderred dependent on Uganda and Tanzania and as such she had no alternative but to accept or concede to their joint demands. Thus Uganda became an owner / and legislator on matters outside her territorial jurisdiction. Obote had wisely detected that if two out of three partners work closely together as allies the third is renderred impotent. So because of Tanzania's support Uganda obtained the best relations in East Africa which were later spoilt by Obote's predecessor Field Marshall Idi Amin Dada. But while Obote ruled Kenya could neither deny nor frustrate Uganda's basic transport needs. Her economy

The ascension of Idi Amin to the Presidency in Uganda reversed everything in East Africa to the detriment of Uganda. Amin was not a politician but a practical, ill-educated and erratic soldier who believed that the power of the gun could do everything the country needed. He never had any policy on anything "anytime without caring about the possible repercussions for the country. He ignored or was unable to make or retain friends in East Africa. The result was the end of the Uganda-Tanzania alliance and this alienated Uganda in East Africa completely. Without Tanzania she became a prey to Kenya and the careless manner in which he behaved towards the two sister countries could do nothing but lock her up completely. As noted in chapter four her economy was in ruins. The full implications of Uganda's location to her well being came to be fully understood and appreciated during and after the demise of Amin's diabolical rule.

Considering the performance of both Niger and Uganda it has been shown that geographical location and foreign policies they pursue are the two most important factors influencing their economic development. The economies of these two states are in a real stalemate because of the excessive transport costs, inability to find an attractive environment for foreign investors to come in and complete disillusionment due to prolonged stagnation. It has also come to light that geography has had a controlling hand to use in the way these two states have conducted and still conduct interestate relations with their neighbours. Every state must aim at its

survival and prosperity first. The policies she follows in its inter action with other states must herefore reflect this overall objective. It has been noted that Niger has done precisely this and she has as a result been able to score the successes she wanted. Uganda under Dr. Milton Obote tried and succeeded in achieving as much. The Amin era revealed the link between foreign policy and economic development for a landlocked country. Failure for the former to service the latter led to the sudden and drastic decline of the country economically and politically.

The Uganda case also showed that the geopolitics of landlocked countries makes it very difficult for them to preserve their sovereignty and pursuance of independent dynamic policies which may be in their national interests but not in the interests of the coastal states around them. The latter have too much at their disposal to use against the former so as to impair their sovereignty. This was applied by both Kenya and Tanzania against Uganda and Rhodesia used it against Zambia while South Africa is using it against Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Niger has been spared of it because of her deliberate policy to avoid friction between her and her neighbours. But this does not show that the way she is behaving is the way she would behave if she had not been landlocked. The low profile she is putting up appears to be dictated to herh by the environmental setting in which she is placed. Any departure from this pattern of interstate politics with her neighbours would destroy her and the surrounding states can always call her

back to order as Uganda's neighbours did when Idi Amin tried to boss them. Things are brightening up in Uganda again following Obote's return to power and one hopes that soon most the current blockages in the country's external transport system will be a thing of the past.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN LAND-LOCKED COUNTRIES

From the information assembled in the previous chapters, it is quite clear that the multiple problems confronting African landlocked states cannot be resolved by anybody other than these states themselves. The international community to which they have hitherto depended so much has proved incapable of finding adequate solutions for them. A deliberate policy of self-reliance ought therefore to be seriously considered. These states must take it upon themselves either to negotiate better transit terms with their neighbours or re-organise their economics so that they stop depending too much on an export-import trade with distant overseas states. If this new strategy is adopted it would mean that assistance from the international community would no longer be the basis but a supplement to their own development efforts.

However, while this new approach remains to be considered it is worthwhile to review briefly the contribution foreign aid has made to alleviate the hardship confronting these states. But before a detailed examination of this is attempted a few words must be said about the concept of foreign aid itself and its implications for development in Africa. Foreign aid means the transfer of money, goods, or technical advice

from a donor to a recipient state. Aid programmes benefit simultaneously the donors and the recipients. The latter receive money, loans, materials and advice from which they hope to build modern and robust economics, political stability or military security. The former always hope to receive some political or commercial dividends either immediately or in the long run. Because of this aid has been a very important instrument of foreign policy that has been used for centuries.[1]

There are three types of foreign aid relevant to this study namely military, economic and technical. Military aid concerns making defence of governments whose existence is deemed vital to the defence of the donor states' interests. Economic aid on the other hand has a much longer history dating from the Marshall Plan to Western states ravaged by the war in 1945. It is a form of emergency assistance in situations where the recipient state or states are divastated by war or natural hazards like earthquakes, floods or famine. Situations of emergency like those make a state eligible for economic aid. The aid sought and received by the African states under examination here is, however, conditioned and justified by different economic and political reasons as the foregoing discussions will reveal. Finally there is technical aid which deals with a technological problem whose main objective is to

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1. See Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972 pp 257-269.

stimulate change through technological or innovative development in underdeveloped states.[2]

The first two types of aid are political in their objectives and shortrun in their conception. Whenever military or economic aid is given the state that gives it expects a fairly obvious foreign policy result in the immediate future. To this extent they are considered to be bribes and can be withdrawn from states which do not comply with this requirement. As it will be shown later many African countries both maritime and landlocked have been victims of this type of aid with a result that their chances of receiving father aid are curtailed. In some cases its their sovereignty and freedom to act freely which has been impaired. Technical aid differs from military and economic aid in that it is essentially long run and economic in its objective. It is directed towards the basic characteristics of the underdeveloped state's economy. This is the most important form of aid desired by the landlocked states.

The International community which gives or tries to give aid to Africa's landlocked states includes governments of developed western and eastern countries, private international commercial companies and the United Nations together with its numerous agencies. Among the govern-

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2 See George, I, Blenkston, International Politics and Foreign Policy in Developing Systems; in Louis, J. Cantori, Stephen, L. Spiegel, (e.ds). The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, 1970 pp 129-130.

ments to be considered here are the governments of the former colonial powers which ruled these states and the United States of America as well as leading Eastern European and Asian Countries namely the Soviet Union and China. The Western governments happen to control the private merchant companies operating in Africa and as such the two would be considered together. The United Nations itself and its agencies like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (BRD). International Monetary Fund (IMF), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and several others also engage in aid giving to those states and some of them will be studied in detail.

The crucial questions to be answered in this chapter are how much and what kind of aid have the African landlocked states been receiving? What contribution has this aid made or is making to their economies? What political strings if any is this aid having on these states? If the contribution being made is not satisfactory or is not in the right direction what must they do to solve their problems? With these questions in view the role of the various organisations and governments named above can be examined beginning with the aid from the governments of Great Britain and France as former colonial powers of most of these states and the United States of America their main ally and aid giver.

Because of the long historical connections Great Britain is expected to be the main aid giver to her former

colonial territories in Africa. The economies of these territories were shaped by Great Britain and she is the main customer of their raw materials. Added to this is the fact that her Western allies give her chance to dominate affairs of these newly independent states. They do not want to compete with her. Similarly France is the main aid giver to her former colonies and principle customer of their raw materials. She, too, has monoply over the economic life of these states. The aid given includes both military, economic and technological, and it carries with it all the characteristics already mentioned. Thus if a state is not willing to give political gains to them they do not give her any aid or give only token gifts for instance Uganda under Idi Amin could not get any economic help from Great Britain or United States.

Furthermore, these countries have economic and political strategies to follow in giving aid. If a country is not strategically important to them and if the raw materials obtained there are not crucial to their own economies or if they can obtain them from elsewhere they give only token aid. For this reason Kenya has been receiving more aid from Britain than Uganda. Similarly France puts more money in countries like South Africa, Ivory Coast, Senegal and others than Niger, Chad, Mali or Upper Volta. To put it briefly African countries as a whole receive aid which is too inadequate for their development needs and this is not evenly distributed. The landlocked states which are of little strategic and economic

importance to them receive less than the coastal states.

The private firms are essentially profit orientated. As such they are reluctant to move into areas where their capacity to make profit is only minimal due to existing economic and political strings. Thus Kenya which is coastal and whose policies are close to what the British investors require get more of their investments than Uganda and Tanzania. As a matter of fact the two states are on the economic periphecy of Kenya and this is the situation they are now desperately trying to rectify. To sum up, then, Britain and France have shown little interest in Africa's landlocked states and only keep nominal ties with them for the purpose of selling their manufactured goods to them.

In the same vein the United States of America's concern with Africa is small. It is true she has steadily increased her links with the latter since the end of the second world war - but concrete and identifiable American interests have always been and continue to be slight. The American attitude towards Africa is negative in character. She assigns no vital place to Africa in her scheme of work. She, however, admits that she would suffer if Africa were to fall into hostile hands and to prevent this she keeps token assistance to all African states. The distribution of such assistance follows her economic and political interests as they are to day.

There are three distinct characteristics of American aid in Africa.[3] The first is that she has deliberately held down her aid to modest proportions. The second characteristic is that she sees no immediate defence interests in Black Africa so her military assistance is slight. Finally she made her aid only supplementary to aid from the former colonial powers. She does not want to be the principle aid giver in territories where her main NATO allies have special interests as this would set her in competition with them. For this reason a special committee on Aid appointed by President Kennedy in 1963 recommended a low performance in Africa and to shift most of the aid to countries adjacent to communist states in Asia for security of American interests there. The great distance Africa is from the Cold War forces America to ignore her.[4]

The United States further argues that the virtually unlimited needs of Africa in every respect raises insoluble problems as to the proper priorities to be followed. Because of his a sensible allocation of available aid resources is greatly complicated by the existence of so many states, a number of which give little promise of being able to do more than to survive at a bare subsistence level. Even if substantial external aid was to be continued indefinitely their prospects for development in the progressive terms of the modern world appear to be dishearteningly slim. Illiteracy, disease, poverty,

4. Ibid p 36

primitive agricultural methods, the lack of such fundamentals as transport and communications, power and presence of no more than the rudiments of modern industry are given as the basic conditions withholding development and amount of aid from the United States of America.[5]

Prerequisites of development such as effective administration, skilled managerial class, technicians and a properly trained labour force are also lacking. This shows that the foundations on which development can be built have barely been laid. The colonial regimes merely cleared the ground on which the development process could start but did not do much beyond that. In some cases the ground has in fact yet to be cleared. On this basis the United States government experiences difficulties in portioning out development aid which is too small for the needs of these states. As a result she has given priority to those states where aid would achieve the most substantial results.

For this reason a review of American Aid to Africa was carried out by Edward, M, Korry, then American Ambassador to Ethiopia. Korry recommend that aid should be based on the stability of recipient countries, their prospects for growth, ability to help themselves by making effective use of aid and their own resources and readiness to play a constructive role in regional affairs. The States which met this criteria and therefore received and continue to receive the bulk of American aid were Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Zaire, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana and Sudan. None of these is landlocked.[6]

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5 Ibid

6 Ibid p. 38

Ambassador Korry carried out his review and made the recommendations in 1966 to guide President Johnson's administration in giving aid to Africa. This has remained the formular America is using. As it can be seen the criteria set does not favour landlocked countries a number of which are seen not to be able to do more than mere survival. While the total aid to Africa is small the portion that goes to the landlocked countries is even smaller. Korry's criteria cannot be attained by these countries so they need to find other means of development.

A final note on aid from western governments is that after 1966 it became too much of a weapon to subdue African governments. For instance in Uganda aid from Great Britain, United States and other western countries diminished after Obote made the famous Nakivubo pronouncements on the new economic policies. By these measures the government acquired a controlling share in all foreign owned firms operating in Uganda and all the foreign banks, insurance firms and other similar economic institutions were forced to be incorporated in Uganda and those which were not willing to do so were told to quit. Most of these enterprises agreed to incorporate in Uganda. A few small ones sold their shares to big enterprises and oozed out of existence. But up to his over throw in 1971 it was becoming increasingly difficult to get foreign assistance from these governments, private firms based there and even from United Nations established agencies because they, too, are some how controlled by the same governments as it will

be shown later.[7]

In Niger's case France, which is the main trading partner and buys nearly all uranium products made matters very difficult for her in 1978. She pleaded that the price for uranium in the world market had fallen and as such she could not continue to buy Niger's uranium at the fixed prices that were operating at the time. The result was that Niger's Five Year Development Plan for the period 1979-1983 could not be implemented for lack of funds. Since the expected income from uranium had dwindled drastically. These changes occurred after Niger had repudiated the defence pact with France and asked the latter's troops to leave Niger. Without mentioning it France seemed to adopt punitive measures to punish Niger and perhaps force her to reverse her decision. The two cases noted above therefore show the political expectations of the donor countries. The latter have proved to be of little economic and strategic importance to the former hence the little flow of aid.

Now it is time to highlight on the efforts being made by the United Nations and its agencies to help landlocked countries in Africa overcome their economic hardships. The type of aid given in this respect is mainly economic and technological not military. The aim is to boost trade of these countries so that they can increase their external earnings and by so doing be able to expand their economies.

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7 Source: This information was kindly made available through personal interview with the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development in his office at Entebbe, June, 1977.

The methods used include improving transport infrastructures both internal and external to link these countries to the main streams of world comerce, financing of economic projects to aid industrial development in each country and provisions of technical experts in relevent fields to give technical advice and train local personnel. Each agency of the United Nations specialises in a specific aspect of aid. It is therefore better to treat one agency at a time beginning with the United Nations itself.

It has been noted in previous chapters that the main cause of under development for landlocked countries in Africa is their isolation from the sea which is the main carrier of world commerce and the discriminatory nature of the laws governing the use of the high seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, use of port facilities as well as the exploitation of the living and non-living wealth of the same seas. The United Nations has been working relentless to revise the laws governing traffic on the high seas and ships and goods in foreign ports. A special organ known as the Seabed Committee was established in 1968 to handle this responsibility on behalf of the United Nations. Its establishment was accompanied by a declaration known as The Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Sub-soild thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.[8]

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8 See UN, Economic and Social Council, Special Measures Related to the Particular Needs of the Landlocked Developing Countries: Study of the Establishment of a Fund in favour of the landlocked Developing Countries, General E/5501 21st May, 1974.

The purpose of this declaration was to emphasize the need for all countries of the world to be accorded equal treatment in the exploitation and use of the high seas which is a common heritage of mankind. The SeaBed Committee conducts international conferences to work out a suitable international legal and economic order which would benefit all countries regardless of where they are located. It was reported from New York that a new convention to this effect was finally concluded in June, 1982. Its main clauses are not yet available for detailed analysis. This has been the main activity of the United Nations itself. Attention can now be given to two of its agencies which work hand in hand in Africa namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The UNDP has offices almost in every country in Africa and has on a number of occasions provided research funds to the staff of UNCTAD to carry out field studies in as many of these countries as possible. From the results of the research, recommendations are made regarding investment priorities and countries which require more assistance. Between February 1975 and June 1977 for instance the N UNDP provided funds which enabled UNCTAD research teams to visit twenty-two least developed countries in Africa to evaluate the immediate and medium term economic projects for them. The teams were also to determine individual and joint needs for technical assistance in policy formulation planning and management of their foreign trade

sectors. The teams concentrated on three major areas of economic activity namely foreign trade policy, commercial infrastructures and invisible earnings as well as external aid.[9]

The reports of these teams showed that quite a number of the countries visited had a number of common weaknesses in their economic planning and implementation. The first weakness was that they had short comings in their trade policy formulation which included design and use of commercial policy instruments. They also had weaknesses in their foreign exchange management, transit and transport costing. Other weaknesses were discovered in their import procurement policies, procedures and techniques plus in accurate trade and payments statistics and projection, acquisition of foreign assistance and investments as well as in the transfer of technology. The reports were made available to each country visited and to donor agencies which pledged to donate funds and manpower to alleviate their problems. The reports now form the basis of the UNDP's programmes cycles fort the period 1977 to 1981. The following landlocked countries were visited, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Lesotho, Niger, Rwanda and Uganda.

A second visit was undertaken under the same sponsorship and other landlocked countries of Central Africa Republic, Mali and Upper Volta were included. Altogether

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9 UNDP/UNCTAD, Project Int. 73/013 Exploratory Mission on Foreign Trade Policy aand Planning in the Least Developed Countries Terminal Report, Geneva August 1977.

the UNDP spent 460,000 (US) dollars. The economic indicators worked out showed that all these countries except Botswana had their total output gross national product (GNP) expanding at annual rates below those projected in the United National Second Development Decade. When this was compared with the rate of natural increase of their populations per capita gross national products stagnated or declined in a majority of cases. The reports showed further that for all the landlocked countries surveyed transit costs at least doubled the landed price of their imports. The high transport costs were due to delays resulting from the freezing of capital, high interest and damage costs, pilferage, red tape and gratuity payments to cut through it rather than rising costs of transportation as such.[10]

Unit transport costs were high because of rising inbalances between the volume and nature of inward and outside cargo movements, transhipments between different transport modes such as rail, road or sea. In four cases the landlocked countries visited were members of economic groupings located within their regions. These included Niger and Uganda. To these countries a recommendation was made for them to deal with their problems through these regional organisations. Niger has little problem in this respect because she belongs to robust organisations still existing. But Uganda no longer has a regional group to work through due to the demise of the East African Community. There is need for landlocked countries to elaborate

10 Ibid.

transport and transit policies based on the optimal use of all routes and transport modes available.

The recommendations extended to cost - benefit analysis of specific projects which would improve the transport and transit infrastructures. For Uganda assistance was pledged with costing the construction of a drypott in Kampala and for training local personnel in organising and managing large scale transport operations which include scheduling, routing, spare parts inventorying, maintainance and procurement. For countries having ports and shipping lines UNCTAD has been running training seminars and providing advisory services in port management, maritime legislation and shipping policy for many years as a way of helping landlocked countries which use these ports and shipping lines. The specialised staff of United Nations and Regional Economic Commissions joined hands with UNCTAD to help these countries. As a matter of fact UNCTAD staff enquiries in the field of maritime river and lake transport were frequently of a follow-up nature. In Africa the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has been spearheading this exercise.

In addition to the above UNCTAD explored new fields which included coastal shipping and integrated development of port, free zones, processing and cold storage facilities. Tanzania was studied in connection with coastal shipping and Sudan for the other activities. With regard to Burundi and Uganda they recommended Lake and river port development. Widespread congestion problems were prevalent

everywhere in Africa and the high utlisation rates of port facilities were being exacerbated by weak management and lack of coordination with rail and road transport services. It was therefore necessary to rectify this. Furthermore, port statistics were also fragile and too narrow in scope without proper costing of port operations, cargo handling and storage. The result was that port and warehouse charges were out of line with true costs and no pricing policy could be laid down. There was lack of comparative information on charge and rates practiced outside Africa.

The efforts described above shows that both UNDP and UNCTAD tried to surface data relating to the poor state of affairs inside the landlocked countries. The two organisations did not do much beyond the level of information gathering. The assistance these countries received was in using expert research personnel who carried out the research for them at their organisations' expense but left the responsibility of data utilisation to the countries themselves. What this meant was that the landlocked countries were expected to organise their own capital and skills to reconstruct the needed services using the data collected. If they could not manage to do so by themselves they were expected to borrow technology and financial resources from outside. As it turned out they failed in both ways.

The cause of failure was due to two good reasons. The first is their great dependence on foreign technologies which makes them unable to do much for themselves.

Secondly the investment policies of these agencies and sources of their finances are in many ways controlled or influenced by the major western powers which have veto powers in the United Nations namely the United State of America, Great Britain and France. The aid policy for these countries, as noted earlier, follows their economic and strategic interests and because of their great influence in the United Nations they force these agencies to adopt the same pattern. After all, the main source of their funds is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) commonly called the World Bank, whose Chairman is always an American. Many of the key experts in decision making positions of these agencies are also from the same groups of countries who are very loyal to their countries' interests.

It has tended to follow therefore that those African Countries which do not rank high in American or western economic and strategic interest and therefore receive only minimual aid from her also get only minimal aid from United National based agencies. If a country is popular to the American, British and French governments it bags substantial amounts of aid from both these countries and the United Nations agencies under their influence. Uganda serves as an example of this. Under Idi Amin Britain and the United States of America broke off both diplomatic and trade relations and all their business concerns in Uganda wound up. Uganda stopped receiving aid from these countries which in addition to their own boycott of Uganda's products

engineered a campaign for other western countries to follow suit.

It was observed that aid from the UNDP and UNCTAD virtually came to a halt and loans from the World Bank were no longer available. The proposed dryport in Kampala was never built and the projected transport infrastructures within and linking Uganda to the sea could not be constructed or maintained. The UNDP and other agencies kept their offices open but there was no vigorous economic activities going on. This case showed that unless and until a country proves to be of great economic and political promise to these western powers no substantial aid can be given to her by these agencies.

As R.M. Green observed, economic independence refers to a situation where national institutions including private businesses and interest groups have the right, capacity and power to take and implement decisions affecting the national economy and its component parts that the international agencies operating in Africa tend to deplet Africa's independence as they try to help them.

The third problem faced by these countries as a result of their dependence on borrowed technology is that some of the technology imported is not suitable for use in African conditions. Those who produce it want to earn money from their labour as such they are anxious to find buyers. The buyers in the developing countries usually have no chance to examine and test the technological devices they want to buy. Sometimes they lack capacity to assess

their suitibility. So they buy them at very high prices and after only a short time find that the machinery imported cannot be maintained or used for the purposes for which it was bought. So they have to go to market again for new ones. In some cases they may be still paying for old machines bought earlier and then contract fresh loans to pay for the new ones. Because of this imported technology drains rather than help uplift the economies of the poor landlocked countries under review here.

Finally imported technology tends to block the growth of an effective indigenous scientific and innovative capacity. Because every machinery needed in the country can be easily imported from overseas local initiative cannot be launched on a very wide and effective scale. The countries concerned therefore continue to lag behind the already developed countries. In this respect therefore imported technology tends to retain, expand and consolidate underdevelopment and dependence of the recipient countries.

Looking at the landlocked countries of Africa it can easily be noticed that although they have been receiving foreign aid for over two decades now their economics and technological skills have not improved very much. Indeed it is true that some of them are actually worse off than they were twenty years ago. It is not, of course, entirely true to say that this has been caused by their dependence on imported technology. But certainly this has had a part to play. If attention is given to the two case studies of this thesis namely Niger and Uganda it is evident that

that their economies and levels of technological innovation have not improved since independence in 1960 and 1962 respectively. Of course, there are other factors which account for this. But it is possible to identify the conspicuous contributions made by foreign aid.

The ten years of Idi Amin's rule in Uganda highlighted on this fact very vividly. Before Amin came to power all the agricultural, manufacturing commercial and transport industries were running very well. Many Ugandans were employed by them. At this time the role played by foreign technical, managerial and capital resources could not be assessed. Everyone took it for granted. But after the departure of foreigners from the country and stoppage of external capital the true position came to light. Every industry deterrorated and that chaos overtook the commercial sector of the economy. Details of these need not be repeated here. The point being made here is that imported technology and managerial skills never gave chance for local innovative capacity to start and grow. It therefore prolonged expanded and consolidated underdevelopment.

But there is yet another problem connected with external aid by globally based agencies as the ones under review here. This is that the agencies lack the physical means of enforcing their plans or recommendations. They are specialised economic agencies not governments. Once they draw up their plans or make recommendations they can not proceed any further on their own. They need the cooperation of their sponsors and governments of the c[illegible]

countries concerned. UNCTAD for instance made efforts between 1974 and 1980 to help landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states to obtain better terms of transit, access to the sea and use of port facilities to import and export goods overseas. The idea was to get these terms enshrined in the new Law of the Sea Convention which was being debated at the time. It organised a regional conference for Africa in Kampala to help African countries work out a common strategy to adapt in the full scale conference slated for Caracas in Venezuela in October 1974.[12]

In this Kampala meeting all participating countries reaffirmed the right of landlocked countries to have free and unrestricted access to and from the sea as one of the cardinal rights recognised by international law. They reaffirmed further that transit countries should respect and facilitate the exercise of the right of free and unrestricted transit and provide them with all other facilities necessary for traffic in transit without discrimination by all means of transport and communication through all the routes of access in the transit countries. To this they added that traffic in transit should not be subjected to customs duties, taxes or other charges except for specific services rendered. The conference sought to improve market accessibility to landlocked countries, to enable them compete effectively with coastal countries.

12 See The Kampala Declaration A/Conf 62/23 2nd May 1974.

These re-affirmations were passed on to the entire world community to observe. UNCTAD itself could not do anything substantial to see that they were implemented. It all depended on the goodwill and convinience of the coastal countries to accept, modify or refuse them altogether. As it was noted in chapter two the national interests of the coastal countries are always paramount. UNCTAD's view was that developing countries needed to increase their participation in international commercial activities because by so doing they would increase their earnings. To achieve this it was agreed to set up a common fund to finance some of the planned activities and to offset the increasing inflation. This would be accompanied by improving their infrastructures and industrial capacity. The conference also agreed that appropriate remedial and differential measures should be set-up to safe guard the interests of developing importing countries especially the least developed landlocked ones which would also be exempted from financial contributions to enable them cater for their interests.

Finally specific action was recommended for landlocked countries. It had been observed that lack of access to the sea aggravated by remoteness and isolation from existing and potential markets, additional transport, transit and transhipment costs constituted a major and persistent impediment to the social and economic development of these countries. It was therefore necessary to take specific action to help them by giving them more assistance whithin

the framwork of their own development plans and to adopt a cooperative approach to each specific transit situation by improving the transit routes. By this they meant regional and sub-regional integrated transport infrastructures' assistance to be given and wherever possible establish a cooperative airtransport system.

All these recommendations could not be realised by UNCTA. They were more statements as to what would be the right thing to do, but actual implementation depended on several factors. First it depended on whether or not the developed countries which have money to invest would like to spare it into a fund not to benefit them but landlocked countries far away in Africa. None of them were willing to do this. Secondly the operations of the world market are such that it is not easy to give preferential treatment to landlocked countries. Those who control it would be losing a lot of money if this were to be done. Thirdly transit conditions, use of ports, and general access to the sea is governed by the national interests of coastal states which, as noted in chapter two, they are not willing to compromise to fit the interests of their landlocked neighbours. Finally planning of joint transport and other economic and social services at a regional level depends on the harmonisation of interests for all countries concerned. This has proved to be a very difficult undertaking to achieve in Africa, where competing national interests have tended to tear the continent apart.

However, UNCTAD sought a two-tier strategy programme of action. The first was an immediate programme to cover the period 1979 to 1981. This was expected to be a period of greatly expanded assistance for the least developed countries. The second-tier was a more comprehensive programme for the 1980s which was expected to cover a long period and as such caretake all long and short term requirements so that these countries are brought to a stage where they can transform their economies towards self sustained development. The Uganda chief delegate to this conference spoke on behalf of thirty one developing countries. He told the partiripants that the text of this item dealt directly with a question that was of extreme importance to the developing countries which were members of UNCTAD's Trade Development Board.[13]

In January 1980 UNCTAD published a report on a convention on 'International Multimodal Transport'. The main reason for publishing this report was a desire to simplify documentation so that one document services for several stages of the carriage of goods where more than one means of transport are used and the goods are transferred from one means to another without being unpacked for sorting or verification. There was also the desire to ensure that in case of loss, damage or delay of the goods involved in such multimodal transport, the shipper or consignee need pursue only one person who would be responsible for the overall transport rather than against the several transport

13 UNCTAD, Provisional Agenda for the 5th Session of UNCTAD, Distribute General TD/220, 12th April 1979

carriers involved. The term 'multimodal' means the use of more than one method and or companies to carry goods to or from the sea port to their intended destinations.[14]

Many landlocked African countries including those which are case studies in this thesis are caught up in this situation either because they have no continous railways or roads, as it is the case with Niger, or because of barriers erected for political reasons as in the case of Uganda. The UNDP has tried to expand her aid programme to help in such situations. In 1977 for instance the United Nations General Assembly Committee for Development Planning (CDP) listed twenty five least developed countries (LDC) and requested the UNDP to give them special assistance. These countries shared common characteristics which made it difficult for them to activate and sustain adynamic and self perpetuating development process. Subsistence agriculture of extremely low quality engaged most of the people and the exports are concertrated in primary commodities and minerals which are highly vulnerable to poor weather conditions and price fluctuations in world markets. They all have insufficient numbers of professionals, technicians, skilled craftsmen and other relevant skills. Added to this is the general deficiency in the transport and communications infrastructures.[15]

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14 UN, UNCTAD, Report of the United Nations Conference on a Convention on International Multimodal Transport Part two TD/MT: Conf/12/Add I 15th January 1980.

15 UNDP, Report of the Administrator General for 1978, Distr. General DP/80 April 1979

Equally lacking are the development planners trained to mobilise domestic resources and technical assistance. In 1970 the UNDP Governing Council requested the UNDP Administrator General to provide Indicative Planning Figures (IPF) for each country among the LDCs for the period 1972-1976 Programming Cycle. During this period the UNDP spent a total of 290 million dollars to prepare the required figures on which future planning could be based. In the 1977 - 1981 period the Governing Council received more funds totalling 609 million dollars to be spent in twenty-eight least developed countries. The money and efforts made over this period was mainly to prepare the ground on which actual development projects could be based. Thus it was felt that in order to be able to do anything relevant development needs of the economies of these countries must be determined through systematic research. The UNDP efforts are therefore at the preliminary level of data gathering. Nothing substantial has so far been undertaken in the field of real transformation of these countries economic status.

The ECA is another UN agency founded to assist the process of African economic advancement. Founded in 1958 it was given the task to study and plan development strategais for countries located in Africa. It was expected to concentrate on developing transport and communication infrastructures and to devise ways and means of financing the construction of the same. The ECA works in conjuction with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and for that

matter both are located in Addis Ababa. It has the technical expertise to plan and more capable of raising funds being a UN agency. The OAU gives the necessary political backing for the plans made. Essentially the ECA is an agency for planning and implementation of transport policies. As such it has as one of its main objectives to secure cohesive policies in matters of multinational transport. It has therefore to effect coordinated policies, harmonise investment regulations and identify major needs for transport development and investment in each subregion of Africa.[16]

The ECA established five centres to enable her manage her programmes in Africa namely Tangiers in Morocco, Niamey in Niger, Yaunde in Cameroun, Gisenyi in Rwanda, and Lusaka in Zambia. These are known as Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOC) and each one is responsible for coordination of activities in transport as well as in other economic sectors for the area in which it is located. The activities of each centre are then pooled together at the ECA headquarters as plan design for Africa. To supplement these centres a number of regional and subregional institutions were created as a result of ECA initiatives to assist in the promotion of technical cooperation among developing countries. As it can be discerned from the location of the centres there is emphasis on balancing regional development. The Niamey Office's

16 UN, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Office for Programme Planning and Coordination, Transport Newsletter Vol 2 No.2, December 1979

purpose is to concentrate on problems of transport and communications for the Sahel Region which consists of the landlocked and least developed countries of Chad, Niger, Mali and Upper Volta.

The Lusaka Office concentrates on the problems of the landlocked countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Gisenyi Office caters for the landlocked countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda as well as the coastal countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire. The Yaunde Office caters for the West African region excluding the Sahel countries while the Tangiers Office serves North Africa. The Union of African Railways (UAR) with its headquarters in Kinshasa Zaire is one of the most important regional institutions founded to assist the ECA accomplish its objectives in the field of transport. It was established in 1972 and handles cooperation activities involving standardisation, development expanson, coordination and improvement or Railway services in Africa. Its principle aim is to promote interconnection of networks and improvements in internal facilities especially in the field of African external trade.

The main problem confronting the UAR and ECA in this respect is two fold. The first is that many countries particularly those which are landlocked have no railways at all to service their transport needs. All the Sahel countries plus Burundi, and Rwanda belong to this group. They depend solely on the very expensive and cumbersome road transport. The second problem is that the existing

The ECA prepares the studies required for mobilisation of technical and financial resources needed for implementation. It also acts as a secretariat for various coordinating committees. The ECA puts greater emphasis on projects designed to benefit the least developed countries which cannot afford to undertake the work themselves. It also puts more emphasis on projects at borders where joint financing and increased cooperation are key issues. In addition to the Trans African High Way the ECA has the following road projects:

1. The East African High Way expected to run from Cairo to Gaborone in Botswana.
2. The West African High Way expected to run from Lagos to Nouakchott in Mauritania.
3. The Central African High Way expected to run from Tripoli to Kinshasa.
4. The Trans Sahara High Way expected to run from Dakar to Ndjamena.
5. The Trans Sahara High Way expected to run from Algiers to Lagos.[17]

The above projects are under consideration by the ECA and its financiers as well as the OAU. The aim is to start and complete them during the current United Nations Transport and Communications Decade covering the period 1978 to 1988. A special department known as Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC) was formed within the ECA to work on these projects. The theme of the development

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17 Ibid.

decade in the field of transport is on technical cooperation through development of regional, subregional and multinational infrastructures. It also includes the creation and strengthening of institutions which offer specialised training and research facilities in the various transport industries, promotion of legislation for facilitation and adoption of measures for the preservation of the African environment.

The first phase of the plan strategy for the decade has now been completed. It covered the identification of projects in different subsectors of transport which were approved by the Conference of African Transport Ministers held in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in May 1979. This was followed by 'A Pledging Conference for the Transport and Communications Decade for Africa' convenced in New York on 20th November 1979 in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.[18] Twelve countries eleven of them from Africa and the Philippines pledged a total of 128 088 (Us) dollars to help in research and planning as well as serving as preliminary capital to begin the construction of some of these projects. It was also hoped that the countries which could not attend this conference would accept to contribute funds to make the projects a reality.

The turn up of so many African countries for this conference showed how greatly concerned they are about improvements needed in their transport and communications industry. Their willingness to pledge funds to these

18 UN Resolution No. 32/160 19th December 1977 and 33/197 of 29th January 1979.

projects despite their poverty was intended to serve as an invitation to the world community to commit funds to these projects. But the invitation fell on deaf ears. The big financial powers did not attend this conference although they were aware and had been asked to attend. They have up till now not contributed any substantial amount of money to these projects and are not likely to do so in the near future. The very small amount of money contributed by the African countries themselves indicated that these projects could not take off. They therefore remain longterm projects to be completed if funds become available. That means that the ECA has not done much to alter the African economic and social environments as it has been rendered impotent by the fact that it has no independent source of funds to enable her implement her projects. Instead it has to solicit and depend on grants made to it by the United Nations and other financial institution which have not been forthcoming.

The world Bank for Reconstruction and Development is yet another agency of the United Nations which has done a considerable amount of work in the field of transport improvements in Africa. The principle operational activity has been financing for pre-investment or investment support of development. Financing from this bank comes in the form of grants or loans. The projects in which such funds have been invested have tended to be those which offer a wide range of direct and indrect opportunities for the technical cooperation among developing countries.

Thus the bank tries to find funds to help the construction of projects by TCDC. World Bank financed projects have been instrumental in strengthening economic integration among developing countries since they place emphasis on transport planning, modern transport management and administration, development of transport industries and acceleration of training in transport development and operations.

In the East African region the bank used to assist the defunct East African Community to maintain and expand railway services and development of road transport to link Uganda to Kenya, Sudan and Zaire. Under the auspicies of the East African Community the East African Management Training Institute (EAMTI) was built in Arusha Tanzania for the three partners states. Training in various skills used to be offered both at national and regional levels. A number of roads had been earmarked to link Uganda and Zaire. This included development of waterways on Lakes Victoria and Albert. However, it has to bennoted here that the World Bank is one of the United Nations agencies controlled by the United States of America more or less directly. Since the USA contributes the greatest percentage of the funds possessed by the bank, she has a controlling share. As such its President is always an American appointed by the American President. Because of this the American government ensures that the aid disbursed by the bank conforms to American foreign policy and national interests. This means that if a country seeking aid is not on good terms

with America she can hardly get aid from this bank. This was, indeed, the case with Uganda during Idi Amin's tryannical rule. The bank cut off her aid and most of the projects which had been planned could not be pursued any more.[19]

On the whole lending by the bank to developing countries for transport development accounts for twenty five percent of its budget. This includes support of several intercountry infrastructure projects having significant TCDC implications in Africa such as Ivory Coast and Upper Volta which have a joint regional railway project designed to meet the increased capacity needs of the Regie des Chemins de fer Abidjan - Niger. This is a projected railway intended to link Niger to Abidjan through Upper Volta to the sea. The bank gives assistance to several African countries in interstate highway and road development. It assists in trucking and construction industries through providing funds to purchase trucks and equipment as well as establishing workshops. Loans are sometimes made to industries directly or indirectly through national banks. To promote intercountry transit and trade the bank plans to extend the effectiveness of its assistence to the trucking industry by helping to eliminate the legal and administrative obstacles to long distance and intermediate haulage.[20]

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19 This information was kindly made available by the Chief Transport Economist, Ministry of Transport Headquarters in Kampala on 5th July, 1977.

Assistance from the World Bank, together with other sources of funds, has made remarkable improvements in transport links between African countries. It is now possible to travel over long distances on major African highways. Vast improvements have also been made to routes servicing landlocked countries. Concentration was given to the construction of intercountry links and on the improvements of arterials between major centres of economic and social activity in the landlocked countries and frontiers of neighbouring transit countries. From 1950 to 1978 the bank disbursed more than 306 million dollars for the construction of roads and highways in landlocked countries in Africa.

Much of the construction was for purposes of inter-national trade. The beneficiaries included Botswana, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Upper Volta and Zambia. In the past decade UNCTAD took numerous measures to promote technical cooperation between landlocked countries and their transit neighbours. The then prevailing problems were studied by groups of experts in 1969, 1970 and 1973 as a result of which a methodological approach was developed focussing on integrated planning. With the support of the United Nations regional commissions already noted UNCTAD is currently engaged on a service of regional and subregional projects which will identify action requirements to each specific corridor linking landlocked countries to ocean going ports.

Before concluding this chapter mention should be made of two pledges of support to boost the well being of

landlocked countries in Africa. The first pledge was by a block of socialist countries in Eastern Europe during the fourth UNCTAD conference referred to at the beginning of this chapter. The second pledge was made during the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva in June 1975. According to their statement the socialist block of countries observed that those African, Asian and Latin American as well as Pacific states which according to their Socio-economic indicators were classified among the least developed, were encountering very serious difficulties in overcoming the backwardness inherited from the colonial era and in achieving their economic independence. They were also doubly affected by the consequences of the economic crisis of capitalist system and the effect of inflation rise in prices of goods on the world capitalist market. The socialist developed countries therefore sympathised with these disadvantaged states and conveyed their feeling through the economic grouping known as "The Group of 77' to which all the countries affected belong.

The Group of 77 is composed of develping coastal, landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states located in Africa, Asia, Latin America and a few in the Pacific Ocean. The main concern of these states in economic development, search for cheap transit routes, use of foreign ports, fair laws governing the use of the high seas and exploitation of the living and non living resources therein. They are therefore most active during the Law of the Sea conferences. Up to December 1980 the Ugandan Chief delegate

to the United Nations Mr. Kanyanya Wapenyi was their Chairman. The Socialist states pledged support to all appeals made by the group of 77 concerning the need for a special effort to assist them in solving their economic problems, enjoy more favourable terms for participating in the developing states. They also pledged to help in broadening trade and economic cooperation, encourage new forms of national division of labour and increase delivery of machinery and other equipment necessary in the healthy development of their trade. They further expressed willingness to conclude long term agreements and contracts for purchase of exports from developing countries and sale of essential goods to them. Further readiness to assist in the organisation and functioning of state planning systems with a view to achieving maximum use of human, industrial and financial resources and to establish and expand transport infrastructures was also expressed.[21]

Finally the socialist states made a pledge to use a multilateral payments mechanism within the framework of the International Bank for Cooperation. Although these states are not members of this bank they felt that their help shuld be given through it since the states they wanted to help are members of this bank. The bank would save them the bother of dealing with these states themselves. All the pledges made were as a show of goodwill on their part but actual utilisation of the aid depended on the recipients

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21 UNCTAD, Proceedings of the UNCTAD Fourth Session Volt Report and Annexes, Nairobi, New York, 1977, P. 64

willingness or capacity to adapt their attitudes to socialist thinking and economic planning. Most of these states having been colonies of western imperialist countries were still too much under the influence of their former masters and as such they could not move closer to the socialist camp. The help pledged by the socialist countries remained unutilised for a long time and it is of now lapsed.

To conlude this chapter then it has been brought to light that the aid received so far by African countries generally has been multipurpose in character. Politics and economic interests of donor countries have always been dominant. Sometimes this has ruined their economies and political stability. At other times it has helped them to develop their industries and skills which they could not achieve if they were unaided. So there have been both positive and negative aspects of foreign aid in Africa. One conclusion one can draw from the past experience is that only very limited development can be achieved with foreign assistance for these countries to take off finally they have to rely on their own human and material resources.

CHAPTER SEVEN

C O N C L U S I O N

This thesis has tried to analyse and assess the impact geographical location has on the economies and political relations of African landlocked countries. In order to make meaningful conclusions from the information that has been assembled in all the chapters of the thesis it is helpful to use Karl Deutsch's theory of boundaries. According to this theory one can determine external influences on the internal behaviour of nations through the use of boundaries. The term boundaries refers to marked discontinuities in the frequency of interactions and responses made by a nation. The existence of an international boundary which may be physical or ideological causes the discontinuity. Its absence denies the nation from acting secretly and independently of surrounding nations and nations which may be very far away but with which it has to interact.[1]

From what has come to light in this thesis there are no effective boundaries between the landlocked countries and their coastal neighbours in trade and political relations because of the former's geographical location which denies them of independent secret transactions. Similarly there are no effective boundaries between the landlocked countries and the world market systems to which they sell their goods since they happen to be on the periphery of the capitalist

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1 Karl, W. Deutsch, 'External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States', in Barry Farrell, R. ed, Approaches to Comeparative and International Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966 pp 5-25

economic system which controls these markets. Their main problem, therefore, is to establish effective boundaries to enable them develop autonomous international machineries for economic and political development. Autonomy can only be achieved if the responses any of these countries' make to their external and internal environments cannot be predicted even from the most thorough knowledge of these environments.

Thus, there should be nothing to suggest to an outsider how the government of that country is going to react to the issues facing it. Within the country itself autonomy includes a combination of intake of information needed to make decisions and recall of recorded items from past experience which are then used to provide impetus for initiative and novelty. The geographical location of the landlocked countries surveyed makes this impossible. In this respect therefore these countries are not autonomous political entities despite their legal recognition as sovereign states. Sovereignty is an intensive type of autonomy enjoyed by a state. It is attained only in circumstance where from the external point of view the state's decisions cannot be commanded or reversed by events occuring inside the domestic environments of other states. In short there should be no decision centre outside the borders of a sovereign state from which decisions inside the state could be predicted or even modified. Internally a sovereign state must possess a stable and coherent decision making machinery located with in her boundaries. None of the landlocked

countries surveyed enjoys such a position. This means that their sovereignty is incomplete.

The first very formidable problem these countries must grapple with is to re-assert their sovereign status before they can hope to do anything else. This would bring them at par with all other states and on that basis they can then indulge into ventures of development planning. The second thing they have to do is to carefully work out a development design which they can use to transform their economic and social systems without relying on foreign assistance. In other words they must be as self-reliant as possible. This would enable them to discover their actual and potential capabilities and create impetus for development in new directions. To this extent therefore they must reduce to the bare minimum the impact of external events upon their governments, economics and people at large.

The best way to achieve this would be to establish autonomous and stable decision making centres inside their own territories. If this is done they would be in a position to make and control investment policies which the various aid givers would have to follow. They should also cut the direct links to the international world market mechanisms which are used by the developed metropolitan countries to set the terms under which they sell and buy goods they need. New markets and new trade policies must be found to reduce the most cheating and dependent relations now existing between them and the developed industrialised countries. Once this is accomplished the latter would no longer be able to shape

the course of development the former must follow or change their pace for economic development through manipulating terms of commercial transctions in markets located far away and to which these countries have no strong grip.

To achieve these measures the economies and political organisations of these countries need to be reorganised. To begin with most of these countries are very small economic and political units which, as the United States of America admitted, can never become prosperous entities beyond the level of bare subsistence. There is need therefore to unite politically so as to form bigger federal states which would pool all the resources together and direct new paths of development. The landlocked countries in Africa are lucky in that they lie geographically close to each other and this makes it possible to create bigger political units and develop unified development infrastructures once there is goodwill. If political unity is not forthcoming they should at least work on economic unity with a well run common market. This would serve the same purpose.

The question of economic and or political unity should be vigorously pursued because experience has shown that a very large and prosperous country with very strong hold on its population is better able to withstand big imports of foreign policy propaganda by tying its actual and potential linkage groups very strongly to the domestic system to make all the foreign inputs insignificant. The United States of America serves as example here. Following the unity of the American states in 1776 the USA has emerged as a super

military and economic power in the world which no force however great can easily shake. None of the states which united to form the USA could have achieved this status single handedly. The African landlocked countries need to emulate this example if they really mean to improve their lot.

But since both economic and political unity cannot be achieved over-night these countries can still do something for themselves in their present state. They must prepare their people psychologically, economically and politically to disengage themselves from the international linkage which have reduced them to positions of servitude. The linkage groups inside them should be effectively separated from the linkages within the external environment. If they do this they can make changes as adjustments within their bounderies to suit their national interests. By controlling the inputs from the external environment they isolate themselves from the latter and thus enhance their independence. In other words they must attempt to control or master the environments in which they work.

The capacity to withstand stress on the one hand and the ability to pursue their goals are the key criteria for the strength or weakness of a state. The measure of state power is the capacity of government to induce other states or governments to follow lines of conduct or policy which they might otherwise not want to pursue and to withstand the pressure of other states or governments which are intent on deflecting it from a course which the national interest or the interests of its leaders would appear to require.

A small state is more likely to give way under stress. It is also more limited in respect of the political options open to it. Instead it is subjected to a tighter connection between domestic and external affairs. It has been a general tendency that the smaller the human and material resources of a state, the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is to maintain any valid political options at all. Consequently the smaller the state the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the international community.

This is the position in which the African alandlocked countries have found themselves. It is the position therefore their future and present actions or policies must elevate them. But so far the efforts they have made to expand and improve their economic and military resources has led them to widening their exposure to external pressures and interference. It is essential for these states to identify the types of pressures and interferences being applied to them. They must distinguish sharply between those states whose pressure and interfrence is due to commercial transactions and military and or economic aid, and states with which they have only normal political relations. With regards to the former they get material and intellectual nourishment. These are the ones whose actions are more strongly felt and quite often inescapable. Ways of containing them have already been outlined above. As for the latter it is very easy to disentangle themselves

since there is nothing tangible on which they could make their impact felt strongly by the landlocked states in view. Possibilities to do good or evil are automatically eliminated where there is no significant trade and flow of capital between them.

Pressure and subsequent interference in the internal affairs of Africa's landlocked countries has been applied in several ways over the last two decades. The first and commonest form has been economic pressure aimed at the achievement of immediate but limited political goals by the country or countries applying it. Economic pressure is directed at the people and not their government. By starving or impoverishing them, making their private lives difficult or reducing their comforts their morale and resistance as well as support they give to their government is greatly eroded. This renders the government incapable of pursuing its policies and consequently upsets the political arrangements within the country. Uganda, Zambia, Niger and several other countries have been subjected to such pressures during the last ten years. In the end it leads to people controlling their governments and replacing them with regimes which can serve the interests of foreign countries which originated the pressure.

The second form of pressure is the one known as 'Economic Warfare'. This is designed to create lasting havoc and injury over and above the political intensions underlying it. It includes closing of markets to the State's exports, general trade embargoes or economic sanctions as

it was the case with Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) during Ian Smith's illegal regime (which was not effectively applied), denial of shipping and other transport facilities, blocking of national international accounts, freezing of credits, withdrawal of technical assistance, banning of investments and many other measures. This type of pressure is directed at the government of the state. No African country land-locked or not has been controlled with this type of pressure. But it is known that both types of economic pressure are latent permanently in landlocked countries and they must therefore plan for it before it comes.

Another related thing these countries need to provide for is the steady decline of prices of primary commodities which they sell in world markets. The prices of manufactured goods which they import have been going up every year and this has made international trade increasingly more costly for the underdeveloped countries in general and for the landlocked countries in particular. Primary commodities as the main or only output are the symptoms of a backward economy with a very low per capita national income. To these countries this situation worsens their very week linkages in the existing international system in which the market in primary commodities is highly uncertain. Sudden fluctuations in price and in their demand and supply have immediate and serious repercussions on the vulnerable economies of all underdeveloped countries.

The demand for primary commodities is vulnerable to the effects of technological progress in the advanced countries.

There are many substitutes for primary commodities which reduce the capacity of the developing countries to sell their products. Moreover, the advanced countries have shown a tendency to shift their industrial expansion from light industries which are heavy consumers of raw materials per unit of production, to the heavy industries such as engineering and chemical industries which require limited quantities of such materials. Their economic development has further shown a constant growth of tertiary industries which create no demands for raw materials. Tertiary industries are those which are mainly service giving like transport and telecommunication services. A rapid increase in the demand for raw materials is also checked by the economies in industrial production made possible by modern technology. The systematic recovery and reprocessing of metals is an example of this.

The rise in the living standards of industrial nations means an even increased demand for manufactured consumer goods and services and not greater quantities or diversity of agricultural products. Besides certain developed and semi-developed countries like the United State of America, Canada, Australia and others export their foodstuffs and by so doing compete directly with the underdeveloped countries on the international market. This has presented a direct and serious challenge to the landlocked and other developing countries whose main exports are mainly primary commodities. They must shift from this position and diversify their products and markets where they sell them.

Unless they do this quickly and successfully they may find themselves unable to sell anything at all.

The solution to this problem is for these countries to begin on a large scale programme of industrialisation which should result in great expension of international trade and stimulate further economic activity in the presently industrialised countries. This could go through stages to mature. The first stage would be for the developing countries to export semi-finished goods and not raw materials as such. They would also import an increasing volume of capital goods which could be as much as fifty per cent of their total imports. These goods would consist mainly of equipment for the new industries. The second stage would be reached when these countries begin to consume reasonable quantities of their own commodities while at the same time importing great quantities of capital goods. Finally after attaining industrialised status their trade with one another and with advanced countries would be stimulated by the growing purchasing power which now stimulates trade between the industrialised nations.

Economic development should bring in social readjustments to a new type of economy and transformation of social habits and attitudes which conditions the success of economic expansion. It is not possible to spring from the present level of economic underdevelopment to full development. They must therefore go one stage at a time until they attain this goal. They must, however, eliminate social phenomena which hinder social mobility

or reduce the material incentives to higher labour productivity and greater individual initiative. These included things like tribalism, economic cleavages, colonial mentality inferior status of women and many more others. It is also necessary to expand education facilities at all levels and politicisation of citizens to rebuild their sub-structures people must be literate about their condition and be prepared to adopt new ways of living. The great per centage of the population should be made able to desert the agricultural industry and join the manufacturing sector in an expanded manufacturing industry.

It has already been pointed out that since these states are small this hampers their economic and political development. They therefore need to unite either economically or politically or both. It is necessary to stress this point again. Economic development of small-sized states can be facilitated by the formation of regional unions in which member statescan pool their resources. This has a number of advantages. First it offers large markets which reduce the overhead cost of production and allows for lower prices which in turn stimulate demand. Free competition promotes the efficiency of industrial enterprises since industries which produce for large markets tend to have research facilities which are essential for technological progress. Only large markets permit the creation of a fully developed industrial complex because a vigourous industry creates a demand for the products of a related industry.

The second advantage of economic unions is that the excess of production in the territory of one state can be absorbed in the territories of other participating states. Their natural resources are also combined and deficiencies offset. They can therefore establish a broad base for the economy. It is also possible to combine their exports and by so doing strengthen their position in the international markets. If each state relies heavily on one commodity for export they achieve a lot more if they combine all these commodities and export them as one region. Uganda came close to this during her association with Kenya and Tanzania in the defunct East African Community. Now she needs to associate with Burundi and Rwanda in addition to her hopes of re-launching the East African Community. Niger also should aim at achieving the same goal with landlocked countries of Chad, Upper Volta and Mali which are her neighbours.

The third advantage of economic unions is that an economic union which represents a big developing markets and a large population is better able to negotiate with its usual customers among other states and would represent a potentially significant international force. This is made possible because of the increased purchasing power and resources it exports. The bigger the market the more respect it commands in world commercial activity and, of course, the converse is equally correct. Finally there is the advantage of expanding interconnecting transportation facilities in order to stimulate national trade.

This was the main service the partial economic union in East Africa gave to Uganda and which the latter lost in 1976 following the demise of the community.

The problems of economic development are so many and the need for balanced growth so great that governments of these states confronted with this immense task need to have long term plans. Each government needs to know what the probable national income will be during the next several years. This should include income from such sources as agriculture, extractive industries and foreign aid. These plans must show how the national income is to be earned and invested to avoid chaotic actions and to give a sense of direction to national life. Long term planning of this kind is totally missing in many landlocked countries for several reasons. The first and most important is the political instability which has characterised most of them since the time of independence. Absence of steady governments cannot promote long term planning needed here. Secondly, many of these countries have never really woken up to their problems. They have depended too much on foreign aid and their former colonial masters which have turned out to be only a time wasting exercise. Finally the very poor economic situation and harsh geographical environments particularly in the sahal countries has forced them to desperately work for their daily survival and gave no chance at all to sober planning for the future.

These are the problems they must surmount if they are to make any headway to future prosperity. As the situation is now prospects for foreign private capital are not very promising. The economic and social substructures they require cannot be built with the assistance of foreign private investors. These people are not interested in tying up their money into public utilities such as power stations, transportation, communications and other similar enterprises which are good for the economies of these countries but totally unrewarding to the private investors. Furthermore, secondary and tertiary industries are also not of interest to private investors because of lack of demand for goods produced, risk of political upheavils which are rampant on the African continent, and the ever present threat of nationalisation. Considering all these national self assertion appears to be the only answer.

Turning specifically to the foreign policies of African landlooked states several observations can be made. First there is the idea that foreign policy ought to be continous without sharp and sudden breaks. But continuity depends on circumstances prevailing at any given time. A sharp alteration in the situation ought to elicit a rapid alternation and adoption in policy. Continuity applies only if things remain the same. It cannot be upheld in situations where party politics geared to sharply antagonistic conceptions of policy prevail. In the shortrun bipartisan foreign policy may be used. This covers only short periods of national emergency such as Uganda took .

in 1976. But it is so contrary to the very spirit of party politics that it cannot be the answer for long. To the extent, then, that party outlook and ideology impinge upon foreign policy it will necessarily be discontinous. International politics needs the handling of international affairs. This being so most foreign policies of African landlocked countries visa vis their coastal neighbours have been discontinous. The party politics of these states have in a majority of cases been antagonistic to those of their coastal neighbours to which they depend to reach the sea. This has imperilled both their economies and political sovereignty and they just do not know how to redeem them. However, there appear to be one possible solution to this problem and that is internal self-sufficincy. If a landlocked country is self sufficient in most aspects of economic development its reliance on coastal countries for its external trade is diminished. From the data gathered in this thesis the common concern of landlocked countries is to secure access to the sea and free movement of goods across the territories of coastal countries. Internal self-sufficiency would reduce this to a bare minimum.

Niger for instance is an economically very weak country and almost entirely dependent on the goodwill of Nigeria and Benin. Much of her external trade goes through the ports of Lagos and Cotonou. The latter is used as an alternative route to Lagos and it is far more expensive to use than Lagos. The Nigerian Civil War worried Niger,

government so much that they had to think of other ways of exporting and importing goods overseas. But the good relations between Niger and Nigeria can be explained in terms of the former's dependence on the latter for a great part of her trade with thorest of the world. Since the bulk of the African trade is with overseas countries an easy and reliable access to the coast is of paramount importance. Most, if not all of the landlocked countries have tried to keepe cordial relations with their neighbours which give them transit facilities.[2]

The Uganda case has shown the discontinous nature of the foreign policies of neighbouring countries and the resultant sufferring of those which are landlocked. Because of the differences in goals pursued by each state in East Africa Uganda could not and cannot maintain a continous foreign policy towards either Kenya or Tanzania. But because of her landlocked position she has always been the one to suffer. There is no way she could avoid this. Land-Locked countries in Southern Africa have similar conditions in their relations to the coastal countries located there notably South Africa. .

Finally commenting specifically on the two principle propositions of this thesis it is not easy to determine precisely the part geographical location has played and

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2 See Syed Salhuddin Ahmad, Niger-Nigeria Relations 1960-1975. A Study of the Dynamics of Bilateral Relations Between Neighbouring States, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis presented to the Department of Political Science Ahmadu Bello University in 1980 .

is still playing in setting the pace and direction of these countries economic development and foreign policies. This is because at anyone time more than one factor exerts influence on the way countries plan and pursue economic and foreign policy goals. It is not easy therefore to tell which factor is exerting more influence than the others. Some of these factors are internally based while others are located within the external environment. In this study concentration was given to the geographical and other nonhuman characteristics of African landlocked countries only. But there are many social, economic, cultural and psychological processes which limit, enhance or otherwise affect the external and internal progress. It must therefore be understood that the geographical and other nonhuman factors treated are not the only ones which have set the pace of these countries economic welfare and direction of their foreign policy goals. But despite the existence of these other factors what has been brought to light in this study makes it quite clear that the inland geographical location of these countries has, more than any other factors, set the pace of their economic advancement and determined the kind of foreign policy alternatives they can follow.

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