

**THE PERCEPTION OF PEOPLE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL
SMALL ARMS AND ITS IMPACTS ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN
KADUNA METROPOLIS, KADUNA STATE.**

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NIGERIA**

JULY 2011

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**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
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DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this thesis entitled ‘The Perception of People on the Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and its Impacts on Ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna Metropolis’ was carried out by me in the Department of Sociology under the supervision of Drs. J E Gyong and B F Okeshola.

The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of this thesis was previously presented for another degree or diploma at any university.

Ogbadoyi, Charles Thomas

Signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This thesis entitled “THE PERCEPTION OF PEOPLE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS AND ITS IMPACTS ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA METROPOLIS” meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

This work is entirely dedicated to Almighty God.

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ABSTRACT

In recent times, violent communal and religious conflicts have become regular feature of social life in Nigeria. These conflicts result from different value systems, aggressive competition for land, water and political resources, and unhealthy competition of some leaders. There is hardly a year when there is no major violent conflict. Conflict in this respect, especially in Northern part of the country varied in scope, intensity and nature, and has taken immeasurable toll on human lives, leaving many dead, maimed and numerous others displaced, as a result of the involvement of small arms illegally acquired. To this end, this study seeks to examine the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, find out the sources of illegal small arms and examine its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts. In collecting data for this study, two complementary modes of data collection – survey and in depth interviews were used, and the data generated were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. The data revealed that, there are frequent ethno-religious conflicts in the State. The conflicts are usually between the two major ethnic and religious groups, and most often these involve the use of illegal small arms. The study also found out that smuggling from neighbouring States/countries, politicians, local manufacturers, arms dealers, theft of security forces arms constitute the major sources of illegal small arms in kaduna metropolis. Of equal importance is the revelation that prevalence of internal conflicts is responsible for continued proliferation of illegal small arms in the State. It was also found out that, illegal small arms destroy lives and properties, cause injuries and maiming, displacement of people and creates general sense of insecurity. In conclusion, the study recommended the need to take decisive measures to reduce the spate of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis in particular and Nigeria in general as a way of arresting the illegal use of small arms.

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ABBREVIATIONS/DEFINITION OF TERMS

AU	-	African Union
CFE	-	Conventional Force in Europe
DCO	-	Divisional Crime Officer
DIC	-	Defence Industry Corporation
DPO	-	Divisional Police Officer
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West Africa
CSLWRM	-	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms Light Weapons, and other Related Materials
GPMG	-	General Purpose Machine Gun
ISS	-	Institute for Security Study
MEND	-	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
NANSA	-	Nigerian Action Network on Small Arms
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPVF	-	Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NCPTAW	-	National Committee on the Proliferation of illicit Trafficking Small Arms and light Weapons
NUITA	-	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
OPC	-	Oduduwa Peoples Congress
SPDC	-	Shell Petroleum Development Company
UN	-	United Nations
WW	-	World War
Arms	-	Any thing that can be used for fighting.

- Bantustanisation - Exodus of people from perceived unsafe areas to supposed 'safe heaven' where their ethnic and religious groups are dominant, as a result of the ethnic and religious cleansing of groups and individuals in Kaduna State, in which ethnic and religious 'pure' communities are created.
- Ethnicity - The perpetration of nationalism based on language, culture and historical linkages as obtainable in the present Nigerian state.
- Ethno-religious conflicts – This refers to disputes arising from ethnic and religious differences.
- Gariyo - A traditional weapons that is sharp enough, curved and long for a long distance fight.
- Proliferation - Rapid increase in number or abundance. In case of arms, it denotes rapid increase in the spread of weapons, generally.
- Operation Yaki - Security outfit set up to check crime and violence in Kaduna State.
- Religion - Describes an identity which is about solidarity and setting of boundaries between those who are considered to be believers and those that are not.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

In theory, human activities can take two polar forms: pure anarchy and/or randomness, and rule following (Simpson in Croft, 1996: vii). The relations between groups, communities and even states traditionally have been regarded as operating more at the anarchic (conflict) end of this spectrum than through conformity to rules of behaviour. Okoye (2006:6) observes that, ‘no man is an island unto himself’, for individuals interact at the social, psychological and mental levels of existence in real life. This social interaction results in inter personal, intra and inter-family, inter- communal, national and international interests, needs, prejudices and frustrations that invariably result in disagreements, quarrels, clashes and sorrow, which occasioned tension (conflict). The above statement indicates the imperativeness of conflicts in human society. Consequently, polities have sought from their inception to make those relationships and interactions both more predictable and less prone to stimulating conflicts. However, the reverse has often been the case as the world continues to witness various forms of conflict as a result of competing interests, values and ideologies. Oke (2002:1) observes that “the incompatibility of these interests and the need to protect core values created conflicts”.

Thus, conflict as manifested in the form of conventional crime, political instability, economic depression, religious and sectarian disturbances, inter and intra-state is as normal in society as most other phenomena. One of the basic tools man invented in his quest for survival is the weapon. Society grows through the process of socialization of their young ones who are taught to imbibe the basic behavioural values and technology which are subsequently pass on from generation to the other. In this way, young members get socially equipped with the technology of inventing and using tools including their numerous values

like conflicts (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:62). This means that conflict becomes part of the values that older members of society inculcate into their young ones. In this direction, every member of society must satisfactorily be equipped to identify, appreciate, manage and even profit from the phenomenon of conflict. In this way, conflict contains both positive and negative values. It must therefore be managed or resolved in such a way as to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. It is therefore not surprising that Bohanan (1967: xii) observes that conflict is useful and that society is worse-off in its total absence. “Any attempt to totally suppress conflict can lead to anarchy as total lack of control or management of it can also lead to anarchy” (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:62). Thus, in order for society to attain its goals and develop, it needs some quantum of harmony and disharmony, association and competition, discord and accord, peace and conflict. To this extent, conflict is normal, essential and desirable feature of any society (Alemika, 1998 in Bassey and Oshita, 2007:62).

However, it is important to note that if conflict assumes a pathological state, its adverse consequences can in fact inflict serious damages on individual lives and property as well as threaten the corporate existence of communities, nations, continents and the world at large. The present scenario in Africa (Nigeria inclusive) is a typical example of how far conflict can destroy human lives and inflict social, economic, political and psychological misery on those who remain alive.

Conflict is part of several movement of history. On this premise, Francis (2006:20) remarked that “conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence”. Consequently, he defines conflict as the pursuits of incompatible interests and goals by different groups. In similar vein, Igwe (2002:84) quoted in (Ikejiani-Clark, 2010:54) conceives conflict as:

A universal and permanent attribute of nature, life and society, necessary dialectics they serve to advance the positive evolution of phenomena, and unnecessary and avoidable when irresoluble and their consequences are negative for society and man.

These definitions above clearly demonstrate that conflicts are largely the expression of opposing interests. Thus, conflict means a state of open, prolonged fighting, confrontation, hostility, strife, struggle, war, warfare, etc. A state of disagreement and disharmony; clash, contention, difference, dissonance, friction, fraction, schism, variance, etc (Ikejiani-Clark, 2010:54).

The manifestation of conflict and outburst of violence can be seen in different dimensions – political, economic, ethnic and or religious, etc. Almost all countries of the world have experienced one or more of these dimensions of conflict. From Europe to America, and Asia to Africa, these dimensions are common phenomena. Some of these conflicts have been successfully managed, but others have brought about devastating consequences such as whole scale killing. However, the concern of this study is on ethno-religious conflict.

Ethno-religious conflict, occurs when the ultimate goal of conflict is of ethnic and religious nature. This refers to disputes arising from ethnic and religious differences. Such conflicts are often associated with ethnic or religious sentiments. Thus, the usage of the concept denotes the fact that all crises that have religious and ethnic undertones are ethno-religious conflicts (Yakubu, 2005:19).Ethno-Religious conflicts thus, are those conflicts emanating from ethnic and religious differences, attachment or sentiments which divide the conflicting parties along ethnic and religious lines in the quest to ascertain or defined their identities and assert their influence.

Ethno-religion, one of the most personal, but emotive phenomena, is an important area that generates the most pervasive conflict, the resolution of which can hardly be effected durably (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:57). Examples of these abound inherently, in recurrent cycles of the Arab-Israeli question. The Balkans question that overflowed in the break-up of

Yugoslavia, and even the former Soviet Union, with their smothering after-shocks, continues to leave tales of woe, the resolution of which can be hardly predicted.

Furthermore, the Indian and Pakistani subcontinent, with their multi-religious Hinduism, Buddhism, etc, Afghanistan, with mainly Sunnite Moslems majority, whose coexistence with minority Shiite Moslems, on the one hand and Hinduism on the other, have continued to be flash-points and epicentres of religious conflict. Such religio-political subtleties seem to have entangled the Taliban with Bin Laden/terrorism, and which, at the end of the day, culminated in the United States bombing of the war-torn Afghanistan. Emerson (2009:1) also pointed out that radical Islamic influence was the cause of September, 11 2001 bomb blast of World Trade Centre in United States, and the Madrid bombing of March, 2004. According to him, the issue of the riots in Paris suburbs and other urban centres in November to December, 2005 and the London bombing of July 2005 were not unconnected with the radical Islamic influence. The actors of these violent conflicts are the Muslim minorities and the Europeans. Peaceful coexistence thus continues to be elusive because of religious fundamentalism and the propensity to language of violence. Good neighbourliness and other peaceful co-existential imperatives are a language that is beyond the comprehension of extremists, and therefore the continuous developmental deficits as part of their evolving culture (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:58).

There is no doubt that Africa has not been at peace upwards of a century. Conflicts seem to be a recurring decimal in Africa both between various countries and with the various countries that make up the continent. From the North to the South and from the West to the East of the continent, conflicts have become more or less the norm. Tandon (1999) quoted in (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:63) for instance, notes that since 1970 more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa. Most of these have been internal rather than inter-state wars. He further notes that in 1996 alone, about 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were engaged in one

form of armed conflict or the other with a resultant refugee population of over 80 million. The countries that have suffered most from these wars include Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Senegal, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, etc. Most of these wars have been characterized by extreme brutality. In Rwanda alone, in a matter of 100 days, about a million people were massacred, a scale of killing that is almost unprecedented in world history (Tandon, 1999 in Bassey and Oshita, 2007:63). Some of these conflicts are either ethnic or religious in nature.

Nigeria, like other African countries has been bedevilled by several forms of conflicts that have posed a mortal challenge to the state and its structures. Nearly every part of Nigeria has experienced one form of crises or the other with attendant consequences. For instance, the peasant-oriented conflicts and riots that are currently ranging in Nasarawa State which have both ethnic and religious causes, remote and immediate though predicated on the recurrent land question between the Tiv of Benue State and their host (Hausa) community in Nasarawa. Other conflict flash-points in the country include the endemic and prolonged Ife-Modakeke imbroglio, the communal conflict in Shagamu, Lagos in the South-west, In the South-east, the Aguleri-Umohia/Anan conflict which is most noticeable. In the South-South, the communal and oil-induced conflict in the Niger-Delta also increased in scope and intensity, and the Ogoni crises, which almost lead to complete annihilation of Odi Township.

In Northern Nigeria, we have been faced with a more devastating situation. Some communities, ethnic and religious groups that have shared centuries of peaceful co-existence have pitched against one another as enemies. This enmity has often times degenerated to a situation where whole communities are sacked, burnt down or completely devastated. So many lives and properties worth billions of Naira have been lost or destroyed in the process. Most of these conflicts have both ethnic and religious colorations. For instance, in the former

Plateau State before it was divided into Plateau and Nasarawa States there had been many conflicts rooted in intra and inter-ethnic differences. These include the Tiv and Awe communities, Bassa and Egbira communities, Jassawa and indigenes of Jos, Doma and Tiv communities, and Gbagi and Agatu communities. The recent crises in present day Plateau State is also worthy of note. There have also been very serious conflicts with ethnic and religious colorations in the following areas: Maiduguri in 1980, Yola crises in 1984, Gombe in 1985 and Kano in 1994 and another in the same 1999 (Okoye, 2000: xv).

Apart from Kano State, Kaduna State has registered more than any other city in Nigeria a superlative number of ethno-religious disturbances ever in the history of Nigeria (Ikejiani-Clark, 2007:526). In Kaduna State, there have been conflicts leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties in Kasuwan Magani in 1980, Kaduna in 1982, Gure/Kahugu in 1986, Kafanchan in 1987, Kaduna in 1987 and Zango Kataf in 1992, Kafanchan in 1999 and Kaduna, Kachia and Birnin Gwari in February 2000 (Okoye, 2000:xii-xiv), and in 2002 (occasioned by the introduction of Sharia legal system and the Miss World saga respectively). During these periods, many people were killed, houses burnt, properties destroyed, and several people were displaced. The frequency and enormity of these conflicts have foisted a general threat to the security of the citizens, which are not only affecting national but also economic activities of the state, given the manifestation of illegal small arms.

Today, the power of the state is gradually becoming weakened. This may be so because, presently a lot of weapons (particularly small arms) have illegally found their way into the hands of non-state actors, whose motives and intensions are at variance with those of the state. Consequently, arms that were originally intended for the protection of nation-states have become major source of internal threat. Oke (2002:2) pointed out that, “while there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of armed conflict between states within the past 25

years, the number of intra-state conflict appears to be on the increase”. He argues that, out of the 108 armed conflicts since the cold war, 101 have been fought within, rather than between states, and all have been fought with small arms.

Small arm is a generic term covering weapons which may be carried by a man. According to Smith and Haslam (1982:195), “small arms are weapons which are generally man-portable and fire flat trajectory profile. Normally they are considered to calibres less than 12.7mm”. Their unique characteristics have made their proliferation a very lucrative business world-wide, being compact, powerful, highly destructive, relatively inexpensive and easy to operate, conceal, and transport. It is believed that, “more than 500 million small arms are in existence globally, and these are produced in large numbers in over 70 countries” (Ariahu, 2005:2).

From the end of the World War II to the beginning of Cold War, attention of international community was on control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. This was evident in the number of negotiations and treaties reached. Little attention was then paid to small arms. As Vogts (1980:64) pointed out, small arms appear to be almost the least in the order of UN priorities in disarmament negotiations:

- Nuclear weapons
- Chemical weapons
- Incendiary weapons
- Other weapons of mass destruction
- Conventional weapons, and
- Reduction of armed forces.

However, since the Cold War, small arms have attracted increasing scholarly and policy attention, primarily because of growing number of intra-state conflicts and the destructive and destabilising effects in these conflicts. The 50,000,000 who have died in wars

since the Cold War were killed by small arms (Awake, 2001:5). Nigeria is one of such countries that have experienced ethno-religious crises and other hideous crimes, including the current waves of political violence, involving the use of these dangerous weapons.

Realising the destructive effects of small arms, given the numerous conflicts world over, several steps were taken to control the trafficking, proliferation and use of small arms. Such steps were taken at international, regional/sub-regional and national levels. For instance, the United Nations Programmes of Action on Small Arms (UNPOSA), the African Union, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and other Related Materials (ECSALWRM), and as well as a coalition of country-based NGO, the Nigeria Action Network on Small Arms (NANSA), sharing information and harnessing support from civil society groups.

Yet, small arms trafficking, proliferation and misuse continue unabated as intra-conflicts continue. Their availability continues not only to fuel crises but have dominant and destabilizing effects in ethno-religious crises, particularly in Kaduna state where most of such violence have taken place over the years.

Given the above scenario, control of illegal small arms proliferation has become an important task for Nigeria. Though no real progress has been made in the crucial field of weapons control, as their spread and use continue unabated vis-à-vis frequent ethno-religious conflicts, and the attendant insecurity. However, certain positive measures taken provide some encouragement. But the fact remains that these measures have only resulted in limited restraint as situations (ethno-religious conflicts) precipitating demands for arms remain unresolved. However, it is important to note that violence is no easy or the best choice to resolve conflicting issues. Our society can be organised in a way that the last resort (violence) does not have to be used. It is in this regard that this study is designed to examine

the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, identify the sources of illegal small arms, and ascertain its impacts in ethno-religious conflicts.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In the last two decades, the West African sub-region has been plagued with intra-state conflicts. Political, ethnic and religious clashes were common in most countries in the sub-region, with some escalating to full scale civil war as in Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, etc, bringing with them death, destruction and despair to the citizenry. The trend seems to suggest that intra-state conflicts have not only remained violent and protracted, they seem to defy existing policy responses and peace building efforts of civil society groups.

Violent communal conflicts are a regular feature of social life in Nigeria, especially since 1960s. These conflicts according to Otite and Albert (1999:86) result from different value systems, aggressive competition for land, water and political resources, and unhealthy competition of some leaders. There is hardly a year when there is no major violent community conflict in Nigeria. As observed by Best (2006:422), one could be alarmed of the multitude of conflicts that need to be solved in our polity. Conflict in this respect, especially in Northern part of the country varied in scope, intensity and nature, and has taken immeasurable toll on human lives, living many dead, maimed and numerous others displaced.

The nature, scale and dimension of conflicts vary according to the issues involved in relation to the cultures concerned. That is to say, conflicts take different forms depending on their specific contexts. This is central to many cases of conflicts in Kaduna State. For instance, "the struggle of ethnic minorities framed by their experience of domination, tends to be targeted primarily against the Hausa/Fulani, and indirectly against the Nigerian state" (Best, 2006:422). Best pointed out that, conflicts of this nature which have turned Kaduna city and rural locations within the state into killing fields seem to have been fought by

minority groups who perceive their relationship with the majority group at state and local levels, the former seeing their relationship with the later as 'internal colony' . Consequently, demands have centred on issues of access to power and opportunities as well as demands for cultural autonomy.

More often than not in Kaduna State, when conflicts of this nature erupt and spread, they tend to assume religious dimension, given the long time antagonism between the major religions in the state. Kaduna more than any city in Nigeria, seems to have become what Agbese (2002:12) referred to as 'hot bed' constantly generating religious crises of high magnitude. In this vein, it may be right to say that in Kaduna State, the two major religions that have always been in constant crises and conflicts are Islam and Christianity, especially as their beliefs and religious practices seem to run counter to each other. In the quest to assert their relevance, there are bound to be skirmishes which naturally end up in violent religious crises. These struggles for relevance have tended to pose a mortal challenge to the state and its structures. They have also led to destruction of lives and properties and displacement of people. Most of the injuries and deaths recorded in these conflicts are caused by small arms and light weapons illegally acquired.

Nigeria given its strategic position and role in West Africa sub-region has become a receptacle of arms flowing from war-torn West African countries. The sources and level of these illegal small arms in circulation in Nigeria can hardly be ascertained. It is believed that the frequency of political and ethno-religious violence has led to arms build-up in the country. Police records show that between 1990 and 1999, 12,000 people were arrested in different parts of the country in possession of prohibited fire-arms. In Aba for instance, it was estimated that one in ten adults in the town owned a gun either for self-defence or for criminal purposes. In Lagos, more than 6,000 rifles, pistols as well as about 20,000 rounds of ammunition were seized by security agents between 1996 and 1999 (Obasi, 2002:80). As

from January to September 2007 alone, the Inspector General of Police, Mike Okiro, revealed that about 1,582 arms and 6,614 rounds of ammunition were recovered from various parts of the country (NTA Network News, 4 September 2007). Local observers have estimated that few thousand weapons melted down from the cameras is only a fraction of the number of weapons in circulation.

The sources of these illegal small arms remain a mystery. As Okiro (2004:12) observes:

If the interactions between legal and illegal small arms markets are intricate and complex, identifying their sources are even more nebulous. Even when the transaction is done through licensed manufacturers and distribution is legal, the movement of arms is often shrewd in secrecy.

Given this observation, it is also difficult to say categorically the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna State. If it is so, the question then is, how can we identify the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna State? Some people are of the view that ethnic/religious groups and politicians might have equipped their followers and thugs with various weapons (Olorunfemi, 2006:34), which are either smuggled into the country or produced locally to perpetuate violence. This may not be unconnected with the fact that most of the crises in the state are either fought along ethnic or religious lines. Which ever the case, it may be argued that the sources of arms in Kaduna state may not be different from other parts of the country. This is because communities and states in Nigeria are inter-related and inter-dependent, and like the saying, 'what affects the eyes, must affect the nose'. This has become a diffused problem for the state, given the frequency of ethno-religious conflicts and the role these arms play in conflicts.

Proliferation and use of illegal small arms tends to have impacted negatively on conflicts all over the world. In event of conflicts, the flagrant use of these arms illegally acquired cannot be over emphasised. They are believed to be responsible for the continuing conflicts in Nigeria, and have sent a large population to their early graves. In Kaduna State,

the availability and use of these weapons is believed not only to fuel ethno-religious conflicts, but may have prominent and destabilising impacts on ethno-religious conflicts, with untold consequences on development. This may be so because, frequent ethnic and religious conflicts in the state have witnessed the use of these weapons, sometimes involving highly sophisticated ones suitable for external defence. It is not easy to quantify the level of destruction to lives and property, however, the clash in 2000 between Muslims and Christians over the implementation of Sharia resulted in massive loss of lives and property. The accompanying riots in Kaduna town in which many lives and property worth billions of Naira have been lost and destroyed, are worthy of note. It may be difficult to quantify the number of people that died because, government and other security agencies do underplay the number of casualties and extent of destruction to properties, however, it is believed by the public that nothing less than 5,000 people died, over 42,000 people were displaced and properties worth billions of Naira were destroyed during the 2000 crises alone (Okoye, 2002:128). Could the extent of these destructions have been possible if arms are not available for use? Some observers believe that the enormity of these may not be unconnected with the availability and rampant use of these arms illegally acquired. More worrisome is the sense of insecurity created and reinforced by this situation. Proliferation of illegal small arms thus, tends to contribute to culture of violence and a cycle that is difficult to break. Owing to the vicious cycle of conflict and prevalent insecurity, Kaduna State like other parts of the country is now believed to have been plagued by massive arms.

Realising the destructive impacts of illegal small arms, the government made several attempts to control their circulation and use. For instance, as part of the country's efforts at sensitising the public to the emerging threat of illegal small arms, public burning and destruction of assorted seized weapons were carried out in Lagos and Kaduna on 9th July 2001 (This day Lagos, Nigeria. 13th July 2001). Above this, there are legislations to regulate

the use of firearms, e.g. the Firearms Act 1958, Sections 403B and 428 of the Criminal Code Act (Oke, 2002:49).

In spite of these attempts, proliferation and use of these offensive weapons continue unabated. This therefore appears to show that the entire situation have surpassed government solutions. What then is responsible for this? Perhaps, more distressing is the absence of any form of government reconciliation and weapons collection programmes in the state. Most often government seems to rely on the use of security outfit to subdue conflicts or restore peace, which in public view is a palliative measure. This may be so because, even when the fighting parties lay down their arms, probably due to the presence of security men, “the intervals during conflicts are often not used for reconciliation but for armaments and preparations for the next round” (Okoye, 2000:167). And because the warring parties retreated to their bedrooms does not imply peace or absence of arms. Since the obvious causes of conflicts in society tend to be rooted in religious, economic and social inequalities and imbalance among people of same community, which are often not properly resolved, it is possible to anticipate particular eruptions. The desire then may be to keep these weapons in case of a relapse.

It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna State, identify the sources of illegal small arms and ascertain its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts, with the view to proffering useful suggestions.

1.3 Research Questions

Answers to the following research questions were sought in this study.

1. What is the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis?
2. What are the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis?
3. What are the impacts of proliferation of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis?

4. What possible measures can be taken to reduce ethno-religious conflicts and proliferation of illegal small arms

1.4.1 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this study is to shed light on the perception of people on proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, with view to proffering possible solutions. These were accomplished through the following research objectives:

1. To examine the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis.
2. To identify the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis.
3. To ascertain the impacts of proliferation of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis.
4. To suggest ways in which incidences of ethno-religious violence, and proliferation and use of illegal small arms can be reduced to ensure peace and security of the State.

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study seeks to shed light on the perception of people on proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, and produce a stimulating analysis which can be used in several ways.

Proliferation of illegal small arms and ethno-religious conflicts have been receiving coverage in many books, magazines, newspapers and journals. In addition to these existing literatures, this study provides an essential background to further understanding of salient issues of today.

It also offers interesting basis for policy makers and relevant institutions to fashion out a framework for thinking about how the problems of incessant conflicts can be handled in order to curtail proliferation of illegal small arms and their misuse.

Finally, this work does not claim to be exhaustive, nonetheless, it serves not only as reference material, but the findings will be of tremendous help to other bodies and researchers who may wish to carry out further investigations in this particular field.

1.6 Scope or delimitation of the study

This study covers the period between 2000 and 2002. It was limited only to Kaduna State, particularly Kaduna metropolis given the frequent occurrence of ethno-religious violence in the area, and the fragile relationship and pent-up tension culminating in residents living in perpetual fear and expectation of likely out break of violence at any time. While in the metropolis, attention was limited to the police whose duty is to curtail crises and violent crimes, and the general public who are at the receiving end. Consequently, the research focused mainly on perception of people on proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts.

Further more, research of this nature is usually threatened by certain problems, such as time factor and economic problems, as regard obtaining vital information, that is, in terms of data gathering. For these reasons, this study was limited to the available information (primary and secondary data) at the disposal of the researcher. However, the results obtained were generalised.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

As Black and Champion (1976:107) pointed out, literature review is designed to familiarize the investigator with much relevant information pertaining to the topic being studied. Thus, this section presents a review of related literature as deemed relevant to the topic under study. In this regard, attention was focused on various competing arguments on ethno-religious conflicts, the sources of illegal small arms, and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts.

2.2 Conflict

Consensus is achieved by scholars that conflict is an inevitable part or process of social life. It is a continuing reality of social existence. Necessarily, conflict involves two or more parties that have, or perceive incompatibility in either interests and or values, or in strategy of achieving the ends desire (Akpuru-Aja, 2007) in Bassey and Oshita (2007:12).

Conflict is a strain in a relationship that goes with emotion. The higher the emotion, the higher the tendency of intensity of conflict.

The concept conflict has been defined to mean “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals” (Gyong citing Coker 1968:8, in Bassey and Oshita 2007:63). For Durumoye (1998), conflict means a type of interaction that is often characterized by antagonistic encounters or collision of interests, ideas and policies. Similarly, Alemike (1998) sees conflict to represent antagonistic interests between two or more opposing forces or groups. Consequently, conflict is the struggle for dominance or control of one person or group by the other in such a way as to subjugate or even eliminate the opponent. Conflict is, in fact, a design aimed at resolving some kinds of unity even if it be through the annihilation of one of the antagonistic parties (Bassey and Oshita, 2007:63).

Man as a gregarious animal is naturally predisposed to live in groups, communities and societies. From the cradle to the Stone Age, man had sought to live and interrelate with fellow man. This gregarious instinct in man finds its minute expression in association of man with woman to form a family; also in association of man with fellow man to institute social order within clans, villages and communities. Furthermore, with the progressive development of productive forces and consolidated refinement of the relations of production, this gregarious instinct in man expanded and found fullest expression in the revolutionisation of the communication instruments. Thus man, as a social animal expresses both individual and group solidarity, which constantly interrelate to produce a given social order within the given social environment. As a corollary to the above, man, as an embodiment of self and communal instincts to produce social existence and eke out a living, sometimes generate conflicts.

The common sense understanding of conflict is in the negative. It is a setback. It is disintegrative. In this regard, Bassey and Oshita (2007:63) observe that:

For most people, the mere mention of conflict sends down cold sweat down their system. This sometimes creates unnecessary fear, insecurity and discomfort to the extent that such people become apprehensive in carrying out their desired socio-economic and political activities. To such people, conflict is seen as an aberration

Conflict assumes this form, but not always. The other social reality is that conflict can symbolise, as much as lead to positive developments for individuals, groups and the society as a whole. So, conflict can be a corrective signals or warning. It can be an integrative process. Conflict can be developmental driven. Yet, whether conflict is in the negative or positive, it cannot be left alone. It needs to be tailored towards the support of existing norms and rules of social existence. Either way, an uncontrolled conflict situation may be counter productive.

Thus, conflict contains both positive and negative values if it is managed or resolved in such a way as to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. It is in this regard that Bohanan (1967:xii) remarks that conflict is useful and that society is worse-off in its total absence. He pointed out that the necessity of conflict in societies is analogous to sex. According to him:

Society is impossible without sex. Any attempt at its total repression will definitely result in extinction, as total lack of some form of repression can also lead to extinction. Similarly, any attempt to totally suppress conflict can lead to anarchy as total lack of control/management of it can also lead to anarchy (Bohanan, 1967: xii).

Thus, in order for society to attain its goals and thus develop, it needs some quantum of harmony and disharmony, association and competition, discord and accord, peace and conflict. To this end, conflict is normal, essential and desirable feature of any society. However, when it assumes a pathological state, its adverse consequences can in fact inflict

serious damages on individual lives and property as well as threaten the corporate existence of communities, nations, continents and the world at large.

In our present world characterised by excruciating and suffocating poverty, misery, malnourishment and diseases, especially in most Latin America, Asia and African countries, the seemingly futile struggle to eke out a living has further exacerbated and complicated the incidence of conflict. Indeed, the wanton and seemingly unregulated proliferation of conflicts across the globe, and especially in Africa, has further thrown up new challenges and calls for re-evaluation of conflict reduction strategies. Perhaps, the root causes of conflicts have not been adequately addressed. However, the fact that conflict exist is not an abnormality. In so far as there are human elements living within a polity, conflict must constantly arise as a consequence of conflicting interests.

The manifestation of conflict and outburst of violence can be seen in different dimensions – political, economic, ethnic and religious, etc. Almost all countries of the world have experienced one or more of these dimensions. From Europe to America, and Asia to Africa, these dimensions are common phenomena. Some of these conflicts have been successfully managed, but others have brought about devastating consequences such as whole scale killing. Our concern here is ethno-religious conflict and destructive violence associated with the insurgence of religious and ethnic militias.

2.3 Ethno-Religious Conflict

A cursory look at the world map showing areas of conflicts and armed clashes will easily convince one that, today peace in the world is increasingly becoming elusive. We are threatened with imminent extinction. The threat to peace emanates from the various clashes between neighbouring countries, and between factions within the same country.

While the reasons for these clashes are numerous, it is not worth the efforts of this work to go into them in detail. The point to take cognizance of is the enormous quantity of

resources, both human and materials that are destroyed in these conflicts. The unfortunate issue here is that some of the countries in which these conflicts or wars are fought are among the least developed. The consequences are that the existing social amenities are destroyed; commercial activities halted and by extension, arrested development. What exacerbates the situation is that the prevalence of hunger, refugees, diseases and illegal small arms proliferation take their tolls on the unfortunate citizens and the resources of these countries.

This section of this work therefore, dwells on ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna State. This will enable us understand the extent ethno-religious conflict has become a permanent phenomenon in the state, leading to illegal acquisition of arms. Before proceeding to discuss ethno-religious conflict, clarification of key terms is necessary.

2.3.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity denotes the identification usually attached by a certain group to their peculiar traits such as language, culture, folktales, etc, which are summed up into a given nationality (Yakubu et al, 2005:19).

In defining ethnicity, Rosel sees the term “as groups which see themselves as constituted by real or imagined bonds of common descent, religion, language, culture or ideology” (Rosel, 1995:123). According to Egwu in Okoye (1998:21), ethnicity is a phenomenon which could be deciphered by five major characteristics which he listed as contextual discrimination i.e. “we versus them” syndrome, conflicts generation, political phenomenon with the attendant “authoritative allocation of values” close interaction between ethnicity and religion, and lastly flexibility and situational character.

In spite of Egwu’s analysis, which gives the impression that largely ethnicity has major negative tendencies, one cannot close eyes to the fact that ethnicity as a concept may have its own positive values in the sense that there is the need to be conscious of one’s background, environment, situational challenges and on the whole assessment of one’s base before

aspiring to be a patriot. Late Obafemi Awolowo puts it in a clear perspective when he was reported to have said that to be a good Nigerian; he first had to be a good Yoruba man (Alemika and Okoye, 2007:74). Thus, ethnicity here, similar to Rosel's view point above, implies the perpetration of nationalism based on language, culture and historical linkages as obtainable in the present Nigerian state.

2.3.2 Religion

In conceptual term, religion will be viewed from sociological perspective. The truthfulness or falsity of religion is not the concern here, but its social consequences.

Religion has been defined in various ways. Isokun defined religion as “ a regulated pattern of life of a people in which experiences, beliefs and knowledge reflects or repeated in man's conception of himself in relation to others, his social world, the physical as well as metaphysical world” (Isokun, 2000:21). Religion thus, is a unification of being with his creator. It reflects on the organization of his worldly, when individual realizes that he has duty to account for his deeds on earth in the here after. This position will ordinarily put man on his toes and make him perpetually subservient to the creator.

People chorusing Karl Marx have described religion as the opium of the masses. However, Agbese (1987:7) observed that:

Religion is essentially harmless and has non of the heady intoxicants of opium, although, there may be some who short in rational thought and long in blind dogma present the pitiable sights of drunkards, religion is a product, a dangerous invention of the consuming fear that rules men and women turning them into horrendous case studies of those full of hearts empty of brains. Religion, therefore, is the opium of the masses.

This view may be fairly correct; but cannot be completely discarded when atrocities perpetuated in the name of religion are considered. To this end, religion here can be

described as ‘an issue, identity which is about solidarity and setting of boundaries between those who are considered to be believers and those that are not. These deal with issues of sentiments, feelings and norms that may be a result of shared experiences’ (Abdul, 2002:146).

Ethno-religious conflict therefore, occurs when the ultimate goal of conflict is of ethnic and religious nature. This refers to disputes arising from ethnic and religious differences. Such conflicts are often associated with ethnic or religious sentiments. Thus, the usage of the concept denotes the fact that all crises that have religious and ethnic undertones are ethno-religious conflicts (Yakubu, 2005:19).

2.4 Nature of Ethno-Religious Conflict

In recent times, Nigerian has been facing a resurgence of several forms of identities. Some of these identities manifest in ethnic and religious forms, all competing to occupy the political space. In fact, the past ten to fifteen years were characterized by some of the most deadly conflicts to occur among several ethnic and religious communities in different regions and some states of Nigeria” (Best, 2003:7). Hardly was any region spared of some of these conflicts, even though the conflicts differ either in prevalence and intensity, or their protracted or non-protracted nature. In the far North, for instance, conflicts of religious nature even though sometimes over non-religious issues, continued to break out at locations like Kano, Katsina, Kaduna among other places. In the Southwest, there were violent communal conflicts at Shagamu, Lagos; Ife – Modakeke, etc. in the Southeast, the Umulari – Aguleri conflicts were most noticeable. The communal and oil-induced conflicts of Niger Delta also increased in scope and intensity. “Not even the transition from military rule to democratic governance in 1999, with the accompany assumption that democracy provides alternatives to violent methods of conflicts transformation, could slow down the prevalence of such conflicts (Best, 20003:7). These struggles for relevance have tended to pose a mortal

challenge to the state and its structures, destroyed lives and properties and displaced whole communities and ethnic nationalities.

Perhaps, the larger part of the conflicts occurred in the North-central region of the country, otherwise called Middle-Belt. Ethnicity and religion have become powerful instruments of mobilization. They can also serve as an instrument of demobilization or destabilization. They are powerful because, people can easily be galvanized around issues concerning their ethnic or religious identities (Okoye, 2000: xi).

Although Kaduna State is now known to be volatile when it comes to ethnic and religious conflicts, Kaduna metropolis was not susceptible or prone to crises, until the spill-over effect of Zango Kataf crises in 1992 which resulted in selective destruction of lives and properties in some areas, particularly high density areas in Kaduna metropolis. Apart from that, Kaduna metropolis did not witness any serious ethnic or religious crises until the event of February 21 to 23, 2000 (Abdul, 2002:117).

Kaduna State, unlike most states in Northern Nigeria, is much more complex. The heterogeneous composition of the state provides a veritable ground for conflicts. Ethnic and religious crises started in Kaduna State in the 1980s. Since then a number of conflicts with specific ethno-religious character were recorded in the state. One of the very first serious religious crises that wrecked quite an unimaginable havoc on both lives and economy of the state was in May 1980 in Zaria city when properties belonging mainly to Christians were destroyed without any iota of regrets. Still, in 1980 in Kasuwar Magani, 1984 in Zango-Kataf and Gure-Kanugu.

Another similar incident occurred in March 1987, this time from College of Education, Kafanchan when Christian students had to clash with Muslim students who were openly against Christian students who organized a crusade on campus. This led to the killing of people and burning of some mosques by Christians and some native Kajes. These crises

involved the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the Christian ethnic minorities from southern part of the State.

In yet another religious crisis in Katsina, Funtua, Zaria, Gusau and Kaduna, there were waves of religious riots extending from across the state that resulted in the burning of churches and damaging property belonging to Christians. Lives were also involved. In February 1988, Kaduna State also witnessed another religious disturbances in Kaduna polytechnic where some Muslim students destroyed the foundation walls of Christian Chapel.

The other very notorious religious crises, which wrecked the city of Kaduna precisely in May 1992, was the Zango-kataf riot. This later spread to Zaria, kaduna and Ikara all in Kaduna State. This simply arose as a communal feud between the Kataf Christians and Zango Muslims (Hausa). It later assumed a new dimension spreading to other parts of the state. It was recorded that several lives and property were lost in the episode (Gofwen, 2004: 65-67).

Again in February 2000, religious conflict seized the city as the crises between Christians and Muslims metamorphosed into inter- religious war leaving the state in a state of helplessness as several lives and property were destroyed. The next was in 2002 occasioned by Miss World controversy but was not too severe compared to 2000 crises.

The immediate cause of the 2000 crises was an attempt to introduce Islamic Judicial and administrative system (Shariah). After almost two months of tensed political atmosphere in Kaduna, a violent ethno-religious 'war' erupted; thousands of people were allegedly killed. Property estimated at several hundred millions were destroyed, and thousands of people were displaced (Alemika Okoye, 2002:117-118).

Although Shariah is not new in Nigeria politics, it has become part of the politics of the country since 1978. Nevertheless, the 1978 to 1979 and 1989 Sharia debates were on the establishment of Shariah Court of Appeal and administration of justice under Shariah Courts.

The situation took a very different dimension in 1999 Shariah controversy. This time around, the debate and politics were on the full application of Islamic jurisprudence as provided by the Quaran, Hadith and other authorities of Islam (Alemika and Okoye, 2002:121). According to them, amidst this controversy, attempt towards the adoption of Shariah moved to Kadun State.

In December 1999, the Kaduna Legislative Assembly constituted an 11 man committee to look at the applicability of Shariah or otherwise in Kaduna. This singular action polarised the house of assembly across religious line. There were a lot of misgivings and mutual suspicions among the members of the house.

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Kaduna branch, protested to the house on the issue, and expressed their fears on the attempt to islamise the state and the possibility of such action generating crises in Kaduna. The committee began its sitting in January; memorandum was demanded from various groups and individuals. However, before this period, there were series of demonstrations by both Muslims and Christian groups in Kaduna for and against Shariah. Muslims and Christians also organised lectures and rallies on the issue.

While the sitting continued, thousands of Muslims from various local governments in Kaduna state trooped into the House of Assembly in support of Shariah and submitted memorandum. The Christians became apprehensive, apparently because of the controversy surrounding the composition of the committee and the suspicion that a hidden agenda was harbouring by the Muslim members of the House.

After the completion of the 11 member committee's assignment on Thursday 17 February, 2000, rumour began to go round that Christians were going to demonstrate against Shariah in Kaduna. Information went round on Sunday in almost all the churches in Kaduna metropolis, calling on all Christians to come out enmass to gather at various designated

points for peaceful protest. The demonstration started on Monday. What started as a peaceful demonstration resulted into violent crises spanning two to three days. It spread all over Kaduna and spilled over to other local government areas like Kachia and Brinin-Gwari. Many lives and property destroyed.

Though, the first crises in the city was the spill-over of 1992 Zango Kataf. This like most of the crises that took place in other parts of the state before, had ethnic coloration but when the crises spread to Kaduna city, it assumed religious dimension. However, the crises of February and May 2000 marked the first serious crises in Kaduna metropolis and had more religious than ethnic concern. After almost two months of tense political atmosphere in Kaduna, a violent ethno-religious ‘war’ erupted, thousands of people were allegedly killed, property estimated at several hundred millions were destroyed, and thousands of people displaced. This crisis was reported to be the worst since the civil war in 1967 – 1970, and the most destructive in the history of Nigeria (Abdul, 2002:124). It was three days of agony for the people of Kaduna and the entire nation.

The nature of the crises and its intensity was a reflection of the complex character of Kaduna State. Unlike most cities in Northern Nigeria, Kaduna has its peculiarities; it was a creation of colonial government and served as the capital of the defunct Northern Nigeria. Against the exclusive nature of most old cities of Northern Nigeria, like Zaria, Sokoto, etc where the indigenous communities are separated from settler communities through the “Sabon-Gari” and “Tudun-Wada” system, in Kaduna there is serious inter-penetration across ethnic and religious lines (Alemika and Okoye, 2000:124). It is however possible to find places where Christians or Muslims predominate. There is also differentiation and settlement across economic and political status: high-density areas, with higher level of jobless youths and miscreants and low-density government reserved areas occupied by high status elites. The crises was more in high-density areas with overwhelming presence of uneducated,

unemployed youths and social miscreants such places include Rigasa, Tudun-wada, Sabon-Tasha, Television, Kakuri, Barnawa, Narayi, Hayin-Banki, Badarawa, Ungwar- Dosa, Abakpa, etc. Incidentally, in these high-density areas some have predominance of one religious group against the other. Those found in the southern part of Kaduna metropolis are predominantly Christians such areas of majority Christian population include: Kakuri, Narayi, Sabon-Tasha, Ungwar-Boro, Television, etc. In these areas, Muslims were overwhelmed and many of them were killed and their properties destroyed. In Northern Kaduna, particularly in areas like Rigasa, Tudun-Wada, Abakpa, Kawo, Hayin-Banki, Badarawa etc, Christians were attacked, killed and their properties destroyed. The extent of the destructions was made possible due to the availability and use of illegal small arms.

The causes of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria, and particularly Kaduna are numerous. While it is not the concern of this project to go into detail analysis of the causes of these conflicts, but to determine the impacts of illegal small arms in these conflicts, it is important to note that they are not unconnected with the maladministration and imperfection of Nigeria's Federalism, though the Sharia issue was seen as the immediate factor.

In Kaduna State, the rivalry and animosity can be traced to the pre-colonial political structure of Hausa land and the politics of colonialism. In recent time, the intelligentsia of southern Kaduna argued that the underdevelopment of their communities is the result of deliberate and persistent neglect by the emirate official who until 1976 Local Government reforms also dominated the system of native administration. The communities have been complaining of perceived domination by the Hausa/Fulani. The differences over political control, culture, religion and resources distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitation and confrontations (Alemika and Okoye, 2002:130).

This historical condition coupled with the economic crisis and the introduction of harsh economic measure of structural adjustment programme and its resultant implications led to

series of crisis in Kaduna. The perceived political domination by a group considered as “external or illegitimate” and control over land and power and resistance by indigenous groups against their domination by an ‘alien’ or imperial ethno-religious group constitute the remote causes (Alemika and Okoye, 2002:131).

Though the Kaduna crisis of February 2000 and the subsequent ones can be seen from these spates of crisis between Muslims and Christian in the State, frequently, religious differences have been evoked to explain these bloody clashes in which thousands of lives were lost and people displaced.

2.5 Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms

Arm in its widest sense both literally and metaphorically, cover any thing that can be used in fighting (Goad and Halsey, 1982:1). However, small arms or light weapons have defied a universal definition. According to Obasi (2002:2), such arms have been defined by different scholars and schools of thought, some of whom draw no distinction between the two but simply refer to them as small or firearms. Consequently, the two terms will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing in this study.

Small arm is a generic term covering weapons, which may be carried by a man. The broad expression, ‘Infantry Weapons’ has been used in the past, but it is no longer descriptively accurate in the sense because modern infantry also use such weapons as anti-tank guns and mortars which are pieces of ordnance (Report of Institute of Armament Technology).

The Webster’s Dictionary defined small arms or light weapons as “Fire arms of small calibre, held in the hand or hands when fired, as pistols, rifles, etc”.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines small arms to include, “all crew – portable direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 5mm and which will include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters (Okiro, 2004:10).

The ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons (Abuja 2006), attempts to establish distinction. According to the convention, light weapons include portable arms designed to be used by small persons working together in a team and which include:

- Heavy machine guns,
- Portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted,
- Portable anti – tank missile launchers or rocket, launchers
- Portable anti – aircraft cannons, non recoil guns
- Portable anti – aircraft launchers and
- Mortars with caliber of less than 10mm.

Similarly, the report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on small arms (in Obasi, 2002:3) defines small arms as ranging from clubs, knives, and machetes to those weapons just below those covered by the United Nations regulation of conventional arms. These include “revolvers and loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub – machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. The report defines light weapons as designed for use by several people as a crew. These include “heavy machine-guns, hand-held, under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti- aircraft guns, portable launchers of anti-craft missiles system and mortars of calibres of less than 100mm (Obasi, 2002:3).

What ever the contentions in the above definitions, small arms and light weapons have common characteristics:

- a. They are lethal and are generally used by military and paramilitary.
- b. They are man-portable or transportable light vehicles.
- c. They are easy to maintain, can function without much logistic backup and require little training to use.
- d. They are in frequent use by military, politicians, armed robbers, etc, and can easily kill.

For the purpose of this study, the researcher adopts the definition of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on small Arms above, which defines small arms as ranging from clubs, knives, and matches to those weapons just below those covered by United Nations regulation of conventional arms. They include revolvers loading pistols, riffles and carbines, sub-machines guns, assault riffles and light machine guns. This is because, most violence in the country is characterized by the use of both sophisticated and non – sophisticated weapons which are all offensive and destructive.

2.5.1 Illegal small arms

Talking about small arms, it is difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal because the terms do not lend themselves to any universal definition. This is because, in the context of arms transfer or proliferation, different countries interpreted international laws relevant to small arms differently. Some scholars regard any arms transfers that are authorized by the national government authorities as legal sales (Okiro 2004:11). While Lumpe, as quoted by Obasi (2004:2) defined legal transfer as “those that fully observed the national laws of arms exporting, transit and importing, to countries as well as all applicable international law”.

For Obasi, illegal may be defined as; “all arms being transferred, procured or used in violation of the national laws of the countries export transit and import as well as any applicable international laws” (Obasi,2004:2). They include any weapon sold by private dealers who knowingly, contravene the arms sales laws of place of source, transit, delivery or use, arms sales to government or gorillas that have been placed under legally binding arms embargos by the United Nations or other international organizations and arms supplies which though authorized covertly by an exporting government being shipped through the approval or indeed against the wishes of the transit recipient state.

Arms therefore, are not legal or illegal parse, but the compliance of their status with applicable national and international laws categorized them as such. Arms that are exported

legally may fall into illegal circulation through diversion, theft, etc, and may go into black market supply. In other words, when such arms fall into wrong hands their use becomes illegal. Thus, arms can transfer from legal to illegal status and vice – visa.

All over the world, most individual deaths by guns of various shapes and sizes remain private tragedies unknown to humanity, but their cumulative social effects are displayed in the ravages of war, political and ethno religious conflicts, in the million of refugees and internally displaced persons, who have fled their homes and communities to escape “similar fates in the emergency rooms of city hospitals and in the massive humanitarian relief operations worldwide” (Choe, 2006:336).

Today’s conflicts are primarily internal and international rules of warfare governing internecine wars are routinely ignored. Unlike in the past, today’s weapons are not properly regulated resulting in its proliferation that now has become global problem.

The Webster dictionary defined proliferation as “to multiply rapidly or increase profusely”. It implies rapid increase in number or abundance. In case of arms, it denotes rapid increase in the spread of weapons, generally.

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has come to a shocking realization that most of the injuries and deaths recorded in internecine conflicts are caused by small arms and light weapons, most often, illegally acquired, and not weapons of mass destruction. Keegan noted that;

Nuclear weapons have since 9th August 1945, kill no one. The 50,000,000 who have died in war since that date have for the most part, been killed by cheap, mass produced weapons and small calibre ammunition, costing a little more than the transistor radios and dry cell batteries which have flooded the world in that same period. No one knows precisely how many small arms and light weapons are in circulation, but experts estimated that military style firearms may number 500 million (Awake, 2001:5).

From late 1980s, stimulated by a feeling of greater security as the Cold War came to an end, small arms and light weapons began to attract increasing scholarly and policy

attention, primarily because of the growing number of intra-state conflicts and the destructive and destabilizing impacts these arms have on these conflicts. As Harkavy observed:

While a tremendous amount of attention has been paid to the problems of strategic nuclear balance and nuclear proliferation, wars were still being fought with more prosaic weapons. All the major conflicts of the past 30 years have been fought with conventional weapons, and all in the countries of the 3rd world (Harkavy, 1975:211-239).

Ironically, even as the debates and negotiations for disarmament were being conducted continuously during the past two decades, the total military expenditures in the world doubled to reach over 500 billion per year. Although a proportion of this is devoted to nuclear armaments, the rate of increase and spread of conventional weapons (small arms/light weapons) are staggering.

Some of the 3rd world countries have used their financial capability or industrial potential to buy arms and weapons technology itself from the unrestricted arms markets from the great wealth acquired through the sale of oil or uranium, etc. To illustrate the arms traffic, Laszio and keys (1981:4-6) citing Garvasi (1977), give figures of arms supplied by United States in 5 years (1971-1975) to developing countries. They include 3,56 tanks and self – propelled guns, 5, 240 armoured cars, 63 fighting ships, 22 submarines, 593 supersonic combat aircraft, 460 helicopters, and more than 10,000 missiles of various types. According to Laszio and keys, the USSR was also alleged in the first half of 1978 to have delivered to some African countries alone about 120,000 tones of military equipment including arms and ammunitions. These figures of arms supplied from United States and USSR to developing countries, according to them, may not be exact, but they give an estimate of the volume involved. All these arms evidently were not acquired for ceremonial parades or for agricultural development, but to fuel crises.

The Cold War era witnessed a lot of arms build-up, particularly small arms, which were not intended for the direct use of the supper-powers, but were generously supplied to their

surrogates, particularly in Africa to fight proxy wars. In Angola for example, a bloody civil war has been going on since 1975, with the United States supporting the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Though the Cold War has ended, the weapons made available for its prosecution have not been retrieved. Availability of surplus weapons is now making arms cheap enough for criminals and insurgent groups to acquire in large quantity. It is now possible to purchase an AK 47 assault rifles for as little as \$10 on the street of some developing countries (Oke, 2002:17, Olorunfemi 2006:32).

The proliferation of illegal arms in Nigeria has been an issue which the police have been confronting for a long time now. The frequency of political (and ethno-religious) conflict has led to arms build-up in the country. Police records show that between 1990 and 1999, 12,000 people were arrested in different parts of the country in possession of prohibited firearms. In Aba, it is estimated that one in ten adults in the town own a gun either for self defence or for criminal purposes. In Lagos, more than 6,000 rifles as well as about 20,000 rounds of ammunition were seized by security agents between 1996 and 1999 (Obasi, 2002:80). From the period to date, one can not imagine the number of illegal arms in circulations, given the vicious circle of conflicts and violent crimes in the country. Local observers have estimated that few thousand weapons melted down from the cameras is only a small fraction of the number of weapons still in circulation.

The issue of curbing the proliferation of these offending small arms or light weapons is problematic. This is because while some countries are advocating their confiscation and destruction, others encourage their manufacture, sale and distribution, and see the trade as a legitimate business through which their citizens make a living and sustain their economy.

Howe (1984:132) puts these facts in clear perspective. "For France, arms export play a particular important economic role, and her arms sales policies have been described as

‘aggressive’ and often irresponsible’ by political opponents and less competitive arms suppliers”. Howe quoting Albecht, went further to say:

The view that Soviet arms exports reflects a strong soviet drive for expansion, hegemony and revolution is simplistic and a great appreciation of the complexities of soviet opportunism is required. Commercial motives are increasingly apparent as the Soviet Union frequently insists on payment in hard currency. Ideological motives can not easily explain the massive transfer of soviet weapons --- the more plausible explanations for these sales is that they earned hard currency (Howe, 1984:134-135).

Recognising this fact, Goldblat in Howe (1984:128) observe that, “one can hardly imagine workable or lasting arms transfer limitations without restrictions on arms manufacture both in the recipient and the supplier states”. Given this scenario, it is difficult to control arms proliferation. In other words, this has made management of the proliferation much less significant issue until more recent times. Croft (1996:50) argued that areas affected by arms control, conventional arms transfers are one of the most confused. This is because, those countries, benefiting from the trade argued against disarmament that, a world, in which armaments are non-existence, would not necessarily guarantee that aggression would be contemplated. There is the possibility that sovereign states might attack a neighbour with internal police or the sheer weight of unarmed members. Howe (1984:126) made similar observation in her article on ‘Arms Trade and Arms Convention; when she writes, “Arms trade restrictions ... would not remove the sources of conflicts”. Croft (1996:6) is of the same view. “There is no sense that arms control regimes can develop any robustness, for it is politics that leads states to war, not weapons”. Strachey (1962:191) puts it this way:

Arms and arms race are not a very important cause of war and even their complete abolition would not ensure peace. No serious student of the subject supposes that nations fight each other because they possess arms. Clearly arms are the instruments with which they fight, the competitive race to arms themselves better and better is a symptom rather than a cause of their rivalries, conflicts and mutual apprehension.

These considerations apply, on the other hand, to the Russian contention that if only all states would agree to and implement a treaty of total disarmament, peace would be secured because hence forward they simply could not make war even if they wished to.

However, at one level (as seen above) it can be replied that such totally disarmed states could make war on each other, and the states, which most quickly learnt to manufacture weapons and train its manpower would win. Above all, the whole conception of a world of total disarmament, totally sovereign states, is too illusory and misleading as to be almost a contradiction in terms. The state of nature, or internationally anarchy, in which completely sovereign states by definition must live, necessarily means that each must look after itself. It is inconceivable that such could ever wholly deprive themselves of the means of doing so.

Factors stimulating demands for arms are many, while the network of their proliferation is complex. Prominent on the demand side is the frequency of intra-state conflicts. The interplay of these supply and demand forces is the driving force behind small arms proliferation.

Small arms proliferation not only destroys lives, it also decimates nations. Chemical and biological weapons, with all their horror, have not killed any one since the World II, while small arms are said to be responsible for the 500,000,000 death since then. “Africa alone is reported to have suffered about 5,994,000 fatalities in the last 50 years due to mostly availability and spread of small arms and light weapons” (Oke, 2002:18).

African nations that are major producers of small arms are few; however, incessant conflicts have turned the region into a dumping ground for surplus arms from developed countries. “It is estimated that about 7 million small arms are in circulation in West Africa alone, which help to escalate conflicts, prevent post-conflicts reconstruction, undermine sustainable development initiative, and of course play a key role in ethno-religious conflicts and violent crimes” (Oke, 2002:25).

2.6 Sources of illegal small arms

If the interaction between legal and illegal small arms market are intricate and complex, identifying their sources is even more nebulous. Even when transaction is done through licensed manufacturers and distribution is legal, the movement of arms is often shrewded in secrecy (Okiro, 2004:12). This makes it difficulty for any observer or researcher to say categorically the sources or quantity of illegal arms moving into a particular country or state. Therefore, to say with precision and certainty the sources of illegal small arms in Nigeria, and particularly Kaduna State, is as well hazardous given its large size and complex nature.

Many nations, procured arms and ammunitions for their armed forces, and also approved the legal importation of firearms for licensed civilian owners, using this channel. Legitimate transfer between arms producing nations and the Nigerian Government accounts for the primary (Legal and illegal) sources of small arms. This is so because, “arms that are exported legally may fall into circulation through diversion, theft and capture of security forces arms and may go into black market supply”. Through these “arms can transfer from legal to illegal and from licit to illicit status vice-versa”(Okiro, 2004:12).

Obasi (2002:17) stated that Nigeria’s involvement in the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone (and other African Countries) “has provided the Nigerian black market with ready source of assault weapons”. He went further to say, “Many people point to returnee ECOMOG soldiers from peacekeeping duties in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other places”. Citing Leo Okafor, President of Alaba International Market, Lagos as reported by (Tell magazine of 6 August 2001:35), Okiro (2004:12) accused ECOMOG soldiers as a ready source of arms. He alleges many of them to have returned with guns, which they sold to people.

Other sources include smuggling, activities of multinational Corporations, local production, internal war, and thefts from individual licensed owners and security agencies. Nigeria shares borders with some African countries such as, Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon. The borders between Nigeria and these countries, given their porous nature

provide channels for smugglers to bring in assorted firearms. Oke (2002:26) confirmed that “smuggling of arms and ammunitions has become rampant as arms and ammunitions are sometimes concealed in second-hand clothes and vehicles that are smuggled into the country”.

According to Ariaahu (2005:25), these smuggling activities are also carried out through land borders in the South west and North Eastern Zones of the country, and also through the creeks of the Niger Delta. “There are about 1000 smuggling routes, which form a network of roads around Idi-Iroko in Egbadu area of Ogun State. Patrolling the area effectively is difficult” (Obasi, 2000:7). According to him, the exact number of weapons smuggled into the country is impossible to estimate. However, some of examples of seizures and recoveries made by the Customs service and the Police since 1998 may cast some light on the enormity of the issue. In May 1998 a smuggler was arrested at the Seme border by a combine team, with arms concealed in 15 wooden boxes. The smuggler confessed to having pass 20 of such with 1000 pieces of live cartridges each. On 26 July 1999, six Ghanaians were arrested at Lagos Bar Beach by the Nigerian Customs Service men in possession of 96 sacks containing smuggling guns and 72,5000 live ammunitions. On 2 November, 2000, the Lagos State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Mike Okiro at a press conference, disclosed to news men that on 31 October, 2000 two Nigerians (Chibuzor Ilozue and Abuchi Okonkwo) and a Ghanaian (Seth Tabro) were arrested at Seme border while attempting into Nigeria 7,950 live cartridges all concealed in packet of fruit juice. On interrogation, they confessed that they had crossed into Nigeria a total of 11,725 live cartridges between June and September 2000 (Obasi, 2002:73).

Apart from the border with Benin Republic, another major corridor through which illegal arms are smuggled into Nigeria is the Niger Delta. Warri has been acknowledged as the hub of gun trade in Niger Delta. Gun trading is not a new phenomenon. It has been

known that foreign sailors used to trade in some quantity of arms through Warri. Using fast boats, smugglers cruise to the ships anchored in the high seas and buy the guns. Some prominent men in the community buy these guns and resell them to the youths (Obasi, 2002:75).

The North Eastern part of Nigeria shares boundaries with Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad Republic. There is a large scale of smuggling of arms into Nigeria through these frontiers and as a spill over effect from the informal conflicts in Chad, Niger and nearby Sudan. Guns come into the country with ease through Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States because the vast border region is not effectively patrolled by Nigerian customs and other security agencies (Obasi, 2002:75).

The Table below shows some selected cases of seizures of illegal small arms and ammunition smuggled into the country in 1993 – 2001 alone.

YEAR	ARMS/AMMUNATION	QTY	PLACE
Mar 1993	Live ammunition	1000	Kano Airport
1998	Live cartridges packed in 15 boxes	15,412	Seme border
Jul 1999	Live ammunition	72,500	Lagos Bar Beach
Jun–Oct 2000	Live ammunition	19,675	Seme border
Apr 2001	Live ammunition	2,252	Ibadan
Jul 2001	Shotguns/cartridges	26,500	Ogun State

Source: (Obasi, 2002:72 – 74)

This may be so because of the porous nature of our borders. This tends to indict the capability and effectiveness of our security agencies whose responsibilities it is to man the country’s borders. According to Nwizu (2004:138), the coastal area until recently was characterized by private owned jetties and beaches with little or no governmental control. There is no doubt that effective patrol of such large expanse of land mass and coastline amidst controversial border demarcation and sensitive border population is highly challenging.

Associated with problem of ill-defined borderline, are that of improper location of control posts and corruption of security agents at the borders. Nwizu observes that, “Some of our control posts are located some distance into the hinter land thereby creating a stretch of

land often referred to as 'no man's land'. This stretch of land invariably becomes an entry and gathering point for illegal immigrants and a breeding ground for all sorts of anti-social and criminal activities" especially arms trafficking (Nwizu, 2004:139).The incidence cited above are just a tip of iceberg as many more consignments of small arms and ammunitions have filtered into the country undetected since then.

Discussing the source of illegal arms in the country, activities of local manufacturers and the Nigerian Defence Industries Corporation cannot be undermined. "Many villages have developed small armouries as general level of armaments has increased" (Olorunfemi, 2006:32). The local manufactures whose workshops are located in remote areas produce single and double barrel guns for hunters and night watchmen and local pistols and revolvers of various kinds for armed robbers, assassins, vigilante groups, militias and those seeking self protection from robbers (Okiro, 2004:13). These manufacturers are those that have worked and have acquired the skill in DICON, and have retired into private business of arms manufacturing.

Arsenal of illegal owners of small arms, sales and loss of such arms to under world by security agents is another worrisome source. The police was implicated for loss of arms to armed robbers. In September 1999, the then Minister of police Affairs, Major-General David Jemibewon (Rtd) was alarmed at the rate with which small arms issued to Nigerian police Personnel were being lost to criminals (Obasi,2002:78). However, the then Commissioner of police in Lagos, Mr. Mike Okiro, contended that most of the guns recovered from robbers and traced to the police are those that were taken away when a police is killed...". Last year (2000) he continued, "about 29 police Officers were killed in Lagos alone by robbers; their arms were also taken away by the robbers" (Post Express, 29 July, 2001:33). To confirm the above assertion, the Vanguard Newspaper, 17 April, 2007:16, reported police massacre in Port Harcourt by militias. The militias were armed with automatic weapons, tossing grenades

and detonating dynamites. According to the paper, “the fire works and fire power of the militants were overwhelming. The police could not even lift a finger”. In the attack, the DPO, DCO and three superintendents were killed. No fewer than 7 police officers were killed and large amount of arms were taken away. Similarly, on 11 April 2007, unknown gunmen killed 2 police officers in Kano. The police later arrested 8 suspects in connection with the killing. In the attack, 40 riffles and thousand rounds of ammunition were stolen (Daily Trust, 13 April, 2007:3). These examples are few of such incidences.

Despite these incidences aimed at defending the police, it is important also to realize that the police (and other security agents) can not be completely exonerated from this unwholesome act of dishonesty. The police and other security agents owe it constitutional duty to protect and safeguard lives and property of the Nigerian society. But most often they become the real enemies of the society in disguise by either perpetrating or aiding and abetting the illegal business of arms detrimental to the well-being of the society. Evidences available indicate that security agents have overtime been involved in illegal arms deal.

In 2003, the Police Commissioner, Katsina State, Alhaji Suleiman Dauda Fakai disclose that on November 16, a soldier Bulus Magaji (rtd) was arrested for unlawful manufacturing, possession and sale of firearms. He confessed to have sold several arms and ammunitions to people both within and outside the State The breakdown of all the arms and ammunitions recovered from the Ex soldier were 14 locally made pistols, one G – 3 military rifle, 33 live cartridges, one Dane gun, 28 rounds of assorted calibers of ammunitions, 33 blank ammunitions and 16 locally made ammunitions (New Nigerian Weekly, 5 December, 2003:2).

Aware of the involvement of security agents in illegal arms deal, on 2 December 2001, President Olusegun Obasanjo (Fmr) indicted security agents for supplying arms and ammunitions to warring factions. He said, “Most arms and ammunitions we have found in

wrong hands have come from security agencies ... the Police, the militaryonly recently, we found that 3000 rounds of ammunitions were sold here in Abuja by police and in Jos by the military” (Okiro, 2004:14). In affirmation, the Nigerian Tribune reported a startling revelation about how Army officers sold weapons to the public from the Nigerian Army Central Ordinance Depot in Kaduna. The paper disclosed that 16 officers of the Nigerian Army, made up of 3 colonels, 2 Lt-Colonels, 1 major and about 10 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) serving in Central Ordinance Depot Kaduna sold thousands of AK-47 rifles, General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and ammunitions belonging to the Nigerian Army (Nigerian Tribune 16th January 2008: 1 and 4). During the investigations, it was discovered that over 30,000 AK-47, 5000 GPMGs and boxes and grenades were missing from the Central Depot. These few examples indicate that security agencies are also into illegal arms business.

2.7 Impacts of Illegal Small Arms on Ethno-religious Conflict

The presence of arms affects behaviour and attitudes in a society. The easy availability and accessibility to arms could increase cases of violence. Incessant conflicts have turned the country into dumping ground for surplus arms, either smuggled into the country or manufactured locally. This helps to escalate conflicts and have a vital impact particularly on ethno-religious conflicts. As Okiro (2004:18) observes, “due to prevalence of conflicts, communities that are prone to attacks and perennial conflicts armed their youths in preparation for any attack or self-defence. And due to sense of insecurity, even individual have acquired arms”.

In Nigeria such numerous conflicts include Niger-Delta crisis, Urohbo, Ilaje and Istshekiri crisis, ethnic violence in Plateau, Nassarawa, Benue, Taraba States, and ethnic and religious violence in many parts of Northern Nigeria. As pointed out by Ariaahu (2005:36), since the enthronement of democracy in 1999, it is estimated that over 100,000 persons have

been killed in over 50 ethno-religious conflicts across the country. Such conflicts have progressively acquired wider dimensions and greater intensity, resulting in higher levels than would have been expected of such local disputes if illegal small arms are not available for use.

Religious differences culminating in religious riots and disturbances like those of the maitatsine riots in 1981, Kano riots in 1984 in which an estimate number of people between 1,000 and 5,000 died. More importantly these crises were further precipitated by introduction of Sharia Islamic legal code system in some Northern States of the country such as Zamfara, Kano and Kaduna States. The clash between Moslems and Christians over the implementation of Sharia has resulted in massive loss of lives and property. The accompanying religious riots in Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, Minna, Jos, and other places in the country are still fresh in our memory (Omada, 2005:186).

The proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta region has been held responsible for the bloody conflicts among the three major ethnic groups in the area – Ijaw, Urhobo and Isekiri who are contesting for political and economic power. For instance, in June 1999, there was a bloody and destructive conflict between these three major ethnic groups involving the use of small guns, automatic rifle, pump action guns, Napalm bombs, Dynamites and Bazookas (Ariahu, 2005:37).

The clash between Tiv/Jukun escalated into full-blown hostilities between the Tivs and Fulanis in Wukari Local Government Area, which claimed 22 lives, 49,264 herds of cattle and 2,226 houses. The conflict later spread to include Jukuns against the Tivs their historical enemies, and engulfed six Local Governments Areas. A detachment of soldiers was deployed to the area to restore peace, but in a bizarre twist of events, the peace makers (soldiers) were massacred by one of the warring factions.

The disagreement between the Yorubas and Hausa traders over the control of the Mile 12, Ketu market led to the crisis in which the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) took side with the Yorubas. During the clash, illegal arms were used leaving 144 people dead and property worth hundreds of millions of Naira destroyed.

In Northern Nigeria, we are faced with a more devastating situation. According to Okoye (2000:xxii), though, "It is not easy to quantify, but it may be estimated that between 1990 and 1999 over 15,000 people may have been killed in various conflicts in the Middle Belt area of Northern Nigeria". Normally, government officials under count casualties. In Takum for instance, government said 269 people were killed. Combatants however, think that over 1000 may have been killed. The Jukuns has spoken of 5000 having been killed during the crises with Tiv in 1992 to 1993, while the Hausas said 2000 of their kin in Zango Kataf were killed (Okoye, 2000:21).

In December 1980 there was a bloody clash between the militant followers of maitatsine in Kano. It was however difficult to quantify the number of people that died. Nevertheless, some said about 1000 people lost their lives. Realising that the disturbances had assumed a more serious dimension, and it was evident that the police could not contain the situation, the government ordered the use of the military that eventually succeeded in restoring order after fierce pitched battles and bloodshed (Okoye, 2000:77).

In Kaduna State alone, there have been conflicts leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties. During the 1987 crises in Kaduna State, 19 lives were lost, while damage to properties were valued at seventy eight million, five hundred and thirty seven thousand, seven hundred and sixty eight Naira (Report of Committee on 1987 Crises: 55).

On the 6th of February 1992, another riot broke out in Zango Kataf, kaduna State leading to loss of lives and properties. The Hausa Community submitted a list of 88 persons killed. About 260 people were wounded and the police submitted a list of 6 unidentified

bodies. The Hausa Community also claimed that they lost properties estimated at 45 million Naira. In the second riot the Hausa Community claimed they lost 1,528 people in Zango Kataf Local government, while the State Security Service gave the figures as 424 and the Police gave a figure of 188. In Kaduna, the Hausa Community claimed they lost 16 people, Yoruba Community 3, Ibo Community 5, Idoma Community 4, and Akwa Ibom Community 3. The total claim before the Committee for movable and immovable properties was over 400 million Naira (Okoye, 2000:xiii – xiv). During this period, many people were displaced as the entire settlement known as Zango was completely burnt down. The internally displaced people were housed in various rehabilitation centres all over the State.

In February 2000, religious conflict seized the city of Kaduna as the crises between Christians and Muslims metamorphosed into inter-religious war leaving the state in a state of helplessness as several lives and properties were destroyed. Official record of casualties was that 1,295 persons died, unspecified number were buried unidentified, and some others were declared missing. Properties estimated at N6, 373,187,754.00 were destroyed in the crisis (White paper on the Report of Judicial Commission of Inquiry, April 2001:15). However, studies carried out by Alemika and Okoye (2002:127-128) revealed that, on the number of residential houses destroyed and other casualties, there were controversial information from the police, religious groups and members of the public. For instance, while Jaamatu Nasir Islam claimed that about 799 Muslims were killed, the police reported a total of 609 deaths, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) on the hand provided a much higher figure for Christian victims. However, it is generally believed by the public that nothing less than 5,000 people died during the crises. According to them, on the number of properties destroyed, the police reported 1,944 houses including business centers and Hotels destroyed. Others include;

- A total of 746 vehicles of various descriptions were burnt.
- About 123 Churches and Mosques were burnt in various locations like Kawo,

Barnawa, Sabo- Tasha, Kakuri, Tudun-Wadw, Kurmin Mashi, Rigasa, etc.

- Over 100 persons sustained various injuries and received treatments in hospitals

Estimated number of houses destroyed and people displaced

Crises Areas	Houses Destroyed	People Displaced
Rigasa	203	13,000
Kano Rd/HayinBanki	74	5,350
Tudun Wada	153	15,000
Kakuri	71	3,058
Hassarawa	83	5,800

Source: Alemika and Okoye (2002:128).

The proliferations of illegal arms do not only fuel ethno-religious violence, but also have political, economic and security implication for the nation. According to Okiro (2004:10), the proliferation of small arms also contributes to the culture of violence and a cycle that is difficult to break. Violence fuels insecurity, and insecurity fuels violence. The misuses of small arms are an impediment to economic development, provision of health and education services as well as the development of effective governance and democracy. Quoting the former Defence Minister, Gen. TY Danjuma, he said, “as long as (crises is on the increase and) large quantities of small arms are in the wrong hands, there will be no future for democracy”.

The foregoing shows the proliferation and destructive impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts. An indication that arms does not proliferate in a vacuum; but conflicts are the basis upon which the desire for accumulation of arms is nurtured and proliferates. Thus, conflicts exacerbate proliferation of illegal small arms and proliferation of illegal arms fuels or contribute to cycle of violence, and a cycle that is difficult to break. The negative impacts are the destruction of lives and property. Hence, the need to find solutions to incessant conflicts in the state in order not to only curb proliferation of illegal small arms but take necessary measures to retrieve those already in circulation.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

The vicious circle of ethno-religious conflicts and violent crimes in Nigeria, resulting in the proliferation and use of sophisticated weapons illegally acquired to redress perceived anomalies or press home demands persuades one to suggest conflict / radical approach to present this study.

Prior to the 1960's, the prevailing ideology, which dominated theory and research in criminology, was liberalism. The liberal approach did not assume a state definition of crime or even rationalize the existing political and socio-economic arrangement of the society. However, the social and political turmoil in the United States during the 1960's and 1970s created a renewed interest in Marxist theory. The conflict theory is based on Marx's ideas, though he wrote very little about crime, "Marx was concerned with how the working class could become an organized political force, capable of overthrowing capitalist relation" (Hirst in Danbazau, 1999:27). Among the first criminologist in United States to employ Marxist theory to explain crime and justice were scholars like Richard Quinney, William Chamblis, Anthony Platt, Ian Taylor, etc.

The conflict and radical theorists argued that the criminal law that defines certain acts as crime or delinquency, do not represent the consensus of society. Laws, they argue, are instruments, which the ruling class employ to protect their interest (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2001:23). As a result, criminal laws prohibit the behaviours of the poor and the powerless that threaten the interests of the ruling class while excusing or condoning equally or even more injurious behaviours of the rulers or those who control the politics and economy of the society that harm the majority of the citizens (Quinney, 1970:169).

Conflict theorists explain crime and delinquency in terms of inequality in the distribution of socio-economic opportunities and political power. It is this inequality that is reflected in criminal laws and actions of the criminal justice agencies and officials. Crime

and delinquency are products of socio-economic inequality and injustice as well as the political oppression that sustain them.

In this light, Taylor et al (1973) accepts that the key to understanding crime is in the material basis of society. They believe that capitalist societies are characterized by inequality in wealth and power between individuals, and that these inequalities lie at the root of crime and conflict. Crime therefore, “is a rational response to the circumstances in which people found themselves in the competitive class struggle to acquire material wealth” (Bohn, 2002:101). According to Gills (1974:131) in Alemika and Chukwuma (2001:24).

The troubles of the children of the poor were deeply imbedded in the economic and demographic structure of society. The growing tendency to treat as psychological and therefore as subject of clinical, rather than political or economic solution was at least as disturbing as the phenomenon itself.

Conflict theory has made several contributions to the analysis of conflict. It will be difficult to capture the entire debate in this study. This section, however, only attempts to highlight the aspects of conflict theory that best suit and explain the conflict between ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria vis-à-vis the phenomenon of illegal arms in such conflicts (i.e conflicts that take dangerous and violent dimensions). This will not only contribute to knowledge but also provide a guide to those who might be serious in tackling the problem of illegal arms proliferation.

Complex processes of change and development are at the core of the problematic connected with conflict. The questions of groups perceiving themselves as neglected or excluded from terrain of political power, and in the sharing of the benefits of the resources and wealth of a country, are central. The problematic of contestations in conflict permeates central issues of class relation, ethnicity, religion, gender, justice, social equality/inequality, citizenship rights and governance.

As Alemike and Chukwuma (2001:86) observed, the incidence and prevalence rates as well as patterns of crime (conflict) are largely determined by the way a society is organized; the way resources are mobilized and distributed, the pattern of distribution of political power, the degree of popular and democratic participation in law-making, the extent to which judicial and police powers are subject to democratic control and public scrutiny in order to protect human rights, and the character of laws and law enforcement.

Nigeria political and economic structures are characterized by injustice and corruption resulting in highly skewed distribution of power and wealth. This has created mass poverty, high level of illiteracy, high and growing unemployment levels especially among the youths, resulting in crime and other social problems. The quest for better conditions of living of the people who had been exposed to years of neglect, deprivation and injustice, created conflicts which led to aggressive pursuit and acquisition of arms, and the formation of armed youth who had taken it upon themselves the responsibilities of redressing the inherent anomalies in the existing structure in the country.

The people in the area of study, like elsewhere in Nigeria, were enmeshed in serious difficulties. Bills in relation to schools, hospitals and different sectors kept going up by the day. From the late 1980s peasants started paying more for agricultural inputs, while the prices of consumers' goods and services were escalating. A large number of workers were thrown back into the peasantry, in the communities, as a result of retrenchment in different sectors. School leavers and university graduates swelled the number of the rural poor, as unemployment increased (Usang 1992:4). This neglect or perceived neglect was capitalized upon by opposing groups to whip up ethnic sentiments which invariably resulted to communal and religious conflicts" (Danjuma in Olorunfemi, 2006:30). This is because the more the people feel frustrated, the more likelihood of them also choosing to resort to violence.

Linked to these are other issues including control and distribution of resources, economic privileges not being extended to all section of the people, not respecting the beliefs and culture of dominated peoples, entrenched sectarian and chauvinistic arrogance by ruling elites which permeates society and the role of external factors. As the point made by Sisk in Toure (2003:10) goes, “when the boundaries overlap between those who control political power, dominate the economy and other facets of the state, and particular ethnic group, the conflict become more serious at the ethnic level” resulting in arm violence.

Using the conflict frame work, the theoretical conclusion to make is that the frequency of ethno religious conflicts in the country, particularly in Kaduna involving the use of sophisticated weapons is driven by the general lack of confidence in the police, judiciary, and the system as a whole, are making the citizens to procure arms to be used during violence to redress the anomalies which the government is pretending to be unaware of. Writing on Niger Delta Omade (2005:193) observes:

The much endemic rising tide of armed ethnic militant groups and resort to the use of light and heavy sophisticated weapons are to press home their demand for enhanced revenue derivation formula as well as the yearning for the transfer of ownership rights to oil bearing communities in order to enhanced equality, justice and fair play.

From the view of the conflicts theory, all the practices which generate conflicts and sustaining the proliferation of illegal small arms will continue to flourish because the public institutions, laws and internationally binding treaties and conventions on illegal arms are subordinate to private and parochial interest of individuals and groups (Okiro, 2004:18). And because the socio-economic conditions of Nigerians have not changed, those who acquire arms for criminal activities, and to prosecute conflicts would never surrender such arms as long as that sense of alienation, injustice, deprivation and oppression continue.

Giving the above, according to the theory, structural reforms towards economic efficiency and equity, democracy, popular participation in public policy formulation, social justice and equity between individuals and groups, observance of rule of laws, transparency and accountability are required (Alemika and Chukwu 2001:186). In other words, government should address the issues of poverty, social inequality, oppression and lopsided development among social, ethnic and religious groups to avoid situations that create communal clashes that precipitate the acquisition, accumulation and use of illegal small arms. These conditions will enhance better resource management, improve social, economic and political conditions, and thereby reduce not only pressures towards crime, but also the incidence and prevalence rates of conflicts that are instrumental to the acquisition of illegal arms.

In other words, to combat the proliferation of illegal small arms in Nigeria without up-rooting or reconstructing the socio-economic and political structures is as messy as trying to wash one's feet while putting on his socks. This is so because, arms itself is not a problem or the cause of ethno-religious conflicts, or that arms proliferate in a vacuum. It is the injustice perpetrated in the system that gives birth to the emergency of conflicts and spread of arms. Conflicts and the use of illegal small arms are therefore mere reflections of the former.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The main focus of this section is on the procedure the researcher used in order to carry out the research investigation, on “The perception of people on the proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts”. It is essential to note that adopting a particular method is dependent on the prevailing situation, such as the type and nature of the research, and the resources at the disposal of the researchers, which are in the main, crucial to the completion of the research work.

3.2 Location of Study

The research location for this study is the Kaduna metropolis. The city of Kaduna developed in the first instance in the dual capacity of a garrison town and an administrative center of colonialism. It was established in 1913 on virgin land, which had adequate water supply. Its centrality in the Northern Nigeria and accessibility from the coast made it attractive to the colonial government whose primary function was domination and exploitation.

Kaduna lies within territory of the emirate of Zaria. Until the coming of the British, the local population around, and to the south of the town was widely scattered and sparse. These scattered settlements were mainly Gwari and Fulani settlement stretching along the bank of the Kaduna River e.g. Kudanda (now referred to as Kakuri), which was Gwari settlement. There was the Fulani settlement of Kukogi (now called Gworo) about 15km from Kaduna to the north. Others within the locality were Jima, Kadi, Kukau, Kadupe, and Gwasonu. “This is an indication of the degree to which the Gwari and other people could be considered as the indigenous inhabitants of Kaduna” (Bello and Oyedele in Ashiwaju et al (1977:63 – 72). Though these settlements were small in terms of population and size, yet, some of them e.g. Makera constitute the earlier base from which Kaduna developed.

Kaduna derived its name from the plural form of Hausa word for crocodiles (Kadduna), which are found in the River Kaduna. Kaduna is basically a product of colonialism. It was built to serve the needs of colonialism. The quest for an effective administration of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria was the establishment of Kaduna, first as the base of the West African Frontier Force, and then as capital of the colonial administration. These two factors were the important causes for migration into Kaduna, in the first two decades of 20th C. Thus, endowed with a virtually unlimited supply of water, a central position in the country, with basic land communications and with vast potential for growth, Kaduna fast developed from an army encampment to a center of colonial government for Northern Nigeria, then to a satellite commercial, and market town.

The late 1940s and early 1950s saw increased immigration of various groups into Kaduna; with varying educational and social backgrounds. Most of these immigrants came in search of jobs as well as trade. The population of Kaduna swelled and this period saw great and rapid changes in the city. As a result of this, Tundun Wada, Abakpa, Unguwar shanu, and other places across the railway track grew, and now after half a century, a third of the population are cut off from their town center and market, except the dangerous level crossings over the railway.

Apart from ethnic cleansing of the 1966 occasioned by Maj. Nzeogwu's coup, Kaduna has been one of the peaceful cities in the country, until in the 1980s when major ethno-religious crises raised its ugly face in Kaduna. Since then to date Kaduna has witnessed several ethno-religious crises. The enormity of these crises has led to the adoption of what Okoye (2000:xvii) referred to as "Bantustanisation" policy. Due to the ethnic and religious cleansing of groups and individuals, there has been an exodus of people from perceived unsafe areas to supposed "safe heaven" where their ethnic and religious groups are dominant. In the process ethnic and religious "pure" communities are created.

3.3 Types and Sources of Data

Kaduna metropolis was the major research location and source for the collection of survey data as well as in-depth interviews. However, the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja also constitute a minor research site for the study, where special data for key informants were sourced to complement the major research site (Kaduna metropolis). The study used both primary and secondary data sets.

The primary data were collected through survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The study populations from which they were drawn are the police, the general public and an NGO based in Abuja. The survey questionnaire were designed to cover members of the Nigerian Police Force, and the general public that were selected from the crises endemic areas of the metropolis. This is because, the Nigerian police are the major institution responsible for the control of illegal small arms, and the general public constitutes those who have suffered from the use of such weapons during several of the violent crises. In-depth interview on the other hand, covered some selected police officials in the State Headquarters and metropolis Area Command, and an NGO based in Abuja (Nigerian Action Network on Small Arms – NANSA) This is to strengthen the evidence base of the research.

The divisional commands in the metropolis served as the main research sites for the conduct of the survey, while the state Police Headquarters and the Headquarters Area Command served as major sites for the in-depth interviews with some selected special key informants. To complement these, a country-based non-governmental organization (NGO) concerned with illegal small arms proliferation (NANSA) was included in the study for in-depth interviews.

The secondary data were collected from relevant materials as they relate to this study. Such materials were collected from the police records in the Area Command and State Command Headquarters in Kaduna. Additional relevant secondary data this study depended

include textbooks, magazines, projects reports, seminar papers, official publications, etc as they relate to illegal small arms proliferation and ethno-religious violence.

3.4 Techniques of Data Collection

In collecting data for this study, the researcher employed two complementary modes of data collection.

Survey technique: The main survey technique used was the questionnaire. The same set of questionnaire schedule was employed to elicit response from both the police personnel and the members of the general public. Thus, the questionnaire was drawn to carry the same variables, but respondents were required to respond where applicable only. This is to enhance uniformity in questions and response options, and facilitate easy analysis.

In-depth interview: The essence of in-depth interview was to afford the researcher the opportunity to examine realities pertaining issues under investigation. Thus, in-depth interview was used to complement the questionnaire, and was designed to elicit information from the respondents specially selected on the basis of their knowledge and position they occupied. The method enabled some special light to be shed on salient issues surrounding illegal small arms and ethno-religious violence.

However, to supplement the above two methods, documentary evidences were also sought and used in the most suitable places. This entailed perusing, scrutinizing and analyzing relevant materials that have bearing on the research problem.

3.5 Population and Sampling

Every research problem has its own corresponding population which serves as the testing ground for the research work. Thus, in carrying out this research, Kaduna Metropolis was chosen as the population of study.

To facilitate the selection of the respondents, the population was broken into two categories. The first category is the police personnel within Kaduna Metropolis Area

Command. The second category consists of members of the public in selected research sites in the metropolis. The target portion of this population (i.e. members of the public) consists of all adults who lived and witnessed some of the crises in Kaduna. This category of people was identified through the assistance of agents who are either community or religious leaders.

For the purpose of selecting the respondents, the researcher used a combination of stratified – systematic and cluster-purposive sampling techniques. For the police personnel, the metropolis Area Command was stratified into the existing 15 divisional commands namely, Tudun Wada, Kawo, Angwan Sarki, Sabon Tasha, Kakuri, Sabon Gari, Angwan Rimi, Malali, Gabasawa, Barnawa, Kurmin Mashi, Kabala West, Rigasa, Rigachikun, and Kajuru. Out of these, 4 Divisional Commands (Kawo, Kakuri, Tudun Wada, and Sabon Tasha) were selected through simple random sampling. In the bid to administer the questionnaire, sample frame for each of the division selected was determined, and 20 respondents were disproportionately selected from each Divisional HQs through systematic sampling techniques (making a total of 80 respondents). This was adopted because of the relatively homogeneous nature of the population. The procedures for selecting the respondents are shown in the table below.

Sampling of Respondents for Quantitative Survey of Police Personnel

Divisional Commands	SF	%	SS	Interval
Kawo	346	5.7	20	17
Tudun Wada	149	13.4	20	7
Kakuri	444	4.5	20	22
Sabon Tasha	421	4.7	20	21
Total	1,360	Total	80	-

Key:

SF = Sample Frame (Total number of police in Divisional Command)

SS = Sample Size (Number of police sampled from each frame)

SF/SS = Interval (This determine the interval at which SS was selected from each SF)

To select respondents from the members of the public for survey schedule, cluster-purposive sampling techniques was used. This is to ensure that the resultant sample reflect the characteristics of different individuals and the crises endemic areas in the metropolis (i.e.

settlements/towns that crises occur most frequently and at high degree). Thus, the metropolis was clustered into 10 crises endemic areas namely, Rigasa, Kawo, Angwan Rimi, Tudun Wada, Hayin Banki, Sabon Tasha, Narayi, Kakuri, Angwan Sarki, and Barnawa. Out of which 4 areas (Kawo, Sabon Tasha, Hayin Banki and Kakuri) were selected through simple random sampling technique. For convenience, 30 respondents were selected from each of the 4 areas or settlements (making a total of 120 respondents) through purposive sampling techniques. These people were identified and selected through the help of community and religious leaders in the areas. Consequently, a total number of 200 questionnaire items were drawn to cover both the police personnel and the members of the public.

For the in-depth interview, 7 key informants were purposively selected. That is, 2 from the Nigerian police (one each from State Headquarters and Area Command) in Kaduna, 2 community leaders (one each from Kawo and Sabon Tasha), 2 religious leaders (one each from Christian Association of Nigeria, CAN and Jamaatu Nasir Islam), and one from a country based NGO (NANSA) in Abuja on the basis of the position they occupy and their knowledge of the issue under investigation.

3.6 Instrumentation

This comprises of both the questionnaire and in-depth interview schedules. In the questionnaire schedule, the researcher used close-ended questions. The questionnaire was divided into two sections. Section 'A' dealt with demographic characteristics of respondents, while section 'B' dealt with the main research work. The section 'B' was further divided into sub-sections in line with the research objectives. All the questions were simple and straightforward to avoid confusion and boredom. However, efforts were made to ensure they reflect the research objectives to facilitate the needed results.

As for the in-depth interview, interview guide (schedule) was designed to elicit information from the respondents specially selected on the basis of their knowledge and

position they occupy. Their responses were recorded through tape recorder. This was supplemented by field notes to capture non-verbal cues.

3.7 Variables

For the purpose of analysis, the major variables that were used are ethno-religious violence (independent variable) and illegal small arms proliferation (dependent variable). This is because; proliferation of illegal small arms is a consequence of the incessant ethnic and religious conflicts in the country. These variables encompass other variables, which the views of the respondents were sought, such as level of proliferation, sources of illegal arms, reasons for proliferation, and control measures. Others include causes of ethno-religious violence, role of illegal small arms in violence and other related consequences.

In addition, socio-demographic variables such as age, sex, occupation, educational background, ethnic group, religion, marital status, and length of stay in Kaduna, were measured and analyzed for the police and the public respondents.

3.8 Techniques of Data Analysis

This summarizes data into categories or forms that can be understood and interpreted. For accurate and objective analysis of data, the researcher used both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis.

For quantitative analysis, the mass of data that were generated through questionnaire were subjected to simple statistical analysis and interpretation. The statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) was used to generate frequencies, percentages, and contingency (cross tabulation) tables to test the association between certain selected variables. To achieve these, the Likert scale measurement was adopted on a 5-point scale to answer the research objectives.

A codebook was prepared to reduce responses to basic essentials and grouped into similar response categories and presented numerically. The essence of coding was to

organize the mass of data into more concise form so that it can be easily understood and handled statistically. The information derived from the codebook were transferred to the coding sheet and analyzed with the aid of computer.

While the qualitative analysis, data collected through in depth interview were processed and analyzed through listening to the audio tape, translating the content into print form (transcribing) and interjecting them where appropriate. These procedures facilitated the making of the final analyses. The data analysis was situated within Nigeria's socio-economic and political environment that give rise to ethno-religious violence, and consequently proliferation of illegal small arms.

3.9 Limitation of Data Collection

To execute research of this nature, be it small or large, has its own intrinsic problems that tend to restrict its scope or findings from achieving the optimum result. Prominent among these are the cost, which is generally considered in terms of finance, materials available to the researcher, and time perception, since the study is not a sponsored work.

Kaduna metropolis being the major location for the collection of both primary and secondary data is very vast, with the specific research areas located far apart, including the minor research area at Abuja. Repeated journeys were made to these locations with the purpose of collecting survey and in-depth interview data for this study. This definitely involved huge amount of money in terms of transportation. Several trips were unavoidably made by the researcher to these areas regardless of the limited finance at the disposal of the researcher.

Sequel to the above is the problem emanating from accessibility to information, particularly information gotten from police records. This has to do with the very nature of police (security consciousness). Even though permission was sought and granted by the

police authority, the researcher yet faced serious difficulties in obtaining some relevant information due to the uncooperative attitude of the custodians of such information. For instance, attempts to have interview conducted at the Police Area Command failed despite the researcher's appeals.

Further more, in the area of survey questionnaire, some police personnel never wanted to respond favourably for feeling that the study required information that bothers on security and police allegiance. The researcher and some of their superiors most often had to take pain to explain to them the essence of this study, and the approval of the police authority. This could have thwarted the success of this work if not for the fact that the researcher himself is a military personnel, which to certain degree allay their fears and doubts.

Though the sampling techniques used (stratified-systematic and cluster-purposive sampling techniques) helped a great deal in the retrieving of the questionnaire from both the police and public respondents, however some degree of difficulties were experienced in the area of questionnaire distribution. For instance, a good number of police respondents that were eventually selected were often on official duty outside their stations. There were problems of administering questionnaire to, and retrieving of questionnaire from them. These resulted in great deal of delay in compiling the final report.

The problem of literacy in this regard cannot be undermined. Though only few of the respondents sampled possess inadequate qualification, however, this to some extent posed some degree of problems in terms of understanding and filling the questionnaire. Extra efforts were made by the researcher to explain areas of difficulties to those identified since the questionnaire were administered through hand-delivery method.

Regardless of these problems, vigorous attempts were made by the researcher to present a relatively objective analysis of the research findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals specifically with analysis and interpretation of data collected. The chapter is categorized into two sections. Section 'A' deals with the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. While section 'B' focuses on issues surrounding the perception of people on proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis.

4.2 SOCIO – DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

The following socio-demographic variables were measured and are thus reported:

Age: On the age of respondents, out of the 200 respondents, 100 (50.0%) are within the age bracket of 35 – 44 years, while the lowest of 6 respondents (30%) of the total respondents fall within the age category of 15 – 24 years. This shows that majority of the respondents are adults who are familiar or have good understanding of the issue under investigation.

Sex: Information was also sought on the sex of the respondents. The study revealed that 137 respondents (68.5%) are males, while 63 (31.5%) are females. This indicates that majority of our respondents are males. This revelation is important because, the males are

usually at the heart of every crises and use of arms. In other words, the use of arms to prosecute crises or war falls mainly within the domain of men.

Marital Status: On marital status, the study indicates that 143 of the total respondents (71.5%) are married, while the lowest of 57 respondents (28.5%) are single. Meaning that majority of our respondents are married.

Educational Background: The responses of the respondents on their educational background indicate that, out of the total respondents (200), an overwhelming majority of 142 (71.0%) has tertiary education. While the lowest number of 2 respondents, representing 1.0% do not have formal education. This means that majority of the respondents are OND, NCE, HND or have university degrees. It therefore implies that majority of the respondents can read and write, and hence have the intellectual capacity to understand the subject of this study and should respond appropriately.

Occupation: On the occupation of the respondents, this study indicates that 112 of the total respondents (56.0%) are civil servants, while the lowest numbers of 4 respondents (2.0%) are self-employed and unemployed respectively. This means that civil servants constitute majority for this study.

Rank: On the rank of respondents, this study revealed that 60% are civilians, while the lowest number of 2.5% falls within the rank of deputy superintendent of police and above. The highest percentage of the civilian respondents is so because they formed the highest number of the total respondents, given the fact that these crises in which illegal small arms were violently used are purely civil (civil disturbances).

Length of Service: The study also sought information on the length of service for the police respondents (only). It shows that, out of the total population of police respondents (80), 12.5% have served not only in the police force, but in Kaduna State for 10 – 14 and 15 – 19 years respectively, while 0.5% served less than 5 years. Majority, having been in

service, and have served in the State for these long periods have good knowledge of the issue under investigation, being the major institution charged with the responsibility of controlling illegal small arms and violent crimes.

4.3 THE PERCEPTION OF PEOPLE ON THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS AND ITS IMPACTS ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS

This section addresses the perception of people on the proliferation of illegal small arms and its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis. Attempt was made to look at the nature of ethno-religious conflicts, the sources of illegal small arms and its impacts in order to proffer solutions in line with the research objectives. The responses of respondents to these issues are presented in tables 4.3.1 – 4.3.3.

In addition, the responses of the respondents (findings) were rated and rank – ordered to determine the strength of impact of each variable on the factor under examination. Consequently, to determine the highest or lowest impacts, the class limit for variables in each table was calculated. Thus, variables with scores equal to, or above the calculated class limit represent the highest or most impressive opinions of the respondents on the issue under examination, while those below the class limit are considered to have less impact, meaning that the respondents differ in their opinions on the items, and hence vary in their ratings. The rank-ordering are presented in tables 4.3.2.2 – 3.

VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE NATURE OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA METROPOLIS

To determine the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, views of respondents were sought, and their responses presented on the table below.

Table 4.3.1: Nature of ethno-religious Conflicts in Kaduna Metropolis

	ITEMS	SA 5	A 4	UD 3	D 2	SD 1	TL
1	There are incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis.	64 32.0%	95 47.5%	11 5.5%	20 10.0%	10 5.0%	200 100%
2	The frequency of ethno-religious conflict is increasing.	28 14.0%	102 51.0%	33 16.5%	24 12.0%	13 6.5%	200 100%
3	The conflicts are between ethnic groups and/or religious groups.	28 14.0%	103 51.5%	26 13.0%	31 15.5%	12 6.0%	200 100%
4	The conflicts usually involve the use of illegal small arms.	39 19.5%	101 50.5%	21 10.0%	34 17.0%	5 2.5%	200 100%
5	The conflicts have increased the feelings of insecurity in the metropolis.	72 36.0%	90 45.0%	13 6.5%	18 9.0%	7 3.5%	200 100%

Key:

- SA - Strongly Agreed
- A - Agreed
- UD - Undecided
- D - Disagreed
- SD - Strongly Disagreed
- TL - Total

Table 4.3.1 shows that out of the 200 respondents, an overwhelming majority of 79.55 respondents agreed that there are incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, while 15% respondents disagreed. It is therefore not surprising that Kaduna has been described as a hot-bed of ethno-religious crises (Agbese, 2002:12). About 65% of the respondents affirmed that the level of ethno-religious conflicts is increasing, while 18.5% disagreed. This has created a serious concern given its implication for security of lives and property.

The analysis of the in depth interview shows that there is consensus among the respondents on the incidences and frequency of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna State. For instance, an informant who is a religious leader in this study has it that:

We are always faced with incidences of ethno-religious crises in the state. However, there are always deliberate efforts by religious leaders to stop escalation. Recently, there were attempts by some people to ferment trouble in some parts of the state, but these were controlled with the efforts of some Christian leaders and Muslim clerics.

In similar vein, a police informant reacted this way:

We keep on experiencing crises everyday. Recently, there was a minor issue in certain area of Tudun Wada that could have escalated to fill crises if not for the timely intervention of the security men. Infact, it is like that everywhere in the state, but we are not resting.

Another informant who is a traditional leader also pointed out that the frequency of crises in Kaduna metropolis has assumed a disturbing level. According to him, “if you take cursory look of states in northern Nigeria with cases of violence, you will discover that Kaduna may top the list. This is not good peaceful coexistence”.

Lamenting on the incidences and frequency of ethno-religious conflicts in the state, another informant who is also a traditional leader pointed out that:

It is not an exaggeration to say that Kaduna has become a centre of crises in the north. Crises keep on occurring all the time. This has forced the residents to move to areas they think they are more safe. Infact, the presence of security men everywhere in the town should tell one that that the city is not safe.

The table also indicates that 65.5% agreed that these conflicts are often between the two major ethnic and religious groups in the state, while 21.5% disagreed. This is not surprising because most of the crises have either ethnic or religious coloration.

A police informant reacted this way:

Conflict has become a common phenomenon in Kaduna State. The disturbing aspect of these conflicts is that, when it erupts, in which ever form, they always manifest in religious forms. For instance, crises that started one time in southern part of the state

over the so called indigene-settler issues later assumed religious status, spreading to almost every parts of the state.

The findings further show that the crises are usually religious in nature mainly between Christians and Muslims. This was confirmed by one of the informants who is a traditional leader.

The crises in Kaduna are usually between the two major ethnic and religious groups in the state. For instance, that of College of Education Kafanchan started between Christian and Muslim students over place of worship. And the 2000 crises as you may be aware, was between Christians and Muslims over the implementation of Shariah, which even polarised the State House of Assembly along religious line.

Another informant who works for an NGO corroborated this observation as thus;

The long-age religious sentiments between the two major religions in the state deepened during the introduction and implementation of the Shariah. This seemed not to have given the non-Muslims sense of belonging. The argument was that state resources should not be used to propagate one religion to the detriment of the other. Disagreement and confusion caused by this finally resulted into violence, which claimed many lives, and property destroyed.

The disturbing aspect of these conflicts is that, they usually involve the use of arms illegally acquired as indicated by 70.0% of the respondents, while 19.5% disagreed with the opinion of the majority. This may be true because of the degree of destruction recorded during many of these conflicts.

On the involvement of arms in these conflicts, the in-depth interview respondent also agreed with the survey respondents. An informant who is a religious leader puts his feelings this way:

We don't have to allow crises to happen. This is because people have now developed culture of violence. Careless use of dangerous weapons in crises is now alarming. Internal misunderstanding of this nature should not involve arms. But regrettably, today's conflicts people are trigger happy. They kill their fellow citizens without iota of concern.

In similar vein, another informant who is a traditional leader also shared the same view.

According to him:

I tell you the fact. Our society is no longer safe. People no longer have respect for human life. We say we are brothers in this country, but when there is a crisis, you see people carrying arms and killing each other. This is very unfortunate. I think something more seriously has to be done to curtail this situation.

Another traditional leader who is of the same view, observed that arms have become a lucrative business because of incessant conflicts. According to him:

Peaceful demonstration is no longer the language, but arms demonstration. No matter how little the misunderstanding may look like, people prefer using arms to settle scores than peaceful resolution. This should not be allowed to continue.

Consequently, overwhelming majority 81.0% of the respondents agreed that there is an increasing feeling of insecurity in the metropolis, while 12.5% disagreed. This opinion of the majority of the respondents may not be unconnected with the frequency of ethno-religious conflicts and the flagrant use of illegal small arms during the conflicts, which have resulted in movement of people to where they perceived as 'safe heaven', where their ethnic or religious groups are dominant.

The informants of the in depth interview also agreed with this findings. On the level of insecurity created as a result of the involvement of arms in these conflicts, the informant from the NGO pointed out that the dangerous aspect of these conflicts is the extent of destruction resulting from the use of arms illegally acquired. According to him:

Regrettably, the frequency of crises in the state has heightened feeling of insecurity. The seemingly helplessness of the law enforcement agencies and corruption in the face of these developments, have led many citizens to procure arms for self-protection and use in event of crises.

In similar vein, another informant who is a religious leader pointed out that:

Because of insecurity, fear of possible attacks and outbreak of violence, people continue to be busy arming and preparing themselves....Even when crises are brought under control,

weapons are largely left to those who acquire them, insisting on hiding them in case of a relapse.

A police informant also shares the same view;

To be frank, there is a general feeling of insecurity in the state, though we are doing our best to protect lives and properties. But the society is not helping matters. The atrocities perpetuated in the name of ethnic and religious differences are worrisome. Situation where one has to sleep with one eye closed and the other opened is bad.

He went further to say;

Let me tell you, Kaduna would have been more populated and developed than this by now if not for the killings and destructions during the several crises. These have forced many to leave the city for their home towns or relocated to safer places, like Abuja, because they believe their safety is not guaranteed.

Views of Respondents on the Sources of illegal Small Arms in Kaduna Metropolis

To ascertain the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis, the table below shows the responses of the respondents to that effect.

Table 4.3.2: Sources of Illegal Small Arms in Kaduna Metropolis

	ITEMS	SA 5	A 4	UD 3	D 2	SD 1	TL
6	There are illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis.	63 31.5%	124 62.0%	6 3.0%	5 2.5%	2 1.5%	200 100%
7	Politicians provide illegal small arms	84 42.0%	82 41.0%	14 7.0%	19 9.5%	1 0.5%	200 100%
8	Religious groups provide illegal small arms	44 22.0%	71 35.5%	26 13.0%	39 19.5%	20 10.0%	200 100%
9	Ethnic groups provide illegal small arms	31 15.5%	72 36.0%	24 12.0%	41 20.5%	32 16.0%	200 100%
10	Military returnees from peace keeping	35 17.5%	72 36.0%	39 19.5%	39 19.5%	15 7.5%	200 100%
11	Sales by security agents (police and soldiers)	41 20.5%	95 47.5%	31 15.5%	25 12.5%	8 4.0%	200 100%
12	Theft of security forces arms	49 24.5%	102 51.0%	24 12.9%	19 9.5%	6 3.0%	200 100%
13	Smuggling from neighbouring states/countries	84 42.0%	87 43.5%	14 7.0%	12 6.0%	3 1.5%	200 100%
14	Arms dealers provides illegal small arms	53 26.5%	100 50.0%	27 13.5%	14 7.0%	6 3.0%	200 100%
15	Defence Industry Corporation (DIC) provides illegal small arms	17 8.5%	49 24.5%	48 24.0%	54 27.0%	32 16.0%	200 100%
16	Local manufacturers (Black smiths) provide illegal small arms	53 26.5%	104 52.0%	22 11.0%	15 7.5%	6 3.0%	200 100%

The survey data and the in depth interview informants for the study revealed the existence, and complex sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis, except on items 9, 10 and 13 which some informants disagreed.

Table 4.3.2 shows that majority of the respondents in their responses reported that 93% agreed that illegal small arms exist in kaduna metropolis, while 4% disagreed.

An informant for this study who is a traditional leader has it that:

It is obvious that illegal small arms are everywhere in the country. It is not the issue of Kaduna alone. You can see that crises and violent crime have assumed a terrifying dimension. People are being kidnapped, killed and robbed of valuables. All these are made possible because people can easily access arms. Our society is no longer safe, except government do something urgently (traditional leader).

Weapons believed to be in circulation included locally made and sophisticated ones. An informant (religious leader) revealed that, “locally made guns noticed to have been used during the crises include single/double barrel guns, dane guns, bows/arrows, daga, and traditional weapons called ‘gariyo’”. Another religious leader also pointed out that, “some people were firing and shooting guns that were not locally made, such as machine guns and rifles. “Indeed many arrests and seizures of both sophisticated and locally made weapons have been made. But I am not in position to give the details now” (police informant).

Another informant who is a traditional leader reacted this way:

We cannot rule out the possibility of existence of illegal small arms in the state, considering the magnitude of all the crises, especially the 2000 crises. Though I have not been opportune to see any arms, but during the crises there were sounds of gun shots all over the places. This gives the impression that small arms are also in Kaduna like other parts of the country.

However, on the sources of these illegal small arms the table above shows that 83% of the respondents strongly agreed that politicians often supply these illegal arms in circulation against 21% of the respondents who disagreed. This may be so because, Nigerian political

history has been characterized by use of thugs by politicians either to intimidate their opponents or to redress their failures. About 57% identified religious groups as a source of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis, while 29.5% disagreed. Also, 51.5% respondents identified ethnic groups against 36.5% who disagreed. These revelations may not be unconnected with the fact that most of the crises in Kaduna state have both ethnic and religious connotations. However, 53.5% respondents indicated military returnees as against 27.0% who disagreed, 68.0% respondents indicated sales by security agents as against 16.5% who disagreed, 75.5% reported theft of security forces weapons as another source as against 12.5% who disagreed. This information may be so because many soldiers and police have often been implicated in illegal small arms transactions across the country (Okiro, 2004:14 and Nigerian Tribune 16 Jan. 2009). Other sources as shown in the table indicate that, overwhelming majority 85.5% identified smuggling from neighbouring states and countries as against 7.5% respondents who disagreed, 76.5% identified arms dealers as against 10.0% who disagreed. These may be as a result of the porous nature of our borders, security check-points and lapses on the part of security agents, coupled with the fact that Kaduna State is close to other crises endemic states, like Plateau and Kano States. While 78.5% identified local manufacturers (Blacksmiths) as other source of illegal small arms in the metropolis, insignificant number of 10.5% of the respondents disagreed. Given the above findings, we can there consider all the factors as the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis.

Like the survey respondents, the in-depth interview informants for this study agreed on the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis. For instance, an NGO informant pointed out that:

Talking about sources of illegal small arms, the case of Kaduna cannot be treated in isolation. Which ever state in Nigeria, the sources are common to all of them. For example, arms smuggled through the border can go to any part of the country. Secondly, our politicians, both ethnic and religious leaders themselves cannot be completely exonerated, while the security agents too are not

sincere. Most worrisome is the local manufacturers who not only produce arms for youths to cause mayhem, but even for armed robbers.

Another informant who is a police, in his response pointed out this fact;

From my experience in the course of my job, I can say there are several sources of illegal small arms into the country (Kaduna inclusive), like other contraband goods. It ranges from smuggling, theft, unscrupulous security agents, and local manufacturers to indeed, the activities of our politicians and religious members. But the ones that pose challenges to all stakeholders are smuggling and local manufacturers, which we think fertilise other sources.

In similar vain, a traditional leader observed that, the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna State are numerous. But most worrisome is the involvement of security agents, our brothers in the villages who manufacture and sell arms to criminals and militants, and the porous nature of our borders due to corruption has even made easier for unscrupulous elements to continue to smuggle arms into the country. Some of these arms are even sourced by politicians to intimidate or eliminate their opponents whom they perceive as threat to their success at polls. These have made it difficult for government to take decisive action since some of these people are also in position of governance.

The observations by these informants may be true because most of the sophisticated weapons found to be used by militants could not be said to have been manufactured or sourced locally, but were smuggled into the country from troubled countries within the sub-region.

However, contrary to survey findings on security agents supplying arms, an informant tends to discount the police of complicity. He explained:

I am not holding brief for the police anyway. Cases of police directly supplying arms for militants or hoodlums are very rare. Experience has shown that the police do not have arsenal of sophisticated arms discovered to be used in most conflicts. Even the fire-power of the hoodlums often overwhelms that of the police. However, there is a saying that in any society there must be

Judah. There may be some but honestly I don't know (police informant).

The observation made by this informant seems too simplistic and defensive. Apart from the survey finding, acknowledged by other informants, evidences abound in the literature that tends to implicate the police.

This study also revealed that the informants also have conflicting views on the findings on religious groups and ethnic groups. For instance, an informant who is a religious leader pointed out that:

Religious groups use Koran and the Bible and not weapons. We are still having incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in the state. There are always deliberate efforts by religious leaders to stop escalation....But these were controlled with the efforts of some Christian leaders and Muslim clerics. If we encourage arms build-up, these would have been opportunities to use them.

Similarly, ethnic groups were also discounted by an informant (traditional leader) as one of the sources of illegal small arms. According to him, ethnic leaders have a stake in ensuring peace and wellbeing of Nigerian society.” Thus, it is ridiculous and unethical for us to equip our subjects (ethnic groups) with arms to cause mayhem, chaos, or encourage violence”. Another traditional leader observed that:

Traditional or ethnic rulers were not only like fathers to the people, but were on oath to defend the interest of the people and the nation...It is therefore wicked of any body to connect the traditional leaders with evil plan by misguided people.

Despite the above, one cannot totally rule out the finding of the survey respondents given the fragile nature of the state in terms of crises, and for the fact that most of the crises have religious and ethnic colorations. A police informant observed that:

To be candid, I must agree that there is a general state of insecurity in the state. Crises keep on occurring in the state that is ethnic or religious in nature. And most often some religious leaders make utterances that are provocative. Even when their members are arrested, instead of joining hands with the police, they trivialize the issue complicating it the more. These are indications that they have hands in it.

Another informant who works for an NGO declared;

My brother, even if you are not told, you know that. As for Kaduna, to be precise, the crises are usually between the Christians and Muslims. Most of the people arrested during the crises are those who cannot afford three square meals. Yet they were found with arms, at times, sophisticated ones. How did they get these weapons? For me, I think they are equipped by the privileged ones among them.

However, 43.0% of the respondents rejected item 17 on the table which suggests Defence Industry Corporation (DIC) as one of the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis, while a relatively lesser number of 33.0% agreed. The rejection of the DIC by the majority of the respondents could possibly be attributed to the public little knowledge and understanding of the activities of the corporation given its military-oriented nature (secrecy). Given this information, we can therefore say that DIC is not one of sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis.

Table 4.3.2.1. Ranking of findings on sources of illegal small arms

Item No	Variable	Score	Rank
15	Smuggling from neighbouring states/countries	85.5%	1 st
8	Politicians provide illegal small arms	83.0%	2 nd
18	Local manufacturers (Black smiths)	78.5%	3 rd
16	Arms dealers	76.5%	4 th
13	Theft of security forces arms	75.5%	5 th
12	Sales by security agents (police/military)	68.0%	6 th
9	Religious groups provide illegal small arms	57.5%	7 th
11	Military returnees from peace keeping	53.5%	8 th
10	Ethnic groups provide illegal small arms	51.5%	9 th

Class limit > 70.0%

Rank-ordering of findings in the table above revealed that item 15 with the highest score of 85.5% indicates the strongest feelings of the members of the public on the sources of illegal small arms. While item 10 with 51.5% score assumes the least position.

However, items 15, 8, 18, 16, 13, and 12 (1st – 6th) can be considered as the strongest feelings of the respondents on sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis having obtained scores above the class limit of 67.5%. This means that majority of the respondents

have common opinions or feelings on the items as against items 9, 11 and 10 with scores below the class limit.

Views of Respondents on the Impacts of illegal Small Arms on Ethno-religious Violence

Table 4.3.4 sought to examine the role illegal small arms play in ethno-religious violence and the likely consequences. The responses of the respondents to this effect are presented below.

Table 4.3.3 Impacts of Illegal Small Arms on Ethno-religious Violence

S/N	ITEMS	SA 5	A 4	UD 3	D 2	SD 1	TL
17	Fuel ethno-religious violence	59 29.5%	103 51.5%	16 8.0%	16 8.0%	6 3.0%	200 100%
18	Perpetuate culture of violence	66 33.0%	81 40.5%	21 10.0%	25 12.5%	7 3.5%	200 100%
19	Destruction of lives	103 51.5%	76 38.0%	8 4.0%	9 4.5%	4 0.2%	200 100%
20	Destruction of properties	99 39.5%	90 45.0%	3 1.5%	3 1.5%	5 2.5%	200 100%
21	Cause injuries and maiming	91 45.5%	91 45.5%	11 5.5%	5 2.5%	2 1.0%	200 100%
22	Displacement of people	74 37.0%	98 49.0%	13 6.5%	8 4.0%	7 3.5%	200 100%
23	Create general sense of insecurity	84 42.0%	98 49.0%	8 4.0%	5 2.5%	5 2.5%	200 100%

Table 4.3.4 contains question items that attempt to examine the impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts. The responses of the respondents on the table revealed several impacts, and possible consequences.

On item 31, out of the 200 respondents, an overwhelming majority of 81.0% respondents reported that availability of illegal small arms fuels ethno-religious violence and insignificant number of 11.0% disagreed. This information implies that little provocation or peaceful protest can easily become violent if large amount of illegal small arms exist in a crises endemic society. Also, about 73.5% agreed that illegal small arms perpetuate culture of violence, 16.0% disagreed. While 91.0% of the respondents agreed that availability of illegal small arms creates general sense of insecurity as against

insignificant number of 5.0% who disagreed. This is closely related to the above. It implies that when there are no crises these arms are used to carry out other crimes such as armed robbery, assassination, etc.

Majority of the informants subscribed to these findings. For instance, an informant who works for an NGO observed that, “because of agony people suffered, and the circle of violence, people have continued to arm themselves in case of possible outbreak”. He maintained that, “this can further escalate or turn little provocation into violence. So we must be very careful with the situation in which we find ourselves now”.

Another informant who is a police collaborated as he said:

The scale of destruction recorded in some of the recent crises was caused because people possessed arms. Crises without arms, the effects in terms of killing, injuries and destruction will be less. But once arms are introduced it becomes disastrous. That is why we are worried.

A traditional leader in his view observed that,

Arms are instrument of violence we know. If crises in our society are not controlled, then we will continue to experience danger, because once it occurs, people will pick up their arms. No matter how little such conflict may be, it will assume greater scale.

Proliferation of illegal small arms also contributes to culture of violence and a cycle that is difficult to break. Violence fuels insecurity, and insecurity fuels violence. One of the religious leaders who is an informant made this point clearer:

In a crises endemic society where there is pent-up anger, mutual suspicions, and strife, availability of arms helps to escalate conflicts. The gravity of destructions (death, maiming and displacement of people) indicate dangerous role of illegal small arms in conflicts.

Another traditional leader also observed that;

If you were not in Kaduna during the violent crises (he laughed), you must have been told the extent of destructions, killings, and injuries people suffered....These were not done by bare hands, but with weapons of different make. These

show that arms are dangerous in crises. Its availability fuels or escalates conflicts beyond imagination.

Furthermore, the table also shows that, overwhelming majority of 89.5% respondents agreed that illegal small arms lead to destruction of lives, while insignificant number of 6.5% disagreed. Similarly, overwhelming majority of 94.5% reported destruction of properties, insignificant number of 4.0% disagreed. And 91.0% respondents reported that proliferation of illegal small arms causes injuries and maiming against 3.5% who disagreed. These information provided by items 33, 34 and 35 in the table are in view of alarming casualties and destructions recorded in several crises that have taken place not only in Kaduna State, but across the country where several families lost their beloved ones, properties destroyed, some sustained injuries or permanent disability, and majority often displaced, as revealed by (86.0%) respondents as against 7%.5% respondents on the table.

Both the survey and the in-depth interview respondents all agreed that illegal small arms play a destructive role in conflicts. For instance, according to an informant from an NGO:

The frequency of ethno-religious crises has led to arms build-up in the country. The result has been death, maiming, displacement of people and destruction of properties. It is difficult to tell you how many people died or were injured because both the government and the warring factions will not tell you the truth. While the government understates figures in order not to heighten tension, the warring factions often make counter claims to attract sympathy. But sincerely speaking, thousands have died.

Since the enthronement of democracy in 1999, it is estimated that about 100,000 persons have been killed in over 50 ethno-religious conflicts across the country (Ariahu, 2005:36). Another informant who is a police puts his view this way:

Arms are dangerous. They cause death, injuries and destruction in crises. It is not possible for me to tell the number of casualties or persons that died during the crises in Kaduna. But I can say, thousands of people died and their properties

destroyed. Without arms, I don't think the casualties and destructions recorded would have reached disturbing proportion.

According to another informant (traditional leader),

Weapons are dangerous, because they kill. So the purpose of using them in conflicts is to kill the opponents if possible. The high degree of deaths and injuries in conflicts are as a result of the use of arms. That is why we are worried about proliferation of these weapons. The more people acquire them, the likelihood of using them, more so that our society is fragile. People are looking for the slightest opportunity to cause mayhem.

The points made above are important to note when considering the role of illegal small arms in conflicts. In May 1999, when Jema'a natives clashed with the Hausa/Fulani in Kafanchan over the attempted installation of a Hausa/Fulani as the new emir of Jama'a emirate council, the natives protested, though peaceful, later turned violent through shooting, resulting into several deaths. "That shooting incident escalated the conflict, such that by the next day, it had assumed far bloodier dimension.

The consequences of these are enormous. The misuse can impede economic development, provision of health and education services as well as the development of effective good governance and democracy. Thus, as long as large quantities of small arms are in circulation or in wrong hands, the security, economic and political development of the nation are at stake

Table 4.3.3.1 Ranking of findings on the impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts

Item No	Variable	Score	Rank
35	Causes injuries and maiming	91.0%	1st
43	Create general sense of insecurity	91.0%	1st
33	Destruction of lives	89.5%	3 rd
38	Displacement of people	86.0%	4 th
34	Destruction of property	85.0%	5 th
31	Fuel ethno-religious violence	81.0%	6 th
32	Perpetuate culture of violence	73.0%	7 th

Class limit > 85.2%

The above table shows the rank-ordering of findings in table 4.3.4. It revealed that item 34 with 94.5% score indicates destruction of properties as the strongest role of illegal small arms, while item 39 with 73.5% score came least.

However, the table revealed that the strongest opinions of the respondents on the role of illegal small arms are items 34, 35, 43, 33, and 38, which obtained scores equal to, and above the class limit of 84.5%. On the other hand, items 31 and 32, with scores below the class limit indicate the lowest impact. Thus, given these overwhelming opinions, it can be implied that the role of illegal small arms in ethno-religious violence are destruction of lives and properties, injuries and maiming, sense of insecurity, violent crimes and displacement of people.

4.4. CHI-SQUARE TEST

To test the relationship or association between the proliferation of illegal small arms and ethno religious violence in Kaduna metropolis, certain independent and dependent variables were correlated, using the Chi-Square procedure.

Thus, to determine whether a particular variable or factor correlates with the proliferation of illegal small arms and or ethno-religious conflicts in the metropolis, the level of significance is put at 0.05 or less. Thus, if the critical table value is less than the calculated X^2 value, it implies the factor has significant association with proliferation of illegal small arms and or ethno-religious violence in the metropolis. But, where it is higher, such a variable or factor cannot be considered to have significant impact.

Table 4.4.1: Ethno-religious violence Vs Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms

		Are illegal small arms still in circulation in Kaduna metropolis?		
		YES	NO	TOTAL
Is frequent ethno-religious conflicts responsible for proliferation of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis?	YES	157 41.4%	28 7.4%	185 48.8%
	NO	187 49.3%	7 1.8%	194 51.2%
	TOTAL	344 90.8%	35 9.2%	378 100%

$X^2 = 15.011b$, Df = 1, Critical (table) value = 3.841

Note: Tables 4.4.1 – 4.4.4 exclude respondents who remained undecided.

Table 4.4.1 above examines the relationship between ethno-religious conflicts and proliferation of illegal small arms.

Decision:

X^2 at 1 df at 0.05 level of significance = 3.841

Since the critical (table) value (3.841) is less than the calculated X^2 value (15.011b), we can conclude that there is a significant relationship between frequent ethno-religious conflicts and proliferation of illegal small arms. This means that the prevalence of ethno-religious conflicts is responsible for the proliferation of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis. This explains why several efforts to curtail proliferation and use of illegal arms have not yielded meaningful results. The analysis of the in-depth interview revealed the same finding. An informant pointed out thus:

As you know, the frequent crises in the state, coupled with other violent crimes, have heightened the feeling of insecurity among the inhabitants of the state. So, because of possible attacks and outbreak of violence, people have continue to be busy arming and preparing themselves against any eventualities or to protect themselves against the increasing activities of criminals, having lost confidence in the ability of the state to do so (NGO informant).

Table 4.4.2: Impacts of Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms Vs Destruction of Lives in Ethno-religious Conflicts

	Are there Loss of lives in ethno-religious Conflicts?
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		YES	NO	TOTAL
Do Proliferation of illegal small arms have impacts on Impacts on ethno-religious conflicts?	YES	48.4%	7 1.8%	194 50.2%
	NO	158 40.9%	34 8.8%	192 49.7%
	TOTAL	345 89.4%	41 10.6%	386 100%

$X^2 = 20.208b$, Df = 1, Critical (table) value = 3.841

The relationship between proliferation of illegal small arms and destruction of lives was examined in order to ascertain the impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts.

Decision:

X^2 at 1 df at 0.05 level of significance = 3.841

Since the critical (table) value (3.841) is less than the calculated X^2 value (20.208b), we can imply that there is a significant relationship between proliferation of illegal small arms and loss of lives in ethno-religious conflicts. Given this, the conclusion therefore, is that, illegal small arms have destructive impacts on ethno-religious conflicts. In other words, most of the injuries and deaths recorded in ethno-religious conflicts are caused by the use of small arms illegally acquired.

The analysis of the in-depth interview also confirms this finding. It revealed that proliferation of illegal small arms does not only cause destruction of lives and properties, but even fuels ethno-religious violence and perpetuate culture of violence. For instance, according to an informant:

...Availability of illegal arms helps to escalate conflicts. The gravity of destruction (death, maiming and displacement of people) indicates dangerous impacts of illegal small arms in conflicts (religious leader).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter specifically attempts to summarise the major findings, discussion of the findings *vis-à-vis* other findings and theoretical framework, draw conclusion, and make useful recommendations based on the findings. The research was carried out on Kaduna metropolis, with the view to finding out the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in the metropolis, identify the sources of illegal small arms, and examine its impacts on ethno-religious conflicts, and then suggest useful ways of curbing proliferation of illegal small arms in the state.

5.2 Summary of major findings

The major findings regarding the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis are that: there are incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in the state, the frequency of ethno-religious conflicts is increasing, the conflicts are usually between the two major ethnic and religious groups in the State, the conflicts usually involve the use of arms illegally acquired, resulting in increasing feeling of insecurity in the state. The major findings in respect of the second objectives, which is to identify the possible sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis are that smuggling from neighbouring states/countries, politicians, local manufacturers, arms dealers and theft of security forces arms constitute the major sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis.

On objective three, which is on the impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts, this study revealed that illegal small arms proliferation and particularly, their use result in destruction of lives, destruction of property, causes injuries and maiming, displacement of people, and creates general sense of insecurity.

5.3 Discussion of findings

Research objective which is on the nature of ethno-religious conflicts has been determined. The questions derived from the research objective to ascertain the nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis have shown that, in recent years, Kaduna has recorded several conflicts that are of ethnic and religious nature. The findings also revealed that ethno-religious conflict is a common phenomenon in Kaduna given its frequency. The conflicts are usually between the different ethnic and religious groups especially that their beliefs and religious practices seem to run counter to each other. The struggle for relevance between these ethnic and religious groups has led to destruction of lives and properties, and displacement of people, given the involvement and use of arms illegally acquired. This situation as revealed by the findings has heightened serious feelings of insecurity among the citizens of the state.

The works of (Abdul 2002:117, Alemika and Okoye 2000:124, Alemika and Okoye 2002:121, 130 and 131, Okoye 2000: xii-xiv, Best 2006:422, Agbese 2002:12, and Ikejiani-Clark 2007:526) tend to be consistent with these findings. For instance, the work of Okoye (2000: xii-xiv) in particular shows that, there have been conflicts of ethnic and religious nature leading to loss of lives and destruction of properties in Kasuwa Magani in 1980, Kaduna/Buruku in 1992, Gure/Kahugu in 1986, Kafanchan in 1987, Kaduna in 1987 and Zango Kataf in 1992, Kafanchan in 1999, and Kaduna, Kachia and Birnin Gwari in 2000; and again in Kaduna in 2002. The frequency of these conflicts has resulted in the description of Kaduna as a hot bed of ethno-religious conflicts (Agbese, 2002:12 and Ikejiani-Clark, 2007:526). As a result, Kaduna has been described as a hot-bed of ethno-religious crises, as the metropolis and other rural locations within the state have been turned into killing fields (Agbese 2002:12 and Ikejiani-Clark 2007:526).

The transactions between legal and illegal small arms market are intricate and complex. As a result, identifying their sources is even more nebulous. Even when the transaction is done through licensed manufacturers and distribution is legal, the movements of arms are often carried out in secret. This makes it difficult for any observer or researcher to say categorically the sources of arms in any particular of the country or state. In similar vein, it may be difficult to say with certainty the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis. This notwithstanding, information gathered from this study (public perception) indicate that the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis are to a certain extent not different from other parts of the country as identified in the literature.

From this study, research objective which is on the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis has been ascertained. The demonstration by this study, that the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis include smuggling, politicians, local manufacturers, arms dealers, and theft of security forces arms are in conformity with the works and reports

of (Ariahu 2005:25, Obasi 2002:17,75 and 78, Oke 2002:27-28, Okiro 2004:12,13 and 14, Oke 2002:26-28, Nwizu 2004:138 and 139, Olorunfemi 2006:32, Vanguard Newspaper 17 Apr 2007:16, Post express 29 July, 2001:33, and Daily Trust 13 Apr, 2007:3)

For instance, the work of Okiro 2004:13 and Daily Trust of 13 April, 2007:3 revealed that, “most of the guns recovered from robbers (and unwarranted people) and traced to the police are those that were stolen or taken away when a police is killed”. These however, clearly indicate the negligence and incapacitation of the security agencies, particularly the police to effectively fight crime, as members of the public perceive the police as conniving with hoodlums, under the pretence of being attacked and overpowered.

Though the findings suggested arms dealers as one of the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis, there is no clear evidence from studies to buttress this claim. However, owing to the fact that the movement of arms is shrouded in secrecy, and arms that are imported legally may fall into illegal circulation through diversion, theft, etc, and may go into black market supply or fall into wrong hands, one cannot completely rule out the possibility of arms dealer’s involvement in the proliferation of illegal small arms in Kaduna like other cities in Nigeria.

The findings on the objective which is on the impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts have been determined. The study found that arms used in ethno-religious conflicts cause injuries and maiming, create general sense of insecurity, destruction of lives and properties, and displacement of people. These findings are in consonance with the literature, particularly the works of (Abdul 2002:124, Alemika and Okoye 2002:117 and 118, 127 and 128, Ariahu 2005:36 and 37, Gofwen 2004:65 – 67, Okiro 2004:10, Okoye 2000: xiii - xiv, 21 and 77, Omade: 186, Report of Committee on 1987 Crises: 55, New Nigerian Weekly, 5 December 2003:2, and Nigerian Tribune 16 January 2008:1 and 4). For instance, during the 1987 crises in Kaduna, 19 lives were lost, while damage to properties was valued

at N78, 537,768 (Report of Committee on 1987 Crises: 55). While in the 2000 crises, official record of the extent of damage to lives and properties has it that 1,295 persons died and properties estimated at N6,373,187,754.00 were destroyed (White Paper on Report of Commission of Inquiry, April 2001:15). However, according to Alemika and Okoye (2002:128), it is generally believed by the public that nothing less than 5,000 people died during the 2000 crises.

The gravity of the destructions recorded (i.e. in term of maiming, destruction of lives and properties, and the displacement of people) during the crises, and other crises that followed were made possible due to availability of illegal small arms in circulation. Easy availability and accessibility to arms therefore, could increase cases of violence or contribute to the culture of violence, a circle that is difficult to break.

These indicate that, arms do not proliferate in a vacuum. Rather, conflict/insecurity is the basis upon which the desire for acquisition and accumulation of arms is nurtured and proliferate. Supporting the above, Strachey (1996:191) maintained that arms and arms accumulation are therefore not in themselves a very important cause of conflicts. No community could be said to have fought each other because they possess arms. Arms are only instruments or means through which conflicts are prosecuted. Conflicts therefore exacerbate proliferation of illegal arms and proliferation of illegal small arms fuels or contribute to cycle of violence. Thus, in a crises endemic society like Kaduna, as long as large quantities of illegal small arms remain in circulation or in wrong hands, trivial issues that could be resolved through dialogue will increasingly become violent.

In the above therefore, lies the major justification for situating this study within the conflict/radical theoretical framework. The present Nigerian society, in terms of socio-political and economic structures is characterized by injustice and corruption, resulting in highly skewed distribution of power and wealth. The practical effects are mass poverty, high

level of illiteracy, high and growing unemployment levels especially among the youths, resulting in crime, crises and other social problems. The inability of government to develop and properly manage the economy for the benefit of the citizens created widespread poverty, and gap between the rich and poor progressively widens. These generate propensity to crime and conflict. As those in power continue to loot the treasury, the poor resort to diverse form of behaviours such as violence, aggressive pursuit and acquisition of arms and formation of armed youth who had taken it upon themselves the responsibilities of re-dressing the inherent anomalies in the system. Franz Fanon described this scenario as “psychological violence”. And since violence begets violence, the people resort to crimes and violence (physical violence) as options. This is because the impoverished citizens see these as capable of keeping them in perpetual misery. Thus, the issue of illegal small arms and ethno-religious violence in Nigeria are predicated on structural and institutional factors.

It therefore follows that any worthwhile attempt to minimize/eliminate the issue of illegal small arms must take into cognizance the issue of poverty, social inequality, oppression and lopsided development among social, ethnic and religious groups to avoid situations that create communal or religious clashes that precipitate the desire for acquisition, accumulation and use of illegal small arms. Attempt to combat proliferation of illegal small arms in Nigeria without up-rooting or restructuring the socio-economic and political structures will be as messy as trying to wash one’s feet while putting on his socks. This is because, arms itself is not a problem or the cause of ethno-religious conflicts, or that arms proliferate in a vacuum. Arms are merely instruments of prosecuting conflicts, while conflicts are reflections of injustice and corruption inherent in the system. Strachey (1962:191) puts this succinctly clear:

Arms and arms race are not a very important cause of war (ethno-religious conflicts) and even their complete abolition would not ensure peace. No serious student of the subject supposes that nations (or groups) fight each other because they

posses arms. Clearly, arms are the instruments with which they fight and the competitive race to arms themselves better and better is a symptom rather than a cause of their rivalries, conflicts and mutual apprehension.

It has therefore become imperative to work out sustainable measures that can be more effective in solving cases of ethno-religious conflicts and arms proliferation for the well being of the state and the country as a whole.

5.4 Conclusions

Kaduna metropolis has registered several crises of ethnic and religious nature. The conflicts have been fought by ethnic and religious groups in the State, which have turned the city and the rural locations into killing fields. More often than not, when conflicts of this nature erupt and spread, they assume more religious dimension than ethnic, making the city a hot bed constantly generating religious crises of high magnitude. The violent nature of these conflicts has led to destruction of lives and properties, given the involvement of arms illegally acquired.

The sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis cannot be completely detached from the sources in the country, which include smuggling, politicians, local manufacturers, arms dealers, and theft of security forces arms.

The presence of arms affects behaviour and attitudes in a society. The easy availability of, and accessibility to illegal small arms have increased cases of violence across the country, resulting in destruction of lives and properties, increasing general sense of insecurity, cause injuries and maiming, facilitating violent crimes, displacement of people and contributes to culture of violence

It is therefore the opinion of the researcher that, if the spate of ethno-religious conflicts is not quickly brought under control as a way of arresting the illegal use of small arms, the fact cannot be ignored that in the nearest future, Nigeria as a whole will become a country of street gangs and will increasingly continue to witness unprecedented rise in lawlessness and

anarchy, where organized and unorganized groups and armed militias will erode and undermine government's monopoly of arms, and even the relevance of security forces.

The most important contribution of this study to knowledge is its demonstration that, it is the quest for better conditions of living by the people who had been exposed to years of neglect, deprivation and injustice that precipitate conflicts which is responsible for the demand, acquisition and use of arms. The need to take this into account when devising strategies to curb and control proliferation of illegal small arms cannot be over-emphasized.

5.5 Recommendations

1. No meaningful research can be conducted without some underlining purposes; this research work makes the following recommendations. The recommendations range from short term to long term based on temporal order that their implementation should take. The expected urgent measure the government should take to address proliferation of illegal small arms is on conflict resolution.
2. Given the finding that incessant conflicts is one of the major factors precipitating the demands for illegal small arms, the government should take pro-active measures to resolve conflicting issues. To this end, white paper reports of past commissions of inquiry into communal and religious conflicts (like that of 1987 Zango Kataf, which spread to Kaduna and the Sharia crises of 2000) be visited and reviewed by the government with the view to implementing them.
3. Our borders are porous and the security agents are poorly equipped to face the challenges. Therefore, as an urgent measure to combat smuggling, the government should take step to ensure proper security of our borders and seaports. To this end, the police and other security agencies should be well funded, and need overhauling of its equipment, training of personnel, and attitudinal change.

4. Granting of licenses to arms dealers for the importation of small arms should be discouraged since some of these arms are often diverted for illegal use. Instead, the Defense Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) be properly equipped to modern standard and empowered to be the only producer and distributor of small arms and ammunition in the country, and their activities closely monitored by relevant authorities to prevent any lapses on their part. This will reduce cases of illegal diversion of arms imported legally.
5. There are legislations to control the acquisition and use of fire-arms. These laws have become obsolete and insufficient to ensure deterrence in relation to penalties for breaching them. The current penalties of 4 years imprisonment or a fine of N100, 000.00 or both (Ariahu, 2005:45) no longer justify the present realities. Therefore, punishment for those who breach the laws prohibiting illegal importation, acquisition and use of illegal small arms be made more stringent. Offenders should be made to face life jail without option of fine.
6. In addition, government should develop proper programmes for raising public awareness on control of illegal small arms. It should use its media organizations and other informal media to educate the public on the danger of illegal small arms. To achieve this, engaging civil society organizations and other relevant bodies and agencies to sensitize the public on the implications of imbibing culture of violence is imperative.
7. As a measure to check ease lost of arms, theft of security forces arms, the security agencies keeping stockpiles of small arms should build more secure armouries and develop effective internal systems to ensure regular and accurate accounting for all weapons in their custody and those issued for use to reduce theft and recycling of arms by corrupt officials.

8. Most of the arms found to be used during the crises were manufactured locally. To check the increasing production and use of arms, activities of the local manufacturers should be closely monitored. Only credible people who cannot compromise their integrity should be licensed to produce local weapons. Since the workshops of these manufacturers are located in the hinterland, the government should collaborate with community leaders to achieve this.

The above, though short term measures, have the potentials of becoming mutually reinforced and sustaining. If well implemented, their effects will endure for sometimes to come. However, there is also need to embark on long term measures.

9. In the long term, and in line with the position of the theory of this study, structural reforms towards economic efficiency and equity, democracy, popular participation in public policy formulation, social justice and equity between individuals and groups, observance of the rule of laws, transparency and accountability are therefore required. In this direction, the government should address the issues of poverty, social inequality, injustice, oppression and lopsided development among social, ethnic and religious groups to avoid situations that create communal and religious conflicts that precipitate the acquisition, accumulation and use of illegal small arms. These conditions will enhance better resource management, improve social, economic and political conditions, and thereby reduce not only pressures towards crime, but also incidence and prevalence rates of conflicts that are instrumental to acquisition of illegal arms. This is important because, to combat proliferation of illegal small arms in the country without up-rooting or restructuring the socio-economic and political structures which are at the base of conflicts will be a fruitless effort.

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QUESTIONNAIRE (FOR BOTH THE POLICE AND PUBLIC)

Introduction

The researcher is an Msc student in the Department of Sociology Ahamadu Bello University, Zaria. He is conducting a research on “The Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and Ethno-religious Violence in Kaduna Metropolis, Kaduna State”.

The study is being carried out as an academic requirement for the award of M.sc Degree in Sociology. You are requested to please assist by providing honest answers to the following questions.

What ever answers or information given, will be not be released to any individual or authority, but will be strictly treated as confidential and utilized for the said purpose. The final report will not contain information about any individual respondents. In view of this, you are requested to feel secured to supply the most sincere information that would facilitate the research work.

Thanks for your cooperation.

Ogbadoyi, Charles Thomas

INSTRUCTION: please tick the responses that best apply to you.

SECTION ‘A’

1. **Age:**
a. 15 – 24 years () b. 25 – 34 years ()
c. 35 – 49 years () d. 50 years and above ()
2. **Sex:** a. () b. ()
3. **Marital Status:**
a. () b. () c. () d. ()
4. **Level of Education:**
a. () b. () c. () d. ()
5. **Occupation:**
a. Police () b. Farmer () c. Civil Servant ()
d. Self Employed () e. Unemployed ()
6. **Rank:**

- a. Constable () b. Corporal/Sergeant () c. Inspector ()
 d. Asst. Commissioner & above () e. Civilian ()

7. **Years of Service: (police only)**

- a. Less than 2 years () b. 2 – 5 years () c. 6 – 10 years ()
 d. 11 – 20 years () e. 21 years and above ()

Section ‘B’

Nature of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Kaduna Metropolis

A	Nature of Ethno- religious Conflicts	Strongly Agreed (SA)	Agreed (A)	Strongly Disagreed (SD)	Disagreed (D)	Undecided (UD)
1	There are incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis					
2	The frequency of ethno-religious conflict is increasing					
3	The conflicts are between ethnic groups and/or religious groups					
4	The conflicts usually involve the use of illegal small arms					
5	The conflicts have increased the feeling of insecurity in the metropolis					

Sources of Illegal Small Arms in Kaduna Metropolis

B	Sources of illegal small arms	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6	There are illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis					
7	Politicians provide the illegal small arms					
8	Religious groups provide the illegal small arms					
9	Ethnic groups provide the illegal small arms					
10	Military returnees from peace keeping					
11	Sales by security agents (police and soldiers)					
12	Theft of security forces arms					
13	Smuggling from neighbouring states/countries					
14	Arms dealers provide the illegal small arms					
15	Defence Industry Corporation (DIC) provides illegal small arms					
16	Local manufacturers (Blacksmiths) provide illegal small arms					

Impacts of Illegal Small Arms on Ethno-religious Conflicts

D	Impacts of illegal small arms	SA	A	UD	D	SD UD
17	Fuel ethno-religious violence					
18	Perpetuate culture of violence					
19	Destruction of lives					
20	Destruction of properties					

21	Cause injuries and maiming					
22	Displacement of people					
23	Create general sense of insecurity					

D	Solutions	SA	A	UD	D	SD UD
24	Review of firearms legislations					
25	Empowerment of police					
26	Creating job opportunities for youths					
27	Suspending granting of licenses					
28	Jail term without options of fine					
29	Public enlightenment					
30	Border patrol by security agents					
31	Review of past commission of inquiries on ethno-religious conflicts					

APPENDIX II

INDEPTH INTERVIEW (QUESTION GUIDE)

INTRODUCTION

Dear Sir/Madam;

I am a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. I am carrying out a research on the Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and ethno-religious Violence in Kaduna metropolis, Kaduna State. This study is being carried out as an academic requirement for the award of M.sc degree in Sociology.

In view of this, you are please requested to feel secured and give the most sincere information that would facilitate the completion of this work. You are assured that information given will be kept secret and utilized for the said purpose. The final report will also not contain names of individual respondents. Thanks for your cooperation.

Mr. Ogbadoyi, Charles Thomas

QUESTION GUIDE

1. What is your position?

A. Nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis

1. Do you think there are incidences of ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis?
2. If yes, what is the level of its frequency?
3. Are the incidences of ethno-religious conflicts on the increase?
4. Do these conflicts involve the use of illegal small arms?
5. What type of illegal small arms are most commonly used or found in the metropolis?
6. What categories of people do you think are involve in these conflicts in the state?

B. SOURCES OF ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS IN KADUNA METROPOLIS

7. What are the sources of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis?
8. Are there people or groups instrumental to the circulation of these illegal small arms in the metropolis?
9. If yes, who do you think are the people?

D. IMPACTS OF ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

10. Do you think the availability of illegal small arms play any significant impacts on ethno-religious violence?

11. What are the major impacts of illegal small arms on ethno-religious conflicts?
12. What are consequences of the role they in violence?

E. MEASURES TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION IN THE METROPOLIS

13. Have there been measures to check proliferation of illegal small arms in Kaduna metropolis?
14. What are the attempts made to control proliferation of illegal small arms in kaduna metropolis?
15. What are the possible solutions the problem of ethno-religious conflicts and proliferation of illegal small arms?